[Congressional Record Volume 153, Number 21 (Monday, February 5, 2007)]
[Senate]
[Pages S1555-S1567]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




      EXPRESSING THE SENSE OF CONGRESS ON IRAQ--MOTION TO PROCEED

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senate will 
proceed to the consideration of the motion to proceed to S. 470, which 
the clerk will report.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       A bill (S. 470) to express the sense of Congress on Iraq.

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia.
  Mr. WARNER. I wonder if I can ask unanimous consent at this time to 
proceed for another 5 minutes. Seeing my distinguished colleague on the 
Senate floor----
  Mr. BROWN. If the Senator will yield?
  Mr. WARNER. If I might finish the unanimous consent request? Then I 
will be happy to listen to the Senator.
  In other words, at this point in time I ask unanimous consent that we 
proceed as in morning business such that I could complete in 5 minutes. 
And my distinguished colleague. We have been waiting for about 2 hours 
this afternoon. I do not know--perhaps I am mistaken--if there are 
Senators in the Chamber who wish to address the subject matter of the 
order just given by the Chair. I wouldn't want to interfere with them 
going forward.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, there is an hour-and-a-half 
debate scheduled on this motion.
  The Senator is recognized.
  Mr. REED. Parliamentary inquiry: Is the Chair establishing an order 
for speaking?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. No order has been established.
  Mr. WARNER. If I might say to my distinguished colleague, Mr. Reed of 
Rhode Island, I think the Chair has granted me 5 minutes, to be 
followed by a period of about 5 minutes to my colleague from Nebraska, 
Senator Ben Nelson. From that point on, there may be those who wish to 
address the underlying order, or the Chair could recognize other 
Senators who wish to speak on the subject.
  Mr. REED. If the Chair is ready, I ask that at the conclusion of the 
5 minutes of Senator Nelson, I be recognized for 5 minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Brown). The Senator from Texas.
  Mr. CORNYN. Mr. President, reserving the right to object, and I will 
not object, I ask unanimous consent that the unanimous consent 
agreement stipulate that following Senator Reed's comments, I be 
recognized.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the unanimous consent 
request as modified by the Senator from Texas? The Chair hears none and 
it is so ordered.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I thank the Presiding Officer and the 
preceding Presiding Officer, my distinguished colleague.
  I was speaking about the need to have greater involvement of the 
Iraqi forces. I ask unanimous consent to have this chart printed in 
today's Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

    Transition Iraq to Security Self-Reliance--Iraqi Security Forces

                      Ministry of Interior Forces*


        Component                                  Trained and Equipped
Police......................................................***8135,000
National police.................................................824,400

[[Page S1556]]

Other MOI forces................................................828,900
                                                             __________
                                                             
  Total......................................................**8188,300
                                                               ==========
_______________________________________________________________________


                       Ministry of Defense Forces


        Component                                           Operational
Army........................................................***8132,700
Air Force..........................................................8900
Navy.............................................................81,100
                                                             __________
                                                             
  Total......................................................**8134,700
                                                               ==========
_______________________________________________________________________


               Total Trained & Equipped ISF: ****8323,000

* Ministry of Interior Forces: Unauthorized absence personnel are 
included in these numbers.
** Ministry of Defense Forces: Unauthorized absence personnel are not 
included in these numbers.
*** Army numbers included Special Operations Forces and Support Forces.
**** Does not include the approximately 144,000 Facilities Protection 
Service personnel working in 27 ministries.
Note.--Data as of January 22, 2007 (Updated bi-weekly by DOD).

  Mr. WARNER. It is dated as of January 27, 2007. It says, ``Transition 
Iraq to Security Self-Reliance--Iraq Security Forces.''
  It lays it out. This is what the American taxpayer has been 
expending--an enormous sum of money for 2\1/2\ years to train the Iraqi 
forces. I bring to your attention, for the Ministry of Defense Forces: 
the army, 132,700; air force, 900; the navy, 1,100; total, 134,700. 
Ministry of Interior, trained and equipped: police, 135,000; national 
police, 24,400; other MOI forces, 28,900; total, 188,300. That is a 
total of 323,000 forces trained in the past 2\1/2\ years.
  In the resolution my distinguished colleagues and I have put 
together, we specifically say look at all options. I say the Iraqi's 
are the ones who should be responsible for these problems in Baghdad. 
We will give them support. We will give them the training. But I say to 
my colleagues here in the Senate, this is what we have trained these 
people to do. The Iraqi forces understand the language. They understand 
the culture. How does an American GI, being thrust into the darkened 
alleys of this city, with all of the crossfire between the Sunni and 
the Shia, and Shia upon Shia decide whom to shoot, how to direct the 
force?
  The National Intelligence Estimate just released made mention of 
this. The report states--I shall read it.

       The intelligence community judges that the term ``civil 
     war'' does not adequately capture the complexity of the 
     conflict in Iraq, which includes extensive Shia-on-Shia 
     violence, al-Qa'ida and Sunni insurgent attacks on Coalition 
     forces, and widespread criminally motivated violence. 
     Nonetheless, the term ``civil war'' accurately describes key 
     elements of the Iraqi conflict, including the hardening of 
     ethno-sectarian identities, a sea change in the character of 
     the violence, ethno-sectarian mobilization, and population 
     displacement.

  I say most respectfully to our President: Mr. President, recognize 
what we have done in 2\1/2\ years to train these people. Let them take 
the point. Let them take the brunt of the fight. And maybe we do not 
need 21,500, together with support troops, to go in and do the job we 
have trained these people to do themselves.
  In this regard I would like to quote from T.E. Lawrence. This quote 
is also cited in the Army Field Manual on Counterinsurgency. Lawrence 
said:

       Do not try to do too much with your own hands, better the 
     Arabs do it tolerably than you do it perfectly. It is their 
     war, and you are to help them, not to win it for them.

  Additionally, the National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq also 
describes a very complex conflict between all parties in Iraq. Putting 
American soldiers in the midst of that will require military plans and 
orders to contain exquisite tactical detail sufficient to afford our 
men and women in uniform the ability to discern friend from foe in an 
urban environment.
  I, and others, also remain very concerned about the command and 
control structure that has been planned for this operation in Baghdad. 
In his January 10, 2007, address to the Nation, President Bush stated 
that U.S. troops would be ``embedded'' in Iraqi formations. This left a 
very serious question about the unity of command. On February 1, 
General Casey described the command and control as `` a nonstandard 
arrangement.'' This nonstandard arrangement must be clarified and our 
resolution addresses this serious concern.
  I yield the floor.

                               Exhibit 1

                             S. Con. Res. 7

       Whereas we respect the Constitutional authorities given a 
     President in article II, section 2, which states that ``The 
     President shall be commander in chief of the Army and Navy of 
     the United States''; it is not the intent of this resolution 
     to question or contravene such authority, but to accept the 
     offer to Congress made by the President on January 10, 2007, 
     that, ``if members have improvements that can be made, we 
     will make them. If circumstances change, we will adjust'';
       Whereas the United States strategy and operations in Iraq 
     can only be sustained and achieved with support from the 
     American people and with a level of bipartisanship;
       Whereas over 137,000 American military personnel are 
     currently serving in Iraq, like thousands of others since 
     March 2003, with the bravery and professionalism consistent 
     with the finest traditions of the United States Armed Forces, 
     and are deserving of the support of all Americans, which they 
     have strongly;
       Whereas many American service personnel have lost their 
     lives, and many more have been wounded, in Iraq, and the 
     American people will always honor their sacrifices and honor 
     their families;
       Whereas the U.S. Army and Marine Corps, including their 
     Reserve and National Guard organizations, together with 
     components of the other branches of the military, are under 
     enormous strain from multiple, extended deployments to Iraq 
     and Afghanistan;
       Whereas these deployments, and those that will follow, will 
     have lasting impacts on the future recruiting, retention and 
     readiness of our Nation's all volunteer force;
       Whereas in the National Defense Authorization Act for 
     Fiscal Year 2006, the Congress stated that ``calendar year 
     2006 should be a period of significant transition to full 
     sovereignty, with Iraqi security forces taking the lead for 
     the security of a free and sovereign Iraq'';
       Whereas United Nations Security Council Resolution 1723, 
     approved November 28, 2006, ``determin[ed] that the situation 
     in Iraq continues to constitute a threat to international 
     peace and security'';
       Whereas Iraq is experiencing a deteriorating and ever-
     widening problem of sectarian and intra-sectarian violence 
     based upon political distrust and cultural differences 
     between some Sunni and Shia Muslims;
       Whereas Iraqis must reach political settlements in order to 
     achieve reconciliation, and the failure of the Iraqis to 
     reach such settlements to support a truly unified government 
     greatly contributes to the increasing violence in Iraq;
       Whereas the responsibility for Iraq's internal security and 
     halting sectarian violence must rest primarily with the 
     Government of Iraq and Iraqi Security Forces;
       Whereas U.S. Central Command Commander General John Abizaid 
     testified to Congress on November 15, 2006, ``I met with 
     every divisional commander, General Casey, the Corps 
     Commander, [and] General Dempsey. We all talked together. And 
     I said, in your professional opinion, if we were to bring in 
     more American troops now, does it add considerably to our 
     ability to achieve success in Iraq? And they all said no. And 
     the reason is, because we want the Iraqis to do more. It's 
     easy for the Iraqis to rely upon us to do this work. I 
     believe that more American forces prevent the Iraqis from 
     doing more, from taking more responsibility for their own 
     future'';
       Whereas Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki stated on 
     November 27, 2006, that ``The crisis is political, and the 
     ones who can stop the cycle of aggravation and bloodletting 
     of innocents are the politicians'';
       Whereas there is growing evidence that Iraqi public 
     sentiment opposes the continued U.S. troop presence in Iraq, 
     much less increasing the troop level;
       Whereas, in the fall of 2006, leaders in the Administration 
     and Congress, as well as recognized experts in the private 
     sector, began to express concern that the situation in Iraq 
     was deteriorating and required a change in strategy; and, as 
     a consequence, the Administration began an intensive, 
     comprehensive review by all components of the Executive 
     Branch to devise a new strategy;
       Whereas, in December 2006, the bipartisan Iraq Study Group 
     issued a valuable report, suggesting a comprehensive strategy 
     that includes ``new and enhanced diplomatic and political 
     efforts in Iraq and the region, and a change in the primary 
     mission of U.S. forces in Iraq that will enable the United 
     States to begin to move its combat forces out of Iraq 
     responsibly'';
       Whereas, on January 10, 2007, following consultations with 
     the Iraqi Prime Minister, the President announced a new 
     strategy (hereinafter referred to as the ``plan''), which 
     consists of three basic elements: diplomatic, economic, and 
     military; the central component of the military element is an 
     augmentation of the present level of the U.S. military forces 
     through additional deployments of approximately 21,500 U.S. 
     military troops to Iraq;
       Whereas, on January 10, 2007, the President said that the 
     ``Iraqi government will appoint a military commander and two 
     deputy commanders for their capital'' and that U.S. forces 
     will ``be embedded in their formations''; and in subsequent 
     testimony before the Armed Services Committee on January 25, 
     2007, by the retired former Vice Chief of the Army it was 
     learned that there will also be a comparable U.S. command in 
     Baghdad, and that this dual chain of command may be

[[Page S1557]]

     problematic because ``the Iraqis are going to be able to move 
     their forces around at times where we will disagree with that 
     movement'', and called for clarification;
       Whereas this proposed level of troop augmentation far 
     exceeds the expectations of many of us as to the 
     reinforcements that would be necessary to implement the 
     various options for a new strategy, and led many members of 
     Congress to express outright opposition to augmenting our 
     troops by 21,500;
       Whereas the Government of Iraq has promised repeatedly to 
     assume a greater share of security responsibilities, disband 
     militias, consider Constitutional amendments and enact laws 
     to reconcile sectarian differences, and improve the quality 
     of essential services for the Iraqi people; yet, despite 
     those promises, little has been achieved;
       Whereas the President said on January 10, 2007, that ``I've 
     made it clear to the Prime Minister and Iraq's other leaders 
     that America's commitment is not open-ended'' so as to dispel 
     the contrary impression that exists; and
       Whereas the recommendations in this resolution should not 
     be interpreted as precipitating any immediate reduction in, 
     or withdrawal of, the present level of forces: Now, 
     therefore, be it--
       Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives 
     concurring), That it is the sense of Congress that--
       (1) the Senate disagrees with the ``plan'' to augment our 
     forces by 21,500, and urges the President instead to consider 
     all options and alternatives for achieving the strategic 
     goals set forth below;
       (2) the Senate believes the United States should continue 
     vigorous operations in Anbar province, specifically for the 
     purpose of combating an insurgency, including elements 
     associated with the Al Qaeda movement, and denying terrorists 
     a safe haven;
       (3) the Senate believes a failed state in Iraq would 
     present a threat to regional and world peace, and the long-
     term security interests of the United States are best served 
     by an Iraq that can sustain, govern, and defend itself, and 
     serve as an ally in the war against extremists;
       (4) the Congress should not take any action that will 
     endanger United States military forces in the field, 
     including the elimination or reduction of funds for troops in 
     the field, as such an action with respect to funding would 
     undermine their safety or harm their effectiveness in 
     pursuing their assigned missions;
       (5) the primary objective of the overall U.S. strategy in 
     Iraq should be to encourage Iraqi leaders to make political 
     compromises that will foster reconciliation and strengthen 
     the unity government, ultimately leading to improvements in 
     the security situation;
       (6) the military part of this strategy should focus on 
     maintaining the territorial integrity of Iraq, denying 
     international terrorists a safe haven, conducting 
     counterterrorism operations, promoting regional stability, 
     supporting Iraqi efforts to bring greater security to 
     Baghdad, and training and equipping Iraqi forces to take full 
     responsibility for their own security;
       (7) United States military operations should, as much as 
     possible, be confined to these goals, and should charge the 
     Iraqi military with the primary mission of combating 
     sectarian violence;
       (8) the military Rules of Engagement for this plan should 
     reflect this delineation of responsibilities, and the 
     Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
     Staff should clarify the command and control arrangements in 
     Baghdad;
       (9) the United States Government should transfer to the 
     Iraqi military, in an expeditious manner, such equipment as 
     is necessary;
       (10) the United States Government should engage selected 
     nations in the Middle East to develop a regional, 
     internationally sponsored peace-and-reconciliation process 
     for Iraq;
       (11) the Administration should provide regular updates to 
     the Congress, produced by the Commander of United States 
     Central Command and his subordinate commanders, about the 
     progress or lack of progress the Iraqis are making toward 
     this end; and
       (12) our overall military, diplomatic, and economic 
     strategy should not be regarded as an ``open-ended'' or 
     unconditional commitment, but rather as a new strategy that 
     hereafter should be conditioned upon the Iraqi government's 
     meeting benchmarks that must be delineated in writing and 
     agreed to by the Iraqi Prime Minister. Such benchmarks should 
     include, but not be limited to, the deployment of that number 
     of additional Iraqi security forces as specified in the plan 
     in Baghdad, ensuring equitable distribution of the resources 
     of the Government of Iraq without regard to the sect or 
     ethnicity of recipients, enacting and implementing 
     legislation to ensure that the oil resources of Iraq benefit 
     Sunni Arabs, Shia Arabs, Kurds, and other Iraqi citizens in 
     an equitable manner, and the authority of Iraqi commanders to 
     make tactical and operational decisions without political 
     intervention.

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Nebraska is recognized.
  Mr. NELSON of Nebraska. Mr. President, I state again for my 
colleagues that this debate is not about support for the troops or 
support for their extraordinary work on the ground in Iraq. Our troops, 
the best fighting force in the history of the world, have performed 
admirably, honorably, and successfully under extreme and dangerous 
conditions in Iraq. We are not here today to besmirch their efforts, 
their work, or their sacrifice. To indicate otherwise is disingenuous 
and out of line.
  This is not the time or the place for political attacks. The 
President even made an offer to Congress before a nationally televised 
audience on January 10 that, ``if Members have improvements that can be 
made, we will make them.''
  This is a debate about a serious topic: What is the way forward in 
Iraq? How can we achieve a political solution without the additional 
loss of American lives?
  One of my colleagues has said over and over, ``this comes down to if 
you support an escalation or not'' and ``the American people deserve 
this debate.'' For me, the question is, Will the Senate lead? Will the 
Senate express its opposition to the surge? I know many do not think 
passing a nonbinding resolution is leading, and I know others say the 
resolution goes too far. I say that, on an issue of this magnitude, an 
issue this important, it is critical for the Senate to speak with the 
strongest voice possible. Generating a revised resolution with broader 
appeal was putting our best foot forward in securing the strongest 
bipartisan vote possible.
  I am proud to have worked with my colleague, Senator Warner, the most 
recent past chairman of the Armed Services Committee, and our 
colleague, Senator Collins of Maine, in this cause. They have shown 
tremendous leadership on this issue, as have Senator Levin, Senator 
Biden, and Senator Hagel. But it seems that even when it comes to the 
lives of our troops, partisanship prevails. Here we are, after weeks of 
negotiations, after weeks of public proclamations, after weeks of 
consideration, about to witness the minority choose politics over 
progress--and this is after we revised our original resolution to 
address some of the concerns that were raised by both Democrats and 
Republicans.
  It is important that we point out that this is not simply about being 
opposed to a surge. It is about opposition to a surge to do what? To go 
into Baghdad? To go into the midst of sectarian violence, civil war, 
criminality? There is no opposition to continuing to support troops in 
Al-Anbar and even an increase in the troops to fight the bad guys in 
that location. But that is altogether different from going into Baghdad 
where our troops will be expected to be on the point and in harm's way 
in the midst of sectarian violence that is unparalleled across our 
great world today. But in strong support of Iraq, we must, in fact, do 
what we can to support Iraq but without putting our troops in the midst 
of that caldron.
  The Baker-Hamilton report made things very clear. We have established 
benchmarks as well--that we should empower the Iraqi Government to be 
able to do what it can to quell its own violence. We cannot win their 
civil war. We cannot stop the violence in Baghdad. Only a political 
solution achieved by the Iraqis will be able to do that.
  If we are to do our duty, if we are to exhibit leadership, let us 
begin by allowing a full debate on the resolutions we have pending. 
Let's talk about the President's plan to deploy American troops to the 
crossroads of civil war in Iraq. Let's talk about holding the Iraqi 
Government accountable for its responsibilities.
  I am prepared to defend the resolutions I have offered with Senators 
Warner, Collins, and Levin. I am prepared to vote on the McCain 
resolution. And I am prepared for the debate because its time has come.
  I ask my colleagues, if not now, when? If not now, do we wait for 
more troops to die before we oppose the President's plan? If not now, 
do we wait for more violence, more unrest, more danger for our troops 
before we act? Some have said the President deserves one last chance to 
succeed. How do we ask our troops to do again what has failed in the 
past? We have had other surges that have not succeeded for a variety of 
reasons, not the least of which is the Iraqis have not shown up. So 
what is different this time?
  I hope we do not look at this as our last hurrah.
  I yield the floor.

[[Page S1558]]

  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Brown). The Senator from Rhode Island is 
recognized for 5 minutes.
  Mr. REED. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senator 
from Florida, Mr. Nelson, be recognized after the Senator from Texas.
  Mr. CORNYN. Mr. President, reserving the right to object, I have a 
list of speakers on our side, and I would ask to be recognized to ask 
if the Senator would revise his request that following Senator Reed, 
Senator Specter be recognized for 7\1/2\ minutes. Then if we can 
alternate sides, and on our side, then, it would be the Senator from 
Texas, Mr. Cornyn, for 7\1/2\ minutes; Senator Lieberman for 10 
minutes; and then Senator Hagel, who would use the remainder of our 
time, which I believe would be 8 more minutes. If we could revise the 
UC to reflect that order of speakers for our time, I would appreciate 
it.
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, reserving the right to object, may I get in 
the queue?
  Mr. REED. Mr. President, might I suggest that while I speak an order 
be established, and at the conclusion of my remarks I would again make 
the unanimous consent for that order.
  Mr. CORNYN. No objection.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Rhode Island is recognized.
  Mr. REED. Mr. President, I commend Senator Warner, Senator Nelson, 
Senator Levin and others who have worked so hard on this resolution. I 
do believe, like my colleagues, that this measure and an alternative 
measure deserve an up-or-down vote by the Senate. That is what the 
American people want, and that is what they should receive.
  We embarked on this effort in Iraq more than 4 years ago. From the 
very beginning I thought this was not a response to an imminent threat 
to the United States or even to the region. It was based upon highly 
speculative and, it turns out in many cases, flat wrong intelligence. 
It represents, in my view, a flawed strategy because the approach the 
President has taken in Iraq fails to recognize that the major regional 
threat was not Iraq but Iran and failed to recognize the huge amounts 
of resources that will be necessary to successfully occupy and 
stabilize a country the size of Iraq with the cultural and historical 
issues that are inherent in that country.
  The strategy, as I said, I think was flawed. Strategy, to me, means 
having a clear objective and putting forth the resources necessary to 
achieve that objective. The objective in Iraq shifted from the WMD 
allegations, to terrorist connections allegations, to creating a 
transformative oasis of democracy and free enterprise in a country that 
has not seen that in many years. And the resources were never adequate 
for the task.
  One of the most important resources in a strategy is public support. 
I think one of the major problems with the President's last address a 
few days ago when he talked about Iraq and his so-called new strategy 
is that, I believe, he squandered significantly the willingness of the 
American public to support any proposal made. Without that public 
support, it will be very difficult to sustain our activities in Iraq.
  I think the proof of this failed strategy is evident. Today Iran is 
in an enhanced strategic position vis-a-vis the United States and is 
being much more difficult to deal with, with respect to the region and 
to its aspirations of nuclear technology. We have compromised our 
efforts in Afghanistan and in Pakistan where real significant threats 
exist to the world and to the United States. We have diverted our 
attention from North Korea and from the Iranian aspirations for nuclear 
technology.
  According to many experts such as Hank Crumpton, who is leaving as 
the Assistant Secretary of State for Counterterrorism:

       We have made it more likely this country will be struck by 
     terrorists, not less likely.

  Of course, we can talk at length about the incompetent execution of 
these policies in Iraq, but I want to go right to the heart of what the 
President is talking about. He suggests that we have a changed 
strategy. I would suggest that perhaps we are changing our tactics; we 
are taking American units and putting them in the heart of Baghdad. But 
it seems that this surge is more of the same, more of the clear hold 
and build, more of involvement in the existing conflicts of the Iraqi 
people and not essential to our national security, which would be to 
protect ourselves from terrorists there, to stabilize the country so it 
doesn't disintegrate, and also to go ahead and to train, continually 
train the Iraqi security forces.
  Many have criticized this surge on purely military grounds. Too few 
troops. The doctrine calls for more than 120,000 troops to cover the 
city of Baghdad. We will be lucky to muster 50,000 to 60,000 to 70,000. 
Including Iraqi security forces.
  There is a lack of unity of command. There is uncertain leadership by 
the Iraqis. Their commanding general is a virtual unknown who has been 
plucked by Maliki to lead this effort, probably more for political 
reliability than for tactical skill. And the rolling start, the gradual 
buildup has already led many Iraqis in Baghdad to suggest that our 
efforts have further compromised their security, as evidenced by the 
bombing just a few days ago of a marketplace in a Shia neighborhood in 
Baghdad.
  The strategy we have to pursue is a complementary and reinforcing 
strategy involving military, political, and economic steps, together 
with regional and international diplomacy. It rests fundamentally on 
the capacity of Iraq and non-DOD, nonuniform military advisers to carry 
the day. Frankly, the Iraqi Government is in too many cases 
dysfunctional and incompetent, and elements outside of our uniformed 
military personnel--our State Department officials, our Agriculture 
officials, our Justice officials, our AID officials--have not been in 
Iraq in sufficient numbers and in sufficient quality to deal decisively 
with these issues. There is nothing in this plan which suggests that 
situation will change.
  I think we are also at a point where we have been informed by the 
National Intelligence Estimate of the true nature of the struggle in 
Iraq. It is a sectarian battle between Shia and Sunni, with insurgents 
who, according to the NIE, accelerate the violence between these two 
sectarian groups. It is an existential battle where the Shias feel 
insecure because they have labored for many years under the yoke of the 
Saddam Hussein regime, and they don't want to go back there. It is 
existential from the Sunni position because they see themselves 
entitled to rule.
  I think our best course is outlined in the Warner resolution, clearly 
stating our disapproval and disagreement with the augmentation as the 
resolution describes, and focusing ourselves on reconciliation, on both 
military efforts, but scaled back, and also concentrating on diplomacy 
and economic activities. I would hope that at least we could get a vote 
on it and, frankly, I think it will pass.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. NELSON of Nebraska. Mr. President, is someone offering the order?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Texas is recognized.
  Mr. CORNYN. Mr. President, I believe under the previous UC, if I am 
not mistaken, the Senator from Pennsylvania would be the next in our 
queue on our side. If I may ask for clarification, the order that I 
believe was encompassed in the UC on our side was the Senator from 
Pennsylvania, then the Senator from Texas, then Senator Lieberman, the 
Senator from Connecticut, and then Senator Hagel, the Senator from 
Nebraska.
  Mr. REED. Mr. President, I believe, again, the Senator suggested we 
would alternate from side to side, and at the conclusion of--in fact, 
if I may, I have a unanimous consent stating that after Senator 
Specter, I would suggest that from our side the order be Senator 
Nelson, 5 minutes; Senator Biden, 10 minutes; Senator Levin, 10 
minutes; and Senator Schumer, 5 minutes; and they would be alternating 
between the Republican side and the Democratic side, and the Republican 
side would be----
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Does the Senator from Texas modify his 
unanimous consent request to include the remarks and the proposal of 
the Senator from Rhode Island?
  Mr. CORNYN. That is correct. If I could, just in the interest of 
clarity, and I know this is confusing, Senator Specter will be 
allocated 7\1/2\ minutes, followed by myself for 7\1/2\ minutes, 
Senator Lieberman will be allocated 10 minutes, and then Senator Hagel, 
8 minutes, on our side.

[[Page S1559]]

  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, reserving the right to object, and I will 
not, I would like to have Senator Collins included for 10 minutes.
  Mr. CORNYN. Mr. President, we have 33 minutes total.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Texas has 31 minutes to dole 
out.
  Mr. WARNER. Could Senator Collins be accommodated subsequent to the 
other names that have been enumerated, just to add her to the list, for 
10 minutes?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time is being counted now until 5:20.
  Mr. WARNER. Very well. I will try and work with colleagues to see if 
we can find time for Senator Collins on somebody else's time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. The 
Senator from Pennsylvania is recognized.
  Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I have sought recognition to oppose 
cloture on the pending motion to proceed on the issue of how to deal 
with the Iraqi problem.
  As I look at this issue, it is one of enormous magnitude, and it 
ought not to be subject to shortcuts in the debate of the Senate. We 
pride ourselves on being the world's greatest deliberative body, and 
now is the time to show it. But what is happening on this motion for 
cloture and what is happening behind the scenes on negotiations is an 
effort to short-circuit debate on this matter of great importance, 
great magnitude. It is the issue which is engulfing the work of this 
body, the work of the House, and, really, all of Washington, and many 
of the eyes of the world are focused on this issue. There is no oxygen 
left in this town except on what to do on Iraq.
  I suggest that this is not the kind of an issue where we ought to be 
short-circuited. There ought to be a full opportunity to debate this 
issue and all of its ramifications. What is happening behind the scenes 
is an effort to limit the number of resolutions and/or bills which may 
be offered as alternatives as to what the course of the United States 
ought to be on this very important subject.
  Although it is arcane and esoteric and not subject to being 
understood, what is happening, again, behind the scenes, is the threat 
by the majority to fill up the tree, and that means when a bill is on 
the floor, if there is a first-degree amendment and a second-degree 
amendment, both of which are technical in nature and both of which may 
be offered by the majority leader because of the rule of priority of 
recognition, nobody else can offer an amendment.
  Now, the countersuggestion has been made that there would be two 
amendments by the Republicans. That is down from five amendments, and 
it may be that even five are insufficient. As we debate this issue, 
other ideas may occur as to what ought to happen. But we are dealing 
with very complex issues.
  On this state of the record, I cannot support an additional 
allocation of 21,500 troops because it is my judgment that would not be 
material or helpful in what is going on at the present time. This comes 
against the backdrop of extensive hearings in the Armed Services 
Committee and Foreign Relations Committee, and in the context of the 
military having given many estimates with many of those in key command 
positions saying that no more troops are necessary. This comes with the 
Iraqi Prime Minister Maliki saying a variety of things but at some 
times saying he doesn't want any more troops.
  This debate ought to be taking up alternative proposals, and the one 
which is the most attractive to this Senator on this state of the 
record and has been endorsed by a number of the military is to give 
notice to the Iraqis that at some point in the future, with the exact 
time to be determined by the military experts, perhaps 6 months or 
perhaps some other point, that the Iraqis will be called upon to take 
over Baghdad, the security of Baghdad, to keep U.S. troops out of the 
line of fire between the Sunnis and the Shias, and that our current 
force would remain in Iraq to guard the infrastructure, to guard the 
oil wells, to give advice and to give training but not to undertake the 
major responsibility.
  The obvious answer ultimately has to be a diplomatic solution, and as 
long as the Iraqis know that we are going to send in additional troops, 
that we are going to take over the responsibilities which they should 
be undertaking, they are going to sit back and let us do it. It is a 
matter of human nature. If Uncle Sam will do it, why should the Iraqis 
do it? But if we put them on notice that it is going to be their 
responsibility at a given time, then that puts the obligation on them.
  In the President's State of the Union speech, he was explicit that 
the Iraqis had to do two things: No. 1, end the sectarian violence, 
and, no. 2, secure Baghdad. And on this state of the record there is no 
showing that the Iraqis are capable of doing either.
  It is my hope, as we listen to the Senators who have been engaged in 
these hearings, who have studied the matter in some detail, and as we 
explore the alternatives, explore the alternative resolution of putting 
benchmarks that the Iraqis have to meet, when we explore the 
alternative of limiting funding--which I think there is unanimity we 
cannot limit funding at a time when American troops will be put in 
harm's way--this is the time for the Senate to assert congressional 
responsibility, which we have.
  When the President says repeatedly he is the ``decider,'' I say 
respectfully to the President that is a shared responsibility. Under 
the Constitution, the Congress has the authority to decide, to maintain 
armies. The Constitution specifically limited appropriations to 2 
years.
  However, if we are to assert that responsibility and that support, it 
seems to me we have to do it in a way which does not limit our debate. 
Right now, we are under a tremendous time pressure, with only an hour 
and a half to debate this important matter, and Senators are looking 
for more time. That is a very poor way for this Senate to approach this 
very important subject.
  I yield back the remainder of my time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Florida is recognized for 5 
minutes.
  Mr. NELSON of Florida. Mr. President, in November, General Abizaid 
told our Senate Committee on Armed Services, when asked did he need any 
more troops in Iraq, he said ``no.'' Admiral Fallon, who has been 
chosen by the administration to succeed General Abizaid, when asked did 
he think by the Senate taking a position in opposition to the 
President's determination to put 21,000 new troops in Iraq that was 
undercutting the military forces in Iraq, Admiral Fallon deferred and 
would not answer that, as some others had been quick to answer in the 
affirmative.
  When General Casey was in front of our committee last week, when 
asked how many additional troops do you think should be put into 
Baghdad, he said two brigades--not the five brigades the President has 
determined.
  What we have is a majority of Members in this Senate feel there 
should not be any increase. We have General Casey, the commander for 
the last 2\1/2\ years, saying there should only be a two-brigade 
increase. So there is, in fact, conflicting opinion.
  If we are going to have any increase in troops in Iraq, the Marine 
generals in Anbar Province have convinced this Senator that an increase 
in Anbar Province would be helpful, but the conclusion of this Senator 
was that putting more American troops in the middle of Baghdad, in the 
middle of that sectarian violence, was not going to do any good; it was 
going to put more Americans in harm's way, particularly in the limited 
numbers the President is talking about.
  If we wish to make a difference in Baghdad in the midst of all that 
sectarian violence, where it has been going on for 1,327 years, since 
the year 688 A.D., after the death of Mohammed, when the grandson was 
assassinated because he broke off and that became the Shiite branch and 
the Sunnis and the Shiites have been at it ever since, if you want to 
make a difference in Baghdad with all that sectarian strife, put in 50, 
100, 200 or 300,000 troops. But 21,000--17,000 of which are going into 
Baghdad additionally--in this Senator's opinion, is not going to do the 
job.
  As the Senator from Virginia knows, this Senator is one of his 
cosponsors. I support his resolution. I think it is very important 
there be truth and openness. In this Senator's position on

[[Page S1560]]

the Foreign Relations Committee, on the Senate Committee on Armed 
Services, and on the Intelligence Committee of the Senate, I have been 
hammering away at correct information over and over because what we 
have been dished out over the last several years has been incorrect 
information.
  That leads us to this point where we have to make a judgment. We are 
a coequal branch. We are part of the formulation of policy, and it is 
intended that way by the U.S. Constitution that the people speak 
through us as well as through the President.
  It is my privilege to say I support the Senator from Virginia in his 
resolution.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Texas is recognized for 7\1/
2\ minutes.
  Mr. CORNYN. Mr. President, as I try to count up the number of 
positions of Senators articulating either for or against the various 
resolutions, I count at least six, and maybe there are more.
  There are some who say, yes, that the President's plan--basically, 
that General Petraeus, the architect of that plan, will have 
responsibility for implementing--that plan ought to get a chance.
  Then there are those who say: No, we disagree with that plan. We do 
not believe that General Petraeus should get the additional five 
brigades that the plan calls for, but we do think in Anbar Province 
additional troops ought to go in to fight al-Qaida in Iraq.
  Then there is a third position I count that says we think there 
shouldn't be additional troops, and we want to cap the number of 
troops, period, and we want to set a timetable for their withdrawal. 
That would actually be No. 4.
  Some of the distinguished Members of this Senate have said these 
nonbinding resolutions are shooting with blanks. What we ought to do is 
have a vote on cutting off funds because that is the sole way that 
Congress can have a definitive impact on what is happening. We do not 
believe any funds should be appropriated for this effort. That is a 
fifth position, as I count it.
  Then there are those--and I find myself in this group--who say: No, 
we shouldn't cut off funds that support our troops during a time of 
war. In fact, we ought to give this a chance.
  Some of these positions may have some commonality and some may merge 
and diverge, but the point is, for the majority to say we have one vote 
on one resolution, in spite of the fact there are at least six 
positions, as I count them, on this issue is asking Members to 
accept limited debate and does not reflect the diversity of views in 
this Senate.

  The vote we are going to have at 5:30 tonight--and I thank the 
distinguished Senator from Virginia and others who, perhaps, share a 
different view from me on the substance of the resolution, for 
supporting our right to have a fair process and to have all the various 
resolutions or, I should say, at least two, in opposition that ought to 
be offered, that Senators ought to be given the chance to vote for.
  Senator Reid, the majority leader, on the floor earlier asked 
rhetorically: What makes the Baghdad security plan different from the 
ones that have come before? Let me mention the specific answer to his 
question. First of all, this is an Iraqi-initiated plan for taking 
control of the capital of Iraq. No. 2, there will be adequate forces--
Iraqis supported by American and coalition forces--to hold 
neighborhoods cleared of terrorist extremists. Third, there is a new 
operational concept, one devised not just to pursue terrorists and 
extremists but actually to secure the city once they are cleared. 
Fourth, new rules of engagement will pursue that Iraqi and U.S. forces 
can pursue lawbreakers, regardless of their communities or sect. Five, 
security operations will be followed by economic assistance and 
reconstruction aid, including billions of dollars in Iraqi funds, 
offering jobs and the prospect for better lives.
  The reason I support the plan General Petraeus is largely the 
architect of, and the very same commander whom we have confirmed by 
unanimous vote about a week or so ago, is because I think it represents 
the last best chance for success in Iraq. I don't know anyone who 
believes the status quo is acceptable.
  The question is, Are we simply going to give up and see a regional 
conflict? Are we going to see ethnic cleansing occur? Are we going to 
see countries that have Sunni majorities come to the aid of their Sunni 
brothers and sisters who might be the subject of ethnic cleansing by 
the Shia majority? Are we going to allow Iraq to become another failed 
state which will then serve as a launching pad for future terrorist 
attacks, perhaps including against the United States? The risks of that 
happening by doing nothing or by simply saying what we have been doing 
now is not working so we are simply going to refuse to endorse any 
alternative plan because we are not sure it is going to be successful 
is giving up before we should.
  While opinion polls should not govern our conduct, it is significant 
the one question I have heard, when asked by Opinion Dynamics Poll on 
the process we are engaged in today, the question was: Congress has 
been considering a nonbinding resolution expressing opposition to the 
President's plan to send more troops. By almost two to one, Americans 
think passing a resolution would do more harm than good; 47 percent in 
this poll that was reported February 1, 2007, say it is likely to 
encourage the enemy and hurt troop morale compared with 24 percent who 
think it would make a positive difference to the policy of the United 
States toward Iraq.
  Regardless of the sincerely held beliefs that I know Senators have on 
this very important topic, the last thing we should be forced to do 
would be to vote on a single resolution when there are so many 
different points of view that deserve full and fair debate on what is 
the most important issue that conflicts our country and, literally, the 
world at this time and that is the global war on terror, the central 
front of that war in Iraq and what we are going to do about it, whether 
we are going to give up or whether we are going to try to secure that 
country in a way that will allow it to govern and defend itself.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware is recognized for 10 
minutes.
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, we will hear a lot, today and this week, of 
phrases such as ``last best chance,'' ``refuse to endorse an 
alternative plan,'' ``Iraq is a central front of the war on terror.'' 
Virtually no one subscribes to any of those three points--all of the 
experts who have given testimony, the Iraqi Study Group, the plans that 
have been put forward that are real alternatives.
  The President has not put forward a plan. He has put forward a 
tactic, a tactic that most experts, including his own military, think 
will make a plan for success less likely to be able to be arrived at.
  No one in this Senate, at least in this debate, at least from my 
perspective, is calling for us cutting and running--none of that. I 
hope we keep our eye focused, our eye on the ball.
  The Senate is today taking a first step toward a bipartisan effort to 
prevent the escalation of a war in Iraq and to adapt a strategy for 
Iraq for leaving Iraq without leaving behind chaos.
  The first step is to debate and vote the resolution offered by 
Senator Warner and reintroduced by Senator Levin and me as a bill. That 
says the Senate disagrees with the President's plan to send 17,500 more 
American troops into the middle of a city of over 6.2 million people in 
the midst of a civil war, because what we are afraid of is that the 
Senator from Texas may be right; this may make things so bad that 
everyone will conclude there is no more chance of succeeding.

  We have vital interests in that region. I am afraid this policy, this 
tactic of the President, is going to be a self-fulfilling prophesy. The 
question before us today is whether a minority of Senators will even 
allow a debate to start. That is what this is about. All they have to 
do--there will be other resolutions brought up; they are able to be 
brought up--all they have to do is take issue with this. They can stop 
the debate by getting 41 votes. But they can actually engage in debate 
and try to defeat the notion, when the message of this resolution is: 
Mr. President, stop. No more escalation, Mr. President.
  Everyone from the Iraq Study Group to the Biden-Gelb plan, to every 
other plan that has been put out there says the way to get the Iraqis 
to reach a political solution is to begin to draw

[[Page S1561]]

down American forces. No one, including General Petraeus, whom I know 
fairly well, suggests there is a military answer. A political solution 
is required. So to my colleagues who are thinking about trying to block 
the debate, let me say this: Iraq dominates our national life. It is on 
the minds of tens of millions of Americans. It shapes the lives of 
hundreds of thousands of our men and women in uniform and their 
families. And that the Senate would not even debate, much less vote, on 
the single most urgent issue of our time would be a total forfeiture of 
our responsibility.
  We have a duty to debate and to vote on the President's tactic. We 
have a duty to debate and vote on our overall strategy in Iraq. And we 
have a duty as Senators to speak out and say where we are.
  Three weeks ago, Secretary of State Rice came before the Foreign 
Relations Committee and presented the President's plan. Its main 
feature is to send more troops, increase the total number of troops, 
and send them into Baghdad in the middle of a sectarian war.
  The reaction on the committee, from Republicans to Democrats alike, 
ranged from skepticism, to profound skepticism, to outright opposition. 
That pretty much reflects the reaction all across the country.
  So Senator Hagel joined me and Senator Lugar and Senator Snowe. We 
sat down and wrote a resolution to give Senators a way to vote what 
their voices were saying, for we believe the quickest and most 
effective way to get the President to change course is to demonstrate 
to him that his policy has little or no support across the board, 
Democrats and Republicans.
  After we introduced the resolution, the distinguished ranking member 
of the Armed Services Committee, Senator Warner, came forward with his 
resolution. The bottom line of the resolutions is the same: Mr. 
President, don't send more Americans into the middle of a civil war.
  There was one critical difference. As originally written, the Warner 
resolution left open the possibility of increasing the overall number 
of troops in Iraq, when in fact the Iraq Study Group and others said we 
should be declining to get action from the politicians in Iraq.
  We believe that would have sent the wrong message. Not ramp up; 
again, to draw down, redeploy forces remaining in Iraq. And the best 
way to make that clear to the Iraqi people is to let them know we are 
not going to be there forever, as the President said. And they must 
begin to make the hard compromises necessary for a political solution 
that virtually everyone agrees is necessary to end this war.
  So we approached Senator Warner to work out our differences, and I am 
very pleased to say we succeeded in doing that. The language Senator 
Warner removed from his resolution removed the possibility that it 
could be read as calling for a troop increase. With that change, we 
agreed to support his resolution. And I do.
  When I first spoke out against the President's planned surge before 
the New Year, I made it clear I had one objective: I hoped to build and 
demonstrate bipartisan opposition to this plan because it was the 
fastest way to turn the President around. And that is exactly what we 
have done.
  Now we have a real opportunity for the Senate to speak clearly. Every 
Senator should be given a chance to vote on whether he or she approves 
or disapproves of the President's tactic to send more troops into the 
middle of a civil war.
  The debate we will have is important, but the debate is as important 
as the vote. And I hope the American people carefully listen. I predict 
they will hear very few colleagues stand up and support the President's 
plan to send more troops into the middle of a civil war. Listen to the 
voices. Listen to the voices as well as the votes.
  Just as important as what we are voting against is what we are voting 
for. This bill, similar to the Biden-Hagel-Levin-Snowe provision, makes 
three things clear.
  First, Iraq needs a political settlement. Second, the United States 
has to work with other regional powers. And third, the mission of our 
forces should be confined to counterterrorism, training, and 
maintaining the territorial integrity of Iraq.

  Mr. President, how much time do I have remaining?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. There is 2 minutes 55 seconds.
  Mr. BIDEN. I will continue, Mr. President.
  As I said at the outset, this is the first step, this rejection of 
the President's increase of more troops into Iraq into the middle of a 
civil war. But it can set the foundation for everything that follows.
  If the President does not listen to the majority of Congress and the 
majority of the American people, we will have to look for other ways to 
turn this surge around.
  Even if we succeed in this effort, we still need to turn our overall 
policy around. We need a strategy that can produce a political 
settlement in Iraq. That is the only way to stop the Shiites and the 
Sunnis from killing each other and to allow our troops to leave Iraq at 
an appropriate time without trading a dictator for chaos.
  But today my message is simple. The American people want us to debate 
Iraq, the most important issue of our day. They expect it. They demand 
it. And if we attempt to hide behind procedure and delaying tactics, I 
believe the American people will not be very happy. They get it. The 
question is, Do we?
  Are you for or against the President escalating this war in Iraq? I 
am against it. I believe the majority of Members on both sides are as 
well. We should vote on that.
  I yield the remainder of my time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Ms. Stabenow). The Senator from Connecticut is 
recognized for 10 minutes.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. I thank the Chair.
  Madam President, America has reached a critical crossroad in the war 
in Iraq. More than 4 years ago, this Senate voted to authorize the use 
of force against Saddam Hussein, a tyrant who slaughtered his own 
people, attacked his neighbors, and threatened our security.
  Thanks to the courageous service of the men and women of the American 
military, that evil regime was overthrown and in its place came hopes 
for a democracy in the heart of the Middle East, hopes for a victory in 
the war for the hearts and minds of the Muslim world.
  As of today, sadly, as we all know, those hopes have not been 
realized. Because of the ruthless conduct of our enemies in Iraq, as 
well as our own failures, we instead today find ourselves on a knife's 
edge in Iraq.
  Now a new course has been chosen. A new commander is in place in 
Iraq, confirmed unanimously by this Senate. A new Secretary of Defense 
is in place at the Pentagon, also confirmed overwhelmingly by the 
Senate. And a new strategy has begun to be put into action on the 
ground in Iraq by American troops.
  It is altogether proper that we debate our policy in Iraq. It should 
be a debate that is as serious as the situation in Iraq and that 
reflects the powers the Constitution gives to Congress in matters of 
war.
  But that, sadly, is not the debate that the Warner-Levin resolution 
invites us to have. I am going to speak strongly against this 
resolution because I feel strongly about it. I do so with the greatest 
respect for my colleagues who have offered it. But I believe its 
passage would compromise America's security, and I will say so within 
the clearest terms I can muster.
  The resolution before us, its sponsors concede, will not stop the new 
strategy from going forward on the ground in Iraq. In fact, as we speak 
in the Senate, thousands of American troops are already there in 
Baghdad, with thousands more moving into position to carry out their 
Commander's orders. This resolution does nothing to alter those facts.
  Instead, its sponsors say it will send a message of rebuke from this 
Senate to the President of the United States, from one end of 
Pennsylvania Avenue to the other. But the President has made clear he 
will not be deterred in carrying out what he sees as his duties and 
responsibilities as Commander in Chief.
  And there is a world well beyond Pennsylvania Avenue that is also 
watching and listening to what we do. What we say is being heard in 
Baghdad by Iraqi political leaders, by moderates trying to decide 
whether we Americans will stand with them over the long term.

[[Page S1562]]

  What we say is being heard by our men and women in uniform who 
naturally will be interested in knowing whether we support the plan 
they have been asked to carry out at risk to their own lives.
  What we say in the Senate will be heard by the leaders of the 
thuggish regimes in Iran and Syria and by al-Qaida terrorists eager for 
evidence that America's will is breaking.
  And what we say in the Senate will be heard across America by our 
constituents who are wondering if their Congress is capable of serious 
action, not hollow posturing.
  This resolution is not about Congress taking responsibility. It is 
the opposite. This is a resolution of irresolution.
  For the Senate to take up a symbolic vote of no confidence on the eve 
of a decisive battle is unprecedented. But it is not inconsequential. 
It is an act which I fear will discourage our troops, hearten our 
enemies, and showcase our disunity. And that is why I will vote against 
the motion for cloture.
  My colleagues, if you believe that General Petraeus and his new 
strategy have a reasonable chance of success in Iraq, then you should 
resolve to support him and his troops through the difficult days ahead 
and oppose this resolution.
  On the other hand, if you believe this new strategy is flawed or that 
our cause is hopeless in Iraq, then you should put aside this 
resolution--nonbinding--and you should vote to stop what is happening 
in Iraq, vote to cut off the funds, vote for a binding time line for 
American withdrawal.
  If that is where your convictions lie, then have the courage of your 
convictions to accept the consequences of your convictions. That would 
be a resolution.
  This nonbinding resolution before us, by contrast, is an accumulation 
of ambiguities and inconsistencies. It is at once for the war but also 
against the war. It pledges its support to the troops in the field but 
then washes its hands of what they have been commanded to do. It urges 
more troops be sent for Anbar Province but not for Baghdad.
  My colleagues, we cannot have it both ways. We cannot vote full 
confidence in General Petraeus but no confidence in the strategy he 
says he needs for success.
  We cannot say our troops have our full support but disavow their 
mission on the eve of battle. This is what happens when you try to wage 
war by committee. And that is why the Constitution gave the authority 
of Commander in Chief to one person, the President.
  Cynics may say this kind of irresolution happens all the time in 
Congress. In this case, however, they would be wrong. If it passed, 
this resolution would be unique in American legislative history.
  I asked the Library of Congress this question last week and was told 
that never before, when American soldiers have been in harm's way, 
fighting and dying in a conflict Congress had voted to authorize, has 
Congress turned around and passed a nonbinding resolution such as this 
one, disapproving of a particular battlefield strategy.
  I ask each of my colleagues to stop for a moment and consider the 
precedent that passage of this resolution would establish. Even during 
Vietnam, even after the Tet Offensive, even after the invasion of 
Cambodia, Congress did not take up a nonbinding resolution such as this 
one.
  Past Congresses certainly debated wars. They argued heatedly about 
them. And they sometimes clashed directly with the executive branch, 
with the President, over their execution. But in so doing, they 
accepted the consequences of their convictions
  This resolution does no such thing. It is simply an expression of 
opinion. It does not pretend to have any substantive effect on policy 
on the ground in Iraq. But again, I ask my colleagues, what will this 
resolution say to our soldiers? What will it say to our allies? What 
will it say to our enemies?
  We heard from General Petraeus during his confirmation hearing that 
war is a battle of wills. Our enemies believe they are winning in Iraq 
today. They believe they can outlast us, that sooner or later we will 
tire of this grinding conflict and go home and leave the field in that 
country open for them. That is the lesson Osama bin Laden has told us, 
in his writings and statements, he took from our retreats from Lebanon 
and Somalia in the 1980s and 1990s. It is a belief at the core of the 
insurgency in Iraq and at the core of the fanatical goals of radical 
Islam worldwide.
  I fear this resolution before the Senate, by codifying our disunity, 
by disavowing the mission our troops are about to undertake, will 
confirm our enemies' beliefs that America has grown impatient and 
unable to fight the long fight to victory. This resolution also sends a 
terrible message to our allies. Of course, I agree that we must hold 
the Iraqi Government to account. That is exactly what the resolution 
Senator McCain and I and others have offered would do. But I ask you, 
imagine for a moment that you are a Sunni or Shia politician in Baghdad 
who wants the violence to end, and ask yourself how the Warner-Levin 
resolution would affect your thinking, your calculations of risk, your 
willingness to stand against the forces of extremism. Will the 
resolution empower you or will it undermine you? Will it make you feel 
safer or will it make you feel you should hedge your bets, or go over 
to the extremists, or leave Iraq?
  Finally, what is the message this resolution sends to our soldiers? I 
know that every Member of the Senate supports our troops but actions 
have consequences, often unintended.
  I ask unanimous consent that I be given an additional moment to 
finish my statement. That would come from Senator McConnell's time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. When we send a message of irresolution, it does not 
support our troops. When we renounce their mission, it does not support 
our troops. We heard recently in the Senate Armed Services Committee 
from GEN Jack Keane, a former chief of staff of the U.S. Army, who said 
of a resolution like this one:

       It's just not helpful . . . What the enemy sees is an 
     erosion of the political and moral will of the American 
     people . . .
       Our soldiers are Americans first. They clearly understand 
     there's a political process in this country that they clearly 
     support . . . But at the end of the day, they are going to go 
     out and do a tough mission, and I certainly would like to see 
     them supported in that mission as opposed to declaring 
     nonsupport. . . .

  I agree. Everyone here knows the American people are frustrated about 
the lack of progress in Iraq. Everyone here shares that frustration. 
And as elected representatives of the people, everyone here feels 
pressure to give expression to that frustration. This is not a new 
challenge. It is one that every democracy in every long war has had to 
confront. Nearly a century and a half ago, an American President 
wrestled with just this problem. It was in the midst of a terrible war, 
a civil war in which hundreds of thousands of Americans were fighting 
and dying to secure the freedom of millions long and cruelly denied it.
  ``We here highly resolve,'' that was Lincoln's message at Gettysburg. 
It was a message of resolution.
  I ask unanimous consent for an additional moment from the time of 
Senator McConnell to finish the statement.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Lincoln said at Gettysburg: ``We here highly 
resolve.'' It was a message of resolution, of steadfastness in the face 
of adversity, of hope over despair, and of confidence in the cause of 
freedom which is America's eternal cause. Today, in the depths of a 
terrible war, on the brink of a decisive battle for Baghdad, let us 
have a serious debate about where we stand and where we must go in 
Iraq. But that is not the debate this resolution of irresolution would 
bring.
  The 60-vote requirement to close debate was put in place by our 
predecessors as a way to make it harder for the passions of a 
particular moment to sweep through the American people and across this 
Congress in a way that would do serious damage to our Nation in the 
long term. Because I believe this resolution, if passed, would have 
such an effect, I will respectfully oppose the motion for cloture.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Kentucky.
  Mr. McCONNELL. Madam President, I believe Senator Hagel is----
  Mr. LEVIN. Madam President, I yield to the Senator from Virginia 1 
minute

[[Page S1563]]

to ask a question of the Senator from Connecticut.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Republican leader has the floor.
  Mr. McCONNELL. I am happy to yield the floor, if the understanding is 
that the Senator from Michigan is next.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan is next for 10 
minutes.
  The Senator from Virginia.
  Mr. WARNER. I thank the Chair.
  My question to my good friend and colleague is as follows: This 
debate is well under way. The plans are being discussed. I just 
inquired at the desk, and the McCain resolution is not filed. Yet I 
understood you to say it had been filed. Could you help clarify for the 
Senate the position on that?
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. I would be happy to, briefly. The resolution Senator 
McCain and I and others have has been prepared and I gather has been 
the subject of negotiation between Senator Reid and Senator McConnell.
  Mr. WARNER. But it is not a part of the record so----
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. That is right. The debate going on now----
  Mr. WARNER. I feel very strongly that the Senate should work its will 
on facts that are out in the open. I have filed my resolutions, one 
after the other, at the desk so all Senators could have the benefit. Is 
that a possibility, that we could have the benefit of this resolution?

  Mr. LIEBERMAN. My dear friend, it is more than a possibility; it is a 
promise.
  Mr. WARNER. And what time might the promise be executed?
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. There are copies of it around now, and we will get you 
one. They were publicly distributed Thursday of last week.
  Mr. WARNER. I will be glad to give you my copy, but I feel it is 
presumptuous of me to address it unless it is properly before the 
Senate.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. I thank my friend. The difference, of course, is that 
ours is as nonbinding as yours, but ours is a statement of support to 
our troops and benchmarks to the Iraqis.
  Mr. WARNER. Madam President, clearly what is read is correct. But I 
assure you that I forcefully argue that ours is in support of the 
troops. There is no suggestion that one is less patriotic than the 
other, if I may say to my dear friend.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. One is not less patriotic than the other, but actions 
have consequences. As I said during my remarks, for the Senate to take 
this unprecedented action on a nonbinding resolution, to disavow, 
disapprove a mission that our troops are being asked to carry out right 
now cannot help their morale.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan.
  Mr. LEVIN. Madam President, I hope the Senate will be allowed to 
debate our policy in Iraq by proceeding to this legislation this 
afternoon. Iraq is the single most important policy issue facing our 
country. It was a major issue in the November elections last fall. The 
American people have strong opinions about what is happening in Iraq. 
They want their elected officials to debate this issue, and we should 
do it. The debate should go forward. A filibuster is out of place on 
war and peace issues, on something of this magnitude. The debate is not 
about whether we want the United States to act to maximize chances of 
success in Iraq. We all want to maximize chances of success in Iraq. We 
all want to see a stable Iraq which enhances our own national security. 
But the President's course of action, which he has been on for 3\1/2\ 
years and which he has now proposed to continue on to deepen our 
involvement in Iraq, does not enhance our security. It does not 
maximize chances of success in Iraq.
  The debate is about the best way to maximize chances of success in 
Iraq. Is the new strategy of the President, which puts over 21,000 more 
American troops in the middle of an Iraqi civil war, the best way to 
bring that about? That is what this debate is about. There actually 
seems to be an agreement among most observers that an Iraqi political 
settlement is the key to ending the violence in Iraq. The difference of 
opinion exists on whether Iraqi politicians need breathing space, as 
President Bush has said, to reach required political compromises or 
whether, as many of us believe, Iraqi politicians need to be pressured 
to make those compromises and that the addition of 21,000 more troops 
doesn't make a political compromise more likely; it just gets us in 
deeper in the middle of a civil conflict.
  The bill we are hoping to proceed to today incorporates the modified 
Warner resolution verbatim, except for a minor change in order to make 
it a bill instead of a resolution. The reason for making it a bill 
instead of a resolution is simply to make it more amendable. Unlike a 
resolution, which is clumsy to amend, there is no intent to put this 
modified Warner language in the form of a bill for any other purpose. 
As a matter of fact, the majority leader has asked for unanimous 
consent to treat a resolution with Senator Warner's language as 
amendable, as though it were a bill, to achieve the goal we are trying 
to achieve. This unanimous consent was objected to by the Republican 
leader.
  The majority leader, Senator Reid, has also told Senator McConnell 
that we are more than willing to transform this bill into a resolution 
prior to final passage, if we can get to final passage, if a filibuster 
does not thwart our getting to final passage.
  What does the modified Warner language do which is incorporated into 
this bill? It makes it clear the Congress disagrees with the 
President's plan to increase force levels and urges the President 
instead to consider all options and alternatives. This bill makes it 
clear that we will fund troops in the field. There is no difference 
between these two documents in that regard. Both our bill and the 
McCain resolution make it clear we want to fund the troops in the 
field. Our bill makes it clear that the responsibility for Iraq's 
internal security and for halting sectarian violence must rest 
primarily with the Government of Iraq and Iraqi security forces. It 
makes it clear that Iraqis must reach political settlements in order to 
achieve reconciliation, and the failure of the Iraqis to reach such 
settlements to create a truly unified government contributes to 
increasing violence in Iraq.
  Our bill makes it clear that the primary objective of the overall 
United States strategy in Iraq should be to encourage Iraqi leaders to 
make political compromises that will foster reconciliation and 
establish a true unity government, ultimately leading to improvements 
in the security situation.
  Adding American troops does not increase the probability of achieving 
the primary objective. Listen to what GEN John Abizaid said when he 
testified to Congress in November of last year:

       I met with every divisional commander, General Casey, the 
     Corps Commander, [and] General Dempsey. We all talked 
     together. And I said to them, in your professional opinion, 
     if we were to bring in more American troops now, does it add 
     considerably to our ability to achieve success in Iraq? And 
     they all said no. And the reason is, because we want the 
     Iraqis to do more. It's easy for the Iraqis to rely upon us 
     to do this work.

  Finally, General Abizaid said:

       I believe that more American forces prevent the Iraqis from 
     doing more, [prevent the Iraqis] from taking more 
     responsibility for their own future.

  Besides making it less likely that the Iraqis will take more 
responsibility for their own future, adding more American troops is an 
attempt to reach a military solution to an inherently political 
problem.
  The Prime Minister of Iraq himself stated last November:

       The crisis is political, and the ones who can stop the 
     cycle of aggravation and bloodletting of innocents are the 
     [Iraqi] politicians.
  Adding more American troops does not pressure Iraqi politicians to be 
Iraqi leaders and to make the political compromises essential for a 
political solution; it only allows them to continue what in the words 
of the National Intelligence Estimate is the ``current winner-take-all 
attitude and sectarian animosities infecting the political scene.''
  The administration says this bill emboldens the enemy. Congressional 
debate over Iraq policy doesn't embolden the enemy. The enemy is 
already emboldened.
  What emboldens the enemy is the almost 4 years' presence of Western 
troops in the middle of a Muslim country's capital, which causes over 
70 percent of the residents of that country to oppose our presence.

[[Page S1564]]

  What emboldens the enemy is the open-ended presence of Western 
troops, which serves as a magnet for extremists and gives a propaganda 
club to our enemies.
  What emboldens the enemy is invading Iraq without the support of the 
international community.
  What emboldens the enemy is lawlessness and looters ransacking public 
buildings and institutions in Iraq.
  What emboldens the enemy is invading Iraq without a plan for the 
aftermath of the invasion.
  What emboldens the enemy is increasing the number of American troops, 
which results in Iraqis taking less responsibility for providing 
security for all the citizens of Iraq.
  What emboldens the enemy is the creation of Green Zones protecting 
Iraqi political leaders, in which they pursue a winner-take-all 
political approach.
  Madam President, how much time do I have?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. One minute 15 seconds.
  Mr. LEVIN. Madam President, we owe our troops everything. We owe them 
the best equipment we can provide. We owe them the best training. We 
owe their families the best support we can give them.
  We also owe them our best thinking. I think it is an insult to the 
intelligence of our troops to suggest that debating the wisdom of 
deepening the military presence in Iraq somehow or other emboldens the 
enemy. Our troops depend upon us to give them what they deserve: 
support. And part of that support in a democracy is debating the policy 
which not only brought them there but which keeps them there and, if 
many of us are correct, will keep them there longer and with greater 
casualties. The best way to change course in Iraq is to adopt the 
modified Warner language.
  It has been said that this is not as strong as withholding funds. We 
don't want to withhold funds from troops in the field. We want to 
change this policy. If you want to change the policy this 
administration is following, which relies on a military solution, a 
deepening military presence in Iraq, we hope you will vote for cloture 
on this bill.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Republican leader is recognized.
  Mr. McCONNELL. Madam President, I yield 8 minutes to the Senator from 
Nebraska, Mr. Hagel.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Nebraska is recognized.
  Mr. HAGEL. Madam President, I will not speak to the specifics of the 
resolution or resolutions, but I am confident we will be allowed to 
debate this week. I say that because I know--and I have complete 
confidence in the two leaders--that they will, in fact, find an 
accommodation. They each understand how critically important this 
debate is for our country and for the world.
  I have listened carefully this afternoon to my colleagues, and there 
will be more intense and engaged and enlightened debate this week. But 
I believe what we are about here--and we will be about this week--is 
something far more important than just constitutional responsibilities 
or resolutions. What we are about is finding a policy worthy of our 
young men and women and their families who go off to fight and die in a 
very difficult war. That is what we owe our troops. That is what we owe 
this country. That is what we owe the world.
  It surely is not and cannot be a weakness for America, as seen in the 
eyes of the world, to openly debate the most critically important issue 
that any of us will ever debate; that is, war. That is the strength of 
America, not the weakness of America. The reason America has prospered 
for over 200 years is because the world has had confidence not in its 
power, trusted not its power, but trusted America's purpose.
  In 1968, when I served with my brother and many others in Vietnam--
and I believe I speak for most who were there then, and I have heard 
from a lot of Vietnam veterans about this debate--I believe that in 
1968, the troops, the ones at the bottom doing the fighting and the 
dying, would have welcomed the Congress of the United States into a 
debate about Vietnam. They would have welcomed somebody paying 
attention rather than just going along.
  No, Madam President, that is a strength of this country. And surely 
we have clear constitutional responsibilities. How could anyone argue 
differently? We have clear constitutional responsibilities here.
  I heard my colleague from Connecticut talking about nonbinding 
resolutions. I don't doubt his staff's research, but I remind the 
Senator that over the last 12 years there have been a number of 
nonbinding resolutions debated on this floor--on Bosnia, Kosovo, 
Somalia, Haiti, and others. I remind some of my colleagues who do not 
believe it is in the interest of our country or our troops to talk 
about nonbinding resolutions, papier mache resolutions, senseless 
resolutions, that they actually voted for some of those resolutions 
over the last 12 years. I would be very happy to provide for the record 
a list of how everybody in this Chamber voted over the last 12 years, 
if they were here, on those resolutions. It might be very interesting 
and enlightening. Surely it is not because one political party controls 
the White House and the other does not. Surely it cannot be that.
  The National Intelligence Estimate summary--unclassified portions--
was made public on Friday. Those watching should have a clear 
understanding of what that document is and who produced that document. 
That document is an accumulation of the 16 intelligence agencies of 
this country. None that I am aware of has had the integrity of the 
institution they represent--any of those 16--ever impugned on questions 
of quality of research--maybe other facets of intelligence but not the 
integrity of the intent of the product. The National Intelligence 
Estimate says that we are involved today, and have been, in Iraq in not 
just a sectarian conflict--a violent, vicious sectarian conflict--but 
an intrasectarian conflict. Is it not time and don't our troops and the 
American people expect the Congress, after 4 years, when things have 
gotten progressively worse, not better, to engage? And is it not our 
responsibility to address the issue of escalating our military 
involvement, putting American troops in the middle of a sectarian-
intrasectarian war? Is that not our responsibility? Of course, it is 
our responsibility.

  Madam President, I will have more to say as the debate goes forward 
this week. As I noted, I have every confidence in our two leaders that 
they will work out a resolution where we will have this debate because 
it is clearly in the interest of our country, clearly in the interest 
of our troops.
  With that, I yield back my time and yield the floor.
  Mr. WARNER. Madam President, before the Senator yields, I would like 
to associate myself with his remarks. I, too, have confidence in our 
leadership being able to work this out accordingly. No matter how 
strongly I feel about my resolution, I shall vote with our 
distinguished leader on this issue and hope he can reconcile the 
differences.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Republican leader is recognized.
  Mr. McCONNELL. Madam President, I extend my gratitude to both the 
Senator from Nebraska and the Senator from Virginia for understanding 
the importance of having a full-fledged debate.
  How much time remains on this side?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Republican leader has 5 minutes.
  Mr. McCONNELL. Madam President, the Republican side of the aisle is 
ready for this debate. We are anxious to have it. There are different 
voices. We just heard from a couple of my distinguished colleagues who 
have a different view of this debate than I. What we are unified upon 
is a process that guarantees fairness for the consideration of what is 
clearly and unambiguously the most significant issue in the country at 
this moment.
  The majority leader and I have been working in good faith on an 
agreement that provides for a structured debate on the various 
proposals and votes on each. The other side said we turned down three 
compromises but, frankly, that is not the full story.
  The majority leader said he would agree to a consent that would allow 
votes on the McCain proposal and the Warner proposal. He also mentioned 
that he would agree to a 60-vote threshold on each of those. All we are 
asking for is the same agreement on

[[Page S1565]]

the Gregg resolution. Now, in fact, there was demand among Republican 
Senators for additional alternatives. We were able to pair those down 
to two.
  Why 60 votes? Let me remind all of our colleagues--and certainly the 
distinguished senior Senator from Virginia doesn't need to be reminded 
of that, having been here 29 years--that one single Senator can insist 
that a matter be subject to 60 votes. One single Senator. There are 
many Senators on this side of the aisle who would insist upon that. So 
it is a statement of the obvious that matters of consequence in the 
Senate over the years have developed in the following way: They are all 
subject to a 60-vote threshold. To suggest that is anything 
extraordinary really defies our experience here. It is ordinary, not 
extraordinary, for matters of great controversy--and even, in this day 
and age, matters of only a little controversy--to be subject to a 60-
vote threshold.
  Our good friends on the other side of the aisle--and this was an 
issue the Senator from Virginia was very much involved with in the last 
Congress--were seeking to establish in one of the last areas where 60 
votes was not customarily required--the confirmation of judges--that we 
should start requiring it there as well. That would leave virtually 
nothing the Senate would consider, except the budget resolution, not 
being subject to a 60-vote threshold.
  So what we are asking for on the Republican side is not at all 
extraordinary. The term ``filibuster'' has become a pejorative term for 
suggesting that one wants to stop something. Let me repeat, as I have 
said to the distinguished majority leader, to the Senator from 
Virginia, and to the Senator from Nebraska, we are not trying to stop 
this debate. We are trying to structure it in a way that is fair to the 
competing voices in the Republican conference who will band together 
shortly in a significant enough number to insist on a fair process.
  So that is what this is about, Madam President. I have indicated to 
the Democratic leader--and I certainly wouldn't want to surprise him--
that I intended to propound a unanimous consent request that would be 
acceptable to our side, and I will be happy to do that now, having 
given notice to the majority leader that I would do so.
  But before doing that, let me say one more time, there is not a 
single Republican Senator seeking to avoid this debate. We have just 
heard from two voices that are in the minority in our conference--the 
Senator from Virginia and the Senator from Nebraska--who don't share my 
view, who nevertheless will vote against cloture shortly to make the 
point that this Republican minority insists upon fair treatment on this 
important debate.
  Therefore, Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that at a time 
determined by the majority leader, after consultation with the 
Republican leader, the Senate proceed en bloc to the following 
concurrent resolutions under the following agreement:
  S. Con. Res. 7, the Warner resolution which is to be discharged from 
the Foreign Relations Committee; McCain-Lieberman-Graham, regarding 
benchmarks; Gregg related to funding.
  I further ask unanimous consent that there be a total of 10 hours--
and I will be happy to pick whatever number might be agreeable to the 
majority leader--of debate equally divided between the two leaders or 
their designees; provided further, that no amendments be in order to 
any of the measures; further, that after the use or yielding back of 
time, the Senate proceed to three consecutive votes on the adoption of 
the concurrent resolutions in the following order, with no intervening 
action or debate: first, McCain-Lieberman-Graham; second, Gregg; third, 
S. Con. Res. 7. Finally, I ask unanimous consent that any resolution 
that does not achieve 60 votes in the affirmative, the vote on adoption 
be vitiated and the concurrent resolution be returned to its previous 
status.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Mr. REID. Reserving the right to object.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The majority leader.
  Mr. REID. Madam President, the vast, vast, vast majority of 
legislation passed out of this Senate is done by a simple majority. 
That is a fact. All one has to do is look at the Congressional Record. 
So with this new direction of the minority, it is very clear what is 
happening. They are trying to avoid debate on this matter. They want a 
new set of rules.
  We have offered them votes, up-or-down votes on McCain, Warner, 
Gregg, and they turned that down. I said: OK, fine, we will have 60-
vote margins on McCain, Warner. They turned that down. So I object, 
Madam President, and I will continue.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Objection is heard.
  Mr. REID. Madam President, it is also very interesting--and I have 
the greatest respect for my friend from Virginia and my friend from 
Nebraska--but with all due respect to them, how could they vote against 
a motion to proceed? How could they vote against a motion to proceed 
saying let the two leaders work this out? What more could we give them 
than what they asked for last week? But now they want to throw in the 
Gregg amendment with a 60-vote margin.
  Earlier today, the minority leader said: This vote is ``about getting 
fair treatment for the minority here in the Senate.'' He was half 
right. This vote is about fairness but has little to do with being fair 
to the minority. The vote is about being fair to 132,000 troops already 
in Iraq by making sure they have the strategy they need to complete 
their mission so they can come home.
  This vote is about being fair to the 48,000 American men and women 
who would be sent to Iraq should President Bush be permitted to 
escalate this war.
  This vote is about being fair to the bipartisan majority of Senators 
who seek to voice their opposition to the President's plan to escalate 
the war.
  This vote is about being fair to the American people and the millions 
of voters who chose a new direction last November.
  As Senators, we owe it to our troops and our people to have a real 
debate about the way forward in Iraq. For 4 years, this body, under the 
control of the Republicans, sat silent on the most pressing issue 
facing our country--Iraq. As thousands of our soldiers were killed and 
tens of thousands wounded, the Senate, directed by the Republicans, sat 
silent, no debate on Iraq. As hundreds of billions of dollars were 
spent, the Senate sat silent. Republicans were in charge--no debate. 
They said no.
  As Iraq fell into chaos and civil war, it became increasingly clear 
that the President's plan was flawed and failing. The Senate sat 
silent. The Republicans who were in control of the Senate said: No, no 
debate on Iraq.
  As Senators and Americans, we cannot permit the silence to continue. 
This Democratic majority will not allow it to continue.
  The administration's failures have dug us into a deep hole in Iraq--
we all know that--and we have an obligation to find a way out. Our 
troops, most of all, need our help. They need a policy that is as 
worthy as their heroic sacrifice. They need a legislative branch that 
will finally exercise its constitutional responsibilities.
  Madam President, I say to my friend from Connecticut, I wasn't able 
to hear all of his speech, but I did hear this that caused me to take 
note: He said words to the effect: What are the Shia politicians going 
to think? What are the Sunni politicians going to think if, in fact, 
Warner passed? I wonder what the Sunni politicians thought, and I 
wonder what the Shia politicians thought when the Iraqi Prime Minister, 
duly elected, told the President of the United States that he wanted 
American troops out of Baghdad. So let's not direct this to Senator 
Warner.
  A ``no'' vote on the motion to proceed is a green light to George 
Bush to continue down the same failed course of almost 4 years.
  A ``no'' vote is an endorsement of escalation, sending 48,000 more 
troops to Iraq and spending at least an extra $27 billion--$27 billion 
extra--when this war has already cost almost a half a trillion dollars.

  A ``no'' vote is a vote in support of this President continuing the 
same policy of failure in Iraq.
  We have been told by our intelligence experts that the war is not 
going to be won by the military; it is only going to be won 
politically. That is what the

[[Page S1566]]

Iraq Study Group said. That is what all people say, with rare 
exception. Those are the people holding hands with the President.
  We must heed the results of the November elections and the wishes of 
the American people. We must change course, and this change starts with 
this next vote.
  This side--Democrats--have offered the minority everything they have 
asked for. Remember: Vote on Warner, vote on McCain; you want a simple 
majority; you want a supermajority; we will go along with that. We have 
been fair to them. Now the Senate must be fair to our troops, their 
families, and the American people. We must proceed with a debate about 
Iraq and send a clear message to President Bush that escalation is not 
the answer.
  Some say let the leaders work it out. Part of this stall has been a 
stall for obvious reasons. If not tonight, tomorrow? I must file a 
motion to invoke cloture on the continuing resolution because the 
Republicans said they are going to filibuster it. I have gotten letters 
to that effect. We should have been debating the Warner, McCain 
resolutions today, but they have not allowed us. They wouldn't allow us 
to proceed on this matter.
  I am telling everyone within the sound of my voice, a decision will 
have to be made whether to go further than tonight, but the time is 
very tenuous--very tenuous. If they stop us from going forward on this 
debate, this does not end the debate on Iraq. It may end the debate for 
a few days or a few weeks, but, remember, we have the 9/11 Commission 
recommendations coming and that is open to amendment and I can 
guarantee everybody there will be Iraq amendments involved in that 
debate.
  The supplemental bill is coming. This is to fund the war in Iraq 
basically more than $100 billion. I think there will probably very 
likely be a number of amendments dealing with Iraq.
  They can run, but they can't hide. We are going to debate Iraq, and 
they may have gotten all their folks to vote against the motion to 
proceed, they may stop us temporarily from debating the escalation, but 
they are not going to stop us from debating Iraq.
  We have lost 3,100 soldiers, sailors, and marines. They are dead, 
Madam President. We don't know the exact number of how many have been 
wounded--24,000, 25,000.
  We are not going to allow the situation in Iraq to continue. It is 
wrong. There can be no military solution. The President has been told 
that. I think it speaks volumes when he meets with the Iraqi Prime 
Minister who is elected, and the Iraqi Prime Minister says: Mr. 
President of the United States, get all American soldiers out of 
Baghdad.
  That's what he said. I think it speaks volumes when military 
commanders say that it is not the way to go. We know what Casey said. 
His tune has changed a little bit since he was relieved of duty over 
there.
  The families of the 3,100 soldiers who have been killed, the families 
of the 24,000, 25,000 who have been wounded demand we go forward with 
this debate.
  We are going to start voting momentarily, and remember what the vote 
is. The vote is whether we can proceed to debate the escalation of the 
war in Iraq. And the Republicans have told everybody they are all going 
to vote no. If they think this can pop up real easily again, I think 
they may have another thing coming.
  I repeat, the Republicans left town and left the Government without 
adequate resources to go ahead and complete funding of the Federal 
Government for this year. We have to take up the work they did not 
complete. They funded the Government until February 15, and now it is 
up to us to make sure the Government continues to run.
  If they want to pull a Newt Gingrich and close down the Government, 
that is their responsibility. But I believe we should move forward and 
make sure the Government is funded, and there is not a lot of time for 
Iraq. That is a sad commentary on the situation because we lost days as 
a result of these parliamentary delays.
  I ask unanimous consent that if we get to third reading of S. 470 it 
then be turned into a concurrent resolution and passage occur on the 
concurrent resolution and not S. 470. Before hearing how anybody feels 
about this, I said last week that we would be happy to consider this 
bill as a resolution. Everybody heard me say that. The American people 
heard me say that. So anybody who tries to hide under a procedural vote 
because this is a bill and not a resolution is not being fair because 
simply I have stated--and I know that everyone in this Chamber heard me 
say this, and I have said it many times--I ask unanimous consent that 
if we get to third reading of S. 470, that it be turned into a 
concurrent resolution and that passage occur on the concurrent 
resolution and not S. 470.
  I add another unanimous consent request to this. I am willing to 
change it to a concurrent resolution right now, as I was willing to do 
last week.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Mr. McCONNELL. Reserving the right to object, this is essentially the 
same unanimous consent request propounded last Thursday night. This 
matter ought to be dealt with as a concurrent resolution. It is clear 
the other side does not want to vote on the Gregg amendment. Therefore, 
I object.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Objection is heard.


                             Cloture Motion

  Under the previous order, pursuant to rule XXII, the Chair lays 
before the Senate the pending cloture motion, which the clerk will 
report.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

                             Cloture Motion

       We, the undersigned Senators, in accordance with the 
     provisions of rule 22 of the Standing Rules of the Senate, do 
     hereby move to bring to a close the debate on the motion to 
     proceed to Calendar No. 19, S. 470, Bipartisan Iraq 
     legislation.
         Carl Levin, Joe Biden, Ken Salazar, Harry Reid, Pat 
           Leahy, Sherrod Brown, Patty Murray, Robert Menendez, 
           John F. Kerry, Barbara Mikulski, Dick Durbin, Jack 
           Reed, Tom Harkin, Dianne Feinstein, Bill Nelson, H.R. 
           Clinton, Herb Kohl, Ben Nelson.

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. By unanimous consent, the mandatory quorum 
call has been waived.
  The question is, Is it the sense of the Senate that debate on the 
motion to proceed to S. 470, a bill to express the sense of the 
Congress on Iraq, shall be brought to a close?
  The yeas and nays are mandatory under the rule.
  The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk called the roll.
  Mr. DURBIN. I announce that the Senator from South Dakota (Mr. 
Johnson) and the Senator from Louisiana (Ms. Landrieu), are necessarily 
absent.
  Mr. LOTT. The following Senators were necessarily absent: the Senator 
from Florida (Mr. Martinez) and the Senator from Arizona (Mr. McCain).
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Sanders). Are there any other Senators in 
the Chamber desiring to vote?
  The yeas and nays resulted--yeas 49, nays 47, as follows:

                      [Rollcall Vote No. 44 Leg.]

                                YEAS--49

     Akaka
     Baucus
     Bayh
     Biden
     Bingaman
     Boxer
     Brown
     Byrd
     Cantwell
     Cardin
     Carper
     Casey
     Clinton
     Coleman
     Collins
     Conrad
     Dodd
     Dorgan
     Durbin
     Feingold
     Feinstein
     Harkin
     Inouye
     Kennedy
     Kerry
     Klobuchar
     Kohl
     Lautenberg
     Leahy
     Levin
     Lincoln
     McCaskill
     Menendez
     Mikulski
     Murray
     Nelson (FL)
     Nelson (NE)
     Obama
     Pryor
     Reed
     Rockefeller
     Salazar
     Sanders
     Schumer
     Stabenow
     Tester
     Webb
     Whitehouse
     Wyden

                                NAYS--47

     Alexander
     Allard
     Bennett
     Bond
     Brownback
     Bunning
     Burr
     Chambliss
     Coburn
     Cochran
     Corker
     Cornyn
     Craig
     Crapo
     DeMint
     Dole
     Domenici
     Ensign
     Enzi
     Graham
     Grassley
     Gregg
     Hagel
     Hatch
     Hutchison
     Inhofe
     Isakson
     Kyl
     Lieberman
     Lott
     Lugar
     McConnell
     Murkowski
     Reid
     Roberts
     Sessions
     Shelby
     Smith
     Snowe
     Specter
     Stevens
     Sununu
     Thomas
     Thune
     Vitter
     Voinovich
     Warner

                             NOT VOTING--4

     Johnson
     Landrieu
     Martinez
     McCain
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. On this vote, the yeas are 49, the nays are 
47. Three-fifths of the Senators duly chosen and sworn not having voted 
in the affirmative, the motion is rejected.
  The majority leader is recognized.
  Mr. REID. Mr. President, I enter a motion to reconsider that vote.

[[Page S1567]]

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The motion is entered.

                          ____________________