[Congressional Record Volume 153, Number 23 (Wednesday, February 7, 2007)]
[House]
[Pages H1313-H1315]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
{time} 1600
IRAQ STUDY GROUP
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Ms. Solis). Under a previous order of the
House, the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Wolf) is recognized for 5
minutes.
Mr. WOLF. Madam Speaker, before I begin, I would also like to second
what the Speaker said with regard to Leo McCarthy. He was also a member
of the National Commission on Gambling, which I was the author of. And
he came by my office a number times. And I was actually going to put
his bio in the Congressional Record. So I thank the Speaker for that
comment, and second it.
Madam Speaker, I was the author of the amendment to set up the Iraq
Study Group. I felt that more should be done to look at what we were
doing in Iraq, and so we put together a group and picked 10 people. It
was chaired by former Secretary of State Jim Baker and former
Congressman Lee Hamilton, head of the 9/11 Commission. Also
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serving on it was former Secretary of State Larry Eagleberger; former
prominent lawyer, Vernon Jordan; former Justice of the Supreme Court
Sandra Day O'Connor; former Member of the House and Chief of Staff, in
the Clinton administration, Leon Panetta; former Secretary of Defense,
in the Clinton administration, Bill Perry; former Senator, and Governor
from my State, Chuck Robb; and at one time, up until the end, a month
before, current Secretary of Defense Gates, former head of the CIA.
This group was provided the opportunity to, in depth, to take a look
at what was going on in Iraq and to develop some recommendations. The
resolution that I have introduced as House Con. Res., that puts the
Congress on record in support of the recommendations of the Iraq Study
Group.
Now, here's a group that has taken 9 months to analyze extensive
hearings. Also there were 45 military and diplomatic experts, retired
and active duty, of all political persuasions, along with key
congressional leaders that came up with these recommendations. So I am
asking Members to support my resolution when it comes up next week in
support of this.
Secondly, it makes a major effort and encourages the administration
to adopt also a diplomatic effort in addition to what it is doing. We
urge the administration to engage Syria the same way that President
Reagan during the 1980s, when we were defeating communism, President
Reagan, God bless him, one of the greatest presidents we have ever had,
gave the famous speech in Orlando about the evil empires. But he was
also having his administration engage with the Soviet Union. And when
Ronald Reagan then gave his speech, saying, ``Mr. Gorbachev, tear down
that wall,'' Reagan also had emissaries going to Moscow to engage.
Those of us in the Congress, when we used to go behind the Soviet
Union, the Berlin Wall in the Soviet Union, during the 1980s would
always meet with the dissidents, would always attempt to meet with the
leadership of the government on behalf of freedom, on behalf of
liberty.
President Reagan was self-confident in what he believed. He believed
that to engage the Soviets was not a sign of weakness. It was a sign of
strength.
Madam Speaker, I would like to put in the Record an article from the
Wall Street Journal by Abraham D. Sofaer, who was counselor to
Secretary of State Schultz, who also explains how Reagan engaged with
the Soviets and how it is appropriate now how he would engage with
Syria.
I am hopeful and I ask all Members to support the resolution when it
comes up.
[From the Wall Street Journal, Dec. 20, 2006]
A Reagan Strategy for Iran and Syria
(By Abraham D. Sofaer)
The Iraq Study Group's recommendation that the Bush
administration drop its preconditions and negotiate with
Syria and Iran has been praised as a ``no-brainer''--and
condemned as an improper effort to reward rogue regimes.
Neither reaction is correct. Negotiating with enemies can be
a useful aspect of effective diplomacy. But successful
negotiations with enemies result not from the talks
themselves but from the diplomatic strategy that accompanies
them. The Group's recommendations deserve support, but must
be effectively integrated into President Bush's strategy of
ending state-sponsored terror.
The arguments against negotiating with Syria and Iran were
also made against negotiating with the Soviet Union, and by
some of the same people. Soviet misconduct easily matches
that of Syria or Iran in aggression, oppression, murder,
support for terrorist groups and mendacity. President Reagan
challenged Soviet behavior by supporting groups fighting
communist intervention, building the military, strengthening
NATO, condemning human-rights violations, commencing a
missile-defense program, and conveying the message of freedom
in every way possible. George Shultz supported these efforts
but sought to negotiate with the Soviets in an attempt to
increase stability, reduce nuclear weapons, attain freedom
for oppressed groups, and enhance understanding. To make
negotiations possible the U.S. adopted specific policies,
including:
Regime acceptance. The U.S. refrained from activities aimed
at destroying the Soviet regime it was seeking to influence,
while vigorously denouncing its political and moral
legitimacy.
Limited linkage. Negotiations on human rights, arms
control, regional issues and bilateral relations were pursued
without linkage to Soviet conduct, enabling negotiations to
proceed while the U.S. responded firmly through deeds.
Rhetorical restraint. Reagan vigorously criticized the
Soviet system and its behavior, but promised not to ``crow''
when the Soviets agreed to U.S. proposals, enabling Soviet
leaders to avoid being seen as capitulating to U.S. demands.
Self-Interest. U.S. negotiating policy was based on
convincing the Soviets to act in their own best interests.
The Study Group's ``external'' strategy for Iraq contains
several elements necessary for successful diplomacy: the need
for both incentives and ``disincentives''; negotiations
``without preconditions''; and negotiations that are
``extensive and substantive,'' requiring a balancing of
interests. The general incentives identified by the Group are
unlikely, however, to lead to constructive discussions. While
Syria and Iran should realize that preventing a breakdown in
Iraq is in their interests, they see great advantages in
having the U.S. lose strength and credibility in a costly
effort to help a state they are relieved to see powerless.
The notion that they will help in order to have ``enhanced
diplomatic relations'' with the U.S. assumes that states,
will do what they know the U.S. wants simply because
Washington will not otherwise talk to them. The
pronouncements that accompany this Bush policy exemplify the
sort of rhetoric that discourages cooperation. The
possibility of obtaining U.S. assistance in joining the WTO
would be a real incentive in an ongoing negotiation, but it
is not a credible incentive in the context of hostile
confrontation and proliferating sanctions.
The incentives proposed for negotiating with Syria are, by
contrast, concrete and substantial. Syria are, by contrast,
concrete and substantial. Syria would benefit economically
from a stable Iraq, and getting back the Golan Heights would
give President Bashar Assad's standing a much needed boost.
Syria has no deep commitment to Hezbollah or Hamas to prevent
it from accepting peace and with Israel and increased
cooperation in Iraq, Lebanon and the Palestinian areas, in
exchange for the Golan and a constructive role in the area.
But the Study Group too casually assumes that the U.S. can
secure ``Syria's full cooperation with all investigations
into political assassinations in Lebanon.'' The ``full
cooperation'' of a sovereign state in such situations must be
negotiated, rather than made a precondition. Convincing
Israel to give up the Golan Heights will also be difficult,
and Syria's help in securing the release of Israeli soldiers
seized by Hamas and Hezbollah is a good place to start. While
the security threat posed by returning the Golan has largely
been worked out in prior negotiations, the challenge posed by
Syria's claim to access to the Sea of Galilee, and the
meaning of a ``full and secure peace agreement'' will require
great of forts. Still, bringing Syria into a responsible
nation-hood is an objective well worth pursuing.
The anger and scorn heaped on the Study Group for
advocating negotiations with Syria echo the opposition to
negotiating with the Soviet Union. But Syrian behavior must
be addressed, not just condemned. Egypt, too, wrongfully
supported terrorism against Israel after the 1967 war, and
launched the 1973 war, to get back the Sinai. Yet, the U.S.
properly urged Israel to negotiate with Egypt, and the peace
between them serves the interests of both countries.
Similarly an agreement to return the Golan in exchange for
peace would have the support of most Israelis and the current
Israeli government, and would be consistent with governing
Security Council resolutions and the principle that precludes
acquiring territory by force.
The Study Group is probably right that Iran is unlikely to
agree to negotiate with the U.S. to bring stability to Iraq.
The distrust between the U.S. and Iran suggests that
negotiations between them should commence on limited issues,
in a noncontroversial forum. The U.S./Iran Tribunal in The
Hague might well work. Iran resents that many of its
significant claims against the U.S. remain unresolved there
after over 20 years. The U.S. should offer to negotiate these
claims on an expedited basis. As progress is made, the
dialogue would likely expand to include such issues as
Afghanistan, Iraq, commercial matters and human-rights
concerns. (During my negotiations with Iran as legal adviser
between 1985 and 1990, we resolved many cases and discussed
other issues; my interlocutor eventually agreed, for example,
that the fatwa against Salman Rushdie could not be enforced
in any state outside Iran.) A successful negotiation will
include Iranian demands, such as an end to efforts at regime
change. Major change in Iran is in fact more likely to result
from normalization and internal activities, than by
opposition groups seeking to overthrow the regime.
Finally, any effort to negotiate with Syria or Iran will
fail if based only on incentives. The Study Group's proposal
lacks a program of sufficient pressure to make diplomacy
potentially successful. James Baker was able to convene the
Madrid Conference in 1991 only after the U.S. had expelled
Saddam Hussein from Kuwait. The effort to impose sanctions on
Iran for its nuclear program should continue as forcefully as
possible. Multilateral sanctions helped get Libya to abandon
its quest for nuclear weapons. A clear warning that Syria and
Iran must end all forms of state-sponsored terrorism, as now
required by Security Council resolutions, must be a central
element of U.S. negotiating policy, backed with meaningful
preparations for action. The power of the U.S. to inflict
damage
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on its enemies remains substantial, despite current
difficulties in Iraq. While it is now difficult to
contemplate military action against Syria or Iran, continued
sponsorship of terror against other states will eventually
provoke the American people, if not the international
community, to exercise their right of self-defense through
affordable wars of destruction instead of costly nation-
building exercises.
No one can convey this message more effectively than George
Bush, who remains determined to prevent a future of state-
sponsored terror. He should accept the Study Group's sound
message on negotiating with enemies but supplement it with
the toughness that effective diplomacy demands.
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