[Congressional Record Volume 153, Number 13 (Tuesday, January 23, 2007)]
[Senate]
[Pages S914-S918]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

      By Mr. ROCKEFELLER:
  S. 364. A bill to strengthen United States trade laws and for other 
purposes; to the Committee on Finance.
  Mr. ROCKEFELLER. Mr. President, I rise today to introduce legislation 
that will help America's manufacturers compete on even terms with 
foreign manufacturers.
  For generations, American manufacturing has been a tremendous source 
of pride and a ladder to the middle class. Unfortunately, over the last 
several years, the manufacturing sector of our economy has suffered 
disproportionately and millions of good jobs have been lost. In my home 
State of West Virginia, well over 10,000 manufacturing jobs have 
disappeared since 2001. Workers and manufacturers in all of our States 
have found it increasingly difficult to compete in today's global 
markets, when the odds are stacked against them because of unfair 
trading practices.
  American industry can compete with anyone in the world when it's a 
fair fight. Our domestic and international trade laws were set up to 
establish a level playing field, but unfortunately some of our trading 
partners have repeatedly found ways to circumvent these laws in order 
to gain an unfair advantage in trade with the United States. This has 
led to our record-breaking--and still growing--trade deficits, which 
threaten the long-term health of our economy, and have contributed to 
the migration of manufacturing jobs to factories overseas. This is an 
enormous problem that the United States must face and conquer.
  A large part of the problem in recent years is that the Bush 
Administration has not been an aggressive enforcer of U.S. domestic 
trade laws. It has also failed to successfully advocate for U.S. 
interests in the multilateral dispute settlement setting. The bill I 
introduce today, the Strengthening America's Trade Law Act of 2007, 
will improve our ability to correct deficiencies in four areas of U.S. 
trade policy: first, it will address problems in the U.S. approach to 
the WTO Dispute Settlement process; second, it will strengthen 
antidumping remedies, third, it will expand

[[Page S915]]

the reach of countervailing duties, and fourth, it will remove the 
President's discretion to disregard the recommendations of the 
International Trade Commission in certain circumstances.
  The steel industry is perhaps the best-known example of how our trade 
laws can help or hurt domestic industry when it is injured by unfair 
foreign trade practices, but industries from timber to chinaware to 
candlemaking are all too familiar with this point.
  This bill contains a number of provisions that would provide 
meaningful improvements to U.S. trade law. The United States would 
remain fully compliant with its obligations in the World Trade 
Organization under this legislation.
  Let me briefly describe what this bill will do to level the playing 
field for American manufacturers.
  Title I of the Strengthening America's Trade Laws Act bolsters the 
United States' position in WTO dispute settlement proceedings. The 
dispute settlement system set up in 1994 upon the creation of the WTO 
was intended to establish a rules-based system of enforcing trade 
agreements. However, recent cases involving U.S. application of its 
laws regarding import surges, anti-dumping and countervailing duties 
have raised concerns about the fairness of the system.
  To address these concerns, Title I allows the direct participation in 
WTO dispute settlement proceedings of the U.S. business and trade 
associations that are directly affected by these proceedings, which 
would improve the prospects of zealous advocacy on behalf of U.S. 
interests at stake. It also creates a Congressional Advisory Commission 
on WTO Dispute Settlement that would analyze WTO decisions that are 
adverse to the United States, report to Congress on the propriety of 
the decisions and provide guidance for how the Congress might proceed 
in responding to adverse decisions.
  Title I also requires Congressional approval of all measures taken by 
the U.S. government to comply with adverse decisions. In most cases, 
compliance with an adverse WTO decision calls for legislative changes, 
but in some cases such as the recent case involving ``zeroing'' on 
dumping determinations, the Bush Administration has determined that the 
United States can comply with the adverse decision through regulatory 
changes such as altering the methodology through which the Commerce 
Department calculates the dumping margin. This provision of my trade 
bill would prevent the Administration from side-stepping Congress in 
determining how to respond to an adverse decision in the WTO. 
Congressional oversight is an important element of our trade policy, 
and these provisions would help restore it.
  Title II of the Strengthening America's Trade Laws Act tightens the 
rules in anti-dumping cases in favor of the petitioning domestic 
industry and makes it harder for dumping countries and businesses to 
circumvent the rules. Additionally, it applies a stricter methodology 
for determining the market value of goods from countries designated as 
``nonmarket economies'' (NMEs). These countries presently include small 
former Soviet republics such as Turkmenistan and Georgia, and also 
large U.S. trading partners such as China. These NME designations are 
an important element of U.S. trade policy, and Title II gives Congress 
the ability to approve or disapprove any change in a country's NME 
status.
  Title II also overrules the recent decision by the Federal Circuit in 
the Bratsk case, which inappropriately added a new requirement not 
presently included in our anti-dumping laws, namely that ITC anti-
dumping investigations must include evaluating the role of imports that 
are not actually subject to the investigation. This speculative element 
is not part of the investigation process that Congress mandated the ITC 
to follow in anti-dumping cases, and my bill would remove this 
judicially-added requirement that was never a part of our trade remedy 
law.
  Title III of the Strengthening America's Trade Laws Act expands the 
reach of countervailing duties (CVDs) in order to address two 
significant sources of unfair trade: China's artificially undervalued 
currency, and the disparate treatment that international trade rules 
give to value-added taxes (VAT) used by most U.S. trade partners.

  Unlike anti-dumping duties, CVDs have not been applied against 
imports from NME countries like China, leaving a huge hole in the trade 
remedies available to U.S. manufacturers who are competing against 
subsidized imports from China. This bill explicitly makes CVDs 
applicable to NME countries, and it and provides a methodology for 
determining subsidy levels in NMEs that is similar to the methodology 
for determining fair market value in anti-dumping investigations 
regarding NME countries.
  Next, Title III designates currency exchange rate manipulation as a 
subsidy that can be addressed by application of CVDs. It is well known 
that China's government pegs its currency's value to the value of a 
``basket'' of currencies including the dollar rather than allowing the 
value to be determined freely in currency exchange markets. This 
practice keeps China's currency artificially low, boosting Chinese 
exports and protecting Chinese domestic industry from imports. In 
December, Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke called this practice 
what it is, an ``effective subsidy.'' This provision of Title III would 
allow the U.S. government to apply our CVD law to this subsidy.
  Title III also contains a vital provision that would lead to the 
possible future use of CVDs as a remedy for the differential treatment 
that international trade rules give to value-added taxes (VAT) used by 
most U.S. trade partners. WTO rules provide that rebates on ``direct'' 
taxes such as income, employment, and real estate taxes constitute 
subsidies, whereas rebates on ``indirect taxes'' such as sales and VAT 
taxes are not subsidies. This puts U.S. producers at a significant 
disadvantage to producers in countries that use value-added tax (VAT) 
systems.
  Over 135 U.S. trading partners use VAT taxes for a significant amount 
of their revenue, and when U.S. exports enter a VAT tax country, they 
are subject to the importing country's VAT tax, whereas U.S. imports 
from a VAT tax country are not subject to the producing country's VAT 
tax. This unfair tax treatment constitutes both a hidden import duty 
for U.S. exports and a hidden export subsidy for VAT tax country 
products entering the United States.
  This provision of Title III would push the USTR to negotiate this 
issue to a satisfactory conclusion within the next two years. Failing 
such negotiations, it would designate this differential treatment a 
countervailable subsidy which would then be subject to CVDs.
  Finally, Title IV of the Strengthening America's Trade Laws Act would 
remove Presidential discretion to ignore the recommendations of the ITC 
in safeguard cases regarding China, or so-called ``Section 421'' cases. 
Section 421 of the legislation that provided for China's accession to 
the WTO is a ``safeguard'' provision that provides for temporary relief 
from surges of imports that have caused injury to domestic industry. 
There are a number of recent examples of President Bush's failure to 
take action in cases in which the ITC has recommended ``safeguard'' 
relief most notably on December 30, 2005, when he denied the relief 
that the ITC had recommended for U.S. steel pipe and tube manufacturers 
in the face of a surge of imports from China. Title IV would ensure 
that such denials do not happen in the future by removing Presidential 
discretion in applying safeguard measures in cases involving imports 
from China and instead making the findings and recommendations of the 
ITC the final word on the matter.
  The Strengthening America's Trade Laws Act will provide meaningful 
improvements to U.S. trade law and a more level playing field for U.S. 
workers and manufacturers in an increasingly competitive global 
economy. I commend it to my colleagues and urge them to join me in 
pushing for its swift enactment. Congress has sat on the sidelines for 
too long as our country's finest manufacturers have been dealt blow 
after blow. This bill will not solve the trade deficit alone, but it is 
a reasonable start.
  I am going to ask my leadership, in my caucus and on the Finance 
Committee, to work with me on this legislation, and I look forward to 
joining

[[Page S916]]

forces with my allies on the other side of the aisle to move this bill. 
I ask unanimous consent that the bill be entered into the record. I ask 
unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the text of the bill was ordered to be 
printed in the Record, as follows:

                                 S. 364

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

       (a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the 
     ``Strengthening America's Trade Laws Act''.
       (b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act 
     is as follows:

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.

                      TITLE I--DISPUTE SETTLEMENT

             Subtitle A--Findings, Purpose, and Definitions

Sec. 101. Congressional findings and purpose.
Sec. 102. Definitions.

           Subtitle B--Participation in WTO Panel Proceedings

Sec. 111. Participation in WTO panel proceedings.

Subtitle C--Congressional Advisory Commission on WTO Dispute Settlement

Sec. 121. Establishment of Commission.
Sec. 122. Duties of the Commission.
Sec. 123. Powers of the Commission.

  Subtitle D--Congressional Approval of Regulatory Action Relating to 
                         Adverse WTO Decisions

Sec. 131. Congressional approval of regulatory actions relating to 
              adverse WTO decisions.

      Subtitle E--Clarification of Rights and Obligations Through 
                              Negotiations

Sec. 141. Clarification of rights and obligations in the WTO through 
              negotiations.

    TITLE II--STRENGTHENING ANTIDUMPING AND COUNTERVAILING DUTY LAWS

Sec. 201. Prevention of circumvention.
Sec. 202. Export price and constructed export price.
Sec. 203. Nonmarket economy methodology.
Sec. 204. Determinations on the basis of facts available.
Sec. 205. Clarification of determination of material injury.
Sec. 206. Revocation of nonmarket economy country status.

     TITLE III--EXPANSION OF APPLICABILITY OF COUNTERVAILING DUTIES

Sec. 301. Application of countervailing duties to nonmarket economies 
              and strengthening application of the law.
Sec. 302. Treatment of exchange-rate manipulation as countervailable 
              subsidy under title VII of the Tariff Act of 1930.
Sec. 303. Affirmation of negotiating objective on border taxes.
Sec. 304. Presidential certification; application of countervailing 
              duty law.

 TITLE IV--LIMITATION ON PRESIDENTIAL DISCRETION IN ADDRESSING MARKET 
                               DISRUPTION

Sec. 401. Action to address market disruption.

                         TITLE V--MISCELLANEOUS

Sec. 501. Application to Canada and Mexico.

                      TITLE I--DISPUTE SETTLEMENT

             Subtitle A--Findings, Purpose, and Definitions

     SEC. 101. CONGRESSIONAL FINDINGS AND PURPOSE.

       (a) Findings.--The Congress finds the following:
       (1) The United States joined the World Trade Organization 
     as an original member with the goal of creating an improved 
     global trading system and providing expanded economic 
     opportunities for United States workers, farmers, and 
     businesses.
       (2) The dispute settlement rules of the WTO were created to 
     enhance the likelihood that governments will observe their 
     WTO obligations.
       (3) Successful operation of the WTO dispute settlement 
     system was critical to congressional approval of the Uruguay 
     Round Agreements and is critical to continued support by the 
     United States for the WTO. In particular, it is imperative 
     that dispute settlement panels and the Appellate Body--
       (A) operate with fairness and in an impartial manner;
       (B) strictly observe the terms of reference and any 
     applicable standard of review set forth in the Uruguay Round 
     Agreements; and
       (C) not add to the obligations, or diminish the rights, of 
     WTO members under the Uruguay Round Agreements in violation 
     of Articles 3.2 and 19.2 of the Dispute Settlement 
     Understanding.
       (4) An increasing number of reports by dispute settlement 
     panels and the Appellate Body have raised serious concerns 
     within the Congress about the ability of the WTO dispute 
     settlement system to operate in accordance with paragraph 
     (3).
       (5) In particular, several reports of dispute settlement 
     panels and the Appellate Body have added to the obligations 
     and diminished the rights of WTO members, particularly under 
     the Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General 
     Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, the Agreement on 
     Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, and the Agreement on 
     Safeguards.
       (6) In order to come into compliance with reports of 
     dispute settlement panels and the Appellate Body that have 
     been adopted by the Dispute Settlement Body, the Congress may 
     need to amend or repeal statutes of the United States. In 
     such cases, the Congress must have a high degree of 
     confidence that the reports are in accordance with paragraph 
     (3).
       (7) The Congress needs impartial, objective, and juridical 
     advice to determine the appropriate response to reports of 
     dispute settlement panels and the Appellate Body.
       (8) The United States remains committed to the 
     multilateral, rules-based trading system.
       (b) Purpose.--It is the purpose of this subtitle to provide 
     for the establishment of the Congressional Advisory 
     Commission on WTO Dispute Settlement to provide objective and 
     impartial advice to the Congress on the operation of the 
     dispute settlement system of the World Trade Organization.

     SEC. 102. DEFINITIONS.

       In this title:
       (1) Adverse finding.--The term ``adverse finding'' means--
       (A) in a proceeding of a dispute settlement panel or the 
     Appellate Body that is initiated against the United States, a 
     finding by the panel or the Appellate Body that any law, 
     regulation, practice, or interpretation of the United States, 
     or any State, is inconsistent with the obligations of the 
     United States under a Uruguay Round Agreement (or nullifies 
     or impairs benefits accruing to a WTO member under such an 
     Agreement); or
       (B) in a proceeding of a panel or the Appellate Body in 
     which the United States is a complaining party, any finding 
     by the panel or the Appellate Body that a measure of the 
     party complained against is not inconsistent with that 
     party's obligations under a Uruguay Round Agreement (or does 
     not nullify or impair benefits accruing to the United States 
     under such an Agreement).
       (2) Appellate body.--The term ``Appellate Body'' means the 
     Appellate Body established by the Dispute Settlement Body 
     pursuant to Article 17.1 of the Dispute Settlement 
     Understanding.
       (3) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term 
     ``appropriate congressional committees'' means the Committee 
     on Finance of the Senate and the Committee on Ways and Means 
     of the House of Representatives.
       (4) Dispute settlement body.--The term ``Dispute Settlement 
     Body'' means the Dispute Settlement Body established pursuant 
     to the Dispute Settlement Understanding.
       (5) Dispute settlement panel; panel.--The terms ``dispute 
     settlement panel'' and ``panel'' mean a panel established 
     pursuant to Article 6 of the Dispute Settlement 
     Understanding.
       (6) Dispute settlement understanding.--The term ``Dispute 
     Settlement Understanding'' means the Understanding on Rules 
     and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes referred 
     to in section 101(d)(16) of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act 
     (19 U.S.C. 3511(d)(16)).
       (7) Terms of reference.--The term ``terms of reference'' 
     has the meaning given that term in the Dispute Settlement 
     Understanding.
       (8) Trade representative.--The term ``Trade 
     Representative'' means the United States Trade 
     Representative.
       (9) United states person.--The term ``United States 
     person'' means--
       (A) a United States citizen or an alien admitted for 
     permanent residence into the United States; and
       (B) a corporation, partnership, labor organization, or 
     other legal entity organized under the laws of the United 
     States or of any State, the District of Columbia, or any 
     commonwealth, territory, or possession of the United States.
       (10) Uruguay round agreement.--The term ``Uruguay Round 
     Agreement'' means any of the Agreements described in section 
     101(d) of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act.
       (11) World trade organization; wto.--The terms ``World 
     Trade Organization'' and ``WTO'' mean the organization 
     established pursuant to the WTO Agreement.
       (12) WTO agreement.--The term ``WTO Agreement'' means the 
     Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization entered 
     into on April 15, 1994.
       (13) WTO member.--The term ``WTO member'' has the meaning 
     given that term in section 2(10) of the Uruguay Round 
     Agreements Act (19 U.S.C. 3501(10)).

           Subtitle B--Participation in WTO Panel Proceedings

     SEC. 111. PARTICIPATION IN WTO PANEL PROCEEDINGS.

       (a) In General.--If the Trade Representative, in 
     proceedings before a dispute settlement panel or the 
     Appellate Body of the WTO, seeks--
       (1) to enforce United States rights under a multilateral 
     trade agreement, or
       (2) to defend an action or determination of the United 
     States Government that is challenged,

     a United States person that is supportive of the United 
     States Government's position before the panel or Appellate 
     Body and that has a direct economic interest in the panel's 
     or Appellate Body's resolution of the matters in dispute 
     shall be permitted to participate in consultations and panel 
     or Appellate Body proceedings. The Trade Representative shall 
     issue regulations, consistent with subsections (b) and (c), 
     ensuring full and effective participation by any such person.

[[Page S917]]

       (b) Access to Information.--The Trade Representative shall 
     make available to persons described in subsection (a) all 
     information presented to or otherwise obtained by the Trade 
     Representative in connection with the WTO dispute settlement 
     proceeding in which such persons are participating. The Trade 
     Representative shall promulgate regulations to protect 
     information designated as confidential in the proceeding.
       (c) Participation in Panel Process.--Upon request from a 
     person described in subsection (a), the Trade Representative 
     shall--
       (1) consult in advance with such person regarding the 
     content of written submissions from the United States to the 
     panel or Appellate Body concerned or to the other member 
     countries involved;
       (2) include, if appropriate, such person or the person's 
     appropriate representative as an advisory member of the 
     delegation in sessions of the dispute settlement panel or 
     Appellate Body;
       (3) allow such person, if such person would bring special 
     knowledge to the proceeding, to appear before the panel or 
     Appellate Body, directly or through counsel, under the 
     supervision of responsible United States Government 
     officials; and
       (4) in proceedings involving confidential information, 
     allow the appearance of such person only through counsel as a 
     member of the special delegation.

Subtitle C--Congressional Advisory Commission on WTO Dispute Settlement

     SEC. 121. ESTABLISHMENT OF COMMISSION.

       (a) Establishment.--There is established a commission to be 
     known as the Congressional Advisory Commission on WTO Dispute 
     Settlement (in this subtitle referred to as the 
     ``Commission'').
       (b) Membership.--
       (1) Composition.--The Commission shall be composed of 5 
     members, all of whom shall be judges or former judges of the 
     Federal judicial circuits and shall be appointed by the 
     Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President pro 
     tempore of the Senate after considering the recommendations 
     of the Chairman and ranking member of each of the appropriate 
     congressional committees. Commissioners shall be chosen 
     without regard to political affiliation and solely on the 
     basis of each Commissioner's fitness to perform the duties of 
     a Commissioner.
       (2) Date.--The appointments of the initial members of the 
     Commission shall be made not later than 90 days after the 
     date of the enactment of this Act.
       (c) Period of Appointment; Vacancies.--
       (1) In general.--Members of the Commission shall each be 
     appointed for a term of 5 years, except that of the members 
     first appointed, 3 members shall each be appointed for a term 
     of 3 years.
       (2) Vacancies.--
       (A) In general.--Any vacancy on the Commission shall not 
     affect its powers, but shall be filled in the same manner in 
     which the original appointment was made and shall be subject 
     to the same conditions as the original appointment.
       (B) Unexpired term.--An individual chosen to fill a vacancy 
     shall be appointed for the unexpired term of the member 
     replaced.
       (d) Initial Meeting.--Not later than 30 days after the date 
     on which all members of the Commission have been appointed, 
     the Commission shall hold its first meeting.
       (e) Meetings.--Except for the initial meeting, the 
     Commission shall meet at the call of the Chairperson.
       (f) Quorum.--A majority of the members of the Commission 
     shall constitute a quorum, but a lesser number of members may 
     hold hearings.
       (g) Chairperson and Vice Chairperson.--The Commission shall 
     select a Chairperson and Vice Chairperson from among its 
     members.
       (h) Funding.--Members of the Commission shall be allowed 
     travel expenses, including per diem in lieu of subsistence at 
     rates authorized for employees of agencies under subchapter I 
     of chapter 57 of title 5, United States Code, while away from 
     their homes or regular places of business in the performance 
     of services for the Commission.

     SEC. 122. DUTIES OF THE COMMISSION.

       (a) Advising the Congress on the Operation of the WTO 
     Dispute Settlement System.--
       (1) In general.--The Commission shall review--
       (A) all adverse findings that are--
       (i) adopted by the Dispute Settlement Body; and
       (ii) the result of a proceeding initiated against the 
     United States by a WTO member; and
       (B) upon the request of either of the appropriate 
     congressional committees--
       (i) any adverse finding of a dispute settlement panel or 
     the Appellate Body--

       (I) that is adopted by the Dispute Settlement Body; and
       (II) in which the United States is a complaining party; or

       (ii) any other finding that is contained in a report of a 
     dispute settlement panel or the Appellate Body that is 
     adopted by the Dispute Settlement Body.
       (2) Scope of review.--The Commission shall advise the 
     Congress in connection with each adverse finding under 
     paragraph (1)(A) or (1)(B)(i) or other finding under 
     paragraph (1)(B)(ii) on--
       (A) whether the dispute settlement panel or the Appellate 
     Body, as the case may be--
       (i) exceeded its authority or its terms of reference;
       (ii) added to the obligations, or diminished the rights, of 
     the United States under the Uruguay Round Agreement that is 
     the subject of the finding;
       (iii) acted arbitrarily or capriciously, engaged in 
     misconduct, or demonstrably departed from the procedures 
     specified for panels and the Appellate Body in the applicable 
     Uruguay Round Agreement; or
       (iv) deviated from the applicable standard of review, 
     including in antidumping, countervailing duty, and other 
     trade remedy cases, the standard of review set forth in 
     Article 17.6 of the Agreement on Implementation of Article VI 
     of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994;
       (B) whether the finding is consistent with the original 
     understanding by the United States of the Uruguay Round 
     Agreement that is the subject of the finding as explained in 
     the statement of administrative action approved under section 
     101(a) of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (19 U.S.C. 
     3511(a)); and
       (C) what actions, if any, the United States should take in 
     response to the finding, including any proposals to amend, 
     rescind, or otherwise modify a law, regulation, practice, or 
     interpretation of the United States.
       (3) No deference.--In advising the Congress under paragraph 
     (2), the Commission shall not accord deference to findings of 
     law made by the dispute settlement panel or the Appellate 
     Body, as the case may be.
       (b) Determination; Report.--
       (1) Determination.--
       (A) In general.--Not later than 150 days after the date on 
     which the Commission receives notice of a report or request 
     under section 123(b), the Commission shall make a written 
     determination with respect to the matters described in 
     paragraph (2) of subsection (a), including a full analysis of 
     the basis for its determination. A vote by a majority of the 
     members of the Commission shall constitute a determination of 
     the Commission, although the members need not agree on the 
     basis for their vote.
       (B) Dissenting or concurring opinions.--Any member of the 
     Commission who disagrees with a determination of the 
     Commission or who concurs in such a determination on a basis 
     different from that of the Commission or other members of the 
     Commission, may write an opinion expressing such disagreement 
     or concurrence, as the case may be.
       (2) Report.--The Commission shall promptly report the 
     determinations described in paragraph (1)(A) to the 
     appropriate congressional committees. The Commission shall 
     include with the report any opinions written under paragraph 
     (1)(B) with respect to the determination.
       (c) Availability to the Public.--Each report of the 
     Commission under subsection (b)(2), together with the 
     opinions included with the report, shall be made available to 
     the public.

     SEC. 123. POWERS OF THE COMMISSION.

       (a) Hearings.--The Commission may hold a public hearing to 
     solicit views concerning an adverse finding or other finding 
     described in section 122(a)(1), if the Commission considers 
     such hearing to be necessary to carry out the purpose of this 
     subtitle. The Commission shall provide reasonable notice of a 
     hearing held pursuant to this subsection.
       (b) Information From Interested Parties and Federal 
     Agencies.--
       (1) Notice to commission.--
       (A) Under section 122(a)(1)(A).--The Trade Representative 
     shall advise the Commission not later than 5 business days 
     after the date the Dispute Settlement Body adopts an adverse 
     finding that is to be reviewed by the Commission under 
     section 122(a)(1)(A).
       (B) Under section 122(a)(1)(B).--Either of the appropriate 
     congressional committees may make and notify the Commission 
     of a request under section 122(a)(1)(B) not later than 1 year 
     after the Dispute Settlement Body adopts the adverse finding 
     or other finding that is the subject of the request.
       (C) Findings adopted prior to appointment of commission.--
     With respect to any adverse finding or other finding to which 
     section 122(a)(1)(B) applies and that is adopted before the 
     date on which the first members of the Commission are 
     appointed under section 121(b)(2), either of the appropriate 
     congressional committees may make and notify the Commission 
     of a request under section 122(a)(1)(B) with respect to the 
     adverse finding or other finding not later than 1 year after 
     the date on which the first members of the Commission are 
     appointed under section 121(b)(2).
       (2) Submissions and requests for information.--
       (A) In general.--The Commission shall promptly publish in 
     the Federal Register notice of--
       (i) the notice received under paragraph (1) from the Trade 
     Representative or either of the appropriate congressional 
     committees; and
       (ii) an opportunity for interested parties to submit 
     written comments to the Commission.
       (B) Comments available to public.--The Commission shall 
     make comments submitted pursuant to subparagraph (A)(ii) 
     available to the public.
       (C) Information from federal agencies and departments.--The 
     Commission may secure directly from any Federal department or 
     agency such information as the Commission considers necessary 
     to carry out the provisions of this subtitle. Upon the 
     request of the chairperson of the Commission, the

[[Page S918]]

     head of such department or agency shall furnish the 
     information requested to the Commission in a timely manner.
       (3) Access to panel and appellate body documents.--
       (A) In general.--The Trade Representative shall make 
     available to the Commission all submissions and relevant 
     documents relating to an adverse finding described in section 
     122(a)(1), including any information contained in such 
     submissions and relevant documents identified by the provider 
     of the information as proprietary information or information 
     designated as confidential by a foreign government.
       (B) Public access.--Any document that the Trade 
     Representative submits to the Commission shall be available 
     to the public, except information that is identified as 
     proprietary or confidential or the disclosure of which would 
     otherwise violate the rules of the WTO.
       (c) Assistance From Federal Agencies; Confidentiality.--
       (1) Administrative assistance.--Any agency or department of 
     the United States that is designated by the President shall 
     provide administrative services, funds, facilities, staff, or 
     other support services to the Commission to assist the 
     Commission with the performance of the Commission's 
     functions.
       (2) Confidentiality.--
       (A) Documents and information from agencies.--The 
     Commission shall protect from disclosure any document or 
     information submitted to it by a department or agency of the 
     United States that the agency or department requests be kept 
     confidential.
       (B) Disclosure of documents and information of 
     commission.--The Commission shall not be considered to be an 
     agency for purposes of section 552 of title 5, United States 
     Code.

  Subtitle D--Congressional Approval of Regulatory Action Relating to 
                         Adverse WTO Decisions

     SEC. 131. CONGRESSIONAL APPROVAL OF REGULATORY ACTIONS 
                   RELATING TO ADVERSE WTO DECISIONS.

       (a) In General.--Section 123(g) of the Uruguay Round 
     Agreements Act (19 U.S.C. 3533(g)) is amended--
       (1) in paragraph (1)--
       (A) in subparagraph (E), by striking ``and'';
       (B) by redesignating subparagraph (F) as subparagraph (H); 
     and
       (C) by inserting after subparagraph (E) the following new 
     subparagraphs:
       ``(F) the appropriate congressional committees have 
     received the report on the determinations of the 
     Congressional Advisory Commission on WTO Dispute Settlement 
     under section 122(b)(2) of the Strengthening America's Trade 
     Laws Act with respect to the relevant dispute settlement 
     panel or Appellate Body decision;
       ``(G) a joint resolution, described in paragraph (2), 
     approving the proposed modification or final rule is enacted 
     into law after the appropriate congressional committees 
     receive the report on the determinations of the Congressional 
     Advisory Commission on WTO Dispute Settlement under section 
     122(b)(2) of the Strengthening America's Trade Laws Act; 
     and''; and
       (2) by amending paragraph (2) to read as follows:
       ``(2) Joint resolution to approve modification in agency 
     regulation or practice.--
       ``(A) In general.--For the purposes of paragraph (1)(G), a 
     joint resolution is a joint resolution of the 2 Houses of the 
     Congress, the matter after the resolving clause of which is 
     as follows: `That the Congress approves the modifications to 
     the regulation or practice of the United States proposed in a 
     report submitted to the Congress under subparagraph (D) or 
     (F) of section 123(g)(1) of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act 
     (19 U.S.C. 3533(g)(1) (D) and (F)) on _______