[Congressional Record Volume 153, Number 19 (Wednesday, January 31, 2007)]
[Senate]
[Pages S1391-S1394]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
IRAQ
Mr. WARNER. Madam President, about a week ago, I think it was on the
23rd, my colleagues, the Senator from Nebraska, Mr. Ben Nelson, and the
Senator from Maine, Ms. Collins, and I, together with several
cosponsors, put into the Record a resolution--I underline put into the
Record--so that all could have the benefit of studying it.
We three have continued to do a good deal of work. We have been in
consultation with our eight other cosponsors on this resolution, and we
are going to put in tonight, into the Record--the same procedures we
followed before--another resolution which tracks very closely the one
that is of record. But it has several provisions we believe should be
considered by the Senate in the course of the debate. How that debate
will occur and when it will occur. I cannot advise the Senate, but I do
hope it is expeditious. I understand there is a cloture motion that
could well begin the debate, depending upon how it is acted upon.
We have also had a hearing of the Senate Armed Services Committee
last Friday. We had a hearing of the Senate Armed Services Committee
again this morning. Friday was in open session. The session this
morning was in closed session. The three of us, as members of the Armed
Services Committee, have learned a good deal more about this subject
and, I say with great respect, the plan as laid down by the President
on the 10th of January. We believed we should make some additions to
our resolution.
We have not had the opportunity, given the hour, to circulate this
among all of our cosponsors so at this time it will not bind them, but
subsequently, tomorrow, I hope to contact all of them, together with my
two colleagues, and determine their concurrence to go on this one. I am
optimistic they will all stay.
But let me give the Senate several examples of what we think is
important in the course of the debate--that these subjects be raised.
We put it before the Senate now in the form of filing this resolution,
such that all can see it and have the benefit, to the extent it is
reproduced and placed into the public domain. Because the three of us
are still open for suggestions, and we will continue to have
receptivity to suggestions as this critical and very important subject
is deliberated by the Senate.
Our objective is to hope that somehow through our efforts and the
efforts
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of others, a truly bipartisan statement--I don't know in what form it
may be made--a truly bipartisan statement can evolve from the debate
and the procedure that will ensue in the coming days, and I presume
into next week. We feel very strongly that we want to see our Armed
Forces succeed in Iraq to help bring about greater stability to that
country, greater security to that country, so that the current elected
government, through a series of free elections--the current elected
government can take a firmer and firmer hand on the reins of
sovereignty. We believe if for political reasons all Members of the
Senate go over to vote with their party, and the others go over to vote
with their party, we will have lost and failed to provide the
leadership I believe this Chamber can provide to the American people so
they can better understand the new strategy, and that the President can
take into consideration our resolution hasn't been changed.
We say to the President: We urge that you take into consideration the
options that we put forth, the strategy that we sort of lay out, in the
hopes that it will be stronger and better understood by the people in
this country. Their support, together with a strong level of bipartisan
support in the Congress for the President's plan, hopefully as slightly
modified, can be successful. We want success, Madam President. We want
success.
So that is the reason we come this evening. I am going to speak to
one or two provisions, and my colleagues can address others.
First, the unity of command. We have a time-honored tradition with
American forces that wherever possible, there be a unity of command
from an American commander, whatever rank that may be, down to the
private, and that our forces can best operate with that unity of
command and provide the best security possible to all members of the
Armed Forces that are engaged in carrying out such mission as that
command is entrusted to perform.
A number of Senators, in the course of the hearing on Friday and the
hearing this morning, raised questions about this serious issue of
unity of command. I say serious issue because the President, in his
remarks, described--and this is on January 10--described how there will
be an Iraqi commander, and that we will have embedded forces with the
Iraqi troops. Well, we are currently embedding forces, but I think the
plan--and that is what I refer to, the President's announcement on
January 10 in the generic sense as the plan--will require perhaps a
larger number of embedded forces. But the plan envisions an Iraqi chain
of command. The Iraqis indicated, in working with the President, this
plan in many respects tracks the exchange of thoughts that the
President and the Prime Minister have had through a series of meetings
and telephonic conversations. So the plan embraces the goals of the
Prime Minister of Iraq, the goals of our President.
But this is a unique situation where the Iraqis have a complete chain
of command, from a senior officer in each of the nine districts in
Baghdad, and the United States likewise will have a chain of command in
that same district or such segments of this plan as the military
finally put together--each will have a chain of command, the Iraqi
forces and the United States forces.
In the course of the testimony that we received, particularly
testimony from the retired Vice Chief of the U.S. Army on Friday
afternoon, he was concerned, as a number of Senators are concerned--and
our provision literally flags this, and flags it in such a way that we
call upon the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff to look at that plan and to bring such clarification forward
as may be necessary, and to do it in a way that will secure the safety
of our forces, the protection of our forces, and yet go forward with
this idea of a greater sharing of the command responsibility in the
operations to take place in Baghdad. So we simply call on the
administration to bring such clarification and specificity to the
Congress and the people of the United States to ensure the protection
of our force and that this command structure will work because I
believe it doesn't have--I am trying to find a precedent where we have
operated like this. I have asked the expert witnesses in hearings, and
thus far those witnesses have not been able to explain the command
structure that we have conceived, the concept of the plan of January
10, just how it will work.
Likewise, we put in a very important paragraph which says that
nothing in this resolution should be construed as indicating that there
is going to be a cutoff of funds. Given the complexity of this
situation, there has been a lot of press written on the subject of our
resolution. Colleagues have come up to me and said: Well, can you
assure me that this doesn't provide a cutoff of funds.
Now, the cutoff of funds is the specific power given under the
Constitution to the Congress of the United States. I personally think
that power should not be exercised, certainly not given the facts and
the circumstances today where this plan--which I hope in some manner
will succeed and we are working better with the Prime Minister and his
forces. So at this point in time I think it is important that our
resolution carry language as follows:
The Congress should not take any action that will endanger
United States military forces in the field, including the
elimination or reduction of funds for troops in the field, as
such an action with respect to funding would undermine their
safety or harm their effectiveness in pursuing their assigned
missions.
So I think that very clearly eliminates any consideration there.
At this time I would like to yield the floor so that my colleagues
can speak, and maybe I will have some concluding remarks.
I yield the floor.
Mr. LEVIN. Madam President, I wonder if the Senator will yield for a
unanimous consent request.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan is recognized.
Mr. WARNER. Madam President, I really feel, if we could more fully--
--
Mr. LEVIN. It is just a unanimous consent request.
Mr. WARNER. Does it affect what we are trying to lay down in any way?
Mr. LEVIN. I was just going to ask unanimous consent that I be added
as a cosponsor of the resolution.
Mr. WARNER. That is fine. I didn't realize that was coming to pass.
It is late in the day, and I suppose we could anticipate a lot of
things. But anyway I thank the Senator.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan is recognized.
Mr. LEVIN. As I understand, the resolution has not yet been sent to
the desk.
Mr. WARNER. It momentarily will be.
Mr. LEVIN. I ask unanimous consent that I be added as a cosponsor to
the resolution.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. LEVIN. I thank my friend from Nebraska.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Nebraska is recognized.
Mr. NELSON of Nebraska. Madam President, tonight I believe we have
seen the introduction of a resolution which not only has had bipartisan
support in its prior form but will receive very strong bipartisan
support in its current form, as amended.
I rise to support this resolution for a number of reasons. I think it
is important that we continue to support our troops in the field and
those who support the troops across the world. I think it is important
that we thank them for their service and that we make it very clear
that this resolution does not impair their ability to move forward in
their command.
It is also important to point out that while some of the cosponsors
haven't had the opportunity to review this, it is being circulated to
them so that they do have the opportunity to review it. And I am sure
they will become cosponsors with the new resolution.
It is important to point out that in this resolution, benchmarks are
included that I believe will help break the cycle of dependence in Iraq
by empowering and requiring the authority of the Iraqi Government and
the responsibility of the Iraqi Government to take a greater role in
the battle in Iraq, particularly as it relates to Baghdad. We generally
believe that it is inappropriate for our troops to intercede in the
battle between the Sunnis and the Shias on a sectarian basis in battles
that are of a similar nature that
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certainly do involve sectarian violence. There is a greater role for
the Iraqi Government and the Iraqi military. This resolution in its
present form will assure the assuming of that greater role, that
greater responsibility by the Iraqi Government and certainly by the
Iraqi Army.
It is a pleasure for me to introduce and thank our cosponsor, the
Senator from Maine, Ms. Collins.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine is recognized.
Ms. COLLINS. Madam President, first let me thank Senator Warner and
Senator Nelson for their continuing hard work in refining the language
of this very important resolution, a resolution that I hope will garner
widespread bipartisan support when it is brought to the Senate floor
and debated next week.
Since we first introduced our resolution last week, we have had the
benefit of further consultations with experts. We have had the benefit
of conversations with our colleagues. We have had the benefit of
alternative resolutions that have been proposed by other Senators, and
we have had the benefit, most of all, of additional hearings in the
Senate Armed Services Committee, including a classified briefing today.
All of this activity has confirmed my belief that our resolution as
originally proposed was on precisely the right track, but the benefit
of these hearings, briefings, conversations and consultations has led
us to improve our resolution by making four modifications that the
distinguished Senators have just explained.
Let me, for the benefit of our colleagues, run through them one more
time.
First, the resolution now makes very clear that nothing in it is to
be construed as advocating any lessening of financial support for our
troops. Indeed, it goes firmly on record as being opposed to cutting
off funds that would be needed by our troops in Iraq. The language is
very clear on that.
Second, there has been a great deal of discussion about the need for
the Iraqis to meet certain benchmarks--benchmarks that in the past they
have not met. So we include language in this resolution that makes very
clear that we expect the Iraqi Prime Minister to agree to certain
benchmarks; for example, to agree to work for the passage and achieve
the passage of legislation that would ensure an equitable distribution
of oil revenues. That is a very important issue in Iraq.
It also includes a benchmark that the Iraqis are going to produce the
troops they have promised, and that they are going to operate according
to the military rules of engagement without regard to the sectarian
information or the sect of the people involved in the fighting. In
other words, it doesn't matter whether an insurgent is a Sunni or a
Shiite; if he is violating the law, engaging in violence, the Iraqi
troops and our troops would be able to arrest and detain or otherwise
battle these individuals.
It clarifies the language regarding the troop increase that the
President has proposed, and as the Senator from Virginia has explained
to our colleagues, it calls for a clarification of the command and
control structure so that we don't have a dual line of command. We want
to have a very clear chain of command, and we call for that. That isn't
the case now, and if you ask any military officer, he or she will tell
you that having a clear chain of command, a unity of command, is
absolutely essential. We have made these four changes in our
legislation, in the resolution. We hope our colleagues will take a
close look at it. I look forward to debating it more fully when we get
on this issue next week.
Again, I commend the distinguished Senators with whom I have been
very privileged to work on this: Senator Warner, the former chairman of
the Committee on Armed Services, my colleague, Senator Nelson, also a
member of the Committee on Armed Services. All three of us serve on
that committee. We have brought to bear our experience and what we have
learned in the last week as we continue to study this very important
issue, perhaps the most vital issue facing our country.
Mr. WARNER. Madam President, I thank our distinguished colleague from
Maine.
It has been a hard work in progress, but we reiterate, perhaps
Members want to offer their own resolutions. We are open to
suggestions. We are not trying to grab votes, just make ours stronger.
I bring to the attention of my colleague, this is not to be construed
as saying, Mr. President, you cannot do anything; we suggest you look
at openings by which we could, hopefully, have substantially less
United States involvement of troops in what we foresee as a bitter
struggle of sectarian violence.
The American GI, in my judgment, has sacrificed greatly, and their
families, in giving sovereignty to this Nation. Now we see it is in the
grip of extraordinary sectarian violence. Sunni upon Shia, Shia upon
Sunni. I am not trying to ascribe which is more guilty than the other,
but why should they proceed to try and destabilize the very government
that gives all Iraqis a tremendous measure of freedom, free from
tyranny and from Saddam Hussein. Why should the American GI, who does
not have a language proficiency, who does not have a full understanding
of the culture giving rise to these enormous animosities and hatreds
that precipitate the killings and other actions--why should not that be
left to the Iraqi forces?
We have trained upwards of 200,000. We have reason to believe today
there are 60,000 to 70,000 who are tested--in many respects they have
been participating in a number of military operations, together with
our forces. Let elements of that group be the principals to take the
lead, as they proudly say, give them the lead, and go into the
sectarian violence. That would enable our commanders, our President, to
send fewer than 20,500 into that area.
On the other hand, we support the President with respect to his
options regarding the Anbar Province and the additional forces.
Am I not correct in that?
Ms. COLLINS. If the Senator will yield on that point.
Mr. WARNER. Yes.
Ms. COLLINS. The resolution we drafted very carefully distinguishes
between the sectarian violence engulfing Baghdad, where the Senator and
Senator Nelson believe it would be a huge mistake for additional
American troops to be in the midst of that, versus a very different
situation in Anbar Province.
In Anbar, the violence is not sectarian; the battle is with al-Qaida
and with foreign fighters, the Sunni insurgencies, so we have Sunni
versus Sunni. It is not sectarian. And what is more, local tribal
leaders have recently joined with the coalition forces to fight al-
Qaida. It is a completely different situation in Anbar. I do support
the addition of more troops in Anbar. Indeed, the one American
commander whom I met with in December who called for more troops in
Anbar was General Kilmer.
Mr. WARNER. You refer to the one commander you met. I wonder if the
Senator would reference your trip in December and what others told you
about the addition of United States forces. I think that is important
for the Record.
Ms. COLLINS. Madam President, if the Senator will continue to yield.
Mr. WARNER. Yes.
Ms. COLLINS. It was a very illuminating trip with other Senators. It
has shaped my views on the issues before the Senate.
One American commander in Baghdad told me a jobs program would do
more good than additional American troops in quelling the sectarian
violence. He told me many Iraqi men were joining the militias or
planting roadside bombs simply because they had been unemployed for so
long they were desperate for money and would do anything to support
their families. This was an American commander who told me this.
Prime Minister Maliki, in mid-December, made very clear he did not
welcome the presence of additional American troops and, indeed, that he
chafed at the restrictions on his control of the Iraqi troops. So I
didn't hear it from Iraqi leaders, either.
The only place where I heard a request for more troops was in Anbar
Province where the situation, as we have discussed, is totally
different than the sectarian violence plaguing Baghdad.
Mr. WARNER. Madam President, I thank my colleague.
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In my trip in the October timeframe, I would see much the same
expression from military and civilian. Our codel visited, and it was
following my trip that I came back and said in a press conference, this
situation is moving sideways.
My observations, together with the observations of others--some in
our Government, some in the private sector--induced the
administration--I am not suggesting we were the triggering cause, but
we may have contributed--to go to an absolutely, as you say in the
Navy, ``general quarters'' to study every aspect of the strategy which
then was in place, and which now is clearly stated as late as yesterday
by the admiral who will be the CENTCOM commander, wasn't working.
I commend the President for taking the study and inviting a number of
consultants. That whole process was very thorough.
The point the Senator is making, as late as December--mine in
October, yours in December--we both gained the same impressions that no
one was asking for additional United States troops at that time.
Ms. COLLINS. If the Senator will yield on that point, since the
Senator was the chairman of the Committee on Armed Services, as well, I
would also share with our colleagues that the Senator presided over a
hearing in mid-November at which General Abizaid, the central command
general, testified before our committee that more American troops were
not needed. He reported he had consulted widely with generals on the
ground in Iraq, including General Casey, in reaching that conclusion.
I say to our colleagues that I think the record is clear. If you look
at the findings of your trip from October, the testimony before the
Committee on Armed Services from General Abizaid in November, what I
heard in mid-December, I have to say, respectfully, I do not believe
the President's plan with regard to Baghdad--not Anbar but Baghdad--is
consistent with what we were told.
Mr. WARNER. I thank my colleague.
We should add an important reference to work done by the Baker-
Hamilton commission. They have made similar findings. They mention a
slight surge, but in my study of that one sentence in that report, I
don't think they ever envisioned a surge of the magnitude that is here.
They can best speak for themselves and, indeed, yesterday there was
testimony taken from two senior members of that commission, but I don't
know whether they were speaking for the entire commission, and whether,
in their remarks, they may wish to amend portions of their report. I
wasn't present for that testimony.
I hope someone in the Foreign Relations Committee can make that
clear. Were they speaking for the entire commission? Did they wish to
have their remarks amend their report which we followed? It was one of
the guideposts we used, the important work of that group.
Again, we are doing what we think is constructive to help the Senate
in preparing for its deliberations, to invite other colleagues to make
suggestions. We stand open to consider other options that may come
before the Senate.
At this point in time, our resolution is the same form as the
resolution we filed here a week or so ago. We are not changing any of
the procedures by which the Senate takes into consideration our points.
Whether we will be able to utilize this as a substitute should other
amendments be called upon the floor, the rules are quite complex on
that matter, and I will not bring all of that into the record at this
point. But there are certain impediments procedurally as to how this
specific resolution could ever be actually used for the purposes of a
substitute.
I yield the floor and suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. WARNER. I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum
call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mrs. MURRAY). Without objection, it is so
ordered.
Mr. WARNER. Madam President, in the colloquy I participated in with
my distinguished colleagues, Senator Ben Nelson of Kansas and Senator
Collins of Maine--and I take responsibility--somehow we had a
misunderstanding about the status. We wish to send to the desk and ask
that this be numbered a new S. Con. Res. and, therefore, have the same
status as the current S. Con. Res. we had submitted a week ago.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The resolution will be received and referred.
Mr. WARNER. I thank the Chair. I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. REID. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
____________________