[Congressional Record Volume 153, Number 27 (Tuesday, February 13, 2007)]
[Senate]
[Pages S1900-S1901]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
WILLIAM ODOM'S ``VICTORY IS NOT AN OPTION''
Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, William Odom is one of the finest
intelligence officers who have served in our military. Retiring at the
rank of lieutenant general, his distinguished Army career culminated in
his heading up the U.S. Army's intelligence division and the National
Security Agency. He has worked tirelessly to help the country
understand and deal with the challenges to its security and defense. I
have known the general for decades, and, like many of my colleagues, I
deeply value his judgment and insight.
That is why I read his opinion piece from last Sunday's Washington
Post, ``Victory is Not an Option,'' with great interest.
General Odom lays out the truths and myths of the Nation's
involvement in Iraq. Among the clear truths is that the dream of a real
democracy gaining roots in that war-torn country is simply that, a
dream. He rightly points out, too, that any Iraqi government is likely
to be more anti than pro-American at the end of the day.
As for the myths, he sensibly lays out that it is pure fantasy for
anyone to think that our presence is actually preventing the horrible
carnage from unfolding or holding Iran back from gaining influence with
its neighbor. It is similarly a flight of the imagination to think that
our military presence is actually stanching--as opposed to
encouraging--al-Qaida's involvement in the country. Finally, it is a
myth to think that we must stay in Iraq ``to support the troops.'' In
fact, he notes, many of our brave men and women in the country
understand the cold realities that unfold there every day, and many of
them believe that we should get out of Iraq.
General Odom makes some sensible suggestions for a new policy
direction, something beyond the absurd ``surge'' that is only the same
old repast of stay-the-course with a different seasoning. We should get
out of Iraq and recognize that our presence there has become a source
of instability for the whole Middle East. He smartly suggests that we
should work with our international partners to seek order and
stability, which will fundamentally alter the balance against the
radicals who want to stir up even more strife.
I ask unanimous consent that General Odom's article, ``Victory Is Not
an Option,'' now be printed in the Record. I urge my colleagues to read
this article closely and truly think about what General Odom is saying.
The logic is clear and sensible. I think it is incontrovertible.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
[From the Washington Post, Feb. 11, 2007]
Victory Is Not an Option
(By William E. Odom)
The new National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq starkly
delineates the gulf that separates President Bush's illusions
from the realities of the war. Victory, as the president sees
it, requires a stable liberal democracy in Iraq that is pro-
American. The NIE describes a war that has no chance of
producing that result. In this critical respect, the NIE, the
consensus judgment of all the U.S. intelligence agencies, is
a declaration of defeat.
Its gloomy implications--hedged, as intelligence agencies
prefer, in rubbery language that cannot soften its impact--
put the intelligence community and the American public on the
same page. The public awakened to the reality of failure in
Iraq last year and turned the Republicans out of control of
Congress to wake it up. But a majority of its members are
still asleep, or only half-awake to their new writ to end the
war soon.
Perhaps this is not surprising. Americans do not warm to
defeat or failure, and our politicians are famously reluctant
to admit their own responsibility for anything resembling
those un-American outcomes. So they beat around the bush,
wringing hands and debating ``nonbinding resolutions'' that
oppose the president's plan to increase the number of U.S.
troops in Iraq.
For the moment, the collision of the public's clarity of
mind, the president's relentless pursuit of defeat and
Congress's anxiety has paralyzed us. We may be doomed to two
more years of chasing the mirage of democracy in Iraq and
possibly widening the war to Iran. But this is not
inevitable. A Congress, or a president, prepared to quit the
game of ``who gets the blame'' could begin to alter American
strategy in ways that will vastly improve the prospects of a
more stable Middle East.
No task is more important to the well-being of the United
States. We face great peril in that troubled region, and
improving our prospects will be difficult. First of all, it
will require, from Congress at least, public acknowledgment
that the president's policy is based on illusions, not
realities. There never has been any right way to invade and
transform Iraq. Most Americans need no further convincing,
but two truths ought to put the matter beyond question:
First, the assumption that the United States could create a
liberal, constitutional democracy in Iraq defies just about
everything known by professional students of the topic. Of
the more than 40 democracies created since World War II,
fewer than 10 can be considered truly ``constitutional''--
meaning that their domestic order is protected by a broadly
accepted rule of law, and has survived for at least a
generation. None is a country with Arabic and Muslim
political cultures. None has deep sectarian and ethnic
fissures like those in Iraq.
Strangely, American political scientists whose business it
is to know these things have been irresponsibly quiet. In the
lead-up to the March 2003 invasion, neoconservative agitators
shouted insults at anyone who dared to mention the many
findings of academic research on how democracies evolve.
They also ignored our own struggles over two centuries to
create the democracy Americans enjoy today. Somehow Iraqis
are now expected to create a constitutional order in a
country with no conditions favoring it.
This is not to say that Arabs cannot become liberal
democrats. When they immigrate to the United States, many do
so quickly. But it is to say that Arab countries, as well as
a large majority of all countries, find creating a stable
constitutional democracy beyond their capacities.
Second, to expect any Iraqi leader who can hold his country
together to be pro-American, or to share American goals, is
to abandon common sense. It took the United States more than
a century to get over its hostility toward British
occupation. (In 1914, a majority of the public favored
supporting Germany against Britain.) Every month of the U.S.
occupation, polls have recorded Iraqis' rising animosity
toward the United States. Even supporters of an American
military presence say that it is acceptable temporarily and
only to prevent either of the warring sides in Iraq from
winning. Today the Iraqi government survives only because its
senior members and their families live within the heavily
guarded Green Zone, which houses the U.S. Embassy and
military command.
As Congress awakens to these realities--and a few members
have bravely pointed them out--will it act on them? Not
necessarily. Too many lawmakers have fallen for the myths
that are invoked to try to sell the president's new war aims.
Let us consider the most pernicious of them.
(1) We must continue the war to prevent the terrible
aftermath that will occur if our forces are withdrawn soon.
Reflect on the double-think of this formulation. We are now
fighting to prevent what our invasion made inevitable!
Undoubtedly we will leave a mess--the mess we created, which
has become worse each year we have remained. Lawmakers
gravely proclaim their opposition to the war, but in the next
breath express fear that quitting it will leave a blood bath,
a civil war, a terrorist haven, a ``failed state,'' or some
other horror. But this ``aftermath'' is already upon us; a
prolonged U.S. occupation cannot prevent what already exists.
(2) We must continue the war to prevent Iran's influence
from growing in Iraq. This is another absurd notion. One of
the president's initial war aims, the creation of a democracy
in Iraq, ensured increased Iranian influence, both in Iraq
and the region. Electoral democracy, predictably, would put
Shiite groups in power--groups supported by Iran since Saddam
Hussein repressed them in 1991. Why are so many members of
Congress swallowing the claim that prolonging the war is now
supposed to prevent precisely what starting the war
inexorably and predictably caused? Fear that Congress will
confront this contradiction helps explain the administration
and neocon drumbeat we now hear for expanding the war to
Iran.
Here we see shades of the Nixon-Kissinger strategy in
Vietnam: widen the war into Cambodia and Laos. Only this
time, the adverse consequences would be far greater. Iran's
ability to hurt U.S. forces in Iraq are not trivial. And the
anti-American backlash in the region would be larger, and
have more lasting consequences.
(3) We must prevent the emergence of a new haven for al-
Qaeda in Iraq. But it was the U.S. invasion that opened
Iraq's doors to al-Qaeda. The longer U.S. forces have
remained there, the stronger al-Qaeda has become. Yet its
strength within the Kurdish
[[Page S1901]]
and Shiite areas is trivial. After a U.S. withdrawal, it will
probably play a continuing role in helping the Sunni groups
against the Shiites and the Kurds. Whether such foreign
elements could remain or thrive in Iraq after the resolution
of civil war is open to question. Meanwhile, continuing the
war will not push al-Qaeda outside Iraq. On the contrary, the
American presence is the glue that holds al-Qaeda there now.
(4) We must continue to fight in order to ``support the
troops.'' This argument effectively paralyzes almost all
members of Congress. Lawmakers proclaim in grave tones a
litany of problems in Iraq sufficient to justify a rapid
pullout. Then they reject that logical conclusion, insisting
we cannot do so because we must support the troops. Has
anybody asked the troops?
During their first tours, most may well have favored
``staying the course''--whatever that meant to them--but now
in their second, third and fourth tours, many are changing
their minds. We see evidence of that in the many news stories
about unhappy troops being sent back to Iraq. Veterans groups
are beginning to make public the case for bringing them home.
Soldiers and officers in Iraq are speaking out critically to
reporters on the ground.
But the strangest aspect of this rationale for continuing
the war is the implication that the troops are somehow
responsible for deciding to continue the president's course.
That political and moral responsibility belongs to the
president, not the troops. Did not President Harry S. Truman
make it clear that ``the buck stops'' in the Oval Office? If
the president keeps dodging it, where does it stop? With
Congress?
Embracing the four myths gives Congress excuses not to
exercise its power of the purse to end the war and open the
way for a strategy that might actually bear fruit.
The first and most critical step is to recognize that
fighting on now simply prolongs our losses and blocks the way
to a new strategy. Getting out of Iraq is the pre-condition
for creating new strategic options. Withdrawal will take away
the conditions that allow our enemies in the region to enjoy
our pain. It will awaken those European states reluctant to
collaborate with us in Iraq and the region.
Second, we must recognize that the United States alone
cannot stabilize the Middle East.
Third, we must acknowledge that most of our policies are
actually destabilizing the region. Spreading democracy, using
sticks to try to prevent nuclear proliferation, threatening
``regime change,'' using the hysterical rhetoric of the
``global war on terrorism''--all undermine the stability we
so desperately need in the Middle East.
Fourth, we must redefine our purpose. It must be a stable
region, not primarily a democratic Iraq. We must redirect our
military operations so they enhance rather than undermine
stability. We can write off the war as a ``tactical draw''
and make ``regional stability'' our measure of ``victory.''
That single step would dramatically realign the opposing
forces in the region, where most states want stability. Even
many in the angry mobs of young Arabs shouting profanities
against the United States want predictable order, albeit on
better social and economic terms than they now have.
Realigning our diplomacy and military capabilities to
achieve order will hugely reduce the numbers of our enemies
and gain us new and important allies. This cannot happen,
however, until our forces are moving out of Iraq. Why should
Iran negotiate to relieve our pain as long as we are
increasing its influence in Iraq and beyond? Withdrawal will
awaken most leaders in the region to their own need for U.S.-
led diplomacy to stabilize their neighborhood.
If Bush truly wanted to rescue something of his historical
legacy, he would seize the initiative to implement this kind
of strategy. He would eventually be held up as a leader
capable of reversing direction by turning an imminent, tragic
defeat into strategic recovery.
If he stays on his present course, he will leave Congress
the opportunity to earn the credit for such a turnaround. It
is already too late to wait for some presidential candidate
for 2008 to retrieve the situation. If Congress cannot act,
it, too, will live in infamy.
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