[Congressional Record Volume 153, Number 24 (Thursday, February 8, 2007)]
[Senate]
[Pages S1737-S1743]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
EXECUTIVE SESSION
______
NOMINATION OF GENERAL GEORGE W. CASEY, JR., TO BE CHIEF OF STAFF,
UNITED STATES ARMY
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senate will
proceed to executive session to resume consideration of Calendar No.
15, which the clerk will report.
The bill clerk read the nomination of General George W. Casey, Jr.,
to be Chief of Staff, United States Army.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, there will be 50
minutes for debate, with the time equally divided and controlled by the
senior Senator from Michigan, Mr. Levin, and the senior Senator from
Arizona, Mr. McCain, or their designees, and 10 minutes for each of the
leaders.
The Senator from Arizona is recognized.
Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, may I inquire, how much time do I have
again?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. There is 50 minutes total. The Senator from
Arizona gets 15 minutes and 15 minutes for the Senator from Michigan,
and the leaders have 10 minutes each.
Mr. McCAIN. I thank the Chair.
I ask the clerk to tell me when I have consumed 8 minutes.
I come again this morning to the not particularly pleasant task of
opposing the nomination of General Casey to be Chief of Staff of the
U.S. Army. I preface my remarks, again, with my appreciation for
honorable service to the country, his family, and the sacrifices they
have made for many years. This isn't a question of character because
his character is outstanding; it is a question of judgment.
I will try to put this in context, why I am in opposition. For
several years, I and a number of others have bemoaned and complained
and criticized and been saddened as we have watched this train wreck in
Iraq. Not long after the initial invasion, I came back from a visit to
Iraq and visited with the then-Secretary of Defense, who bears great
responsibility for this debacle, and history will judge him very badly
for his performance as Secretary of Defense. I told him how it was that
we were not going to win, we were not going to succeed, that we didn't
have enough troops over there, that Anbar Province was going to erupt--
basically all the things many of us saw were going to transpire.
General Casey, for 2\1/2\ years up until recently, would come back to
the Congress and say that things were going well. I quoted many quotes
yesterday, from time to time, including in 2005, saying we could start
withdrawing by 2006 and on and on and on, completely divorced from
reality on the ground, as was the Secretary of Defense.
I will state at the beginning that Presidents are responsible, but
Presidents also rely on the advice and counsel of their military
leaders. That is a normal thing and has happened in every conflict.
President Bush said time and time again: I have said to the American
people, as Iraqis stand up, we will stand down. But I have also said
our commanders on the ground will make that decision. We will talk to
General Casey. On and on. The Army is getting on its feet. We have
turned over a lot of territory to the Army. They are good fighters. I
have spent a great deal of time with General Abizaid and General Casey.
They are in Washington. They are generals who will be happy to tell me
the way it is, not the way they think I would like to it be.
Time after time, it has been clear that the President of the United
States, as appropriate, has been relying on the advice and counsel of
commanders in the field who did not give him appropriate information or
recommendations. We are all responsible. In the military, you are
responsible for the decisions you make on the battlefield, particularly
when they cost our most valuable and important asset--American blood.
In his opening statement at a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing
on September 29, General Casey said: ``The capacity of Iraqi security
forces has increased quantitatively and qualitatively over the past
year'' and ``we have also developed with the Iraqis a readiness
reporting system, not unlike the one we have in place for our own
forces. So over the past 18 months we have built enough Iraqi capacity
where we can begin talking seriously about transitioning this
counterinsurgency mission to them.''
Did he realize at the time that statement was wrong? And when did he
tell someone?
At the same hearing, General Casey said:
More coalition is not necessarily better. More and more
capable Iraqi security forces are better. Increased coalition
presence speeds the notion of occupation. It contributes to
the dependency of Iraqi security forces on the coalition. It
extends the amount of time it will take for Iraqi security
forces to become self-reliant and exposes more coalition
forces to attacks at a time when Iraqi security forces are
increasingly available and increasingly capable.
There has been no sign of that. Why did it take 15 months for General
Casey to change that assessment and then not even agree with the new
strategy of five additional brigades, which most of us pray is enough
and most of us believe is a direct contravention to the Powell
doctrine, which is, use overwhelming force in order to gain military
victory?
President Bush said General Casey will make decisions as to how many
troops we have there. Why did it take 2\1/2\ years? Why did it have to
take 2\1/2\ years of steady degradation for General Casey to figure out
we didn't have enough troops there, and the situation is worsening in
Iraq.
The NIE that came out yesterday should frighten anyone, any American,
[[Page S1738]]
because of the stark depiction in the NIE--the public document--that
states that the situation is grave and deteriorating in Iraq, which is
also the conclusion of the Iraq Study Group, whether you happen to
agree with their recommendations or not.
Mr. President, responsibility is one of the first things that is
taught at our service academies. We are responsible for our decisions.
When the Missouri runs aground, we relieve the captain. When four
sailors are washed overboard, we relieve the captain. Now we are
rewarding failure as we did during the Vietnam war when we named
General Westmoreland as Chief of Staff of the Army after a failed
search and destroy. There are eerie parallels here. General
Westmoreland employed the search and destroy strategy which is counter
to any counterinsurgency strategy. That kind of strategy is clear,
hold, and build. That is what General Petraeus is trying to do now.
That is not what has been done in the past under General Casey.
So what are we doing? We are promoting a general who has pursued a
failed policy, advocated it to the President, whom he is responsible to
advise, and he is advocating it to the Congress of the United States
despite the overwhelming view by many of us that it was not a
successful strategy. Still, today, where he will be in place if he is
confirmed by the Senate, he will be responsible for the operation,
training, and doctrine that will be employed in Iraq, and he still, to
this day, as far as I know, from the hearing of a short time ago,
believes--and I could give the quote--that we are not failing but we
are succeeding. I don't know of anyone who believes that who is in a
responsible position in Government.
Mr. President, it is with a bit of regret that I do this. Again, I
repeat what I said yesterday. Senator Levin asked him:
I am wondering whether you would agree that what we are
doing in Iraq was maybe a slow failure.
General Casey said:
I don't actually see it as a slow failure. I actually see
it as slow progress.
How could you depict the situation in Baghdad today, with six
helicopters being shot down in the last few weeks, with a spike in
casualties that has taken place, and the continued level of sectarian
violence, as a slow progress?
So I want to tell my friends that people in the military,
particularly our young officers, are watching what we do here. We teach
them in our service schools, and we teach our noncommissioned officers
and junior officers: You are responsible for success or failure. That
is why we appoint you as leaders. In this case, this leader, despite
his honorable character and dedication to this country, has not led,
and his responsibility has not been carried out.
So I hope my colleagues will turn down this nomination and that we
will appoint one of the many highly qualified senior military officers
we have to fulfill this position.
May I finally say that I am very nervous about this new strategy. I
am very doubtful that we have enough troops. I don't know if the Maliki
government will be strong enough. But if General Casey is appointed to
this position, my confidence will be lowered because it is not
appropriate to put someone who does not support wholeheartedly the new
strategy in a position where he will be responsible for a great deal of
it. To this day, he doesn't admit that this present strategy has
failed.
Do I have any time remaining?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has 5\1/2\ minutes.
Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I reserve the remainder of my time.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan is recognized.
Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, again, it is extraordinarily ironic that my
good friend from Arizona says there is no one in a high position in
this Government who thinks we are succeeding, when the President, just
2 or 3 months ago, said we are absolutely winning in Iraq. That is the
Commander in Chief--a pretty high position of responsibility. The Vice
President, just last year, said that the insurgency is in its last
throes, when it was not. So it was clear to everybody, and apparently
to my good friend from Arizona because he says he had seen this for
years--failure after failure in Iraq--identified by the highest levels
and the highest level of this administration as being a success.
Year after year, we were told this is a successful strategy. Now all
of a sudden, a general who was assigned to carry out that strategy and
did the best he could, acknowledging some mistakes in implementation,
is going to be held accountable by some who will vote against his
nomination for the massive failures at the highest levels of civilian
authority. The strategy was wrong going into Iraq; it was poorly
implemented. The Iraqi Army was disbanded. That was not General Casey;
that was before he came.
The people who made those decisions were given awards and medals by
the administration. George Tenet was given a medal for his work. He
said the intelligence was a slam-dunk, that there were weapons of mass
destruction. Medal after medal was given to the civilian leaders. A
Medal of Freedom was awarded to George Tenet. Ambassador Bremer was
given a medal. He just disbanded the Iraqi Army and had a
debaathification program, which was a complete failure because of its
excess. He was given a Medal of Freedom.
William Haynes, General Counsel of the Department of Defense--his
dubious legal judgment contributed to the interrogation abuses of
detainees that led to the horrors of Abu Ghraib. He was given the
Department of Defense medal for distinguished public service.
Under Secretary of Defense Doug Feith, who hyped false intelligence
used to justify the war in Iraq, was given a medal.
Now you have a general who was given a strategy and was told to
implement the strategy. Yes, he was optimistic that it could work. He
is in charge of the morale of his troops. Now, suddenly, some say he
should be, in effect, punished. He should carry the burdens that
properly should be carried by the top civilian leaders of this Nation.
It is not appropriate.
It is not fair that General Casey be held responsible for massive
failures that were caused by the wrong policies, the deceptions, the
ignorance, the arrogance, and the cockiness of civilian leaders in this
administration. It is just plain wrong that this all be heaped onto his
back.
What do we know about General Casey? By the way, we know he is
forthright and acknowledges his mistakes. There is not a commander I
know of who does not acknowledge his mistakes. Every commander worth
his or her salt acknowledges mistakes, and General Casey has done that.
In fact, he has given us a list of mistakes. We asked him what went
wrong that you contributed to, and he gave us a list very openly. But
you cannot lay the chaos and the violence in Iraq on General Casey's
doorstep. This belongs on the doorstep of the top civilian leaders of
this country who went into Iraq the way they did, who didn't plan for
an aftermath, who disbanded the Iraqi army, and who perpetrated some of
the other mistakes that have put us in some of the positions that we
are in, in Iraq.
General Casey is a long and distinguished servant in the military,
including the position of Vice Chief of Staff of the Army. This was
preceded by assignments on the joint staff and a career commanding
Infantry units at all levels, up to and including Division Command. He
knows Iraq, he knows the challenges the Army faces in Iraq, he knows
the Pentagon, and he knows the challenges he will be facing in the
Pentagon if we confirm him. He has the knowledge and skills to carry
out his primary responsibility as Chief of Staff, which is the training
and equipping of soldiers, caring for them and their families.
I want to discuss two issues that have been raised. One is the
general's decision to support an increase in U.S. forces in Iraq after
previously opposing such an increase, and also the proposition that
General Casey somehow or other should be denied this position because
of mistakes that he may have made in Iraq.
First, the issue of additional troops. I pressed General Casey about
this issue at his nomination hearing before the Armed Services
Committee. He said his general view was that he agreed with General
Abizaid's view that more American forces prevent the Iraqis from doing
more, from taking more responsibility for their own future. That is
something, it seems to me, that is key to those of us who oppose this
surge. That goes to the heart of our argument--the fact that General
Casey
[[Page S1739]]
believed more American forces prevent the Iraqis from doing more, from
taking more responsibility for their own future.
So how is it that now General Casey supports the surge? That is the
question I asked him:
Senator Levin: We asked General Abizaid back in November
when he appeared before this committee whether we needed more
troops or he supported more troops going to Iraq. And this is
just last November. And this is what he said. He said that he
met with every divisional commander, General Casey, the Corps
commander, General Dempsey. ``We all talked together, and I
said, `In your professional opinion, if you were to bring in
more American troops now, does it add considerably to our
ability to achieve success in Iraq?' And they all said no.
And the reason is because we want Iraqis to do more. It's
easy for the Iraqis to rely upon us to do this work. I
believe that more American forces prevent the Iraqis from
doing more, from taking more responsibility for their own
future.''
I asked General Casey:
Now, General Abizaid said that he spoke to you and that his
opinion reflected your opinion and all the other commanders.
Was that true when he said that?
General Casey: I'm not exactly sure when in November it
was, but it was.
Senator Levin: So you've changed your view since November?
General Casey: As I described in my opening testimony,
Senator, in mid-November was when the reevaluation of the
plan was taking place. So I suspect John and I talked before
that. And that does reflect my general view on additional
U.S. forces in Iraq.
Senator Levin: It reflects a general view, but then there
was some kind of reevaluation which took place in mid-
November.
General Casey: That's right, Senator. We're constantly
reevaluating how we're doing and what we need.
Senator Levin: But that position that General Abizaid
stated was your position when you spoke to him in early
November presumably still remains your general view.
General Casey: That's correct.
Senator Levin: Well, if that's your general view, what is
the change? Why are you modifying your general view for this
surge?
General Casey: What has changed, Senator, are several
things. One, the development of a plan, a new plan that was
conceived by the Iraqis and worked in concert with us; so
there is a plan that laid out requirements for those forces.
So just to say do you need more forces is one thing; to say
do you need more forces to execute this plan is quite
another. And we do need an additional two brigades to
implement that plan.
Now, there is a new plan, a plan that I very strongly disagree with,
the surge plan of the President. It is a new plan given to the
commanders, and they are now told, with this new plan, to insert troops
into neighborhoods of Iraq, hold that territory, and have more American
troops--many more--embedded with Iraqi forces. That is the plan. That
is the Commander in Chief's decision.
Will that require more troops? And now General Casey gives his honest
answer that it will require, in his judgment, two additional brigades.
General Abizaid says it will require more brigades, but General Casey
said two. I give him credit for giving his honest opinion.
So what has changed? He still believes in general that putting more
troops in there takes the Iraqis off the hook, but if you change your
plan, you change your mission and you say, as the Commander in Chief
has, that is now our mission, that is what we are going to do, it is
obviously up to the commanders to say how many additional troops it
would take to carry out that mission.
That is an honest response, and that is the response we expect of our
leaders. But his general view has been correct, and so has General
Abizaid's. More American troops is a mistake. It takes the Iraqis off
the hook. It lessens the responsibility on them to do what only they
can do with their military and with their political leaders.
People who have visited General Casey in Iraq--colleagues--have
always found him to be honest about the situation in Iraq and true to
the pledge that he would give Congress his personal views, even if
those views differ from the administration in power. And he did this
again at his nomination hearing when he disagreed with the Commander in
Chief's sudden epiphany that things are not going well in Iraq.
All of a sudden, now the Commander in Chief says we are on the road
to slow failure. That is a new revelation. Until a few months ago, the
Commander in Chief was telling the American people we are absolutely
winning in Iraq. So now I pressed General Casey about that:
Do you agree with the President that now the situation in
Iraq is maybe a slow failure?
He said:
I actually don't see it as a slow failure. I actually see
it as slow progress.
Do I agree with his assessment? I do not. I have seen chaos in Iraq--
consistent chaos, growing chaos. But do I admire an honest answer even
when it disagrees with the Commander in Chief? I do. Even though I
disagree with that answer, I think it was an honest answer that he gave
to the committee.
What about denying him confirmation as Chief of Staff because of the
mistakes he may have made? Again, I think this is an ironic argument
given the fact that the architects of these policies, the architects of
the major failures which led to the mess General Casey was assigned to
clean up, are given medals--Medals of Freedom, medals by the Defense
Department. They are given the medals, and now some will want to lay on
General Casey's doorstep the mess that was not created by his policies
but by the policies of others.
I want to read for the Record a statement of Senator Jim Webb on the
Casey nomination. He is tied up in a hearing, and so I will read this
very brief statement into the Record for Senator Webb:
Mr. President, I rise today to speak in support of GEN
George Casey, Jr.'s, nomination as the Chief of Staff of the
U.S. Army. General Casey's service to the Nation during a
long career and his experiences in Iraq qualify him well to
address the formidable challenges facing the U.S. Army today.
Questions have been raised regarding General Casey's tenure
as commander of the Multinational Force-Iraq. The national
strategy in Iraq was flawed even before the invasion, and
attacks on General Casey's performance only divert attention
from the true architects of that strategy.
The situation faced by General Casey in Iraq represents the
classic conundrum of military service at the highest level of
command. In this administration, it has not been unheard of
for some officers who spoke too loudly, very often, to have
lost their jobs. At the same time, to speak too softly often
causes the military leader, rather than the civilian boss, to
be blamed when things go wrong. While I believe strongly that
military leaders should be held accountable, General Casey
performed as well as one could expect given the strategy for
the war's direction that he inherited when he reported to
Baghdad.
I wonder, Mr. President, if there is any time remaining.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan has 25 seconds
remaining.
Mr. LEVIN. I thank the Presiding Officer.
This is the conclusion of Senator Webb's statement:
The consequences of a failed U.S. national strategy should
be raised at a far higher level than General Casey's in Iraq.
Mr. President, I urge my esteemed colleagues to support
General Casey's nomination to be the next Chief of Staff of
the U.S. Army.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's time has expired.
Mr. LEVIN. I thank the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia is recognized.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I ask the two managers, is it possible
that the Senator from Virginia could get 2, 3 minutes at most to speak?
Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senator
from Virginia be allowed 3 minutes to speak on this issue, not to be
taken from the time remaining.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
Mr. LEVIN. Reserving the right to object, and I obviously will not
object, I apologize to the Senator from Virginia. I didn't realize he
was here to speak on the nomination. If he is speaking in favor, I
would have reserved some time for him.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The Senator from Alabama.
Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. President, would it be acceptable that I be given 2
minutes to speak after Senator Warner?
Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I ask further unanimous consent--and I
tell my colleagues that I will not seek further unanimous consent after
this; I will object to a further unanimous consent request--that an
additional 2 minutes be given to the Senator from Alabama to speak on
this issue.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The unanimous consent request is 3 minutes for
the Senator from Virginia and
[[Page S1740]]
2 minutes for the Senator from Alabama. Is there objection? Without
objection, it is so ordered.
The Senator from Virginia.
Mr. WARNER. I thank the Presiding Officer. I thank the two managers
of this very important nomination.
Mr. President, I have the deepest respect for my colleague, Senator
McCain. We have an association that goes back some 30 years. It is not
often we are on different sides of an issue. I wish to respect Senator
McCain's evaluation of a military officer. I think probably he is as
well qualified as anyone in this Chamber to speak to those critical
issues.
I bring a different perspective to this nomination. There is going to
be, clearly, a division of thought as to General Casey and his role as
the senior officer in charge of our combat missions in Iraq. But I wish
to clearly say that throughout the history of the United States, the
doctrine is civilian control over the military.
True, we hold accountable, as best we can, those who we feel have not
carried out their responsibilities in the best interests of the
country. I believe the accountability of General Casey has been spoken
to by the general himself. He recognizes mistakes were made, and I
think he accepted that level of accountability he, as a military
officer, had. But, indeed, it is the civilians above him, if there is
greater wrong, who should be held accountable.
Second, I think of the institution of the U.S. Army. The Chief of
Staff is the very pinnacle of the military service, and those
nominations are exceedingly carefully thought out from the President on
down through the Department of Defense before a nomination goes
forward.
I was privileged for some many years to serve as the Navy Secretary
and witness the careful process that went through selecting a chief of
service. I was personally involved in two of those processes for the
U.S. Navy. So I say to my colleagues, do take into consideration the
differing views of Senator McCain and others eminently qualified to
assess this nomination, but I believe this nomination was carefully
thought through at all levels. It represents the institution of the
U.S. Army, and they have to take pride in their senior Chief of Staff.
I believe that General Casey, when one looks at the entirety of the
record, is deserving of the support of colleagues in the Senate.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Alabama is recognized.
Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Arizona for
granting me this extra time. He is not required to do so.
I think we have had a problem and a difference of opinion for some
time. Senator McCain has been quite open that he is concerned about the
troop levels in Iraq not being sufficient. History may well record he
is right on that regard, but our policy was different.
General Abizaid, the commander for that region, the Central Command,
studied the area throughout his career. He was concerned about too many
troops in Iraq from the beginning. General Casey came on after General
Abizaid was CENTCOM commander and became the commander in Iraq. He was
Vice Chief of Staff of the Army at that time, he was to be gone for 18
months. He ended up being away from his family for 30 months, 2\1/2\
years, and he executed the policy as best he could.
He testified that in his view, he didn't want to ask for a single
soldier more than he needed to do the job. I don't know what the
tension is, but there was a constant tension between the need to have
more soldiers and to not take over the entire effort in Iraq.
General Abizaid and General Casey made their recommendations. We
followed them. That experience in Iraq, in my view, can only make him
better as Chief of Staff.
He was Vice Chief of Staff, lead our forces for 30 months in Iraq,
and now he will be Chief of Staff. He was born in an Army hospital. His
father was killed in Vietnam. He served 37 years in the Army. His son
is a member of the Army.
He should not bear the brunt of a difference of opinion about how we
should have conducted the effort in Iraq. He gave his absolute best
effort to it. He could not help but have learned a lot in the process.
He will be a fine Chief of Staff.
Mr. President, my time is up. I yield the floor.
Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I voted for GEN George W. Casey, Jr., to
be U.S. Army Chief of Staff. While questions have been raised about
General Casey's performance as U.S. commander in Iraq, I do not believe
the general can be held responsible for the failures of a policy
devised at the highest levels of this administration.
But my vote to confirm General Casey does not change my opposition to
the President's policies in Iraq. The President has made the wrong
judgment about Iraq time and again, first by taking us into war on a
fraudulent basis, then by keeping our brave troops in Iraq, and now by
sending 21,500 more American troops into harm's way.
The indefinite presence of U.S. military personnel in Iraq will not
fix that country's political problems. And as we have seen over the
last few years, sending more troops will not provide the stability in
Iraq that can only come from a political agreement. Congress must
develop the courage to confront this President on what has become one
of the greatest foreign policy mistakes in our history.
Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, I would like to recognize the service of
General Casey and speak in support of his confirmation as Chief of
Staff of the Army.
General Casey has had a long and distinguished career. After his
graduation from Georgetown University in 1970, he received his
commission and served in the mechanized infantry. During his career, he
has commanded the 3rd Brigade of the 1st Cavalry Division and acted as
the assistant division commander of the 1st Armored Division. In 1999,
General Casey assumed command of the 1st Armored Division.
Additionally, General Casey has served as Director of Strategic Plans
and Policy at the Pentagon and as Director of the Joint Staff.
As we all know, General Casey has most recently served as the
commander of Multi-National Forces--Iraq. As commander of our forces in
Iraq, General Casey faced extremely difficult issues everyday.
I believe General Casey to be a good man, and I would like to again
congratulate him on his promotion and thank him for his continued
service to our country. I look forward to working with him while he
serves as Chief of Staff of the Army.
Mr. DODD. Mr. President, I rise today to express my support for the
confirmation of General George Casey to become the next Chief of Staff
of the U.S. Army.
Let us be clear. Our soldiers are fighting a grueling and dangerous
war. They need to know that their leaders will have no higher priority
than their safety and well-being. I believe that General Casey will do
just that.
He has been on the frontlines of the war in Iraq. As commander of
U.S. forces there, he has overseen operations on the ground; he
understands our soldiers' basic needs and will take action to keep them
fighting safely and effectively.
I believe that in this new position, like GEN Peter Schoomaker before
him, he will work hard to ensure that our soldiers have the equipment
and support they need to get the job done.
Regrettably, I am concerned that some in this administration and in
this Congress have decided to blame General Casey for the worsening
situation on the ground. To them I would say that it is simply wrong,
and frankly un-American, to hold one soldier responsible for the
administration's policy failures in Iraq.
In his book, ``Deriliction of Duty,'' H.R. McMasters put the blame
for Vietnam on our military leaders. To McMasters, it was our generals
who were at fault for not speaking out when they disagreed with the
civilians at the Pentagon and White House.
As a result of their silence, America became further entrenched in
Vietnam. Nine years ago, then-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff GEN
Hugh Shelton took this message to heart; requiring all 17 four-star
general commanders to read Major McMasters' book. The book had an
impact. As the situation in Iraq has deteriorated, we have seen our
generals stand up to civilian leaders--putting their country before
their careers--and courageously advocating for alternative, more
sensible policies.
[[Page S1741]]
Unfortunately, the same arrogance and incompetence that has blinded
U.S. foreign policy for the past 6 years has also allowed the dire
warnings from these generals to fall on deaf ears. The candor from the
likes of Generals Shinseki and Riggs, and now Abizaid, Casey, and
Schoomaker, has been rewarded with dismissal, transfer or demotion.
In my private meeting with General Casey in Iraq 2 months ago, he
explained his concern over proposals to ``surge'' additional troops
into Iraq if Iraqis are unable to meet their own responsibilities to
unite politically and contribute more meaningfully to their own
security.
He echoed these objections along with then-Central Command's top
general, GEN John Abizaid, in a Washington Post report on December 21,
2006.
Obviously, General Casey is uniquely qualified to make these
statements. He has been thoroughly immersed in our Iraq operations. And
it is for this reason that he is uniquely prepared to assume the Army
Chief of Staff post.
But there is another quality of his that I believe will also serve
our Nation and our Army well during his tenure as Chief of Staff. It
his is loyalty to our soldiers--from the newly enlisted private to the
career officer.
I observed this quality firsthand 3 years ago on a visit to Walter
Reed Medical Center. I met with soldiers recuperating from injuries
they had suffered in Iraq and Afghanistan, and expressed my gratitude
for their brave service.
General Casey happened to be at Walter Reed that day as well. I knew
he was there for the same reason I was: to thank these soldiers for
their service and to assure them that their sacrifices will never be
forgotten.
The Chief of Staff must constantly exhibit such loyalty to his
troops. He must be their strongest advocate and continue to address
their needs, even when doing so is in direct conflict with the orders
being handed down from civilian leadership. General Schoomaker, the
outgoing Chief of Staff, has been faced with this situation time and
again as the administration proposed inadequate budgets to carry out
their deeply flawed Iraq strategy. And he has performed superbly.
As Chief of Staff for the last few years, General Schoomaker, has
long voiced concern that the administration failed to budget for the
replacement and repair of thousands of war-battered trucks, aircraft,
and vehicles. In fact, it was General Schoomaker's testimony last year
that compelled me to offer an amendment to fund these priorities and
help begin restoring Army readiness. I regret that the White House
decided to reward General Schoomaker's candor by replacing him at the
Pentagon.
At his recent confirmation hearing the other day, I was pleased to
hear that General Casey will resume General Schoomaker's mission to
ensure that our forces are outfitted with the equipment they need to
get the job done.
Mr. President, there are no easy answers in Iraq. But, when it comes
to discerning tactics on the ground, our civilian leaders must defer to
our generals. In this case, it is my sincere hope that the President
takes heed of the advice of his newly installed Army Chief of Staff, to
make the safety and well-being of our soldiers a top priority and not
an afterthought. I urge my colleagues to join me in supporting this
nominee for confirmation.
Mrs. BOXER. Mr. President, I support the nomination of General George
Casey to be Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army and disavow attempts to
blame him for the failures in Iraq.
The blame for the disastrous and reckless war in Iraq lies with the
President, Vice President Dick Cheney, former Secretary of Defense
Donald Rumsfeld and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice. The blame
starts at the top. It is they who must be held accountable.
General Casey did not author the misguided doctrine of preemptive
war. General Casey did not manipulate and politicize intelligence to
sell the Iraq war to the American people. And General Casey did not
fail to provide a political solution to end the sectarian violence that
is now engulfing Iraq. It is the civilian leadership of the Bush
administration that continues to fail us in Iraq.
When I traveled to Iraq and met with General Casey, he told me the
truth. He said that the U.S. presence was fueling the insurgency. I
appreciated his candor. He fully understood the dangers and challenges
in Iraq. Unlike so many in the Bush administration, his view of the
situation in Iraq was not distorted by rose-colored classes.
General Casey did not lead us down this dangerous path in Iraq.
Therefore I cast a ``yes'' vote.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's time has expired.
The Senator from Arizona is recognized for 5 minutes 20 seconds.
Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, let me make it clear, I don't support
medals for failure. I don't support promotion to a higher position for
failure. I believe that the awards and accolades Senator Levin alluded
to that have been provided to those who have committed egregious
failures was not only inappropriate, it was absolutely insulting.
I also, though, point out that history will judge many of these
people who have been given medals of various types, and already that
judgment has been harsh. All of us are more concerned about our place
in history than we are medals. History and the American people are
already judging the failures and the misleading statements, such as
``stuff happens'' and ``mission accomplished'' and a few ``dead-
enders'' and ``last throes'' and all of those statements which have
been made over the past 3\1/2\ years which led the American people to
believe we were succeeding in Iraq when many of us knew we weren't
because we violated a fundamental principle called the Powell doctrine:
If you want to win, you go in with overwhelming force.
The reason I am very concerned today, even though we have a very
outstanding general in Petraeus, is that I am not sure we have enough
troops still.
Throughout our history, military commanders have been held
responsible. Abraham Lincoln held General McClellan responsible and
fired him. In World War II, those who were in command who were
responsible for December 7, 1941, were held responsible. In the Korean
war, General MacArthur was held responsible. The fact is that military
leaders are held responsible as well as civilian leaders.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to print in the Record the
number of times President Bush said that he relied on the judgment of
the military commanders. Those military commanders did not exercise
good judgment and therefore are responsible for the rosy scenario and
the inaccurate depiction of facts on the ground in Iraq as they came
before our committee, the Armed Services Committee, and spoke to the
President of the United States and the American people.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
President George W. Bush on Support for Commanders/Generals
President Bush: ``One of the things that's important is
for--and one of the reasons why you trust the commanders on
the ground is because there needs to be flexibility. And I
explained to the Prime Minister that I'll be making my
decisions based upon the recommendations of General Casey.''
(President George W. Bush, Press Conference, 7/31/06)
President Bush: ``I have said to the American people, as
the Iraqis stand up, we'll stand down. But I've also said
that our commanders on the ground will make that decision.
And I have--we'll talk to General Casey once he is--conferred
with the new Government of Iraq.'' (President George W. Bush,
Press Conference, 5/29/06)
President Bush: ``And so the army is getting on its feet.
We've turned over a lot of territory to the army. And they're
good fighters; they really are. I spent a great deal of time
with General Abizaid and General Casey--they were in
Washington this past week--these are generals, you'd be happy
to hear, who tell me the way it is, not the way they think I
would like it to be.'' (President George W. Bush, Remarks On
The War On Terror And A Question-And-Answer Session,
Louisville, KY, 1/16/06)
President Bush: ``The best people to give any politician
advice about whether or not we're achieving a military
objective is the people you put out there on the ground. I
told you I've got good confidence in these generals and the
people who report to them. These are honest, honorable,
decent, very capable, smart people, and they'll decide the
troop levels.'' (President George W. Bush, Remarks On The War
On Terror And A Question-And-Answer Session, Louisville, KY,
1/16/06)
[[Page S1742]]
``President Bush said he relies on military advisors and
other officials on the ground in Iraq to keep him abreast of
the situation in the country, and they're telling him civil
war is not imminent. `This notion that we're in civil war is
just not true according to them,' he told Wolf Blitzer in an
interview taped earlier this week that aired today.
(``President Bush: Iraq Not On Brink Of Civil War,''
Congressional Quarterly, 9/24/06)
``Bush also has said he would rely on the opinions of U.S.
military commanders in the two countries for determining how
soon troops would be withdrawn. `As we see more of these
Iraqi forces in the lead, we'll be able to continue with our
desire, our stated strategy that says as Iraqis stand up,
we'll stand down,' the president said. ``In 2006, we expect
Iraqis will take more and more control of the battle space,
and as they do so, we will need fewer U.S. troops to conduct
combat operations around that country.'' (``Bush Says U.S.
Forces Will Be Reduced In Iraq, Afghanistan,'' State News
Service, 1/4/06)
Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, in 2004, General Casey said:
My view of winning is that we are broadly on track to
accomplishing our objectives . . . with Iraqi security forces
that are capable of maintaining domestic order and denying
Iraq as a safe haven for terror, and I believe we are on
track to get there by December of 2005.
In September of 2005, General Casey said:
We have a strategy and a plan for success in Iraq, and we
are broadly on track in achieving our goals.
Time after time, the American people were told that things were going
fine, and they were not.
I wish to emphasize again that I believe General Casey has served
this Nation honorably. I think he and his family have made great
sacrifices for this country. I have nothing but respect. But to reward
failure is going to send a message all around the military that I don't
think is a healthy one. I don't support promotion and I don't support
medals for failure. I support people being held responsible, and I
regret that those who are responsible on the civilian side have not
been held more responsible, although, as we speak today, the American
people, by their opinions as reflected in the polls, are certainly
reflecting their judgment about the performance and responsibility of
our civilian leaders.
I hope we can move forward and obtain successes in Iraq under this
new strategy. I am not sure right now that General Casey completely
supports it, and I don't think that it enhances our chance for
succeeding in Iraq. I urge my colleagues to vote against this
nomination and select a leader, of which there are many, who is far
more capable, in my view, of carrying out the new strategy in Iraq.
Mr. President, I yield back the remainder of my time, as I see the
majority leader here on the floor.
Mr. REID. Mr. President, it is my understanding that I will be the
last speaker. The distinguished minority leader is not going to speak
at this time. So after I speak, we will vote. Is that the understanding
of the Chair?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. That has not been made clear at this time.
Mr. REID. That is what I have been told. But if the minority leader
comes to the floor to speak, he can, and I will make my statement now.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The majority leader is recognized.
Mr. REID. Mr. President, when Harry Truman was President, he put a
sign on his desk. It said: The buck stops here. He chose this message
because it conveyed to the American public that, as President, Truman
was responsible for everything in his administration. Everything.
The buck stops here. It is a phrase we should keep in mind as we vote
on GEN George Casey's nomination to be Army Chief of Staff.
Despite his service to our country, I know many Senators would like
to vote no on General Casey's nomination because he has been associated
with a broken Iraq policy. I understand others would like to vote no in
an attempt to make the general a scapegoat for a war that has gone
horribly wrong. I believe there are still others who are using this
nomination as a way to express opposition to the President's escalation
proposal, a plan General Casey once opposed but now supports. While I
understand these reasons for voting no, I am reminded of that sign on
President Truman's desk. In Iraq, the buck stops with President Bush.
The Commander in Chief, not General Casey, is responsible for the
failed policy in Iraq.
Four years and running, the cost of the war has been staggering. We
have lost, as of this morning, 3,111 of our soldiers and seen tens of
thousands more wounded. The war has stretched our military and their
families to the breaking point, depleted our Treasury of hundreds of
billions of dollars, detracted our attention from al-Qaida and the real
war on terror, and hurt our image in the Arab community and around the
world. Yet despite all this sacrifice and all these costs and because
of numerous errors by the Commander in Chief, America is less safe. We
must change course.
Unfortunately, President Bush's answer to this growing chaos and
sectarian violence in Iraq is not a new direction but more of the same.
He wants to send 48,000 more troops to Baghdad and give them mission
impossible--policing an Iraqi civil war.
This so-called surge policy has many critics, and one of them used to
be General Casey. On January 2 of this year, the general is quoted as
saying in the New York Times:
It's always been my view that a heavy and sustained
American military presence was not going to solve the
problems in Iraq over the long term.
In other words, escalation is not the answer. But just a month later,
in his Senate confirmation hearing, he reversed course, saying:
The increase in the U.S. forces is a key piece of our new
strategy to secure Baghdad.
One day, escalation was not going to solve the problem; the next day,
escalation was a key piece of our strategy. There is a troubling
disconnect between General Casey's two statements. I understand he has
since attempted to explain his change of heart by noting, in the time
between his two comments, that a new strategy, the so-called surge, had
been propounded by the White House and more troops were needed to
institute the President's new policy. But does General Casey really
believe this? Do we believe a general on the battlefield or in his
plush Pentagon office? I will take General Casey at his word. After
all, the buck stops with the President, not with General Casey.
Even though I have grave concerns about the direction of the war and
General Casey, I will vote for his confirmation to be Army Chief of
Staff. I do, however, pray that General Casey has the courage to speak
his convictions in his new post. The last thing our Nation and our
troops need is a ``yes'' man with access to the Oval Office--someone
who tells the President what he wants to hear and not what he needs to
hear. ``Yes'' men, such as Vice President Cheney and former Secretary
of Defense Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz, led us into this Iraq quagmire. To
end the war, the President is going to have to start listening to and
heeding the advice of those who disagree with him in order to get us
out.
In the Senate this week, we attempted to give the President another
chance to listen. We tried to give the bipartisan majority of Senators
who oppose escalation the chance to send a clear message to President
Bush. Unfortunately, our majority was silenced by a minority of
Republicans who decided protecting the President was more important
than sending him a message: Do not surge. Do not escalate.
It is time the White House and its champions in Congress stopped
playing politics in the war. We have had enough politics and far too
little diplomacy. What we need is a strategy that will succeed in Iraq.
I hope General Casey will play such a role in bringing such a strategy
about and, thus, I will vote for his confirmation.
Mr. President, I yield back all the time, and I ask for the yeas and
nays.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
There appears to be a sufficient second.
The question is, Will the Senate advise and consent to the nomination
of General George W. Casey, Jr., to be Chief of Staff, United States
Army?
The clerk will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk called the roll.
Mr. DURBIN. I announce that the Senator from South Dakota (Mr.
Johnson) is necessarily absent.
Mr. LOTT. The following Senators were necessarily absent: the Senator
from Florida (Mr. Martinez) and the Senator from Ohio (Mr. Voinovich).
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Tester). Are there any other Senators in
the Chamber desiring to vote?
The result was announced--yeas 83, nays 14, as follows:
[[Page S1743]]
[Rollcall Vote No. 45 Ex.]
YEAS--83
Akaka
Alexander
Allard
Baucus
Bennett
Biden
Bingaman
Boxer
Brown
Brownback
Burr
Byrd
Cantwell
Cardin
Carper
Casey
Cochran
Coleman
Collins
Conrad
Corker
Cornyn
Craig
Crapo
Dodd
Dole
Domenici
Dorgan
Durbin
Enzi
Feingold
Grassley
Gregg
Hagel
Hatch
Hutchison
Inhofe
Inouye
Isakson
Kennedy
Kerry
Klobuchar
Kohl
Kyl
Landrieu
Lautenberg
Leahy
Levin
Lieberman
Lincoln
Lott
Lugar
McCaskill
McConnell
Menendez
Mikulski
Murkowski
Murray
Nelson (FL)
Nelson (NE)
Obama
Pryor
Reed
Reid
Roberts
Rockefeller
Salazar
Sanders
Schumer
Sessions
Shelby
Snowe
Specter
Stabenow
Stevens
Tester
Thomas
Thune
Vitter
Warner
Webb
Whitehouse
Wyden
NAYS--14
Bayh
Bond
Bunning
Chambliss
Clinton
Coburn
DeMint
Ensign
Feinstein
Graham
Harkin
McCain
Smith
Sununu
NOT VOTING--3
Johnson
Martinez
Voinovich
The nomination was confirmed.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the motion to
reconsider is laid upon the table, and the President shall be
immediately notified of the Senate's action.
____________________