[Congressional Record Volume 153, Number 10 (Thursday, January 18, 2007)]
[Senate]
[Pages S722-S723]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                                  IRAQ

  Mr. OBAMA. Mr. President, I would like to speak briefly on what is a 
roiling debate not only in the Senate but across the country and that 
is the President's policy with respect to Iraq. There are countless 
reasons the American people have lost confidence in the President's 
Iraq policy, but chief among them has been the administration's 
insistence on making promises and assurances about progress and victory 
that do not appear to be grounded in the reality of the facts. We have 
been told we would be greeted as liberators. We have been promised the 
insurgency was in its last throes. We have been assured again and again 
that we are making progress and that the Iraqis would soon stand up so 
we could stand down and our brave sons and daughters could start coming 
home. We have been asked to wait, we have been asked to be patient, and 
we have been asked to give the President and the new Iraqi Government 6 
more months and then 6 more months after that and then 6 more months 
after that.
  Now, after the loss of more than 3,000 American lives, after spending 
almost $400 billion after Iraq has descended into civil war, we have 
been promised, once again, that the President's plan to escalate the 
war in Iraq will, this time, be well planned, well coordinated, and 
well supported by the Iraqi Government. This time, we didn't have to 
wait to find out that none of this seems to be the case. Already, 
American military officials have told the New York Times that there is 
no clear chain of command between Iraqis and U.S. commanders and no 
real indication that the Iraqis even want such a partnership. 
Yesterday, Prime Minister al-Maliki, the person whom the President said 
had brought this plan to us, the man who is supposed to be our partner 
in chief for this new plan, told foreign journalists that if the United 
States would only give his Army better weapons and equipment, our 
soldiers could go home.
  The President's decision to move forward with this escalation anyway, 
despite all evidence and military advice to the contrary, is the 
terrible consequence of the decision to give him the broad, open-ended 
authority to wage this war back in 2002. Over 4 years later, we can't 
revisit that decision or reverse some of the tragic outcomes, but what 
we can do is make sure we provide the kind of oversight and constraints 
on the President this time that we failed to do the last time.
  I cannot in good conscience support this escalation. It is a policy 
which has already been tried and a policy which has failed. Just this 
morning, I had veterans of the Iraq war visit my office to explain to 
me that this surge concept is, in fact, no different from what we have 
repeatedly tried, but with 20,000 troops we will not in any imaginable 
way be able to accomplish any new progress.
  The fact is that we have tried this road before. In the end, no 
amount of American forces can solve the political differences that lie 
at the heart of somebody else's civil war. As the President's own 
military commanders have said, escalation only prevents the Iraqis from 
taking more responsibility for their own future. It is even eroding our 
efforts in the wider war on terror as some of the extra soldiers will 
come directly from Afghanistan where the Taliban has become resurgent.
  The President has offered no evidence that more U.S. troops will be 
able to pressure Shias, Sunnis, and Kurds toward the necessary 
political settlement, and he has attached no consequences to his plan 
should the Iraqis fail to make progress. In fact, just last week, when 
I repeatedly asked Secretary Rice what would happen if the Iraqi 
Government failed to meet the benchmarks the President has called for 
and says are an integral part of their rationale for escalation, she 
couldn't give me an answer. When I asked her if there were any 
circumstances whatsoever in which we would tell the Iraqis that their 
failure to make progress means the end of our military commitment, she 
could not give me an answer. This is simply not good enough. When you 
ask how many more months and how many more dollars and how many more 
lives it will take to end the policy that everyone now knows has not 
succeeded, ``I don't know'' isn't good enough.
  Over the past 4 years, we have given this administration every chance 
to get this right, and they have disappointed us many times. But 
ultimately it is our brave men and women in uniform and their families 
who bear the greatest burden for these mistakes. They have performed in 
an exemplary fashion. At no stage have they faltered in the mission 
that has been presented to them.
  Unfortunately, the strategy, the tactics, and the mission itself have 
been flawed. That is why Congress now has the duty to prevent even more 
mistakes and bring this war to a responsible end. That is why I plan to 
introduce legislation which I believe will stop the escalation of this 
war by placing a cap on the number of soldiers in Iraq. I wish to 
emphasize that I am not unique in taking this approach. I know Senator 
Dodd has crafted similar legislation. Senator Clinton, I believe, 
yesterday indicated she shared similar views. The cap would not affect 
the

[[Page S723]]

money spent on the war or on our troops, but it would write into law 
that the number of U.S. forces in Iraq should not exceed the number 
that were there on January 10, 2007, the day the President announced 
his escalation policy.
  This measure would stop the escalation of the war in Iraq, but it is 
my belief that simply opposing the surge is not good enough. If we 
truly believe the only solution in Iraq is a political one--and I 
fervently believe that--if we believe a phased redeployment of U.S. 
forces in Iraq is the best--perhaps only--leverage we have to force a 
settlement between the country's warring factions, then we should act 
on that. That is why the second part of my legislation is a plan for 
phased redeployment that I called for in a speech in Chicago 2 months 
ago. It is a responsible plan that protects American troops without 
causing Iraq to suddenly descend into chaos. The President must 
announce to the Iraqi people that, within 2 to 4 months, under this 
plan, U.S. policy will include a gradual and substantial reduction in 
U.S. forces. The President should then work with our military 
commanders to map out the best plan for such a redeployment and 
determine precise levels and dates.
  Drawing down our troops in Iraq will put pressure on Iraqis to arrive 
at the political settlement that is needed and allow us to redeploy 
additional troops in Afghanistan and elsewhere in the region, as well 
as bring some back home. The forces redeployed elsewhere in the region 
could then help to prevent the conflict in Iraq from becoming a wider 
war, something that every international observer is beginning to worry 
about. It will also reassure our allies in the gulf. It will allow our 
troops to strike directly at al-Qaida wherever it may exist and 
demonstrate to international terrorist organizations that they have not 
driven us from the region.
  My plan would couple this phased redeployment with an enhanced effort 
to train Iraqi security forces and would expand the number of our 
personnel--especially special forces--who are deployed with Iraqis as 
unit advisers and would finally link continued economic aid in Iraq 
with the existence of tangible progress toward reducing sectarian 
violence and reaching a political settlement.
  One final aspect of this plan that I believe is critical is it would 
call for the engagement by the United States of a regional conference 
with other countries that are involved in the Middle East--particularly 
our allies but including Syria and Iran--to find a solution to the war 
in Iraq. We have to realize that neither Iran nor Syria wants to see 
the security vacuum in Iraq filled with chaos, terrorism, refugees, and 
violence, as it could have a destabilizing effect throughout the entire 
region and within their own countries. So as odious as the behavior of 
those regimes may be at times, it is important that we include them in 
a broader conversation about how we can stabilize Iraq.

  In closing, let me say this: I have been a consistent and strong 
opponent of this war. I have also tried to act responsibly in that 
opposition to ensure that, having made the decision to go into Iraq, we 
provide our troops, who perform valiantly, the support they need to 
complete their mission. I have also stated publicly that I think we 
have both strategic interests and humanitarian responsibilities in 
ensuring that Iraqi is as stable as possible under the circumstances.
  Finally, I said publicly that it is my preference not to micromanage 
the Commander in Chief in the prosecution of war. Ultimately, I do not 
believe that is the ideal role for Congress to play. But at a certain 
point, we have to draw a line. At a certain point, the American people 
have to have some confidence that we are not simply going down this 
blind alley in perpetuity.
  When it comes to the war in Iraq, the time for promises and 
assurances, for waiting and patience is over. Too many lives have been 
lost and too many billions have been spent for us to trust the 
President on another tried-and-failed policy, opposed by generals and 
experts, opposed by Democrats and Republicans, opposed by Americans and 
even the Iraqis themselves. It is time to change our policy. It is time 
to give Iraqis their country back, and it is time to refocus America's 
effort on the wider struggle against terror yet to be won.
  Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. WYDEN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. WYDEN. I ask unanimous consent to speak as if in morning business 
for up to 15 minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

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