[Congressional Record Volume 153, Number 12 (Monday, January 22, 2007)]
[Senate]
[Pages S869-S872]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
RESOLUTION ON THE NEW STRATEGY IN IRAQ
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I first thank the Presiding Officer for
addressing the Senate earlier this evening with regard to the proposed
resolution which you and our distinguished colleague from Maine,
Senator Collins, have been working on now for several days and
throughout the weekend, placing it into the Record for all Senators to
have an opportunity to study it.
I ask unanimous consent that it be printed in the Record following my
statement.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
(See Exhibit 1.)
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, as I said when I was joined by you and
Senator Collins in our brief press conference this afternoon, the
resolution we currently anticipate will not be filed formally at the
desk until the State of the Union is completed tomorrow and the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee works its will on a resolution which is
pending before it, authored by the chairman, Senator Biden, and Senator
Hagel of Nebraska and other Senators who have joined in that
resolution. As that resolution works its way through the Foreign
Relations Committee, we, the three of us who have worked on this
resolution, will take an examination of what is sent to the floor for
purposes of floor consideration, and at that time I anticipate we could
indicate to the Senate a desire that our resolution be considered as a
substitute resolution and therefore an alternative to the resolution
that will be reported out from the Foreign Relations Committee.
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That is what we stated today, and it is my intention to continue to
work along in that vein because my motivation solely is to do what is
in the best interests of the United States of America, and most
particularly the men and women of the Armed Forces at this very pivotal
time in the history of our Nation's commitment to Iraq, considering the
President's plan.
As I said earlier, America's contribution to try to bring about a
settlement of so many of the controversies in the Middle East is done
in the spirit only of trying to bring peace and freedom to that very
troubled region. Iraq, at this moment, is very much before the Congress
because the President has, on the 10th of this month, laid down a plan.
I say it is very much before us at this time, but also there are the
very serious questions relating to Iran and their desire to go ahead
and develop certain aspects of nuclear energy which could at some point
in time undertake a program that would lead to the development of
nuclear weapons. That is a very serious question. The question of
Lebanon is before this body, as is the question of the relationship
between Israel and the Palestinian people. So what we do in the context
of Iraq is not isolated from all of these serious problems.
But for the moment, we have before us the plan laid down by the
President on the 10th of this month. We go back and we trace the
evolution of this problem from, say, early last fall when clearly, in
the minds of many of us, the situation was not measuring up to our
expectations. Our strategy at that time was not bringing about clear
benchmarks with positive results.
We had an extraordinary chapter of history when our military
campaign, together with our coalition partners, enabled the Iraqi
people to have free and open elections, to elect a government, and for
that government to take office. They were enabled to begin the
fundamental steps to create, No. 1, a sovereign nation with the full
exercise of sovereignty in the hands of the government and the Iraqi
people, and No. 2, an improved security situation in Iraq which would
reflect throughout the region.
Those were all very positive accomplishments. It is owing to the
commitment of the nations forming the coalition of forces--to some
extent the United Nations and the Security Council, so many
institutions and commitments, and the bravery of the men and women of
the Armed Forces--that they brought about a nation now that is a
sovereign nation, Iraq, whose government was elected by a free people.
But the security situation has deteriorated, and it deteriorated in
the fall to the point that I and others began to express our concern
publicly. Senator Levin and I returned from a trip to that region--
specifically Iraq--and in the context of reporting back to this body,
the Senate, I indicated that, in my judgment, the situation was
drifting sideways. We were simply not seeing the improvements in
security. The reins of sovereignty which we put into the hands of the
Iraqi people and their elected government were not bringing about the
results we wished.
The level of attacks was quite significant, and a measure of total
distrust was beginning to evolve between the various factions--the
Sunnis distrusting the Shias, the Shias distrusting the Sunnis--and
this has led to where the sectarian violence is now the predominant
problem, bringing back instability into Iraq.
Following comments by leaders of our administration, leaders here in
the Congress and, indeed, very respected experts in the private sector,
the President--and I commend him--instituted a total analysis of the
situation. I had specifically said, when I mentioned it was drifting
sideways, that we ought to consider all aspects of changing this
strategy we were currently employing at that time. I am not suggesting
my remarks were the motivation, but the President took the initiative
and the leadership, and he is to be commended. Every entity within the
Federal system, from the Departments of State and Defense to all other
entities, made contributions to what should be done to change his
strategy.
The Joint Chiefs did a very significant study on their own
initiative, and I commend Chairman Pace. I think the Baker-Hamilton
commission did a remarkably fine study and of value, certainly, in my
judgment, to this institution and all those who are concentrating on
how to resolve the problems in Iraq.
So the President's plan presumably was his analysis of all of this
extraordinary input into a change of strategy, and he laid down his
proposal. At the same time he addressed the country, he said--and I
would like to quote him. He said very clearly that ``he would welcome
and encourage others to make contributions.''
So what we did by way of putting this together was not to contravene
in any way the constitutional authorities of our President which are
expressed, his role as Commander in Chief, but to accept the offer to
the Congress and others made by the President on January 10, 2007, and
I quote:
If Members have improvements that can be made, we will make
them. If circumstances change, we will adjust.
Now, I commend the President for that, and it is in that vein that
the three of us came together and began our concentrated effort shortly
after January 10, and this is the work product.
It is clear to us that the U.S. strategy and operations in Iraq can
only be sustained and achieved with the support of the American people
and with a level of bipartisanship in the Congress. On that note,
indulge me to reflect a little bit on the Vietnam era where I was
privileged to serve as Under Secretary, Secretary of the Navy for 5
years and some months during that extraordinary chapter of American
history. I can say unequivocally that my heart goes out to the men and
women in the Armed Forces in that chapter of our history. There was a
great deal of public misunderstanding about their role and what they
were trying to do individually and collectively in the cause of
freedom.
Eventually, that public opinion began to infuse itself here in the
two bodies of the Congress, and the rest is history. The Congress began
to pull back and, as I say, the rest is history.
I do not suggest there is a parallel between the combat situations,
although there was enormous suffering and a tremendous level of
casualties--over 50,000 men and women killed, wounded and missing in
Vietnam--a great sacrifice for our country in the cause of freedom. But
today I see an absolute magnificent response all across this Nation
among the American citizens to that brave individual in uniform, both
men and women. And the same for our many dedicated civilians who are
also taking risks in connection with carrying out the instructions our
President has laid down for the military, as well as all branches of
this Government, to achieve our goals in Iraq.
Our group agreed with the President that a loss, a failed state in
Iraq will affect peace in the region and indeed possibly peace
elsewhere in the world. The stakes are very high, and we weighed that
always, as the three of us prepared these documents. But that is why I
say during the Vietnam chapter the support of the American people and a
level of bipartisanship in this institution were essential, and that is
the purpose of this resolution: to hopefully achieve that.
The purpose of this resolution is not to cut our forces at their
present level, nor to institute and force a timetable for withdrawal.
That is a matter--those are both matters that have to be left to the
President--but, rather, to express the genuine concerns of a number of
Senators from both parties about the President's plan and to set forth
a strategy.
Unlike some of the other resolutions that have been before the body,
we detail a change in strategy which offers to the President the
possibility of modification of his plan. We do not mean to be
confrontational with our President but instead to provide a sense of
bipartisan resolve on recommendations, alternatives, modifications, we
should say, to the plan that he laid down. Our thoughts were in many
respects guided by the Baker-Hamilton report.
As I say, I personally, and I think the Presiding Officer and others,
attach a great deal of significance to that report.
Now, the primary objective we see of our strategy in Iraq should be
the following: First, to encourage Iraqi leaders to make political
compromises that
[[Page S871]]
will foster reconciliation and strengthen the unity of government,
ultimately leading to improvements in the security situation. Further,
our resolution states the military part of this strategy should focus
on the following. Now, let me address the military part. I think the
President very wisely--and this reflects on the strength of his
proposal. It is really three parts. It is diplomacy. It is economic
support in the nature of reconstruction, a greater emphasis on helping
the civilian infrastructure, whether it be their electricity, their
sanitation, their water, or many things that are very much lacking,
regrettably. Irrespective of the enormity of the contributions we have
made thus far to improve those situations, they just haven't improved.
So this plan of the President's is really three parts, but I address
now the military part. But I caution that a chain is no stronger than
its weakest link. All three of these vital parts of the President's
program, in order to have any measure of success, have to work
together. Our committee, the Armed Services Committee on which the
Presiding Officer, Senator Collins and I serve, a year or so ago put in
specific legislation to encourage the Secretaries of the Cabinet
positions here, the Cabinet Secretaries and the administrators of our
Government--we put into law giving them flexibility to encourage more
of their people to get into the mainstream to support the economic and
reconstruction parts of the President's program. That part has to be
every bit as strong as whatever the final military components will be,
and the same with the diplomacy.
But our military strategies should focus on the following: First,
maintaining the territorial integrity of Iraq; second, denying
international terrorists a safe haven, conducting counterterrorism
operations, promoting regional stability, and training and equipping
Iraqi forces to take full responsibility for their own security.
Further, our resolution states that the U.S. military operations
should, as much as possible, be confined to these goals and charges the
Iraqi military with the primary mission of combating sectarian
violence. That has been a matter of intense interest for this
particular Senator, and I drew up this paragraph accordingly, with the
Presiding Officer's help and concurrence.
That is, I said, charges--it says to the Iraqi military: We have
invested in this military, over years and years, of training, 2 full
years, plus--equipment. Now, this sectarian violence is something that
you should be out on the point to handle. That is your primary
responsibility. The coalition GI, be it American or British or the
others, should not be cast into situations--whenever possible, trying
not to let them be cast into situations--or firefights, to be more
precise--where Sunni is shooting at Shia, or vice versa, and for them
to try and make the decisions of how to solve that. That, to me, we
should charge the Iraqis as their responsibility, with their armed
forces which we have trained, and which number over 200,000 because
they understand the language, they understand the culture, and they
understand the complexity of this deep-rooted distrust, this hatred
which propels the Sunni versus the Shia, or the Shia versus the Sunni.
This results in these wanton killings, the horrible tortures every
day. The bodies are in the streets. I will not describe how those
bodies have been desecrated as a symbol of this hatred and distrust.
That is not for us to solve. That is for the Iraqis to solve.
As such, our resolution states that the Senate disagrees with the
President's plan to augment our forces by 21,500 and urges the
President instead to consider all options and alternatives for
achieving the strategic goals outlined above. Take a look at 21,500.
That sends a difficult signal, a tough signal. We have discussed Anbar
Province, the province where the Marines are fighting. There we
recognize that an augmentation of forces is necessary; namely, because
we are engaged directly with al-Qaida.
I say respectfully to the President, we urge him to consider other
options, to use a lesser number of troops. Particularly, we have had
briefings recently about the growing sentiment among the Iraqi people,
the rank and file, that they do not want more troops on their soil.
They are anxious to have them leave now. Leaving precipitously could
topple that situation into an all-out civil war, an imploding which has
disastrous consequences, as we all know.
Again, the signal we are sending 21,500 is, in our judgment, not a
wise strategy. We are looking at Baghdad, which is the central focus of
sectarian violence, the central focus of the majority of the
insecurity, the failure of security in that sovereign country. There
are nine different districts, as I understand the President's plan.
Sequentially, we will take a district, go into it, and see whether we
can lower the level of violence, provide some stability and confidence
for their people so they can look forward to some quality of life and
personal safety. However, as we take the initial section of Baghdad and
do that, we should lay down clear and precise benchmarks that the Iraqi
forces must follow.
First, the commitment of their troop level, together with the troop
level of the United States, should be all present and accounted for on
the day before that operation starts. Unlike the failure of the
previous surge efforts in Baghdad, where the United States showed up
and a far less number of Iraqis--although committed--showed up. That is
the first thing.
The second thing is, it is imperative the political leadership in
that Government, which has tried to reach down and make decisions
affecting the tactics of the Armed Forces--both Iraqi Armed Forces and
the coalition forces, principally the American forces--that comes to an
absolute end. The military commanders should be entrusted to make the
tactical decisions, to take the missions they see fit for each of the
nine districts--the missions can be different in the nine districts--
and carry them out halfway through, after perhaps sacrificing life and
limb to accomplish some measure of success, will not be reversed by a
political decision made somewhere in the Iraqi Government. That is
important.
We had the benchmarks. Before we go to a second location in Baghdad,
we will have, hopefully, a clearly documented case of this operation
going according to plan. It will document the Iraqis taking the point,
as we say in military work, with regard to incidents of sectarian
violence. Before we go to another sequenced operation in Baghdad, we
better be sure. Words will not do it. Statements will not do it. Only
deeds will be convincing that there is a full and unqualified
commitment to the Iraqi Government.
Our resolution is worthy of consideration by our colleagues. There is
a great deal of concern in the Senate and adversity of opinion. I
respect that. I hope it will be considered. The three of us will be
glad to work with colleagues individually, collectively, and most
respectfully of our own leadership, as to what guidance they might wish
to give us.
I thank the Presiding Officer. I thank Senator Collins. I wish to
thank staff who worked throughout the weekend and over the past few
days: Tim Becker, from the staff of the Presiding Officer; Christiana
Gallagher, also of your staff; Jane Alonso, of Senator Collins' staff;
John Ullyot, of my staff; Bill Caniano and Ann Loomis and Sandy Luff,
of my staff. We have had quite a team working. They all made possible
the completion of this resolution today.
Exhibit 1
Language Sponsored by Mr. Warner (for himself, Mr. Nelson
of Nebraska, and Ms. Collins)
Resolution expressing the sense of Congress on the new
strategy in Iraq.
Whereas, we respect the Constitutional authorities given a
President in Article II, Section 2, which states that ``The
President shall be commander in chief of the Army and Navy of
the United States;'' it is not the intent of this resolution
to question or contravene such authority, but to accept the
offer to Congress made by the President on January 10, 2007
that, ``if members have improvements that can be made, we
will make them. If circumstances change, we will adjust;''
Whereas, the United States' strategy and operations in Iraq
can only be sustained and achieved with support from the
American people and with a level of bipartisanship;
Whereas, over 137,000 American military personnel are
currently serving in Iraq, like thousands of others since
March 2003, with the bravery and professionalism consistent
with the finest traditions of the United States armed forces,
and are deserving of the support of all Americans, which they
have strongly;
[[Page S872]]
Whereas, many American service personnel have lost their
lives, and many more have been wounded, in Iraq, and the
American people will always honor their sacrifices and honor
their families;
Whereas, the U.S. Army and Marine Corps, including their
Reserve and National Guard organizations, together with
components of the other branches of the military, are under
enormous strain from multiple, extended deployments to Iraq
and Afghanistan;
Whereas, these deployments, and those that will follow,
will have lasting impacts on the future recruiting, retention
and readiness of our nation's all volunteer force;
Whereas in the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2006, the Congress stated that ``calendar year
2006 should be a period of significant transition to full
sovereignty, with Iraqi security forces taking the lead for
the security of a free and sovereign Iraq;''
Whereas, United Nations Security Council Resolution 1723,
approved November 28, 2006, ``determin[ed] that the situation
in Iraq continues to constitute a threat to international
peace and security;''
Whereas, a failed state in Iraq would present a threat to
regional and world peace, and the long-term security
interests of the United States are best served by an Iraq
that can sustain, govern, and defend itself, and serve as an
ally in the war against extremists;
Whereas, Iraq is experiencing a deteriorating an ever-
widening problem of sectarian and intra-sectarian violence
based upon political distrust and cultural differences
between some Sunni and Shia Muslims;
Whereas, Iraqis must reach political settlements in order
to achieve reconciliation, and the failure of the Iraqis to
reach such settlements to support a truly unified government
greatly contributes to the increasing violence in Iraq;
Whereas, the responsibility for Iraq's internal security
and halting sectarian violence must rest primarily with the
Government of Iraq and Iraqi Security Forces;
Whereas, U.S. Central Command Commander General John
Abizaid testified to Congress on November 15, 2006, ``I met
with every divisional commander, General Casey, the Corps
Commander, [and] General Dempsey. We all talked together. And
I said, in your professional opinion, if we were to bring in
more American troops now, does it add considerably to our
ability to achieve success in Iraq? And they all said no. And
the reason is, because we want the Iraqis to do more. It's
easy for the Iraqis to rely upon us to do this work. I
believe that more American forces prevent the Iraqis from
doing more, from taking more responsibility for their own
future;''
Whereas, Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki stated on
November 27, 2006 that ``The crisis is political, and the
ones who can stop the cycle of aggravation and bloodletting
of innocents are the politicians;''
Whereas, there is growing evidence that Iraqi public
sentiment opposes the continued U.S. troop presence in Iraq,
much less increasing the troop level;
Whereas, in the fall of 2006, leaders in the Administration
and Congress, as well as recognized experts in the private
sector, began to express concern that the situation in Iraq
was deteriorating and required a change in strategy; and, as
a consequence, the Administration began an intensive,
comprehensive review of the Iraq strategy, by all components
of the Executive branch;
Whereas, in December 2006, the bipartisan Iraq Study Group
issued a valuable report, suggesting a comprehensive strategy
that includes ``new and enhanced diplomatic and political
efforts in Iraq and the region, and a change in the primary
mission of U.S. forces in Iraq that will enable the United
States to begin to move its combat forces out of Iraq
responsibly;''
Whereas, on January 10, 2007, following consultations with
the Iraqi Prime Minister, the President announced a new
strategy (hereinafter referred to as the ``plan,'') the
central element of which is an augmentation of the present
U.S. military force structure through additional deployments
of approximately 21,500 U.S. military troops to Iraq;
Whereas, this proposed level of troop augmentation far
exceeds the expectations of many of us as to the
reinforcements that would be necessary to implement the
various options for a new strategy, and led many members to
express outright opposition to augmenting our troops by
21,500;
Whereas, the Government of Iraq has promised repeatedly to
assume a greater share of security responsibilities, disband
militias, consider Constitutional amendments and enact laws
to reconcile sectarian differences, and improve the quality
of essential services for the Iraqi people; yet, despite
those promises, little has been achieved;
Whereas, the President said on January 10, 2007 that ``I've
made it clear to the Prime Minister and Iraq's other leaders
that America's commitment is not open-ended'' so as to dispel
the contrary impression that exists;
Whereas, the recommendations in this resolution should not
be interpreted as precipitating any immediate reduction in,
or withdrawal of, the present level of forces: Now therefore,
be it
Resolved, by the Senate (the House of Representatives
concurring), That it is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the Senate disagrees with the ``plan'' to augment our
forces by 21,500, and urges the President instead to consider
all options and alternatives for achieving the strategic
goals set forth below with reduced force levels than
proposed;
(2) the primary objective of the overall U.S. strategy in
Iraq should be to encourage Iraqi leaders to make political
compromises that will foster reconciliation and strengthen
the unity government, ultimately leading to improvements in
the security situation;
(3) the military part of this strategy should focus on
maintaining the territorial integrity of Iraq, denying
international terrorists a safe haven, conducting
counterterrorism operations, promoting regional stability,
and training and equipping Iraqi forces to take full
responsibility for their own security;
(4) United States military operations should, as much as
possible, be confined to these goals, and charge the Iraqi
military with the primary mission of combating sectarian
violence;
(5) the military Rules of Engagement for this plan should
reflect this delineation of responsibilities;
(6) the United States Government should transfer to the
Iraqi military, in an expeditious manner, such equipment as
is necessary;
(7) the Senate believes the United States should continue
vigorous operations in Anbar province, specifically for the
purpose of combating an insurgency, including elements
associated with the Al Qaeda movement, and denying terrorists
a safe haven;
(8) the United States Government should engage selected
nations in the Middle East to develop a regional,
internationally sponsored peace-and-reconciliation process
for Iraq;
(9) the Administration should provide regular updates to
the Congress, produced by the Commander of United States
Central Command and his subordinate commanders, about the
progress or lack of progress the Iraqis are making toward
this end.
(10) our overall military, diplomatic and economic strategy
should not be regarded as an ``open-ended'' or unconditional
commitment, but rather as a new strategy that hereafter
should be conditioned upon the Iraqi government's meeting
benchmarks that must be specified by the Administration.
I yield the floor.
ADJOURNMENT UNTIL 10 A.M. TOMORROW
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under a previous order, the Senate stands in
adjournment until 10 a.m., Tuesday, January 23, 2007.
Thereupon, the Senate, at 6:59 p.m., adjourned until Tuesday, January
23, 2007, at 10 a.m.
____________________