[Congressional Record Volume 153, Number 12 (Monday, January 22, 2007)]
[Senate]
[Pages S869-S872]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                 RESOLUTION ON THE NEW STRATEGY IN IRAQ

  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I first thank the Presiding Officer for 
addressing the Senate earlier this evening with regard to the proposed 
resolution which you and our distinguished colleague from Maine, 
Senator Collins, have been working on now for several days and 
throughout the weekend, placing it into the Record for all Senators to 
have an opportunity to study it.
  I ask unanimous consent that it be printed in the Record following my 
statement.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  (See Exhibit 1.)
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, as I said when I was joined by you and 
Senator Collins in our brief press conference this afternoon, the 
resolution we currently anticipate will not be filed formally at the 
desk until the State of the Union is completed tomorrow and the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee works its will on a resolution which is 
pending before it, authored by the chairman, Senator Biden, and Senator 
Hagel of Nebraska and other Senators who have joined in that 
resolution. As that resolution works its way through the Foreign 
Relations Committee, we, the three of us who have worked on this 
resolution, will take an examination of what is sent to the floor for 
purposes of floor consideration, and at that time I anticipate we could 
indicate to the Senate a desire that our resolution be considered as a 
substitute resolution and therefore an alternative to the resolution 
that will be reported out from the Foreign Relations Committee.

[[Page S870]]

  That is what we stated today, and it is my intention to continue to 
work along in that vein because my motivation solely is to do what is 
in the best interests of the United States of America, and most 
particularly the men and women of the Armed Forces at this very pivotal 
time in the history of our Nation's commitment to Iraq, considering the 
President's plan.
  As I said earlier, America's contribution to try to bring about a 
settlement of so many of the controversies in the Middle East is done 
in the spirit only of trying to bring peace and freedom to that very 
troubled region. Iraq, at this moment, is very much before the Congress 
because the President has, on the 10th of this month, laid down a plan. 
I say it is very much before us at this time, but also there are the 
very serious questions relating to Iran and their desire to go ahead 
and develop certain aspects of nuclear energy which could at some point 
in time undertake a program that would lead to the development of 
nuclear weapons. That is a very serious question. The question of 
Lebanon is before this body, as is the question of the relationship 
between Israel and the Palestinian people. So what we do in the context 
of Iraq is not isolated from all of these serious problems.
  But for the moment, we have before us the plan laid down by the 
President on the 10th of this month. We go back and we trace the 
evolution of this problem from, say, early last fall when clearly, in 
the minds of many of us, the situation was not measuring up to our 
expectations. Our strategy at that time was not bringing about clear 
benchmarks with positive results.
  We had an extraordinary chapter of history when our military 
campaign, together with our coalition partners, enabled the Iraqi 
people to have free and open elections, to elect a government, and for 
that government to take office. They were enabled to begin the 
fundamental steps to create, No. 1, a sovereign nation with the full 
exercise of sovereignty in the hands of the government and the Iraqi 
people, and No. 2, an improved security situation in Iraq which would 
reflect throughout the region.
  Those were all very positive accomplishments. It is owing to the 
commitment of the nations forming the coalition of forces--to some 
extent the United Nations and the Security Council, so many 
institutions and commitments, and the bravery of the men and women of 
the Armed Forces--that they brought about a nation now that is a 
sovereign nation, Iraq, whose government was elected by a free people.
  But the security situation has deteriorated, and it deteriorated in 
the fall to the point that I and others began to express our concern 
publicly. Senator Levin and I returned from a trip to that region--
specifically Iraq--and in the context of reporting back to this body, 
the Senate, I indicated that, in my judgment, the situation was 
drifting sideways. We were simply not seeing the improvements in 
security. The reins of sovereignty which we put into the hands of the 
Iraqi people and their elected government were not bringing about the 
results we wished.
  The level of attacks was quite significant, and a measure of total 
distrust was beginning to evolve between the various factions--the 
Sunnis distrusting the Shias, the Shias distrusting the Sunnis--and 
this has led to where the sectarian violence is now the predominant 
problem, bringing back instability into Iraq.
  Following comments by leaders of our administration, leaders here in 
the Congress and, indeed, very respected experts in the private sector, 
the President--and I commend him--instituted a total analysis of the 
situation. I had specifically said, when I mentioned it was drifting 
sideways, that we ought to consider all aspects of changing this 
strategy we were currently employing at that time. I am not suggesting 
my remarks were the motivation, but the President took the initiative 
and the leadership, and he is to be commended. Every entity within the 
Federal system, from the Departments of State and Defense to all other 
entities, made contributions to what should be done to change his 
strategy.
  The Joint Chiefs did a very significant study on their own 
initiative, and I commend Chairman Pace. I think the Baker-Hamilton 
commission did a remarkably fine study and of value, certainly, in my 
judgment, to this institution and all those who are concentrating on 
how to resolve the problems in Iraq.
  So the President's plan presumably was his analysis of all of this 
extraordinary input into a change of strategy, and he laid down his 
proposal. At the same time he addressed the country, he said--and I 
would like to quote him. He said very clearly that ``he would welcome 
and encourage others to make contributions.''
  So what we did by way of putting this together was not to contravene 
in any way the constitutional authorities of our President which are 
expressed, his role as Commander in Chief, but to accept the offer to 
the Congress and others made by the President on January 10, 2007, and 
I quote:

       If Members have improvements that can be made, we will make 
     them. If circumstances change, we will adjust.

  Now, I commend the President for that, and it is in that vein that 
the three of us came together and began our concentrated effort shortly 
after January 10, and this is the work product.
  It is clear to us that the U.S. strategy and operations in Iraq can 
only be sustained and achieved with the support of the American people 
and with a level of bipartisanship in the Congress. On that note, 
indulge me to reflect a little bit on the Vietnam era where I was 
privileged to serve as Under Secretary, Secretary of the Navy for 5 
years and some months during that extraordinary chapter of American 
history. I can say unequivocally that my heart goes out to the men and 
women in the Armed Forces in that chapter of our history. There was a 
great deal of public misunderstanding about their role and what they 
were trying to do individually and collectively in the cause of 
freedom.
  Eventually, that public opinion began to infuse itself here in the 
two bodies of the Congress, and the rest is history. The Congress began 
to pull back and, as I say, the rest is history.
  I do not suggest there is a parallel between the combat situations, 
although there was enormous suffering and a tremendous level of 
casualties--over 50,000 men and women killed, wounded and missing in 
Vietnam--a great sacrifice for our country in the cause of freedom. But 
today I see an absolute magnificent response all across this Nation 
among the American citizens to that brave individual in uniform, both 
men and women. And the same for our many dedicated civilians who are 
also taking risks in connection with carrying out the instructions our 
President has laid down for the military, as well as all branches of 
this Government, to achieve our goals in Iraq.
  Our group agreed with the President that a loss, a failed state in 
Iraq will affect peace in the region and indeed possibly peace 
elsewhere in the world. The stakes are very high, and we weighed that 
always, as the three of us prepared these documents. But that is why I 
say during the Vietnam chapter the support of the American people and a 
level of bipartisanship in this institution were essential, and that is 
the purpose of this resolution: to hopefully achieve that.
  The purpose of this resolution is not to cut our forces at their 
present level, nor to institute and force a timetable for withdrawal. 
That is a matter--those are both matters that have to be left to the 
President--but, rather, to express the genuine concerns of a number of 
Senators from both parties about the President's plan and to set forth 
a strategy.
  Unlike some of the other resolutions that have been before the body, 
we detail a change in strategy which offers to the President the 
possibility of modification of his plan. We do not mean to be 
confrontational with our President but instead to provide a sense of 
bipartisan resolve on recommendations, alternatives, modifications, we 
should say, to the plan that he laid down. Our thoughts were in many 
respects guided by the Baker-Hamilton report.
  As I say, I personally, and I think the Presiding Officer and others, 
attach a great deal of significance to that report.
  Now, the primary objective we see of our strategy in Iraq should be 
the following: First, to encourage Iraqi leaders to make political 
compromises that

[[Page S871]]

will foster reconciliation and strengthen the unity of government, 
ultimately leading to improvements in the security situation. Further, 
our resolution states the military part of this strategy should focus 
on the following. Now, let me address the military part. I think the 
President very wisely--and this reflects on the strength of his 
proposal. It is really three parts. It is diplomacy. It is economic 
support in the nature of reconstruction, a greater emphasis on helping 
the civilian infrastructure, whether it be their electricity, their 
sanitation, their water, or many things that are very much lacking, 
regrettably. Irrespective of the enormity of the contributions we have 
made thus far to improve those situations, they just haven't improved.
  So this plan of the President's is really three parts, but I address 
now the military part. But I caution that a chain is no stronger than 
its weakest link. All three of these vital parts of the President's 
program, in order to have any measure of success, have to work 
together. Our committee, the Armed Services Committee on which the 
Presiding Officer, Senator Collins and I serve, a year or so ago put in 
specific legislation to encourage the Secretaries of the Cabinet 
positions here, the Cabinet Secretaries and the administrators of our 
Government--we put into law giving them flexibility to encourage more 
of their people to get into the mainstream to support the economic and 
reconstruction parts of the President's program. That part has to be 
every bit as strong as whatever the final military components will be, 
and the same with the diplomacy.
  But our military strategies should focus on the following: First, 
maintaining the territorial integrity of Iraq; second, denying 
international terrorists a safe haven, conducting counterterrorism 
operations, promoting regional stability, and training and equipping 
Iraqi forces to take full responsibility for their own security. 
Further, our resolution states that the U.S. military operations 
should, as much as possible, be confined to these goals and charges the 
Iraqi military with the primary mission of combating sectarian 
violence. That has been a matter of intense interest for this 
particular Senator, and I drew up this paragraph accordingly, with the 
Presiding Officer's help and concurrence.
  That is, I said, charges--it says to the Iraqi military: We have 
invested in this military, over years and years, of training, 2 full 
years, plus--equipment. Now, this sectarian violence is something that 
you should be out on the point to handle. That is your primary 
responsibility. The coalition GI, be it American or British or the 
others, should not be cast into situations--whenever possible, trying 
not to let them be cast into situations--or firefights, to be more 
precise--where Sunni is shooting at Shia, or vice versa, and for them 
to try and make the decisions of how to solve that. That, to me, we 
should charge the Iraqis as their responsibility, with their armed 
forces which we have trained, and which number over 200,000 because 
they understand the language, they understand the culture, and they 
understand the complexity of this deep-rooted distrust, this hatred 
which propels the Sunni versus the Shia, or the Shia versus the Sunni.
  This results in these wanton killings, the horrible tortures every 
day. The bodies are in the streets. I will not describe how those 
bodies have been desecrated as a symbol of this hatred and distrust. 
That is not for us to solve. That is for the Iraqis to solve.
  As such, our resolution states that the Senate disagrees with the 
President's plan to augment our forces by 21,500 and urges the 
President instead to consider all options and alternatives for 
achieving the strategic goals outlined above. Take a look at 21,500. 
That sends a difficult signal, a tough signal. We have discussed Anbar 
Province, the province where the Marines are fighting. There we 
recognize that an augmentation of forces is necessary; namely, because 
we are engaged directly with al-Qaida.
  I say respectfully to the President, we urge him to consider other 
options, to use a lesser number of troops. Particularly, we have had 
briefings recently about the growing sentiment among the Iraqi people, 
the rank and file, that they do not want more troops on their soil. 
They are anxious to have them leave now. Leaving precipitously could 
topple that situation into an all-out civil war, an imploding which has 
disastrous consequences, as we all know.
  Again, the signal we are sending 21,500 is, in our judgment, not a 
wise strategy. We are looking at Baghdad, which is the central focus of 
sectarian violence, the central focus of the majority of the 
insecurity, the failure of security in that sovereign country. There 
are nine different districts, as I understand the President's plan. 
Sequentially, we will take a district, go into it, and see whether we 
can lower the level of violence, provide some stability and confidence 
for their people so they can look forward to some quality of life and 
personal safety. However, as we take the initial section of Baghdad and 
do that, we should lay down clear and precise benchmarks that the Iraqi 
forces must follow.
  First, the commitment of their troop level, together with the troop 
level of the United States, should be all present and accounted for on 
the day before that operation starts. Unlike the failure of the 
previous surge efforts in Baghdad, where the United States showed up 
and a far less number of Iraqis--although committed--showed up. That is 
the first thing.
  The second thing is, it is imperative the political leadership in 
that Government, which has tried to reach down and make decisions 
affecting the tactics of the Armed Forces--both Iraqi Armed Forces and 
the coalition forces, principally the American forces--that comes to an 
absolute end. The military commanders should be entrusted to make the 
tactical decisions, to take the missions they see fit for each of the 
nine districts--the missions can be different in the nine districts--
and carry them out halfway through, after perhaps sacrificing life and 
limb to accomplish some measure of success, will not be reversed by a 
political decision made somewhere in the Iraqi Government. That is 
important.
  We had the benchmarks. Before we go to a second location in Baghdad, 
we will have, hopefully, a clearly documented case of this operation 
going according to plan. It will document the Iraqis taking the point, 
as we say in military work, with regard to incidents of sectarian 
violence. Before we go to another sequenced operation in Baghdad, we 
better be sure. Words will not do it. Statements will not do it. Only 
deeds will be convincing that there is a full and unqualified 
commitment to the Iraqi Government.
  Our resolution is worthy of consideration by our colleagues. There is 
a great deal of concern in the Senate and adversity of opinion. I 
respect that. I hope it will be considered. The three of us will be 
glad to work with colleagues individually, collectively, and most 
respectfully of our own leadership, as to what guidance they might wish 
to give us.
  I thank the Presiding Officer. I thank Senator Collins. I wish to 
thank staff who worked throughout the weekend and over the past few 
days: Tim Becker, from the staff of the Presiding Officer; Christiana 
Gallagher, also of your staff; Jane Alonso, of Senator Collins' staff; 
John Ullyot, of my staff; Bill Caniano and Ann Loomis and Sandy Luff, 
of my staff. We have had quite a team working. They all made possible 
the completion of this resolution today.

                               Exhibit 1

       Language Sponsored by Mr. Warner (for himself, Mr. Nelson 
     of Nebraska, and Ms. Collins)
       Resolution expressing the sense of Congress on the new 
     strategy in Iraq.
       Whereas, we respect the Constitutional authorities given a 
     President in Article II, Section 2, which states that ``The 
     President shall be commander in chief of the Army and Navy of 
     the United States;'' it is not the intent of this resolution 
     to question or contravene such authority, but to accept the 
     offer to Congress made by the President on January 10, 2007 
     that, ``if members have improvements that can be made, we 
     will make them. If circumstances change, we will adjust;''
       Whereas, the United States' strategy and operations in Iraq 
     can only be sustained and achieved with support from the 
     American people and with a level of bipartisanship;
       Whereas, over 137,000 American military personnel are 
     currently serving in Iraq, like thousands of others since 
     March 2003, with the bravery and professionalism consistent 
     with the finest traditions of the United States armed forces, 
     and are deserving of the support of all Americans, which they 
     have strongly;

[[Page S872]]

       Whereas, many American service personnel have lost their 
     lives, and many more have been wounded, in Iraq, and the 
     American people will always honor their sacrifices and honor 
     their families;
       Whereas, the U.S. Army and Marine Corps, including their 
     Reserve and National Guard organizations, together with 
     components of the other branches of the military, are under 
     enormous strain from multiple, extended deployments to Iraq 
     and Afghanistan;
       Whereas, these deployments, and those that will follow, 
     will have lasting impacts on the future recruiting, retention 
     and readiness of our nation's all volunteer force;
       Whereas in the National Defense Authorization Act for 
     Fiscal Year 2006, the Congress stated that ``calendar year 
     2006 should be a period of significant transition to full 
     sovereignty, with Iraqi security forces taking the lead for 
     the security of a free and sovereign Iraq;''
       Whereas, United Nations Security Council Resolution 1723, 
     approved November 28, 2006, ``determin[ed] that the situation 
     in Iraq continues to constitute a threat to international 
     peace and security;''
       Whereas, a failed state in Iraq would present a threat to 
     regional and world peace, and the long-term security 
     interests of the United States are best served by an Iraq 
     that can sustain, govern, and defend itself, and serve as an 
     ally in the war against extremists;
       Whereas, Iraq is experiencing a deteriorating an ever-
     widening problem of sectarian and intra-sectarian violence 
     based upon political distrust and cultural differences 
     between some Sunni and Shia Muslims;
       Whereas, Iraqis must reach political settlements in order 
     to achieve reconciliation, and the failure of the Iraqis to 
     reach such settlements to support a truly unified government 
     greatly contributes to the increasing violence in Iraq;
       Whereas, the responsibility for Iraq's internal security 
     and halting sectarian violence must rest primarily with the 
     Government of Iraq and Iraqi Security Forces;
       Whereas, U.S. Central Command Commander General John 
     Abizaid testified to Congress on November 15, 2006, ``I met 
     with every divisional commander, General Casey, the Corps 
     Commander, [and] General Dempsey. We all talked together. And 
     I said, in your professional opinion, if we were to bring in 
     more American troops now, does it add considerably to our 
     ability to achieve success in Iraq? And they all said no. And 
     the reason is, because we want the Iraqis to do more. It's 
     easy for the Iraqis to rely upon us to do this work. I 
     believe that more American forces prevent the Iraqis from 
     doing more, from taking more responsibility for their own 
     future;''
       Whereas, Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki stated on 
     November 27, 2006 that ``The crisis is political, and the 
     ones who can stop the cycle of aggravation and bloodletting 
     of innocents are the politicians;''
       Whereas, there is growing evidence that Iraqi public 
     sentiment opposes the continued U.S. troop presence in Iraq, 
     much less increasing the troop level;
       Whereas, in the fall of 2006, leaders in the Administration 
     and Congress, as well as recognized experts in the private 
     sector, began to express concern that the situation in Iraq 
     was deteriorating and required a change in strategy; and, as 
     a consequence, the Administration began an intensive, 
     comprehensive review of the Iraq strategy, by all components 
     of the Executive branch;
       Whereas, in December 2006, the bipartisan Iraq Study Group 
     issued a valuable report, suggesting a comprehensive strategy 
     that includes ``new and enhanced diplomatic and political 
     efforts in Iraq and the region, and a change in the primary 
     mission of U.S. forces in Iraq that will enable the United 
     States to begin to move its combat forces out of Iraq 
     responsibly;''
       Whereas, on January 10, 2007, following consultations with 
     the Iraqi Prime Minister, the President announced a new 
     strategy (hereinafter referred to as the ``plan,'') the 
     central element of which is an augmentation of the present 
     U.S. military force structure through additional deployments 
     of approximately 21,500 U.S. military troops to Iraq;
       Whereas, this proposed level of troop augmentation far 
     exceeds the expectations of many of us as to the 
     reinforcements that would be necessary to implement the 
     various options for a new strategy, and led many members to 
     express outright opposition to augmenting our troops by 
     21,500;
       Whereas, the Government of Iraq has promised repeatedly to 
     assume a greater share of security responsibilities, disband 
     militias, consider Constitutional amendments and enact laws 
     to reconcile sectarian differences, and improve the quality 
     of essential services for the Iraqi people; yet, despite 
     those promises, little has been achieved;
       Whereas, the President said on January 10, 2007 that ``I've 
     made it clear to the Prime Minister and Iraq's other leaders 
     that America's commitment is not open-ended'' so as to dispel 
     the contrary impression that exists;
       Whereas, the recommendations in this resolution should not 
     be interpreted as precipitating any immediate reduction in, 
     or withdrawal of, the present level of forces: Now therefore, 
     be it
       Resolved, by the Senate (the House of Representatives 
     concurring), That it is the sense of Congress that--
       (1) the Senate disagrees with the ``plan'' to augment our 
     forces by 21,500, and urges the President instead to consider 
     all options and alternatives for achieving the strategic 
     goals set forth below with reduced force levels than 
     proposed;
       (2) the primary objective of the overall U.S. strategy in 
     Iraq should be to encourage Iraqi leaders to make political 
     compromises that will foster reconciliation and strengthen 
     the unity government, ultimately leading to improvements in 
     the security situation;
       (3) the military part of this strategy should focus on 
     maintaining the territorial integrity of Iraq, denying 
     international terrorists a safe haven, conducting 
     counterterrorism operations, promoting regional stability, 
     and training and equipping Iraqi forces to take full 
     responsibility for their own security;
       (4) United States military operations should, as much as 
     possible, be confined to these goals, and charge the Iraqi 
     military with the primary mission of combating sectarian 
     violence;
       (5) the military Rules of Engagement for this plan should 
     reflect this delineation of responsibilities;
       (6) the United States Government should transfer to the 
     Iraqi military, in an expeditious manner, such equipment as 
     is necessary;
       (7) the Senate believes the United States should continue 
     vigorous operations in Anbar province, specifically for the 
     purpose of combating an insurgency, including elements 
     associated with the Al Qaeda movement, and denying terrorists 
     a safe haven;
       (8) the United States Government should engage selected 
     nations in the Middle East to develop a regional, 
     internationally sponsored peace-and-reconciliation process 
     for Iraq;
       (9) the Administration should provide regular updates to 
     the Congress, produced by the Commander of United States 
     Central Command and his subordinate commanders, about the 
     progress or lack of progress the Iraqis are making toward 
     this end.
       (10) our overall military, diplomatic and economic strategy 
     should not be regarded as an ``open-ended'' or unconditional 
     commitment, but rather as a new strategy that hereafter 
     should be conditioned upon the Iraqi government's meeting 
     benchmarks that must be specified by the Administration.

  I yield the floor.


                   ADJOURNMENT UNTIL 10 A.M. TOMORROW

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under a previous order, the Senate stands in 
adjournment until 10 a.m., Tuesday, January 23, 2007.
  Thereupon, the Senate, at 6:59 p.m., adjourned until Tuesday, January 
23, 2007, at 10 a.m.

                          ____________________