[Congressional Record Volume 153, Number 23 (Wednesday, February 7, 2007)]
[Senate]
[Pages S1684-S1706]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                           EXECUTIVE SESSION

                                 ______
                                 

   NOMINATION OF GENERAL GEORGE W. CASEY, JR., TO BE CHIEF OF STAFF, 
                           UNITED STATES ARMY

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senate will 
proceed to executive session to consider the following nomination, 
which the clerk will report.
  The assistant legislative clerk read the nomination of General George 
W. Casey, Jr., to be Chief of Staff, United States Army.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I support GEN George Casey's confirmation 
to be the next Chief of Staff of the United States Army. His nomination 
was approved by the Armed Services Committee by a vote of 19 to 6.
  Through a long and distinguished career, he has held positions of 
increasing responsibility, culminating in that of Commanding General of 
multinational forces in Iraq, in which capacity he served for over 2\1/
2\ years.
  Prior to that command, he was Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, which 
was preceded by an assignment as Director of the Joint Staff, and 
before that as Director of Strategy, Plans, and Policy, J-5, on the 
Joint Staff.
  General Casey is an infantryman, having commanded at all levels up to 
and including division command. As an assistant division commander, he 
served in Bosnia, and earlier in his career he served in Cairo as a 
U.N. military observer with the U.N. Truce Supervision Organization. He 
also served a tour of duty as a congressional liaison officer.
  General Casey knows Iraq and the challenges the Army faces there. He 
also knows the Pentagon and the challenges he will face there. General 
Casey has the knowledge to perform his primary responsibilities as 
Chief of Staff, which is the training and equipping of soldiers and 
caring for them and their families.
  There is some opposition to General Casey's nomination because he is 
identified with the administration's failed Iraq strategy, and I agree 
that strategy has not been successful. As a matter of fact, I have 
argued as forcefully as I know how that strategy has not been 
successful and that we need to change course in Iraq.
  It is appropriate to hold military leaders responsible for their own 
failures, but the principal failures that have led to the chaos in Iraq 
were decisions of the civilian leaders. General Casey had to deal with 
the consequences of a myriad of flawed policies, including having 
insufficient forces at the outset of the operation, failing to properly 
plan for postwar stability operations, disbanding the Iraqi Army, then 
trying to build a new army, initially using civilian contractors, and 
an overly extensive debaathification program, to name but a few.
  All of these critical mistakes, which fueled the insurgency and civil 
disorder, are attributed to the civilian leadership in the White House, 
in the Department of Defense, and in the Coalition Provisional 
Authority. Compounding those mistakes was the effect of detainee abuse 
at Abu Ghraib attributed, in part, to ambiguities in what was 
considered permissible in the interrogation of prisoners fostered by 
that very same civilian leadership in the administration, the White 
House, and the Pentagon, where the advice of uniformed military lawyers 
was overruled. Those critical mistakes were made in the year before 
General Casey took command and had severe adverse consequences which he 
inherited.
  General Casey's focus in Iraq was on training and equipping Iraqi 
security forces to bring them as quickly as possible to a level where 
they could relieve American forces from the burden of providing the 
security that Iraqis should be providing for themselves. He was not 
alone in seeing this was a priority. It was also the focus of his boss, 
the Central Command commander, General Abizaid, and his subordinates, 
the Corps commander, Lieutenant General Chiarelli, and the commanders 
of that training effort, Generals Petraeus and later Dempsey. General 
Casey put it this way:

       The longer we in the United States forces continue to bear 
     the main burden of Iraq's security, it lengthens the time 
     that the Government of Iraq has to take the hard decisions 
     about reconciliation and dealing with the militias. And the 
     other thing is that they can continue to blame us for all of 
     Iraq's problems, which are at base their problems.

  Those are wise words. General Casey recognized there is no military 
solution to the situation in Iraq, that only a political solution 
enabled by Iraqi politicians making the essential political compromises 
can save the Iraqis from themselves. General Casey is not alone. There 
actually seems to be an agreement among most observers that an Iraqi 
political settlement is a key to ending the violence in Iraq. The 
difference of opinion exists on whether Iraqi politicians need 
breathing space, as President Bush has said, to reach required 
political compromises or whether, as many of us believe, Iraqi 
politicians need to be pressured to make those compromises and that the 
addition of 21,000 more troops doesn't make a political compromise more 
likely, it just gets us in deeper into a civil conflict.
  It has been said that General Casey was too optimistic about the 
possibility of troops being reduced, having predicted in the spring and 
summer of 2006 and then subsequently predicting that reduction toward 
the end of 2006 and into 2007 was possible. He did make those 
predictions, and I think he was clearly overly optimistic. He has made 
a number of mistakes, but the key fundamental flaws were the mistakes

[[Page S1685]]

made, the wrong judgments of the civilian leadership of this country, 
not the uniformed military leaders of this country.

  Was he too optimistic? Yes. Is he still too optimistic? I believe he 
is. When asked about whether he agreed with what the President finally 
said the other day, that we are on a road to slow failure--the 
President finally stepping up to acknowledging the reality in Iraq--
General Casey said he believed we are still on a road to slow success. 
That is how optimistic he is.
  I am not going to hold that against him. I think he is wrong in that 
excessive optimism, but we expect our military leaders to be 
enthusiastic and positive about the missions they are assigned--the 
missions that they are assigned--by their civilian leaders. We expect 
them to be confident and to inspire their soldiers with the importance 
of those missions, to keep their morale high, and General Casey did 
that.
  He has also increased and decreased troops--both--depending on the 
missions assigned to him by the civilian leaders.
  As he testified, he requested additional troops on six occasions for 
specific missions, such as to provide security for the elections or 
otherwise deal with spikes of violence. However, mindful of the stress 
on soldiers and their families and on the deteriorating readiness of 
the nondeployed units in the Army and the Marine Corps, he also sought 
opportunities for reductions--both directions.
  One of the real questions I had to face in addressing this nomination 
was whether General Casey changed his tune when it came to this surge 
of additional troops that is being requested or being sent by the 
President. I pressed him on this issue at his nomination hearing before 
the Armed Services Committee.
  I want to read the exchange between General Casey and myself at his 
hearing within the last week.
  I asked General Casey the following:

       We asked General Abizaid back in November when he appeared 
     before this committee whether he needed more troops or 
     whether he supported more troops going to Iraq. And this is 
     just last November. And this is what he said. He said that he 
     met with every divisional commander, General Casey, the Corps 
     commander, General Dempsey. ``We all talked together. And I 
     said, in your professional opinion, if you were to bring in 
     more American troops now, does it add considerably to our 
     ability to achieve success in Iraq? And they all said no. And 
     the reason is because we want Iraqis to do more. It's easy 
     for the Iraqis to rely upon us to do this work. I believe--

  This is General Abizaid speaking--

     that more American forces prevent the Iraqis from doing more, 
     from taking more responsibility for their own future.''

  I continued in my questioning of General Casey:

       Now, General Abizaid said that he spoke to you and that his 
     opinion reflected your opinion and all the other commanders. 
     Was that true when he said it?

  General Casey:

       I'm not exactly sure when in November it was, but it was.

  Senator Levin:

       So you've changed your view since November?

  General Casey:

       As I described in my opening testimony, Senator, in mid 
     November was when the reevaluation of the plan was taking 
     place. So I suspect John and I talked before that. And that 
     does reflect my general view on additional U.S. forces in 
     Iraq.

  Senator Levin:

       It reflects a general view, but then there was some kind of 
     a reevaluation which took place in mid November.

  General Casey:

       That's right, Senator. We're constantly reevaluating how 
     we're doing and what we need.

  Senator Levin:

       But that position that General Abizaid stated was your 
     position when you spoke to him in early November presumably 
     still remains your general view.

  General Casey:

       That's correct.

  Senator Levin:

       Well, if that's your general view, what is the change? Why 
     are you modifying your general view for this surge?

  General Casey:

       What has changed, Senator, are several things: One, the 
     development of a plan, a new plan that was conceived by the 
     Iraqis and worked in concert with us; so there is a plan that 
     laid out requirement for those forces. So just to say do you 
     need more forces is one thing; to say do you need more forces 
     to execute this plan is quite another. And we do need an 
     additional two brigades to implement that plan.

  I think he is giving us a straightforward answer to that question. 
His general view is, and was before the new plan was adopted, that we 
did not need more forces in Iraq; that it took the Iraqis off the hook. 
There was a new plan which was adopted by the administration, by the 
Commander in Chief, by the civilian leadership of this country. That 
plan requires that we not just clear neighborhoods but that we then 
remain in neighborhoods in Baghdad.
  Do I think that is a wise plan? I do not. I am going to vote against 
the surge. I think it gets us in deeper militarily. This is a military 
officer who has been given a new plan and has been asked what are the 
requirements for that new plan which has been adopted by the civilian 
leaders of this country. And when given a new plan by the Commander in 
Chief, he very properly said that is going to require some additional 
troops.
  Again, we are going to debate the plan, the wisdom of it, I hope one 
of these days. We are going to debate the wisdom of whether this surge 
makes sense. But given a new plan, given that decision, what General 
Casey is saying is that his general view about the lack of the wisdom 
of increasing the military presence in Iraq has to be modified when 
there is a new requirement, a new plan which requires us to be present 
in the neighborhoods of Baghdad.
  Once again, although I disagree with the plan, I view that as a 
satisfactory explanation for why he now supports the additional troops. 
Not to the same extent that the President has proposed or decided upon, 
but to the extent of two brigades. He said the additional brigades will 
give additional flexibility. He doesn't have any problem with that, but 
he testified that was not what his recommendation was.
  So his emphasis on building up Iraqi security forces to relieve 
Americans of the tasks that Iraqis should be doing for themselves is a 
critical part of any strategy in Iraq that has a chance of success, and 
it is key to the ultimate U.S. military disengagement. The real key to 
a stable and secure Iraq and a viable Iraq is a political solution that 
can only be reached by the leaders in Iraq, the politicians. And what 
American political leaders need to do, in my judgment, is to pressure 
those politicians to make that happen.
  That was never General Casey's responsibility. General Casey never 
had the responsibility of doing what is critically essential 
politically, which is to put pressure on the Iraqi politicians to reach 
a political settlement. He is a military man. He is a military man who, 
by his own acknowledgment, has made a number of mistakes. Indeed, he 
listed a number of mistakes for us that he has made and that he takes 
responsibility for. But the fundamental mistakes which have led to the 
chaos in Iraq, which did not allow us to help to create in Iraq a 
stable and viable country, which is the goal of all of us, those 
fundamental mistakes were the mistakes made by the civilian leaders of 
this country. To hold him accountable or responsible, and to vote 
against him because of the major mistakes which led to this chaos 
through not the uniformed leaders' mistakes but through our civilian 
leaders' mistakes, it seems to me, is inappropriate and unfair, and I 
will vote for his confirmation.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona.
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I rise to express opposition to the 
nomination of General George Casey to be the next Chief of Staff of the 
Army.
  I admire General Casey's patriotism and his long service to our 
country. I have concluded, based on his role as commander of the 
multinational forces in Iraq, that I cannot support his nomination.
  Let me first make clear that General Casey has had a long and 
distinguished career in the U.S. Army and is deserving of the utmost 
respect and gratitude for the contributions he has made to this 
Nation's defense over his long career. At his nomination hearing on 
February 1, I stated my appreciation to him and his family for their 
extraordinary service and personal sacrifice, as well as the support 
they have provided to the men and women in uniform and their families. 
I emphasized

[[Page S1686]]

then, and I reiterate today, I do not in any way question General 
Casey's honor, patriotism or service to America, nor do I question his 
sincere desire to continue serving the Army.
  At this critical moment in our history, however, with the obvious--
obvious--lack of success in achieving our goals in Iraq, this 
nomination should bear unusual weight in our deliberations. All of the 
Armed Services, and particularly our ground forces, are undergoing 
difficult changes to adjust to the global war on terror. The next Chief 
of Staff of the Army will be faced with enormous challenges in matters 
relating to recruiting, training, and retention of soldiers, the 
continuing organizing of the Army, and requirements for the procurement 
of weapon systems. The next Chief of Staff must be able to evaluate 
ongoing strategy and be able to react with sound advice when unforeseen 
challenges are encountered. Perhaps most importantly, the next Chief of 
Staff must be unconstrained in evaluating the past while giving advice 
for the future.
  I have questioned in the past, and question today, a number of the 
decisions and judgments that General Casey has made over the past 2\1/
2\ years. During that time, conditions in Iraq have grown remarkably 
and progressively worse, and the situation now can best be described as 
dire and deteriorating. I regret that our window of opportunity to 
reverse momentum may be closing.
  The bombing at the Golden Mosque in Samarra last February sparked 
sectarian violence throughout Iraq and in Baghdad, in particular. Yet 
in the face of this dramatic change in the Iraqi security environment, 
our military strategy--and I emphasize military strategy--remained 
essentially unchanged. Instead of conducting a traditional insurgency 
campaign, our troops focused on training and equipping Iraqis, hoping, 
in vain, that they could do the job. After repeated elections and 
political events demonstrated that the democratic process would not, on 
its own, bring down the level of violence, our troops did not begin 
focusing on protecting the population. Instead, the coalition and Iraqi 
forces launched Operation Together Forward in June 2006. This 
operation, aimed at securing Baghdad, failed. Yet the coalition 
launched Operation Together Forward II in August in a very similar 
fashion. The result, predictably, was a similar failure.
  I am not going to go over the many times I complained about a failed 
strategy. A number of times I asked our leaders, both civilian and 
military, why they were continuing to pursue this failed strategy. I 
continued to give speeches denouncing this strategy and predicted we 
would end up in the dire circumstances we are in today. It is all a 
matter of responsibility--a matter of responsibility.
  General Casey, more than any other individual, has been the architect 
of U.S. military strategy in Iraq over the last 2 years. During this 
time, I fear he consistently presented unrealistically rosy, optimistic 
assessments of the situation in Iraq. For example, in December 2004, 
General Casey stated at a Pentagon press conference:

       My view of winning is that we are broadly on track to 
     accomplishing our objectives, with Iraqi security forces that 
     are capable of maintaining domestic order and denying Iraq as 
     a safe haven for terrorists. And I believe we are on track to 
     get there by December of 2005.

  I repeat that:

       I believe we are on track to get there by December of 2005.

  Almost a year later, in September of 2005, General Casey repeated:

       We have a strategy and a plan for success in Iraq, and we 
     are broadly on track in achieving our goals.

  Last October of 2006, he stated, before the Armed Services Committee, 
I believe:

       The idea that the country is aflame in sectarian violence 
     is just not right. General Casey said: I do not subscribe to 
     the civil war idea.

  Mr. President, we have hearings to try to get an honest, unvarnished 
opinion of how our Armed Forces are doing, what their needs are, what 
their missions are, and of course because we are in a war, what is 
happening in Iraq. We are not on the ground there. We visit frequently, 
but we rely to a large degree, obviously, on the judgment and the 
recommendations and the evaluations of our military leaders. This is 
the opening statement of GEN George W. Casey before the Armed Services 
Committee on 23 June of 2005:

       Thank you, Mr. Chairman . . .

  Remember, this is 23 June 2005.

       . . . In the past year, the Iraqis, supported by the 
     coalition, have established an interim government, 
     neutralized the Shia insurgency, eliminated terrorist and 
     insurgent safe havens across Iraq, mobilized their security 
     forces to confront the insurgency . . .

  How could he possibly give that kind of assessment? Senator Levin 
says, well, we should have put pressure on the Iraqis. Well, maybe we 
should have put pressure on the Iraqis, but it was pretty obvious to 
even the most uninitiated that the Iraqis weren't performing. They 
weren't performing.
  In his nomination hearing last Thursday, I asked General Casey about 
these and other statements he has made, both publicly and privately, 
that seem entirely at odds with the situation as most observers find 
it. I noted, for example, that in recent days, the Secretary of 
Defense, General Pace, and Admiral Fallon, the new head of Central 
Command, have all stated that the United States is not winning in Iraq 
and that we have had a failed strategy. These were clear-cut, realistic 
statements. But General Casey disagreed, saying I do not agree that we 
have a failed policy. I do not believe that the current policy has 
failed.
  He may be the only person in America who believes that. This is a 
judgment issue, not an honor issue. Of course, the civilian leadership 
is responsible. I believe that the former Secretary of Defense will go 
down in history with Robert Strange McNamara. But military leaders are 
also responsible. That is why we give them positions of responsibility 
because we place in their trust our most precious asset: American 
blood.
  During his own nomination hearing on January 23, Lieutenant General 
Petraeus stated that five additional brigades were required to 
implement the President's new military strategy and that he could not 
accomplish his mission if he didn't have these additional troops. I, 
for one, worry that five brigades may still be insufficient to 
accomplish all we are asking our troops to do in Iraq and would prefer 
that we are on the side of too many troops rather than too few, as has 
been the case in the past.
  General Casey, however, confounding the experts, said in his hearing:

       We do need an additional two brigades to implement that 
     plan.

  Not five, not more than five, but just two.
  General Casey said the additional three brigades the Department will 
send ``merely gives General Petraeus great flexibility.''
  Remember, we are putting this person, who still doesn't believe we 
need five brigades, in the position to be the one who is implementing 
the policy. Given this and other judgments, I don't see in this nominee 
an accurate assessment of the situation in Iraq or what is required to 
avoid catastrophe there.
  My colleague from Michigan says, well, it is all the civilian 
commanders' fault. I will put plenty of blame on the civilian 
commanders and I have for many years, but somehow to absolve the 
military commander on the ground there, conducting the operations, of 
any responsibility flies in the face of everything I ever learned in my 
lifetime of involvement with the military.
  Recently, I noticed in the paper there was a submarine with four 
sailors who were washed overboard. I believe they were later rescued. 
The commander of the submarine was relieved. I still remember in my 
earliest youth, when the captain was asleep in the cabin and the USS 
Missouri ran aground in the mudflats someplace south of here, he was 
relieved that day of his command.
  We put people in positions of responsibility and hold them 
responsible and we try to reward them as much as we can when they 
succeed, with the approval of a grateful nation. But we also hold them 
responsible for failure.
  My friend from Michigan and I have a very different view of the 
responsibilities of commanders in the field, which is why, during World 
War II and other wars, we have relieved commanders in the field because 
they were not accomplishing the mission and, if they didn't like the 
mission, they didn't speak up to get the mission changed, and if they 
embraced a failed mission, then they were held even more responsible.

[[Page S1687]]

  I would go on. I want to emphasize, again, what General Casey said in 
the hearings the other day. Senator Levin said:

        . . . even he came to the point, after all these years, of 
     not having what everybody wanted, which is success in Iraq. 
     He finally described that mistakes were made. And then he 
     said, ``Yes, one could define that, doing what we're doing, 
     as maybe a slow failure.''

  In other words, Senator Levin was asking General Casey if what has 
happened in Iraq was a ``slow failure,'' as stated by the President of 
the United States. General Casey:

       I didn't--I actually don't see it as slow failure. I 
     actually see it as slow progress.

  In the last 4 weeks I believe we have had five helicopters shot down. 
Casualties have spiked to a very high level. I saw in one of the 
newspapers this morning that over the past 3-month period they have 
been perhaps as high or the highest of any time in the war. And we are 
in a situation of slow progress?
  Judgment. Judgment. Judgment. We expect people who are placed in 
positions of responsibility to exercise good judgment.
  There is a lot I could say in response to the statement of my friend 
from Michigan concerning no responsibility whatsoever for the failures 
in the hands of the commander on the ground in Iraq. I mean, on its 
face it is a rather unusual interpretation of the responsibility we 
give to our commanders on the ground. Of course the ultimate 
responsibility rests with civilian leadership. Of course it does. That 
is how our democracy is shaped. But we don't absolve anybody in the 
chain of command, civilian or military, for the responsibility for 
failure and it is widely believed by everyone, perhaps with the 
exception of General Casey, that the policy in Iraq is a failure and 
that is why we are trying a new strategy in hopes that we prevail in 
very difficult conditions. There is an old saw about those who ignore 
the lessons of history are doomed to repeat them. During the Vietnam 
war there was failure. General Westmoreland, then head of forces in 
Vietnam, was brought back and made Chief of Staff of the Army even 
though our policy and strategy in Vietnam had failed. Ask anyone who 
was a young officer in those days in the United States Army or Marine 
Corps. It was a blow to their morale because they were held responsible 
for their performance on the field of battle. We are holding our men 
and women, both officer and enlisted, responsible for their behavior on 
the field of battle, as to whether they succeed or fail. But now, in 
this particular instance, a failed commander is now, again, 
unfortunately, being promoted to a greater position of responsibility. 
We are, again, repeating the lessons of history because we ignore them.
  I intend to vote against the nomination of General Casey and I hope 
my colleagues will as well. I say that with all due respect to the 
honorable service of him and his family to this Nation. It has nothing 
to do with honorable service. It has everything to do with judgment and 
positions of responsibility. Just as Abraham Lincoln held generals 
responsible for performance on the battlefield, so today we should hold 
commanders responsible for performance on the battlefield.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, a couple of quick comments on my good 
friend's statement. First, no one suggests that the commanders be 
absolved from any responsibility. In fact, when we asked General Casey 
what mistakes had been made, he listed a number of mistakes in his own 
answers, including:

       We underestimated the ability of al-Qaida, the Sunni 
     insurgents, to provoke sectarian conflict and failed to 
     preempt the attack against the Golden Mosque in Samarra; we 
     thought that as more security forces were trained and 
     equipped we would be able to gradually shift ever increasing 
     security responsibilities to them and thus reduce our forces 
     proportionately. This is occurring slower than we originally 
     projected. We were slow to anticipate the extent of the 
     radical Shia death squads.

  He has acknowledged mistakes have been made. But the fundamental 
mistakes which have been made which caused us to be in the situation we 
are in were not George Casey's. Every commander makes mistakes. There 
is no commander I know of who would say he or she did not make 
mistakes. No one is absolving General Casey of the mistakes, which he 
is the first to acknowledge. The question is whether he is going to be 
held accountable--not for his mistakes but for the fundamental mistakes 
which were made by the civilian leadership of this Nation. That is the 
question.
  When my friend says General Casey must be the only one in America who 
doesn't think this policy is a failure, let me give you a couple of 
other Americans who seem to think the same way. Let's start with the 
President of the United States, last October, when he said: ``We are 
absolutely winning in Iraq.''
  That is the Commander in Chief. ``We are absolutely winning in 
Iraq.''
  How about another person, the Vice President of the United States, 
within the last year? ``The insurgency is in its last throes.''
  To say that General Casey is the only person in America who has made 
statements that are overly optimistic, to put it mildly, in terms of 
what is going on in Iraq, when he is trying to carry out the policies 
of the administration, keep the morale of his troops, and now, after 
November the President now says we are on a road to slow failure, after 
the American public told the President of the United States that we are 
on a road to slow failure, now what we are saying is: OK, the President 
acknowledges we are on a road to slow failure unless we adopt his 
policy of a surge. What General Casey is saying, honestly, when I 
pressed him--he doesn't frame it that way. He believes we are on a slow 
progress road. Are we going to say he is not qualified to be Chief of 
Staff of the United States Army, when he has been Vice Chief, he has 
been a Commander, he has been a three star general--because he believes 
it is slow progress instead of slow failure, when we have a Commander 
in Chief who just a few months ago said we are absolutely winning in 
Iraq, absolutely winning?
  And George Casey, now it is all piled on him. He is the only one in 
America who seems to think we are winning in Iraq. Well, he doesn't 
think we are winning in Iraq; he thinks we are slowly making progress 
in Iraq, to use his words. Do I agree with him? No. I think this policy 
has been a failure right from the beginning. Going in was a mistake. It 
was a mistake that was based on arrogance, it was based on a 
misunderstanding of history, it was based on a misreading of what the 
threat was, it was based on a lot of mistakes. Disbanding the Iraqi 
Army? Look what it has led to. Not having a plan for the aftermath? 
Look what it has led to. These are the fundamentals. These are the 
transcendent mistakes which have created the chaos in Iraq, and George 
Casey inherits that.
  He makes his own mistakes at a totally different level, degree, than 
these fundamental mistakes. Suddenly we say he is not qualified to be a 
chief of staff of the Army because he was a commander who inherited 
that mess and made his own mistakes of a much lower degree, obviously. 
Much too optimistic. He is a commander of troops, trying to keep morale 
up. So he is optimistic, I believe he is overly optimistic, history has 
proven he is overly optimistic. But to say we are trying to absolve him 
of mistakes when he acknowledges his own mistakes as any good commander 
will, learning from mistakes--he listed his mistakes; it is his list--
no one is absolving him. We are simply saying he should not be carrying 
the load of the mistakes the civilian leadership of this country has 
made, which has helped to create such chaos in Iraq.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona.
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I repeat, in case Senator Levin didn't 
hear me, I have criticized the policies and, placed responsibilities on 
the President, the Vice President and the former Secretary of Defense 
for the last 3 years over a failed policy in Iraq. The difference 
Senator Levin and I seem to have is I also hold responsible the 
commanders in the field for giving accurate information, for providing 
recommendations that will help to win a conflict rather than 
subscribing and continuing to this day, to this very day to support a 
policy everyone acknowledges has failed.
  By the way, I said today says are failed--not quotes from a month ago 
or

[[Page S1688]]

6 months ago or a year ago, I say to my friend from Michigan. No one 
decried those comments, such as ``last throes'' and ``stuff happens'' 
and ``dead enders'' more than I did at the time. But I hold the entire 
chain of command responsible down to the commanders in the field.
  He says just a few days ago:

       I don't see it as slow failure. I actually see it as slow 
     progress.

  The unclassified NIE we have read, the National Intelligence Estimate 
on Iraq says, ``We are not making progress.'' It says, ``We are 
losing.''
  We are going to make the chief of staff of the Army the guy who 
thinks that ``We are making slow progress'' as opposed to the National 
Intelligence Estimate, which is agreed on by our entire intelligence 
establishment, that we are losing. So, of course, we hold people 
responsible. Of course we do. Do I hold our former Secretary of Defense 
responsible? Absolutely. Absolutely. If he were up for another job, I 
would be standing here on the floor objecting to it.
  Do I hold others in the administration responsible? Absolutely. But 
this is a leader who is up for an increased responsibility and he has 
failed in his mission, and that is what it is all about. An honorable 
and decent man who has served his country, but the message throughout 
the military now is, unfortunately, as it was with General 
Westmoreland, ``Even though you fail, you are going to be promoted.''
  To somehow say the commander in the field is in some way not 
responsible in any way for the ``mistakes'' I think flies in the face 
not only of the record but the tradition we have in the United States 
of America, of placing the commanders in the field in positions of 
responsibility and making them accountable for their performance and 
how they carry out those responsibilities.
  I am sure the Senator from Michigan and I will continue to disagree 
for some period of time because we have a philosophical difference, a 
fundamental difference of opinion. If you want to blame everything on 
the civilian leadership, who are of course responsible, who of course 
history will judge very harshly, that is one way of looking at it. If 
you say that responsibility is shared down to the commanders in the 
field, as I do, then you probably have a different view.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Colorado is recognized.
  Mr. ALLARD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to speak as in 
morning business.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I have no objection at all. I am just 
curious as to about how long. I am not in any way trying to influence 
the length of time.
  Mr. ALLARD. Let me just say I am anticipating somewhere around 12 or 
15 minutes.
  Mr. LEVIN. I thank my colleague.
  Mr. ALLARD. In October 2002, this body saw fit to authorize, by a 
large majority, the use of force against Iraq. Specifically the 
resolution authorizes the President: to use the Armed Forces of the 
United States as he determines to be necessary and appropriate in order 
to defend the national security of the United States against the 
continuing threat posed by Iraq.
  I remind my colleagues that we did so because of two important 
reasons--the same two reasons offered by the President to the American 
public.
  First, Saddam Hussein was in breach of more than a dozen United 
Nations Security Council resolutions. He refused to cooperate with U.N. 
weapons inspectors even after a decade of sanctions, and rejected 
proposal after proposal to verify that he did not have such weapons.
  Second, after September 11, it was clear that America could not 
afford to allow imminent threats to our Nation go unopposed. At the 
time, Iraq represented a dangerous crossroad between terrorism and 
weapons of mass destruction. In the context of Saddam's hostile 
intentions, it was a nexus that we could not ignore.
  When critics attempt to cover up their support for the use of force 
against Iraq, they damage U.S. credibility overseas and send mixed 
messages to our servicemembers. Even more dangerously, they encourage 
an enemy who believes America will give up when the fighting gets 
tough.
  Of course, there is no doubt that the strategic imperatives in Iraq 
have changed since 2002. I will readily admit that this fight is one 
that we fully recognize. But that in no way diminishes the importance 
of our mission there now. We have a vital national interest to remain 
in Iraq and help maintain a secure and stable nation.
  The terrorists have made it abundantly clear that Iraq is central in 
their war against the civilized world. They are committed to fighting 
there and will not stop unless we defeat them. If we have to fight, it 
is preferable to fight on their own soil.
  They have also made it clear that they will not stop with Iraq. They 
will strike Iraq's neighbors as they did in Jordan and Lebanon. They 
will strike Europe as they did in the Madrid bombings. And, they will 
not hesitate to strike America again as they did on September 11.
  And yet now, in this body, we are debating another resolution, but 
one that does not hold any legal weight; a resolution that would tie 
the hands of our soldiers in the field by limiting their options, lower 
their morale, and harm their efforts in Iraq. I am convinced that a 
long-term stable Iraq is in the best interest of our national security, 
and as I have said many times before, the price of failure in Iraq is 
too great to walk away now.

  We should not forfeit our progress in Iraq to meet arbitrary 
deadlines whether they are in the short or in the long term. We should 
not think about giving up when our men and women in uniform who have 
achieved so much. Such defeatism encourages the terrorists, undermines 
our efforts to persuade other nations to join us, and opens the door to 
attacks here at home. We must stand firm. We must stand strong.
  Thus, I support the President's plan to move forward in trying to 
secure Baghdad.
  One of the keys to success in Iraq, I believe, is obtaining a sincere 
commitment from the Iraqi Prime Minister to get the Iraqi government to 
play a much stronger role in the destiny of Iraq.
  President Bush is confident that we now have that commitment and I 
think that this will have a major impact on our new efforts to bring 
stability to Baghdad.
  I am supportive of this new strategy because it contains a much 
stronger commitment from Iraqis, in terms of their share of force 
strength and their financial share of the costs of the war, and 
includes new thresholds for the Iraqis to meet. To date, the Iraqis 
have become too reliant on U.S. troops and U.S. dollars. This plan 
shows a new commitment from the Iraqis to step up to the plate and 
fight for their country's future.
  I am optimistic that the President's shift in direction was needed, 
and may have already resulted in two positive results:
  No. 1, Iraq's prime minister dropped his protection of an anti-
American cleric's Shiite militia after U.S. intelligence convinced him 
the group was infiltrated by death squads; and
  No. 2, recently, U.S. forces arrested the top aide to radical cleric 
al-Sadr in a raid. I think this signals that the important change in 
our strategy shows hope for success and that Iraq is ready to come 
forward with a renewed commitment to solving its problems.
  Mr. President, I enter in the Record the following newspaper articles 
describing these accounts.

               [From the Washington Post, Jan. 20, 2007]

   Key Aide to Sadr Arrested in Baghdad--Iraqi-Led Operation Part of 
                              Broader Push

                          (By Ernesto Londono)

       U.S.-backed Iraqi forces arrested a top aide to anti-
     American Shiite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr in eastern Baghdad on 
     Friday, amid growing signs of stepped-up efforts to quell 
     Sadr and his supporters.
       U.S. military officials said in November that Sadr's Mahdi 
     Army militia represents the greatest threat to Iraq's 
     security. U.S. and Iraqi forces are preparing a renewed 
     effort to pacify Baghdad, including the deployment of 
     additional U.S. troops.
       Abdul Hadi al-Daraji, Sadr's media director in Baghdad, was 
     arrested at his house in the neighborhood of Baladiyat, near 
     the Mahdi Army stronghold of Sadr City, shortly after 
     midnight, said Sadr spokesman Abdul Razak al-Nadawi.
       The spokesman said a guard was killed during the operation. 
     At least two other aides were taken into custody, according 
     to a statement released by the U.S. military.
       The statement did not identify Daraji by name, but said the 
     main suspect was involved in the assassination of numerous

[[Page S1689]]

     members of Iraq's security forces and is ``affiliated with 
     illegal armed group cells targeting Iraqi civilians for 
     sectarian attacks.'' The military said the arrest was the 
     result of an ``Iraqi-led'' operation.
       Nadawi said ``the occupation forces are provoking Sadr . . 
     . by these daily operations or every-other-day operations.'' 
     The spokesman added that the cleric's followers ``are the 
     only ones demanding and putting a timetable for the 
     occupation withdrawal.''
       Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, who has been 
     pressured by the Bush administration to bring the Mahdi Army 
     and other Shiite militias under control, was not forewarned 
     about the arrest, said Ali Dabbagh, a spokesman for Maliki. 
     Dabbagh said the prime minister was not notified about every 
     impending high-profile arrest.
       ``No one is untouchable for the security forces,'' Dabbagh 
     said. ``At the same time, no one was interested to go into a 
     fight with the Sadr movement.'' Sadr, whose supporters hold 
     30 seats in parliament, is a key supporter of Maliki, who is 
     a Shiite, but the cleric is also widely seen as an instigator 
     of the country's sectarian violence.
       Neither Dabbagh nor the U.S. military said whether Daraji 
     had been charged with a crime. ``Definitely, if he's not 
     charged, he will be released in a respectful way,'' Dabbagh 
     said.
       Sadr said in an interview with an Italian newspaper 
     published Friday that a crackdown had begun and that 400 of 
     his men had been arrested, according to the Associated Press.
       Maliki told reporters this week that 430 Mahdi Army members 
     had been arrested in recent days, but Nadawi said Thursday 
     that the arrests stretched back to August 2004.
       In the interview, Sadr said his militiamen would not fight 
     back during the Muslim holy month of Muharram, which started 
     Friday for Sunnis and begins Saturday for Shiites, saying it 
     was against the faith to kill at that time.
       ``Let them kill us. For a true believer there is no better 
     moment than this to die: Heaven is ensured,'' he was quoted 
     as saying. ``After Muharram, we'll see.''
       Also on Friday, the U.S. military reported the death of an 
     American soldier killed Thursday by an improvised explosive 
     device.
       The soldier, who was not identified pending notification of 
     relatives, was traveling in a convoy conducting an escort 
     mission in a neighborhood in northwest Baghdad when the blast 
     occurred. Three other soldiers were injured.
                                  ____


              [From the Los Angeles Times, Jan. 18, 2007]

          Maliki Pledges To Treat Militants With an Iron Fist

                            (By Louise Roug)

       Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri Maliki promised Wednesday to 
     crack down on Shiite Muslim militias and Sunni Arab 
     insurgents, warning that no one--not even political ally 
     Muqtada Sadr--would be above the law.
       ``We will not allow any politicians to interfere with this 
     Baghdad security plan . . . whether they are Sunnis or 
     Shiites, Arabs or Kurds, militias or parties, insurgents or 
     terrorists,'' Maliki said in a rare interview.
       The prime minister's comments appeared to align his 
     government's security plan with the Bush administration's 
     call to confront Shiite militias. But in other remarks, 
     Maliki underscored his differences with the U.S., suggesting 
     that American miscalculations had worsened the bloodshed in 
     Iraq, and warning that his patience for political negotiation 
     with warring factions was wearing thin.
       ``When military operations start in Baghdad, all other 
     tracks will stop,'' Maliki said. ``We gave the political side 
     a great chance, and we have now to use the authority of the 
     state to impose the law and tackle or confront people who 
     break it.''
       U.S. officials have said that renewed military operations 
     should go hand in hand with efforts at political 
     reconciliation between warring Shiites and Sunnis.
       Maliki said if Iraqi security forces were given sufficient 
     training and equipment, they could stabilize the country 
     enough to allow the withdrawal of U.S. troops starting in 
     three to six months--a period in which President Bush's 
     proposed troop buildup would still be underway.
       He said if better U.S. training and supplies had come 
     earlier, lives could have been saved.
       ``I think that within three to six months our need for the 
     American troops will dramatically go down,'' Maliki said. 
     ``That's on the condition that there are real strong efforts 
     to support our military forces.''
       The U.S.-Iraq security plan involves sending 21,500 more 
     American troops to Iraq and 8,000 to 10,000 Iraqi forces to 
     Baghdad in an effort to quell the civil war between Sunnis 
     and Shiites that on average kills more than 100 people a day.
       Maliki said Iraqi security forces this week had detained 
     400 Shiite militiamen affiliated with Sadr, a radical Shiite 
     cleric whose followers constitute part of Maliki's political 
     base. He offered no further details.


                        Return to political form

       The interview, which took place in a pavilion inside the 
     heavily fortified Green Zone, was a return to the 
     freewheeling style that characterized Maliki's political 
     manner before he became prime minister last year.
       When asked whether the Bush administration needed him now 
     more than he needed the administration, Maliki laughed 
     uproariously, calling it an ``evil question.''
       Throughout, Maliki appeared confident and seemed to relish 
     the chance to respond to statements by Bush and U.S. 
     officials, including allegations that his government had 
     botched the hanging of deposed leader Saddam Hussein and had 
     not done enough to stop the sectarian violence.
       Commenting on a recent statement by Secretary of State 
     Condoleezza Rice, he said, ``Rice is expressing her own point 
     of view if she thinks that the [Iraqi] government is on 
     borrowed time,'' humorously suggesting that it might be the 
     Bush administration that is on borrowed time.
       ``I understand and realize that inside the American 
     administration there is some kind of a crisis situation, 
     especially after the results of the last election,'' he said.
       Maliki said suggestions by Bush officials that the U.S. did 
     not fully support his government played into the hands of 
     insurgents.
       ``I believe such statements give a morale boost to the 
     terrorists and push them toward making an extra effort, 
     making them believe they have defeated the American 
     administration,'' Maliki said. ``But I can tell you, they 
     haven't defeated the Iraqi government.''


                           Concern all around

       The widening split between the U.S. and Iraqi governments 
     comes at an inopportune time.
       Maliki has promised to carry out a security plan to halt 
     the civil war, but his government has been riddled with 
     sectarian fighting and corruption.
       The Bush administration is under fire in the U.S. over the 
     Iraq security plan. The strategy to send more American troops 
     is being resisted by many Democrats, who control the House 
     and the Senate.
       In Washington on Wednesday, a group of senators introduced 
     a nonbinding resolution opposing the troop buildup.
       In the Middle East, there is great concern that Iraq's 
     civil war could spill over into neighboring countries.
       When Rice visited Kuwait this week, officials told her that 
     the U.S. needed to start talks with Syria and Iran in order 
     to ease the violence in Iraq. But the White House has 
     resisted the suggestion, also put forward by the bipartisan 
     Iraq Study Group.
       U.S. rhetoric directed at Iran has become more aggressive 
     even as Iraq is working to strengthen its ties with its 
     eastern neighbor and largest trade partner.
       When American forces detained five Iranians in northern 
     Iraq last week, some Iraqi officials were angered by what 
     they saw as U.S. interference in their foreign affairs.
       In the interview, Maliki asserted his government's 
     independence from U.S. interests in the region. But he 
     underscored that the U.S. and Iraqi governments shared basic 
     goals for his country: stability and prosperity.
       ``The success that can be achieved in Iraq will be a 
     success for President Bush and the United States, and vice 
     versa,'' Maliki said. ``A failure here would be a failure for 
     President Bush and the United States.''
       He took issue with Bush's contentions during a PBS 
     interview Tuesday that Maliki's government ``has still got 
     some maturation to do,'' and that it had botched Hussein's 
     execution by allowing Shiite guards to taunt the former 
     leader and videotape his hanging.
       Maliki said that Hussein and his codefendants were given a 
     fair trial, and that it was his government's constitutional 
     prerogative to carry out the death penalty. He said Hussein 
     was shown greater respect than the former president gave to 
     his rivals.
       Maliki appeared to bristle at Bush's criticism, but he 
     acknowledged that ``mistakes had happened.'' He said he had 
     personally given orders to his deputies to treat Hussein with 
     respect before and after he was hanged.
       He said the pressure Bush was feeling might have prompted 
     the critical remarks.
       ``Maybe this has led to President Bush saying that he's 
     sorry, or he's not happy, ahout the way the execution 
     happened.''

  Significant developments like these are exactly the type of results 
the President is working toward. Iraqi officials must do more to defend 
their country and President Bush is making that clear. In turn, we must 
remain steadfast in our resolve to show the Iraqis that we will honor 
this renewed commitment by allowing the plan to proceed without trying 
to weaken it before it has a chance to work.
  Our new Commander in Iraq, General David H. Petraeus, has testified 
before the Senate Armed Services Committee that he would not be able to 
get his job done without an increase in troops.
  Think about that Mr. President. Just two weeks ago, the Senate 
unanimously approved General Petraeus to head our efforts in Iraq, but 
some in this body would now restrict his efforts by scuttling the new 
strategy before the General has been given opportunity to perform.
  Why would we support him and recognize his stellar career with a 
unanimous nomination vote, but say we would rather not give him the 
troops to get the job done we have sent him over there for?
  General Petraeus also testified that the adoption of a Congressional 
resolution of disapproval of our efforts in

[[Page S1690]]

Iraq would not have a beneficial effect on our troops. I've felt all 
along that the field commanders should be given the opportunity to try 
the new plan of action.
  Mr. President, I enter in the Record the following media report 
regarding General Petraeus' Senate confirmation hearing.

                [From the New York Times, Jan. 24, 2007]

          General Says New Strategy in Iraq Can Work Over Time

                         (By Michael R. Gordon)

       Lt. Gen. David H. Petraeus, President Bush's new choice as 
     the top commander in Iraq, told senators on Tuesday that the 
     new military strategy to secure Baghdad can work, and that he 
     had asked that the additional troops the administration 
     promised be deployed as quickly as possible.
       In his first public comments about Mr. Bush's plan to send 
     some 21,500 troops, the general described the situation in 
     Iraq as ``dire'' but not hopeless. He asserted that the 
     ``persistent presence'' of American and Iraqi forces in 
     strife-ridden Baghdad neighborhoods was a necessary step, but 
     also cautioned that the mission would not succeed if the 
     Iraqi government did not carry out its program of political 
     reconciliation.
       ``The way ahead will be neither quick nor easy, and 
     undoubtedly there will be tough days,'' he told the Senate 
     Armed Services Committee. ``We face a determined, adaptable, 
     barbaric enemy. He will try to wait us out. In fact any such 
     endeavor is a test of wills, and there are no guarantees.''
       But much of the hearing focused not on details of the 
     strategy about to unfold in Iraq, but rather on the political 
     debate within the Senate over resolutions that would signal 
     disapproval of the new strategy.
       When Senator John McCain, Republican of Arizona, who has 
     long favored sending more troops to Iraq, asked if approval 
     of a Senate resolution assailing Mr. Bush's new strategy 
     could hurt the morale of American troops, the general 
     replied, ``It would not be a beneficial effect, sir.''
       Asked by Senator Joseph I. Lieberman of Connecticut, who 
     also backs the plan, if a resolution would also ``give the 
     enemy some encouragement'' by suggesting that the American 
     people are divided, General Petraeus replied, ``That's 
     correct, sir.''
       That answer sparked admonishments by critics of Mr. Bush's 
     strategy, who insisted that the point of the Senate 
     resolutions is to put pressure on the government of Prime 
     Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki of Iraq to follow through on 
     its political program and take more responsibility for its 
     own security.
       ``We know this policy is going forward,'' said Senator 
     Hillary Rodham Clinton, Democrat of New York. ``We know the 
     troops are moving. We know that we're not likely to stop this 
     escalation. But we are going to do everything we can to send 
     a message to our government and the Iraqi government that 
     they had better change, because the enemy we are confronting 
     is adaptable.''
       Senator John W. Warner, the Virginia Republican who is 
     promoting a resolution opposing Mr. Bush's troop 
     reinforcement plan, cautioned General Petraeus to be sure 
     that ``this colloquy has not entrapped you into some 
     responses that you might later regret.''
       By the end of the hearing, General Petraeus sought to 
     extricate himself from the political tussle by insisting that 
     as a military man he did not want to take a position on the 
     Senate debate. ``There are a number of resolutions out 
     there,'' he said.
       ``Learning that minefields are best avoided and gone around 
     rather than walked through on some occasions, I'd like to 
     leave that one there.''
       Senator Carl Levin of Michigan, the Democratic chairman of 
     the panel, said later that he was satisfied that the general 
     had not intended to involve himself in the debate. The 
     exchanges at the hearing did not appear to have any ill 
     effect on the prospects for the confirmation of General 
     Petraeus, and Mr. McCain said he hoped the commander would 
     ``catch the next flight'' to Iraq after winning Senate 
     confirmation.
       When their questions focused on the military plan, senators 
     elicited several new details. General Petraeus said Lt. Gen. 
     Raymond T. Odierno, the day-to-day commander of American 
     troops in Iraq, advised that in order to carry out the new 
     strategy, five additional brigades were needed in Baghdad and 
     two additional battalions were needed in Anbar Province in 
     western Iraq.
       Under the current deployment schedule, it will be May 
     before all five of the brigades are in Iraq, but General 
     Petraeus hinted that he would like them sooner, saying that 
     he had asked the Pentagon to dispatch them ``as rapidly as 
     possible.''
       General Petraeus acknowledged that the guidelines in the 
     military's counterinsurgency manual implied that 120,000 
     troops would be needed to secure Baghdad. But he reasoned 
     that the roughly 32,000 American troops that would be 
     deployed in the capital under the plan would be enough, 
     because the total number of American and Iraqi security 
     personnel would be about 85,000, while the use of civilian 
     contractors to guard government buildings would reduce troop 
     requirements.
       If the troops are sent according to the current schedule, 
     General Petraeus said the United States would know by late 
     summer if the plan to clear contested neighborhoods of 
     insurgents and militias, hold them with American and Iraqi 
     security forces and win public support through reconstruction 
     was working.
       He said he would raise the issue of suspending troop 
     reinforcements with his military superiors if the Iraqi 
     government appeared to have not lived up to its commitments. 
     But he suggested that withholding assistance from specific 
     Iraqi institutions that fall short would have a greater 
     influence. The general also said that a decision to withdraw 
     American troops within six months would lead to more 
     sectarian attacks and increased ``ethnic cleansing.''
       General Petraeus acknowledged that he had concerns about 
     the absence of a unified command structure. Under the new 
     plan, the Iraqi Army and police units will be under direct 
     Iraqi command. The American Army units that work with them 
     will be under a parallel American command. To ensure proper 
     coordination, American officers are trying to establish joint 
     command posts.
       Senator Levin said his committee had repeatedly asked the 
     administration to make available a list of the security and 
     political ``benchmarks'' the Iraqi had agreed to meet. He 
     warned that the committee would use its subpoena power or 
     hold up military nominations if benchmarks were not provided.
       By insisting on that the benchmarks be provided, Mr. Levin 
     seemed to be trying to position himself to argue that the 
     ``surge'' of ``reinforcements be suspended if the Iraqis fell 
     short of meeting commitments.

  There is no doubt that we face extremely difficult challenges in Iraq 
and we have not made enough progress. The citizens of Iraq must be 
willing to fight for their own freedom. The President recognizes this 
and his new plan is the result of increased commitments from the Iraqi 
Prime Minister.
  Again, the cost of failure in Iraq is too great as far as our future 
long-term national security. It's in America's security interests to 
have an Iraq that can sustain, govern and defend itself. Too much is at 
stake to simply abandon Iraq at this point; the price of failure is too 
great.
  I wish we could move forward and have legitimate votes on when we 
should leave or if we should reduce funding for the effort. But 
unfortunately we won't proceed to those votes due to a decision of the 
Democratic leadership.
  Let me remind the American people, it is the majority leadership 
which determines the schedule here in the Senate. It is the Democratic 
leadership that does not want to have a real debate on Iraq. I would 
welcome an open and fair debate over our future involvement in Iraq and 
the Middle East.
  Personally, I cannot and will not support a proposal that would at 
this time condemn the new strategy our Commander in Chief has advocated 
for--a strategy that requires our full support in order for it to 
succeed. I would rather have an opportunity to vote on Senator Gregg's 
amendment in support of what our troops are trying to accomplish rather 
than a resolution that does nothing but diminish morale, sow confusion 
and discord without achieving anything but short term political 
pandering. If we are going to debate, let's have a real debate.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor, and I suggest the absence of a 
quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. REED. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. REED. Mr. President, I rise today to comment on the nomination of 
George Casey to be Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army. I have had the 
occasion, as so many others have had, to visit Iraq on numerous 
occasions to talk to General Casey. I knew of him before his 
appointment to Iraq. I think you have to first begin assessing his 
tenure in Iraq by understanding the situation as he arrived. He arrived 
after the CPA--the Coalition Provisional Authority--under Mr. Bremer 
had made systematic and fundamental mistakes with respect to the 
occupation. He arrived, in fact, after our national command authority 
entered a country and attempted an occupation without a plan. That, I 
think, can be attributed to many people but not to George Casey. 
Without this plan, they were improvising constantly, both on the 
military side and on the civilian side.
  The chief master of improvisation was Ambassador Jerry Bremer. He and 
his colleagues decided to disband the Iraqi Army without any 
alternative approach to retaining individuals, paying

[[Page S1691]]

them, or directing them into useful services. He also embarked on a 
very elaborate debaathification program.

  In this time it became increasingly more obvious that our forces, 
because of the misguided and poor decisions by the President and the 
Secretary of Defense, were engaging in an occupation without sufficient 
resources. This became most obvious in Abu Ghraib, an incident that 
shocked the conscience of the world, shocked America particularly. 
Again, this all preceded George Casey.
  When he arrived on the ground he had a situation of chaos, both 
administratively and also a situation in which the leadership of this 
Nation--not the officers but the civilian leadership--had grossly 
miscalculated in terms of successfully stabilizing this country.
  Over the intervening months, General Casey established some degree of 
administrative routine, some degree of planning. He, along with 
colleagues such as General Petraeus, started an Iraqi training program. 
Once again, to understand what he saw when he came in, I can recall, as 
can many of my colleagues, going up and being briefed by Secretary 
Rumsfeld and others about the 200,000 Iraqi security forces. In fact, 
they usually pulled out a big pie chart which each week was designed to 
show the slice of American forces as growing smaller and smaller. That 
was a total fiction. These people could not be found. When they were 
found, they were not trained. Again, that is what George Casey 
inherited.
  If people are trying to lay blame and accountability on someone, 
George Casey is somewhere in the middle or the end of the line. It 
begins at the top, with the President of the United States whose 
policies were flawed, with implementation that was incompetent. A large 
part of the burden should be shared by Secretary Rumsfeld whose 
personality, whose temperament added further to the chaos that we saw 
in Iraq. I think we could also include Secretary Wolfowitz and other 
civilians--Doug Feith, Steve Cambone all of them misguided and 
impervious to the reality of the ground in Iraq.
  Yet just a few weeks ago, as Secretary Rumsfeld left, he was lauded 
by the President of the United States and the Vice President as the 
greatest Secretary of Defense we have ever had. That is really 
accountability.
  This nomination is difficult in some respects because in that chaotic 
and difficult and challenging assignment, General Casey would be the 
first to admit that his performance was not without flaws. That is one 
of the appealing aspects of General Casey. He has a certain candor and 
honesty that he has generated throughout his entire career.
  Today, we are debating his nomination. I will support that 
nomination. I will support it not because he succeeded in every 
endeavor but because he gave his last ounce of effort and energy to a 
very difficult and challenging role. He made progress, but that 
progress today is hampered--but hampered not by his role, certainly, 
alone--but by strategic decisions that were made by the President, by 
the Secretary of Defense, and by many others.
  Interestingly enough, too, this nomination is not strictly the result 
of the President's work, but it is also that of Bob Gates who, I think, 
is an individual of competence and character who has already created a 
new tone and a good tone in the Department of Defense. Secretary Gates 
thought long and hard about this, and in some respects to suggest that 
Casey is the wrong person for this job is to question the judgment of 
Bob Gates. At this point, I am not quite ready to do that.
  I will support General Casey's nomination. He has an important role 
to play in the Army, an Army that because of this administration has 
been severely strained. All of the nondeployed units in the United 
States are not combat ready. There is a huge personnel turmoil caused 
by extended deployments overseas. The ability of the Army to modernize 
is sincerely compromised by operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. He has 
to face all these problems.
  There is something else he has to face, too--and, again, it goes 
right back to the top. It is the selective realism of this President 
and his Cabinet and his civilian leadership. I was amazed to look at 
the budget released yesterday, the budget that General Casey will have 
to operate with, to find out that this administration is estimating the 
cost of operations in Iraq--not in this fiscal year but the following 
one, starting October 1, 2008--at a mere $50 billion. Yes, I say a mere 
$50 billion because this year we will spend about $240 billion; yet 
next year it will remarkably be brought to $50 billion, although 
General Pace told me in my questioning that they operate with the 
assumption at the Pentagon they will spend at least $84 billion.
  Where is this $200 billion, or $34 billion, disappearing? It is 
disappearing into the fiction that this administration is trying to 
project, not just about Iraq but the deficit reduction, their tax cut 
plans--all of these things. And General Casey will have to work with 
that budget.
  And there are those in the Senate demanding we vote not to cut off 
funds for troops. We are not going to cut off funds. But I tell you 
what. If the President's budget is to be believed, come October 1 of 
2008 there will be a huge reduction in funds for those troops in Iraq--
but, then again, do we believe the President on this or many other 
issues?
  I will vote for General Casey. I think he should be criticized for 
shortcomings that he admits readily, but he should not be condemned 
because he was carrying out a strategy and a policy that was seriously 
flawed when he arrived on the ground in Iraq. He has done his best to 
do the job he was given.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from South Carolina.
  Mr. DeMINT. I ask unanimous consent I be allowed to speak 10 minutes 
in morning business.
  Mr. LEVIN. Reserving the right to object, of course, I will not--did 
I understand the Senator to say 10 minutes? We don't have any shortage 
of time, so I am not trying to restrict the Senator in any way. I just 
want to plan.
  Mr. DeMINT. Ten minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mrs. McCaskill). Without objection, it is so 
ordered.
  Mr. DeMINT. Madam President, I take a few minutes today, despite my 
hoarse voice, to discuss the fiscal year 2007 spending resolution that 
we will be debating next week.
  The operations of the Federal Government are currently being funded 
by a temporary spending measure that expires on February 15, and the 
proposed resolution will fund the Government for the rest of the year.
  It is important we understand how we got to this point. Last year, we 
did not debate and pass all of our annual spending bills before the 
November elections. When we came back after the election for the 
lameduck session, a few Members worked successfully to stop Congress 
from passing a last-minute, foot-tall omnibus spending bill--like this 
one--that would have been filled with thousands of wasteful earmarks. 
As a result, we passed an earmark-free stopgap spending measure that, 
if continued, would have saved the American taxpayer some $17 billion.
  There were several media reports last year that said Republicans were 
trying to push this debate into the future so Democrats would have to 
clean up this mess. That may have been true for some, but it was never 
true for me. My goal has always been to stop wasteful earmarks. I am 
happy to work with Members in either party to get that done. That is 
why I offered to work with the Democratic leader to pass a clean 
resolution this year that would not contain any new earmarks and that 
would keep spending at last year's levels.
  While the Democratic leader did not work with me on this measure, I 
am pleased to say that it does not contain any new earmarks. Let me say 
that again so that there won't be any confusion. There are no new 
earmarks in this spending resolution. I applaud the Democrats for 
continuing the progress we started last year.

  As my colleagues can see, this resolution is only 137 pages. That can 
be compared to where we were headed before we were able to stop the 
earmarks. It is a major improvement over the last omnibus spending bill 
we passed that has over 1,600 pages.
  Let me make another point clear if I could. This resolution does not 
stop the administration from enacting the hundreds and even thousands 
of earmarks

[[Page S1692]]

that are not written into this bill. As my colleagues know, over 95 
percent of all earmarks never show up in our bills but are buried in 
hidden committee reports that do not carry the force of law. This 
resolution says--the one we are considering next week--that the 
earmarks contained in fiscal year 2006, in the committee reports in 
2006, shall have no legal effect. That is a good thing, but those 
earmarks had no legal effect anyway. The administration was not bound 
by them last year and is not bound by them now.
  Also, this resolution is completely silent with respect to the 
earmarks in fiscal year 2007 in those committee reports. I am not sure 
why these reports were left out of this measure, but it appears to be a 
glaring mistake.
  The supporters of this resolution say it is earmark-free. While that 
is technically true, earmarks can still sneak in the back door. I 
praise Democrats when they call for a moratorium on earmarks, but this 
resolution does not actually achieve that goal. That is why I am 
sending a letter to the President today asking him to do his part by 
prohibiting anyone in his administration from giving preference to any 
earmark request that is not legally binding. We need to put a stop to 
committee report earmarks. We need to end the practice where a Member 
calls up a Federal agency and threatens its funding if it does not fund 
that Member's pet project.
  Our Federal agencies need to be free to use American tax dollars in 
ways that meet true national priorities rather than serving one special 
interest or another. The President has the power to stop secret 
earmarks. He said in his State of the Union that he wants to stop them. 
I hope he will do so.
  This spending resolution has several other flaws. For example, it 
uses budget gimmicks to hide its true cost. The proponents say it does 
not exceed the budget, but that is less than honest. First, it cuts 
spending on national defense programs with the expectation that funds 
will be added as emergency spending later this year. This is not the 
time to cut defense and security spending while adding social programs. 
It is not honest to hide spending this way. Second, the resolution also 
pays for new spending by cutting funding in budget accounts that are 
already empty. These are phony offsets, and they should not be used.
  This resolution not only pretends to reduce spending in places where 
it does not, it also fails to reduce spending where it should. First, 
the resolution leaves out thousands of congressional earmarks worth 
billions of dollars. Rather than passing those savings along to 
American taxpayers, it spends them on other programs. Second, this 
resolution fails to eliminate a number of programs which were proposed 
for termination by the President and agreed to last year by the House 
and the Senate Committee on Appropriations. These programs should be 
terminated, but this resolution fails to do so.
  There are a number of problems with this resolution. I hope we can 
fully debate this measure and offer amendments to make it stronger.
  I understand the Democratic leader does not intend to allow 
amendments, which is very unfortunate since we have plenty of time to 
consider and debate them. The current stopgap spending measure lasts 
for another week, and the House can easily take up our final bill and 
pass it in a matter of hours. I am glad there are no new earmarks 
written into the text of this resolution, and I thank my colleagues for 
that, but if we are not allowed to fix other problems in this 
resolution, I will not be able to support it.
  As I am sure many of my colleagues remember, I came to the floor a 
few weeks ago and had a spirited and important debate with the 
Democratic leader on how the Senate will disclose earmarks. We worked 
through that issue and came to a bipartisan agreement that resulted in 
earmark disclosure rules that were unanimously approved. It was a clear 
example of how this body can and should work together. I believe we can 
do that again on this resolution. I hope the Democratic leader will 
reconsider his position and work with us to allow a limited number of 
amendments.
  Madam President, I yield the floor and the remainder of my time.
  I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. BROWNBACK. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the 
order for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. BROWNBACK. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent to speak as 
in morning business for 15 minutes.
  Mr. LEVIN. No objection.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The Senator from Kansas.
  Mr. BROWNBACK. Madam President, I wish to address the body and my 
colleagues about Iraq, the complex situation that exists there today, 
the resolution we were not able to address on the floor this week. My 
hope is we will be able to address this resolution in the very near 
future.
  Iraq is one of the most important and, certainly, complex subjects we 
will ever debate on this floor. For example, there are some Members of 
this body who want to reduce this to an either/or decision: surge into 
Iraq or withdraw from it. But the issue cannot be discussed in such 
oversimplified terms, I do not believe. Our decisions, whatever they 
end up being, carry consequences far beyond the number of troops who 
are deployed within Iraq's borders. Those who favor a withdrawal or a 
phased withdrawal from Iraq must wholly appreciate those consequences.
  We have heard that withdrawal from Iraq would leave a safe haven for 
terrorists. That is almost certainly assured. We have heard that 
withdrawal would destabilize the region. That is certainly true as 
well. But a withdrawal is even worse than that. A cut-and-run strategy 
would set the stage for a regionwide conflict between gulf states, Arab 
countries, and Iran and its sphere of influence, and not just a 
regional war but a bigger one. Such a war would have enormous 
implications for the war on terrorism and stability around the world. 
We cannot withdraw from the Middle East and leave behind the kind of 
chaos in which al-Qaida thrives. If Arabs feel compelled to counter an 
Iranian threat, the governments are likely to become more radical, not 
more moderate. We recognized in the aftermath of September 11 that 
winning the war on terror requires the emergence of moderate 
governments across the Middle East. Withdrawing from Iraq would amount 
to pushing the governments of the region toward the arms of Islamist 
radicals and undermine the core of our counterterrorism strategy since 
9/11. This is not the way to go.
  We must acknowledge that we cannot afford to lose in Iraq because 
such a loss would reverse the gains we have made in the war on terror 
and extend the war on terror for years to come. On the other hand, I am 
not convinced that a troop surge into Iraq will usher in the sort of 
peace we need to take the place of the consequences I have just 
discussed.
  I have no doubt our forces are capable of winning any and every 
individual battle in which they engage. I have been with the troops. I 
have been with the troops within the past month. They are strong. They 
are determined. They are courageous. And they are doing a fabulous job. 
I believe strongly they are capable of defeating the al-Qaida 
insurgency in Iraq and, as they have demonstrated recently, they are 
quite capable of defeating Iranian agents seeking to foment violence 
and instability inside of Iraq. What they cannot do, what our troops 
cannot do, is achieve a political solution between Iraq's sectarian 
groups. That is a political problem which requires a political 
solution. As I found out during my recent travels to Iraq, the 
sectarian violence is the overwhelming cause of Iraq's difficulties. 
Additional troops on the streets simply will not make Sunni and Shia 
trust each other.
  I say this with great respect to General Petraeus, who is a friend, 
whom we have confirmed to be the commander of the multinational forces 
in Iraq. I met with General Petraeus several times during his tenure 
when he was commander at Fort Leavenworth in my home State of Kansas. 
He is a bright, articulate, and outstanding officer. I believe he is 
well qualified to take on this extraordinarily difficult assignment. I 
voted to confirm him because he is the right man for such a difficult 
position, and I wish him Godspeed.

[[Page S1693]]

  I understand there are different constitutional roles that must be 
played in the debate over our strategy in Iraq. The President has the 
responsibility as Commander in Chief to direct the Armed Forces. As 
part of that responsibility, he sent us a commander he believes will 
serve well under his overall direction, and I could not agree more.
  The Senate has the right, if it chooses, to express its opinion of 
the President's actions. And we do so. It is entirely possible for the 
Senate to express its disapproval of the President's strategy without 
taking steps to undermine the commander or the troops. I have indicated 
that I do not support the President's surge plan, but I did not attempt 
to undermine the Commander in Chief or our soldiers in the field by 
voting against General Petraeus, who is very well qualified for 
command, nor will I attempt or support efforts to undermine our troops 
by withdrawing their funding. This is the essence of disagreeing at 
home while being united overseas.
  A Senate debate over strategy is consistent with our constitutional 
roles to voice opinion and oversee the executive branch. Denying 
promotions of qualified leaders or cutting funding to the troops in the 
field would not only be inappropriate but irresponsible.
  Let me now turn to those things which I endorse wholeheartedly.
  First, I support our troops. They are brave, as I have stated, 
dedicated, and talented. They deserve not only our admiration and 
gratitude but our very best efforts to help them achieve their mission. 
And I support that mission. Our troops are vital to prevent the kind of 
regional instability I spoke of earlier. They are crucial to denying 
radical Islamic extremists a safe haven from which they can launch 
further attacks. They are essential to providing the training necessary 
for the Iraqi security forces to take charge of their own country's 
security.
  As I have said, we cannot afford to lose this fight. Iraq is the key 
front in the war on terrorism. We must remain in Iraq as long as it 
takes to ensure that Iraq can fend off external threats in a tough 
neighborhood as well as take full responsibility for its own internal 
security and prevent the establishment of terrorist safe havens within 
its territory. But I fully understand we cannot sustain this kind of 
long-term commitment in Iraq that will likely be necessary unless we 
have bipartisan support here at home. We must be united here if we are 
to achieve victory over there.
  This principle was at the foundation of the efforts of the Baker-
Hamilton commission, which sought to bring people together on a way 
forward that could have broad support. I supported the commission's 
report as something we could rally around together. I do not agree with 
every part of that report. Some recommendations, such as those linking 
the Arab-Israeli conflict with the problems in Iraq, just do not seem 
to make sense to me. Neither a peace accord between Israel and 
Palestinians nor new arrangements in the Golan Heights will convince 
Iran or al-Qaida to get out of Iraq or end the sectarian violence. But 
I supported the overall report because it could have been something we 
could use to build bipartisan support for a new strategy in Iraq.
  If we cannot rally around that report, perhaps we can rally around a 
Senate resolution that can gain strong bipartisan support, uniting us 
here to win over there. Many of us have been working toward this goal. 
Many of us support a resolution or resolutions that provide responsible 
opposition to the surge. We do not want to see funds withdrawn from our 
troops, nor do we believe in withdrawing from Iraq. I hope the party 
now in the majority in this Chamber will articulate exactly what it can 
support.
  There has been a lot of discussion in the last several days about 
funding for our troops. I am concerned that already there are plans to 
use the supplemental and the regular appropriations process to restrict 
funding for operations in Iraq. Our troops face the threat of real 
casualties daily. They ought not be casualties of our debates on Iraq.
  I have indicated my support for the Warner resolution because it 
responsibly articulates an opposition to the surge while guaranteeing 
our troops in the field have the support they deserve from this body 
and from the American public. This is a responsible approach. I hope 
that whatever resolution reaches the floor includes a promise of 
support for our troops. I will not support proposals that do not 
include such provisions. We need this debate, and we need to vote on 
this.
  I believe there is a way we can come together across the aisle. I 
think we can be clear about our priorities. The first priority I think 
we can agree on is getting the Iraqis to work and agree on a political 
solution to the sectarian violence occurring between Sunnis and Shias. 
We must encourage the Iraqis to reach a political equilibrium, 
eliminating the motivation for sectarian strife. We should make sure 
Iraq's borders are secure. We should chase the foreign fighters out of 
Iraq and deny the terrorists safe haven. And we should limit the 
influence of Iran.
  I believe we can sustain this kind of military strategy for the 
necessary time to come, preserving our interests while we put pressure 
on Iraq's various groups to reach a political settlement. For this 
reason, I have indicated support for the resolution, as I stated, put 
forward by Senator Warner. I believe it is the most constrictive 
resolution we will consider. It outlines the importance of winning in 
Iraq, opposes the surge, offers reasonable political and military 
goals, and praises the efforts of our men and women in uniform. This 
resolution moves us toward the kind of consensus needed for success.
  Other proposals that fail to recognize the consequences of failure, 
that advocate a precipitous withdrawal, or that provide less than full 
support for our men and women in uniform, polarize, move us away from 
consensus and further from victory.
  Madam President, the Senate needs to express itself on the subject of 
Iraq. I hope we can get to a vote on a resolution that will have strong 
bipartisan support that achieves the goals I have outlined and sustains 
our commitments for as long as it takes to win in Iraq. We need to have 
an open process. We need to be able to vote on various resolutions. 
This is the most important issue facing our country. We should have a 
full, open debate and debate about it a long time and vote on several 
resolutions that people see as key. We need to address this, and we 
need to do it now. We can win. We must pull together.
  Madam President, I thank the Chair and suggest the absence of a 
quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. COCHRAN. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. COCHRAN. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that I be 
permitted to speak for up to 15 minutes as in morning business.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. COCHRAN. Madam President, there has been much debate and 
discussion about President Bush's plan for a new way forward in Iraq. 
In fact, there was much discussion between the President and his team 
of military and civilian advisers prior to his making the decision to 
change course and outline a new strategy to help bring stability to the 
country and to hasten the day when our troops could come home.
  There is no easy answer and no easy solution to the situation in Iraq 
and the Middle East. The President's decision was informed by input 
from many sources, including his national security advisers, civilian 
and military, members of his Cabinet, his intelligence experts, as well 
as Members of Congress, foreign leaders, and others with foreign policy 
experience. In the end, it was the President who decided this new 
strategy and that this new strategy had the best chance of success.
  He acknowledged, and we all know, there is no guarantee of success. 
But the dangers are too great to not try to create an opportunity to 
provide an increased level of stability in Iraq. A temporary deployment 
of additional U.S. troops in Iraq to support the Iraqi security forces 
will provide a new window of opportunity for Iraqi political and 
economic initiatives to take hold and reduce sectarian violence.
  The President and his military and civilian advisers reviewed last 
year's

[[Page S1694]]

efforts and determined there were not enough troops to secure the 
cleared neighborhoods. They also determined that unnecessarily 
burdensome operational restrictions were placed on the military. The 
President and our military leaders have assured us that these mistakes 
will not be repeated.
  Prime Minister Maliki has assured us that more Iraqi troops will be 
engaged in the fight and that political restrictions will be removed. 
In addition, the Prime Minister of Iraq has committed to take 
responsibility for security for all Iraq provinces by November, to work 
to pass legislation to share oil revenues equitably among Iraqi 
citizens, and to spend $10 billion of Iraqi reserve funds for 
reconstruction and initiatives that will create jobs. He will also work 
toward demobilizing militias, holding provincial elections, and 
reforming debaathification laws, which should help improve the civil 
structure so the Government can meet the needs of its people and help 
promote economic growth.
  Last week the National Intelligence Estimate, entitled ``Prospects 
for Iraq's Stability: A Challenging Road Ahead,'' was delivered to 
Congress. I will not speak to the 90-page classified report. But there 
were some unclassified judgments provided to us that I can mention. 
Within this National Intelligence Estimate, this information is 
provided to support these conclusions:

       If strengthened Iraqi security forces, more loyal to the 
     government and supported by Coalition forces, are able to 
     reduce levels of violence and establish more effective 
     security for Iraq's population, Iraqi leaders could have an 
     opportunity to begin the process of political compromise 
     necessary for longer-term stability, political progress, and 
     economic recovery.
       Nevertheless, even if violence is diminished, given the 
     current winner-take-all attitude and sectarian animosities 
     infecting the political scene, Iraqi leaders will be hard 
     pressed to achieve sustained political reconciliation in the 
     timeframe of this Estimate.
       Coalition capabilities, including force levels, resources, 
     and operations, remain an essential stabilizing element in 
     Iraq. If Coalition forces were withdrawn rapidly during the 
     term of this Estimate, [that is 12 to 18 months] we judge 
     that this almost certainly would lead to a significant 
     increase in the scale and scope of sectarian conflict in 
     Iraq, intensify Sunni resistance to the Iraqi government, and 
     have adverse consequences for national reconciliation.
       If such a rapid withdrawal were to take place, we judge 
     that the ISF [Iraqi Security Forces] would be unlikely to 
     survive as a nonsectarian national institution: neighboring 
     countries--invited by Iraqi factions or unilaterally--might 
     intervene openly in the conflict; massive civilian casualties 
     and forced population displacement would be probable; AQI 
     [al-Qaida in Iraq] would attempt to use parts of the 
     country--particularly al-Anbar province--to plan increased 
     attacks in and outside of Iraq; and spiraling violence and 
     political disarray in Iraq, along with Kurdish moves to 
     control Kirkuk and strengthen autonomy, could prompt Turkey 
     to launch a military incursion.

  Madam President, these statements remind me of prepared testimony 
presented by Dr. Henry Kissinger to the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee on January 31. He indicated that U.S. forces are 
indispensable and withdrawal would not only have dire consequences in 
Iraq but would also have a negative impact on the region. I will quote 
from Dr. Kissinger's testimony at that hearing in the Senate:

       The disenchantment of the American public with the burdens 
     it has borne largely alone for nearly four years has 
     generated growing demands for some type of unilateral 
     withdrawal, usually expressed as benchmarks to be put to the 
     Baghdad government that, if not fulfilled in specific 
     timeframes, would trigger American disengagement.
       But under present conditions, withdrawal is not an option. 
     American forces are indispensable. They are in Iraq not as a 
     favor to its government or as a reward for its conduct. They 
     are there as an expression of the American national interest 
     to prevent the Iranian combination of imperialism and 
     fundamentalist ideology from dominating a region on which the 
     energy supplies of the industrial democracies depend. An 
     abrupt American departure would greatly complicate efforts to 
     stem the terrorist tide far beyond Iraq; fragile governments 
     from Lebanon to the Persian Gulf would be tempted into 
     preemptive concessions. It might drive the sectarian conflict 
     in Iraq to genocidal dimensions beyond levels that impelled 
     U.S. intervention in the Balkans. Graduated withdrawal would 
     not ease these dangers until a different strategy was in 
     place and showed progress. For now, it would be treated 
     within Iraq and in the region as the forerunner of a total 
     withdrawal, and all parties would make their dispositions 
     on that basis.
       President Bush's decision should, therefore, not be debated 
     in terms of the ``stay the course'' strategy he has 
     repeatedly disavowed in recent days. Rather, it should be 
     seen as the first step toward a new grand strategy relating 
     power to diplomacy for the entire region, ideally on a 
     nonpartisan basis.
       The purpose of the new strategy should be to demonstrate 
     that the United States is determined to remain relevant to 
     the outcome in the region; to adjust American military 
     deployments and numbers to emerging realities; and to provide 
     the maneuvering room for a major diplomatic effort to 
     stabilize the Middle East. Of the current security threats in 
     Iraq--the intervention of outside countries, the presence of 
     al-Qaida fighters, an extraordinarily large criminal element, 
     the sectarian conflict--the United States has a national 
     interest in defeating the first two; it must not involve 
     itself in the sectarian conflict for any extended period, 
     much less let itself be used by one side for its sectarian 
     goals.

  Madam President, it is clear to me from Dr. Kissinger's comments that 
it is truly in our national interest to support the President's new 
strategy to help provide a new opportunity for political and economic 
solutions in Iraq and for more effective diplomatic efforts in the 
Middle East region. Of course, we know there are no guarantees of 
success. But according to the National Intelligence Estimate, the 
perspective of one of our most experienced foreign policy experts, Dr. 
Kissinger, included maintaining the current course or withdrawal 
without additional stability in Iraq will be harmful to our national 
interests and to the entire region.
  Over the last few weeks, there have been a number of hearings in 
which the situation in Iraq and the President's new plan have been 
debated. During the January 30, 2007, hearing before the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee on his nomination to be Deputy Secretary of State, 
Ambassador John Negroponte stated:

       . . . I believed, and still believe, that it is possible 
     for Iraq to make a successful transition to democracy. What I 
     would like to say is that my belief that success in Iraq 
     remains possible is based on my experience in dealing with 
     Iraq as U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. and Ambassador to Iraq, 
     and as Director of National Intelligence.

  We know there are challenges in Iraq and in the region. And the 
President has developed a new strategy for dealing with the problem, 
which I applaud. This includes involving the Government in Iraq and the 
military forces and the police in Iraq in a more aggressive way. 
Together they have worked with our military and diplomatic leadership 
to come up with a new plan that, if it is not undermined by the 
Congress, has a chance of succeeding.
  During the January 23 hearing before the Senate Armed Services 
Committee on the nomination of General David Petraeus to be Commander 
of the Multinational Forces-Iraq, General Petraeus said:

       I believe this plan can succeed if, in fact, all of those 
     enablers and all the rest of the assistance is, in fact, 
     provided.

  He, also, indicated this:

       It will not be easy, but if we could get them to where they 
     are shouting instead of shooting, that would be a very 
     substantial improvement.

  Madam President, it is obvious to me we need to do what we can to 
help stabilize this situation and bring our troops home. As a beginning 
point for this strategy, for it to work, we should show a commitment by 
our country to success. I support this new initiative, and I think we 
should give it a chance to work.
  This does not mean we should not monitor the situation or that the 
plan should not be adjusted as new developments occur. But we need to 
move forward in hopes of stabilizing Iraq, stabilizing the region, and 
in hopes of bringing our troops home at an early date. The President 
deserves our support in this effort, and I intend to support him.
  I yield the floor and suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. GRAHAM. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Obama). Without objection, it is so 
ordered.
  Mr. GRAHAM. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to speak for 5 
minutes as in morning business on Iraq.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. GRAHAM. Mr. President, this whole debate regarding what the 
Senate should do and how to send the right

[[Page S1695]]

messages regarding Iraq war policy is important, but the most important 
message the Senate can send, to me, would be to our troops and to our 
potential enemies.
  Everybody in America understands the war is not going well. Those who 
don't understand it are in denial because it clearly has not been the 
success we were hoping for.
  The new strategy we are about to embark on, the Petraeus doctrine, 
for lack of a better word, I do believe has the best chance left for us 
to succeed, and additional troops in Iraq can make a huge difference. 
We have been able to clear in the past but never hold. We don't need 
any more combat power to clear. We have won every battle we have ever 
been in with the insurgents. But we have been unable to hold the 
territory. Mr. President, 17,500 more troops in Baghdad would allow us 
to hold territory for the purpose of political reconciliation.
  The ultimate question for the body is how to bring out the best in 
the Iraqi political leadership. Some say we need to send a strong 
message that we are going to leave at a date certain, threaten to cut 
off funding for the Iraqi military, quit providing security to 
political leaders in Iraq.
  My answer is that democracy is hard without being shot at. The reason 
we don't solve immigration, Social Security, and other emotional 
problems is because in our own country we get locked down by pretty 
extreme voices who have political action committees and run 527 ads.
  The problem the Iraqi political leadership has to deal with is a 
violent country, to the point where it is hard to get political 
compromise. It is tough to go to Baghdad and do an oil-sharing revenue 
agreement among Sunnis, Kurds, and Shias when 100 of your constituents 
have been shot in the head and left out in the street that day.
  So I believe precondition to political reconciliation is better 
security and the better security can only be achieved by going into 
militia strongholds that were previously off limits, by more combat 
capability on the ground to hold territory cleared, and by putting the 
Iraqi troops out front with a sufficient support network behind them 
and American hands to give them the capacity they are lacking today to 
deal with the insurgency.
  The McCain-Graham-Lieberman resolution understands a million troops 
won't matter if the Iraqi political leadership doesn't reach political 
consensus on oil, rule of law, and on a million other problems they 
have. But the benchmarks in our resolution are an acknowledgment that 
it takes political compromise in Iraq to bring about stability, but we 
cannot have that political compromise with this level of violence.
  The resolution also talks about a failed state in Iraq and the 
consequences to this country. They are long lasting and far reaching. A 
failed state in Iraq is partitioned, where the civil war environment 
spreads to the region, as a disaster. So if you throw in the towel on 
Iraq, you don't stop the fight; you guarantee a larger fight.
  The debate for the Senate is how many votes should we have to express 
the differences we have in this body? If the Warner-Levin resolution--I 
respect both authors, but I just disagree with the message it sends--if 
Warner-Levin is ever adopted by this body, the headlines throughout 
this world will be: Senate condemns surge. Baghdad lost.
  The resolution disapproves of sending more troops. I believe we need 
more troops in the short term to bring about political reconciliation. 
But it is not only me saying it. It is General Petraeus, the commander. 
I think the message from the resolution considers his efforts lost 
before they have had a chance to be implemented. It is a lack of 
resolve in terms of the enemy. The enemy will see this as a lack of 
resolve on our part, and no good comes from it because it doesn't stop 
the troops.
  Secondly, it says you can continue operations in Anbar, the Sunni 
area where al-Qaida is operating, but you can't go into Baghdad. 
Baghdad is a mess. Baghdad is a very violent place where they have 
sectarian violence occurring. The question is: Do we stop it now or let 
it grow bigger? There are 6 million people in Baghdad. The nightmare I 
worry about is an open civil war, where we have a bloodletting that 
will bring in Sunni Arab nations to come to the aid of their Sunni 
brothers, Iran will get involved in the south of Iraq, and nothing good 
will come of that.
  The reason we are having this sectarian violence is because al-Qaida 
struck the mother lode when it bombed the Golden Mosque in Samarra, the 
third most holy religious site in the Shia religion. That has created 
sectarian fighting that has gotten out of control.
  For decades, Sunnis and Shias married and lived together in Baghdad 
and other places. The Shia population was terribly oppressed during the 
Saddam Hussein regime, but the Shia majority had remarkable restraint 
up until the bombing of the mosque, which was al-Qaida inspired. I 
don't want to give in to acts of terrorism that bring out the worst in 
people.
  Our goal is not to get the oil from Iraq; it is not to create a 
puppet state for the United States in Iraq. It is to bring out the best 
in the Iraqi people, to allow the moderates in the region a chance to 
conquer and defeat the extremists who have no place for anybody other 
than only their way of doing business, including us.
  We can't kill enough of the terrorists to win, but we surely can 
empower the moderates so they have a chance of winning.
  I am glad we did not take a vote in isolation on Warner-Levin. It 
would have been 50-something votes, less than 60, and the headlines 
throughout the world would read: Surge condemned. Baghdad lost. It 
would have been embarrassing to the President. This is not about 
President Bush being embarrassed. It is about the message we send to 
our troops and our enemies.
  The reason the Senate is not the House is because we have a chance 
for the minority; we have a chance to have a healthy, full debate. We 
were asking for two votes, not one. If you are going to vote on Warner-
Levin, fine, I will come to the floor and take the responsibility for 
opposing it, vote against it, and argue vehemently that it undercuts 
our efforts in Iraq. But there was another vote being proposed on the 
Judd Gregg amendment that simply said we will not cut off funding, we 
will not cap troops as a statement of this body. It would have gotten 
70 votes. And the reason we couldn't have those two votes, in my 
opinion, is because the Democratic left--and we have them on the 
right--would have ginned up and gone nuts over the idea that the 
Democratic caucus would not cut off funding for a war that the 
Democratic left thought should have ended last week.
  I know what it is like. I have been through this on immigration. Once 
your base gets mad at you, it is not pleasant, but you can't build 
policies around bloggers.
  So I am glad the Senate did not take a single vote that was designed 
to embarrass a single political element in the country. If we are going 
to debate Iraq on the floor of the Senate, we should be willing to take 
more than one vote. Two votes is not too much to ask.
  Where we go from here, I don't know. I can't promise success from 
this new strategy, but I can promise the consequences of failure, and 
these young men and women who will leave to go off as part of this new 
strategy, I know every Member of the Senate wishes them well and prays 
for their safety. But I do hope as they leave, we do not take any 
action to undercut their efforts because of 2008 politics. The war in 
Iraq is much bigger than the next election.
  I yield the floor. I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, during the course of the afternoon, a 
group of Republican Senators have been meeting, including our final 
meeting with our distinguished Republican leader, Mitch McConnell, and 
our assistant Republican leader, Senator Lott. We now have a letter 
signed by seven Senators: myself, Senator Collins, Senator Smith, 
Senator Voinovich, Senator Snowe, Senator Hagel, and Senator Coleman. 
The letter is addressed

[[Page S1696]]

to our two Republican leaders and to the distinguished majority leader, 
Senator Reid, and the assistant majority leader, Senator Durbin.
  I would like to now read the text of the letter to place it into the 
Record:

       Dear Leaders: The war in Iraq is the most pressing issue of 
     our time. It urgently deserves the attention of the full 
     Senate and a full debate on the Senate floor without delay.
       We respectfully advise you, our leaders, that we intend to 
     take S. Con. Res. 7 and offer it, where possible, under the 
     Standing Rules of the Senate, to bills coming before the 
     Senate.
       On January 10, 2007, the President stated, with respect to 
     his Iraq strategy, ``if Members have improvements that can be 
     made, we will make them. If circumstances change, we will 
     adjust.'' In a conscientious, respectful way, we offered our 
     resolution consistent with the President's statement.
       We strongly believe the Senate should be allowed to work 
     its will on our resolution as well as on the concepts brought 
     forward by other Senators. Monday's procedural vote should 
     not be interpreted as any lessening of our resolve to go 
     forward advocating the concepts of S. Con. Res. 7.
       We will explore all of our options under the Senate 
     procedures and practices to ensure a full and open debate on 
     the Senate floor. The current stalemate is unacceptable to us 
     and to the people of this country.

  Mr. President, for reference purposes, a copy of S. Con. Res. 7 is 
printed in the Record of Monday, February 5, 2007 at page 51556.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor, and I suggest the absence of a 
quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent the order for the 
quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, in the debate over whether we should be 
supporting or withdrawing our support from the President's plan to 
surge over 20,000 more troops into Iraq, I am acutely aware of one 
overriding irony. Those who are seeking to begin the withdrawal from 
Iraq are committing the same conceptual error that many of the same 
critics have accused the administration of committing when they made 
their flawed plans for the invasion of Iraq. They are not thinking 
about what will happen on the day after we begin our withdrawal.
  Let me say that the situation in which we find ourselves today in 
Iraq is certainly in part due to the administration's failure to 
anticipate many variables in the Iraqi theater, in the region, and in 
Iraqi society. Those who prepared only for the military defeat of 
Saddam's forces committed such a profound error that it will be a 
lesson learned in the history books long after we are gone.
  We did not prepare for the vehemence with which certain elements of 
the displaced Sunni elite would fight to retain their status quo.
  We did not anticipate how fractured and weak the oppressed Shia 
society of Iraq would be once the dictator was deposed, and we did not 
appreciate how unprepared the Shia would be to present true leadership.
  And we did not anticipate, because we apparently did not plan for 
this, that a political and leadership vacuum created by the fall of 
Saddam would invite the influence of Iran, whose interests in Iraq are 
anything but charitable.
  The mistakes that we have read so much about--the failure to secure 
massive ammunition dumps, the peremptory disbanding of the Iraqi army, 
the sweeping de-Baathification policies that alienated many Sunnis not 
directly responsible for the Saddam's tyranny--all of these mistakes 
derive from our failure to think about what would happen in Iraq the 
day after Saddam fell. It was a much more profound mistake than not 
sending enough troops; we simply did not imagine that we would be 
facing problems that would require more troops.
  Thinking of what was the most fundamental criticisms of our failures 
to anticipate the terror of September 11, I am reminded of the 9/11 
Commission's conclusion that we did not have the imagination to prepare 
for that attack.
  In Iraq, where our imagination failed again, a thorough understanding 
of Iraqi history and society should have helped.
  I am not talking about rehashing the history of imperialists, who 
would argue to justify their creation of the unnatural state of Iraq, 
or who would argue about the superiority of one sect over the other.
  I am not talking about the history as told by anthropologists, who 
argue about ancient fights and long-simmering disputes.
  A thorough study and understanding of Iraq would have required us--
and the top policymakers of this administration--to understand the 
complexity of Iraqi society as it was in 2003. And if we had done so, 
we would have had the imagination to prepare for the many contingencies 
that quite naturally developed when we so boldly sought to change the 
status quo.
  We know that we had next to no intelligence on Iraq--and if you have 
read the latest NIE on Iraq put out last Friday, you will be dismayed, 
as I am, to read that we have very little more intelligence today.
  But how about open source knowledge on which we could have made more 
careful assessments of what to expect the day after the tyrant toppled?
  It was a tragic mistake to underestimate the role of criminality 
underpinning Saddam's regime in its last decrepit days, a criminality 
that was unleashed immediately after we invaded and which has added 
great complexity to the conflict among the many armed groups in Iraq 
today.
  But we should not have underestimated the reluctance with which the 
Sunnis would accept their new de-classed position in Iraq.
  We should not have overestimated the ability of the Shia, with no 
political experience, to assume political power. Had we properly 
assumed the difficulties that we would have faced, we should have been 
prepared for a period of instability, during which the neighbor to the 
east, Iran, would not sit idle.
  I say this because I cannot support the administration today without 
honestly assessing what happened in the preparation and implementation 
of this war over 4 years ago.
  And now, 4 years later, the Senate has determined to take up an 
increasingly partisan debate over what to do to prevent losing the Iraq 
war.
  And we are now debating a variety of what I hope will be non-binding 
resolutions in response to the President's announcement to surge 21,500 
troops into the Iraq conflict.
  This is an extremely somber moment in the history of this nation. We 
find ourselves in the midst of a war that it appears some still do not 
fully understand. It is a war whose dynamics and politics are 
completely in flux, and with the consequences of both our actions in 
the field--as well as in our politics right here--being profound for 
the Iraqi people, the Middle East region and our national security.
  Make no mistake: What we do communicate is America's political will, 
and our political will is directly related to the morale of our troops. 
Those who seek to, for rhetorical purposes only, assert their support 
of the troops while communicating their opposition to their mission 
cannot sever this natural connection between political will and morale.
  While it is always good for the Senate to debate great matters of war 
and peace--and, indeed, there are no more important matters--the 
imbalance between partisan rhetoric and substantive direction on this 
question has been, to my mind, unsettling. A perilous state of war in 
Iraq is not improved by the partisan level of debate here.
  I have watched the course of this conflict with increasing concern 
and dismay.
  As I said, I have been profoundly disappointed in realizing the 
errors we have made in implementing this war.
  I have been greatly dismayed in the failure of the Iraqi people to 
resist the descent into sectarian violence, and their failure to demand 
leadership from their elected leaders.
  I have been horrified by the level of barbarism. I have not been 
surprised, I must say, by the Sunni jihadists, whose barbarism should 
be well known by now, but by Shia militias, who, operating under a 
government dominated by the Iraqi Shia for the first time in modern 
Iraq's history, seem to operate without restraint or morality by their 
authorities in their nihilistic persecution of their real and perceived 
enemies. I can understand the sense of revenge one must feel when one 
has been

[[Page S1697]]

released from decades of oppression; I can understand the anger and 
despair one feels when one's family is targeted for murder; I can 
appreciate the rage when one's shrines and mosques are bombed. I will 
never understand a revenge that takes as its victims other innocents 
and noncombatants.
  The American people have been shocked by this level of brutality as 
well--but we shouldn't call it mindless, because in the diabolic minds 
of the Sunni al-Qaida and ex-Baathist perpetrators, it has a reason: to 
push Iraq into chaos. In the minds of the bloody Shia militia leaders 
like Moqtada al-Sadr, there is also a rationale: Their militias 
complete the cyclical logic of barbarism.
  In this cycle is perpetuated a nihilistic violence that will so 
destabilize Iraq that the Sunni jihadists will be able to create a 
safehaven where they will expand their reach and refocus on their long-
term goals. They are succeeding, and if they succeed they will focus on 
us.
  In this cycle is perpetuated a nihilistic violence that will so 
destabilize Iraq that the Shia will be left so victimized and subject 
to militia rule that Iran will further assert its influence to 
undermine this fledgling nation. If post-Saddam Iraq succeeds, its 
success would provide the Shia world with an alternate model to the 
corrupt and failing regime in Tehran. If it fails, Tehran will have a 
field in which to meddle for years.

  The Iraqi Shia, so traumatized by years of oppression under Saddam, 
and traumatized--let us be perfectly honest about this--by America 
misleading them and neglecting them in their hour of need immediately 
after the first gulf war--have failed to stand up and present political 
figures who can assert leadership instead of political impotence.
  Iran is not a passive player here, no.
  It is not in Iran's interest for the Iraqi Shia to build a strong, 
independent, Shia Arab state.
  It is not in Iran's interest to have the seminaries of Najaf and 
Karbala returned to their central position in the world of Shia 
scholarship, possibly eclipsing Qum. To have this occur would lessen 
the legitimacy Iran desperately needs as ideological cover for Persian 
supremacy. The Iraqi Shia, Arabs who were the rank-and-file cannon 
fodder in the 8-year war against Iran, are now left open to Iran's 
meddling by their own weak government.
  The Sunnis, Iraqi and others throughout the region, are quick to tell 
us we have fallen into a preexisting and ancient conflict between the 
Arabs and the Persians, and the Iraqi Shia and their seemingly hapless 
leaders are caught in between. And that is where we find ourselves 
today.
  Now the Senate is to respond to the policy advanced by the President 
before the Nation on January 10.
  We are to express approval or disapproval to the President's 
initiative in the middle of a war like this Nation has never faced. At 
a moment when the situation in Iraq is critical and the outcome is 
uncertain, some believe our excercise here will provide valuable 
clarity.
  As I have said, it is fitting that the Senate debate this war.
  From the day we passed a resolution authorizing the use of force to 
remove Saddam Hussein the fall of 2002, it has been fitting to debate 
this war, and we have, through many floor speeches and amendments to 
authorizing or appropriating legislation. Whether it is fitting that we 
respond to the President's latest change in military strategy with 
these resolutions is another matter.
  I have paid a great deal of attention to the hearings held before the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the Senate Armed Services 
Committee. I thank and commend the chairmen and ranking minority 
members of both committees for the many opportunities for substantive 
review they have sought to present to us and to the American public.
  Dozens of substantive testimonies have been submitted, and the 
questioning has been, in many cases, direct and detailed.
  As a member of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, I have 
also had the opportunity to listen to the opinions of the leaders of 
the intelligence community, and I have read the reports coming from 
Iraq including, most recently, the National Intelligence Estimate 
released last Friday.
  The public needs to be reminded: There are no silver bullets, no 
glowing assessments, no confident predictions.
  Surrounding this debate, there is a level of political taunting 
amongst ourselves that I find troubling.
  From the majority leader, I hear public pronouncements of 21 
Republican seats to be defended in 2008--and I find it disturbing that 
anyone would question that a Senator of any party would hinge his or 
her voice on such momentous policy problems for the purpose of personal 
political survival.
  Does anyone doubt that the November election in 2008 is a world away 
from the carnage of Iraq today?
  Can anyone predict with certainty what the situation will be in Iraq 
almost 2 years from now?
  I do not like the rhetoric of ``cut and run'' any more than I like 
the rhetoric accusing members of my party for ``heading for the tall 
grass.''
  Lives are in balance and we should not be throwing around glib 
rhetoric.
  In that sense, the exclamation of a member of my party 2 weeks ago 
that we should all be accountable on these resolutions or go be shoe 
salesmen has a certain urgency, although I do not condescend to the 
working man, a good many of whom are fighting in this war as we speak.
  Nor do I believe that if I go and buy a pair of shoes from a good 
shoe salesman today that those shoes will not last longer and give 
better value than some of the resolutions being bandied about today, to 
be forgotten months from now when the war will bring to us either the 
reality of some progress toward stability, more stalemate in strife or 
even greater chaos.
  One should predict the future with caution and humility. But, I can 
make one prediction here, particularly to those on the other side of 
the aisle: Iraq will be a central issue before this Congress, and 
before the next administration, in 2009.
  We cannot make it go away before then. There is no way that a 
withdrawal begun now will leave a new administration free from the 
policy problems presented by Iraq.
  So we should liberate ourselves right now from seeking partisan 
advantage, because as much as some may wish to walk away from Iraq, its 
relevance to our security and standing is not going to diminish. Not 
for a long time.
  I will support the President's plan for this surge, and I will 
support any resolution that articulates such support, provided I can 
agree with all of its language. In doing so, I am acutely aware that 
the situation we are addressing is at least in some part a function of 
policy failures committed by this administration.
  Admitting this, I have to say that I am unaware, through my reading 
of American military and diplomatic history, of any conflict in the 
midst of which our leaders saw clearly the end. Rarely have outcomes 
been perceivable through the shifting tactics and circumstances that 
war presented in the moment of greatest chaos.
  Many times, in hot wars and cold wars, we have reassessed and changed 
policy.
  Retroactive analysis and accountability are important--sometimes it 
is critical to understand minor and major mistakes in order to correct 
flawed policy--but the challenge is to seek the policy amongst the 
realistic options that will best deliver us to our goals for the 
future, not to sink in self-satisfying denunciations of the past.
  I have read each of these resolutions carefully. I oppose the 
original Biden amendment, because I fundamentally disagree with it.
  Its first resolution clause states:

       It is not in the national interest of the U.S. to deepen 
     its military involvement in Iraq, particularly by escalating 
     the United States military force presence in Iraq.

  I deeply disagree.
  Not only does this set up a potential constitutional conflict between 
the executive and legislature as to who runs foreign policy in a war, 
its intent is to inhibit the President from trying to improve the 
situation in Iraq at a perilous time. Further, to maintain the status 
quo in Iraq, as this clause implies, is to guarantee greater chaos in 
Iraq.
  If the opponents of the President want to force a withdrawal, 
shouldn't they say so directly?
  The second clause of the original Biden resolution stated:


[[Page S1698]]


       The primary objective of U.S. strategy in Iraq should be to 
     have the Iraqi political leaders make the political 
     compromises necessary to end the violence in Iraq.

  When I read this, I have to ask, where have the authors of this 
language been? That was our strategy, which we tried mightily, from 
2004 until last year: to let politics lead the way to security. But the 
forces of insurgency and chaos overwhelmed the fledgling political 
process and now we clearly realize we have to implement and achieve 
security before we can regain political process.
  Am I the only one here who finds it ironic that critics of the 
administration who support this resolution appear to be advocating a 
policy that has failed?

  The next clause reads:

       Greater concerted regional and international support would 
     assist the Iraqis in achieving a political and national 
     reconciliation.

  This is not a policy option, but a dreamer's delusion. It is true, in 
the abstract, that international support would be greatly beneficial to 
the Iraqis. But if you look at the region, this dream of international 
cooperation is not based on reality. Aspirations should not substitute 
for harsh reality.
  Then the resolution states:

       Main elements of the mission of the U.S. forces in Iraq 
     should transition to helping ensure the territorial integrity 
     of Iraq, conduct counterterrorism activities, reduce regional 
     interference in the internal affairs of Iraq, and accelerate 
     training of Iraqi troops.

  But, we are conducting counterterrorist activities, and the fight in 
al-Anbar for which the President has requested a small number of this 
surge is exactly for that. But this resolution disapproves of that, if 
you are to re-read the first clause. We are accelerating training, but 
we have learned that, if you are going to do it right, you can't speed 
it up beyond a certain point.
  To paraphrase my colleague, the vice chairman of the Intelligence 
Committee, Senator Bond, who has said of rushed intelligence 
assessments:

       If you want it bad, you're going to get it . . . bad.

  If we rush the training, as we have seen, we're going to get 
ineffective results. If our training of the Iraqi security forces is to 
be effective and successful, we need to take the time to do it right.
  I am all for reducing regional interference, but to do so might mean 
exercising power and influence, and critics of this President have a 
conniption if you suggest anything other than a diplomatic tea party 
with Syria or Iran.
  And I do not consider it wise to commit to the territorial integrity 
of Iraq. We should be agnostic about this question, and recent history 
should keep us humble against knee-jerk commitments to territorial 
lines drawn by imperial powers. A previous Bush administration fumbled 
on the wrong side of history in the last days of the Cold War when it 
argued against ``suicidal nationalism'' at a time when the Soviet Union 
was dissolving. A failure to recognize that Yugoslavia was a false 
state led the U.S. to delay for years an involvement that could have 
saved hundreds of thousands of civilian lives.
  If a soft partition could be achieved without bloodshed, I would 
support that in Iraq, although no one has figured out how to do that, 
yet, and it remains unclear whether Iraqis themselves, particularly 
urbanized Iraqis, desire this or could survive a bloody partition.
  But I repeat: If I could imagine a nonviolent partition implemented 
by an international organization that would have the support of the 
Iraqi people, I would rather find the billions to do that than the 
billions to fight a war. In the case of finding financial resources for 
soft partition, I would expect we would have a somewhat better response 
from the international community than we are having now.
  The next resolution clause states:

       The U.S. should transfer, under an appropriately expedited 
     timeline, responsibility for internal security and halting 
     sectarian violence in Iraq to the Government of Iraq and 
     Iraqi security forces.

  But just because we want to shed ourselves of this war does not mean 
we can immediately stand up Iraqi security forces. We have been trying 
to do that, and it is taking time. This clause is, in effect, purely 
aspirational. It makes us feel good, but it doesn't change the reality 
on the ground.
  The final clause states:

       The U.S. should engage nations in the Middle East to 
     develop a regional, internationally-sponsored peace and 
     reconciliation process for Iraq.

  Mr. President, who are the players in the Middle East who are both: 
(a) sympathetic to the Iraqi cause, and (b) strong enough to be 
effective?
  No country meets both of these simple conditions.
  They aren't there. It is too typical of the critics of this 
administration to substitute the process of diplomacy for the substance 
of hard policy choices.
  Now, I do not oppose diplomacy. It is a legitimate tool in the tool 
kit. But diplomacy must always be part of a broader policy. Before I 
would support this administration's diplomatic initiative toward Iran, 
I would want to see a comprehensive Iran policy. However late in the 
day, the administration appears to to be forming such a policy, and it 
appears to include elements of confrontation and competition, as well 
as a clearly stated solicitation for more constructive relations, as 
any sound and sophisticated policy should.
  If we are to sit down with Iran while Iran is continuing with a 
program for nuclear development, continues to be the No. 1 state 
sponsor of terrorism in the world, continues to undermine the stability 
in Lebanon, and is working against the coalition's forces in Iraq, I 
would want those Iranian diplomats that we are sipping tea with to know 
that we are competing and challenging them on all of those fronts. It 
would be foolish to talk to Iran simply hoping we could convince the 
Iranians to see the world our way.
  The nations of the region with whom we are close do support the peace 
and reconciliation in Iraq. And those nations want us to remain in Iraq 
until the situation is stabilized. Kuwait, Jordan, Turkey, Saudi 
Arabia--none of those governments want us to leave Iraq the way it is 
now. But Syria and Iran and al-Qaida, too--they want us to leave, and 
leave behind chaos they can exploit.
  My colleague and good friend, Senator Warner, has made an effort to 
write a resolution that smoothed away some of the aspects of the 
original Biden legislation which I find I cannot support.
  In particular, the senior Senator from Virginia recognizes, in the 
first clause, the President's foreign policy prerogative, while 
somewhat ambiguously also stating that the resolution's intent is not 
``to question or contravene'' the President's constitutional authority 
as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces of the United States.
  I say ``ambiguously,'' because Senator Warner's first resolution 
clause is remarkably similar to Senator Biden's:

       The Senate disagrees with the plan to augment our forces 
     and urges the President to consider all options and 
     alternatives for achieving the strategic goals set forth 
     below.

  It seems to me, however, that adding troops to meet the goals the 
President has set--achieving a zone of security in Baghdad from which 
the Iraqi political leadership can assert its leadership and implement 
essential policies--is a major option that the Warner resolution 
precludes.
  Further, Senator Warner's resolution strongly supports our efforts 
against Sunni jihadists, including al-Qaida, in Anbar Province, as I 
do.
  Senator Warner and the cosponsors of his resolution, however, do not 
want to see us in between the various sects fighting in Baghdad.
  I have to ask: If we are to encourage the anti-al-Qaida Sunni 
elements in Anbar to join us in a fight to eradicate al-Qaida, what 
credibility do we have to do so if we are standing by while Sunni 
jihadists target Shia in Baghdad, and Shia militias slaughter Sunnis in 
response?
  Part of how we got here is by not imagining the way the perpetrators 
of sectarian strife calculate. We can't continue to fail to understand 
this dynamic, nor to believe that we can ignore it.
  I will support the President's surge strategy because I believe there 
is a reasonable chance--reasonable, not guaranteed--that a strong 
military presence that has open rules of engagement to attack 
insurgents, militias and other criminal elements may create a zone of 
calm and security for Baghdad. This goal is to create the

[[Page S1699]]

space for political leaders to make effective decisions on oil 
resources, federalism, economic development and other critical issues 
to entice the majority of the Iraqis into believing there is an 
alternative to civil war.
  Such a period of calm, if achieved, is essential not only for the 
political system to assert itself, but for us to complete the majority 
of our training of Iraqi security forces.
  If we are to succeed, we won't be able to do it alone. The Iraqi 
Sunnis are going to have to lead in defeating the foreigners who are 
terrorizing them in their homes in western Iraq and leading the attacks 
against Shia in Baghdad.
  The Sunnis will have to lead in ejecting al-Qaida, as they have begun 
to do so.
  The Sunnis, not the Shia, are going to have to definitively expose 
and defeat the former Baathists who have not accepted that the Baath 
era is over.
  The Sunni will have to address this challenge, not the Shia.
  And the Shia, not the Sunni, are going to have to lead in ending the 
terror of the Shia militias.
  The Shia are going to have to defeat those who claim to advance the 
Shia cause by revenge, by torture, by barbarism. If the Maliki 
government fails to muster the political will to do so, we cannot 
impose it from the outside.
  Perhaps the Iraqi government can finally make progress toward 
building institutions that will sustain a unified Iraq, toward passing 
legislation that will divide Iraq's enormous natural resources 
equitably among the three ethnicities, that will open the civil society 
to Sunnis, instead of punishing them indiscriminately for their 
dominance during the Baath era.
  Perhaps.
  But if not, this Nation and this administration should not be 
irrationally wedded to the notion of a unitary state of Iraq. We need 
to imagine all options, rather than cling to ideas which may have 
departed from the realm of reasonable options.
  I will support this surge because the option right now of withdrawing 
leaves three critical questions unanswered:
  No. 1: How do we continue the fight against foreign Sunni extremists, 
including al-Qaida, in the west of Iraq?
  No. 2: Are we to leave a fractured Shia substate unstable enough for 
Iran to exert expansionist influence, thereby strengthening Tehran?
  No. 3: Are we prepared as a nation to see a bloodbath ensue, in 
Baghdad and elsewhere, that may make other American foreign policy 
failures--Budapest in 1956, Vietnam in 1975, the Shia slaughter after 
we ejected Saddam from Kuwait in 1991--pale in comparison?
  As I said at the beginning of this speech, the critics' attempts to 
set the stage for withdrawal commits the same strategic blunder they 
legitimately accuse the Bush administration of making in its 
implementation of the Iraq war. They didn't think of the day after 
Saddam fell. Today the critics are not thinking of the day after we 
withdraw.
  Today, however, we need to recognize that worse than the vanity about 
easy victory committed in 2003 is the denial of calamitous defeat that 
would occur if we leave before we make every attempt to stabilize the 
country.
  For this reason, I will support the administration, but I will do so 
under no casual assumptions or glib assurances.
  I will also do so by demanding that the administration be much more 
forthcoming in its plans for the day after--the day after we complete 
our surge into Baghdad, the day after we can honestly assess that 
Baghdad has been pacified, and heaven forbid, the day after we assess 
that the chaos unleashed and manipulated by the forces of destruction 
are prohibiting a meaningful and comprehensive success.
  I am not conceding defeat, nor preparing for withdrawal.
  I am supporting a strategy for success. So far, President Bush--who 
has a lot to answer for the mistakes that have been made--is offering 
the only way to try to leave Iraq in better shape than it is now.
  He has my support, and I urge my colleagues to join me.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Ms. Cantwell). The Senator from New York is 
recognized.
  Mrs. CLINTON. Madam President, we are all well aware in this Chamber 
that our country finds itself in a deepening crisis in Iraq, and we 
find ourselves at a moment of decision in the Senate. Nearly 4 years 
ago, our President rushed us into war in Iraq, a war now longer than 
American involvement in World War II, which next month will actually 
exceed the length of our own Civil War. For 4 years, Members on both 
sides of the aisle have watched with shock and dismay as our President 
has made mistake after misjudgment after miscalculation. Even before 
the invasion ended, the administration rejected the voluminous plans 
drawn up by the State Department to deal with the chaotic aftermath. 
The successful examples of the U.S. experience in Bosnia and Kosovo 
during the 1990s were summarily rejected. State Department and other 
American officials with experience in nation-building were blackballed 
in favor of inexperienced ideologues who were selected on the basis of 
political litmus tests, including answering questions about whether 
they were for or against Roe v. Wade and whether they had voted for 
George W. Bush.
  Despite the urgent warnings of Army Chief of Staff Rick Shinseki and 
other senior military commanders, the necessary number of troops to 
ensure security and stability was not sent at the start of the 
conflict. Our men and women in uniform were ordered into harm's way 
without the necessary body armor or armored vehicles, a mortal error I 
have tried to correct time and again since I first learned of it. The 
strategic blunders now fill an entire library shelf of books, and they 
are certainly too numerous for me to list in the time allotted here.
  Through these 4 years, there has also been another abdication of 
responsibility. That was the failure of this Congress to engage in its 
Constitutional obligation of oversight and accountability. While our 
troops have stood valiantly on the frontlines, the Congress has stood 
on the sidelines. Defending a partisan position trumped U.S. national 
security interests and the welfare of our troops in the field. Many 
Members attempted to raise the debate, and we were unable to do so 
because of the majority's refusal to hold the administration 
accountable.
  In the election last year, the American people decided the status quo 
was no longer acceptable. So we have a new Congress, and it is past 
time we in this Chamber do our duty to balance the President and 
provide a check against his failed policy in Iraq. As there is a 
majority in our country against the President's failed policy in Iraq, 
there is a bipartisan majority in this Senate against it, as well. The 
resolution before the Senate reflects that bipartisan consensus as it 
also reflects the sentiments of the overwhelming majority of Americans.
  But a partisan minority seeking to shield the administration's 
continuing failure in Iraq seeks to thwart the bipartisan majority and 
the will of the American people. This is not a debate about 
abstractions. I have seen the consequences of our involvement in Iraq, 
as have many of my fellow Senators. Three weeks ago, I visited Iraq to 
express gratitude to our soldiers, to meet with Iraqi leaders and U.S. 
commanders and our troops on the ground.
  What I saw and what I did not see underscored my concerns. I saw 
American service men and women performing their duty admirably, but I 
did not see a strategy that, under the current circumstances, has much 
chance of success. The collective analysis of our intelligence 
community in the latest National Intelligence Estimate is that the term 
``civil war'' does not adequately capture the complexity of the 
conflict in Iraq. The bipartisan Baker-Hamilton Commission said the 
situation in Iraq is grave and deteriorating. Yet the President's 
response to the bipartisan commission and the latest National 
Intelligence Estimate does not match the urgency that is described. The 
so-called surge is not a new strategy but a tactic that has been tried 
and failed.
  The absence of leadership on the part of the President leaves 
Congress no choice but to demonstrate the leadership that the American 
people and the reality on the ground demand. The previous two 
Congresses abdicated their duty. We must not. Every single day our feet 
sink deeper into the sands. Every day the crisis worsens. To hide from 
this debate with our troops in such danger is wrong, plain and simple.

[[Page S1700]]

  The crisis in Iraq has fostered a crisis of democracy at home. The 
American people expect a debate. Our troops are owed a debate. Our 
Constitution commands we debate. But a partisan minority acting at the 
behest of the administration is standing in the way. This amounts to a 
gag rule on our democracy, contrary to the national security interests 
of the United States.
  Even though America voted for a new direction in Iraq, even though 
the majority of Senators opposes escalation in Iraq, we cannot get the 
Republicans to allow us to take a symbolic vote to condemn the 
escalation, much less a real vote to stop it. This resolution deserves 
a debate. It deserves a vote. It deserves passage.
  There are those in the Senate who invoke our grave troops, suggesting 
that a debate on the most important issue facing our country and facing 
our troops would somehow undermine the mission and weaken our Nation. 
It is a pernicious, shameful argument and it is dead wrong. Our 
democracy is stronger than that and the American people and our troops 
deserve better than that.
  Our troops understand we are debating this war. We are debating it 
not just in this Senate, we are debating it in kitchen table 
conversations, around water coolers, and standing in line at 
supermarkets. We are debating this war everywhere Americans gather. 
Indeed, our troops are debating this war.
  The American people understand it is the policy that undermines our 
national security interests, not a vote disapproving the policy.
  This debate and this resolution have merit and purpose and it will, 
if permitted to go forward, begin the process of changing the policy; 
otherwise, why would the administration and my colleagues on the other 
side of the aisle fight so hard to prevent us from having a debate and 
a vote? Because they understand this will be the first step to restore 
our strength and renew our leadership around the world, to begin 
redeploying our troops out of Iraq and start on the long road of 
undoing the damage brought by the President to America's leadership 
around the world.
  If you believe the escalation is the right strategy, cast your vote 
for it. If you believe, as the majority in this Chamber believes, that 
escalation is not the right strategy, then cast your vote against it. 
But standing on the sidelines is no way to stand up for the troops.

  Now, there are many--both in the Chamber and outside--who wish to go 
further than this resolution and look for ways to bind the actions of 
the President and to require him to change course. I understand and 
agree with the frustration that has afflicted many Members in dealing 
with the President's policy. However, if we can get a bipartisan vote 
against escalation, it will be the first time the Senate has exercised 
its constitutional responsibility to be a check and balance on the 
President. The first step for the Senate will be a giant leap toward 
accountability and toward the right end to this war.
  There is a big difference between calling for the end of this war and 
doing the difficult, painstaking work of building the political will 
within the Congress to take action. We, in the Senate, entrusted by our 
constituents to cast tough votes, should not have the luxury of 
standing outside the arena and lobbing criticism from within.
  Once we pass this resolution, we should go further. Rather than an 
escalation of U.S. troops, which will not contribute to fundamentally 
changing the conditions on the ground, we should put pressure on the 
Iraqi Government in a way that they will understand there are 
consequences to their empty promises and their continued inaction.
  Last week, the National Intelligence Counsel released the 
unclassified key judgments of the National Intelligence Estimate on 
Iraq. That presents the consensus views of the U.S. intelligence 
community. It underscores the need for a political solution. The NIE 
states that in the coming 12 to 18 months, the overall security 
situation will continue to deteriorate at rates comparable to the 
latter part of 2006. And it goes on further to say that even if 
violence is diminished, given the current winner-takes-all attitude and 
sectarian animosities infecting the political scene, Iraqi leaders will 
be hard-pressed to achieve sustained political reconciliation in the 
timeframe of the estimate, namely, a year to a year and a half. Even if 
the intelligence experts argue the escalation results in greater 
security, their best judgment is that the bloodshed and violence will 
continue to spiral out of control.
  So what should we do? Many believe, and we have been arguing for this 
and voting for this for more than a year and a half, that we have to 
chart a new course that emphasizes greater Iraqi responsibility. I 
still believe that is the path we should be taking. Instead, the 
President has chosen a very narrow course that relies heavily on 
American military force.
  I will be introducing legislation that I think offers a better 
alternative. First, my legislation will cap the number of troops in 
Iraq as of January 1st and will require the administration to seek 
congressional authorization for any additional troops. The President 
has finally said, this is not an open-ended commitment in Iraq, but he 
is providing the Iraqis with an open-ended presence of American troops.
  Second, as a means to increase our leverage with the Iraqi Government 
and to clearly send a message that there are consequences to their 
inaction, I would impose conditions for continued funding of the Iraqi 
security forces and the private contractors working for the Iraqis.
  My legislation would require certification that the security forces 
were free of sectarian and militia influence and were actually assuming 
greater responsibility for Iraqi security, along with other conditions. 
We must not let U.S. funds, taxpayer funds, be used to train members of 
sectarian militias who are responsible for so much of the violence in 
Iraq. Unfortunately, it appears our funds to Iraqi security forces may 
be going to the people we are trying to restrain.
  A news report last week in an article entitled ``Mahdi Army Gains 
Strength through Unwitting Aid of U.S.'' reports that:

       . . . the U.S. military drive to train and equip Iraq's 
     security forces has unwittingly strengthened Muslin cleric 
     Muqtada al-Sadr's Mahdi Army militia, which has been battling 
     to take over much of the capital city as American forces are 
     trying to secure it.

  According to this new report, U.S. Army commanders and enlisted men 
who are patrolling East Baghdad, said al-Sadr's militias had heavily 
infiltrated the Iraqi police and Army units that they've trained and 
armed. Said one soldier:

       They'll wave at us during the day and shoot at us during 
     the night.

  We need to inform the Iraqi Government, in no uncertain terms, that 
there are consequences, that we will take funds away from their 
troops--not from our troops, many of whom still lack armored vehicles 
and counterinsurgency measure devices and communications equipment. And 
we will not fund the Iraqis if our troops are going to enter into 
sectarian battles where some of the participants have received American 
training and support.

  Third, I would hold the administration accountable for their empty 
promises as well. My bill requires the Bush administration to certify 
that Iraq has disarmed the militias, has ensured that a law has finally 
been passed for the equitable sharing of oil revenues; that the Iraqi 
Government, under American influence and even pressure, has made the 
constitutional changes necessary to ensure rights for minority 
communities; that the debaathification process has been reversed to 
allow teachers, professionals, and others who joined the Baath Party as 
a means to get a job to serve in the new Iraqi Government.
  I would also require the administration to engage in a regional 
diplomatic initiative, including all of Iraq's neighbors, to address 
Iraq's future and to understand and convey clearly that the United 
States expects Iraq's neighbors to be partners in the stability and 
security of the new Iraqi state.
  If these conditions are not met or are not on their way to being met 
within 6 months, a new congressional authorization requirement would be 
triggered.
  Finally, I would prohibit any spending to increase troop levels 
unless and until the Secretary of Defense certifies that our American 
troops will have the proper training and equipment for

[[Page S1701]]

whatever mission they are ordered to fulfill.
  Yesterday, I read the classified report outlining the findings by the 
Department of Defense inspector general about the problems that have 
been faced by our troops getting the equipment they desperately need in 
combat areas such as Iraq.
  The inspector general did not have the full cooperation of the 
Department of Defense. It is heartbreaking that the inspector general 
could conclude that the U.S. military still has failed to equip our 
soldiers in Iraq and Afghanistan, especially for the kind of warfare 
they are confronting, with IEDs and insurgents who are attacking them 
in asymmetric, unconventional warfare.
  This report comes on the heels of an article in the Washington Post 
last week titled ``Equipment for Added Troops Is Lacking: New Iraq 
Forces Must Make Do, Officials Say.'' The Washington Post story raised 
serious questions about the adequacy of the supply of up-armored HMMWVs 
and trucks.
  One of our generals is quoted as saying he does not have the 
equipment our forces need, and they will have to go into battle with 
what they have.
  On my way back from Iraq and Afghanistan, I stopped at Landstuhl 
Hospital in Germany to visit with some of our wounded soldiers. I met 
with one young man who was lying in his bed with injuries he had 
suffered from one of the shape charges, these new more advanced, more 
sophisticated command-controlled IEDs, the improvised explosive 
devices. He told me that the armored, fully equipped HMMWV had saved 
his life and that of the lives of his buddies who were with him. But he 
also told me that not everybody he served with had that kind of 
protection because there were not enough of those armored vehicles to 
go around.
  I do not believe the Congress can shirk its responsibility. It is 
past time we live up to our constitutional responsibility. If I had 
been President in October of 2002, I would have never asked for 
authority to divert our attention from Afghanistan to Iraq, and I 
certainly would never have started this war. But we are where we are, 
and this Congress must deliver a strategy to help us end this war in 
the right way and begin returning our troops home.
  So on this most important issue of our time, I call on my colleagues 
not to hide from this debate but to welcome it, to welcome the 
opportunity to set forth whatever one's opinions might be because this 
debate is about more than our policy in Iraq. It is about the role and 
responsibility of this august institution. Great debates in our past 
have not only moved public opinion but furthered the progress of our 
country.
  This debate is not merely about whether the President should escalate 
troops into Iraq, whether he has failed to grasp the complexity of the 
situation we confront in Iraq, and to take every diplomatic, political, 
economic, and military strategy available to him, but it is about our 
democracy itself.
  We should consider this resolution, and I hope we will. Our duty is 
rooted in the faith entrusted to us by our constituents and enshrined 
in our Constitution. When we think about the patriotism and bravery, 
the humor and resolve, the optimism and strength of our soldiers, 
marines, airmen, and sailors, our Active Duty, our Guard, and Reserve, 
I think it humbles us all. But it comes out of this great democratic 
tradition that we are all blessed to be a part of.
  I hope we have the opportunity in the next days to do our duty just 
as the men and women who are serving us have done and are doing theirs.
  A week ago, I was privileged to go to San Antonio for the opening of 
a remarkable center called the Center for the Intrepid. It is a new 
state-of-the-art facility devoted to the rehabilitation and recovery of 
our wounded heroes. It was funded by contributions from more than 
600,000 Americans. It was not built by our Government. It was built by 
our citizens.
  It is not only going to be a place of great hope and healing for the 
brave men and women who have given their full measure, but it will also 
stand as a symbol of our democracy, of our values, of people coming 
together across our country--a unique partnership that you find nowhere 
else in the world except here.
  As I sat on the stage during the ceremonies for the opening of this 
new rehabilitation center, I watched the hundreds of young men and 
women who had been injured march in, and in some cases wheeled in, to 
take their place in the audience. I believe they are owed this debate. 
And certainly all those who are currently serving, and the thousands 
who are on their way to carry out this escalation strategy, deserve it 
even more.
  So I hope we will have a chance to express the will of our 
constituents, our deeply held opinions, and participate in a debate 
that is historic and necessary. That is the least we can do.
  Mr. COBURN. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that an analysis 
of the consequences of our actions in Iraq entitled ``Now What?'' by 
Army Retired LTG Jerry Max Bunyard be printed in the Congressional 
Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                               Now What?

                         (By Jerry Max Bunyard)

       At church every Sunday, the Fort Belvoir, VA Installation 
     Chaplain uses the question ``now what?'' to get the 
     congregation to analyze the message he just delivered and 
     find a way to apply it to their lives. I believe as citizens 
     and leaders of this nation we are at a point in the 
     continuing War in Iraq that we must ask the same question; 
     ``Now What?''
       Today we have been bombarded with facts, figures, 
     commentaries, interpretations, and subjective thoughts 
     concerning the Middle East activities. Depending on the 
     writer, attempts are made to sway you one way or the other 
     concerning a particular issue. There are many half-truths 
     that are spoken, which tend to lead the reader in a given 
     direction. Our world-wide media has led us astray on many 
     Middle East subjects. They tend to be over zealous to ensure 
     what is being written follows the point they are attempting 
     to make or stays within the bounds of being politically 
     correct or meet their organization's marketing goals for 
     selling air time or copy. They sometimes convince the reader 
     to believe and support a particular political agenda. In many 
     cases these misleading and unbalanced reports cause the 
     reader to be convinced that what is being said is the truth. 
     On the other hand, there are some excellent articles, books 
     and writings that exist on the subject but they have been 
     overlooked or ignored to some degree by both academia and the 
     media because of political correctness coupled with political 
     sensitivity for fear of offending major non-western religion, 
     reigning political and ideological orthodoxies, or a mix of 
     both. So the question is how do we get to the truth of the 
     Middle East conundrum?
       For many Americans (as well as other nationalities) they 
     simply rely on what the newspaper, radio or TV is telling 
     them. They do not question or seek other sources on any given 
     event or subject being discussed. They make no attempt to 
     understand the totality of the area of interest they just 
     swing with the ``news of the day'' from their favorite news 
     media or TV station. Then we have the politicians and their 
     army of supporters who will do and say what they think John 
     Q. Public wants to hear in order to glean their vote. They 
     twist and slant the news to meet their agenda. As we approach 
     the 2008 Presidential election this aspect has become the 
     norm and is simply misleading the American people, causing 
     great harm to our chances of achieving the National 
     objectives throughout the world as well as showing, 
     indirectly, lack of support for the members of our armed 
     forces who are serving in harms way supporting these 
     objectives. This, I consider personal aggrandizement and, 
     unquestionably, it is not in the best interest of the 
     country.
       There are others, thank goodness, who do take the time and 
     energy to study the subject pro and con and attempt to be 
     objective and analyze the big picture along with the day to 
     day events as they occur. Likewise, there are some very 
     knowledgeable Middle East analysts who have made it their 
     life's endeavor to understand the intricacies of the 
     situation, various cultures, religion and politics of this 
     volatile region of the world. Many of these people are not in 
     the government. In my opinion, we should be listening to and 
     incorporating their thoughts and experience into any 
     decisions concerning that region of the world. These 
     dedicated, unbiased ``subject matter experts'' should be 
     consulted regularly for opinions and recommendations.
       Based upon this multitude of diverse information one has to 
     sort the wheat from the chaff. This requires some personal 
     knowledge of the Middle East and Iraq war as well as the 
     writer or speaker providing information concerning the area 
     of interest. One must do his homework in order to place the 
     information in ``categories'' to establish a prioritization 
     of credible information. Once this task is completed then one 
     only uses that information and ``files'' the rest. Throughout 
     this paper I will use quotes or information from whom I 
     consider credible sources and will footnote where the 
     comments or quotes originated.
       The purpose of this paper is to provide my two cents worth 
     on how to answer the question of ``Now What'' relative to 
     what we should be thinking about and doing concerning the 
     Iraqi situation or, better yet, the

[[Page S1702]]

     Middle East regional situation. There will not be any effort 
     to address the question of how we got into this situation. We 
     are where we are, so what course of action should we follow 
     from this point forward? To address this one must take a look 
     at the region itself and place into perspective the 
     consequences of the various choices that are now before us.


                             The Challenge

       I cautioned earlier about politicians and how they use or 
     misuse information. However, there is at least one exception 
     in the political arena, Senator Joseph Lieberman (I-CT) who 
     very clearly summed up the current Iraqi situation and the 
     challenge that faces Iraq, the United States and the free 
     world in general. Based on his long term interest in the 
     region, the wars (both past and current), and the information 
     gleaned from his trip to Iraq in December of 2006, he 
     provided the following comments upon his return:
       ``Because of the bravery of many Iraqi and coalition 
     military personnel and the recent coming together of moderate 
     political forces in Baghdad, the war is winnable. We and our 
     Iraqi allies must do what is necessary to win it.
       The American people are justifiably frustrated by the lack 
     of progress, and the price paid by our heroic troops and 
     their families has been heavy. But what is needed now, 
     especially in Washington and Baghdad, is not despair but 
     decisive action--and soon.
       ``The most pressing problem we face in Iraq is not an 
     absence of Iraqi political will or American diplomatic 
     initiative, both of which are increasing and improving; it is 
     a lack of basic security. As long as insurgents and death 
     squads terrorize Baghdad, Iraq's nascent democratic 
     institutions cannot be expected to function, much less win 
     the trust of the people. The fear created by gang murders and 
     mass abductions ensures that power will continue to flow to 
     the very thugs and extremists who have the least interest in 
     peace and reconciliation.''
       Senator Lieberman brought out very salient points--the war 
     is winnable; American people are frustrated by lack of 
     progress; price paid by troops and families has been heavy; 
     what is needed, especially in Washington and Baghdad, is not 
     despair but decisive action--and soon; most pressing problem 
     is the lack of basic security.
       To me, that captures the status that continues to exist at 
     present.
       So, this sets the stage as to the situation we find 
     ourselves in today. Now what do we do about it and how?


                               Background

       Before getting into the current Middle East issues and 
     possible courses of action it is necessary one have a general 
     understanding of the key religious aspects along with a basic 
     knowledge of the Jewish, Arab, and Islamic history.
       Religion has once again become a force that no government 
     can safely ignore. The United States and other Western 
     countries experts have failed to recognize the importance of 
     faith as it relates to world affairs. One, if not the most, 
     important aspects to be considered when discussing the Middle 
     East and the growing dominance of the Islam religion concerns 
     the differences of opinion between Islam and the Western 
     World view of separation of Church and State.
       Bruce Feiler states ``Abraham, the great patriarch of the 
     Hebrew Bible, is also the spiritual forefather of the New 
     Testament and the grand holy architect of the Koran. Abraham 
     is the shared ancestor of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. 
     He is the linchpin of the Arab-Israeli conflict. He is the 
     centerpiece of the battle between the West and Islamic 
     extremists. He is the father--in many cases, the purported 
     biological father--of 12 million Jews, 2 billion Christians, 
     and 1 billion Muslims around the world. He is history's first 
     monotheist.''
       Thomas Jefferson once remarked that in matters of religion 
     ``the maxim of civil government'' should be reversed and we 
     should rather say, ``Divided we stand, united, we fall.'' In 
     this remark Jefferson was setting forth with classic 
     terseness an idea that has come to be regarded as essentially 
     American: the separation of Church and State. This idea was 
     not entirely new; it had some precedents in the writings of 
     Spinoza, Locke, and the philosophers of the European 
     Enlightenment. It was in the United States, however, that the 
     principle was first given the force of law and gradually, in 
     the course of two centuries, has become a reality.
       Another very important aspect of this overall issue is to 
     address the total Middle East environment. An important 
     consideration is the countries that border Iraq and what 
     impact our actions and those of others may have on these 
     specific countries. Shown next is a map of the Middle East 
     countries. The countries directly adjacent to Iraq are Iran, 
     Jordan, Syria, Turkey, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.
       George Friedman describes the dilemma that now faces the 
     United States as it relates to the potential influence of 
     Iran on the outcome of the Iraqi war. ``The Iraq war has 
     turned into a duel between the United States and Iran. For 
     the United States, the goal has been the creation of a 
     generally pro-American coalition government in Baghdad--
     representing Iraq's three major ethnic communities. For Iran, 
     the goal has been the creation of either a pro-Iranian 
     government in Baghdad or, alternatively, the division of Iraq 
     into three regions, with Iran dominating the Shiite south.''


                       The Costs of Disengagement

       The next logical step would be to understand as best as 
     possible, the implications of not continuing our efforts in 
     Iraq and, in so doing, what this would mean to the United 
     States, in the future. One of the best analyses I have found 
     thus far comes from two men outside the government who have 
     significant experience in Middle East studies. Over the years 
     Daniel Bynum and Kenneth Pollack have gained an excellent 
     understanding of that region. In August of 2006 they 
     published an article titled, ``What Next,'' and have followed 
     that up with a 130 page report titled, ``Things Fall Apart'' 
     that was published in January 2007 by the Brookings 
     Institution's Saban Center for Middle East Policy. This 
     latest report states: ``Iraq is rapidly sliding into all-out 
     civil war that is likely to spill over into neighboring 
     countries, resulting in mass deaths and refugees, serious 
     disruption of oil supplies and a drastic decline in US 
     influence.''
       In the August 2006 article, Bynum and Pollack state:
       `` . . . The consequences of an all-out civil war in Iraq 
     could be dire. Considering the experiences of recent such 
     conflicts, hundreds of thousands of people may die. Refugees 
     and displaced people could number in the millions. And with 
     Iraqi insurgents, militias and organized crime rings wreaking 
     havoc on Iraq's oil infrastructure, a full-scale civil war 
     could send global oil prices soaring even higher.
       ``However, the greatest threat that the United States would 
     face from civil war in Iraq is from the spillover--the 
     burdens, the instability, the copycat secession attempts and 
     even the follow-on wars that could emerge in neighboring 
     countries. Welcome to the new `new Middle East'--a region 
     where civil wars could follow one after another, like so many 
     Cold War dominoes.
       ``And unlike communism, these dominoes may actually fall.''
       There are other consequences of civil war as explained by 
     Bynum and Pollack. A top-level summary of their in-depth 
     study reveals: ``. . .civil wars tend to spread across 
     borders . . . and Washington must decide how to deal with the 
     most common and dangerous ways such conflicts spill across 
     national boundaries. Only by understanding the refugee 
     crises, terrorism, radicalization of neighboring populations, 
     copycat secessions and foreign interventions that such wars 
     frequently spark can we begin to plan for how to cope with 
     them in the months and years ahead . . . massive refugee 
     flows are a hallmark of major civil wars . . . refugee camps 
     often become a sanctuary and recruiting grounds for militias, 
     which use them to launch raids on their homelands . . . 
     terrorism finds new homes during civil wars . . . radicalism 
     is contagious as civil wars tend to inflame the passions of 
     neighboring populations . . . the problem worsens whenever 
     ethnic or religious groupings also spill across borders . . . 
     Iraq's neighbors are just as fractured as Iraq itself . . . 
     should Iraq fragment, voices for secession elsewhere will 
     gain strength . . . the first candidate for secession is 
     obviously Kurdistan . . . another critical problem of civil 
     wars is the tendency of neighboring states to get involved, 
     turning the conflicts into regional wars . . . covert foreign 
     intervention is proceeding apace in Iraq, with Iran leading 
     the way . . . Iran has set up an extensive network of safe 
     houses, arms caches, communications channels and proxy 
     fighters, and will be well-positioned to pursue its interests 
     in a full-blown civil war. The Sunni powers of Jordan, 
     Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Turkey are frightened by Iran's 
     growing influence and presence in Iraq and have been 
     scrambling to catch up . . . Turkey may be the most likely 
     country to overtly intervene in Iraq . . . none of Iraq's 
     neighbors thinks that it can afford to have the country fall 
     into the hands of the other side . . . an Iranian ``victory'' 
     would put the nation's forces in the heartland of the Arab 
     world, bordering Jordan, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Syria--
     several of these states poured tens of billions of dollars 
     into Saddam Hussein's military to prevent just such an 
     occurrence in the 1980s . . . similarly, a Sunni Arab victory 
     (backed by the Jordanians, Kuwaitis and Saudis) would put 
     radical Sunni fundamentalists on Iran's doorstepa nightmare 
     scenario for Tehran . . . add in, too, each country's 
     interest in preventing its rivals from capturing Iraq's oil 
     resources . . . if these states are unable to achieve their 
     goals through clandestine intervention, they will have a 
     powerful incentive to launch a conventional invasion.''
       George Friedman provides his assessment of Iran's concern 
     if Iraq is able to stabilize its government and the country 
     in general. He also indicates what the Iranians are doing to 
     counter the U.S. efforts to accomplish stabilizing Iraq.
       ``A stable Iraq under U.S. influence represents a direct 
     threat to Iran, while a fragmented or pro-Iranian Iraq does 
     not. Therefore, the Iranians will do whatever they can to 
     undermine U.S. attempts to create a government in Baghdad. 
     Tehran can use its influence to block a government, but it 
     cannot--on its own--create a pro-Iranian one. Therefore, 
     Iran's strategy is to play spoiler and wait for the United 
     States to tire of the unending conflict. Once the Americans 
     leave, the Iranians can pick up the chips on the table. 
     Whether it takes 10 years or 30, the Iranians assume that, in 
     the end, they will win. None of the Arab countries in the 
     region has the power to withstand Iran, and the Turks are 
     unlikely to get into the game.''
       The National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq, released 2 
     February 2007, warns that

[[Page S1703]]

     pulling U.S. troops out of the country too soon would lead to 
     a collapse of the Iraqi military, outside intervention and 
     the creation of safe havens for al Qaeda terrorists. It also 
     states that if coalition forces were withdrawn rapidly . . . 
     we judge that this almost certainly would lead to a 
     significant increase in the scale and scope of sectarian 
     conflict in Iraq, intensify Sunni resistance to the Iraqi 
     government and have adverse consequences for national 
     reconciliation. Additionally, if such a rapid withdrawal were 
     to take place, we judge that the [Iraqi Security Force] would 
     be unlikely to survive as a non-sectarian national 
     institution; neighboring countries . . . might intervene 
     openly in the conflict; massive civilian casualties and 
     forced population displacement would be probable. The report 
     also says that the al Qaeda terrorist group in Iraq would try 
     to ``use parts of the country''--particularly al-Anbar 
     province--to plan increased attacks in and outside of Iraq. 
     Additionally, Turkey could launch a military incursion if 
     there were no U.S. or allied troops to block Kurdish attempts 
     to control northern Iraq.


        Alternative Courses of Action (C/A) and Supporting Base

       Many alternatives and options have surfaced over the past 
     several weeks and months. The repercussion of exercising 
     certain alternatives have been looked at in considerable 
     depth with some alarming results that not only impact what 
     goes on in Iraq, but the impact they could have on the entire 
     Middle East.
       In my opinion, there are at least four alternatives that 
     have been put on the table in respect to the way ahead in 
     Iraq. These are not new but have been identified by different 
     sources.
       Cut and Run--The first C/A being considered was initiated 
     by Congressman Murtha in what has been termed as the ``cut 
     and run'' scenario. There are other variations of this C/A 
     but, essentially, they all boil down to get the troops out of 
     Iraq as quick as you can--some say immediately others say six 
     months others say by the end of the year (2007). This is easy 
     to say but carries with it tremendous implications and 
     ramifications.
       In my opinion, this C/A would simply embolden the 
     terrorists to include Iran, Syria and other countries that 
     are supportive of terrorism. At the same time it would 
     demoralize our friends in the region. Once again it would 
     place America in everyone's minds as a feckless country that 
     does not have the will to see actions through to completion. 
     How many times do we have to learn that lesson? This would be 
     a strategic defeat for American interests with potentially 
     catastrophic consequences both in the Middle East region and 
     elsewhere. Thus, this C/A could lead to Iran expanding their 
     influence throughout the region and utilizing Hamas and 
     Hezbollah in Syria, Lebanon, Palestinian territories and 
     Jordan. What Arab friends the U.S. may have would feel 
     abandoned and it would place their governments in jeopardy. 
     No longer could they look to the U.S. as a reliable ally or 
     guarantor of peace and stability in this critical region. The 
     implications are that the effects of pulling out of Iraq 
     would spread over into the energy resources and transit choke 
     points vital to the global economy. How this would all play 
     out is unknown but these are potential outcomes of pursuing 
     this C/A.
       Annexation of Iraq--The second C/A would be the annexation 
     of Iraq by American forces, which means the U.S. would govern 
     with a military governor-general and local commanders, and a 
     long-term commitment made that no matter the cost in 
     resources (people and dollars) the U.S. would defend, assist, 
     and help develop those who put their trust in us, in every 
     hamlet, village, and neighborhood until they are able to 
     defend themselves. This would entail sealing the borders and 
     providing local security, local civic actions and local 
     government and public services. The oil industry, agriculture 
     and other agencies would be franchised to U.S. companies to 
     redevelop with royalties going to the governor-general to 
     defray the costs of the occupation and security campaign. 
     This C/A could take decades before they are ready to become 
     an independent nation of Iraqis--no longer Kurds, Arabs and 
     other minorities but Iraqis. Complicating this C/A is Islam 
     and the differences that exist within the various 
     interpretations of Islam. In my opinion, this C/A would never 
     be supported by either Americans or Arabs/Iraqis and, 
     therefore, is discarded for further discussion.
       Stay the Course--The third is to ``stay the course,'' which 
     falls in the unacceptable category, based on the failure to 
     date, plus the votes from the recent elections and the 
     sentiments of Congress. This C/A is not supported by the 
     Administration, Congress or the Defense Department. 
     Therefore, it is not considered viable and will be discarded 
     for further discussion.
       Presidential Proposal--The fourth C/A follows what the 
     President is proposing. That is to provide support to the 
     Iraqi government in order for it to, as quickly as possible, 
     establish a unified democratic federal Iraq that can govern 
     and defend itself and serve as an ally in the War on Terror. 
     As I understand it, these have been the U.S. strategic goals 
     and objectives from the outset.
       Stephen Hadley, Presidential security advisor, described 
     the President's proposal as follows:
       ``The Baker-Hamilton report explained that failure in Iraq 
     could have severe consequences for our national interests in 
     a critical region and for our national security here at home. 
     In my many conversations with members of Congress and foreign 
     policy experts, few have disagreed.
       ``Most people agree that we must focus on fighting al-
     Qaeda. The president's strategy steps up this fight--
     particularly in Anbar province, where al-Qaeda seeks a 
     sanctuary. The administration also agrees that we must 
     accelerate the training of Iraqi security forces. The 
     president's strategy does this--with benchmarks to track 
     progress and bolster the size and effectiveness of those 
     forces. Training and supporting Iraqi troops will remain 
     our military's essential and primary mission.
       ``But the president's review also concluded that the 
     strategy with the best chance of success must have a plan for 
     securing Baghdad. Without such a plan, the Iraqi government 
     and its security institutions could fracture under the 
     pressure of widespread sectarian violence, ethnic cleansing 
     and mass killings. Chaos would then spread throughout the 
     country--and throughout the region. The al-Qaeda movement 
     would be strengthened by the flight of Sunnis from Baghdad 
     and an accelerated cycle of sectarian bloodletting. Iran 
     would be emboldened and could be expected to provide more 
     lethal aid for extremist groups. The Kurdish north would be 
     isolated, inviting separation and regional interference. 
     Terrorists could gain pockets of sanctuary throughout Iraq 
     from which to threaten our allies in the region and our 
     security here at home.
       ``The new plan for Baghdad specifically corrects the 
     problems that plagued previous efforts. First, it is an 
     Iraqi-initiated plan for taking control of their capital. 
     Second, there will be adequate forces (Iraqi and American) to 
     hold neighborhoods cleared of terrorists and extremists. 
     Third, there is a new operational concept--one devised not 
     just to pursue terrorists and extremists but to secure the 
     population. Fourth, new rules of engagement will ensure that 
     Iraqi and U.S. forces can pursue lawbreakers regardless of 
     their community or sect. Fifth, security operations will be 
     followed by economic assistance and reconstruction aid--
     including billions of dollars in Iraqi funds--offering jobs 
     and the prospect of better lives.''
       Stephen Hadley continues his explanation of the totality of 
     the President's plan by explaining the key strategic shifts 
     that are major changes from previous approach:
       ``Reinforcing our military presence is not the strategy--it 
     is a means to an end and part of a package of key strategic 
     shifts that will fundamentally restructure our approach to 
     achieving our objectives in Iraq.
       ``Building on experience elsewhere in the country, the new 
     strategy doubles the number of provincial reconstruction 
     teams (PRTs) in Iraq. These civilian-led units will target 
     development aid where it is needed and help the Iraqi 
     government extend its reach to all corners of the country.
       ``Because close civilian-military cooperation is key to 
     success, 10 new civilian PRTs will be embedded with U.S. 
     combat brigades.
       The new strategy incorporates other essential elements of 
     the Baker-Hamilton report, such as doubling the number of 
     troops embedded with Iraqi forces, using benchmarks to help 
     us and the Iraqis chart progress, and launching a renewed 
     diplomatic effort to increase support for the Iraqi 
     government and advance political reconciliation.''


                               Discussion

       Earlier in this paper the Byman-Pollack report identified 
     consequences of an all-out civil war in Iraq. In their ``what 
     to do about it'' part of their report they had the following 
     to say:
       ``Much as Americans may want to believe that the United 
     States can just walk away from Iraq should it slide into all-
     out civil war, the threat of spillover from such a conflict 
     throughout the Middle East means it can't. Instead, 
     Washington will have to devise strategies to deal with 
     refugees, minimize terrorist attacks emanating from Iraq, 
     dampen the anger in neighboring populations caused by the 
     conflict, prevent secession fever and keep Iraq's neighbors 
     from intervening. The odds of success are poor, but, 
     nonetheless, we have to try.
       ``The United States, along with its Asian and European 
     allies, will have to make a major effort to persuade Iraq's 
     neighbors not to intervene in its civil war. Economic aid 
     should be part of such an effort, but will not suffice. For 
     Jordan and Saudi Arabia, it may require an effort to 
     reinvigorate Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations, thereby 
     addressing one of their major concerns--an effort made all 
     the more important and complex in light of the recent 
     conflict between Hezbollah and Israel. For Iran and Syria, it 
     may be a clear (but not cost-free) path toward acceptance 
     back into the international community.
       ``When it comes to foreign intervention, Iran is the 
     biggest headache of all. Given its immense interests in Iraq, 
     some involvement is inevitable. For Tehran, and probably for 
     Damascus, the United States and its allies probably will have 
     to put down red lines regarding what is absolutely 
     impermissible--such as sending uniformed Iranian military 
     units into Iraq or claiming Iraqi territory. Washington and 
     its allies will also have to lay out what they will do if 
     Iran crosses any of those red lines. Economic sanctions would 
     be one possibility, but they could be effective only if the 
     European Union, China, India and Russia all cooperate. On its 
     own, the United States could employ punitive military 
     operations, either to make Iran pay an unacceptable price for 
     one-time infractions

[[Page S1704]]

     or to persuade it to halt ongoing violations of one or more 
     red lines.
       ``A full-scale war in Iraq could result in hundreds of 
     thousands of deaths and millions of refugees streaming across 
     the nation's borders. The level of killings and displacement 
     from other major civil conflicts--such as those in Bosnia, 
     Congo, Lebanon and Rwanda--suggests the toll in Iraq could 
     surge even higher if conditions there deteriorate further.''
       David Dolan, a reputable journalist and author, who has 
     spent the last 27 years living and working in Israel, 
     provides his assessment of what is viewed from the lens of 
     the Israeli military analysts concerning the turmoil that 
     exists today in the Middle East and the prognosis for the 
     coming year.
       ``Israeli military analysts said the main reason for 
     growing regional instability is stepped up Iranian meddling 
     throughout the Middle East. They noted that the oil-flushed 
     theocratic Muslim regime in Tehran is pumping copious amounts 
     of financial aid and weapons to its Syrian, Lebanese 
     Hizbullah and Palestinian Hamas and Islamic Jihad allies, 
     along with material aid going to Iranian-backed Shiite 
     militias operating next door in violence-torn Iraq. Coming 
     against the ominous backdrop of Iran's escalating nuclear 
     uranium enrichment program, the mullah's meddling is 
     succeeding in destabilizing the entire region, adding to 
     growing prospects that major portions of the tense Middle 
     East will erupt into full-scale warfare during 2007.''
       The Brookings Institution Saban Center Analysis Number 11, 
     released 29 January 2007, examines the history of some dozen 
     recent civil wars to reveal the general patterns by which 
     such conflicts can ``spill over'' into neighboring states, 
     causing further civil wars or regional conflicts. 
     Historically, six patterns of spillover have been the most 
     harmful in other cases of all-out civil war: refugees; 
     terrorism; radicalization of neighboring populations; 
     secession that breeds secessionism; economic losses; and 
     neighborly interventions. The purpose of this review was to 
     determine what policy options the United States could employ 
     to try to contain the spillover effects of a full-scale Iraqi 
     civil war. It is recognized that with each passing day, Iraq 
     sinks deeper into the abyss of civil war. President Bush has 
     proposed one last-chance effort to quell the fighting and 
     jumpstart a process of political reconciliation and economic 
     reconstruction. Comments coming from this review state:
       ``Should this last effort fail, the United States is likely 
     to very quickly have to determine how best to handle an Iraq 
     that will be erupting into Bosnia- or Lebanon-style all-out 
     civil war. The history of such wars is that they are 
     disastrous for all parties, but the United States will have 
     little choice but to try to stave off disaster as best it 
     can.''
       These tasks will be difficult and will require the 
     deployment of large ground forces to accomplish them. Ending 
     an all-out civil war requires overwhelming military power to 
     nail down a political settlement. The Byman-Pollack report of 
     2006 states:
       ``It took 30,000 British troops to bring the Irish civil 
     war to an end, 45,000 Syrian troops to conclude the Lebanese 
     civil war, 50,000 NATO troops to stop the Bosnian civil war, 
     and 60,000 to do the job in Kosovo. Considering Iraq's much 
     larger population, it probably would require 450,000 troops 
     to quash an all-out civil war there. Such an effort would 
     require a commitment of enormous military and economic 
     resources, far in excess of what the United States has 
     already put forth [and planned future increases].''


                       Meanwhile, back in the USA

       This discussion would be incomplete if we did not discuss 
     the home front and what is going on here in the United States 
     relative to the Iraq War. The November 2006 elections started 
     a fire storm of various anti-war factions rising to the 
     surface and demanding we pull out of the war immediately or 
     within a short period of time. With the Democrats taking over 
     both sides of the Congress we now have a political 
     confrontation as to who can get his or her resolution to pass 
     both sides of the Congress. Lately, the Congress is awash 
     with resolutions. Senator Obama submitted legislation 30 
     January, which would remove all combat brigades from Iraq by 
     March 31, 2008. This timetable for completing a withdrawal 
     puts him at odds with other leading rivals for the Democratic 
     nomination. Senator Hillary Clinton supports capping the 
     number of troops at their levels of Jan. 1, 2007. Sen. 
     Christopher J. Dodd (Conn.) has proposed a similar troop cap. 
     But neither has embraced a timetable for a troop removal. 
     Former Senator and Vice Presidential candidate in 2004 and 
     now a Presidential candidate for 2008, John Edwards (D-NC), 
     has been outspoken in his opposition to Bush's new plan and 
     has called for the immediate withdrawal of 40,000 to 50,000 
     troops. But he, too, has stopped short of setting a firm date 
     by which all would be removed. New Mexico Gov. Bill 
     Richardson is the only other prominent Democrat in the field 
     to set a withdrawal timetable, declaring that troops ``can 
     and should'' be brought home by the end of 2007. The Obama 
     plan, called the Iraq War De-escalation Act of 2007, would 
     begin a troop withdrawal no later than May 1, 2007, but it 
     includes several caveats that could forestall a clean break: 
     It would leave a limited number of troops in place to conduct 
     counterterrorism activities and train Iraqi forces. (The 
     question one must ask in respect to this proposal is how 
     could you leave a small contingent of U.S. forces in a 
     country rife with civil war?) And the withdrawal could be 
     temporarily suspended if the Iraqi government meets a 
     series of benchmarks laid out by the Bush administration. 
     That list includes a reduction in sectarian violence; the 
     equitable distribution of oil revenue; government reforms; 
     and democratic, Iraqi-driven reconstruction and economic 
     development efforts. Senator Obama's proposal also would 
     reverse Bush's troop-increase plan.
       On the other side of the aisle the Republicans have their 
     own versions of resolutions. A resolution by Sen. John McCain 
     (R-AZ) and Sen. Lindsey O. Graham (R-S.C.) demanding tough 
     benchmarks for progress in Iraq was supposed to garner 
     overwhelming Republican support, being a more palatable 
     alternative to language by Sen. John W. Warner (R-Va.) that 
     would state opposition to the troop buildup. Instead, rival 
     measures continue to proliferate. Sen. Judd Gregg (R-N.H.) 
     said he is circulating language that would forbid a cutoff of 
     funding for troops in the field under any circumstance, 
     similar to another proposal by Sen. Johnny Isakson (R-Ga.). 
     Sen. John Cornyn (R-Tex.) is shopping around a measure that 
     would demand that the president's policies be given a chance 
     to work while calling for the reversal of perceived war-
     related mistakes, such as the wholesale purging of Baath 
     Party members from the Iraqi government and the failure to 
     ensure equitable oil-revenue sharing among Iraqi groups. 
     ``Resolutions are flying like snowflakes around here,'' Sen. 
     Specter said. There may be more in the wings of Congress that 
     have yet to surface but, at this writing, these appear to be 
     the ones being discussed.
       Meanwhile, the two camps promoting competing resolutions of 
     opposition--one headed by Senators Joseph R. Biden Jr. (D-
     Del.) and Chuck Hagel (R-Neb.) and the other by Senator 
     Warner (R-Va.) and Senator Levin (D-Mich.)--initially 
     appeared to be closing in on common language that could win a 
     clear majority within the Senate, but, at this writing it 
     appears that may not happen.
       These non-binding resolutions, regardless of which side of 
     the aisle they come from, are not constructive--they change 
     nothing, take responsibility for nothing, and hurt both 
     morale and whatever semblance of national unity the USA might 
     project. They aid and abet the enemy just like the 
     discussions that occurred during the Vietnam War. If we set 
     deadlines or propose certain number of troops be withdrawn by 
     a certain date then this gives the enemy a timetable to work 
     to in respect to holding off until the Americans leave. It 
     certainly doesn't take a rocket scientist to figure that one 
     out. Rhetoric influences perceptions, and perceptions can 
     drive responses.
       Unless Congress can find the intestinal fortitude to assert 
     its true Constitutional authority and actually freeze or even 
     mandate a drawdown in spending on operations in Iraq and use 
     of funds to move troops individually or as units to Iraq, 
     this is just a lot of hypocritical political theater--
     attempting to look assertive while in fact denying 
     responsibility and showing the lack of commitment and 
     fecklessness of America--once again. J. D. Pendry said, ``Our 
     enemies, just as enemies past, know that winning a war with 
     the United States is not about combat assaults, but about 
     wearing down the will of the American people to continue to 
     support the fight. Because they're winning the war of wills, 
     they wouldn't dare attack inside the country. Our enemies 
     know that our weak link in fighting a war is our politics, 
     media, and the socialist elites who ally with them in waging 
     war against the American will to sustain a fight.''
       General David Petraeus, the new U.S. commander of the 
     forces in Iraq, explained in hearings before Congress, that 
     reinforcing U.S. troops is necessary for this new plan to 
     succeed. Any plan that limits our ability to reinforce our 
     troops in the field is a plan for failure--and could hand 
     Baghdad to terrorists and extremists before legitimate Iraqi 
     forces are ready to take over the fight. General Petraeus 
     made clear his disdain for ideas that are very much in vogue 
     in Washington these days: getting out of Iraq altogether, or 
     the current favorite of the Democratic leadership: passing 
     resolutions critical of the war.
       In the Congressional confirmation hearing Sen. John McCain 
     asked what would happen if we were to leave Iraq. Gen. 
     Petraeus pointed to ``the very real possibility of 
     involvement of countries from elsewhere in the region, around 
     Iraq, entering Iraq to take sides with one or the other 
     groups.'' He added that there ``is the possibility, 
     certainly, of an international terrorist organization truly 
     getting a grip on some substantial piece of Iraq.'' In 
     response to questions from Sen. McCain and Sen. Joe 
     Lieberman, Gen. Petraeus added that resolutions of 
     disapproval for the war would be unhelpful to American troop 
     morale and would encourage our enemies in Iraq.
       During the recent confirmation hearing of Admiral Fallon to 
     be the Central Command Commander Sen. Carl M. Levin (D-
     Mich.), the committee chairman, proposed to hold the Iraqi 
     leaders accountable to meeting benchmarks, Admiral Fallon 
     said he believed that imposing ``edicts'' or ``deadlines'' 
     would be unconstructive. He also suggested a need to lower 
     American expectations for Iraq, indicating that U.S. goals 
     for Iraq following the 2003 invasion were unrealistically 
     ambitious.
       Sen. John Cornyn, Texas Republican said, ``Congress is 
     sending mixed messages to the troops, to voters and to the 
     world with a ``no confidence'' vote that carries no force . . 
     . We

[[Page S1705]]

     can't claim to support the troops and not support their 
     mission,'' he said in a floor speech 31 January. ``If we 
     don't support the mission, we shouldn't be passing nonbinding 
     resolutions. We should be doing everything in our power to 
     stop it . . . we should send them the message that, yes, we 
     believe you can succeed and it's important to our national 
     security that you do.''
       We also hear from Congress and others about how ``we 
     support the troops'' but also we hear anti-Iraq war and anti-
     surge overtones. If Congress and the American public truly 
     support the troops then they must provide the full support. 
     It is incoherent and irresponsible to say one supports the 
     troops but not the war. How can Congress on one hand 
     unanimously approve the appointment of General Petraeus to 
     command the troops in Iraq and execute the war plan and, 
     at the same time, refuse to support the war effort and 
     provide resolutions restricting the necessary troops and 
     wherewithal to accomplish the task they have assigned to 
     him? This simply does not pass the common sense test. It 
     is simply a cop out!
       Summarization--America cannot win a counter-insurgency 
     campaign in a Muslim territory as long as it is ruled by 
     Muslims. That is why the effort must be led by the Muslims 
     (Iraq) in order to win their own counter-insurgency campaign. 
     Absolutely, we must assist them and apply more forces but the 
     Iraqi leaders are the ones who have to gain the confidence of 
     the populace as well as subdue and disassemble the militias, 
     particularly that of Al Sadr. If Maliki and his government do 
     not take the lead and insist on the breakup of the militias 
     then we are wasting our time, soldier's lives and billions of 
     dollars to help reconstruct that country. The world is 
     watching to see what course of action Maliki takes and 
     whether we will continue to provide support. If this fails we 
     will have least tried to make it work. I don't know how long 
     we continue this support--probably a year to eighteen months 
     to see if it is going to work and then decide if it is being 
     successful or not. If not, then we execute a strategic 
     withdrawal removing our troops, equipment, and supplies. 
     Concurrently we must have made plans for dealing with the 
     aftermath of our withdrawal--a point which no politicians are 
     talking about right now. This action will embolden Iran and 
     Syria plus others and then the ``global'' terrorist and 
     economic problems will start to build. The predictions of 
     all-out civil war will prevail and the spill-over to adjacent 
     countries will most likely occur. How will the United States 
     address this situation Madam Speaker of the House/Mr. 
     President of the Senate?


   Probable Scenario following a Collapse of Iraqi Government and US 
                               Withdrawal

       ``Responsible'' Middle East experts say that if we withdraw 
     it will be a blood bath to start with and then the ``Middle 
     East region'' will turn into a haven for terrorists that will 
     be controlled by Iran and Syria--primarily Iran--all under 
     the guise of Islam and in preparation for the return of the 
     12th Imam. This in turn will cause our quasi Arab friends, 
     Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait (and perhaps a few others) to 
     begin making alliances with Iran in fear for their own 
     country and lives therein.
       Then, guess what? Terrorism will spread like wild fire and 
     Iran et al will now control the majority of the world oil 
     reserves (which can be used for terrorist activities) and the 
     rest of the world will start experiencing an economic 
     disaster just over the price of oil. One may rest assured 
     that President Chavez in Venezuela will chime right in there 
     with them and raise the price of his oil as well.
       The OPEC will be overtaken by Iran et al and the free world 
     will have no choice but to, most likely, use military force 
     to sort this out--assuming the free world has the will and 
     determination to do so. The free world would have no leverage 
     via the UN to do anything in respect to sanctions against 
     Iran et al as they would just thumb their nose at them. It is 
     a ``pay me now or pay me later'' situation and it appears at 
     present that Congress and much of the American public are 
     just sticking their heads in the sand and hoping it will all 
     go away. We continue to debate the overwhelming importance of 
     oil. Unfortunately, our efforts to find substitutes will not 
     pay off in a big way for most likely another 15-20 years.
       A stronger and more pointed discussion needs to occur in 
     this country relative to the radical/militant Islamists. Our 
     enemy is not only terrorists. Terrorism is a symptom, not the 
     basic cause. Our true enemy is radical or militant Islam and 
     their goals and objectives are to take over the world by 
     jihad and impose on EVERYONE their beliefs, which include 
     living by the law of Shari'a under their interpretation of 
     the Koran. Daniel Pipes said, ``The problem at hand is not 
     the religion of Islam but the totalitarian ideology of 
     militant Islam. Islam is one of the world's major religions 
     in terms of duration, extent, and numbers of adherents; as a 
     faith, it has meant very different things over fourteen 
     centuries and several continents. Two common points one can 
     note are that: Islam is, more than any other major religion, 
     deeply political in the sense that it pushes its adherents to 
     hold power; and once Muslims gain power, there is a strong 
     impetus to apply the law of Islam, the Shari'a.'' There is no 
     separation of Church and State. Under their belief they are 
     one in the same.
       Anyone who has any knowledge about the Islamic goals and 
     objectives knows full well that they are not going away and 
     will continue their pursuit to control the entire world and 
     have it under the Islamic law/religion and, in the meantime, 
     kill us infidels along the way. We have been told that Islam 
     is the religion of peace, and that the vast majority of 
     Muslims just want to live in peace. Although this unqualified 
     assertion may be true, it is entirely irrelevant. It is 
     meaningless fluff, meant to make us feel better, and meant to 
     somehow diminish the specter of fanatics rampaging across the 
     globe in the name of Islam. The fact is, in the Middle East, 
     the fanatics rule Islam at this moment in history. The 
     ``peaceful majority'' is the ``silent majority'' and it is 
     cowed and extraneous. Peace-loving Muslims have been made 
     irrelevant by their silence. Not a pretty picture at all!!


    consequences of currently proposed actions need to be revisited

       The proposed Congressional alternatives of capping the 
     number of troops, cutting off funds for the war, withdrawal 
     within six months or a year or sending our troops to 
     ``control the borders and search out terrorists but don't get 
     involved in Baghdad'' is irrational thinking. If that is what 
     they think we should be doing then we should withdraw 
     completely now and turn the country over to these radical 
     Islamists, terrorists, thugs and criminals and let them kill 
     each other off and watch Iran come in behind us and take 
     control. Then, watch Congress and the American public howl 
     and complain about how ``we lost the war.'' Sometime later 
     this would come back to haunt us here in the US when we 
     start having our fair share of terrorists attacks and 
     encroachment of radical Islamists on our soil.


                             So, Now What?

       I submit that in lieu of the defeatist attitude shown by so 
     many in the Congress and the media, that this is no time to 
     feel desperate. What we need is a sense of mission, a 
     purposeful dynamism. General Petraeus will be issuing a 
     progress report on Iraq every two weeks. He'll report on what 
     progress we are having on de-Baathification, disarming the 
     Shia militias, on taking the fight to the bad guys in a very 
     methodical way.
       To lose this war is to lose our soul, the soul of our 
     country, the soul of America. If we lose in Iraq, it is 
     inevitable that the terrorists and radical Islamists will be 
     here. The war will come to our shores and threaten the 
     freedoms we so dearly cherish. It is not too late to resolve 
     to win instead. We still have an enormously strong hand to 
     play and we must play it.
       The alternative of pursuing the President's proposal is the 
     only viable alternative we have at present time. The 
     Brookings Institute recent report states: ``If there is 
     anything that should make us recognize the need to stay 
     engaged in Iraq, it is the likely impact that such a war 
     could have on the Persian Gulf region (if not the entire 
     Middle East) and the enormous difficulties we will face in 
     trying to contain that impact. If we cannot prevent such a 
     full-scale civil war, then containment, as awful as it 
     threatens to be, might still prove to be our least bad 
     options.''

  Mr. AKAKA. Madam President, earlier this week the Senate had an 
opportunity to begin debate on Iraq and the current plan proposed by 
President Bush. While I and 48 of my colleagues supported moving 
forward with this important debate, others in this Chamber elected to 
prevent discussion on an issue of national importance.
  I understand that there are doubts as to what is the proper course of 
action to pursue in Iraq. We all wish for victory. We all wish for an 
end to the death and destruction. None of us want to waste additional 
lives in futile missions, or futile gestures. We all wish for a stable, 
democratic Iraq--and I would add to that Afghanistan, as this conflict 
is being waged on more than one front. We all share those common 
desires and none of us, none of us can predict the future. But what we 
can do is to apply our wisdom and judgement as to what is the best 
course of action for the United States to take. That task is our solemn 
duty.
  We cannot perform that duty with all the honesty and clarity that 
this great body--the United States Senate--is known for if we cannot 
begin debate. Denying an open discussion of the issues of grave 
importance to our national security does not serve our Nation well.
  We are at a great turning point and the consequences of this policy 
must be debated. Future generations will be affected by the course of 
action our Nation takes in the Middle East. No one can say with 
certainty which path will lead us toward light and which could lead us 
toward a darker future. But these courses of action demand debate.
  Right now our Nation's wealth is being poured into a growing 
maelstrom in the Middle East--a storm that is engulfing the lives of 
our most talented soldiers, a storm that is exhausting our national 
treasure and sinking us deeper into a debt that our grandchildren and 
great-grandchildren will be paying off. It means our Nation's 
education, environment, health, and transportation

[[Page S1706]]

systems are eroding for a lack of basic resources.
  Again, the consequences of this policy must be debated. In Iraq, 
there is a clear choice: support the President's policy of full steam 
ahead and continue the current policy of putting American soldiers in 
harm's way or shift strategy and make it clear that it is time for the 
Iraqi government to govern and Iraqi troops to protect the Iraqi 
people.
  In any case, whatever policy advocated--whether one supports staying 
in, getting out now, or getting out later--those choices deserve to be 
fully and completely debated and voted on in the United States Senate.
  I urge my colleagues on the other side to support a full and open 
debate on the President's Iraq policy.
  Madam President, I yield the floor and suggest the absence of a 
quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. REID. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. REID. Madam President, it is my understanding we are now in 
executive session; is that right?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The majority leader is correct.

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