[Congressional Record Volume 153, Number 26 (Monday, February 12, 2007)]
[Senate]
[Pages S1825-S1831]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
IRAQ RESOLUTION
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I shall be joined by a number of
colleagues and the purpose of our taking this time is as follows: We
have decided to put in an amendment to H.J. Res. 20, amendment number
259 which will be printed in today's record. This amendment mirrors S.
Con. Res. 7, a resolution prepared by myself and others sometime last
week, which expresses certain concerns we have with regard to the
President's plan as announced on January 10 of this year.
This amendment, to H.J. Res. 20 is cosponsored by Mr. Levin, Ms.
Collins, Ben Nelson of Nebraska, Mr. Hagel, Ms. Snowe, Mr. Smith, Mr.
Biden, and as other Senators return to town, we may have further
cosponsors.
We are concerned that the fighting rages on throughout Iraq, and
particularly in Baghdad. It is very important that the Senate should,
as the greatest deliberative body--certainly in matters of war and
peace--in a prompt way address the issues regarding Iraq.
Our men and women in the Armed Forces are fighting bravely in that
conflict, as they are in conflicts elsewhere worldwide. Our concerns
are heartfelt, not driven by political motivation. As we gathered as a
group in the past 2 weeks to work on this, we took note of the fact
that the President, on January 10, in his message to the Nation
explicitly said that others could come forward with their ideas. I will
paraphrase it--the exact quote is in the amendment we are putting in
today--that he would take into consideration the views of others. So in
a very constructive and a respectful way, our group said we disagreed
with the President and we gave a series of points urging him to
consider those points as he begins to implement such plan as finally
devised throughout Iraq but most specifically in Baghdad.
We are very respectful of the fact that the plan put in by the
President was in three parts: a diplomatic part, an economic part, and
a military part. We explicitly stated in the resolution our support for
the diplomatic and economic parts, and we are hopeful it can be put
together in a timely fashion. There is some concern as to whether the
three main parts can progress together, unified, in this operation,
given the short timetable to implement it. So two parts of the program
we wholeheartedly support and so state in this amendment.
The concern is about the military section. We state the explicit
nature of our concerns. Some Senators have suggested the resolution
expresses matters which I can find no source whatsoever in the
resolution for those complaints. Nevertheless, I will address in the
course of this time each and every one of those concerns.
Indeed, on the weekend talk shows, one Senator said: My problem with
the Warner proposal and others that criticize the surge is, what is
your plan? All right. That is a legitimate question. I say that our
amendment states a clear strategy. It says as follows:
The Senate believes the United States should continue
vigorous operations in Anbar Province specifically for the
purpose of combating an insurgency including elements
associated with the al-Qaida movement and denying terrorists
a safe haven.
Secondly, the primary objective of the overall strategy in Iraq
should be to encourage Iraqi leaders to make political compromises that
will foster reconciliation and strengthen the unity government,
ultimately leading to improvements in the security situation.
Next, the military part of the strategy should focus on maintaining
the territorial integrity of Iraq, denying international terrorists a
safe haven, conducting counterterrorism operations, promoting regional
stability, supporting the Iraqi efforts to bring
[[Page S1826]]
greater security to Baghdad, and training and equipping Iraqi forces to
take full responsibility for their own security.
Likewise, another part of our amendment states:
The United States military operations should, as much as
possible, be confined to these goals and should charge the
Iraqi military with the primary mission of combating
sectarian violence.
The United States Government should engage selected nations
in the Middle East to develop a regional, internationally
sponsored peace and reconciliation process. Overall,
military, diplomatic, and economic strategies should not be
regarded as an open-ended or unconditional commitment, but
rather, as a new strategy, hereafter should be conditioned
upon the Iraqi government meeting benchmarks that must be
delivered in writing and agreed to by the Prime Minister.
Then we spell out a series of benchmarks. Such benchmarks should
include, but not be limited to, the deployment of that number of
additional Iraqi security forces as specified in the plan in Baghdad,
ensuring equitable distribution of resources of the Government of Iraq
without regard to the sect or ethnicity of recipients, enacting and
implementing legislation to ensure that the oil resources of Iraq
benefit Sunni Arabs, Shia Arabs, Kurds and other Iraqi citizens in an
equitable manner, and the authority of the Iraqi commanders to make
tactical and operational decisions without political intervention.
Further, some Senators have indicated, again incorrectly, that our
resolution either fails to recognize, or disagrees with all aspects of
the President's plan, namely the political and economic aspects, in
addition to the military part of his plan.
In fact, our resolution acknowledges directly that the President's
plan is multi-faceted. Our resolution states, whereas, on January 10,
2007, following consultations with the Iraqi Prime Minister, the
President announced a new strategy, which consists of three basic
elements: diplomatic, economic, and military.
As such, our resolution disagrees only with the military aspect of
the President's plan, and actually supports the diplomatic and economic
aspects of his plan.
Finally, some Senators have suggested that our resolution either
fails to support the troops, or threatens a cut-off in funding.
Actually, our resolution does neither. It states forcefully our support
for the troops: whereas, over 137,000 American military personnel are
currently serving in Iraq, like thousands of others since March 2003,
with the bravery and professionalism consistent with the finest
traditions of the United States Armed Forces, and are deserving of our
support of all Americans, which they have strongly; whereas, many
American service personnel have lost their lives, and many more have
been wounded, in Iraq, and the American people will always honor their
sacrifices and honor their families.
And our resolution, specifically protects funding for our troops in
the field and states: the Congress should not take any action that will
endanger United States military forces in the field, including the
elimination or reduction of funds for troops in the field, as such an
action with respect to funding would undermine their safety or harm
their effectiveness in pursuing their assigned missions.
In sum, our resolution aims not to contravene the Constitutional
authorities as Commander-in-Chief, but, rather, to accept the offer to
Congress made by the President on January 10, 2007 that, ``if members
have improvements that can be made, we will make them. If circumstances
change, we will adjust.''
It is clear that the United States' strategy and operations in Iraq
can only be sustained and achieved with support from the American
people and with a level of bipartisanship in Congress.
The purpose of this resolution is not to cut our forces or to set a
timetable for withdrawal, but, rather, to express the genuine concerns
of a number of Senators from both parties about the President's plan.
It is not meant to be confrontational, but instead to provide a sense
of bipartisanship resolve on our new strategy in Iraq. It follows many
of the conclusions of the Baker-Hamilton report by focusing on what is
truly in our national interest in Iraq, and spells those goals out in
detail.
I want to divide our time between colleagues. I will ask at this time
that the distinguished Senator from Nebraska, Mr. Hagel, be recognized
and that, following his comments, I shall be recognized again to give
the remainder of my remarks. I say on a personal note to the Senator
how much I valued our conversation over the weekend, together with our
distinguished colleague from Maine, after which we decided today to put
the language of S. Con. Res. 7 in as an amendment to the pending matter
before the Senate.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Nebraska is recognized.
Mr. HAGEL. Mr. President, I rise to join my colleagues, Senators
Warner, Collins, and others, in offering this amendment to the
continuing resolution.
Last week, Senators Collins, Snowe, Smith, Voinovich, Coleman, and
myself sent a letter to the Senate leadership urging our distinguished
majority and minority leaders to reach an agreement so the Senate could
debate the war in Iraq.
We said, and I quote from that letter:
The current stalemate is unacceptable to us and to the
people of this country.
In the letter, we pledged to--again quoting the letter--``explore all
of our options under the Senate procedures and practices to ensure a
full and open debate on the Senate floor.'' That, of course, is why we
are here today.
I, similar to my colleagues, am deeply disappointed that a full and
open debate on Iraq remains stymied in the Senate. All Members--Members
of both parties--have the right and responsibility to present their
views and, if they choose, submit other resolutions regarding the war
in Iraq.
I am also deeply disappointed that both sides have used procedural
tactics in this process. My colleagues and I were assured that the
leaders were committed to reaching an agreement on this debate. That
has not yet happened, and I, similar to my colleagues, intend to do
everything in my power as a Senator to ensure a full and open debate of
the Iraq war on the Senate floor in front of the American people. We
owe it to our soldiers and their families, and we owe it to the
American people.
I wish to focus on one particular aspect of this debate and that has
to do with the resolution itself--the relevancy and importance of
Senate resolutions. In the last 15 years, there is ample, strong, and
significant precedent in the Senate debating a President's military
policies while troops are deployed overseas--Bosnia, Somalia, Haiti,
Kosovo. In each of those situations, I and many of my colleagues here
today in the Senate debated and most of us voted binding and nonbinding
resolutions regarding U.S. military operations abroad. Many of these
measures expressed opposition to the military operations, criticizing,
for example, one, the open-ended nature of the deployment; two, the
danger of mission creep or escalation of military involvement; three,
the danger of deploying U.S. forces into sectarian conflict; and four,
the failure of the President to consult with Congress.
It might be instructive to review some of the Senate's history on
these recent debates regarding these recent resolutions. Let me begin
with Bosnia.
In June of 1992, U.S. forces began to deploy to Bosnia. In December
1995, the United States was preparing to deploy substantial ground
forces into Bosnia, roughly 20,000 American ground force combat troops,
very similar to the number we are now looking at in the President's
escalation of more American troops into Iraq today.
As a result of President Clinton's decision in 1995, the Senate
considered Senate Concurrent Resolution 35, a resolution submitted by
our colleague from Texas, the senior Senator, Mrs. Hutchison. This
resolution was a nonbinding resolution. Again, this was a nonbinding
resolution. This resolution said:
The Congress opposes President Clinton's decision to deploy
United States military ground forces into the Republic of
Bosnia and Herzegovina to implement the General Framework
Agreement for peace
in Bosnia. . . .
This resolution also said:
Congress strongly supports the United States military
personnel who may be ordered by the President to implement
the general framework for the peace in Bosnia.
[[Page S1827]]
So, therefore, it is saying we support our troops, but we disapprove
of the President's policy to send more troops. This resolution also
said it was a continuation of the previous debate on support of the
troops already deployed.
As Senator Hutchison said on the Senate floor on December 13:
There are many of us who do not think that this is the
right mission, but who are going to go full force to support
our troops. In fact, we believe we are supporting our troops
in the most effective way by opposing this mission because we
think it is the wrong one. . . .
A month earlier in November 1995, Senator Hutchison framed the
complexities of our military intervention in Bosnia in terms that are
eerily relevant to today. She said:
I am very concerned that we are also setting a precedent
for our troops to be deployed on the ground in border
conflicts, in ethnic conflicts, in civil wars. . . .
Opposition to the President's policy but strong support for the U.S.
military--this is similar to the debate we are having today on Iraq.
Senator Hutchison's resolution had 28 cosponsors, including our
friends and colleagues, Senators Inhofe, Craig, Kyl, Lott, Bennett,
Hatch, Shelby, and Stevens.
On December 13, 1995, 47 Senators voted in favor of Senator
Hutchison's nonbinding resolution. That day, 47 Senators believed you
could oppose the President's policy but still support our troops.
The next day, December 14, 1995, the Senate considered Senate Joint
Resolution 44, a binding resolution introduced by Senator Dole. This
resolution supported U.S. troops in Bosnia. This resolution had six
cosponsors, including our colleagues, Senators McCain and Lieberman.
On December 14, 1995, the Senate adopted this resolution by a vote of
69 to 30. That was Bosnia in 1995.
Somalia: In December 1992, U.S. troops began to deploy to Somalia.
Nearly a year later, in September 1993, the Senate debated the
objectives, the mission, and strategy of our military deployment in
Somalia. Speaking on the Senate floor on September 23, 1993, Senator
McCain framed the debate when he said:
Somalia is a prime example of lofty ambitions gone awry.
Our service men and women have become . . . part of a mission
to build Somalia into a stable democracy--something,
incidentally, it has never been, and shows no sign of ever
becoming this decade.
The manner in which military force is to be used to further
this grandiose objective has been left unclear. Without a
clear military objective, our forces in Somalia have found
themselves involved in a situation where they cannot
distinguish between friend and foe. They have often been
presented with situations where they cannot even distinguish
between civilians and combatants.
On September 9, the Senate voted 90 to 7 to adopt a nonbinding--a
nonbinding--sense-of-Congress resolution submitted by Senator Byrd.
This resolution called on the President to outline the goals,
objectives, and duration of the U.S. deployment in Somalia and said
Congress believes the President ``should seek and receive congressional
authorization in order for the deployment of U.S. forces to Somalia to
continue.''
There are 11 cosponsors of the Byrd measure, including our
colleagues, Senators McCain, Cochran, Bond, and Warner.
One month later, after the horrible death of 18 U.S. troops in early
October, the Senate considered two binding measures to cut off funds,
one introduced by Senator McCain and one by Senator Byrd.
On October 15, 1993, the McCain measure, which would have terminated
further U.S. military operations in Somalia, was tabled 61 to 38. That
same day, the Senate voted 76 to 23 to adopt the Byrd measure to cut
off all funding in March 1994 for U.S. forces in Somalia.
There are two more very clear examples, such as the examples I have
given on Somalia and Bosnia, that I could discuss--Haiti and Kosovo--in
some detail, and I may do that later. But the point is, the facts are
clear. There is clear precedent--clear precedent--for both binding and
nonbinding resolutions, as well as legislation to redirect, condition
or cut off funds for military operations, and this is at the same time
we have and we had military forces in those countries.
So to argue, to state, to imply this is somehow not only irrelevant
but unprecedented is not the case. The Congress has always had a
responsibility, not just constitutionally but morally, to inject itself
in the great debate of war.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield on that very point?
Mr. HAGEL. Yes, I yield to Senator Warner.
Mr. WARNER. We had in our discussions, and Senator Collins joined in
this discussion--that we could not conceive--and that I, this Senator
from Virginia, could ever participate in a cutoff-of-funding in regards
to this situation in Iraq.
But back to historical precedents. I have this volume, the
``Encyclopedia of the United States Congress,'' compiled by 20 eminent
historians in 1995. And on this subject that the Senator addressed,
they said the following:
Another informal power of the Congress in the foreign
policy field is the passage of resolutions by the House or
the Senate, often called a sense-of-the-House or sense-of-
the-Senate resolution. Although not legally enforceable, such
resolutions are often taken seriously by the President and
his foreign policy advisers because they are useful
indicators of underlying public concern about important
foreign policy questions. Moreover, as a general rule, the
White House wants to maintain cooperative relations with the
Congress and to give legislators the impression that their
views have been heard and have been taken into account in
policy formulation.
Clear documentation of the Senator's points in this very erudite
resource of the history of the Congress. I thank the Senator.
Mr. HAGEL. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Virginia.
In conclusion, I add that the American people have had enough of the
misrepresentations, the politics, and the procedural intrigue in the
Senate. I say again to our distinguished leaders of both our parties:
It is your responsibility, as leaders of this body, to resolve this
procedural dispute so that the Senate can have a full, fair, open
debate on the war in Iraq. And I will continue to join my colleagues--
Senators Warner, Collins, Snowe, and others--in making every effort to
bring up our resolution at every available opportunity until that
debate occurs.
Mr. President, I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Durbin). The Senator from Virginia.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, before the Senator leaves the floor, I
have another point of history. I find this fascinating. I hope,
hereafter, colleagues, pundits, and writers will at least recognize
that, and I repeat it. Senate Historian documents confirm the Senate
has been posing sense-of-the-Senate resolutions since 1789. Thus, our
Framers of the Constitution and those who served in the early
Congresses recognized the value of this type of resolution.
I yield the floor. I thank my distinguished colleague from Maine,
again, for her steadfast support and advice throughout this entire
process today, tomorrow, and well into the future.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine is recognized.
Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I am very pleased to join with the
distinguished senior Senator from Virginia--a former chairman of the
Senate Armed Services Committee, an individual who has devoted his life
to the support of our military--in offering, along with a number of our
colleagues, this very important resolution as an amendment to the
continuing resolution. There are many differing views in this body on
the road ahead in Iraq, and those views are legitimate but they deserve
to be debated. There is no more pressing issue facing this country than
Iraq. The public is disappointed to see the Senate avoid the debate on
the most important issue of our day. The current stalemate is
unacceptable. It is unacceptable to the American people. Regardless of
our views on the appropriate strategy for Iraq, we have an obligation,
we have a duty as Senators to fully debate this issue and to go on
record on what we believe to be the appropriate strategy, the road
ahead in Iraq.
I am very disappointed that the procedural wrangling on both sides of
the aisle prevented that kind of full and fair debate last week. I
believed strongly that we should go ahead with that debate, and I am
sorry that did not occur. I hope our leaders on both sides of the aisle
will work together to come up with a fair approach to debate this most
important issue.
[[Page S1828]]
Just this last weekend, the State of Maine lost another soldier in
combat in Iraq. The American people deserve to know where each and
every one of us stands on the President's strategy, on whether to cut
off funding, on the important issues related to this very pressing
issue. There are legitimate arguments on both sides. There are those
who agree with my position that a surge of 21,500 troops would be a
mistake. There are those who believe that the surge is the right course
to follow. I respect the views of Senators on both sides of the aisle
and, indeed, this is not a partisan issue. But surely--surely this is
an issue that deserves our full debate in the best traditions of this
historic body. Surely--surely our constituents deserve to know where we
stand.
I think this is so important that nothing should prevent us from
going to this debate prior to our recessing. I think we should make
this so important that if it is not done, perhaps we should reconsider
our plans for next week. I think we should proceed with this most
important debate without further delay. There are a number of
worthwhile resolutions that have been brought forward. Let the debate
begin.
Finally, I want to add just a couple of comments to those made by the
distinguished Senator from Virginia and the distinguished Senator from
Nebraska, and that is about the importance of these resolutions. They
are by no means unprecedented, as both of my colleagues have so
articulately pointed out. They offer guidance to the administration. It
remains my hope that if the Senate passes the resolution that I have
helped to coauthor that the President will accept our invitation to
take a second look at his plan. We urge him to explore all alternatives
and to work with us on a bipartisan strategy to chart a new road ahead
in Iraq.
As a result of my trip to Iraq in December, I concluded that we face
a number of different challenges in Iraq and the strategy depends on
where you are in Iraq. In Baghdad, the capital is engulfed in sectarian
violence. Yes, Baghdad is in the midst of a civil war between the
Shiites and the Sunnis. To insert more American soldiers in the midst
of this sectarian struggle would, in my judgment, be a major mistake.
Only the Iraqis can devise a solution to the sectarian strife that is
gripping Baghdad, and I think if the Iraqis had taken the long overdue
political steps, if they more fully integrated the Sunni minority into
the power structures, if they had passed an oil revenue bill that more
equitably distributed oil revenues, if they had held the long overdue
provincial elections, we would not be in the crisis in which we are
today.
Indeed, that is not just my opinion, that was the opinion of General
Petraeus when I asked him that question during his nomination hearing
before the Armed Services Committee.
By contrast to the sectarian strife that is plaguing Baghdad, the
battle is very different in Anbar Province to the west. There the fight
is with al-Qaida and with foreign jihadists, and there and only there
did I hear an American commander ask for more troops--only in Anbar
Province--and he did so in order to capitalize on a recent positive
development in which some of the local Sunni tribal leaders are now
backing the coalition forces against al-Qaida.
My conclusion is that we do need more troops in Anbar, but we should
reallocate from troops already in the country. I personally would
choose to take troops out of Baghdad and send them west, to Anbar
Province, and put the Iraqis in charge, fully in charge of security in
Baghdad. I fear that by inserting thousands of additional troops into
the midst of the sectarian strife in Baghdad, ironically we will ease
the pressure on the Iraqi leaders to take the long-overdue steps to
quell the sectarian violence, for I am convinced that the sectarian
violence in Baghdad requires a political, not a military, solution.
In Basra, the third stop on our trip, I heard a British commander, a
British colonel, give an excellent presentation to us. He said that
initially the British and American troops were welcomed in Iraq, but as
time has gone on, what he called the consent line has declined and
their presence has been less and less tolerated and more and more
resented.
I think perhaps the only issue on which all Members of this body can
agree is that our troops have served nobly and well in Iraq, and that
we need a new strategy. We disagree on the road ahead, but that is what
democracy and the traditions of the Senate are all about. We should not
be afraid of this debate. We should debate this issue fully and openly
and let our constituents and the administration know exactly where the
Senate stands.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I thank our colleague. I wonder if I could
ask our colleague a question before she departs? She made reference to
her trip and the discussions that she had with the senior commanders. I
would like to bring to her attention testimony that came before our
committee, of which the distinguished Senator from Maine is a member,
at which time we heard from the Commander of the United States Central
Command, General Abizaid.
In the course of his testimony to Congress on November 15, 2006--
right in the timeframe the Senator made her trip--I will quote him,
General Abizaid. The general said:
I met with every divisional commander, General Casey, Corps
Commander, and General Dempsey--we all talked together. And I
said, ``In your professional opinion, if we were to bring in
more American troops now, does it add considerably to our
ability to achieve success in Iraq?'' And they all said no.
And the reason is because we want the Iraqis to do more. It's
easy for the Iraqis to rely upon us to do this work. I
believe that more American forces prevent the Iraqis from
doing more, from taking more responsibility for their own
future.
I say to my colleague, that quote captured my own visit, which was
just barely a month before that, when I came back and I described in my
public comments that the situation in Iraq was drifting sideways.
That was a very serious summary. But I said it because I felt
obligated to our troops who were fighting bravely and courageously and
with a level of professionalism that equals the finest hour in the 200-
plus-year history of our military--and the support their families give
them. I felt ever so strongly that we were obligated as a country to
reexamine our strategy and I called for that reexamination of strategy
and it has been done.
But I say to my colleague, General Abizaid's summary about the need
for more forces, does that not summarize what you learned on your trip?
Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, if I may respond to the Senator from
Virginia, I remember very well General Abizaid's testimony before the
Armed Services Committee in mid-November. And as the Senator has
pointed out--and he presided over that hearing--it could not have been
clearer General Abizaid said that he consulted with all the American
commanders and that the effect of bringing in more American troops
would be to relieve the pressure on the Iraqis to step up and take
control of the security themselves.
Indeed, and ironically, General Petraeus, the new commander in Iraq,
had written an article for the Military Review in January of 2006 in
which he said that one of the lessons from his tours of duty in Iraq
was that you should not do too much, that you should call upon the
Iraqis to take responsibility for themselves. Indeed, my experience was
just as the Senator's was. About a month after General Abizaid's
testimony, I was in Iraq. I talked with the commanders on the ground,
and I would like to share with the senior Senator what one American
commander told me.
He said that a jobs program for Iraqis would do more good to quell
the sectarian violence than the addition of more American troops. He
told me that some Iraqi men are so desperate for money because they
have been unemployed for so long that they are joining the Shiite
militias. They are planting roadside bombs simply for the money because
they are desperate.
I thought that was such a telling comment, I say to my distinguished
colleague, because this was from a very experienced commander who had
been in Iraq for a long time. At that moment he was not calling for
more troops. None of the American commanders with whom I talked in
Baghdad called for more troops. The only place where we heard a request
for more troops was in Anbar Province, and as I have explained, the
situation
[[Page S1829]]
in Anbar is totally different. It is not sectarian violence. The
violence is with al-Qaida, the foreign jihadists, mainly Sunni versus
Sunni, and it requires a different strategy.
So my experience, when added to the distinguished Senator's, shows a
consistent pattern. Whether it was the distinguished Senator's trip in
October or the testimony of General Abizaid in November or my journey
in December, we heard exactly the same themes, exactly the same answers
to the questions of whether we needed more troops.
Finally, let me say I went to Iraq with a completely open mind on
this issue, and I came back convinced that sending more troops to
Baghdad would be a colossal error.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I thank our colleague. I wonder if at this
point in the colloquy--and then I will yield the floor because I know
other Senators are anxious to speak--but we, the United States, the
military, and the taxpayers have trained and equipped over 300,000
Iraqi security forces composed of the professional Army, police, border
security, and a group of others. The thrust of our resolution
originally, and this one that is here, the amendment which is
identical, was to give the Iraqis this opportunity, which the Prime
Minister himself called for. He said: Give us the opportunity to show
that we can do this operation.
That is the basis on which we drew up the resolution. And in our
resolution we said two things: The responsibility for Iraq's internal
security and halting sectarian violence must rest primarily with the
Government of Iraq and Iraqi security forces. Then, specifically we
said in the conclusion: The United States military operations should,
as much as possible, be confined to the goals that are enumerated in
the previous paragraph and should charge--I repeat--charge the Iraqi
military with the primary mission of combating sectarian violence, and
that is in the Baghdad operation.
So I think those facts, our resolution, now referred to as an
amendment, absolutely parallels what we learned firsthand on our trips
into that region.
Mr. President, I see other Senators are waiting. I see the
distinguished senior Senator from Maine, Ms. Snowe.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine is recognized.
Ms. SNOWE. Mr. President, first, I want to commend the senior Senator
from Virginia, Senator Warner, for his unparalleled leadership, because
it is borne of a tremendous credibility based on his military and
professional experience on these vital issues, and that precise
credibility lends the kind of expertise to the Senate, to the Congress,
and to our Nation that is so vital at this point in time. But I think
in the final analysis, it is something we have to honor as we consider
the most consequential issue of our time.
I am very pleased the Senator has offered an amendment that reflects
his resolution that was modified and that was supported by both sides
of the political aisle. I am pleased to join my colleague from
Nebraska, Senator Hagel, and my colleague from Maine, Senator Collins,
because this is a critical issue. It is one of the issues that is the
most significant of our time.
As we begin this week, it is regrettable we don't have the Iraq
debate before the floor of the Senate in the form of considering a
resolution. Tomorrow, the House of Representatives is going to proceed.
They are going to proceed to debate a resolution in opposition to the
troop surge proposed by the President of the United States. They will
have that debate this week. The question is when and if the Senate is
going to have that debate on a specific resolution, on specific issues,
with specific votes.
Unfortunately, what we are witnessing today is the shrinking role of
the Senate when it comes to the war in Iraq, a war that has been
ongoing for 4 years. I am dismayed because I don't see any evidence. I
don't see any evidence of working on a bipartisan basis to coalesce
around an issue and on a position where it has been demonstrated there
is a majority of support in the Senate to have negotiations, to have
consultation, to work it out. I don't see any evidence of that. Have we
come to the point in the Senate where we haven't been able to determine
procedurally how to move forward on a nonbinding resolution? It is hard
to believe the Senate would be marginalized on that point.
Now I am speaking from experience. This is my 13th year in the
Senate--my 13th year. I served in the House of Representatives for 16
years. I served for more than 20 years--I think about 24 years--on
Foreign Affairs, Foreign Relations, Armed Services, and currently the
Intelligence Committee. So I speak from experience. You have to work
across the political aisle. And there wasn't a time when we didn't
discuss these issues: Lebanon, Persian Gulf, Panama before the Persian
Gulf. We had Bosnia and Kosovo. We were able to work it out. The fact
is I well recall a statement I had drafted back in 2000 illustrating
examples of bipartisanship here on the floor of the Senate, one of
which I said about the Senator from Virginia, Senator Warner, in
working across the aisle with the Senator from West Virginia, Mr. Byrd,
on the issue of Kosovo.
That has been the hallmark of the Senate. Does it mean that we
disagree on a major issue of our time? No. There are differences of
opinion, but what is the Senate afraid of? What are we afraid of? To
debate and to vote on various positions, whether it is on our position
on the troop surge, whether it is on the position of cutting out
funding, the troop gaps, a new authorization? Some of those issues and
positions I would disagree with. But does that mean to say the Senate
cannot withstand the conflicting views of various Members of the
Senate? It is not unheard of, that both sides of the political aisle
will have differing views.
I came to this debate a few weeks ago when we were getting prepared
ostensibly to work on this issue, to debate, which is consistent with
the traditions and principles of this institution, which has been its
hallmark. That is why it has been considered the greatest deliberative
body in the world. Unfortunately, it is not living up to that
expectation or characterization, regrettably. But I joined with the
Senator from Nebraska in his effort across the aisle with the chairman
of the Foreign Relations Committee and the chairman of the Senate Armed
Services Committee because I wanted to send a message that here and
now, there will be those of us on this side of the aisle who disagree
with the President on the troop surge. So I wanted to send that
message. I read the resolution. I know there are some on this side of
the aisle who didn't accept that language. But I thought it was
important to do that. I cosponsored that resolution.
We had many meetings, as the Senator from Nebraska would note, with
Chairman Biden and Chairman Levin, to work through this issue: how we
could work with the Senator from Virginia, because we knew we had a
majority on both sides of the aisle that could work it out, who were
opposed to the troop surge. So how is it we couldn't get from here to
there? And we met in good faith to negotiate, working out even the
procedures. We agreed: Let's have an open, unfettered, unrestricted
debate, which is consistent with this institution that is predicated on
our Founding Fathers' vision of an institution based on accommodation
and consensus. You have to get 60 votes. So we said: Let's work it out,
and the good Senator from Virginia worked it out. He incorporated our
concerns in his modified resolution so we could enjoin our efforts.
Now, it is not surprising on this side of the aisle that there are
strong views that support the President, that don't believe we should
have a vote. But does that mean to say we can't move forward and the
House of Representatives can? So the House of Representatives is going
to be debating this issue this week, and the Senate is going to be
dithering. While our troops are on the front lines, the Senate is
sitting on the sidelines.
I am amazed we have reached this point in the Senate. We should be
embracing this moment. We are the voice of the American people.
Constitutional democracy is predicated on majority rule, but a respect
for minority rights. I don't see any ongoing negotiations and
discussions. Maybe I missed something. I don't see that happening
across the political aisle. If historically we took the position: You
missed your chance, that you missed your chance with a vote--2 weeks
ago--you mean that is it in the Senate? How did we pass major pieces of
legislation, major
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initiatives without saying: That is it; there is no room for
discussion, there is no room for negotiation, there is no room for
compromise.
Oftentimes I am challenged on this side because I work so much across
the political aisle. Senator Hagel did the same thing, as did Senator
Warner. We worked across the political aisle to make it work. But I do
not see that mutual trust to say: Let's see how we can move forward on
the most profound issue of our time. It is unimaginable that we cannot
develop a strategy for deliberating on this most consequential issue.
We are expecting to adjourn next week for a recess. I thought to
myself: Why? Why, so we will get back to Iraq before we know it? That
is what we have heard: Just wait. The troop surge isn't going to wait.
The Iraqi war doesn't take a recess. Our men and women aren't taking a
recess. Why can't we debate now and vote on these issues? Are we saying
we are simply not capable of talking?
That is what the Senate is all about. It is based on consensus. It is
based on compromise. It is based on conciliation. It is based on the
fact that you have to develop cooperation in order to get anything
done. It is not unusual. If historically we took the position: You
missed your chance because there are disparate views, so that there
would be no opportunity to further discuss or negotiate--we missed our
chance? Are we talking about scoring political points? Are we talking
about what is the best policy for this country with respect to Iraq at
a time when men and women are on the front lines; at a time when the
President is proposing a troop surge which I and others joined with
Senator Warner because we oppose that; at a time in which we are almost
a year to the anniversary of the bombing of the Golden Mosque in
Samarra?
In fact, Senator Warner and I paid a visit just days after that, the
first congressional delegation, and we saw all the manifestations of
what exists today in the most pronounced way. And we are saying we
can't get it done in the Senate. Is this about scoring political
points? I read every day: Who is winning politically? Because that is
what it is about. It is about winning politically on a policy with
respect to Iraq where we have been mired for 4 years with a strategy
that hasn't been working. And we are saying, who is winning
politically? Isn't it about Iraq? Isn't it about our men and women?
Isn't it about what is in the best interests for this country?
We have given so much. Our men and women have sacrificed
immeasurably. As Senator Collins indicated, we lost another from Maine
this weekend, SGT Eric Ross, 26. These men and women have put
themselves on the frontlines. Yet we sit and hesitate to talk about
what is in their best interests. Some say it is a nonbinding resolution
that has no impact. I daresay, if it doesn't have any impact, then why
is it we are not voting? What has a greater resonance in America? Is it
silence or is it taking action on the most consequential issue of our
time? I can only imagine, if we had an overwhelming bipartisan vote on
Senator Warner's resolution--that is bipartisan, I might add--because
those Members strove to make it bipartisan in the Senate, many strive
to do that, so we can send a message that would be profound, that would
resonate. To have a strong vote in the Senate or silence, which would
have greater resonance? I think we know the answer to this question.
I am concerned we are taking a political U-turn away from the message
in the last election. I was in that last election. I heard loudly and
clearly. I don't blame the people of Maine or across this country for
their deep-seated frustration. They are right. There was too much
partisanship and too much polarization.
What we need now is leadership. We need leadership for this country.
They are thirsting for a strong leadership, an honorable leadership
that leads us to a common goal. No one expected unanimity in the Senate
but we would give integrity to this process to allow it to work and not
cynically say who is winning and who is losing today politically, so we
have 30-second ads that will be run by outside groups or we are seeing
them now. We are not shedding the political past. We have made a
political U-turn. We are returning to it.
This isn't about party labels. This isn't whether it is good for
Republicans or good for Democrats. It is what is good for America. It
is not about red States and blue States. It is about the red, white,
and blue.
I am dismayed we are the second month into a new Congress, after the
American people resoundingly repudiated the politics of the past, the
partisanship and polarization, creating a poisonous environment. They
repudiated all of that. Here we are, back to the same old approach.
Instead of giving confidence to the American people that we will speak,
we are their voice, we give voice to their fears and to their hopes, to
their concerns that they rightfully have because we are not making the
kind of progress, we are moving in a different direction on Iraq that
obviously has been exemplified by the continuing and ongoing sectarian
warfare.
Fifteen months ago when Senator Warner came to the Senate and offered
a resolution, 2006 was going to be the year of transition to Iraqi
sovereignty. It was 2006 when we would turn over all the security to
the Iraqi security forces. But 2006 has come and gone. We haven't made
any measurable progress.
As I said, when I was there a year ago, we saw the manifestations of
the sectarian warfare, a vacuum had been created politically because no
new central government had been created. That took months. We allowed
that vacuum to continue. We got a new government. Yet they have been
hesitant--indeed, they have been an impediment--to quelling the
sectarian violence and confronting and demobilizing the militias.
I heard a year ago about the graft and corruption that was running
rampant in the ministries, as we saw recently with the Deputy Minister
of Health funneling money to support the sectarian violence and the
militias. We have seen and we have known all of that.
So Senator Warner got that resolution passed. We united around him.
In June of 2006, we passed a resolution as well that called for a
regional conference so we would begin the diplomatic offensive the Iraq
Study Group spoke to. But that has been ignored as well. I know the
administration has had a number of strategies in Iraq. They had the
national strategy for victory that was also 15 months old, that
represented all the issues Senator Warner has embraced in his
resolution, to which they only paid lip service, regrettably.
So we are here today. We want to give voice to the concerns of the
American people who want us to move in a different direction, not to
commit additional troops at a time in which we have a government in
Iraq that hasn't demonstrated a measurable commitment to controlling
the sectarian violence and make the political changes within its
Government that demonstrate a good-faith effort--whether it is the oil
revenue-sharing distribution money, the provincial elections and, as I
said, the demobilization of the militias; in fact, impeding our efforts
to capture people who were responsible for some of the genocide and the
warfare. But here we are.
I hope we can find a way. What could be of higher priority than to be
able to debate and to vote on our respective positions, to give a vote
on the Warner resolution that is so important that a majority of
Senators support? I know we can build the threshold for the 60. It is
imperative we do it. It is inexcusable, frankly, that on the process
for debating, we cannot reach an agreement. We are failing the American
people on a colossal scale. We are held up by arcane procedural
measures that could be worked out, if only we reached across the
political aisle.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I thank our distinguished colleague from
Maine.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's 60 minutes has been expired.
Mr. WARNER. I ask for 2 minutes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. WARNER. I thank the Senator from Maine. The Senator mentioned the
bipartisan spirit. I am very pleased to state that Senator Levin, whom
I spoke with this afternoon, Senator Ben Nelson, who has been with us
steadily on this, and Senator Biden allowed with very extensive
enthusiasm to
[[Page S1831]]
have their names attached as cosponsors.
I thank my colleagues who have come over and participated in this
debate and others who have listened. I thank the distinguished Senator,
my good friend from Nebraska, for working so hard on this amendment. We
will fight on.
We may be idealists, but we will fight on for what we believe in and
the integrity of this institution because we firmly believe, to the
extent we can, forging a bipartisan consensus is the extent to which we
can hopefully regain the full confidence of the American people on what
we are doing in Iraq.
I agree with the President, we should not let it slip into a chaotic
situation, but we do have some different constructive thoughts as to
our strategy ahead.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Washington.
____________________