[Congressional Record Volume 153, Number 6 (Thursday, January 11, 2007)]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Pages E71-E72]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




      IMPLEMENTING THE 9/11 COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS ACT OF 2007

                                 ______
                                 

                               speech of

                           HON. JOHN L. MICA

                               of florida

                    in the house of representatives

                        Tuesday, January 9, 2007

  Mr. MICA. Madam Speaker, I rise today to bring to Members' attention 
a number of concerns have with the aviation security, emergency 
preparedness, and port security provisions contained in H.R. 1, the 
``Implementing the 9/11 Commission Recommendations Act of 2007.''


                      AVIATION SECURITY PROVISIONS

  Almost all of the aviation security provisions in H.R. 1 address 
requirements previously authorized or mandated by the Republicans in 
the years since September 11th.
  H.R. 1 sets up an unrealistic Cargo Inspection Program that will be 
impossible to implement without bringing commerce to a halt and diverts 
limited funding and attention from higher security threats. Even more, 
Congress already addressed this recommendation in the Intelligence 
Reform and Terrorist Prevention Act of 2004; provided $200M each year 
2005-2007 to improve cargo security and $100M each year 2005-2007 for 
research and development.
  H.R. 1 will require inspection or a physical search of each piece of 
cargo and will therefore bring commerce to a grinding halt.
  H.R. 1 ignores risk assessments to date that cargo is not a high 
threat area. Rather, passenger and baggage screening has been and 
should continue to be the first priority. Yet, passenger security 
checkpoints are still using 1950's technology with little explosive 
detection capability. Currently, only 28 out of 441 commercial airports 
have full or partial in-line EDS. Of the largest 29 airports that 
handle 75% of all passengers, only 9 have full in-line EDS systems.
  Additionally, even though it is NOT a 9/11 Commission Recommendation, 
H.R. 1 gives TSA employees collective bargaining which will keep in 
place a flawed system and negatively impact the introduction of much 
needed screening technology.
  Only thing worse than government bureaucracy is entrenched government 
bureaucracy. Yet that is exactly what H.R. 1 is seeking to create. In 
fact, H.R. 1 ignores and reverses Congressional direction in the 
Aviation and Transportation Security Act that a flexible personnel 
management system is essential to TSA's critical national security 
role. H.R. 1 also ignores and reverses TSA's January 2003 determination 
that, ``. . . individuals carrying out the security screening function 
. . ., in light of their critical national security responsibilities, 
shall not, . . . be entitled to engage in collective bargaining. . . 
.''
  H.R. 1 will be costly and will keep in place a flawed, security 
system and deny the opportunity to put in place much needed screening 
technology. Europeans learned the hard way and moved from a government-
run airport security system to a private system with government 
oversight. It looks like we are not learning from their efforts.

  Finally, H.R. 1 does not address many important aviation security 
issues such as: Ensuring biometrics operations in identification and 
access control; deploying high technology solutions; improving pilots' 
licenses; setting a term for TSA Deputy Secretary position. We have had 
4 different people in charge in the 5 years since the agency was 
created (Magaw, Loy, Stone and Hawley)--not counting when the post was 
unfilled. For instance, in 2001, the Democrat-lead Senate adjourned for 
the year without taking action to fill this post--the President had to 
make a recess appointment on January 7th, 2002.


                    EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT PROVISIONS

  The Post Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act and past 
appropriations bills already address most of the 9/11 Commission's 
first responder recommendations. Republicans already implemented 
comprehensive emergency management reform. Normal procedure and a 
committee markup would have allowed Congress to address the few 
inconsistencies with the Post Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act 
enacted by the last Congress.
  H.R. 1 makes only minor emergency management reforms. Republicans 
enacted comprehensive emergency management reform last year in the Post 
Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act addressing interoperable 
communications, emergency preparedness standards and FEMA reform. H.R. 
1 authorizes another grant program for communications equipment, 
providing for ``such sums as necessary.'' This is just an 
authorization, not real money. In contrast, the Republicans passed a 
law that will allocate a portion of the digital spectrum sale to 
interoperable communications grants. This is real money, and will be a 
billion dollars.
  H.R. 1 is a first step toward the Federal Government placing unfunded 
mandates for preparedness on private businesses. It is important for 
individuals and businesses to be prepared for disasters, but H.R. 1 
includes a provision that is a first step toward the Federal government 
placing unfunded mandates for preparedness on private businesses. It 
goes well beyond any Congressionally-mandated role and inserts the 
Federal Government into state and local affairs.


                        PORT SECURITY PROVISIONS

  Well before the 9/11 Commission's report in 2004, Congress recognized 
the potential for a maritime-based terrorist attack. In 2002, Congress 
adopted the Maritime Transportation Security Act which established a 
framework of comprehensive port and vessel security. Congress expanded 
the Act in 2004 and adopted the SAFE Port Act last year. The SAFE Port 
Act established a cargo scanning pilot program. That program will start 
scanning containers bound for the United States in at least 5 foreign 
ports later this year.

  So, I am surprised to see the proposal to mandate 100 percent 
screening on the floor today. That is NOT the recommendation of the 9/
11 Commission. The Commission recommends that the government ``identify 
and evaluate the transportation assets that need to be protected, set 
risk-based priorities for defending them, select the most practical and 
cost-effective ways of doing so, and then develop a plan, budget, and 
funding to implement the effort.'' That isn't what this provision does.
  While the proposal before us today would allow the existing pilot 
program to continue, it

[[Page E72]]

would also require each and every cargo container to be screened in 
each and every foreign port not later than 5 years, and as soon as 3 
years from enactment. This requirement would come into effect 
regardless of the results of the pilot program and, perhaps, regardless 
of the availability of any sufficient screening system.
  When this proposal was first made last year, it was opposed by the 
Administration, the maritime transportation industries, and such voices 
as the Washington Post's editorial page. Instead of enacting any 
blanket requirements on the maritime transportation sector without any 
technologies capable of achieving the standards, Congress rightly 
required the Department of Homeland Security to test the capabilities 
of available scanning technologies.
  My friends on the other side of the aisle are justifying their 
proposal by saying that 100 percent scanning systems are in place at 
two ports overseas. It is not. In these ports, some--but not all--
containers are scanned, and none of the scans are analyzed to determine 
that the container is or is not a risk.
  No system currently in place in any port worldwide is capable of 
scanning and reviewing 100 percent of containers that are bound for the 
United States. What will we do in 3 years if there are no scanning 
technologies available without creating massive backups and delays in 
international maritime commerce? Let's complete the pilot program and 
not establish mandatory requirements that we may not be able to meet.
  Congress has acted to make America's maritime commerce is safer than 
before 9/11. It is unfortunate that this bill has been brought to the 
House Floor with the intention of convincing the American people that 
until now Congress has simply let the 9/11 Commission's recommendations 
languish. Nothing could be further from the truth.

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