[Congressional Record Volume 153, Number 5 (Wednesday, January 10, 2007)]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Pages E62-E63]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




      IMPLEMENTING THE 9/11 COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS ACT OF 2007

                                 ______
                                 

                               speech of

                         HON. ANTHONY D. WEINER

                              of new york

                    in the house of representatives

                        Tuesday, January 9, 2007

  Mr. WEINER. Madam Speaker, I rise today to call upon my colleagues to 
address the very real threat to the security of rail passengers in 
America. I am a supporter of the 9/11 Commission Bill and commend the 
Speaker and Chairman Thompson for their leadership in at long last 
implementing the basic reforms directed by the 9/11 Commission.
  But the 9/11 Commission's recommendations were but a first step. 
Since the Commission completed its work, the evolution of terrorism has 
continued in countries around our planet, and we cannot turn a blind 
eye to the vulnerabilities that we face in this Nation--particularly 
those vulnerabilities that are being routinely targeted by terrorists 
in other parts of the world. Most notably, as demonstrated by the 
bombings in Madrid in 2004, London in 2005, and Mumbai in 2006--the 
passenger rail and transit system in this country is a high-risk target 
and we must address this critical security need immediately.
  We rightfully have devoted extensive efforts towards securing 
aviation, but now it is time to devote significant resources towards 
one of this country's most vital economic assets.
  Each weekday, there are 11.3 million passengers using some form of 
rail and mass transit. That's more than 5 times as many people taking 
air passenger trips. At New York's Penn Station alone--there are over 
half a million people passing through; that is more passengers than at 
our two busiest air hubs--Chicago and Atlanta--combined. And yet, on 
average, we have spent $9 per air passenger compared to 1 penny per 
rail and mass transit passenger.
  The Secretary of Homeland Security often states that it is the 
management of risk and not the elimination of risk that is the core 
principle for DHS--and the management of risk requires the 
prioritization of risk based on three key components: threat, 
vulnerability, and consequence.
  Passenger rail facilities have a high passenger density, which 
creates the potential for a spectacular attack that is intended to 
instill fear--we know this is what our enemies look for when planning 
attacks. We know that they have already mounted vicious attacks in 
Madrid, London, and Mumbai over the last 3 years, and even before 9/
11--in Paris and Tokyo. This threat is real, it is serious, and it is 
not going away.
  We also know that if anything were to happen to disrupt our passenger 
rail system, the economic consequences and impacts on our way of life 
would be devastating.
  Finally, we know that most of our major passenger rail facilities are 
old, in some cases falling apart, lack modern security enhancements 
built into the station design, and would be unable to recover quickly 
from even a minor attack. They have not been retrofitted, reinforced, 
or rebuilt in ways consistent with today's threat environment.
  Thus, our passenger rail system is clearly at a high risk based on 
all three components--threat, vulnerability, and consequence. And this 
risk must be managed better.
  Now some people argue that because the rail system in our country is 
open and dynamic and therefore impossible to secure like other parts of 
the transportation system, that we should not spend a lot of money 
trying--that it becomes a ``slippery slope.'' To the contrary, to do 
nothing in the face of such demonstrated high risk is irresponsible.
  Rail and transit authorities have made efforts to improve security. 
However, authorities are having a difficult time identifying resources 
that can be used for capital improvements. In fact, between 2001 and 
2003 over $1.7 billion was spent on security efforts for rail and 
transit by state and local authorities, but 75 percent was used just 
for overtime and other labor-intensive security operating expenses. 
While these measures are a key part of securing open facilities like 
rail stations, their costs leave very little money for the much needed 
capital investments in security.
  The American Public Transportation Association estimated that it cost 
State and local transportation authorities nearly $1 million a day 
during the 36 days of high alert status after the July 2005 London 
bombings--and this number does not even include the costs incurred in 
the additional efforts of New York and New Jersey's random searches.
  No matter what we may have planned, the fact is that we will end up 
devoting tremendous resources should there be a rail attack. I would 
rather see us be strategic in our investments than be reactive every 
time a new threat is evident. Targeted investments in capital security 
enhancements at our most critical, high-risk locations will serve us 
during normal and heightened alerts and can possibly reduce our 
operating costs by leveraging the capability of people on the scene.
  The Federal Government does not have to do this alone. We constantly 
hear about the importance of public-private partnerships, yet we have 
few positive examples to point at. The rail system has the opportunity 
to leverage the investments of private developers who seek to benefit 
from transit-oriented development. As we address capital security 
investments in passenger rail facilities, Congress should acknowledge 
and even encourage these public-private partnerships by providing a way 
for private developers to be guaranteed that the Federal Government's 
commitment to long-term projects is real. The current homeland security 
annual grant cycle is a road block for these larger projects, and it is 
critical to our Nation's security and fiscal well-being that we take 
advantage of such investment opportunities as they arise.
  From 9/11 through 2005 we have spent approximately $20 billion on 
aviation security, but only $500 million on rail and transit security. 
We can and must do better than this. I call on my colleagues to join me 
in this Congress to address the critical issue of capital investments 
in our rail passenger security.
  After Madrid and London, we can have no more excuses.

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