[Congressional Record Volume 153, Number 5 (Wednesday, January 10, 2007)]
[Senate]
[Pages S352-S354]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
CREATION OF A U.S. AFRICA COMMAND
Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, as the Defense Department continues its
planning for the creation of an Africa Command, it is important to
realize that the creation of a new regional combatant command focused
exclusively on Africa will have a profound impact on our country's
presence, policies, and engagement in what is becoming one of the most
critical regions of the world. New bases, new personnel, new missions,
new efforts, and new relationships will be created, and our potential
to have a positive impact throughout the continent will be enhanced
greatly.
We have to be strategic and forward-thinking as we create this new
organization, though. Because we are making such a profound change to
our posture on the continent, we need to ensure that the new
organization will contribute to, not define, the U.S. Government's
overall strategy and objectives for the continent. We also need to make
sure that the U.S. military's activities and involvement on the
continent do not overshadow, skew, or otherwise hinder our Government's
other key objectives.
It is clear that challenges in Africa are diverse and complex. We
have a number of security-related concerns there, ranging from
terrorist organizations and safe havens to large-scale corruption,
regional conflicts, and the disruption of global energy markets.
Continuing to establishing firm and productive military-to-military
relations with a number of African nations is also critical.
But we have learned that the way to address the underlying causes of
the security challenges throughout the continent is not generally
through military power. In fact, the best way to address the full range
of security-related concerns in Africa is to focus on the underlying
conditions that plague governments and societies throughout the
continent. Security threats and instability stem from corruption,
absence of human rights, poverty, disease, lagging economies, and
joblessness. Weak governments are incapable of addressing the dynamics
that often contribute to lawlessness or violence, and are often left
without any capacity to help defeat trans-national threats.
Our focus as a government, therefore, must be on strengthening
African governance capacities and legitimacy, as well as the commitment
to the rule of law, sound democratic mechanisms, and human rights. We
must continue to help alleviate the humanitarian suffering that exists
throughout the continent, and we must work hard to assist African
countries develop sound democratic institutions that are credible and
capable, and that have the technical capacity to provide for their
people and to govern fairly. Only then will we start to see real
returns--real, long-term returns--for our national security.
This isn't to suggest that continued military involvement throughout
the continent isn't essential. It is. But only if it is a component of
a broader strategy to address these underlying causes of instability.
U.S. military activities throughout Africa must help support a larger
framework that seeks to strengthen African governments and balance the
need for good governance and security capacity. Our security assistance
to African nations, and more broadly, the work of the U.S. military
throughout Africa, must not interfere with, create an imbalance in, or
skew the necessary political, economic, and social work that must be
done if we are going to see any long-term improvement in areas of
critical concern.
Accordingly, establishing a new combatant command for Africa presents
an opportunity to strengthen our national security focus in Africa, but
it also presents an opportunity to create a military command with the
primary mission of supporting diplomatic, development, humanitarian
assistance, and regional initiatives led by the Department of State,
USAID, and other agencies. This command, if designed right, will be
able to serve as a contributor to broader U.S. Government efforts
throughout the continent, and will help provide an additional platform
for regional thinking, strategizing, and activity that will advance the
strategic interests of our country throughout Africa.
To be effective, of course, this command will take careful planning.
It will also take a considerable amount of planning on the part of the
Department of State, USAID, and other departments and agencies that
will have to adjust to this new organization. It will take intensive
coordination and adjustments throughout the civilian interagency and it
will be crucial that State, USAID, and other departments and agencies
are playing a full role in the creation of this command.
The mission of this command will need to be relatively broad. Africa
Command should establish strong security-oriented relationships with
our partner nations throughout Africa. These relationships should be
coordinated with our embassies and with Washington, but should only be
part of our broader efforts with any given country. The command's
efforts should be balanced and should take into consideration the scale
and scope of diplomatic, development, humanitarian, and human rights
efforts in each country.
The command should also prepare to deal with international
organizations--particularly the African Union and subregional
organizations that often play leading roles in regional and continental
peacekeeping efforts, conflict mitigation activities, and humanitarian
response. Establishing a strong relationship with the AU and other
organizations will be essential to unlocking the potential for Africans
to address security challenges throughout their continent.
The command should also prepare to conduct missions that have often
taken a backseat to higher profile or less military-focused efforts.
Humanitarian assistance--often one of the best ways to win hearts and
minds in the immediate aftermath of a natural disaster or conflict--
will need to be at the top of the command's list of priorities. So too
should efforts to help rebuild societies after conflict. This might
take the form of logistical assistance for humanitarian or development
personnel, or potentially a direct role for U.S. military personnel,
when appropriate. Other critical components of the new command's
mission should include anticorruption efforts, leadership training,
strengthening civilian oversight of national militaries, preventing the
spread of HIV/AIDS, demobilizing or reintegrating ex-combatants, and
being on standby for rapid response to new conflicts or challenges.
The Department of Defense does a lot of this already. Many of these
missions have been carried out by dedicated men and women in uniform
who are stationed in places like Nigeria, Uganda, or at the Combined
Joint Task Force--Horn of Africa. The challenge, though, is to
establish a command that places these initiatives on its priority list,
and to ensure that these efforts are resourced appropriately, are
coordinated with the appropriate departments and agencies, and that
they do not distort or disrupt other key initiatives throughout the
continent.
With this new mission and these challenges in mind, I would like to
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raise a series of issues that I believe to be important as our
government begins developing this new command.
First, as the Department of Defense plans for the creation of an
Africa Command, it is essential that it think outside of the
traditional model of the regional combatant command. While this new
command will help us defeat terrorist networks that operate, recruit,
stage, or otherwise seek haven throughout the continent of Africa, this
new command should not have combat as its primary mission. It should
have as its core mission the task of supporting bilateral, regional,
and continental diplomatic and development efforts. It also should be
focused on bolstering State, USAID, and other government activities--
providing resources, information, and logistical support for programs
that have often been slowed or stopped because of the very absence of
these things.
Second, the creation of an Africa Command and the design of its
mission, objectives, and capacity, must be done in concert with the
Department of State, the U.S. Agency for International Development, and
other departments and agencies that are active in Africa. This new
organization--the first regional command to be focused exclusively on
Africa--will obviously be military in nature, but it must cast a new
mold for regional combatant commands that incorporates interagency
interests and responsibilities from the outset, as well as personnel
from throughout the government that can help advance the mission of the
U.S. Government in Africa. The Department of State and USAID personnel
should be embedded deeply into the command and should play important
leadership roles in the various components of this command. Formal
coordination mechanisms, too, must be established between the new
command, our embassies, Washington, and other pertinent regional and
functional commands around the world.
Given its potential impact throughout the continent, we should make
every effort to ensure that the command represents a unified U.S.
Government effort, and that in the early planning phases of this
command that civilian interagency requirements are absorbed and
incorporated into the final organization.
Third, and more specifically, the planning process for the creation
of an Africa Command must be met with parallel--and equally
aggressive--discussions within the Department of State. The Department
of State must realize that an Africa Command will have a significant
impact on how it does its business and how it coordinates and
collaborates with the Defense Department. It should begin planning for
internal bureaucratic changes, as well as posture changes throughout
the continent, to account for the fact that the Defense Department's
presence and focus will be regional, while the Department of State's
efforts will remain largely bilateral.
Africa Command will help alleviate many coordinate challenges between
departments that have existed to date. But it won't change the fact
that the State Department still focuses on bilateral relationships and
often has trouble organizing, coordinating, or planning for regional
initiatives or programs. Closer State-DOD relations will come about as
a result of the creation of Africa Command if and when the State
Department begins addressing how it can better organize itself to
address regional conflicts, transnational counterterrorism efforts,
humanitarian emergencies that spill over borders, and ungoverned
spaces.
We must also recognize the resource disparity between the Defense
Department and the Department of State. This will most likely be an
important issue as this new command is created. But short of
dramatically increasing the State Department's budget in the next few
years to account for an additional and needed focus on Africa, it will
be essential that the State Department maintain a leadership role
throughout this entire process, and that it adjusts itself to better
manage and coordinate all U.S. government efforts throughout the
continent. The State Department should apply its best Africa and
political-military minds to DOD's efforts to create this new command,
and it should view its role as both client and patron, knowing well
that the creation of this new command will require new leadership
efforts within the State Department.
Fourth, it is crucial that the Defense Department and the State
Department move faster to establish joint planning mechanisms--both
strategic and financial. It has become widely known that Defense and
State planning mechanisms are not in sync, and that both organizations
plan, or don't plan, for events, missions, and strategic objectives
differently. This needs to be addressed immediately. The creation of
Africa Command will give both departments an opportunity to begin
syncing planning capabilities, and may open the window to truly
interagency budgeting and strategic planning processes that will align
all U.S. Government resources to address challenges in places like
Africa.
This may sound bureaucratic, but it has real implications on how we
position our government to address the wide-ranging challenges
throughout Africa, and indeed throughout the rest of the world. The
State Department develops bilateral strategic plans and generates
resource requirements largely based on bilateral, and sometimes
multilateral efforts. The Defense Department views things more
regionally, establishing regional commands and task forces that can
evaluate, strategize, and implement programs based on the needs or
challenges unique to a given region--challenges that often transcend
national borders or programming allocations. Neither department's
strategic planning process is perfect, but I would urge both
Departments--in addition to USAID, the Department of Treasury, Justice,
Agriculture, as well as others--to begin evaluating how the strategic
planning process can incorporate departmental or agency-specific
activities and efforts into comprehensive U.S. Government strategies
for the continent, subregions, and partner nations. Creating combined
planning processes would also benefit lawmakers that are constantly
seeking better coordination and a higher return on taxpayer
investments.
Fifth, and in a related vein, the President should make absolutely
clear that ambassadors--chiefs of mission in any given country--are his
representatives and must be accountable and responsible for all actions
taken on behalf of the U.S. Government in any given country. It is
essential that ambassadors have the ultimate say of what happens in
country, and that he or she has the ability to ``turn off'' any
programs, initiatives, or efforts that may adversely affect our
government's broader goals in or relationship with a given country.
That said, the Department of State may want to consider creating a new
position for Africa that can help liaise--at a sufficiently senior
level--with the senior Africa Command commander on daily issues. This
position would be more than a political advisor. This person would
ideally have the ability to make decisions at the traditional three- or
four-star level, and provide a substantive and management-oriented
perspective on State and DOD efforts throughout the continent. This
person would ideally not be based in Washington, and might benefit from
serving side-by-side with the new combatant commander.
The Department of State--both in Washington and at our embassies--
must step up and play a stronger leadership role. I would imagine that
DOD would welcome this. In many countries in Africa the Defense
Department represents the bulk of U.S. efforts or presence. Our
security assistance programs are wide-ranging and often overshadow
development, economic, or political assistance to fragile and poor
countries. This is not to suggest that the creation of a new command
for Africa is bad. It is not. I authored a successful piece of
legislation last year that required the Defense Department to do a
complete feasibility study on this very issue. I believe that it will
enhance our ability to do important work throughout Africa, and that it
will have a positive impact on our national security. But it is
essential that as we increase our efforts to strengthen the security
capabilities of our partners in Africa, we do not undermine critical
human rights and that we work to strengthen democratic institutions.
The State Department must prepare to exert its authority and influence
on the new command's activities and ensure that future U.S. Government
efforts in Africa are balanced and take into consideration the larger
strategic efforts in any
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given country, region, and throughout the continent.
Finally, the Congress needs to be prepared to support this new
effort. It will be essential that Congress take into account the needs
of the Defense Department and the individual uniformed services as this
new command is created. But it is equally essential that Congress take
into account the needs of the State Department, USAID, and other
agencies that are trying to ramp up their efforts throughout the
continent. If anything, the creation of a new combatant command for
Africa should signal the dramatically increasing importance of Africa
to our national security, and that to truly address the range of
challenges present there we need to look at an equally aggressive plan
to strengthen our diplomatic, development, humanitarian, and human
rights work throughout the continent. This may include addressing how
the Congress allocates funds--both to this new command and to the other
departments and agencies that will make the spirit and intent of this
command work.
In closing, we must focus greater resources on Africa but we should
ensure that our efforts in Africa do not become primarily military in
nature, and that the State Department continues to play the primary
leadership role with respect to our efforts on the continent. Those
within the Defense Department, the State Department, at USAID and other
key departments and agencies will need to use this as an opportunity to
evaluate and enhance the way they do business. The success of this
governmental effort requires it, and our national security depends on
it.
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