[Congressional Record Volume 153, Number 23 (Wednesday, February 7, 2007)]
[Senate]
[Pages S1684-S1706]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
EXECUTIVE SESSION
______
NOMINATION OF GENERAL GEORGE W. CASEY, JR., TO BE CHIEF OF STAFF,
UNITED STATES ARMY
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senate will
proceed to executive session to consider the following nomination,
which the clerk will report.
The assistant legislative clerk read the nomination of General George
W. Casey, Jr., to be Chief of Staff, United States Army.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan.
Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I support GEN George Casey's confirmation
to be the next Chief of Staff of the United States Army. His nomination
was approved by the Armed Services Committee by a vote of 19 to 6.
Through a long and distinguished career, he has held positions of
increasing responsibility, culminating in that of Commanding General of
multinational forces in Iraq, in which capacity he served for over 2\1/
2\ years.
Prior to that command, he was Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, which
was preceded by an assignment as Director of the Joint Staff, and
before that as Director of Strategy, Plans, and Policy, J-5, on the
Joint Staff.
General Casey is an infantryman, having commanded at all levels up to
and including division command. As an assistant division commander, he
served in Bosnia, and earlier in his career he served in Cairo as a
U.N. military observer with the U.N. Truce Supervision Organization. He
also served a tour of duty as a congressional liaison officer.
General Casey knows Iraq and the challenges the Army faces there. He
also knows the Pentagon and the challenges he will face there. General
Casey has the knowledge to perform his primary responsibilities as
Chief of Staff, which is the training and equipping of soldiers and
caring for them and their families.
There is some opposition to General Casey's nomination because he is
identified with the administration's failed Iraq strategy, and I agree
that strategy has not been successful. As a matter of fact, I have
argued as forcefully as I know how that strategy has not been
successful and that we need to change course in Iraq.
It is appropriate to hold military leaders responsible for their own
failures, but the principal failures that have led to the chaos in Iraq
were decisions of the civilian leaders. General Casey had to deal with
the consequences of a myriad of flawed policies, including having
insufficient forces at the outset of the operation, failing to properly
plan for postwar stability operations, disbanding the Iraqi Army, then
trying to build a new army, initially using civilian contractors, and
an overly extensive debaathification program, to name but a few.
All of these critical mistakes, which fueled the insurgency and civil
disorder, are attributed to the civilian leadership in the White House,
in the Department of Defense, and in the Coalition Provisional
Authority. Compounding those mistakes was the effect of detainee abuse
at Abu Ghraib attributed, in part, to ambiguities in what was
considered permissible in the interrogation of prisoners fostered by
that very same civilian leadership in the administration, the White
House, and the Pentagon, where the advice of uniformed military lawyers
was overruled. Those critical mistakes were made in the year before
General Casey took command and had severe adverse consequences which he
inherited.
General Casey's focus in Iraq was on training and equipping Iraqi
security forces to bring them as quickly as possible to a level where
they could relieve American forces from the burden of providing the
security that Iraqis should be providing for themselves. He was not
alone in seeing this was a priority. It was also the focus of his boss,
the Central Command commander, General Abizaid, and his subordinates,
the Corps commander, Lieutenant General Chiarelli, and the commanders
of that training effort, Generals Petraeus and later Dempsey. General
Casey put it this way:
The longer we in the United States forces continue to bear
the main burden of Iraq's security, it lengthens the time
that the Government of Iraq has to take the hard decisions
about reconciliation and dealing with the militias. And the
other thing is that they can continue to blame us for all of
Iraq's problems, which are at base their problems.
Those are wise words. General Casey recognized there is no military
solution to the situation in Iraq, that only a political solution
enabled by Iraqi politicians making the essential political compromises
can save the Iraqis from themselves. General Casey is not alone. There
actually seems to be an agreement among most observers that an Iraqi
political settlement is a key to ending the violence in Iraq. The
difference of opinion exists on whether Iraqi politicians need
breathing space, as President Bush has said, to reach required
political compromises or whether, as many of us believe, Iraqi
politicians need to be pressured to make those compromises and that the
addition of 21,000 more troops doesn't make a political compromise more
likely, it just gets us in deeper into a civil conflict.
It has been said that General Casey was too optimistic about the
possibility of troops being reduced, having predicted in the spring and
summer of 2006 and then subsequently predicting that reduction toward
the end of 2006 and into 2007 was possible. He did make those
predictions, and I think he was clearly overly optimistic. He has made
a number of mistakes, but the key fundamental flaws were the mistakes
[[Page S1685]]
made, the wrong judgments of the civilian leadership of this country,
not the uniformed military leaders of this country.
Was he too optimistic? Yes. Is he still too optimistic? I believe he
is. When asked about whether he agreed with what the President finally
said the other day, that we are on a road to slow failure--the
President finally stepping up to acknowledging the reality in Iraq--
General Casey said he believed we are still on a road to slow success.
That is how optimistic he is.
I am not going to hold that against him. I think he is wrong in that
excessive optimism, but we expect our military leaders to be
enthusiastic and positive about the missions they are assigned--the
missions that they are assigned--by their civilian leaders. We expect
them to be confident and to inspire their soldiers with the importance
of those missions, to keep their morale high, and General Casey did
that.
He has also increased and decreased troops--both--depending on the
missions assigned to him by the civilian leaders.
As he testified, he requested additional troops on six occasions for
specific missions, such as to provide security for the elections or
otherwise deal with spikes of violence. However, mindful of the stress
on soldiers and their families and on the deteriorating readiness of
the nondeployed units in the Army and the Marine Corps, he also sought
opportunities for reductions--both directions.
One of the real questions I had to face in addressing this nomination
was whether General Casey changed his tune when it came to this surge
of additional troops that is being requested or being sent by the
President. I pressed him on this issue at his nomination hearing before
the Armed Services Committee.
I want to read the exchange between General Casey and myself at his
hearing within the last week.
I asked General Casey the following:
We asked General Abizaid back in November when he appeared
before this committee whether he needed more troops or
whether he supported more troops going to Iraq. And this is
just last November. And this is what he said. He said that he
met with every divisional commander, General Casey, the Corps
commander, General Dempsey. ``We all talked together. And I
said, in your professional opinion, if you were to bring in
more American troops now, does it add considerably to our
ability to achieve success in Iraq? And they all said no. And
the reason is because we want Iraqis to do more. It's easy
for the Iraqis to rely upon us to do this work. I believe--
This is General Abizaid speaking--
that more American forces prevent the Iraqis from doing more,
from taking more responsibility for their own future.''
I continued in my questioning of General Casey:
Now, General Abizaid said that he spoke to you and that his
opinion reflected your opinion and all the other commanders.
Was that true when he said it?
General Casey:
I'm not exactly sure when in November it was, but it was.
Senator Levin:
So you've changed your view since November?
General Casey:
As I described in my opening testimony, Senator, in mid
November was when the reevaluation of the plan was taking
place. So I suspect John and I talked before that. And that
does reflect my general view on additional U.S. forces in
Iraq.
Senator Levin:
It reflects a general view, but then there was some kind of
a reevaluation which took place in mid November.
General Casey:
That's right, Senator. We're constantly reevaluating how
we're doing and what we need.
Senator Levin:
But that position that General Abizaid stated was your
position when you spoke to him in early November presumably
still remains your general view.
General Casey:
That's correct.
Senator Levin:
Well, if that's your general view, what is the change? Why
are you modifying your general view for this surge?
General Casey:
What has changed, Senator, are several things: One, the
development of a plan, a new plan that was conceived by the
Iraqis and worked in concert with us; so there is a plan that
laid out requirement for those forces. So just to say do you
need more forces is one thing; to say do you need more forces
to execute this plan is quite another. And we do need an
additional two brigades to implement that plan.
I think he is giving us a straightforward answer to that question.
His general view is, and was before the new plan was adopted, that we
did not need more forces in Iraq; that it took the Iraqis off the hook.
There was a new plan which was adopted by the administration, by the
Commander in Chief, by the civilian leadership of this country. That
plan requires that we not just clear neighborhoods but that we then
remain in neighborhoods in Baghdad.
Do I think that is a wise plan? I do not. I am going to vote against
the surge. I think it gets us in deeper militarily. This is a military
officer who has been given a new plan and has been asked what are the
requirements for that new plan which has been adopted by the civilian
leaders of this country. And when given a new plan by the Commander in
Chief, he very properly said that is going to require some additional
troops.
Again, we are going to debate the plan, the wisdom of it, I hope one
of these days. We are going to debate the wisdom of whether this surge
makes sense. But given a new plan, given that decision, what General
Casey is saying is that his general view about the lack of the wisdom
of increasing the military presence in Iraq has to be modified when
there is a new requirement, a new plan which requires us to be present
in the neighborhoods of Baghdad.
Once again, although I disagree with the plan, I view that as a
satisfactory explanation for why he now supports the additional troops.
Not to the same extent that the President has proposed or decided upon,
but to the extent of two brigades. He said the additional brigades will
give additional flexibility. He doesn't have any problem with that, but
he testified that was not what his recommendation was.
So his emphasis on building up Iraqi security forces to relieve
Americans of the tasks that Iraqis should be doing for themselves is a
critical part of any strategy in Iraq that has a chance of success, and
it is key to the ultimate U.S. military disengagement. The real key to
a stable and secure Iraq and a viable Iraq is a political solution that
can only be reached by the leaders in Iraq, the politicians. And what
American political leaders need to do, in my judgment, is to pressure
those politicians to make that happen.
That was never General Casey's responsibility. General Casey never
had the responsibility of doing what is critically essential
politically, which is to put pressure on the Iraqi politicians to reach
a political settlement. He is a military man. He is a military man who,
by his own acknowledgment, has made a number of mistakes. Indeed, he
listed a number of mistakes for us that he has made and that he takes
responsibility for. But the fundamental mistakes which have led to the
chaos in Iraq, which did not allow us to help to create in Iraq a
stable and viable country, which is the goal of all of us, those
fundamental mistakes were the mistakes made by the civilian leaders of
this country. To hold him accountable or responsible, and to vote
against him because of the major mistakes which led to this chaos
through not the uniformed leaders' mistakes but through our civilian
leaders' mistakes, it seems to me, is inappropriate and unfair, and I
will vote for his confirmation.
Mr. President, I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona.
Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I rise to express opposition to the
nomination of General George Casey to be the next Chief of Staff of the
Army.
I admire General Casey's patriotism and his long service to our
country. I have concluded, based on his role as commander of the
multinational forces in Iraq, that I cannot support his nomination.
Let me first make clear that General Casey has had a long and
distinguished career in the U.S. Army and is deserving of the utmost
respect and gratitude for the contributions he has made to this
Nation's defense over his long career. At his nomination hearing on
February 1, I stated my appreciation to him and his family for their
extraordinary service and personal sacrifice, as well as the support
they have provided to the men and women in uniform and their families.
I emphasized
[[Page S1686]]
then, and I reiterate today, I do not in any way question General
Casey's honor, patriotism or service to America, nor do I question his
sincere desire to continue serving the Army.
At this critical moment in our history, however, with the obvious--
obvious--lack of success in achieving our goals in Iraq, this
nomination should bear unusual weight in our deliberations. All of the
Armed Services, and particularly our ground forces, are undergoing
difficult changes to adjust to the global war on terror. The next Chief
of Staff of the Army will be faced with enormous challenges in matters
relating to recruiting, training, and retention of soldiers, the
continuing organizing of the Army, and requirements for the procurement
of weapon systems. The next Chief of Staff must be able to evaluate
ongoing strategy and be able to react with sound advice when unforeseen
challenges are encountered. Perhaps most importantly, the next Chief of
Staff must be unconstrained in evaluating the past while giving advice
for the future.
I have questioned in the past, and question today, a number of the
decisions and judgments that General Casey has made over the past 2\1/
2\ years. During that time, conditions in Iraq have grown remarkably
and progressively worse, and the situation now can best be described as
dire and deteriorating. I regret that our window of opportunity to
reverse momentum may be closing.
The bombing at the Golden Mosque in Samarra last February sparked
sectarian violence throughout Iraq and in Baghdad, in particular. Yet
in the face of this dramatic change in the Iraqi security environment,
our military strategy--and I emphasize military strategy--remained
essentially unchanged. Instead of conducting a traditional insurgency
campaign, our troops focused on training and equipping Iraqis, hoping,
in vain, that they could do the job. After repeated elections and
political events demonstrated that the democratic process would not, on
its own, bring down the level of violence, our troops did not begin
focusing on protecting the population. Instead, the coalition and Iraqi
forces launched Operation Together Forward in June 2006. This
operation, aimed at securing Baghdad, failed. Yet the coalition
launched Operation Together Forward II in August in a very similar
fashion. The result, predictably, was a similar failure.
I am not going to go over the many times I complained about a failed
strategy. A number of times I asked our leaders, both civilian and
military, why they were continuing to pursue this failed strategy. I
continued to give speeches denouncing this strategy and predicted we
would end up in the dire circumstances we are in today. It is all a
matter of responsibility--a matter of responsibility.
General Casey, more than any other individual, has been the architect
of U.S. military strategy in Iraq over the last 2 years. During this
time, I fear he consistently presented unrealistically rosy, optimistic
assessments of the situation in Iraq. For example, in December 2004,
General Casey stated at a Pentagon press conference:
My view of winning is that we are broadly on track to
accomplishing our objectives, with Iraqi security forces that
are capable of maintaining domestic order and denying Iraq as
a safe haven for terrorists. And I believe we are on track to
get there by December of 2005.
I repeat that:
I believe we are on track to get there by December of 2005.
Almost a year later, in September of 2005, General Casey repeated:
We have a strategy and a plan for success in Iraq, and we
are broadly on track in achieving our goals.
Last October of 2006, he stated, before the Armed Services Committee,
I believe:
The idea that the country is aflame in sectarian violence
is just not right. General Casey said: I do not subscribe to
the civil war idea.
Mr. President, we have hearings to try to get an honest, unvarnished
opinion of how our Armed Forces are doing, what their needs are, what
their missions are, and of course because we are in a war, what is
happening in Iraq. We are not on the ground there. We visit frequently,
but we rely to a large degree, obviously, on the judgment and the
recommendations and the evaluations of our military leaders. This is
the opening statement of GEN George W. Casey before the Armed Services
Committee on 23 June of 2005:
Thank you, Mr. Chairman . . .
Remember, this is 23 June 2005.
. . . In the past year, the Iraqis, supported by the
coalition, have established an interim government,
neutralized the Shia insurgency, eliminated terrorist and
insurgent safe havens across Iraq, mobilized their security
forces to confront the insurgency . . .
How could he possibly give that kind of assessment? Senator Levin
says, well, we should have put pressure on the Iraqis. Well, maybe we
should have put pressure on the Iraqis, but it was pretty obvious to
even the most uninitiated that the Iraqis weren't performing. They
weren't performing.
In his nomination hearing last Thursday, I asked General Casey about
these and other statements he has made, both publicly and privately,
that seem entirely at odds with the situation as most observers find
it. I noted, for example, that in recent days, the Secretary of
Defense, General Pace, and Admiral Fallon, the new head of Central
Command, have all stated that the United States is not winning in Iraq
and that we have had a failed strategy. These were clear-cut, realistic
statements. But General Casey disagreed, saying I do not agree that we
have a failed policy. I do not believe that the current policy has
failed.
He may be the only person in America who believes that. This is a
judgment issue, not an honor issue. Of course, the civilian leadership
is responsible. I believe that the former Secretary of Defense will go
down in history with Robert Strange McNamara. But military leaders are
also responsible. That is why we give them positions of responsibility
because we place in their trust our most precious asset: American
blood.
During his own nomination hearing on January 23, Lieutenant General
Petraeus stated that five additional brigades were required to
implement the President's new military strategy and that he could not
accomplish his mission if he didn't have these additional troops. I,
for one, worry that five brigades may still be insufficient to
accomplish all we are asking our troops to do in Iraq and would prefer
that we are on the side of too many troops rather than too few, as has
been the case in the past.
General Casey, however, confounding the experts, said in his hearing:
We do need an additional two brigades to implement that
plan.
Not five, not more than five, but just two.
General Casey said the additional three brigades the Department will
send ``merely gives General Petraeus great flexibility.''
Remember, we are putting this person, who still doesn't believe we
need five brigades, in the position to be the one who is implementing
the policy. Given this and other judgments, I don't see in this nominee
an accurate assessment of the situation in Iraq or what is required to
avoid catastrophe there.
My colleague from Michigan says, well, it is all the civilian
commanders' fault. I will put plenty of blame on the civilian
commanders and I have for many years, but somehow to absolve the
military commander on the ground there, conducting the operations, of
any responsibility flies in the face of everything I ever learned in my
lifetime of involvement with the military.
Recently, I noticed in the paper there was a submarine with four
sailors who were washed overboard. I believe they were later rescued.
The commander of the submarine was relieved. I still remember in my
earliest youth, when the captain was asleep in the cabin and the USS
Missouri ran aground in the mudflats someplace south of here, he was
relieved that day of his command.
We put people in positions of responsibility and hold them
responsible and we try to reward them as much as we can when they
succeed, with the approval of a grateful nation. But we also hold them
responsible for failure.
My friend from Michigan and I have a very different view of the
responsibilities of commanders in the field, which is why, during World
War II and other wars, we have relieved commanders in the field because
they were not accomplishing the mission and, if they didn't like the
mission, they didn't speak up to get the mission changed, and if they
embraced a failed mission, then they were held even more responsible.
[[Page S1687]]
I would go on. I want to emphasize, again, what General Casey said in
the hearings the other day. Senator Levin said:
. . . even he came to the point, after all these years, of
not having what everybody wanted, which is success in Iraq.
He finally described that mistakes were made. And then he
said, ``Yes, one could define that, doing what we're doing,
as maybe a slow failure.''
In other words, Senator Levin was asking General Casey if what has
happened in Iraq was a ``slow failure,'' as stated by the President of
the United States. General Casey:
I didn't--I actually don't see it as slow failure. I
actually see it as slow progress.
In the last 4 weeks I believe we have had five helicopters shot down.
Casualties have spiked to a very high level. I saw in one of the
newspapers this morning that over the past 3-month period they have
been perhaps as high or the highest of any time in the war. And we are
in a situation of slow progress?
Judgment. Judgment. Judgment. We expect people who are placed in
positions of responsibility to exercise good judgment.
There is a lot I could say in response to the statement of my friend
from Michigan concerning no responsibility whatsoever for the failures
in the hands of the commander on the ground in Iraq. I mean, on its
face it is a rather unusual interpretation of the responsibility we
give to our commanders on the ground. Of course the ultimate
responsibility rests with civilian leadership. Of course it does. That
is how our democracy is shaped. But we don't absolve anybody in the
chain of command, civilian or military, for the responsibility for
failure and it is widely believed by everyone, perhaps with the
exception of General Casey, that the policy in Iraq is a failure and
that is why we are trying a new strategy in hopes that we prevail in
very difficult conditions. There is an old saw about those who ignore
the lessons of history are doomed to repeat them. During the Vietnam
war there was failure. General Westmoreland, then head of forces in
Vietnam, was brought back and made Chief of Staff of the Army even
though our policy and strategy in Vietnam had failed. Ask anyone who
was a young officer in those days in the United States Army or Marine
Corps. It was a blow to their morale because they were held responsible
for their performance on the field of battle. We are holding our men
and women, both officer and enlisted, responsible for their behavior on
the field of battle, as to whether they succeed or fail. But now, in
this particular instance, a failed commander is now, again,
unfortunately, being promoted to a greater position of responsibility.
We are, again, repeating the lessons of history because we ignore them.
I intend to vote against the nomination of General Casey and I hope
my colleagues will as well. I say that with all due respect to the
honorable service of him and his family to this Nation. It has nothing
to do with honorable service. It has everything to do with judgment and
positions of responsibility. Just as Abraham Lincoln held generals
responsible for performance on the battlefield, so today we should hold
commanders responsible for performance on the battlefield.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan.
Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, a couple of quick comments on my good
friend's statement. First, no one suggests that the commanders be
absolved from any responsibility. In fact, when we asked General Casey
what mistakes had been made, he listed a number of mistakes in his own
answers, including:
We underestimated the ability of al-Qaida, the Sunni
insurgents, to provoke sectarian conflict and failed to
preempt the attack against the Golden Mosque in Samarra; we
thought that as more security forces were trained and
equipped we would be able to gradually shift ever increasing
security responsibilities to them and thus reduce our forces
proportionately. This is occurring slower than we originally
projected. We were slow to anticipate the extent of the
radical Shia death squads.
He has acknowledged mistakes have been made. But the fundamental
mistakes which have been made which caused us to be in the situation we
are in were not George Casey's. Every commander makes mistakes. There
is no commander I know of who would say he or she did not make
mistakes. No one is absolving General Casey of the mistakes, which he
is the first to acknowledge. The question is whether he is going to be
held accountable--not for his mistakes but for the fundamental mistakes
which were made by the civilian leadership of this Nation. That is the
question.
When my friend says General Casey must be the only one in America who
doesn't think this policy is a failure, let me give you a couple of
other Americans who seem to think the same way. Let's start with the
President of the United States, last October, when he said: ``We are
absolutely winning in Iraq.''
That is the Commander in Chief. ``We are absolutely winning in
Iraq.''
How about another person, the Vice President of the United States,
within the last year? ``The insurgency is in its last throes.''
To say that General Casey is the only person in America who has made
statements that are overly optimistic, to put it mildly, in terms of
what is going on in Iraq, when he is trying to carry out the policies
of the administration, keep the morale of his troops, and now, after
November the President now says we are on a road to slow failure, after
the American public told the President of the United States that we are
on a road to slow failure, now what we are saying is: OK, the President
acknowledges we are on a road to slow failure unless we adopt his
policy of a surge. What General Casey is saying, honestly, when I
pressed him--he doesn't frame it that way. He believes we are on a slow
progress road. Are we going to say he is not qualified to be Chief of
Staff of the United States Army, when he has been Vice Chief, he has
been a Commander, he has been a three star general--because he believes
it is slow progress instead of slow failure, when we have a Commander
in Chief who just a few months ago said we are absolutely winning in
Iraq, absolutely winning?
And George Casey, now it is all piled on him. He is the only one in
America who seems to think we are winning in Iraq. Well, he doesn't
think we are winning in Iraq; he thinks we are slowly making progress
in Iraq, to use his words. Do I agree with him? No. I think this policy
has been a failure right from the beginning. Going in was a mistake. It
was a mistake that was based on arrogance, it was based on a
misunderstanding of history, it was based on a misreading of what the
threat was, it was based on a lot of mistakes. Disbanding the Iraqi
Army? Look what it has led to. Not having a plan for the aftermath?
Look what it has led to. These are the fundamentals. These are the
transcendent mistakes which have created the chaos in Iraq, and George
Casey inherits that.
He makes his own mistakes at a totally different level, degree, than
these fundamental mistakes. Suddenly we say he is not qualified to be a
chief of staff of the Army because he was a commander who inherited
that mess and made his own mistakes of a much lower degree, obviously.
Much too optimistic. He is a commander of troops, trying to keep morale
up. So he is optimistic, I believe he is overly optimistic, history has
proven he is overly optimistic. But to say we are trying to absolve him
of mistakes when he acknowledges his own mistakes as any good commander
will, learning from mistakes--he listed his mistakes; it is his list--
no one is absolving him. We are simply saying he should not be carrying
the load of the mistakes the civilian leadership of this country has
made, which has helped to create such chaos in Iraq.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona.
Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I repeat, in case Senator Levin didn't
hear me, I have criticized the policies and, placed responsibilities on
the President, the Vice President and the former Secretary of Defense
for the last 3 years over a failed policy in Iraq. The difference
Senator Levin and I seem to have is I also hold responsible the
commanders in the field for giving accurate information, for providing
recommendations that will help to win a conflict rather than
subscribing and continuing to this day, to this very day to support a
policy everyone acknowledges has failed.
By the way, I said today says are failed--not quotes from a month ago
or
[[Page S1688]]
6 months ago or a year ago, I say to my friend from Michigan. No one
decried those comments, such as ``last throes'' and ``stuff happens''
and ``dead enders'' more than I did at the time. But I hold the entire
chain of command responsible down to the commanders in the field.
He says just a few days ago:
I don't see it as slow failure. I actually see it as slow
progress.
The unclassified NIE we have read, the National Intelligence Estimate
on Iraq says, ``We are not making progress.'' It says, ``We are
losing.''
We are going to make the chief of staff of the Army the guy who
thinks that ``We are making slow progress'' as opposed to the National
Intelligence Estimate, which is agreed on by our entire intelligence
establishment, that we are losing. So, of course, we hold people
responsible. Of course we do. Do I hold our former Secretary of Defense
responsible? Absolutely. Absolutely. If he were up for another job, I
would be standing here on the floor objecting to it.
Do I hold others in the administration responsible? Absolutely. But
this is a leader who is up for an increased responsibility and he has
failed in his mission, and that is what it is all about. An honorable
and decent man who has served his country, but the message throughout
the military now is, unfortunately, as it was with General
Westmoreland, ``Even though you fail, you are going to be promoted.''
To somehow say the commander in the field is in some way not
responsible in any way for the ``mistakes'' I think flies in the face
not only of the record but the tradition we have in the United States
of America, of placing the commanders in the field in positions of
responsibility and making them accountable for their performance and
how they carry out those responsibilities.
I am sure the Senator from Michigan and I will continue to disagree
for some period of time because we have a philosophical difference, a
fundamental difference of opinion. If you want to blame everything on
the civilian leadership, who are of course responsible, who of course
history will judge very harshly, that is one way of looking at it. If
you say that responsibility is shared down to the commanders in the
field, as I do, then you probably have a different view.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Colorado is recognized.
Mr. ALLARD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to speak as in
morning business.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I have no objection at all. I am just
curious as to about how long. I am not in any way trying to influence
the length of time.
Mr. ALLARD. Let me just say I am anticipating somewhere around 12 or
15 minutes.
Mr. LEVIN. I thank my colleague.
Mr. ALLARD. In October 2002, this body saw fit to authorize, by a
large majority, the use of force against Iraq. Specifically the
resolution authorizes the President: to use the Armed Forces of the
United States as he determines to be necessary and appropriate in order
to defend the national security of the United States against the
continuing threat posed by Iraq.
I remind my colleagues that we did so because of two important
reasons--the same two reasons offered by the President to the American
public.
First, Saddam Hussein was in breach of more than a dozen United
Nations Security Council resolutions. He refused to cooperate with U.N.
weapons inspectors even after a decade of sanctions, and rejected
proposal after proposal to verify that he did not have such weapons.
Second, after September 11, it was clear that America could not
afford to allow imminent threats to our Nation go unopposed. At the
time, Iraq represented a dangerous crossroad between terrorism and
weapons of mass destruction. In the context of Saddam's hostile
intentions, it was a nexus that we could not ignore.
When critics attempt to cover up their support for the use of force
against Iraq, they damage U.S. credibility overseas and send mixed
messages to our servicemembers. Even more dangerously, they encourage
an enemy who believes America will give up when the fighting gets
tough.
Of course, there is no doubt that the strategic imperatives in Iraq
have changed since 2002. I will readily admit that this fight is one
that we fully recognize. But that in no way diminishes the importance
of our mission there now. We have a vital national interest to remain
in Iraq and help maintain a secure and stable nation.
The terrorists have made it abundantly clear that Iraq is central in
their war against the civilized world. They are committed to fighting
there and will not stop unless we defeat them. If we have to fight, it
is preferable to fight on their own soil.
They have also made it clear that they will not stop with Iraq. They
will strike Iraq's neighbors as they did in Jordan and Lebanon. They
will strike Europe as they did in the Madrid bombings. And, they will
not hesitate to strike America again as they did on September 11.
And yet now, in this body, we are debating another resolution, but
one that does not hold any legal weight; a resolution that would tie
the hands of our soldiers in the field by limiting their options, lower
their morale, and harm their efforts in Iraq. I am convinced that a
long-term stable Iraq is in the best interest of our national security,
and as I have said many times before, the price of failure in Iraq is
too great to walk away now.
We should not forfeit our progress in Iraq to meet arbitrary
deadlines whether they are in the short or in the long term. We should
not think about giving up when our men and women in uniform who have
achieved so much. Such defeatism encourages the terrorists, undermines
our efforts to persuade other nations to join us, and opens the door to
attacks here at home. We must stand firm. We must stand strong.
Thus, I support the President's plan to move forward in trying to
secure Baghdad.
One of the keys to success in Iraq, I believe, is obtaining a sincere
commitment from the Iraqi Prime Minister to get the Iraqi government to
play a much stronger role in the destiny of Iraq.
President Bush is confident that we now have that commitment and I
think that this will have a major impact on our new efforts to bring
stability to Baghdad.
I am supportive of this new strategy because it contains a much
stronger commitment from Iraqis, in terms of their share of force
strength and their financial share of the costs of the war, and
includes new thresholds for the Iraqis to meet. To date, the Iraqis
have become too reliant on U.S. troops and U.S. dollars. This plan
shows a new commitment from the Iraqis to step up to the plate and
fight for their country's future.
I am optimistic that the President's shift in direction was needed,
and may have already resulted in two positive results:
No. 1, Iraq's prime minister dropped his protection of an anti-
American cleric's Shiite militia after U.S. intelligence convinced him
the group was infiltrated by death squads; and
No. 2, recently, U.S. forces arrested the top aide to radical cleric
al-Sadr in a raid. I think this signals that the important change in
our strategy shows hope for success and that Iraq is ready to come
forward with a renewed commitment to solving its problems.
Mr. President, I enter in the Record the following newspaper articles
describing these accounts.
[From the Washington Post, Jan. 20, 2007]
Key Aide to Sadr Arrested in Baghdad--Iraqi-Led Operation Part of
Broader Push
(By Ernesto Londono)
U.S.-backed Iraqi forces arrested a top aide to anti-
American Shiite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr in eastern Baghdad on
Friday, amid growing signs of stepped-up efforts to quell
Sadr and his supporters.
U.S. military officials said in November that Sadr's Mahdi
Army militia represents the greatest threat to Iraq's
security. U.S. and Iraqi forces are preparing a renewed
effort to pacify Baghdad, including the deployment of
additional U.S. troops.
Abdul Hadi al-Daraji, Sadr's media director in Baghdad, was
arrested at his house in the neighborhood of Baladiyat, near
the Mahdi Army stronghold of Sadr City, shortly after
midnight, said Sadr spokesman Abdul Razak al-Nadawi.
The spokesman said a guard was killed during the operation.
At least two other aides were taken into custody, according
to a statement released by the U.S. military.
The statement did not identify Daraji by name, but said the
main suspect was involved in the assassination of numerous
[[Page S1689]]
members of Iraq's security forces and is ``affiliated with
illegal armed group cells targeting Iraqi civilians for
sectarian attacks.'' The military said the arrest was the
result of an ``Iraqi-led'' operation.
Nadawi said ``the occupation forces are provoking Sadr . .
. by these daily operations or every-other-day operations.''
The spokesman added that the cleric's followers ``are the
only ones demanding and putting a timetable for the
occupation withdrawal.''
Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, who has been
pressured by the Bush administration to bring the Mahdi Army
and other Shiite militias under control, was not forewarned
about the arrest, said Ali Dabbagh, a spokesman for Maliki.
Dabbagh said the prime minister was not notified about every
impending high-profile arrest.
``No one is untouchable for the security forces,'' Dabbagh
said. ``At the same time, no one was interested to go into a
fight with the Sadr movement.'' Sadr, whose supporters hold
30 seats in parliament, is a key supporter of Maliki, who is
a Shiite, but the cleric is also widely seen as an instigator
of the country's sectarian violence.
Neither Dabbagh nor the U.S. military said whether Daraji
had been charged with a crime. ``Definitely, if he's not
charged, he will be released in a respectful way,'' Dabbagh
said.
Sadr said in an interview with an Italian newspaper
published Friday that a crackdown had begun and that 400 of
his men had been arrested, according to the Associated Press.
Maliki told reporters this week that 430 Mahdi Army members
had been arrested in recent days, but Nadawi said Thursday
that the arrests stretched back to August 2004.
In the interview, Sadr said his militiamen would not fight
back during the Muslim holy month of Muharram, which started
Friday for Sunnis and begins Saturday for Shiites, saying it
was against the faith to kill at that time.
``Let them kill us. For a true believer there is no better
moment than this to die: Heaven is ensured,'' he was quoted
as saying. ``After Muharram, we'll see.''
Also on Friday, the U.S. military reported the death of an
American soldier killed Thursday by an improvised explosive
device.
The soldier, who was not identified pending notification of
relatives, was traveling in a convoy conducting an escort
mission in a neighborhood in northwest Baghdad when the blast
occurred. Three other soldiers were injured.
____
[From the Los Angeles Times, Jan. 18, 2007]
Maliki Pledges To Treat Militants With an Iron Fist
(By Louise Roug)
Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri Maliki promised Wednesday to
crack down on Shiite Muslim militias and Sunni Arab
insurgents, warning that no one--not even political ally
Muqtada Sadr--would be above the law.
``We will not allow any politicians to interfere with this
Baghdad security plan . . . whether they are Sunnis or
Shiites, Arabs or Kurds, militias or parties, insurgents or
terrorists,'' Maliki said in a rare interview.
The prime minister's comments appeared to align his
government's security plan with the Bush administration's
call to confront Shiite militias. But in other remarks,
Maliki underscored his differences with the U.S., suggesting
that American miscalculations had worsened the bloodshed in
Iraq, and warning that his patience for political negotiation
with warring factions was wearing thin.
``When military operations start in Baghdad, all other
tracks will stop,'' Maliki said. ``We gave the political side
a great chance, and we have now to use the authority of the
state to impose the law and tackle or confront people who
break it.''
U.S. officials have said that renewed military operations
should go hand in hand with efforts at political
reconciliation between warring Shiites and Sunnis.
Maliki said if Iraqi security forces were given sufficient
training and equipment, they could stabilize the country
enough to allow the withdrawal of U.S. troops starting in
three to six months--a period in which President Bush's
proposed troop buildup would still be underway.
He said if better U.S. training and supplies had come
earlier, lives could have been saved.
``I think that within three to six months our need for the
American troops will dramatically go down,'' Maliki said.
``That's on the condition that there are real strong efforts
to support our military forces.''
The U.S.-Iraq security plan involves sending 21,500 more
American troops to Iraq and 8,000 to 10,000 Iraqi forces to
Baghdad in an effort to quell the civil war between Sunnis
and Shiites that on average kills more than 100 people a day.
Maliki said Iraqi security forces this week had detained
400 Shiite militiamen affiliated with Sadr, a radical Shiite
cleric whose followers constitute part of Maliki's political
base. He offered no further details.
Return to political form
The interview, which took place in a pavilion inside the
heavily fortified Green Zone, was a return to the
freewheeling style that characterized Maliki's political
manner before he became prime minister last year.
When asked whether the Bush administration needed him now
more than he needed the administration, Maliki laughed
uproariously, calling it an ``evil question.''
Throughout, Maliki appeared confident and seemed to relish
the chance to respond to statements by Bush and U.S.
officials, including allegations that his government had
botched the hanging of deposed leader Saddam Hussein and had
not done enough to stop the sectarian violence.
Commenting on a recent statement by Secretary of State
Condoleezza Rice, he said, ``Rice is expressing her own point
of view if she thinks that the [Iraqi] government is on
borrowed time,'' humorously suggesting that it might be the
Bush administration that is on borrowed time.
``I understand and realize that inside the American
administration there is some kind of a crisis situation,
especially after the results of the last election,'' he said.
Maliki said suggestions by Bush officials that the U.S. did
not fully support his government played into the hands of
insurgents.
``I believe such statements give a morale boost to the
terrorists and push them toward making an extra effort,
making them believe they have defeated the American
administration,'' Maliki said. ``But I can tell you, they
haven't defeated the Iraqi government.''
Concern all around
The widening split between the U.S. and Iraqi governments
comes at an inopportune time.
Maliki has promised to carry out a security plan to halt
the civil war, but his government has been riddled with
sectarian fighting and corruption.
The Bush administration is under fire in the U.S. over the
Iraq security plan. The strategy to send more American troops
is being resisted by many Democrats, who control the House
and the Senate.
In Washington on Wednesday, a group of senators introduced
a nonbinding resolution opposing the troop buildup.
In the Middle East, there is great concern that Iraq's
civil war could spill over into neighboring countries.
When Rice visited Kuwait this week, officials told her that
the U.S. needed to start talks with Syria and Iran in order
to ease the violence in Iraq. But the White House has
resisted the suggestion, also put forward by the bipartisan
Iraq Study Group.
U.S. rhetoric directed at Iran has become more aggressive
even as Iraq is working to strengthen its ties with its
eastern neighbor and largest trade partner.
When American forces detained five Iranians in northern
Iraq last week, some Iraqi officials were angered by what
they saw as U.S. interference in their foreign affairs.
In the interview, Maliki asserted his government's
independence from U.S. interests in the region. But he
underscored that the U.S. and Iraqi governments shared basic
goals for his country: stability and prosperity.
``The success that can be achieved in Iraq will be a
success for President Bush and the United States, and vice
versa,'' Maliki said. ``A failure here would be a failure for
President Bush and the United States.''
He took issue with Bush's contentions during a PBS
interview Tuesday that Maliki's government ``has still got
some maturation to do,'' and that it had botched Hussein's
execution by allowing Shiite guards to taunt the former
leader and videotape his hanging.
Maliki said that Hussein and his codefendants were given a
fair trial, and that it was his government's constitutional
prerogative to carry out the death penalty. He said Hussein
was shown greater respect than the former president gave to
his rivals.
Maliki appeared to bristle at Bush's criticism, but he
acknowledged that ``mistakes had happened.'' He said he had
personally given orders to his deputies to treat Hussein with
respect before and after he was hanged.
He said the pressure Bush was feeling might have prompted
the critical remarks.
``Maybe this has led to President Bush saying that he's
sorry, or he's not happy, ahout the way the execution
happened.''
Significant developments like these are exactly the type of results
the President is working toward. Iraqi officials must do more to defend
their country and President Bush is making that clear. In turn, we must
remain steadfast in our resolve to show the Iraqis that we will honor
this renewed commitment by allowing the plan to proceed without trying
to weaken it before it has a chance to work.
Our new Commander in Iraq, General David H. Petraeus, has testified
before the Senate Armed Services Committee that he would not be able to
get his job done without an increase in troops.
Think about that Mr. President. Just two weeks ago, the Senate
unanimously approved General Petraeus to head our efforts in Iraq, but
some in this body would now restrict his efforts by scuttling the new
strategy before the General has been given opportunity to perform.
Why would we support him and recognize his stellar career with a
unanimous nomination vote, but say we would rather not give him the
troops to get the job done we have sent him over there for?
General Petraeus also testified that the adoption of a Congressional
resolution of disapproval of our efforts in
[[Page S1690]]
Iraq would not have a beneficial effect on our troops. I've felt all
along that the field commanders should be given the opportunity to try
the new plan of action.
Mr. President, I enter in the Record the following media report
regarding General Petraeus' Senate confirmation hearing.
[From the New York Times, Jan. 24, 2007]
General Says New Strategy in Iraq Can Work Over Time
(By Michael R. Gordon)
Lt. Gen. David H. Petraeus, President Bush's new choice as
the top commander in Iraq, told senators on Tuesday that the
new military strategy to secure Baghdad can work, and that he
had asked that the additional troops the administration
promised be deployed as quickly as possible.
In his first public comments about Mr. Bush's plan to send
some 21,500 troops, the general described the situation in
Iraq as ``dire'' but not hopeless. He asserted that the
``persistent presence'' of American and Iraqi forces in
strife-ridden Baghdad neighborhoods was a necessary step, but
also cautioned that the mission would not succeed if the
Iraqi government did not carry out its program of political
reconciliation.
``The way ahead will be neither quick nor easy, and
undoubtedly there will be tough days,'' he told the Senate
Armed Services Committee. ``We face a determined, adaptable,
barbaric enemy. He will try to wait us out. In fact any such
endeavor is a test of wills, and there are no guarantees.''
But much of the hearing focused not on details of the
strategy about to unfold in Iraq, but rather on the political
debate within the Senate over resolutions that would signal
disapproval of the new strategy.
When Senator John McCain, Republican of Arizona, who has
long favored sending more troops to Iraq, asked if approval
of a Senate resolution assailing Mr. Bush's new strategy
could hurt the morale of American troops, the general
replied, ``It would not be a beneficial effect, sir.''
Asked by Senator Joseph I. Lieberman of Connecticut, who
also backs the plan, if a resolution would also ``give the
enemy some encouragement'' by suggesting that the American
people are divided, General Petraeus replied, ``That's
correct, sir.''
That answer sparked admonishments by critics of Mr. Bush's
strategy, who insisted that the point of the Senate
resolutions is to put pressure on the government of Prime
Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki of Iraq to follow through on
its political program and take more responsibility for its
own security.
``We know this policy is going forward,'' said Senator
Hillary Rodham Clinton, Democrat of New York. ``We know the
troops are moving. We know that we're not likely to stop this
escalation. But we are going to do everything we can to send
a message to our government and the Iraqi government that
they had better change, because the enemy we are confronting
is adaptable.''
Senator John W. Warner, the Virginia Republican who is
promoting a resolution opposing Mr. Bush's troop
reinforcement plan, cautioned General Petraeus to be sure
that ``this colloquy has not entrapped you into some
responses that you might later regret.''
By the end of the hearing, General Petraeus sought to
extricate himself from the political tussle by insisting that
as a military man he did not want to take a position on the
Senate debate. ``There are a number of resolutions out
there,'' he said.
``Learning that minefields are best avoided and gone around
rather than walked through on some occasions, I'd like to
leave that one there.''
Senator Carl Levin of Michigan, the Democratic chairman of
the panel, said later that he was satisfied that the general
had not intended to involve himself in the debate. The
exchanges at the hearing did not appear to have any ill
effect on the prospects for the confirmation of General
Petraeus, and Mr. McCain said he hoped the commander would
``catch the next flight'' to Iraq after winning Senate
confirmation.
When their questions focused on the military plan, senators
elicited several new details. General Petraeus said Lt. Gen.
Raymond T. Odierno, the day-to-day commander of American
troops in Iraq, advised that in order to carry out the new
strategy, five additional brigades were needed in Baghdad and
two additional battalions were needed in Anbar Province in
western Iraq.
Under the current deployment schedule, it will be May
before all five of the brigades are in Iraq, but General
Petraeus hinted that he would like them sooner, saying that
he had asked the Pentagon to dispatch them ``as rapidly as
possible.''
General Petraeus acknowledged that the guidelines in the
military's counterinsurgency manual implied that 120,000
troops would be needed to secure Baghdad. But he reasoned
that the roughly 32,000 American troops that would be
deployed in the capital under the plan would be enough,
because the total number of American and Iraqi security
personnel would be about 85,000, while the use of civilian
contractors to guard government buildings would reduce troop
requirements.
If the troops are sent according to the current schedule,
General Petraeus said the United States would know by late
summer if the plan to clear contested neighborhoods of
insurgents and militias, hold them with American and Iraqi
security forces and win public support through reconstruction
was working.
He said he would raise the issue of suspending troop
reinforcements with his military superiors if the Iraqi
government appeared to have not lived up to its commitments.
But he suggested that withholding assistance from specific
Iraqi institutions that fall short would have a greater
influence. The general also said that a decision to withdraw
American troops within six months would lead to more
sectarian attacks and increased ``ethnic cleansing.''
General Petraeus acknowledged that he had concerns about
the absence of a unified command structure. Under the new
plan, the Iraqi Army and police units will be under direct
Iraqi command. The American Army units that work with them
will be under a parallel American command. To ensure proper
coordination, American officers are trying to establish joint
command posts.
Senator Levin said his committee had repeatedly asked the
administration to make available a list of the security and
political ``benchmarks'' the Iraqi had agreed to meet. He
warned that the committee would use its subpoena power or
hold up military nominations if benchmarks were not provided.
By insisting on that the benchmarks be provided, Mr. Levin
seemed to be trying to position himself to argue that the
``surge'' of ``reinforcements be suspended if the Iraqis fell
short of meeting commitments.
There is no doubt that we face extremely difficult challenges in Iraq
and we have not made enough progress. The citizens of Iraq must be
willing to fight for their own freedom. The President recognizes this
and his new plan is the result of increased commitments from the Iraqi
Prime Minister.
Again, the cost of failure in Iraq is too great as far as our future
long-term national security. It's in America's security interests to
have an Iraq that can sustain, govern and defend itself. Too much is at
stake to simply abandon Iraq at this point; the price of failure is too
great.
I wish we could move forward and have legitimate votes on when we
should leave or if we should reduce funding for the effort. But
unfortunately we won't proceed to those votes due to a decision of the
Democratic leadership.
Let me remind the American people, it is the majority leadership
which determines the schedule here in the Senate. It is the Democratic
leadership that does not want to have a real debate on Iraq. I would
welcome an open and fair debate over our future involvement in Iraq and
the Middle East.
Personally, I cannot and will not support a proposal that would at
this time condemn the new strategy our Commander in Chief has advocated
for--a strategy that requires our full support in order for it to
succeed. I would rather have an opportunity to vote on Senator Gregg's
amendment in support of what our troops are trying to accomplish rather
than a resolution that does nothing but diminish morale, sow confusion
and discord without achieving anything but short term political
pandering. If we are going to debate, let's have a real debate.
Mr. President, I yield the floor, and I suggest the absence of a
quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. REED. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. REED. Mr. President, I rise today to comment on the nomination of
George Casey to be Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army. I have had the
occasion, as so many others have had, to visit Iraq on numerous
occasions to talk to General Casey. I knew of him before his
appointment to Iraq. I think you have to first begin assessing his
tenure in Iraq by understanding the situation as he arrived. He arrived
after the CPA--the Coalition Provisional Authority--under Mr. Bremer
had made systematic and fundamental mistakes with respect to the
occupation. He arrived, in fact, after our national command authority
entered a country and attempted an occupation without a plan. That, I
think, can be attributed to many people but not to George Casey.
Without this plan, they were improvising constantly, both on the
military side and on the civilian side.
The chief master of improvisation was Ambassador Jerry Bremer. He and
his colleagues decided to disband the Iraqi Army without any
alternative approach to retaining individuals, paying
[[Page S1691]]
them, or directing them into useful services. He also embarked on a
very elaborate debaathification program.
In this time it became increasingly more obvious that our forces,
because of the misguided and poor decisions by the President and the
Secretary of Defense, were engaging in an occupation without sufficient
resources. This became most obvious in Abu Ghraib, an incident that
shocked the conscience of the world, shocked America particularly.
Again, this all preceded George Casey.
When he arrived on the ground he had a situation of chaos, both
administratively and also a situation in which the leadership of this
Nation--not the officers but the civilian leadership--had grossly
miscalculated in terms of successfully stabilizing this country.
Over the intervening months, General Casey established some degree of
administrative routine, some degree of planning. He, along with
colleagues such as General Petraeus, started an Iraqi training program.
Once again, to understand what he saw when he came in, I can recall, as
can many of my colleagues, going up and being briefed by Secretary
Rumsfeld and others about the 200,000 Iraqi security forces. In fact,
they usually pulled out a big pie chart which each week was designed to
show the slice of American forces as growing smaller and smaller. That
was a total fiction. These people could not be found. When they were
found, they were not trained. Again, that is what George Casey
inherited.
If people are trying to lay blame and accountability on someone,
George Casey is somewhere in the middle or the end of the line. It
begins at the top, with the President of the United States whose
policies were flawed, with implementation that was incompetent. A large
part of the burden should be shared by Secretary Rumsfeld whose
personality, whose temperament added further to the chaos that we saw
in Iraq. I think we could also include Secretary Wolfowitz and other
civilians--Doug Feith, Steve Cambone all of them misguided and
impervious to the reality of the ground in Iraq.
Yet just a few weeks ago, as Secretary Rumsfeld left, he was lauded
by the President of the United States and the Vice President as the
greatest Secretary of Defense we have ever had. That is really
accountability.
This nomination is difficult in some respects because in that chaotic
and difficult and challenging assignment, General Casey would be the
first to admit that his performance was not without flaws. That is one
of the appealing aspects of General Casey. He has a certain candor and
honesty that he has generated throughout his entire career.
Today, we are debating his nomination. I will support that
nomination. I will support it not because he succeeded in every
endeavor but because he gave his last ounce of effort and energy to a
very difficult and challenging role. He made progress, but that
progress today is hampered--but hampered not by his role, certainly,
alone--but by strategic decisions that were made by the President, by
the Secretary of Defense, and by many others.
Interestingly enough, too, this nomination is not strictly the result
of the President's work, but it is also that of Bob Gates who, I think,
is an individual of competence and character who has already created a
new tone and a good tone in the Department of Defense. Secretary Gates
thought long and hard about this, and in some respects to suggest that
Casey is the wrong person for this job is to question the judgment of
Bob Gates. At this point, I am not quite ready to do that.
I will support General Casey's nomination. He has an important role
to play in the Army, an Army that because of this administration has
been severely strained. All of the nondeployed units in the United
States are not combat ready. There is a huge personnel turmoil caused
by extended deployments overseas. The ability of the Army to modernize
is sincerely compromised by operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. He has
to face all these problems.
There is something else he has to face, too--and, again, it goes
right back to the top. It is the selective realism of this President
and his Cabinet and his civilian leadership. I was amazed to look at
the budget released yesterday, the budget that General Casey will have
to operate with, to find out that this administration is estimating the
cost of operations in Iraq--not in this fiscal year but the following
one, starting October 1, 2008--at a mere $50 billion. Yes, I say a mere
$50 billion because this year we will spend about $240 billion; yet
next year it will remarkably be brought to $50 billion, although
General Pace told me in my questioning that they operate with the
assumption at the Pentagon they will spend at least $84 billion.
Where is this $200 billion, or $34 billion, disappearing? It is
disappearing into the fiction that this administration is trying to
project, not just about Iraq but the deficit reduction, their tax cut
plans--all of these things. And General Casey will have to work with
that budget.
And there are those in the Senate demanding we vote not to cut off
funds for troops. We are not going to cut off funds. But I tell you
what. If the President's budget is to be believed, come October 1 of
2008 there will be a huge reduction in funds for those troops in Iraq--
but, then again, do we believe the President on this or many other
issues?
I will vote for General Casey. I think he should be criticized for
shortcomings that he admits readily, but he should not be condemned
because he was carrying out a strategy and a policy that was seriously
flawed when he arrived on the ground in Iraq. He has done his best to
do the job he was given.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from South Carolina.
Mr. DeMINT. I ask unanimous consent I be allowed to speak 10 minutes
in morning business.
Mr. LEVIN. Reserving the right to object, of course, I will not--did
I understand the Senator to say 10 minutes? We don't have any shortage
of time, so I am not trying to restrict the Senator in any way. I just
want to plan.
Mr. DeMINT. Ten minutes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mrs. McCaskill). Without objection, it is so
ordered.
Mr. DeMINT. Madam President, I take a few minutes today, despite my
hoarse voice, to discuss the fiscal year 2007 spending resolution that
we will be debating next week.
The operations of the Federal Government are currently being funded
by a temporary spending measure that expires on February 15, and the
proposed resolution will fund the Government for the rest of the year.
It is important we understand how we got to this point. Last year, we
did not debate and pass all of our annual spending bills before the
November elections. When we came back after the election for the
lameduck session, a few Members worked successfully to stop Congress
from passing a last-minute, foot-tall omnibus spending bill--like this
one--that would have been filled with thousands of wasteful earmarks.
As a result, we passed an earmark-free stopgap spending measure that,
if continued, would have saved the American taxpayer some $17 billion.
There were several media reports last year that said Republicans were
trying to push this debate into the future so Democrats would have to
clean up this mess. That may have been true for some, but it was never
true for me. My goal has always been to stop wasteful earmarks. I am
happy to work with Members in either party to get that done. That is
why I offered to work with the Democratic leader to pass a clean
resolution this year that would not contain any new earmarks and that
would keep spending at last year's levels.
While the Democratic leader did not work with me on this measure, I
am pleased to say that it does not contain any new earmarks. Let me say
that again so that there won't be any confusion. There are no new
earmarks in this spending resolution. I applaud the Democrats for
continuing the progress we started last year.
As my colleagues can see, this resolution is only 137 pages. That can
be compared to where we were headed before we were able to stop the
earmarks. It is a major improvement over the last omnibus spending bill
we passed that has over 1,600 pages.
Let me make another point clear if I could. This resolution does not
stop the administration from enacting the hundreds and even thousands
of earmarks
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that are not written into this bill. As my colleagues know, over 95
percent of all earmarks never show up in our bills but are buried in
hidden committee reports that do not carry the force of law. This
resolution says--the one we are considering next week--that the
earmarks contained in fiscal year 2006, in the committee reports in
2006, shall have no legal effect. That is a good thing, but those
earmarks had no legal effect anyway. The administration was not bound
by them last year and is not bound by them now.
Also, this resolution is completely silent with respect to the
earmarks in fiscal year 2007 in those committee reports. I am not sure
why these reports were left out of this measure, but it appears to be a
glaring mistake.
The supporters of this resolution say it is earmark-free. While that
is technically true, earmarks can still sneak in the back door. I
praise Democrats when they call for a moratorium on earmarks, but this
resolution does not actually achieve that goal. That is why I am
sending a letter to the President today asking him to do his part by
prohibiting anyone in his administration from giving preference to any
earmark request that is not legally binding. We need to put a stop to
committee report earmarks. We need to end the practice where a Member
calls up a Federal agency and threatens its funding if it does not fund
that Member's pet project.
Our Federal agencies need to be free to use American tax dollars in
ways that meet true national priorities rather than serving one special
interest or another. The President has the power to stop secret
earmarks. He said in his State of the Union that he wants to stop them.
I hope he will do so.
This spending resolution has several other flaws. For example, it
uses budget gimmicks to hide its true cost. The proponents say it does
not exceed the budget, but that is less than honest. First, it cuts
spending on national defense programs with the expectation that funds
will be added as emergency spending later this year. This is not the
time to cut defense and security spending while adding social programs.
It is not honest to hide spending this way. Second, the resolution also
pays for new spending by cutting funding in budget accounts that are
already empty. These are phony offsets, and they should not be used.
This resolution not only pretends to reduce spending in places where
it does not, it also fails to reduce spending where it should. First,
the resolution leaves out thousands of congressional earmarks worth
billions of dollars. Rather than passing those savings along to
American taxpayers, it spends them on other programs. Second, this
resolution fails to eliminate a number of programs which were proposed
for termination by the President and agreed to last year by the House
and the Senate Committee on Appropriations. These programs should be
terminated, but this resolution fails to do so.
There are a number of problems with this resolution. I hope we can
fully debate this measure and offer amendments to make it stronger.
I understand the Democratic leader does not intend to allow
amendments, which is very unfortunate since we have plenty of time to
consider and debate them. The current stopgap spending measure lasts
for another week, and the House can easily take up our final bill and
pass it in a matter of hours. I am glad there are no new earmarks
written into the text of this resolution, and I thank my colleagues for
that, but if we are not allowed to fix other problems in this
resolution, I will not be able to support it.
As I am sure many of my colleagues remember, I came to the floor a
few weeks ago and had a spirited and important debate with the
Democratic leader on how the Senate will disclose earmarks. We worked
through that issue and came to a bipartisan agreement that resulted in
earmark disclosure rules that were unanimously approved. It was a clear
example of how this body can and should work together. I believe we can
do that again on this resolution. I hope the Democratic leader will
reconsider his position and work with us to allow a limited number of
amendments.
Madam President, I yield the floor and the remainder of my time.
I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. BROWNBACK. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the
order for the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. BROWNBACK. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent to speak as
in morning business for 15 minutes.
Mr. LEVIN. No objection.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The Senator from Kansas.
Mr. BROWNBACK. Madam President, I wish to address the body and my
colleagues about Iraq, the complex situation that exists there today,
the resolution we were not able to address on the floor this week. My
hope is we will be able to address this resolution in the very near
future.
Iraq is one of the most important and, certainly, complex subjects we
will ever debate on this floor. For example, there are some Members of
this body who want to reduce this to an either/or decision: surge into
Iraq or withdraw from it. But the issue cannot be discussed in such
oversimplified terms, I do not believe. Our decisions, whatever they
end up being, carry consequences far beyond the number of troops who
are deployed within Iraq's borders. Those who favor a withdrawal or a
phased withdrawal from Iraq must wholly appreciate those consequences.
We have heard that withdrawal from Iraq would leave a safe haven for
terrorists. That is almost certainly assured. We have heard that
withdrawal would destabilize the region. That is certainly true as
well. But a withdrawal is even worse than that. A cut-and-run strategy
would set the stage for a regionwide conflict between gulf states, Arab
countries, and Iran and its sphere of influence, and not just a
regional war but a bigger one. Such a war would have enormous
implications for the war on terrorism and stability around the world.
We cannot withdraw from the Middle East and leave behind the kind of
chaos in which al-Qaida thrives. If Arabs feel compelled to counter an
Iranian threat, the governments are likely to become more radical, not
more moderate. We recognized in the aftermath of September 11 that
winning the war on terror requires the emergence of moderate
governments across the Middle East. Withdrawing from Iraq would amount
to pushing the governments of the region toward the arms of Islamist
radicals and undermine the core of our counterterrorism strategy since
9/11. This is not the way to go.
We must acknowledge that we cannot afford to lose in Iraq because
such a loss would reverse the gains we have made in the war on terror
and extend the war on terror for years to come. On the other hand, I am
not convinced that a troop surge into Iraq will usher in the sort of
peace we need to take the place of the consequences I have just
discussed.
I have no doubt our forces are capable of winning any and every
individual battle in which they engage. I have been with the troops. I
have been with the troops within the past month. They are strong. They
are determined. They are courageous. And they are doing a fabulous job.
I believe strongly they are capable of defeating the al-Qaida
insurgency in Iraq and, as they have demonstrated recently, they are
quite capable of defeating Iranian agents seeking to foment violence
and instability inside of Iraq. What they cannot do, what our troops
cannot do, is achieve a political solution between Iraq's sectarian
groups. That is a political problem which requires a political
solution. As I found out during my recent travels to Iraq, the
sectarian violence is the overwhelming cause of Iraq's difficulties.
Additional troops on the streets simply will not make Sunni and Shia
trust each other.
I say this with great respect to General Petraeus, who is a friend,
whom we have confirmed to be the commander of the multinational forces
in Iraq. I met with General Petraeus several times during his tenure
when he was commander at Fort Leavenworth in my home State of Kansas.
He is a bright, articulate, and outstanding officer. I believe he is
well qualified to take on this extraordinarily difficult assignment. I
voted to confirm him because he is the right man for such a difficult
position, and I wish him Godspeed.
[[Page S1693]]
I understand there are different constitutional roles that must be
played in the debate over our strategy in Iraq. The President has the
responsibility as Commander in Chief to direct the Armed Forces. As
part of that responsibility, he sent us a commander he believes will
serve well under his overall direction, and I could not agree more.
The Senate has the right, if it chooses, to express its opinion of
the President's actions. And we do so. It is entirely possible for the
Senate to express its disapproval of the President's strategy without
taking steps to undermine the commander or the troops. I have indicated
that I do not support the President's surge plan, but I did not attempt
to undermine the Commander in Chief or our soldiers in the field by
voting against General Petraeus, who is very well qualified for
command, nor will I attempt or support efforts to undermine our troops
by withdrawing their funding. This is the essence of disagreeing at
home while being united overseas.
A Senate debate over strategy is consistent with our constitutional
roles to voice opinion and oversee the executive branch. Denying
promotions of qualified leaders or cutting funding to the troops in the
field would not only be inappropriate but irresponsible.
Let me now turn to those things which I endorse wholeheartedly.
First, I support our troops. They are brave, as I have stated,
dedicated, and talented. They deserve not only our admiration and
gratitude but our very best efforts to help them achieve their mission.
And I support that mission. Our troops are vital to prevent the kind of
regional instability I spoke of earlier. They are crucial to denying
radical Islamic extremists a safe haven from which they can launch
further attacks. They are essential to providing the training necessary
for the Iraqi security forces to take charge of their own country's
security.
As I have said, we cannot afford to lose this fight. Iraq is the key
front in the war on terrorism. We must remain in Iraq as long as it
takes to ensure that Iraq can fend off external threats in a tough
neighborhood as well as take full responsibility for its own internal
security and prevent the establishment of terrorist safe havens within
its territory. But I fully understand we cannot sustain this kind of
long-term commitment in Iraq that will likely be necessary unless we
have bipartisan support here at home. We must be united here if we are
to achieve victory over there.
This principle was at the foundation of the efforts of the Baker-
Hamilton commission, which sought to bring people together on a way
forward that could have broad support. I supported the commission's
report as something we could rally around together. I do not agree with
every part of that report. Some recommendations, such as those linking
the Arab-Israeli conflict with the problems in Iraq, just do not seem
to make sense to me. Neither a peace accord between Israel and
Palestinians nor new arrangements in the Golan Heights will convince
Iran or al-Qaida to get out of Iraq or end the sectarian violence. But
I supported the overall report because it could have been something we
could use to build bipartisan support for a new strategy in Iraq.
If we cannot rally around that report, perhaps we can rally around a
Senate resolution that can gain strong bipartisan support, uniting us
here to win over there. Many of us have been working toward this goal.
Many of us support a resolution or resolutions that provide responsible
opposition to the surge. We do not want to see funds withdrawn from our
troops, nor do we believe in withdrawing from Iraq. I hope the party
now in the majority in this Chamber will articulate exactly what it can
support.
There has been a lot of discussion in the last several days about
funding for our troops. I am concerned that already there are plans to
use the supplemental and the regular appropriations process to restrict
funding for operations in Iraq. Our troops face the threat of real
casualties daily. They ought not be casualties of our debates on Iraq.
I have indicated my support for the Warner resolution because it
responsibly articulates an opposition to the surge while guaranteeing
our troops in the field have the support they deserve from this body
and from the American public. This is a responsible approach. I hope
that whatever resolution reaches the floor includes a promise of
support for our troops. I will not support proposals that do not
include such provisions. We need this debate, and we need to vote on
this.
I believe there is a way we can come together across the aisle. I
think we can be clear about our priorities. The first priority I think
we can agree on is getting the Iraqis to work and agree on a political
solution to the sectarian violence occurring between Sunnis and Shias.
We must encourage the Iraqis to reach a political equilibrium,
eliminating the motivation for sectarian strife. We should make sure
Iraq's borders are secure. We should chase the foreign fighters out of
Iraq and deny the terrorists safe haven. And we should limit the
influence of Iran.
I believe we can sustain this kind of military strategy for the
necessary time to come, preserving our interests while we put pressure
on Iraq's various groups to reach a political settlement. For this
reason, I have indicated support for the resolution, as I stated, put
forward by Senator Warner. I believe it is the most constrictive
resolution we will consider. It outlines the importance of winning in
Iraq, opposes the surge, offers reasonable political and military
goals, and praises the efforts of our men and women in uniform. This
resolution moves us toward the kind of consensus needed for success.
Other proposals that fail to recognize the consequences of failure,
that advocate a precipitous withdrawal, or that provide less than full
support for our men and women in uniform, polarize, move us away from
consensus and further from victory.
Madam President, the Senate needs to express itself on the subject of
Iraq. I hope we can get to a vote on a resolution that will have strong
bipartisan support that achieves the goals I have outlined and sustains
our commitments for as long as it takes to win in Iraq. We need to have
an open process. We need to be able to vote on various resolutions.
This is the most important issue facing our country. We should have a
full, open debate and debate about it a long time and vote on several
resolutions that people see as key. We need to address this, and we
need to do it now. We can win. We must pull together.
Madam President, I thank the Chair and suggest the absence of a
quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. COCHRAN. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the order
for the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. COCHRAN. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that I be
permitted to speak for up to 15 minutes as in morning business.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. COCHRAN. Madam President, there has been much debate and
discussion about President Bush's plan for a new way forward in Iraq.
In fact, there was much discussion between the President and his team
of military and civilian advisers prior to his making the decision to
change course and outline a new strategy to help bring stability to the
country and to hasten the day when our troops could come home.
There is no easy answer and no easy solution to the situation in Iraq
and the Middle East. The President's decision was informed by input
from many sources, including his national security advisers, civilian
and military, members of his Cabinet, his intelligence experts, as well
as Members of Congress, foreign leaders, and others with foreign policy
experience. In the end, it was the President who decided this new
strategy and that this new strategy had the best chance of success.
He acknowledged, and we all know, there is no guarantee of success.
But the dangers are too great to not try to create an opportunity to
provide an increased level of stability in Iraq. A temporary deployment
of additional U.S. troops in Iraq to support the Iraqi security forces
will provide a new window of opportunity for Iraqi political and
economic initiatives to take hold and reduce sectarian violence.
The President and his military and civilian advisers reviewed last
year's
[[Page S1694]]
efforts and determined there were not enough troops to secure the
cleared neighborhoods. They also determined that unnecessarily
burdensome operational restrictions were placed on the military. The
President and our military leaders have assured us that these mistakes
will not be repeated.
Prime Minister Maliki has assured us that more Iraqi troops will be
engaged in the fight and that political restrictions will be removed.
In addition, the Prime Minister of Iraq has committed to take
responsibility for security for all Iraq provinces by November, to work
to pass legislation to share oil revenues equitably among Iraqi
citizens, and to spend $10 billion of Iraqi reserve funds for
reconstruction and initiatives that will create jobs. He will also work
toward demobilizing militias, holding provincial elections, and
reforming debaathification laws, which should help improve the civil
structure so the Government can meet the needs of its people and help
promote economic growth.
Last week the National Intelligence Estimate, entitled ``Prospects
for Iraq's Stability: A Challenging Road Ahead,'' was delivered to
Congress. I will not speak to the 90-page classified report. But there
were some unclassified judgments provided to us that I can mention.
Within this National Intelligence Estimate, this information is
provided to support these conclusions:
If strengthened Iraqi security forces, more loyal to the
government and supported by Coalition forces, are able to
reduce levels of violence and establish more effective
security for Iraq's population, Iraqi leaders could have an
opportunity to begin the process of political compromise
necessary for longer-term stability, political progress, and
economic recovery.
Nevertheless, even if violence is diminished, given the
current winner-take-all attitude and sectarian animosities
infecting the political scene, Iraqi leaders will be hard
pressed to achieve sustained political reconciliation in the
timeframe of this Estimate.
Coalition capabilities, including force levels, resources,
and operations, remain an essential stabilizing element in
Iraq. If Coalition forces were withdrawn rapidly during the
term of this Estimate, [that is 12 to 18 months] we judge
that this almost certainly would lead to a significant
increase in the scale and scope of sectarian conflict in
Iraq, intensify Sunni resistance to the Iraqi government, and
have adverse consequences for national reconciliation.
If such a rapid withdrawal were to take place, we judge
that the ISF [Iraqi Security Forces] would be unlikely to
survive as a nonsectarian national institution: neighboring
countries--invited by Iraqi factions or unilaterally--might
intervene openly in the conflict; massive civilian casualties
and forced population displacement would be probable; AQI
[al-Qaida in Iraq] would attempt to use parts of the
country--particularly al-Anbar province--to plan increased
attacks in and outside of Iraq; and spiraling violence and
political disarray in Iraq, along with Kurdish moves to
control Kirkuk and strengthen autonomy, could prompt Turkey
to launch a military incursion.
Madam President, these statements remind me of prepared testimony
presented by Dr. Henry Kissinger to the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee on January 31. He indicated that U.S. forces are
indispensable and withdrawal would not only have dire consequences in
Iraq but would also have a negative impact on the region. I will quote
from Dr. Kissinger's testimony at that hearing in the Senate:
The disenchantment of the American public with the burdens
it has borne largely alone for nearly four years has
generated growing demands for some type of unilateral
withdrawal, usually expressed as benchmarks to be put to the
Baghdad government that, if not fulfilled in specific
timeframes, would trigger American disengagement.
But under present conditions, withdrawal is not an option.
American forces are indispensable. They are in Iraq not as a
favor to its government or as a reward for its conduct. They
are there as an expression of the American national interest
to prevent the Iranian combination of imperialism and
fundamentalist ideology from dominating a region on which the
energy supplies of the industrial democracies depend. An
abrupt American departure would greatly complicate efforts to
stem the terrorist tide far beyond Iraq; fragile governments
from Lebanon to the Persian Gulf would be tempted into
preemptive concessions. It might drive the sectarian conflict
in Iraq to genocidal dimensions beyond levels that impelled
U.S. intervention in the Balkans. Graduated withdrawal would
not ease these dangers until a different strategy was in
place and showed progress. For now, it would be treated
within Iraq and in the region as the forerunner of a total
withdrawal, and all parties would make their dispositions
on that basis.
President Bush's decision should, therefore, not be debated
in terms of the ``stay the course'' strategy he has
repeatedly disavowed in recent days. Rather, it should be
seen as the first step toward a new grand strategy relating
power to diplomacy for the entire region, ideally on a
nonpartisan basis.
The purpose of the new strategy should be to demonstrate
that the United States is determined to remain relevant to
the outcome in the region; to adjust American military
deployments and numbers to emerging realities; and to provide
the maneuvering room for a major diplomatic effort to
stabilize the Middle East. Of the current security threats in
Iraq--the intervention of outside countries, the presence of
al-Qaida fighters, an extraordinarily large criminal element,
the sectarian conflict--the United States has a national
interest in defeating the first two; it must not involve
itself in the sectarian conflict for any extended period,
much less let itself be used by one side for its sectarian
goals.
Madam President, it is clear to me from Dr. Kissinger's comments that
it is truly in our national interest to support the President's new
strategy to help provide a new opportunity for political and economic
solutions in Iraq and for more effective diplomatic efforts in the
Middle East region. Of course, we know there are no guarantees of
success. But according to the National Intelligence Estimate, the
perspective of one of our most experienced foreign policy experts, Dr.
Kissinger, included maintaining the current course or withdrawal
without additional stability in Iraq will be harmful to our national
interests and to the entire region.
Over the last few weeks, there have been a number of hearings in
which the situation in Iraq and the President's new plan have been
debated. During the January 30, 2007, hearing before the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee on his nomination to be Deputy Secretary of State,
Ambassador John Negroponte stated:
. . . I believed, and still believe, that it is possible
for Iraq to make a successful transition to democracy. What I
would like to say is that my belief that success in Iraq
remains possible is based on my experience in dealing with
Iraq as U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. and Ambassador to Iraq,
and as Director of National Intelligence.
We know there are challenges in Iraq and in the region. And the
President has developed a new strategy for dealing with the problem,
which I applaud. This includes involving the Government in Iraq and the
military forces and the police in Iraq in a more aggressive way.
Together they have worked with our military and diplomatic leadership
to come up with a new plan that, if it is not undermined by the
Congress, has a chance of succeeding.
During the January 23 hearing before the Senate Armed Services
Committee on the nomination of General David Petraeus to be Commander
of the Multinational Forces-Iraq, General Petraeus said:
I believe this plan can succeed if, in fact, all of those
enablers and all the rest of the assistance is, in fact,
provided.
He, also, indicated this:
It will not be easy, but if we could get them to where they
are shouting instead of shooting, that would be a very
substantial improvement.
Madam President, it is obvious to me we need to do what we can to
help stabilize this situation and bring our troops home. As a beginning
point for this strategy, for it to work, we should show a commitment by
our country to success. I support this new initiative, and I think we
should give it a chance to work.
This does not mean we should not monitor the situation or that the
plan should not be adjusted as new developments occur. But we need to
move forward in hopes of stabilizing Iraq, stabilizing the region, and
in hopes of bringing our troops home at an early date. The President
deserves our support in this effort, and I intend to support him.
I yield the floor and suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. GRAHAM. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Obama). Without objection, it is so
ordered.
Mr. GRAHAM. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to speak for 5
minutes as in morning business on Iraq.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. GRAHAM. Mr. President, this whole debate regarding what the
Senate should do and how to send the right
[[Page S1695]]
messages regarding Iraq war policy is important, but the most important
message the Senate can send, to me, would be to our troops and to our
potential enemies.
Everybody in America understands the war is not going well. Those who
don't understand it are in denial because it clearly has not been the
success we were hoping for.
The new strategy we are about to embark on, the Petraeus doctrine,
for lack of a better word, I do believe has the best chance left for us
to succeed, and additional troops in Iraq can make a huge difference.
We have been able to clear in the past but never hold. We don't need
any more combat power to clear. We have won every battle we have ever
been in with the insurgents. But we have been unable to hold the
territory. Mr. President, 17,500 more troops in Baghdad would allow us
to hold territory for the purpose of political reconciliation.
The ultimate question for the body is how to bring out the best in
the Iraqi political leadership. Some say we need to send a strong
message that we are going to leave at a date certain, threaten to cut
off funding for the Iraqi military, quit providing security to
political leaders in Iraq.
My answer is that democracy is hard without being shot at. The reason
we don't solve immigration, Social Security, and other emotional
problems is because in our own country we get locked down by pretty
extreme voices who have political action committees and run 527 ads.
The problem the Iraqi political leadership has to deal with is a
violent country, to the point where it is hard to get political
compromise. It is tough to go to Baghdad and do an oil-sharing revenue
agreement among Sunnis, Kurds, and Shias when 100 of your constituents
have been shot in the head and left out in the street that day.
So I believe precondition to political reconciliation is better
security and the better security can only be achieved by going into
militia strongholds that were previously off limits, by more combat
capability on the ground to hold territory cleared, and by putting the
Iraqi troops out front with a sufficient support network behind them
and American hands to give them the capacity they are lacking today to
deal with the insurgency.
The McCain-Graham-Lieberman resolution understands a million troops
won't matter if the Iraqi political leadership doesn't reach political
consensus on oil, rule of law, and on a million other problems they
have. But the benchmarks in our resolution are an acknowledgment that
it takes political compromise in Iraq to bring about stability, but we
cannot have that political compromise with this level of violence.
The resolution also talks about a failed state in Iraq and the
consequences to this country. They are long lasting and far reaching. A
failed state in Iraq is partitioned, where the civil war environment
spreads to the region, as a disaster. So if you throw in the towel on
Iraq, you don't stop the fight; you guarantee a larger fight.
The debate for the Senate is how many votes should we have to express
the differences we have in this body? If the Warner-Levin resolution--I
respect both authors, but I just disagree with the message it sends--if
Warner-Levin is ever adopted by this body, the headlines throughout
this world will be: Senate condemns surge. Baghdad lost.
The resolution disapproves of sending more troops. I believe we need
more troops in the short term to bring about political reconciliation.
But it is not only me saying it. It is General Petraeus, the commander.
I think the message from the resolution considers his efforts lost
before they have had a chance to be implemented. It is a lack of
resolve in terms of the enemy. The enemy will see this as a lack of
resolve on our part, and no good comes from it because it doesn't stop
the troops.
Secondly, it says you can continue operations in Anbar, the Sunni
area where al-Qaida is operating, but you can't go into Baghdad.
Baghdad is a mess. Baghdad is a very violent place where they have
sectarian violence occurring. The question is: Do we stop it now or let
it grow bigger? There are 6 million people in Baghdad. The nightmare I
worry about is an open civil war, where we have a bloodletting that
will bring in Sunni Arab nations to come to the aid of their Sunni
brothers, Iran will get involved in the south of Iraq, and nothing good
will come of that.
The reason we are having this sectarian violence is because al-Qaida
struck the mother lode when it bombed the Golden Mosque in Samarra, the
third most holy religious site in the Shia religion. That has created
sectarian fighting that has gotten out of control.
For decades, Sunnis and Shias married and lived together in Baghdad
and other places. The Shia population was terribly oppressed during the
Saddam Hussein regime, but the Shia majority had remarkable restraint
up until the bombing of the mosque, which was al-Qaida inspired. I
don't want to give in to acts of terrorism that bring out the worst in
people.
Our goal is not to get the oil from Iraq; it is not to create a
puppet state for the United States in Iraq. It is to bring out the best
in the Iraqi people, to allow the moderates in the region a chance to
conquer and defeat the extremists who have no place for anybody other
than only their way of doing business, including us.
We can't kill enough of the terrorists to win, but we surely can
empower the moderates so they have a chance of winning.
I am glad we did not take a vote in isolation on Warner-Levin. It
would have been 50-something votes, less than 60, and the headlines
throughout the world would read: Surge condemned. Baghdad lost. It
would have been embarrassing to the President. This is not about
President Bush being embarrassed. It is about the message we send to
our troops and our enemies.
The reason the Senate is not the House is because we have a chance
for the minority; we have a chance to have a healthy, full debate. We
were asking for two votes, not one. If you are going to vote on Warner-
Levin, fine, I will come to the floor and take the responsibility for
opposing it, vote against it, and argue vehemently that it undercuts
our efforts in Iraq. But there was another vote being proposed on the
Judd Gregg amendment that simply said we will not cut off funding, we
will not cap troops as a statement of this body. It would have gotten
70 votes. And the reason we couldn't have those two votes, in my
opinion, is because the Democratic left--and we have them on the
right--would have ginned up and gone nuts over the idea that the
Democratic caucus would not cut off funding for a war that the
Democratic left thought should have ended last week.
I know what it is like. I have been through this on immigration. Once
your base gets mad at you, it is not pleasant, but you can't build
policies around bloggers.
So I am glad the Senate did not take a single vote that was designed
to embarrass a single political element in the country. If we are going
to debate Iraq on the floor of the Senate, we should be willing to take
more than one vote. Two votes is not too much to ask.
Where we go from here, I don't know. I can't promise success from
this new strategy, but I can promise the consequences of failure, and
these young men and women who will leave to go off as part of this new
strategy, I know every Member of the Senate wishes them well and prays
for their safety. But I do hope as they leave, we do not take any
action to undercut their efforts because of 2008 politics. The war in
Iraq is much bigger than the next election.
I yield the floor. I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, during the course of the afternoon, a
group of Republican Senators have been meeting, including our final
meeting with our distinguished Republican leader, Mitch McConnell, and
our assistant Republican leader, Senator Lott. We now have a letter
signed by seven Senators: myself, Senator Collins, Senator Smith,
Senator Voinovich, Senator Snowe, Senator Hagel, and Senator Coleman.
The letter is addressed
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to our two Republican leaders and to the distinguished majority leader,
Senator Reid, and the assistant majority leader, Senator Durbin.
I would like to now read the text of the letter to place it into the
Record:
Dear Leaders: The war in Iraq is the most pressing issue of
our time. It urgently deserves the attention of the full
Senate and a full debate on the Senate floor without delay.
We respectfully advise you, our leaders, that we intend to
take S. Con. Res. 7 and offer it, where possible, under the
Standing Rules of the Senate, to bills coming before the
Senate.
On January 10, 2007, the President stated, with respect to
his Iraq strategy, ``if Members have improvements that can be
made, we will make them. If circumstances change, we will
adjust.'' In a conscientious, respectful way, we offered our
resolution consistent with the President's statement.
We strongly believe the Senate should be allowed to work
its will on our resolution as well as on the concepts brought
forward by other Senators. Monday's procedural vote should
not be interpreted as any lessening of our resolve to go
forward advocating the concepts of S. Con. Res. 7.
We will explore all of our options under the Senate
procedures and practices to ensure a full and open debate on
the Senate floor. The current stalemate is unacceptable to us
and to the people of this country.
Mr. President, for reference purposes, a copy of S. Con. Res. 7 is
printed in the Record of Monday, February 5, 2007 at page 51556.
Mr. President, I yield the floor, and I suggest the absence of a
quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent the order for the
quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, in the debate over whether we should be
supporting or withdrawing our support from the President's plan to
surge over 20,000 more troops into Iraq, I am acutely aware of one
overriding irony. Those who are seeking to begin the withdrawal from
Iraq are committing the same conceptual error that many of the same
critics have accused the administration of committing when they made
their flawed plans for the invasion of Iraq. They are not thinking
about what will happen on the day after we begin our withdrawal.
Let me say that the situation in which we find ourselves today in
Iraq is certainly in part due to the administration's failure to
anticipate many variables in the Iraqi theater, in the region, and in
Iraqi society. Those who prepared only for the military defeat of
Saddam's forces committed such a profound error that it will be a
lesson learned in the history books long after we are gone.
We did not prepare for the vehemence with which certain elements of
the displaced Sunni elite would fight to retain their status quo.
We did not anticipate how fractured and weak the oppressed Shia
society of Iraq would be once the dictator was deposed, and we did not
appreciate how unprepared the Shia would be to present true leadership.
And we did not anticipate, because we apparently did not plan for
this, that a political and leadership vacuum created by the fall of
Saddam would invite the influence of Iran, whose interests in Iraq are
anything but charitable.
The mistakes that we have read so much about--the failure to secure
massive ammunition dumps, the peremptory disbanding of the Iraqi army,
the sweeping de-Baathification policies that alienated many Sunnis not
directly responsible for the Saddam's tyranny--all of these mistakes
derive from our failure to think about what would happen in Iraq the
day after Saddam fell. It was a much more profound mistake than not
sending enough troops; we simply did not imagine that we would be
facing problems that would require more troops.
Thinking of what was the most fundamental criticisms of our failures
to anticipate the terror of September 11, I am reminded of the 9/11
Commission's conclusion that we did not have the imagination to prepare
for that attack.
In Iraq, where our imagination failed again, a thorough understanding
of Iraqi history and society should have helped.
I am not talking about rehashing the history of imperialists, who
would argue to justify their creation of the unnatural state of Iraq,
or who would argue about the superiority of one sect over the other.
I am not talking about the history as told by anthropologists, who
argue about ancient fights and long-simmering disputes.
A thorough study and understanding of Iraq would have required us--
and the top policymakers of this administration--to understand the
complexity of Iraqi society as it was in 2003. And if we had done so,
we would have had the imagination to prepare for the many contingencies
that quite naturally developed when we so boldly sought to change the
status quo.
We know that we had next to no intelligence on Iraq--and if you have
read the latest NIE on Iraq put out last Friday, you will be dismayed,
as I am, to read that we have very little more intelligence today.
But how about open source knowledge on which we could have made more
careful assessments of what to expect the day after the tyrant toppled?
It was a tragic mistake to underestimate the role of criminality
underpinning Saddam's regime in its last decrepit days, a criminality
that was unleashed immediately after we invaded and which has added
great complexity to the conflict among the many armed groups in Iraq
today.
But we should not have underestimated the reluctance with which the
Sunnis would accept their new de-classed position in Iraq.
We should not have overestimated the ability of the Shia, with no
political experience, to assume political power. Had we properly
assumed the difficulties that we would have faced, we should have been
prepared for a period of instability, during which the neighbor to the
east, Iran, would not sit idle.
I say this because I cannot support the administration today without
honestly assessing what happened in the preparation and implementation
of this war over 4 years ago.
And now, 4 years later, the Senate has determined to take up an
increasingly partisan debate over what to do to prevent losing the Iraq
war.
And we are now debating a variety of what I hope will be non-binding
resolutions in response to the President's announcement to surge 21,500
troops into the Iraq conflict.
This is an extremely somber moment in the history of this nation. We
find ourselves in the midst of a war that it appears some still do not
fully understand. It is a war whose dynamics and politics are
completely in flux, and with the consequences of both our actions in
the field--as well as in our politics right here--being profound for
the Iraqi people, the Middle East region and our national security.
Make no mistake: What we do communicate is America's political will,
and our political will is directly related to the morale of our troops.
Those who seek to, for rhetorical purposes only, assert their support
of the troops while communicating their opposition to their mission
cannot sever this natural connection between political will and morale.
While it is always good for the Senate to debate great matters of war
and peace--and, indeed, there are no more important matters--the
imbalance between partisan rhetoric and substantive direction on this
question has been, to my mind, unsettling. A perilous state of war in
Iraq is not improved by the partisan level of debate here.
I have watched the course of this conflict with increasing concern
and dismay.
As I said, I have been profoundly disappointed in realizing the
errors we have made in implementing this war.
I have been greatly dismayed in the failure of the Iraqi people to
resist the descent into sectarian violence, and their failure to demand
leadership from their elected leaders.
I have been horrified by the level of barbarism. I have not been
surprised, I must say, by the Sunni jihadists, whose barbarism should
be well known by now, but by Shia militias, who, operating under a
government dominated by the Iraqi Shia for the first time in modern
Iraq's history, seem to operate without restraint or morality by their
authorities in their nihilistic persecution of their real and perceived
enemies. I can understand the sense of revenge one must feel when one
has been
[[Page S1697]]
released from decades of oppression; I can understand the anger and
despair one feels when one's family is targeted for murder; I can
appreciate the rage when one's shrines and mosques are bombed. I will
never understand a revenge that takes as its victims other innocents
and noncombatants.
The American people have been shocked by this level of brutality as
well--but we shouldn't call it mindless, because in the diabolic minds
of the Sunni al-Qaida and ex-Baathist perpetrators, it has a reason: to
push Iraq into chaos. In the minds of the bloody Shia militia leaders
like Moqtada al-Sadr, there is also a rationale: Their militias
complete the cyclical logic of barbarism.
In this cycle is perpetuated a nihilistic violence that will so
destabilize Iraq that the Sunni jihadists will be able to create a
safehaven where they will expand their reach and refocus on their long-
term goals. They are succeeding, and if they succeed they will focus on
us.
In this cycle is perpetuated a nihilistic violence that will so
destabilize Iraq that the Shia will be left so victimized and subject
to militia rule that Iran will further assert its influence to
undermine this fledgling nation. If post-Saddam Iraq succeeds, its
success would provide the Shia world with an alternate model to the
corrupt and failing regime in Tehran. If it fails, Tehran will have a
field in which to meddle for years.
The Iraqi Shia, so traumatized by years of oppression under Saddam,
and traumatized--let us be perfectly honest about this--by America
misleading them and neglecting them in their hour of need immediately
after the first gulf war--have failed to stand up and present political
figures who can assert leadership instead of political impotence.
Iran is not a passive player here, no.
It is not in Iran's interest for the Iraqi Shia to build a strong,
independent, Shia Arab state.
It is not in Iran's interest to have the seminaries of Najaf and
Karbala returned to their central position in the world of Shia
scholarship, possibly eclipsing Qum. To have this occur would lessen
the legitimacy Iran desperately needs as ideological cover for Persian
supremacy. The Iraqi Shia, Arabs who were the rank-and-file cannon
fodder in the 8-year war against Iran, are now left open to Iran's
meddling by their own weak government.
The Sunnis, Iraqi and others throughout the region, are quick to tell
us we have fallen into a preexisting and ancient conflict between the
Arabs and the Persians, and the Iraqi Shia and their seemingly hapless
leaders are caught in between. And that is where we find ourselves
today.
Now the Senate is to respond to the policy advanced by the President
before the Nation on January 10.
We are to express approval or disapproval to the President's
initiative in the middle of a war like this Nation has never faced. At
a moment when the situation in Iraq is critical and the outcome is
uncertain, some believe our excercise here will provide valuable
clarity.
As I have said, it is fitting that the Senate debate this war.
From the day we passed a resolution authorizing the use of force to
remove Saddam Hussein the fall of 2002, it has been fitting to debate
this war, and we have, through many floor speeches and amendments to
authorizing or appropriating legislation. Whether it is fitting that we
respond to the President's latest change in military strategy with
these resolutions is another matter.
I have paid a great deal of attention to the hearings held before the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the Senate Armed Services
Committee. I thank and commend the chairmen and ranking minority
members of both committees for the many opportunities for substantive
review they have sought to present to us and to the American public.
Dozens of substantive testimonies have been submitted, and the
questioning has been, in many cases, direct and detailed.
As a member of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, I have
also had the opportunity to listen to the opinions of the leaders of
the intelligence community, and I have read the reports coming from
Iraq including, most recently, the National Intelligence Estimate
released last Friday.
The public needs to be reminded: There are no silver bullets, no
glowing assessments, no confident predictions.
Surrounding this debate, there is a level of political taunting
amongst ourselves that I find troubling.
From the majority leader, I hear public pronouncements of 21
Republican seats to be defended in 2008--and I find it disturbing that
anyone would question that a Senator of any party would hinge his or
her voice on such momentous policy problems for the purpose of personal
political survival.
Does anyone doubt that the November election in 2008 is a world away
from the carnage of Iraq today?
Can anyone predict with certainty what the situation will be in Iraq
almost 2 years from now?
I do not like the rhetoric of ``cut and run'' any more than I like
the rhetoric accusing members of my party for ``heading for the tall
grass.''
Lives are in balance and we should not be throwing around glib
rhetoric.
In that sense, the exclamation of a member of my party 2 weeks ago
that we should all be accountable on these resolutions or go be shoe
salesmen has a certain urgency, although I do not condescend to the
working man, a good many of whom are fighting in this war as we speak.
Nor do I believe that if I go and buy a pair of shoes from a good
shoe salesman today that those shoes will not last longer and give
better value than some of the resolutions being bandied about today, to
be forgotten months from now when the war will bring to us either the
reality of some progress toward stability, more stalemate in strife or
even greater chaos.
One should predict the future with caution and humility. But, I can
make one prediction here, particularly to those on the other side of
the aisle: Iraq will be a central issue before this Congress, and
before the next administration, in 2009.
We cannot make it go away before then. There is no way that a
withdrawal begun now will leave a new administration free from the
policy problems presented by Iraq.
So we should liberate ourselves right now from seeking partisan
advantage, because as much as some may wish to walk away from Iraq, its
relevance to our security and standing is not going to diminish. Not
for a long time.
I will support the President's plan for this surge, and I will
support any resolution that articulates such support, provided I can
agree with all of its language. In doing so, I am acutely aware that
the situation we are addressing is at least in some part a function of
policy failures committed by this administration.
Admitting this, I have to say that I am unaware, through my reading
of American military and diplomatic history, of any conflict in the
midst of which our leaders saw clearly the end. Rarely have outcomes
been perceivable through the shifting tactics and circumstances that
war presented in the moment of greatest chaos.
Many times, in hot wars and cold wars, we have reassessed and changed
policy.
Retroactive analysis and accountability are important--sometimes it
is critical to understand minor and major mistakes in order to correct
flawed policy--but the challenge is to seek the policy amongst the
realistic options that will best deliver us to our goals for the
future, not to sink in self-satisfying denunciations of the past.
I have read each of these resolutions carefully. I oppose the
original Biden amendment, because I fundamentally disagree with it.
Its first resolution clause states:
It is not in the national interest of the U.S. to deepen
its military involvement in Iraq, particularly by escalating
the United States military force presence in Iraq.
I deeply disagree.
Not only does this set up a potential constitutional conflict between
the executive and legislature as to who runs foreign policy in a war,
its intent is to inhibit the President from trying to improve the
situation in Iraq at a perilous time. Further, to maintain the status
quo in Iraq, as this clause implies, is to guarantee greater chaos in
Iraq.
If the opponents of the President want to force a withdrawal,
shouldn't they say so directly?
The second clause of the original Biden resolution stated:
[[Page S1698]]
The primary objective of U.S. strategy in Iraq should be to
have the Iraqi political leaders make the political
compromises necessary to end the violence in Iraq.
When I read this, I have to ask, where have the authors of this
language been? That was our strategy, which we tried mightily, from
2004 until last year: to let politics lead the way to security. But the
forces of insurgency and chaos overwhelmed the fledgling political
process and now we clearly realize we have to implement and achieve
security before we can regain political process.
Am I the only one here who finds it ironic that critics of the
administration who support this resolution appear to be advocating a
policy that has failed?
The next clause reads:
Greater concerted regional and international support would
assist the Iraqis in achieving a political and national
reconciliation.
This is not a policy option, but a dreamer's delusion. It is true, in
the abstract, that international support would be greatly beneficial to
the Iraqis. But if you look at the region, this dream of international
cooperation is not based on reality. Aspirations should not substitute
for harsh reality.
Then the resolution states:
Main elements of the mission of the U.S. forces in Iraq
should transition to helping ensure the territorial integrity
of Iraq, conduct counterterrorism activities, reduce regional
interference in the internal affairs of Iraq, and accelerate
training of Iraqi troops.
But, we are conducting counterterrorist activities, and the fight in
al-Anbar for which the President has requested a small number of this
surge is exactly for that. But this resolution disapproves of that, if
you are to re-read the first clause. We are accelerating training, but
we have learned that, if you are going to do it right, you can't speed
it up beyond a certain point.
To paraphrase my colleague, the vice chairman of the Intelligence
Committee, Senator Bond, who has said of rushed intelligence
assessments:
If you want it bad, you're going to get it . . . bad.
If we rush the training, as we have seen, we're going to get
ineffective results. If our training of the Iraqi security forces is to
be effective and successful, we need to take the time to do it right.
I am all for reducing regional interference, but to do so might mean
exercising power and influence, and critics of this President have a
conniption if you suggest anything other than a diplomatic tea party
with Syria or Iran.
And I do not consider it wise to commit to the territorial integrity
of Iraq. We should be agnostic about this question, and recent history
should keep us humble against knee-jerk commitments to territorial
lines drawn by imperial powers. A previous Bush administration fumbled
on the wrong side of history in the last days of the Cold War when it
argued against ``suicidal nationalism'' at a time when the Soviet Union
was dissolving. A failure to recognize that Yugoslavia was a false
state led the U.S. to delay for years an involvement that could have
saved hundreds of thousands of civilian lives.
If a soft partition could be achieved without bloodshed, I would
support that in Iraq, although no one has figured out how to do that,
yet, and it remains unclear whether Iraqis themselves, particularly
urbanized Iraqis, desire this or could survive a bloody partition.
But I repeat: If I could imagine a nonviolent partition implemented
by an international organization that would have the support of the
Iraqi people, I would rather find the billions to do that than the
billions to fight a war. In the case of finding financial resources for
soft partition, I would expect we would have a somewhat better response
from the international community than we are having now.
The next resolution clause states:
The U.S. should transfer, under an appropriately expedited
timeline, responsibility for internal security and halting
sectarian violence in Iraq to the Government of Iraq and
Iraqi security forces.
But just because we want to shed ourselves of this war does not mean
we can immediately stand up Iraqi security forces. We have been trying
to do that, and it is taking time. This clause is, in effect, purely
aspirational. It makes us feel good, but it doesn't change the reality
on the ground.
The final clause states:
The U.S. should engage nations in the Middle East to
develop a regional, internationally-sponsored peace and
reconciliation process for Iraq.
Mr. President, who are the players in the Middle East who are both:
(a) sympathetic to the Iraqi cause, and (b) strong enough to be
effective?
No country meets both of these simple conditions.
They aren't there. It is too typical of the critics of this
administration to substitute the process of diplomacy for the substance
of hard policy choices.
Now, I do not oppose diplomacy. It is a legitimate tool in the tool
kit. But diplomacy must always be part of a broader policy. Before I
would support this administration's diplomatic initiative toward Iran,
I would want to see a comprehensive Iran policy. However late in the
day, the administration appears to to be forming such a policy, and it
appears to include elements of confrontation and competition, as well
as a clearly stated solicitation for more constructive relations, as
any sound and sophisticated policy should.
If we are to sit down with Iran while Iran is continuing with a
program for nuclear development, continues to be the No. 1 state
sponsor of terrorism in the world, continues to undermine the stability
in Lebanon, and is working against the coalition's forces in Iraq, I
would want those Iranian diplomats that we are sipping tea with to know
that we are competing and challenging them on all of those fronts. It
would be foolish to talk to Iran simply hoping we could convince the
Iranians to see the world our way.
The nations of the region with whom we are close do support the peace
and reconciliation in Iraq. And those nations want us to remain in Iraq
until the situation is stabilized. Kuwait, Jordan, Turkey, Saudi
Arabia--none of those governments want us to leave Iraq the way it is
now. But Syria and Iran and al-Qaida, too--they want us to leave, and
leave behind chaos they can exploit.
My colleague and good friend, Senator Warner, has made an effort to
write a resolution that smoothed away some of the aspects of the
original Biden legislation which I find I cannot support.
In particular, the senior Senator from Virginia recognizes, in the
first clause, the President's foreign policy prerogative, while
somewhat ambiguously also stating that the resolution's intent is not
``to question or contravene'' the President's constitutional authority
as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces of the United States.
I say ``ambiguously,'' because Senator Warner's first resolution
clause is remarkably similar to Senator Biden's:
The Senate disagrees with the plan to augment our forces
and urges the President to consider all options and
alternatives for achieving the strategic goals set forth
below.
It seems to me, however, that adding troops to meet the goals the
President has set--achieving a zone of security in Baghdad from which
the Iraqi political leadership can assert its leadership and implement
essential policies--is a major option that the Warner resolution
precludes.
Further, Senator Warner's resolution strongly supports our efforts
against Sunni jihadists, including al-Qaida, in Anbar Province, as I
do.
Senator Warner and the cosponsors of his resolution, however, do not
want to see us in between the various sects fighting in Baghdad.
I have to ask: If we are to encourage the anti-al-Qaida Sunni
elements in Anbar to join us in a fight to eradicate al-Qaida, what
credibility do we have to do so if we are standing by while Sunni
jihadists target Shia in Baghdad, and Shia militias slaughter Sunnis in
response?
Part of how we got here is by not imagining the way the perpetrators
of sectarian strife calculate. We can't continue to fail to understand
this dynamic, nor to believe that we can ignore it.
I will support the President's surge strategy because I believe there
is a reasonable chance--reasonable, not guaranteed--that a strong
military presence that has open rules of engagement to attack
insurgents, militias and other criminal elements may create a zone of
calm and security for Baghdad. This goal is to create the
[[Page S1699]]
space for political leaders to make effective decisions on oil
resources, federalism, economic development and other critical issues
to entice the majority of the Iraqis into believing there is an
alternative to civil war.
Such a period of calm, if achieved, is essential not only for the
political system to assert itself, but for us to complete the majority
of our training of Iraqi security forces.
If we are to succeed, we won't be able to do it alone. The Iraqi
Sunnis are going to have to lead in defeating the foreigners who are
terrorizing them in their homes in western Iraq and leading the attacks
against Shia in Baghdad.
The Sunnis will have to lead in ejecting al-Qaida, as they have begun
to do so.
The Sunnis, not the Shia, are going to have to definitively expose
and defeat the former Baathists who have not accepted that the Baath
era is over.
The Sunni will have to address this challenge, not the Shia.
And the Shia, not the Sunni, are going to have to lead in ending the
terror of the Shia militias.
The Shia are going to have to defeat those who claim to advance the
Shia cause by revenge, by torture, by barbarism. If the Maliki
government fails to muster the political will to do so, we cannot
impose it from the outside.
Perhaps the Iraqi government can finally make progress toward
building institutions that will sustain a unified Iraq, toward passing
legislation that will divide Iraq's enormous natural resources
equitably among the three ethnicities, that will open the civil society
to Sunnis, instead of punishing them indiscriminately for their
dominance during the Baath era.
Perhaps.
But if not, this Nation and this administration should not be
irrationally wedded to the notion of a unitary state of Iraq. We need
to imagine all options, rather than cling to ideas which may have
departed from the realm of reasonable options.
I will support this surge because the option right now of withdrawing
leaves three critical questions unanswered:
No. 1: How do we continue the fight against foreign Sunni extremists,
including al-Qaida, in the west of Iraq?
No. 2: Are we to leave a fractured Shia substate unstable enough for
Iran to exert expansionist influence, thereby strengthening Tehran?
No. 3: Are we prepared as a nation to see a bloodbath ensue, in
Baghdad and elsewhere, that may make other American foreign policy
failures--Budapest in 1956, Vietnam in 1975, the Shia slaughter after
we ejected Saddam from Kuwait in 1991--pale in comparison?
As I said at the beginning of this speech, the critics' attempts to
set the stage for withdrawal commits the same strategic blunder they
legitimately accuse the Bush administration of making in its
implementation of the Iraq war. They didn't think of the day after
Saddam fell. Today the critics are not thinking of the day after we
withdraw.
Today, however, we need to recognize that worse than the vanity about
easy victory committed in 2003 is the denial of calamitous defeat that
would occur if we leave before we make every attempt to stabilize the
country.
For this reason, I will support the administration, but I will do so
under no casual assumptions or glib assurances.
I will also do so by demanding that the administration be much more
forthcoming in its plans for the day after--the day after we complete
our surge into Baghdad, the day after we can honestly assess that
Baghdad has been pacified, and heaven forbid, the day after we assess
that the chaos unleashed and manipulated by the forces of destruction
are prohibiting a meaningful and comprehensive success.
I am not conceding defeat, nor preparing for withdrawal.
I am supporting a strategy for success. So far, President Bush--who
has a lot to answer for the mistakes that have been made--is offering
the only way to try to leave Iraq in better shape than it is now.
He has my support, and I urge my colleagues to join me.
Mr. President, I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Ms. Cantwell). The Senator from New York is
recognized.
Mrs. CLINTON. Madam President, we are all well aware in this Chamber
that our country finds itself in a deepening crisis in Iraq, and we
find ourselves at a moment of decision in the Senate. Nearly 4 years
ago, our President rushed us into war in Iraq, a war now longer than
American involvement in World War II, which next month will actually
exceed the length of our own Civil War. For 4 years, Members on both
sides of the aisle have watched with shock and dismay as our President
has made mistake after misjudgment after miscalculation. Even before
the invasion ended, the administration rejected the voluminous plans
drawn up by the State Department to deal with the chaotic aftermath.
The successful examples of the U.S. experience in Bosnia and Kosovo
during the 1990s were summarily rejected. State Department and other
American officials with experience in nation-building were blackballed
in favor of inexperienced ideologues who were selected on the basis of
political litmus tests, including answering questions about whether
they were for or against Roe v. Wade and whether they had voted for
George W. Bush.
Despite the urgent warnings of Army Chief of Staff Rick Shinseki and
other senior military commanders, the necessary number of troops to
ensure security and stability was not sent at the start of the
conflict. Our men and women in uniform were ordered into harm's way
without the necessary body armor or armored vehicles, a mortal error I
have tried to correct time and again since I first learned of it. The
strategic blunders now fill an entire library shelf of books, and they
are certainly too numerous for me to list in the time allotted here.
Through these 4 years, there has also been another abdication of
responsibility. That was the failure of this Congress to engage in its
Constitutional obligation of oversight and accountability. While our
troops have stood valiantly on the frontlines, the Congress has stood
on the sidelines. Defending a partisan position trumped U.S. national
security interests and the welfare of our troops in the field. Many
Members attempted to raise the debate, and we were unable to do so
because of the majority's refusal to hold the administration
accountable.
In the election last year, the American people decided the status quo
was no longer acceptable. So we have a new Congress, and it is past
time we in this Chamber do our duty to balance the President and
provide a check against his failed policy in Iraq. As there is a
majority in our country against the President's failed policy in Iraq,
there is a bipartisan majority in this Senate against it, as well. The
resolution before the Senate reflects that bipartisan consensus as it
also reflects the sentiments of the overwhelming majority of Americans.
But a partisan minority seeking to shield the administration's
continuing failure in Iraq seeks to thwart the bipartisan majority and
the will of the American people. This is not a debate about
abstractions. I have seen the consequences of our involvement in Iraq,
as have many of my fellow Senators. Three weeks ago, I visited Iraq to
express gratitude to our soldiers, to meet with Iraqi leaders and U.S.
commanders and our troops on the ground.
What I saw and what I did not see underscored my concerns. I saw
American service men and women performing their duty admirably, but I
did not see a strategy that, under the current circumstances, has much
chance of success. The collective analysis of our intelligence
community in the latest National Intelligence Estimate is that the term
``civil war'' does not adequately capture the complexity of the
conflict in Iraq. The bipartisan Baker-Hamilton Commission said the
situation in Iraq is grave and deteriorating. Yet the President's
response to the bipartisan commission and the latest National
Intelligence Estimate does not match the urgency that is described. The
so-called surge is not a new strategy but a tactic that has been tried
and failed.
The absence of leadership on the part of the President leaves
Congress no choice but to demonstrate the leadership that the American
people and the reality on the ground demand. The previous two
Congresses abdicated their duty. We must not. Every single day our feet
sink deeper into the sands. Every day the crisis worsens. To hide from
this debate with our troops in such danger is wrong, plain and simple.
[[Page S1700]]
The crisis in Iraq has fostered a crisis of democracy at home. The
American people expect a debate. Our troops are owed a debate. Our
Constitution commands we debate. But a partisan minority acting at the
behest of the administration is standing in the way. This amounts to a
gag rule on our democracy, contrary to the national security interests
of the United States.
Even though America voted for a new direction in Iraq, even though
the majority of Senators opposes escalation in Iraq, we cannot get the
Republicans to allow us to take a symbolic vote to condemn the
escalation, much less a real vote to stop it. This resolution deserves
a debate. It deserves a vote. It deserves passage.
There are those in the Senate who invoke our grave troops, suggesting
that a debate on the most important issue facing our country and facing
our troops would somehow undermine the mission and weaken our Nation.
It is a pernicious, shameful argument and it is dead wrong. Our
democracy is stronger than that and the American people and our troops
deserve better than that.
Our troops understand we are debating this war. We are debating it
not just in this Senate, we are debating it in kitchen table
conversations, around water coolers, and standing in line at
supermarkets. We are debating this war everywhere Americans gather.
Indeed, our troops are debating this war.
The American people understand it is the policy that undermines our
national security interests, not a vote disapproving the policy.
This debate and this resolution have merit and purpose and it will,
if permitted to go forward, begin the process of changing the policy;
otherwise, why would the administration and my colleagues on the other
side of the aisle fight so hard to prevent us from having a debate and
a vote? Because they understand this will be the first step to restore
our strength and renew our leadership around the world, to begin
redeploying our troops out of Iraq and start on the long road of
undoing the damage brought by the President to America's leadership
around the world.
If you believe the escalation is the right strategy, cast your vote
for it. If you believe, as the majority in this Chamber believes, that
escalation is not the right strategy, then cast your vote against it.
But standing on the sidelines is no way to stand up for the troops.
Now, there are many--both in the Chamber and outside--who wish to go
further than this resolution and look for ways to bind the actions of
the President and to require him to change course. I understand and
agree with the frustration that has afflicted many Members in dealing
with the President's policy. However, if we can get a bipartisan vote
against escalation, it will be the first time the Senate has exercised
its constitutional responsibility to be a check and balance on the
President. The first step for the Senate will be a giant leap toward
accountability and toward the right end to this war.
There is a big difference between calling for the end of this war and
doing the difficult, painstaking work of building the political will
within the Congress to take action. We, in the Senate, entrusted by our
constituents to cast tough votes, should not have the luxury of
standing outside the arena and lobbing criticism from within.
Once we pass this resolution, we should go further. Rather than an
escalation of U.S. troops, which will not contribute to fundamentally
changing the conditions on the ground, we should put pressure on the
Iraqi Government in a way that they will understand there are
consequences to their empty promises and their continued inaction.
Last week, the National Intelligence Counsel released the
unclassified key judgments of the National Intelligence Estimate on
Iraq. That presents the consensus views of the U.S. intelligence
community. It underscores the need for a political solution. The NIE
states that in the coming 12 to 18 months, the overall security
situation will continue to deteriorate at rates comparable to the
latter part of 2006. And it goes on further to say that even if
violence is diminished, given the current winner-takes-all attitude and
sectarian animosities infecting the political scene, Iraqi leaders will
be hard-pressed to achieve sustained political reconciliation in the
timeframe of the estimate, namely, a year to a year and a half. Even if
the intelligence experts argue the escalation results in greater
security, their best judgment is that the bloodshed and violence will
continue to spiral out of control.
So what should we do? Many believe, and we have been arguing for this
and voting for this for more than a year and a half, that we have to
chart a new course that emphasizes greater Iraqi responsibility. I
still believe that is the path we should be taking. Instead, the
President has chosen a very narrow course that relies heavily on
American military force.
I will be introducing legislation that I think offers a better
alternative. First, my legislation will cap the number of troops in
Iraq as of January 1st and will require the administration to seek
congressional authorization for any additional troops. The President
has finally said, this is not an open-ended commitment in Iraq, but he
is providing the Iraqis with an open-ended presence of American troops.
Second, as a means to increase our leverage with the Iraqi Government
and to clearly send a message that there are consequences to their
inaction, I would impose conditions for continued funding of the Iraqi
security forces and the private contractors working for the Iraqis.
My legislation would require certification that the security forces
were free of sectarian and militia influence and were actually assuming
greater responsibility for Iraqi security, along with other conditions.
We must not let U.S. funds, taxpayer funds, be used to train members of
sectarian militias who are responsible for so much of the violence in
Iraq. Unfortunately, it appears our funds to Iraqi security forces may
be going to the people we are trying to restrain.
A news report last week in an article entitled ``Mahdi Army Gains
Strength through Unwitting Aid of U.S.'' reports that:
. . . the U.S. military drive to train and equip Iraq's
security forces has unwittingly strengthened Muslin cleric
Muqtada al-Sadr's Mahdi Army militia, which has been battling
to take over much of the capital city as American forces are
trying to secure it.
According to this new report, U.S. Army commanders and enlisted men
who are patrolling East Baghdad, said al-Sadr's militias had heavily
infiltrated the Iraqi police and Army units that they've trained and
armed. Said one soldier:
They'll wave at us during the day and shoot at us during
the night.
We need to inform the Iraqi Government, in no uncertain terms, that
there are consequences, that we will take funds away from their
troops--not from our troops, many of whom still lack armored vehicles
and counterinsurgency measure devices and communications equipment. And
we will not fund the Iraqis if our troops are going to enter into
sectarian battles where some of the participants have received American
training and support.
Third, I would hold the administration accountable for their empty
promises as well. My bill requires the Bush administration to certify
that Iraq has disarmed the militias, has ensured that a law has finally
been passed for the equitable sharing of oil revenues; that the Iraqi
Government, under American influence and even pressure, has made the
constitutional changes necessary to ensure rights for minority
communities; that the debaathification process has been reversed to
allow teachers, professionals, and others who joined the Baath Party as
a means to get a job to serve in the new Iraqi Government.
I would also require the administration to engage in a regional
diplomatic initiative, including all of Iraq's neighbors, to address
Iraq's future and to understand and convey clearly that the United
States expects Iraq's neighbors to be partners in the stability and
security of the new Iraqi state.
If these conditions are not met or are not on their way to being met
within 6 months, a new congressional authorization requirement would be
triggered.
Finally, I would prohibit any spending to increase troop levels
unless and until the Secretary of Defense certifies that our American
troops will have the proper training and equipment for
[[Page S1701]]
whatever mission they are ordered to fulfill.
Yesterday, I read the classified report outlining the findings by the
Department of Defense inspector general about the problems that have
been faced by our troops getting the equipment they desperately need in
combat areas such as Iraq.
The inspector general did not have the full cooperation of the
Department of Defense. It is heartbreaking that the inspector general
could conclude that the U.S. military still has failed to equip our
soldiers in Iraq and Afghanistan, especially for the kind of warfare
they are confronting, with IEDs and insurgents who are attacking them
in asymmetric, unconventional warfare.
This report comes on the heels of an article in the Washington Post
last week titled ``Equipment for Added Troops Is Lacking: New Iraq
Forces Must Make Do, Officials Say.'' The Washington Post story raised
serious questions about the adequacy of the supply of up-armored HMMWVs
and trucks.
One of our generals is quoted as saying he does not have the
equipment our forces need, and they will have to go into battle with
what they have.
On my way back from Iraq and Afghanistan, I stopped at Landstuhl
Hospital in Germany to visit with some of our wounded soldiers. I met
with one young man who was lying in his bed with injuries he had
suffered from one of the shape charges, these new more advanced, more
sophisticated command-controlled IEDs, the improvised explosive
devices. He told me that the armored, fully equipped HMMWV had saved
his life and that of the lives of his buddies who were with him. But he
also told me that not everybody he served with had that kind of
protection because there were not enough of those armored vehicles to
go around.
I do not believe the Congress can shirk its responsibility. It is
past time we live up to our constitutional responsibility. If I had
been President in October of 2002, I would have never asked for
authority to divert our attention from Afghanistan to Iraq, and I
certainly would never have started this war. But we are where we are,
and this Congress must deliver a strategy to help us end this war in
the right way and begin returning our troops home.
So on this most important issue of our time, I call on my colleagues
not to hide from this debate but to welcome it, to welcome the
opportunity to set forth whatever one's opinions might be because this
debate is about more than our policy in Iraq. It is about the role and
responsibility of this august institution. Great debates in our past
have not only moved public opinion but furthered the progress of our
country.
This debate is not merely about whether the President should escalate
troops into Iraq, whether he has failed to grasp the complexity of the
situation we confront in Iraq, and to take every diplomatic, political,
economic, and military strategy available to him, but it is about our
democracy itself.
We should consider this resolution, and I hope we will. Our duty is
rooted in the faith entrusted to us by our constituents and enshrined
in our Constitution. When we think about the patriotism and bravery,
the humor and resolve, the optimism and strength of our soldiers,
marines, airmen, and sailors, our Active Duty, our Guard, and Reserve,
I think it humbles us all. But it comes out of this great democratic
tradition that we are all blessed to be a part of.
I hope we have the opportunity in the next days to do our duty just
as the men and women who are serving us have done and are doing theirs.
A week ago, I was privileged to go to San Antonio for the opening of
a remarkable center called the Center for the Intrepid. It is a new
state-of-the-art facility devoted to the rehabilitation and recovery of
our wounded heroes. It was funded by contributions from more than
600,000 Americans. It was not built by our Government. It was built by
our citizens.
It is not only going to be a place of great hope and healing for the
brave men and women who have given their full measure, but it will also
stand as a symbol of our democracy, of our values, of people coming
together across our country--a unique partnership that you find nowhere
else in the world except here.
As I sat on the stage during the ceremonies for the opening of this
new rehabilitation center, I watched the hundreds of young men and
women who had been injured march in, and in some cases wheeled in, to
take their place in the audience. I believe they are owed this debate.
And certainly all those who are currently serving, and the thousands
who are on their way to carry out this escalation strategy, deserve it
even more.
So I hope we will have a chance to express the will of our
constituents, our deeply held opinions, and participate in a debate
that is historic and necessary. That is the least we can do.
Mr. COBURN. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that an analysis
of the consequences of our actions in Iraq entitled ``Now What?'' by
Army Retired LTG Jerry Max Bunyard be printed in the Congressional
Record.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
Now What?
(By Jerry Max Bunyard)
At church every Sunday, the Fort Belvoir, VA Installation
Chaplain uses the question ``now what?'' to get the
congregation to analyze the message he just delivered and
find a way to apply it to their lives. I believe as citizens
and leaders of this nation we are at a point in the
continuing War in Iraq that we must ask the same question;
``Now What?''
Today we have been bombarded with facts, figures,
commentaries, interpretations, and subjective thoughts
concerning the Middle East activities. Depending on the
writer, attempts are made to sway you one way or the other
concerning a particular issue. There are many half-truths
that are spoken, which tend to lead the reader in a given
direction. Our world-wide media has led us astray on many
Middle East subjects. They tend to be over zealous to ensure
what is being written follows the point they are attempting
to make or stays within the bounds of being politically
correct or meet their organization's marketing goals for
selling air time or copy. They sometimes convince the reader
to believe and support a particular political agenda. In many
cases these misleading and unbalanced reports cause the
reader to be convinced that what is being said is the truth.
On the other hand, there are some excellent articles, books
and writings that exist on the subject but they have been
overlooked or ignored to some degree by both academia and the
media because of political correctness coupled with political
sensitivity for fear of offending major non-western religion,
reigning political and ideological orthodoxies, or a mix of
both. So the question is how do we get to the truth of the
Middle East conundrum?
For many Americans (as well as other nationalities) they
simply rely on what the newspaper, radio or TV is telling
them. They do not question or seek other sources on any given
event or subject being discussed. They make no attempt to
understand the totality of the area of interest they just
swing with the ``news of the day'' from their favorite news
media or TV station. Then we have the politicians and their
army of supporters who will do and say what they think John
Q. Public wants to hear in order to glean their vote. They
twist and slant the news to meet their agenda. As we approach
the 2008 Presidential election this aspect has become the
norm and is simply misleading the American people, causing
great harm to our chances of achieving the National
objectives throughout the world as well as showing,
indirectly, lack of support for the members of our armed
forces who are serving in harms way supporting these
objectives. This, I consider personal aggrandizement and,
unquestionably, it is not in the best interest of the
country.
There are others, thank goodness, who do take the time and
energy to study the subject pro and con and attempt to be
objective and analyze the big picture along with the day to
day events as they occur. Likewise, there are some very
knowledgeable Middle East analysts who have made it their
life's endeavor to understand the intricacies of the
situation, various cultures, religion and politics of this
volatile region of the world. Many of these people are not in
the government. In my opinion, we should be listening to and
incorporating their thoughts and experience into any
decisions concerning that region of the world. These
dedicated, unbiased ``subject matter experts'' should be
consulted regularly for opinions and recommendations.
Based upon this multitude of diverse information one has to
sort the wheat from the chaff. This requires some personal
knowledge of the Middle East and Iraq war as well as the
writer or speaker providing information concerning the area
of interest. One must do his homework in order to place the
information in ``categories'' to establish a prioritization
of credible information. Once this task is completed then one
only uses that information and ``files'' the rest. Throughout
this paper I will use quotes or information from whom I
consider credible sources and will footnote where the
comments or quotes originated.
The purpose of this paper is to provide my two cents worth
on how to answer the question of ``Now What'' relative to
what we should be thinking about and doing concerning the
Iraqi situation or, better yet, the
[[Page S1702]]
Middle East regional situation. There will not be any effort
to address the question of how we got into this situation. We
are where we are, so what course of action should we follow
from this point forward? To address this one must take a look
at the region itself and place into perspective the
consequences of the various choices that are now before us.
The Challenge
I cautioned earlier about politicians and how they use or
misuse information. However, there is at least one exception
in the political arena, Senator Joseph Lieberman (I-CT) who
very clearly summed up the current Iraqi situation and the
challenge that faces Iraq, the United States and the free
world in general. Based on his long term interest in the
region, the wars (both past and current), and the information
gleaned from his trip to Iraq in December of 2006, he
provided the following comments upon his return:
``Because of the bravery of many Iraqi and coalition
military personnel and the recent coming together of moderate
political forces in Baghdad, the war is winnable. We and our
Iraqi allies must do what is necessary to win it.
The American people are justifiably frustrated by the lack
of progress, and the price paid by our heroic troops and
their families has been heavy. But what is needed now,
especially in Washington and Baghdad, is not despair but
decisive action--and soon.
``The most pressing problem we face in Iraq is not an
absence of Iraqi political will or American diplomatic
initiative, both of which are increasing and improving; it is
a lack of basic security. As long as insurgents and death
squads terrorize Baghdad, Iraq's nascent democratic
institutions cannot be expected to function, much less win
the trust of the people. The fear created by gang murders and
mass abductions ensures that power will continue to flow to
the very thugs and extremists who have the least interest in
peace and reconciliation.''
Senator Lieberman brought out very salient points--the war
is winnable; American people are frustrated by lack of
progress; price paid by troops and families has been heavy;
what is needed, especially in Washington and Baghdad, is not
despair but decisive action--and soon; most pressing problem
is the lack of basic security.
To me, that captures the status that continues to exist at
present.
So, this sets the stage as to the situation we find
ourselves in today. Now what do we do about it and how?
Background
Before getting into the current Middle East issues and
possible courses of action it is necessary one have a general
understanding of the key religious aspects along with a basic
knowledge of the Jewish, Arab, and Islamic history.
Religion has once again become a force that no government
can safely ignore. The United States and other Western
countries experts have failed to recognize the importance of
faith as it relates to world affairs. One, if not the most,
important aspects to be considered when discussing the Middle
East and the growing dominance of the Islam religion concerns
the differences of opinion between Islam and the Western
World view of separation of Church and State.
Bruce Feiler states ``Abraham, the great patriarch of the
Hebrew Bible, is also the spiritual forefather of the New
Testament and the grand holy architect of the Koran. Abraham
is the shared ancestor of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam.
He is the linchpin of the Arab-Israeli conflict. He is the
centerpiece of the battle between the West and Islamic
extremists. He is the father--in many cases, the purported
biological father--of 12 million Jews, 2 billion Christians,
and 1 billion Muslims around the world. He is history's first
monotheist.''
Thomas Jefferson once remarked that in matters of religion
``the maxim of civil government'' should be reversed and we
should rather say, ``Divided we stand, united, we fall.'' In
this remark Jefferson was setting forth with classic
terseness an idea that has come to be regarded as essentially
American: the separation of Church and State. This idea was
not entirely new; it had some precedents in the writings of
Spinoza, Locke, and the philosophers of the European
Enlightenment. It was in the United States, however, that the
principle was first given the force of law and gradually, in
the course of two centuries, has become a reality.
Another very important aspect of this overall issue is to
address the total Middle East environment. An important
consideration is the countries that border Iraq and what
impact our actions and those of others may have on these
specific countries. Shown next is a map of the Middle East
countries. The countries directly adjacent to Iraq are Iran,
Jordan, Syria, Turkey, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.
George Friedman describes the dilemma that now faces the
United States as it relates to the potential influence of
Iran on the outcome of the Iraqi war. ``The Iraq war has
turned into a duel between the United States and Iran. For
the United States, the goal has been the creation of a
generally pro-American coalition government in Baghdad--
representing Iraq's three major ethnic communities. For Iran,
the goal has been the creation of either a pro-Iranian
government in Baghdad or, alternatively, the division of Iraq
into three regions, with Iran dominating the Shiite south.''
The Costs of Disengagement
The next logical step would be to understand as best as
possible, the implications of not continuing our efforts in
Iraq and, in so doing, what this would mean to the United
States, in the future. One of the best analyses I have found
thus far comes from two men outside the government who have
significant experience in Middle East studies. Over the years
Daniel Bynum and Kenneth Pollack have gained an excellent
understanding of that region. In August of 2006 they
published an article titled, ``What Next,'' and have followed
that up with a 130 page report titled, ``Things Fall Apart''
that was published in January 2007 by the Brookings
Institution's Saban Center for Middle East Policy. This
latest report states: ``Iraq is rapidly sliding into all-out
civil war that is likely to spill over into neighboring
countries, resulting in mass deaths and refugees, serious
disruption of oil supplies and a drastic decline in US
influence.''
In the August 2006 article, Bynum and Pollack state:
`` . . . The consequences of an all-out civil war in Iraq
could be dire. Considering the experiences of recent such
conflicts, hundreds of thousands of people may die. Refugees
and displaced people could number in the millions. And with
Iraqi insurgents, militias and organized crime rings wreaking
havoc on Iraq's oil infrastructure, a full-scale civil war
could send global oil prices soaring even higher.
``However, the greatest threat that the United States would
face from civil war in Iraq is from the spillover--the
burdens, the instability, the copycat secession attempts and
even the follow-on wars that could emerge in neighboring
countries. Welcome to the new `new Middle East'--a region
where civil wars could follow one after another, like so many
Cold War dominoes.
``And unlike communism, these dominoes may actually fall.''
There are other consequences of civil war as explained by
Bynum and Pollack. A top-level summary of their in-depth
study reveals: ``. . .civil wars tend to spread across
borders . . . and Washington must decide how to deal with the
most common and dangerous ways such conflicts spill across
national boundaries. Only by understanding the refugee
crises, terrorism, radicalization of neighboring populations,
copycat secessions and foreign interventions that such wars
frequently spark can we begin to plan for how to cope with
them in the months and years ahead . . . massive refugee
flows are a hallmark of major civil wars . . . refugee camps
often become a sanctuary and recruiting grounds for militias,
which use them to launch raids on their homelands . . .
terrorism finds new homes during civil wars . . . radicalism
is contagious as civil wars tend to inflame the passions of
neighboring populations . . . the problem worsens whenever
ethnic or religious groupings also spill across borders . . .
Iraq's neighbors are just as fractured as Iraq itself . . .
should Iraq fragment, voices for secession elsewhere will
gain strength . . . the first candidate for secession is
obviously Kurdistan . . . another critical problem of civil
wars is the tendency of neighboring states to get involved,
turning the conflicts into regional wars . . . covert foreign
intervention is proceeding apace in Iraq, with Iran leading
the way . . . Iran has set up an extensive network of safe
houses, arms caches, communications channels and proxy
fighters, and will be well-positioned to pursue its interests
in a full-blown civil war. The Sunni powers of Jordan,
Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Turkey are frightened by Iran's
growing influence and presence in Iraq and have been
scrambling to catch up . . . Turkey may be the most likely
country to overtly intervene in Iraq . . . none of Iraq's
neighbors thinks that it can afford to have the country fall
into the hands of the other side . . . an Iranian ``victory''
would put the nation's forces in the heartland of the Arab
world, bordering Jordan, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Syria--
several of these states poured tens of billions of dollars
into Saddam Hussein's military to prevent just such an
occurrence in the 1980s . . . similarly, a Sunni Arab victory
(backed by the Jordanians, Kuwaitis and Saudis) would put
radical Sunni fundamentalists on Iran's doorstepa nightmare
scenario for Tehran . . . add in, too, each country's
interest in preventing its rivals from capturing Iraq's oil
resources . . . if these states are unable to achieve their
goals through clandestine intervention, they will have a
powerful incentive to launch a conventional invasion.''
George Friedman provides his assessment of Iran's concern
if Iraq is able to stabilize its government and the country
in general. He also indicates what the Iranians are doing to
counter the U.S. efforts to accomplish stabilizing Iraq.
``A stable Iraq under U.S. influence represents a direct
threat to Iran, while a fragmented or pro-Iranian Iraq does
not. Therefore, the Iranians will do whatever they can to
undermine U.S. attempts to create a government in Baghdad.
Tehran can use its influence to block a government, but it
cannot--on its own--create a pro-Iranian one. Therefore,
Iran's strategy is to play spoiler and wait for the United
States to tire of the unending conflict. Once the Americans
leave, the Iranians can pick up the chips on the table.
Whether it takes 10 years or 30, the Iranians assume that, in
the end, they will win. None of the Arab countries in the
region has the power to withstand Iran, and the Turks are
unlikely to get into the game.''
The National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq, released 2
February 2007, warns that
[[Page S1703]]
pulling U.S. troops out of the country too soon would lead to
a collapse of the Iraqi military, outside intervention and
the creation of safe havens for al Qaeda terrorists. It also
states that if coalition forces were withdrawn rapidly . . .
we judge that this almost certainly would lead to a
significant increase in the scale and scope of sectarian
conflict in Iraq, intensify Sunni resistance to the Iraqi
government and have adverse consequences for national
reconciliation. Additionally, if such a rapid withdrawal were
to take place, we judge that the [Iraqi Security Force] would
be unlikely to survive as a non-sectarian national
institution; neighboring countries . . . might intervene
openly in the conflict; massive civilian casualties and
forced population displacement would be probable. The report
also says that the al Qaeda terrorist group in Iraq would try
to ``use parts of the country''--particularly al-Anbar
province--to plan increased attacks in and outside of Iraq.
Additionally, Turkey could launch a military incursion if
there were no U.S. or allied troops to block Kurdish attempts
to control northern Iraq.
Alternative Courses of Action (C/A) and Supporting Base
Many alternatives and options have surfaced over the past
several weeks and months. The repercussion of exercising
certain alternatives have been looked at in considerable
depth with some alarming results that not only impact what
goes on in Iraq, but the impact they could have on the entire
Middle East.
In my opinion, there are at least four alternatives that
have been put on the table in respect to the way ahead in
Iraq. These are not new but have been identified by different
sources.
Cut and Run--The first C/A being considered was initiated
by Congressman Murtha in what has been termed as the ``cut
and run'' scenario. There are other variations of this C/A
but, essentially, they all boil down to get the troops out of
Iraq as quick as you can--some say immediately others say six
months others say by the end of the year (2007). This is easy
to say but carries with it tremendous implications and
ramifications.
In my opinion, this C/A would simply embolden the
terrorists to include Iran, Syria and other countries that
are supportive of terrorism. At the same time it would
demoralize our friends in the region. Once again it would
place America in everyone's minds as a feckless country that
does not have the will to see actions through to completion.
How many times do we have to learn that lesson? This would be
a strategic defeat for American interests with potentially
catastrophic consequences both in the Middle East region and
elsewhere. Thus, this C/A could lead to Iran expanding their
influence throughout the region and utilizing Hamas and
Hezbollah in Syria, Lebanon, Palestinian territories and
Jordan. What Arab friends the U.S. may have would feel
abandoned and it would place their governments in jeopardy.
No longer could they look to the U.S. as a reliable ally or
guarantor of peace and stability in this critical region. The
implications are that the effects of pulling out of Iraq
would spread over into the energy resources and transit choke
points vital to the global economy. How this would all play
out is unknown but these are potential outcomes of pursuing
this C/A.
Annexation of Iraq--The second C/A would be the annexation
of Iraq by American forces, which means the U.S. would govern
with a military governor-general and local commanders, and a
long-term commitment made that no matter the cost in
resources (people and dollars) the U.S. would defend, assist,
and help develop those who put their trust in us, in every
hamlet, village, and neighborhood until they are able to
defend themselves. This would entail sealing the borders and
providing local security, local civic actions and local
government and public services. The oil industry, agriculture
and other agencies would be franchised to U.S. companies to
redevelop with royalties going to the governor-general to
defray the costs of the occupation and security campaign.
This C/A could take decades before they are ready to become
an independent nation of Iraqis--no longer Kurds, Arabs and
other minorities but Iraqis. Complicating this C/A is Islam
and the differences that exist within the various
interpretations of Islam. In my opinion, this C/A would never
be supported by either Americans or Arabs/Iraqis and,
therefore, is discarded for further discussion.
Stay the Course--The third is to ``stay the course,'' which
falls in the unacceptable category, based on the failure to
date, plus the votes from the recent elections and the
sentiments of Congress. This C/A is not supported by the
Administration, Congress or the Defense Department.
Therefore, it is not considered viable and will be discarded
for further discussion.
Presidential Proposal--The fourth C/A follows what the
President is proposing. That is to provide support to the
Iraqi government in order for it to, as quickly as possible,
establish a unified democratic federal Iraq that can govern
and defend itself and serve as an ally in the War on Terror.
As I understand it, these have been the U.S. strategic goals
and objectives from the outset.
Stephen Hadley, Presidential security advisor, described
the President's proposal as follows:
``The Baker-Hamilton report explained that failure in Iraq
could have severe consequences for our national interests in
a critical region and for our national security here at home.
In my many conversations with members of Congress and foreign
policy experts, few have disagreed.
``Most people agree that we must focus on fighting al-
Qaeda. The president's strategy steps up this fight--
particularly in Anbar province, where al-Qaeda seeks a
sanctuary. The administration also agrees that we must
accelerate the training of Iraqi security forces. The
president's strategy does this--with benchmarks to track
progress and bolster the size and effectiveness of those
forces. Training and supporting Iraqi troops will remain
our military's essential and primary mission.
``But the president's review also concluded that the
strategy with the best chance of success must have a plan for
securing Baghdad. Without such a plan, the Iraqi government
and its security institutions could fracture under the
pressure of widespread sectarian violence, ethnic cleansing
and mass killings. Chaos would then spread throughout the
country--and throughout the region. The al-Qaeda movement
would be strengthened by the flight of Sunnis from Baghdad
and an accelerated cycle of sectarian bloodletting. Iran
would be emboldened and could be expected to provide more
lethal aid for extremist groups. The Kurdish north would be
isolated, inviting separation and regional interference.
Terrorists could gain pockets of sanctuary throughout Iraq
from which to threaten our allies in the region and our
security here at home.
``The new plan for Baghdad specifically corrects the
problems that plagued previous efforts. First, it is an
Iraqi-initiated plan for taking control of their capital.
Second, there will be adequate forces (Iraqi and American) to
hold neighborhoods cleared of terrorists and extremists.
Third, there is a new operational concept--one devised not
just to pursue terrorists and extremists but to secure the
population. Fourth, new rules of engagement will ensure that
Iraqi and U.S. forces can pursue lawbreakers regardless of
their community or sect. Fifth, security operations will be
followed by economic assistance and reconstruction aid--
including billions of dollars in Iraqi funds--offering jobs
and the prospect of better lives.''
Stephen Hadley continues his explanation of the totality of
the President's plan by explaining the key strategic shifts
that are major changes from previous approach:
``Reinforcing our military presence is not the strategy--it
is a means to an end and part of a package of key strategic
shifts that will fundamentally restructure our approach to
achieving our objectives in Iraq.
``Building on experience elsewhere in the country, the new
strategy doubles the number of provincial reconstruction
teams (PRTs) in Iraq. These civilian-led units will target
development aid where it is needed and help the Iraqi
government extend its reach to all corners of the country.
``Because close civilian-military cooperation is key to
success, 10 new civilian PRTs will be embedded with U.S.
combat brigades.
The new strategy incorporates other essential elements of
the Baker-Hamilton report, such as doubling the number of
troops embedded with Iraqi forces, using benchmarks to help
us and the Iraqis chart progress, and launching a renewed
diplomatic effort to increase support for the Iraqi
government and advance political reconciliation.''
Discussion
Earlier in this paper the Byman-Pollack report identified
consequences of an all-out civil war in Iraq. In their ``what
to do about it'' part of their report they had the following
to say:
``Much as Americans may want to believe that the United
States can just walk away from Iraq should it slide into all-
out civil war, the threat of spillover from such a conflict
throughout the Middle East means it can't. Instead,
Washington will have to devise strategies to deal with
refugees, minimize terrorist attacks emanating from Iraq,
dampen the anger in neighboring populations caused by the
conflict, prevent secession fever and keep Iraq's neighbors
from intervening. The odds of success are poor, but,
nonetheless, we have to try.
``The United States, along with its Asian and European
allies, will have to make a major effort to persuade Iraq's
neighbors not to intervene in its civil war. Economic aid
should be part of such an effort, but will not suffice. For
Jordan and Saudi Arabia, it may require an effort to
reinvigorate Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations, thereby
addressing one of their major concerns--an effort made all
the more important and complex in light of the recent
conflict between Hezbollah and Israel. For Iran and Syria, it
may be a clear (but not cost-free) path toward acceptance
back into the international community.
``When it comes to foreign intervention, Iran is the
biggest headache of all. Given its immense interests in Iraq,
some involvement is inevitable. For Tehran, and probably for
Damascus, the United States and its allies probably will have
to put down red lines regarding what is absolutely
impermissible--such as sending uniformed Iranian military
units into Iraq or claiming Iraqi territory. Washington and
its allies will also have to lay out what they will do if
Iran crosses any of those red lines. Economic sanctions would
be one possibility, but they could be effective only if the
European Union, China, India and Russia all cooperate. On its
own, the United States could employ punitive military
operations, either to make Iran pay an unacceptable price for
one-time infractions
[[Page S1704]]
or to persuade it to halt ongoing violations of one or more
red lines.
``A full-scale war in Iraq could result in hundreds of
thousands of deaths and millions of refugees streaming across
the nation's borders. The level of killings and displacement
from other major civil conflicts--such as those in Bosnia,
Congo, Lebanon and Rwanda--suggests the toll in Iraq could
surge even higher if conditions there deteriorate further.''
David Dolan, a reputable journalist and author, who has
spent the last 27 years living and working in Israel,
provides his assessment of what is viewed from the lens of
the Israeli military analysts concerning the turmoil that
exists today in the Middle East and the prognosis for the
coming year.
``Israeli military analysts said the main reason for
growing regional instability is stepped up Iranian meddling
throughout the Middle East. They noted that the oil-flushed
theocratic Muslim regime in Tehran is pumping copious amounts
of financial aid and weapons to its Syrian, Lebanese
Hizbullah and Palestinian Hamas and Islamic Jihad allies,
along with material aid going to Iranian-backed Shiite
militias operating next door in violence-torn Iraq. Coming
against the ominous backdrop of Iran's escalating nuclear
uranium enrichment program, the mullah's meddling is
succeeding in destabilizing the entire region, adding to
growing prospects that major portions of the tense Middle
East will erupt into full-scale warfare during 2007.''
The Brookings Institution Saban Center Analysis Number 11,
released 29 January 2007, examines the history of some dozen
recent civil wars to reveal the general patterns by which
such conflicts can ``spill over'' into neighboring states,
causing further civil wars or regional conflicts.
Historically, six patterns of spillover have been the most
harmful in other cases of all-out civil war: refugees;
terrorism; radicalization of neighboring populations;
secession that breeds secessionism; economic losses; and
neighborly interventions. The purpose of this review was to
determine what policy options the United States could employ
to try to contain the spillover effects of a full-scale Iraqi
civil war. It is recognized that with each passing day, Iraq
sinks deeper into the abyss of civil war. President Bush has
proposed one last-chance effort to quell the fighting and
jumpstart a process of political reconciliation and economic
reconstruction. Comments coming from this review state:
``Should this last effort fail, the United States is likely
to very quickly have to determine how best to handle an Iraq
that will be erupting into Bosnia- or Lebanon-style all-out
civil war. The history of such wars is that they are
disastrous for all parties, but the United States will have
little choice but to try to stave off disaster as best it
can.''
These tasks will be difficult and will require the
deployment of large ground forces to accomplish them. Ending
an all-out civil war requires overwhelming military power to
nail down a political settlement. The Byman-Pollack report of
2006 states:
``It took 30,000 British troops to bring the Irish civil
war to an end, 45,000 Syrian troops to conclude the Lebanese
civil war, 50,000 NATO troops to stop the Bosnian civil war,
and 60,000 to do the job in Kosovo. Considering Iraq's much
larger population, it probably would require 450,000 troops
to quash an all-out civil war there. Such an effort would
require a commitment of enormous military and economic
resources, far in excess of what the United States has
already put forth [and planned future increases].''
Meanwhile, back in the USA
This discussion would be incomplete if we did not discuss
the home front and what is going on here in the United States
relative to the Iraq War. The November 2006 elections started
a fire storm of various anti-war factions rising to the
surface and demanding we pull out of the war immediately or
within a short period of time. With the Democrats taking over
both sides of the Congress we now have a political
confrontation as to who can get his or her resolution to pass
both sides of the Congress. Lately, the Congress is awash
with resolutions. Senator Obama submitted legislation 30
January, which would remove all combat brigades from Iraq by
March 31, 2008. This timetable for completing a withdrawal
puts him at odds with other leading rivals for the Democratic
nomination. Senator Hillary Clinton supports capping the
number of troops at their levels of Jan. 1, 2007. Sen.
Christopher J. Dodd (Conn.) has proposed a similar troop cap.
But neither has embraced a timetable for a troop removal.
Former Senator and Vice Presidential candidate in 2004 and
now a Presidential candidate for 2008, John Edwards (D-NC),
has been outspoken in his opposition to Bush's new plan and
has called for the immediate withdrawal of 40,000 to 50,000
troops. But he, too, has stopped short of setting a firm date
by which all would be removed. New Mexico Gov. Bill
Richardson is the only other prominent Democrat in the field
to set a withdrawal timetable, declaring that troops ``can
and should'' be brought home by the end of 2007. The Obama
plan, called the Iraq War De-escalation Act of 2007, would
begin a troop withdrawal no later than May 1, 2007, but it
includes several caveats that could forestall a clean break:
It would leave a limited number of troops in place to conduct
counterterrorism activities and train Iraqi forces. (The
question one must ask in respect to this proposal is how
could you leave a small contingent of U.S. forces in a
country rife with civil war?) And the withdrawal could be
temporarily suspended if the Iraqi government meets a
series of benchmarks laid out by the Bush administration.
That list includes a reduction in sectarian violence; the
equitable distribution of oil revenue; government reforms;
and democratic, Iraqi-driven reconstruction and economic
development efforts. Senator Obama's proposal also would
reverse Bush's troop-increase plan.
On the other side of the aisle the Republicans have their
own versions of resolutions. A resolution by Sen. John McCain
(R-AZ) and Sen. Lindsey O. Graham (R-S.C.) demanding tough
benchmarks for progress in Iraq was supposed to garner
overwhelming Republican support, being a more palatable
alternative to language by Sen. John W. Warner (R-Va.) that
would state opposition to the troop buildup. Instead, rival
measures continue to proliferate. Sen. Judd Gregg (R-N.H.)
said he is circulating language that would forbid a cutoff of
funding for troops in the field under any circumstance,
similar to another proposal by Sen. Johnny Isakson (R-Ga.).
Sen. John Cornyn (R-Tex.) is shopping around a measure that
would demand that the president's policies be given a chance
to work while calling for the reversal of perceived war-
related mistakes, such as the wholesale purging of Baath
Party members from the Iraqi government and the failure to
ensure equitable oil-revenue sharing among Iraqi groups.
``Resolutions are flying like snowflakes around here,'' Sen.
Specter said. There may be more in the wings of Congress that
have yet to surface but, at this writing, these appear to be
the ones being discussed.
Meanwhile, the two camps promoting competing resolutions of
opposition--one headed by Senators Joseph R. Biden Jr. (D-
Del.) and Chuck Hagel (R-Neb.) and the other by Senator
Warner (R-Va.) and Senator Levin (D-Mich.)--initially
appeared to be closing in on common language that could win a
clear majority within the Senate, but, at this writing it
appears that may not happen.
These non-binding resolutions, regardless of which side of
the aisle they come from, are not constructive--they change
nothing, take responsibility for nothing, and hurt both
morale and whatever semblance of national unity the USA might
project. They aid and abet the enemy just like the
discussions that occurred during the Vietnam War. If we set
deadlines or propose certain number of troops be withdrawn by
a certain date then this gives the enemy a timetable to work
to in respect to holding off until the Americans leave. It
certainly doesn't take a rocket scientist to figure that one
out. Rhetoric influences perceptions, and perceptions can
drive responses.
Unless Congress can find the intestinal fortitude to assert
its true Constitutional authority and actually freeze or even
mandate a drawdown in spending on operations in Iraq and use
of funds to move troops individually or as units to Iraq,
this is just a lot of hypocritical political theater--
attempting to look assertive while in fact denying
responsibility and showing the lack of commitment and
fecklessness of America--once again. J. D. Pendry said, ``Our
enemies, just as enemies past, know that winning a war with
the United States is not about combat assaults, but about
wearing down the will of the American people to continue to
support the fight. Because they're winning the war of wills,
they wouldn't dare attack inside the country. Our enemies
know that our weak link in fighting a war is our politics,
media, and the socialist elites who ally with them in waging
war against the American will to sustain a fight.''
General David Petraeus, the new U.S. commander of the
forces in Iraq, explained in hearings before Congress, that
reinforcing U.S. troops is necessary for this new plan to
succeed. Any plan that limits our ability to reinforce our
troops in the field is a plan for failure--and could hand
Baghdad to terrorists and extremists before legitimate Iraqi
forces are ready to take over the fight. General Petraeus
made clear his disdain for ideas that are very much in vogue
in Washington these days: getting out of Iraq altogether, or
the current favorite of the Democratic leadership: passing
resolutions critical of the war.
In the Congressional confirmation hearing Sen. John McCain
asked what would happen if we were to leave Iraq. Gen.
Petraeus pointed to ``the very real possibility of
involvement of countries from elsewhere in the region, around
Iraq, entering Iraq to take sides with one or the other
groups.'' He added that there ``is the possibility,
certainly, of an international terrorist organization truly
getting a grip on some substantial piece of Iraq.'' In
response to questions from Sen. McCain and Sen. Joe
Lieberman, Gen. Petraeus added that resolutions of
disapproval for the war would be unhelpful to American troop
morale and would encourage our enemies in Iraq.
During the recent confirmation hearing of Admiral Fallon to
be the Central Command Commander Sen. Carl M. Levin (D-
Mich.), the committee chairman, proposed to hold the Iraqi
leaders accountable to meeting benchmarks, Admiral Fallon
said he believed that imposing ``edicts'' or ``deadlines''
would be unconstructive. He also suggested a need to lower
American expectations for Iraq, indicating that U.S. goals
for Iraq following the 2003 invasion were unrealistically
ambitious.
Sen. John Cornyn, Texas Republican said, ``Congress is
sending mixed messages to the troops, to voters and to the
world with a ``no confidence'' vote that carries no force . .
. We
[[Page S1705]]
can't claim to support the troops and not support their
mission,'' he said in a floor speech 31 January. ``If we
don't support the mission, we shouldn't be passing nonbinding
resolutions. We should be doing everything in our power to
stop it . . . we should send them the message that, yes, we
believe you can succeed and it's important to our national
security that you do.''
We also hear from Congress and others about how ``we
support the troops'' but also we hear anti-Iraq war and anti-
surge overtones. If Congress and the American public truly
support the troops then they must provide the full support.
It is incoherent and irresponsible to say one supports the
troops but not the war. How can Congress on one hand
unanimously approve the appointment of General Petraeus to
command the troops in Iraq and execute the war plan and,
at the same time, refuse to support the war effort and
provide resolutions restricting the necessary troops and
wherewithal to accomplish the task they have assigned to
him? This simply does not pass the common sense test. It
is simply a cop out!
Summarization--America cannot win a counter-insurgency
campaign in a Muslim territory as long as it is ruled by
Muslims. That is why the effort must be led by the Muslims
(Iraq) in order to win their own counter-insurgency campaign.
Absolutely, we must assist them and apply more forces but the
Iraqi leaders are the ones who have to gain the confidence of
the populace as well as subdue and disassemble the militias,
particularly that of Al Sadr. If Maliki and his government do
not take the lead and insist on the breakup of the militias
then we are wasting our time, soldier's lives and billions of
dollars to help reconstruct that country. The world is
watching to see what course of action Maliki takes and
whether we will continue to provide support. If this fails we
will have least tried to make it work. I don't know how long
we continue this support--probably a year to eighteen months
to see if it is going to work and then decide if it is being
successful or not. If not, then we execute a strategic
withdrawal removing our troops, equipment, and supplies.
Concurrently we must have made plans for dealing with the
aftermath of our withdrawal--a point which no politicians are
talking about right now. This action will embolden Iran and
Syria plus others and then the ``global'' terrorist and
economic problems will start to build. The predictions of
all-out civil war will prevail and the spill-over to adjacent
countries will most likely occur. How will the United States
address this situation Madam Speaker of the House/Mr.
President of the Senate?
Probable Scenario following a Collapse of Iraqi Government and US
Withdrawal
``Responsible'' Middle East experts say that if we withdraw
it will be a blood bath to start with and then the ``Middle
East region'' will turn into a haven for terrorists that will
be controlled by Iran and Syria--primarily Iran--all under
the guise of Islam and in preparation for the return of the
12th Imam. This in turn will cause our quasi Arab friends,
Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait (and perhaps a few others) to
begin making alliances with Iran in fear for their own
country and lives therein.
Then, guess what? Terrorism will spread like wild fire and
Iran et al will now control the majority of the world oil
reserves (which can be used for terrorist activities) and the
rest of the world will start experiencing an economic
disaster just over the price of oil. One may rest assured
that President Chavez in Venezuela will chime right in there
with them and raise the price of his oil as well.
The OPEC will be overtaken by Iran et al and the free world
will have no choice but to, most likely, use military force
to sort this out--assuming the free world has the will and
determination to do so. The free world would have no leverage
via the UN to do anything in respect to sanctions against
Iran et al as they would just thumb their nose at them. It is
a ``pay me now or pay me later'' situation and it appears at
present that Congress and much of the American public are
just sticking their heads in the sand and hoping it will all
go away. We continue to debate the overwhelming importance of
oil. Unfortunately, our efforts to find substitutes will not
pay off in a big way for most likely another 15-20 years.
A stronger and more pointed discussion needs to occur in
this country relative to the radical/militant Islamists. Our
enemy is not only terrorists. Terrorism is a symptom, not the
basic cause. Our true enemy is radical or militant Islam and
their goals and objectives are to take over the world by
jihad and impose on EVERYONE their beliefs, which include
living by the law of Shari'a under their interpretation of
the Koran. Daniel Pipes said, ``The problem at hand is not
the religion of Islam but the totalitarian ideology of
militant Islam. Islam is one of the world's major religions
in terms of duration, extent, and numbers of adherents; as a
faith, it has meant very different things over fourteen
centuries and several continents. Two common points one can
note are that: Islam is, more than any other major religion,
deeply political in the sense that it pushes its adherents to
hold power; and once Muslims gain power, there is a strong
impetus to apply the law of Islam, the Shari'a.'' There is no
separation of Church and State. Under their belief they are
one in the same.
Anyone who has any knowledge about the Islamic goals and
objectives knows full well that they are not going away and
will continue their pursuit to control the entire world and
have it under the Islamic law/religion and, in the meantime,
kill us infidels along the way. We have been told that Islam
is the religion of peace, and that the vast majority of
Muslims just want to live in peace. Although this unqualified
assertion may be true, it is entirely irrelevant. It is
meaningless fluff, meant to make us feel better, and meant to
somehow diminish the specter of fanatics rampaging across the
globe in the name of Islam. The fact is, in the Middle East,
the fanatics rule Islam at this moment in history. The
``peaceful majority'' is the ``silent majority'' and it is
cowed and extraneous. Peace-loving Muslims have been made
irrelevant by their silence. Not a pretty picture at all!!
consequences of currently proposed actions need to be revisited
The proposed Congressional alternatives of capping the
number of troops, cutting off funds for the war, withdrawal
within six months or a year or sending our troops to
``control the borders and search out terrorists but don't get
involved in Baghdad'' is irrational thinking. If that is what
they think we should be doing then we should withdraw
completely now and turn the country over to these radical
Islamists, terrorists, thugs and criminals and let them kill
each other off and watch Iran come in behind us and take
control. Then, watch Congress and the American public howl
and complain about how ``we lost the war.'' Sometime later
this would come back to haunt us here in the US when we
start having our fair share of terrorists attacks and
encroachment of radical Islamists on our soil.
So, Now What?
I submit that in lieu of the defeatist attitude shown by so
many in the Congress and the media, that this is no time to
feel desperate. What we need is a sense of mission, a
purposeful dynamism. General Petraeus will be issuing a
progress report on Iraq every two weeks. He'll report on what
progress we are having on de-Baathification, disarming the
Shia militias, on taking the fight to the bad guys in a very
methodical way.
To lose this war is to lose our soul, the soul of our
country, the soul of America. If we lose in Iraq, it is
inevitable that the terrorists and radical Islamists will be
here. The war will come to our shores and threaten the
freedoms we so dearly cherish. It is not too late to resolve
to win instead. We still have an enormously strong hand to
play and we must play it.
The alternative of pursuing the President's proposal is the
only viable alternative we have at present time. The
Brookings Institute recent report states: ``If there is
anything that should make us recognize the need to stay
engaged in Iraq, it is the likely impact that such a war
could have on the Persian Gulf region (if not the entire
Middle East) and the enormous difficulties we will face in
trying to contain that impact. If we cannot prevent such a
full-scale civil war, then containment, as awful as it
threatens to be, might still prove to be our least bad
options.''
Mr. AKAKA. Madam President, earlier this week the Senate had an
opportunity to begin debate on Iraq and the current plan proposed by
President Bush. While I and 48 of my colleagues supported moving
forward with this important debate, others in this Chamber elected to
prevent discussion on an issue of national importance.
I understand that there are doubts as to what is the proper course of
action to pursue in Iraq. We all wish for victory. We all wish for an
end to the death and destruction. None of us want to waste additional
lives in futile missions, or futile gestures. We all wish for a stable,
democratic Iraq--and I would add to that Afghanistan, as this conflict
is being waged on more than one front. We all share those common
desires and none of us, none of us can predict the future. But what we
can do is to apply our wisdom and judgement as to what is the best
course of action for the United States to take. That task is our solemn
duty.
We cannot perform that duty with all the honesty and clarity that
this great body--the United States Senate--is known for if we cannot
begin debate. Denying an open discussion of the issues of grave
importance to our national security does not serve our Nation well.
We are at a great turning point and the consequences of this policy
must be debated. Future generations will be affected by the course of
action our Nation takes in the Middle East. No one can say with
certainty which path will lead us toward light and which could lead us
toward a darker future. But these courses of action demand debate.
Right now our Nation's wealth is being poured into a growing
maelstrom in the Middle East--a storm that is engulfing the lives of
our most talented soldiers, a storm that is exhausting our national
treasure and sinking us deeper into a debt that our grandchildren and
great-grandchildren will be paying off. It means our Nation's
education, environment, health, and transportation
[[Page S1706]]
systems are eroding for a lack of basic resources.
Again, the consequences of this policy must be debated. In Iraq,
there is a clear choice: support the President's policy of full steam
ahead and continue the current policy of putting American soldiers in
harm's way or shift strategy and make it clear that it is time for the
Iraqi government to govern and Iraqi troops to protect the Iraqi
people.
In any case, whatever policy advocated--whether one supports staying
in, getting out now, or getting out later--those choices deserve to be
fully and completely debated and voted on in the United States Senate.
I urge my colleagues on the other side to support a full and open
debate on the President's Iraq policy.
Madam President, I yield the floor and suggest the absence of a
quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. REID. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. REID. Madam President, it is my understanding we are now in
executive session; is that right?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The majority leader is correct.
____________________