[Congressional Record Volume 153, Number 12 (Monday, January 22, 2007)]
[Senate]
[Pages S784-S785]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                  THE PRESIDENT'S NEW STRATEGY IN IRAQ

  Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I wish to address recent changes in the 
situation in Iraq and the possibility that resolutions of disapproval 
to the President's new strategy will be offered in the near future--a 
possibility which I believe would be very dangerous to the success of 
our military efforts.
  I will make three points this afternoon.
  The first is that it is important for us to give the newly announced 
strategy of the President an opportunity to succeed. That makes sense 
not only because everyone recognized that the President needed to 
announce a new strategy--he has done that, and it seems to me he should 
be accorded that courtesy--but also because, from a military 
standpoint, it is the only thing that makes sense.
  The key to the new strategy announced by the President is not the 
addition of new troops. We have had far more in terms of numbers of 
troops in Iraq than the increase that will be provided by this latest 
plan. No, the primary change in the strategy is the actions of the 
Iraqi Government--in particular, Prime Minister al-Maliki's commitment 
to begin doing things we wanted him to do a long time ago but which he 
was unwilling to do--to hold people after being arrested rather than 
releasing them on the streets, to allow curfews and checkpoints to 
work, to allow the control of the Mahdi army, which is under the 
leadership of Sadr, the Shiite leader in Iraq, who has confronted al-
Maliki and his government.
  It appears this new strategy is beginning to work even after only a 
few days of its announcement. People have asked: Can we trust al-
Maliki? The answer is that no one knows. But actions speak louder than 
words. Apparently, he has made good--at least initially--on his 
commitment to confront the Mahdi army and to stop Sadr and that army 
from continuing the sectarian violence against Sunnis in Baghdad. 
Apparently, there have been a lot of arrests made, and the United 
States is going to be able to now conduct the type of hold operations, 
after they have cleared an area, that would be necessary to create 
stability for an ultimate peace in Iraq.
  So the first point is we do need to give this new strategy a chance 
to succeed. The very early returns suggest that it just might be having 
that effect.
  In addition, it is important for us to be able to regain control of 
the Anbar Province. Almost a third of the western part of Iraq is under 
attack by al-Qaida and other terrorists who mean to create their own 
little fiefdom--called a caliphate--in that part of the country. 
Clearly, we cannot allow al-Qaida to have a terrorist base in Iraq. The 
additional battalion of marines who are committed to clearing this area 
is critical to the stability in Iraq and the defeat of the terrorists 
there.
  The second reason we should give this strategy a chance is that the 
nonbinding resolution which has already been offered and will 
apparently be brought before the Senate within a week or so is wrong 
for two reasons: First of all, it presents no credible alternative, and 
secondly, it is dangerous. It presents no credible alternative, just 
mere criticism. Albeit in a nonbinding way, it is still criticism 
without any kind of an alternative.

[[Page S785]]

  The resolution itself doesn't contain an alternative except the 
following: ``The primary objective of the United States''--I am really 
listening at this point--``strategy in Iraq''--I am looking for a verb 
here but instead here are the four words--``should be to have the Iraqi 
political leaders make the political compromises necessary to end 
violence in Iraq.''
  ``Should be to have'' them. Well, if I had a magic wand, maybe I 
could make this happen. But the reality is that it is not the lack of 
political compromise, it is the lack of peace that is enabling them to 
make the political compromise. As long as the Mahdi army is controlling 
Sadr City and Sadr is confronting al-Maliki and fomenting violence--
Shiite and Sunni and vice versa--the political compromises are going to 
be impossible to make. That is why the President and al-Maliki 
understood you have to first create peaceful conditions, change the 
conditions on the ground. If the Mahdi army is going to have death 
squads foment this kind of violence, you will never have those 
political compromises. If al-Maliki can control Sadr and eliminate the 
threat, political compromise is possible. So there is no alternative to 
the President's strategy in the nonbinding resolution that was filed.
  Secondly, it would be dangerous. To pass a nonbinding resolution in 
the United States is for effect. What is the effect? Well, the effect 
theoretically is to try to get the President to change policy. This 
strategy isn't going to change in the near term. Troops are on the way. 
Al-Maliki made his commitment and is apparently making good on the 
commitment, so the new strategy is working out right now. So a 
nonbinding resolution passed in a week or two is not going to change 
this. Instead, its effect is a pernicious one. What kind of a message 
does it send, first of all, to our troops that Congress doesn't support 
what the President and they are trying to accomplish here; that the 
Congress thinks we should be going in some other direction, albeit 
there is no alternative being presented, just in a resolution of 
criticism? What kind of a message does it send to the allies that the 
President's policy is going to be undercut to the point that it will 
not be carried out, and therefore they better begin to hedge their 
bets? And most important, what message does it send to our enemies? Can 
they simply decide that in a matter of time, support for the 
President's policies will have diminished to the point that they won't 
have to concern themselves with this new strategy anymore if they can 
wait it out, and they will have an opportunity for success? So it is 
not going to work, No. 1, and secondly, it is dangerous.
  That brings me to the third and final point. It seems to me that 
those people in favor of sending a message without presenting an 
alternative have an obligation to consider what will occur if the 
President's policy doesn't succeed. Almost everybody recognizes that 
the Iraqi Army is not able to defend this country and create a peaceful 
stability in the country at this point.
  So the question is: What would happen if we leave Iraq a failed 
state? Most agree, and the intelligence community has recently 
testified, that it would be disastrous, not only for the people in Iraq 
but for our allies in the region and for our long-term national 
security interests, both because of the ability of al-Qaida and other 
terrorists to consolidate their gains in the area and use that as a 
place from which to operate, and secondly, because all of the momentum 
we have gained in getting support, more or less, from countries such as 
Afghanistan, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Egypt, Jordan--all of the 
countries in the region--that have helped in the war against the 
terrorists will switch the other way as they realize America will not 
stay in the fight, that they have to begin hedging their bets with the 
other powers in the region which include the sectarian killers and the 
terrorists.
  What is the consequence of a failed Iraq? It seems to me that for 
those who present no alternative other than Iraq needs to get its act 
together and provide for its own security, a policy which I don't know 
of anyone who agrees would succeed at this point in time, if that is 
not going to succeed, then what is the consequence of a failed Iraq and 
what is the consequence of the President's strategy failing?
  It all gets back to what I said in the beginning, and that is, it 
seems to me all Americans should want this strategy to succeed. Why 
would anyone want the strategy to fail? Just to prove a political 
point? That doesn't make sense when we have young men and women in 
harm's way and a lot riding on it not just for Iraqis but also for our 
national security. We should all want this strategy to work. We should 
do everything in our power to help make it work, and that begins by 
giving the plan a chance and not criticizing it before the strategy 
even has a few days to work out. That is why the possibility of a 
resolution, which is highly critical of the President's strategy and 
suggests a different course of action, a timeline for leaving, is the 
wrong strategy.
  What is that alternative in terms of timeline? It simply reads as 
follows:

       The United States should transfer under an appropriately 
     expedited time line responsibility for internal security and 
     halting sectarian violence in Iraq to the Government of Iraq 
     and Government security forces.

  That is the alternative, in an appropriately expedited timeline. That 
is no alternative at all. That doesn't direct anybody to provide for 
security in Iraq on any faster basis than we are already attempting. I 
have heard no one criticize our training of the Iraqi forces or finding 
or suggesting there is some other way to train them in a better way, in 
a faster way. It takes time. We are doing the best we can.
  The general who was in charge of creating that program, General 
Petraeus, will be our general in charge again. I think, by all 
accounts, he did a terrific job of setting up the program. We know it 
takes a certain amount of time to train these Iraqi forces. We know the 
country is not in a position to defend itself at this point. Why would 
we want to set ourselves on a course to leave when we know they cannot 
defend themselves?
  The truth is, for the time being, we are going to have to remain 
there to help secure the peace in Iraq, and that means we ought to give 
the President's policy a chance to succeed, and all of us hope it will 
succeed.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from North Dakota.

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