[Congressional Record Volume 153, Number 35 (Thursday, March 1, 2007)]
[Senate]
[Pages S2460-S2472]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
IMPROVING AMERICA'S SECURITY ACT OF 2007--Continued
Amendment No. 298
Mr. LIEBERMAN. Madam President, at 4:45, there will be a vote on or
in relation to the amendment offered by Senator Schumer and Senator
Menendez. I wish to explain very briefly--and Senator Collins will
speak later--on why we did not include this provision in the committee
bill.
This provision which Senators Schumer and Menendez have offered
mirrors the section of the House-passed 9/11 bill. It was not actually
called for by the 9/11 Commission, specifically, but it obviously
relates to security and our concern about nuclear weapons or dirty
bombs coming in through the thousands of containers that enter our
ports every day.
The reasons our committee in its deliberation in bringing this bill
to the floor did not include language similar to the House bill is,
first, the 9/11 Commission didn't ask for it, and most of what we have
done, though not all, was included in that report; but, secondly, we
acted last year in adopting the SAFE Port Act, enacted into law on
October 13, 2006.
It does provide for a pilot program at three foreign ports to provide
for the scanning of cargo containers by radiation detection monitors
and x-ray devices required under this proposal. There will be a report
coming 6 months after the end of that one year pilot program. Among
other responsibilities dictated by the law, the Secretary of Homeland
Security will be required to report not only on how the pilot program
went, but when we will achieve the goal of which--reading from the law,
section 232--``all containers entering the United States, before such
containers arrive in the United States, shall as soon as possible be
scanned using nonintrusive imaging equipment and radiation detection
equipment.''
In other words, existing law requires that we move--and I quote
again--``as soon as possible to 100 percent scanning of all of the
containers coming into the country.'' It requires the Secretary to
report on how we are moving toward that goal, and when he thinks we can
achieve it, every 6 months.
In my opinion, existing law has a 100-percent goal right now, with
reporting every 6 months to the relevant committees. Senators Schumer
and Menendez have asked that it occur within 5 years and actually give
a 1-year waiver opportunity to the Secretary.
At this point, I say respectfully that this requirement is premature.
I hope that under current law, ``as soon as possible'' will occur
before 5 years time. To my friends who offer the amendment, if after
the first 6-month report, due next April, or the second 6-month report,
it looks like, based on what the Secretary reports, 100 percent
scanning of containers coming into the country is to be much more
delayed than I had hoped it would be, then I will join them in offering
an amendment that will have a definite date by which 100 percent
scanning should occur. It is for that reason that our committee did not
include this section. We talked about it and decided not to include
it--as it was in the House bill, because we think existing law does at
least as good, and perhaps a better job. I will respectfully oppose the
amendment.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New York is recognized.
Mr. SCHUMER. Madam President, I know the time is divided equally. How
much time does each side have?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New York has 16 minutes. The
Senator from Connecticut has 7 minutes 21 seconds.
Mr. SCHUMER. Madam President, I have a great deal of respect for my
colleague, and I know he cares a great deal about protecting our
country. But with all due respect, I cannot stand here and say that the
SAFE Port Act does enough. The SAFE Port Act says that 100 percent
scanning must be imposed ``as soon as possible.'' It might as well say
whenever DHS feels like it.
For somebody like myself and my colleague from New Jersey and my
colleague from New York, we have been waiting for DHS to do this ``as
soon as possible'' for 4 years. We have been alerting DHS to this
terrible potential tragedy we face--a nuclear weapon being smuggled
into our harbors, a nuclear weapon exploding on a ship right off our
harbors--for years. DHS just slow-walks it. Why?
Part of the reason is that they are never adequately funded, which is
no fault of my colleague from Connecticut. But the administration does
not like to spend money on anything domestic. They never put the
adequate money into it. It is amazing to me that they will spend
everything it takes to fight a war on terror overseas. Some of that is
well spent and some, I argue, is not. Nonetheless, they spend it. They
won't spend hardly a nickel, figuratively speaking, to protect us on
defense at home. So the progress has been slow.
This is not the first time I have offered amendments to prod DHS to
do more on nuclear detection devices, on port security. I don't know
why anyone in this Chamber, faced with the potential tragedy that we
have, would decide
[[Page S2461]]
to leave it up to DHS. But that is just what this base bill does. I
don't know what people are afraid of. Yes, we have people with shipping
interests who say don't do this, it will cost a little bit more.
Terrorism costs all of us more. To allow a narrow band of shippers to
prevail on an issue that affects our security is beyond me.
Is the technology available? I will be honest with you that there is
a dispute. Either way, the amendment the Senator from New Jersey and I
have introduced makes sense. If it is available, they will implement
it. If it is not available, they will perfect it and get it working
because they have a deadline. Nothing will concentrate the mind of DHS
like a deadline. But vague, amorphous language that says ``as soon as
possible''--their view of ``as soon as possible'' is not enough to
safeguard America.
Very few things that we do in the Senate frustrate me more than this.
Why don't we force DHS and force the administration to make us safe
against arguably the greatest disaster that could befall us--one that
we know al-Qaida and other terrorists would like to pursue? Why do we
allow laxity, just obliviousness, and a narrow special interest to
prevail over what seems to be so much the common good?
I am aghast. This amendment should not even be debated by now. Maybe
in 2003, maybe in 2004. But it is now 2007, and we are still not doing
close to what we should be doing. Just last night, I spoke to an expert
who said the technology is there. If there is a will, there is a way.
Again, I say if you believe the technology isn't there, the answer
isn't to let DHS proceed at the same lackadaisical pace, when one of
the greatest dangers that could befall us could happen.
My colleagues, nobody wants to wake up in a ``what if'' scenario.
After 9/11 occurred, we were all ``what-ifing''--what if we had done
this or what if we had done that. It was hard before that because
nobody envisioned that somebody would fly a whole bunch of airplanes
into our buildings. We know the terrorists want to explode a nuclear
device in America or off our shores. That is not a secret. I argue that
that is as great a danger to us as is what is happening in Iraq. Will
my colleagues say we should not spend all the money when it comes to
fighting a war on terror overseas? Of course not.
The other side of the aisle says spend every nickel we need. Here,
when it comes to homeland security, they are either defending an
administration that has botched this issue like they botched so many
others or because maybe some shipping interests complain or because
they truly believe the technology is not available, and we continue to
slow-walk this issue.
I will have more to say in a few minutes. I will yield the floor so
my colleague from Maine and my colleague from New Jersey can have a
chance to speak.
I ask unanimous consent that the remainder of my time be reserved.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The Senator from Connecticut is recognized.
Mr. LIEBERMAN. Very briefly, the Senator from New York has spoken
passionately. I agree with everything he said about the urgency of the
threat and the need to protect our people from weapons of mass
destruction, which may arrive in containers. But I want to come back to
what I said for a few moments. There is existing law that sets up a
process that compels the Secretary of Homeland Security to achieve 100
percent cargo scanning as soon as possible, based on the outcome of the
three port pilot projects that are occurring this year.
My friend from New York has said that ``as soon as possible'' could
be whenever the Department of Homeland Security wants, that they have
been doing nothing for the 5\1/2\ years since
9/11. However, this law, the SAFE Ports Act, just became law last
October 13, 2006. So the pilot programs at the three ports have just
started in the last 5 months.
At the end of the year, the Secretary will make a report to Congress
about how those pilots are going. Again, he is required by the law to
state to the appropriate Congressional committees in April of next
year, and every 6 months thereafter, the status of full-scale
deployment under subsection (b), which is basically saying how soon can
we get to exactly what Senators Schumer, Menendez, Collins, and I and I
presume everybody--wants, which is 100 percent cargo container
scanning.
So, again, we think we have a mechanism. We share the same goal. If
for some reason after the first 6 month report, or the second one, we
are dissatisfied with the pace of implementation by the Secretary, I am
sure we will all join to set a deadline. For now, the committee has
decided that it is not necessary.
Mr. SCHUMER. Will my colleague yield for a question on my time?
Mr. LIEBERMAN. Certainly.
Mr. SCHUMER. Again, I have great respect for my colleague and all he
has done in homeland security. But I don't get the argument. My
colleague just said they will report to us, and if we are not satisfied
we can later impose a deadline. Given the urgency, why not do it the
other way? Put in a deadline, and if 2 years from now they say they
cannot do it, they will come back to us and we can remove the deadline.
It seems to me that would get them to act more quickly than the
approach my colleague has suggested.
I yield for an answer.
Mr. LIEBERMAN. I thank my friend from New York. Of course, I send
back the same respect to him, truly, coming from New York, particularly
after 9/11, he has been an effective advocate for homeland security. My
answer is this: Maybe history will show me to be an unjustified
optimist. I hope ``as soon as possible,'' as stated in the law, means
that we should have 100 percent scanning sooner than 5 years. I will
not have a real sense of that until we get the first 6 month report, or
maybe the second. So to me, again, it is the judgment of the committee
to not include the House-passed provision, not recommended by the 9/11
Commission, and to give the system time to work.
Mr. SCHUMER. I yield 5 minutes of our remaining time to my colleague
and fellow sponsor, Senator Menendez.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Jersey is recognized.
Mr. MENENDEZ. I appreciate the leadership and advocacy of my
colleague from New York to work with us on this issue. Look, the
question is, On what side do we err? It seems to me we should err on
the side of having a deadline that moves the Department of Homeland
Security and us as a nation toward having the greatest possibility of
security in a post-September 11 world.
If this was pre-September 11 and we were arguing that a conventional
means of transportation--in this case a cargo ship--could, in fact, be
used as a weapon of mass destruction and we hadn't had that experience,
I could see the skepticism. But the reality is we are in a post-
September 11 world. Five years after we saw a traditional form of
transportation be used as a weapon of mass destruction, as we saw a
simple envelope be tainted ultimately and be used as a weapon against
an individual, as we saw someone who boarded an aircraft and tried to
ignite his shoes, the reality is it doesn't take a lot to be convinced
you can take 95 percent of the cargo, which goes unscanned, comes into
this country, and have a great shot of including something in there,
particularly a nuclear device, that would cost us far more--far more--
than what we are talking about proceeding on today. Three years for
major ports, 5 years for other ports--that is too fast? Ten years after
September 11, that is too fast? I can't comprehend it.
There are those who say we already have a risk-based approach, it is
layered, it is whatnot. That is great if you trust algorithms to
ultimately protect the Nation. I don't trust algorithms to ultimately
protect the Nation. I want real scanning, and the technology is there.
It seems to me if Hong Kong can do it and other places in the world can
do it, we can expect it as well.
There is also the suggestion of cost. How much did we spend after
September 11? How much will we spend in lives and national treasure if
we make a mistake by not ensuring that the traffic that comes into the
ports of this country is as secure as it can be? And who among us is
willing to look at the sons and daughters of those who work on the
docks or the communities that surround these ports--most were built in
a way where communities surround them--and what will we do about the
[[Page S2462]]
national economy, because it won't be just a regional economy that will
be affected but a ripple effect in the national economy? How much will
we spend? Far more. The lives that will be lost are incalculable and
priceless.
I argue that, in fact, what we saw in the SAFE Port Act got the
Department to act because they, in essence, had a deadline. So when we
have deadlines, we see the Department acting. In my mind, all the more
reason to have what I think is a very reasonable deadline--3 years for
major ports, 5 years on all other ports, and even with the ability to
extend beyond that by virtue of the Secretary making a determination.
That moves the Department to understanding where we want to be.
But ultimately, I don't believe the present risk-based approach that
lets 95 percent of all the cargo coming into this country go unscanned,
that we depend on algorithms, that we use the costs supposedly to
achieve 100-percent scanning is something that is acceptable.
The question is: How much greater will the costs be? Look at the
costs we are incurring in aviation. They are enormous.
Then we won't be able to get host nations to agree: The reality is
those host nations want access to the greatest market in the world, the
United States of America. I cannot fathom that they won't do something
that is necessary to try to get access to the greatest market in the
world, the most prosperous market in the world. I think they will.
As someone who represents a State that lost 700 residents on
September 11, I am not ready--I certainly am not ready--to take the
position that we will do less than what we can do to achieve the
security of our people. That is what this amendment is all about. It is
structured in a reasonable way.
We have seen deadlines generate the Department of Homeland Security
activity we want to see. We give time frames that are reasonable,
technology that is available. We have incentives for all the right
reasons for the marketplace and, above all, we can look at our citizens
and say, in fact, they are protected.
I yield any time remaining.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
Mr. LIEBERMAN. Madam President, I yield such time to the Senator from
Maine as she desires of the time I have remaining.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has 8 minutes 5 seconds remaining.
The Senator from Maine is recognized.
Ms. COLLINS. Madam President, I thank the chairman of the committee
for yielding time to me.
You can read the entire 567 pages of the ``9/11 Commission Report''
as I have and you will not find a recommendation to undertake 100-
percent scanning of cargo containers. This bill's purpose--the bill
before us--is to finish the business of implementing the 9/11
Commission Report recommendations. Senator Schumer's and Senator
Menendez's amendment is not one of the recommendations of the 9/11
Commission.
Further, I want to address what has been said about our system for
improving the security of our seaports by focusing on cargo container
security.
The fact is a great deal has been done since the attacks on our
country on September 11, 2001. We have a layered approach to cargo
security. It balances security interests against the need for efficient
movement of millions of containers through our seaports each year--11
million, in fact, last year alone.
One layer is the screening of all cargo manifests at least 24 hours
before the cargo is loaded onto ships bound for our shores. That
screening, along with work done by the Coast Guard, is used in DHS's
automated targeting system which identifies high-risk containers.
As a result of the cargo security bill that we passed last fall, we
have a requirement that 100 percent of all high-risk cargo be subjected
to scanning and that is appropriate. We want to focus our resources on
the cargo that is of highest risk. But that is only one layer in the
process.
Another layer is the Container Security Initiative. This program
stations Customs and Border Protection officers at foreign ports. CSI
will be operational in 58 foreign ports by the end of this year,
covering approximately 85 percent of all containerized cargo headed to
the United States by sea. That is another layer of security.
There is yet another one. It is the Customs-Trade Partnership Against
Terrorism Program, known as C-TPAT. This program is a cooperative
effort between the Government and the private sector to secure the
entire supply chain. It is a result of the legislation Senator Murray,
Senator Coleman, Senator Lieberman, and I authored last year.
Firms that participate in C-TPAT and secure their supply chain are
given certain advantages when it comes to scanning cargo because DHS
will have certified that they have met certain standards. That is an
important layer of security.
There is another important safeguard that is a result of the SAFE
Port Act, and that is the law requires by the end of this year that the
22 largest American ports must have radiation scanners which will
ensure that 98 percent--98 percent--of inbound containers are scanned
for radiation. That is because we do have the technology to do scanning
for radiation. We have these radiation portal monitors that trucks can
drive through with the containers loaded on them and be scanned for
radiation. There is a problem with some false positives. I was
describing earlier that for some reason, marble and kitty litter tend
to cause false positives. But at least we identify these containers
that are giving off alarms, and then they are subject to further
inspection and search, and that makes sense.
I should mention we are also installing these overseas as part of the
Department of Energy's Megaports Initiative.
The idea that nothing has been done to secure our seaports since 9/11
is demonstrably false. We took a giant step forward last year with the
passage of the SAFE Port Act.
There is more that is being done, however, and that is, as Senator
Lieberman and Senator Coleman have explained, the new law authorizes
pilot programs to test 100-percent integrated scanning programs.
We keep hearing Hong Kong brought up, but the fact is, in Hong Kong,
there is scanning being done on only 2 of 40 lines, and the images are
not being read. What good is it to take the picture, the X-ray,
essentially, but then not have anyone analyzing the images? How does
that increase security?
We still will learn something from the Hong Kong project, but I think
we are going to learn even more from the three projects the Department
has started already as a result of the SAFE Port Act.
There have been allegations that somehow the Department is sitting on
its hands. That is not true. In fact, three ports--one in the United
Kingdom, one in Honduras, and one in Pakistan--have been selected
already and the projects are going forward to test these pilot
programs. I think that is important to know.
So we have made a great deal of progress. We are going to make more
as a result of these pilot projects. But the whole point is until we
have the technology in place to do this effectively and efficiently, it
will cause a massive backup in our ports if we are trying to scan 11
million containers--low-risk containers, containers that pose
absolutely no threat to the security of this country--and that approach
does not make sense.
Finally, let me read something from the Chamber of Commerce which has
sent around an alert on this issue because I think this summarizes the
issue:
The Chamber points out that more than 11 million containers
arrive at our Nation's seaports each year and 95 percent of
our Nation's trade flows through our seaports.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator has expired.
Ms. COLLINS. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that I be given
45 additional seconds.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Ms. COLLINS. I continuing quoting the Chamber of Commerce:
If adopted, the Schumer amendment would significantly
disrupt the flow of trade and impose costly mandates on
American businesses without providing additional security.
[[Page S2463]]
That is the bottom line. I urge the rejection of the Schumer
amendment, and when the time has expired, I will move to table the
amendment.
Mr. SCHUMER. Madam President, what is the status of the time?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New York is recognized. There
is 3 minutes 1 second remaining.
Mr. SCHUMER. Madam President, first, I thank my colleague from Maine
for helping make our case. She says the technology for detecting
radiation is available. Who in God's name thinks if we didn't set a
deadline or if the President didn't order DHS to make it the highest
priority that we wouldn't find a way to scan all containers within 5
years? Of course we would. This is just defense of DHS. I say to my
colleagues, DHS has a terrible track record in this area, like so many
others. They have been asked to do this for years already, and they are
nowhere.
Now, my good friend from Connecticut says: Well, on October 13, we
passed legislation. Well, that is 3 years after 9/11. What is wrong, my
colleagues? Why isn't everything right with a deadline that says you
better move as quickly as you can? Yes, if they should need, if they
come to us 3 years from now and we are convinced that they have done
everything they can, that the money has been spent, that the experts
have been contacted and used appropriately, then we can delay it.
Instead, we have this approach which seems to me to be backward--let us
delay another 2 or 3 years, and if they do not do a good job, we can
then put in a deadline.
No one is arguing we shouldn't have deadlines. The argument boils
down to, do you trust DHS to do the job or would you rather have an
immutable deadline on something which is the most damaging thing? I
can't think of anything worse or close to it than a nuclear weapon
exploding in America or off our shores. The technology is there, my
colleagues. Yes, DHS doesn't want to spend the money necessary. Yes,
DHS has not had very good people in this Department.
How are my colleagues going to go home and tell their constituents
that when there was a chance to really move an agency and set a
deadline, as the House did--this is not some crazy idea; the House
voted by a significant majority for it--that they didn't do it, they
didn't do it because they had faith in DHS? I don't know who does. How
do my colleagues say they didn't do it because their port or a shipping
company said they didn't want to do it or they didn't do it because
they didn't think it was that big a problem? I don't think any of those
reasons stand up. I don't think any of them stand up.
I have to say I have listened carefully to my colleagues, and I have
great respect for them and the jobs they do, but their arguments just
don't wash: Let's give them another chance. My colleagues, when it
comes to this problem, we can't afford to give them another chance.
I urge a vote for the amendment.
Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that Senators Kennedy,
Lautenberg, and Biden be added as cosponsors.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The time of the Senator from New York has expired. The Senator from
Maine is recognized.
Ms. COLLINS. Madam President, has all time expired?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has 15 seconds remaining.
Ms. COLLINS. Madam President, I yield back the remainder of my time.
Madam President, I move to table the Schumer amendment, and I request
the yeas and nays.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second? There is a
sufficient second.
The question is on agreeing to the motion.
The clerk will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk called the roll.
Mr. DURBIN. I announce that the Senator from South Dakota (Mr.
Johnson) is necessarily absent.
Mr. LOTT. The following Senators were necessarily absent: the Senator
from Idaho (Mr. Crapo), the Senator from Arizona (Mr. McCain), and the
Senator from Louisiana (Mr. Vitter).
Further, if present and voting, the Senator from Idaho (Mr. Crapo)
would have voted ``yea.''
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Whitehouse). Are there any other Senators
in the Chamber desiring to vote?
The result was announced--yeas 58, nays 38, as follows:
[Rollcall Vote No. 56 Leg.]
YEAS--58
Akaka
Alexander
Allard
Bennett
Bingaman
Bond
Brown
Brownback
Bunning
Burr
Byrd
Cantwell
Carper
Chambliss
Coburn
Cochran
Coleman
Collins
Conrad
Corker
Cornyn
Craig
DeMint
Dole
Domenici
Ensign
Enzi
Graham
Grassley
Gregg
Hagel
Hatch
Hutchison
Inhofe
Inouye
Isakson
Kyl
Landrieu
Lieberman
Lott
Lugar
Martinez
McConnell
Murkowski
Murray
Nelson (NE)
Roberts
Sessions
Shelby
Smith
Snowe
Stevens
Sununu
Thomas
Thune
Voinovich
Warner
Wyden
NAYS--38
Baucus
Bayh
Biden
Boxer
Cardin
Casey
Clinton
Dodd
Dorgan
Durbin
Feingold
Feinstein
Harkin
Kennedy
Kerry
Klobuchar
Kohl
Lautenberg
Leahy
Levin
Lincoln
McCaskill
Menendez
Mikulski
Nelson (FL)
Obama
Pryor
Reed
Reid
Rockefeller
Salazar
Sanders
Schumer
Specter
Stabenow
Tester
Webb
Whitehouse
NOT VOTING--4
Crapo
Johnson
McCain
Vitter
The motion was agreed to.
Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
Mr. LIEBERMAN. I move to lay that motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, more than 11 million cargo containers enter
the United States each year. One hundred percent of the shipping
manifests are screened to determine their risk. Approximately 17 to 19
percent of those containers determined to be high risk are examined by
screening machines using xray or gamma ray technology, and only 5
percent of containers are physically opened and examined. This is not
satisfactory. Clearly, much more needs to be done to increase the
number of containers that are screened prior to entering this country.
Only a more robust system will provide the deterrence necessary to make
America safer.
I have been a leader in the effort to provide additional funding to
purchase screening equipment and hire the personnel to perform these
inspections. Nevertheless, I voted to table the amendment of the
Senator from New York, Mr. Schumer. I believe we must set realistic
goals. There is a process which has been set in place by the SAFE Port
Act to get us to the ability to conduct 100 percent inspections. I will
continue to do all in my power to provide the funds to ensure that we
reach an achievable goal as rapidly as possible.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Texas.
(The remarks of Mrs. Hutchison are printed in today's Record under
``Morning Business.'')
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Pennsylvania.
(The remarks of Mr. SPECTER pertaining to the introduction of S. 734
are located in today's Record under ``Statements on Introduced Bills
and Joint Resolutions.'')
Mr. SPECTER. I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine.
Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. LIEBERMAN. I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum
call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I note the presence of a friend and
colleague from Hawaii, a distinguished member of our Homeland Security
Committee. I yield the floor to him.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Hawaii is recognized.
Mr. AKAKA. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to speak for 10
minutes as in morning business on the REAL ID Act, and I thank the
chairman for his agreement.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. AKAKA. Mr. President, today the Department of Homeland Security
released its much anticipated proposed
[[Page S2464]]
regulations implementing the REAL ID Act of 2005. Although I am still
reviewing the 162 pages of regulations, I note that the regulations
address the problems with the statutory May 11, 2008, deadline for
compliance. However, the regulations remain troublesome because they
reflect the problems of the underlying statute.
I intend to ensure that these problems are resolved, which is why I
reintroduced the Identity Security Enhancement Act, S. 717, to repeal
REAL ID and replace it with the negotiated rulemaking process and the
more reasonable guidelines established in the Intelligence Reform and
Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004.
I am pleased to be joined ``by Senators Sununu, Leahy, and Tester. I
also thank Senator Collins for her work on this issue.
From its inception, REAL ID has been surrounded in controversy and
subject to criticism from both ends of the political spectrum. The act
places a significant unfunded mandate on States and is a serious threat
to privacy and civil liberties.
I support the goal of making our identification cards and driver's
licenses more secure, as recommended by the 9/11 Commission. However,
the massive amounts of personal information that would be stored in
interconnected databases, as well as on the card, could provide one-
stop shopping for identity thieves. As a result, REAL ID could make us
less secure by giving us a false sense of security.
Nearly half of our Nation's State legislatures--22--have acted to
introduce or to pass legislation to condemn REAL ID since the beginning
of the year. In some cases, States would be prohibited from spending
money to implement the act. Two bills have been introduced in the
Hawaii State legislature, one supporting the repeal of REAL ID and the
other supporting passage of my legislation.
As I noted earlier, DHS has acknowledged the implementation problems
and the need to help address the burdens on States. Secretary Chertoff
announced today that States could easily apply for a waiver from the
compliance deadline and could use up to 20 percent of the State's
Homeland Security Grant Program, SHSGP, funds to pay for REAL ID
implementation. But this is a hollow solution. The President's fiscal
year 2008 budget proposes to cut SHSGP by $835 million. I fail to see
how States are able to implement an $11 billion program with Federal
homeland security grants that the Bush administration continues to cut.
Moreover, the regulations proposed today fail to address several of
the most critical privacy and civil liberties issues raised by REAL ID,
which essentially creates a national ID. No hearings were held on REAL
ID when it was passed as part of the Emergency Supplemental
Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War on Terror, and Tsunami
Relief Act in 2005. I think this is part of the problem and is where I
hope to bring forth a solution.
As chairman of the Subcommittee on Oversight of Government
Management, I plan to hold hearings in the near future to review the
proposed regulations and how DHS plans to implement this costly and
controversial law. Unfunded mandates and the lack of privacy and
security requirements are real problems that deserve real consideration
and real solutions. Congress has a responsibility to ensure that
driver's licenses and ID cards issued in the United States are
affordable, practical, and secure--both from would-be terrorists and
identity thieves.
I look forward to working with my colleagues--Senators Sununu, Leahy,
Tester, Collins and others--to address the real problems with REAL ID.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Iowa.
Mr. GRASSLEY. I ask unanimous consent to talk as in morning business.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
(The remarks of Mr. Grassley are printed in today's Record under
``Morning Business.'')
Mr. GRASSLEY. Mr. President, I yield the floor, and I suggest the
absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. DeMINT. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Menendez). Without objection, it is so
ordered.
Mr. DeMINT. Mr. President, what is the pending business before the
Senate?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Salazar amendment is the pending amendment
before the Senate.
Amendment No. 314 to Amendment No. 275
Mr. DeMINT. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the pending
amendment be set aside and I be allowed to offer an amendment, which I
am sending to the desk.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The clerk will report.
The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:
The Senator from South Carolina [Mr. DeMint] proposes an
amendment numbered 314 to amendment No. 275.
The amendment is as follows:
(Purpose: To strike the provision that revises the personnel management
practices of the Transportation Security Administration)
On page 215, strike line 6 and all that follows through
page 219, line 7.
Amendment No. 315 to Amendment No. 275
Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I have an amendment that I send to the
desk.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:
The Senator from Connecticut [Mr. Lieberman] proposes an
amendment numbered 315 to Amendment No. 275.
Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of
the amendment be dispensed with.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The amendment is as follows:
(Purpose: To provide appeal rights and employee engagement mechanisms
for passenger and property screeners)
In the language proposed to be stricken:
On page 215, strike line 22 and all that follows through
page 219, line 7, and insert the following:
SEC. __. APPEAL RIGHTS AND EMPLOYEE ENGAGEMENT MECHANISM FOR
PASSENGER AND PROPERTY SCREENERS.
(a) Appeal Rights for Screeners.--
(1) In general.--Section 111(d) of the Aviation and
Transportation Security Act (49 U.S.C. 44935 note) is
amended--
(A) by striking ``Notwithstanding'' and inserting the
following:
``(1) In general.--Except as provided in paragraphs (2) and
(3) notwithstanding''; and
(B) by adding at the end the following:
``(2) Right to appeal adverse action.--The provisions of
chapters 75 and 77 of title 5, United States Code, shall
apply to an individual employed or appointed to carry out the
screening functions of the Administrator under section 44901
of title 49, United States Code.
``(3) Employee engagement mechanism for addressing
workplace issues.--The Under Secretary of Transportation
shall provide a collaborative, integrated, employee
engagement mechanism, subject to chapter 71 of title 5,
United States Code, at every airport to address workplace
issues, except that collective bargaining over working
conditions shall not extend to pay. Employees shall not have
the right to engage in a strike and the Under Secretary may
take whatever actions may be necessary to carry out the
agency mission during emergencies, newly imminent threats, or
intelligence indicating a newly imminent emergency risk. No
properly classified information shall be divulged in any non-
authorized forum.''.
(2) Conforming amendments.--Section 111(d)(1) of the
Aviation and Transportation Security Act, as amended by
paragraph (1)(A), is amended--
(A) by striking ``Under Secretary of Transportation for
Security'' and inserting ``Administrator of the
Transportation Security Administration''; and
(B) by striking ``Under Secretary'' each place such appears
and inserting ``Administrator''.
(b) Whistleblower Protections.--Section 883 of the Homeland
Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 463) is amended, in the matter
preceding paragraph (1), by inserting ``, or section 111(d)
of the Aviation and Transportation Security Act,'' after
``this Act''.
(c) Report to Congress.--
(1) Report required.--Not later than 6 months after the
date of enactment of this Act, the Comptroller General of the
United States shall submit to the Committee on Homeland
Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate and the
Committee on Homeland Security of the House of
Representatives a report on--
(A) the pay system that applies with respect to TSA
employees as of the date of enactment of this Act; and
(B) any changes to such system which would be made under
any regulations which have been prescribed under chapter 97
of title 5, United States Code.
[[Page S2465]]
(2) Matters for inclusion.--The report required under
paragraph (1) shall include--
(A) a brief description of each pay system described in
paragraphs (1)(A) and (1)(B), respectively;
(B) a comparison of the relative advantages and
disadvantages of each of those pay systems; and
(C) such other matters as the Comptroller General
determines appropriate.
Amendment No. 316 to Amendment No. 315
Mrs. McCASKILL. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:
The Senator from Missouri [Mrs. McCASKILL] proposes an
amendment numbered 316 to amendment No. 315.
Mrs. McCASKILL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading
of the amendment be dispensed with.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The amendment is as follows:
(Purpose: To provide appeal rights and employee engagement mechanisms
for passenger and property screeners)
In the Amendment strike all after ``SEC.'' on page 1, line
3 and insert the following:
APPEAL RIGHTS AND EMPLOYEE ENGAGEMENT MECHANISM FOR PASSENGER
AND PROPERTY SCREENERS.
(a) Appeal Rights for Screeners.--
(1) In general.--Section 111(d) of the Aviation and
Transportation Security Act (49 U.S.C. 44935 note) is
amended--
(A) by striking ``Notwithstanding'' and inserting the
following:
``(1) In general.--Except as provided in paragraphs (2) and
(3) notwithstanding''; and
(B) by adding at the end the following:
``(2) Right to appeal adverse action.--The provisions of
chapters 75 and 77 of title 5, United States Code, shall
apply to an individual employed or appointed to carry out the
screening functions of the Administrator under section 44901
of title 49, United States Code.
``(3) Employee engagement mechanism for addressing
workplace issues.--The Under Secretary of Transportation
shall provide a collaborative, integrated, employee
engagement mechanism, subject to chapter 71 of title 5,
United States Code, at every airport to address workplace
issues, except that collective bargaining over working
conditions shall not extend to pay. Employees shall not have
the right to engage in a strike and the Under Secretary may
take whatever actions may be necessary to carry out the
agency mission during emergencies, newly imminent threats, or
intelligence indicating a newly imminent emergency risk. No
properly classified information shall be divulged in any non-
authorized forum.''.
(2) Conforming amendments.--Section 111(d)(1) of the
Aviation and Transportation Security Act, as amended by
paragraph (1)(A), is amended--
(A) by striking ``Under Secretary of Transportation for
Security'' and inserting ``Administrator of the
Transportation Security Administration''; and
(B) by striking ``Under Secretary'' each place such appears
and inserting ``Administrator''.
(b) Whistleblower Protections.--Section 883 of the Homeland
Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 463) is amended, in the matter
preceding paragraph (1), by inserting ``, or section 111(d)
of the Aviation and Transportation Security Act,'' after
``this Act''.
(c) Report to Congress.--
(1) Report Required.--Not later than 6 months after the
date of enactment of this Act, the Comptroller General of the
United States shall submit to the Committee on Homeland
Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate and the
Committee on Homeland Security of the House of
Representatives a report on--
(A) the pay system that applies with respect to TSA
employees as of the date of enactment of this Act; and
(B) any changes to such system which would be made under
any regulations which have been prescribed under chapter 97
of title 5, United States Code.
(2) Matters for inclusion.--The report required under
paragraph (1) shall include--
(A) a brief description of each pay system described in
paragraphs (1)(A) and (1)(B), respectively;
(B) a comparison of the relative advantages and
disadvantages of each of those pay systems; and
(C) such other matters as the Comptroller General
determines appropriate.
(d) This section shall take effect one day after date of
enactment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from South Carolina is recognized.
Amendment No. 314
Mr. DeMINT. Mr. President, I thank the managers for their hard work.
They sincerely want to strengthen homeland security and want to keep
this bill focused on that goal and not allow it to be tangled up in
partisan issues. That is my goal, too. That is why I am offering this
amendment today.
The provision in this bill, found on page 215, that reverses a
critical homeland security policy and introduces collective bargaining
for airport screeners who work at the Transportation Security
Administration, or what we call the TSA, has nothing to do with
improving our homeland security. It was certainly not recommended by
the 9/11 Commission. My amendment would strike this provision so TSA
can continue to protect us from another terrorist attack.
It may be helpful to review the history of this debate so my
colleagues understand how we got here. Just 5 years ago, Congress voted
in favor of a flexible personnel management system at TSA in
recognition that special flexibility is necessary to protect American
passengers from terrorists. This system allows security screeners to
join a union, but it doesn't tie the hands of TSA when it comes to
managing its workforce and protecting the American people.
Collective bargaining, however, would allow labor unions to stand
between TSA and its employees in ways that would make the agency less
flexible and less nimble and create an operational and security
disaster. Mr. President, collective bargaining has been a topic of
discussion since TSA's inception. It is important that my colleagues
know that it has been evaluated and rejected in every instance as
something that would be harmful to our safety.
First, in 2001, collective bargaining was not included in the
Aviation and Transportation Security Act when TSA was first created.
Second, in 2003, collective bargaining was rejected by the TSA
Administrator for security reasons.
Third, in 2004, collective bargaining was not recommended by the 9/11
Commission.
I need to repeat that because it is important. This whole bill is
designed to fulfill the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission, and
they did not mention anything about collective bargaining.
Finally, the decision against collective bargaining at TSA has been
upheld by multiple Federal and labor relations courts between 2002 and
2006.
Now I will outline six of the negative security consequences of this
dramatic change in policy. First, TSA currently uses a security
strategy as recommended by the 9/11 Commission that is based on
flexible, random, and unpredictable methods. This approach keeps would-
be attackers off guard.
Under collective bargaining, TSA will have to negotiate a
predetermined framework within which the agency will be required to
operate. This policy was not recommended in the 9/11 Commission Report,
and it goes directly against the Commission's recommendations. This
will weaken our security.
Second, TSA currently establishes security protocols on a national
and international basis without having to bargain in advance over the
impact of these protocols.
Under collective bargaining, TSA will be required to negotiate on
every security protocol with multiple unions on an airport-by-airport
basis. At its worst, this could stop many critical new security
protocols, but even at its best it will slow them down. This will
weaken our security.
Third, TSA currently shifts resources in real time without having to
inform any entity. Under collective bargaining, redeployment decisions
will be subject to binding arbitration review by a third party who has
no Government or security experience but has authority to reverse TSA
security decisions.
As my colleagues know, arbitration can take months or even years to
resolve. This will weaken our security.
Fourth, TSA currently moves, upgrades, replaces, and repositions
equipment to stay in tune with operational requirements. Under
collective bargaining, equipment deployment will be subject to a 60- to
180-day negotiation process. All information, including standard
operating procedures and tactics, will also be subject to union
negotiation. This will weaken our security.
Fifth, TSA currently protects sensitive security information, such as
the security resources at a particular site, and releases this
information only to those who need to know.
Under collective bargaining, TSA will be required to disclose
security information to third party negotiators and arbitrators,
increasing the risk of unauthorized information release. This will
weaken our security.
[[Page S2466]]
Sixth, and finally, TSA currently deploys many innovative security
programs within weeks. Under collective bargaining, new positions and
promotions will all be subject to months, or years, of impact in
implementation.
TSA provided just-in-time explosive training to more than 38,000
security screeners in less than 3 weeks in November of 2005. Under
collective bargaining, training is subject to negotiation on the need,
design, order of training delivered, and method of delivery. This
process could add 60 to 180 days to security training programs and
weaken our security.
I know my colleagues understand the need for TSA to be able to move
quickly, so I want to make sure everyone knows how slow and how
cumbersome collective bargaining will be. Let's please keep in mind as
we look at this situation the whole purpose of TSA is to protect our
country. That is their first priority. We cannot allow the unionization
and union requirements to preempt this first priority of TSA.
Today, TSA--and I know this is very difficult to read--can implement
its changes in 1 day or less, and we will talk about some of those
examples. But under collective bargaining, it can take up to 568 days
to work out the negotiations and possible litigation that could occur
when they are trying to establish new protocols. This is not acceptable
when it comes to protecting our country.
If we introduce collective bargaining at TSA as proposed in this
bill, changes could take, as I said, up to 568 days. My colleagues can
see a collective bargaining process starts with up to 14 days of
advance notice, up to 14 days for the union to decide how they are
going to negotiate, plus up to 180 days to negotiate, and followed by 7
days to implement.
This whole process does not fit with national security interests. I
hope my colleagues agree that this is too long and too cumbersome to
subject our Nation's security to.
I wish to share with my colleagues several real-world examples of how
TSA has been able to rapidly respond to security threats. I will point
the attention of my colleagues to the United Kingdom bomb plot, of
which we are all aware, last August in 2006. On August 10 of last year,
information about one of the most spectacular terrorist plots since 9/
11 was shared with TSA. TSA worked very quickly to develop a plan that
would, over the course of 12 hours, ban all liquids beyond the security
checkpoint and enact the quickest changes to the prohibited items list
in history. It was simply the most drastic change airport security had
ever undergone, and it happened in less than 6 hours from the time the
arrest of the alleged terrorists was revealed.
I understand one of my colleagues has offered an amendment that would
undercut the whole idea of this bill and force TSA to prove it is an
emergency or an imminent threat in order to take the action we did when
this plot was revealed.
What will TSA have to go through to prove there is an emergency? What
kind of court case, what kind of litigation, what kind of hearings in
Congress will they have to go through to prove it is an emergency? This
attempt to gut this bill makes it worse than the underlying bill
because it subjects our security to constant litigation and second-
guessing.
The success of this operation--this United Kingdom bomb plot--was
based on a number of factors, including a nimble and professional
workforce who is highly trained and rewarded for their performance: an
ability to change procedures within hours, expertise in dealing with
the public to educate, inform, and help them handle the changes, and a
commitment to security in the face of emerging threats. This is a clear
example of why we should not tie TSA's hands and prevent it from
accomplishing its security mission.
Another example of how TSA has been able to react quickly happened
last July, when Lebanon erupted into violence and fighting broke out,
leaving thousands of Americans trapped in between the warring factions.
The Government of the United States safely evacuated these Americans
and thousands of other refugees.
From July 22 to July 31, TSA officers helped to secure 58 chartered
flights from Cypress to the United States and screened over 11,000
passengers. The overseas and domestic deployment was the first of its
kind, and it demonstrated TSA's ability to use its flexible structure
to appropriately respond to both domestic and overseas needs.
TSA delivered on its security mission and ensured the security of
arriving airplanes and passengers. The mission was designed, executed,
and people were being screened overseas within 96 hours, which is
remarkable for a Government agency that had never deployed overseas and
had not envisioned a need to do so.
It is important for us to remember at this point the amendment that
has been offered to change my amendment would likely have resulted by
now with TSA being in court, being challenged as to whether the
situation in Lebanon was an imminent threat to our country, which is
the language of the amendment that has been offered to change this
bill.
We cannot water down our Nation's security by allowing TSA to have to
follow collective bargaining rules or, which has been proposed, prove
it is an emergency or an imminent threat. This would create a heyday
for lawyers.
If these operations had been subject to arbitration and review
required by collective bargaining, changes in deployments of personnel
would have required notification on TSA's management to the collective
bargaining unit, followed by a response accepting the changes in
employment conditions or proposing modifications. This process would
have created time-consuming rounds of negotiation, even using an
expedited process.
TSA's response to the United Kingdom terrorist plot was developed in
12 hours, and the screeners were deployed to Lebanon and Cypress within
96 hours, response times that would have been significantly delayed by
days and weeks, if not made impossible, had the notification and
negotiation requirements in this bill been in effect. We cannot allow
that to happen to our Nation's security.
I would now like to outline three ways collective bargaining will
negatively affect workforce performance.
First, TSA currently uses a paid-for performance system that is based
on technical competence, readiness for duty, and operational
performance. Top security screeners receive a 5-percent base pay
increase on top of a 2.1-percent cost-of-living adjustment and a $3,000
bonus.
Under collective bargaining, this paid-for performance system will be
replaced with a pass-fail system based heavily on seniority that will
not adequately assess technical skills. The collective bargaining
system will not reward screening performance or good customer service,
and it will reduce standards. This will weaken workforce performance.
Second, TSA can also currently remove ineffective security screeners
within 72 hours. Imagine that: The frontline security of our country
can identify someone who is not doing their job and remove them so our
country and the airline passengers can be safe.
Under collective bargaining, however, arbitration proceedings will
retain substandard employees for months, preventing the hiring of
replacement officers. This process could take 90 to 240 days and will
reduce overall workforce performance. This will weaken workforce
performance.
Third, TSA currently uses multiple screening disciplines, adding
interlocking layers of security. Under collective bargaining, employees
will be able to refuse multidisciplinary jobs resulting in fewer
resources to serve passenger checkpoints. This will weaken workforce
performance.
My colleagues should know exactly how this weakened workforce
performance affects air travelers in our country, and we can have a
good look at how that is going to affect us by looking at Canada. A
recent incident in Canada provides a great example.
Canada's air security system does not have the flexibility that TSA
enjoys. Last Thanksgiving, as part of a labor dispute, passenger
luggage was not properly screened and sometimes not screened at all as
airport screeners engaged in a work-to-rule campaign, as they called
it, creating long lines at the Toronto airport.
A government report found that to clear the lines, about 250,000
passengers were rushed through with minimal or
[[Page S2467]]
no screening whatsoever. One Canadian security expert was quoted as
saying that if terrorists had known that in those 3 days their baggage
wasn't going to be searched, that would have been bad. That is an
understatement of the year. We cannot afford to have this kind of
union-sponsored disruption at our airports. The Canadian union's
airport security was not allowed to strike either, but we can see what
they did in order to disrupt the proper screening of baggage there.
This would happen in our country as well.
I think it is also important that people know how collective
bargaining will impact passenger service. I know that for most
Americans, security is the No. 1 goal when it comes to air travel, but
they also want security operations to be efficient and not needlessly
disrupt their schedules.
I know my colleagues would be pleased to know that TSA has managed
the growth of passenger travel and kept average peak wait times to less
than 12 minutes. Under collective bargaining, TSA will have to pull at
least 3,500 screeners, or 8 percent of the total workforce, off a line
to fulfill the needs of the new labor-management infrastructure. This
would close at least 250 screening lanes, causing longer lines at
checkpoints.
Under these circumstances, average wait times would increase from 12
minutes at peak to more than 30 minutes. This is something that will be
very unpopular, especially given the fact that these longer wait lines
come with less security.
TSA is also currently capable of relocating security screeners to
enable on-time aircraft departures. Under collective bargaining,
negotiating job stations and functions will result in poor staffing,
leading to longer lines, late flight departures, and other adverse
industry impacts. Americans want to make their flights, and they will
not support needless delays that come at the expense of their security.
I think it is also important that my colleagues understand what I am
talking about and how it could play out in real terms.
During Hurricane Katrina, TSA deployed security officers from around
the country to New Orleans to screen evacuees during the aftermath of
the storm. This response allowed them to evacuate 22,000 men, women,
and children through the airport safely and securely. Several weeks
later, TSA responded the same in response to Hurricane Rita in Houston.
Security screeners left their home airports with little notice to fly
to Houston to help those in need.
Another example of how TSA has been able to react quickly to weather-
related events occurred this past December when a big snowstorm hit
Denver. Because local TSA employees were unable to get to the airport,
TSA responded quickly by deploying 55 officers from Las Vegas, Salt
Lake City, and Colorado Springs to Denver. The deployment allowed TSA
to open every security lane around the clock at the airport until they
were back to normal operations.
Should we force TSA to prove this was an imminent danger or an
emergency before they respond to the needs of the American people? That
is what the second-degree amendment is intended to do. We cannot allow
that. That will weaken our security.
These operations have been subject to arbitration review required by
collective bargaining. Changes in deployment of personnel would have
required notification by TSA management to the collective bargaining
unit, followed by a response accepting the changes in employment
conditions or proposing modifications. This process would have created
time-consuming rounds of negotiations, even using an expedited process.
Americans do not want needless bureaucracy in our airports, especially
when it comes at the expense of our safety.
I also want my colleagues to understand the amount of money
collective bargaining is going to cost and how it will impact TSA's
operation in air travel security.
The first year startup costs of creating a collective bargaining
infrastructure is conservatively estimated at $160 million, forcing TSA
to relocate thousands of screeners currently working on aviation
security. Since there is no money allocated for this change, this
mandate would force TSA to pull 3,500 transportation security officers,
or 8 percent of the total workforce, off the checkpoints.
These officers equate to 250 of the 2,054 active screening lanes
across the Nation at any given time, closing 250 lanes. This impact is
equivalent to closing all the checkpoint screening lanes in Chicago,
Los Angeles, Boston, and New York. This impact is the equivalent of
closing all screening operations across the system 1 day every week.
This impact would result in failing to screen 300,000 passengers every
day.
Some may say we should increase spending for TSA by $160 million. But
if we have this money, why use it to pay for redtape? Let's use it for
security.
I also want to address some of the objections to TSA's flexible
management. First, those who want collective bargaining at TSA say they
want screeners to be treated as every other Federal employee. That
would be fine, except for the fact they are not like every other
Federal employee. They have a mission to protect the American people,
and collective bargaining will prevent them from accomplishing this
mission.
Second, those who want collective bargaining at TSA say it will lead
to lower attrition and, therefore, more safety. Collective bargaining
may lead to lower rates of attrition, but it will not lead to more
security.
I am sure there are security screeners who would like to be
guaranteed lifetime employment, but that would prohibit TSA from
keeping America safe. TSA currently has the ability to reward screeners
based on their performance and to remove those screeners who are not
performing. That is what ensures safety, not a workforce that is
rewarded for seniority and is not accountable.
We have also heard the supporters of collective bargaining at TSA say
it is working at Customs and border control. First, I take issue with
the claim it is working with Customs or working at our borders. Our
Customs agency has experienced numerous delays and complications in
securing our borders that have been caused by collective bargaining. I
think our Customs agency and border security should have the same
flexibility TSA enjoys, and it is a debate we should have as we look at
ways to better secure our borders.
Let's make sure we understand what we are saying. Advocates of
collective bargaining for airport security are saying our border
security has worked well. It is hard to look at 10 to 12 million
illegal aliens in our country and say our border security is working
well. It is not working well.
We are also hearing increasingly from all over the world that our
customs process is among the worst in the world. Our tourism is down
and our business visits are down because we are making it harder and
harder for people from around the world to get into our country. Our
customs system doesn't work and neither does our border security.
The supporters of collective bargaining at TSA also believe our
screeners are lacking important protections to address their
grievances. I hope my colleagues know TSA has given screeners the
ability to have their whistleblower complaints reviewed by the Office
of the Independent Counsel, even though it is not required in law.
Critics also claim screeners do not have the ability to appeal adverse
actions against them, such as suspensions and terminations, through the
Merit System Protection Board. This is true, but TSA has created its
own disciplinary review board that provides workers with relief faster
than the Merit System Protection Board.
I want my colleagues to understand what all of this means for unions,
because I am afraid that is what this policy is all about. Unionizing
the 48,000 workers at TSA will give labor unions a $17 million annual
windfall in dues from these new union workers. Let me share a quote.
For my colleagues who doubt this policy is being driven by unions, I
want them to hear what was said earlier this week by two leaders of the
American Federation of Government Employees, which is affiliated with
the AFL-CIO. They said:
We must gain 40,000 new members a year to break even today.
But because of the age of our members and pending
retirements, that number will grow to 50,000 in 2 years and
probably 60,000 a few years after that.
[[Page S2468]]
An additional comment:
This campaign is the perfect opportunity to convince TSA
employees to join our union and become activist volunteers in
our one great union.
The purpose of TSA is not to create activist volunteers for unions.
It is to protect our country. Again, I need to remind my colleagues the
top priority of Homeland Security and TSA is to protect Americans.
I conclude by saying this is a very serious issue, and I encourage
all my colleagues to think about it carefully. We all want workers to
have better benefits, but that is not what this debate is about. TSA
offers great benefits and important protections to its workforce. This
debate is about how to keep our country safe, and we cannot tie TSA up
in knots of redtape.
I understand the unions want this new policy because it will add
thousands of new dues-paying members to their rolls, but they are going
to have to live without it in order to keep our country safe. This bill
is about doing things that will prevent another 9/11 attack. Adding an
earmark for labor unions that prevents TSA from doing its job is the
last thing we should do.
I realize the Senator from Connecticut feels strongly about this
issue, and I know I probably haven't changed his mind. Unionizing the
Federal workforce is something that is very important to him, and it is
something he has worked on for many years, most notably when Congress
created the new Department of Homeland Security in 2002. I also realize
the majority leader has impressed upon the Senators on the other side
of the aisle to stick together in supporting this destructive policy.
This is very disappointing, because it shows the majority may be more
interested in having a political showdown than they are in
strengthening our security.
The President has issued a veto threat on this bill if it creates
collective bargaining at TSA, and there are enough Senators to sustain
it. That leaves us with two options: We can remove this misguided
position and preserve the bill or we can let the bill die. I simply ask
my colleagues: Is this union earmark worth killing this bill for? I
don't think so.
I think it is important to also note the second-degree amendment that
is being offered to change my amendment is not supported by Homeland
Security. In fact, they believe it will make this bill worse than it is
right now.
My colleagues, I ask everyone to set aside the partisan politics, set
aside special interests, and let us continue to improve TSA, our
Transportation Security Agency. They have demonstrated that while there
have been a lot of problems with starting up a new agency, each year
they have gotten better. Each year their workforce has gotten better
trained. Each year we are moving passengers through with less and less
inconvenience and better and better security. This is not the time to
turn back. This is not the time to play politics and payback with our
security.
I encourage everyone to take a careful look at this amendment and I
ask my colleagues to support it.
With that, Mr. President, I yield back.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Missouri.
Mrs. McCASKILL. Mr. President, I have listened to the arguments of my
colleague on the other side of the aisle, and I believe the amendment I
have offered answers many of his concerns but also provides basic
rights for our 40,000-some TSA officers across this country.
Let us first talk about what this amendment does that I have offered.
It does three things, three simple things. First, it gives them
whistleblower protection.
As somebody who has spent 8 years as an auditor, as someone who has
spent a great deal of time figuring out where Government is doing its
job well and not so well, I understand the importance of whistleblower
protection. The best information you get as an auditor comes from the
employees of the Government, and they all must be reassured, especially
those working on the front line of security, that they will be
protected if they tell things they see that need to be fixed. That is
important.
Secondly, this bill gives them the right to appeal suspensions of 14
days or more to an independent board, as other Federal workers.
It also gives them the right to collectively bargain, like the Border
Patrol, like the Capitol Police, like FEMA employees, and like
Immigration and Customs Enforcement.
What does this amendment not do? It is important to understand the
limitations in this amendment. First, it makes sure they do not have
the right to strike.
Secondly, it prohibits them from bargaining for higher pay. They
cannot bargain for higher pay. This is important, because my colleagues
spent a great deal of time talking about safety. It explicitly states
that no classified or sensitive intelligence can be divulged or
released during any grievance process.
It goes further than the original legislation and the original
amendment by saying the TSA Administrator or the Secretary of Homeland
Security can take whatever actions necessary to carry out an agency
mission during emergencies and whenever needed to address newly
imminent threats. No questions asked. These employees have to follow
orders. In any emergency, the director has the complete and immediate
control over these workers. Let me emphasize that again. In any
emergency the director, the administrator have complete control over
anything these workers should do.
By the way, as an aside, having talked with and been around these
screening officers many times as I move through the airports, I think
it is a little insulting to them to act as if they would not respond
when directed to an emergency. Americans across the board want to do
what is right in times of crisis for our country. To indicate these
Americans would not do what was asked of them in time of an emergency,
and that they would try to rely on some kind of right under the law to
not do what is necessary in an emergency, frankly, I think, is unfair
to them.
What does collective bargaining get these workers? It provides a
structure for quick and fair resolution of grievances and workplace
disputes. It provides a forum to discuss health and safety issues,
which will reduce the number of on-the-job injuries suffered by TSOs.
It reduces the high TSO turnover rate.
Let's talk about that turnover rate. Talk about saving money. Think
of the money we are investing in these officers that is wasted right
now. We have a 23-percent annual turnover among these screening
officers. Among the part-time officers, it is 50 percent. As somebody
who has worried about the bottom line in a private business, that kind
of turnover is completely unacceptable in terms of the costs.
Let's look at the safety issue. The experience we are losing by that
kind of turnover--and I am not talking about people being dismissed for
bad conduct or getting rid of bad screeners; I am talking about people
who are leaving. That turnover rate, if you don't consider anything
else, should tell my colleagues something is wrong. I believe what is
wrong is they do not have the basic rights and protections other
Federal workers have.
It increases public safety by allowing the TSOs to go through their
union to expose threats to aviation security without fear of
retaliation. It addresses procedures for emergency and security
situations so workers are fully aware of their duties in the event of
an emergency.
This is a good amendment for everyone. It puts these workers on equal
footing with other Federal workers. It does not give them the right to
strike. It does not give them the right to refuse to be deployed in
case of an emergency. It does not allow them to negotiate for higher
pay.
I was not a Senator at the time, but I understand that the Department
of Homeland Security needed the flexibility to get up and running when
the agency was first created years ago--5 years ago; more than 5 years
ago.
But they are no longer processing 5,000 more screener applications
per month in order to transition from a private force to a Federal
force. We are no longer scrambling to create a Department of Homeland
Security. We are now in a position to professionalize. We are now in a
position to professionalize airport officers and give them basic worker
protections and, as a result, we will have a seasoned staff and much
better security.
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My colleague mentioned the threatened veto. That is kind of hard to
figure out. It is hard to imagine that the President would use a veto
to veto legislation that is all about making our country safer, all of
the provisions that this bill will contain, that will go directly to
the heart of the matter of the safety of our Nation, that will do what
the 9/11 Commission wanted. It is hard to imagine, because the
President does not like unions, that he would threaten to veto this
bill just because we want to give the same basic worker protections to
the screeners at airports that the Border Patrol, the Capitol Police,
and immigration officials currently have.
I cannot imagine that the President would veto under those
circumstances. I can't imagine that the American public would think
that is a good use of a veto pen. I can't imagine that some of our
colleagues who think that unions are the enemy would use the collective
bargaining rights--that are so limited in scope in this amendment--as
an excuse to stop this concerted effort that we are all making to do
what we must do to improve homeland security.
If we continue to treat our TSA officers different from their
colleagues in the Border Patrol and their colleagues in homeland
security, we will never have the seasoned and professional and
experienced staff in place as part of our important effort to protect
the Nation's transportation system and the people who live and work and
care about the United States of America.
Mr. DeMINT. Will the Senator yield for a question?
Mrs. McCASKILL. Sure.
Mr. DeMINT. I want to make sure I understand the provisions in the
Senator's amendment. I know one of them is TSA, in order to act quickly
and make changes rapidly, would need to establish that there is an
emergency.
My question is, Would the ongoing global war on terror be considered
an emergency?
Mrs. McCASKILL. I do not believe declaring that we have a problem
with terrorism worldwide, that is a status quo day in and day out,
would be considered a day-to-day emergency. The examples you used,
however, of Hurricane Katrina or the necessity to respond in Lebanon--I
think those issues certainly would be issues that the professionals at
TSA, the officers, would want to respond to quickly.
Mr. DeMINT. I know another criterion is that if they could establish
that we have a newly imminent threat they could act quickly to respond
and not go through the collective bargaining process. Would al-Qaida be
considered a newly imminent threat?
Mrs. McCASKILL. I understand the point my colleague is trying to
make. I would say there are a whole lot of things that some are trying
to put under the rubric of a continuing threat against America. There
have been proposals to take away some basic constitutional rights.
There have been proposals to change the way we view some of the rights
and privileges that Americans have.
I think to say that these workers don't get the same benefits as the
Border Patrol or Customs agents just because they are screening in
airports, under this rubric that we have to be concerned about
worldwide terror, is specious reasoning.
Mr. DeMINT. If I could make one last appeal? This document is the
collective bargaining procedures the border agents have for just one
unit. This bill opens the possibility of literally hundreds of unions
in every airport. I appeal to my colleagues. If every airport has to
deal with separate collective bargaining arrangements and has to
establish an emergency or imminent threat on every occasion, and we can
second-guess them in Congress--and lawyers will--I think we need to
work together to make sure we come to the best conclusion. I know the
amendment of the Senator is well intended. Hopefully we can discuss it
more on the floor tomorrow or next week.
Mrs. McCASKILL. I thank the Senator.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Hawaii.
Mr. AKAKA. Mr. President, I rise today to speak against the amendment
offered by my colleague, Senator DeMint, and in support of employee
protections for Transportation Security Officers TSOs at the
Transportation Security Administration
It is only fair to give TSOs the same rights and protections as other
employees at the Department of Homeland Security.
The provision in S. 4 would allow the President to put TSOs in the
same personnel system that President Bush argued was needed for
homeland security employees in 2002 in order to put the right people in
the right jobs at the right pay--to hold employees accountable--and to
reorganize and quickly shift resources to meet new terrorist threats.
Although DHS was authorized to waive certain provisions of title 5
related to pay, labor relations, and employee appeals in order to
protect the U.S. from terrorists attacks, other employee rights and
protections remained--veterans preference, collective bargaining, and
full whistleblower rights with appeal to the Merit Systems Protection
Board, MSPB.
It is wrong to deny these basic rights and protections to TSOs--who
work for DHS.
Because TSOs lack employee protections, they have one of the largest
attrition rates, one of the highest workers compensation claims, and
one of the lowest levels of morale among Federal employees.
I recognize the efforts by TSA to address these issues, but I firmly
believe that the gains made by those efforts are only temporary if
employees continually feel threatened by retaliatory action or that
they cannot bring their concerns to management.
National security is jeopardized if agencies charged with protecting
our Nation continually lose trained and talented employees due to
workplace injuries and a lack of employee protections--including
protection against retaliation for blowing the whistle on security
breaches.
Moreover, the whole point of creating DHS was to consolidate 22
agencies into one entity in order to prevent and respond to terrorist
attacks. By denying TSOs the same rights provided to other DHS
employees, we are reinforcing the very stovepipes we sought to tear
down with the Homeland Security Act.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine is recognized.
Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, this is a very difficult issue that is
now before the Senate. The Aviation Transportation Security Act
provided TSA with flexibility with respect to the critical national
security mission of TSA security officers. These management authorities
allow TSA to shift resources and implement new procedures daily, in
some cases hourly, to respond to critical intelligence and to meet an
ever-changing airline schedule. This was made very clear to us in a
classified briefing that I attended yesterday. Sometimes these
situations can be classified as emergencies. Other times the day-to-day
situations, such as a flight gets canceled, still require extensive
modifications that may not constitute emergencies.
I think, however, that there is a middle ground in this debate. I
think we can find a solution, and I am working with Senators on both
sides of the aisle to try to see if there is a middle ground. It seems
to me that TSA does need some flexibility to allow it to adjust the
workforce in order to provide additional security. That happened in
response to the United Kingdom air bombing plot last summer. In that
case, TSA changed the nature of employees' work and even the location
of their work to respond to that emergency.
But I see no reason TSA employees cannot have the protections of the
Whistleblower Protection Act, for example. There is no reason they
should not have the same protections as other Federal employees and be
brought under that law.
Similarly, I think there should be some way for TSA employees to have
the right to appeal adverse actions, such as a removal, a suspension
action, a reduction in grade level or pay that has been taken away from
them. I am still exploring this issue, but it seems to me that they
should have the right to appeal adverse employment actions to the Merit
System Protection Board.
I know there is another one of my colleagues waiting to speak, so I
am not going to go into great detail tonight. But let me say that I do
not think this is an all-or-nothing situation as, unfortunately, much
of the debate suggested tonight. I do not think
[[Page S2470]]
that we have to deny TSA employees whistleblower protections and the
right to appeal adverse employment actions in the name of security. I
think we can still achieve our vital security goals while affording TSA
employees employment rights when an adverse action is taken, appellate
rights. I also believe there is absolutely no reason they can't be
brought under the Whistleblower Protection Act.
I ask my colleagues to take a close look at this issue. I think it is
unfortunate that the debate has been so polarized on this issue and
that it is being portrayed as whether you appreciate the work done by
the TSO's or whether you don't appreciate it or whether you are pro-
union or anti-union. That does not do justice to the debate before us.
I believe we can come up with a middle ground that gives TSA the
flexibility it truly needs to be able to change working conditions,
working hours, unexpectedly to respond to critical intelligence and new
threats, or canceled flights for that matter, without depriving TSA
employees of other rights that Federal employees enjoy and that they
should enjoy, too.
Part of the problem is--and then I am going to yield to my colleague
who I see is waiting--we have not had the kind of thorough review of
this issue that is needed. I hope Senator Akaka and Senator Voinovich,
who are the leaders on civil service issues on the Homeland Security
and Governmental Affairs Committee, might hold hearings to take a close
look at this and to bring in the experts and hear from the employees,
hear from the employees' representatives, the unions, TSA; to have the
kind of information that Kip Holly, the head of TSA, has provided us in
the past few days.
I think that while it is premature to do what the committee did on
the spur of the moment, I also am not enamored of the idea of just
striking all of that.
I think there is a middle ground and with goodwill and a sincere
effort we can find it. I hope we would avoid what I saw tonight--where
the tree was filled up instantly to block alternatives, to block an
attempt, a good-faith attempt to find that middle ground.
I am going to keep working on that along with interested colleagues,
and I hope that, in fact, maybe we can find a compromise that achieves
our goals.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Sanders). The Senator from North Dakota.
Amendment No. 313 to Amendment No. 275
Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, I thank my colleague from Maine.
I have an amendment at the desk on behalf of myself and Senator
Conrad. I ask unanimous consent that the pending amendment be set
aside.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. DORGAN. I call up my amendment and ask for its consideration.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
The bill clerk read as follows:
The Senator from North Dakota [Mr. Dorgan], for himself and
Mr. Conrad, proposes an amendment numbered 313 to amendment
No. 275.
Mr. DORGAN. I ask unanimous consent that reading of the amendment be
dispensed with.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The amendment is as follows:
(Purpose: To require a report to Congress on the hunt for Osama Bin
Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri, and the leadership of al Qaeda)
At the appropriate place, insert the following:
SEC. __. REPORT ON THE HUNT FOR OSAMA BIN LADEN, AYMAN AL-
ZAWAHIRI, AND THE LEADERSHIP OF AL QAEDA.
(a) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
enactment of this Act, and every 180 days thereafter, the
Director of National Intelligence and the Secretary of
Defense jointly shall submit to Congress a report describing
the status of their efforts to capture Osama Bin Laden, Ayman
al-Zawahiri, and the leadership of al Qaeda.
(b) Contents.--Each report required by subsection (a) shall
include the following:
(1) A statement whether or not the January 11, 2007,
assessment provided by Director of National Intelligence John
Negroponte to the Select Committee on Intelligence of the
Senate that the top leadership of al Qaeda has a ``secure
hideout in Pakistan'' was applicable during the reporting
period and, if not, a description of the current whereabouts
of that leadership.
(2) A statement identifying each country where Osama bin
Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri, and the leadership of al Qaeda are
or may be hiding, including an assessment whether or not the
government of each country so identified has fully cooperated
in the efforts to capture them, and, if not, a description of
the actions, if any, being taken or to be taken to obtain the
full cooperation of each country so identified in the efforts
to capture them.
(3) A description of the additional resources required to
promptly capture Osama bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri, and the
leadership of al Qaeda.
Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, this is an amendment which is similar to
one Senator Conrad and I have offered previously. It deals with the
issue of al-Qaeda and its leadership. It has been now 5\1/2\ years
since that fateful morning with the bright sunshine and the blue sky
here in Washington, DC, when I was looking out the window of the
leadership meeting which I was attending that Tuesday. We could see the
smoke rising from the Pentagon because of the attacks. We watched on
television the collapse of the World Trade towers, attacked by
commercial airplanes being used as guided missiles full of fuel. None
of us will ever forget that morning. More than 3,000 innocent Americans
were murdered. Shortly after that period, we heard people boast about
orchestrating the murder of those innocent Americans. Osama bin Laden,
Mr. al-Zawahiri, his chief lieutenant, and al-Qaeda have boasted about
orchestrating the attacks against our country that murdered innocent
Americans.
The legislation before the Senate deals with the 9/11 Commission
Report. That Commission did an extraordinary job. I appreciate Senator
Reid bringing this to the floor and the work that has been done by the
committees. These are recommendations which are long overdue. They
should have been dealt with previously by the Congress, but they have
not been.
Now we have legislation on the Senate floor, recommendations on how
to provide for this country's protection, how to provide security, how
to prevent another attack by al-Qaeda or other terrorist organizations.
It is very important legislation. We do need to protect our country
from attacks. But there is something else that is long overdue; that
is, we have taken our eye off the greatest threat. That is not me
saying so. Let me tell my colleagues what the greatest threat to our
country is. This is testimony on January 11, a month and a half or so
ago, before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence by Mr.
Negroponte, who was a top intelligence chief.
Here is what he said:
Al Qaeda continues to plot attacks against our homeland and
other targets with the objective of inflicting mass
casualties. And they continue to maintain active connections
and relationships that radiate outward from their leaders'
secure hideout in Pakistan to affiliates throughout the
Middle East, northern Africa and Europe.
Mr. Negroponte continued by saying:
Al Qaeda is the terrorist organizations that poses the
greatest threat to US interests, including to the Homeland.
That is from the top intelligence expert in our Government. He says
the terrorist organization that poses the greatest threat to U.S.
interests is al-Qaeda; the greatest threat to our homeland is from al-
Qaeda. He says they are in a secure hideout in Pakistan.
Tuesday of this week, the new Director of Intelligence, Mike
McConnell, said almost exactly the same thing.
We also read in the New York Times a week or so ago the following:
Senior leaders of Al Qaeda operating from Pakistan over the
past year have set up a band of training camps in the tribal
regions near the Afghan border, according to American
intelligence and counterterrorism officials.
American officials said there was mounting evidence that
Osama bin Laden and his deputy, Ayman al-Zawahri, have been
steadily building an operations hub in the mountainous
Pakistani tribal area of North Waziristan.
Now, let me go back to 4 days after
9/11. President Bush said the following in an address to a joint
session of Congress. I was sitting near the front row. The President
said:
We will not only deal with those who dare attack America.
We will deal with those who harbor them and feed them and
house them.
In his State of the Union Address several months later, he said:
As part of our offensive against terror, we are also
confronting the regimes that harbor and support terrorists.
So the head of our intelligence services, the Directors of
Intelligence, know that the leadership of al-Qaeda,
[[Page S2471]]
including Osama bin Laden--or ``Osama bin Forgotten,'' as some have
suggested in recent years--are in a secure hideaway in Pakistan. At the
same time, we have 21,000 troops sent on a surge elsewhere. And so I
ask: Why are we not making a greater effort to capture the leadership
of the biggest terrorist threat to this country, as described by the
Directors of Intelligence, past and current? Are they being harbored?
We read that there has been an agreement of sorts between the
Government of Pakistan and al-Qaeda and those who harbor al-Qaeda in
Pakistan. We know there are training organizations now. We see the
examples of them in the film and video on our television sets, more
sophisticated attacks, additional techniques about terrorist attacks.
So we offer an amendment that is very simple. It is an amendment that
says: We want every 6 months from this administration a classified
report to the Congress that tells us several things: First, where is
the al-Qaeda leadership? If they know they are in Pakistan, reaffirm
that. If they are not in Pakistan, tell us where they are, each
country, and whether those countries are harboring these terrorists.
Second, we deserve to know whether these countries in which these
terrorists reside are helping us. Are they helping us bring to justice
and capture the leadership of the greatest terrorist threat to our
country? We deserve to know that.
And third, if Osama bin Laden and the other top leaders are still at
large, we need a report describing what resources are needed to hunt
them down and finally capture them.
I don't understand at all why year after year passes and those who
directed the attacks against this country that killed thousands of
innocent Americans are not brought to justice.
It is perfectly appropriate--in fact, it is essential--that we bring
to the floor of the Senate a 9/11 Commission bill that helps protect
this country. I commend the managers of the bill for it. I want to be
out here helping pass this legislation. But that is one part of
providing security.
Another part of providing security is to apprehend those who
perpetrated the most aggressive attacks ever launched against this
country. Apparently, based on the testimony of the heads of
intelligence on two occasions in the last month, we know where they
are. Yet they remain at large.
I asked a question the other day of the Secretary of Defense, the
Secretary of State, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff when
they testified. I asked the question: If we know where the leadership
of al-Qaeda is and if this is the greatest threat to our country's
security and our homeland, then why on Earth, if we have soldiers to
surge, are we not trying to apprehend and bring to justice the
leadership of al-Qaeda to destroy the leadership? I was told: Well, we
can't just invade some other country to go find them.
I thought we were getting cooperation from this other country. If
they are in Pakistan, are the Pakistanis cooperating with us? If not,
are they harboring al-Qaeda? If they are not harboring them, then how
about allowing us to work with them to bring to justice the leadership
of the organization that poses the most significant terrorist threat to
this country? When will that happen?
There are some who have said Osama bin Laden and the leadership of
al-Qaeda do not matter. They are dead wrong. I think the intelligence
community knows that. The question is, When will this country, with its
capability, decide to eliminate the greatest terrorist threat to
America?
Let me again quote what Mr. Negroponte said on January 11 of this
year:
Al Qaeda is the terrorist organization that poses the
greatest threat to U.S. interests, including to the Homeland.
How long will it be before this Congress can expect the same
aggressive activity against the leadership of al-Qaeda as President
Bush decided to take against Saddam Hussein? Saddam Hussein has been
executed. He is gone. We understand this was a brutal dictator. We have
unearthed mass graves with apparently somewhere near 400,000 skeletons
of human beings murdered by that dictator. But he is executed; he is
gone. Iraq has its own Constitution. They have their own Government.
The question is, Do they have the will to provide for their security?
That is another issue, and an important one.
We have American soldiers in harm's way in the middle of sectarian
violence, in the middle of what clearly is now a civil war in Iraq. But
when we talk about committing America's soldiers for this country's
security, when will this President and this Congress decide to confront
the greatest terrorist threat to our country and to our homeland--the
leadership of al-Qaeda in a secure hideaway in Pakistan? Four days
after 9/11, our President said that those who harbor terrorists are
just like the terrorists. So let's decide to ask those in whose
countries terrorists now reside to work with us to bring them to
justice, to capture them, and to eliminate the leadership of the
greatest terrorist threat to this country.
My colleague, Senator Conrad, and I have offered an amendment. We
will hope it will be given a vote next week. It ought not be a
controversial amendment for anybody in this Chamber. It is a deep
reservoir of common sense, for a change, for us to do what we ought to
do, and protect this country.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Massachusetts.
Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I strongly support the Improving
America's Security Act.
The 9/11 Commission released its report in July 2004. But more than 2
years have now passed, and many of its recommendations still haven't
been implemented. The Nation remains seriously unprepared for another
terrorist strike.
I commend Senator Reid for making these recommendations a top
priority. Democrats are committed to implementing the Commission's
recommendations and we intend to honor that commitment.
The Commission urged Congress to prevent further attacks by stopping
terrorists before they reach our shores. This bill includes practical
steps using technology and diplomacy to keep terrorists out of the
country. It provides greater security for the visa waiver program, by
authorizing the Department of Homeland Security to establish a
simplified online electronic visa application to visitors before they
enter the United States. It also improves the reporting of lost and
stolen passports and the exchange of information about prospective
visitors who may be a security threat. The visa waiver program is
worthwhile, but we need to make it as secure as possible.
I commend the committee for including in the bill an amendment
granting collective bargaining and appeal rights to Transportation
Security Administration officers. These men and women are on the
frontlines of our effort to keep America safe. But for years, they have
been treated as second-class citizens, lacking basic workplace rights.
The agency has higher injury and attrition rates than any other Federal
agency. It is vital to our national security to minimize turnover in
this important profession and give these workers a voice on the job to
speak out on safety issues without fear of reprisal or retaliation.
Granting them these fundamental rights will stabilize this essential
workforce, increase its morale, and improve our national security.
In addition, the bill establishes a dedicated funding stream to
promote communications interoperability. This was one of the hard
lessons we learned on 9/11 and also during Katrina. The lack of funding
for interoperable communications is one of the highest concerns I hear
from first responders in Massachusetts. They shouldn't have to rely on
uncertain funding from the overburdened and underfunded FIRE grants
program to achieve such communications. The committee correctly
recognized that this is a national goal and it has proposed a $3.3
billion grant program over 5 years to achieve it.
This bill makes real progress in another key area that the Commission
identified for improvement: intelligence sharing at all levels of
Government, in order to disrupt terrorist networks before their plan is
carried out. Information sharing is vital so that analysts have all
available information to ``connect the dots'' before an attack is
launched. The bill orders a homeland security advisory system to alert
State and local governments about threats, and authorizes a training
program for State and local law enforcement in
[[Page S2472]]
handling intelligence. It also establishes homeland security fusion
centers to bring Federal, State and local antiterrorism efforts under
the same roof and promote further information sharing.
The bill makes progress in other areas identified by the 9/11
Commission as needing improvement. It provides support to State and
local governments to establish incident command stations to coordinate
response efforts during a terrorist attack or other disasters. It calls
for a national strategy for transportation security to provide transit
system operators with guidance to protect passengers and
infrastructure. It calls on the Department of Homeland Security to make
annual risk assessments of critical infrastructure, and to make
recommendations for hardening those targets and putting other
countermeasures in place.
The bill also strengthens the Privacy and Civil Liberties Board in
significant ways. It requires Senate confirmation of all of its members
and ensures that no more than three members will be of the same party.
Importantly, it requires that the Board expand its public activities,
which will allow for greater accountability. It also gives the Board
authority to request that the Attorney General issue a subpoena and
requires that the Attorney General notify Congress if he does not do
so. Finally, it includes a $30 million authorization over the next 4
years to ensure that it has the resources to carry out its important
responsibilities.
In some areas, the bill could be improved. The 9/11 Commission
recommended that homeland security funds be allocated strictly on the
basis of risk. While all States may bear some degree of risk, our
experience on 9/11 suggests that terrorists are most likely to target
areas that will produce the greatest loss of life or property or
national symbols. The bill improves on current law in allocating
resources under the largest of the homeland security grant programs---
the State homeland security grants. Currently, each State is guaranteed
at least three-quarters of 1 percent of the total appropriated for the
program. That may seem like a relatively modest amount, but when you
multiply it 50 times, it represents nearly 40 percent of the total
appropriation. The bill lowers the minimum guarantee to 0.45 percent,
allowing more of the overall sum to be allocated based purely on actual
risk. The House bill lowers that amount even further to one-quarter of
1 percent. The issue is how best to allocate these limited resources,
and I believe the House funding formula more faithfully reflects the 9/
11 Commission's recommendation and is the wisest use of limited
resources.
On the bill's proposal for a National Bioterrorism Integration
Center, I agree that the Nation must be able to rapidly identify and
localize biological threats, but I am concerned that this new system
will duplicate existing disease monitoring systems. I appreciate the
chairman's willingness to work out ways to minimize duplication and
allow a flow of information between the new system proposed in the bill
and existing disease monitoring systems.
One issue not addressed in this legislation is the health needs of
first responders, volunteers, and residents of New York City harmed by
the 9/11 terrorist attacks. On that day, valiant police officers,
firefighters and health care workers rushed to the site, and many lost
their lives. Many others today are sick, and growing sicker, because of
their heroism. Tens of thousands of others who worked to clean up and
rebuild downtown Manhattan were also exposed to a toxic mix of dust and
chemicals whose effects are just beginning to be understood. This is an
issue we will be taking up in the coming weeks in the HELP Committee,
with the leadership of Senator Clinton, and I hope we can work together
to enact legislation to help these brave men and women and their
families as soon as possible.
Again, I commend the committee for proposing this needed bipartisan
bill.
We also owe an immense debt to the members of the 9/11 Commission,
especially Chairman Tom Kean and Vice Chairman Lee Hamilton, for never
relenting in their mission to see that their recommendations are
implemented to protect the Nation from future terrorist attacks. I have
no doubt that their persistence is in no small part the reason this
bill is being acted on today.
Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order
for the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Order Of Business
Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, for the information of our colleagues, I
know the distinguished assistant leader is going to be making comments
shortly about the schedule tomorrow, but it appears there may be two
rollcall votes. It is still being negotiated as to exactly what they
are going to be on. It looks as if they may be on amendments offered by
Senators Salazar and Sununu.
I want, for the record, to state those amendments are acceptable on
this side of the aisle. I was prepared to accept them without the need
for a rollcall vote, but at this point it is my understanding that
rollcalls are likely for tomorrow. I am sure we will hear shortly from
the leaders on that.
Mr. President, I thank my colleague for allowing me to precede him.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Illinois.
Mr. DURBIN. Mr. President, I will speak to the schedule and
adjournment in just a moment, but before that I ask unanimous consent
to be recognized to speak as in morning business.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
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