[Congressional Record Volume 153, Number 30 (Friday, February 16, 2007)]
[Senate]
[Pages S2127-S2131]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                                  IRAQ

  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I rise to address the issue of the Iraq 
resolutions.
  Tomorrow at 1:45, I will vote for cloture, and I do that for reasons 
that I will set forth. I, like many of us, have to leave early this 
afternoon. I have consolidated all my State obligations and speeches 
between now and late tonight so I may return for the vote.
  I want to go back and retrace the history of this debate. When I 
returned from Iraq, with several other Senators, and Senator Levin with 
me, at that time I was chairman of the Armed Services Committee and he 
was ranking. I indicated to the Nation by way of a press conference 
that I felt the situation was going sideways; that our strategy was not 
working.
  Initially, in the days following that, I was highly criticized for 
those remarks. Eventually, however, others began to recognize the 
situation as I had, and, indeed, the President, when he was asked 
publicly if he supported the observations that I had made, said yes. I 
commend the President for immediately swinging into full gear his whole 
administration to study intensively the matters with regard to the 
current strategy. It included work by the Baker-Hamilton group, which I 
think played a very constructive role.
  In the resolution which I prepared, with the assistance of Senator 
Ben Nelson and Senator Collins, we make direct reference to that. I 
bring up that background because the President then, on January 10, 
announced his intention to go forward with a changed strategy. The 
President, in that speech, specifically said:

       If Members have improvements that can be made--I repeat--if 
     Members have improvements that can be made, we will make 
     them. If circumstances change, we will adjust.

  Now, that was an open invitation to Members of Congress and others to 
address this very important plan laid down by the President. Our group, 
my 2 colleagues who worked with me, Senator Levin joining us later, and 
a half dozen others, some 8 or 10, up almost to 12, joined in an honest 
forthright way in accepting the President's offer. That is how this 
started. In drawing up our resolution, we were careful to say, yes, we 
had different views, but we urged the President to consider all 
options--I repeat all options--other than the utilization of 21,500 
individuals to go into that situation.
  Specifically, our resolution charges the Iraqi military with taking 
the lead, with taking the brunt. I reiterate, the Iraqis should be 
taking the full measure of responsibility for this Baghdad campaign. 
Therein rests this Senator's primary concern with the President's plan. 
I say that because our American GIs have fought bravely, courageously, 
and we have had sacrifice and loss of life and limb, and in no way have 
they failed in the attempt to try to help the Iraqi people achieve 
their freedom, achieve their Government through elections, and to 
become a sovereign Nation. Now it should fall upon the over 300,000 
Iraqi troops, police, and other security officials to bring about the 
cessation of this violence in Baghdad.
  The Iraqis are far better qualified by virtue of their understanding 
of the language. They have a far better understanding of what is it 
that is bringing about this sectarian violence. These are the very 
people we liberated and gave them back their sovereign land and who are 
now fighting themselves, Sunni upon Shia, Shia upon Sunni, with wanton 
murder and criminal activity. Our forces do not understand the 
language. It is hard for those here in this Chamber to go back and look 
at the origins of the difference between the Sunni and Shia, which go 
back some 1,400 years. Our troops shouldn't be in there trying to 
decide do we shoot at a Sunni or do we shoot at a Shia. That should be 
the responsibility of the Iraqi forces. That is the principal reason I 
found differences with the President.

  Our leaders, the Record will reflect, have tried to reconcile the 
differences between our two sides. The last time I didn't support 
cloture. I did that to support the institution of the Senate, because 
this Senate stands apart from the House, and stands apart from 
legislatures all over the world because of the right and the freedom to 
debate and for all to bring forth their ideas. We are behind that now. 
So far as I know, the leaders have done their best and we were not able 
to achieve agreement, and now, procedurally, we are faced with the 
situation of a House resolution, which will be voted on in an hour or 
more, and will then be considered by the Senate. For that purpose, I 
will vote cloture.
  We supported the President in our resolution. As I read the House 
resolution, it does not reject the President's initiative to have a 
diplomatic component to his plan. The House resolution does not reject 
the economic aspect of what the President puts in his plan. So I say to 
my colleagues that what comes before us does not reject outright the 
President's program. It directs itself to that military operation, much 
as we did in S. Con. Res. 7, and says respectfully that we urge the 
President to consider all options, options that were set forth in 
testimony before the Armed Services Committee by General Abizaid, when 
he said we don't need any more troops; by General Casey, when he was up 
for confirmation and he said he thought we only needed two brigades, 
not five brigades.
  So it is against that background that I think our group has come 
forth in response to the President's invitation and stated our case in 
a very respectful way. This matter we will address, the House 
resolution, I do not believe rejects the entire plan of the President. 
The components of diplomacy and the components of economics are there. 
It is only the question of how we employ our forces. I say the burden 
falls on the Iraqi security forces.
  I will submit for the Record a New York Times story which appeared 
this week outlining an operation in which we had 2,500 Americans and 
less than 100 Iraqi forces turned up to participate. I asked about this 
yesterday when questioning the Chief of Staff of the United States Army 
and the Commandant of the Marine Corps, as to what their idea of the 
plan had been, and it was represented to us that there were to be joint 
forces, a joint command.
  Certainly this is an early report, and I cannot speak to the 
authenticity of the article, but I have invited the Department of 
Defense to comment on it. It indicates to me that the Americans are 
bearing the brunt, not the Iraqi forces.
  I ask unanimous consent that the article be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

[[Page S2128]]

                 [From the Daily Press, Feb. 16, 2007]

               Warner Questions Credibility of Bush Plan

                           (By David Lerman)

       The Democratic chairman and former Republican chairman of 
     the Senate Armed Services Committee questioned the 
     credibility of President Bush's new security plan for Baghdad 
     Thursday, citing news reports of an overwhelmingly American-
     led operation despite administration promises to let Iraqi 
     forces take the lead.
       Virginia Sen. John Warner, a senior Republican, used a 
     committee hearing to call attention to a New York Times 
     report that the first major sweep of the Iraqi capital under 
     the new security plan used only 200 Iraqi police and 
     soldiers, but 2,500 Americans.
       Warner, who has warned against sending more Americans to 
     combat a low-grade civil war, expressed surprise that the 
     first major security sweep of Baghdad under the new plan 
     would be conducted by so few Iraqi forces. Defense officials 
     had stressed in recent weeks that U.S. troops would be 
     deployed in phases over coming months--with time allowed to 
     measure the commitment of the Iraqi government to beef up its 
     own security.
       ``I was led to believe that as we moved out in phases, that 
     things would be in place,'' Warner said. ``This is 
     astonishing.''
       Warner, who sponsored a resolution opposing Bush's planned 
     surge of 21,500 more American troops, added, ``That falls far 
     short of the public representation made by the administration 
     that this would be a joint operation and that Iraqis would 
     take the lead and we would be in a support role.''
       Sen. Carl Levin, D-Mich., the committee chairman, said he 
     was dismayed at the reported reliance on U.S. forces, saying 
     it ``runs counter to what we were told the surge would be and 
     how it would be handled.''
       Gen. Peter Pace, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
     described the new security plan as an Iraqi-led operation 
     during an appearance before Levin's committee earlier this 
     month.
       ``We will not be out front by plan,'' Pace said of U.S. 
     forces. ``The Iraqis would be the ones going door-to-door, 
     knocking on doors, doing the census work, doing the kinds of 
     work that would put them out in front for the first part of 
     the--if it develops--firefight. Our troops would be available 
     to backstop them and to bring in the kind of fire support we 
     bring in. But it would not be one Iraqi and one U.S. 
     soldier.''
       Instead, the security sweep that unfolded Wednesday in 
     three mostly Shiite neighborhoods of northeastern Baghdad was 
     largely an American operation, the New York Times reported 
     from the Iraqi capital.
       Gen. Peter Schoomaker, chief of staff of the Army, and Gen. 
     James T. Conway, the Marine Corps commandant, told Warner 
     Thursday they were not familiar with the details of the 
     described security sweep. But Conway added, ``It is counter 
     to what I understand to be the plan as well.''
       The public criticism of White House war strategy by two of 
     the Senate's leading voices on defense policy came as the 
     House prepared to vote today on a non-binding resolution 
     opposing Bush's troop surge. Senate Democratic leaders, 
     meanwhile, announced plans to hold a rare Saturday session to 
     vote on whether to consider the same measure after weeks of 
     procedural wrangling.
       While the largely symbolic resolution is virtually 
     guaranteed to pass the Democrat-controlled House, the surge 
     in troops is already under way.
       Whether it succeeds in quelling the mix of sectarian and 
     insurgent violence in Baghdad as promised could shape public 
     attitudes on Iraq far more profoundly than any vote in 
     Congress.
       At the Pentagon late Thursday, Pace defended the progress 
     of Iraqi forces in providing more security. He cited an 
     operation about three weeks ago on Baghdad's Haifa Street, in 
     which the Iraqi army faced down Sunni insurgents, and another 
     in Najaf in which Iraqi forces battled against a Shia 
     stronghold.
       ``To date, in the operations that have taken place since 
     the prime minister has announced that he wants to have a very 
     balanced approach to the problem, his armed forces have done 
     just that,'' Pace said.
       Of the three Iraqi brigades scheduled to be moving into 
     Baghdad, he said, two have moved in and the third is moving 
     this month.

  Mr. WARNER. I yield the floor.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Massachusetts.
  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the remaining 
time between now and 2:05 be divided equally between myself and the 
Senator from Montana.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so 
ordered.
  Mr. KERRY. I ask that I be given sort of a 2-minute notice before the 
division.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator will be notified.
  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Virginia whom I 
think has been unbelievably thoughtful, unbelievably patient and 
courageous in this effort. I had the privilege of traveling with him to 
Iraq, together with Senator Stevens. I could see the thought that he 
was giving then to the ways in which he was visually perceiving that it 
wasn't working the way it was promised. There is no stronger advocate 
for our Armed Forces. There is nobody who understands the military 
better, having just finished a tour as the chair of the Armed Services 
Committee. I really think the administration should bend over backwards 
to listen to this Senator who speaks with a voice of great 
reasonableness. He is greatly respected in the Senate. I thank him for 
his courage, for being willing to stand up on this issue.
  The Congress, all of us, come here with a new responsibility in a 
sense. The last election could not have been more clear. People all 
across the country registered their disapproval of the policy that was 
being executed in Iraq. In fact, the Iraq Study Group report was 
awaited with enormous anticipation by everybody as an opportunity to 
bring everybody together and think this through anew and find a way to 
get a legitimate, across-the-aisle, Republican/Democrat, joint effort 
in the best interests of our country. I regret to say that the best 
efforts of former Secretary of State Jim Baker; the former Attorney 
General, Chief of Staff of the President, Ed Meese; another former 
Secretary of State, Larry Eagleburger; a former leader in the United 
States Senate and moderate from the State of Wyoming, Al Simpson; and a 
former Secretary of Defense, Bill Perry--just to name a group of those 
who were on the Iraq Study Group--that their efforts were just cast 
aside. Every recommendation they made was left on the sidelines.
  Today we find the President adopting a policy which runs counter even 
to the advice of his own generals. Rather than listen to the advice, 
they change the generals and they put people in who would pursue a 
different policy. General Casey comes back, General Abizaid departs, 
and the policy goes on.
  This institution has a solemn obligation to vote on this issue. It 
should not be procedurally delayed, and it should not be played around 
with. The fact is, the American people asked us to accept 
responsibility for something for which we already have some 
responsibility because we voted as an institution to empower the 
President to be able to send troops to Iraq, though many of us who 
voted for that resolution never voted for the President to abuse the 
power he was given by ignoring diplomacy, rushing to war, and 
forgetting to do the planning that they had promised they would do.
  Our troops have done their duty. Our troops have served with 
remarkable courage under the most difficult circumstances. They have a 
right, together with the American people, to expect that this Congress 
does its duty. That does not mean avoiding a simple vote. If you are in 
favor of sending the troops, you have an opportunity tomorrow to 
register that vote, say you are in favor, stand up and be counted; if 
you are opposed you should vote no--as the House will do in a short 
period of time.
  Whatever procedural games are played on the floor of the Senate will 
never erase the perception by the American people of the responsibility 
that we ought to be exercising. They understand that this is the time 
and this is the place and they expect us now to execute our 
responsibility. We owe it to the troops. For all those who come to the 
Senate floor and talk about supporting the troops, responsibility for 
the troops, what would be fair for the troops, don't demoralize the 
troops--there is nothing more demoralizing, I will tell you, as a 
former troop myself, than having a policy that doesn't work; sending 
you out on missions which don't have the kind of purpose that you 
believe can succeed. You send these guys out in these vehicles, waiting 
to be blown up by an IED, knowing as they hold their breath that they 
don't have an adequately armored vehicle to be able to withstand it, 
and they go out and come back and turn to each other and say: What did 
we accomplish? What did we do? Did we secure a territory? Did we change 
minds? Did we actually hold onto some advantage gained by driving 
through a city in that kind of a dangerous situation?
  Sending an additional 20,000 of our troops in the middle of a raging 
civil war is not a sensible policy on any

[[Page S2129]]

number of levels. I believe, as a matter of larger strategy, raising 
the stakes by sending 20,000 additional troops and saying at the same 
time, publicly, ``This is it, this is our big move, if this doesn't 
work we don't know what,'' is an unbelievable invitation to those who 
make mischief to make more mischief. And what's more, the very people 
who keep saying, ``Don't set a date, don't set a timeline,'' set a 
timeline on this very deployment because they have come to us and said 
this is only going to be for a few months. So they announce a timeline 
on the very escalation that they say is supposed to make the difference 
and advertise: If you are one of the bad guys, just wait those 3 
months. That is what they can do, knowing it is only 3 months.

  I think there is a smarter strategy. I think there is a better way to 
be successful in Iraq, and it involves holding Iraqis accountable and 
setting legitimate benchmarks for what they ought to be doing. It is 
incredible to me that some people on the other side would obstruct a 
debate on the most fundamental issue confronting our country today. We 
are sent here to be a great deliberative body, and they don't want to 
deliberate. They don't want to make a decision. They think somehow they 
can just walk away and avoid responsibility for voting on the question 
of this escalation.
  The majority leader has said they will have every opportunity to vote 
on that in a short period of time. Every amendment they want to bring 
they will have an opportunity to bring. We can have, in the meantime, a 
real vote on Iraq.
  Since the end of last month when we started talking about talking 
about Iraq, 60 American troops have died in Iraq. There is a fellow by 
the name of Kevin Landeck, whom I just learned yesterday was killed on 
February 2 by an IED. Kevin Landeck comes from Wheaton, IL. He was a 
member of a Ranger unit over there. I have a wonderful photograph, a 
digital photograph on my computer of Kevin and a bunch of his other 
troops standing on a stairwell celebrating Christmas. The Christmas 
stockings are all hanging from the stairwell. I am proud that our 
office--Mary Tarr in our office particularly--has led an effort to help 
send packages to those troops regularly. Our office sends them boxes 
full of goodies, at Christmastime particularly--the stockings.
  Sadly, Kevin has given his life in the ultimate act of patriotism, a 
courageous young man, admired by his fellow soldiers. That happened 
during the time that we couldn't even debate this issue on the floor of 
the Senate, during a time that the Senate avoided its responsibility.
  We have every right to expect that the people who were elected to 
protect Kevin Landeck and the rest of those troops get this policy 
right--for their parents, for them, and for all of us.
  I believe the only way we are going to do that is, ultimately, to be 
able to set a target date which gives the President the discretion to 
keep troops there to complete the training. What other purpose is there 
to be there? We give the President that discretion. We give him the 
discretion to leave troops necessary to chase al-Qaida. We give him the 
discretion to be able to leave troops necessary to protect American 
forces and facilities. What other purpose would there be, after 4 
years, to have us there but to finish the training of the Iraqis and to 
provide an emergency buffer against Iran and others?
  But you don't need to be on patrol in Baghdad, carrying the brunt of 
a civil war on a daily basis in order to provide that. You can be over 
the horizon. You can be deployed in garrison. You can be rear deployed. 
There are any number of ways to protect American interests in the 
region, and I am tired of our colleagues on the other side suggesting 
that a policy that clearly advantages America's position in the region, 
changes the dynamics, shifts responsibility to the Iraqis, and 
ultimately protects our troops is somehow a policy of abandonment. It 
is not. It is a policy for success. And it is to be measured against 
the current policy, which is an invitation to more jihadists.
  Our own intelligence agencies are telling us we are building the 
numbers of jihadists. We are inviting more terror. The world is more 
dangerous. Iraq is less united. Iran is stronger. Hezbollah is 
stronger. Hamas is stronger. This is a failed policy, and when a policy 
is failing, day after day, leaders have an obligation to stop and get 
it right.
  I believe that requires us to have a summit, bring the nations 
together to solve the issues between the stakeholders and ultimately 
resolve what our troops are powerless to resolve. A civil war is a 
struggle for power. We have to resolve that at the diplomatic and 
negotiating table.
  So I strongly believe it is not enough for Congress simply to go on 
record opposing the President's reckless plan. Congress has an 
obligation to provide a responsible exit strategy that preserves our 
interests in the region, retains our ability to protect the security of 
the United States, and honors the sacrifice our troops have made.
  Eight months ago in the Senate, 13 of us stood up against appeals to 
politics and pride and demanded a date to bring our troops home, to 
make Iraqis stand up for Iraq and fight a more effective war on terror. 
But while we lost that roll call, I still believe it was the right 
policy to put in place, to demand accountability, and to leverage 
action.
  Now, I am more convinced than ever that a combination of serious, 
sustained diplomacy and the enforcement of benchmarks for progress by 
the Iraqi government, leveraged by a 1-year deadline for redeployment 
of U.S. troops, is the best way to achieve our goal of stability in 
Iraq and security in the region.
  That is why I will again introduce legislation that offers a 
comprehensive strategy for achieving a political solution and bringing 
our troops home within 1 year. We have to find a way to end this 
misguided war, and I believe this legislation is the best and most 
responsible way forward.
  Let me emphasize that this strategy does not mean abandoning Iraq in 
1 year: in fact, it gives the President the discretion to leave the 
minimum number of U.S. troops necessary to complete the training of 
Iraqi security forces, go after terrorists, and protect U.S. facilities 
and personnel.
  This 1-year deadline is not arbitrary. It is consistent with the Iraq 
Study Group's goal of withdrawing U.S. combat forces from Iraq by the 
first quarter of 2008--it's consistent with the timeframe for 
transferring control to the Iraqis set forth by General Casey, and the 
schedule agreed upon by the Iraqi government itself. Even the President 
has said that, under his new strategy, responsibility for security 
would be transferred to Iraqis before the end of this year. It is the 
opposite of arbitrary. The President has said it, our generals have 
said it, the Iraq Study Group has said it.
  Some say those of us who oppose the President's failed policy in Iraq 
do not offer an alternative--nothing could be further from the truth. 
This legislation offers a comprehensive military and diplomatic 
strategy that incorporates key recommendations of the Iraq Study 
Group--including many that some of us here have long been advocating--
to provide us with the best chance to succeed: holding a summit with 
all of Iraq's neighbors, including Iran and Syria--creating an 
international contact group--enforcing a series of benchmarks for 
meeting key political objectives--shifting the military mission to 
training Iraqi security forces and conducting targeted counterterrorism 
operations--and maintaining an over-the-horizon presence to protect our 
interests throughout the region.
  It is time for Iraqis to assume responsibility for their country. We 
need a timetable which forces Iraqi politicians to confront reality and 
start making the hard compromises they have resisted thus far. Instead, 
they are using America's presence as a security blanket. Americans 
should not be dying to buy time for Iraqi politicians hoping to cut a 
better deal. We should be working to bring about the compromise that is 
ultimately the only solution to what is happening today in Iraq. And 
Iraqi politicians have repeatedly shown they only respond to 
deadlines--a deadline to transfer authority, deadlines to hold two 
elections and a referendum, and a deadline to form a government.

  Without hard deadlines, our best hopes for progress in Iraq have been 
repeatedly dashed. When Prime Minister Maliki took power in May, 
General Casey and Ambassador Khalilzad said the new government had 6 
months to make the political compromises necessary to win public 
confidence and

[[Page S2130]]

unify the country. They were right, but with no real deadline to force 
the new government's hand, that period passed without meaningful 
action--and we are now seeing the disastrous results.
  In fact, for 4 years now, we have been hearing from this 
administration that progress is right around the corner. We have been 
hearing the Iraqis are near a deal on oil revenues, that they are 
making progress towards reconciliation--but we still haven't seen any 
results.
  That is why we must give teeth to the benchmarks agreed upon by the 
Iraqi government for national reconciliation, security and governance. 
Meeting these benchmarks is crucial, but without any enforcement 
mechanism, they are little more than a wish list. That is why this 
legislation supports the Iraq Study Group proposal to make U.S. 
political, military, or economic assistance conditional on Iraqis's 
meeting these benchmarks.
  A deadline is also essential to getting Iraq's neighbors to face up 
to the realities of the security needs of the region. None of them want 
to see Iraq fall apart. That should be the basis for cooperation in 
stabilizing Iraq, and yet a sense of urgency has been lacking. This 
deadline will make clear the stakes and hopefully focus their minds on 
helping the Iraqis reach a political solution.
  We cannot turn back the clock and reverse the decisions that brought 
us to this pass in Iraq and the Middle East. We cannot achieve the kind 
of clear and simple victory the administration promised the American 
people again and again even as Iraq went up in flames. But we can avoid 
an outright defeat. We can avoid creating the chaos we all say we want 
to avoid. We can avoid a victory for our adversaries by taking a clear-
eyed approach to identifying specifically what we can and cannot 
accomplish in Iraq.
  With a new Congress comes a new responsibility: to get this policy 
right. That starts with preventing the President from going forward 
with this senseless escalation. And it has to end with an exit strategy 
that preserves our core interests in Iraq, in the region, and 
throughout the world. Only then will we have honored the sacrifices of 
our troops and the wishes of those who sent us here. Only then will we 
have done our duty.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The senior Senator from Montana.
  Mr. BAUCUS. Mr. President, I think it is clear that the American 
people want the Senate to have a debate on this issue. There is no 
doubt about that. I very much hope that enough Senators, when we vote 
tomorrow, will vote to invoke cloture so we can do just that, have a 
debate. I think for the Senate to not vote to invoke cloture would be 
very irresponsible. I cannot for the life of me imagine why the Senate 
would not conduct that vote. I very much hope when we have that vote 
tomorrow that 60 Senators, more than 60 Senators vote in favor of 
cloture so the Senate can address one of the most fundamental issues 
that I think is on Americans' minds.
  I was going to go to Iraq tonight because I wanted to see firsthand 
what is going on. I wanted to talk to troops, talk to commanders. I 
wanted to talk to not only the American personnel but also the Iraqis. 
I wanted to determine, the best I could, the degree to which Prime 
Minister Maliki and the Iraqis are able to stand on their own two feet 
and do what they are supposed to do; that is, govern and run their own 
country. I am not going to go over tonight, obviously. I want to be 
here tomorrow and cast my vote so we can start debating. That is the 
right thing to do.
  Based upon what I see in the newspapers, what I see on television, 
based upon the comments of my colleagues who have recently been to 
Iraq, I am very disturbed. To put it simply, Iraq is a mess. It is a 
mess because the United States, to some degree, started it by invading 
the country and opened up Pandora's box and got the Shias and the 
Sunnis and the Kurds all stirred up. Now they are fighting each other.
  We did a good thing by toppling Saddam Hussein. That was the right 
thing to do. But we did not think through the consequences. We did not 
understand what we were doing as a country. We did not have an exit 
strategy. We did not know what the consequences of occupation would be.
  Certainly, the United States, with its very superior Armed Forces, 
can very easily occupy Iraq--Baghdad. In fact, the occupation was 
probably a little easier than many people anticipated. But when you go 
back and talk to generals, talk to defense personnel, talk to analysts, 
they all--many of them, many of them are very clear in saying that they 
advised the Pentagon not to go ahead and do this until we knew what we 
were doing once we got there. It would be a big mistake, many said, to 
proceed unless we knew what we were doing.
  Put simply, there was just no exit strategy. There was none 
whatsoever. I have read so many reports and quotes of so many generals 
advising us to not go into Iraq until we knew what we were doing that I 
am appalled, frankly, at how unprepared the United States was when it 
went in.
  All Americans, if they have any second thoughts about that statement 
I just made, they, too, would be appalled if they would read those same 
statements. They are all in the record. They are all in the public 
domain. I strongly urge people to read them and look at them.
  The key here, as has been stated by the Senator from Virginia, the 
senior Senator from Virginia, is: Can the Iraqis stand up on their own 
two feet? It is my belief that they are not standing up on their own 
two feet. Clearly, the continued civil war's death toll indicates that 
Iraq is not taking control of the situation. There are so many reports 
that the Iraqi Army is unfit and that they are not doing the job. There 
are questions about how well it is trained or is being trained. Clearly 
the answer is, it is not being trained. They are not doing a good job.

  My view is it doesn't make much sense to throw more troops, a modest 
number of more troops, at a failed policy. That is what it comes down 
to. The Iraqis aren't taking care of themselves, and if they aren't 
taking care of themselves, why should we take care of them? We have 
lost so many American lives, so many Montanans, young men and women who 
have been killed over there, and it makes no sense, in my judgment, to 
keep doing this.
  That is why I think we should vote on this resolution on Monday and, 
secondly, why I think the resolution should pass. We should not 
continue a failed policy. I don't know very many people who think the 
policy is working. Most think it has failed. So let's, as the U.S. 
Senate, make that statement.
  What do we do now? If it has failed, what do we do? I don't think 
anybody has a simple answer. There is no real silver bullet here. But I 
do think we need to give the Iraqis a set date and say to them: We are 
going to get out of here on this set date, and you need to know that. 
My fear is, if we don't do that, they are just going to keep thinking 
the United States is going to keep sending more troops and keep taking 
care of them. It is human nature for them to do so, to think that. That 
is why I believe we should give them a definite date we will start 
bringing our troops home.
  I also think we have to engage other countries in the region. We are 
not doing a good job of doing that. This administration says: Well, we 
can't talk to Iran; we shouldn't do that. We can't talk to Syria; we 
shouldn't do that. I don't understand that. It seems to me, if you want 
a solution, you have to talk to people. You have to talk to people who 
are involved. We are talking to the Saudis, we are talking to the 
Jordanians, the Israelis, and others in the region. That is good. But 
two very key players are Iran and Syria.
  In life, we talk to our friends, but we should also talk to our 
enemies. We don't have to agree with our enemies, but we should talk to 
them. When you start talking to people with whom you have 
disagreements, after a while you learn there may be a common assumption 
or two. After a while you might learn something that indicates there is 
progress. There might be a little bit of daylight once you start 
talking to somebody. You certainly aren't going to learn anything 
unless you talk to them. The stakes are so high and the consequences 
are so great, I strongly urge the administration to start talking to 
people. So what if the public policy was that we were not going to do 
that in the past. Don't be stubborn. Don't be too proud. Do what is 
right.

[[Page S2131]]

Just try to talk to the people in the region so we can find some common 
solutions.
  I know it is not going to be easy. It will be very difficult. But I 
know of no other alternative--no other alternative--but to give them a 
date and say: we are out of here; by this certain date we are going to 
start repositioning troops elsewhere in the region. We should tell them 
that so they sober up more--not just Prime Minister Maliki but the 
other principals in the country--and realize they have to start getting 
their act together. As I said, we need to have some very serious 
negotiations with groups in the region and also with countries in the 
region so we can manage the situation as best we possibly can.
  This is one of the most serious issues I have confronted since I have 
been in the Senate in the last several years, and I commend my 
colleagues for addressing it so seriously. It is the right thing to do. 
But it is also the right thing to do to start debating this issue in 
the Senate. I think we will be doing the country a great service if we 
do.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Webb). The Senator from Georgia is 
recognized.

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