[Congressional Record Volume 153, Number 21 (Monday, February 5, 2007)]
[Senate]
[Pages S1555-S1567]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
EXPRESSING THE SENSE OF CONGRESS ON IRAQ--MOTION TO PROCEED
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senate will
proceed to the consideration of the motion to proceed to S. 470, which
the clerk will report.
The legislative clerk read as follows:
A bill (S. 470) to express the sense of Congress on Iraq.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia.
Mr. WARNER. I wonder if I can ask unanimous consent at this time to
proceed for another 5 minutes. Seeing my distinguished colleague on the
Senate floor----
Mr. BROWN. If the Senator will yield?
Mr. WARNER. If I might finish the unanimous consent request? Then I
will be happy to listen to the Senator.
In other words, at this point in time I ask unanimous consent that we
proceed as in morning business such that I could complete in 5 minutes.
And my distinguished colleague. We have been waiting for about 2 hours
this afternoon. I do not know--perhaps I am mistaken--if there are
Senators in the Chamber who wish to address the subject matter of the
order just given by the Chair. I wouldn't want to interfere with them
going forward.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, there is an hour-and-a-half
debate scheduled on this motion.
The Senator is recognized.
Mr. REED. Parliamentary inquiry: Is the Chair establishing an order
for speaking?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. No order has been established.
Mr. WARNER. If I might say to my distinguished colleague, Mr. Reed of
Rhode Island, I think the Chair has granted me 5 minutes, to be
followed by a period of about 5 minutes to my colleague from Nebraska,
Senator Ben Nelson. From that point on, there may be those who wish to
address the underlying order, or the Chair could recognize other
Senators who wish to speak on the subject.
Mr. REED. If the Chair is ready, I ask that at the conclusion of the
5 minutes of Senator Nelson, I be recognized for 5 minutes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Brown). The Senator from Texas.
Mr. CORNYN. Mr. President, reserving the right to object, and I will
not object, I ask unanimous consent that the unanimous consent
agreement stipulate that following Senator Reed's comments, I be
recognized.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the unanimous consent
request as modified by the Senator from Texas? The Chair hears none and
it is so ordered.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I thank the Presiding Officer and the
preceding Presiding Officer, my distinguished colleague.
I was speaking about the need to have greater involvement of the
Iraqi forces. I ask unanimous consent to have this chart printed in
today's Record.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
Transition Iraq to Security Self-Reliance--Iraqi Security Forces
Ministry of Interior Forces*
Component Trained and Equipped
Police......................................................***8135,000
National police.................................................824,400
[[Page S1556]]
Other MOI forces................................................828,900
__________
Total......................................................**8188,300
==========
_______________________________________________________________________
Ministry of Defense Forces
Component Operational
Army........................................................***8132,700
Air Force..........................................................8900
Navy.............................................................81,100
__________
Total......................................................**8134,700
==========
_______________________________________________________________________
Total Trained & Equipped ISF: ****8323,000
* Ministry of Interior Forces: Unauthorized absence personnel are
included in these numbers.
** Ministry of Defense Forces: Unauthorized absence personnel are not
included in these numbers.
*** Army numbers included Special Operations Forces and Support Forces.
**** Does not include the approximately 144,000 Facilities Protection
Service personnel working in 27 ministries.
Note.--Data as of January 22, 2007 (Updated bi-weekly by DOD).
Mr. WARNER. It is dated as of January 27, 2007. It says, ``Transition
Iraq to Security Self-Reliance--Iraq Security Forces.''
It lays it out. This is what the American taxpayer has been
expending--an enormous sum of money for 2\1/2\ years to train the Iraqi
forces. I bring to your attention, for the Ministry of Defense Forces:
the army, 132,700; air force, 900; the navy, 1,100; total, 134,700.
Ministry of Interior, trained and equipped: police, 135,000; national
police, 24,400; other MOI forces, 28,900; total, 188,300. That is a
total of 323,000 forces trained in the past 2\1/2\ years.
In the resolution my distinguished colleagues and I have put
together, we specifically say look at all options. I say the Iraqi's
are the ones who should be responsible for these problems in Baghdad.
We will give them support. We will give them the training. But I say to
my colleagues here in the Senate, this is what we have trained these
people to do. The Iraqi forces understand the language. They understand
the culture. How does an American GI, being thrust into the darkened
alleys of this city, with all of the crossfire between the Sunni and
the Shia, and Shia upon Shia decide whom to shoot, how to direct the
force?
The National Intelligence Estimate just released made mention of
this. The report states--I shall read it.
The intelligence community judges that the term ``civil
war'' does not adequately capture the complexity of the
conflict in Iraq, which includes extensive Shia-on-Shia
violence, al-Qa'ida and Sunni insurgent attacks on Coalition
forces, and widespread criminally motivated violence.
Nonetheless, the term ``civil war'' accurately describes key
elements of the Iraqi conflict, including the hardening of
ethno-sectarian identities, a sea change in the character of
the violence, ethno-sectarian mobilization, and population
displacement.
I say most respectfully to our President: Mr. President, recognize
what we have done in 2\1/2\ years to train these people. Let them take
the point. Let them take the brunt of the fight. And maybe we do not
need 21,500, together with support troops, to go in and do the job we
have trained these people to do themselves.
In this regard I would like to quote from T.E. Lawrence. This quote
is also cited in the Army Field Manual on Counterinsurgency. Lawrence
said:
Do not try to do too much with your own hands, better the
Arabs do it tolerably than you do it perfectly. It is their
war, and you are to help them, not to win it for them.
Additionally, the National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq also
describes a very complex conflict between all parties in Iraq. Putting
American soldiers in the midst of that will require military plans and
orders to contain exquisite tactical detail sufficient to afford our
men and women in uniform the ability to discern friend from foe in an
urban environment.
I, and others, also remain very concerned about the command and
control structure that has been planned for this operation in Baghdad.
In his January 10, 2007, address to the Nation, President Bush stated
that U.S. troops would be ``embedded'' in Iraqi formations. This left a
very serious question about the unity of command. On February 1,
General Casey described the command and control as `` a nonstandard
arrangement.'' This nonstandard arrangement must be clarified and our
resolution addresses this serious concern.
I yield the floor.
Exhibit 1
S. Con. Res. 7
Whereas we respect the Constitutional authorities given a
President in article II, section 2, which states that ``The
President shall be commander in chief of the Army and Navy of
the United States''; it is not the intent of this resolution
to question or contravene such authority, but to accept the
offer to Congress made by the President on January 10, 2007,
that, ``if members have improvements that can be made, we
will make them. If circumstances change, we will adjust'';
Whereas the United States strategy and operations in Iraq
can only be sustained and achieved with support from the
American people and with a level of bipartisanship;
Whereas over 137,000 American military personnel are
currently serving in Iraq, like thousands of others since
March 2003, with the bravery and professionalism consistent
with the finest traditions of the United States Armed Forces,
and are deserving of the support of all Americans, which they
have strongly;
Whereas many American service personnel have lost their
lives, and many more have been wounded, in Iraq, and the
American people will always honor their sacrifices and honor
their families;
Whereas the U.S. Army and Marine Corps, including their
Reserve and National Guard organizations, together with
components of the other branches of the military, are under
enormous strain from multiple, extended deployments to Iraq
and Afghanistan;
Whereas these deployments, and those that will follow, will
have lasting impacts on the future recruiting, retention and
readiness of our Nation's all volunteer force;
Whereas in the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2006, the Congress stated that ``calendar year
2006 should be a period of significant transition to full
sovereignty, with Iraqi security forces taking the lead for
the security of a free and sovereign Iraq'';
Whereas United Nations Security Council Resolution 1723,
approved November 28, 2006, ``determin[ed] that the situation
in Iraq continues to constitute a threat to international
peace and security'';
Whereas Iraq is experiencing a deteriorating and ever-
widening problem of sectarian and intra-sectarian violence
based upon political distrust and cultural differences
between some Sunni and Shia Muslims;
Whereas Iraqis must reach political settlements in order to
achieve reconciliation, and the failure of the Iraqis to
reach such settlements to support a truly unified government
greatly contributes to the increasing violence in Iraq;
Whereas the responsibility for Iraq's internal security and
halting sectarian violence must rest primarily with the
Government of Iraq and Iraqi Security Forces;
Whereas U.S. Central Command Commander General John Abizaid
testified to Congress on November 15, 2006, ``I met with
every divisional commander, General Casey, the Corps
Commander, [and] General Dempsey. We all talked together. And
I said, in your professional opinion, if we were to bring in
more American troops now, does it add considerably to our
ability to achieve success in Iraq? And they all said no. And
the reason is, because we want the Iraqis to do more. It's
easy for the Iraqis to rely upon us to do this work. I
believe that more American forces prevent the Iraqis from
doing more, from taking more responsibility for their own
future'';
Whereas Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki stated on
November 27, 2006, that ``The crisis is political, and the
ones who can stop the cycle of aggravation and bloodletting
of innocents are the politicians'';
Whereas there is growing evidence that Iraqi public
sentiment opposes the continued U.S. troop presence in Iraq,
much less increasing the troop level;
Whereas, in the fall of 2006, leaders in the Administration
and Congress, as well as recognized experts in the private
sector, began to express concern that the situation in Iraq
was deteriorating and required a change in strategy; and, as
a consequence, the Administration began an intensive,
comprehensive review by all components of the Executive
Branch to devise a new strategy;
Whereas, in December 2006, the bipartisan Iraq Study Group
issued a valuable report, suggesting a comprehensive strategy
that includes ``new and enhanced diplomatic and political
efforts in Iraq and the region, and a change in the primary
mission of U.S. forces in Iraq that will enable the United
States to begin to move its combat forces out of Iraq
responsibly'';
Whereas, on January 10, 2007, following consultations with
the Iraqi Prime Minister, the President announced a new
strategy (hereinafter referred to as the ``plan''), which
consists of three basic elements: diplomatic, economic, and
military; the central component of the military element is an
augmentation of the present level of the U.S. military forces
through additional deployments of approximately 21,500 U.S.
military troops to Iraq;
Whereas, on January 10, 2007, the President said that the
``Iraqi government will appoint a military commander and two
deputy commanders for their capital'' and that U.S. forces
will ``be embedded in their formations''; and in subsequent
testimony before the Armed Services Committee on January 25,
2007, by the retired former Vice Chief of the Army it was
learned that there will also be a comparable U.S. command in
Baghdad, and that this dual chain of command may be
[[Page S1557]]
problematic because ``the Iraqis are going to be able to move
their forces around at times where we will disagree with that
movement'', and called for clarification;
Whereas this proposed level of troop augmentation far
exceeds the expectations of many of us as to the
reinforcements that would be necessary to implement the
various options for a new strategy, and led many members of
Congress to express outright opposition to augmenting our
troops by 21,500;
Whereas the Government of Iraq has promised repeatedly to
assume a greater share of security responsibilities, disband
militias, consider Constitutional amendments and enact laws
to reconcile sectarian differences, and improve the quality
of essential services for the Iraqi people; yet, despite
those promises, little has been achieved;
Whereas the President said on January 10, 2007, that ``I've
made it clear to the Prime Minister and Iraq's other leaders
that America's commitment is not open-ended'' so as to dispel
the contrary impression that exists; and
Whereas the recommendations in this resolution should not
be interpreted as precipitating any immediate reduction in,
or withdrawal of, the present level of forces: Now,
therefore, be it--
Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives
concurring), That it is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the Senate disagrees with the ``plan'' to augment our
forces by 21,500, and urges the President instead to consider
all options and alternatives for achieving the strategic
goals set forth below;
(2) the Senate believes the United States should continue
vigorous operations in Anbar province, specifically for the
purpose of combating an insurgency, including elements
associated with the Al Qaeda movement, and denying terrorists
a safe haven;
(3) the Senate believes a failed state in Iraq would
present a threat to regional and world peace, and the long-
term security interests of the United States are best served
by an Iraq that can sustain, govern, and defend itself, and
serve as an ally in the war against extremists;
(4) the Congress should not take any action that will
endanger United States military forces in the field,
including the elimination or reduction of funds for troops in
the field, as such an action with respect to funding would
undermine their safety or harm their effectiveness in
pursuing their assigned missions;
(5) the primary objective of the overall U.S. strategy in
Iraq should be to encourage Iraqi leaders to make political
compromises that will foster reconciliation and strengthen
the unity government, ultimately leading to improvements in
the security situation;
(6) the military part of this strategy should focus on
maintaining the territorial integrity of Iraq, denying
international terrorists a safe haven, conducting
counterterrorism operations, promoting regional stability,
supporting Iraqi efforts to bring greater security to
Baghdad, and training and equipping Iraqi forces to take full
responsibility for their own security;
(7) United States military operations should, as much as
possible, be confined to these goals, and should charge the
Iraqi military with the primary mission of combating
sectarian violence;
(8) the military Rules of Engagement for this plan should
reflect this delineation of responsibilities, and the
Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff should clarify the command and control arrangements in
Baghdad;
(9) the United States Government should transfer to the
Iraqi military, in an expeditious manner, such equipment as
is necessary;
(10) the United States Government should engage selected
nations in the Middle East to develop a regional,
internationally sponsored peace-and-reconciliation process
for Iraq;
(11) the Administration should provide regular updates to
the Congress, produced by the Commander of United States
Central Command and his subordinate commanders, about the
progress or lack of progress the Iraqis are making toward
this end; and
(12) our overall military, diplomatic, and economic
strategy should not be regarded as an ``open-ended'' or
unconditional commitment, but rather as a new strategy that
hereafter should be conditioned upon the Iraqi government's
meeting benchmarks that must be delineated in writing and
agreed to by the Iraqi Prime Minister. Such benchmarks should
include, but not be limited to, the deployment of that number
of additional Iraqi security forces as specified in the plan
in Baghdad, ensuring equitable distribution of the resources
of the Government of Iraq without regard to the sect or
ethnicity of recipients, enacting and implementing
legislation to ensure that the oil resources of Iraq benefit
Sunni Arabs, Shia Arabs, Kurds, and other Iraqi citizens in
an equitable manner, and the authority of Iraqi commanders to
make tactical and operational decisions without political
intervention.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Nebraska is recognized.
Mr. NELSON of Nebraska. Mr. President, I state again for my
colleagues that this debate is not about support for the troops or
support for their extraordinary work on the ground in Iraq. Our troops,
the best fighting force in the history of the world, have performed
admirably, honorably, and successfully under extreme and dangerous
conditions in Iraq. We are not here today to besmirch their efforts,
their work, or their sacrifice. To indicate otherwise is disingenuous
and out of line.
This is not the time or the place for political attacks. The
President even made an offer to Congress before a nationally televised
audience on January 10 that, ``if Members have improvements that can be
made, we will make them.''
This is a debate about a serious topic: What is the way forward in
Iraq? How can we achieve a political solution without the additional
loss of American lives?
One of my colleagues has said over and over, ``this comes down to if
you support an escalation or not'' and ``the American people deserve
this debate.'' For me, the question is, Will the Senate lead? Will the
Senate express its opposition to the surge? I know many do not think
passing a nonbinding resolution is leading, and I know others say the
resolution goes too far. I say that, on an issue of this magnitude, an
issue this important, it is critical for the Senate to speak with the
strongest voice possible. Generating a revised resolution with broader
appeal was putting our best foot forward in securing the strongest
bipartisan vote possible.
I am proud to have worked with my colleague, Senator Warner, the most
recent past chairman of the Armed Services Committee, and our
colleague, Senator Collins of Maine, in this cause. They have shown
tremendous leadership on this issue, as have Senator Levin, Senator
Biden, and Senator Hagel. But it seems that even when it comes to the
lives of our troops, partisanship prevails. Here we are, after weeks of
negotiations, after weeks of public proclamations, after weeks of
consideration, about to witness the minority choose politics over
progress--and this is after we revised our original resolution to
address some of the concerns that were raised by both Democrats and
Republicans.
It is important that we point out that this is not simply about being
opposed to a surge. It is about opposition to a surge to do what? To go
into Baghdad? To go into the midst of sectarian violence, civil war,
criminality? There is no opposition to continuing to support troops in
Al-Anbar and even an increase in the troops to fight the bad guys in
that location. But that is altogether different from going into Baghdad
where our troops will be expected to be on the point and in harm's way
in the midst of sectarian violence that is unparalleled across our
great world today. But in strong support of Iraq, we must, in fact, do
what we can to support Iraq but without putting our troops in the midst
of that caldron.
The Baker-Hamilton report made things very clear. We have established
benchmarks as well--that we should empower the Iraqi Government to be
able to do what it can to quell its own violence. We cannot win their
civil war. We cannot stop the violence in Baghdad. Only a political
solution achieved by the Iraqis will be able to do that.
If we are to do our duty, if we are to exhibit leadership, let us
begin by allowing a full debate on the resolutions we have pending.
Let's talk about the President's plan to deploy American troops to the
crossroads of civil war in Iraq. Let's talk about holding the Iraqi
Government accountable for its responsibilities.
I am prepared to defend the resolutions I have offered with Senators
Warner, Collins, and Levin. I am prepared to vote on the McCain
resolution. And I am prepared for the debate because its time has come.
I ask my colleagues, if not now, when? If not now, do we wait for
more troops to die before we oppose the President's plan? If not now,
do we wait for more violence, more unrest, more danger for our troops
before we act? Some have said the President deserves one last chance to
succeed. How do we ask our troops to do again what has failed in the
past? We have had other surges that have not succeeded for a variety of
reasons, not the least of which is the Iraqis have not shown up. So
what is different this time?
I hope we do not look at this as our last hurrah.
I yield the floor.
[[Page S1558]]
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Brown). The Senator from Rhode Island is
recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. REED. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senator
from Florida, Mr. Nelson, be recognized after the Senator from Texas.
Mr. CORNYN. Mr. President, reserving the right to object, I have a
list of speakers on our side, and I would ask to be recognized to ask
if the Senator would revise his request that following Senator Reed,
Senator Specter be recognized for 7\1/2\ minutes. Then if we can
alternate sides, and on our side, then, it would be the Senator from
Texas, Mr. Cornyn, for 7\1/2\ minutes; Senator Lieberman for 10
minutes; and then Senator Hagel, who would use the remainder of our
time, which I believe would be 8 more minutes. If we could revise the
UC to reflect that order of speakers for our time, I would appreciate
it.
Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, reserving the right to object, may I get in
the queue?
Mr. REED. Mr. President, might I suggest that while I speak an order
be established, and at the conclusion of my remarks I would again make
the unanimous consent for that order.
Mr. CORNYN. No objection.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Rhode Island is recognized.
Mr. REED. Mr. President, I commend Senator Warner, Senator Nelson,
Senator Levin and others who have worked so hard on this resolution. I
do believe, like my colleagues, that this measure and an alternative
measure deserve an up-or-down vote by the Senate. That is what the
American people want, and that is what they should receive.
We embarked on this effort in Iraq more than 4 years ago. From the
very beginning I thought this was not a response to an imminent threat
to the United States or even to the region. It was based upon highly
speculative and, it turns out in many cases, flat wrong intelligence.
It represents, in my view, a flawed strategy because the approach the
President has taken in Iraq fails to recognize that the major regional
threat was not Iraq but Iran and failed to recognize the huge amounts
of resources that will be necessary to successfully occupy and
stabilize a country the size of Iraq with the cultural and historical
issues that are inherent in that country.
The strategy, as I said, I think was flawed. Strategy, to me, means
having a clear objective and putting forth the resources necessary to
achieve that objective. The objective in Iraq shifted from the WMD
allegations, to terrorist connections allegations, to creating a
transformative oasis of democracy and free enterprise in a country that
has not seen that in many years. And the resources were never adequate
for the task.
One of the most important resources in a strategy is public support.
I think one of the major problems with the President's last address a
few days ago when he talked about Iraq and his so-called new strategy
is that, I believe, he squandered significantly the willingness of the
American public to support any proposal made. Without that public
support, it will be very difficult to sustain our activities in Iraq.
I think the proof of this failed strategy is evident. Today Iran is
in an enhanced strategic position vis-a-vis the United States and is
being much more difficult to deal with, with respect to the region and
to its aspirations of nuclear technology. We have compromised our
efforts in Afghanistan and in Pakistan where real significant threats
exist to the world and to the United States. We have diverted our
attention from North Korea and from the Iranian aspirations for nuclear
technology.
According to many experts such as Hank Crumpton, who is leaving as
the Assistant Secretary of State for Counterterrorism:
We have made it more likely this country will be struck by
terrorists, not less likely.
Of course, we can talk at length about the incompetent execution of
these policies in Iraq, but I want to go right to the heart of what the
President is talking about. He suggests that we have a changed
strategy. I would suggest that perhaps we are changing our tactics; we
are taking American units and putting them in the heart of Baghdad. But
it seems that this surge is more of the same, more of the clear hold
and build, more of involvement in the existing conflicts of the Iraqi
people and not essential to our national security, which would be to
protect ourselves from terrorists there, to stabilize the country so it
doesn't disintegrate, and also to go ahead and to train, continually
train the Iraqi security forces.
Many have criticized this surge on purely military grounds. Too few
troops. The doctrine calls for more than 120,000 troops to cover the
city of Baghdad. We will be lucky to muster 50,000 to 60,000 to 70,000.
Including Iraqi security forces.
There is a lack of unity of command. There is uncertain leadership by
the Iraqis. Their commanding general is a virtual unknown who has been
plucked by Maliki to lead this effort, probably more for political
reliability than for tactical skill. And the rolling start, the gradual
buildup has already led many Iraqis in Baghdad to suggest that our
efforts have further compromised their security, as evidenced by the
bombing just a few days ago of a marketplace in a Shia neighborhood in
Baghdad.
The strategy we have to pursue is a complementary and reinforcing
strategy involving military, political, and economic steps, together
with regional and international diplomacy. It rests fundamentally on
the capacity of Iraq and non-DOD, nonuniform military advisers to carry
the day. Frankly, the Iraqi Government is in too many cases
dysfunctional and incompetent, and elements outside of our uniformed
military personnel--our State Department officials, our Agriculture
officials, our Justice officials, our AID officials--have not been in
Iraq in sufficient numbers and in sufficient quality to deal decisively
with these issues. There is nothing in this plan which suggests that
situation will change.
I think we are also at a point where we have been informed by the
National Intelligence Estimate of the true nature of the struggle in
Iraq. It is a sectarian battle between Shia and Sunni, with insurgents
who, according to the NIE, accelerate the violence between these two
sectarian groups. It is an existential battle where the Shias feel
insecure because they have labored for many years under the yoke of the
Saddam Hussein regime, and they don't want to go back there. It is
existential from the Sunni position because they see themselves
entitled to rule.
I think our best course is outlined in the Warner resolution, clearly
stating our disapproval and disagreement with the augmentation as the
resolution describes, and focusing ourselves on reconciliation, on both
military efforts, but scaled back, and also concentrating on diplomacy
and economic activities. I would hope that at least we could get a vote
on it and, frankly, I think it will pass.
I yield the floor.
Mr. NELSON of Nebraska. Mr. President, is someone offering the order?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Texas is recognized.
Mr. CORNYN. Mr. President, I believe under the previous UC, if I am
not mistaken, the Senator from Pennsylvania would be the next in our
queue on our side. If I may ask for clarification, the order that I
believe was encompassed in the UC on our side was the Senator from
Pennsylvania, then the Senator from Texas, then Senator Lieberman, the
Senator from Connecticut, and then Senator Hagel, the Senator from
Nebraska.
Mr. REED. Mr. President, I believe, again, the Senator suggested we
would alternate from side to side, and at the conclusion of--in fact,
if I may, I have a unanimous consent stating that after Senator
Specter, I would suggest that from our side the order be Senator
Nelson, 5 minutes; Senator Biden, 10 minutes; Senator Levin, 10
minutes; and Senator Schumer, 5 minutes; and they would be alternating
between the Republican side and the Democratic side, and the Republican
side would be----
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Does the Senator from Texas modify his
unanimous consent request to include the remarks and the proposal of
the Senator from Rhode Island?
Mr. CORNYN. That is correct. If I could, just in the interest of
clarity, and I know this is confusing, Senator Specter will be
allocated 7\1/2\ minutes, followed by myself for 7\1/2\ minutes,
Senator Lieberman will be allocated 10 minutes, and then Senator Hagel,
8 minutes, on our side.
[[Page S1559]]
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, reserving the right to object, and I will
not, I would like to have Senator Collins included for 10 minutes.
Mr. CORNYN. Mr. President, we have 33 minutes total.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Texas has 31 minutes to dole
out.
Mr. WARNER. Could Senator Collins be accommodated subsequent to the
other names that have been enumerated, just to add her to the list, for
10 minutes?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time is being counted now until 5:20.
Mr. WARNER. Very well. I will try and work with colleagues to see if
we can find time for Senator Collins on somebody else's time.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. The
Senator from Pennsylvania is recognized.
Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I have sought recognition to oppose
cloture on the pending motion to proceed on the issue of how to deal
with the Iraqi problem.
As I look at this issue, it is one of enormous magnitude, and it
ought not to be subject to shortcuts in the debate of the Senate. We
pride ourselves on being the world's greatest deliberative body, and
now is the time to show it. But what is happening on this motion for
cloture and what is happening behind the scenes on negotiations is an
effort to short-circuit debate on this matter of great importance,
great magnitude. It is the issue which is engulfing the work of this
body, the work of the House, and, really, all of Washington, and many
of the eyes of the world are focused on this issue. There is no oxygen
left in this town except on what to do on Iraq.
I suggest that this is not the kind of an issue where we ought to be
short-circuited. There ought to be a full opportunity to debate this
issue and all of its ramifications. What is happening behind the scenes
is an effort to limit the number of resolutions and/or bills which may
be offered as alternatives as to what the course of the United States
ought to be on this very important subject.
Although it is arcane and esoteric and not subject to being
understood, what is happening, again, behind the scenes, is the threat
by the majority to fill up the tree, and that means when a bill is on
the floor, if there is a first-degree amendment and a second-degree
amendment, both of which are technical in nature and both of which may
be offered by the majority leader because of the rule of priority of
recognition, nobody else can offer an amendment.
Now, the countersuggestion has been made that there would be two
amendments by the Republicans. That is down from five amendments, and
it may be that even five are insufficient. As we debate this issue,
other ideas may occur as to what ought to happen. But we are dealing
with very complex issues.
On this state of the record, I cannot support an additional
allocation of 21,500 troops because it is my judgment that would not be
material or helpful in what is going on at the present time. This comes
against the backdrop of extensive hearings in the Armed Services
Committee and Foreign Relations Committee, and in the context of the
military having given many estimates with many of those in key command
positions saying that no more troops are necessary. This comes with the
Iraqi Prime Minister Maliki saying a variety of things but at some
times saying he doesn't want any more troops.
This debate ought to be taking up alternative proposals, and the one
which is the most attractive to this Senator on this state of the
record and has been endorsed by a number of the military is to give
notice to the Iraqis that at some point in the future, with the exact
time to be determined by the military experts, perhaps 6 months or
perhaps some other point, that the Iraqis will be called upon to take
over Baghdad, the security of Baghdad, to keep U.S. troops out of the
line of fire between the Sunnis and the Shias, and that our current
force would remain in Iraq to guard the infrastructure, to guard the
oil wells, to give advice and to give training but not to undertake the
major responsibility.
The obvious answer ultimately has to be a diplomatic solution, and as
long as the Iraqis know that we are going to send in additional troops,
that we are going to take over the responsibilities which they should
be undertaking, they are going to sit back and let us do it. It is a
matter of human nature. If Uncle Sam will do it, why should the Iraqis
do it? But if we put them on notice that it is going to be their
responsibility at a given time, then that puts the obligation on them.
In the President's State of the Union speech, he was explicit that
the Iraqis had to do two things: No. 1, end the sectarian violence,
and, no. 2, secure Baghdad. And on this state of the record there is no
showing that the Iraqis are capable of doing either.
It is my hope, as we listen to the Senators who have been engaged in
these hearings, who have studied the matter in some detail, and as we
explore the alternatives, explore the alternative resolution of putting
benchmarks that the Iraqis have to meet, when we explore the
alternative of limiting funding--which I think there is unanimity we
cannot limit funding at a time when American troops will be put in
harm's way--this is the time for the Senate to assert congressional
responsibility, which we have.
When the President says repeatedly he is the ``decider,'' I say
respectfully to the President that is a shared responsibility. Under
the Constitution, the Congress has the authority to decide, to maintain
armies. The Constitution specifically limited appropriations to 2
years.
However, if we are to assert that responsibility and that support, it
seems to me we have to do it in a way which does not limit our debate.
Right now, we are under a tremendous time pressure, with only an hour
and a half to debate this important matter, and Senators are looking
for more time. That is a very poor way for this Senate to approach this
very important subject.
I yield back the remainder of my time.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Florida is recognized for 5
minutes.
Mr. NELSON of Florida. Mr. President, in November, General Abizaid
told our Senate Committee on Armed Services, when asked did he need any
more troops in Iraq, he said ``no.'' Admiral Fallon, who has been
chosen by the administration to succeed General Abizaid, when asked did
he think by the Senate taking a position in opposition to the
President's determination to put 21,000 new troops in Iraq that was
undercutting the military forces in Iraq, Admiral Fallon deferred and
would not answer that, as some others had been quick to answer in the
affirmative.
When General Casey was in front of our committee last week, when
asked how many additional troops do you think should be put into
Baghdad, he said two brigades--not the five brigades the President has
determined.
What we have is a majority of Members in this Senate feel there
should not be any increase. We have General Casey, the commander for
the last 2\1/2\ years, saying there should only be a two-brigade
increase. So there is, in fact, conflicting opinion.
If we are going to have any increase in troops in Iraq, the Marine
generals in Anbar Province have convinced this Senator that an increase
in Anbar Province would be helpful, but the conclusion of this Senator
was that putting more American troops in the middle of Baghdad, in the
middle of that sectarian violence, was not going to do any good; it was
going to put more Americans in harm's way, particularly in the limited
numbers the President is talking about.
If we wish to make a difference in Baghdad in the midst of all that
sectarian violence, where it has been going on for 1,327 years, since
the year 688 A.D., after the death of Mohammed, when the grandson was
assassinated because he broke off and that became the Shiite branch and
the Sunnis and the Shiites have been at it ever since, if you want to
make a difference in Baghdad with all that sectarian strife, put in 50,
100, 200 or 300,000 troops. But 21,000--17,000 of which are going into
Baghdad additionally--in this Senator's opinion, is not going to do the
job.
As the Senator from Virginia knows, this Senator is one of his
cosponsors. I support his resolution. I think it is very important
there be truth and openness. In this Senator's position on
[[Page S1560]]
the Foreign Relations Committee, on the Senate Committee on Armed
Services, and on the Intelligence Committee of the Senate, I have been
hammering away at correct information over and over because what we
have been dished out over the last several years has been incorrect
information.
That leads us to this point where we have to make a judgment. We are
a coequal branch. We are part of the formulation of policy, and it is
intended that way by the U.S. Constitution that the people speak
through us as well as through the President.
It is my privilege to say I support the Senator from Virginia in his
resolution.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Texas is recognized for 7\1/
2\ minutes.
Mr. CORNYN. Mr. President, as I try to count up the number of
positions of Senators articulating either for or against the various
resolutions, I count at least six, and maybe there are more.
There are some who say, yes, that the President's plan--basically,
that General Petraeus, the architect of that plan, will have
responsibility for implementing--that plan ought to get a chance.
Then there are those who say: No, we disagree with that plan. We do
not believe that General Petraeus should get the additional five
brigades that the plan calls for, but we do think in Anbar Province
additional troops ought to go in to fight al-Qaida in Iraq.
Then there is a third position I count that says we think there
shouldn't be additional troops, and we want to cap the number of
troops, period, and we want to set a timetable for their withdrawal.
That would actually be No. 4.
Some of the distinguished Members of this Senate have said these
nonbinding resolutions are shooting with blanks. What we ought to do is
have a vote on cutting off funds because that is the sole way that
Congress can have a definitive impact on what is happening. We do not
believe any funds should be appropriated for this effort. That is a
fifth position, as I count it.
Then there are those--and I find myself in this group--who say: No,
we shouldn't cut off funds that support our troops during a time of
war. In fact, we ought to give this a chance.
Some of these positions may have some commonality and some may merge
and diverge, but the point is, for the majority to say we have one vote
on one resolution, in spite of the fact there are at least six
positions, as I count them, on this issue is asking Members to
accept limited debate and does not reflect the diversity of views in
this Senate.
The vote we are going to have at 5:30 tonight--and I thank the
distinguished Senator from Virginia and others who, perhaps, share a
different view from me on the substance of the resolution, for
supporting our right to have a fair process and to have all the various
resolutions or, I should say, at least two, in opposition that ought to
be offered, that Senators ought to be given the chance to vote for.
Senator Reid, the majority leader, on the floor earlier asked
rhetorically: What makes the Baghdad security plan different from the
ones that have come before? Let me mention the specific answer to his
question. First of all, this is an Iraqi-initiated plan for taking
control of the capital of Iraq. No. 2, there will be adequate forces--
Iraqis supported by American and coalition forces--to hold
neighborhoods cleared of terrorist extremists. Third, there is a new
operational concept, one devised not just to pursue terrorists and
extremists but actually to secure the city once they are cleared.
Fourth, new rules of engagement will pursue that Iraqi and U.S. forces
can pursue lawbreakers, regardless of their communities or sect. Five,
security operations will be followed by economic assistance and
reconstruction aid, including billions of dollars in Iraqi funds,
offering jobs and the prospect for better lives.
The reason I support the plan General Petraeus is largely the
architect of, and the very same commander whom we have confirmed by
unanimous vote about a week or so ago, is because I think it represents
the last best chance for success in Iraq. I don't know anyone who
believes the status quo is acceptable.
The question is, Are we simply going to give up and see a regional
conflict? Are we going to see ethnic cleansing occur? Are we going to
see countries that have Sunni majorities come to the aid of their Sunni
brothers and sisters who might be the subject of ethnic cleansing by
the Shia majority? Are we going to allow Iraq to become another failed
state which will then serve as a launching pad for future terrorist
attacks, perhaps including against the United States? The risks of that
happening by doing nothing or by simply saying what we have been doing
now is not working so we are simply going to refuse to endorse any
alternative plan because we are not sure it is going to be successful
is giving up before we should.
While opinion polls should not govern our conduct, it is significant
the one question I have heard, when asked by Opinion Dynamics Poll on
the process we are engaged in today, the question was: Congress has
been considering a nonbinding resolution expressing opposition to the
President's plan to send more troops. By almost two to one, Americans
think passing a resolution would do more harm than good; 47 percent in
this poll that was reported February 1, 2007, say it is likely to
encourage the enemy and hurt troop morale compared with 24 percent who
think it would make a positive difference to the policy of the United
States toward Iraq.
Regardless of the sincerely held beliefs that I know Senators have on
this very important topic, the last thing we should be forced to do
would be to vote on a single resolution when there are so many
different points of view that deserve full and fair debate on what is
the most important issue that conflicts our country and, literally, the
world at this time and that is the global war on terror, the central
front of that war in Iraq and what we are going to do about it, whether
we are going to give up or whether we are going to try to secure that
country in a way that will allow it to govern and defend itself.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware is recognized for 10
minutes.
Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, we will hear a lot, today and this week, of
phrases such as ``last best chance,'' ``refuse to endorse an
alternative plan,'' ``Iraq is a central front of the war on terror.''
Virtually no one subscribes to any of those three points--all of the
experts who have given testimony, the Iraqi Study Group, the plans that
have been put forward that are real alternatives.
The President has not put forward a plan. He has put forward a
tactic, a tactic that most experts, including his own military, think
will make a plan for success less likely to be able to be arrived at.
No one in this Senate, at least in this debate, at least from my
perspective, is calling for us cutting and running--none of that. I
hope we keep our eye focused, our eye on the ball.
The Senate is today taking a first step toward a bipartisan effort to
prevent the escalation of a war in Iraq and to adapt a strategy for
Iraq for leaving Iraq without leaving behind chaos.
The first step is to debate and vote the resolution offered by
Senator Warner and reintroduced by Senator Levin and me as a bill. That
says the Senate disagrees with the President's plan to send 17,500 more
American troops into the middle of a city of over 6.2 million people in
the midst of a civil war, because what we are afraid of is that the
Senator from Texas may be right; this may make things so bad that
everyone will conclude there is no more chance of succeeding.
We have vital interests in that region. I am afraid this policy, this
tactic of the President, is going to be a self-fulfilling prophesy. The
question before us today is whether a minority of Senators will even
allow a debate to start. That is what this is about. All they have to
do--there will be other resolutions brought up; they are able to be
brought up--all they have to do is take issue with this. They can stop
the debate by getting 41 votes. But they can actually engage in debate
and try to defeat the notion, when the message of this resolution is:
Mr. President, stop. No more escalation, Mr. President.
Everyone from the Iraq Study Group to the Biden-Gelb plan, to every
other plan that has been put out there says the way to get the Iraqis
to reach a political solution is to begin to draw
[[Page S1561]]
down American forces. No one, including General Petraeus, whom I know
fairly well, suggests there is a military answer. A political solution
is required. So to my colleagues who are thinking about trying to block
the debate, let me say this: Iraq dominates our national life. It is on
the minds of tens of millions of Americans. It shapes the lives of
hundreds of thousands of our men and women in uniform and their
families. And that the Senate would not even debate, much less vote, on
the single most urgent issue of our time would be a total forfeiture of
our responsibility.
We have a duty to debate and to vote on the President's tactic. We
have a duty to debate and vote on our overall strategy in Iraq. And we
have a duty as Senators to speak out and say where we are.
Three weeks ago, Secretary of State Rice came before the Foreign
Relations Committee and presented the President's plan. Its main
feature is to send more troops, increase the total number of troops,
and send them into Baghdad in the middle of a sectarian war.
The reaction on the committee, from Republicans to Democrats alike,
ranged from skepticism, to profound skepticism, to outright opposition.
That pretty much reflects the reaction all across the country.
So Senator Hagel joined me and Senator Lugar and Senator Snowe. We
sat down and wrote a resolution to give Senators a way to vote what
their voices were saying, for we believe the quickest and most
effective way to get the President to change course is to demonstrate
to him that his policy has little or no support across the board,
Democrats and Republicans.
After we introduced the resolution, the distinguished ranking member
of the Armed Services Committee, Senator Warner, came forward with his
resolution. The bottom line of the resolutions is the same: Mr.
President, don't send more Americans into the middle of a civil war.
There was one critical difference. As originally written, the Warner
resolution left open the possibility of increasing the overall number
of troops in Iraq, when in fact the Iraq Study Group and others said we
should be declining to get action from the politicians in Iraq.
We believe that would have sent the wrong message. Not ramp up;
again, to draw down, redeploy forces remaining in Iraq. And the best
way to make that clear to the Iraqi people is to let them know we are
not going to be there forever, as the President said. And they must
begin to make the hard compromises necessary for a political solution
that virtually everyone agrees is necessary to end this war.
So we approached Senator Warner to work out our differences, and I am
very pleased to say we succeeded in doing that. The language Senator
Warner removed from his resolution removed the possibility that it
could be read as calling for a troop increase. With that change, we
agreed to support his resolution. And I do.
When I first spoke out against the President's planned surge before
the New Year, I made it clear I had one objective: I hoped to build and
demonstrate bipartisan opposition to this plan because it was the
fastest way to turn the President around. And that is exactly what we
have done.
Now we have a real opportunity for the Senate to speak clearly. Every
Senator should be given a chance to vote on whether he or she approves
or disapproves of the President's tactic to send more troops into the
middle of a civil war.
The debate we will have is important, but the debate is as important
as the vote. And I hope the American people carefully listen. I predict
they will hear very few colleagues stand up and support the President's
plan to send more troops into the middle of a civil war. Listen to the
voices. Listen to the voices as well as the votes.
Just as important as what we are voting against is what we are voting
for. This bill, similar to the Biden-Hagel-Levin-Snowe provision, makes
three things clear.
First, Iraq needs a political settlement. Second, the United States
has to work with other regional powers. And third, the mission of our
forces should be confined to counterterrorism, training, and
maintaining the territorial integrity of Iraq.
Mr. President, how much time do I have remaining?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. There is 2 minutes 55 seconds.
Mr. BIDEN. I will continue, Mr. President.
As I said at the outset, this is the first step, this rejection of
the President's increase of more troops into Iraq into the middle of a
civil war. But it can set the foundation for everything that follows.
If the President does not listen to the majority of Congress and the
majority of the American people, we will have to look for other ways to
turn this surge around.
Even if we succeed in this effort, we still need to turn our overall
policy around. We need a strategy that can produce a political
settlement in Iraq. That is the only way to stop the Shiites and the
Sunnis from killing each other and to allow our troops to leave Iraq at
an appropriate time without trading a dictator for chaos.
But today my message is simple. The American people want us to debate
Iraq, the most important issue of our day. They expect it. They demand
it. And if we attempt to hide behind procedure and delaying tactics, I
believe the American people will not be very happy. They get it. The
question is, Do we?
Are you for or against the President escalating this war in Iraq? I
am against it. I believe the majority of Members on both sides are as
well. We should vote on that.
I yield the remainder of my time.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Ms. Stabenow). The Senator from Connecticut is
recognized for 10 minutes.
Mr. LIEBERMAN. I thank the Chair.
Madam President, America has reached a critical crossroad in the war
in Iraq. More than 4 years ago, this Senate voted to authorize the use
of force against Saddam Hussein, a tyrant who slaughtered his own
people, attacked his neighbors, and threatened our security.
Thanks to the courageous service of the men and women of the American
military, that evil regime was overthrown and in its place came hopes
for a democracy in the heart of the Middle East, hopes for a victory in
the war for the hearts and minds of the Muslim world.
As of today, sadly, as we all know, those hopes have not been
realized. Because of the ruthless conduct of our enemies in Iraq, as
well as our own failures, we instead today find ourselves on a knife's
edge in Iraq.
Now a new course has been chosen. A new commander is in place in
Iraq, confirmed unanimously by this Senate. A new Secretary of Defense
is in place at the Pentagon, also confirmed overwhelmingly by the
Senate. And a new strategy has begun to be put into action on the
ground in Iraq by American troops.
It is altogether proper that we debate our policy in Iraq. It should
be a debate that is as serious as the situation in Iraq and that
reflects the powers the Constitution gives to Congress in matters of
war.
But that, sadly, is not the debate that the Warner-Levin resolution
invites us to have. I am going to speak strongly against this
resolution because I feel strongly about it. I do so with the greatest
respect for my colleagues who have offered it. But I believe its
passage would compromise America's security, and I will say so within
the clearest terms I can muster.
The resolution before us, its sponsors concede, will not stop the new
strategy from going forward on the ground in Iraq. In fact, as we speak
in the Senate, thousands of American troops are already there in
Baghdad, with thousands more moving into position to carry out their
Commander's orders. This resolution does nothing to alter those facts.
Instead, its sponsors say it will send a message of rebuke from this
Senate to the President of the United States, from one end of
Pennsylvania Avenue to the other. But the President has made clear he
will not be deterred in carrying out what he sees as his duties and
responsibilities as Commander in Chief.
And there is a world well beyond Pennsylvania Avenue that is also
watching and listening to what we do. What we say is being heard in
Baghdad by Iraqi political leaders, by moderates trying to decide
whether we Americans will stand with them over the long term.
[[Page S1562]]
What we say is being heard by our men and women in uniform who
naturally will be interested in knowing whether we support the plan
they have been asked to carry out at risk to their own lives.
What we say in the Senate will be heard by the leaders of the
thuggish regimes in Iran and Syria and by al-Qaida terrorists eager for
evidence that America's will is breaking.
And what we say in the Senate will be heard across America by our
constituents who are wondering if their Congress is capable of serious
action, not hollow posturing.
This resolution is not about Congress taking responsibility. It is
the opposite. This is a resolution of irresolution.
For the Senate to take up a symbolic vote of no confidence on the eve
of a decisive battle is unprecedented. But it is not inconsequential.
It is an act which I fear will discourage our troops, hearten our
enemies, and showcase our disunity. And that is why I will vote against
the motion for cloture.
My colleagues, if you believe that General Petraeus and his new
strategy have a reasonable chance of success in Iraq, then you should
resolve to support him and his troops through the difficult days ahead
and oppose this resolution.
On the other hand, if you believe this new strategy is flawed or that
our cause is hopeless in Iraq, then you should put aside this
resolution--nonbinding--and you should vote to stop what is happening
in Iraq, vote to cut off the funds, vote for a binding time line for
American withdrawal.
If that is where your convictions lie, then have the courage of your
convictions to accept the consequences of your convictions. That would
be a resolution.
This nonbinding resolution before us, by contrast, is an accumulation
of ambiguities and inconsistencies. It is at once for the war but also
against the war. It pledges its support to the troops in the field but
then washes its hands of what they have been commanded to do. It urges
more troops be sent for Anbar Province but not for Baghdad.
My colleagues, we cannot have it both ways. We cannot vote full
confidence in General Petraeus but no confidence in the strategy he
says he needs for success.
We cannot say our troops have our full support but disavow their
mission on the eve of battle. This is what happens when you try to wage
war by committee. And that is why the Constitution gave the authority
of Commander in Chief to one person, the President.
Cynics may say this kind of irresolution happens all the time in
Congress. In this case, however, they would be wrong. If it passed,
this resolution would be unique in American legislative history.
I asked the Library of Congress this question last week and was told
that never before, when American soldiers have been in harm's way,
fighting and dying in a conflict Congress had voted to authorize, has
Congress turned around and passed a nonbinding resolution such as this
one, disapproving of a particular battlefield strategy.
I ask each of my colleagues to stop for a moment and consider the
precedent that passage of this resolution would establish. Even during
Vietnam, even after the Tet Offensive, even after the invasion of
Cambodia, Congress did not take up a nonbinding resolution such as this
one.
Past Congresses certainly debated wars. They argued heatedly about
them. And they sometimes clashed directly with the executive branch,
with the President, over their execution. But in so doing, they
accepted the consequences of their convictions
This resolution does no such thing. It is simply an expression of
opinion. It does not pretend to have any substantive effect on policy
on the ground in Iraq. But again, I ask my colleagues, what will this
resolution say to our soldiers? What will it say to our allies? What
will it say to our enemies?
We heard from General Petraeus during his confirmation hearing that
war is a battle of wills. Our enemies believe they are winning in Iraq
today. They believe they can outlast us, that sooner or later we will
tire of this grinding conflict and go home and leave the field in that
country open for them. That is the lesson Osama bin Laden has told us,
in his writings and statements, he took from our retreats from Lebanon
and Somalia in the 1980s and 1990s. It is a belief at the core of the
insurgency in Iraq and at the core of the fanatical goals of radical
Islam worldwide.
I fear this resolution before the Senate, by codifying our disunity,
by disavowing the mission our troops are about to undertake, will
confirm our enemies' beliefs that America has grown impatient and
unable to fight the long fight to victory. This resolution also sends a
terrible message to our allies. Of course, I agree that we must hold
the Iraqi Government to account. That is exactly what the resolution
Senator McCain and I and others have offered would do. But I ask you,
imagine for a moment that you are a Sunni or Shia politician in Baghdad
who wants the violence to end, and ask yourself how the Warner-Levin
resolution would affect your thinking, your calculations of risk, your
willingness to stand against the forces of extremism. Will the
resolution empower you or will it undermine you? Will it make you feel
safer or will it make you feel you should hedge your bets, or go over
to the extremists, or leave Iraq?
Finally, what is the message this resolution sends to our soldiers? I
know that every Member of the Senate supports our troops but actions
have consequences, often unintended.
I ask unanimous consent that I be given an additional moment to
finish my statement. That would come from Senator McConnell's time.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. LIEBERMAN. When we send a message of irresolution, it does not
support our troops. When we renounce their mission, it does not support
our troops. We heard recently in the Senate Armed Services Committee
from GEN Jack Keane, a former chief of staff of the U.S. Army, who said
of a resolution like this one:
It's just not helpful . . . What the enemy sees is an
erosion of the political and moral will of the American
people . . .
Our soldiers are Americans first. They clearly understand
there's a political process in this country that they clearly
support . . . But at the end of the day, they are going to go
out and do a tough mission, and I certainly would like to see
them supported in that mission as opposed to declaring
nonsupport. . . .
I agree. Everyone here knows the American people are frustrated about
the lack of progress in Iraq. Everyone here shares that frustration.
And as elected representatives of the people, everyone here feels
pressure to give expression to that frustration. This is not a new
challenge. It is one that every democracy in every long war has had to
confront. Nearly a century and a half ago, an American President
wrestled with just this problem. It was in the midst of a terrible war,
a civil war in which hundreds of thousands of Americans were fighting
and dying to secure the freedom of millions long and cruelly denied it.
``We here highly resolve,'' that was Lincoln's message at Gettysburg.
It was a message of resolution.
I ask unanimous consent for an additional moment from the time of
Senator McConnell to finish the statement.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. LIEBERMAN. Lincoln said at Gettysburg: ``We here highly
resolve.'' It was a message of resolution, of steadfastness in the face
of adversity, of hope over despair, and of confidence in the cause of
freedom which is America's eternal cause. Today, in the depths of a
terrible war, on the brink of a decisive battle for Baghdad, let us
have a serious debate about where we stand and where we must go in
Iraq. But that is not the debate this resolution of irresolution would
bring.
The 60-vote requirement to close debate was put in place by our
predecessors as a way to make it harder for the passions of a
particular moment to sweep through the American people and across this
Congress in a way that would do serious damage to our Nation in the
long term. Because I believe this resolution, if passed, would have
such an effect, I will respectfully oppose the motion for cloture.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Kentucky.
Mr. McCONNELL. Madam President, I believe Senator Hagel is----
Mr. LEVIN. Madam President, I yield to the Senator from Virginia 1
minute
[[Page S1563]]
to ask a question of the Senator from Connecticut.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Republican leader has the floor.
Mr. McCONNELL. I am happy to yield the floor, if the understanding is
that the Senator from Michigan is next.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan is next for 10
minutes.
The Senator from Virginia.
Mr. WARNER. I thank the Chair.
My question to my good friend and colleague is as follows: This
debate is well under way. The plans are being discussed. I just
inquired at the desk, and the McCain resolution is not filed. Yet I
understood you to say it had been filed. Could you help clarify for the
Senate the position on that?
Mr. LIEBERMAN. I would be happy to, briefly. The resolution Senator
McCain and I and others have has been prepared and I gather has been
the subject of negotiation between Senator Reid and Senator McConnell.
Mr. WARNER. But it is not a part of the record so----
Mr. LIEBERMAN. That is right. The debate going on now----
Mr. WARNER. I feel very strongly that the Senate should work its will
on facts that are out in the open. I have filed my resolutions, one
after the other, at the desk so all Senators could have the benefit. Is
that a possibility, that we could have the benefit of this resolution?
Mr. LIEBERMAN. My dear friend, it is more than a possibility; it is a
promise.
Mr. WARNER. And what time might the promise be executed?
Mr. LIEBERMAN. There are copies of it around now, and we will get you
one. They were publicly distributed Thursday of last week.
Mr. WARNER. I will be glad to give you my copy, but I feel it is
presumptuous of me to address it unless it is properly before the
Senate.
Mr. LIEBERMAN. I thank my friend. The difference, of course, is that
ours is as nonbinding as yours, but ours is a statement of support to
our troops and benchmarks to the Iraqis.
Mr. WARNER. Madam President, clearly what is read is correct. But I
assure you that I forcefully argue that ours is in support of the
troops. There is no suggestion that one is less patriotic than the
other, if I may say to my dear friend.
Mr. LIEBERMAN. One is not less patriotic than the other, but actions
have consequences. As I said during my remarks, for the Senate to take
this unprecedented action on a nonbinding resolution, to disavow,
disapprove a mission that our troops are being asked to carry out right
now cannot help their morale.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan.
Mr. LEVIN. Madam President, I hope the Senate will be allowed to
debate our policy in Iraq by proceeding to this legislation this
afternoon. Iraq is the single most important policy issue facing our
country. It was a major issue in the November elections last fall. The
American people have strong opinions about what is happening in Iraq.
They want their elected officials to debate this issue, and we should
do it. The debate should go forward. A filibuster is out of place on
war and peace issues, on something of this magnitude. The debate is not
about whether we want the United States to act to maximize chances of
success in Iraq. We all want to maximize chances of success in Iraq. We
all want to see a stable Iraq which enhances our own national security.
But the President's course of action, which he has been on for 3\1/2\
years and which he has now proposed to continue on to deepen our
involvement in Iraq, does not enhance our security. It does not
maximize chances of success in Iraq.
The debate is about the best way to maximize chances of success in
Iraq. Is the new strategy of the President, which puts over 21,000 more
American troops in the middle of an Iraqi civil war, the best way to
bring that about? That is what this debate is about. There actually
seems to be an agreement among most observers that an Iraqi political
settlement is the key to ending the violence in Iraq. The difference of
opinion exists on whether Iraqi politicians need breathing space, as
President Bush has said, to reach required political compromises or
whether, as many of us believe, Iraqi politicians need to be pressured
to make those compromises and that the addition of 21,000 more troops
doesn't make a political compromise more likely; it just gets us in
deeper in the middle of a civil conflict.
The bill we are hoping to proceed to today incorporates the modified
Warner resolution verbatim, except for a minor change in order to make
it a bill instead of a resolution. The reason for making it a bill
instead of a resolution is simply to make it more amendable. Unlike a
resolution, which is clumsy to amend, there is no intent to put this
modified Warner language in the form of a bill for any other purpose.
As a matter of fact, the majority leader has asked for unanimous
consent to treat a resolution with Senator Warner's language as
amendable, as though it were a bill, to achieve the goal we are trying
to achieve. This unanimous consent was objected to by the Republican
leader.
The majority leader, Senator Reid, has also told Senator McConnell
that we are more than willing to transform this bill into a resolution
prior to final passage, if we can get to final passage, if a filibuster
does not thwart our getting to final passage.
What does the modified Warner language do which is incorporated into
this bill? It makes it clear the Congress disagrees with the
President's plan to increase force levels and urges the President
instead to consider all options and alternatives. This bill makes it
clear that we will fund troops in the field. There is no difference
between these two documents in that regard. Both our bill and the
McCain resolution make it clear we want to fund the troops in the
field. Our bill makes it clear that the responsibility for Iraq's
internal security and for halting sectarian violence must rest
primarily with the Government of Iraq and Iraqi security forces. It
makes it clear that Iraqis must reach political settlements in order to
achieve reconciliation, and the failure of the Iraqis to reach such
settlements to create a truly unified government contributes to
increasing violence in Iraq.
Our bill makes it clear that the primary objective of the overall
United States strategy in Iraq should be to encourage Iraqi leaders to
make political compromises that will foster reconciliation and
establish a true unity government, ultimately leading to improvements
in the security situation.
Adding American troops does not increase the probability of achieving
the primary objective. Listen to what GEN John Abizaid said when he
testified to Congress in November of last year:
I met with every divisional commander, General Casey, the
Corps Commander, [and] General Dempsey. We all talked
together. And I said to them, in your professional opinion,
if we were to bring in more American troops now, does it add
considerably to our ability to achieve success in Iraq? And
they all said no. And the reason is, because we want the
Iraqis to do more. It's easy for the Iraqis to rely upon us
to do this work.
Finally, General Abizaid said:
I believe that more American forces prevent the Iraqis from
doing more, [prevent the Iraqis] from taking more
responsibility for their own future.
Besides making it less likely that the Iraqis will take more
responsibility for their own future, adding more American troops is an
attempt to reach a military solution to an inherently political
problem.
The Prime Minister of Iraq himself stated last November:
The crisis is political, and the ones who can stop the
cycle of aggravation and bloodletting of innocents are the
[Iraqi] politicians.
Adding more American troops does not pressure Iraqi politicians to be
Iraqi leaders and to make the political compromises essential for a
political solution; it only allows them to continue what in the words
of the National Intelligence Estimate is the ``current winner-take-all
attitude and sectarian animosities infecting the political scene.''
The administration says this bill emboldens the enemy. Congressional
debate over Iraq policy doesn't embolden the enemy. The enemy is
already emboldened.
What emboldens the enemy is the almost 4 years' presence of Western
troops in the middle of a Muslim country's capital, which causes over
70 percent of the residents of that country to oppose our presence.
[[Page S1564]]
What emboldens the enemy is the open-ended presence of Western
troops, which serves as a magnet for extremists and gives a propaganda
club to our enemies.
What emboldens the enemy is invading Iraq without the support of the
international community.
What emboldens the enemy is lawlessness and looters ransacking public
buildings and institutions in Iraq.
What emboldens the enemy is invading Iraq without a plan for the
aftermath of the invasion.
What emboldens the enemy is increasing the number of American troops,
which results in Iraqis taking less responsibility for providing
security for all the citizens of Iraq.
What emboldens the enemy is the creation of Green Zones protecting
Iraqi political leaders, in which they pursue a winner-take-all
political approach.
Madam President, how much time do I have?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. One minute 15 seconds.
Mr. LEVIN. Madam President, we owe our troops everything. We owe them
the best equipment we can provide. We owe them the best training. We
owe their families the best support we can give them.
We also owe them our best thinking. I think it is an insult to the
intelligence of our troops to suggest that debating the wisdom of
deepening the military presence in Iraq somehow or other emboldens the
enemy. Our troops depend upon us to give them what they deserve:
support. And part of that support in a democracy is debating the policy
which not only brought them there but which keeps them there and, if
many of us are correct, will keep them there longer and with greater
casualties. The best way to change course in Iraq is to adopt the
modified Warner language.
It has been said that this is not as strong as withholding funds. We
don't want to withhold funds from troops in the field. We want to
change this policy. If you want to change the policy this
administration is following, which relies on a military solution, a
deepening military presence in Iraq, we hope you will vote for cloture
on this bill.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Republican leader is recognized.
Mr. McCONNELL. Madam President, I yield 8 minutes to the Senator from
Nebraska, Mr. Hagel.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Nebraska is recognized.
Mr. HAGEL. Madam President, I will not speak to the specifics of the
resolution or resolutions, but I am confident we will be allowed to
debate this week. I say that because I know--and I have complete
confidence in the two leaders--that they will, in fact, find an
accommodation. They each understand how critically important this
debate is for our country and for the world.
I have listened carefully this afternoon to my colleagues, and there
will be more intense and engaged and enlightened debate this week. But
I believe what we are about here--and we will be about this week--is
something far more important than just constitutional responsibilities
or resolutions. What we are about is finding a policy worthy of our
young men and women and their families who go off to fight and die in a
very difficult war. That is what we owe our troops. That is what we owe
this country. That is what we owe the world.
It surely is not and cannot be a weakness for America, as seen in the
eyes of the world, to openly debate the most critically important issue
that any of us will ever debate; that is, war. That is the strength of
America, not the weakness of America. The reason America has prospered
for over 200 years is because the world has had confidence not in its
power, trusted not its power, but trusted America's purpose.
In 1968, when I served with my brother and many others in Vietnam--
and I believe I speak for most who were there then, and I have heard
from a lot of Vietnam veterans about this debate--I believe that in
1968, the troops, the ones at the bottom doing the fighting and the
dying, would have welcomed the Congress of the United States into a
debate about Vietnam. They would have welcomed somebody paying
attention rather than just going along.
No, Madam President, that is a strength of this country. And surely
we have clear constitutional responsibilities. How could anyone argue
differently? We have clear constitutional responsibilities here.
I heard my colleague from Connecticut talking about nonbinding
resolutions. I don't doubt his staff's research, but I remind the
Senator that over the last 12 years there have been a number of
nonbinding resolutions debated on this floor--on Bosnia, Kosovo,
Somalia, Haiti, and others. I remind some of my colleagues who do not
believe it is in the interest of our country or our troops to talk
about nonbinding resolutions, papier mache resolutions, senseless
resolutions, that they actually voted for some of those resolutions
over the last 12 years. I would be very happy to provide for the record
a list of how everybody in this Chamber voted over the last 12 years,
if they were here, on those resolutions. It might be very interesting
and enlightening. Surely it is not because one political party controls
the White House and the other does not. Surely it cannot be that.
The National Intelligence Estimate summary--unclassified portions--
was made public on Friday. Those watching should have a clear
understanding of what that document is and who produced that document.
That document is an accumulation of the 16 intelligence agencies of
this country. None that I am aware of has had the integrity of the
institution they represent--any of those 16--ever impugned on questions
of quality of research--maybe other facets of intelligence but not the
integrity of the intent of the product. The National Intelligence
Estimate says that we are involved today, and have been, in Iraq in not
just a sectarian conflict--a violent, vicious sectarian conflict--but
an intrasectarian conflict. Is it not time and don't our troops and the
American people expect the Congress, after 4 years, when things have
gotten progressively worse, not better, to engage? And is it not our
responsibility to address the issue of escalating our military
involvement, putting American troops in the middle of a sectarian-
intrasectarian war? Is that not our responsibility? Of course, it is
our responsibility.
Madam President, I will have more to say as the debate goes forward
this week. As I noted, I have every confidence in our two leaders that
they will work out a resolution where we will have this debate because
it is clearly in the interest of our country, clearly in the interest
of our troops.
With that, I yield back my time and yield the floor.
Mr. WARNER. Madam President, before the Senator yields, I would like
to associate myself with his remarks. I, too, have confidence in our
leadership being able to work this out accordingly. No matter how
strongly I feel about my resolution, I shall vote with our
distinguished leader on this issue and hope he can reconcile the
differences.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Republican leader is recognized.
Mr. McCONNELL. Madam President, I extend my gratitude to both the
Senator from Nebraska and the Senator from Virginia for understanding
the importance of having a full-fledged debate.
How much time remains on this side?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Republican leader has 5 minutes.
Mr. McCONNELL. Madam President, the Republican side of the aisle is
ready for this debate. We are anxious to have it. There are different
voices. We just heard from a couple of my distinguished colleagues who
have a different view of this debate than I. What we are unified upon
is a process that guarantees fairness for the consideration of what is
clearly and unambiguously the most significant issue in the country at
this moment.
The majority leader and I have been working in good faith on an
agreement that provides for a structured debate on the various
proposals and votes on each. The other side said we turned down three
compromises but, frankly, that is not the full story.
The majority leader said he would agree to a consent that would allow
votes on the McCain proposal and the Warner proposal. He also mentioned
that he would agree to a 60-vote threshold on each of those. All we are
asking for is the same agreement on
[[Page S1565]]
the Gregg resolution. Now, in fact, there was demand among Republican
Senators for additional alternatives. We were able to pair those down
to two.
Why 60 votes? Let me remind all of our colleagues--and certainly the
distinguished senior Senator from Virginia doesn't need to be reminded
of that, having been here 29 years--that one single Senator can insist
that a matter be subject to 60 votes. One single Senator. There are
many Senators on this side of the aisle who would insist upon that. So
it is a statement of the obvious that matters of consequence in the
Senate over the years have developed in the following way: They are all
subject to a 60-vote threshold. To suggest that is anything
extraordinary really defies our experience here. It is ordinary, not
extraordinary, for matters of great controversy--and even, in this day
and age, matters of only a little controversy--to be subject to a 60-
vote threshold.
Our good friends on the other side of the aisle--and this was an
issue the Senator from Virginia was very much involved with in the last
Congress--were seeking to establish in one of the last areas where 60
votes was not customarily required--the confirmation of judges--that we
should start requiring it there as well. That would leave virtually
nothing the Senate would consider, except the budget resolution, not
being subject to a 60-vote threshold.
So what we are asking for on the Republican side is not at all
extraordinary. The term ``filibuster'' has become a pejorative term for
suggesting that one wants to stop something. Let me repeat, as I have
said to the distinguished majority leader, to the Senator from
Virginia, and to the Senator from Nebraska, we are not trying to stop
this debate. We are trying to structure it in a way that is fair to the
competing voices in the Republican conference who will band together
shortly in a significant enough number to insist on a fair process.
So that is what this is about, Madam President. I have indicated to
the Democratic leader--and I certainly wouldn't want to surprise him--
that I intended to propound a unanimous consent request that would be
acceptable to our side, and I will be happy to do that now, having
given notice to the majority leader that I would do so.
But before doing that, let me say one more time, there is not a
single Republican Senator seeking to avoid this debate. We have just
heard from two voices that are in the minority in our conference--the
Senator from Virginia and the Senator from Nebraska--who don't share my
view, who nevertheless will vote against cloture shortly to make the
point that this Republican minority insists upon fair treatment on this
important debate.
Therefore, Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that at a time
determined by the majority leader, after consultation with the
Republican leader, the Senate proceed en bloc to the following
concurrent resolutions under the following agreement:
S. Con. Res. 7, the Warner resolution which is to be discharged from
the Foreign Relations Committee; McCain-Lieberman-Graham, regarding
benchmarks; Gregg related to funding.
I further ask unanimous consent that there be a total of 10 hours--
and I will be happy to pick whatever number might be agreeable to the
majority leader--of debate equally divided between the two leaders or
their designees; provided further, that no amendments be in order to
any of the measures; further, that after the use or yielding back of
time, the Senate proceed to three consecutive votes on the adoption of
the concurrent resolutions in the following order, with no intervening
action or debate: first, McCain-Lieberman-Graham; second, Gregg; third,
S. Con. Res. 7. Finally, I ask unanimous consent that any resolution
that does not achieve 60 votes in the affirmative, the vote on adoption
be vitiated and the concurrent resolution be returned to its previous
status.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
Mr. REID. Reserving the right to object.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The majority leader.
Mr. REID. Madam President, the vast, vast, vast majority of
legislation passed out of this Senate is done by a simple majority.
That is a fact. All one has to do is look at the Congressional Record.
So with this new direction of the minority, it is very clear what is
happening. They are trying to avoid debate on this matter. They want a
new set of rules.
We have offered them votes, up-or-down votes on McCain, Warner,
Gregg, and they turned that down. I said: OK, fine, we will have 60-
vote margins on McCain, Warner. They turned that down. So I object,
Madam President, and I will continue.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Objection is heard.
Mr. REID. Madam President, it is also very interesting--and I have
the greatest respect for my friend from Virginia and my friend from
Nebraska--but with all due respect to them, how could they vote against
a motion to proceed? How could they vote against a motion to proceed
saying let the two leaders work this out? What more could we give them
than what they asked for last week? But now they want to throw in the
Gregg amendment with a 60-vote margin.
Earlier today, the minority leader said: This vote is ``about getting
fair treatment for the minority here in the Senate.'' He was half
right. This vote is about fairness but has little to do with being fair
to the minority. The vote is about being fair to 132,000 troops already
in Iraq by making sure they have the strategy they need to complete
their mission so they can come home.
This vote is about being fair to the 48,000 American men and women
who would be sent to Iraq should President Bush be permitted to
escalate this war.
This vote is about being fair to the bipartisan majority of Senators
who seek to voice their opposition to the President's plan to escalate
the war.
This vote is about being fair to the American people and the millions
of voters who chose a new direction last November.
As Senators, we owe it to our troops and our people to have a real
debate about the way forward in Iraq. For 4 years, this body, under the
control of the Republicans, sat silent on the most pressing issue
facing our country--Iraq. As thousands of our soldiers were killed and
tens of thousands wounded, the Senate, directed by the Republicans, sat
silent, no debate on Iraq. As hundreds of billions of dollars were
spent, the Senate sat silent. Republicans were in charge--no debate.
They said no.
As Iraq fell into chaos and civil war, it became increasingly clear
that the President's plan was flawed and failing. The Senate sat
silent. The Republicans who were in control of the Senate said: No, no
debate on Iraq.
As Senators and Americans, we cannot permit the silence to continue.
This Democratic majority will not allow it to continue.
The administration's failures have dug us into a deep hole in Iraq--
we all know that--and we have an obligation to find a way out. Our
troops, most of all, need our help. They need a policy that is as
worthy as their heroic sacrifice. They need a legislative branch that
will finally exercise its constitutional responsibilities.
Madam President, I say to my friend from Connecticut, I wasn't able
to hear all of his speech, but I did hear this that caused me to take
note: He said words to the effect: What are the Shia politicians going
to think? What are the Sunni politicians going to think if, in fact,
Warner passed? I wonder what the Sunni politicians thought, and I
wonder what the Shia politicians thought when the Iraqi Prime Minister,
duly elected, told the President of the United States that he wanted
American troops out of Baghdad. So let's not direct this to Senator
Warner.
A ``no'' vote on the motion to proceed is a green light to George
Bush to continue down the same failed course of almost 4 years.
A ``no'' vote is an endorsement of escalation, sending 48,000 more
troops to Iraq and spending at least an extra $27 billion--$27 billion
extra--when this war has already cost almost a half a trillion dollars.
A ``no'' vote is a vote in support of this President continuing the
same policy of failure in Iraq.
We have been told by our intelligence experts that the war is not
going to be won by the military; it is only going to be won
politically. That is what the
[[Page S1566]]
Iraq Study Group said. That is what all people say, with rare
exception. Those are the people holding hands with the President.
We must heed the results of the November elections and the wishes of
the American people. We must change course, and this change starts with
this next vote.
This side--Democrats--have offered the minority everything they have
asked for. Remember: Vote on Warner, vote on McCain; you want a simple
majority; you want a supermajority; we will go along with that. We have
been fair to them. Now the Senate must be fair to our troops, their
families, and the American people. We must proceed with a debate about
Iraq and send a clear message to President Bush that escalation is not
the answer.
Some say let the leaders work it out. Part of this stall has been a
stall for obvious reasons. If not tonight, tomorrow? I must file a
motion to invoke cloture on the continuing resolution because the
Republicans said they are going to filibuster it. I have gotten letters
to that effect. We should have been debating the Warner, McCain
resolutions today, but they have not allowed us. They wouldn't allow us
to proceed on this matter.
I am telling everyone within the sound of my voice, a decision will
have to be made whether to go further than tonight, but the time is
very tenuous--very tenuous. If they stop us from going forward on this
debate, this does not end the debate on Iraq. It may end the debate for
a few days or a few weeks, but, remember, we have the 9/11 Commission
recommendations coming and that is open to amendment and I can
guarantee everybody there will be Iraq amendments involved in that
debate.
The supplemental bill is coming. This is to fund the war in Iraq
basically more than $100 billion. I think there will probably very
likely be a number of amendments dealing with Iraq.
They can run, but they can't hide. We are going to debate Iraq, and
they may have gotten all their folks to vote against the motion to
proceed, they may stop us temporarily from debating the escalation, but
they are not going to stop us from debating Iraq.
We have lost 3,100 soldiers, sailors, and marines. They are dead,
Madam President. We don't know the exact number of how many have been
wounded--24,000, 25,000.
We are not going to allow the situation in Iraq to continue. It is
wrong. There can be no military solution. The President has been told
that. I think it speaks volumes when he meets with the Iraqi Prime
Minister who is elected, and the Iraqi Prime Minister says: Mr.
President of the United States, get all American soldiers out of
Baghdad.
That's what he said. I think it speaks volumes when military
commanders say that it is not the way to go. We know what Casey said.
His tune has changed a little bit since he was relieved of duty over
there.
The families of the 3,100 soldiers who have been killed, the families
of the 24,000, 25,000 who have been wounded demand we go forward with
this debate.
We are going to start voting momentarily, and remember what the vote
is. The vote is whether we can proceed to debate the escalation of the
war in Iraq. And the Republicans have told everybody they are all going
to vote no. If they think this can pop up real easily again, I think
they may have another thing coming.
I repeat, the Republicans left town and left the Government without
adequate resources to go ahead and complete funding of the Federal
Government for this year. We have to take up the work they did not
complete. They funded the Government until February 15, and now it is
up to us to make sure the Government continues to run.
If they want to pull a Newt Gingrich and close down the Government,
that is their responsibility. But I believe we should move forward and
make sure the Government is funded, and there is not a lot of time for
Iraq. That is a sad commentary on the situation because we lost days as
a result of these parliamentary delays.
I ask unanimous consent that if we get to third reading of S. 470 it
then be turned into a concurrent resolution and passage occur on the
concurrent resolution and not S. 470. Before hearing how anybody feels
about this, I said last week that we would be happy to consider this
bill as a resolution. Everybody heard me say that. The American people
heard me say that. So anybody who tries to hide under a procedural vote
because this is a bill and not a resolution is not being fair because
simply I have stated--and I know that everyone in this Chamber heard me
say this, and I have said it many times--I ask unanimous consent that
if we get to third reading of S. 470, that it be turned into a
concurrent resolution and that passage occur on the concurrent
resolution and not S. 470.
I add another unanimous consent request to this. I am willing to
change it to a concurrent resolution right now, as I was willing to do
last week.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
Mr. McCONNELL. Reserving the right to object, this is essentially the
same unanimous consent request propounded last Thursday night. This
matter ought to be dealt with as a concurrent resolution. It is clear
the other side does not want to vote on the Gregg amendment. Therefore,
I object.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Objection is heard.
Cloture Motion
Under the previous order, pursuant to rule XXII, the Chair lays
before the Senate the pending cloture motion, which the clerk will
report.
The legislative clerk read as follows:
Cloture Motion
We, the undersigned Senators, in accordance with the
provisions of rule 22 of the Standing Rules of the Senate, do
hereby move to bring to a close the debate on the motion to
proceed to Calendar No. 19, S. 470, Bipartisan Iraq
legislation.
Carl Levin, Joe Biden, Ken Salazar, Harry Reid, Pat
Leahy, Sherrod Brown, Patty Murray, Robert Menendez,
John F. Kerry, Barbara Mikulski, Dick Durbin, Jack
Reed, Tom Harkin, Dianne Feinstein, Bill Nelson, H.R.
Clinton, Herb Kohl, Ben Nelson.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. By unanimous consent, the mandatory quorum
call has been waived.
The question is, Is it the sense of the Senate that debate on the
motion to proceed to S. 470, a bill to express the sense of the
Congress on Iraq, shall be brought to a close?
The yeas and nays are mandatory under the rule.
The clerk will call the roll.
The legislative clerk called the roll.
Mr. DURBIN. I announce that the Senator from South Dakota (Mr.
Johnson) and the Senator from Louisiana (Ms. Landrieu), are necessarily
absent.
Mr. LOTT. The following Senators were necessarily absent: the Senator
from Florida (Mr. Martinez) and the Senator from Arizona (Mr. McCain).
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Sanders). Are there any other Senators in
the Chamber desiring to vote?
The yeas and nays resulted--yeas 49, nays 47, as follows:
[Rollcall Vote No. 44 Leg.]
YEAS--49
Akaka
Baucus
Bayh
Biden
Bingaman
Boxer
Brown
Byrd
Cantwell
Cardin
Carper
Casey
Clinton
Coleman
Collins
Conrad
Dodd
Dorgan
Durbin
Feingold
Feinstein
Harkin
Inouye
Kennedy
Kerry
Klobuchar
Kohl
Lautenberg
Leahy
Levin
Lincoln
McCaskill
Menendez
Mikulski
Murray
Nelson (FL)
Nelson (NE)
Obama
Pryor
Reed
Rockefeller
Salazar
Sanders
Schumer
Stabenow
Tester
Webb
Whitehouse
Wyden
NAYS--47
Alexander
Allard
Bennett
Bond
Brownback
Bunning
Burr
Chambliss
Coburn
Cochran
Corker
Cornyn
Craig
Crapo
DeMint
Dole
Domenici
Ensign
Enzi
Graham
Grassley
Gregg
Hagel
Hatch
Hutchison
Inhofe
Isakson
Kyl
Lieberman
Lott
Lugar
McConnell
Murkowski
Reid
Roberts
Sessions
Shelby
Smith
Snowe
Specter
Stevens
Sununu
Thomas
Thune
Vitter
Voinovich
Warner
NOT VOTING--4
Johnson
Landrieu
Martinez
McCain
The PRESIDING OFFICER. On this vote, the yeas are 49, the nays are
47. Three-fifths of the Senators duly chosen and sworn not having voted
in the affirmative, the motion is rejected.
The majority leader is recognized.
Mr. REID. Mr. President, I enter a motion to reconsider that vote.
[[Page S1567]]
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The motion is entered.
____________________