[Congressional Record Volume 153, Number 19 (Wednesday, January 31, 2007)]
[Senate]
[Pages S1464-S1465]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




  SENATE CONCURRENT RESOLUTION 7--EXPRESSING THE SENSE OF CONGRESS ON 
                                  IRAQ

  Mr. WARNER (for himself, Mr. Nelson of Nebraska, Ms. Collins, Mr. 
Levin, and Ms. Snowe) submitted the following concurrent resolution; 
which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations:

                             S. Con. Res. 7

       Whereas, we respect the Constitutional authorities given a 
     President in Article II, Section 2, which states that ``The 
     President shall be commander in chief of the Army and Navy of 
     the United States;'' it is not the intent of this resolution 
     to question or contravene such authority, but to accept the 
     offer to Congress made by the President on January 10, 2007 
     that, ``if members have improvements that can be made, we 
     will make them. If circumstances change, we will adjust;''
       Whereas, the United States' strategy and operations in Iraq 
     can only be sustained and achieved with support from the 
     American people and with a level of bipartisanship;
       Whereas, over 137,000 American military personnel are 
     current1y serving in Iraq, like thousands of others since 
     March 2003, with the bravery and professionalism consistent 
     with the finest traditions of the United States armed forces, 
     and are deserving of the support of all Americans, which they 
     have strongly;
       Whereas, many American service personnel have lost their 
     lives, and many more have.been wounded, in Iraq, and the 
     American people will always honor their sacrifices and honor 
     their families;
       Whereas, the U.S. Army and Marine Corps, including their 
     Reserve and National Guard organizations, together with 
     components of the other branches of the military, are under 
     enormous strain from multiple, extended deployments to Iraq 
     and Afghanistan;
       Whereas, these deployments, and those that will follow, 
     will have lasting impacts on the future recruiting, retention 
     and readiness of our nation's all volunteer force;
       Whereas in the National Defense Authorization Act for 
     Fiscal Year 2006, the Congress stated that ``calendar year 
     2006 should be a period of significant transition to full 
     sovereignty, with Iraqi security forces taking the lead for 
     the security of a free and sovereign Iraq;''
       Whereas, United Nations Security Council Resolution 1723, 
     approved November 28, 2006, ``determin[ed] that the situation 
     in Iraq continues to constitute a threat to international 
     peace and security;''
       Whereas, Iraq is experiencing a deteriorating and ever-
     widening problem of sectarian and intra-sectarian violence 
     based upon political distrust and cultural differences 
     between some Sunni and Shia Muslims;
       Whereas, Iraqis must reach political settlements in order 
     to achieve reconciliation, and the failure of the Iraqis to 
     reach such settlements to support a truly unified government 
     greatly contributes to the increasing violence in Iraq;
       Whereas, the responsibility for Iraq's internal security 
     and halting sectarian violence must rest primarily with the 
     Government of Iraq and Iraqi Security Forces;
       Whereas, U.S. Central Command Commander General John 
     Abizaid testified to Congress on November 15, 2006, ``I met 
     with every divisional commander, General Casey, the Corps 
     Commander, [and] General Dempsey. We all talked together. And 
     I said, in your professional opinion, if we were to bring in 
     more American troops now, does it add considerably to our 
     ability to achieve success in Iraq? And they all said no. And 
     the reason is, because we want the Iraqis to do more. It's 
     easy for the Iraqis to rely upon us to do this work. I 
     believe that more American forces prevent the Iraqis from 
     doing more, from taking more responsibility for their own 
     future;''
       Whereas, Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki stated on 
     November 27, 2006 that ``The crisis is political, and the 
     ones who can stop the cycle of aggravation and bloodletting 
     of innocents are the politicians;''
       Whereas, there is growing evidence that Iraqi public 
     sentiment opposes the continued U.S. troop presence in Iraq, 
     much less increasing the troop level;
       Whereas, in the fall of 2006, leaders in the Administration 
     and Congress, as well as recognized experts in the private 
     sector, began to express concern that the situation in Iraq 
     was deteriorating and required a change in strategy; and, as 
     a consequence, the Administration began an intensive, 
     comprehensive review by all components of the Executive 
     Branch to devise a new strategy;
       Whereas, in December 2006, the bipartisan Iraq Study Group 
     issued a valuable report, suggesting a comprehensive strategy 
     that includes ``new and enhanced diplomatic and political 
     efforts in Iraq and the region, and a change in the primary 
     mission of U.S. forces in Iraq that will enable the United 
     States to begin to move its combat forces out of Iraq 
     responsibly;''
       Whereas, on January 10, 2007, following consultations with 
     the Iraqi Prime Minister, the President announced a new 
     strategy (hereinafter referred to as the ``plan''), which 
     consists of three basic elements: diplomatic, economic, and 
     military; the central component of the military element is an 
     augmentation of the present level of the U.S. military forces 
     through additional deployments of approximately 21,500 US. 
     military troops to Iraq;
       Whereas, on January 10, 2007, the President said that the 
     ``Iraqi government will appoint a military commander and two 
     deputy commanders for their capital'' and that U.S. forces 
     will ``be embedded in their formations;'' and in subsequent 
     testimony before the Armed Services Committee on January 25, 
     2007, by the retired former Vice Chief of the Army it was 
     learned that there will also be a comparable US. command in 
     Baghdad, and that this dual chain of command may be 
     problematic because ``the Iraqis are going to be able to move 
     their forces around at times where we will disagree with that 
     movement,'' and called for clarification;
       Whereas, this proposed level of troop augmentation far 
     exceeds the expectations of many of us as to the 
     reinforcements that would be necessary to implement the 
     various options for a new strategy, and led many members of 
     Congress to express outright opposition to augmenting our 
     troops by 21,500;
       Whereas, the Government of Iraq has promised repeatedly to 
     assume a greater share of security responsibilities, disband 
     militias, consider Constitutional amendments and enact laws 
     to reconcile sectarian differences, and improve the quality 
     of essential services for the Iraqi people; yet, despite 
     those promises, little has been achieved;
       Whereas, the President said on January 10, 2007 that ``I've 
     made it clear to the Prime Minister and Iraq's other leaders 
     that America's commitment is not openended'' so as to dispel 
     the contrary impression that exists;
       Whereas, the recommendations in this resolution should not 
     be interpreted as precipitating any immediate reduction in, 
     or withdrawal of, the present level of forces: Now therefore 
     be it--
       Resolved, by the Senate (the House of Representatives 
     concurring), That it is the sense of Congress that--
       (1) the Senate disagrees with the ``plan'' to augment our 
     forces by 21,500, and urges the President instead to consider 
     all options and alternatives for achieving the strategic 
     goals set forth below;
       (2) the Senate believes the United States should continue 
     vigorous operations in

[[Page S1465]]

     Anbar province, specifically for the purpose of combating an 
     insurgency, including elements associated with the Al Qaeda 
     movement, and denying terrorists a safe haven;
       (3) the Senate believes a failed state in Iraq would 
     present a threat to regional and world peace, and the long-
     term security interests of the United States are best served 
     by an Iraq that can sustain, govern, and defend itself, and 
     serve as an ally in the war against extremists;
       (4) the Congress should not take any action that will 
     endanger United States military forces in the field, 
     including the elimination or reduction of funds for troops in 
     the field, as such an action with respect to funding would 
     undermine their safety or harm their effectiveness in 
     pursuing their assigned missions;
       (5) the primary objective of the overall U.S. strategy in 
     Iraq should be to encourage Iraqi leaders to make political 
     compromises that will foster reconciliation and strengthen 
     the unity government, ultimately leading to improvements in 
     the security situation;
       (6) the military part of this strategy should focus on 
     maintaining the territorial integrity of Iraq, denying 
     international terrorists a safe haven, conducting 
     counterterrorism operations, promoting regional stability, 
     supporting Iraqi efforts to bring greater security to 
     Baghdad, and training and equipping Iraqi forces to take full 
     responsibility for their own security;
       (7) United States military operations should, as much as 
     possible, be confined to these goals, and should charge the 
     Iraqi military with the primary mission of combating 
     sectarian violence;
       (8) the military Rules of Engagement for this plan should 
     reflect this delineation of responsibilities, and the 
     Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
     Staff should clarify the command and control arrangements in 
     Baghdad;
       (9) the United States Government should transfer to the 
     Iraqi military, in an expeditious manner, such equipment as 
     is necessary;
       (10) the United States Government should engage selected 
     nations in the Middle East to develop a regional, 
     internationally sponsored peace-and-reconciliation process 
     for Iraq;
       (11) the Administration should provide regular updates to 
     the Congress, produced by the Commander of United States 
     Central Command and his subordinate commanders, about the 
     progress or lack of progress the Iraqis are making toward 
     this end.
       (12) our overall military, diplomatic and economic strategy 
     should not be regarded as an ``open-ended'' or unconditional 
     commitment, but rather as a new strategy that hereafter 
     should be conditioned upon the Iraqi government's meeting 
     benchmarks that must be delineated in writing and agreed to 
     by the Iraqi Prime Minister. Such benchmarks should include, 
     but not be limited to, the deployment of that number of 
     additional Iraqi security forces as specified in the plan in 
     Baghdad, ensuring equitable distribution of the resources of 
     the Government of Iraq without regard to the sect or 
     ethnicity of recipients, enacting and implementing 
     legislation to ensure that the oil resources of Iraq benefit 
     Sunni Arabs, Shia Arabs, Kurds, and other Iraqi citizens in 
     an equitable manner, and the authority of Iraqi commanders to 
     make tactical.and operational decisions without political 
     intervention:

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