[Congressional Record Volume 153, Number 12 (Monday, January 22, 2007)]
[Senate]
[Pages S828-S852]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




          STATEMENTS ON INTRODUCED BILLS AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS

      By Mr. VOINOVICH (for himself, Mr. Akaka, Mr. Lugar, Ms. 
        Mikulski, and Mr. Stevens):
  S. 342. A bill to expand visa waiver program to countries on a 
probationary basis and for other purposes; to the Committee on the 
Judiciary.
  Mr. VOINOVICH. Mr. President, I rise to introduce The Secure Travel 
and Counterterrorism Partnership Act of 2007, along with my good 
friends Senators Akaka, Lugar, and Mikulski.
  This legislation would expand the U.S. Visa Waiver Program in a way 
that would increase cooperation with key allies in the War on Terror 
while strengthening U.S. national security.
  The bill provides a way for us to expand and improve the Visa Waiver 
Program so that Americans are safer and our Nation is more prosperous 
for years to come.
  This legislation comes at a particularly important time in our 
Nation's history. We are currently facing multiple foreign policy 
challenges in the post-9/11 world. We need the cooperation of several 
allies to combat transnational threats. As such, we are asking our 
friends and allies to contribute more of their troops and resources to 
Iraq, Afghanistan, and other conflicts in the world, so that we can be 
successful. This legislation will help us to solidify key relationships 
and increase goodwill toward the U.S. for years to come, while also 
enhancing travel security standards and safety at home.
  My legislation would authorize the Department of Homeland Security, 
in consultation with the Department of State, to expand the Visa Waiver 
Program to countries that are true friends of America and are prepared 
to do more to help us keep terrorists and criminals out of our borders.
  For those that do not know about the Visa Waiver Program, it was 
established in 1986 to improve relations with U.S. allies and 
strengthen the U.S. economy. The program permitted nationals from the 
selected countries to enter the United States without a visa for up to 
90 days for tourism or business purposes.
  Currently, 27 countries participate in the program, including the 
United Kingdom. No countries have been added to the Visa Waiver Program 
since 1999. But there are a number of newer allies who would also like 
to participate in the Visa Waiver Program and are willing to meet 
strict security requirements and cooperate on counterterrorism 
initiatives.
  Many of these countries were former members of the Soviet Union. They 
were victims of Soviet oppression for years, against their will, and 
despite their desire for freedom. These countries have a unique 
understanding of the struggle for democracy taking place in Iraq and 
Afghanistan. Today, many of these countries have had boots on the 
ground in Iraq and Afghanistan

[[Page S829]]

and want to help the U.S. combat terrorism and promote democracy.
  Despite their commitments to the principles of freedom and democracy, 
these countries are still paying a price that other countries in the 
West do not pay. Citizens of Portugal, the UK, or Spain can travel 
easily to the U.S., while citizens of Poland, Hungary, and Slovakia are 
given second-class treatment.
  I recently learned of a story involving a young Czech officer who 
served in Iraq with Americans. This soldier wanted to come to America 
to visit the American friends he made during combat operations. But his 
application for a visa was refused. Why? Because his passport included 
a visit to Iraq, the very place he served with American soldiers.
  Many young people from places like Latvia, Estonia, and Bulgaria have 
a positive view of America and hope to visit our country. However, 
their expensive visa applications are frequently rejected, dampening 
their spirits and tainting their image of America. And this view is 
spreading every day.
  By limiting legitimate travel to the U.S., we are risking a loss of 
influence with the future leaders of our closest allies.
  I have been working for many months to develop legislation that will 
expand the Visa Waiver Program, without sacrificing U.S. security. I 
was pleased last November when I heard President Bush announce his 
intention to work with Congress on this issue. On the margins of the 
NATO Summit in Riga, he called on Congress to expand the Visa Waiver 
Program so that we can reward our closest allies for their help and 
friendship.
  I agree with the President--but I want to clarify that visa-free 
travel privileges are not simply a reward for our allies. The true 
reward is the knowledge that we are free and democratic countries 
working together to advance international security. The foremost goal 
of this legislation is to create mutually beneficial partnerships with 
clear national security advantages for the United States.

  By continuing on the current path, we risk marginalizing some of our 
closest allies in the War on Terror and losing the hearts and minds of 
their future leaders and citizens. We have an opportunity to change 
direction in a way that will promote our own national security 
interests and improve control of our borders. The Secure Travel and 
Counterterrorism Partnership Act of 2007 can achieve all of these 
objectives.
  The legislation would give the executive branch the necessary 
authority to expand visa-free travel privileges for up to five new 
countries, for a probationary period of three years.
  In order for a country to participate in the plan, the executive 
branch would first need to certify that the country is cooperative on 
counterterrorism and does not pose a security or law enforcement threat 
to the United States. Prospective countries would also be required to 
take a number of new steps to enhance our common security.
  Prior to participation, the countries would be required to conclude 
new agreements with the United States to further strengthen cooperation 
on counterterrorism and improve information-sharing about critical 
security issues.
  Some might say--if these countries are key allies, aren't they 
cooperating with us already? The answer is yes. They are very 
cooperative. But in today's heightened security environment, there is 
more that each country can do, such as sharing additional sensitive 
information that can help our intelligence community and law 
enforcement agencies investigate threats and combat terrorist activity. 
By negotiating new agreements on counterterrorism and information-
sharing to permit participation in the Visa Waiver Program, we can 
reduce threats to the United States. Additionally, the legislation 
would require the countries to enact a number of significant security 
measures, which would limit illegal entry and unlawful presence in 
their countries and impede travel by terrorists and transnational 
criminals. Security standards required for participation in the program 
would include electronic passports with biometric information, as well 
as prompt reporting of lost, stolen, or fraudulent travel documents to 
the U.S. and Interpol.
  These new requirements would help make the U.S. more secure. 
Expanding the number of participating visa waiver countries would 
increase the number of states meeting common security standards. This 
would allow the United States to shift consular resources used to issue 
visas to other missions with more critical security needs.
  If at any time, participant countries are not complying with these 
requirements, their probationary status in the program could be 
revoked.
  Likewise, if the program is determined to be successful, it could be 
expanded to include additional countries.
  The last part of the legislation is aimed at enhancing security 
requirements for countries who are currently participating in the Visa 
Waiver Program. In this post-9/11 world, the U.S. Government has 
already required additional security measures of participating visa 
waiver countries, such as machine readable passports with biometric 
information. But we can and must do more.
  I was very pleased last November when Homeland Security Secretary 
Chertoff recommended several new measures to further enhance the 
efficiency and security of the Visa Waiver Program. His recommendations 
included an electronic travel authorization system, additional 
passenger information exchanges, common standards for airport security 
and baggage screening, cooperation in the air marshal program, and home 
country assistance in repatriation of any traveler who overstays the 
terms of their visa or violates U.S. law.
  As the Administration works to develop the details of its 
recommendations, my legislation would require that within one year, the 
executive branch provide a report to Congress on its plans for Visa 
Waiver Program improvements.
  In addition to the substantial benefits my legislation would create 
for U.S. foreign relations and homeland security, the bill would also 
advance U.S. economic competitiveness. Visa-free travel to the United 
States has been proven to significantly boost tourism and business, as 
well as airline revenues, and would generate substantial economic 
benefits to the United States well into the future. Additionally, it 
would improve attitudes toward the United States throughout the world, 
which would benefit the U.S. economy and national security for 
generations to come.
  As a member of both the Foreign Relations and the Homeland Security 
and Governmental Affairs Committees, I have studied this issue from 
every angle. I believe the legislation I am introducing presents us 
with a real opportunity to strengthen diplomatic relationships, enhance 
our homeland security, and improve the Visa Waiver Program overall.
  I look forward to working with my colleagues in the Congress and the 
President to move this legislation forward.
  I ask unanimous consent that the text of this bill be printed in the 
Record.
  There being no objection, the text of the bill was ordered to be 
printed in the Record, as follows:

                                 S. 342

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

       This Act may be cited as the ``Secure Travel and 
     Counterterrorism Partnership Act''.

     SEC. 2. SENSE OF CONGRESS.

       It is the sense of Congress that the United States should 
     expand the visa waiver program to extend visa-free travel 
     privileges to nationals of foreign countries that are allies 
     in the war on terrorism as that expansion will--
       (1) enhance bilateral cooperation on critical 
     counterterrorism and information sharing initiatives;
       (2) support and expand tourism and business opportunities 
     to enhance long-term economic competitiveness; and
       (3) strengthen bilateral relationships.

     SEC. 3. VISA WAIVER PROGRAM EXPANSION.

       Section 217(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 
     U.S.C. 1187(c)) is amended by adding at the end the 
     following:
       ``(8) Probationary participation of program countries.--
       ``(A) Requirement to establish.--Notwithstanding any other 
     provision of this section and not later than 1 year after the 
     date of the enactment of the Secure Travel and 
     Counterterrorism Partnership Act, the Secretary of Homeland 
     Security, in consultation

[[Page S830]]

     with the Secretary of State, shall establish a pilot program 
     to permit not more than 5 foreign countries that are not 
     designated as program countries under paragraph (1) to 
     participate in the program.
       ``(B) Designation as a probationary program country.--A 
     foreign country is eligible to participate in the program 
     under this paragraph if--
       ``(i) the Secretary of Homeland Security determines that 
     such participation will not compromise the security or law 
     enforcement interests of the United States;
       ``(ii) that country is close to meeting all the 
     requirements of paragraph (2) and other requirements for 
     designation as a program country under this section and has 
     developed a feasible strategic plan to meet all such 
     requirements not later than 3 years after the date the 
     country begins participation in the program under this 
     paragraph;
       ``(iii) that country meets all the requirements that the 
     Secretary determines are appropriate to ensure the security 
     and integrity of travel documents, including requirements to 
     issue electronic passports that include biometric information 
     and to promptly report lost, stolen, or fraudulent passports 
     to the Government of the United States;
       ``(iv) that country cooperated with the Government of the 
     United States on counterterrorism initiatives and information 
     sharing before the date of the enactment of this paragraph; 
     and
       ``(v) that country has entered into an agreement with the 
     Government of the United States by which that country agrees 
     to further advance United States security interests by 
     implementing such additional counterterrorism cooperation and 
     information sharing measures as may be requested by the 
     Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with the 
     Secretary of State.
       ``(C) Considerations for country selection.--
       ``(i) Visa refusal rates.--The Secretary of Homeland 
     Security may consider the rate of refusals of nonimmigrant 
     visitor visas for nationals of a foreign country in 
     determining whether to permit that country to participate in 
     the program under this paragraph but may not refuse to permit 
     that country to participate in the program under this 
     paragraph solely on the basis of such rate unless the 
     Secretary determines that such rate is a security concern to 
     the United States.
       ``(ii) Overstay rates.--The Secretary of Homeland Security 
     may consider the rate at which nationals of a foreign country 
     violate the terms of their visas by remaining in the United 
     States after the expiration of such a visa in determining 
     whether to permit that country to participate in the program 
     under this paragraph.
       ``(D) Term of participation.--
       ``(i) Initial probationary term.--A foreign country may 
     participate in the program under this paragraph for an 
     initial term of 3 years.
       ``(ii) Extension of participation.--The Secretary of 
     Homeland Security, in consultation with the Secretary of 
     State, may permit a country to participate in the program 
     under this paragraph after the expiration of the initial term 
     described in clause (i) for 1 additional period of not more 
     than 2 years if that country--

       ``(I) has demonstrated significant progress toward meeting 
     the requirements of paragraph (2) and all other requirements 
     for designation as a program country under this section;
       ``(II) has submitted a plan for meeting the requirements of 
     paragraph (2) and all other requirements for designation as a 
     program country under this section; and
       ``(III) continues to be determined not to compromise the 
     security or law enforcement interests of the United States.

       ``(iii) Termination of participation.--The Secretary of 
     Homeland Security may terminate the participation of a 
     country in the program under this paragraph at any time if 
     the Secretary, in consultation with the Secretary of State, 
     determines that the country--

       ``(I) is not in compliance with the requirements of this 
     paragraph; or
       ``(II) is not able to demonstrate significant and 
     quantifiable progress, on an annual basis, toward meeting the 
     requirements of paragraph (2) and all other requirements for 
     designation as a program country under this section.

       ``(E) Technical assistance.--The Secretary of Homeland 
     Security, in consultation with the Secretary of State, shall 
     provide technical guidance to a country that participates in 
     the program under this paragraph to assist that country in 
     meeting the requirements of paragraph (2) and all other 
     requirements for designation as a program country under this 
     section.
       ``(F) Reporting requirements.--
       ``(i) Annual report.--The Secretary of Homeland Security, 
     in consultation with the Secretary of State, shall submit to 
     Congress an annual report on the implementation of this 
     paragraph.
       ``(ii) Final assessment.--Not later than 30 days after the 
     date that the foreign country's participation in the program 
     under this paragraph terminates, the Secretary of Homeland 
     Security, in consultation with the Secretary of State, shall 
     submit a final assessment to Congress regarding the 
     implementation of this paragraph. Such final assessment shall 
     contain the recommendations of the Secretary of Homeland 
     Security and the Secretary of State regarding permitting 
     additional foreign countries to participate in the program 
     under this paragraph.''.

     SEC. 4. CALCULATION OF THE RATES OF VISA OVERSTAYS.

       Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of 
     this Act, the Secretary of Homeland Security shall develop 
     and implement procedures to improve the manner in which the 
     rates of nonimmigrants who violate the terms of their visas 
     by remaining in the United States after the expiration of 
     such a visa are calculated.

     SEC. 5. REPORTS.

       (a) Visa Fees.--Not later than 1 year after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act, the Comptroller General of the United 
     States shall review the fee structure for visas issued by the 
     United States and submit to Congress a report on that 
     structure, including any recommendations of the Comptroller 
     General for improvements to that structure.
       (b) Secure Travel Standards.--Not later than 1 year after 
     the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of 
     Homeland Security, in conjunction with the Secretary of 
     State, shall submit a report to Congress that describes plans 
     for enhancing secure travel standards for existing visa 
     waiver program countries, including the feasibility of 
     instituting an electronic authorization travel system, 
     additional passenger information exchanges, and enhanced 
     airport security standards.

     SEC. 6. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

       There are authorized to be appropriated such sums as may be 
     necessary for each of the fiscal years 2007 through 2013 to 
     carry out this Act and the amendment made by this Act.
                                 ______
                                 
      By Mr. VOINOVICH (for himself, Mr. Brownback, Mr. Akaka, and Ms. 
        Landrieu):
  S. 343. A bill to extend the District of Columbia College Access Act 
of 1999; to the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental 
Affairs.
  Mr. VOINOVICH. Mr. President, today I am pleased to introduce 
legislation to reauthorize the District of Columbia Tuition Assistance 
Grant (D.C. TAG) program for an additional five years. This successful 
program, which began in 2000, has produced dramatic results in higher 
education in the District of Columbia by enabling District students to 
choose a college that best suits their educational needs.
  One of the most worthwhile things I have done during my time in the 
Senate was to sponsor the legislation that created the D.C. TAG 
program. The aim of this program is to assist District students who do 
not have access to State-supported education systems. Originally, the 
D.C. TAG program provided District residents with grant funding to pay 
the difference between in-State and out-of-State tuition at State 
universities nationwide. D.C. TAG participants are eligible for up to 
$l0,000 per student per school year, capped at $50,000. Since March 
2002, District students attending private institutions in Maryland and 
Virginia, as well as Historically Black Colleges and Universities 
nationwide are eligible to receive tuition grants of $2,500 per student 
per school year, capped at $12,500.
  Since the programs inception, more than 26,000 grants have been 
dispersed to 9,769 District students, amounting to approximately $141 
million. As a result, the District has seen a 50 percent increase in 
college attendance. Our States have benefited from having these 
talented students attending their universities. In Ohio, District 
students attend nine of our colleges and universities with grants 
valued at $500,000. Reauthorizing this successful program will ensure 
that D.C. TAG grants are available for future generations of deserving 
District high school students.
  As the ranking member of the Subcommittee on Oversight of Government 
Management, the Federal Workforce and the District of Columbia, I am 
committed to ensuring quality educational opportunities for District 
residents. I urge all of my colleagues to support this legislation.
  I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the 
Record.
  There being no objection, the text of the bill was ordered to be 
printed in the Record, as follows:

                                 S. 343

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. 5-YEAR REAUTHORIZATION OF TUITION ASSISTANCE 
                   PROGRAMS.

       (a) Public School Program.--Section 3(i) of the District of 
     Columbia College Access Act of 1999 (sec. 38-2702(i), D.C. 
     Official Code) is amended by striking ``each of the 7 
     succeeding fiscal years'' and inserting ``each of the 12 
     succeeding fiscal years''.
       (b) Private School Program.--Section 5(f) of such Act (sec. 
     38-2704(f), D.C. Official

[[Page S831]]

     Code) is amended by striking ``each of the 7 succeeding 
     fiscal years'' and inserting ``each of the 12 succeeding 
     fiscal years''.
                                 ______
                                 
      By Mr. SPECTER (for himself, Mr. Grassley, Mr. Durbin, Mr. 
        Schumer, and Mr. Feingold):
  S. 344. A bill to permit the televising of Supreme Court proceedings; 
to the Committee on the Judiciary.
  Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, once again I seek recognition to 
introduce legislation that will give the public greater access to our 
Supreme Court. This bill requires the high Court to permit television 
coverage of its open sessions unless it decides by a majority vote of 
the Justices that allowing such coverage in a particular case would 
violate the due process rights of one or more of the parties involved 
in the matter.
  The purpose of this legislation is to open the Supreme Court doors so 
that more Americans can see the process by which the Court reaches 
critical decisions of law that affect this country and everyday 
Americans. The Supreme Court makes pronouncements on Constitutional and 
Federal law that have a direct impact on the rights of Americans. Those 
rights would be substantially enhanced by televising the oral arguments 
of the Court so that the public can see and hear the issues presented 
to the Court. With this information, the public would have insight into 
key issues and be better equipped to understand the impact of and 
reasons for the Court's decisions.
  In a very fundamental sense, televising the Supreme Court has been 
implicitly recognized--perhaps even sanctioned--in a 1980 decision by 
the Supreme Court of the United States entitled Richmond Newspapers v. 
Virginia. In this case, the Court noted that a public trial belongs not 
only to the accused but to the public and the press as well and 
recognized that people now acquire information on court procedures 
chiefly through the print and electronic media.
  That decision, in referencing the electronic media, appears to 
anticipate televising court proceedings, although I do not mean to 
suggest that the Supreme Court is in agreement with this legislation. I 
should note that the Court could, on its own initiative, televise its 
proceedings but has chosen not to do so, which presents, in my view, 
the necessity for legislating on this subject.
  When I argued the case of the Navy Yard, Dalton v. Specter, back in 
1994, the Court proceedings were illustrated by an artist's drawings--
some of which now hang in my office. Today, the public gets a 
substantial portion, if not most, of its information from television 
and the internet. While many court proceedings are broadcast routinely 
on television, the public has little access to the most important and 
highest court in this country. Although the internet has made receipt 
of the Court's transcripts, and even more recently, audio recordings, 
more widely accessible, the public is still deprived of the real time 
transmission of audio and video feeds from the Court. I believe it is 
vital for the public to see, as well as to hear, the arguments made 
before the Court and the interplay among the justices. I think the 
American people will gain a greater respect for the way in which our 
High Court functions if they are able to see oral arguments.
  Justice Felix Frankfurter perhaps anticipated the day when Supreme 
Court arguments would be televised when he said that he longed for a 
day when: ``The news media would cover the Supreme Court as thoroughly 
as it did the World Series, since the public confidence in the 
judiciary hinges on the public's perception of it, and that perception 
necessarily hinges on the media's portrayal of the legal system.''
  When I spoke in favor of this legislation in September of 2000, I 
said, ``I do not expect a rush to judgment on this very complex 
proposition, but I do believe the day will come when the Supreme Court 
of the United States will be televised. That day will come, and it will 
be decisively in the public interest so the public will know the 
magnitude of what the Court is deciding and its role in our democratic 
process.'' I reiterated those sentiments in September of 2005 when I 
re-introduced an identical bill. Today, I believe the time has come and 
that this legislation is crucial to the public's awareness of Supreme 
Court proceedings and their impact on the daily lives of all Americans.
  I pause to note that it was not until 1955 that the Supreme Court, 
under the leadership of Chief Justice Warren, first began permitting 
audio recordings of oral arguments. Between 1955 and 1993, there were 
apparently over 5,000 recorded arguments before the Supreme Court. That 
roughly translates to an average of about 132 arguments annually. But 
audio recordings are simply ill suited to capture the nuance of oral 
arguments and the sustained attention of the American citizenry. Nor is 
it any response that people who wish to see open sessions of the 
Supreme Court should come to the Capital and attend oral arguments. 
For, according to one source: ``Several million people each year visit 
Washington, D.C., and many thousands tour the White House and the 
Capitol. But few have the chance to sit in the Supreme Court chamber 
and witness an entire oral argument. Most tourists are given just three 
minutes before they are shuttled out and a new group shuttled in. In 
cases that attract headlines, seats for the public are scarce and 
waiting lines are long. And the Court sits in open session less than 
two hundred hours each year. Television cameras and radio microphones 
are still banned from the chamber, and only a few hundred people at 
most can actually witness oral arguments. Protected by a marble wall 
from public access, the Supreme Court has long been the least 
understood of the three branches of our Federal Government.''
  In light of the increasing public desire for information, it seems 
untenable to continue excluding cameras from the courtroom of the 
Nation's highest court. As one legal commentator observes: ``An 
effective and legitimate way to satisfy America's curiosity about the 
Supreme Court's holdings, Justices, and modus operandi is to permit 
broadcast coverage of oral arguments and decision announcements from 
the courtroom itself.''
  Televised court proceedings better enable the public to understand 
the role of the Supreme Court and its impact on the key decisions of 
the day. Not only has the Supreme Court invalidated Congressional 
decisions where there was, in the views of many, simply a difference of 
opinion as to what is preferable public policy, but the Court 
determines novel issues such as whether AIDS is a disability under the 
Americans with Disabilities Act, whether Congress can ban obscenity 
from the Internet, and whether states can impose term limits upon 
members of Congress. The current Court, like its predecessors, hands 
down decisions which vitally affect the lives and liberties of all 
Americans. Since the Court's historic 1803 decision, Marbury v. 
Madison, the Supreme Court has the final authority on issues of 
enormous importance from birth to death. In Roe v. Wade (1973), the 
Court affirmed a Constitutional right to abortion in this country and 
struck down state statutes banning or severely restricting abortion 
during the first two trimesters on the grounds that they violated a 
right to privacy inherent in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. In the case of Washington v. Glucksberg, 1997, the court 
refused to create a similar right to assisted suicide. Here the Court 
held that the Due Process Clause does not recognize a liberty interest 
that includes a right to commit suicide with another's assistance.
  In the Seventies, the Court first struck down then upheld state 
statutes imposing the death penalty for certain crimes. In Furman v. 
Georgia, 1972, the Court struck down Georgia's death penalty statute 
under the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the Eighth Amendment 
and stated that no death penalty law could pass constitutional muster 
unless it took aggravating and mitigating circumstances into account. 
This decision led Georgia and many States to amend their death penalty 
statutes and, four years later, in Gregg v. Georgia, 1976, the Supreme 
Court upheld Georgia's amended death penalty statute.
  Over the years, the Court has also played a major role in issues of 
war and peace. In its opinion in Scott v. Sanford, 1857--better known 
as the Dredd Scott decision--the Supreme Court held that Dredd Scott, a 
slave who had been taken into ``free'' territory by his owner, was 
nevertheless still a slave.

[[Page S832]]

The Court further held that Congress lacked the power to abolish 
slavery in certain territories, thereby invalidating the careful 
balance that had been worked out between the North and the South on the 
issue. Historians have noted that this opinion fanned the flames that 
led to the Civil War.
  The Supreme Court has also ensured adherence to the Constitution 
during more recent conflicts. Prominent opponents of the Vietnam War 
repeatedly petitioned the Court to declare the Presidential action 
unconstitutional on the grounds that Congress had never given the 
President a declaration of war. The Court decided to leave this 
conflict in the political arena and repeatedly refused to grant writs 
of certiorari to hear these cases. This prompted Justice Douglas, 
sometimes accompanied by Justices Stewart and Harlan, to take the 
unusual step of writing lengthy dissents to the denials of cert.
  In New York Times Co. v. United States, 1971--the so called 
``Pentagon Papers'' case--the Court refused to grant the government 
prior restraint to prevent the New York Times from publishing leaked 
Defense Department documents which revealed damaging information about 
the Johnson Administration and the war effort. The publication of these 
documents by the New York Times is believed to have helped move public 
opinion against the war.
  In its landmark civil rights opinions, the Supreme Court took the 
lead in effecting needed social change, helping us to address 
fundamental questions about our society in the courts rather than in 
the streets. In Brown v. Board of Education, the Court struck down the 
principle of ``separate but equal'' education for blacks and whites and 
integrated public education in this country. This case was then 
followed by a series of civil rights cases which enforced the concept 
of integration and full equality for all citizens of this country, 
including Gamer v. Louisiana, 1961, Burton v. Wilmington Parking 
Authority, 1961, and Peterson v. City of Greenville, 1963.
  In recent years Marbury, Dred Scott, Furman, New York Times, and Roe, 
familiar names in the lexicon of lawyerly discussions concerning 
watershed Supreme Court precedents, have been joined with similarly 
important cases like Hamdi, Rasul and Roper--all cases that affect 
fundamental individual rights. In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 2004, the Court 
concluded that although Congress authorized the detention of 
combatants, due process demands that a citizen held in the United 
States as an enemy combatant be given a meaningful opportunity to 
contest the factual basis for that detention before a neutral 
decisionmaker. The Court reaffirmed the nation's commitment to 
constitutional principles even during times of war and uncertainty. 
Similarly, in Rasul v. Bush, 2004, the Court held that the Federal 
habeas statute gave district courts jurisdiction to hear challenges of 
aliens held at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba in the U.S. War on Terrorism. In 
Roper v. Simmons, a 2005 case, the Court held that executions of 
individuals who were under 18 years of age at the time of their capital 
crimes is prohibited by Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.
  When deciding issues of such great national import, the Supreme Court 
is rarely unanimous. In fact, a large number of seminal Supreme Court 
decisions have been reached through a vote of 5-4. Such a close margin 
reveals that these decisions are far from foregone conclusions 
distilled from the meaning of the Constitution, reason and the 
application of legal precedents. On the contrary, these major Supreme 
Court opinions embody critical decisions reached on the basis of the 
preferences and views of each individual justice. In a case that is 
decided by a vote of 5-4, an individual justice has the power by his or 
her vote to change the law of the land.
  Since the beginning of its October 2005 Term when Chief Justice 
Roberts first began hearing cases, the Supreme Court has issued 11 
decisions with a 5-4 split out of a total of 93 decisions. It has also 
issued 4 5-3 decisions in which one justice recused. Finally, it has 
issued a rare 5-2 decision in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justice 
Alito took no part. In sum, since the beginning of its October 2005 
Term, the Supreme Court has issued l6 decisions establishing the law of 
the land in which only 5 justices explicitly concurred. Many of these 
narrow majorities occur in decisions involving the Court's 
interpretation of our Constitution--a sometimes divisive endeavor on 
the Court. I will not discuss all 16 thinly decided cases but will 
describe a few to illustrate my point about the importance of the Court 
and its decisions in the lives of Americans.
  The first 5-4 split decision, decided on January 11, 2006, was Brown 
v. Sanders. In this case the Court considered ``the circumstances in 
which an invalidated sentencing factor will render a death sentence 
unconstitutional by reason of its adding an improper element to the 
aggravation scale in the jury's weighing process.'' A majority of the 
Court held that henceforth in death penalty cases, an invalidated 
sentencing factor will render the sentence unconstitutional by reason 
of its adding an improper element to the aggravation scale unless one 
of the other sentencing factors enables the sentencer to give 
aggravating weight to the same facts and circumstances. The majority 
opinion was authored by Justice Scalia and joined by Chief Justice 
Roberts and Justices O'Connor, Kennedy and Thomas. Justice Stevens 
filed a dissenting opinion in which Justice Souter joined. Similarly, 
Justice Breyer filed a dissenting opinion in which Justice Ginsburg 
joined.
  Last November the Supreme Court decided Ayers v. Belmontes, a capital 
murder case in which the Belmontes contended that California law and 
the trial court's instructions precluded the jury from considering his 
forward looking mitigation evidence suggesting he could lead a 
constructive life while incarcerated. In Ayers the Supreme Court found 
the Ninth Circuit erred in holding that the jury was precluded by jury 
instructions from considering mitigation evidence. Justice Kennedy 
authored the majority opinion while Justice Stevens wrote a dissent 
joined by three other justices.
  Other 5-4 split decisions since October 2005 include United States v. 
Gonzalez-Lopez, concerning whether a defendant's Sixth Amendment right 
to counsel was violated when a district court refused to grant his paid 
lawyer permission to represent him based upon some past ethical 
violation by the lawyer, June 26, 2006; LULAC v. Perry, deciding 
whether the 2004 Texas redistricting violated provisions of the Voting 
Rights Act, June 28, 2006; Kansas v. Marsh, concerning the Eighth and 
Fourteenth Ariiendments in a capital murder case in which the defense 
argued that a Kansas statute established an unconstitutional 
presumption in favor of the death sentence when aggravating and 
mitigating factors were in equipoise, April 25, 2006; Clark v. Arizona, 
a capital murder case involving the constitutionality of an Arizona 
Supreme Court precedent governing the admissibility of evidence to 
support an insanity defense, June 29, 2006; Garcetti v. Ceballos, a 
case holding that when public employees make statements pursuant to 
their official duties they are not speaking as citizens for First 
Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate their 
communications from employer discipline, May 30, 2006.
  The justices have split 5-3 4 times since October 2005.
  In Georgia v. Randolph, March 22, 2006, a 5-3 majority of the Supreme 
Court held that a physically present co-occupant's stated refusal to 
permit a warrantless entry and search rendered the search unreasonable 
and invalid as to that occupant. Justice Souter authored the majority 
opinion. Justice Stevens filed a concurring opinion as did Justice 
Breyer. The Chief Justice authored a dissent joined by Justice Scalia. 
Moreover, Justice Scalia issued his own dissent as did Justice Thomas. 
In Randolph, there were six opinions in all from a Court that only has 
nine justices. One can only imagine the spirited debate and interplay 
of ideas, facial expressions and gestures that occurred in oral 
arguments. Audio recordings are simply inadequate to capture all of the 
nuance that only cameras could capture and convey.
  In House v. Bell, a 5-3 opinion authored by Justice Kennedy, (June 
12, 2006), the Supreme Court held that because House had made the 
stringent showing required by the actual innocence exception to 
judicially-established procedural default rules, he

[[Page S833]]

could challenge his conviction even after exhausting his regular 
appeals. Justice Alito took no part in considering or deciding the 
House case. It bears noting, however, that if one justice had been on 
the other side of this decision it would have resulted in a 4-4 tie 
and, ultimately, led to affirming the lower court's denial of House's 
post-conviction habeas petitions due to a procedural default.
  In Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, a 5-3 decision in which Chief Justice Roberts 
took no part, the Supreme Court held that Hamdan could challenge his 
detention and the jurisdiction of the President's military commissions 
to try him despite recent enactment of the Detainee Treatment Act. A 
thin majority of the justices supported the decision despite knowledge 
that the DTA explicitly provides ``no court . . . shall have 
jurisdiction to hear or consider . . . an application for . . . habeas 
corpus filed by . . . an alien detained . . . at Guantanamo Bay.'' In 
deciding the merits, the Court went on to hold that the President 
lacked authority to establish a military commission to try Hamdan or 
others without enabling legislation passed by both houses of Congress 
and enacted into law. This case was one of a handful of recent cases in 
which the Supreme Court released audiotapes or oral arguments almost 
immediately after they occurred. Yet it would have been vastly 
preferable to watch the parties' advocates grapple with the legal 
issues as the justices peppered them with jurisdictional, 
constitutional and merits-related questions from the High Court's 
bench.
  In another fascinating 5-3 case, Jones v. Flowers, April 26, 2006, 
Supreme Court considered whether, when notice of a tax sale is mailed 
to the owner and returned undelivered, the government must take 
additional reasonable steps to provide notice before taking the owner's 
property. In an opinion by Chief Justice Roberts, the Court held that 
where the Arkansas Commissioner of State Lands had mailed Jones a 
certified letter and it had been returned unclaimed, the Commissioner 
had to take additional reasonable steps to provide Jones notice. 
Justices Thomas, Scalia and Kennedy dissented and Justice Alito took no 
part in the decision.
  Though Jones v. Flowers involved the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, not the Takings Clause of Fifth Amendment, one 
could draw interesting analogies to the Court's controversial 2005 
decision in Kelo v. City of New London. In Kelo, a majority of the 
justices held that a city's exercise of eminent domain power in 
furtherance of a privately initiated economic development plan 
satisfied the Constitution's Fifth Amendment ``public use'' requirement 
despite the absence of any blight. Four justices dissented in Kelo and 
public opinion turned sharply against the decision immediately after it 
was issued.
  It's possible, though merely speculation, that the public ire aimed 
at Kelo informed what became a majority of justices in Jones v. 
Flowers. In a passage by Chief Justice Roberts, the Court notes, ``when 
a letter is returned by the post office, the sender will ordinarily 
attempt to resend it, if it is practicable to do so. This is especially 
true when, as here, the subject matter of the letter concerns such an 
important and irreversible prospect as the loss of a house.''
  Not only lawyers but all homeowners could benefit from knowing how 
the Court grapples with legal issues governing the rights to their 
houses. My legislation creates the opportunity for all interested 
Americans to watch the Court in action in cases like these. From his 
perch on the High Court one justice has been heard to contend that most 
Americans could care less about the arcane legal issues argued before 
the Court. But as elected representatives of the people we must 
endeavor to view America from a bottoms-up, rather than a top-down 
perspective.
  Regardless of ones view concerning the merits of these decisions, it 
is clear that they frequently have a profound effect on the interplay 
between the government, on the one hand, and the individual on the 
other. So, it is with these watershed decisions in mind that I 
introduce legislation designed to make the Supreme Court less esoteric 
and more accessible to common men and women who are so clearly affected 
by its decisions.
  Given the enormous significance of each vote cast by each justice on 
the Supreme Court, televising the proceedings of the Supreme Court will 
allow sunlight to shine brightly on these proceedings and ensure 
greater public awareness and scrutiny.
  In a democracy, the workings of the government at all levels should 
be open to public view. With respect to oral arguments, the more 
openness and the more real the opportunity for public observation the 
greater the understanding and trust. As the Supreme Court observed in 
the 1986 case of Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, ``People in an 
open society do not demand infallibility from their institutions, but 
it is difficult for them to accept what they are prohibited from 
observing.''
  It was in this spirit that the House of Representatives opened its 
deliberations to meaningful public observation by allowing C-SPAN to 
begin televising debates in the House chamber in 1979. The Senate 
followed the House's lead in 1986 by voting to allow television 
coverage of the Senate floor.
  Beyond this general policy preference for openness, however, there is 
a strong argument that the Constitution requires that television 
cameras be permitted in the Supreme Court.
  It is well established that the Constitution guarantees access to 
judicial proceedings to the press and the public. In 1980, the Supreme 
Court relied on this tradition when it held in Richmond Newspapers v. 
Virginia that the right of a public trial belongs not just to the 
accused, but to the public and the press as well. The Court noted that 
such openness has ``long been recognized as an indisputable attribute 
of an Anglo-American trial.''
  Recognizing that in modern society most people cannot physically 
attend trials, the Court specifically addressed the need for access by 
members of the media: ``Instead of acquiring information about trials 
by first hand observation or by word of mouth from those who attended, 
people now acquire it chiefly through the print and electronic media. 
In a sense, this validates the media claim of acting as surrogates for 
the public. [Media presence] contributes to public understanding of the 
rule of law and to comprehension of the functioning of the entire 
criminal justice system.''
  To be sure, a strong argument can be made that forbidding television 
cameras in the court, while permitting access to print and other media, 
constitutes an impermissible discrimination against one type of media 
over another. In recent years, the Supreme Court and lower courts have 
repeatedly held that differential treatment of different media is 
impermissible under the First Amendment absent an overriding 
governmental interest. For example, in 1983 the Court invalidated 
discriminatory tax schemes imposed only upon certain types of media in 
Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Commissioner of Revenue. In 
the 1977 case of ABC v. Cuomo, the Second Circuit rejected the 
contention by the two candidates for mayor of New York that they could 
exclude some members of the media from their campaign headquarters by 
providing access through invitation only. The Court wrote that: ``Once 
there is a public function, public comment, and participation by some 
of the media, the First Amendment requires equal access to all of the 
media or the rights of the First Amendment would no longer be 
tenable.''
  However, in the 1965 case of Estes v. Texas, the Supreme Court 
rejected the argument that the denial of television coverage of trials 
violates the equal protection clause. In the same opinion, the Court 
held that the presence of television cameras in the Court had violated 
a Texas defendant's right to due process. Subsequent opinions have cast 
serious doubt upon the continuing relevance of both prongs of the Estes 
opinion.
  In its 1981 opinion in Chandler v. Florida, the court recognized that 
Estes must be read narrowly in light of the state of television 
technology at that time. The television coverage of Estes' 1962 trial 
required cumbersome equipment, numerous additional microphones, yards 
of new cables, distracting lighting, and numerous technicians present 
in the courtroom. In contrast, the court noted, television coverage in 
1980 can be achieved

[[Page S834]]

through the presence of one or two discreetly placed cameras without 
making any perceptible change in the atmosphere of the courtroom. 
Accordingly, the Court held that, despite Estes, the presence of 
television cameras in a Florida trial was not a violation of the rights 
of the defendants in that case. By the same logic, the holding in Estes 
that exclusion of television cameras from the courts did not violate 
the equal protection clause must be revisited in light of the 
dramatically different nature of television coverage today.
  Given the strength of these arguments, it is not surprising that over 
the last two decades there has been a rapidly growing acceptance of 
cameras in American courtrooms which has reached almost every court 
except for the Supreme Court itself.
  On September 6, 2000, the Senate Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee 
on Administrative Oversight and the Courts held a hearing titled 
``Allowing Cameras and Electronic Media in the Courtroom.'' The primary 
focus of the hearing was Senate bill S. 721, legislation introduced by 
Senators Grassley and Schumer that would give Federal judges the 
discretion to allow television coverage of court proceedings. One of 
the witnesses at the hearing, the late Judge Edward R. Becker, then-
Chief Judge U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, spoke in 
opposition to the legislation and the presence of television cameras in 
the courtroom. The remaining five witnesses, however, including a 
Federal judge, a State judge, a law professor and other legal experts, 
all testified in favor of the legislation. They argued that cameras in 
the courts would not disrupt proceedings but would provide the kind of 
accountability and access that is fundamental to our system of 
government.
  On November 9, 2005, the Judiciary Committee held a hearing to 
address whether Federal court proceedings should be televised generally 
and to consider S. 1768, my earlier version of this bill, and S. 829, 
Senator Grassley's ``Sunshine in the Courtroom Act of 2005.'' During 
the November 9 hearing, most witnesses spoke favorably of cameras in 
the courts, particularly at the appellate level. Among the witnesses 
favorably disposed toward the cameras were Peter Irons, author of May 
It Please the Court, Seth Berlin, a First Amendment expert at a local 
firm, Brian Lamb, founder of C-SPAN, Henry Schleif of Court TV 
Networks, and Barbara Cochran of the Radio-Television News Directors 
Association and Foundation.

  The notable exception was the Honorable Judge Jan DuBois of the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania, who testified on behalf of the 
Judicial Conference. Judge DuBois warned of problems particularly at 
the trial level, where witnesses who appear uncomfortable because of 
cameras might seem less credible to jurors. I note, however, that 
appellate courts do not appear susceptible to this criticism because 
there are no witnesses or jurors present for appellate arguments.
  The Judiciary Committee considered and passed both bills on March 30, 
2006. The Committee vote to report S. 1768 was 12-6, and the bill was 
placed on the Senate Legislative Calendar. Unfortunately, due to the 
press of other business neither bill was allotted time on the Senate 
Floor.
  During their confirmation hearings over the past two years, Chief 
Justice John Roberts stated he would keep an open mind on the issue and 
Justice Alito stated that as a circuit judge he unsuccessfully voted 
(in the minority) to permit televised open proceedings in the Third 
Circuit. I applaud the fact the new Chief Justice has taken steps to 
make the Court more open and to ensure the timely publication of audio 
recordings of the arguments as well as the written transcripts.
  In my judgment, Congress, with the concurrence of the President, or 
overriding his veto, has the authority to require the Supreme Court to 
televise its proceedings. Such a conclusion is not free from doubt and 
is highly likely to be tested with the Supreme Court, as usual, having 
the final word. As I see it, there is clearly no constitutional 
prohibition against such legislation.
  Article 3 of the Constitution states that the judicial power of the 
United States shall be vested ``in one Supreme Court and such inferior 
Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.'' 
While the Constitution specifically creates the Supreme Court, it left 
it to Congress to determine how the Court would operate. For example, 
it was Congress that fixed the number of justices on the Supreme Court 
at nine. Likewise, it was Congress that decided that any six of these 
justices are sufficient to constitute a quorum of the Court. It was 
Congress that decided that the term of the Court shall commence on the 
first Monday in October of each year, and it was Congress that 
determined the procedures to be followed whenever the Chief Justice is 
unable to perform the duties of his office.
  Beyond such basic structural and operational matters, Congress also 
controls more substantive aspects of the Supreme Court. Most 
importantly, it is Congress that in effect determines the appellate 
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. Although the Constitution itself 
sets out the appellate jurisdiction of the Court, it provides that such 
jurisdiction exist ``with such exceptions and under such regulations as 
the Congress shall make.''
  Some objections have been raised to televised proceedings of the 
Supreme Court on the ground that it would subject justices to undue 
security risks. My own view is such concerns are vastly overstated. 
Well-known members of Congress walk on a regular basis in public view 
in the Capitol complex. Other very well-known personalities, 
presidents, vice presidents, cabinet officers, all are on public view 
with even incumbent presidents exposed to risks as they mingle with the 
public. Such risks are minimal in my view given the relatively minor 
ensure that Supreme Court justices would undertake through television 
appearances. Also, any concerns could be mitigated by focusing only on 
the attorneys presenting arguments. There is no requirement that the 
justices permit the cameras to focus on the bench.
  As I explained earlier, the Supreme Court could, of course, permit 
television through its own rule but has decided not to do so. Congress 
should be circumspect and even hesitant to impose a rule mandating the 
televising of Supreme Court proceedings and should do so only in the 
face of compelling public policy reasons. The Supreme Court has such a 
dominant role in key decision-making functions that their proceedings 
ought to be better known to the public; and, in the absence of Court 
rule, public policy would be best served by enactment of legislation 
requiring the televising of Supreme Court proceedings.
  This legislation embodies sound policy and will prove valuable to the 
public. I urge my colleagues to support this bill.
  I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the 
Record.
  There being no objection the bill was ordered to be printed in the 
Record, as follows:

                                 S. 344

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. AMENDMENT TO TITLE 28.

       (a) In General.--Chapter 45 of title 28, United States 
     Code, is amended by inserting at the end the following:

     ``Sec. 678. Televising Supreme Court proceedings

       ``The Supreme Court shall permit television coverage of all 
     open sessions of the Court unless the Court decides, by a 
     vote of the majority of justices, that allowing such coverage 
     in a particular case would constitute a violation of the due 
     process rights of 1 or more of the parties before the 
     Court.''.
       (b) Clerical Amendment.--The chapter analysis for chapter 
     45 of title 28, United States Code, is amended by inserting 
     at the end the following:

``678. Televising Supreme Court proceedings.''.
                                 ______
                                 
      By Mr. REID (for Mr. Biden):
  S. 345. A bill to establish a Homeland Security and Neighborhood 
Safety Trust Fund and refocus Federal priorities toward securing the 
Homeland, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Homeland Security 
and Governmental Affairs.
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I rise today to introduce the Homeland 
Security Trust Fund Act of 2007. I introduced this legislation in the 
last Congress, and I do so again because it is my sincere belief that 
in order to better prevent attacks here at home, we must dramatically 
reorder the priorities of the Federal Government.

[[Page S835]]

  This legislation says in basic terms that we value the security of 
all Americans over the tax cuts for our Nation's millionaires. Right 
now, we under fund homeland security and public safety, and at the same 
time, we have established extremely large tax cuts for the wealthiest 
among us. This legislation will re-set our priorities by creating a 
homeland security trust fund that will set aside $53.3 billion 
dollars--less than one year of the tax cut for millionaires--for the 
exclusive purpose of investing in our homeland security. Through this 
trust fund we will allocate an additional $10 billion per year over the 
next 5 years to enhance the safety and security of our communities.
  Everyone in this body knows that we are not yet safe enough. 
Independent experts, law enforcement personnel, and first responders 
have warned us that we have not done enough to prevent an attack and we 
are ill-equipped to respond to one. Hurricane Katrina showed us that 
little has been done to enhance our preparedness and the devastating 
consequences of our failure to act responsibly here in Washington. And, 
just over a year ago, the 9/11 Commission issued their report card on 
the Administration's and Congresses' progress in implementing their 
recommendations. The result was a report card riddled with D's and F's.
  Last November, the American people voted for a change and their 
decision ushered in a new Democratic Congress. Under new leadership, we 
have made a decision to implement the 9/11 Recommendations. I have long 
argued that we need to take these prudent steps, and I look forward to 
working with my colleagues to see that this is done, but under the 
proposals currently being circulated we do not put forward any 
dedicated funding to pay for these security upgrades.
  I believe that the most important responsibility of our Federal 
Government is to provide for the safety and security of the American 
people. And, I also believe that we need to do this in a fiscally 
responsible way. Secretary Chertoff has argued that one strategy of Al 
Qaeda is to bankrupt us by forcing us to invest too much in our 
domestic security.
  This is an outrageous claim. This is simply a matter of priorities.
  This year the tax cut for Americans that make over $1 million is 
nearly $60 billion. Let me repeat that, just one year of the Bush tax 
cut for Americans making over $1 million dollars is nearly $60 billion. 
In contrast, we dedicate roughly one-half of that--approximately $34 
billion--to fund the operations of the Department of Homeland Security. 
We have invested twice as much for a tax cut for millionaires--less 
than 1 percent of the population--than we do for the Department 
intended to help secure the entire Nation.

  For a Nation that is repeatedly warned about the grave threats we 
face, how can this be the right priority? The Homeland Security Trust 
Fund Act of 2007 would change this by taking less than 1 year of the 
tax cut for millionaires and invest it in homeland security over the 
next 5 years.
  By investing $10 billion per year over the next 5 years, we could 
implement all the 9/11 Commission recommendations. We could hire 50,000 
additional police officers and help local agencies create locally based 
counter-terrorism units. We could hire an additional 1,000 FBI agents 
to help ensure that FBI is able to implement critical reforms without 
abandoning its traditional crime fighting functions. We could also 
invest in security upgrades within our critical infrastructure, fund 
efforts to implement 100 percent scanning of cargo containers, fund a 
grant program to ensure that our first responders can talk in the event 
of an emergency, and nearly double the funding for state homeland 
security grants. And, the list goes on.
  To add to the concerns that we face with respect to homeland 
security, crime is unquestionably on the rise in the United States. The 
FBI reported earlier this past fall that violent crime and murders are 
on the rise after years of decreases. Given all of this, it is hard to 
argue that we are as safe as we should be.
  We know that the murder rate is up and that there is an officer 
shortage in communities throughout the nation. Yet, we provide $0 
funding for the COPS hiring program, and we've slashed funding for the 
Justice Assistance Grant.
  We know that our first responders can't talk because they don't have 
enough interoperable equipment and available spectrum. Yet, we have not 
forced the networks to turn over critical spectrum, and we vote down 
funding to help local agencies purchase equipment every year.
  We know that only 5 percent of cargo containers are scanned, yet we 
do not invest in the personnel and equipment to upgrade our systems.
  We know that our critical infrastructure is vulnerable. Yet, we allow 
industry to decide what is best and provide scant resources to harden 
soft targets.
  I am hopeful that this will change under the new Democratic Congress, 
and this legislation will help ensure that we do all this in a fiscally 
responsible manner.
  In addition, this legislation will also establish an independent 
agency whose sole purpose will be to make recommendations to the 
Department of Homeland Security with respect to distributing homeland 
security with respect to risk and vulnerabilities, to improve the grant 
making process to ensure that all spending is made towards the common 
goal of improving preparedness and response, and to eliminate any waste 
of our precious homeland security resources. This board will be 
comprised of experts at the Federal, State and local level, with law 
enforcement and first responder experience to ensure that all 
stakeholders' viewpoints are considered in the recommendation process.
  I will conclude where I started. This is all about setting the right 
priorities for America. Instead of giving a tax cut to the richest 
Americans who don't need it, we should take some of it and dedicate it 
towards the security of all Americans. Our Nations most fortunate are 
just as patriotic as the middle class. They are just as willing to 
sacrifice for the good of our Nation. The problem is that no one has 
asked them to sacrifice.
  The Homeland Security Trust Fund Act of 2007 will ask them to 
sacrifice, and I am convinced that they will gladly help us out. And to 
those who say this won't work, I would remind them that the 1994 Crime 
Bill established the Violent Crime Reduction Trust Fund, specifically 
designated for public safety that put more than 100,000 cops on the 
street, funded prevention programs, and more prison beds to lock up 
violent offenders. It worked; violent crime went down every year for 8 
years from the historic highs to the lowest levels in a generation.
  Our Nation is at its best when we all pull together and sacrifice. 
The bottom line is that with this legislation, we make clear what our 
national priorities should be, we set out how we will pay for them, and 
we ensure those who are asked to sacrifice that money the government 
raises for security actually gets spent on security.
  This legislation is about re-ordering our homeland security 
priorities. I will push for its prompt passage, and I hope to gain the 
support of my colleagues in this effort.
                                 ______
                                 
      By Mr. CRAPO:
  S. 348. A bill to improve the amendments made by the No Child Left 
Behind Act of 2001; to the Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and 
Pensions.
  Mr. CRAPO. Mr. President, today I introduce the Improving No Child 
Left Behind (INCLB) Act. As a father and a legislator, I am committed 
to advocating for public education in Idaho and throughout the Nation. 
Ensuring that every child receives a good education is one of my top 
priorities. President Bush's sweeping education reforms included in the 
No Child Left Behind Act have had measurable positive effects on many 
students across the country, and I support the law's objective of 
ensuring that every child achieves his or her potential.
  However, five years after passage of the law, it is now appropriate 
to review opportunities for needed improvements to the underlying 
program. After conferring with a number of organizations in Idaho and 
at the national level, I have identified implementation concerns that 
seem common to various stakeholder groups. In response, I have created 
the INCLB Act. This bill contains a number of workable, common-

[[Page S836]]

sense modifications to the law. These provisions preserve the major 
focus on student achievement and accountability and, at the same time, 
ensure that schools and school districts are accurately and fairly 
assessed. The act ensures that local schools and districts have more 
flexibility and control in educating our Nation's children. The goal of 
the act is expressed in its name: to improve No Child Left Behind.
  The bill does a number of things: INCLB would allow supplemental 
services like tutoring to be offered to students sooner than they are 
currently available; INCLB would provide flexibility for States to use 
additional types of assessment models for measuring student progress; 
INCLB grants states more flexibility in assessing students with 
disabilities; INCLB would ensure more fair and accurate assessments of 
Limited English Proficiency (LEP) students; INCLB would create a 
student testing participation range, providing flexibility for 
uncontrollable variations in student attendance; INCLB would allow 
schools to target resources to those student populations who need the 
most attention by applying sanctions only when the same student group 
fails to make adequate progress in the same subject for two consecutive 
years; and INCLB would ensure that students are counted properly and 
accurately in assessment and reporting systems.
  Taken together, these provisions reflect a realistic assessment of 
both the strengths and weaknesses of No Child Left Behind. While there 
may be many issues that divide us, our responsibility in education is 
clear. We must promote successful, meaningful public education for our 
children. The INCLB Act will ensure that NCLB continues to be an avenue 
to success for educators and students throughout Idaho and the Nation.
  I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the 
Record.
  There being no objection, the text of the bill was ordered to be 
printed in the Record, as follows:

                                 S. 348

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

       This Act may be cited as the ``Improving No Child Left 
     Behind Act''.

     SEC. 2. REFERENCES.

       Except as otherwise specifically provided, whenever in this 
     Act an amendment or repeal is expressed in terms of an 
     amendment to, or a repeal of, a section or other provision, 
     the reference shall be considered to be made to a section or 
     other provision of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act 
     of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 6301 et seq.).

     SEC. 3. ADEQUATE YEARLY PROGRESS.

       (a) Accountability.--Section 1111(b)(2) (20 U.S.C. 
     6311(b)(2)) is amended--
       (1) in subparagraph (I)(ii)--
       (A) by striking ``95 percent'' the first place the term 
     appears and inserting ``90 percent (which percentage shall be 
     based on criteria established by the State in the State 
     plan)''; and
       (B) by striking ``95 percent'' the second place the term 
     appears and inserting ``90 percent'';
       (2) by redesignating subparagraph (K) as subparagraph (N); 
     and
       (3) by inserting, after subparagraph (J), the following:
       ``(K) Single count of students.--In meeting the definition 
     of adequate yearly progress under subparagraph (C), a student 
     who may be counted in 2 or more groups described in 
     subparagraph (C)(v)(II), may be counted as an equal fraction 
     of 1 for each such group.
       ``(L) Students with disabilities requiring alternate 
     assessments.--Notwithstanding any other provision of this 
     part, a State may implement the amendments made to part 200 
     of title 34, Code of Federal Regulations on December 9, 2003 
     (68 Fed. Reg. 68698) (related to achievement of students with 
     significant cognitive disabilities) as if such amendments--
       ``(i) permitted the proficient or advanced scores on 
     alternate assessments of not more than 3.0 percent of all 
     tested students to be considered as proficient or advanced, 
     respectively, for the purposes of determining adequate yearly 
     progress, except that--

       ``(I) any assessment given to any such so considered 
     student for the purposes of determining such adequate yearly 
     progress shall be required by the individualized education 
     program of such so considered student;
       ``(II) the individualized education program shall reflect 
     the need for any such alternate assessment based on the 
     evaluation of such so considered student and the services 
     provided such so considered student under section 614 of the 
     Individuals with Disabilities Education Act; and
       ``(III) the individualized education program shall include 
     written consent from the parent of such so considered student 
     prior to such alternate assessment being administered;

       ``(ii) used the term `students requiring alternate 
     assessments' in lieu of the term `students with the most 
     significant cognitive disabilities'; and
       ``(iii) permitted the eligibility, of such so considered 
     students to have the students' scores of proficient or 
     advanced on alternate assessments counted as proficient or 
     advanced for purposes of determining adequate yearly 
     progress, to be determined by the State educational agency, 
     except that such eligibility shall, at a minimum, include--

       ``(I) such so considered students who are receiving 
     services pursuant to a plan required under section 504 of the 
     Rehabilitation Act of 1973;
       ``(II) the students described in subclause (I) who are 
     assessed at a grade level below the grade level in which the 
     students are enrolled (out of level assessments); and
       ``(III) the students described in subclause (I) who are 
     considered students with the most significant cognitive 
     disabilities, as defined by the State educational agency, on 
     the day before the date of enactment of the Improving No 
     Child Left Behind Act .

       ``(M) Other measures of adequate yearly progress.--
     Notwithstanding any other provision of this paragraph, a 
     State may establish in the State plan an alternative 
     definition of adequate yearly progress, subject to approval 
     by the Secretary under subsection (e). Such alternative 
     definition may--
       ``(i) include measures of student achievement over a period 
     of time (such as a value added accountability system) or the 
     progress of some or all of the groups of students described 
     in subparagraph (C)(v) to the next higher level of 
     achievement described in subparagraph (II) or (III) of 
     paragraph (1)(D)(ii) as a factor in determining whether a 
     school, local educational agency, or State has made adequate 
     yearly progress, as described in this paragraph; or
       ``(ii) use the measures of achievement or the progress of 
     groups described in clause (i) as the sole basis for 
     determining whether the State, or a local educational agency 
     or school within the State, has made adequate yearly 
     progress, if--

       ``(I) the primary goal of such definition is that all 
     students in each group described in subparagraph (C)(v) meet 
     or exceed the proficient level of academic achievement, 
     established by the State, not later than 12 years after the 
     end of the 2001-2002 school year; and
       ``(II) such definition includes intermediate goals, as 
     required under subparagraph (H).''.

       (b) Assessments.--Section 1111(b)(3)(C) (20 U.S.C. 
     6311(b)(3)(C)) is amended--
       (1) in clause (ix), by striking subclause (III) and 
     inserting the following:

       ``(III) the inclusion of limited English proficient 
     students, who--

       ``(aa) may, consistent with paragraph (2)(M), be assessed, 
     as determined by the local educational agency, through the 
     use of an assessment which requires achievement of specific 
     gains for up to 3 school years from the first year the 
     student is assessed for the purposes of this subsection;
       ``(bb) may, at the option of the State educational agency, 
     be assessed in the first year the student attends school in 
     the United States (not including the Commonwealth of Puerto 
     Rico); and
       ``(cc) shall not be included in any calculation of an 
     adequate yearly progress determination when the student is in 
     the first year of attendance at a school in the United States 
     (not including the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico).''; and
       (2) in clause (x), by inserting ``of clause (ix)'' after 
     ``subclause (III)''.
       (c) Regulations Affecting Limited English Proficient 
     Children and Children With Disabilities.--Section 1111 (20 
     U.S.C. 6311) is amended by adding at the end the following:
       ``(n) Codification of Regulations Affecting Limited English 
     Proficient Children.--Notwithstanding any other provision of 
     this part, this part shall be implemented consistent with the 
     amendments proposed to part 200 of title 34 of the Code of 
     Federal Regulations on June 24, 2004 (69 Fed. Reg. 35462) 
     (relating to the assessment of limited English proficient 
     children and the inclusion of limited English proficient 
     children in subgroups) as if such amendments permitted 
     students who were previously identified as limited English 
     proficient to be included in the group described in 
     subsection (b)(2)(C)(v)(II)(dd) for 3 additional years, as 
     determined by a local educational agency (based on the 
     individual needs of a child) for the purposes of determining 
     adequate yearly progress.''.

     SEC. 4. SCHOOL IMPROVEMENT AND PUBLIC SCHOOL CHOICE.

       Section 1116(b) (20 U.S.C. 6316(b)) is amended--
       (1) in paragraph (1)--
       (A) in subparagraph (A), by inserting ``(in the same 
     subject for the same group of students, as described in 
     section 1111(b)(2)(C)(v))'' after ``2 consecutive years'';
       (B) in subparagraph (E)(i)--
       (i) by striking ``In the case'' and inserting ``Except as 
     provided in subparagraph (G), in the case''; and
       (ii) by striking ``all students enrolled in the school with 
     the option to transfer to another public school'' and 
     inserting ``students who failed to meet the proficient level 
     of achievement on the assessments described in section 
     1111(b)(3), are enrolled in the school, and are in the group 
     whose academic performance caused the identification under

[[Page S837]]

     this paragraph, with the option to transfer to one other 
     public school identified by and''; and
       (C) by adding at the end the following:
       ``(G) Options.--A local educational agency may offer 
     supplemental educational services as described in subsection 
     (e) in place of the option to transfer to another public 
     school described in subparagraph (E), for the first school 
     year a school is identified for improvement under this 
     paragraph.'';
       (2) in the matter preceding subparagraph (A) of paragraph 
     (5), by inserting ``(in the same subject for the same group 
     of students)'' after ``adequate yearly progress''; and
       (3) in the matter preceding clause (i) of paragraph (7)(C), 
     by inserting ``(in the same subject for the same group of 
     students)'' after ``adequate yearly progress''.
                                 ______
                                 
      By Mr. GRASSLEY (for himself, Mr. Schumer, Mr. Leahy, Mr. 
        Specter, Mr. Graham, Mr. Feingold, Mr. Cornyn, Mr. Durbin, Mr. 
        Craig, and Mr. Allard):
  S. 352. A bill to provide for media coverage of Federal court 
proceedings; to the Committee on the Judiciary.
  Mr. GRASSLEY. Mr. President, I rise today to reintroduce the Sunshine 
in the Courtroom Act, a bipartisan bill which will allow judges at all 
Federal court levels to open their courtrooms to television cameras and 
radio broadcasts.
  Openness in our courts improves the public's understanding of what 
goes on there. Our judicial system is a secret to many people across 
the country. Letting the sun shine in on Federal courtrooms will give 
Americans an opportunity to better understand the judicial process. It 
is the best way to maintain confidence and accountability in the system 
and help judges do a better job.
  For decades, States such as my home State of Iowa have allowed 
cameras in their courtrooms, with great results. As a matter of fact, 
only the District of Columbia prohibits trial and appellate court 
coverage entirely. Nineteen States allow news coverage in most courts; 
fifteen allow coverage with slight restrictions; and the remaining 
sixteen allow coverage with stricter rules.
  The bill I'm introducing today, along with Senator Schumer and eight 
other cosponsors from both sides of the aisle, including Judiciary 
Chairman Leahy and Ranking Member Specter, will greatly improve public 
access to Federal courts. It lets Federal judges open their courtrooms 
to television cameras and other electronic media.
  The Sunshine in the Courtroom Act is full of provisions that ensure 
that the introduction of cameras and other broadcasting devices into 
the courtrooms goes as smoothly as it has at the State level. First, 
the presence of the cameras in Federal trial and appellate courts is at 
the sole discretion of the judges--it is not mandatory. The bill also 
provides a mechanism for Congress to study the effects of this 
legislation on our judiciary before making this change permanent 
through a three-year sunset provision. The bill also protects the 
privacy and safety of non-party witnesses by giving them the right to 
have their faces and voices obscured. Finally, it includes a provision 
to protect the due process rights of any party, and prohibits the 
televising of jurors.
  We need to bring the Federal judiciary into the 21st Century. This 
bill improves public access to and therefore understanding of our 
Federal courts. It has safety provisions to ensure that the cameras 
won't interfere with the proceedings or with the safety or due process 
of anyone involved in the cases. Our States have allowed news coverage 
of their courtrooms for decades. It is time we join them.
  I ask unanimous consent that the text of this bill be printed in the 
Record.
  There being no objection, the text of the bill was ordered to be 
printed in the Record, as follows:

                                 S. 352

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

       This Act may be cited as the ``Sunshine in the Courtroom 
     Act of 2007''.

     SEC. 2. FEDERAL APPELLATE AND DISTRICT COURTS.

       (a) Definitions.--In this section:
       (1) Presiding judge.--The term ``presiding judge'' means 
     the judge presiding over the court proceeding concerned. In 
     proceedings in which more than 1 judge participates, the 
     presiding judge shall be the senior active judge so 
     participating or, in the case of a circuit court of appeals, 
     the senior active circuit judge so participating, except 
     that--
       (A) in en banc sittings of any United States circuit court 
     of appeals, the presiding judge shall be the chief judge of 
     the circuit whenever the chief judge participates; and
       (B) in en banc sittings of the Supreme Court of the United 
     States, the presiding judge shall be the Chief Justice 
     whenever the Chief Justice participates.
       (2) Appellate court of the united states.--The term 
     ``appellate court of the United States'' means any United 
     States circuit court of appeals and the Supreme Court of the 
     United States.
       (b) Authority of Presiding Judge To Allow Media Coverage of 
     Court Proceedings.--
       (1) Authority of appellate courts.--
       (A) In general.--Except as provided under subparagraph (B), 
     the presiding judge of an appellate court of the United 
     States may, at the discretion of that judge, permit the 
     photographing, electronic recording, broadcasting, or 
     televising to the public of any court proceeding over which 
     that judge presides.
       (B) Exception.--The presiding judge shall not permit any 
     action under subparagraph (A), if--
       (i) in the case of a proceeding involving only the 
     presiding judge, that judge determines the action would 
     constitute a violation of the due process rights of any 
     party; or
       (ii) in the case of a proceeding involving the 
     participation of more than 1 judge, a majority of the judges 
     participating determine that the action would constitute a 
     violation of the due process rights of any party.
       (2) Authority of district courts.--
       (A) In general.--
       (i) Authority.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law, 
     except as provided under clause (iii), the presiding judge of 
     a district court of the United States may, at the discretion 
     of that judge, permit the photographing, electronic 
     recording, broadcasting, or televising to the public of any 
     court proceeding over which that judge presides.
       (ii) Obscuring of witnesses.--Except as provided under 
     clause (iii)--

       (I) upon the request of any witness (other than a party) in 
     a trial proceeding, the court shall order the face and voice 
     of the witness to be disguised or otherwise obscured in such 
     manner as to render the witness unrecognizable to the 
     broadcast audience of the trial proceeding; and
       (II) the presiding judge in a trial proceeding shall inform 
     each witness who is not a party that the witness has the 
     right to request the image and voice of that witness to be 
     obscured during the witness' testimony.

       (iii) Exception.--The presiding judge shall not permit any 
     action under this subparagraph, if that judge determines the 
     action would constitute a violation of the due process rights 
     of any party.
       (B) No televising of jurors.--The presiding judge shall not 
     permit the televising of any juror in a trial proceeding.
       (3) Advisory guidelines.--The Judicial Conference of the 
     United States may promulgate advisory guidelines to which a 
     presiding judge, at the discretion of that judge, may refer 
     in making decisions with respect to the management and 
     administration of photographing, recording, broadcasting, or 
     televising described under paragraphs (1) and (2).
       (4) Sunset of district court authority.--The authority 
     under paragraph (2) shall terminate 3 years after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act.
                                 ______
                                 
      By Mr. NELSON of Florida (for himself and Mr. Martinez):
  S. 353. A bill to authorize ecosystem restoration projects for the 
Indian River Lagoon-South and the Picayune Strand, Collier County, in 
the State of Florida; to the Committee on Environment and Public Works.
  Mr. NELSON of Florida. Mr. President, today I am introducing 
legislation authorizing two important Everglades projects: the Indian 
River Lagoon, IRL, and the Picayune Strand Restoration, PSR. Senator 
Mel Martinez has joined me as an original cosponsor.
  These two projects constitute the first phase of the overall 
restoration of the Everglades. IRL at the northern tip of the 
Everglades ecosystem and PSR in the southwest section of the 
Everglades--are essential to getting the water right. IRL will restore 
natural sheet flow to the Everglades ecosystem by re-directing water to 
the Everglades instead of out to the ocean, provide reservoirs for 
storage of water in the wet season and release in the dry season, build 
stormwater treatment facilities to improve the water quality of the 
water flowing through the Everglades ecosystem and remove millions of 
cubic yards of muck from the St. Lucie Estuary.
  I toured the St. Lucie River when it turned phosphorescent green 
during an algae bloom and what was more amazing to me was that I saw 
absolutely no wildlife, it was a dead river.

[[Page S838]]

  PSR will re-establish the natural sheet flow to the Ten Thousand 
Islands, restore 72,320 acres of habitat, and restore ecological 
connectivity of the Florida Panthers National Wildlife Refuge, the 
Belle Meade State Conservation and Recreation Lands Project Area and 
the Fakahatchee Strand State Preserve. For these reasons, the Indian 
River Lagoon and Picayune Strand projects must be authorized and 
completed.
  Last year we came close to meeting that goal, as the projects were 
included in the Senate passed WRDA 2006. Today I am renewing this 
effort and will work to ensure these projects are included in WRDA 
2007.
  I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the 
Record.
  There being no objection, the text of the bill was ordered to be 
printed in the Record, as follows:

                                 S. 353

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

       This Act may be cited as the ``Restoring the Everglades, an 
     American Legacy Act of 2007''.

     SEC. 2. INDIAN RIVER LAGOON-SOUTH, FLORIDA.

       (a) Indian River Lagoon-South.--The Secretary of the Army 
     may carry out the project for ecosystem restoration, water 
     supply, flood control, and protection of water quality, 
     Indian River Lagoon-South, Florida, at a total cost of 
     $1,357,167,000, with an estimated Federal cost of 
     $678,583,500 and an estimated non-Federal cost of 
     $678,583,500, in accordance with section 601 of the Water 
     Resources Development Act of 2000 (114 Stat. 2680) and the 
     recommendations of the report of the Chief of Engineers, 
     dated August 6, 2004.
       (b) Deauthorizations.--As of the date of enactment of this 
     Act, the following projects are not authorized:
       (1) The uncompleted portions of the project authorized by 
     section 601(b)(2)(C)(i) of the Water Resources Development 
     Act of 2000 (114 Stat. 2682), C-44 Basin Storage Reservoir of 
     the Comprehensive Everglades Restoration Plan, at a total 
     cost of $112,562,000, with an estimated Federal cost of 
     $56,281,000 and an estimated non-Federal cost of $56,281,000.
       (2) The uncompleted portions of the project authorized by 
     section 203 of the Flood Control Act of 1968 (82 Stat. 740), 
     Martin County, Florida modifications to the Central and South 
     Florida Project, as contained in Senate Document 101, 90th 
     Congress, 2d Session, at a total cost of $15,471,000, with an 
     estimated Federal cost of $8,073,000 and an estimated non-
     Federal cost of $7,398,000.
       (3) The uncompleted portions of the project authorized by 
     section 203 of the Flood Control Act of 1968 (82 Stat. 740), 
     East Coast Backpumping, St. Lucie--Martin County, Spillway 
     Structure S-311 of the Central and South Florida Project, as 
     contained in House Document 369, 90th Congress, 2d Session, 
     at a total cost of $77,118,000, with an estimated Federal 
     cost of $55,124,000 and an estimated non-Federal cost of 
     $21,994,000.

     SEC. 3. PICAYUNE STRAND ECOSYSTEM RESTORATION, COLLIER 
                   COUNTY, FLORIDA.

       The Secretary of the Army may carry out the project for 
     ecosystem restoration, Picayune Strand, Collier County, 
     Florida, at a total cost of $375,328,000, with an estimated 
     Federal cost of $187,664,000 and an estimated non-Federal 
     cost of $187,664,000, in accordance with section 601 of the 
     Water Resources Development Act of 2000 (114 Stat. 2680), 
     Report of the Chief of Engineers dated September 15, 2005.
                                 ______
                                 
      By Mr. DOMENICI (for himself and Mrs. Feinstein):
  S. 355. A bill to establish a National Commission on Entitlement 
Solvency; to the Committee on Finance.
  Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, I rise today with my colleague, Senator 
Feinstein to introduce the Social Security and Medicare Solvency 
Commission Act.
  Our country is facing a looming financial crisis. The Medicare and 
Social Security programs face major financial problems. Current trends 
show that these programs are not sustainable, and that if we do not 
take action soon to reform both these programs, they will drive Federal 
spending to unprecedented levels.
  Without reform, spending on these programs will consume nearly all 
projected federal revenues, and threaten our country's future 
prosperity. Social Security costs are projected to rise from about 4.2 
percent of gross domestic product today to 6.3 percent of gross 
domestic product by 2080. Similarly, Medicare expenditures are 
projected to rise from 2.7 percent of gross domestic product today to 
more than 11 percent of gross domestic product by 2080. At this rate, 
no money will be left for any other federal activity. There will be no 
money for education, defense, federal law enforcement, or any of our 
other valued social programs.
  Federal Reserve Board Chairman Bernacke and GAO Comptroller Walker 
have testified in front of the Senate Budget Committee in recent weeks 
that entitlement spending is already a threat to the U.S. economy. 
However, despite the universal recognition of out of control 
entitlement spending growth and the problems this will cause, Congress 
has repeatedly failed to come together to work on a solution.
  The legislation we are introducing today will create a bipartisan 
commission tasked with making recommendations and creating legislation 
that will ensure the solvency of both Social Security and Medicare. 
However, unlike past commissions, these recommendations will not sit on 
a shelf and collect dust. This legislation will force action by 
Congress.
  This legislation mandates that the commission seek public input 
through a series of public hearings, and then requires the commission 
to put together a report and submit accompanying legislative language. 
However, then this bill goes further. It sets a mandatory timelines for 
Congress to introduce the legislation, take committee action and for 
action on the floor. In short, it forces Congress to do its job.
  When this legislation passes, Congress will be forced to take action 
that will generate a sustainable Social Security and Medicare system. 
And, most importantly, this will be a bipartisan effort. I am very 
pleased that my distinguished colleague, Senator Feinstein has joined 
me in taking up this cause.
  Though highly challenging, the financial difficulties facing Social 
Security and Medicare are not insurmountable. But the time has come to 
take action. The sooner these challenges are addressed, the more 
solutions will be available to us and the less pain they will cause. We 
need serious and thoughtful engagement from everyone to make sure that 
Medicare and Social Security are strengthened and sustainable for 
future generations.
  I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the 
Record.
  There being no objection, the text of the bill was ordered to be 
printed in the Record, as follows:

                                 S. 355

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

       This Act may be cited as the ``The Social Security and 
     Medicare Solvency Commission Act''.

     SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.

       In this subtitle:
       (1) Administrator.--The term ``Administrator'' means the 
     Administrator of the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid 
     Services.
       (2) Calendar day.--The term ``calendar day'' means a 
     calendar day other than one in which either House is not in 
     session because of an adjournment of more than 3 days to a 
     date certain.
       (3) Commission.--The term ``Commission'' means the National 
     Commission on Entitlement Solvency established under section 
     3(a).
       (4) Commission bill.--The term ``Commission bill'' means a 
     bill consisting of the proposed legislative language 
     submitted by the Commission under section 3(c)(2)(A) that is 
     introduced under section 7(a).
       (5) Commissioner.--The term ``Commissioner'' means the 
     Commissioner of Social Security.
       (6) Long-term.--The term ``long-term'' means a period of 
     not less than 75 years beginning on the date of enactment of 
     this Act.
       (7) Medicaid.--The term ``Medicaid'' means the program 
     established under title XIX of the Social Security Act (42 
     U.S.C. 1396 et seq.)
       (8) Medicare.--The term ``Medicare'' means the program 
     established under title XVIII of the Social Security Act (42 
     U.S.C. 1395 et seq.).
       (9) Social security.--The term ``Social Security'' means 
     the program of old-age, survivors, and disability insurance 
     benefits established under title II of the Social Security 
     Act (42 U.S.C. 401 et seq.).
       (10) Solvency of medicare program.--
       (A) In general.--Subject to subparagraph (B), the term 
     ``solvency'', in relation to the Medicare program, means any 
     year in which there is not excess general revenue Medicare 
     funding (as defined in section 801(c)(1) of the Medicare 
     Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003 
     (Public Law 108-173; 117 Stat. 2358)).
       (B) Treatment of new revenue.--
       (i) In general.--For purposes of the requirement that the 
     Commission evaluate the solvency of the Medicare program and 
     recommend legislation to restore such solvency as needed, the 
     Commission shall treat any new revenue that is a result of 
     any action

[[Page S839]]

     taken or any legislation enacted by Congress pursuant to the 
     recommendations of the Commission, as being a dedicated 
     medicare financing source (as defined in section 801(c)(3) of 
     the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and 
     Modernization Act of 2003 (Public Law 108-173; 117 Stat. 
     2358)).
       (ii) Definition of new revenue.--For purposes of this 
     subparagraph, the term ``new revenue'' means only those 
     revenues collected as a result of legislation enacted by 
     Congress pursuant to section 7 of this Act. The term ``new 
     revenue'' shall not include any revenue otherwise collected 
     under law, including any such revenue that is dedicated to 
     the Federal Hospital Insurance Trust Fund under section 1817 
     of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 1395i) or the Federal 
     Supplementary Medical Insurance Trust Fund under section 1841 
     of such Act (42 U.S.C. 1395t).
       (11) Solvency of social security program.--The term 
     ``solvency'', in relation to Social Security, means any year 
     in which the balance ratio (as defined under section 709(b) 
     of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 910(b)) of the Federal 
     Old-Age and Survivors Insurance Trust Fund and the Federal 
     Disability Insurance Trust Fund established under section 201 
     of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 401) is greater than 
     zero; and

     SEC. 3. ESTABLISHMENT OF COMMISSION.

       (a) Establishment.--There is permanently established an 
     independent and bipartisan commission to be known as the 
     ``National Commission on Entitlement Solvency''.
       (b) Purpose.--The Commission shall conduct a comprehensive 
     review of the Social Security and Medicare programs for the 
     following purposes:
       (1) Review.--Reviewing relevant analyses of the current and 
     long-term actuarial financial condition of the Social 
     Security and Medicare programs.
       (2) Identifying problems.--Identifying problems that may 
     threaten the long-term solvency of the Social Security and 
     Medicare programs.
       (3) Analyzing potential solutions.--Analyzing potential 
     solutions to problems that threaten the long-term solvency of 
     the Social Security and Medicare programs.
       (4) Providing recommendations and proposed legislative 
     language.--Providing recommendations and proposed legislative 
     language that will ensure the long-term solvency of the 
     Social Security and Medicare programs and the provision of 
     appropriate benefits.
       (c) Duties.--
       (1) In general.--The Commission shall conduct a 
     comprehensive review of the Social Security and Medicare 
     programs consistent with the purposes described in subsection 
     (b) and shall submit the report required under paragraph (2).
       (2) Report, recommendations, and proposed legislative 
     language.--
       (A) Report.--
       (i) In general.--Not later than 1 year after the date of 
     enactment of this Act, and every 5 years thereafter, the 
     Commission shall submit a report on the long-term solvency of 
     the Social Security and Medicare programs that contains a 
     detailed statement of the findings, conclusions, 
     recommendations, and the proposed legislative language (as 
     required under subparagraph (C)) of the Commission to the 
     President, Congress, the Commissioner, and the Administrator.
       (ii) Proposed legislative language.--The Commission shall 
     submit the proposed legislative language (as required under 
     clause (i)) in the form of a proposed bill for introduction 
     in Congress.
       (B) Findings, conclusions, and recommendations.--A finding, 
     conclusion, or recommendation of the Commission shall be 
     included in the report under subparagraph (A) only if not 
     less than 10 members of the Commission voted for such 
     finding, conclusion, or recommendation.
       (C) Legislative language.--
       (i) In general.--If a recommendation submitted with respect 
     to the Social Security or Medicare programs under 
     subparagraph (A) involves legislative action, the report 
     shall include proposed legislative language to carry out such 
     action. Such legislative language shall only be included in 
     the report under subparagraph (A) if the Commission has 
     considered the impact the recommendation would have on the 
     Medicaid program.
       (ii) Exclusion of recommendations with respect to 
     medicaid.--Proposed legislative language to carry out any 
     recommendation submitted by the Commission with respect to 
     the Medicaid program shall not be included in the legislative 
     language submitted under clause (i).

     SEC. 4. STRUCTURE AND MEMBERSHIP OF THE COMMISSION.

       (a) Appointment.--
       (1) In general.--The Commission shall be composed of 15 
     members, of whom--
       (A) 7 members shall be appointed by the President--
       (i) 3 of whom shall be Democrats, appointed in consultation 
     with the Majority Leader of the Senate and the Speaker of the 
     House of Representatives;
       (ii) 3 of whom shall be Republicans; and
       (iii) 1 of whom shall not be affiliated with any political 
     party;
       (B) 2 members shall be appointed by the Majority Leader of 
     the Senate, 1 of whom is from the Committee on Finance of the 
     Senate;
       (C) 2 members shall be appointed by the Minority Leader of 
     the Senate, 1 of whom is from the Committee on Finance of the 
     Senate;
       (D) 2 members shall be appointed by the Speaker of the 
     House of Representatives, 1 of whom is from the Committee on 
     Ways and Means of the House of Representatives; and
       (E) 2 members shall be appointed by the Minority Leader of 
     the House of Representatives, 1 of whom is from the Committee 
     on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives.
       (2) Qualifications.--The members shall be individuals who 
     are, by reason of their education, experience, and 
     attainments, exceptionally qualified to perform the duties of 
     members of the Commission.
       (3) Date.--Members of the Commission shall be appointed by 
     not later than January 1, 2008.
       (4) Terms.--A member of the Commission shall be appointed 
     for a single term of 5 years, except the members initially 
     appointed shall be appointed for terms of 6 years.
       (b) Vacancies.--A vacancy on the Commission shall be filled 
     not later than 30 calendar days after the date on which the 
     Commission is given notice of the vacancy, in the same manner 
     as the original appointment. The individual appointed to fill 
     the vacancy shall serve only for the unexpired portion of the 
     term for which the individual's predecessor was appointed.
       (c) Committee Members of Commission.--In the case of an 
     individual appointed to the Commission under subsection 
     (a)(1) who is required to be a member of the Committee on 
     Finance of the Senate or the Committee on Ways and Means of 
     the House of Representatives, if such individual is no longer 
     a member of the required Committee they shall no longer be 
     eligible to serve on the Commission. Such individual shall be 
     removed from the Commission and replaced in accordance with 
     subsection (b).
       (d) Co-Chairperson.--The Commission shall designate 2 Co-
     Chairpersons from among the members of the Commission, 
     neither of whom may be affiliated with the same political 
     party.

     SEC. 5. POWERS OF THE COMMISSION.

       (a) Meetings and Hearings.--
       (1) Meetings.--The Commission shall meet at the call of the 
     Co-Chairpersons. The Co-Chairpersons of the Commission or 
     their designee shall convene and preside at the meetings of 
     the Commission
       (2) Hearings.--
       (A) Initial town-hall style public hearings.--
       (i) In general.--The Commission shall hold at least 1 town-
     hall style public hearing within each Federal reserve 
     district not later than the date on which the Commission 
     submits the report required under section 3(c)(2)(A), and 
     shall, to the extent feasible, ensure that there is broad 
     public participation in the hearings.
       (ii) Hearing format.--During each hearing, the Commission 
     shall present to the public, and generate comments and 
     suggestions regarding, the issues reviewed under section 
     3(b), policies designed to address those issues, and 
     tradeoffs between such policies.
       (B) Additional hearings.--In addition to the hearings 
     required under subparagraph (A), the Commission shall hold 
     such other hearings as the Commission determines appropriate 
     to carry out the purposes of this Act.
       (3) Quorum.--Ten members of the Commission shall constitute 
     a quorum for purposes of voting, but a quorum is not required 
     for members to meet and hold hearings.
       (b) Administration.--
       (1) Compensation.--Each member, other than the Co-
     Chairpersons, shall be paid at a rate equal to the daily 
     equivalent of the minimum annual rate of basic pay prescribed 
     for level IV of the Executive Schedule under section 5315 of 
     title 5, United States Code, for each day (including travel 
     time) during which such member is engaged in the performance 
     of the duties of the Commission. The Co-Chairpersons shall be 
     paid at a rate equal to the daily equivalent of the minimum 
     annual rate of basic pay prescribed for level III of the 
     Executive Schedule under section 5314 of title 5, United 
     States Code, for each day (including travel time) during 
     which such member is engaged in the performance of the duties 
     of the Commission.
       (2) Travel expenses.--Members shall receive travel 
     expenses, including per diem in lieu of subsistence, in 
     accordance with sections 5702 and 5703 of title 5, United 
     States Code, while away from their homes or regular places of 
     business in performance of services for the Commission.
       (c) Federal Advisory Committee Act.--The Commission shall 
     be exempt from the provisions of the Federal Advisory 
     Committee Act (5 U.S.C. App.).
       (d) Personnel.--
       (1) Director.--The Commission shall have a staff headed by 
     an Executive Director. The Executive Director shall be paid 
     at a rate equivalent to a rate established for the Senior 
     Executive Service under section 5382 of title 5, United 
     States Code.
       (2) Staff appointment.--With the approval of the Co-
     Chairpersons, the Executive Director may appoint such 
     personnel as the Executive Director and the Commission 
     determines to be appropriate.
       (3) Actuarial experts and consultants.--With the approval 
     of the Co-Chairpersons, the Executive Director may procure 
     temporary and intermittent services under section 3109(b) of 
     title 5, United States Code.
       (4) Detail of government employees.--Upon the request of 
     the Co-Chairpersons, the

[[Page S840]]

     head of any Federal agency may detail, without reimbursement, 
     any of the personnel of such agency to the Commission to 
     assist in carrying out the duties of the Commission. Any such 
     detail shall not interrupt or otherwise affect the civil 
     service status or privileges of the Federal employee.
       (5) Other resources.--The Commission shall have reasonable 
     access to materials, resources, statistical data, and other 
     information from the Library of Congress, the Chief Actuary 
     of Social Security, the Secretary of Health and Human 
     Services, the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, the 
     Congressional Budget Office, and other agencies and elected 
     representatives of the executive and legislative branches of 
     the Federal Government. The Co-Chairpersons of the Commission 
     shall make requests for such access in writing when 
     necessary.

     SEC. 6. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

       There are authorized to be appropriated such sums as are 
     necessary to carry out the purposes of this Act.

     SEC. 7. EXPEDITED CONSIDERATION OF COMMISSION 
                   RECOMMENDATIONS.

       (a) Introduction and Committee Consideration.--
       (1) Introduction.--A Commission bill shall be introduced in 
     the Senate by the majority leader, or the majority leader's 
     designee, and in the House of Representatives, by the 
     majority leader, or the majority leader's designee. Upon such 
     introduction, the Commission bill shall be referred to the 
     appropriate committees of Congress under paragraph (2). If 
     the Commission bill is not introduced in accordance with the 
     preceding sentence, then any member of Congress may introduce 
     the Commission bill in their respective House of Congress 
     beginning on the date that is the 5th calendar day that such 
     House is in session following the date of the submission of 
     the Commission report under section 3(c)(2)(A).
       (2) Committee consideration.--
       (A) Referral.--A Commission bill introduced in the Senate 
     shall be referred to the Committee on Finance of the Senate. 
     A Commission bill introduced in the House of Representatives 
     shall be referred jointly to the Committee on Ways and Means 
     and the Committee on Energy and Commerce of the House of 
     Representatives.
       (B) Reporting.--Not later than 60 calendar days after the 
     introduction of the Commission bill, each Committee of 
     Congress to which the Commission bill was referred shall 
     report the bill. Each such reported bill shall meet the 
     requirement of ensuring the long-term solvency of the Social 
     Security and Medicare programs, and the provision of 
     appropriate benefits, that the proposed legislative language 
     provided by the Commission is subject to under section 
     3(b)(4).
       (C) Discharge of committee.--If a committee to which is 
     referred a Commission bill has not reported such Commission 
     bill at the end of 60 calendar days after its introduction, 
     such committee shall be automatically discharged from further 
     consideration of the Commission bill and it shall be placed 
     on the appropriate calendar.
       (b) Expedited Procedure.--
       (1) Amendments.--No amendment that is not relevant to the 
     provisions of the Commission bill shall be in order in either 
     the Senate or the House of Representatives. In either House, 
     an amendment, any amendment to an amendment, or any debatable 
     motion or appeal is debatable for not to exceed 5 hours to be 
     divided equally between those favoring and those opposing the 
     amendment, motion, or appeal.
       (2) Floor consideration in the senate.--
       (A) In general.--Not later than 30 calendar days after the 
     date on which a committee has reported or has been discharged 
     from consideration of a Commission bill, the majority leader 
     of the Senate, or the majority leader's designee shall move 
     to proceed to the consideration of the Commission bill. It 
     shall also be in order for any member of the Senate to move 
     to proceed to the consideration of the bill at any time after 
     the conclusion of such 30-day period.
       (B) Motion to proceed.--A motion to proceed to the 
     consideration of a Commission bill is privileged in the 
     Senate. The motion is not debatable and is not subject to a 
     motion to postpone consideration of the Commission bill or to 
     proceed to the consideration of other business. A motion to 
     reconsider the vote by which the motion to proceed is agreed 
     to or not agreed to shall not be in order. If the motion to 
     proceed is agreed to, the Senate shall immediately proceed to 
     consideration of the Commission bill without intervening 
     motion, order, action, or other business, and the Commission 
     bill shall remain the unfinished business of the Senate until 
     disposed of.
       (C) Limited debate.--
       (i) In general.--Consideration in the Senate of the 
     Commission bill and all amendments to such bill, and on all 
     debatable motions and appeals in connection therewith, shall 
     be limited to not more than 40 hours, which shall be equally 
     divided between, and controlled by, the majority leader and 
     the minority leader of the Senate or their designees. A 
     motion further to limit debate on the Commission bill is in 
     order and is not debatable. All time used for consideration 
     of the Commission bill, including time used for quorum calls 
     (except quorum calls immediately preceding a vote), shall 
     come from the 40 hours of consideration.
       (ii) Recommital to committee.--Upon expiration of the 40-
     hour period provided under clause (i), the Commission bill 
     shall be recommitted to committee for further consideration 
     unless \3/5\ of the Members, duly chosen and sworn, of the 
     Senate agree to proceed to passage. Any bill reported by a 
     committee as a result of such further consideration shall--

       (I) meet the requirement of ensuring the long-term solvency 
     of the Social Security and Medicare programs and the 
     provision of appropriate benefits that the proposed 
     legislative language provided by the Commission is subject to 
     under section 3(b)(4); and
       (II) be considered under the expedited procedures under 
     this subsection.

       (D) Vote on passage.--
       (i) In general.--The vote on passage in the Senate of the 
     Commission bill shall occur immediately following the 
     conclusion of the 40-hour period for consideration of the 
     Commission bill under subparagraph (C) and a request to 
     establish the presence of a quorum.
       (ii) Other motions not in order.--A motion in the Senate to 
     postpone consideration of the Commission bill, a motion to 
     proceed to the consideration of other business, or a motion 
     to recommit the Commission bill is not in order. A motion in 
     the Senate to reconsider the vote by which the Commission 
     bill is agreed to or not agreed to is not in order.
       (3) Floor consideration in the house.--
       (A) In general.--Not later than 30 calendar days after the 
     date on which a committee has reported or has been discharged 
     from consideration of a Commission bill, the majority leader 
     of the House of Representatives, or the majority leader's 
     designee shall move to proceed to the consideration of the 
     Commission bill. It shall also be in order for any member of 
     the House of Representatives to move to proceed to the 
     consideration of the bill at any time after the conclusion of 
     such 30-day period.
       (B) Motion to proceed.--A motion to proceed to the 
     consideration of a Commission bill is privileged in the House 
     of Representatives. The motion is not debatable and is not 
     subject to a motion to postpone consideration of the 
     Commission bill or to proceed to the consideration of other 
     business. A motion to reconsider the vote by which the motion 
     to proceed is agreed to or not agreed to shall not be in 
     order. If the motion to proceed is agreed to, the House of 
     Representatives shall immediately proceed to consideration of 
     the Commission bill without intervening motion, order, 
     action, or other business, and the Commission bill shall 
     remain the unfinished business of the House of 
     Representatives until disposed of.
       (C) Limited debate.--
       (i) In general.--Consideration in the House of 
     Representatives of the Commission bill and all amendments to 
     such bill, and on all debatable motions and appeals in 
     connection therewith, shall be limited to not more than 40 
     hours, which shall be equally divided between, and controlled 
     by, the majority leader and the minority leader of the House 
     of Representatives or their designees. A motion further to 
     limit debate on the Commission bill is in order and is not 
     debatable. All time used for consideration of the Commission 
     bill, including time used for quorum calls (except quorum 
     calls immediately preceding a vote), shall come from the 40 
     hours of consideration.
       (ii) Recommital to committee.--Upon expiration of the 40-
     hour period provided under clause (i), the Commission bill 
     shall be recommitted to committee for further consideration 
     unless \3/5\ of the Members, duly chosen and sworn, of the 
     House of Representatives agree to proceed to final passage. 
     Any bill reported by a committee as a result of such further 
     consideration shall--

       (I) meet the requirement of ensuring the long-term solvency 
     of the Social Security and Medicare programs and the 
     provision of appropriate benefits that the proposed 
     legislative language provided by the Commission is subject to 
     under section 3(b)(4); and
       (II) be considered under the expedited procedures under 
     this subsection.

       (D) Vote on passage.--
       (i) In general.--The vote on passage in the House of 
     Representatives of the Commission bill shall occur 
     immediately following the conclusion of the 40-hour period 
     for consideration of the Commission bill under subparagraph 
     (C) and a request to establish the presence of a quorum.
       (ii) Other motions not in order.--A motion in the House of 
     Representatives to postpone consideration of the Commission 
     bill, a motion to proceed to the consideration of other 
     business, or a motion to recommit the Commission bill is not 
     in order. A motion in the House of Representatives to 
     reconsider the vote by which the Commission bill is agreed to 
     or not agreed to is not in order.
       (4) Consideration by other house.--If, before the passage 
     by one House of the Commission bill that was introduced in 
     such House, such House receives from the other House a 
     Commission bill as passed by such other House--
       (A) the Commission bill of the other House shall not be 
     referred to a committee and may only be considered for 
     passage in the House that receives it under subparagraph (C);
       (B) the procedure in the House in receipt of the Commission 
     bill of the other House, with respect to the Commission bill 
     that was introduced in the receiving House, shall be the same 
     as if no Commission bill had been received from the other 
     House; and
       (C) notwithstanding subparagraph (B), the vote on final 
     passage shall be on the Commission bill of the other House.

[[Page S841]]

     Upon disposition of a Commission bill that is received by one 
     House from the other House, it shall no longer be in order to 
     consider the Commission bill that was introduced in the 
     receiving House.
       (5) Consideration in conference.--
       (A) Convening of conference.--In the case of any 
     disagreement between the two Houses of Congress with respect 
     to a Commission bill passed by both Houses, conferees shall 
     be promptly appointed and a conference convened. All motions 
     to proceed to conference are nondebatable. The committee of 
     conference shall make and file a report with respect to such 
     Commission bill within 30 calendar days after the day on 
     which managers on the part of the Senate and the House of 
     Representatives have been appointed. Notwithstanding any rule 
     in either House concerning the printing of conference reports 
     or concerning any delay in the consideration of such reports, 
     such report shall be acted on by both Houses not later than 5 
     calendar days after the conference report is filed in the 
     House in which such report is filed first. In the event the 
     conferees are unable to agree within 30 calendar days after 
     the date on which the conference was convened, they shall 
     report back to their respective Houses in disagreement.
       (B) Conference report defeated.--Should the conference 
     report be defeated, debate on any request for a new 
     conference and the appointment of conferees shall be limited 
     to 1 hour, to be equally divided between, and controlled by, 
     the manager of the conference report and the minority leader 
     or the minority leader's designee, and should any motion be 
     made to instruct the conferees before the conferees are 
     named, debate on such motion shall be limited to \1/2\ hour, 
     to be equally divided between, and controlled by, the mover 
     and the manager of the conference report. Debate on any 
     amendment to any such instructions shall be limited to 20 
     minutes, to be equally divided between, and controlled by, 
     the mover and the manager of the conference report. In all 
     cases when the manager of the conference report is in favor 
     of any motion, appeal, or amendment, the time in opposition 
     shall be under the control of the minority leader or the 
     minority leader's designee.

  Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, as the new Congress begins work, I am 
pleased to join with Senator Domenici in addressing one of the most 
serious and intractable problems facing the Nation--restoring the long-
term fiscal health of Social Security and Medicare.
  Today we propose a bipartisan, independent and permanently existing 
commission to return these essential programs to solid financial 
footing for generations to come.
  Our legislation mandates the periodic, comprehensive review of Social 
Security and Medicare to ensure their present and future solvency. By a 
year from the date of enactment, it requires the Commission to devise 
and recommend to Congress and the President a benefit and revenue 
structure that allows Social Security and Medicare to become, once 
again, stable and effective.
  A key aspect of the bill is that its mission is ongoing indefinitely. 
Every five years the Commission returns with new recommendations--small 
tweaks or larger adjustments, whatever is necessary--to keep these 
entitlement programs in actuarial balance.
  Since 2005, the President, Congress and the Nation have stalemated 
over the issue of privatizing Social Security. The issue remains 
contentious. Recent press articles suggest the Administration would be 
prepared to drop carve out accounts as the price of overall reform.
  Meanwhile, the Social Security funding shortfall is projected to 
balloon to roughly $4.6 trillion over the next 75 years to pay all 
scheduled benefits. This unfunded obligation has increased by $600 
billion alone over the last year. Medicare is in far worse shape, 
needing $11.3 trillion over the next seventy-five years to close the 
gap and remain in balance.
  The 2006 report from the Trustees of Medicare and Social Security is 
alarming to say the least. They describe the current path of spending 
for both as ``problematic'', ``unsustainable,'' ``severe'', and in 
``poor fiscal shape.'' In sum the Trustees say that ``the problems of 
both programs are driven by inexorable demographics, and, in the case 
of Medicare, inexorable health care cost inflation, and are not likely 
to be ameliorated by economic growth or mere tinkering with program 
financing.''
  Simple numbers tell the story: growing cash flow deficits will 
exhaust the Medicare trust fund in 2018, and Social Security reserves 
will be overcome in 2040, according to the Trustees report.
  Our legislation takes a new approach and is bipartisan to the core. 
Instead of emphasizing the merits of one proposal over another, we wipe 
the slate clean.
  Fifteen experts, some of whom are Members of Congress from the 
committees of jurisdiction, are appointed. They take a full year to 
conduct town hall meetings nationwide, assess these trillion dollar 
programs from top to bottom, and rationalize their cost structure 
through intensive evaluation.
  We advocate an open process, where all American voices can be heard. 
We have learned in the last two years that these issues effectively 
surpass the Congress' and President's ability to reach a compromise.
  Relying strictly on elected officials to meet privately and out of 
the public view to negotiate a multi-trillion agreement I believe risks 
more failure. We have no demonstrated track record since 2005 of being 
able to achieve bipartisan consensus. And there are no new developments 
of late that suggest a different outcome than more partisan gridlock.
  I know Majority Leader Reid is instructing on certain members of the 
Senate to gather and discuss these issues in the coming months. I hope 
it works. But I basically share his outlook for the prospects of a 
bipartisan deal: ``It's a tremendous long shot. If you were a Las Vegas 
bookmaker, you'd put the odds pretty [long] for being able to do 
that.''
  The Commission we propose would not be offering one-time solutions 
that get tossed aside and collect dust. Far from it: the Commission's 
detailed analysis, nonpartisan recommendations and findings are 
provided in writing and take the form of legislation that Congress 
formally considers.
  The Senate and House, in turn, through expedited legislative 
procedures, will hopefully be poised to amend if need be and then enact 
the changes into law.
  Compromise, in the form of increasing payroll tax revenues or other 
fees and cutting benefits, is the inevitable reality which we face. 
Senator Domenici and I are focused on creating a pathway to reach that 
compromise. We do not hold out, today, certain ideas that we believe 
Commission Members ought to consider.
  We rely on their independent expertise and motivation to derive what 
is best for the Nation. Then we let the chips fall where they may from 
there.
  The former Chairman of the Federal Reserve, Alan Greenspan, said two 
years ago that we had little time to waste in fixing Social Security. 
He endorsed the notion of establishing a Commission, much like the one 
he led in 1983 that led to historic changes in the program. His 
congressional testimony bears repeating:

       This is not a hugely difficult problem to solve . . . And I 
     guess what is missing is the fact that at this stage there 
     has been a rather low interest in actually joining, in 
     finding out where some of the agreements are, and I have a 
     suspicion that when that occurs, that will happen. It may 
     well be that some mechanism such as that which we employed in 
     1983 may be a useful mechanism to get groups together and 
     find out where there are agreements. I tend to think what 
     happens in these debates is nobody talks about what they 
     agree about but only about what they differ about. And 
     something has got to give soon because we do not have the 
     choice of not resolving this issue.

  Chairman Greenspan is absolutely right that it is only a matter of 
time that we implement Social Security reform. That is because 48 
million people, or 1 out of every 6 Americans, depend on it. And by 
2050, an astounding 82 million Americans will receive this guaranteed 
benefit.
  For more than 20 percent of retirees, Social Security is it: their 
only source of income.
  For half of those 48 million, Social Security keeps them out of 
poverty. And for almost two-thirds, Social Security makes up more than 
half of their total income.
  4.8 million widows and widowers rely on Social Security, as do 6.8 
million disabled workers and 4 million children.
  The long-term challenges are significant. It is not a crisis, we have 
time to implement gradual reform over time, but we need to get started.
  While the current projected shortfall for Social Security amounts to 
about $4.6 trillion, the fact of the matter is that 100 percent of 
benefits can be paid until 2040 by some estimates (Social Security 
Administration) or 2046 by

[[Page S842]]

others (CBO). Beyond that time horizon, 73 percent of benefits can be 
paid.
  So the bottom line is, there is time, the know-how, and the resources 
to be able to maintain the current system, with phased adjustments 
occurring over many years to the Social Security Trust Fund.
  The key, of course, is coming to a rational consensus--Democrats and 
Republicans united--in the effort to make Social Security solvent from 
this day forward.
  Most budget experts agree that the Social Security problem pales in 
comparison to the enormous shortfall facing the Medicare Trust Fund 
(Part A)--over the next 75 years a total of $11.3 trillion. The various 
technical estimates are that Medicare is projected to become insolvent 
far sooner than Social Security.
  In fact the most recent Medicare Trustees report confirms that the 
trust fund will be exhausted in 2018, yet the number of beneficiaries 
skyrockets upwards--from 42.7 million now, a number which will double 
by 2030--as the Baby Boom generation ages.
  Compounding the problem, the Congressional Budget Office projects 
that Medicare spending will rise to 11 percent of the gross domestic 
product by 2080, up from 3.21 percent of GDP in 2006.
  And the number of those paying into the system gets smaller and 
smaller: in 2000, 4 workers supported every Medicare beneficiary. That 
number shrinks to 2.4 workers per beneficiary by 2030.
  The plain truth is that surging health care costs need to come under 
control or Medicare faces a dire situation. Because the program is 
financed through payroll taxes on working Americans, and general tax 
revenue, the pressure is building now on working Americans, given the 
huge demographic changes we expect when Baby Boomers retire.
  In closing let me share one pertinent fact from the Social Security 
and Medicare Trustees and their 2006 report: ``to the extent that 
changes are delayed or phased in gradually, greater adjustments in 
scheduled benefits and revenues would be required.'' The time to act is 
now, and Senator Domenici and I believe that our legislation represents 
a reasonable and good faith step for curing what ills these vital 
safety net programs.
                                 ______
                                 
      By Mr. BROWNBACK (for himself, Mr. Alexander, Mr. Bunning, Mr. 
        Burr, Mr. Chambliss, Mr. Coburn, Mr. Cochran, Mr. Coleman, Mr. 
        Cornyn, Mr. DeMint, Mrs. Dole, Mr. Ensign, Mr. Enzi, Mr. 
        Graham, Mr. Grassley, Mr. Hagel, Mr. Hatch, Mr. Inhofe, Mr. 
        Isakson, Mr. Kyl, Mr. Lott, Mr. Martinez, Mr. McConnell, Mr. 
        Roberts, Mr. Sessions, Mr. Thune, Mr. Vitter, and Mr. 
        Voinovich):
  S. 356. A bill to ensure that women seeking an abortion are fully 
informed regarding the pain experienced by their unborn child; to the 
Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions.
  Mr. BROWNBACK. Mr. President, I rise today to introduce the Unborn 
Child Pain Awareness Act. I am joined by 27 original cosponsors.
  After carefully reviewing the medical and ethical arguments that 
underpin this Act, I am convinced that my colleagues will agree that 
this legislation is pro-woman, pro-child, and pro-information.
  The Unborn Child Pain Awareness Act is about empowering women with 
information and treating them as adults who are able to participate 
fully in the medical decision-making process. It is also about 
respecting and treating the unborn child more humanely. This 
legislation is, at heart, an informed consent bill which would do two 
simple things: first, this act would require abortion providers to 
present women seeking an abortion twenty or more weeks after 
fertilization with scientific information about what is known regarding 
the pain capacity of the unborn child inside of her womb.
  Second, should the woman desire to continue with the abortion after 
being presented with this information, the legislation calls for her to 
be given the opportunity to choose anesthesia for the unborn child in 
order to lessen its pain.
  No abortion procedures would be prohibited by the Unborn Child Pain 
Awareness Act. This is strictly an informed consent bill.
  I don't believe that anyone in this chamber thinks that any patient 
should ever be denied her right to all the information that is 
available on a surgery she or her child is about to undergo simply 
because the patient is pregnant. Providing a woman with medical and 
scientific information on the development of her unborn child and the 
pain the child will experience during an abortion will equip her to 
make an informed decision about how or if to proceed. Pregnant women 
must be treated as intelligent, mature human beings who are capable of 
understanding this information and making difficult choices.
  Due to amazing advances in medical technology, we have known for some 
time now that unborn children can and do respond to pain and to human 
touch in general. This is evidenced by anatomical, functional, 
physiological and behavioral indicators that are correlated with pain 
in children and adults.
  In light of this knowledge, when a child undergoes prenatal surgery 
in order to alleviate certain types of congenital hernias which can 
affect the child's liver and lungs or to correct prenatal heart 
failure, both the child and the mother are offered anesthesia as a 
matter of course. Certainly everyone would agree that, at the very 
least, abortion is a surgical procedure performed on the fetus. Why 
should the medical community be required to offer anesthesia to one 20-
week-old unborn baby undergoing any other type of prenatal surgery, but 
not require it for another 20-week-old unborn baby who is undergoing 
the life-terminating surgery of an abortion? Are both babies not at the 
same stage of development with the same capacity for pain?
  Of course, this new scientific knowledge that unborn babies can 
experience pain is not news to most women. Any mother can tell you her 
unborn child can feel and respond to stimuli from outside the womb. 
Sometimes a voice or a sharp movement by the mother will cause the 
unborn child to stir. And usually, at some point in the late second 
trimester, even the father can feel and see the unborn child's 
movements. And if you push the unborn child's limb, the limb may push 
back. I have many fond memories of feeling my own children kick and 
move around inside my wife's womb. It was obvious to both of us that 
our children were very much alive.
  In the proposed legislation, we have settled on a 20-week benchmark 
because there is strong medical and scientific knowledge that unborn 
children feel and experience pain by 20 weeks after fertilization.
  Many scientists and anesthesiologists believe that unborn children 
actually feel pain weeks earlier, but we chose the 20 week benchmark as 
a point on which the most scientists and doctors can agree.
  We do know that unborn children at 20 weeks' gestation can not only 
feel, but that their ability to experience pain is heightened. The 
highest density of pain receptors per square inch of skin in human 
development occurs in utero from 20 to 30 weeks gestation.
  The Unborn Child Pain Awareness Act offers us a rare chance to 
transcend the traditional political boundaries on the abortion issue. 
It is a matter of human decency, access to information for women, and 
patients' rights.
  It is my hope that this bill will offer us a chance to work across 
political divides to forge new understandings in this chamber.
  I think that we can all support giving women more information when 
they are making life-altering decisions.
  In fact, according to a Wirthlin Worldwide poll conducted after the 
2004 election, 75 percent of respondents favored ``laws requiring that 
women who are 20 weeks or more along in their pregnancies be given 
information about fetal pain before having an abortion.''
  During the 2006 elections, candidates from both sides of the aisle 
promised to support bipartisan solutions dealing with abortion, such as 
promoting adoption and passing parental notification requirements for 
minors seeking abortions.
  Adoption and parental notification for minors are indeed issues on 
which I hope we can work together. Perhaps we

[[Page S843]]

can begin with this measure. The Unborn Child Pain Awareness Act would 
provide a wonderful opportunity for us to affirm that the 110th 
Congress is pro-woman, pro-child, and pro-patient access to 
information.
                                 ______
                                 
      By Mrs. FEINSTEIN (for herself, Ms. Snowe, Mr. Inouye, Mr. 
        Durbin, Mr. Kerry, Mrs. Boxer, Mr. Nelson of Florida, Ms. 
        Cantwell, Mr. Lautenberg, Mr. Lieberman, Mr. Menendez, and Ms. 
        Collins):
  S. 357. A bill to improve passenger automobile fuel economy and 
safety, reduce greenhouse gas emissions, reduce dependence on foreign 
oil, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Commerce, Science, and 
Transportation.
  Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, I rise today to offer a bill with my 
colleagues Senators Snowe, Inouye, Durbin, Kerry, Boxer, Bill Nelson, 
Cantwell, Lautenberg, Lieberman, Menendez, and Collins to close the SUV 
loophole.
  This bill would increase Corporate Average Fuel Economy, CAFE, 
standards for SUVs and other light duty trucks. It would increase the 
combined fleet average for all automobiles--SUVs, light trucks and 
passenger cars--from 25 miles per gallon to 35 miles per gallon by 
model year 2019.
  The high price of oil is not a problem we can drill our way out of. 
Global oil demand is rising. China imports more than 40 percent of its 
record 6.4 million-barrel-per-day oil demand and its consumption is 
growing by 7.5 percent per year, seven times faster than the U.S.
  India imports approximately 70 percent of its oil, which is projected 
to rise to more than 90 percent by 2020. Their rapidly growing 
economies are fueling their growing dependence on oil--which makes 
continued higher prices inevitable.
  The most effective step we can take to reduce gas prices is to reduce 
demand. We must use our finite fuel supplies more wisely.
  This legislation is an important first step to limit our Nation's 
dependence on oil and better protect our environment.
  If implemented, closing the SUV Loophole would: save the U.S. 2.1 
million barrels of oil a day by 2025, almost the same amount of oil we 
currently import from the Persian Gulf.
  It would also prevent about 350 million tons of carbon dioxide--the 
top greenhouse gas and biggest single cause of global warming from 
being emitted into our atmosphere by 2025. This is an 18 percent 
reduction, the equivalent of taking 60 million cars--or 50 million cars 
and light trucks--off the road in one year.
  This bill would also save SUV and light duty truck owners hundreds of 
dollars each year in gasoline costs.
  CAFE standards were first established in 1975. At that time, light 
trucks made up only a small percentage of the vehicles on the road, 
they were used mostly for agriculture and commerce, not as passenger 
cars.
  Today, our roads look much different, SUVs and light duty trucks 
comprise more than half of the new car sales in the United States. As a 
result, the overall fuel economy of our Nation's fleet is the lowest it 
has been in two decades, because fuel economy standards for these 
vehicles are so much lower than they are for other passenger vehicles.
  The bill we are introducing today would change that. SUVs and other 
light duty trucks would have to meet the same fuel economy requirements 
by 2013 that passenger cars meet today.
  In 2002, the National Academy of Sciences, NAS, released a report 
stating that adequate lead time can bring about substantive increases 
in fuel economy standards. Automakers can meet higher CAFE standards if 
existing technologies are utilized and included in new models of SUVs 
and light trucks.
  In 2003, the head of the National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration said he favored an increase in vehicle fuel economy 
standards beyond the 1.5-mile-per-gallon hike slated to go into effect 
by 2007. ``We can do better,'' said Jeffrey Runge in an interview with 
Congressional Green Sheets. ``The overriding goal here is better fuel 
economy to decrease our reliance on foreign oil without compromising 
safety or American jobs,'' he said.
  With this in mind, we have developed the following phase-in schedule 
which would follow up on what NHTSA has proposed for the short term and 
remain consistent with what the NAS report said is technologically 
feasible over the next decade or so. As a first step, by model year 
2010, passenger cars must meet an average fuel economy standard of 29.5 
mpg, and SUVs and light trucks must meet 23.5 mpg. By way of 
comparison, passenger cars in model year 2005 averaged 30 mpg, light 
trucks averaged 21.8 mpg, and the overall combined fleet average is 
25.2 mpg.
  The bill also increases the weight limit within which vehicles are 
bound by CAFE standards to make it harder for automotive manufacturers 
to build SUVs large enough to become exempted from CAFE standards. 
Because SUVs are becoming larger and larger, some may become so large 
that they will no longer qualify as even SUVs anymore.
  We are introducing this legislation because we believe that the 
United States needs to take a leadership role in the fight against 
global warming.
  We have already seen the potential destruction that global warming 
can cause in the United States.
  Snowpacks in the Sierra Nevada are shrinking and will almost entirely 
disappear by the end of the century, devastating the source of 
California's water.
  Eskimos are being forced inland in Alaska as their native homes on 
the coastline are melting into the sea.
  Glaciers are disappearing in Glacier National Park in Montana. In 100 
years, the park has gone from having 150 glaciers to fewer than 30. And 
the 30 that remain are two-thirds smaller than they once were.
  Beyond our borders, scientists are predicting how the impact of 
global warming will be felt around the globe.
  It has been estimated that two-thirds of the glaciers in western 
China will melt by 2050, seriously diminishing the water supply for the 
region's 300 million inhabitants. Additionally, the disappearance of 
glaciers in the Andes in Peru is projected to leave the population 
without an adequate water supply during the summer.
  The United States is the largest energy consumer in the world, with 4 
percent of the world's population using 25 percent of the planet's 
energy.
  And much of this energy is used in cars and light trucks: 43 percent 
of the oil we use goes into our vehicles and one-third of all carbon 
dioxide emissions come from our transportation sector.
  The U.S. is falling behind the rest of the world in the development 
of more fuel efficient automobiles. Quarterly auto sales reflect that 
consumers are buying smaller more fuel efficient cars and sales of the 
big, luxury vehicles that are the preferred vehicle of the American 
automakers have dropped significantly.
  Even SUV sales have slowed. First quarter 2005 deliveries of these 
vehicles are down compared to the same period last year--for example, 
sales of the Ford Excursion is down by 29.5 percent, the Cadillac 
Escalade by 19.9 percent, and the Toyota Sequoia by 12.6 percent.
  On the other hand, the Toyota Prius hybrid had record sales in March 
with a 160.9 percent increase over the previous year.
  The struggling U.S. auto market cannot afford to fall behind in the 
development of fuel efficient vehicles. Our bill sets out a reasonable 
time frame for car manufacturers to design vehicles that are more fuel 
efficient and that will meet the growing demand for more fuel efficient 
vehicles.
  We can do this, and we can do this today. I urge my colleagues to 
support this legislation.
  I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the 
Record.
  There being no objection, the text of the bill was ordered to be 
printed in the Record, as follows:

                                 S. 357

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

       (a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Ten-in-Ten 
     Fuel Economy Act''.
       (b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act 
     is as follows:


[[Page S844]]


Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
Sec. 2. Average fuel economy standards for passenger automobiles and 
              light trucks.
Sec. 3. Passenger car program reform.
Sec. 4. Definition of work truck.
Sec. 5. Definition of light truck.
Sec. 6. Ensuring safety of passenger automobiles and light trucks.
Sec. 7. Onboard fuel economy indicators and devices.
Sec. 8. Secretary of Transportation to certify benefits.
Sec. 9. Credit trading program.
Sec. 10. Report to Congress.
Sec. 11. Labels for fuel economy and greenhouse gas emissions.

     SEC. 2. AVERAGE FUEL ECONOMY STANDARDS FOR PASSENGER 
                   AUTOMOBILES AND LIGHT TRUCKS.

       (a) Increased Standards.--Section 32902 of title 49, United 
     States Code, is amended--
       (1) in subsection (a)--
       (A) by striking ``Non-Passenger Automobiles.--'' and 
     inserting ``Prescription of Standards by Regulation.--''; and
       (B) by striking ``(except passenger automobiles)'' and 
     inserting ``(except passenger automobiles and light 
     trucks)''; and
       (2) by amending subsection (b) to read as follows:
       ``(b) Standards for Passenger Automobiles and Light 
     Trucks.--
       ``(1) In general.--The Secretary of Transportation, after 
     consultation with the Administrator of the Environmental 
     Protection Agency, shall prescribe average fuel economy 
     standards for passenger automobiles and light trucks 
     manufactured by a manufacturer in each model year beginning 
     with model year 2010 in order to achieve a combined average 
     fuel economy standard for passenger automobiles and light 
     trucks for model year 2019 of at least 35 miles per gallon 
     (or such other number of miles per gallon as the Secretary 
     may prescribe under subsection (c)).
       ``(2) Elimination of suv loophole.--Beginning not later 
     than model year 2013, the regulations prescribed under this 
     section may not make any distinction between passenger 
     automobiles and light trucks.
       ``(3) Progress toward standard required.--In prescribing 
     average fuel economy standards under paragraph (1), the 
     Secretary shall prescribe appropriate annual fuel economy 
     standard increases for passenger automobiles and light trucks 
     that--
       ``(A) increase the applicable average fuel economy standard 
     ratably beginning with model year 2010 and ending with model 
     year 2019;
       ``(B) require that each manufacturer achieve--
       ``(i) a fuel economy standard for passenger automobiles 
     manufactured by that manufacturer of at least 29.5 miles per 
     gallon not later than model year 2010; and
       ``(ii) a fuel economy standard for light trucks 
     manufactured by that manufacturer of at least 23.5 miles per 
     gallon not later than model year 2010.
       ``(4) Fuel economy baseline for passenger automobiles.--
     Notwithstanding the maximum feasible average fuel economy 
     level established by regulations prescribed under subsection 
     (c), the minimum fleetwide average fuel economy standard for 
     passenger automobiles manufactured by a manufacturer in a 
     model year for that manufacturer's domestic fleet and foreign 
     fleet, as calculated under section 32904 as in effect before 
     the date of the enactment of the Ten-in-Ten Fuel Economy Act, 
     shall be the greater of--
       ``(A) 27.5 miles per gallon; or
       ``(B) 92 percent of the average fuel economy projected by 
     the Secretary for the combined domestic and foreign fleets 
     manufactured by all manufacturers in that model year.
       ``(5) Deadline for regulations.--The Secretary shall 
     promulgate the regulations required by paragraphs (1) and (2) 
     in final form not later than 18 months after the date of the 
     enactment of the Ten-in-Ten Fuel Economy Act.''.

     SEC. 3. PASSENGER CAR PROGRAM REFORM.

       Section 32902(c) of title 49, United States Code, is 
     amended to read as follows:
       ``(c) Amending Passenger Automobile Standards.--Not later 
     than 18 months before the beginning of each model year, the 
     Secretary of Transportation may prescribe regulations 
     amending a standard prescribed under subsection (b) for a 
     model year to a level that the Secretary determines to be the 
     maximum feasible average fuel economy level for that model 
     year. Section 553 of title 5 applies to a proceeding to amend 
     any standard prescribed under subsection (b). Any interested 
     person may make an oral presentation and a transcript shall 
     be taken of that presentation. The Secretary may prescribe 
     separate standards for different classes of passenger 
     automobiles.''.

     SEC. 4. DEFINITION OF WORK TRUCK.

       (a) Definition of Work Truck.--Section 32901(a) of title 49 
     is amended by adding at the end the following:
       ``(17) `work truck' means an automobile that the Secretary 
     determines by regulation--
       ``(A) is rated at between 8,500 and 10,000 pounds gross 
     vehicle weight; and
       ``(B) is not a medium-duty passenger vehicle (as defined in 
     section 86.1803-01 of title 40, Code of Federal 
     Regulations).''.
       (b) Deadline for Regulations.--The Secretary of 
     Transportation--
       (1) shall issue proposed regulations implementing the 
     amendment made by subsection (a) not later than 1 year after 
     the date of the enactment of this Act; and
       (2) shall issue final regulations implementing the 
     amendment not later than 18 months after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act.
       (c) Fuel Economy Standards for Work Trucks.--The Secretary 
     of Transportation, in consultation with the Administrator of 
     the Environmental Protection Agency, shall prescribe 
     standards to achieve the maximum feasible fuel economy for 
     work trucks (as defined in section 32901(a)(17) of title 49, 
     United States Code) manufactured by a manufacturer in each 
     model year beginning with model year 2013.

     SEC. 5. DEFINITION OF LIGHT TRUCK.

       (a) Definition of Light Truck.--
       (1) In general.--Section 32901(a) of title 49, United 
     States Code, is amended by inserting after paragraph (11) the 
     following:
       ``(11) `light truck' means an automobile that the Secretary 
     determines by regulation--
       ``(A) is manufactured primarily for transporting not more 
     than 10 individuals;
       ``(B) is rated at not more than 10,000 pounds gross vehicle 
     weight;
       ``(C) is not a passenger automobile; and
       ``(D) is not a work truck.''.
       (2) Deadline for regulations.--The Secretary of 
     Transportation--
       (A) shall issue proposed regulations implementing the 
     amendment made by paragraph (1) not later than 1 year after 
     the date of the enactment of this Act; and
       (B) shall issue final regulations implementing the 
     amendment not later than 18 months after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act.
       (3) Effective date.--Regulations prescribed under paragraph 
     (1) shall apply beginning with model year 2010.
       (b) Applicability of Existing Standards.--This section does 
     not affect the application of section 32902 of title 49, 
     United States Code, to passenger automobiles or non-passenger 
     automobiles manufactured before model year 2010.
       (c) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized 
     to be appropriated to the Secretary of Transportation 
     $25,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2009 through 2021 to 
     carry out the provisions of chapter 329 of title 49, United 
     States Code.

     SEC. 6. ENSURING SAFETY OF PASSENGER AUTOMOBILES AND LIGHT 
                   TRUCKS.

       (a) In General.--The Secretary of Transportation shall 
     exercise such authority under Federal law as the Secretary 
     may have to ensure that--
       (1) passenger automobiles and light trucks (as such terms 
     are defined in section 32901 of title 49, United States Code) 
     are safe;
       (2) progress is made in improving the overall safety of 
     passenger automobiles and light trucks; and
       (3) progress is made in maximizing United States 
     employment.
       (b) Vehicle Safety.--Subchapter II of chapter 301 of title 
     49, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the 
     following:

     ``Sec. 30129. Vehicle compatibility and aggressivity 
       reduction standard

       ``(a) Standards.--The Secretary of Transportation shall 
     issue a motor vehicle safety standard to reduce vehicle 
     incompatibility and aggressivity between passenger vehicles 
     and non-passenger vehicles. The standard shall address 
     characteristics necessary to ensure better management of 
     crash forces in multiple vehicle frontal and side impact 
     crashes between different types, sizes, and weights of 
     vehicles with a gross vehicle weight of 10,000 pounds or less 
     in order to decrease occupant deaths and injuries.
       ``(b) Consumer Information.--The Secretary shall develop 
     and implement a public information side and frontal 
     compatibility crash test program with vehicle ratings based 
     on risks to occupants, risks to other motorists, and combined 
     risks by vehicle make and model.''.
       (c) Rulemaking Deadlines.--
       (1) Rulemaking.--The Secretary of Transportation shall 
     issue--
       (A) a notice of a proposed rulemaking under section 30129 
     of title 49, United States Code, not later than January 1, 
     2010; and
       (B) a final rule under such section not later than December 
     31, 2011.
       (2) Effective date of requirements.--Any requirement 
     imposed under the final rule issued under paragraph (1) shall 
     become fully effective not later than September 1, 2013.
       (d) Conforming Amendment.--The chapter analysis for chapter 
     301 is amended by inserting after the item relating to 
     section 30128 the following:

``30129. Vehicle compatibility and aggressivity reduction standard''.

     SEC. 7. ONBOARD FUEL ECONOMY INDICATORS AND DEVICES.

       (a) In General.--Chapter 329 of title 49, United States 
     Code, is amended by adding at the end the following:

     ``Sec. 32920. Fuel economy indicators and devices

       ``(a) In General.--The Secretary of Transportation, in 
     consultation with the Administrator of the Environmental 
     Protection Agency, shall prescribe a fuel economy standard 
     for passenger automobiles and light trucks manufactured by a 
     manufacturer in each model year beginning with model year 
     2014 that requires each such automobile and light truck to be 
     equipped with--
       ``(1) an onboard electronic instrument that provides real-
     time and cumulative fuel economy data;

[[Page S845]]

       ``(2) an onboard electronic instrument that signals a 
     driver when inadequate tire pressure may be affecting fuel 
     economy; and
       ``(3) a device that will allow drivers to place the 
     automobile or light truck in a mode that will automatically 
     produce greater fuel economy.
       ``(b) Exception.--Subsection (a) shall not apply to any 
     vehicle that is not subject to an average fuel economy 
     standard under section 32902(b).
       ``(c) Enforcement.--Subchapter IV of chapter 301 of this 
     title shall apply to a fuel economy standard prescribed under 
     subsection (a) to the same extent and in the same manner as 
     if that standard were a motor vehicle safety standard under 
     chapter 301.''.
       (b) Conforming Amendment.--The chapter analysis for chapter 
     329 of title 49, United States Code, is amended by inserting 
     after the item relating to section 32919 the following:

``32920. Fuel economy indicators and devices''.

     SEC. 8. SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION TO CERTIFY BENEFITS.

       Beginning with model year 2010, the Secretary of 
     Transportation, in consultation with the Administrator of the 
     Environmental Protection Agency, shall annually determine and 
     certify to Congress the reduction in United States 
     consumption of gasoline and petroleum distillates used for 
     vehicle fuel and the reduction in greenhouse gas emissions 
     during the most recent year that are properly attributable to 
     the implementation of the average fuel economy standards 
     imposed under section 32902 of title 49, United States Code, 
     as a result of the amendments made by this Act.

     SEC. 9. CREDIT TRADING PROGRAM.

       Section 32903 of title 49, United States Code, is amended--
       (1) by striking ``passenger'' each place it appears;
       (2) by striking ``section 32902(b)-(d) of this title'' each 
     place it appears and inserting ``subsection (a), (c), or (d) 
     of section 32902'';
       (3) in subsection (a)(2), by striking ``clause (1) of this 
     subsection'' and inserting ``paragraph (1)''; and
       (4) by amending subsection (e) to read as follows:
       ``(e) Credit Trading Among Manufacturers.--The Secretary of 
     Transportation may establish, by regulation, a corporate 
     average fuel economy credit trading program to allow 
     manufacturers whose automobiles exceed the average fuel 
     economy standards prescribed under section 32902 to earn 
     credits to be sold to manufacturers whose automobiles fail to 
     achieve the prescribed standards.''.

     SEC. 10. REPORT TO CONGRESS.

       Not later than December 31, 2014, the Secretary of 
     Transportation shall submit to Congress a report on the 
     progress made by the automobile manufacturing industry 
     towards meeting the 35 miles per gallon average fuel economy 
     standard required under section 32902(b)(1) of title 49, 
     United States Code.

     SEC. 11. LABELS FOR FUEL ECONOMY AND GREENHOUSE GAS 
                   EMISSIONS.

       Section 32908 of title 49, United States Code, is amended--
       (1) in subsection (a)(1), by striking ``of this title'' and 
     inserting ``and a light truck manufactured by a manufacturer 
     in a model year after model year 2010; and'';
       (2) in subsection (b)--
       (A) in paragraph (1)--
       (i) by redesignating subparagraph (F) as subparagraph (H); 
     and
       (ii) by inserting after subparagraph (E) the following:
       ``(F) a label (or a logo imprinted on a label required by 
     this paragraph) that--
       ``(i) reflects an automobile's performance on the basis of 
     criteria developed by the Administrator to reflect the fuel 
     economy and greenhouse gas and other emissions consequences 
     of operating the automobile over its likely useful life;
       ``(ii) permits consumers to compare performance results 
     under clause (i) among all passenger automobiles and light 
     duty trucks; and
       ``(iii) is designed to encourage the manufacture and sale 
     of passenger automobiles and light trucks that meet or exceed 
     applicable fuel economy standards under section 32902.
       ``(G) a fuelstar under paragraph (5).''; and
       (B) by adding at the end the following:
       ``(4) Green Label Program.--
       ``(A) Marketing analysis.--Not later than 2 years after the 
     date of the enactment of the Ten-in-Ten Fuel Economy Act, the 
     Administrator shall complete a study of social marketing 
     strategies with the goal of maximizing consumer understanding 
     of point-of-sale labels or logos described in paragraph 
     (1)(F).
       ``(B) Eligibility.--Not later than 3 years after the date 
     described in subparagraph (A), the Administrator shall issue 
     requirements for the label or logo required under paragraph 
     (1)(F) to ensure that a passenger automobile or light truck 
     is not eligible for the label or logo unless it--
       ``(i) meets or exceeds the applicable fuel economy 
     standard; or
       ``(ii) will have the lowest greenhouse gas emissions over 
     the useful life of the vehicle of all vehicles in the vehicle 
     class to which it belongs in that model year.
       ``(C) Criteria.--In developing criteria for the label or 
     logo, the Administrator shall also consider, among others as 
     appropriate, the following factors:
       ``(i) The recyclability of the automobile.
       ``(ii) Any other pollutants or harmful byproducts related 
     to the automobile, which may include those generated during 
     manufacture of the automobile, those issued during use of the 
     automobile, or those generated after the automobile ceases to 
     be operated.
       ``(5) Fuelstar Program.--
       ``(A) In general.--The Secretary shall establish a program, 
     to be known as the `Fuelstar Program', under which stars 
     shall be imprinted on or attached to the label required by 
     paragraph (1).
       ``(B) Green stars.--Under the Fuelstar Program, a 
     manufacturer may include on the label maintained on an 
     automobile under paragraph (1)--
       ``(i) 1 green star for any automobile that meets the 
     average fuel economy standard for the model year under 
     section 32902; and
       ``(ii) 1 additional green star for each 2 miles per gallon 
     by which the automobile exceeds such standard.
       ``(C) Gold stars.--Under the Fuelstar Program, a 
     manufacturer may include a gold star on the label maintained 
     on an automobile under paragraph (1) if--
       ``(i) in the case of a passenger automobile, the automobile 
     attains a fuel economy of at least 50 miles per gallon; and
       ``(ii) in the case of a light truck, the truck attains a 
     fuel economy of at least 37 miles per gallon.''.

  Mr. INOUYE. Mr. President: I rise today to join my colleague Senator 
Feinstein in introducing probably one of the most important bills we 
can consider this Congress in terms of energy, economic, and 
environmental security: the Ten-In-Ten Fuel Economy Act of 2007. Simply 
put, this bill would raise the average fuel economy standards for all 
passenger cars and light trucks from 25 miles per gallon to 35 miles 
per gallon by the year 2019.
  While Senator Feinstein and I have taken the lead on this issue, the 
bill we are introducing today is the product of considerable input and 
expertise provided by our colleagues Senators Snowe, Durbin, and 
Cantwell.
  I also want to thank Senators Kerry, Boxer, Bill Nelson, Lautenberg, 
Lieberman, Menendez, and Collins for joining us in this effort.
  This bill is a win-win for the American public. It will substantially 
reduce America's dependence on foreign oil from unstable governments, 
as well as decrease the amount of harmful emissions coming from our 
nation's passenger vehicles. At the same time, it will save American 
families money by reducing their fuel costs.
  According to the Union of Concerned Scientists, this bill, if 
enacted, would save 6 billion gallons of gas--equating to $12 billion 
in fuel cost savings for motorists in this country--within 6 years of 
the first model year requiring improvement.
  That $12 billion in fuel cost savings also translates into a 
reduction of 65 million metric tons of carbon dioxide emissions--one of 
the largest contributors to global warming. This level of savings after 
only 6 years would be accomplished before the full contribution of the 
bill is achieved.
  By 2025, assuming today's price for a gallon of gas, enactment of 
this bill would effectively reduce consumption of foreign oil by 2.1 
million barrels a day by saving over 35 billion gallons of gasoline 
annually. It would provide motorists with $64 billion in fuel cost 
savings, and reduce emissions of carbon dioxide by 358 million metric 
tons. This decrease in carbon dioxide emissions would be the equivalent 
of taking 52 million cars and trucks off the road. This incredible 
savings is achieved by simply raising the fuel economy standard from 25 
miles per gallon to 35 miles per gallon in a 10 year period.
  Some of our colleagues may question whether this proposed standard 
can be achieved. Let me just note that the Commerce Committee helped 
establish the first CAFE standards in 1975, against the cries of 
critics then. History, however, shows that Congress' action then was 
largely responsible for the Nation's decreased demand for oil during 
the 1980s necessitated by the Arab Oil Embargo. Since the 1980s, 
however, the fuel economy average for cars and light trucks combined 
has remained essentially flat even though advances in technology have 
continued. It is time to update CAFE standards. The benefits gained 
from undertaking this endeavor are many, and too long overdue.
                                 ______
                                 
      By Ms. SNOWE (for herself, Mr. Kennedy, Mr. Enzi, Mr. Dodd, Mr. 
        Gregg, Mr. Harkin, Ms. Murkowski, Ms. Mikulski, Mr.

[[Page S846]]

        Hatch, Mr. Bingaman, Mr. Allard, Mrs. Murray, Mr. Reed, Mrs. 
        Clinton, Mr. Obama, Mr. Sanders, Mr. Brown, Mr. Biden, Mr. 
        Lautenberg, Mr. Nelson of Florida, Mr. Salazar, Mr. Cardin, and 
        Ms. Collins):
  S. 358. A bill to prohibit discrimination on the basis of genetic 
information with respect to health insurance and employment; to the 
Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions.
  Ms. SNOWE. Mr. President, I rise today to introduce the Genetic 
Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2007 and I am joined in doing so 
by a number of my colleagues including the Chairman and Ranking Member 
of the Senate HELP Committee, Senators Kennedy and Enzi. The bill we 
are introducing today represents a triumph of bipartisan 
collaboration--true consensus-building which is so vital to achieving 
substantive action for our constituents. Such efforts are certainly not 
always easy--as so many here today know--I have worked with many of you 
for more than 10 years on this issue.
  Today we are on the threshold of a new era, as for the first time, we 
act to prevent discrimination before it has taken firm hold. Indeed, 
Senator Gregg described this legislation so well when he said it is, 
truly, ``the first civil rights act of the 21st Century.''
  And that is what makes this legislation so unique. For in the past 
Congress has had to act to address existing discrimination. But today 
we are acting proactively to address genetic bias, before 
discrimination becomes entrenched.
  This type of discrimination is so different than other forms. Because 
most discrimination is a response to an obvious trait, such as one's 
gender or the color of your skin. But discrimination based on one's 
genetic makeup involves actively looking for information on which to 
discriminate. Because it is so deliberate, one cannot even argue it 
was--on any level--subconscious or unintentional.
  It used to be difficult to find such information on which to 
discriminate. You might be asked if you had a family history of a 
disorder. But today things have changed dramatically.
  We have long known about a small number of genes which play a role in 
some diseases--such as Huntington's Disease, and early onset 
Alzheimer's. Yet the progress of discovery and study was so slow and 
tedious. But the Human Genome Project changed all that. Today, with new 
technology we are seeing an explosive increase in our understanding of 
genetics and human health.
  That growing genetic knowledge offers the potential of disease cures 
and even customized therapies. Even more promising, genetic advances 
will enable us to actually prevent the development of disease. But this 
potential . . . and the billions spent in discovering genetic 
relationships and developing treatments and preventive agents . . . 
will certainly be in vain if Americans do not avail themselves of these 
advances.
  To do so, Americans will need to take genetic tests. But would you do 
so if you knew that the information about your genetic makeup would be 
used against you--to deny you employment or health coverage?
  Some say that kind of discrimination is but a future possibility--
that we can afford to wait until genetic discrimination begins to take 
a toll. But it already has done so. I learned from the real life 
experience of one of my constituents, Bonnie Lee Tucker. In 1997, 
Bonnie Lee wrote me about her fear of having the BRCA test for breast 
cancer, even though she has nine women in her immediate family who were 
diagnosed with breast cancer, and she herself is a survivor. She wrote 
to me about her fear of having the BRCA test, because she worried it 
will ruin her daughter's ability to obtain insurance in the future. And 
Bonnie Lee isn't the only one who has this fear. When the National 
Institutes of Health offered women genetic testing, nearly 32 percent 
of those who were offered a test for breast cancer risk declined to 
take it citing concerns about health insurance discrimination. Mr. 
President, what good is scientific progress if it cannot be applied to 
those who would most benefit?
  And we have seen cases where some attempted to mandate genetic 
testing. Even when this is done to improve the delivery of health care, 
it must be recognized that once that information is disclosed . . . and 
is unprotected . . . a future employer or insurer may not necessarily 
use that information in such a benign way. Yet we recognize that if an 
individual can avail themselves of a genetic test, they may be able to 
take action as a result which prevents disease or premature death, and 
reduces the burden of high health costs. And wouldn't everyone want to 
see that?
  I recall the testimony before Congress of Dr. Francis Collins, the 
Director of the National Human Genome Research Institute, without whom 
we wouldn't have reached this day. In speaking of the next step for 
those involved in the Genome project, he explained that the project's 
scientists were engaged in a major endeavor to ``uncover the 
connections between particular genes and particular diseases,'' to 
apply the knowledge they just unlocked. In order to do this, Dr. 
Collins said, ``we need a vigorous research enterprise with the 
involvement of large numbers of individuals, so that we can draw more 
precise connections between a particular spelling of a gene and a 
particular outcome.'' Well, this effort cannot be successful if people 
are afraid of possible repercussions of their participation in genetic 
testing.
  The bottom line is that, given the advances in science, there are two 
separate issues at hand. The first is to restrict discrimination by 
health insurers. The second is to prevent employment discrimination 
based simply upon an individual's genetic information.
  Some of us saw this danger 10 years ago and the threat it could pose 
to millions of Americans. I think back to when Representative Louise 
Slaughter and I first introduced our bills to ban genetic 
discrimination in health insurance back in the l04th Congress. At that 
time the completion of the human genome seemed far away. But the 
science has certainly out-paced Congressional action.
  The following year, with the commitment of Senators Frist and 
Jeffords to address this issue, I introduced a bill to ensure we would 
effectively provide the needed protections to prevent genetic 
discrimination in the health insurance industry. In turn, that bill was 
the basis for an amendment offered by Senator Jeffords, to the Fiscal 
Year 2001 Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services 
Appropriations bill which passed the Senate by a vote of 58-40.

  While that victory was a notable step forward, unfortunately, it was 
not followed by the enactment of our bill. It did, however, re-spark 
the debate--which helped lay the foundation for our subsequent efforts.
  Indeed, in March of 2002, I was again joined by Senators Frist and 
Jeffords in introducing an updated version of our bill with the added 
support of Senator Gregg and Senator Enzi. That bill not only addressed 
what had become the real threat of employment discrimination but also 
captured the changing world of science as this was the first bill to 
include what we had learned with the completion of the Genome Project.
  In June of 2003, after sixteen months of bipartisan negotiation, we 
achieved a unified, bipartisan agreement to address genetic 
discrimination. Today we again introduce the legislation encompassing 
that agreement, which the Senate has twice passed . . . unanimously.
  The bill we are introducing again today addresses genetic 
discrimination in both employment and health insurance based on the 
firm foundation of current law. With regard to health insurance, the 
issues are clear and familiar, and something the Senate has debated 
before, in the context of the consideration of larger privacy issues. 
Indeed, as Congress considered what is now the Health Insurance 
Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, we also addressed the 
issues of privacy of medical information.
  Moreover, any legislation that seeks to fully address these issues 
must consider the interaction of the new protections with the privacy 
rule which was mandated by HIPAA--and our legislation does just that. 
Specifically, we clarify the protections of genetic information as well 
as information on the request or receipt of genetic tests, from being 
used by the insurer against the patient.

[[Page S847]]

  Because the fact of the matter is, genetic information only detects 
the potential for a genetically linked disease or disorder--and 
potential does not equal a diagnosis of disease. At the same time, it 
is critical that this information be available to doctors and other 
health care professionals when necessary to diagnose, or treat, an 
illness. This is a distinction that begs our acknowledgment, as we 
discuss protect patients from potential discriminatory practices by 
insurers.
  On the subject of employment discrimination, unlike our legislative 
history on debating health privacy matters, the issues surrounding 
protecting genetic information from workplace discrimination is not as 
extensive. To that end, our bipartisan bill creates these protections 
in the workplace--and there should be no question of this need.
  As demonstrated by the Burlington Northern case, the threat of 
employment discrimination is very real, and therefore it is essential 
that we take this information off the table, so to speak, before the 
use of this information becomes more widespread. While Congress has not 
yet debated this specific type of employment discrimination, we have a 
great deal of employment case law and legislative history on which to 
build.
  Indeed, as we considered the need for this type of protection, we 
agreed that we must extend current law discrimination protections to 
genetic information. We reviewed current employment discrimination law 
and considered what sort of remedies people would have for instances of 
genetic discrimination and if these remedies would be different from 
those available to people under current law--for instance under the ADA 
or the EEOC. The bill we introduce today creates new protections by 
paralleling current law and clarifies the remedies available to victims 
of discrimination. Ensuring that regardless of whether a person is 
discriminated against because of their religion, their race or their 
DNA, these people will all receive the same strong protections under 
the law.
  Indeed, I believe those who have questioned the need for this 
legislation will see that if we can provide these protections, then 
individuals can avail themselves of medical knowledge which will not 
only improve their health, but will reduce health care costs. For 
employers attempting to address the escalating cost of coverage, isn't 
it essential to utilize our investment in advancing medical knowledge 
to prevent disease and disability? Isn't that just the sort of action 
we need to encourage to reduce health costs and make our businesses, 
large and small, more competitive?
  Indeed we have seen the business community recognizing the critical 
importance of putting our medical investment to work to reduce health 
costs . . . not discouraging employees from undergoing tests that could 
prevent disease or death. To that end, I noted during the last Congress 
that IBM pledged to not use genetic information in its hiring practices 
or in deciding eligibility for health insurance coverage. This 
demonstrates an admirable understanding of how such discrimination can 
harm both individuals and business.
  It has been more than six years since the completion of the working 
draft of the Human Genome. Like a book which is never opened, the 
wonders of the Human Genome are useless unless people are willing to 
take advantage of it. This bill is the product of over a year of 
bipartisan negotiations and is a shining example of what we can 
accomplish if we set aside partisan differences in order to address the 
challenges facing the American people. Certainly this bill was only 
possible due to the commitment of members working together--setting 
aside partisanship--and for that I am grateful.
  I know I speak for my colleagues when I say that it is my hope that 
we shall see this bill again receive the unanimous support of the 
Senate and that this will allow the House of Representatives to act 
swiftly to pass this legislation so that the President can sign this 
bill into law and finally ensure the American public is protected from 
this newest form of discrimination.
  Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, it is a privilege to introduce the 
Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2007. It is an honor to 
join Senator Snowe, Senator Enzi, Senator Dodd, Senator Harkin, Senator 
Gregg, and other members of our committee in support of this needed 
legislation.
  I especially commend Senator Snowe for her leadership in this effort 
to establish protections for the public against genetic discrimination. 
It is now over a decade since Senator Snowe first introduced 
legislation on the issue. It passed the Senate 98-0 in the last 
Congress, and I am very hopeful we can work with our colleagues in the 
House and enact it into law, so that our people will finally have the 
protections they need against the misuse of genetic information.
  In this century of the life sciences, much of what we learn through 
biomedical research is being translated into new treatments and cures, 
and nowhere is the explosion of scientific progress more apparent than 
in the field of genetics. Four years after the remarkable achievement 
of discovering the sequence of the human genome, clinical testing is 
now possible for over a thousand genetic diseases. It has led to rapid 
growth in the field of personalized medicine, in which patients' 
treatment and care is individualized according to their genetic makeup.
  In the absence of federal protections, however, patients fear that 
undergoing genetic tests may lead to disqualification from future 
insurance coverage, or that an employer will fire them or deny a 
promotion based on the results of a genetic test. The consequence is 
that many Americans are choosing not to be tested, and are declining to 
participate in clinical trials so important for the development of new 
treatments.
  Discrimination based on genetics is just as wrong as discrimination 
based on race or gender. Our bill provides specific protections for 
citizens against genetic discrimination. It prohibits health insurers 
from picking and choosing their customers based on genetics. Employers 
cannot fire or refuse to hire persons because of their genetic 
characteristics. It enables Americans to benefit from better health 
care through the use of genetic information, without the fear that it 
will be misused against them.
  It is difficult to imagine information more personal or more private 
than a person's genetic makeup. It should not be shared by insurers or 
employers, or be used in making decisions about health coverage or a 
job. It should only be used by patients and their doctors to make the 
best diagnostic and treatment decisions they can.
  In the near future, genetic tests will become even cheaper and more 
widely available. If we don't ban discrimination now, it may soon be 
routine for employers to use genetic tests to deny jobs to employees, 
based on their risk for disease.
  If Congress enacts clear protections against genetic discrimination 
in employment and health insurance, all Americans will be able to enjoy 
the benefits of genetic research, free from the fear that their 
personal genetic information will be misused. If Congress fails to make 
sure that genetic information is used only for legitimate purposes, we 
may well squander the vast potential of genetic research to improve the 
nation's health.
  The bill that we are considering today has been unanimously approved 
by the full Senate in the past two Congresses. We passed it 95-0 in the 
108th Congress, and 98-0 in the 109th Congress. It had over 240 
cosponsors in the House in both Congresses, but the leadership refused 
to bring it to a vote.
  As President Bush himself has said, ``Genetic information should be 
an opportunity to prevent and treat disease, not an excuse for 
discrimination. Just as our nation addressed discrimination based on 
race, we must now prevent discrimination based on genetic 
information.''
  We are closer than ever to enactment. I urge the Senate to approve 
the bill, and this time, I think we will finally see it become law.
                                 ______
                                 
      By Mr. KENNEDY (for himself, Ms. Mikulski, Mr. Lieberman, Mr. 
        Schumer, Mr. Durbin, and Mr. Obama):
  S. 359. A bill to amend the Higher Education Act of 1965 to provide 
additional support to students; to the Committee on Finance.
  Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, today I rise to introduce the Student 
Debt Relief Act of 2007.

[[Page S848]]

  It's long past time for Congress to take action to address the crisis 
in college affordability. The cost of college has more than tripled in 
the last 20 years. Today, the average cost of attendance at a 4-year 
public college is almost $13,000.
  As a result, students and families are pinching pennies more than 
ever to pay for higher education. Increasingly, more and more students 
are finding it's just not possible. Every year, 400,000 students who 
are qualified to attend a 4-year college find themselves shut out 
because of cost factors.
  At a time when 6 out of 10 jobs require some form of post-secondary 
training, this is completely unacceptable. When qualified students are 
blocked from the college gates because of cost, they're also blocked 
from their ticket to the American Dream. It's a situation that's 
putting our prosperity and economic security as a country at risk.
  But the crisis on college affordability is not just limited to those 
most in need. Every low and middle income family in America is affected 
by it.
  Today, the average student in the U.S. leaves college saddled with 
more than $17,000 in federal student loans on graduation day. At 
private universities, the level of student loan debt has increased 108 
percent over the past decade. And at public universities, student loan 
debt has increased an astonishing 116 percent.
  This mountain of debt is distorting countless young Americans' basic 
life choices, from decisions on their career, to getting married, to 
buying a home, and to starting a family. It's discouraging many from 
occupations such as teaching, social work and law enforcement, which 
are lower paying, but bring large rewards for our society. And it's 
perpetuating a shameful status quo, in which low-income and first-
generation students are far less likely to earn a college degree than 
other students.
  It's obvious we need to act immediately to make both college costs 
and student debt more manageable--and that is what this bill is all 
about. The Student Debt Relief Act will help lift the financial yoke 
that burdens our students and families as they try to pay for college.
  To assist our neediest students, it will immediately increase the 
maximum Pell Grant from $4050 to $5100 with mandatory funding. The Pell 
Grant has been the indispensable lifeline to college for low-income and 
middle income students for more than 40 years. But today--after five 
years of broken promises from the President to increase the maximum 
grant--we've seen its buying power erode.
  Twenty years ago, the maximum Pell grant covered 55 percent of the 
cost of tuition, fees, room and board at a public 4-year college. Now 
it covers less than 32 percent of those costs. Over the last five 
years, the gap between the cost of attending college and the maximum 
Pell grant has continued to grow.
  In addition, for the first time in six years, the average Pell Grant 
has declined. We must reverse this trend. It's time to say, No more 
broken promises. That's what we'll do by passing the Student Debt 
Relief Act. The Act will also cut interest rates in half--from 6.8 
percent to 3.4 percent--on new student loans for our neediest students.
  Last year, the Republican Congress allowed interest rates to rise on 
student loans, putting college even further out of reach for millions 
of students. Because of this interest rate hike, typical student 
borrowers--already straining with more than $17,000 in debt--will be 
forced to pay an additional $5,800 for their college loans.
  But a new day has now dawned in Congress, and last week, our 
colleagues in the House showed they have their priorities right on 
college costs by cutting student loan interest rates in half. Now it's 
our turn in the Senate. But we won't stop there.
  We also need to do more to help students manage the burden of 
unreasonable debt on their student loans. No student should have to 
mortgage their future to pay for college. And no one should have their 
lives thrown into disarray when unexpected financial hardship makes it 
much harder for them to make their student loan payments.
  That's why the Student Debt Relief Act caps student loan payments at 
15 percent of monthly discretionary income. It forgives loans after 25 
years, and also provides a 10-year loan forgiveness option for students 
who work in public service professions.
  This Act will also help reform our broken student loan system, which 
is larded with inexcusably large subsidies to big lenders and filled 
with rules that are unfriendly to borrowers.
  Like my Student Aid Reward Act, it gives colleges new incentives to 
offer loans to students through the Direct Loan program--which is 
cheaper for taxpayers--rather than the more expensive loan FFEL program 
that's operated through private lenders.
  President Bush's own figures back this up. According to his 2007 
education budget, the privately-funded student loan program costs 
taxpayers $6 more for every $100 lent than the same loans made through 
the Direct Loan program.
  When colleges switch to the less-expensive program, the Student Debt 
Relief Act will let them keep a portion of the savings to the 
government generated by that switch by giving it back to the schools, 
in the form of increased Pell Grant aid to students.
  The savings generated by this Act will be enough to increase federal 
Pell Grants by $1000 each at many colleges, making higher education 
more affordable for millions of students. For example, in my home state 
of Massachusetts, college students would reap an extra $53 million in 
Pell Grant scholarships per year. And all told, it could generate an 
additional $13 billion in Pell Grants for students over 10 years.
  The Student Debt Relief Act also extends the college tuition tax 
deduction, increasing the allowable deduction to $12,000. It repeals 
the student-unfriendly rule that prevents students from consolidating 
their loans while they're still in school, and allows them to 
reconsolidate them as well.
  In the Direct Loan program, it also reduces the origination fee that 
students pay when loans are made, also helping to ease the burden on 
borrowers. In short, it's a comprehensive plan to ease the double blow 
of soaring college costs and heavy student loan burdens. It's a plan we 
must move forward--for the sake of our students, their future, and the 
future of our Nation.
  Access to college is the key to our opportunity, to our economy, and 
to our values. So we must act now.
  Today, in communities across America, students are dreaming about 
what they want to be when they become adults. And as their parents 
watch tomorrow's doctors, teachers, engineers and lawyers in action, 
they know that all of those dreams depend on a college education.
  When our children dream about their future, they need to know that 
those dreams are within their reach. A college education is the 
foundation of the opportunity society that will keep this country 
strong and growing in the 21st century. So let's work together to get 
it done.
  I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the 
Record.
  There being no objection, the text of the bill was ordered to be 
printed in the Record, as follows:

                                 S. 359

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

       This Act may be cited as the ``Student Debt Relief Act of 
     2007''.

     SEC. 2. INCREASE IN FEDERAL PELL GRANTS.

       (a) Program Authority.--Section 401(a)(1) of the Higher 
     Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1070a(a)(1)) is amended by 
     striking ``2004'' and inserting ``2012''.
       (b) Amount of Grants.--Section 401(b)(2)(A) of the Higher 
     Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1070a(b)(2)(A)) is amended 
     by striking clauses (i) through (v) and inserting the 
     following:
       ``(i) $5,100 for academic year 2007-2008;
       ``(ii) $5,400 for academic year 2008-2009;
       ``(iii) $5,700 for academic year 2009-2010;
       ``(iv) $6,000 for academic year 2010-2011; and
       ``(v) $6,300 for academic year 2011-2012,''.
       (c) Additional Funds.--
       (1) In general.--For an academic year, there are authorized 
     to be appropriated, and there are appropriated, to carry out 
     paragraph (2) (in addition to any other amounts appropriated 
     to carry out section 401 of the Higher Education Act of 1965 
     (20 U.S.C. 1070a) and out of any money in the Treasury not 
     otherwise appropriated) as follows:
       (A) For academic year 2007-2008, $4,331,000,000.
       (B) For academic year 2008-2009, $5,674,000,000.

[[Page S849]]

       (C) For academic year 2009-2010, $7,050,000,000.
       (D) For academic year 2010-2011, $8,452,000,000.
       (E) For academic year 2011-2012, $9,894,000,000.
       (2) Increase in pell grants.--The amounts made available 
     pursuant to paragraph (1) shall be used to increase the 
     amount of the maximum Federal Pell Grant under section 401 of 
     the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1070a) for which 
     funds are appropriated under appropriations Acts for a fiscal 
     year by--
       (A) $1,050 for award year 2007-2008;
       (B) $1,350 for award year 2008-2009;
       (C) $1,650 for award year 2009-2010;
       (D) $1,950 for award year 2010-2011; and
       (E) $2,250 for award year 2011-2012.

     SEC. 3. STUDENT AID REWARD PROGRAM.

       Part G of title IV of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 
     U.S.C. 1088 et seq.) is amended by inserting after section 
     489 the following:

     ``SEC. 489A. STUDENT AID REWARD PROGRAM.

       ``(a) Program Authorized.--The Secretary shall carry out a 
     Student Aid Reward Program to encourage institutions of 
     higher education to participate in the student loan program 
     under this title that is most cost-effective for taxpayers.
       ``(b) Program Requirements.--In carrying out the Student 
     Aid Reward Program, the Secretary shall--
       ``(1) provide to each institution of higher education 
     participating in the student loan program under this title 
     that is most cost-effective for taxpayers, a Student Aid 
     Reward Payment, in an amount determined in accordance with 
     subsection (c), to encourage the institution to participate 
     in that student loan program;
       ``(2) require each institution of higher education 
     receiving a payment under this section to provide student 
     loans under such student loan program for a period of 5 years 
     after the date the first payment is made under this section;
       ``(3) where appropriate, require that funds paid to 
     institutions of higher education under this section be used 
     to award students a supplement to such students' Federal Pell 
     Grants under subpart 1 of part A;
       ``(4) permit such funds to also be used to award need-based 
     grants to lower- and middle-income graduate students; and
       ``(5) encourage all institutions of higher education to 
     participate in the Student Aid Reward Program under this 
     section.
       ``(c) Amount.--The amount of a Student Aid Reward Payment 
     under this section shall be not less than 50 percent of the 
     savings to the Federal Government generated by the 
     institution of higher education's participation in the 
     student loan program under this title that is most cost-
     effective for taxpayers instead of the institution's 
     participation in the student loan program that is not most 
     cost-effective for taxpayers.
       ``(d) Trigger to Ensure Cost Neutrality.--
       ``(1) Limit to ensure cost neutrality.--Notwithstanding 
     subsection (c), the Secretary shall not distribute Student 
     Aid Reward Payments under the Student Aid Reward Program 
     that, in the aggregate, exceed the Federal savings resulting 
     from the implementation of the Student Aid Reward Program.
       ``(2) Federal savings.--In calculating Federal savings, as 
     used in paragraph (1), the Secretary shall determine Federal 
     savings on loans made to students at institutions of higher 
     education that participate in the student loan program under 
     this title that is most cost-effective for taxpayers and 
     that, on the date of enactment of this section, participated 
     in the student loan program that is not most cost-effective 
     for taxpayers, resulting from the difference of--
       ``(A) the Federal cost of loan volume made under the 
     student loan program under this title that is most cost-
     effective for taxpayers; and
       ``(B) the Federal cost of an equivalent type and amount of 
     loan volume made, insured, or guaranteed under the student 
     loan program under this title that is not most cost-effective 
     for taxpayers.
       ``(3) Distribution rules.--If the Federal savings 
     determined under paragraph (2) is not sufficient to 
     distribute full Student Aid Reward Payments under the Student 
     Aid Reward Program, the Secretary shall--
       ``(A) first make Student Aid Reward Payments to those 
     institutions of higher education that participated in the 
     student loan program under this title that is not most cost-
     effective for taxpayers on the date of enactment of this 
     section; and
       ``(B) with any remaining Federal savings after making 
     Student Aid Reward Payments under subparagraph (A), make 
     Student Aid Reward Payments to the institutions of higher 
     education eligible for a Student Aid Reward Payment and not 
     described in subparagraph (A) on a pro-rata basis.
       ``(4) Distribution to students.--Any institution of higher 
     education that receives a Student Aid Reward Payment under 
     this section--
       ``(A) shall distribute, where appropriate, part or all of 
     such payment among the students of such institution who are 
     Federal Pell Grant recipients by awarding such students a 
     supplemental grant; and
       ``(B) may distribute part of such payment as a supplemental 
     grant to graduate students in financial need.
       ``(5) Estimates, adjustments, and carry over.--
       ``(A) Estimates and adjustments.--The Secretary shall make 
     Student Aid Reward Payments to institutions of higher 
     education on the basis of estimates, using the best data 
     available at the beginning of an academic or fiscal year. If 
     the Secretary determines thereafter that loan program costs 
     for that academic or fiscal year were different than such 
     estimate, the Secretary shall adjust by reducing or 
     increasing subsequent Student Aid Reward Payments rewards 
     paid to such institutions of higher education to reflect such 
     difference.
       ``(B) Carry over.--Any institution of higher education that 
     receives a reduced Student Aid Reward Payment under paragraph 
     (3)(B), shall remain eligible for the unpaid portion of such 
     institution's financial reward payment, as well as any 
     additional financial reward payments for which the 
     institution is otherwise eligible, in subsequent academic or 
     fiscal years.
       ``(e) Definition.--In this section:
       ``(1) Student loan program under this title that is most 
     cost-effective for taxpayers.--The term `student loan program 
     under this title that is most cost-effective for taxpayers' 
     means the loan program under part B or D of this title that 
     has the lowest overall cost to the Federal Government 
     (including administrative costs) for the loans authorized by 
     such parts.
       ``(2) Student loan program under this title that is not 
     most cost-effective for taxpayers.--The term `student loan 
     program under this title that is not most cost-effective for 
     taxpayers' means the loan program under part B or D of this 
     title that does not have the lowest overall cost to the 
     Federal Government (including administrative costs) for the 
     loans authorized by such parts.''.

     SEC. 4. INTEREST RATE REDUCTIONS.

       (a) FFEL Interest Rates.--
       (1) Section 427A(l) of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 
     U.S.C. 1077a(l)) is amended by adding at the end the 
     following:
       ``(4) Reduced rates for undergraduate subsidized loans.--
     Notwithstanding subsection (h) and paragraph (1) of this 
     subsection, with respect to any loan to an undergraduate 
     student made, insured, or guaranteed under this part (other 
     than a loan made pursuant to section 428B, 428C, or 428H) for 
     which the first disbursement is made on or after July 1, 
     2006, and before July 1, 2012, the applicable rate of 
     interest shall be as follows:
       ``(A) For a loan for which the first disbursement is made 
     on or after July 1, 2006, and before July 1, 2007, 6.8 
     percent on the unpaid principal balance of the loan.
       ``(B) For a loan for which the first disbursement is made 
     on or after July 1, 2007, and before July 1, 2008, 6.12 
     percent on the unpaid principal balance of the loan.
       ``(C) For a loan for which the first disbursement is made 
     on or after July 1, 2008, and before July 1, 2009, 5.44 
     percent on the unpaid principal balance of the loan.
       ``(D) For a loan for which the first disbursement is made 
     on or after July 1, 2009, and before July 1, 2010, 4.76 
     percent on the unpaid principal balance of the loan.
       ``(E) For a loan for which the first disbursement is made 
     on or after July 1, 2010, and before July 1, 2011, 4.08 
     percent on the unpaid principal balance of the loan.
       ``(F) For a loan for which the first disbursement is made 
     on or after July 1, 2011, and before July 1, 2012, 3.40 
     percent on the unpaid principal balance of the loan.''.
       (2) Special allowance cross reference.--Section 
     438(b)(2)(I)(ii)(II) of such Act is amended by striking 
     ``section 427A(l)(1)'' and inserting ``section 427A(l)(1) or 
     (l)(4)''.
       (b) Direct Loan Interest Rates.--Section 455(b)(7) of the 
     Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1087e(b)(7)) is 
     amended by adding at the end the following:
       ``(D) Reduced rates for undergraduate fdsl.--
     Notwithstanding the preceding paragraphs of this subsection, 
     for Federal Direct Stafford Loans made to undergraduate 
     students for which the first disbursement is made on or after 
     July 1, 2006, and before July 1, 2012, the applicable rate of 
     interest shall be as follows:
       ``(i) For a loan for which the first disbursement is made 
     on or after July 1, 2006, and before July 1, 2007, 6.8 
     percent on the unpaid principal balance of the loan.
       ``(ii) For a loan for which the first disbursement is made 
     on or after July 1, 2007, and before July 1, 2008, 6.12 
     percent on the unpaid principal balance of the loan.
       ``(iii) For a loan for which the first disbursement is made 
     on or after July 1, 2008, and before July 1, 2009, 5.44 
     percent on the unpaid principal balance of the loan.
       ``(iv) For a loan for which the first disbursement is made 
     on or after July 1, 2009, and before July 1, 2010, 4.76 
     percent on the unpaid principal balance of the loan.
       ``(v) For a loan for which the first disbursement is made 
     on or after July 1, 2010, and before July 1, 2011, 4.08 
     percent on the unpaid principal balance of the loan.
       ``(vi) For a loan for which the first disbursement is made 
     on or after July 1, 2011, and before July 1, 2012, 3.40 
     percent on the unpaid principal balance of the loan.''.

     SEC. 5. INCOME CONTINGENT REPAYMENT FOR PUBLIC SECTOR 
                   EMPLOYEES.

       Section 455(e) of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 
     U.S.C. 1087e(e)) is amended by adding at the end the 
     following:
       ``(7) Repayment plan for public sector employees.--
       ``(A) In general.--The Secretary shall forgive the balance 
     due on any loan made under

[[Page S850]]

     this part or section 428C(b)(5) for a borrower--
       ``(i) who has made 120 payments on such loan pursuant to 
     income contingent repayment; and
       ``(ii) who is employed, and was employed for the 10-year 
     period in which the borrower made the 120 payments described 
     in clause (i), in a public sector job.
       ``(B) Public sector job.--In this paragraph, the term 
     `public sector job' means a full-time job in emergency 
     management, government, public safety, law enforcement, 
     public health, education (including early childhood 
     education), social work in a public child or family service 
     agency, or public interest legal services (including 
     prosecution or public defense).
       ``(8) Return to standard repayment.--A borrower who is 
     repaying a loan made under this part pursuant to income 
     contingent repayment may choose, at any time, to terminate 
     repayment pursuant to income contingent repayment and repay 
     such loan under the standard repayment plan.''.

     SEC. 6. FAIR PAYMENT ASSURANCE.

       (a) Amendment.--Part G of title IV of the Higher Education 
     Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1088 et seq.) is further amended by 
     adding at the end the following:

     ``SEC. 493C. FAIR PAYMENT ASSURANCE.

       ``(a) Definitions.--In this section:
       ``(1) Excepted plus loan.--The term `excepted PLUS loan' 
     means a loan under section 428B, or a Federal Direct PLUS 
     Loan, that is made, insured, or guaranteed on behalf of a 
     dependent student.
       ``(2) Partial financial hardship.--The term `partial 
     financial hardship' means the amount by which the annual 
     amount due on the total amount of loans made, insured, or 
     guaranteed under part B or D (other than an excepted PLUS 
     loan) to a borrower as calculated under the standard 
     repayment plan under section 428(b)(9)(A)(i) or 455(d)(1)(A) 
     exceeds 15 percent of the result obtained by calculating the 
     amount by which--
       ``(A) the borrower's adjusted gross income; exceeds
       ``(B) 150 percent of the poverty line applicable to the 
     borrower's family size as determined under section 673(2) of 
     the Community Services Block Grant Act.
       ``(b) Fair Payment Assurance Program Authorized.--
     Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, the 
     Secretary shall carry out a program under which--
       ``(1) a borrower of any loan made, insured or guaranteed 
     under part B or D (other than an excepted PLUS loan) who has 
     a partial financial hardship may elect, during any period the 
     borrower has the partial financial hardship, to have the 
     borrower's aggregate monthly payment for all such loans not 
     exceed 15 percent of the result described in subsection 
     (a)(2) divided by 12;
       ``(2) the holder of such a loan shall apply the borrower's 
     monthly payment under this subsection first toward interest 
     due on the loan and then toward the principal of the loan;
       ``(3) any interest due and not paid under paragraph (2)--
       ``(A) in the case of a Federal Stafford Loan or Federal 
     Direct Stafford Loan, shall be paid by the Secretary; or
       ``(B) in the case of any other loan under part B or D 
     (other than a loan described in subparagraph (A) or an 
     excepted PLUS loan), shall be capitalized;
       ``(4) any principal due and not paid under paragraph (2) 
     shall be deferred in the same manner as deferments under 
     section 428(b)(1)(M);
       ``(5) the amount of time the borrower makes monthly 
     payments under paragraph (1) may exceed 10 years;
       ``(6) if the borrower no longer has a partial financial 
     hardship or no longer wishes to continue the election under 
     this subsection, then--
       ``(A) the maximum monthly payment required to be paid for 
     all loans made to the borrower under part B or D (other than 
     an excepted PLUS loan) shall not exceed the monthly amount 
     calculated under section 428(b)(9)(A)(i) or 455(d)(1)(A) when 
     the borrower first made the election described in this 
     subsection; and
       ``(B) the amount of time the borrower is permitted to repay 
     such loans may exceed 10 years; and
       ``(7) the Secretary shall repay or cancel any outstanding 
     balance of principal and interest due on all loans made under 
     part B or D (other than an excepted PLUS Loan) to a borrower 
     who--
       ``(A) is in deferment due to an economic hardship described 
     in section 435(o) for a period of time prescribed by the 
     Secretary, not to exceed 25 years; or
       ``(B)(i) makes the election under this subsection; and
       ``(ii) for a period of time prescribed by the Secretary, 
     not to exceed 25 years (including any period during which the 
     borrower is in deferment due to an economic hardship 
     described in section 435(o)), meets any 1 or more of the 
     following requirements:
       ``(I) Has made reduced monthly payments under paragraph 
     (1).
       ``(II) Has made monthly payments of not less than the 
     monthly amount calculated under section 428(b)(9)(A)(i) or 
     455(d)(1)(A) when the borrower first made the election 
     described in this subsection.
       ``(III) Has made payments under a standard repayment plan 
     under section 428(b)(9)(A)(i) or 455(d)(1)(A).
       ``(IV) Has made payments under an income contingent 
     repayment plan under section 455(d)(1)(D).''.
       (b) Conforming ICR Amendment.--Section 455(d)(1)(D) of the 
     Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1087e(d)(1)(D)) is 
     amended by inserting ``made on behalf of a dependent 
     student'' after ``PLUS loan''.

     SEC. 7. DEFINITION OF ECONOMIC HARDSHIP.

       Section 435(o) of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 
     U.S.C. 1085(o)) is amended--
       (1) in paragraph (1)--
       (A) in subparagraph (A)(ii), by striking ``100 percent of 
     the poverty line for a family of 2'' and inserting ``150 
     percent of the poverty line applicable to the borrower's 
     family size'';
       (B) by striking subparagraph (B); and
       (C) by redesignating subparagraph (C) as subparagraph (B); 
     and
       (2) in paragraph (2), by striking ``(1)(C)'' and inserting 
     ``(1)(B)''.

     SEC. 8. DEFERRALS.

       (a) FISL.--Section 427(a)(2)(C)(iii) of the Higher 
     Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1077(a)(2)(C)(iii)) is 
     amended by striking ``not in excess of 3 years''.
       (b) Interest Subsidies.--Section 428(b)(1)(M)(iv) of the 
     Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1078(b)(1)(M)(iv)) is 
     amended by striking ``not in excess of 3 years''.
       (c) Direct Loans.--Section 455(f)(2)(D) of the Higher 
     Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1087e(f)(2)(D)) is amended 
     by striking ``not in excess of 3 years''.
       (d) Perkins.--Section 464(c)(2)(A)(iv) of the Higher 
     Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1087dd(c)(2)(A)(iv)) is 
     amended by striking ``not in excess of 3 years''.

     SEC. 9. MAXIMUM REPAYMENT PERIOD.

       (a) In General.--Section 455(e) of the Higher Education Act 
     of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1087e(e)) is amended by adding at the end 
     the following:
       ``(7) Maximum repayment period.--In calculating the 
     extended period of time for which an income contingent 
     repayment plan under this subsection may be in effect for a 
     borrower, the Secretary shall include all time periods during 
     which a borrower of loans under part B, part D, or part E--
       ``(A) is not in default on any loan that is included in the 
     income contingent repayment plan; and
       ``(B)(i) is in deferment due to an economic hardship 
     described in section 435(o);
       ``(ii) makes monthly payments under paragraph (1) or (6) of 
     section 493C(b); or
       ``(iii) makes payments under a standard repayment plan 
     described in section 428(b)(9)(A)(i) or subsection 
     (d)(1)(A).''.
       (b) Technical Correction.--Section 455(d)(1)(C)) (20 U.S.C. 
     1087e(d)(1)(C)) is amended by striking ``428(b)(9)(A)(v)'' 
     and inserting ``428(b)(9)(A)(iv)''.

     SEC. 10. IN-SCHOOL CONSOLIDATION.

       Section 428(b)(7)(A) of the Higher Education Act of 1965 
     (20 U.S.C. 1078(b)(7)(A)) is amended by striking ``shall 
     begin'' and all that follows through the period and inserting 
     ``shall begin--
       ``(i) the day after 6 months after the date the student 
     ceases to carry at least one-half the normal full-time 
     academic workload (as determined by the institution); or
       ``(ii) on an earlier date if the borrower requests and is 
     granted a repayment schedule that provides for repayment to 
     commence at an earlier date.''.

     SEC. 11. CONSOLIDATION LOAN CHANGES.

       Section 428C(a)(3) of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 
     U.S.C. 1078-3(a)(3)) is amended to read as follows:
       ``(3) Definition of eligible borrower.--For the purpose of 
     this section, the term `eligible borrower' means a borrower 
     who--
       ``(A) is not subject to a judgment secured through 
     litigation with respect to a loan under this title or to an 
     order for wage garnishment under section 488A; and
       ``(B) at the time of application for a consolidation loan--
       ``(i) is in repayment status as determined under section 
     428(b)(7)(A);
       ``(ii) is in a grace period preceding repayment; or
       ``(iii) is a defaulted borrower who has made arrangements 
     to repay the obligation on the defaulted loans satisfactory 
     to the holders of the defaulted loans.''.

     SEC. 12. REDUCTION OF DIRECT LOAN ORIGINATION FEES.

       Section 455(c) of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 
     U.S.C. 1087e(c)) is amended--
       (1) in paragraph (1)--
       (A) by striking ``4.0 percent'' and inserting ``3.0 
     percent''; and
       (B) by striking ``shall'' and inserting ``is authorized 
     to''; and
       (2) in paragraph (2)--
       (A) in subparagraph (A), by striking `` `3.0 percent' for 
     `4.0 percent' '' and inserting `` `2.0 percent' for `3.0 
     percent' '';
       (B) in subparagraph (B), by striking `` `2.5 percent' for 
     `4.0 percent' '' and inserting `` `1.5 percent' for `3.0 
     percent' '';
       (C) in subparagraph (C), by striking `` `2.0 percent' for 
     `4.0 percent' '' and inserting `` `1.0 percent' for `3.0 
     percent' '';
       (D) in subparagraph (D), by striking `` `1.5 percent' for 
     `4.0 percent' '' and inserting `` `0.5 percent' for `3.0 
     percent' ''; and
       (E) in subparagraph (E), by striking `` `1.0 percent' for 
     `4.0 percent' '' and inserting `` `0.0 percent' for `3.0 
     percent' ''.

     SEC. 13. ADMINISTRATIVE ACCOUNT FOR DIRECT LOAN PROGRAM.

       Section 458 of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 
     1087h) is amended--
       (1) in subsection (a)--
       (A) by striking paragraphs (2) and (3) and inserting the 
     following:
       ``(2) Mandatory funds for fiscal years 2007 through 2011.--
     Each fiscal year there

[[Page S851]]

     shall be available to the Secretary, from funds not otherwise 
     appropriated, funds to be obligated for--
       ``(A) administrative costs under this part and part B, 
     including the costs of the direct student loan programs under 
     this part; and
       ``(B) account maintenance fees payable to guaranty agencies 
     under part B and calculated in accordance with subsection 
     (b),

     not to exceed (from such funds not otherwise appropriated) 
     $904,000,000 (less any amounts previously appropriated for 
     the costs and fees described this paragraph for fiscal year 
     2007) for fiscal year 2007, $943,000,000 for fiscal year 
     2008, $983,000,000 for fiscal year 2009, $1,023,000,000 for 
     fiscal year 2010, $1,064,000,000 for fiscal year 2011, and 
     $1,106,000,000 for fiscal year 2012.'';
       (B) by redesignating paragraphs (4) and (5) as paragraphs 
     (3) and (4), respectively; and
       (C) in paragraph (3) (as redesignated in subparagraph (B)), 
     by striking ``paragraph (3)'' and inserting ``paragraph 
     (2)''; and
       (2) in subsection (b), by striking ``(a)(3)'' and inserting 
     ``(a)(2)''.

     SEC. 14. COLLEGE TUITION DEDUCTION AND CREDIT FOR INTEREST ON 
                   HIGHER EDUCATION LOANS.

       (a) Expansion of Deduction for Higher Education Expenses.--
       (1) Amount of deduction.--Subsection (b) of section 222 of 
     the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (relating to deduction for 
     qualified tuition and related expenses) is amended to read as 
     follows:
       ``(b) Limitations.--
       ``(1) Dollar limitations.--
       ``(A) In general.--Except as provided in paragraph (2), the 
     amount allowed as a deduction under subsection (a) with 
     respect to the taxpayer for any taxable year shall not exceed 
     the applicable dollar limit.
       ``(B) Applicable dollar limit.--The applicable dollar limit 
     for any taxable year shall be determined as follows:

                                                             Applicable
``Taxable year:                                          dollar amount:
  2007......................................................$8,000 ....

  2008 and thereafter......................................$12,000.....

       ``(2) Limitation based on modified adjusted gross income.--
       ``(A) In general.--The amount which would (but for this 
     paragraph) be taken into account under subsection (a) shall 
     be reduced (but not below zero) by the amount determined 
     under subparagraph (B).
       ``(B) Amount of reduction.--The amount determined under 
     this subparagraph equals the amount which bears the same 
     ratio to the amount which would be so taken into account as--
       ``(i) the excess of--

       ``(I) the taxpayer's modified adjusted gross income for 
     such taxable year, over
       ``(II) $65,000 ($130,000 in the case of a joint return), 
     bears to

       ``(ii) $15,000 ($30,000 in the case of a joint return).
       ``(C) Modified adjusted gross income.--For purposes of this 
     paragraph, the term `modified adjusted gross income' means 
     the adjusted gross income of the taxpayer for the taxable 
     year determined--
       ``(i) without regard to this section and sections 199, 911, 
     931, and 933, and
       ``(ii) after the application of sections 86, 135, 137, 219, 
     221, and 469.

     For purposes of the sections referred to in clause (ii), 
     adjusted gross income shall be determined without regard to 
     the deduction allowed under this section.
       ``(D) Inflation adjustments.--
       ``(i) In general.--In the case of any taxable year 
     beginning in a calendar year after 2007, both of the dollar 
     amounts in subparagraph (B)(i)(II) shall be increased by an 
     amount equal to--

       ``(I) such dollar amount, multiplied by
       ``(II) the cost-of-living adjustment determined under 
     section 1(f)(3) for the calendar year in which the taxable 
     year begins, by substituting `calendar year 2006' for 
     `calendar year 1992' in subparagraph (B) thereof.

       ``(ii) Rounding.--If any amount as adjusted under clause 
     (i) is not a multiple of $50, such amount shall be rounded to 
     the nearest multiple of $50.''.
       (2) Qualified tuition and related expenses of eligible 
     students.--
       (A) In general.--Section 222(a) of the Internal Revenue 
     Code of 1986 (relating to allowance of deduction) is amended 
     by inserting ``of eligible students'' after ``expenses''.
       (B) Definition of eligible student.--Section 222(d) of such 
     Code (relating to definitions and special rules) is amended 
     by redesignating paragraphs (2) through (6) as paragraphs (3) 
     through (7), respectively, and by inserting after paragraph 
     (1) the following new paragraph:
       ``(2) Eligible student.--The term `eligible student' has 
     the meaning given such term by section 25A(b)(3).''.
       (3) Deduction made permanent.--Title IX of the Economic 
     Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 (relating to 
     sunset of provisions of such Act) shall not apply to the 
     amendments made by section 431 of such Act.
       (4) Effective date.--The amendments made by this subsection 
     shall apply to payments made in taxable years beginning after 
     December 31, 2006.
       (b) Credit for Interest on Higher Education Loans.--
       (1) In general.--Subpart A of part IV of subchapter A of 
     chapter 1 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (relating to 
     nonrefundable personal credits) is amended by inserting after 
     section 25D the following new section:

     ``SEC. 25E. INTEREST ON HIGHER EDUCATION LOANS.

       ``(a) Allowance of Credit.--In the case of an individual, 
     there shall be allowed as a credit against the tax imposed by 
     this chapter for the taxable year an amount equal to the 
     interest paid by the taxpayer during the taxable year on any 
     qualified education loan.
       ``(b) Maximum Credit.--
       ``(1) In general.--Except as provided in paragraph (2), the 
     credit allowed by subsection (a) for the taxable year shall 
     not exceed $1,500.
       ``(2) Limitation based on modified adjusted gross income.--
       ``(A) In general.--If the modified adjusted gross income of 
     the taxpayer for the taxable year exceeds $50,000 ($100,000 
     in the case of a joint return), the amount which would (but 
     for this paragraph) be allowable as a credit under this 
     section shall be reduced (but not below zero) by the amount 
     which bears the same ratio to the amount which would be so 
     allowable as such excess bears to $20,000 ($40,000 in the 
     case of a joint return).
       ``(B) Modified adjusted gross income.--The term `modified 
     adjusted gross income' means adjusted gross income determined 
     without regard to sections 199, 222, 911, 931, and 933.
       ``(C) Inflation adjustment.--In the case of any taxable 
     year beginning after 2007, the $50,000 and $100,000 amounts 
     referred to in subparagraph (A) shall be increased by an 
     amount equal to--
       ``(i) such dollar amount, multiplied by
       ``(ii) the cost-of-living adjustment determined under 
     section (1)(f)(3) for the calendar year in which the taxable 
     year begins, by substituting `2006' for `1992'.
       ``(D) Rounding.--If any amount as adjusted under 
     subparagraph (C) is not a multiple of $50, such amount shall 
     be rounded to the nearest multiple of $50.
       ``(c) Dependents Not Eligible for Credit.--No credit shall 
     be allowed by this section to an individual for the taxable 
     year if a deduction under section 151 with respect to such 
     individual is allowed to another taxpayer for the taxable 
     year beginning in the calendar year in which such 
     individual's taxable year begins.
       ``(d) Limit on Period Credit Allowed.--A credit shall be 
     allowed under this section only with respect to interest paid 
     on any qualified education loan during the first 60 months 
     (whether or not consecutive) in which interest payments are 
     required. For purposes of this paragraph, any loan and all 
     refinancings of such loan shall be treated as 1 loan.
       ``(e) Definitions.--For purposes of this section--
       ``(1) Qualified education loan.--The term `qualified 
     education loan' has the meaning given such term by section 
     221(d)(1).
       ``(2) Dependent.--The term `dependent' has the meaning 
     given such term by section 152.
       ``(f) Special Rules.--
       ``(1) Denial of double benefit.--No credit shall be allowed 
     under this section for any amount taken into account for any 
     deduction under any other provision of this chapter.
       ``(2) Married couples must file joint return.--If the 
     taxpayer is married at the close of the taxable year, the 
     credit shall be allowed under subsection (a) only if the 
     taxpayer and the taxpayer's spouse file a joint return for 
     the taxable year.
       ``(3) Marital status.--Marital status shall be determined 
     in accordance with section 7703.''.
       (2) Conforming amendment.--The table of sections for 
     subpart A of part IV of subchapter A of chapter 1 of the 
     Internal Revenue Code of 1986 is amended by inserting after 
     the item relating to section 25D the following new item:

``Sec. 25E. Interest on higher education loans.''.

       (3) Effective date.--The amendments made by this section 
     shall apply to any qualified education loan (as defined in 
     section 25E(e)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as 
     added by this section) incurred on, before, or after the date 
     of the enactment of this Act, but only with respect to any 
     loan interest payment due after December 31, 2006.

  Mr. OBAMA. Mr. President, since coming to the Senate two years ago, I 
have worked to fulfill pledges I made during my campaign. The first 
piece of legislation I introduced, the HOPE Act, addressed my pledge to 
make college more affordable. The HOPE Act arose from what I heard when 
meeting people across Illinois during my Senate campaign, and what I 
now continue to hear from students and families across the Nation.
  The dreams of our Nation's youth increasingly require a college 
diploma, but that diploma is becoming, for many, ever more difficult to 
attain. That difficulty arises not from lack of ambition or aptitude, 
but from lack of any realistic way for many American families to afford 
the requisite college education.
  This difficulty impacts not only the dreams of millions of students, 
but also the wellbeing of our Nation. Competition in the global economy 
requires the attainment of a college degree, in order to create and 
strengthen the innovative and flexible workforce America needs.

[[Page S852]]

  But as college costs increase, financial aid lags. The College Board 
reports that over the most recent five-year period, the cost of tuition 
and fees at public four-year colleges jumped 35 percent, even adjusting 
for inflation. Over that same five-year period, the maximum award 
offered by the Federal Government through Pell grants increased little. 
As a result, the proportion of college expenses met by Pell Grants 
decreased from 42 percent to 33 percent over that five-year period. At 
the same time, we see that qualified high school graduates from low- 
and moderate-income families are much less likely to earn that college 
degree than their wealthier peers.
  That is why I am pleased to support Senator Kennedy as he introduces 
the Student Debt Relief Act. Not only does it substantially increase 
Federal support for the Pell Grant, it also takes other steps to make 
college more affordable. The Act proposes to cut student loan interest 
rates, to make loan reconsolidation more feasible for many students, 
and to cap the amount of monthly loan payments for graduates who enter 
public service careers.
  These measures require a major investment. I believe we must continue 
to support qualified students who deserve the opportunity to turn their 
dreams into reality. I will continue to work to increase support for 
our students though the Pell Grant Program, and other measure that make 
a college degree attainable for many. This remains a priority for me, 
and I ask all my colleagues to join in this effort.

                          ____________________