[Congressional Record Volume 153, Number 10 (Thursday, January 18, 2007)]
[Senate]
[Pages S731-S737]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                    PROTECT THE POWER OF THE PEOPLE

  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, in the late hours last night, I took to the 
floor to decry some Senators who wish, if I may put it in this 
language, to sabotage the ethics reform legislation with a dangerous 
and unconstitutional line-item veto proposal. What is happening is 
little more than political blackmail, and the American people--those 
people out there who are watching through the lenses above the 
President's chair, the American people--should be outraged. I have been 
around here a long time. I have spoken on this subject many times. This 
so-called line-item veto is an assault on the single most important 
protection that the American people have against a President, any 
President, who wants to run roughshod over the liberties of the people 
prescribed in the Constitution. Today I am talking about the 
congressional power over the purse. The congressional power that is 
right here, and over on the other side of the Capitol, the 
congressional power over the purse.
  Weaken the power of the purse and one weakens strong--the word 
``strong'' is too weak--one weakens oversight, for example, on this 
bloody nightmare of a war in Iraq. Get that? Weaken the power over the 
public purse and we weaken the oversight over this bloody war in Iraq. 
That is just one example. One weakens the power of the purse and one 
weakens the checks on a President who wants to tap into personal 
telephone calls or pry into bank accounts or tear open the mail. 
Without congressional power over the purse--money--there is no 
effective way to stop an out-of-control President who is bent on his 
way, no matter the price, no matter the repercussion. Make no mistake--
hear me, now. The Roman orator would say, ``Romans, lend me your 
ears.'' Make no mistake, this line-item veto authority would grant 
tremendous--I say tremendous and dangerous--new power to the President.
  There are new Members of this body. Perhaps we ought to have some 
discussions about the line-item veto. The President would have 
unchecked authority to imperil congressional power over the purse, a 
power that the constitutional Framers felt was absolutely vital to 
reining in an overzealous President.
  Eight years ago, the United States Supreme Court ruled that the line-
item veto--hear me, Senators; you may be watching your boob tubes. Hear 
me. Eight years ago, the United States Supreme Court ruled that the 
line-item veto was unconstitutional. I said at the time that the 
Supreme Court saved the Congress from its own folly. But now, it seems, 
memories in this Senate are short and wisdom may be even shorter in 
supply. Here we are, on the heels of 6 years of assault on personal 
liberty, 6 years of a do-nothing Congress all too willing to turn its 
eyes from the real problems of the Nation, 6 years of rubberstamps and 
rubber spines--here we are, all too ready to jettison the single most 
important protection of the people's liberties: the power of the purse.
  Let's review the record. We have a President--I say this in all due 
respect.

[[Page S732]]

I respect the President of the United States. I respect the Presidency; 
I respect the Chief Executive. We have a President who already has 
asserted too much power while refusing to answer questions:

       I am the commander--see, I don't need to explain--I do not 
     need to explain why I say things. That's the interesting 
     thing about being the President. Maybe somebody needs to 
     explain to me why they say something, but I don't feel like I 
     owe anybody an explanation.

  Those are the words of our President, the very President who some in 
this body are all too willing to allow to dominate the people's branch, 
this branch, your branch--the people's branch of Government.
  This President claimed the unconstitutional authority to tap into the 
telephone conversations of American citizens without a warrant, without 
court approval. This President claimed the unconstitutional authority 
to sneak and peek, to snoop and scoop into the private lives of you, 
the American people. This President has taken the Nation to a failed 
war--yes, to a failed war that we should have never entered into--based 
on faulty evidence and an unconstitutional doctrine of preemptive 
strikes, a doctrine that is absolutely unconstitutional on its face. 
More than 3,000 American sons and daughters have died in Iraq in this 
failed Presidential misadventure.
  What is the response of the Senate? To give the President even more 
unfettered authority? Give him greater unchecked powers? It is 
astounding. We have seen the danger of the blank check. We have lived 
through the aftermath of a rubberstamp Congress. We should not continue 
to lie down for this or any other President.
  Of course, this President wants to strip Congress of its strongest 
and most important power, the power of the purse. Congress has the 
ability to shut down the administration's unconstitutional practices. 
Congress is asking tough questions and demanding honest answers. 
Congress is taking a hard look at finding ways to bring our troops home 
from the President's misadventure in Iraq that has already cost the 
lives of more than 3,000 of the American people's sons and daughters. 
Of course, the President wants to control the Congress. Some Presidents 
have wanted to do this before--silence the critics, ignore, if you 
will, the will of the people seriously cripple oversight.

  Strip away the power of the Congress to control the purse strings, 
then you strip away the power of the Congress to say ``No more, Mr. 
President;'' strip away the single most important power granted to the 
people in this Constitution. That is the White House demand. I, for 
one, will not kowtow to this President or to any President. I, for one, 
will not stand quietly by while the people's liberties are placed in 
jeopardy. No Senator should want to hand such power to the President. 
No American should stand for it--not now, not today, not tomorrow, not 
the day after tomorrow, not ever.
  Just a few weeks ago, Members of the Senate took an oath, ``I do 
solemnly swear that I will support and defend. . . .'' This is in our 
oath, my oath, that I have taken several times.

       I do solemnly swear that I will support and defend the 
     Constitution of the United States against all enemies, 
     foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and 
     allegiance to the same; that I take this obligation freely, 
     without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and 
     that I will well and faithfully discharge the duties of the 
     office on which I am about to enter: So help me God.

  That is the oath I take: ``So help me God.''
  If our Republican colleagues want to stop the Senate's efforts to end 
the scandals that plagued the last Congress, that is their right. If 
our Republican colleagues want to stop the first increase in the 
minimum wage in the past decade, that is their right. But I, this 
mountain boy from the hills, will not stand with them. And the American 
people will see through this transparent effort to gut ethics reform.

  I, as one Senator with others, if they will stand with me, will do my 
very best to support and defend the Constitution of the United States. 
Yet I will bear true faith and allegiance to this Constitution and to 
the people of this great Nation, defying an effort to weaken the power 
of the purse.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor and suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. GREGG. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. GREGG. Mr. President, I will speak briefly on the second look at 
waste amendment which I have offered which has generated a fair amount 
of interest and discussion in this Senate. It is an amendment that 
essentially is an enhanced rescission amendment. It is not a line-item 
veto.
  I am a great admirer of the Senator from West Virginia. I have 
enjoyed serving in the Senate and being educated by him on all sorts of 
issues. I respect his view on the importance of the power of the purse 
and identify with it. That is the essence of the legislative branch's 
source of power. But I must respectfully disagree with his 
characterization of this amendment, and I believe I can defend that 
position effectively and respond to the points he has made and make it 
clear to our colleagues that we are not voting on line-item veto.
  Back in 1995, a line-item veto was given to the President. It was 
ruled unconstitutional. This amendment is not that proposal or anything 
similar to that proposal.
  I said earlier today, to compare this amendment to the line-item veto 
amendment is akin to comparing the New England Patriots to the Buffalo 
Bills. They may be in the same league, but they have no identity of 
ability or purpose, as far as I could tell.
  The enhanced rescission language which I have proposed--which is 
essentially second-look-at-waste language--the purpose of it is to give 
the Congress another look at provisions that may have been buried in a 
bill and which the executive branch thinks need a second look.
  The enhanced rescission language which I have proposed essentially 
tracks the proposal that was put forward by, at that time, Senator 
Daschle as their alternative to the line-item veto. It has the same 
essential purposes, except it is weaker, quite honestly, than what 
Senator Daschle proposed. It allows the President to send up a group of 
rescissions, in our case four. Under the Daschle proposal, he could 
have sent up as many as 13 different packages.
  Those rescissions, if a Member introduces them, must be voted on in a 
timeframe; the same thing as the Daschle proposal was. Those 
rescissions, under the Daschle proposal, were not referred to committee 
but under our proposal do go back to committees of authorization--a 
weaker proposal than the Daschle proposal.
  Both Houses must act on the rescissions, not just one House, for the 
rescissions to survive, and they must be acted on with a majority--the 
same thing as the Daschle proposal.
  The President is limited in the amount of time that he can hold the 
money. The timeframe under the Daschle proposal was, I believe, longer 
than under our proposal. I am not absolutely sure of that, but our 
proposal limits him to 45 days that he can hold that money, pending the 
Senate taking action.
  There is some sunlight between the two because the Daschle proposal 
allowed motions to strike in specific instances, if there were 49 
Senators agreeing to the motion to strike. I have said I am open to 
that as a concept, were we to get into a process of amending the 
proposal I have proposed. But that is an element of difference.
  But there is very little else that is different between what I am 
proposing and what Senator Daschle proposed as his rescission package. 
This is not a line-item veto amendment. It reserves to the Congress the 
authority to make the final call. All it gives to the President is the 
ability to ask us to take another look at something. That is pretty 
reasonable in the context of what we see today because we see all these 
omnibus bills arrive at our doorstep, spending tens of millions, in 
some instances hundreds of billions of dollars, and in those bills a 
lot of language works its way in that could be suspect, a lot of 
earmarks, a lot of things which maybe do not have majority support, but 
the President gets this big bill. He

[[Page S733]]

has to sign the whole thing or the Government shuts down or something 
else heinous happens.
  So it is reasonable to say: All right, let's take out those earmarks 
and send them back up and give Congress another look. It gives the 
President no unique authority--no unique authority--that could be 
identified as a line-item veto. There is no supermajority which is the 
essence of a line-item veto, no capacity to go in and delete something 
from a bill which is the essence of a line-item veto. It simply gives 
him the capacity to say to Congress, four times: Take a look. See if 
these rescissions make sense.
  The Daschle amendment was so far from a line-item veto that the most 
effective spokesperson in opposition to line-item veto in this Senate, 
in my lifetime, and probably in anybody else's lifetime, cosponsored 
the Daschle amendment. That was Senator Byrd.
  So I would ask Senator Byrd to take a serious look at what I have 
offered and say: Aren't we dealing with apples and oranges? Yes, I can 
understand his opposition to line-item veto. That is fine. That is his 
position. It has been well said for years. The argument of the 
importance of protecting the power of the purse is a good one. It is 
critical--critical. But this rescission language does not affect that. 
It does not affect the power of the purse. It is not a line-item veto 
amendment and so far from it that it basically tracks the Daschle 
amendment.
  In fact, I ask unanimous consent that the Daschle amendment be 
printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:


    daschle (and others) amendment no. 348 (senate--march 21, 1995)

      SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

       This Act may be cited as the ``Legislative Line Item Veto 
     Act''.

     SEC. 2. EXPEDITED CONSIDERATION OF CERTAIN PROPOSED 
                   CANCELLATIONS OF BUDGET ITEMS.

       (a) In General.--Title X of the Congressional Budget and 
     Impoundment Control Act of 1974 (2 U.S.C. 621 et seq.) is 
     amended by adding after section 1012 the following new 
     section:

 ``EXPEDITED CONSIDERATION OF CERTAIN PROPOSED CANCELLATIONS OF BUDGET 
                                 ITEMS

       ``Sec. 1012A. (a) Proposed Cancellation of Budget Item.--
     The President may propose, at the time and in the manner 
     provided in subsection (b), the cancellation of any budget 
     item provided in an Act. An item proposed for cancellation 
     under this section may not be proposed for cancellation again 
     under this title.
       ``(b) Transmittal of Special Message.--
       ``(1) Special message.--
       ``(A) In general.--Subject to the time limitations provided 
     in subparagraph (B), the President may transmit to Congress a 
     special message proposing to cancel budget items contained in 
     an Act. A separate special message shall be transmitted for 
     each Act that contains budget items the President proposes to 
     cancel.
       ``(B) Time limitations.--A special message may be 
     transmitted under this section--
       ``(i) during the 20-calendar-day period (excluding 
     Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays) commencing on the day 
     after the date of enactment of the provision proposed to be 
     rescinded or repealed; or
       ``(ii) at the same time as the President's budget for any 
     provision enacted after the date the President submitted the 
     preceding budget.
       ``(2) Draft bill.--The President shall include in each 
     special message transmitted under paragraph (1) a draft bill 
     that, if enacted, would cancel those budget items as provided 
     in this section. The draft bill shall clearly identify each 
     budget item that is proposed to be canceled including, where 
     applicable, each program, project, or activity to which the 
     budget item relates.
       ``(3) Contents of special message.--Each special message 
     shall specify, with respect to the budget item proposed to be 
     canceled--
       ``(A) the amount that the President proposes be canceled;
       ``(B) any account, department, or establishment of the 
     Government to which such budget item is available for 
     obligation, and the specific project or governmental 
     functions involved;
       ``(C) the reasons why the budget item should be canceled;
       ``(D) to the maximum extent practicable, the estimated 
     fiscal, economic, and budgetary effect (including the effect 
     on outlays and receipts in each fiscal year) of the proposed 
     cancellation; and
       ``(E) all facts, circumstances, and considerations relating 
     to or bearing upon the proposed cancellation and the decision 
     to effect the proposed cancellation, and to the maximum 
     extent practicable, the estimated effect of the proposed 
     cancellation upon the objects, purposes, and programs for 
     which the budget item is provided.
       ``(4) Deficit reduction.--
       ``(A) Discretionary spending limits and adjustment of 
     committee allocations.--Not later than 5 days after the date 
     of enactment of a bill containing the cancellation of budget 
     items as provided under this section, the President shall--
       ``(i) with respect to a rescission of budget authority 
     provided in an appropriations Act, reduce the discretionary 
     spending limits under section 601 of the Congressional Budget 
     Act of 1974 for the budget year and any outyear affected by 
     the rescission, to reflect such amount; and
       ``(ii) with respect to a repeal of a targeted tax benefit, 
     adjust the balances for the budget year and each outyear 
     under section 252(b) of the Balanced Budget and Emergency 
     Deficit Control Act of 1985 to reflect such amount.
       ``(B) Adjustment of committee allocations.--Not later than 
     5 days after the date of enactment of a bill containing the 
     cancellation of budget items as provided under this section, 
     the chairs of the Committees on the Budget of the Senate and 
     the House of Representatives shall revise levels under 
     section 311(a) and adjust the committee allocations under 
     section 602(a) to reflect such amount.
       ``(c) Procedures for Expedited Consideration:
       ``(1) In general.--
       ``(A) Introduction.--Before the close of the second day of 
     session of the Senate and the House of Representatives, 
     respectively, after the date of receipt of a special message 
     transmitted to Congress under subsection (b), the majority 
     leader or minority leader of each House shall introduce (by 
     request) the draft bill accompanying that special message. If 
     the bill is not introduced as provided in the preceding 
     sentence in either House, then, on the third day of session 
     of that House after the date of receipt of that special 
     message, any Member of that House may introduce the bill.
       ``(B) Referral and reporting.--The bill shall be referred 
     to the appropriate committee or (in the House of 
     Representatives) committees. The committee shall report the 
     bill without substantive revision and with or without 
     recommendation. The committee shall report the bill not later 
     than the seventh day of session of that House after the date 
     of receipt of that special message. If the committee fails to 
     report the bill within that period, the committee shall be 
     automatically discharged from consideration of the bill, 
     and the bill shall be placed on the appropriate calendar.
       ``(C) Final passage.--A vote on final passage of the bill 
     shall be taken in the Senate and the House of Representatives 
     on or before the close of the 10th day of session of that 
     House after the date of the introduction of the bill in that 
     House. If the bill is passed, the Secretary of the Senate or 
     the Clerk of the House of Representatives, as the case may 
     be, shall cause the bill to be engrossed, certified, and 
     transmitted to the other House within one calendar day of the 
     day on which the bill is passed.
       ``(2) Consideration in the house of representatives.--
       ``(A) Motion to proceed to consideration.--A motion in the 
     House of Representatives to proceed to the consideration of a 
     bill under this subsection shall be highly privileged and not 
     debatable. An amendment to the motion shall not be in order, 
     nor shall it be in order to move to reconsider the vote by 
     which the motion is agreed to or disagreed to.
       ``(B) Motion to strike.--During consideration under this 
     subsection in the House of Representatives, any Member of the 
     House of Representatives may move to strike any proposed 
     cancellation of a budget item if supported by 49 other 
     Members.
       ``(C) Limits on debate.--Debate in the House of 
     Representatives on a bill under this subsection shall not 
     exceed 4 hours, which shall be divided equally between those 
     favoring and those opposing the bill. A motion further to 
     limit debate shall not be debatable. It shall not be in order 
     to move to recommit a bill under this subsection or to move 
     to reconsider the vote by which the bill is agreed to or 
     disagreed to.
       ``(D) Appeals.--Appeals from decisions of the Chair 
     relating to the application of the Rules of the House of 
     Representatives to the procedure relating to a bill under 
     this section shall be decided without debate.
       ``(E) Application of house rules.--Except to the extent 
     specifically provided in this section, consideration of a 
     bill under this section shall be governed by the Rules of the 
     House of Representatives. It shall not be in order in the 
     House of Representatives to consider any bill introduced 
     pursuant to the provisions of this section under a suspension 
     of the rules or under a special rule.
       ``(3) Consideration in the senate.--
       ``(A) Motion to proceed to consideration.--A motion to 
     proceed to the consideration of a bill under this subsection 
     in the Senate shall be nondebatable. It shall not be in order 
     to move to reconsider the vote by which the motion to proceed 
     is agreed to or disagreed to.
       ``(B) Motion to strike.--During consideration of a bill 
     under this subsection in the Senate, any Member of the Senate 
     may move to strike any proposed cancellation of a budget item 
     if supported by 11 other Members.
       ``(C) Limits on debate.--Debate in the Senate on a bill 
     under this subsection, amendments thereto, and all debatable 
     motions and appeals in connection therewith (including debate 
     pursuant to subparagraph (D)),

[[Page S734]]

     shall not exceed 10 hours. The time shall be equally divided 
     between, and controlled by, the majority leader and the 
     minority leader or their designees.
       ``(D) Appeals.--Debate in the Senate on any debatable 
     motion or appeal in connection with a bill under this 
     subsection shall be limited to not more than 1 hour, to be 
     equally divided between, and controlled by, the mover and the 
     manager of the bill, except that in the event the manager 
     of the bill is in favor of any such motion or appeal, the 
     time in opposition thereto, shall be controlled by the 
     minority leader or his designee. Such leaders, or either 
     of them, may, from time under their control on the passage 
     of a bill, allot additional time to any Senator during the 
     consideration of any debatable motion or appeal.
       ``(E) Motion to limit debate.--A motion in the Senate to 
     further limit debate on a bill under this subsection is not 
     debatable.
       ``(F) Motion to recommit.--A motion to recommit a bill 
     under this subsection is not in order.
       ``(G) Placed on calendar.--Upon receipt in the Senate of 
     the companion bill for a bill that has been introduced in the 
     Senate, that companion bill shall be placed on the calendar.
       ``(H) Consideration of house companion bill.--
       ``(i) In general.--Following the vote on the Senate bill 
     required under paragraph (l)(C), when the Senate proceeds to 
     consider the companion bill received from the House of 
     Representatives, the Senate shall--
       ``(I) if the language of the companion bill is identical to 
     the Senate bill, as passed, proceed to the immediate 
     consideration of the companion bill and, without intervening 
     action, vote on the companion bill; or
       ``(II) if the language of the companion bill is not 
     identical to the Senate bill, as passed, proceed to the 
     immediate consideration of the companion bill.
       ``(ii) Amendments.--During consideration of the companion 
     bill under clause (i)(II), any Senator may move to strike all 
     after the enacting clause and insert in lieu thereof the text 
     of the Senate bill, as passed. Debate in the Senate on such 
     companion bill, any amendment proposed under this 
     subparagraph, and all debatable motions and appeals in 
     connection therewith, shall not exceed 10 hours less such 
     time as the Senate consumed or yielded back during 
     consideration of the Senate bill.
       ``(4) Conference.--
       ``(A) Consideration of conference reports.--Debate in the 
     House of Representatives or the Senate on the conference 
     report and any amendments in disagreement on any bill 
     considered under this section shall be limited to not more 
     than 2 hours, which shall be divided equally between the 
     majority leader and the minority leader. A motion further to 
     limit debate is not debatable. A motion to recommit the 
     conference report is not in order, and it is not in order to 
     move to reconsider the vote by which the conference report is 
     agreed to or disagreed to.
       ``(B) Failure of conference to act.--If the committee on 
     conference on a bill considered under this section fails to 
     submit a conference report within 10 calendar days after the 
     conferees have been appointed by each House, any Member of 
     either House may introduce a bill containing only the text of 
     the draft bill of the President on the next day of session 
     thereafter and the bill shall be considered as provided in 
     this section except that the bill shall not be subject to any 
     amendment.
       ``(d) Amendments and divisions prohibited.--Except as 
     otherwise provided by this section, no amendment to a bill 
     considered under this section shall be in order in either the 
     Senate or the House of Representatives. It shall not be in 
     order to demand a division of the question in the House of 
     Representatives (or in a Committee of the Whole). No motion 
     to suspend the application of this subsection shall be in 
     order in the House of Representatives, nor shall it be in 
     order in the House of Representatives to suspend the 
     application of this subsection by unanimous consent.
       ``(e) Temporary Presidential Authority To Cancel.--At the 
     same time as the President transmits to Congress a special 
     message under subsection (b)(I)(B)(i) proposing to cancel 
     budget items, the President may direct that any budget item 
     or items proposed to be canceled in that special message 
     shall not be made available for obligation or take effect for 
     a period not to exceed 45 calendar days from the date the 
     President transmits the special message to Congress. The 
     President may make any budget item or items canceled pursuant 
     to the preceding sentence available at a time earlier than 
     the time specified by the President if the President 
     determines that continuation of the cancellation would not 
     further the purposes of this Act.
       ``(f) Definitions.--For purposes of this section--
       ``(1) The term `appropriation Act' means any general or 
     special appropriation Act, and any Act or joint resolution 
     making supplemental, deficiency, or continuing 
     appropriations.
       ``(2) The term `budget item' means--
       ``(A) an amount, in whole or in part, of budget authority 
     provided in an appropriation Act except to fund direct 
     spending programs and the administrative expenses social 
     security; or
       ``(B) a targeted tax benefit.
       ``(3) The term `cancellation of a budget item' means--
       ``(A) the rescission of any budget authority provided in an 
     appropriation Act; or
       ``(B) the repeal of any targeted tax benefit.
       ``(4) The term `companion bill' means, for any bill 
     introduced in either House pursuant to subsection (c)(1)(A), 
     the bill introduced in the other House as a result of the 
     same special message.
       ``(5) The term `targeted tax benefit' means any provision 
     which has the practical effect of providing a benefit in the 
     form of a different treatment to a particular taxpayer or a 
     limited class of taxpayers, whether or not such provision is 
     limited by its terms to a particular taxpayer or a class of 
     taxpayers. Such term does not include any benefit provided to 
     a class of taxpayers distinguished on the basis of general 
     demographic conditions such as income, number of dependents, 
     or marital status.''.
       (b) Exercise of Rulemaking Powers.-- Section 904 of the 
     Congressional Budget Act of 1974 (2 U.S.C. 621 note) is 
     amended--
       (1) in subsection ( a), by striking ``and 1017'' and 
     inserting ``1012A, and 1017''; and
       (2) in subsection (d), by striking ``section 1017'' and 
     inserting ``sections 1012A and 1017''.
       (c) Clerical Amendments.--The table of sections for subpart 
     B of title X of the Congressional Budget and Impoundment 
     Control Act of 1974 is amended by inserting after the item 
     relating to section 1012 the following:
       ``Sec. 1012A. Expedited consideration of certain proposed 
     cancellations of budget items.''.
       (d) Effective Period.--The amendments made by this Act 
     shall--
       (1) take effect on the date of enactment of this Act;
       (2) apply only to budget items provided in Acts enacted on 
     or after the date of enactment of this Act; and
       (3) cease to be effective on September 30, 1998.

  Mr. GREGG. As to this amendment, on March 23, Senator Byrd rose and 
said: `` . . . I am 100 percent behind the substitute by Mr. Daschle, 
and I ask unanimous consent that my name may be added as a cosponsor.''
  This amendment is essentially what I have offered as the second-look-
at-waste amendment. In fact, I will be honest, I would be willing to 
probably modify my amendment to basically track the Daschle amendment 
exactly. I have some differences with the Daschle amendment. I do not 
think in some places it is constructed as well as mine because it has 
13 shots from the President. I happen to think that is a mistake. And 
it is not referred to committees, which I think is a mistake. I would 
be willing to offer it. If that is what it takes to mute the argument 
that this is a line-item veto amendment, then I will do that because 
this is not a line-item veto amendment.
  So my immense respect for the Senator from West Virginia and my very 
high regard for his arguments as to why he opposes the line-item veto 
remain. I continue to have enthusiasm in both those accounts for him. 
But I have to say I think for him to characterize this amendment as a 
line-item veto amendment is incorrect. This amendment is much better 
characterized as being close to, in fact, the child of, the Daschle 
amendment of 1995, which had broad support on the other side of the 
aisle, as I have already mentioned.
  With that, Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, will the Senator withhold his yielding the 
floor? I would like to ask him a few questions.
  Mr. GREGG. Of course.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Republican whip.
  Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I thank Senator Gregg for his work in this 
area and for the several speeches he has given on this matter over the 
last few days. I have found it very informative. I hope we have 
something worked out where we can actually get a vote on this issue. It 
is still the Senate and, generally speaking, we try to accommodate 
Members' wishes to discuss an issue and get a vote.
  But a little bit of history: I worked very hard, as I pointed out 
yesterday, on line-item veto legislation, and we got it done. The first 
time it was used I was very disappointed in the way that President 
Clinton used it. I thought the veto list had some serious political 
implications and was very disappointed in that and wondered if I had 
done the right thing. Then, of course, the Supreme Court struck it 
down. And now we are back here.
  Now, tell me again--where a layman can understand--why is this so-
called enhanced rescission?
  Mr. GREGG. Second look at waste.
  Mr. LOTT. Second look at waste. I like that. I like them taking 
another look at waste. And I like putting it

[[Page S735]]

against the deficit. In fact, I remember back in the 1970s arguing that 
a President should be able to rescind funding, not spend money that 
Congress said he should spend because they had been doing it back since 
the time of Jefferson. That led to, in 1974, the Budget Empowerment 
Act, which stopped President Nixon and subsequent Presidents from doing 
that.
  There is no question that we sometimes adopt bills that spend funds 
that should not be spent or events overtake spending. I think there 
should be some process for a President to get a reconsideration. There 
may be better ways to use that money. But I do think we have a 
constitutional role in that too. Once we indicate this is where we 
think it should be spent, the overwhelming burden should be to explain 
why not.
  The question to you, I say to the Senator, is this: No. 1, why is 
this different from the line-item veto that we passed that was stricken 
down by the Supreme Court?
  Mr. GREGG. Well, the fundamental difference from the line-item veto 
is that it does not require a supermajority to reject the idea of the 
President. It requires a majority of both Houses--both Houses have to 
have a majority vote in favor of the President's position. Therefore, 
either House can strike down the President's position. So you retain--
we, the Congress--the power of the purse.
  Mr. LOTT. Was there language in the Supreme Court that indicated this 
sort of thing might solve their constitutional reservations?
  Mr. GREGG. It is my understanding, from the constitutional lawyers 
whom we have had look at this, that this would solve the constitutional 
issues which were raised by a line-item veto because it is not a line-
item veto.
  Mr. LOTT. Why do you think it is necessary to have four bites at this 
apple? I am inclined to give Presidents a chance to send up a 
rescission list. I think it should have a vote. I think it should be an 
expedited procedure. I like the fact that if we do not spend it, he 
cannot turn around and spend it somewhere else and it goes to reduce 
the deficit. I can even see giving him a second bite later on in the 
year as long as it is not some of the same things a second time. And 
you took care of that concern I had last year.
  But why four times? We will wind up spending half the year working on 
expedited proceedings to get a vote on rescissions, possibly.
  Mr. GREGG. Well, Mr. President, the administration asked for 10 
times. The Daschle amendment had 13 times. We reduced it to 4 times, 
for the exact point that the assistant Republican leader made, which 
was we did not think the Congress should be able to have these issues 
wrap up our schedule.
  Under this schedule, each rescission would be subject to 10 days 
before it had to be voted on. I am perfectly agreeable, should we get 
this into a process where we can amend it, as I said earlier, to 
include strike language or consider that and to also include language 
which would take it down to fewer times. That is not a problem, as far 
as I am concerned. We settled on four, arbitrarily, to say the least.
  Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I say to the Senator, I hear a lot of talk 
in this Chamber on both sides of the aisle about how we do worry about 
deficits and getting spending under control and getting some further 
disclosure or limits on earmarks. Some of that I do not even agree 
with. But there is a lot of positioning about how we need to get some 
better control on spending. Wouldn't this be one way to do that? ``It 
would sort of help me before I do it again,'' sort of thing.
  Mr. GREGG. To answer the Senator's question, absolutely, that is what 
it would do. It, essentially, would create another mechanism where 
Congress would have a light-of-day experience on things that tend to 
get buried in these omnibus bills and may have to make a clear call as 
to whether that spending was appropriate. So, yes, it is very much an 
issue of fiscal discipline. It is very much an issue of managing 
earmarks.
  Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, we gripe about this earmark or that earmark. 
Usually it is somebody else's earmark, not our earmark. So we do 
position on that subject. But this is one last way to make sure those 
earmarks see the light of day and are reviewed, not in a way where the 
President can just summarily do it but where he can do it, and we have 
to face up and vote yes or no.
  So I thank the Senator for what he has done. He has been a great 
chairman of the Budget Committee. I am looking forward to watching him 
and the Senator from North Dakota work together. I believe we might 
actually do some good things under yours and his leadership. I wish you 
the very best in that effort. Thank you.
  Mr. President, here we are, the Sun has set on Thursday. It is a 
quarter to 6. The Sun officially went down at 5:13. We are like bats. 
The Senate will soon come out from wherever we have been. I am not 
blaming anybody on either side of the aisle, but I don't know what 
happened today. Somewhere back, I guess, about 2 o'clock all the 
combatants went to their respective corners, and there has not been a 
blow thrown since.
  So some people might say: Do something about it. Well, I am trying to 
do something about it by shedding a little light on what we are not 
doing. We have been out here marking time all afternoon.
  I know how it works. Papers are exchanged, amendments added and 
struck, and agreements are made. Hello, it is a quarter to 6. I had 
high hopes and I have high hopes that the Senate is going to find a way 
to work together and do a better job and that we work at 11 o'clock on 
Wednesday morning instead of 11 o'clock at night. I know a lot of 
people don't agree with me on this, but I don't see why it is a good 
idea to be voting at 11 o'clock on Thursday night but not on Friday 
morning. I still think it is a really good idea to work during the 
daylight and go home and not have a meal with a lobbyist but have a 
meal with your family.
  I don't know what else to do. I have called everybody involved. I 
have been to offices. I have been stirring around, scurrying around. Is 
there an agenda here? I don't get it. But I know what is going to 
happen. All of a sudden, we are going to come out of our cages and we 
are going to start a whole series of votes. Well, let's get started.
  I notice the Presiding Officer is an old House Member. There was a 
clear rule in the House, an adage that was proven right every time, and 
that has been one of the problems with the House. More and more, the 
House tried to cram a week's worth of work into 2\1/2\ days, and they 
would have a series of votes at 11 o'clock--outrageous--at night. Any 
time you are in session beyond 9 o'clock, the odds are pretty good you 
are going to mess up, do something wrong and embarrass yourself.
  So I would say to our leaders: We have an opportunity here to do a 
better job and to work with each other. But the last 2 days? Again, you 
might say: Well, it is because Senator Gregg had an amendment. Well, 
why don't we just vote and move on? People can say: Well, we are 
working out an agreement where we won't have a lot of votes. Well, we 
might just as well have a lot of votes. We are standing around giving 
speeches on something we are not even going to vote on. This is the 
kind of thing that I think leads to problems and tarnishes our image. I 
wish we could find a way to do things in a more normal way. But maybe 
the Senate can't do that. Maybe the Senator from Maryland will help us 
find a better way to do things as a new Member of the institution. I 
hope so.
  I thought maybe I could draw somebody out, but I guess I was too 
general. Nobody has moved. The doors are still closed. I have half a 
mind to ask unanimous consent that we complete all votes on all 
amendments and all time be expired effective in the morning at 9 
o'clock, and I will see you all tomorrow. Maybe I ought to do that. 
That would be good. Of course, I have no authority to do that, but 
somebody ought to do it to try to get this place to function normally.
  With that, I yield the floor and suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mrs. McCaskill). The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Tester). Is there objection?

[[Page S736]]

  Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I hope to speak at some length about the 
line-item veto at a later time. However, for the benefit of my 
colleagues, I want to respond to the arguments put forward today about 
two measures I endorsed in 1995 and 1996.
  The Daschle amendment that I cosponsored in 1995, and the amendment I 
offered to the motion to recommit the line-item veto conference report 
in 1996, are vastly different in regard to their Constitutional 
ramifications from what has been offered by Senator Gregg to the ethics 
reform bill.
  The Gregg proposal allows the President to submit rescission 
proposals up to 365 days after he signs a bill into law. Such latitude 
would allow the President to unilaterally veto a one-year appropriation 
by delaying its expenditure, and then submitting it for rescission 
within 45 days of its expiration. In contrast, the proposals I endorsed 
in 1995 and 1996 would have limited a President to submitting 
rescission proposals within 20 days of a bill being signed into law. 
The proposals I have endorsed would have prevented the President from 
unilaterally cancelling a one-year appropriations. The Gregg amendment 
contains no such protection.
  The Gregg proposal also prohibits amendments to the President's 
rescission requests. In contrast, the proposals I have endorsed would 
have allowed motions to strike. Without the right to amend, Senators 
are vulnerable to threats by any President who would target a Member's 
spending and revenue priorities and force the Senate to vote on them at 
a time and in the manner decided by the President.
  I have the greatest respect for the Senator from New Hampshire, and 
the knowledge and expertise he brings to the Congressional budget and 
appropriations process. He is a good Senator. But I cannot endorse his 
views with regard to the line-item veto.


                            AMENDMENT NO. 31

  Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I wish to speak on amendment No. 31, 
which I have offered with Senator Obama, and which, unless agreement is 
reached otherwise, will be voted on when we return to the bill in an 
attempt to finish it. We have offered this amendment to try to give 
some teeth to the so-called revolving door statute.
  The shortcomings of the revolving door law have been known for some 
time. This bill already corrects two of them, and I strongly support 
those provisions.
  First, it increases the so-called cooling off period--that is, the 
period during which restrictions on the activities of former Members of 
Congress apply--from 1 year to 2 years.
  Second, it expands the prohibition that applies to senior staff 
members who become lobbyists. Rather than having to refrain from 
lobbying the former employing Senator or committee, staffers turned 
lobbyists may not lobby the entire Senate during this cooling-off 
period.
  These are important changes, but there is an additional reform that I 
believe we must adopt if the revolving door statute is to be a serious 
impediment to improper influence peddling.
  My amendment would prohibit former Senators not only from personally 
lobbying their former colleagues during the 2-year cooling-off period, 
but also from engaging in lobbying activities during that period.
  Let me talk for a minute about revolving door restrictions generally, 
and then I will discuss the need for this particular amendment. The 
revolving door is a problem for two basic reasons. First, because of 
the revolving door, some interests have better access to the 
legislative process than others. Former Members and staff, or former 
executive branch employees, know how to work the system and get results 
for their clients. Those who have the money to hire them have a leg up.
  The public perceives this as an unfair process, and I agree. 
Decisions in Congress on legislation, or in regulatory agencies on 
regulations or enforcement, or in the Defense Department on huge 
Government contracts, should be made, to the extent possible, on the 
merits, not based on who has the best connected lobbyist.
  The second problem of the revolving door is it creates the 
perception--perception--that public officials are cashing in on their 
public service, trading on their connections and their knowledge for 
personal profit. When you see former Members or staff becoming 
lobbyists and making three or four or five times what they made in 
Government service to work on the same issues they worked on here, that 
raises questions for a lot of people.
  Both sides of this coin combine to further the cynicism about how 
policy is made in this country and who is making it. That, ultimately, 
is the biggest problem here. The public loses confidence in elected 
officials and public servants.
  One of the worst things we can do here is say we are addressing a 
problem, knowing we are not getting at the core of the problem. That is 
what has happened with the revolving door. We have a so-called cooling-
off period, which basically has become a ``warming-up period.'' Former 
Members leave office and they almost immediately join these lobbying 
firms. Both they and their employers know they cannot lobby Congress 
for a year, but it does not matter. They can do everything short of 
picking up the phone or coming to the meeting. They can strategize 
behind the scenes. They can give advice on who to contact, what 
arguments to use, what buttons to push. They can even direct others to 
make the contacts, and say they are doing so at the suggestion of the 
ex-Senator in question, who is supposedly in the middle of this 2-year 
cooling-off period.
  Making it a 2-year warming-up period does not do enough. We have to 
change what is allowed during that period. Only then will the public 
believe we have addressed the revolving door problem.
  The Lobbying Disclosure Act requires lobbying firms and organizations 
that lobby to report on how much they spend not on lobbying contacts 
but on lobbying activities. ``Lobbying activities'' is a defined term, 
covering ``lobbying contacts and efforts in support of such contacts, 
including preparation and planning activities, research and other 
background work that is intended, at the time it is performed, for use 
in contacts, and coordination with the lobbying activities of others.'' 
This term I just mentioned and defined has been in use for over a 
decade without controversy.
  So the Feingold-Obama amendment simply prohibits former Members of 
Congress from engaging in lobbying activities for the 2 years following 
their congressional service. If the money spent on what the former 
Member is doing would have to be reported under the LDA, then the 
former Member cannot do it. Adopting this amendment will show the 
public we are serious about addressing the revolving door problem. It 
will make a real difference, which I fear simply lengthening the 
cooling-off period will not.
  I have heard some complain that by doing this we are going after our 
former colleagues' ability to make a living and support their families. 
I strongly disagree with that.
  According to a study done by Public Citizen in 2005, it is only in 
the last decade or so that lobbying has become the profession of choice 
for former Members of Congress. In any event, we are not talking about 
a lifetime ban, just a real cooling-off period for 2 years. Members of 
Congress are highly talented, highly employable people. Surely, their 
experience and expertise is of interest to potential employers for 
something other than trying to influence legislation right after they 
leave the House or the Senate.
  There are many other kinds of work, including some that may be just 
as fulfilling, though perhaps not as rewarding financially, as 
representing private interests before their former colleagues. This is 
not a question of punishing those who serve in Congress. It is a 
question of Members of Congress recognizing that we are here as public 
servants, and when that service ends, we should not be allowed to turn 
around and transform it into a huge personal financial benefit.
  If after sitting out an entire Congress--2 full years--a former 
Member wishes to come to Washington and lobby, he or she can do that. 
But some of the issues will have changed, and so will the membership of 
the Congress. The former Member will not have quite the same advantages 
and connections after a true 2-year cooling-off period. So even if 
these Members do become lobbyists at that point, I think we will be 
able to tell our constituents with a

[[Page S737]]

straight face that we have addressed the revolving door problem in a 
meaningful way.
  Let me emphasize one thing about this amendment. It does not apply to 
former staff. The reason is simple. We let, under this, former staffers 
leave this building and become lobbyists tomorrow. They are limited in 
what offices they can contact, but they are allowed to lobby. So 
preventing them from engaging in lobbying activities only with respect 
to certain offices would not make sense. But for former Members, who 
are prohibited from contacting anyone in the Congress, this additional 
prohibition actually makes a lot of sense and will have a real impact.
  The American people are looking for real results in this legislation. 
We cannot claim to be giving them that with respect to the revolving 
door without this amendment. So I urge my colleagues to vote for the 
Feingold-Obama amendment.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Utah.
  Mr. BENNETT. Mr. President, I listened with interest to my friend 
from Wisconsin. I have to repeat what I said on the floor before. I may 
be the only one--I am not sure--who has had experience with the 
revolving door, as one who went through it. I worked in the Nixon 
administration. The day after I walked out, I had a number of clients 
who wanted me to lobby them at my former department. I was at the 
Department of Transportation, and I was the chief lobbyist. We pretend 
that executive departments don't have lobbyists. We call them 
congressional relations specialists or congressional liaisons, but they 
are lobbyists. And I had been lobbying the Congress on behalf of the 
Department of Transportation.
  In that role I got access to the Secretary's inner circle. And the 
day after I left, I was hired by people who had interests before the 
Department. There was no prohibition for that at that time. So I went 
to the Department of Transportation and to my old friends with whom I 
had been working very closely for that period of time. I discovered 
very quickly that the fact that I no longer was at the Secretary's ear, 
the fact that I no longer had any position of influence in the 
Department made me a whole lot less welcome in their offices than I had 
been the week before. They were happy to see me. They were polite. But 
they had other things to do. And they were happy to get me out of their 
offices and out of their hair as quickly as they could.
  Did I have an advantage? Yes, I had the advantage of knowing the 
Department well enough to know where to go and not waste my time. Did I 
have any additional clout to get these people to do something that 
would not have been in the public interest by virtue of the fact that I 
had been there and worked with them and knew them? Not at all. These 
were legitimate public servants who were not about to do something 
improper just because a friend who had worked with them asked them to 
do it. Of course, I was not about to ask them to do anything improper 
because that would be a violation of my responsibility to my clients. 
But I learned quickly that this idea of the revolving door is vastly 
overrated and overstated by some of our friends in the media.
  I suppose we will pass the Feingold amendment. I don't suppose it 
will make any difference. But the idea that a former Member sitting in 
a board room talking to other people who are engaged in lobbying 
activity and saying to them: Don't talk to Senator so-and-so, talk to 
Senator so-and-so because the second Senator so-and-so is the one who 
really understands this issue. Don't waste your time with the first 
one. I know him well enough to know that he really won't get your 
argument--to criminalize that kind of a statement made in a law firm or 
a lobbying firm, to me, is going much too far. But we will probably 
pass it. We will go forward. We will see if it survives the scrutiny 
that it will get in conference and in conversations with the House.
  I, once again, say that we are doing a lot of things that are in 
response to the media and in response to special interest groups that 
call themselves public interest groups but raise money and pay salaries 
just as thoroughly as the special interest groups. And they have to 
have something to do to keep their members happy. They have to have 
something to do to keep those dues coming in, those contributions 
coming in. So they scare them that a U.S. Senator, who leaves and goes 
to a law firm, cannot be in the room when anybody in that law firm is 
talking about exercising their constitutional right to petition the 
Government for redress of their grievances because, if the Senator is 
in that room for a 2-year period, he is somehow corrupting the entire 
process. I think that is silly.
  Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I would just say, in response to my 
friend from Utah, that I don't doubt for a minute that what he has said 
is true. But to generalize from his experience I don't think makes 
sense. Our former colleagues are making millions of dollars trading on 
their experience. I don't think these lobbying firms are throwing away 
their money for nothing. And I know the public doesn't believe that, 
which is a very good reason to adopt this amendment. It is not silly; 
it is the right thing to do.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. REID. I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant journal clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. REID. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

                          ____________________