[Congressional Record Volume 153, Number 4 (Tuesday, January 9, 2007)]
[House]
[Pages H132-H198]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




      IMPLEMENTING THE 9/11 COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS ACT OF 2007

  Mr. THOMPSON of Mississippi. Madam Speaker, pursuant to House 
Resolution 6, and as the designee of the majority leader, I call up the 
bill (H.R. 1) to provide for the implementation of the recommendations 
of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 
and ask for its immediate consideration.
  The Clerk read the title of the bill.
  The text of the bill is as follows:

                                 H.R. 1

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

       This Act may be cited as the ``Implementing the 9/11 
     Commission Recommendations Act of 2007''.

     SEC. 2. TABLE OF CONTENTS.

       The table of contents for this Act is as follows:

Sec. 1. Short title.
Sec. 2. Table of contents.

       TITLE I--RISK-BASED ALLOCATION OF HOMELAND SECURITY GRANTS

Sec. 101. First responders homeland security funding.

TITLE II--ENSURING COMMUNICATIONS INTEROPERABILITY FOR FIRST RESPONDERS

Sec. 201. Improve Communications for Emergency Response Grant Program.

   TITLE III--STRENGTHENING USE OF A UNIFIED INCIDENT COMMAND DURING 
                              EMERGENCIES

Sec. 301. National exercise program design.
Sec. 302. National exercise program model exercises.
Sec. 303. Responsibilities of Regional Administrators of the Federal 
              Emergency Management Agency.

               TITLE IV--STRENGTHENING AVIATION SECURITY

Sec. 401. Installation of in-line baggage screening equipment.
Sec. 402. Aviation security capital fund.
Sec. 403. Airport checkpoint screening explosive detection.
Sec. 404. Strengthening explosive detection at airport screening 
              checkpoints.
Sec. 405. Extension of authorization of aviation security funding.
Sec. 406. Inspection of cargo carried aboard passenger aircraft.
Sec. 407. Appeal and redress process for passengers wrongly delayed or 
              prohibited from boarding a flight.
Sec. 408. Transportation Security Administration personnel management.
Sec. 409. Strategic plan to test and implement advanced passenger 
              prescreening system.

        TITLE V--STRENGTHENING THE SECURITY OF CARGO CONTAINERS

Sec. 501. Requirements relating to entry of containers into the United 
              States.

      TITLE VI--STRENGTHENING EFFORTS TO PREVENT TERRORIST TRAVEL

    Subtitle A--Human Smuggling and Trafficking Center Improvements

Sec. 601. Strengthening the capabilities of the Human Smuggling and 
              Trafficking Center.

  Subtitle B--International Collaboration to Prevent Terrorist Travel

Sec. 611. Report on international collaboration to increase border 
              security, enhance global document security, and exchange 
              terrorist information.

           Subtitle C--Biometric Border Entry and Exit System

Sec. 621. Submittal of plan on biometric entry and exit verification 
              system implementation.

 TITLE VII--IMPROVING INTELLIGENCE AND INFORMATION SHARING WITH LOCAL 
                  LAW ENFORCEMENT AND FIRST RESPONDERS

 Subtitle A--Fusion and Law Enforcement Education and Teaming (FLEET) 
                             Grant Program

Sec. 701. Findings.
Sec. 702. FLEET Grant program.

         Subtitle B--Border Intelligence Fusion Center Program

Sec. 711. Findings.
Sec. 712. Establishment of Border Intelligence Fusion Center Program.

     Subtitle C--Homeland Security Information Sharing Enhancement

Sec. 721. Short title.
Sec. 722. Homeland Security Advisory System.
Sec. 723. Homeland security information sharing.

     Subtitle D--Homeland Security Information Sharing Partnerships

Sec. 731. Short title.
Sec. 732. State, Local, and Regional Information Fusion Center 
              Initiative.
Sec. 733. Homeland Security Information Sharing Fellows Program.

   Subtitle E--Homeland Security Intelligence Offices Reorganization

Sec. 741. Departmental reorganization.
Sec. 742. Intelligence components of Department of Homeland Security.
Sec. 743. Office of Infrastructure Protection.

 TITLE VIII--PROTECTING PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES WHILE EFFECTIVELY 
                           FIGHTING TERRORISM

        Subtitle A--Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Boards

Sec. 801. Short title.
Sec. 802. Findings.
Sec. 803. Making the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board 
              independent.
Sec. 804. Requiring all members of the Privacy and Civil Liberties 
              Oversight Board be confirmed by the Senate.
Sec. 805. Subpoena power for the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight 
              Board.
Sec. 806. Reporting requirements.

         Subtitle B--Enhancement of Privacy Officer Authorities

Sec. 811. Short title.
Sec. 812. Authorities of the privacy officer of the Department of 
              Homeland Security.

          TITLE IX--IMPROVING CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY

Sec. 901. Vulnerability assessment and report on critical 
              infrastructure information.
Sec. 902. National Asset Database and the National At-Risk Database.

   TITLE X--TRANSPORTATION SECURITY PLANNING AND INFORMATION SHARING

Sec. 1001. Strategic transportation security information sharing.
Sec. 1002. Transportation security strategic planning.

                 TITLE XI--PRIVATE SECTOR PREPAREDNESS

Sec. 1101. Participation of private sector organizations in emergency 
              preparedness and response activities.

  TITLE XII--PREVENTING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION PROLIFERATION AND 
                               TERRORISM

Sec. 1201. Findings.
Sec. 1202. Definitions.

 Subtitle A--Repeal and Modification of Limitations on Assistance for 
             Prevention of WMD Proliferation and Terrorism

Sec. 1211. Repeal and modification of limitations on assistance for 
              prevention of weapons of mass destruction proliferation 
              and terrorism.

             Subtitle B--Proliferation Security Initiative

Sec. 1221. Proliferation Security Initiative improvements and 
              authorities.

[[Page H133]]

Sec. 1222. Authority to provide assistance to cooperative countries.

  Subtitle C--Assistance to Accelerate Programs to Prevent Weapons of 
              Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism

Sec. 1231. Findings; statement of policy.
Sec. 1232. Authorization of appropriations for the Department of 
              Defense Cooperative Threat Reduction Program.
Sec. 1233. Authorization of appropriations for the Department of Energy 
              programs to prevent weapons of mass destruction 
              proliferation and terrorism.

Subtitle D--Office of the United States Coordinator for the Prevention 
       of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism

Sec. 1241. Office of the United States Coordinator for the Prevention 
              of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and 
              Terrorism.
Sec. 1242. Request for corresponding Russian coordinator.

Subtitle E--Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction 
                      Proliferation and Terrorism

Sec. 1251. Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction 
              Proliferation and Terrorism.
Sec. 1252. Purposes.
Sec. 1253. Composition.
Sec. 1254. Responsibilities.
Sec. 1255. Powers.
Sec. 1256. Nonapplicability of Federal Advisory Committee Act.
Sec. 1257. Report.
Sec. 1258. Termination.

         TITLE XIII--NUCLEAR BLACK MARKET COUNTER-TERRORISM ACT

Sec. 1301. Short title.
Sec. 1302. Definitions.

      Subtitle A--Sanctions for Transfers of Nuclear Enrichment, 
    Reprocessing, and Weapons Technology, Equipment, and Materials 
                Involving Foreign Persons and Terrorists

Sec. 1311. Authority to impose sanctions on foreign persons.
Sec. 1312. Presidential notification on activities of foreign persons.

   Subtitle B--Further Actions Against Corporations Associated With 
                       Sanctioned Foreign Persons

Sec. 1321. Findings.
Sec. 1322. Campaign by United States Government officials.
Sec. 1323. Coordination.
Sec. 1324. Report.

         Subtitle C--Rollback of Nuclear Proliferation Networks

Sec. 1331. Nonproliferation as a condition of United States assistance.
Sec. 1332. Report on identification of nuclear proliferation network 
              host countries.
Sec. 1333. Suspension of arms sales licenses and deliveries to nuclear 
              proliferation host countries.

        TITLE XIV--9/11 COMMISSION INTERNATIONAL IMPLEMENTATION

Sec. 1401. Short title; table of contents.

Subtitle A--Quality Educational Opportunities in Arab and Predominantly 
                           Muslim Countries.

Sec. 1411. Findings; Policy.
Sec. 1412. International Arab and Muslim Youth Opportunity Fund.
Sec. 1413. Annual report to Congress.
Sec. 1414. Extension of program to provide grants to American-sponsored 
              schools in Arab and predominantly Muslim Countries to 
              provide scholarships.

Subtitle B--Democracy and Development in Arab and Predominantly Muslim 
                               Countries

Sec. 1421. Promoting democracy and development in the Middle East, 
              Central Asia, South Asia, and Southeast Asia.
Sec. 1422. Middle East Foundation.

          Subtitle C--Restoring United States Moral Leadership

Sec. 1431. Advancing United States interests through public diplomacy.
Sec. 1432. Expansion of United States scholarship, exchange, and 
              library programs in Arab and predominantly Muslim 
              countries.
Sec. 1433. United States policy toward detainees.

     Subtitle D--Strategy for the United States Relationship With 
                Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia

Sec. 1441. Afghanistan.
Sec. 1442. Pakistan.
Sec. 1443. Saudi Arabia.

       TITLE I--RISK-BASED ALLOCATION OF HOMELAND SECURITY GRANTS

     SEC. 101. FIRST RESPONDERS HOMELAND SECURITY FUNDING.

       (a) In General.--The Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Public 
     Law 107-296; 6 U.S.C. 361 et seq.) is amended--
       (1) in section 1(b) in the table of contents by striking 
     the items relating to the second title XVIII, as added by 
     section 501(b)(3) of Public Law 109-347, and inserting the 
     following:

             ``TITLE XIX--DOMESTIC NUCLEAR DETECTION OFFICE

``Sec. 1901. Domestic Nuclear Detection Office.
``Sec. 1902. Mission of Office.
``Sec. 1904. Testing authority.
``Sec. 1905. Relationship to other Department entities and Federal 
              agencies.
``Sec. 1906. Contracting and grant making authorities.'';

       (2) by redesignating the second title XVIII, as added by 
     section 501(a) of Public Law 109-347, as title XIX;
       (3) in title XIX (as so redesignated)--
       (A) by redesignating sections 1801 through 1806 as sections 
     1901 through 1906, respectively;
       (B) in section 1904(a) (6 U.S.C. 594(a)), as so 
     redesignated, by striking ``section 1802'' and inserting 
     ``section 1902''; and
       (C) in section 1906 (6 U.S.C. 596), as so redesignated, by 
     striking ``section 1802(a)'' each place it appears and 
     inserting ``section 1902(a)'';
       (4) in section 1(b) in the table of contents by adding at 
     the end the following:

                ``TITLE XX--FUNDING FOR FIRST RESPONDERS

``Sec. 2001. Definitions.
``Sec. 2002. Faster and Smarter Funding for First Responders.
``Sec. 2003. Covered grant eligibility and criteria.
``Sec. 2004. Risk-based evaluation and prioritization.
``Sec. 2005. Use of funds and accountability requirements.'';

       and
       (5) by adding at the end the following:

                ``TITLE XX--FUNDING FOR FIRST RESPONDERS

     ``SEC. 2001. DEFINITIONS.

       ``In this title:
       ``(1) Covered grant.--The term `covered grant' means any 
     grant to which this title applies under section 2002.
       ``(2) Directly eligible tribe.--The term `directly eligible 
     tribe' means any Indian tribe or consortium of Indian tribes 
     that--
       ``(A) meets the criteria for inclusion in the qualified 
     applicant pool for Self-Governance that are set forth in 
     section 402(c) of the Indian Self-Determination and Education 
     Assistance Act (25 U.S.C. 458bb(c));
       ``(B) employs at least 10 full-time personnel in a law 
     enforcement or emergency response agency with the capacity to 
     respond to calls for law enforcement or emergency services; 
     and
       ``(C)(i) is located on, or within 5 miles of, an 
     international border or waterway;
       ``(ii) is located within 5 miles of a facility designated 
     as high-risk critical infrastructure by the Secretary;
       ``(iii) is located within or contiguous to one of the 50 
     largest metropolitan statistical areas in the United States; 
     or
       ``(iv) has more than 1,000 square miles of Indian country, 
     as that term is defined in section 1151 of title 18, United 
     States Code.
       ``(3) Elevations in the threat alert level.--The term 
     `elevations in the threat alert level' means any designation 
     (including those that are less than national in scope) that 
     raises the homeland security threat level to either the 
     highest or second highest threat level under the Homeland 
     Security Advisory System referred to in section 201(d)(7).
       ``(4) First responder.--The term `first responder' shall 
     have the same meaning as the term `emergency response 
     provider'.
       ``(5) Indian tribe.--The term `Indian tribe' means any 
     Indian tribe, band, nation, or other organized group or 
     community, including any Alaskan Native village or regional 
     or village corporation as defined in or established pursuant 
     to the Alaskan Native Claims Settlement Act (43 U.S.C. 1601 
     et seq.), that is recognized as eligible for the special 
     programs and services provided by the United States to 
     Indians because of their status as Indians.
       ``(6) Region.--The term `region' means--
       ``(A) any geographic area consisting of all or parts of 2 
     or more contiguous States that have a combined population of 
     at least 1,650,000 or have an area of not less than 20,000 
     square miles, and that, for purposes of an application for a 
     covered grant, is represented by 1 or more governments or 
     governmental agencies within such geographic area, and that 
     is established by law or by agreement of 2 or more such 
     governments or governmental agencies in a mutual aid 
     agreement; or
       ``(B) any other combination of contiguous local government 
     units (including such a combination established by law or 
     agreement of two or more governments or governmental agencies 
     in a mutual aid agreement) that is formally certified by the 
     Secretary as a region for purposes of this Act with the 
     consent of--
       ``(i) the State or States in which they are located, 
     including a multi-State entity established by a compact 
     between two or more States; and
       ``(ii) the incorporated municipalities, counties, and 
     parishes that they encompass.
       ``(7) Terrorism preparedness.--The term `terrorism 
     preparedness' means any activity designed to improve the 
     ability to prevent, prepare for, respond to, mitigate 
     against, or recover from threatened or actual terrorist 
     attacks.
       ``(8) Capabilities.--The term `capabilities' shall have the 
     same meaning that term has under title VIII.

     ``SEC. 2002. FASTER AND SMARTER FUNDING FOR FIRST RESPONDERS.

       ``(a) Covered Grants.--This title applies to grants 
     provided by the Department to States, urban areas, regions, 
     or directly eligible tribes for the primary purpose of 
     improving the ability of first responders to prevent, prepare 
     for, respond to, mitigate

[[Page H134]]

     against, or recover from threatened or actual terrorist 
     attacks, especially those involving weapons of mass 
     destruction, administered under the following:
       ``(1) State homeland security grant program.--The State 
     Homeland Security Grant Program of the Department, or any 
     successor to such grant program.
       ``(2) Urban area security initiative.--The Urban Area 
     Security Initiative of the Department, or any successor to 
     such grant program.
       ``(3) Law enforcement terrorism prevention program.--The 
     Law Enforcement Terrorism Prevention Program of the 
     Department, or any successor to such grant program.
       ``(b) Excluded Programs.--This title does not apply to or 
     otherwise affect the following Federal grant programs or any 
     grant under such a program:
       ``(1) Nondepartment programs.--Any Federal grant program 
     that is not administered by the Department.
       ``(2) Fire grant programs.--The fire grant programs 
     authorized by sections 33 and 34 of the Federal Fire 
     Prevention and Control Act of 1974 (15 U.S.C. 2229, 2229a).
       ``(3) Emergency management planning and assistance account 
     grants.--The Emergency Management Performance Grant program 
     and the Urban Search and Rescue Grants program authorized by 
     title VI of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and 
     Emergency Assistance Act (42 U.S.C. 5195 et seq.); the 
     Departments of Veterans Affairs and Housing and Urban 
     Development, and Independent Agencies Appropriations Act, 
     2000 (113 Stat. 1047 et seq.); and the Earthquake Hazards 
     Reduction Act of 1977 (42 U.S.C. 7701 et seq.).

     ``SEC. 2003. COVERED GRANT ELIGIBILITY AND CRITERIA.

       ``(a) Grant Eligibility.--
       ``(1) State, region, or directly eligible tribe.--Any 
     State, region, or directly eligible tribe shall be eligible 
     to apply for a covered grant under the programs referred to 
     in paragraphs (1) and (3) of section 1802(a).
       ``(2) High-threat urban areas.--Any urban area that is 
     determined by the Secretary to be a high-threat urban areas 
     shall be eligible to apply for a covered grant referred to in 
     paragraph (2) of section 1802(a).
       ``(b) Grant Criteria.--The Secretary shall award covered 
     grants to assist States and local governments in achieving, 
     maintaining, and enhancing the capabilities for terrorism 
     preparedness established by the Secretary.
       ``(c) Submission of State Preparedness Report.--
       ``(1) Submission required.--The Secretary shall require 
     that any State applying to the Secretary for a covered grant 
     must submit State Preparedness Report specified in section 
     652(c) of the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations 
     Act, 2007 (Public Law 109-295).
       ``(2) Consultation.--The State report submitted under 
     paragraph (1) shall be developed in consultation with and 
     subject to appropriate comment by local governments and first 
     responders within the State.
       ``(d) Consistency With State Plans.--
       ``(1) In general.--The Secretary shall ensure that each 
     covered grant is used to supplement and support, in a 
     consistent and coordinated manner, the applicable State 
     homeland security report or plan.
       ``(2) Approval of plan by secretary.--The Secretary may not 
     award any covered grant to a State unless the Secretary has 
     approved the applicable State homeland security plan.
       ``(3) Revisions.--A State may revise the applicable State 
     homeland security plan approved by the Secretary under this 
     subsection, subject to approval of the revision by the 
     Secretary.
       ``(e) Application for Grant.--
       ``(1) In general.--Except as otherwise provided in this 
     subsection, any State, urban area, region, or directly 
     eligible tribe may apply for a covered grant by submitting to 
     the Secretary an application at such time, in such manner, 
     and containing such information as is required under this 
     subsection, or as the Secretary may reasonably require.
       ``(2) Deadlines for applications and awards.--All 
     applications for covered grants must be submitted at such 
     time as the Secretary may reasonably require for the fiscal 
     year for which they are submitted. The Secretary shall award 
     covered grants pursuant to all approved applications for such 
     fiscal year as soon as practicable, but not later than March 
     1 of such year.
       ``(3) Availability of funds.--All funds awarded by the 
     Secretary under covered grants in a fiscal year shall be 
     available for obligation through the end of the subsequent 
     fiscal year.
       ``(4) Minimum contents of application.--The Secretary shall 
     require that each applicant include in its application, at a 
     minimum--
       ``(A) the purpose for which the applicant seeks covered 
     grant funds and the reasons why the applicant needs the 
     covered grant to meet the capabilities for terrorism 
     preparedness within the State, urban area, region, or 
     directly eligible tribe to which the application pertains;
       ``(B) a description of how, by reference to the applicable 
     State homeland security plan or plans under subsection (c), 
     the allocation of grant funding proposed in the application, 
     including, where applicable, the amount not passed through 
     under section 2005(g)(1), would assist in fulfilling the 
     capabilities for terrorism preparedness specified in such 
     plan or plans;
       ``(C) a statement of whether a mutual aid agreement applies 
     to the use of all or any portion of the covered grant funds;
       ``(D) if the applicant is a State, a description of how the 
     State plans to allocate the covered grant funds to local 
     governments and Indian tribes;
       ``(E) if the applicant is a region--
       ``(i) a precise geographical description of the region and 
     a specification of all participating and nonparticipating 
     local governments within the geographical area comprising 
     that region;
       ``(ii) a specification of what governmental entity within 
     the region will administer the expenditure of funds under the 
     covered grant; and
       ``(iii) a designation of a specific individual to serve as 
     regional liaison;
       ``(F) a capital budget showing how the applicant intends to 
     allocate and expend the covered grant funds;
       ``(G) if the applicant is a directly eligible tribe, a 
     designation of a specific individual to serve as the tribal 
     liaison; and
       ``(H) a statement of how the applicant intends to meet the 
     matching requirement, if any, that applies under section 
     2005(g)(2).
       ``(5) Regional applications.--
       ``(A) Relationship to state applications.--A regional 
     application--
       ``(i) shall be coordinated with an application submitted by 
     the State or States of which such region is a part;
       ``(ii) shall supplement and avoid duplication with such 
     State application; and
       ``(iii) shall address the unique regional aspects of such 
     region's terrorism preparedness needs beyond those provided 
     for in the application of such State or States.
       ``(B) State review and submission.--To ensure the 
     consistency required under subsection (d) and the 
     coordination required under subparagraph (A) of this 
     paragraph, an applicant that is a region must submit its 
     application to each State of which any part is included in 
     the region for review and concurrence prior to the submission 
     of such application to the Secretary. The regional 
     application shall be transmitted to the Secretary through 
     each such State within 30 days of its receipt, unless the 
     Governor of such a State notifies the Secretary, in writing, 
     that such regional application is inconsistent with the 
     State's homeland security plan and provides an explanation of 
     the reasons therefor.
       ``(C) Distribution of regional awards.--If the Secretary 
     approves a regional application, then the Secretary shall 
     distribute a regional award to the State or States submitting 
     the applicable regional application under subparagraph (B), 
     and each such State shall, not later than the end of the 45-
     day period beginning on the date after receiving a regional 
     award, pass through to the region all covered grant funds or 
     resources purchased with such funds, except those funds 
     necessary for the State to carry out its responsibilities 
     with respect to such regional application: Provided, That in 
     no such case shall the State or States pass through to the 
     region less than 80 percent of the regional award.
       ``(D) Certifications regarding distribution of grant funds 
     to regions.--Any State that receives a regional award under 
     subparagraph (C) shall certify to the Secretary, by not later 
     than 30 days after the expiration of the period described in 
     subparagraph (C) with respect to the grant, that the State 
     has made available to the region the required funds and 
     resources in accordance with subparagraph (C).
       ``(E) Direct payments to regions.--If any State fails to 
     pass through a regional award to a region as required by 
     subparagraph (C) within 45 days after receiving such award 
     and does not request or receive an extension of such period 
     under section 2006(h)(2), the region may petition the 
     Secretary to receive directly the portion of the regional 
     award that is required to be passed through to such region 
     under subparagraph (C).
       ``(F) Regional liaisons.--A regional liaison designated 
     under paragraph (4)(E)(iii) shall--
       ``(i) coordinate with Federal, State, local, regional, and 
     private officials within the region concerning terrorism 
     preparedness;
       ``(ii) develop a process for receiving input from Federal, 
     State, local, regional, and private sector officials within 
     the region to assist in the development of the regional 
     application and to improve the region's access to covered 
     grants; and
       ``(iii) administer, in consultation with State, local, 
     regional, and private officials within the region, covered 
     grants awarded to the region.
       ``(6) Tribal applications.--
       ``(A) Submission to the state or states.--To ensure the 
     consistency required under subsection (d), an applicant that 
     is a directly eligible tribe must submit its application to 
     each State within the boundaries of which any part of such 
     tribe is located for direct submission to the Department 
     along with the application of such State or States.
       ``(B) Opportunity for state comment.--Before awarding any 
     covered grant to a directly eligible tribe, the Secretary 
     shall provide an opportunity to each State within the 
     boundaries of which any part of such tribe is located to 
     comment to the Secretary on the consistency of the tribe's 
     application with the State's homeland security plan. Any such 
     comments shall be submitted to the Secretary concurrently 
     with the submission of the State and tribal applications.

[[Page H135]]

       ``(C) Final authority.--The Secretary shall have final 
     authority to determine the consistency of any application of 
     a directly eligible tribe with the applicable State homeland 
     security plan or plans, and to approve any application of 
     such tribe. The Secretary shall notify each State within the 
     boundaries of which any part of such tribe is located of the 
     approval of an application by such tribe.
       ``(D) Tribal liaison.--A tribal liaison designated under 
     paragraph (4)(G) shall--
       ``(i) coordinate with Federal, State, local, regional, and 
     private officials concerning terrorism preparedness;
       ``(ii) develop a process for receiving input from Federal, 
     State, local, regional, and private sector officials to 
     assist in the development of the application of such tribe 
     and to improve the tribe's access to covered grants; and
       ``(iii) administer, in consultation with State, local, 
     regional, and private officials, covered grants awarded to 
     such tribe.
       ``(E) Limitation on the number of direct grants.--The 
     Secretary may make covered grants directly to not more than 
     20 directly eligible tribes per fiscal year.
       ``(F) Tribes not receiving direct grants.--An Indian tribe 
     that does not receive a grant directly under this section is 
     eligible to receive funds under a covered grant from the 
     State or States within the boundaries of which any part of 
     such tribe is located, consistent with the homeland security 
     plan of the State as described in subsection (c). If a State 
     fails to comply with section 2006(g)(1), the tribe may 
     request payment under section 2006(h)(3) in the same manner 
     as a local government.
       ``(7) Equipment standards.--If an applicant for a covered 
     grant proposes to upgrade or purchase, with assistance 
     provided under the grant, new equipment or systems that do 
     not meet or exceed any applicable national voluntary 
     consensus standards established by the Secretary, the 
     applicant shall include in the application an explanation of 
     why such equipment or systems will serve the needs of the 
     applicant better than equipment or systems that meet or 
     exceed such standards.

     ``SEC. 2004. RISK-BASED EVALUATION AND PRIORITIZATION.

       ``(a) Prioritization of Grant Applications.--
       ``(1) Factors to be considered.--The Secretary shall 
     evaluate and annually prioritize all pending applications for 
     covered grants based upon the degree to which they would, by 
     achieving, maintaining, or enhancing the capabilities of the 
     applicants on a nationwide basis, lessen the threat to, 
     vulnerability of, and consequences for persons (including 
     transient commuting and tourist populations) and critical 
     infrastructure. Such evaluation and prioritization shall be 
     based upon the most current risk assessment available by the 
     Office of Intelligence Analysis and the Office of 
     Infrastructure Protection of the threats of terrorism against 
     the United States. In establishing criteria for evaluating 
     and prioritizing applications for covered grants, the 
     Secretary shall coordinate with the National Advisory Council 
     established under section 508, the Director of the Federal 
     Emergency Management Agency, the United States Fire 
     Administrator, the Chief Intelligence Officer of the 
     Department, the Assistant Secretary for Infrastructure 
     Protection, and other Department officials as determined by 
     the Secretary.
       ``(2) Critical infrastructure sectors.--The Secretary 
     specifically shall consider threats of terrorism against the 
     following critical infrastructure sectors in all areas of the 
     United States, urban and rural:
       ``(A) Agriculture and food.
       ``(B) Banking and finance.
       ``(C) Chemical industries.
       ``(D) The defense industrial base.
       ``(E) Emergency services.
       ``(F) Energy.
       ``(G) Government facilities.
       ``(H) Postal and shipping.
       ``(I) Public health and health care.
       ``(J) Information technology.
       ``(K) Telecommunications.
       ``(L) Transportation systems.
       ``(M) Water.
       ``(N) Dams.
       ``(O) Commercial facilities.
       ``(P) National monuments and icons.
     The order in which the critical infrastructure sectors are 
     listed in this paragraph shall not be construed as an order 
     of priority for consideration of the importance of such 
     sectors.
       ``(3) Types of threat.--The Secretary specifically shall 
     consider the following types of threat to the critical 
     infrastructure sectors described in paragraph (2), and to 
     populations in all areas of the United States, urban and 
     rural:
       ``(A) Biological threats.
       ``(B) Nuclear threats.
       ``(C) Radiological threats.
       ``(D) Incendiary threats.
       ``(E) Chemical threats.
       ``(F) Explosives.
       ``(G) Suicide bombers.
       ``(H) Cyber threats.
       ``(I) Any other threats based on proximity to specific past 
     acts of terrorism or the known activity of any terrorist 
     group.
     The order in which the types of threat are listed in this 
     paragraph shall not be construed as an order of priority for 
     consideration of the importance of such threats.
       ``(4) Consideration of additional factors.--The Secretary 
     shall take into account any other specific threat to a 
     population (including a transient commuting or tourist 
     population) or critical infrastructure sector that the Board 
     has determined to exist. In evaluating the threat to a 
     population or critical infrastructure sector, the Secretary 
     shall give greater weight to threats of terrorism based upon 
     their specificity and credibility, including any pattern of 
     repetition.
       ``(5) Minimum amounts.--After evaluating and prioritizing 
     grant applications under paragraph (1), the Department shall 
     ensure that, for each fiscal year--
       ``(A) each of the States, other than the Virgin Islands, 
     American Samoa, Guam, and the Northern Mariana Islands, that 
     has an approved State homeland security plan receives no less 
     than 0.25 percent of the funds available for covered grants 
     for that fiscal year for purposes of implementing its 
     homeland security plan;
       ``(B) each of the States, other than the Virgin Islands, 
     American Samoa, Guam, and the Northern Mariana Islands, that 
     has an approved State homeland security plan and that meets 
     one or both of the additional high-risk qualifying criteria 
     under paragraph (6) receives no less than 0.45 percent of the 
     funds available for covered grants for that fiscal year for 
     purposes of implementing its homeland security plan;
       ``(C) the Virgin Islands, American Samoa, Guam, and the 
     Northern Mariana Islands each receives no less than 0.08 
     percent of the funds available for covered grants for that 
     fiscal year for purposes of implementing its approved State 
     plan; and
       ``(D) directly eligible tribes collectively receive no less 
     than 0.08 percent of the funds available for covered grants 
     for such fiscal year for purposes of addressing the needs 
     identified in the applications of such tribes, consistent 
     with the homeland security plan of each State within the 
     boundaries of which any part of any such tribe is located, 
     except that this clause shall not apply with respect to funds 
     available for a fiscal year if the Secretary receives less 
     than 5 applications for such fiscal year from such tribes or 
     does not approve at least one such application.
       ``(6) Additional high-risk qualifying criteria.--For 
     purposes of paragraph (5)(B), additional high-risk qualifying 
     criteria consist of--
       ``(A) having a significant international land border; or
       ``(B) adjoining a body of water within North America 
     through which an international boundary line extends.
       ``(b) Effect of Regional Awards on State Minimum.--Any 
     regional award, or portion thereof, provided to a State under 
     section 2003(e)(5)(C) shall not be considered in calculating 
     the minimum State award under subsection (a)(5) of this 
     section.
       ``(c) Relationship to Other Programs.--This section shall 
     be carried out in consultation with the Secretary of Health 
     and Human Services. Nothing in this section affects the scope 
     of authority of the Secretary of Health and Human Services, 
     including such authority under the Public Health Service Act.

     ``SEC. 2005. USE OF FUNDS AND ACCOUNTABILITY REQUIREMENTS.

       ``(a) In General.--A covered grant may be used for--
       ``(1) purchasing or upgrading equipment, including computer 
     hardware and software, to enhance terrorism preparedness;
       ``(2) exercises to strengthen terrorism preparedness;
       ``(3) training for prevention (including detection) of, 
     preparedness for, response to, or recovery from attacks 
     involving weapons of mass destruction, including training in 
     the use of equipment and computer software;
       ``(4) developing or updating State homeland security plans, 
     risk assessments, mutual aid agreements, and emergency 
     management plans to enhance terrorism preparedness;
       ``(5) establishing or enhancing mechanisms for sharing 
     terrorism threat information;
       ``(6) systems architecture and engineering, program 
     planning and management, strategy formulation and strategic 
     planning, life-cycle systems design, product and technology 
     evaluation, and prototype development for terrorism 
     preparedness purposes;
       ``(7) additional personnel costs resulting from--
       ``(A) elevations in the threat alert level of the Homeland 
     Security Advisory System by the Secretary, or a similar 
     elevation in threat alert level issued by a State, region, or 
     local government with the approval of the Secretary;
       ``(B) travel to and participation in exercises and training 
     in the use of equipment and on prevention activities;
       ``(C) the temporary replacement of personnel during any 
     period of travel to and participation in exercises and 
     training in the use of equipment and on prevention 
     activities; and
       ``(D) the hiring of staff to serve as intelligence analysts 
     to strengthen information and intelligence sharing 
     capabilities;
       ``(8) the costs of equipment (including software) required 
     to receive, transmit, handle, and store classified 
     information;
       ``(9) protecting critical infrastructure against potential 
     attack by the addition of barriers, fences, gates, and other 
     such devices that are constructed consistent with the 
     requirements of section 6(j)(9) of the Robert T. Stafford 
     Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (42 U.S.C. 
     5196(j)(9), except that the cost of such measures may not 
     exceed the greater of--
       ``(A) $1,000,000 per project; or

[[Page H136]]

       ``(B) such greater amount as may be approved by the 
     Secretary, which may not exceed 10 percent of the total 
     amount of the covered grant;
       ``(10) the costs of commercially available interoperable 
     communications equipment (that, where applicable, is based on 
     national, voluntary consensus standards) that the Secretary, 
     in consultation with the Assistant Secretary for Emergency 
     Communications, deems best suited to facilitate 
     interoperability, coordination, and integration between and 
     among emergency communications systems, and that complies 
     with prevailing grant guidance of the Department for 
     interoperable communications;
       ``(11) educational curricula development for first 
     responders to ensure that they are prepared for terrorist 
     attacks;
       ``(12) training and exercises to assist public elementary 
     and secondary schools in developing and implementing programs 
     to instruct students regarding age-appropriate skills to 
     prevent, prepare for, respond to, mitigate against, or 
     recover from an act of terrorism;
       ``(13) paying of administrative expenses directly related 
     to administration of the grant, except that such expenses may 
     not exceed 3 percent of the amount of the grant;
       ``(14) Public safety answering points;
       ``(15) paying for the conduct of any activity permitted 
     under the Law Enforcement Terrorism Prevention Program, or 
     any such successor to such program; and
       ``(16) other appropriate activities as determined by the 
     Secretary.
       ``(b) Prohibited Uses.--Funds provided as a covered grant 
     may not be used--
       ``(1) to supplant State or local funds;
       ``(2) to construct buildings or other physical facilities;
       ``(3) to acquire land; or
       ``(4) for any State or local government cost-sharing 
     contribution.
       ``(c) Intelligence Analysts.--An individual hired to serve 
     as an intelligence analyst under subsection (a)(7)(D) must 
     meet at least one of the following criteria:
       ``(1) The individual has successfully completed training 
     that meets the standards of the International Association of 
     Law Enforcement Intelligence Analysts to ensure baseline 
     proficiency in intelligence analysis and production.
       ``(2) The individual has previously served in a Federal 
     intelligence agency as an intelligence analyst for at least 
     two years.
       ``(d) Multiple-Purpose Funds.--Nothing in this section 
     shall be construed to preclude State and local governments 
     from using covered grant funds in a manner that also enhances 
     first responder preparedness for emergencies and disasters 
     unrelated to acts of terrorism, if such use assists such 
     governments in achieving capabilities for terrorism 
     preparedness established by the Secretary.
       ``(e) Reimbursement of Costs.--
       ``(1) Paid-on-call or volunteer reimbursement.--In addition 
     to the activities described in subsection (a), a covered 
     grant may be used to provide a reasonable stipend to paid-on-
     call or volunteer first responders who are not otherwise 
     compensated for travel to or participation in training 
     covered by this section. Any such reimbursement shall not be 
     considered compensation for purposes of rendering such a 
     first responder an employee under the Fair Labor Standards 
     Act of 1938 (29 U.S.C. 201 et seq.).
       ``(2) Performance of federal duty.--An applicant for a 
     covered grant may petition the Secretary for the 
     reimbursement of the cost of any activity relating to 
     prevention (including detection) of, preparedness for, 
     response to, or recovery from acts of terrorism that is a 
     Federal duty and usually performed by a Federal agency, and 
     that is being performed by a State or local government (or 
     both) under agreement with a Federal agency.
       ``(f) Assistance Requirement.--The Secretary may not 
     require that equipment paid for, wholly or in part, with 
     funds provided as a covered grant be made available for 
     responding to emergencies in surrounding States, regions, and 
     localities, unless the Secretary undertakes to pay the costs 
     directly attributable to transporting and operating such 
     equipment during such response.
       ``(g) Flexibility in Unspent Homeland Security Grant 
     Funds.--Upon request by the recipient of a covered grant, the 
     Secretary may authorize the grantee to transfer all or part 
     of funds provided as the covered grant from uses specified in 
     the grant agreement to other uses authorized under this 
     section, if the Secretary determines that such transfer is in 
     the interests of homeland security.
       ``(h) State, Regional, and Tribal Responsibilities.--
       ``(1) Pass-through.--The Secretary shall require a 
     recipient of a covered grant that is a State to obligate or 
     otherwise make available to local governments, first 
     responders, and other local groups, to the extent required 
     under the State homeland security plan or plans specified in 
     the application for the grant, not less than 80 percent of 
     the grant funds, resources purchased with the grant funds 
     having a value equal to at least 80 percent of the amount of 
     the grant, or a combination thereof, by not later than the 
     end of the 45-day period beginning on the date the grant 
     recipient receives the grant funds.
       ``(2) Cost sharing.--
       ``(A) In general.--The Federal share of the costs of an 
     activity carried out with a covered grant to a State, region, 
     or directly eligible tribe awarded after the 2-year period 
     beginning on the date of the enactment of this section shall 
     not exceed 75 percent.
       ``(B) Interim rule.--The Federal share of the costs of an 
     activity carried out with a covered grant awarded before the 
     end of the 2-year period beginning on the date of the 
     enactment of this section shall be 100 percent.
       ``(C) In-kind matching.--Each recipient of a covered grant 
     may meet the matching requirement under subparagraph (A) by 
     making in-kind contributions of goods or services that are 
     directly linked with the purpose for which the grant is made, 
     including, but not limited to, any necessary personnel 
     overtime, contractor services, administrative costs, 
     equipment fuel and maintenance, and rental space.
       ``(3) Certifications regarding distribution of grant funds 
     to local governments.--Any State that receives a covered 
     grant shall certify to the Secretary, by not later than 30 
     days after the expiration of the period described in 
     paragraph (1) with respect to the grant, that the State has 
     made available for expenditure by local governments, first 
     responders, and other local groups the required amount of 
     grant funds pursuant to paragraph (1).
       ``(4) Quarterly report on homeland security spending.--The 
     Federal share described in paragraph (2)(A) may be increased 
     by up to 2 percent for any State, region, or directly 
     eligible tribe that, not later than 30 days after the end of 
     each fiscal quarter, submits to the Secretary a report on 
     that fiscal quarter. Each such report must include, for each 
     recipient of a covered grant or a pass-through under 
     paragraph (1)--
       ``(A) the amount obligated to that recipient in that 
     quarter;
       ``(B) the amount expended by that recipient in that 
     quarter; and
       ``(C) a summary description of the items purchased by such 
     recipient with such amount.
       ``(5) Annual report on homeland security spending.--Each 
     recipient of a covered grant shall submit an annual report to 
     the Secretary not later than 60 days after the end of each 
     Federal fiscal year. Each recipient of a covered grant that 
     is a region must simultaneously submit its report to each 
     State of which any part is included in the region. Each 
     recipient of a covered grant that is a directly eligible 
     tribe must simultaneously submit its report to each State 
     within the boundaries of which any part of such tribe is 
     located. Each report must include the following:
       ``(A) The amount, ultimate recipients, and dates of receipt 
     of all funds received under the grant during the previous 
     fiscal year.
       ``(B) The amount and the dates of disbursements of all such 
     funds expended in compliance with paragraph (1) or pursuant 
     to mutual aid agreements or other sharing arrangements that 
     apply within the State, region, or directly eligible tribe, 
     as applicable, during the previous fiscal year.
       ``(C) How the funds were utilized by each ultimate 
     recipient or beneficiary during the preceding fiscal year.
       ``(D) The extent to which capabilities identified in the 
     applicable State homeland security plan or plans were 
     achieved, maintained, or enhanced as the result of the 
     expenditure of grant funds during the preceding fiscal year.
       ``(E) The extent to which capabilities identified in the 
     applicable State homeland security plan or plans remain 
     unmet.
       ``(6) Inclusion of restricted annexes.--A recipient of a 
     covered grant may submit to the Secretary an annex to the 
     annual report under paragraph (5) that is subject to 
     appropriate handling restrictions, if the recipient believes 
     that discussion in the report of unmet needs would reveal 
     sensitive but unclassified information.
       ``(i) Incentives to Efficient Administration of Homeland 
     Security Grants.--
       ``(1) Penalties for delay in passing through local share.--
     If a recipient of a covered grant that is a State fails to 
     pass through to local governments, first responders, and 
     other local groups funds or resources required by subsection 
     (g)(1) within 45 days after receiving funds under the grant, 
     the Secretary may--
       ``(A) reduce grant payments to the grant recipient from the 
     portion of grant funds that is not required to be passed 
     through under subsection (g)(1);
       ``(B) terminate payment of funds under the grant to the 
     recipient, and transfer the appropriate portion of those 
     funds directly to local first responders that were intended 
     to receive funding under that grant; or
       ``(C) impose additional restrictions or burdens on the 
     recipient's use of funds under the grant, which may include--
       ``(i) prohibiting use of such funds to pay the grant 
     recipient's grant-related overtime or other expenses;
       ``(ii) requiring the grant recipient to distribute to local 
     government beneficiaries all or a portion of grant funds that 
     are not required to be passed through under subsection 
     (g)(1); or
       ``(iii) for each day that the grant recipient fails to pass 
     through funds or resources in accordance with subsection 
     (g)(1), reducing grant payments to the grant recipient from 
     the portion of grant funds that is not required to be passed 
     through under subsection (g)(1), except that the total amount 
     of such reduction may not exceed 20 percent of the total 
     amount of the grant.
       ``(2) Extension of period.--The Governor of a State may 
     request in writing that the

[[Page H137]]

     Secretary extend the 45-day period under section 
     2003(e)(5)(E) or paragraph (1) for an additional 15-day 
     period. The Secretary may approve such a request, and may 
     extend such period for additional 15-day periods, if the 
     Secretary determines that the resulting delay in providing 
     grant funding to the local government entities that will 
     receive funding under the grant will not have a significant 
     detrimental impact on such entities' terrorism preparedness 
     efforts.
       ``(3) Provision of non-local share to local government.--
       ``(A) In general.--The Secretary may upon request by a 
     local government pay to the local government a portion of the 
     amount of a covered grant awarded to a State in which the 
     local government is located, if--
       ``(i) the local government will use the amount paid to 
     expedite planned enhancements to its terrorism preparedness 
     as described in any applicable State homeland security plan 
     or plans;
       ``(ii) the State has failed to pass through funds or 
     resources in accordance with subsection (g)(1); and
       ``(iii) the local government complies with subparagraphs 
     (B) and (C).
       ``(B) Showing required.--To receive a payment under this 
     paragraph, a local government must demonstrate that--
       ``(i) it is identified explicitly as an ultimate recipient 
     or intended beneficiary in the approved grant application;
       ``(ii) it was intended by the grantee to receive a 
     severable portion of the overall grant for a specific purpose 
     that is identified in the grant application;
       ``(iii) it petitioned the grantee for the funds or 
     resources after expiration of the period within which the 
     funds or resources were required to be passed through under 
     subsection (g)(1); and
       ``(iv) it did not receive the portion of the overall grant 
     that was earmarked or designated for its use or benefit.
       ``(C) Effect of payment.--Payment of grant funds to a local 
     government under this paragraph--
       ``(i) shall not affect any payment to another local 
     government under this paragraph; and
       ``(ii) shall not prejudice consideration of a request for 
     payment under this paragraph that is submitted by another 
     local government.
       ``(D) Deadline for action by secretary.--The Secretary 
     shall approve or disapprove each request for payment under 
     this paragraph by not later than 15 days after the date the 
     request is received by the Department.
       ``(j) Reports to Congress.--The Secretary shall submit an 
     annual report to Congress by January 31 of each year covering 
     the preceding fiscal year--
       ``(1) describing in detail the amount of Federal funds 
     provided as covered grants that were directed to each State, 
     region, and directly eligible tribe in the preceding fiscal 
     year;
       ``(2) containing information on the use of such grant funds 
     by grantees; and
       ``(3) describing--
       ``(A) the Nation's progress in achieving, maintaining, and 
     enhancing the capabilities established by the Secretary as a 
     result of the expenditure of covered grant funds during the 
     preceding fiscal year; and
       ``(B) an estimate of the amount of expenditures required to 
     attain across the United States the essential capabilities 
     established by the Secretary.''.

TITLE II--ENSURING COMMUNICATIONS INTEROPERABILITY FOR FIRST RESPONDERS

     SEC. 201. IMPROVE COMMUNICATIONS FOR EMERGENCY RESPONSE GRANT 
                   PROGRAM.

       (a) Establishment.--Title V of the Homeland Security Act of 
     2002 (6 U.S.C. 311 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end 
     the following new section:

     ``SEC. 522. IMPROVE COMMUNICATIONS FOR EMERGENCY RESPONSE 
                   GRANT PROGRAM.

       ``(a) Establishment.--The Secretary, acting through the 
     Director of the Office of Grants and Training and in 
     coordination with the Director for Emergency Communications, 
     shall establish the Improve Communications for Emergency 
     Response Grant Program to make grants to States and regions 
     to carry out initiatives to improve interoperable emergency 
     communications, including initiatives to achieve solutions to 
     statewide, regional, national, and, where appropriate, 
     international interoperability.
       ``(b) Use of Grant Funds.--A State or region receiving a 
     grant under this section may use the grant for short-term or 
     long-term goals for improving interoperable emergency 
     communications, including interoperability within that State 
     or region, and to assist with--
       ``(1) statewide or regional communications planning;
       ``(2) design and engineering for interoperable emergency 
     communications systems;
       ``(3) procurement and installation of interoperable 
     emergency communications equipment;
       ``(4) interoperable emergency communications exercises;
       ``(5) modeling and simulation exercises for operational 
     command and control functions;
       ``(6) technical assistance and training for interoperable 
     emergency communications; and
       ``(7) other activities determined by the Secretary to be 
     integral to interoperable emergency communications.
       ``(c) Region Defined.--For the purposes of this section, 
     the term `region' means any combination of contiguous local 
     government units, including such a combination established by 
     law or mutual aid agreement between two or more local 
     governments or governmental agencies.''.
       (b) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized 
     to be appropriated to the Secretary of Homeland Security for 
     grants under section 522 of the Homeland Security Act of 
     2002, as added by subsection (a)--
       (1) such sums as may be necessary for the first fiscal year 
     that begins after the later of--
       (A) the date on which the Secretary of Homeland Security 
     completes and submits to Congress the National Emergency 
     Communications Plan required under section 1802 of the 
     Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 572);
       (B) the date on which the Secretary of Homeland Security 
     completes and submits to Congress the first baseline 
     interoperability assessment required under section 1803 of 
     such Act (6 U.S.C. 573); or
       (C) the date on which the Secretary of Homeland Security, 
     after consultation with the Director of Emergency 
     Communications, determines and notifies Congress that 
     substantial progress has been made towards the development 
     and promulgation of voluntary consensus-based interoperable 
     communications standards pursuant to section 1801(c)(11) of 
     such Act (6 U.S.C. 571(c)(11)); and
       (2) such sums as may be necessary for each subsequent 
     fiscal year.
       (c) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents in section 
     1(b) of that Act is amended by inserting after the item 
     relating to section 521 the following:

``Sec. 522. Improve Communications for Emergency Response Grant 
              Program.''.

   TITLE III--STRENGTHENING USE OF A UNIFIED INCIDENT COMMAND DURING 
                              EMERGENCIES

     SEC. 301. NATIONAL EXERCISE PROGRAM DESIGN.

       Section 648(b)(2)(A) of the Department of Homeland Security 
     Appropriations Act, 2007 (Public Law 109-295) is amended by 
     striking clauses (iv) and (v) and inserting the following:
       ``(iv) designed to provide for systematic evaluation of 
     readiness and enhance operational understanding of the 
     Incident Command System and relevant mutual aid agreements;
       ``(v) designed to address the unique requirements of 
     populations with special needs; and
       ``(vi) designed to include the prompt development of after-
     action reports and plans for quickly incorporating lessons 
     learned into future operations; and''.

     SEC. 302. NATIONAL EXERCISE PROGRAM MODEL EXERCISES.

       Section 648(b)(2)(B) of the Department of Homeland Security 
     Appropriations Act, 2007 (Public Law 109-295) is amended by 
     striking so much as precedes clause (i) and inserting the 
     following:
       ``(B) shall include a selection of model exercises that 
     State, local, and tribal governments can readily adapt for 
     use, and shall provide assistance to State, local, and tribal 
     governments with the design, implementation, and evaluation 
     of exercises, whether a model exercise program or an exercise 
     designed locally, that--''.

     SEC. 303. RESPONSIBILITIES OF REGIONAL ADMINISTRATORS OF THE 
                   FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY.

       Section 507(c)(2) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 
     (enacted by section 611 of the Department of Homeland 
     Security Appropriations Act, 2007 (Public Law 109-295)) is 
     amended by striking ``and'' after the semicolon at the end of 
     subparagraph (H), by redesignating subparagraph (I) as 
     subparagraph (J), and by inserting after subparagraph (H) the 
     following:
       ``(I) assisting State, local, or tribal governments, where 
     appropriate, to pre-identify and evaluate suitable sites 
     where a multi-jurisdictional unified command system can be 
     quickly established if the need for such a system arises; 
     and''.

               TITLE IV--STRENGTHENING AVIATION SECURITY

     SEC. 401. INSTALLATION OF IN-LINE BAGGAGE SCREENING 
                   EQUIPMENT.

       Not later than 30 days after the date of enactment of this 
     Act, the Secretary for Homeland Security shall submit to the 
     appropriate congressional committees the cost sharing study 
     described in section 4019(d) of the Intelligence Reform and 
     Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (118 Stat. 3722), together 
     with the Secretary's analysis of the study, a list of 
     provisions of the study the Secretary intends to implement, 
     and a plan and schedule for implementation of such listed 
     provisions.

     SEC. 402. AVIATION SECURITY CAPITAL FUND.

       (a) In General.--Section 44923(h)(1) of title 49, United 
     States Code, is amended in the second sentence by striking 
     ``2007'' and inserting ``2011''.
       (b) Discretionary Grants.--Section 44923(h)(3) of such 
     title is amended by striking ``for a fiscal year, 
     $125,000,000'' and inserting ``, $125,000,000 for each of 
     fiscal years

[[Page H138]]

     2004, 2005, and 2006 and such sums as may be necessary for 
     each of fiscal years 2007 through 2011''.

     SEC. 403. AIRPORT CHECKPOINT SCREENING EXPLOSIVE DETECTION.

       Section 44940 of title 49, United States Code, is amended--
       (1) in subsection (d)(4) by inserting ``, other than 
     subsection (i),'' before ``except to''; and
       (2) by adding at the end the following:
       ``(i) Checkpoint Screening Security Fund.--
       ``(1) Establishment.--There is established in the 
     Department of Homeland Security a fund to be known as the 
     `Checkpoint Screening Security Fund'.
       ``(2) Deposits.--In fiscal year 2008, after amounts are 
     made available under section 44923(h), the next $250,000,000 
     derived from fees received under subsection (a)(1) shall be 
     available to be deposited in the Fund.
       ``(3) Fees.--The Secretary of Homeland Security shall 
     impose the fee authorized by subsection (a)(1) so as to 
     collect at least $250,000,000 in fiscal year 2008 for deposit 
     into the Fund.
       ``(4) Availability of amounts.--Amounts in the Fund shall 
     be available until expended for the research, development, 
     purchase, deployment, and installation of equipment to 
     improve the ability of security screening personnel at 
     screening checkpoints to detect explosives.''.

     SEC. 404. STRENGTHENING EXPLOSIVE DETECTION AT AIRPORT 
                   SCREENING CHECKPOINTS.

       Not later than 7 days after the date of enactment of this 
     Act, the Assistant Secretary for Homeland Security 
     (Transportation Security Administration) shall submit to the 
     appropriate congressional committees the strategic plan 
     described in the section amended by section 4013(a) of the 
     Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (118 
     Stat. 3719).

     SEC. 405. EXTENSION OF AUTHORIZATION OF AVIATION SECURITY 
                   FUNDING.

       Section 48301(a) of title 49, United States Code, is 
     amended by striking ``and 2006'' and inserting ``2006, 2007, 
     2008, 2009, 2010, and 2011''.

     SEC. 406. INSPECTION OF CARGO CARRIED ABOARD PASSENGER 
                   AIRCRAFT.

       (a) In General.--Section 44901 of title 49, United States 
     Code, is amended--
       (1) by redesignating subsections (g) and (h) as subsections 
     (h) and (i), respectively; and
       (2) by inserting after subsection (f) the following:
       ``(g) Air Cargo on Passenger Aircraft.--
       ``(1) In general.--Not later than 3 years after the date of 
     enactment of the Implementing the 9/11 Commission 
     Recommendations Act of 2007, the Secretary of Homeland 
     Security shall establish a system to inspect 100 percent of 
     cargo transported on passenger aircraft operated by an air 
     carrier or foreign air carrier in air transportation or 
     intrastate air transportation to ensure the security of all 
     such passenger aircraft carrying cargo.
       ``(2) Minimum standards.--The system referred to in 
     paragraph (1) shall require, at a minimum, that equipment, 
     technology, procedures, and personnel are used to inspect 
     cargo carried on passenger aircraft to provide a level of 
     security equivalent to the level of security for the 
     inspection of passenger checked baggage as follows:
       ``(A) 35 percent of such cargo is so inspected by the end 
     of fiscal year 2007.
       ``(B) 65 percent of such cargo is so inspected by the end 
     of fiscal year 2008.
       ``(C) 100 percent of such cargo is so inspected by the end 
     of fiscal year 2009.
       ``(3) Regulations.--
       ``(A) Interim final rule.--The Secretary of Homeland 
     Security may issue an interim final rule as a temporary 
     regulation to implement this subsection without regard to the 
     provisions of chapter 5 of title 5.
       ``(B) Final rule.--
       ``(i) In general.--If the Secretary issues an interim final 
     rule under subparagraph (A), the Secretary shall issue, not 
     later than one year after the effective date of the interim 
     final rule, a final rule as a permanent regulation to 
     implement this subsection in accordance with the provisions 
     of chapter 5 of title 5.
       ``(ii) Failure to act.--If the Secretary does not issue a 
     final rule in accordance with clause (i) on or before the 
     last day of the 1-year period referred to in clause (i), the 
     interim final rule issued under subparagraph (A) shall not be 
     effective after the last day of such period.
       ``(iii) Superceding of interim final rule.--The final rule 
     issued in accordance with this subparagraph shall supersede 
     the interim final rule issued under subparagraph (A).
       ``(4) Report.--Not later than 1 year after the date of 
     establishment of the system under paragraph (1), the 
     Secretary shall transmit to Congress a report that describes 
     the system.''.
       (b) Assessment of Exemptions.--
       (1) TSA assessment of exemptions.--
       (A) In general.--Not later than 120 days after the date of 
     enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Homeland Security 
     shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress and to 
     the Comptroller General a report regarding an assessment of 
     each exemption granted for inspection of air cargo and an 
     analysis to assess the risk of maintaining such exemption.
       (B) Contents.--The report referred to in subparagraph (A) 
     shall include--
       (i) the rationale for each exemption;
       (ii) what percentage of cargo is not screened as a result 
     of each exemption;
       (iii) the impact of each exemption on aviation security;
       (iv) the projected impact on the flow of commerce of 
     eliminating each exemption, respectively, should the 
     Secretary choose to take such action; and
       (v) plans and rationale for maintaining, changing, or 
     eliminating each exemption.
       (2) GAO assessment.--Not later than 120 days after the date 
     on which the report under paragraph (1) is submitted, the 
     Comptroller General shall review the report and provide to 
     Congress an assessment of the methodology of determinations 
     made by the Secretary for maintaining, changing, or 
     eliminating an exemption.

     SEC. 407. APPEAL AND REDRESS PROCESS FOR PASSENGERS WRONGLY 
                   DELAYED OR PROHIBITED FROM BOARDING A FLIGHT.

       (a) In General.--Subtitle C of title IV of the Homeland 
     Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 231 et. seq.) is amended by 
     adding at the end the following:

     ``SEC. 432. APPEAL AND REDRESS PROCESS FOR PASSENGERS WRONGLY 
                   DELAYED OR PROHIBITED FROM BOARDING A FLIGHT.

       ``(a) In General.--The Secretary shall establish a timely 
     and fair process for individuals who believe they have been 
     delayed or prohibited from boarding a commercial aircraft 
     because they were wrongly identified as a threat under the 
     regimes utilized by the Transportation Security 
     Administration, the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection, 
     or any other Department entity.
       ``(b) Office of Appeals and Redress.--
       ``(1) Establishment.--The Secretary shall establish an 
     Office of Appeals and Redress to oversee the process 
     established by the Secretary pursuant to subsection (a).
       ``(2) Records.--The process established by the Secretary 
     pursuant to subsection (a) shall include the establishment of 
     a method by which the Office of Appeals and Redress, under 
     the direction of the Secretary, will be able to maintain a 
     record of air carrier passengers and other individuals who 
     have been misidentified and have corrected erroneous 
     information.
       ``(3) Information.--To prevent repeated delays of a 
     misidentified passenger or other individual, the Office of 
     Appeals and Redress shall--
       ``(A) ensure that the records maintained under this 
     subsection contain information determined by the Secretary to 
     authenticate the identity of such a passenger or individual; 
     and
       ``(B) furnish to the Transportation Security 
     Administration, the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection, 
     or any other appropriate Department entity, upon request, 
     such information as may be necessary to allow such agencies 
     to assist air carriers in improving their administration of 
     the advanced passenger prescreening system and reduce the 
     number of false positives.
       ``(4) Initiation of appeal and redress process at 
     airports.--The Office of Appeals and Redress shall establish 
     at each airport at which the Department has a significant 
     presence a process to allow air carrier passengers to begin 
     the appeals process established pursuant to subsection (a) at 
     the airport.''.
       (b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents in section 
     1(b) of such Act is amended by inserting after the item 
     relating to section 430 the following:

``Sec. 432. Appeal and redress process for passengers wrongly delayed 
              or prohibited from boarding a flight.''.

     SEC. 408. TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION PERSONNEL 
                   MANAGEMENT.

       (a) Elimination of Certain Personnel Management 
     Authorities.--Effective 90 days after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act--
       (1) section 111(d) of the Aviation and Transportation 
     Security Act (49 U.S.C. 44935 note) is repealed and any 
     authority of the Secretary of Homeland Security derived from 
     such section 111(d) shall terminate;
       (2) any personnel management system, to the extent 
     established or modified pursuant to such section 111(d) 
     (including by the Secretary through the exercise of any 
     authority derived from such section 111(d)) shall terminate; 
     and
       (3) the Secretary shall ensure that all TSA employees are 
     subject to the same personnel management system as described 
     in subsection (e)(1) or (e)(2).
       (b) Establishment of Certain Uniformity Requirements.--
       (1) System under subsection (e)(1).--The Secretary shall, 
     with respect to any personnel management system described in 
     subsection (e)(1), take any measures which may be necessary 
     to provide for the uniform treatment of all TSA employees 
     under such system.
       (2) System under subsection (e)(1).--Section 9701(b) of 
     title 5, United States Code, is amended--
       (A) by striking ``and'' at the end of paragraph (4);
       (B) by striking the period at the end of paragraph (5) and 
     inserting ``; and''; and
       (C) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
       ``(6) provide for the uniform treatment of all TSA 
     employees (as defined in section 408(d) of the Implementing 
     the 9/11 Commission Recommendations Act of 2007).''.
       (3) Effective date.--
       (A) Provisions relating to a system under subsection 
     (e)(1).--Any measures necessary to carry out paragraph (1) 
     shall take

[[Page H139]]

     effect 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act.
       (B) Provisions relating to a system under subsection 
     (e)(2).--Any measures necessary to carry out the amendments 
     made by paragraph (2) shall take effect 90 days after the 
     date of the enactment of this Act or, if later, the 
     commencement date of the system involved.
       (c) Report to Congress.--
       (1) Report required.--Not later than 6 months after the 
     date of the enactment of this Act, the Government 
     Accountability Office shall submit to the Committee on 
     Homeland Security of the House of Representatives and the 
     Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of 
     the Senate a report on--
       (A) the pay system that applies with respect to TSA 
     employees as of the date of the enactment of this Act; and
       (B) any changes to such system which would be made under 
     any regulations which have been prescribed under chapter 97 
     of title 5, United States Code.
       (2) Matters for inclusion.--The report required under 
     paragraph (1) shall include--
       (A) a brief description of each pay system described in 
     paragraphs (1)(A) and (1)(B), respectively;
       (B) a comparison of the relative advantages and 
     disadvantages of each of those pay systems; and
       (C) such other matters as the Government Accountability 
     Office considers appropriate.
       (d) TSA Employee Defined.--In this section, the term ``TSA 
     employee'' means an individual who holds--
       (1) any position which was transferred (or the incumbent of 
     which was transferred) from the Transportation Security 
     Administration of the Department of Transportation to the 
     Department of Homeland Security by section 403 of the 
     Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 203); or
       (2) any other position within the Department of Homeland 
     Security the duties and responsibilities of which include 
     carrying out one or more of the functions that were 
     transferred from the Transportation Security Administration 
     of the Department of Transportation to the Secretary by such 
     section.
       (e) Personnel Management System Described.--A personnel 
     management system described in this subsection is--
       (1) any personnel management system, to the extent that it 
     applies with respect to any TSA employees by virtue of 
     section 114(n) of title 49, United States Code; and
       (2) any human resources management system, established 
     under chapter 97 of title 5, United States Code.

     SEC. 409. STRATEGIC PLAN TO TEST AND IMPLEMENT ADVANCED 
                   PASSENGER PRESCREENING SYSTEM.

       Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of 
     the Act, the Secretary of Homeland Security shall submit to 
     Congress a plan that--
       (1) describes the system to be utilized for the Department 
     of Homeland Security to assume the performance of comparing 
     passenger information, as defined by the Assistant Secretary 
     of Homeland Security (Transportation Security 
     Administration), to the automatic selectee and no fly lists, 
     utilizing appropriate records in the consolidated and 
     integrated terrorist watchlist maintained by the Federal 
     Government;
       (2) provides a projected timeline for each phase of testing 
     and implementation of the system;
       (3) explains how the system will be integrated with the 
     prescreening system for passenger on international flights; 
     and
       (4) describes how the system complies with section 552a of 
     title 5, United States Code.

        TITLE V--STRENGTHENING THE SECURITY OF CARGO CONTAINERS

     SEC. 501. REQUIREMENTS RELATING TO ENTRY OF CONTAINERS INTO 
                   THE UNITED STATES.

       (a) Requirements.--Section 70116 of title 46, United States 
     Code, is amended by adding at the end the following new 
     subsection:
       ``(c) Requirements Relating to Entry of Containers.--
       ``(1) In general.--A container may enter the United States, 
     either directly or via a foreign port, only if--
       ``(A) the container is scanned with equipment that meets 
     the standards established pursuant to paragraph (2)(A) and a 
     copy of the scan is provided to the Secretary; and
       ``(B) the container is secured with a seal that meets the 
     standards established pursuant to paragraph (2)(B), before 
     the container is loaded on the vessel for shipment to the 
     United States.
       ``(2) Standards for scanning equipment and seals.--
       ``(A) Scanning equipment.--The Secretary shall establish 
     standards for scanning equipment required to be used under 
     paragraph (1)(A) to ensure that such equipment uses the best-
     available technology, including technology to scan a 
     container for radiation and density and, if appropriate, for 
     atomic elements.
       ``(B) Seals.--The Secretary shall establish standards for 
     seals required to be used under paragraph (1)(B) to ensure 
     that such seals use the best-available technology, including 
     technology to detect any breach into a container and identify 
     the time of such breach.
       ``(C) Review and revision.--The Secretary shall--
       ``(i) review and, if necessary, revise the standards 
     established pursuant to subparagraphs (A) and (B) not less 
     than once every two years; and
       ``(ii) ensure that any such revised standards require the 
     use of technology, as soon as such technology becomes 
     available, to--

       ``(I) identify the place of a breach into a container;
       ``(II) notify the Secretary of such breach before the 
     container enters the Exclusive Economic Zone of the United 
     States; and
       ``(III) track the time and location of the container during 
     transit to the United States, including by truck, rail, or 
     vessel.

       ``(D) Definition.--In subparagraph (C), the term `Exclusive 
     Economic Zone of the United States' has the meaning given the 
     term `Exclusive Economic Zone' in section 2101(10a) of this 
     title.''.
       (b) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized 
     to be appropriated to carry out section 70116(c) of title 46, 
     United States Code, as added by subsection (a) of this 
     section, such sums as may be necessary for each of the fiscal 
     years 2008 through 2013.
       (c) Regulations; Application.--
       (1) Regulations.--
       (A) Interim final rule.--Consistent with the results of and 
     lessons derived from the pilot system implemented under 
     section 231 of the SAFE Port Act (Public Law 109-347), the 
     Secretary of Homeland Security shall issue an interim final 
     rule as a temporary regulation to implement section 70116(c) 
     of title 46, United States Code, as added by subsection (a) 
     of this section, not later than 180 days after the date of 
     the submission of the report under section 231 of the SAFE 
     Port Act, without regard to the provisions of chapter 5 of 
     title 5, United States Code.
       (B) Final rule.--The Secretary shall issue a final rule as 
     a permanent regulation to implement section 70116(c) of title 
     46, United States Code, as added by subsection (a) of this 
     section, not later than one year after the date of the 
     submission of the report under section 231 of the SAFE Port 
     Act, in accordance with the provisions of chapter 5 of title 
     5, United States Code. The final rule issued pursuant to that 
     rulemaking may supersede the interim final rule issued 
     pursuant to subparagraph (A).
       (2) Phased-in application.--
       (A) In general.--The requirements of section 70116(c) of 
     title 46, United States Code, as added by subsection (a) of 
     this section, apply with respect to any container entering 
     the United States, either directly or via a foreign port, 
     beginning on--
       (i) the end of the 3-year period beginning on the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, in the case of a container loaded 
     on a vessel destined for the United States in a country in 
     which more than 75,000 twenty-foot equivalent units of 
     containers were loaded on vessels for shipping to the United 
     States in 2005; and
       (ii) the end of the 5-year period beginning on the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, in the case of a container loaded 
     on a vessel destined for the United States in any other 
     country.
       (B) Extension.--The Secretary may extend by up to one year 
     the period under clause (i) or (ii) of subparagraph (A) for 
     containers loaded in a port, if the Secretary--
       (i) finds that the scanning equipment required under 
     section 70116(c) of title 46, United States Code, as added by 
     subsection (a) of this section, is not available for purchase 
     and installation in the port; and
       (ii) at least 60 days prior to issuing such extension, 
     transmits such finding to the appropriate congressional 
     committees.
       (d) International Cargo Security Standards.--The Secretary, 
     in consultation with the Secretary of State, is encouraged to 
     promote and establish international standards for the 
     security of containers moving through the international 
     supply chain with foreign governments and international 
     organizations, including the International Maritime 
     Organization and the World Customs Organization.
       (e) International Trade and Other Obligations.--In carrying 
     out section 70116(c) of title 46, United States Code, as 
     added by subsection (a) of this section, the Secretary shall 
     consult with appropriate Federal departments and agencies and 
     private sector stakeholders to ensure that actions under such 
     section do not violate international trade obligations or 
     other international obligations of the United States.

      TITLE VI--STRENGTHENING EFFORTS TO PREVENT TERRORIST TRAVEL

    Subtitle A--Human Smuggling and Trafficking Center Improvements

     SEC. 601. STRENGTHENING THE CAPABILITIES OF THE HUMAN 
                   SMUGGLING AND TRAFFICKING CENTER.

       (a) In General.--The Secretary, acting through the 
     Assistant Secretary of Homeland Security for United States 
     Immigration and Customs Enforcement, shall provide to the 
     Human Smuggling and Trafficking Center (in this section 
     referred to as the ``Center'') the administrative support and 
     funding required for its maintenance, including funding for 
     personnel, leasing of office space, supplies, equipment, 
     technology, training, and travel expenses necessary for the 
     Center to carry out its mission.
       (b) Staffing of the Center.--
       (1) In general.--Funding provided under subsection (a) 
     shall be used for the hiring of for not fewer than 30 full-
     time equivalent staff for the Center, to include the 
     following:
       (A) One Director.
       (B) One Deputy Director for Smuggling.
       (C) One Deputy Director for Trafficking.
       (D) One Deputy Director for Terrorist Travel.
       (E) Not fewer than 15 intelligence analysts or Special 
     Agents, to include the following:

[[Page H140]]

       (i) Not fewer than ten such analysts or Agents shall be 
     intelligence analysts or law enforcement agents who shall be 
     detailed from entities within the Department of Homeland 
     Security with human smuggling and trafficking related 
     responsibilities, as determined by the Secretary.
       (ii) Not fewer than one full time professional staff 
     detailee from each of the United States Coast Guard, United 
     States Immigration and Customs Enforcement, United States 
     Customs and Border Protection, Transportation Security 
     Administration, and the Office of Intelligence and Analysis.
       (2) Requirements.--Intelligence analysts or Special Agents 
     detailed to the Center under paragraph (1)(E) shall have at 
     least three years experience related to human smuggling or 
     human trafficking.
       (3) Duration of assignment.--An intelligence analyst or 
     Special Agent detailed to the Center under paragraph (1)(E) 
     shall be detailed for a period of not less than two years.
       (c) Funding Reimbursement.--In operating the Center, the 
     Secretary of Homeland Security shall act in accordance with 
     all applicable requirements of the Economy Act (31 U.S.C. 
     1535), and shall seek reimbursement from the Attorney General 
     and the Secretary of State, in such amount or proportion as 
     is appropriate, for costs associated with the participation 
     of the Department of Justice and the Department of State in 
     the operation of the Center.
       (d) Development of Plan.--The Secretary of Homeland 
     Security shall develop a plan for the Center that--
       (1) defines the roles and responsibilities of each 
     Department participating in the Center;
       (2) describes how the Department of Homeland Security shall 
     utilize its resources to ensure that the Center uses 
     intelligence to focus and drive its efforts;
       (3) describes the mechanism for the sharing of information 
     from United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement and 
     United States Customs and Border Protection field offices to 
     the Center;
       (4) describes the mechanism for the sharing of homeland 
     security information from the Center to the Office of 
     Intelligence and Analysis, including how such sharing shall 
     be consistent with section 1016(b) of the Intelligence Reform 
     and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (Public Law 108-458);
       (5) establishes reciprocal security clearance status to 
     other participating agencies in the Center in order to ensure 
     full access to necessary databases;
       (6) establishes or consolidates networked systems for the 
     Center; and
       (7) ensures that the assignment of personnel to the Center 
     from agencies of the Department of Homeland Security is 
     incorporated into the civil service career path of such 
     personnel.
       (e) Memorandum of Understanding.--The Secretary of Homeland 
     Security shall execute with the Attorney General a Memorandum 
     of Understanding in order to clarify cooperation and 
     coordination between United States Immigration and Customs 
     Enforcement and the Federal Bureau of Investigation regarding 
     issues related to human smuggling, human trafficking, and 
     terrorist travel.
       (f) Coordination With the Office of Intelligence and 
     Analysis.--The Office of Intelligence and Analysis, in 
     coordination with the Center, shall submit to Federal, State, 
     local, and tribal law enforcement and other relevant agencies 
     periodic reports regarding terrorist threats related to human 
     smuggling, human trafficking, and terrorist travel.

  Subtitle B--International Collaboration to Prevent Terrorist Travel

     SEC. 611. REPORT ON INTERNATIONAL COLLABORATION TO INCREASE 
                   BORDER SECURITY, ENHANCE GLOBAL DOCUMENT 
                   SECURITY, AND EXCHANGE TERRORIST INFORMATION.

       (a) Report Required.--Not later than 270 days after the 
     date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State and 
     the Secretary of Homeland Security, in conjunction with the 
     Director of National Intelligence and the heads of other 
     appropriate Federal departments and agencies, shall submit to 
     the appropriate congressional committees a report on efforts 
     of the Government of the United States to collaborate with 
     international partners and allies of the United States to 
     increase border security, enhance global document security, 
     and exchange terrorist information.
       (b) Contents.--The report required by subsection (a) shall 
     outline--
       (1) all presidential directives, programs, and strategies 
     for carrying out and increasing United States Government 
     efforts described in subsection (a);
       (2) the goals and objectives of each of these efforts;
       (3) the progress made in each of these efforts; and
       (4) the projected timelines for each of these efforts to 
     become fully functional and effective.
       (c) Definition.--In this section, the term ``appropriate 
     congressional committees'' means--
       (1) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on 
     Homeland Security, the Committee on the Judiciary, and the 
     Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of 
     Representatives; and
       (2) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on 
     Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, the Committee on 
     the Judiciary, and the Select Committee on Intelligence of 
     the Senate.

           Subtitle C--Biometric Border Entry and Exit System

     SEC. 621. SUBMITTAL OF PLAN ON BIOMETRIC ENTRY AND EXIT 
                   VERIFICATION SYSTEM IMPLEMENTATION.

       Not later than 7 days after the date of the enactment of 
     this Act, the Secretary for Homeland Security shall submit to 
     the Committee on Homeland Security and the Committee on the 
     Judiciary and the Committee on Homeland Security and 
     Governmental Affairs and the Committee on the Judiciary of 
     the Senate the plan developed by the Secretary under section 
     7208(c) of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention 
     Act of 2004 (8 U.S.C. 1365b(c)(2)) to accelerate the full 
     implementation of an automated biometric entry and exit data 
     system.

 TITLE VII--IMPROVING INTELLIGENCE AND INFORMATION SHARING WITH LOCAL 
                  LAW ENFORCEMENT AND FIRST RESPONDERS

 Subtitle A--Fusion and Law Enforcement Education and Teaming (FLEET) 
                             Grant Program

     SEC. 701. FINDINGS.

       Congress finds the following:
       (1) The intelligence component of a State, local, or 
     regional fusion center (in this title referred to generally 
     as ``fusion centers'') focuses on the intelligence process, 
     in which information is collected, integrated, evaluated, 
     analyzed, and disseminated. The Federal Government and 
     nontraditional sources of intelligence information--such as 
     public safety entities at the State, local, and tribal 
     levels, and private sector organizations--all possess 
     valuable information that when ``fused'' with law enforcement 
     data and properly analyzed at fusion centers can provide law 
     enforcement officers with specific and actionable 
     intelligence about terrorist and related criminal activity.
       (2) Participation by local and tribal law enforcement 
     officers and intelligence analysts in fusion centers helps 
     secure the homeland by involving such officers and analysts 
     in the intelligence process on a daily basis, by helping them 
     build professional relationships across every level and 
     discipline of government and the private sector, and by 
     ensuring that intelligence and other information, including 
     threat assessment, public safety, law enforcement, public 
     health, social service, and public works, is shared 
     throughout and among relevant communities. Such local and 
     tribal participation in fusion centers supports the efforts 
     of all law enforcement agencies and departments to 
     anticipate, identify, monitor, and prevent terrorist and 
     related criminal activity.
       (3) Some local and tribal law enforcement agencies and 
     departments, however, lack resources to participate fully in 
     fusion centers.
       (4) Needs-based grant funding will maximize the 
     participation of local and tribal law enforcement agencies 
     and departments in fusion centers by reducing the costs 
     associated with detailing officers and intelligence analysts 
     to fusion centers. Consequently, such grant funding will not 
     only promote the development of more effective, resourceful, 
     and situationally aware fusion centers, but will also advance 
     the cause of homeland security.

     SEC. 702. FLEET GRANT PROGRAM.

       (a) In General.--Subtitle A of title II of the Homeland 
     Security Act of 2002 is further amended by adding at the end 
     the following new section:

     ``SEC. 203. FLEET GRANT PROGRAM.

       ``(a) Implementation Plan and Establishment.--
       ``(1) Implementation plan.--Not later than 90 days after 
     the date of the enactment of the Implementing the 9/11 
     Commission Recommendations Act of 2007, the Secretary shall 
     develop a Fusion and Law Enforcement Education and Teaming 
     Grant Program (in this section referred to as the `FLEET 
     Grant program') implementation plan and submit to the 
     appropriate congressional committees a copy of such plan. In 
     developing such plan, the Secretary shall consult with the 
     Attorney General, the Bureau of Justice Assistance, and the 
     Office of Community Oriented Policing of the Department of 
     Justice and shall encourage the participation of fusion 
     centers and local and tribal law enforcement agencies and 
     departments in the development of such plan. Such plan shall 
     include--
       ``(A) a clear articulation of the purposes, goals, and 
     specific objectives for which the program is being developed;
       ``(B) an identification of program stakeholders and an 
     assessment of their interests in and expectations for the 
     program;
       ``(C) a developed set of quantitative metrics to measure, 
     to the extent possible, program output; and
       ``(D) a developed set of qualitative instruments (e.g., 
     surveys and expert interviews) to assess the extent to which 
     stakeholders believe their needs and expectations are being 
     met by the program.
       ``(2) Establishment.--Not later than 180 days after the 
     enactment of the Implementing the 9/11 Commission 
     Recommendations Act of 2007, the Secretary shall implement 
     and carry out a FLEET Grant program under which the 
     Secretary, in consultation with the Attorney General, shall 
     make grants to local and tribal law enforcement agencies and 
     departments specified by the Secretary, in consultation with 
     the Attorney General, for the purposes described in 
     subsection (b). Subject to subsection (g), each such grant 
     shall be made for a two-year period.

[[Page H141]]

       ``(b) Use of Grant Amounts.--
       ``(1) In general.--A grant made to a local or tribal law 
     enforcement agency or department under subsection (a) shall 
     be used to enable such agency or department to detail 
     eligible law enforcement personnel to participate in a fusion 
     center that serves the geographic area in which such agency 
     or department is located, and may be used for the following 
     purposes:
       ``(A) To hire new personnel, or to pay existing personnel, 
     to perform the duties of eligible law enforcement personnel 
     who are detailed to a fusion center during the absence of 
     such detailed personnel.
       ``(B) To provide appropriate training, as determined and 
     required by the Secretary, in consultation with the Attorney 
     General, for eligible law enforcement personnel who are 
     detailed to a fusion center.
       ``(C) To establish communications connectivity between 
     eligible law enforcement personnel who are detailed to a 
     fusion center and the home agency or department of such 
     personnel in accordance with all applicable laws and 
     regulations.
       ``(2) Mandatory privacy and civil liberties training.--All 
     eligible law enforcement personnel detailed to a fusion 
     center under the FLEET Grant Program shall undergo 
     appropriate privacy and civil liberties training that is 
     developed, supported, or sponsored by the Privacy Officer and 
     the Officer for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties in 
     partnership with the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight 
     Board.
       ``(3) Limitation.--A local or tribal law enforcement agency 
     or department participating in the FLEET Grant program shall 
     continue to provide a salary and benefits to any eligible law 
     enforcement personnel detailed to a fusion center, in the 
     same amounts and under the same conditions that such agency 
     or department provides a salary and benefits to such 
     personnel when not detailed to a fusion center. None of the 
     funds provided by the FLEET grant program may be used to 
     carry out this paragraph.
       ``(4) Eligible law enforcement personnel defined.--For 
     purposes of this section, the term `eligible law enforcement 
     personnel' means any local or tribal law enforcement officer 
     or intelligence analyst who meets each eligibility 
     requirement specified by the Secretary. Such eligibility 
     requirements shall include a requirement that the officer or 
     analyst has at least two years of experience as a law 
     enforcement officer or intelligence analyst with the local or 
     tribal law enforcement agency or department selected to 
     participate in the FLEET Grant program.
       ``(c) Applications.--
       ``(1) In general.--No grant may be made under subsection 
     (a) unless an application for such grant has been submitted 
     to, and approved by, the Secretary, in consultation with the 
     Attorney General. Such an application shall be submitted in 
     such form, manner, and time, and shall contain such 
     information, as the Secretary, in consultation with the 
     Attorney General, may prescribe by regulation or guidelines.
       ``(2) Joint applications.--A local or tribal law 
     enforcement agency or department may file a joint grant 
     application to detail eligible law enforcement personnel to a 
     fusion center. Such application shall be--
       ``(A) for a single detailed officer or intelligence 
     analyst, who shall be detailed to work at a fusion center on 
     a full-time basis; or
       ``(B) in the case of participating local and tribal law 
     enforcement agencies or departments for which a detail 
     arrangement described in subparagraph (A) is likely to result 
     in hardship due to a staffing shortage (as determined by the 
     Secretary, in consultation with the Attorney General), for 
     several eligible law enforcement personnel from multiple 
     local or tribal law enforcement agencies or departments in 
     the same geographic area, who shall be detailed to a fusion 
     center, each on a part-time basis, as part of a shared detail 
     arrangement, as long as--
       ``(i) any hours worked by a detailed officer or analyst at 
     a fusion center in a shared detail arrangement shall be 
     counted toward the hourly shift obligations of such officer 
     or analyst at his or her local or tribal law enforcement 
     agency or department; and
       ``(ii) no detailed officer or analyst working at a fusion 
     center in a shared detail arrangement shall be required to 
     regularly work more hours than the officer or analyst would 
     otherwise work if the officer or analyst was not 
     participating in the shared detail arrangement.
       ``(d) Distribution of Grants.--In considering applications 
     for grants under subsection (a), the Secretary, in 
     consultation with the Attorney General, shall ensure that, to 
     the extent practicable--
       ``(1) entities that receive such grants are representative 
     of a broad cross-section of local and tribal law enforcement 
     agencies and departments;
       ``(2) an appropriate geographic distribution of grants is 
     made among urban, suburban, and rural communities; and
       ``(3) such grants are awarded based on consideration of any 
     assessments of risk by the Department of Homeland Security.
       ``(e) Priority.--The Secretary, in consultation with the 
     Attorney General, shall issue regulations regarding the use 
     of a sliding scale based on financial need to ensure that a 
     local or tribal law enforcement agency or department that is 
     eligible to receive a grant under subsection (a) and that 
     demonstrates to the satisfaction of the Secretary, in 
     consultation with the Attorney General, that it is in 
     financial need (as determined by the Secretary, in 
     consultation with the Attorney General) receives priority in 
     receiving funds under this section.
       ``(f) Matching Funds.--
       ``(1) In general.--Subject to paragraph (2), the portion of 
     the costs of a program, project, or activity funded by a 
     grant made to an entity under subsection (a) may not exceed 
     80 percent.
       ``(2) Exception.--The Secretary, in consultation with the 
     Attorney General, may waive, wholly or in part, the 
     requirement under paragraph (1) of a non-Federal contribution 
     to the costs of a program, project, or activity if the entity 
     receiving the grant for such program, project, or activity 
     can demonstrate to the satisfaction of the Secretary, in 
     consultation with the Attorney General, that it would be a 
     hardship for such entity to satisfy such requirement.
       ``(g) Renewal of Grants.--A grant made to a local or tribal 
     law enforcement agency or department under subsection (a) may 
     be renewed on an annual basis for an additional year after 
     the first two-year period during which the entity receives 
     its initial grant, if--
       ``(1) the entity can demonstrate to the satisfaction of the 
     Secretary, in consultation with the Attorney General, 
     significant progress in achieving the objectives of the 
     application for the initial grant involved; and
       ``(2) such renewal would not prevent another local or 
     tribal law enforcement agency or department that has applied 
     for a grant under subsection (a), has not previously received 
     such a grant, and that would otherwise qualify for such a 
     grant, from receiving such a grant, as determined by the 
     Secretary, in consultation with the Attorney General.
       ``(h) Revocation or Suspension of Funding.--If the 
     Secretary, in consultation with the Attorney General, 
     determines that a grant recipient under this section is not 
     in substantial compliance with the terms and requirements of 
     an approved grant application submitted under subsection (c), 
     the Secretary, in consultation with the Attorney General, may 
     revoke or suspend funding of that grant, in whole or in part. 
     In the case of a revocation or suspension of funds under this 
     subsection based on a determination of fraud, waste, or 
     abuse, with respect to a grant recipient, such grant 
     recipient shall be required to refund the grant funds 
     received under subsection (a) that are related to such fraud, 
     waste, or abuse, respectively.
       ``(i) Reports.--
       ``(1) Reports to secretary.--Each local or tribal law 
     enforcement agency or department that receives a grant under 
     subsection (a) shall submit to the Secretary and the Attorney 
     General a report for each year such agency or department is a 
     recipient of such grant. Each such report shall include a 
     description and evaluation of each program, project, or 
     activity funded by such grant.
       ``(2) Report to congress.--One year after the date of the 
     implementation of the FLEET grant program, and biannually 
     thereafter, the Secretary, in consultation with the Attorney 
     General, shall submit to the appropriate congressional 
     committees a report describing the implementation and 
     progress of the FLEET Grant Program. Each such report shall 
     include the following:
       ``(A) A list of the local and tribal law enforcement 
     agencies and departments receiving grants.
       ``(B) Information on the grant amounts awarded to each such 
     agency or department.
       ``(C) Information on the programs, projects, and activities 
     for which the grant funds are used.
       ``(D) An evaluation of the effectiveness of the FLEET Grant 
     program with respect to the cause of advancing homeland 
     security, including--
       ``(i) concrete examples of enhanced information sharing and 
     a description of any preventative law enforcement actions 
     taken based on such information sharing;
       ``(ii) an evaluation of the effectiveness of the detail 
     arrangements with FLEET Grant program grant recipients;
       ``(iii) an evaluation of how the FLEET Grant program 
     benefits the fusion centers;
       ``(iv) a description of how individual law enforcement 
     officers and intelligence analysts detailed to the fusion 
     centers benefit from the detail experience; and
       ``(v) an evaluation of how the detail of the law 
     enforcement officers and intelligence analysts assists the 
     fusion centers in learning more about criminal or terrorist 
     organizations operating within their areas of operation, 
     including a description of any homeland security information 
     requirements that were developed, or any homeland security 
     information gaps that were filled, as a result of the detail 
     arrangement.
       ``(E) An analysis of any areas of need, with respect to the 
     advancement of homeland security, that could be addressed 
     through additional funding or other legislative action.
       ``(j) Customer Satisfaction Surveys.--The Secretary, in 
     consultation with the Attorney General, shall create a 
     mechanism for State, local, and tribal law enforcement 
     officers and intelligence analysts who participate in the 
     FLEET Grant program to fill out an electronic customer 
     satisfaction survey, on an appropriate periodic basis, to 
     assess the effectiveness of the FLEET Grant program with 
     respect to improving information sharing. The results of 
     these voluntary surveys shall be provided electronically to 
     appropriate personnel at the Office of Grants and Training of 
     the Department and at the Bureau of Justice Assistance and 
     the Office

[[Page H142]]

     of Community Oriented Policing of the Department of Justice. 
     The results of these customer satisfaction surveys shall also 
     be included in an appropriate format in the reports described 
     in subsection (i).
       ``(k) Continuation Assessment.--Five years after the date 
     of the implementation of the FLEET Grant program, the 
     Secretary, in consultation with the Attorney General, shall 
     submit to the appropriate congressional committees a FLEET 
     Grant program continuation assessment. Such continuation 
     assessment shall--
       ``(1) recommend whether Congress should continue to 
     authorize and fund the FLEET Grant program (as authorized 
     under this section or with proposed changes), and provide the 
     reasoning for such recommendation; and
       ``(2) if the Secretary recommends the continuation of the 
     FLEET Grant program--
       ``(A) recommend any changes to the program which the 
     Secretary, in consultation with the Attorney General, has 
     identified as necessary to improve the program, and the 
     reasons for any such changes;
       ``(B) list and describe legislative priorities for Congress 
     relating to the continuation of the program; and
       ``(C) provide recommendations for the amounts of funding 
     that should be appropriated for the continuation of the 
     program in future fiscal years, including justifications for 
     such amounts.
       ``(l) General Regulatory Authority.--The Secretary, in 
     consultation with the Attorney General, may promulgate 
     regulations and guidelines to carry out this section.
       ``(m) Definitions.--For the purposes of this section:
       ``(1) The term `local law enforcement agency or department' 
     means a local municipal police department or a county 
     sheriff's office in communities where there is no police 
     department.
       ``(2) The term `tribal law enforcement agency or 
     department' means the police force of an Indian tribe (as 
     such term is defined in section 4 of the Indian Self-
     Determination and Education Assistance Act (25 U.S.C. 450b)) 
     established and maintained by such a tribe pursuant to the 
     tribe's powers of self-government to carry out law 
     enforcement.''.
       (b) Definition of Fusion Center.--Section 2 of such Act is 
     amended by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
       ``(17) The terms `State, local, or regional fusion center' 
     and `fusion center' mean a State intelligence center or a 
     regional intelligence center that is the product of a 
     collaborative effort of at least two qualifying agencies that 
     provide resources, expertise, or information to such center 
     with the goal of maximizing the ability of such intelligence 
     center and the qualifying agencies participating in such 
     intelligence center to provide and produce homeland security 
     information required to detect, prevent, apprehend, and 
     respond to terrorist and criminal activity. For purposes of 
     the preceding sentence, qualifying agencies include--
       ``(A) State, local, and tribal law enforcement authorities, 
     and homeland and public safety agencies;
       ``(B) State, local, and tribal entities responsible for the 
     protection of public health and infrastructure;
       ``(C) private sector owners of critical infrastructure, as 
     defined in section 1016(e) of the Uniting and Strengthening 
     America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept 
     and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of 2001 (42 
     U.S.C. 5195c(e));
       ``(D) Federal law enforcement and homeland security 
     entities; and
       ``(E) other appropriate entities specified by the 
     Secretary.''.
       (c) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents in section 
     1(b) of such Act is amended by inserting after the item 
     relating to section 202 the following:

``Sec. 203. FLEET Grant Program.''.

         Subtitle B--Border Intelligence Fusion Center Program

     SEC. 711. FINDINGS.

       Congress finds the following:
       (1) The United States has 216 airports, 143 seaports, and 
     115 official land border crossings that are official ports of 
     entry. Screening all the people and goods coming through 
     these busy ports is an enormous resource challenge for the 
     men and women of the Department of Homeland Security 
     (``Department'') .
       (2) Department personnel, including personnel from the 
     Bureau of Customs and Border Protection (``CBP'') and U.S. 
     Immigration and Customs Enforcement (``ICE''), cannot be 
     everywhere at all times to ensure that terrorists, weapons of 
     mass destruction, and other related contraband are not being 
     smuggled across the border in order to support attacks 
     against the United States.
       (3) State, local, and tribal law enforcement personnel are 
     uniquely situated to help secure the border areas in their 
     respective jurisdictions by serving as ``force multipliers''. 
     To do so, however, law enforcement officers need access to 
     available border intelligence developed by the Department. 
     Such access shall help State, local, and tribal law 
     enforcement personnel deploy their resources most effectively 
     to detect and interdict terrorists, weapons of mass 
     destruction, and related contraband at United States borders.
       (4) The Department has not yet developed a single, easily 
     accessible, and widely available system to consistently share 
     border intelligence and other information with its State, 
     local, and tribal law enforcement partners. It likewise has 
     failed to establish a process by which State, local, and 
     tribal law enforcement personnel can consistently share with 
     the Department information that they obtain that is relevant 
     to border security.
       (5) As a result, State, local, and tribal law enforcement 
     personnel serving jurisdictions along the northern and 
     southern borders typically depend upon personal relationships 
     with CBP and ICE personnel in their respective jurisdictions 
     to get the information they need. While personal 
     relationships have helped in some locales, they have not in 
     others. This has led to an inconsistent sharing of border 
     intelligence from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.
       (6) State, local, and regional fusion centers (``fusion 
     centers'') may help improve this situation.
       (7) In the wake of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 
     2001, numerous State, local, and tribal authorities 
     responsible for the protection of the public and critical 
     infrastructure established fusion centers to help prevent 
     terrorist attacks while at the same time preparing to respond 
     to and recover from a terrorist attack should one occur.
       (8) Most border States have some variation of a fusion 
     center.
       (9) In general, while the Federal Government has helped to 
     establish fusion centers through the Department's grants, a 
     substantial percentage of the financial burden to support 
     ongoing fusion center operations is borne by States and 
     localities.
       (10) The Department, and in particular, the Department's 
     Office of Intelligence and Analysis, has undertaken a program 
     through which it sends such office's personnel to fusion 
     centers to establish a Department presence at those centers. 
     In so doing, the hope is that such personnel will serve as a 
     point of contact for information being shared at fusion 
     centers by State, local, and tribal law enforcement 
     personnel. Personnel at fusion centers hopefully will also 
     act as a channel for information being shared by the 
     Department itself.
       (11) Border State, local, and tribal law enforcement 
     officers anticipate that fusion centers will be a critical 
     source of border intelligence from the Department. While the 
     Department's border intelligence products generated in the 
     District of Columbia and disseminated to fusion centers will 
     undoubtedly be helpful, a far richer source of border 
     intelligence will likely come from CBP and ICE personnel 
     working locally in border jurisdictions themselves.
       (12) Establishing a CBP and ICE presence at border State 
     fusion centers will help ensure the most consistent, timely, 
     and relevant flow of border intelligence to and from the 
     Department and State, local, and tribal law enforcement in 
     border communities. Border State fusion centers thus could 
     serve as a tool to build upon the personal relationships and 
     information sharing that exists in some, but not all, 
     jurisdictions between CBP, ICE, and State, local, and tribal 
     law enforcement.

     SEC. 712. ESTABLISHMENT OF BORDER INTELLIGENCE FUSION CENTER 
                   PROGRAM.

       (a) In General.--Subtitle A of title II of the Homeland 
     Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 121 et seq.) is further 
     amended by adding at the end the following new section:

     ``SEC. 204. BORDER INTELLIGENCE FUSION CENTER PROGRAM.

       ``(a) Establishment.--
       ``(1) In general.--There is established in the Department 
     the Border Intelligence Fusion Center Program, to be 
     administered by the Under Secretary for Intelligence and 
     Analysis, for the purpose of stationing Bureau of Customs and 
     Border Protection and U.S. Immigration and Customs 
     Enforcement officers or intelligence analysts in the fusion 
     centers of participating border States.
       ``(2) New hires.--Funding provided under the Border 
     Intelligence Fusion Center Program shall be available to hire 
     new CBP and ICE officers or intelligence analysts to replace 
     CBP and ICE officers or intelligence analysts who are 
     stationed at border State fusion centers under this section.
       ``(b) Participation.--
       ``(1) In general.--The Secretary may develop qualifying 
     criteria for a border state fusion center's participation in 
     the Border Intelligence Fusion Center Program.
       ``(2) Criteria.--Such criteria may include the following:
       ``(A) Whether the center focuses on a broad 
     counterterrorism and counter-criminal approach, and whether 
     that broad approach is pervasive through all levels of the 
     organization.
       ``(B) Whether the center has sufficient numbers of 
     adequately trained personnel to support a broad 
     counterterrorism and counter-criminal mission.
       ``(C) Whether the center has access to relevant law 
     enforcement, private sector, open source, and national 
     security data, as well as the ability to share and 
     analytically exploit such data for actionable ends in 
     accordance with all applicable laws and regulations.
       ``(D) The entity or entities providing financial support 
     for the center's funding.
       ``(E) Whether the center's leadership is committed to the 
     fusion center's mission, and how the leadership sees the 
     center's role in terrorism prevention, mitigation, response, 
     and recovery.
       ``(c) Assignment.--Wherever possible, not fewer than one 
     CBP officer or intelligence analyst and one ICE officer or 
     intelligence analyst shall be stationed at each participating 
     border State fusion center.
       ``(d) Prerequisite.--

[[Page H143]]

       ``(1) Prior work experience in area.--To be stationed at a 
     border State fusion center under this section, a CBP or ICE 
     officer shall have served as a CBP or ICE officer in the 
     State in which the fusion center where such officer shall be 
     stationed is located for not less than two years before such 
     assignment in order to ensure that such officer is familiar 
     with the geography and people living in border communities, 
     as well as the State, local, and tribal law enforcement 
     agencies serving those communities.
       ``(2) Intelligence analysis, privacy, and civil liberties 
     training.--Before being stationed at a border State fusion 
     center under this section, a CBP or ICE officer shall 
     undergo--
       ``(A) appropriate intelligence analysis training via an 
     intelligence-led policing curriculum that is consistent with 
     the standards and recommendations of the National Criminal 
     Intelligence Sharing Plan, the Department of Justice and 
     Department Fusion Center Guidelines, title 28, part 23, Code 
     of Federal Regulations, as well as any other training 
     prescribed by the Under Secretary for Intelligence and 
     Analysis; and
       ``(B) appropriate privacy and civil liberties training that 
     is developed, supported, or sponsored by the Privacy Officer 
     and the Officer for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties in 
     partnership with the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight 
     Board.
       ``(3) Expedited security clearance processing.--The Under 
     Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis shall ensure that 
     security clearance processing is expedited for each CBP and 
     ICE officer or intelligence analyst stationed at border State 
     fusion centers under this section and shall ensure that such 
     officer or analyst has the appropriate clearance to conduct 
     the work of the Border Intelligence Fusion Center Program.
       ``(4) Further qualifications.--Each CBP and ICE officer or 
     intelligence analyst stationed at a border State fusion 
     center under this section shall satisfy any other 
     qualifications the Under Secretary for Intelligence and 
     Analysis may prescribe.
       ``(e) Responsibilities.--
       ``(1) In general.--
       ``(A) Creation and dissemination of border intelligence 
     products.--CBP and ICE officers and intelligence analysts 
     assigned to border State fusion centers under this section 
     will help State, local, and tribal law enforcement in 
     jurisdictions along the northern and southern borders, and 
     border State fusion center staff, overlay threat and 
     suspicious activity with Federal homeland security 
     information in order to develop a more comprehensive and 
     accurate threat picture. Such CBP and ICE officers and 
     intelligence analysts accordingly shall have as their primary 
     mission the review of border security-relevant information 
     from State, local, and tribal law enforcement sources, and 
     the creation of border intelligence products derived from 
     such information and other border-security relevant 
     information provided by the Department, and the dissemination 
     of such products to border State, local, and tribal law 
     enforcement. CBP and ICE officers or intelligence analysts 
     assigned to border State fusion centers under this section 
     shall also provide such products to the Office of 
     Intelligence and Analysis of the Department for collection 
     and dissemination to other fusion centers in other border 
     States.
       ``(B) Database access.--In order to fulfill the objectives 
     described in subparagraph (A), CBP and ICE officers and 
     intelligence analysts stationed at border State fusion 
     centers under this section shall have direct access to all 
     relevant databases at their respective agencies.
       ``(C) Customer satisfaction surveys.--The Secretary shall 
     create a mechanism for State, local, and tribal law 
     enforcement officers who are consumers of the intelligence 
     products described in subparagraph (A) to fill out an 
     electronic customer satisfaction survey whenever they access 
     such a product. The results of these voluntary surveys should 
     be provided electronically to appropriate personnel of the 
     Department. The results of these customer satisfaction 
     surveys should also be included in an appropriate format in 
     the annual status reports described in subsection (h)(2)(A).
       ``(2) Cultivation of relationships.--CBP and ICE officers 
     and intelligence analysts stationed at border State fusion 
     centers under this section shall actively cultivate 
     relationships with State, local, and tribal law enforcement 
     personnel in border communities in order to satisfy the 
     mission described in paragraph (1), and shall make similar 
     outreach to Canadian and Mexican law enforcement authorities 
     serving neighboring communities across the northern and 
     southern borders. CBP and ICE officers and intelligence 
     analysts stationed at border State fusion centers under this 
     section may also serve as a conduit of border intelligence 
     products from the Department itself and shall ensure that 
     such products are provided to all appropriate law enforcement 
     agencies, departments, and offices in border States.
       ``(f) Rule of Construction.--Nothing in this section shall 
     be construed to require a border State fusion center to 
     participate in the Border Intelligence Fusion Center Program.
       ``(g) Reports.--
       ``(1) Development of implementation plan.--
       ``(A) In general.--Not later than 90 days after the date of 
     the enactment of the Implementing the 9/11 Commission 
     Recommendations Act of 2007, the Secretary shall develop a 
     Border Intelligence Fusion Center Program implementation plan 
     and submit to the appropriate congressional committees a copy 
     of such plan. In developing such plan, the Secretary shall 
     consult with State, local, and tribal authorities responsible 
     for border State fusion centers.
       ``(B) Contents.--The implementation plan should also 
     address the following elements for effective program 
     assessment:
       ``(i) A clear articulation of the purposes, goals, and 
     specific objectives for which the program is being developed.
       ``(ii) An identification of program stakeholders and an 
     assessment of their interests in and expectations of the 
     program.
       ``(iii) A developed set of quantitative metrics to measure, 
     to the extent possible, program output.
       ``(iv) A developed set of qualitative instruments (e.g., 
     surveys and expert interviews) to assess the extent to which 
     stakeholders believe their needs and expectations are being 
     met.
       ``(2) Status reports and continuation assessment.--
       ``(A) Status reports.--
       ``(i) In general.--The Secretary shall submit to the 
     appropriate congressional committees status reports on the 
     Border Intelligence Fusion Center Program. The reports shall 
     address the elements described in paragraph (1)(B). The 
     reports shall also include the following:

       ``(I) A description of the training programs in place for 
     CBP and ICE officers and intelligence analysts participating 
     in the program.
       ``(II) A listing of the border State fusion centers where 
     CBP and ICE officers and intelligence analysts are deployed.
       ``(III) A representative survey of State, local, and tribal 
     law enforcement officers serving border jurisdictions 
     regarding the specificity and actionable nature of the border 
     intelligence provided by CBP and ICE officers at such fusion 
     centers.
       ``(IV) A description of the results of the customer 
     satisfaction surveys submitted by users of the products 
     described in subsection (e)(1).

       ``(ii) Deadlines.--Status reports under clause (i) shall be 
     submitted not later than--

       ``(I) one year after the date of the enactment of the 
     Implementing the 9/11 Commission Recommendations Act of 2007; 
     and
       ``(II) three and five years after the date on which the 
     Border Intelligence Fusion Center Program is established.

       ``(B) Continuation assessment.--Not later than the end of 
     the fifth year following the date on which the Border 
     Intelligence Fusion Center Program is established, the 
     Secretary shall submit to the appropriate congressional 
     committees a Border Intelligence Fusion Center Program 
     Continuation Assessment. The continuation assessment shall 
     accomplish the following:
       ``(i) Recommend whether the program should continue in its 
     present or some altered form or not.
       ``(ii) Provide the reasons for that recommendation.
       ``(iii) If the recommendation is that the program should 
     continue, list and describe legislative priorities for 
     Congress regarding the continuation of the program, and 
     provide recommended appropriations amounts and justifications 
     for them.
       ``(h) Definition of Border State Fusion Center.--The term 
     `border State fusion center' means a fusion center located in 
     the State of Washington, Idaho, Montana, North Dakota, 
     Minnesota, Wisconsin, Michigan, Ohio, Pennsylvania, New York, 
     Vermont, New Hampshire, Maine, California, Arizona, New 
     Mexico, or Texas.''.
       (b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents in section 
     1(b) of such Act is amended by inserting after the item 
     relating to section 203 the following:

``Sec. 204. Border Intelligence Fusion Center Program.''.

     Subtitle C--Homeland Security Information Sharing Enhancement

     SEC. 721. SHORT TITLE.

       This subtitle may be cited as the ``Homeland Security 
     Information Sharing Enhancement Act of 2007''.

     SEC. 722. HOMELAND SECURITY ADVISORY SYSTEM.

       (a) In General.--Subtitle A of title II of the Homeland 
     Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 121 et seq.) is amended by 
     adding at the end the following:

     ``SEC. 205. HOMELAND SECURITY ADVISORY SYSTEM.

       ``(a) Requirement.--The Under Secretary for Intelligence 
     and Analysis shall implement a Homeland Security Advisory 
     System in accordance with this section to provide public 
     advisories and alerts regarding threats to homeland security, 
     including national, regional, local, and economic sector 
     advisories and alerts, as appropriate.
       ``(b) Required Elements.--The Under Secretary, under the 
     System--
       ``(1) shall include, in each advisory and alert regarding a 
     threat, information on appropriate protective measures and 
     countermeasures that may be taken in response to the threat;
       ``(2) shall, whenever possible, limit the scope of each 
     advisory and alert to a specific region, locality, or 
     economic sector believed to be at risk; and
       ``(3) shall not, in issuing any advisory or alert, use 
     color designations as the exclusive means of specifying the 
     homeland security threat conditions that are the subject of 
     the advisory or alert.''.
       (b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents in section 
     1(b) of such Act is

[[Page H144]]

     amended by adding at the end of the items relating to 
     subtitle A of title II the following:

``Sec. 205. Homeland Security Advisory System.''.

     SEC. 723. HOMELAND SECURITY INFORMATION SHARING.

       (a) In General.--Subtitle A of title II of the Homeland 
     Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 121 et seq.) is further 
     amended by adding at the end the following:

     ``SEC. 206. HOMELAND SECURITY INFORMATION SHARING.

       ``(a) Information Sharing Environment.--Consistent with 
     section 1016 of the National Intelligence Reform and 
     Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (6 U.S.C. 485) and in 
     accordance with all other applicable laws and regulations, 
     the Secretary shall integrate and standardize the information 
     of the intelligence components of the Department into a 
     Department information sharing environment, to be 
     administered by the Under Secretary for Intelligence and 
     Analysis.
       ``(b) Information Sharing and Knowledge Management 
     Officers.--For each intelligence component of the Department, 
     the Secretary shall designate an information sharing and 
     knowledge management officer who shall report to the Under 
     Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis with respect to 
     coordinating the different systems used in the Department to 
     gather and disseminate homeland security information.
       ``(c) State, Local, and Private-Sector Sources of 
     Information.--
       ``(1) Establishment of business processes.--The Under 
     Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis shall establish 
     Department-wide procedures for the review and analysis of 
     information gathered from State, local, tribal, and private-
     sector sources and, as appropriate, integrate such 
     information into the information gathered by the Department 
     and other department and agencies of the Federal Government.
       ``(2) Feedback.--The Secretary shall develop mechanisms to 
     provide analytical and operational feedback to any State, 
     local, tribal, and private-sector entities that gather 
     information and provide such information to the Secretary.
       ``(d) Training and Evaluation of Employees.--
       ``(1) Training.--The Under Secretary shall provide to 
     employees of the Department opportunities for training and 
     education to develop an understanding of the definition of 
     homeland security information, how information available to 
     them as part of their duties might qualify as homeland 
     security information, and how information available to them 
     is relevant to the Office of Intelligence and Analysis.
       ``(2) Evaluations.--The Under Secretary shall, on an 
     ongoing basis, evaluate how employees of the Office of 
     Intelligence and Analysis and the intelligence components of 
     the Department are utilizing homeland security information 
     and participating in the Department information sharing 
     environment.''.
       (b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents in section 
     1(b) of such Act is further amended by adding at the end of 
     the items relating to such subtitle the following:

``Sec. 206. Homeland security information sharing.''.

       (c) Establishment of Comprehensive Information Technology 
     Network Architecture.--
       (1) In general.--Subtitle A of title II of the Homeland 
     Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 121 et seq.) is further 
     amended by adding at the end the following new section:

     ``SEC. 207. COMPREHENSIVE INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY NETWORK 
                   ARCHITECTURE.

       ``(a) Establishment.--The Secretary, acting through the 
     Chief Intelligence Officer, shall establish a comprehensive 
     information technology network architecture for the Office of 
     Intelligence and Analysis.
       ``(b) Network Model.--The comprehensive information 
     technology network architecture established under subsection 
     (a) shall, to the extent possible, incorporate the 
     approaches, features, and functions of the network proposed 
     by the Markle Foundation in reports issued in October 2002 
     and December 2003, known as the System-wide Homeland Security 
     Analysis and Resource Exchange (SHARE) Network.
       ``(c) Comprehensive Information Technology Network 
     Architecture Defined.--the term `comprehensive information 
     technology network architecture' means an integrated 
     framework for evolving or maintaining existing information 
     technology and acquiring new information technology to 
     achieve the strategic goals and information resources 
     management goals of the Office of Intelligence and 
     Analysis.''.
       (2) Clerical amendment.--The table of contents in section 
     1(b) of such Act is further amended by adding at the end of 
     the items relating to such subtitle the following:

``Sec. 207. Comprehensive information technology network 
              architecture.''.

       (3) Reports.--
       (A) Report on implementation of plan.--Not later than 360 
     days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the 
     Secretary of Homeland Security shall submit to the Committee 
     on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate 
     and the Committee on Homeland Security of the House of 
     Representatives a report containing a plan to implement the 
     comprehensive information technology network architecture for 
     the Office of Intelligence and Analysis of the Department of 
     Homeland Security required under section 205 of the Homeland 
     Security Act of 2002, as added by paragraph (1). Such report 
     shall include the following:
       (i) Priorities for the development of the comprehensive 
     information technology network architecture and a rationale 
     for such priorities.
       (ii) An explanation of how the various components of the 
     comprehensive information technology network architecture 
     will work together and interconnect.
       (iii) A description of the technology challenges that the 
     Office of Intelligence and Analysis will face in implementing 
     the comprehensive information technology network 
     architecture.
       (iv) A description of technology options that are available 
     or are in development that may be incorporated into the 
     comprehensive technology network architecture, the 
     feasibility of incorporating such options, and the advantages 
     and disadvantages of doing so.
       (v) An explanation of any security protections to be 
     developed as part of the comprehensive information technology 
     network architecture.
       (vi) A description of any safeguards for civil liberties 
     and privacy to be built into the comprehensive information 
     technology network architecture.
       (vii) An operational best practices plan.
       (B) Progress report.--Not later than 180 days after the 
     date on which the report is submitted under subparagraph (A), 
     the Secretary of Homeland Security shall submit to the 
     Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of 
     the Senate and the Committee on Homeland Security of the 
     House of Representatives a report on the progress of the 
     Secretary in developing the comprehensive information 
     technology network architecture required under section 205 of 
     the Homeland Security Act of 2002, as added by paragraph (1).
       (d) Intelligence Component Defined.--Section 2 of the 
     Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 101) is further 
     amended by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
       ``(18) The term `intelligence component of the Department' 
     means any directorate, agency, or element of the Department 
     that gathers, receives, analyzes, produces, or disseminates 
     homeland security information except--
       ``(A) a directorate, agency, or element of the Department 
     that is required to be maintained as a distinct entity under 
     this Act; or
       ``(B) any personnel security, physical security, document 
     security, or communications security program within any 
     directorate, agency, or element of the Department.''.

     Subtitle D--Homeland Security Information Sharing Partnerships

     SEC. 731. SHORT TITLE.

       This subtitle may be cited as the ``Homeland Security 
     Information Sharing Partnerships Act of 2007''.

     SEC. 732. STATE, LOCAL, AND REGIONAL INFORMATION FUSION 
                   CENTER INITIATIVE.

       (a) In General.--Subtitle A of title II of the Homeland 
     Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 121 et seq.) is further is 
     amended by adding at the end the following:

     ``SEC. 208. STATE, LOCAL, AND REGIONAL FUSION CENTER 
                   INITIATIVE.

       ``(a) Establishment.--The Secretary shall establish a 
     State, Local, and Regional Fusion Center Initiative to 
     establish partnerships with State, local, and regional fusion 
     centers.
       ``(b) Duties.--Through the State, Local, and Regional 
     Fusion Center Initiative, the Secretary shall--
       ``(1) coordinate with the principal official of each State, 
     local, or regional fusion center and the official designated 
     as the Homeland Security Advisor of the State;
       ``(2) provide Department operational and intelligence 
     advice and assistance to State, local, and regional fusion 
     centers;
       ``(3) support efforts to include State, local, and regional 
     fusion centers into efforts to establish an information 
     sharing environment (as defined under section 1016(a)(2) of 
     the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 
     (6 U.S.C. 485(a)(2))) in accordance with all applicable laws 
     and regulations;
       ``(4) conduct table-top and live training exercises to 
     regularly assess the capability of individual and regional 
     networks of State, local, and regional fusion centers to 
     integrate the efforts of such networks with the efforts of 
     the Department;
       ``(5) coordinate with other relevant Federal entities 
     engaged in homeland security-related activities;
       ``(6) provide analytic and reporting advice and assistance 
     to State, local, and regional fusion centers;
       ``(7) review homeland security information gathered by 
     State, local, and regional fusion centers and incorporate 
     relevant information with homeland security information of 
     the Department;
       ``(8) provide management assistance to State, local, and 
     regional fusion centers;
       ``(9) serve as a point of contact to ensure the 
     dissemination of relevant homeland security information.
       ``(10) facilitate close communication and coordination 
     between State, local, and regional fusion centers and the 
     Department;
       ``(11) provide State, local, and regional fusion centers 
     with expertise on Department resources and operations;
       ``(12) provide training to State, local, and regional 
     fusion centers and encourage such

[[Page H145]]

     fusion centers to participate in terrorist threat-related 
     exercises conducted by the Department; and
       ``(13) carry out such other duties as the Secretary 
     determines are appropriate.''.
       (b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents in section 
     1(b) of such Act is further amended by adding at the end of 
     the items relating to such subtitle the following:

``Sec. 208. State, Local, and Regional Information Fusion Center 
              Initiative.''.

       (c) Reports.--
       (1) Concept of operations.--Not later than 90 days after 
     the date of the enactment of this Act and before the State, 
     Local, and Regional Fusion Center Initiative under section 
     208 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002, as added by 
     subsection (a), has been implemented, the Secretary shall 
     submit to the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental 
     Affairs of the Senate and the Committee on Homeland Security 
     of the House of Representatives a report that contains a 
     concept of operations for the Initiative, which shall include 
     a privacy and civil liberties impact assessment.
       (2) Privacy and civil liberties.--
       (A) Review of concept of operations.--Not later than 180 
     days after the date on which the report under paragraph (1) 
     is submitted, the Privacy Officer of the Department of 
     Homeland Security and the Officer for Civil Rights and Civil 
     Liberties of the Department of Homeland Security shall review 
     the privacy and civil liberties implications of the 
     Initiative and the concept of operations and report any 
     concerns to the Secretary of Homeland Security and the Under 
     Secretary of Homeland Security for Intelligence and Analysis. 
     The Secretary may not implement the Initiative until the 
     Privacy Officer and the Officer for Civil Rights and Civil 
     Liberties have certified that any privacy or civil liberties 
     concerns have been addressed.
       (B) Review of privacy impact.--Under the authority of 
     section 222(5) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 
     142(5)), not later than one year after the date on which the 
     State, Local, and Regional Fusion Center Initiative is 
     implemented, the Privacy Officer of the Department of 
     Homeland Security, in consultation with the Officer for Civil 
     Rights and Civil Liberties of the Department of Homeland 
     Security, shall submit to Congress, the Secretary of Homeland 
     Security, and the Under Secretary of Homeland Security for 
     Intelligence and Analysis a report on the privacy and civil 
     liberties impact of the Initiative.

     SEC. 733. HOMELAND SECURITY INFORMATION SHARING FELLOWS 
                   PROGRAM.

       (a) Establishment of Program.--Subtitle A of title II of 
     the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 121 et seq.) is 
     further amended by adding at the end the following:

     ``SEC. 209. HOMELAND SECURITY INFORMATION SHARING FELLOWS 
                   PROGRAM.

       ``(a) Establishment.--
       ``(1) In general.--The Secretary, acting through the Under 
     Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis, shall establish a 
     fellowship program in accordance with this section for the 
     purpose of--
       ``(A) detailing State, local, and tribal law enforcement 
     officers and intelligence analysts to the Department to 
     participate in the work of the Office of Intelligence and 
     Analysis in order to become familiar with--
       ``(i) the mission and capabilities of the Office of 
     Intelligence and Analysis; and
       ``(ii) the role, programs, products, and personnel of the 
     Office of Intelligence and Analysis; and
       ``(B) promoting information sharing between the Department 
     and State, local, and tribal law enforcement officers and 
     intelligence analysts by stationing such officers and 
     analysts in order to--
       ``(i) serve as a point of contact in the Department to 
     assist in the representation of State, local, and tribal 
     homeland security information needs;
       ``(ii) identify homeland security information of interest 
     to State, local, and tribal law enforcement officers and 
     intelligence analysts; and
       ``(iii) assist Department analysts in preparing and 
     disseminating terrorism-related products that are tailored to 
     State, local, and tribal law enforcement officers and 
     intelligence analysts and designed to thwart terrorist 
     attacks.
       ``(2) Program name.--The program under this section shall 
     be known as the `Homeland Security Information Sharing 
     Fellows Program'.
       ``(b) Eligibility.--
       ``(1) In general.--In order to be eligible for selection as 
     an Information Sharing Fellow under the program, an 
     individual must--
       ``(A) have homeland security-related responsibilities or 
     law enforcement-related responsibilities;
       ``(B) be eligible for an appropriate national security 
     clearance;
       ``(C) possess a valid need for access to classified 
     information, as determined by the Under Secretary for 
     Intelligence and Analysis;
       ``(D) be an employee of an eligible entity; and
       ``(E) have undergone appropriate privacy and civil 
     liberties training that is developed, supported, or sponsored 
     by the Privacy Officer and the Officer for Civil Rights and 
     Civil Liberties in partnership with the Privacy and Civil 
     Liberties Oversight Board.
       ``(2) Eligible entities.--For purposes of this subsection, 
     the term `eligible entity' means--
       ``(A) a State, local, or regional fusion center;
       ``(B) a State or local law enforcement or other government 
     entity that serves a major metropolitan area, as determined 
     by the Secretary;
       ``(C) a State or local law enforcement or other government 
     entity that serves a suburban or rural area, as determined by 
     the Secretary;
       ``(D) a State or local law enforcement or other government 
     entity with port responsibilities, as determined by the 
     Secretary;
       ``(E) a State or local law enforcement or other government 
     entity with border responsibilities, as determined by the 
     Secretary;
       ``(F) a State or local law enforcement or other government 
     entity with agricultural responsibilities, as determined by 
     the Secretary;
       ``(G) a tribal law enforcement or other authority; or
       ``(H) such other entity as the Secretary determines is 
     appropriate.
       ``(c) Optional Participation.--No State, local, or tribal 
     law enforcement or other government entity shall be required 
     to participate in the Homeland Security Information Sharing 
     Fellows Program.
       ``(d) Procedures for Nomination and Selection.--
       ``(1) In general.--The Under Secretary shall establish 
     procedures to provide for the nomination and selection of 
     individuals to participate in the Homeland Security 
     Information Sharing Fellows Program.
       ``(2) Limitations.--The Under Secretary shall--
       ``(A) select law enforcement officers and intelligence 
     analysts representing a broad cross-section of State, local, 
     and tribal agencies; and
       ``(B) ensure that the number of Information Sharing Fellows 
     selected does not impede the activities of the Office of 
     Intelligence and Analysis.
       ``(e) Length of Service.--Information Sharing Fellows shall 
     serve for a reasonable period of time, as determined by the 
     Under Secretary. Such period of time shall be sufficient to 
     advance the information-sharing goals of the Under Secretary 
     and encourage participation by as many qualified nominees as 
     possible.
       ``(f) Condition.--As a condition of selecting an individual 
     as an Information Sharing Fellow under the program, the Under 
     Secretary shall require that the individual's employer agree 
     to continue to pay the individual's salary and benefits 
     during the period for which the individual is detailed.
       ``(g) Stipend.--During the period for which an individual 
     is detailed under the program, the Under Secretary shall, 
     subject to the availability of appropriations provide to the 
     individual a stipend to cover the individual's reasonable 
     living expenses for that period.
       ``(h) Security Clearances.--If an individual selected for a 
     fellowship under the Information Sharing Fellows Program does 
     not possess the appropriate security clearance, the Under 
     Secretary shall ensure that security clearance processing is 
     expedited for such individual and shall ensure that each such 
     Information Sharing Fellow has obtained the appropriate 
     security clearance prior to participation in the Program.''.
       (b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents in section 
     1(b) of such Act is further amended by adding at the end of 
     the items relating to such subtitle the following:

``Sec. 209. Homeland Security Information Sharing Fellows Program.''.

       (c) Reports.--
       (1) Concept of operations.--Not later than 90 days after 
     the date of the enactment of this Act and before the 
     implementation of the Homeland Security Information Sharing 
     Fellows Program under section 209 of the Homeland Security 
     Act of 2002, as added by subsection (a), the Secretary shall 
     submit to the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental 
     Affairs of the Senate and the Committee on Homeland Security 
     of the House of Representatives a report that contains a 
     concept of operations for the Program, which shall include a 
     privacy and civil liberties impact assessment.
       (2) Privacy and civil liberties.--
       (A) Review of concept of operations.--Not later than 180 
     days after the date on which the report under paragraph (1) 
     is submitted, the Privacy Officer of the Department of 
     Homeland Security and the Officer for Civil Rights and Civil 
     Liberties of the Department of Homeland Security shall review 
     the privacy and civil liberties implications of the Program 
     and the concept of operations and report any concerns to the 
     Secretary of Homeland Security and the Under Secretary of 
     Homeland Security for Intelligence and Analysis. The 
     Secretary may not implement the Program until the Privacy 
     Officer and the Officer for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties 
     have certified that any privacy or civil liberties concerns 
     have been addressed.
       (B) Review of privacy impact.--Under the authority of 
     section 222(5) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 
     142(5)), not later than one year after the date on which the 
     Homeland Security Information Sharing Fellows Program is 
     implemented, the Privacy Officer of the Department of 
     Homeland Security, in consultation with the Officer for Civil 
     Rights and Civil Liberties of the Department of Homeland 
     Security, shall submit to Congress, the Secretary of Homeland 
     Security, and the Under Secretary of Homeland Security for 
     Intelligence and Analysis a

[[Page H146]]

     report on the privacy and civil liberties impact of the 
     Program.

   Subtitle E--Homeland Security Intelligence Offices Reorganization

     SEC. 741. DEPARTMENTAL REORGANIZATION.

       (a) Redesignation of Directorate for Information Analysis 
     and Infrastructure Protection.--Section 201 of the Homeland 
     Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 121) is amended--
       (1) in subsection (a)(1)--
       (A) by striking ``a Directorate for Information Analysis 
     and Infrastructure Protection'' and inserting ``an Office of 
     Intelligence and Analysis''; and
       (B) by striking ``an Under Secretary for Information 
     Analysis and Infrastructure Protection'' and inserting ``an 
     Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis'';
       (2) by striking subsection (b) and redesignating 
     subsections (c) through (g) as subsections (b) through (f), 
     respectively;
       (3) in subsection (b), as so redesignated--
       (A) by striking ``and infrastructure protection'' before 
     ``are carried out'' and inserting ``and intelligence''; and
       (B) by striking ``the Under Secretary for Information 
     Analysis and Infrastructure Protection'' and inserting ``the 
     Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis'';
       (4) in subsection (c), as so redesignated--
       (A) by striking ``the Under Secretary for Information 
     Analysis and Infrastructure Protection'' and inserting ``the 
     Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis'';
       (B) by striking paragraphs (2), (5), and (6), and 
     redesignating paragraphs (3) through (17) as paragraphs (2) 
     through (14), respectively;
       (C) by redesignating paragraphs (18) and (19) as paragraphs 
     (20) and (21), respectively;
       (D) in paragraph (2), as so redesignated, by striking ``To 
     integrate'' and inserting ``To participate in the integration 
     of'';
       (E) in paragraph (14), as so redesignated, by inserting 
     ``the Assistant Secretary for Infrastructure Protection and'' 
     after ``coordinate with''; and
       (F) by inserting after paragraph (14), as redesignated by 
     subparagraph (B), the following new paragraphs:
       ``(15) To coordinate and enhance integration among 
     intelligence components of the Department.
       ``(16) To establish intelligence priorities, policies, 
     processes, standards, guidelines, and procedures for the 
     Department.
       ``(17) To establish a structure and process to support the 
     missions and goals of the intelligence components of the 
     Department.
       ``(18) To ensure that, whenever possible--
       ``(A) the Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis 
     produces and disseminates reports and analytic products based 
     on open-source information that do not require a national 
     security classification under applicable law; and
       ``(B) such unclassified open source reports are produced 
     and disseminated contemporaneously with reports or analytic 
     products concerning the same or similar information that the 
     Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis produces and 
     disseminates in a classified format.
       ``(19) To establish within the Office of Intelligence 
     Analysis an Internal Continuity of Operations (COOP) Plan 
     that--
       ``(A) assures that the capability exists to continue 
     uninterrupted operations during a wide range of potential 
     emergencies, including localized acts of nature, accidents, 
     and technological or attack-related emergencies, that is 
     maintained at a high level of readiness and is capable of 
     implementation with and without warning; and
       ``(B) includes plans and procedures governing succession to 
     office within the Office of Intelligence and Analysis, 
     including--
       ``(i) emergency delegations of authority (where 
     permissible, and in accordance with applicable law);
       ``(ii) the safekeeping of vital resources, facilities, and 
     records;
       ``(iii) the improvisation or emergency acquisition of vital 
     resources necessary for the performance of operations of the 
     Office; and
       ``(iv) the capability to relocate essential personnel and 
     functions to and to sustain the performance of the operations 
     of the Office at an alternate work site until normal 
     operations can be resumed.'';
       (5) in subsections (d) and (e), as redesignated by 
     subsection (a)(2), by striking ``Directorate'' each place it 
     appears and inserting ``Office''; and
       (6) in subsection (f), as redesignated by subsection 
     (a)(2)--
       (A) by striking ``the Under Secretary for Information 
     Analysis and Infrastructure Protection'' and inserting ``the 
     Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis and the 
     Assistant Secretary for Infrastructure Protection''; and
       (B) by inserting ``and section 203'' after ``under this 
     section''.
       (b) Technical and Conforming Amendments.--
       (1) Homeland security act of 2002.--The Homeland Security 
     Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 101 et seq.) is amended--
       (A) in section 103(a), by adding at the end the following 
     new paragraph:
       ``(10) An Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis.'';
       (B) in section 223, by striking ``Under Secretary for 
     Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection'' and 
     inserting ``Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis, in 
     cooperation with the Assistant Secretary for Infrastructure 
     Protection'';
       (C) in section 224, by striking ``Under Secretary for 
     Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection'' and 
     inserting ``Assistant Secretary for Infrastructure 
     Protection''; and
       (D) in section 302(3), by striking ``Under Secretary for 
     Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection'' and 
     inserting ``Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis and 
     the Assistant Secretary for Infrastructure Protection''.
       (2) Headings.--
       (A) Section 201.--The heading for section 201 of such Act 
     is amended to read as follows:

     ``SEC. 201. OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE AND ANALYSIS.''.

       (B) Section 201(a).--The heading for subsection (a) of 
     section 201 of such Act is amended to read as follows:
       ``(a) Under Secretary of Homeland Security for Intelligence 
     and Analysis.--''.
       (C) Section 201(b).--The heading for subsection (b) of 
     section 201 of such Act, as redesignated by subsection 
     (a)(2), is amended to read as follows:
       ``(b) Discharge of Intelligence and Analysis.--''.
       (3) National security act of 1947.--Section 106(b)(2)(I) of 
     the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-6) is 
     amended to read as follows:
       ``(I) The Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis of 
     the Department of Homeland Security.''.
       (4) Intelligence reform and terrorism prevention act of 
     2004.--Section 7306(a)(1) of the Intelligence Reform and 
     Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (Public Law 108-458; 118 
     Stat. 3848) is amended by striking ``Under Secretary for 
     Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection'' and 
     inserting ``Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis''.

     SEC. 742. INTELLIGENCE COMPONENTS OF DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND 
                   SECURITY.

       (a) Responsibilities.--Subtitle A of title II of the 
     Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 201 et seq.) is 
     further amended by adding at the end the following new 
     section:

     ``SEC. 210. INTELLIGENCE COMPONENTS.

       ``(a) Responsibilities.--Subject to the direction and 
     control of the Secretary, the responsibilities of the head of 
     each intelligence component of the Department are as follows:
       ``(1) To ensure that duties related to the acquisition, 
     analysis, and dissemination of homeland security information 
     are carried out effectively and efficiently in support of the 
     Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis.
       ``(2) To support and implement the goals established in 
     cooperation with the Under Secretary for Intelligence and 
     Analysis.
       ``(3) To incorporate the input of the Under Secretary for 
     Intelligence and Analysis with respect to performance 
     appraisals, bonus or award recommendations, pay adjustments, 
     and other forms of commendation.
       ``(4) To coordinate with the Under Secretary for 
     Intelligence and Analysis in the recruitment and selection of 
     intelligence officials of the intelligence component.
       ``(5) To advise and coordinate with the Under Secretary for 
     Intelligence and Analysis on any plan to reorganize or 
     restructure the intelligence component that would, if 
     implemented, result in realignments of intelligence 
     functions.
       ``(6) To ensure that employees of the intelligence 
     component have knowledge of and comply with the programs and 
     policies established by the Under Secretary for Intelligence 
     and Analysis and other appropriate officials of the 
     Department and that such employees comply with all applicable 
     laws and regulations.
       ``(7) To perform such other duties relating to such 
     responsibilities as the Secretary may provide.
       ``(b) Training of Employees.--The Secretary shall provide 
     training and guidance for employees, officials, and senior 
     executives of the intelligence components of the Department 
     to develop knowledge of laws, regulations, operations, 
     policies, procedures, and programs that are related to the 
     functions of the Department relating to the handling, 
     analysis, dissemination, and acquisition of homeland security 
     information.''.
       (b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents in section 
     1(b) of such Act is further amended by adding at the end of 
     the items relating to such subtitle the following:

``Sec. 210. Intelligence components.''.

     SEC. 743. OFFICE OF INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION.

       (a) Establishment.--Subtitle A of title II of the Homeland 
     Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 201 et seq.) is further 
     amended by adding at the end the following new section:

     ``SEC. 210A. OFFICE OF INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION.

       ``(a) Assistant Secretary for Infrastructure Protection.--
       ``(1) In general.--There shall be in the Department an 
     Office of Infrastructure Protection headed by an Assistant 
     Secretary for Infrastructure Protection.
       ``(2) Responsibilities.--The Assistant Secretary shall 
     assist the Secretary in discharging the responsibilities 
     assigned by the Secretary.
       ``(b) Discharge of Infrastructure Protection.--The 
     Secretary shall ensure that the responsibilities of the 
     Department regarding infrastructure protection are carried 
     out through the Assistant Secretary for Infrastructure 
     Protection.
       ``(c) Responsibilities of Assistant Secretary.--Subject to 
     the direction and control of the Secretary, the 
     responsibilities of

[[Page H147]]

     the Assistant Secretary for Infrastructure Protection shall 
     be as follows:
       ``(1) To carry out comprehensive assessments of the 
     vulnerabilities of the key resources and critical 
     infrastructure of the United States, including the 
     performance of risk assessments to determine the risks posed 
     by particular types of terrorist attacks within the United 
     States (including an assessment of the probability of success 
     of such attacks and the feasibility and potential efficacy of 
     various countermeasures to such attacks).
       ``(2) To participate in the integration of relevant 
     information, analyses, and vulnerability assessments (whether 
     such information, analyses, or assessments are provided or 
     produced by the Department or others) in order to identify 
     priorities for protective and support measures by the 
     Department, other agencies of the Federal Government, State 
     and local government agencies and authorities, the private 
     sector, and other entities.
       ``(3) To develop a comprehensive national plan for securing 
     the key resources and critical infrastructure of the United 
     States, including power production, generation, and 
     distribution systems, information technology and 
     telecommunications systems (including satellites), electronic 
     financial and property record storage and transmission 
     systems, emergency preparedness communications systems, and 
     the physical and technological assets that support such 
     systems.
       ``(4) To recommend measures necessary to protect the key 
     resources and critical infrastructure of the United States in 
     coordination with other agencies of the Federal Government 
     and in cooperation with State and local government agencies 
     and authorities, the private sector, and other entities.
       ``(5) To coordinate with the Under Secretary for 
     Intelligence and Analysis and elements of the intelligence 
     community and with Federal, State, and local law enforcement 
     agencies, and the private sector, as appropriate.
       ``(6) To perform such other duties as assigned by the 
     Secretary under this Act.
       ``(d) Staff.--
       ``(1) In general.--The Secretary shall provide the Office 
     with a staff having appropriate expertise and experience to 
     assist the Assistant Secretary in discharging 
     responsibilities under this section.
       ``(2) Private sector staff.--Staff under this subsection 
     may include staff from the private sector.
       ``(3) Security clearances.--Staff under this subsection 
     shall possess security clearances appropriate for their work 
     under this section.
       ``(e) Detail of Personnel.--
       ``(1) In general.--In order to assist the Office in 
     discharging responsibilities under this section, personnel of 
     other Federal agencies may be detailed to the Department for 
     the performance of analytic functions and related duties.
       ``(2) Cooperative agreements.--The Secretary and the head 
     of the agency concerned may enter into cooperative agreements 
     for the purpose of detailing personnel under this subsection.
       ``(3) Basis.--The detail of personnel under this subsection 
     may be on a reimbursable or non-reimbursable basis.''.
       (b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents in section 
     1(b) of such Act is further amended by adding at the end of 
     the items relating to such subtitle the following:

``Sec. 210A. Office of Infrastructure Protection.''.

 TITLE VIII--PROTECTING PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES WHILE EFFECTIVELY 
                           FIGHTING TERRORISM

        Subtitle A--Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Boards

     SEC. 801. SHORT TITLE.

       This subtitle may be cited as the ``Protection of Civil 
     Liberties Act''.

     SEC. 802. FINDINGS.

       Congress finds the following:
       (1) On July 22, 2004 the National Commission on Terrorist 
     Attacks Upon the United States issued a report that included 
     41 specific recommendations to help prevent future terrorist 
     attacks, including details of a global strategy and 
     government reorganization necessary to implement that 
     strategy.
       (2) One of the recommendations focused on the protections 
     of civil liberties. Specifically the following recommendation 
     was made: ``At this time of increased and consolidated 
     government authority, there should be a board within the 
     executive branch to oversee adherence to the guidelines we 
     recommend and the commitment the government makes to defend 
     our civil liberties.''.
       (3) The report also states that ``the choice between 
     security and liberty is a false choice, as nothing is more 
     likely to endanger America's liberties than the success of a 
     terrorist attack at home. Our History has shown that the 
     insecurity threatens liberty at home. Yet if our liberties 
     are curtailed, we lose the values that we are struggling to 
     defend.''.
       (4) On December 17, 2004, Public Law 108-458, the National 
     Intelligence Reform Act, was signed into law. This law 
     created a civil liberties board that does not have the 
     authority necessary to protect civil liberties.

     SEC. 803. MAKING THE PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT 
                   BOARD INDEPENDENT.

       Section 1061(b) of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism 
     Prevention Act of 2004 (5 U.S.C. 601 note) is amended by 
     striking ``within the Executive Office of the President'' and 
     inserting ``as an independent agency within the Executive 
     branch''.

     SEC. 804. REQUIRING ALL MEMBERS OF THE PRIVACY AND CIVIL 
                   LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BOARD BE CONFIRMED BY THE 
                   SENATE.

       Subsection (e) of section 1061 of the Intelligence Reform 
     and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (5 U.S.C. 601 note) is 
     amended to read as follows:
       ``(e) Membership.--
       ``(1) Members.--The Board shall be composed of a full-time 
     chairman and 4 additional members, who shall be appointed by 
     the President by no later than 6 months after the date of the 
     enactment of the Protection of Civil Liberties Act, by and 
     with the advice and consent of the Senate, which shall move 
     expeditiously following each nomination.
       ``(2) Qualifications.--Members of the Board shall be 
     selected solely on the basis of their professional 
     qualifications, achievements, public stature, expertise in 
     civil liberties and privacy, and relevant experience, and 
     without regard to political affiliation, but in no event 
     shall more than 3 members of the Board be members of the same 
     political party. The President shall, before appointing an 
     individual who is not a member of the same political party as 
     the President consult with the leadership of that party, if 
     any, in the Senate and House of Representatives.
       ``(3) Incompatible office.--An individual appointed to the 
     Board may not, while serving on the Board, be an elected 
     official, officer, or employee of the Federal Government, 
     other than in the capacity as a member of the Board.
       ``(4) Term.--Each member of the Board shall serve a term of 
     six years, except that--
       ``(A) a member appointed to a term of office after the 
     commencement of such term may serve under such appointment 
     only for the remainder of such term;
       ``(B) upon the expiration of the term of office of a 
     member, the member shall continue to serve until the member's 
     successor has been appointed and qualified, except that no 
     member may serve under this subparagraph--
       ``(i) for more than 60 days when Congress is in session 
     unless a nomination to fill the vacancy shall have been 
     submitted to the Senate; or
       ``(ii) after the adjournment sine die of the session of the 
     Senate in which such nomination is submitted; and
       ``(C) the members initially appointed under this subsection 
     shall serve terms of two, three, four, five, and six years, 
     respectively, from the effective date of this Act, with the 
     term of each such member to be designated by the President.
       ``(5) Quorum and meetings.--The Board shall meet upon the 
     call of the chairman or a majority of its members. Three 
     members of the Board shall constitute a quorum.''.

     SEC. 805. SUBPOENA POWER FOR THE PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES 
                   OVERSIGHT BOARD.

       Section 1061(d) of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism 
     Prevention Act of 2004 (5 U.S.C. 601 note) is amended--
       (1) so that subparagraph (D) of paragraph (1) reads as 
     follows:
       ``(D) require, by subpoena issued at the direction of a 
     majority of the members of the Board, persons (other than 
     departments, agencies, and elements of the executive branch) 
     to produce any relevant information, documents, reports, 
     answers, records, accounts, papers, and other documentary or 
     testimonial evidence.''; and
       (2) so that paragraph (2) reads as follows:
       ``(2) Enforcement of subpoena.--In the case of contumacy or 
     failure to obey a subpoena issued under paragraph (1)(D), the 
     United States district court for the judicial district in 
     which the subpoenaed person resides, is served, or may be 
     found may issue an order requiring such person to produce the 
     evidence required by such subpoena.''.

     SEC. 806. REPORTING REQUIREMENTS.

       (a) Duties of Board.--Paragraph (4) of section 1061(c) of 
     the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 
     (5 U.S.C. 601 note) is amended to read as follows:
       ``(4) Reports.--
       ``(A) Receipt, review, and submission.--
       ``(i) In general.--The Board shall--

       ``(I) receive and review reports from privacy officers and 
     civil liberties officers described in section 212; and
       ``(II) periodically submit, not less than semiannually, 
     reports to the appropriate congressional committees, 
     including the Committees on the Judiciary of the Senate and 
     the House of Representatives, the Committee on Homeland 
     Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate, the 
     Committee on Oversight and Government Reform of the House of 
     Representatives, the Select Committee on Intelligence of the 
     Senate, and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of 
     the House of Representatives, the Committee on Homeland 
     Security of the House of Representatives, and to the 
     President.

     Such reports shall be in unclassified form to the greatest 
     extent possible, with a classified annex where necessary.
       ``(ii) Contents.--Not less than 2 reports the Board submits 
     each year under clause (i)(II) shall include--

       ``(I) a description of the major activities of the Board 
     during the preceding period;

[[Page H148]]

       ``(II) information on the findings, conclusions, and 
     recommendations of the Board resulting from its advice and 
     oversight functions under subsection (c);
       ``(III) the minority views on any findings, conclusions, 
     and recommendations of the Board resulting from its advice 
     and oversight functions under subsection (c); and
       ``(IV) each proposal reviewed by the Board under subsection 
     (c)(1) that the Board advised against implementing, but that 
     notwithstanding such advice, was implemented.

       ``(B) Informing the public.--The Board shall--
       ``(i) make its reports, including its reports to Congress, 
     available to the public to the greatest extent that is 
     consistent with the protection of classified information and 
     applicable law; and
       ``(ii) hold public hearings and otherwise inform the public 
     of its activities, as appropriate and in a manner consistent 
     with the protection of classified information and applicable 
     law.''.
       (b) Privacy and Civil Liberties Officers.--
       (1) Designation of officers.--Section 1062 of the 
     Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (118 
     Stat. 3688) is amended to read as follows:

     ``SEC. 1062. PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES OFFICERS.

       ``(a) Designation and Functions.--The Attorney General, the 
     Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, the Secretary 
     of the Treasury, the Secretary of Health and Human Services, 
     the Secretary of Homeland Security, the National Intelligence 
     Director, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, 
     any other entity within the intelligence community (as 
     defined in section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 
     U.S.C. 401a)), and the head of any other department, agency, 
     or element of the executive branch designated by the Privacy 
     and Civil Liberties Oversight Board to be appropriate for 
     coverage under this section shall designate not less than 1 
     senior officer to--
       ``(1) assist the head of such department, agency, or 
     element and other officials of such department, agency, or 
     element in appropriately considering privacy and civil 
     liberties concerns when such officials are proposing, 
     developing, or implementing laws, regulations, policies, 
     procedures, or guidelines related to efforts to protect the 
     Nation against terrorism;
       ``(2) periodically investigate and review department, 
     agency, or element actions, policies, procedures, guidelines, 
     and related laws and their implementation to ensure that such 
     department, agency, or element is adequately considering 
     privacy and civil liberties in its actions;
       ``(3) ensure that such department, agency, or element has 
     adequate procedures to receive, investigate, respond to, and 
     redress complaints from individuals who allege such 
     department, agency, or element has violated their privacy or 
     civil liberties; and
       ``(4) in providing advice on proposals to retain or enhance 
     a particular governmental power the officer shall consider 
     whether such department, agency, or element has established--
       ``(A) that the power actually enhances security and the 
     need for the power is balanced with the need to protect 
     privacy and civil liberties;
       ``(B) that there is adequate supervision of the use by such 
     department, agency, or element of the power to ensure 
     protection of privacy and civil liberties; and
       ``(C) that there are adequate guidelines and oversight to 
     properly confine its use.
       ``(b) Exception to Designation Authority.--
       ``(1) Privacy officers.--In any department, agency, or 
     element referred to in subsection (a) or designated by the 
     Board, which has a statutorily created privacy officer, such 
     officer shall perform the functions specified in subsection 
     (a) with respect to privacy.
       ``(2) Civil liberties officers.--In any department, agency, 
     or element referred to in subsection (a) or designated by the 
     Board, which has a statutorily created civil liberties 
     officer, such officer shall perform the functions specified 
     in subsection (a) with respect to civil liberties.
       ``(c) Supervision and Coordination.--Each privacy officer 
     or civil liberties officer described in subsection (a) or (b) 
     shall--
       ``(1) report directly to the head of the department, 
     agency, or element concerned; and
       ``(2) coordinate their activities with the Inspector 
     General of such department, agency, or element to avoid 
     duplication of effort.
       ``(d) Agency Cooperation.--The head of each department, 
     agency, or element shall ensure that each privacy officer and 
     civil liberties officer--
       ``(1) has the information, material, and resources 
     necessary to fulfill the functions of such officer;
       ``(2) is advised of proposed policy changes;
       ``(3) is consulted by decisionmakers; and
       ``(4) is given access to material and personnel the officer 
     determines to be necessary to carry out the functions of such 
     officer.
       ``(e) Reprisal for Making Complaint.--No action 
     constituting a reprisal, or threat of reprisal, for making a 
     complaint or for disclosing information to a privacy officer 
     or civil liberties officer described in subsection (a) or 
     (b), or to the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board, 
     that indicates a possible violation of privacy protections or 
     civil liberties in the administration of the programs and 
     operations of the Federal Government relating to efforts to 
     protect the Nation from terrorism shall be taken by any 
     Federal employee in a position to take such action, unless 
     the complaint was made or the information was disclosed with 
     the knowledge that it was false or with willful disregard for 
     its truth or falsity.
       ``(f) Periodic Reports.--
       ``(1) In general.--The privacy officers and civil liberties 
     officers of each department, agency, or element referred to 
     or described in subsection (a) or (b) shall periodically, but 
     not less than quarterly, submit a report on the activities of 
     such officers--
       ``(A)(i) to the appropriate congressional committees, 
     including the Committees on the Judiciary of the Senate and 
     the House of Representatives, the Committee on Homeland 
     Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate, the 
     Committee on Oversight and Government Reform of the House of 
     Representatives, the Select Committee on Intelligence of the 
     Senate, and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of 
     the House of Representatives;
       ``(ii) to the head of such department, agency, or element; 
     and
       ``(iii) to the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board; 
     and
       ``(B) which shall be in unclassified form to the greatest 
     extent possible, with a classified annex where necessary.
       ``(2) Contents.--Each report submitted under paragraph (1) 
     shall include information on the discharge of each of the 
     functions of the officer concerned, including--
       ``(A) information on the number and types of reviews 
     undertaken;
       ``(B) the type of advice provided and the response given to 
     such advice;
       ``(C) the number and nature of the complaints received by 
     the department, agency, or element concerned for alleged 
     violations; and
       ``(D) a summary of the disposition of such complaints, the 
     reviews and inquiries conducted, and the impact of the 
     activities of such officer.
       ``(g) Informing the Public.--Each privacy officer and civil 
     liberties officer shall--
       ``(1) make the reports of such officer, including reports 
     to Congress, available to the public to the greatest extent 
     that is consistent with the protection of classified 
     information and applicable law; and
       ``(2) otherwise inform the public of the activities of such 
     officer, as appropriate and in a manner consistent with the 
     protection of classified information and applicable law.
       ``(h) Savings Clause.--Nothing in this section shall be 
     construed to limit or otherwise supplant any other 
     authorities or responsibilities provided by law to privacy 
     officers or civil liberties officers.
       ``(i) Protections for Human Research Subjects.--The 
     Secretary of Homeland Security shall ensure that the 
     Department of Homeland Security complies with the protections 
     for human research subjects, as described in part 46 of title 
     45, Code of Federal Regulations, or in equivalent regulations 
     as promulgated by such Secretary, with respect to research 
     that is conducted or supported by such Department.''.
       (2) Clerical amendment.--The table of contents in section 
     1(b) of such Act is amended by striking the item relating to 
     section 1062 and inserting the following:

``Sec. 1062. Privacy and civil liberties officers.''.

         Subtitle B--Enhancement of Privacy Officer Authorities

     SEC. 811. SHORT TITLE.

       This subtitle may be cited as the ``Privacy Officer With 
     Enhanced Rights Act of 2007'' or the ``POWER Act''.

     SEC. 812. AUTHORITIES OF THE PRIVACY OFFICER OF THE 
                   DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY.

       Section 222 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 
     142) is amended--
       (1) by inserting before the first sentence the following: 
     ``(a) Appointment and Responsibilities.--''; and
       (2) by adding at the end the following:
       ``(b) Authority to Investigate.--
       ``(1) In general.--The senior official appointed under this 
     section is specifically authorized--
       ``(A) to have access to all records, reports, audits, 
     reviews, documents, papers, recommendations, and other 
     materials available to the Department that relate to programs 
     and operations with respect to which the senior official has 
     responsibilities under this section;
       ``(B) to make such investigations and reports relating to 
     the administration of the programs and operations of the 
     Department as are, in the senior official's judgment, 
     necessary or desirable;
       ``(C) to require by subpoena the production, by persons 
     other than Federal agencies, of all information, documents, 
     reports, answers, records, accounts, papers, and other data 
     and documentary evidence necessary to performance of the 
     functions of the senior official under this section;
       ``(D) to administer to or take from any person an oath, 
     affirmation, or affidavit, whenever necessary to performance 
     of the functions of the senior official under this section; 
     and
       ``(E) to take any other action that may be taken by the 
     Inspector General of the Department, as necessary to require 
     employees of the Department to produce documents and answer 
     questions relevant to performance of the functions of the 
     senior official under this section.
       ``(2) Enforcement of subpoenas.--Any subpoena issued under 
     paragraph (1)(C) shall,

[[Page H149]]

     in the case of contumacy or refusal to obey, be enforceable 
     by order of any appropriate United States district court.
       ``(3) Effect of oaths, etc.--Any oath, affirmation, or 
     affidavit administered or taken under paragraph (1)(D) by or 
     before an employee of the Privacy Office designated for that 
     purpose by the senior official appointed under subsection (a) 
     shall have the same force and effect as if administered or 
     taken by or before an officer having a seal of office.
       ``(c) Term of Office.--The term of appointment of a senior 
     official under subsection (a) shall be 5 years.
       ``(d) Reports to Congress.--The senior official appointed 
     under subsection (a) shall submit reports directly to 
     Congress regarding performance of the responsibilities of the 
     senior official under this section, without any prior comment 
     or amendment by the Secretary, Deputy Secretary, or any other 
     officer or employee of the Department or the Office of 
     Management and Budget.''.

          TITLE IX--IMPROVING CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY

     SEC. 901. VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT AND REPORT ON CRITICAL 
                   INFRASTRUCTURE INFORMATION.

       (a) In General.--Subtitle B of title II of the Homeland 
     Security Act of 2002 is amended by adding at the end the 
     following new section:

     ``SEC. 216. ANNUAL CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE VULNERABILITY 
                   ASSESSMENT AND REPORT.

       ``(a) Vulnerability Assessment Required.--Except where a 
     vulnerability assessment is required under another provision 
     of law, for each fiscal year, the Secretary, acting through 
     the Assistant Secretary for Infrastructure Protection 
     pursuant to the responsibilities under section 210A, shall 
     prepare a vulnerability assessment of the critical 
     infrastructure information available to the Secretary with 
     respect to that fiscal year. Each vulnerability assessment 
     shall contain any actions or countermeasures proposed or 
     recommended by the Secretary to address security concerns 
     covered in the assessment. The information in each such 
     assessment shall be set forth separately for each critical 
     infrastructure sector, including the critical infrastructure 
     sectors named in Homeland Security Presidential Directive-7, 
     as in effect on January 1, 2006.
       ``(b) Annual Report to Congress.--
       ``(1) Report required.--Not later than six months after the 
     last day of a fiscal year, the Secretary shall submit to the 
     Committee on Homeland Security of the House of 
     Representatives and the Committee on Homeland Security and 
     Governmental Affairs of the Senate a report containing a 
     summary and review of the vulnerability assessments prepared 
     by the Secretary under subsection (a) for that fiscal year 
     and the two preceding fiscal years. The information in the 
     report shall be set forth separately for each of the critical 
     infrastructure sectors described in subsection (a).
       ``(2) Contents of report.--The Secretary shall include in 
     the report required under paragraph (1)--
       ``(A) for each critical infrastructure sector covered by 
     the report, a summary comparison describing any changes 
     between the vulnerability assessment for the fiscal year 
     covered by the report and the vulnerability assessment for 
     the preceding fiscal year;
       ``(B) the explanation and comments of the Secretary with 
     respect to the greatest risks to critical infrastructure for 
     each such sector; and
       ``(C) the recommendations of the Secretary for mitigating 
     such risks.
       ``(3) Classified annex.--The report required under 
     paragraph (1) may contain a classified annex.''.
       (b) Technical Amendment.--Section 212(3) of such Act (6 
     U.S.C. 131(3)) is amended--
       (1) by inserting ``relating to'' after ``the security of 
     critical infrastructure or protected systems''; and
       (2) in subparagraph (A), by inserting ``the'' after 
     ``(A)''.
       (c) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents in section 
     1(b) of such Act is amended by inserting after the item 
     relating to section 215 the following new item:

``Sec. 216. Annual critical infrastructure vulnerability assessment and 
              report.''.

     SEC. 902. NATIONAL ASSET DATABASE AND THE NATIONAL AT-RISK 
                   DATABASE.

       (a) In General.--Subtitle A of title II of the Homeland 
     Security Act of 2002 is amended by adding at the end the 
     following new sections:

     ``SEC. 210C. NATIONAL ASSET DATABASE AND NATIONAL AT-RISK 
                   DATABASE.

       ``(a) Establishment.--
       ``(1) National asset database.--The Secretary shall 
     establish and maintain a national database of nationwide 
     critical infrastructure assets to identify and prioritize 
     critical infrastructure and key resources and to protect them 
     from terrorist attack. The database shall be known as the 
     `National Asset Database'.
       ``(2) National at-risk database.--The Secretary shall 
     establish within the National Asset Database, a database 
     containing a list of the infrastructure the Secretary 
     determines is most at risk, to be known as the `National At-
     Risk Database'.
       ``(3) National asset database consortium.--
       ``(A) Establishment.--The Secretary shall establish a 
     consortium to be known as the `National Asset Database 
     Consortium'. The Consortium shall advise the Secretary on the 
     best way to identify, generate, organize, and maintain the 
     databases described in paragraphs (1) and (2) and shall be 
     made up of at least two but not more than four national 
     laboratories and the heads of such other Federal agencies as 
     the Secretary deems appropriate.
       ``(B) Administration and consultation.--The Secretary 
     shall--
       ``(i) select as members of the National Asset Database 
     Consortium national laboratories or Federal agencies that 
     have demonstrated experience working with and identifying 
     critical infrastructure;
       ``(ii) enter into contracts, as necessary, with the members 
     of the National Asset Database Consortium to perform the 
     tasks required under this section; and
       ``(iii) solicit and receive comments from the National 
     Asset Database Consortium on--

       ``(I) the appropriateness of the protection and risk 
     methodologies in the National Infrastructure Protection Plan 
     or other nationwide infrastructure protection plan issued by 
     the Department; and
       ``(II) alternative means to define risk and identify 
     specific criteria to prioritize the most at-risk 
     infrastructure or key resources.

       ``(b) Use of Database.--The Secretary shall use the 
     database established under subsection (a)--
       ``(1) in the development, coordination, integration, and 
     implementation of plans and programs, including to identify, 
     catalog, prioritize, and protect critical infrastructure and 
     key resources in accordance with Homeland Security 
     Presidential Directive number 7, and in cooperation with all 
     levels of government and private sector entities that the 
     Secretary considers appropriate; and
       ``(2) in providing any covered grant to assist in 
     preventing, reducing, mitigating, or responding to terrorist 
     attack.
       ``(c) Maintenance of Database.--
       ``(1) In general.--The Secretary shall maintain and 
     annually update the database, including by--
       ``(A) annually defining and systematically examining assets 
     in the database that are described incorrectly or that do not 
     meet national assets guidelines used by the Secretary to 
     determine which assets should remain in the National Asset 
     Database and the National At-Risk Database;
       ``(B) annually providing a list to the States of assets 
     referred to in subparagraph (A) for review before finalizing 
     the decision of which assets to include in the National Asset 
     Database and the National At-Risk Database;
       ``(C) reviewing the guidelines to the States to ensure 
     consistency and uniformity for inclusion and how the 
     Department intends to use that data;
       ``(D) meeting annually with the States to provide guidance 
     and clarification of the guidelines to promote consistency 
     and uniformity in submissions;
       ``(E) utilizing on an ongoing basis the National Asset 
     Database and other expert panels established by the 
     Department to review and refine the National Asset Database 
     and the National At-Risk Database; and
       ``(F) utilizing the Department's National Infrastructure 
     Simulation and Analysis Center for the National Asset 
     Database taxonomy and asset information in the National Asset 
     Database and facilitating the future exchange of information 
     between the National Asset Database and such center.
       ``(2) Organization of information in database.--The 
     Secretary shall--
       ``(A) remove from the National Asset Database or the 
     National At-Risk Database any asset that the Secretary 
     determines to be unverifiable and as not meeting national 
     asset guidelines set forth by the Secretary in requests for 
     information from States; and
       ``(B) classify assets in the database according to the 17 
     sectors listed in National Infrastructure Protection Plan 
     developed pursuant to Homeland Security Presidential 
     Directive 7, to ensure that the assets in the National Asset 
     Database and the National At-Risk Database can be categorized 
     by State and locality, regionally, and in such a manner as is 
     effective for grants and other purposes.
       ``(3) Milestones and guidelines.--The Secretary shall--
       ``(A) identify and evaluate key milestones for the National 
     Asset Database and the National At-Risk Database, including 
     methods to integrate private sector assets and tasks that 
     must be completed to eventually allocate homeland security 
     grant programs based on the information contained in the 
     database; and
       ``(B) issue guidelines for--
       ``(i) States to submit uniform information for possible 
     inclusion in the National Asset Database or the National At-
     Risk Database; and
       ``(ii) review of such submissions by the Department.
       ``(d) Reports.--
       ``(1) In general.--Not later than March 1 of each year, the 
     Secretary shall submit to the Committee on Homeland Security 
     of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Homeland 
     Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate a report on 
     the critical infrastructure included in the National Asset 
     Database that is most at risk to terrorism.
       ``(2) Contents.--Each report shall include the following:
       ``(A) The name, location, and sector classification of 
     assets in the National Asset Database that have been 
     identified or deemed critical infrastructure that is most at 
     risk to terrorism.

[[Page H150]]

       ``(B) Changes made in such database regarding such critical 
     infrastructure made during the period covered by the report 
     regarding--
       ``(i) defining and identifying critical infrastructure; and
       ``(ii) compiling a usable database.
       ``(C) The extent to which the database has been used as a 
     tool for allocating funds to prevent, reduce, mitigate, and 
     respond to terrorist attacks.
       ``(3) Classified information.--The Secretary shall provide 
     to the members of the committees to which the report required 
     under this subsection is required to be submitted under 
     paragraph (1) a classified briefing on the contents of such 
     report. The Secretary shall also submit with each report a 
     classified annex containing information required to be 
     submitted under this section that cannot be made public.
       ``(e) Covered Grant Defined.--In this section, the term 
     `covered grant' means any grant provided by the Department 
     under any of the following:
       ``(1) The Urban Area Security Initiative.
       ``(2) The Buffer Zone Protection Program.
       ``(3) Any other grant program administered by the 
     Department, as determined appropriate by the Secretary.
       ``(4) Any successor to a program referred to in this 
     paragraph.''.
       (b) Deadlines for Implementation and Notification of 
     Congress.--
       (1) Deadline for recommendations.--Not later than 60 days 
     after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of 
     Homeland Security shall secure recommendations on how to 
     identify, generate, organize, and maintain the list of assets 
     in the databases from the consortium of national 
     laboratories, as required under section 210C(a)(2) of the 
     Homeland Security Act of 2002, as added by subsection (a).
       (2) Deadline for first report regarding use of the national 
     asset database.--Notwithstanding the date specified under 
     section 210C(d) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002, as 
     added by subsection (a), the Secretary of Homeland Security 
     shall submit the first report required under that section not 
     later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this 
     Act.
       (c) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents in section 
     1(b) of such Act is further amended by inserting after the 
     item relating to section 210 the following:

``Sec. 210C. National Asset Database and National At-Risk Database.''.

       (d) Submittal of Certain Reports.--Each report that is 
     authorized or required by this Act (or the amendments made by 
     this Act) to be prepared by the Secretary of Homeland 
     Security and that concerns a matter of the type carried out 
     under an program under the jurisdiction of the Committee on 
     Energy and Commerce of the House of Representatives shall be 
     submitted to the Committee on Energy and Commerce of the 
     House of Representatives, in addition to the other 
     congressional committees involved.

   TITLE X--TRANSPORTATION SECURITY PLANNING AND INFORMATION SHARING

     SEC. 1001. STRATEGIC TRANSPORTATION SECURITY INFORMATION 
                   SHARING.

       Section 114 of title 49, United States Code, is amended by 
     adding at the end the following:
       ``(u) Strategic Information Sharing.--
       ``(1) Establishment of plan.--The Secretary of Homeland 
     Security shall establish a Strategic Transportation Security 
     Information Sharing Plan.
       ``(2) Purpose of plan.--The plan shall ensure the robust 
     development of tactical and strategic intelligence products 
     for disseminating to public and private stakeholders security 
     information relating to threats to and vulnerabilities of 
     transportation modes, including aviation, bridge and tunnel, 
     commuter rail and ferry, highway, maritime, pipeline, rail, 
     mass transit, and over-the-road bus transportation.
       ``(3) Content of plan.--The plan shall include--
       ``(A) a description of how intelligence analysts in the 
     Transportation Security Administration are coordinating their 
     activities with other intelligence analysts in the Department 
     of Homeland Security and other Federal, State, and local 
     agencies;
       ``(B) reasonable deadlines for completing any 
     organizational changes within the Department of Homeland 
     Security required to accommodate implementation of the plan; 
     and
       ``(C) a description of resource needs for fulfilling the 
     plan.
       ``(4) Reports to congress.--
       ``(A) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date 
     of enactment of this subsection, the Secretary shall submit 
     to the appropriate congressional committees a report 
     containing the plan.
       ``(B) Updates.--
       ``(i) Certification of full implementation.--After 
     achieving full implementation of the plan, the Secretary 
     shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a 
     written certification of such implementation.
       ``(ii) Updates on implementation.--Not later than 90 days 
     after the date of submission of a report under subparagraph 
     (A), and every 90 days thereafter until the date of 
     submission of a written certification under clause (i), the 
     Secretary shall submit to the appropriate congressional 
     committees a report containing an update on implementation of 
     the plan.
       ``(C) Annual report.--Following the date of submission of a 
     written certification under subparagraph (B)(i), the 
     Secretary shall submit to the appropriate congressional 
     committees an annual report on the following:
       ``(i) The number of transportation intelligence reports 
     disseminated under the plan and a brief description of each 
     report.
       ``(ii) The security classification of each report.
       ``(iii) The number of public and private stakeholders who 
     were provided with each report.
       ``(5) Survey.--The Secretary shall conduct an annual survey 
     of the satisfaction of each of the recipients of 
     transportation intelligence reports disseminated under the 
     plan, and include the results of the survey as part of the 
     annual report to be submitted under paragraph (4)(C).
       ``(6) Security clearances.--The Secretary shall ensure that 
     public and private stakeholders have the security clearances 
     needed to receive classified information if information 
     contained in transportation intelligence reports cannot be 
     disseminated in an unclassified format.
       ``(7) Classification of material.--To the greatest extent 
     possible, the Secretary shall provide public and private 
     stakeholders with specific and actionable information in an 
     unclassified format.
       ``(8) Definitions.--In this subsection, the following 
     definitions apply:
       ``(A) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term 
     `appropriate congressional committees' has the meaning given 
     that term in subsection (t).
       ``(B) Plan.--The term `plan' means the Strategic 
     Transportation Security Information Sharing Plan established 
     under paragraph (1).
       ``(C) Public and private stakeholders.--The term `public 
     and private stakeholders' means Federal, State, and local 
     agencies, tribal governments, and appropriate private 
     entities, including nonprofit employee labor 
     organizations.''.

     SEC. 1002. TRANSPORTATION SECURITY STRATEGIC PLANNING.

       (a) In General.--Section 114(t)(1)(B) of title 49, United 
     States Code, is amended to read as follows:
       ``(B) transportation modal security plans addressing risks, 
     threats, and vulnerabilities for aviation, bridge and tunnel, 
     commuter rail and ferry, highway, maritime, pipeline, rail, 
     mass transit, over-the-road bus, and other public 
     transportation infrastructure assets.''.
       (b) Role of Secretary of Transportation.--Section 114(t)(2) 
     of such title is amended by inserting before the period at 
     the end the following: ``and in carrying out all other 
     responsibilities set forth in this subsection''.
       (c) Contents of National Strategy for Transportation 
     Security.--Section 114(t)(3) of such title is amended--
       (1) in subparagraph (B) by inserting ``, based on 
     vulnerability assessments conducted by the Department of 
     Homeland Security,'' after ``risk-based priorities'';
       (2) in subparagraph (D)--
       (A) by striking ``and local'' and inserting ``, local, and 
     tribal''; and
       (B) by striking ``private sector cooperation and 
     participation'' and inserting ``cooperation and participation 
     by private sector entities, including nonprofit employee 
     labor organizations,'';
       (3) in subparagraph (E)--
       (A) by striking ``response'' and inserting ``prevention, 
     response,''; and
       (B) by inserting ``and outside of'' before ``the United 
     States''; and
       (4) in subparagraph (F) by adding at the end the following: 
     ``Research and development projects initiated by the 
     Department of Homeland Security shall be based on such 
     prioritization.''.
       (d) Periodic Progress Report.--Section 114(t)(4)(C) is 
     amended--
       (1) in clause (i) by inserting before the period at the end 
     the following: ``, including the transportation modal 
     security plans'';
       (2) by striking clause (ii) and inserting the following:
       ``(ii) Content.--Each progress report submitted under this 
     subparagraph shall include, at a minimum, the following:

       ``(I) Recommendations for improving and implementing the 
     National Strategy for Transportation Security and the 
     transportation modal security plans that the Secretary, in 
     consultation with the Secretary of Transportation, considers 
     appropriate.
       ``(II) An accounting of all grants for transportation 
     security, including grants for research and development, 
     distributed by the Department of Homeland Security in the 
     previous year and a description of how the grants 
     accomplished the goals of the National Strategy for 
     Transportation Security.
       ``(III) An accounting of all funds (other than grants 
     referred in subclause (II)) expended by the Department of 
     Homeland Security on transportation security.
       ``(IV) Information on the number of employees of the 
     Department of Homeland Security, by agency, working on 
     transportation security issues. The listing shall be divided 
     by transportation mode, including aviation, bridge and 
     tunnel, commuter rail and ferry, highway, maritime, pipeline, 
     rail, mass transit, over-the-road bus, and other public 
     transportation modes. The listing shall include information, 
     by transportation mode, on the number of contractors hired by 
     the Department of Homeland Security to work on 
     transportation-related security.

[[Page H151]]

       ``(V) Information on the turnover in the previous year 
     among employees of the Department of Homeland Security 
     working on transportation security issues. Specifically, the 
     report shall provide information on the number of employees 
     who have left the Department, their agency, the area in which 
     they worked, and the amount of time that they worked for the 
     Department.

       ``(iii) Written explanation of transportation security 
     activities not delineated in the national strategy for 
     transportation security.--Before carrying out a 
     transportation security activity that is not clearly 
     delineated in the National Strategy for Transportation 
     Security, the Secretary shall submit to appropriate 
     congressional committees a written explanation of the 
     activity, including the amount of funds to be expended for 
     the activity.''.
       (e) Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined.--Section 
     114(t)(4)(E) of such title is amended by striking ``Select''.
       (f) Priority Status.--Section 114(t)(5)(B) of such title is 
     amended--
       (1) by striking ``and'' at the end of clause (iii);
       (2) by redesignating clause (iv) as clause (v); and
       (3) by inserting after clause (iii) the following:
       ``(iv) the transportation sector specific plan required 
     under Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7; and''.
       (g) Coordination; Plan Distribution.--Section 114(t) of 
     such title is amended by adding at the end the following:
       ``(6) Coordination.--In carrying out the responsibilities 
     set forth in this section, the Secretary of Homeland 
     Security, working with the Secretary of Transportation, shall 
     consult with Federal, State, and local agencies, tribal 
     governments, private sector entities (including nonprofit 
     employee labor organizations), institutions of higher 
     learning, and other appropriate entities.
       ``(7) Plan distribution.--The Secretary of Homeland 
     Security shall provide an unclassified version of the 
     National Strategy for Transportation Security to Federal, 
     State, and local agencies, tribal governments, private sector 
     entities (including nonprofit employee labor organizations), 
     institutions of higher learning, and other appropriate 
     entities.''.

                 TITLE XI--PRIVATE SECTOR PREPAREDNESS

     SEC. 1101. PARTICIPATION OF PRIVATE SECTOR ORGANIZATIONS IN 
                   EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE ACTIVITIES.

       (a) Establishment of Preparedness Program.--Section 519 of 
     the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 318) is amended--
       (1) by striking the section heading and inserting the 
     following:

     ``SEC. 519. PARTICIPATION OF PRIVATE SECTOR ORGANIZATIONS IN 
                   EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE 
                   ACTIVITIES.'';

       (2) by inserting ``(a) Use of Private Sector Networks in 
     Emergency Response.--'' before ``To the maximum''; and
       (3) by adding at the end the following:
       ``(b) Private Sector Emergency Preparedness Program.--
       ``(1) Preparedness program.--Not later than 90 days after 
     the date of enactment of this subsection, the Secretary shall 
     develop and implement a program to enhance private sector 
     preparedness for acts of terrorism and other emergencies and 
     disasters through the promotion of the use of voluntary 
     consensus standards.
       ``(2) Program elements.--In carrying out the program, the 
     Secretary shall develop guidance and identify best practices 
     to assist or foster action by the private sector in--
       ``(A) identifying hazards and assessing risks and impacts;
       ``(B) mitigating the impacts of a wide variety of hazards, 
     including weapons of mass destruction;
       ``(C) managing necessary emergency preparedness and 
     response resources;
       ``(D) developing mutual aid agreements;
       ``(E) developing and maintaining emergency preparedness and 
     response plans, as well as associated operational procedures;
       ``(F) developing and conducting training and exercises to 
     support and evaluate emergency preparedness and response 
     plans and operational procedures;
       ``(G) developing and conducting training programs for 
     security guards to implement emergency preparedness and 
     response plans and operations procedures; and
       ``(H) developing procedures to respond to external requests 
     for information from the media and the public.
       ``(3) Standards.--
       ``(A) In general.--The Secretary shall support the 
     development of, promulgate, and regularly update as necessary 
     national voluntary consensus standards for private sector 
     emergency preparedness that will enable private sector 
     organizations to achieve optimal levels of emergency 
     preparedness as soon as practicable. Such standards shall 
     include the National Fire Protection Association 1600 
     Standard on Disaster/Emergency Management and Business 
     Continuity Programs.
       ``(B) Consultation.--The Secretary shall carry out 
     paragraph (1) in consultation with the Assistant Secretary 
     for Infrastructure Protection, the Assistant Secretary for 
     Cyber Security and Communications, the Under Secretary for 
     Science and Technology, the Director of the Federal Emergency 
     Management Agency, and the Special Assistant to the Secretary 
     for the Private Sector.
       ``(4) Coordination.--The Secretary shall coordinate the 
     program with, and utilize to the maximum extent practicable--
       ``(A) the voluntary standards for disaster and emergency 
     management and business continuity programs accredited by the 
     American National Standards Institute and developed by the 
     National Fire Protection Association; and
       ``(B) any existing private sector emergency preparedness 
     guidance or best practices developed by private sector 
     industry associations or other organizations.''.
       (b) Conforming Amendment.--The table of contents contained 
     in section 1(b) of such Act is amended by striking the item 
     relating to section 519 and inserting the following:

``Sec. 519. Participation of private sector organizations in emergency 
              preparedness and response activities.''.

  TITLE XII--PREVENTING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION PROLIFERATION AND 
                               TERRORISM

     SEC. 1201. FINDINGS.

       (a) Findings of the 9/11 Commission.--Congress finds that 
     the 9/11 Commission made the following determinations:
       (1) The United States Government has made insufficient 
     progress, and receives a grade ``D'', on efforts to prevent 
     weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferation and 
     terrorism.
       (2) The Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program has made 
     significant accomplishments, but much remains to be done to 
     secure weapons-grade nuclear materials. The size of the 
     problem still dwarfs the policy response. Nuclear materials 
     in the former Soviet Union still lack effective security 
     protection, and sites throughout the world contain enough 
     highly-enriched uranium to fashion a nuclear device but lack 
     even basic security features.
       (3) Preventing the proliferation of WMD and acquisition of 
     such weapons by terrorists warrants a maximum effort, by 
     strengthening counter-proliferation efforts, expanding the 
     Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), and supporting the 
     Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program.
       (4) Preventing terrorists from gaining access to WMD must 
     be an urgent national security priority because of the threat 
     such access poses to the American people. The President 
     should develop a comprehensive plan to dramatically 
     accelerate the timetable for securing all nuclear weapons-
     usable material around the world and request the necessary 
     resources to complete this task. The President should 
     publicly state this goal and ensure its fulfillment.
       (5) Congress should provide the resources needed to secure 
     vulnerable materials as quickly as possible.
       (b) Recommendations of 9/11 Commission.--Congress further 
     finds that the 9/11 Commission has made the following 
     recommendations:
       (1) Strengthen ``counter-proliferation'' efforts.--The 
     United States should work with the international community to 
     develop laws and an international legal regime with universal 
     jurisdiction to enable any state in the world to capture, 
     interdict, and prosecute smugglers of nuclear material.
       (2) Expand the proliferation security initiative.--In 
     carrying out the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), the 
     United States should--
       (A) use intelligence and planning resources of the North 
     Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) alliance;
       (B) make participation open to non-NATO countries; and
       (C) encourage Russia and the People's Republic of China to 
     participate.
       (3) Support the cooperative threat reduction program.--The 
     United States should expand, improve, increase resources for, 
     and otherwise fully support the Cooperative Threat Reduction 
     (CTR) program.

     SEC. 1202. DEFINITIONS.

       In this title:
       (1) The terms ``prevention of weapons of mass destruction 
     proliferation and terrorism'' and ``prevention of WMD 
     proliferation and terrorism'' include activities under--
       (A) the programs specified in section 1501(b) of the 
     National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997 
     (Public Law 104-201; 110 Stat. 2731; 50 U.S.C. 2362 note);
       (B) the programs for which appropriations are authorized by 
     section 3101(a)(2) of the Bob Stump National Defense 
     Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 (Public Law 107-314; 
     116 Stat. 2458);
       (C) programs authorized by section 504 of the Freedom for 
     Russia and Emerging Eurasian Democracies and Open Markets 
     Support Act of 1992 (the FREEDOM Support Act) (22 U.S.C. 
     5854) and programs authorized by section 1412 of the Former 
     Soviet Union Demilitarization Act of 1992 (22 U.S.C. 5902); 
     and
       (D) a program of any agency of the Federal Government 
     having a purpose similar to that of any of the programs 
     identified in subparagraphs (A) through (C), as designated by 
     the United States Coordinator for the Prevention of Weapons 
     of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism and the head 
     of the agency.
       (2) The terms ``weapons of mass destruction'' and ``WMD'' 
     mean chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons, and chemical, 
     biological, and nuclear materials that can be used in the 
     manufacture of such weapons.

[[Page H152]]

       (3) The term ``items of proliferation concern'' means 
     equipment or other materials that could be used to develop 
     WMD or for activities involving WMD.

 Subtitle A--Repeal and Modification of Limitations on Assistance for 
             Prevention of WMD Proliferation and Terrorism

     SEC. 1211. REPEAL AND MODIFICATION OF LIMITATIONS ON 
                   ASSISTANCE FOR PREVENTION OF WEAPONS OF MASS 
                   DESTRUCTION PROLIFERATION AND TERRORISM.

       Consistent with the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission, 
     Congress repeals or modifies the limitations on assistance 
     for prevention of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) 
     proliferation and terrorism as follows:
       (1) Soviet nuclear threat reduction act of 1991.--Section 
     211(b) of the Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act of 1991 
     (title II of Public Law 102-228; 22 U.S.C. 2551 note) is 
     repealed.
       (2) Cooperative threat reduction act of 1993.--Section 
     1203(d) of the Cooperative Threat Reduction Act of 1993 
     (title XII of Public Law 103-160; 22 U.S.C. 5952(d)) is 
     repealed.
       (3) Russian chemical weapons destruction facilities.--
     Section 1305 of the National Defense Authorization Act for 
     Fiscal Year 2000 (Public Law 106-65; 22 U.S.C. 5952 note) is 
     repealed.
       (4) Authority to use cooperative threat reduction funds 
     outside the former soviet union--modification of 
     certification requirement; repeal of funding limitation; 
     congressional notice requirement.--Section 1308 of the 
     National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 
     (Public Law 108-136; 22 U.S.C. 5963) is amended--
       (A) in subsection (a)--
       (i) by striking ``the President may'' and inserting ``the 
     Secretary of Defense may''; and
       (ii) by striking ``if the President'' and inserting ``if 
     the Secretary of Defense, with the concurrence of the 
     Secretary of State,'';
       (B) by striking subsection (c);
       (C) in subsection (d)(1)--
       (i) by striking ``The President may not'' and inserting 
     ``The Secretary of Defense may not''; and
       (ii) by striking ``until the President'' and inserting 
     ``until the Secretary of Defense'';
       (D) in subsection (d)(2)--
       (i) by striking ``Not later than 10 days after'' and 
     inserting ``Not later than 15 days prior to'';
       (ii) by striking ``the President shall'' and inserting 
     ``the Secretary of Defense shall''; and
       (iii) by striking ``Congress'' and inserting ``the 
     Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign 
     Affairs of the House of Representatives and the Committee on 
     Armed Services and Committee on Foreign Relations of the 
     Senate''; and
       (E) in subsection (d) by adding at the end the following:
       ``(3) In the case of a situation that threatens human life 
     or safety or where a delay would severely undermine the 
     national security of the United States, notification under 
     paragraph (2) shall be made not later than 10 days after 
     obligating funds under the authority in subsection (a) for a 
     project or activity.''.
       (5) Authority to use international nuclear materials 
     protection and cooperation program funds outside the former 
     soviet union--modification of certification requirement; 
     repeal of funding limitation; congressional notice 
     requirement.--Section 3124 of the National Defense 
     Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 (Public Law 108-136; 
     117 Stat. 1747) is amended--
       (A) in subsection (a)--
       (i) by striking ``the President may'' and inserting ``the 
     Secretary of Energy may''; and
       (ii) by striking ``if the President'' and inserting ``if 
     the Secretary of Energy, with the concurrence of the 
     Secretary of State,'';
       (B) by striking subsection (c);
       (C) in subsection (d)(1)--
       (i) by striking ``The President may not'' and inserting 
     ``The Secretary of Energy may not''; and
       (ii) by striking ``until the President'' and inserting 
     ``until the Secretary of Energy'';
       (D) in subsection (d)(2)--
       (i) by striking ``Not later than 10 days after'' and 
     inserting ``Not later than 15 days prior to'';
       (ii) by striking ``the President shall'' and inserting 
     ``the Secretary of Energy shall''; and
       (iii) by striking ``Congress'' and inserting ``the 
     Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign 
     Affairs of the House of Representatives and the Committee on 
     Armed Services and Committee on Foreign Relations of the 
     Senate''; and
       (E) in subsection (d) by adding at the end the following:
       ``(3) In the case of a situation that threatens human life 
     or safety or where a delay would severely undermine the 
     national security of the United States, notification under 
     paragraph (2) shall be made not later than 10 days after 
     obligating funds under the authority in subsection (a) for a 
     project or activity.''.

             Subtitle B--Proliferation Security Initiative

     SEC. 1221. PROLIFERATION SECURITY INITIATIVE IMPROVEMENTS AND 
                   AUTHORITIES.

       (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress, 
     consistent with the 9/11 Commission's recommendations, that 
     the President should strive to expand and strengthen the 
     Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) announced by the 
     President on May 31, 2003, with a particular emphasis on the 
     following:
       (1) Issuing a presidential directive to the relevant 
     government agencies and departments that establishes a 
     defined annual budget and clear authorities, and provides 
     other necessary resources and structures to achieve more 
     efficient and effective performance of United States PSI-
     related activities.
       (2) Working with the United Nations Security Council to 
     develop a resolution to authorize the PSI under international 
     law.
       (3) Increasing PSI cooperation with non-NATO partners.
       (4) Implementing the recommendations of the Government 
     Accountability Office (GAO) in the September 2006 report 
     titled ``Better Controls Needed to Plan and Manage 
     Proliferation Security Initiative Activities'' (GAO-06-937C), 
     including the following:
       (A) The Department of Defense and the Department of State 
     should establish clear PSI roles and responsibilities, 
     policies and procedures, interagency communication 
     mechanisms, documentation requirements, and indicators to 
     measure program results.
       (B) The Department of Defense and the Department of State 
     should develop a strategy to work with PSI-participating 
     countries to resolve issues that are impediments to 
     conducting successful PSI interdictions.
       (5) Expanding and formalizing the PSI into a multilateral 
     regime to increase coordination, cooperation, and compliance 
     among its participating states in interdiction activities.
       (b) Budget Submission.--The Secretary of State and the 
     Secretary of Defense shall submit a defined budget for the 
     PSI, beginning with the budget submissions for their 
     respective departments for fiscal year 2009.
       (c) Implementation Report.--Not later than 180 days after 
     the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall 
     transmit to the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee 
     on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives and the 
     Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign 
     Relations of the Senate a report on the implementation of 
     this section. The report shall include--
       (1) the steps taken to implement the recommendations 
     described in paragraph (4) of subsection (a); and
       (2) the progress made toward implementing the matters 
     described in paragraphs (1), (2), (3), and (5) of subsection 
     (a).
       (d) GAO Annual Report.--The Government Accountability 
     Office shall submit to Congress, beginning in fiscal year 
     2007, an annual report with its assessment of the progress 
     and effectiveness of the PSI, which shall include an 
     assessment of the measures referred to in subsection (a).

     SEC. 1222. AUTHORITY TO PROVIDE ASSISTANCE TO COOPERATIVE 
                   COUNTRIES.

       (a) In General.--The President is authorized to provide, on 
     such terms as the President considers appropriate, assistance 
     under subsection (b) to any country that cooperates with the 
     United States and with other countries allied with the United 
     States to prevent the transport and transshipment of items of 
     proliferation concern in its national territory or airspace 
     or in vessels under its control or registry.
       (b) Types of Assistance.--The assistance authorized under 
     subsection (a) consists of the following:
       (1) Assistance under section 23 of the Arms Export Control 
     Act (22 U.S.C. 2763).
       (2) Assistance under chapters 4 (22 U.S.C. 2346 et seq.) 
     and 5 (22 U.S.C. 2347 et seq.) of part II of the Foreign 
     Assistance Act of 1961.
       (3) Drawdown of defense excess defense articles and 
     services under section 516 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 
     1961 (22 U.S.C. 2321j).
       (c) Congressional Notification.--Assistance authorized 
     under this section may not be provided until at least 30 days 
     after the date on which the President has provided notice 
     thereof to the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on 
     Foreign Affairs, and the Committee on Appropriations of the 
     House of Representatives and the Committee on Armed Services, 
     the Committee on Foreign Relations, and the Committee on 
     Appropriations of the Senate, in accordance with the 
     procedures applicable to reprogramming notifications under 
     section 634A(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 
     U.S.C. 2394-1(a)), and has certified to such committees that 
     such assistance will be used in accordance with the 
     requirement of subsection (e) of this section.
       (d) Limitation.--Assistance may be provided to a country 
     under section (a) in no more than three fiscal years.
       (e) Use of Assistance.--Assistance provided under this 
     section shall be used to enhance the capability of the 
     recipient country to prevent the transport and transshipment 
     of items of proliferation concern in its national territory 
     or airspace, or in vessels under its control or registry, 
     including through the development of a legal framework in 
     that country, consistent with any international laws or legal 
     authorities governing the PSI, to enhance such capability by 
     criminalizing proliferation, enacting strict export controls, 
     and securing sensitive materials within its borders, and to 
     enhance the ability of the recipient country to cooperate in 
     operations conducted with other participating countries.
       (f) Limitation on Ship or Aircraft Transfers to 
     Uncooperative Countries.--Notwithstanding any other provision 
     of law, the United States may not transfer any excess defense 
     article that is a vessel or an aircraft to a country that has 
     not agreed that it will

[[Page H153]]

     support and assist efforts by the United States to interdict 
     items of proliferation concern until thirty days after the 
     date on which the President has provided notice of the 
     proposed transfer to the appropriate congressional committees 
     in accordance with the procedures applicable to reprogramming 
     notifications under section 634A(a) of the Foreign Assistance 
     Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2394-1(a)), in addition to any other 
     requirement of law.

  Subtitle C--Assistance to Accelerate Programs to Prevent Weapons of 
              Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism

     SEC. 1231. FINDINGS; STATEMENT OF POLICY.

       (a) Findings.--Congress is aware that certain United States 
     threat reduction and nonproliferation programs have in past 
     years encountered obstacles to timely obligating and 
     executing the full amount of appropriated funds, and that 
     certain United States threat reduction and nonproliferation 
     programs currently encounter such obstacles and therefore 
     maintain unobligated and uncosted balances. Such obstacles 
     include lack of effective policy guidance, limits on program 
     scope, practical inefficiencies, lack of cooperation with 
     other countries, and lack of effective leadership to overcome 
     such obstacles.
       (b) Statement of Policy.--It shall be the policy of the 
     United States, consistent with the 9/11 Commission's 
     recommendations, to eliminate the obstacles described in 
     subsection (a) with concrete measures, such as those 
     described in this title, to accelerate and strengthen 
     progress on preventing weapons of mass destruction (WMD) 
     proliferation and terrorism. Such measures described in this 
     title include the removal and modification of statutory 
     limits to executing funds, the expansion and strengthening of 
     the PSI, the establishment of the Office of the United States 
     Coordinator for the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction 
     Proliferation and Terrorism under subtitle D, and the 
     establishment of the Commission on the Prevention of Weapons 
     of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism under 
     subtitle E. As a result, Congress intends that any funds 
     authorized to be appropriated to programs for preventing WMD 
     proliferation and terrorism under this section will be 
     executed in a timely manner.

     SEC. 1232. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS FOR THE DEPARTMENT 
                   OF DEFENSE COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION 
                   PROGRAM.

       (a) Fiscal Year 2007.--In addition to any other amounts 
     authorized to be appropriated, there are authorized to be 
     appropriated to the Department of Defense Cooperative Threat 
     Reduction Program such sums as may be necessary for fiscal 
     year 2007 for the following purposes:
       (1) Biological weapons proliferation prevention.
       (2) Chemical weapons destruction at Shchuch'ye, Russia.
       (3) Acceleration, expansion, and strengthening of all CTR 
     activities.
       (b) Future Years.--It is the sense of Congress that in 
     fiscal year 2008 and future fiscal years, the President 
     should accelerate and expand funding for Cooperative Threat 
     Reduction programs administered by the Department of Defense 
     and such efforts should include, beginning upon enactment of 
     this Act, encouraging additional commitments by the Russian 
     Federation and other partner nations, as recommended by the 
     9/11 Commission.

     SEC. 1233. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS FOR THE DEPARTMENT 
                   OF ENERGY PROGRAMS TO PREVENT WEAPONS OF MASS 
                   DESTRUCTION PROLIFERATION AND TERRORISM.

       In addition to any other amounts authorized to be 
     appropriated, there are authorized to be appropriated to the 
     Department of Energy National Nuclear Security Administration 
     such sums as may be necessary for fiscal year 2007 for 
     programs to prevent weapons of mass destruction (WMD) 
     proliferation and terrorism, to be used as follows:
       (1) To accelerate, expand, and strengthen the Global Threat 
     Reduction Initiative (GTRI), with a particular emphasis on--
       (A) the Russian research reactor fuel return program;
       (B) international radiological threat reduction;
       (C) emerging threats and gap material; and
       (D) development of quick response and short-term 
     capabilities to secure and remove WMD materials throughout 
     the world.
       (2) To accelerate, expand, and strengthen the 
     Nonproliferation and International Security (NIS) program, 
     with a particular emphasis on--
       (A) global security and engagement, and cooperation with 
     the People's Republic of China, India, and other states;
       (B) activities to address emerging proliferation concerns 
     in North Korea, Iran, and elsewhere;
       (C) participation in negotiations regarding North Korea's 
     nuclear programs;
       (D) inter-agency participation in the Proliferation 
     Security Initiative (PSI);
       (E) technical and other assistance to the International 
     Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to support efforts to increase 
     the IAEA's capacity to secure vulnerable WMD materials 
     worldwide and prevent WMD proliferation and terrorism;
       (F) efforts to increase United States ability to help 
     states around the world place the ``effective controls'' on 
     WMD and related materials and technology mandated by United 
     Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004);
       (G) cooperation on international safeguards and export 
     controls in South Asia, the Middle East, and other regions;
       (H) efforts to strengthen United States commitments to 
     international regimes and agreements; and
       (I) establishment of a contingency fund for opportunities 
     to prevent WMD proliferation and terrorism that arise.
       (3) To accelerate, expand, and strengthen the International 
     Materials Protection, Control and Accounting (MPC&A) program, 
     with a particular emphasis on--
       (A) implementation of physical protection and material 
     control and accounting upgrades at sites;
       (B) national programs and sustainability activities in 
     Russia;
       (C) material consolidation and conversion (including 
     significant acceleration of the down-blending of highly-
     enriched uranium to low-enriched uranium, the removal of 
     highly-enriched uranium from facilities, and international 
     participation in these efforts);
       (D) efforts to strengthen cooperation with Russia;
       (E) implementation of Second Line of Defense Megaports 
     agreements;
       (F) implementation of Department of Energy actions under 
     the Security and Accountability for Every Port Act of 2006 
     (also known as the SAFE Port Act; Public Law 109-347); and
       (G) promoting and facilitating worldwide the promulgation 
     of best practices for security of weapons usable and other 
     nuclear materials.
       (4) To accelerate, expand, and strengthen the Research and 
     Development program, with a particular emphasis on--
       (A) improvement of United States government capability for 
     both short and long-term, and innovative, research and 
     development that addresses emerging WMD proliferation and 
     terrorism concerns and will maintain United States 
     technological advantage, including the capacity to detect 
     nuclear material origin, uranium enrichment, and plutonium 
     reprocessing; and
       (B) efforts to significantly expand the scientific research 
     and development skills and resources available to the 
     Department of Energy's programs to prevent WMD proliferation 
     and terrorism.

Subtitle D--Office of the United States Coordinator for the Prevention 
       of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism

     SEC. 1241. OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COORDINATOR FOR THE 
                   PREVENTION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION 
                   PROLIFERATION AND TERRORISM.

       (a) Establishment.--There is established within the 
     Executive Office of the President an office to be known as 
     the ``Office of the United States Coordinator for the 
     Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and 
     Terrorism'' (in this subtitle referred to as the ``Office'').
       (b) Officers.--
       (1) United states coordinator.--The head of the Office 
     shall be the United States Coordinator of the Office (in this 
     subtitle referred to as the ``Coordinator'').
       (2) Deputy united states coordinator.--There shall be a 
     Deputy United States Coordinator of the Office (in this 
     subtitle referred to as the ``Deputy Coordinator''), who 
     shall--
       (A) assist the Coordinator in carrying out the 
     responsibilities of the Coordinator under this subtitle; and
       (B) serve as Acting Coordinator in the absence of the 
     Coordinator and during any vacancy in the office of 
     Coordinator.
       (3) Appointment.--The Coordinator and Deputy Coordinator 
     shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice 
     and consent of the Senate, and shall be responsible on a 
     full-time basis for the duties and responsibilities described 
     in this section.
       (4) Limitation.--No person shall serve as Coordinator or 
     Deputy Coordinator while serving in any other position in the 
     Federal Government.
       (c) Duties.--The responsibilities of the Coordinator shall 
     include the following:
       (1) Serving as the advisor to the President on all matters 
     relating to the prevention of weapons of mass destruction 
     (WMD) proliferation and terrorism.
       (2) Formulating a comprehensive and well-coordinated United 
     States strategy and policies for preventing WMD proliferation 
     and terrorism, including--
       (A) measurable milestones and targets to which departments 
     and agencies can be held accountable;
       (B) identification of gaps, duplication, and other 
     inefficiencies in existing activities, initiatives, and 
     programs and the steps necessary to overcome these obstacles;
       (C) plans for preserving the nuclear security investment 
     the United States has made in Russia, the former Soviet 
     Union, and other countries;
       (D) prioritized plans to accelerate, strengthen, and expand 
     the scope of existing initiatives and programs, which include 
     identification of vulnerable sites and material and the 
     corresponding actions necessary to eliminate such 
     vulnerabilities;
       (E) new and innovative initiatives and programs to address 
     emerging challenges and strengthen United States 
     capabilities, including programs to attract and retain top 
     scientists and engineers and strengthen the capabilities of 
     United States national laboratories;
       (F) plans to coordinate United States activities, 
     initiatives, and programs relating to the prevention of WMD 
     proliferation and terrorism, including those of the 
     Department of

[[Page H154]]

     Energy, Department of Defense, Department of State, and 
     Department of Homeland Security, and including the 
     Proliferation Security Initiative, the G-8 Global Partnership 
     Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass 
     Destruction, United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540, 
     and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism;
       (G) plans to strengthen United States commitments to 
     international regimes and significantly improve cooperation 
     with other countries relating to the prevention of WMD 
     proliferation and terrorism, with particular emphasis on work 
     with the international community to develop laws and an 
     international legal regime with universal jurisdiction to 
     enable any state in the world to interdict and prosecute 
     smugglers of WMD material, as recommended by the 9/11 
     Commission; and
       (H) identification of actions necessary to implement the 
     recommendations of the Commission on the Prevention of 
     Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism 
     established under subtitle E of this title.
       (3) Leading inter-agency coordination of United States 
     efforts to implement the strategy and policies described in 
     this section.
       (4) Conducting oversight and evaluation of accelerated and 
     strengthened implementation of initiatives and programs to 
     prevent WMD proliferation and terrorism by relevant 
     government departments and agencies.
       (5) Overseeing the development of a comprehensive and 
     coordinated budget for programs and initiatives to prevent 
     WMD proliferation and terrorism, ensuring that such budget 
     adequately reflects the priority of the challenges and is 
     effectively executed, and carrying out other appropriate 
     budgetary authorities.
       (d) Staff.--The Coordinator may appoint and terminate such 
     personnel as may be necessary to enable the Coordinator to 
     perform his or her duties.
       (e) Consultation With Commission.--The Office and the 
     Coordinator shall regularly consult with and strive to 
     implement the recommendations of the Commission on the 
     Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and 
     Terrorism, established under subtitle E of this title.
       (f) Annual Report on Strategic Plan.--For fiscal year 2009 
     and each fiscal year thereafter, the Coordinator shall submit 
     to Congress, at the same time as the submission of the budget 
     for that fiscal year under title 31, United States Code, a 
     report on the strategy and policies developed pursuant to 
     subsection (c)(2), together with any recommendations of the 
     Coordinator for legislative changes that the Coordinator 
     considers appropriate with respect to such strategy and 
     policies and their implementation or the Office of the 
     Coordinator.

     SEC. 1242. REQUEST FOR CORRESPONDING RUSSIAN COORDINATOR.

       It is the sense of the Congress that, as soon as practical, 
     the President should personally request the President of the 
     Russian Federation to designate an official of the Russian 
     Federation having authorities and responsibilities for 
     preventing weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferation 
     and terrorism commensurate with those of the Coordinator, and 
     with whom the Coordinator should coordinate planning and 
     implementation of activities in the Russian Federation having 
     the purpose of preventing WMD proliferation and terrorism.

Subtitle E--Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction 
                      Proliferation and Terrorism

     SEC. 1251. COMMISSION ON THE PREVENTION OF WEAPONS OF MASS 
                   DESTRUCTION PROLIFERATION AND TERRORISM.

       There is established the Commission on the Prevention of 
     Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism (in 
     this subtitle referred to as the ``Commission'').

     SEC. 1252. PURPOSES.

       (a) In General.--The purposes of the Commission are to--
       (1) assess current activities, initiatives, and programs to 
     prevent WMD proliferation and terrorism; and
       (2) provide a clear and comprehensive strategy and concrete 
     recommendations for such activities, initiatives, and 
     programs.
       (b) In Particular.--The Commission shall give particular 
     attention to activities, initiatives, and programs to secure 
     all nuclear weapons-usable material around the world and to 
     significantly accelerate, expand, and strengthen, on an 
     urgent basis, United States and international efforts to 
     prevent, stop, and counter the spread of nuclear weapons 
     capabilities and related equipment, material, and technology 
     to terrorists and states of concern.

     SEC. 1253. COMPOSITION.

       (a) Members.--The Commission shall be composed of 9 
     members, of whom--
       (1) 3 members shall be appointed by the President;
       (2) 2 members shall be appointed by the majority leader of 
     the Senate;
       (3) 1 member shall be appointed by the minority leader of 
     the Senate;
       (4) 2 members shall be appointed by the Speaker of the 
     House of Representatives; and
       (5) 1 member shall be appointed by the minority leader of 
     the House of Representatives.
       (b) Co-Chairmen.--The Commission shall have two co-chairmen 
     designated from among the members of the Commission. Of the 
     co-chairmen--
       (1) 1 shall be designated by the President; and
       (2) 1 shall be designated jointly by the majority leader of 
     the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives.
       (c) Deadline for Appointment.--All members of the 
     Commission shall be appointed within 90 days of the date of 
     the enactment of this Act.
       (d) Initial Meeting.--The Commission shall meet and begin 
     the operations of the Commission as soon as practicable.
       (e) Quorum; Vacancies.--After its initial meeting, the 
     Commission shall meet upon the call of the co-chairmen or a 
     majority of its members. Six members of the Commission shall 
     constitute a quorum. Any vacancy in the Commission shall not 
     affect its powers, but shall be filled in the same manner in 
     which the original appointment was made.

     SEC. 1254. RESPONSIBILITIES.

       (a) In General.--The Commission shall address--
       (1) the roles, missions, and structure of all relevant 
     government departments, agencies, and other actors, including 
     the Office of the United States Coordinator for the 
     Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and 
     Terrorism established under subtitle D of this title;
       (2) inter-agency coordination;
       (3) United States commitments to international regimes and 
     cooperation with other countries; and
       (4) the threat of weapons of mass destruction proliferation 
     and terrorism to the United States and its interests and 
     allies, including the threat posed by black-market networks, 
     and the effectiveness of the responses by the United States 
     and the international community to such threats.
       (b) Follow-on Baker-Cutler Report.--The Commission shall 
     also reassess, and where necessary update and expand on, the 
     conclusions and recommendations of the report titled ``A 
     Report Card on the Department of Energy's Nonproliferation 
     Programs with Russia'' of January 2001 (also known as the 
     ``Baker-Cutler Report'') and implementation of such 
     recommendations.

     SEC. 1255. POWERS.

       (a) Hearings and Evidence.--The Commission or, on the 
     authority of the Commission, any subcommittee or member 
     thereof, may, for the purpose of carrying out this subtitle, 
     hold such hearings and sit and act at such times and places, 
     take such testimony, receive such evidence, and administer 
     such oaths as the Commission or such designate subcommittee 
     or designated member may determine advisable.
       (b) Contracting.--The Commission may, to such extent and in 
     such amounts as are provided in appropriations Acts, enter 
     into contracts to enable the Commission to discharge its 
     duties under this subtitle.
       (c) Information From Federal Agencies.--
       (1) In general.--The Commission is authorized to secure 
     directly from any executive department, bureau, agency, 
     board, commission, office, independent establishment, or 
     instrumentality of the Government, information, suggestions, 
     estimates, and statistics for the purposes of this subtitle. 
     Each department, bureau, agency, board, commission, office, 
     independent establishment, or instrumentality shall, to the 
     extent authorized by law, furnish such information, 
     suggestions, estimates, and statistics directly to the 
     Commission, upon request made by the co-chairmen, the 
     chairman of any subcommittee created by a majority of the 
     Commission, or any member designated by a majority of the 
     Commission.
       (2) Receipt, handling, storage, and dissemination.--
     Information shall only be received, handled, stored, and 
     disseminated by members of the Commission and its staff 
     consistent with all applicable statutes, regulations, and 
     Executive orders.
       (d) Assistance From Federal Agencies.--
       (1) General services administration.--The Administrator of 
     General Services shall provide to the Commission on a 
     reimbursable basis administrative support and other services 
     for the performance of the Commission's functions.
       (2) Other departments and agencies.--In addition to the 
     assistance prescribed in paragraph (1), departments and 
     agencies of the United States may provide to the Commission 
     such services, funds, facilities, staff, and other support 
     services as they may determine advisable and as may be 
     authorized by law.
       (e) Gifts.--The Commission may accept, use, and dispose of 
     gifts or donations of services or property.
       (f) Postal Services.--The Commission may use the United 
     States mails in the same manner and under the same conditions 
     as departments and agencies of the United States.

     SEC. 1256. NONAPPLICABILITY OF FEDERAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE 
                   ACT.

       (a) In General.--The Federal Advisory Committee Act (5 
     U.S.C. App.) shall not apply to the Commission.
       (b) Public Meetings and Release of Public Versions of 
     Reports.--The Commission shall--
       (1) hold public hearings and meetings to the extent 
     appropriate; and
       (2) release public versions of the report required under 
     section 1257.
       (c) Public Hearings.--Any public hearings of the Commission 
     shall be conducted in a

[[Page H155]]

     manner consistent with the protection of information provided 
     to or developed for or by the Commission as required by any 
     applicable statute, regulation, or Executive order.

     SEC. 1257. REPORT.

       Not later than 180 days after the appointment of the 
     Commission, the Commission shall submit to the President and 
     Congress a final report containing such findings, 
     conclusions, and recommendations for corrective measures as 
     have been agreed to by a majority of Commission members.

     SEC. 1258. TERMINATION.

       (a) In General.--The Commission, and all the authorities of 
     this subtitle, shall terminate 60 days after the date on 
     which the final report is submitted under section 1257.
       (b) Administrative Activities Before Termination.--The 
     Commission may use the 60-day period referred to in 
     subsection (a) for the purpose of concluding its activities, 
     including providing testimony to committees of Congress 
     concerning its report and disseminating the final report.

         TITLE XIII--NUCLEAR BLACK MARKET COUNTER-TERRORISM ACT

     SEC. 1301. SHORT TITLE.

       This title may be cited as the ``Nuclear Black Market 
     Counter-Terrorism Act of 2007''.

     SEC. 1302. DEFINITIONS.

       In this title:
       (1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term 
     ``appropriate congressional committees'' means the Committee 
     on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Armed Services, the 
     Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, and the Committee 
     on Appropriations of the House of Representatives, and the 
     Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Armed 
     Services, the Select Committee on Intelligence, and the 
     Committee on Appropriations of the Senate.
       (2) Foreign person.--The term ``foreign person''--
       (A) means any person who is not a citizen or national of 
     the United States or lawfully admitted to the United States 
     for permanent residence under the Immigration and Nationality 
     Act;
       (B) includes any foreign corporation, international 
     organization, or foreign government; and
       (C) includes, for purposes of subsections (a) and (b) of 
     section 1311, successors, assigns, subsidiaries, and subunits 
     of the person described in subparagraph (A) or (B) (as the 
     case may be), and other business organizations or 
     associations in which that person may be deemed to have a 
     controlling interest.
       (3) Person.--The term ``person''--
       (A) means a natural person as well as a corporation, 
     business association, partnership, society, trust, any other 
     nongovernmental entity, organization, or group, and any 
     governmental entity, or subsidiary, subunit, or parent entity 
     thereof, and any successor of any such entity; and
       (B) in the case of a country where it may be impossible to 
     identify a specific governmental entity referred to in 
     subparagraph (A), means all activities of that government 
     relating to the development or production of any nuclear 
     equipment or technology.
       (4) United states foreign assistance.--The term ``United 
     States foreign assistance'' means assistance under the 
     foreign operations, export financing, and related programs 
     appropriations Act for a fiscal year, and assistance under 
     the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.

      Subtitle A--Sanctions for Transfers of Nuclear Enrichment, 
    Reprocessing, and Weapons Technology, Equipment, and Materials 
                Involving Foreign Persons and Terrorists

     SEC. 1311. AUTHORITY TO IMPOSE SANCTIONS ON FOREIGN PERSONS.

       (a) Determination of Nuclear Activities by Foreign 
     Persons.--
       (1) Determination.--Notwithstanding any other provision of 
     law, the President shall impose the sanctions described in 
     subsection (b) whenever the President determines that a 
     foreign person, on or after the date of the enactment of this 
     Act, participated in the export, transfer or trade of--
       (A) nuclear enrichment or reprocessing equipment, 
     materials, or technology to any non-nuclear-weapon state (as 
     defined in section 102(c) of the Arms Export Control Act) 
     that--
       (i) does not possess functioning nuclear enrichment or 
     reprocessing plants as of January 1, 2004; and
       (ii)(I) does not have in force an additional protocol with 
     the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of 
     safeguards (as derived from IAEA document INFCIRC/540 and 
     related corrections and additions); or
       (II) is developing, manufacturing, or acquiring a nuclear 
     explosive device; or
       (B) any nuclear explosive device, or design information or 
     component, equipment, materials, or other items or technology 
     that--
       (i) is designated for national export controls under the 
     Nuclear Supplier Group Guidelines for the Export of Nuclear 
     Material, Equipment and Technology (published by the 
     International Atomic Energy Agency as IAEA document INFCIRC/
     254/Rev. 6/Part 1 and subsequent revisions) and the 
     Guidelines for Transfers of Nuclear-Related Dual-Use 
     Equipment, Materials, Software and Related Technology 
     (published as IAEA document INFCIRC/254/Rev. 5/ Part 2 and 
     subsequent revisions); and
       (ii) contributes to the development, manufacture, or 
     acquisition of a nuclear explosive device by--

       (I) a non-nuclear weapon state; or
       (II) a foreign person.

       (2) Definition.--For purposes of paragraph (1), the term 
     ``participated'' means sold, transferred, brokered, financed, 
     assisted, delivered, or otherwise provided or received, and 
     includes any conspiracy or attempt to engage in any of such 
     activities, as well as facilitating such activities by any 
     other person.
       (b) Sanctions.--The sanctions referred to in subsection (a) 
     that are to be imposed on a foreign person are the following:
       (1) No assistance may be provided to the foreign person 
     under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, and the foreign 
     person may not participate in any assistance program of the 
     United States Government. Any such assistance being provided 
     to the foreign person, and any participation in such 
     assistance program by the foreign person, on the date on 
     which the sanction under this paragraph is imposed shall be 
     terminated as of such date.
       (2) The United States Government may not export to the 
     foreign person, or grant a license or other approval to 
     export to or import from the foreign person of, any defense 
     articles, defense services, or design or construction 
     services under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 or the Arms 
     Export Control Act. Any contract to export such articles or 
     services, or license or approval to export or import, under 
     either such Act, that is in effect on the date on which the 
     sanction under this paragraph is imposed shall be terminated 
     as of such date.
       (3) Licenses or any other approval may not be issued for 
     the export to the foreign person of any goods or technology 
     subject to the jurisdiction of the Export Administration 
     Regulations under chapter VII of title 15, Code of Federal 
     Regulations (or successor regulations), other than food and 
     other agricultural commodities, medicines and medical 
     equipment. Any such license or approval that is in effect on 
     the on the date on which the sanction under this paragraph is 
     imposed, shall be terminated as of such date.
       (4) No department or agency of the United States Government 
     may procure, or enter into any contract for the procurement 
     of, any goods or services from the foreign person. The 
     Secretary of the Treasury shall prohibit the importation into 
     the United States of goods, technology, or services produced 
     or provided by the foreign person, other than information or 
     informational materials within the meaning of section 
     203(b)(3) of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act 
     (50 U.S.C. 1702(b)(3)).
       (c) Period Sanctions in Effect.--The sanctions referred to 
     in subsection (b) should be imposed for not less than two 
     years, but may be imposed for longer periods. The President 
     may suspend after one year any sanction imposed pursuant to 
     this section 15 days after submitting to the appropriate 
     congressional committees a report explaining--
       (1) the reasons for suspending the sanction;
       (2) how the purposes of this title and United States 
     national security are furthered by such suspension; and
       (3) what measures the United States will take or is taking 
     to ensure that the foreign person will not engage in similar 
     activities in the future.
       (d) Waiver Authority.--The President may waive the 
     imposition of any sanction under subsection (b) if the 
     President certifies to the appropriate congressional 
     committees that the waiver--
       (1) is important to the national security interests of the 
     United States; and
       (2) would further the purposes of this title.

     SEC. 1312. PRESIDENTIAL NOTIFICATION ON ACTIVITIES OF FOREIGN 
                   PERSONS.

       (a) Reports to Congress.--Not later than 180 days after the 
     date of enactment of this Act, and not later than January 31 
     of each year thereafter, the President shall submit to the 
     appropriate congressional committees a report detailing any 
     activity by any foreign person described in section 1311. 
     This report shall also include a description of any sanctions 
     that have been imposed and their duration.
       (b) Publication.--When the President imposes sanctions 
     under section 1311, the President shall, to the maximum 
     extent possible in unclassified form, publish in the Federal 
     Register, not later than 15 days after reporting such 
     sanctions to the appropriate congressional committees under 
     subsection (a), the identity of each sanctioned foreign 
     person, the period for which sanctions will be in effect, and 
     the reasons for the sanctions.

   Subtitle B--Further Actions Against Corporations Associated With 
                       Sanctioned Foreign Persons

     SEC. 1321. FINDINGS.

       The Congress finds the following:
       (1) Foreign persons and corporations engaging in nuclear 
     black-market activities are motivated by reasons of 
     commercial gain and profit.
       (2) Sanctions targeted solely against the business 
     interests of the sanctioned person or business concern may be 
     unsuccessful in halting these proliferation activities, as 
     the sanctions may be seen merely as the cost of doing 
     business, especially if the business interests of the parent 
     or subsidiary corporate entities are unaffected by the 
     sanctions.
       (3) Such narrow targeting of sanctions creates the 
     incentive to create shell and ``carve-

[[Page H156]]

     out'' corporate entities to perform the proliferation 
     activities and attract sanctions, leaving all other aspects 
     of the larger corporation unaffected.
       (4) To dissuade corporations from allowing their associated 
     commercial entities or persons from engaging in proliferation 
     black-market activities, they must also be made to suffer 
     financial loss and commercial disadvantage, and parent and 
     subsidiary commercial enterprises must be held responsible 
     for the proliferation activities of their associated 
     entities.
       (5) If a corporation perceives that the United States 
     Government will do everything possible to make its commercial 
     activity difficult around the world, then that corporation 
     has a powerful commercial incentive to prevent any further 
     proliferation activity by its associated entities.
       (6) Therefore, the United States Government should seek to 
     increase the risk of commercial loss for associated corporate 
     entities for the proliferation actions of their subsidiaries.

     SEC. 1322. CAMPAIGN BY UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS.

       The President shall instruct all agencies of the United 
     States Government to make every effort in their interactions 
     with foreign government and business officials to persuade 
     foreign governments and relevant corporations not to engage 
     in any business transaction with a foreign person sanctioned 
     under section 1311, including any entity that is a parent or 
     subsidiary of the sanctioned foreign person, for the duration 
     of the sanctions.

     SEC. 1323. COORDINATION.

       The Secretary of State shall coordinate the actions of the 
     United States Government under section 1322.

     SEC. 1324. REPORT.

       Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of 
     this Act and annually thereafter, the Secretary of State 
     shall report to the appropriate congressional committees on 
     the actions taken by the United States to carry out section 
     1322.

         Subtitle C--Rollback of Nuclear Proliferation Networks

     SEC. 1331. NONPROLIFERATION AS A CONDITION OF UNITED STATES 
                   ASSISTANCE.

       United States foreign assistance should only be provided to 
     countries that--
       (1) are not cooperating with any non-nuclear-weapon state 
     or any foreign group or individual who may be engaged in, 
     planning, or assisting any international terrorist group in 
     the development of a nuclear explosive device or its means of 
     delivery and are taking all necessary measures to prevent 
     their nationals and other persons and entities subject to 
     their jurisdiction from participating in such cooperation; 
     and
       (2) are fully and completely cooperating with the United 
     States in its efforts to eliminate nuclear black-market 
     networks or activities.

     SEC. 1332. REPORT ON IDENTIFICATION OF NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION 
                   NETWORK HOST COUNTRIES.

       (a) Report.--
       (1) In general.--Not later than 90 days after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act and annually thereafter, the 
     President shall submit a report to the appropriate 
     congressional committees that--
       (A) identifies any country in which manufacturing, 
     brokering, shipment, transshipment, or other activity 
     occurred in connection with the transactions of the nuclear 
     proliferation network that supplied Libya, Iran, North Korea, 
     and possibly other countries or entities; and
       (B) identifies any country in which manufacturing, 
     brokering, shipment, transshipment, or other activity 
     occurred for the purpose of supplying nuclear technology, 
     equipment, or material to another country or foreign person 
     that could, in the President's judgment, contribute to the 
     development, manufacture, or acquisition, of a nuclear 
     explosive device by a country or foreign person of concern to 
     the United States
       (2) Additional information.--The report under paragraph (1) 
     shall also include a description of the extent to which each 
     country described in the report is, in the opinion of the 
     President, fully cooperating with the United States in its 
     efforts to eliminate the nuclear proliferation network 
     described in paragraph (1)(A) or stopping the activities 
     described in paragraph (1)(B). The President shall base the 
     determination regarding a country's cooperation with the 
     United States in part on the degree to which the country has 
     satisfied United States requests for assistance and 
     information, including whether the United States has asked 
     and been granted direct investigatory access to key persons 
     involved in the nuclear proliferation network described in 
     paragraph (1)(A) or the activities described in paragraph 
     (1)(B).
       (b) Classification.--Reports under this section shall be 
     unclassified to the maximum extent possible.

     SEC. 1333. SUSPENSION OF ARMS SALES LICENSES AND DELIVERIES 
                   TO NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION HOST COUNTRIES.

       (a) Suspension.--Upon submission of the report and any 
     additional information under section 1332 to the appropriate 
     congressional committees, the President shall suspend all 
     licenses issued under the Arms Export Control Act, and shall 
     prohibit any licenses to be issued under that Act, for 
     exports to, or imports from, any country described in the 
     report, unless the President certifies to the appropriate 
     congressional committees that such country--
       (1)(A) has fully investigated or is fully investigating the 
     activities of any person or entity within its territory that 
     has participated in the nuclear proliferation network 
     described in section 1332(a)(1)(A) or the activities 
     described in section 1332(a)(1)(B); and
       (B) has taken or is taking effective steps to permanently 
     halt similar illicit nuclear proliferation activities;
       (2) has been or is fully cooperating with the United States 
     and other appropriate international organizations in 
     investigating and eliminating the nuclear proliferation 
     network, any successor networks operating within its 
     territory, or other illicit nuclear proliferation activities; 
     and
       (3) has enacted or is enacting new laws, promulgated 
     decrees or regulations, or established practices designed to 
     prevent future such activities from occurring within its 
     territory.
       (b) Waiver.--The President may waive the requirements of 
     subsection (a) in a fiscal year if--
       (1) the President has certified to the appropriate 
     congressional committees that the waiver is important to the 
     national security of the United States; and
       (2) at least 5 days have elapsed since making the 
     certification under paragraph (1).

        TITLE XIV--9/11 COMMISSION INTERNATIONAL IMPLEMENTATION

     SEC. 1401. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

       This title may be cited as the ``9/11 Commission 
     International Implementation Act of 2007''.

Subtitle A--Quality Educational Opportunities in Arab and Predominantly 
                           Muslim Countries.

     SEC. 1411. FINDINGS; POLICY.

       (a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
       (1) The report of the National Commission on Terrorist 
     Attacks Upon the United States stated that ``[e]ducation that 
     teaches tolerance, the dignity and value of each individual, 
     and respect for different beliefs is a key element in any 
     global strategy to eliminate Islamic terrorism''.
       (2) The report of the National Commission on Terrorist 
     Attacks Upon the United States concluded that ensuring 
     educational opportunity is essential to the efforts of the 
     United States to defeat global terrorism and recommended that 
     the United States Government ``should offer to join with 
     other nations in generously supporting [spending funds] ... 
     directly on building and operating primary and secondary 
     schools in those Muslim states that commit to sensibly 
     investing financial resources in public education''.
       (3) While Congress endorsed such a program in the 
     Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 
     (Public Law 108-458), such a program has not been 
     established.
       (b) Policy.--It is the policy of the United States--
       (1) to work toward the goal of dramatically increasing the 
     availability of modern basic education through public schools 
     in Arab and predominantly Muslim countries, which will reduce 
     the influence of radical madrassas and other institutions 
     that promote religious extremism;
       (2) to join with other countries in generously supporting 
     the International Arab and Muslim Youth Opportunity Fund 
     authorized under section 7114 of the Intelligence Reform and 
     Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, as amended by section 1412 
     of this Act, with the goal of building and operating public 
     primary and secondary schools in Arab and predominantly 
     Muslim countries that commit to sensibly investing the 
     resources of such countries in modern public education;
       (3) to offer additional incentives to increase the 
     availability of modern basic education in Arab and 
     predominantly Muslim countries; and
       (4) to work to prevent financing of educational 
     institutions that support radical Islamic fundamentalism.

     SEC. 1412. INTERNATIONAL ARAB AND MUSLIM YOUTH OPPORTUNITY 
                   FUND.

       Section 7114 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism 
     Prevention Act of 2004 (22 U.S.C. 2228) is amended to read as 
     follows:

     ``SEC. 7114. INTERNATIONAL ARAB AND MUSLIM YOUTH OPPORTUNITY 
                   FUND.

       ``(a) Findings.--Congress finds the following:
       ``(1) The United Nation's 2003 Arab Human Development 
     Report states that the quantitative expansion of Arab 
     education remains incomplete. The report asserts that high 
     rates of illiteracy, especially among women, persist. 
     Children continue to be denied their basic right to 
     elementary education. Higher education is characterized by 
     decreasing enrollment rates compared to developed countries, 
     and public expenditures on education has declined since 1985.
       ``(2) The UN report cities the decline in quality as the 
     most significant challenge in the educational arena in Arab 
     countries.
       ``(3) Researchers argue that curricula taught in Arab 
     countries seem to encourage submission, obedience, 
     subordination, and compliance, rather than free critical 
     thinking.
       ``(4) Despite major efforts to improve pre-school education 
     in some Arab countries, the quality of education provided in 
     kindergartens in the region does not fulfill the requirements 
     for advancing and developing children's capabilities in order 
     to help socialize a creative and innovative generation.
       ``(5) Many factors in Arab countries adversely affect 
     teachers' capabilities, such as

[[Page H157]]

     low salaries (which force educators in to take on other jobs 
     that consume their energy and decrease the time they can 
     devote to caring for their students), lack of facilities, 
     poorly designed curricula, indifferent quality of teacher 
     training, and overcrowded classes.
       ``(6) Educational attainments in Arab and non-Arab Muslim 
     countries--from literacy rates to mathematical and science 
     achievements--are well below global standards.
       ``(7) It is estimated that there are 65,000,000 illiterate 
     adult Arabs, and two-thirds of them are women.
       ``(8) Educational enrollment for Arab countries rose from 
     31,000,000 children in 1980 to approximately 56,000,000 
     children in 1995. Yet despite this increase, 10,000,000 
     children between the ages of 6 and 15 are currently not in 
     school.
       ``(9) In the Middle East, roughly 10,000,000 children still 
     do not go to school.
       ``(10) Even though women's access to education has tripled 
     in Arab countries since 1970, gender disparities still 
     persist. Illiteracy in Arab countries affects women 
     disproportionately. Women make up two-thirds of illiterate 
     adults, with most living in rural areas.
       ``(11) The publication of books and other reading materials 
     in Arab countries faces many major challenges, including the 
     small number of readers due to high rates of illiteracy in 
     some such countries and the weak purchasing power of the Arab 
     reader. The limited readership in Arab countries is reflected 
     in the small number of books published in such countries, 
     which does not exceed 1.1 percent of world production, 
     although Arabs constitute five percent of the world 
     population.
       ``(12) The nexus between health and education in Arab 
     countries is very strong. Gains in women's education 
     accounted for an estimated 43 percent reduction in child 
     malnutrition between 1970 and 1995. Educated mothers are more 
     likely to better space births, to have adequate prenatal 
     care, and to immunize their children.
       ``(13) Many educational systems in Arab and non-Arab Muslim 
     countries widen the gap between rich and poor: while rich 
     students attend excellent private schools, poor children 
     receive grossly inadequate schooling.
       ``(b) Purpose.--The purpose of this section is to 
     strengthen the public educational systems in Arab and 
     predominantly Muslim countries by--
       ``(1) authorizing the establishment of an International 
     Arab and Muslim Youth Educational Fund through which the 
     United States dedicates resources, either through a separate 
     fund or through an international organization, to assist 
     those countries that commit to education reform; and
       ``(2) providing resources for the Fund to help strengthen 
     the public educational systems in those countries.
       ``(c) Establishment of Fund.--
       ``(1) Authority.--The President is authorized to establish 
     an International Arab and Muslim Youth Opportunity Fund.
       ``(2) Location.--The Fund may be established--
       ``(A) as a separate fund in the Treasury; or
       ``(B) through an international organization or 
     international financial institution, such as the United 
     Nations Educational, Science and Cultural Organization, the 
     United Nations Development Program, or the International Bank 
     for Reconstruction and Development.
       ``(3) Transfers and receipts.--The head of any department, 
     agency, or instrumentality of the United States Government 
     may transfer any amount to the Fund, and the Fund may receive 
     funds from private enterprises, foreign countries, or other 
     entities.
       ``(4) Activities of the fund.--The Fund shall support 
     programs described in this paragraph to improve the education 
     environment in Arab and predominantly Muslim countries.
       ``(A) Assistance to enhance modern educational programs.--
       ``(i) The establishment in Arab and predominantly Muslim 
     countries of a program of reform to create a modern education 
     curriculum in the public educational systems in such 
     countries.
       ``(ii) The establishment or modernization of educational 
     materials to advance a modern educational curriculum in such 
     systems.
       ``(iii) Teaching English to adults and children.
       ``(iv) The establishment in Arab and predominantly Muslim 
     countries of programs that enhance accountability, 
     transparency, and interaction on education policy in such 
     countries between the national government and the regional 
     and local governments through improved information sharing 
     and monitoring.
       ``(v) The establishment in Arab and predominantly Muslim 
     countries of programs to assist in the formulation of 
     administration and planning strategies for all levels of 
     government in such countries, including national, regional, 
     and local governments.
       ``(vi) The enhancement in Arab and predominantly Muslim 
     countries of community, family, and student participation in 
     the formulation and implementation of education strategies 
     and programs in such countries.
       ``(B) Assistance for training and exchange programs for 
     teachers, administrators, and students.--
       ``(i) The establishment of training programs for teachers 
     and educational administrators to enhance skills, including 
     the establishment of regional centers to train individuals 
     who can transfer such skills upon return to their countries.
       ``(ii) The establishment of exchange programs for teachers 
     and administrators in Arab and predominantly Muslim countries 
     and with other countries to stimulate additional ideas and 
     reform throughout the world, including teacher training 
     exchange programs focused on primary school teachers in such 
     countries.
       ``(iii) The establishment of exchange programs for primary 
     and secondary students in Muslim and Arab countries and with 
     other countries to foster understanding and tolerance and to 
     stimulate long-standing relationships.
       ``(C) Assistance targeting primary and secondary 
     students.--
       ``(i) The establishment in Arab and predominantly Muslim 
     countries of after-school programs, civic education programs, 
     and education programs focusing on life skills, such as 
     inter-personal skills and social relations and skills for 
     healthy living, such as nutrition and physical fitness.
       ``(ii) The establishment in Arab and predominantly Muslim 
     countries of programs to improve the proficiency of primary 
     and secondary students in information technology skills.
       ``(D) Assistance for development of youth professionals.--
       ``(i) The establishment of programs in Arab and 
     predominantly Muslim countries to improve vocational training 
     in trades to help strengthen participation of Muslims and 
     Arabs in the economic development of their countries.
       ``(ii) The establishment of programs in Arab and 
     predominantly Muslim countries that target older Muslim and 
     Arab youths not in school in such areas as entrepreneurial 
     skills, accounting, micro-finance activities, work training, 
     financial literacy, and information technology.
       ``(E) Other types of assistance.--
       ``(i) The translation of foreign books, newspapers, 
     reference guides, and other reading materials into local 
     languages.
       ``(ii) The construction and equipping of modern community 
     and university libraries.
       ``(5) Authorization of appropriations.--
       ``(A) In general.--There is authorized to be appropriated 
     to the President to carry out this section such sums as may 
     be necessary for fiscal years 2008, 2009, and 2010.
       ``(B) Availability.--Amounts appropriated pursuant to the 
     authorization of appropriations under subsection (a) are 
     authorized to remain available until expended.
       ``(C) Additional funds.--Amounts authorized to be 
     appropriated under subsection (a) shall be in addition to 
     amounts otherwise available for such purposes.
       ``(6) Report to congress.--Not later than 180 days after 
     the date of the enactment of this section and annually 
     thereafter, the President shall submit to the appropriate 
     congressional committees a report on United States efforts to 
     assist in the improvement of educational opportunities for 
     Arab and predominantly Muslim children and youths, including 
     the progress made toward establishing the International Arab 
     and Muslim Youth Opportunity Fund.
       ``(7) Appropriate congressional committees defined.--In 
     this subsection, the term `appropriate congressional 
     committees' means the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the 
     Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives 
     and the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on 
     Appropriations of the Senate.''.

     SEC. 1413. ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS.

       (a) In General.--Not later than June 1 of each year, the 
     Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate 
     congressional committees a report on the efforts of Arab and 
     predominantly Muslim countries to increase the availability 
     of modern basic education and to close educational 
     institutions that promote religious extremism and terrorism.
       (b) Contents.--Each report shall include--
       (1) a list of Arab and predominantly Muslim countries that 
     are making serious and sustained efforts to improve the 
     availability of modern basic education and to close 
     educational institutions that promote religious extremism and 
     terrorism;
       (2) a list of such countries that are making efforts to 
     improve the availability of modern basic education and to 
     close educational institutions that promote religious 
     extremism and terrorism, but such efforts are not serious and 
     sustained;
       (3) a list of such countries that are not making efforts to 
     improve the availability of modern basic education and to 
     close educational institutions that promote religious 
     extremism and terrorism; and
       (4) an assessment for each country specified in each of 
     paragraphs (1), (2), and (3) of the role of United States 
     assistance with respect to the efforts made or not made to 
     improve the availability of modern basic education and close 
     educational institutions that promote religious extremism and 
     terrorism.
       (c) Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined.--In this 
     section, the term ``appropriate congressional committees'' 
     means the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on 
     Appropriations of the House of Representatives and the 
     Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on 
     Appropriations of the Senate.

[[Page H158]]

     SEC. 1414. EXTENSION OF PROGRAM TO PROVIDE GRANTS TO 
                   AMERICAN-SPONSORED SCHOOLS IN ARAB AND 
                   PREDOMINANTLY MUSLIM COUNTRIES TO PROVIDE 
                   SCHOLARSHIPS.

       (a) Findings.--Congress finds the following:
       (1) Section 7113 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism 
     Prevention Act of 2004 (Pub. Law 108-458) authorized the 
     establishment of a pilot program to provide grants to 
     American-sponsored schools in Arab and predominantly Muslim 
     countries so that such schools could provide scholarships to 
     young people from lower-income and middle-income families in 
     such countries to attend such schools, where they could 
     improve their English and be exposed to a modern education.
       (2) Since the date of the enactment of that section, the 
     Middle East Partnership Initiative has pursued implementation 
     of that program.
       (b) Extension of Program.--
       (1) In general.--Section 7113 of the Intelligence Reform 
     and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 is amended--
       (A) in the section heading--
       (i) by striking ``PILOT''; and
       (ii) by inserting ``ARAB AND'' before ``PREDOMINANTLY 
     MUSLIM'';
       (B) in subsection (a)(2), by inserting ``Arab and'' before 
     ``predominantly Muslim'';
       (C) in subsection (b), in the matter preceding paragraph 
     (1), by inserting ``Arab and'' before ``predominantly 
     Muslim'';
       (D) in subsection (c)--
       (i) in the subsection heading, by striking ``Pilot'';
       (ii) by striking ``pilot''; and
       (iii) by striking ``countries with predominantly Muslim 
     populations'' and inserting ``Arab and predominantly Muslim 
     countries'';
       (E) in subsection (d), by striking ``pilot'' each place it 
     appears;
       (F) in subsection (f)--
       (i) by striking ``pilot''; and
       (ii) by inserting ``an Arab or'' before ``a predominantly 
     Muslim country'';
       (G) in subsection (g), in the first sentence--
       (i) by inserting ``and April 15, 2008,'' after ``April 15, 
     2006,''; and
       (ii) by striking ``pilot''; and
       (H) in subsection (h)--
       (i) by striking ``2005 and 2006'' inserting ``2007 and 
     2008'' ; and
       (ii) by striking ``pilot''.
       (2) Conforming amendment.--Section 1(b) of such Act is 
     amended, in the table of contents, by striking the item 
     relating to section 7113 and inserting after section 7112 the 
     following new item:

``7113. Program to provide grants to American-sponsored schools in Arab 
              and predominantly Muslim countries to provide 
              scholarships.''.

Subtitle B--Democracy and Development in Arab and Predominantly Muslim 
                               Countries

     SEC. 1421. PROMOTING DEMOCRACY AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE MIDDLE 
                   EAST, CENTRAL ASIA, SOUTH ASIA, AND SOUTHEAST 
                   ASIA.

       (a) Findings.--Congress finds the following:
       (1) Al-Qaeda and affiliated groups have established a 
     terrorist network with linkages throughout the Middle East, 
     Central Asia, South Asia, and Southeast Asia.
       (2) While political repression and lack of economic 
     development do not justify terrorism, increased political 
     freedoms, poverty reduction, and broad-based economic growth 
     can contribute to an environment that undercuts tendencies 
     and conditions that facilitate the rise of terrorist 
     organizations.
       (3) It is in the national security interests of the United 
     States to promote democracy, the rule of law, good 
     governance, sustainable development, a vigorous civil 
     society, political freedom, protection of minorities, 
     independent media, women's rights, private sector growth, and 
     open economic systems in the countries of the Middle East, 
     Central Asia, South Asia, and Southeast Asia.
       (b) Policy.--It is the policy of the United States to--
       (1) promote over the long-term, seizing opportunities 
     whenever possible in the short term, democracy, the rule of 
     law, good governance, sustainable development, a vigorous 
     civil society, political freedom, protection of minorities, 
     independent media, women's rights, private sector growth, and 
     open economic systems in the countries of the Middle East, 
     Central Asia, South Asia, and Southeast Asia;
       (2) provide assistance and resources to individuals and 
     organizations in the countries of the Middle East, Central 
     Asia, South Asia, and Southeast Asia that are committed to 
     promoting such objectives and to design strategies in 
     conjunction with such individuals and organizations; and
       (3) work with other countries and international 
     organizations to increase the resources devoted to promoting 
     such objectives.
       (c) Strategy.--Not later than 180 days after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall 
     submit to appropriate congressional committees a report with 
     a country-by-country five year strategy to promote the policy 
     of the United States described in subsection (b). Such report 
     shall contain an estimate of the funds necessary to implement 
     such a strategy.
       (d) Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined.--In this 
     section, the term ``appropriate congressional committees'' 
     means the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on 
     Appropriations of the House of Representatives and the 
     Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on 
     Appropriations of the Senate.

     SEC. 1422. MIDDLE EAST FOUNDATION.

       (a) Purposes.--The purposes of this section are to support, 
     through the provision of grants, technical assistance, 
     training, and other programs, in the countries of the Middle 
     East, the expansion of--
       (1) civil society;
       (2) opportunities for political participation for all 
     citizens;
       (3) protections for internationally recognized human 
     rights, including the rights of women;
       (4) educational system reforms;
       (5) independent media;
       (6) policies that promote economic opportunities for 
     citizens;
       (7) the rule of law; and
       (8) democratic processes of government.
       (b) Middle East Foundation.--
       (1) Designation.--The Secretary of State is authorized to 
     designate an appropriate private, nonprofit organization that 
     is organized or incorporated under the laws of the United 
     States or of a State as the Middle East Foundation (referred 
     to in this section as the ``Foundation'').
       (2) Funding.--
       (A) Authority.--The Secretary of State is authorized to 
     provide funding to the Foundation through the Middle East 
     Partnership Initiative of the Department of State. The 
     Foundation shall use amounts provided under this paragraph to 
     carry out the purposes specified in subsection (a), including 
     through making grants and providing other assistance to 
     entities to carry out programs for such purposes.
       (B) Funding from other sources.--In determining the amount 
     of funding to provide to the Foundation, the Secretary of 
     State shall take into consideration the amount of funds that 
     the Foundation has received from sources other than the 
     United States Government.
       (3) Notification to congressional committees.--The 
     Secretary of State shall notify the Committee on Foreign 
     Affairs and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of 
     Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations and 
     the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate prior to 
     designating an appropriate organization as the Foundation.
       (c) Grants for Projects.--
       (1) Foundation to make grants.--The Secretary of State 
     shall enter into an agreement with the Foundation that 
     requires the Foundation to use the funds provided under 
     subsection (b)(2) to make grants to persons or entities 
     (other than governments or government entities) located in 
     the Middle East or working with local partners based in the 
     Middle East to carry out projects that support the purposes 
     specified in subsection (a).
       (2) Center for public policy.--Under the agreement 
     described in paragraph (1), the Foundation may make a grant 
     to an institution of higher education located in the Middle 
     East to create a center for public policy for the purpose of 
     permitting scholars and professionals from the countries of 
     the Middle East and from other countries, including the 
     United States, to carry out research, training programs, and 
     other activities to inform public policymaking in the Middle 
     East and to promote broad economic, social, and political 
     reform for the people of the Middle East.
       (3) Applications for grants.--An entity seeking a grant 
     from the Foundation under this section shall submit an 
     application to the head of the Foundation at such time, in 
     such manner, and containing such information as the head of 
     the Foundation may reasonably require.
       (d) Private Character of the Foundation.--Nothing in this 
     section shall be construed to--
       (1) make the Foundation an agency or establishment of the 
     United States Government, or to make the officers or 
     employees of the Foundation officers or employees of the 
     United States for purposes of title 5, United States Code; or
       (2) to impose any restriction on the Foundation's 
     acceptance of funds from private and public sources in 
     support of its activities consistent with the purposes 
     specified in subsection (a).
       (e) Limitation on Payments to Foundation Personnel.--No 
     part of the funds provided to the Foundation under this 
     section shall inure to the benefit of any officer or employee 
     of the Foundation, except as salary or reasonable 
     compensation for services.
       (f) Retention of Interest.--The Foundation may hold funds 
     provided under this section in interest-bearing accounts 
     prior to the disbursement of such funds to carry out the 
     purposes specified in subsection (a), and, only to the extent 
     and in the amounts provided for in advance in appropriations 
     Acts, may retain for use for such purposes any interest 
     earned without returning such interest to the Treasury of the 
     United States.
       (g) Financial Accountability.--
       (1) Independent private audits of the foundation.--The 
     accounts of the Foundation shall be audited annually in 
     accordance with generally accepted auditing standards by 
     independent certified public accountants or independent 
     licensed public accountants certified or licensed by a 
     regulatory authority of a State or other political 
     subdivision of the United States. The report of the 
     independent audit shall be included in the annual report 
     required by subsection (h).

[[Page H159]]

       (2) GAO audits.--The financial transactions undertaken 
     pursuant to this section by the Foundation may be audited by 
     the Government Accountability Office in accordance with such 
     principles and procedures and under such rules and 
     regulations as may be prescribed by the Comptroller General 
     of the United States.
       (3) Audits of grant recipients- .--
       (A) In general.--A recipient of a grant from the Foundation 
     shall agree to permit an audit of the books and records of 
     such recipient related to the use of the grant funds.
       (B) Recordkeeping.--Such recipient shall maintain 
     appropriate books and records to facilitate an audit referred 
     to in subparagraph (A), including--
       (i) separate accounts with respect to the grant funds;
       (ii) records that fully disclose the use of the grant 
     funds;
       (iii) records describing the total cost of any project 
     carried out using grant funds; and
       (iv) the amount and nature of any funds received from other 
     sources that were combined with the grant funds to carry out 
     a project.
       (h) Annual Reports.--Not later than January 31, 2008, and 
     annually thereafter, the Foundation shall submit to the 
     appropriate congressional committees and make available to 
     the public a report that includes, for the fiscal year prior 
     to the fiscal year in which the report is submitted, a 
     comprehensive and detailed description of--
       (1) the operations and activities of the Foundation that 
     were carried out using funds provided under this section;
       (2) grants made by the Foundation to other entities with 
     funds provided under this section;
       (3) other activities of the Foundation to further the 
     purposes specified in subsection (a); and
       (4) the financial condition of the Foundation.
       (i) Definitions.--In this section:
       (1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term 
     ``appropriate congressional committees'' means the Committee 
     on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Appropriations of the 
     House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign 
     Relations and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate.
       (2) Middle east.--The term ``Middle East'' means Algeria, 
     Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, 
     Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, United 
     Arab Emirates, West Bank and Gaza, and Yemen.
       (j) Expiration of Authority.--The authority provided under 
     this section shall expire on September 30, 2017.
       (k) Repeal.--Section 534(k) of Public Law 109-102 is 
     repealed.

          Subtitle C--Restoring United States Moral Leadership

     SEC. 1431. ADVANCING UNITED STATES INTERESTS THROUGH PUBLIC 
                   DIPLOMACY.

       (a) Finding.--Congress finds that the report of the 
     National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United 
     States stated that, ``Recognizing that Arab and Muslim 
     audiences rely on satellite television and radio, the 
     government has begun some promising initiatives in television 
     and radio broadcasting to the Arab world, Iran, and 
     Afghanistan. These efforts are beginning to reach large 
     audiences. The Broadcasting Board of Governors has asked for 
     much larger resources. It should get them.''.
       (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
       (1) The United States needs to improve its communication of 
     information and ideas to people in foreign countries, 
     particularly in countries with significant Muslim 
     populations.
       (2) Public diplomacy should reaffirm the paramount 
     commitment of the United States to democratic principles, 
     including preserving the civil liberties of all the people of 
     the United States, including Muslim-Americans.
       (3) A significant expansion of United States international 
     broadcasting would provide a cost-effective means of 
     improving communication with countries with significant 
     Muslim populations by providing news, information, and 
     analysis, as well as cultural programming, through both radio 
     and television broadcasts.
       (c) Special Authority for Surge Capacity.--The United 
     States International Broadcasting Act of 1994 (22 U.S.C. 6201 
     et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following new 
     section:

     ``SEC. 316. SPECIAL AUTHORITY FOR SURGE CAPACITY.

       ``(a) Emergency Authority.--
       ``(1) In general.--Whenever the President determines it to 
     be important to the national interests of the United States 
     and so certifies to the appropriate congressional committees, 
     the President, on such terms and conditions as the President 
     may determine, is authorized to direct any department, 
     agency, or other governmental entity of the United States to 
     furnish the Broadcasting Board of Governors with the 
     assistance of such department, agency, or entity based 
     outside the United States as may be necessary to provide 
     international broadcasting activities of the United States 
     with a surge capacity to support United States foreign policy 
     objectives during a crisis abroad.
       ``(2) Supersedes existing law.--The authority of paragraph 
     (1) shall supersede any other provision of law.
       ``(3) Surge capacity defined.--In this subsection, the term 
     `surge capacity' means the financial and technical resources 
     necessary to carry out broadcasting activities in a 
     geographical area during a crisis abroad.
       ``(b) Authorization of Appropriations.--
       ``(1) In general.--There are authorized to be appropriated 
     to the President such sums as may be necessary for the 
     President to carry out this section, except that no such 
     amount may be appropriated which, when added to amounts 
     previously appropriated for such purpose but not yet 
     obligated, would cause such amounts to exceed $25,000,000.
       ``(2) Availability of funds.--Amounts appropriated pursuant 
     to the authorization of appropriations in this subsection are 
     authorized to remain available until expended.
       ``(3) Designation of appropriations.--Amounts appropriated 
     pursuant to the authorization of appropriations in this 
     subsection may be referred to as the `United States 
     International Broadcasting Surge Capacity Fund'.
       ``(c) Report.--The annual report submitted to the President 
     and Congress by the Broadcasting Board of Governors under 
     section 305(a)(9) shall provide a detailed description of any 
     activities carried out under this section.
       ``(d) Authorization of Appropriations for United States 
     International Broadcasting Activities.--
       ``(1) In general.--In addition to amounts otherwise 
     available for such purposes, there are authorized to be 
     appropriated such sums as may be necessary to carry out 
     United States Government broadcasting activities under this 
     Act, including broadcasting capital improvements, the United 
     States Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948 (22 
     U.S.C. 1431 et seq.), and the Foreign Affairs Reform and 
     Restructuring Act of 1998 (as enacted in division G of the 
     Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental 
     Appropriations Act, 1999; Public Law 105-277), and to carry 
     out other authorities in law consistent with such purposes.
       ``(2) Availability of funds.--Amounts appropriated pursuant 
     to the authorization of appropriations in this section are 
     authorized to remain available until expended.''.

     SEC. 1432. EXPANSION OF UNITED STATES SCHOLARSHIP, EXCHANGE, 
                   AND LIBRARY PROGRAMS IN ARAB AND PREDOMINANTLY 
                   MUSLIM COUNTRIES.

       (a) Report; Certification.--Not later than 30 days after 
     the date of the enactment of this Act and every 180 days 
     thereafter, the Secretary of State shall submit to the 
     appropriate congressional committees a report on the 
     recommendations of the National Commission on Terrorist 
     Attacks Upon the United States and the policy goals described 
     in section 7112 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism 
     Prevention Act of 2004 (Public Law 108-458) for expanding 
     United States scholarship, exchange, and library programs in 
     Arab and predominantly Muslim countries. Such report shall 
     include--
       (1) a certification by the Secretary of State that such 
     recommendations have been implemented and such policy goals 
     have been achieved; or
       (2) if the Secretary of State is unable to make the 
     certification described in paragraph (1), a description of--
       (A) the steps taken to implement such recommendations and 
     achieve such policy goals;
       (B) when the Secretary of State expects such 
     recommendations to be implemented and such policy goals to be 
     achieved; and
       (C) any allocation of resources or other actions by 
     Congress the Secretary of State considers necessary to 
     implement such recommendations and achieve such policy goals.
       (b) Termination of Duty to Report.--The duty to submit a 
     report under subsection (a) shall terminate when the 
     Secretary of State submits a certification pursuant to 
     paragraph (1) of such subsection.
       (c) GAO Review of Certification.--If the Secretary of State 
     submits a certification pursuant to subsection (a)(1), not 
     later than 30 days after the submission of such 
     certification, the Comptroller General of the United States 
     shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a 
     report on whether the recommendations referred to in 
     subsection (a) have been implemented and whether the policy 
     goals described in section 7112 of the Intelligence Reform 
     and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 have been achieved.
       (d) Definition.--In this section, the term ``appropriate 
     congressional committees'' means--
       (1) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on 
     Oversight and Government Reform of the House of 
     Representatives; and
       (2) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on 
     Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate.

     SEC. 1433. UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD DETAINEES.

       (a) Findings.--Congress finds the following:
       (1) The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the 
     United States (commonly referred to as the ``9/11 
     Commission'') declared that the United States ``should work 
     with friends to develop mutually agreed-on principles for the 
     detention and humane treatment of captured international 
     terrorists who are not being held under a particular 
     country's criminal laws'' and recommended that the United 
     States engage our allies ``to develop a common coalition

[[Page H160]]

     approach toward the detention and humane treatment of 
     captured terrorists'', drawing from Common Article 3 of the 
     Geneva Conventions.
       (2) Congress has passed several provisions of law that have 
     changed United States standards relating to United States 
     detainees, but such provisions have not been part of a common 
     coalition approach in this regard.
       (3) A number of investigations remain ongoing by countries 
     who are close United States allies in the war on terrorism 
     regarding the conduct of officials, employees, and agents of 
     the United States and of other countries related to conduct 
     regarding detainees.
       (b) Report; Certification.--Not later than 90 days after 
     the date of the enactment of this Act and every 180 days 
     thereafter, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the 
     Attorney General and the Secretary of Defense, shall submit 
     to the relevant congressional committees a report on any 
     progress towards implementing the recommendations of the 9/11 
     Commission for engaging United States allies to develop a 
     common coalition approach, in compliance with Common Article 
     3 of the Geneva Conventions, toward the detention and humane 
     treatment of individuals detained during Operation Iraqi 
     Freedom, Operation Enduring Freedom, or in connection with 
     United States counterterrorist operations. Such report shall 
     include--
       (1) a certification by the Secretary of State that such 
     recommendations have been implemented and such policy goals 
     have been achieved; or
       (2) if the Secretary of State is unable to make the 
     certification described in paragraph (1), a description of--
       (A) the steps taken to implement such recommendations and 
     achieve such policy goals;
       (B) when the Secretary of State expects such 
     recommendations to be implemented and such policy goals to be 
     achieved; and
       (C) any allocation of resources or other actions by 
     Congress that the Secretary of State considers necessary to 
     implement such recommendations and achieve such policy goals.
       (c) Termination of Duty to Report.--The duty to submit a 
     report under subsection (a) shall terminate when the 
     Secretary of State submits a certification pursuant to 
     subsection (a)(1).
       (d) GAO Review of Certification.--If the Secretary of State 
     submits a certification pursuant to subsection (a)(1), not 
     later than 30 days after the submission of such 
     certification, the Comptroller General shall submit to the 
     relevant congressional committees a report on whether the 
     recommendations described in subsection (a) have been 
     implemented and whether the policy goals described in such 
     subsection have been achieved.
       (e) Definition.--In this section, the term ``relevant 
     congressional committees'' means--
       (1) with respect to the House of Representatives, the 
     Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Armed 
     Services, the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, 
     the Committee on the Judiciary, and the Permanent Select 
     Committee on Intelligence; and
       (2) with respect to the Senate, the Committee on Foreign 
     Relations, the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on 
     Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, the Committee on 
     the Judiciary, and the Select Committee on Intelligence.

     Subtitle D--Strategy for the United States Relationship With 
                Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia

     SEC. 1441. AFGHANISTAN.

       (a) Statements of Policy.--The following shall be the 
     policies of the United States:
       (1) The United States shall vigorously support the 
     Government of Afghanistan as it continues on its path toward 
     a broad-based, pluralistic, multi-ethnic, gender-sensitive, 
     and fully representative government in Afghanistan and shall 
     maintain its long-term commitment to the people of 
     Afghanistan by increased assistance and the continued 
     deployment of United States troops in Afghanistan as long as 
     the Government of Afghanistan supports such United States 
     involvement.
       (2) In order to reduce the ability of the Taliban and Al-
     Qaeda to finance their operations through the opium trade, 
     the President shall engage aggressively with the Government 
     of Afghanistan and our NATO partners, and in consultation 
     with Congress, to assess the success of the Afghan 
     counternarcotics strategy in existence as of December 2006 
     and to explore all additional options for addressing the 
     narcotics crisis in Afghanistan, including possible changes 
     in rules of engagement for NATO and Coalition forces for 
     participation in actions against narcotics trafficking and 
     kingpins.
       (b) Statement of Congress.--Congress strongly urges that 
     the Afghanistan Freedom Support Act of 2002 be reauthorized 
     and updated to take into account new developments in 
     Afghanistan and in the region so as to demonstrate the 
     continued support by the United States for the people and 
     Government of Afghanistan.
       (c) Emergency Increase in Policing Operations.--
       (1) In general.--The President shall make every effort, on 
     an emergency basis, to dramatically increase the numbers of 
     United States and international police trainers, mentors, and 
     police personnel operating in conjunction with Afghanistan 
     civil security forces and shall increase efforts to assist 
     the Government of Afghanistan in addressing the corruption 
     crisis that is threatening to undermine Afghanistan's future.
       (2) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act and every six months thereafter until 
     September 31, 2010, the President shall submit to the 
     Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on 
     Appropriations of the House of Representatives and the 
     Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on 
     Appropriations of the Senate a report on United States 
     efforts to fulfill the requirements of this subsection.
       (d) Emergency Energy Assistance.--
       (1) Finding.--Congress finds that short-term shortages of 
     energy may destabilize the Government of Afghanistan and 
     undermine the ability of President Karzai to carry out 
     critically needed reforms.
       (2) Authorization of assistance.--The President is 
     authorized to provide assistance for the acquisition of 
     emergency energy resources, including diesel fuel, to secure 
     the delivery of electricity to Kabul, Afghanistan, and other 
     major Afghan provinces and cities.
       (3) Authorization of appropriations.--There are authorized 
     to be appropriated to the President to carry out paragraph 
     (2) such sums as may be necessary for each of fiscal years 
     2008 and 2009.

     SEC. 1442. PAKISTAN.

       (a) Findings.--Congress finds the following:
       (1) Since September 11, 2001, the Government of Pakistan 
     has been an important partner in helping the United States 
     remove the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and combating 
     international terrorism in the frontier provinces of 
     Pakistan.
       (2) There remain a number of critical issues that threaten 
     to disrupt the relationship between the United States and 
     Pakistan, undermine international security, and destabilize 
     Pakistan, including--
       (A) curbing the proliferation of nuclear weapons 
     technology;
       (B) combating poverty and corruption;
       (C) building effective government institutions, especially 
     secular public schools;
       (D) promoting democracy and the rule of law, particularly 
     at the national level;
       (E) addressing the continued presence of Taliban and other 
     violent extremist forces throughout the country;
       (F) maintaining the authority of the Government of Pakistan 
     in all parts of its national territory;
       (G) securing the borders of Pakistan to prevent the 
     movement of militants and terrorists into other countries and 
     territories; and
       (H) effectively dealing with Islamic extremism.
       (b) Statements of Policy.--The following shall be the 
     policies of the United States:
       (1) To work with the Government of Pakistan to combat 
     international terrorism, especially in the frontier provinces 
     of Pakistan, and to end the use of Pakistan as a safe haven 
     for forces associated with the Taliban.
       (2) To establish a long-term strategic partnership with the 
     Government of Pakistan to address the issues described in 
     subparagraphs (A) through (H) of subsection (a)(2).
       (3) To dramatically increase funding for programs of the 
     United States Agency for International Development and the 
     Department of State that assist the Government of Pakistan in 
     addressing such issues, if the Government of Pakistan 
     demonstrates a commitment to building a moderate, democratic 
     state, including significant steps towards free and fair 
     parliamentary elections in 2007.
       (4) To work with the international community to secure 
     additional financial and political support to effectively 
     implement the policies set forth in this subsection and help 
     to resolve the dispute between the Government of Pakistan and 
     the Government of India over the disputed territory of 
     Kashmir.
       (c) Strategy Relating to Pakistan.--
       (1) Requirement for report on strategy.--Not later than 90 
     days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the 
     President shall submit to the appropriate congressional 
     committees a report, in classified form if necessary, that 
     describes the long-term strategy of the United States to 
     engage with the Government of Pakistan to address the issues 
     described in subparagraphs (A) through (F) of subsection 
     (a)(2) and carry out the policies described in subsection (b) 
     in order accomplish the goal of building a moderate, 
     democratic Pakistan.
       (2) Appropriate congressional committees defined.--In this 
     subsection the term ``appropriate congressional committees'' 
     means the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on 
     Appropriations of the House of Representatives and the 
     Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on 
     Appropriations of the Senate.
       (d) Limitation on United States Security Assistance to 
     Pakistan.--
       (1) Limitation.--
       (A) In general.--For fiscal years 2008 and 2009, United 
     States assistance under chapter 2 of part II of the Foreign 
     Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2311 et seq.) or section 23 
     of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2763) may not be 
     provided to, and a license for any item controlled under the 
     Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2751 et seq.) may not be 
     approved for, Pakistan until 15 days after

[[Page H161]]

     the date on which President determines and certifies to the 
     appropriate congressional committees that the Government of 
     Pakistan is making all possible efforts to prevent the 
     Taliban from operating in areas under its sovereign control, 
     including in the cities of Quetta and Chaman and in the 
     Northwest Frontier Province and the Federally Administered 
     Tribal Areas.
       (B) Form.--The certification required by subparagraph (A) 
     shall be transmitted in unclassified form, but may contain a 
     classified annex.
       (2) Waiver.--The President may waive the limitation on 
     assistance under paragraph (1) for a fiscal year if the 
     President determines and certifies to the appropriate 
     congressional committees that it is important to the national 
     security interest of the United States to do so.
       (3) Sunset.--The limitation on assistance under paragraph 
     (1) shall cease to be effective beginning on the date on 
     which the President determines and certifies to the 
     appropriate congressional committees that the Taliban, or any 
     related successor organization, has ceased to exist as an 
     organization capable of conducting military, insurgent, or 
     terrorist activities in Afghanistan from Pakistan.
       (4) Appropriate congressional committees defined.--In this 
     subsection, the term ``appropriate congressional committees'' 
     means the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on 
     Appropriations of the House of Representatives and the 
     Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on 
     Appropriations of the Senate.
       (e) Nuclear Proliferation.--
       (1) Finding.--Congress finds that Pakistan's maintenance of 
     a network for the proliferation of nuclear and missile 
     technologies would be inconsistent with Pakistan being 
     considered an ally of the United States.
       (2) Sense of congress.--It is the sense of Congress that 
     the national security interest of the United States will best 
     be served if the United States develops and implements a 
     long-term strategy to improve the United States relationship 
     with Pakistan and works with the Government of Pakistan to 
     stop nuclear proliferation.
       (f) Authorization of Appropriations.--
       (1) In general.--There are authorized to be appropriated to 
     the President for providing assistance for Pakistan for 
     fiscal year 2008--
       (A) for ``Development Assistance'', such sums as may be 
     necessary to carry out the provisions of sections 103, 105, 
     and 106 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 
     2151a, 2151c, and 2151d,);
       (B) for the ``Child Survival and Health Programs Fund'', 
     such sums as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of 
     sections 104 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 
     2151b);
       (C) for the ``Economic Support Fund'', such sums as may be 
     necessary to carry out the provisions of chapter 4 of part II 
     of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2346 et 
     seq.);
       (D) for ``International Narcotics Control and Law 
     Enforcement'', such sums as may be necessary to carry out the 
     provisions of chapter 8 of part I of the Foreign Assistance 
     Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2291 et seq.);
       (E) for ``Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining and 
     Related Programs'', such sums as may be necessary;
       (F) for ``International Military Education and Training'', 
     such sums as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of 
     chapter 5 of part II of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 
     (22 U.S.C. 2347 et seq.); and
       (G) for ``Foreign Military Financing Program'', such sums 
     as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of section 23 
     of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2763).
       (2) Other funds.--Amounts authorized to be appropriated 
     under this subsection are in addition to amounts otherwise 
     available for such purposes.
       (g) Extension of Waivers.--
       (1) Amendments.--The Act entitled ``An Act to authorize the 
     President to exercise waivers of foreign assistance 
     restrictions with respect to Pakistan through September 30, 
     2003, and for other purposes'', approved October 27, 2001 
     (Public Law 107-57; 115 Stat. 403), is amended--
       (A) in section 1(b)--
       (i) in the heading, to read as follows:
       ``(b) Fiscal Years 2007 and 2008.--''; and
       (ii) in paragraph (1), by striking ``any provision'' and 
     all that follows through ``that prohibits'' and inserting 
     ``any provision of the foreign operations, export financing, 
     and related programs appropriations Act for fiscal year 2007 
     or 2008 (or any other appropriations Act) that prohibits'';
       (B) in section 3(2), by striking ``Such provision'' and all 
     that follows through ``as are'' and inserting ``Such 
     provision of the annual foreign operations, export financing, 
     and related programs appropriations Act for fiscal years 2002 
     through 2008 (or any other appropriations Act) as are''; and
       (C) in section 6, by striking ``the provisions'' and all 
     that follows and inserting ``the provisions of this Act shall 
     terminate on October 1, 2008.''.
       (2) Effective date.--The amendments made by paragraph (1) 
     take effect on October 1, 2006.
       (3) Sense of congress.--It is the sense of Congress that 
     determinations to provide extensions of waivers of foreign 
     assistance prohibitions with respect to Pakistan pursuant to 
     Public Law 107-57 for fiscal years after the fiscal years 
     specified in the amendments made by paragraph (1) to Public 
     Law 107-57 should be informed by the pace of democratic 
     reform, extension of the rule of law, and the conduct of the 
     parliamentary elections currently scheduled for 2007 in 
     Pakistan.

     SEC. 1443. SAUDI ARABIA.

       (a) Findings.--Congress finds the following:
       (1) The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has an uneven record in the 
     fight against terrorism, especially with respect to terrorist 
     financing, support for radical madrassas, and a lack of 
     political outlets for its citizens, that poses a threat to 
     the security of the United States, the international 
     community, and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia itself.
       (2) The United States has a national security interest in 
     working with the Government of Saudi Arabia to combat 
     international terrorists who operate within Saudi Arabia or 
     who operate outside Saudi Arabia with the support of citizens 
     of Saudi Arabia.
       (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that, 
     in order to more effectively combat terrorism, the Government 
     of Saudi Arabia must undertake and continue a number of 
     political and economic reforms, including increasing anti-
     terrorism operations conducted by law enforcement agencies, 
     providing more political rights to its citizens, increasing 
     the rights of women, engaging in comprehensive educational 
     reform, enhancing monitoring of charitable organizations, 
     promulgating and enforcing domestic laws, and regulation on 
     terrorist financing.
       (c) Statements of Policy.--The following shall be the 
     policies of the United States:
       (1) To engage with the Government of Saudi Arabia to openly 
     confront the issue of terrorism, as well as other problematic 
     issues, such as the lack of political freedoms, with the goal 
     of restructuring the relationship on terms that leaders of 
     both countries can publicly support.
       (2) To enhance counterterrorism cooperation with the 
     Government of Saudi Arabia, if the political leaders of such 
     government are committed to making a serious, sustained 
     effort to combat terrorism.
       (3) To support the efforts of the Government of Saudi 
     Arabia to make political, economic, and social reforms 
     throughout the country.
       (d) Strategy Relating to Saudi Arabia.--
       (1) Requirement for report on strategy.--Not later than 90 
     days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the 
     President shall submit to the appropriate congressional 
     committees a report, in classified form if necessary, that 
     describes the progress on the Strategic Dialogue (established 
     by President George W. Bush and Crown Prince (now King) 
     Abdullah in April 2005) between the United States and Saudi 
     Arabia, including the progress made in such Dialogue toward 
     implementing the long-term strategy of the United States to--
       (A) engage with the Government of Saudi Arabia to 
     facilitate political, economic, and social reforms that will 
     enhance the ability of the Government of Saudi Arabia to 
     combat international terrorism; and
       (B) work with the Government of Saudi Arabia to combat 
     terrorism, including through effective prevention of the 
     financing of terrorism by Saudi institutions and citizens.
       (2) Appropriate congressional committees defined.--In this 
     subsection the term ``appropriate congressional committees'' 
     means the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on 
     Appropriations of the House of Representatives and the 
     Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on 
     Appropriations of the Senate.
                                 


                             General Leave

  Mr. THOMPSON of Mississippi. Madam Speaker, I ask unanimous consent 
that all Members may have 5 legislative days within which to revise and 
extend their remarks on H.R. 1.
  The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from 
Mississippi?
  There was no objection.
  The SPEAKER. Pursuant to section 507 of House Resolution 6, the 
gentleman from Mississippi (Mr. Thompson) and the gentleman from New 
York (Mr. King) each will control 90 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Mississippi, chairman of the 
Homeland Security Committee.

                              {time}  1300

  Mr. THOMPSON of Mississippi. Madam Speaker, I yield myself such time 
as I may consume.
  Madam Speaker, we are here today considering this bill for one 
reason: To protect America from terrorism and from those who advocate 
hate and violence against our Nation and its values.
  Let's be clear. The bill before us today does not contain Democratic 
or Republican ideas on how to protect our Nation. It contains American 
ideas.
  Madam Speaker, it contains ideas formulated by the 9/11 Commission, a 
bipartisan group of Americans chosen for their wisdom, expertise and 
love of country; Americans who we tasked to tell us what happened on 
September 11,

[[Page H162]]

2001, and how to avoid it happening again. That is why we are here 
today.
  I hope my colleagues will put rhetoric and political games aside to 
do right by the American people, to do right by those whose lives were 
affected by 9/11, including those whose memories we honor.
  I have heard and read a lot of excuses about fulfilling the 
recommendations, Madam Speaker. On one hand, many of my colleagues 
across the aisle have publicly said for months they already fulfilled 
the recommendations.
  In the past week they have accused the Democratic leadership of 
presenting a bill that doesn't fulfill the recommendation and leaves 
gaps.
  Madam Speaker, I am a bit baffled. Did the Republicans fulfill or not 
fulfill the recommendations? I think we all know the answer, and that 
is why we are here today.
  To those who want to point out alleged gaps in the 9/11 bill, I say, 
we can do better than the past. Here is a chance for Congress to stop 
dragging its feet, to become the ``do something'' Congress. We can 
stand around complaining and pointing fingers, or we can finally do the 
job we are here and hired to do.
  There is an old Irish proverb that says, ``You will never plow the 
field if you only turn it over in your mind.''
  Congress has spent 5 years turning over the 9/11 recommendations in 
its mind. On the topics covered by this legislation, we have seen bills 
introduced, amendments offered, hearings held, and investigative 
reports written.
  Don't be fooled by those who say that this bill is moving too 
quickly. It has been 5 years since 9/11. It has been 3 years since the 
9/11 Commission issued its report.
  Now is the time, Mr. Speaker, to plow the field. Now is the time to 
act on the 9/11 recommendations. The 9/11 Commission has told us that 
we must provide Homeland Security grants to States and cities based on 
risk, not a pork barrel formula. This bill meets that recommendation.
  The 9/11 Commission told us many more people could die after a 
terrorist attack or natural disaster if police, fire fighters and 
paramedics can't communicate with each other.
  Today, we will create a dedicated grant program to ensure State and 
local first responders have communication systems that talk to one 
another.
  The 9/11 commissioners told us that more than 5 years after the 
hijacked planes flew into our national landmarks, our aviation system 
is still not secure enough.
  We still do not spend our money cost-effectively to screen checked 
baggage. Airport checkpoints are not equipped with the most modern 
technologies, like those needed to detect liquid explosives, and cargo 
that is stored under a passengers seat is still not adequately 
inspected.
  This bill extends funding for advanced baggage screening and creates 
a novel new trust fund to strengthen checkpoint security.
  Perhaps more importantly, Mr. Speaker, this bill requires TSA to 
create a system of inspections to ensure that 100 percent of the cargo 
shipped on passenger planes is screened within 3 years.
  TSA will do this through a system that uses equipment, technology, 
canines, inspectors and other means to ensure that the level of 
security provided for air cargo is equivalent to the level of security 
for checked baggage.
  This bill also requires all cargo containers carried on ships to be 
scanned and sealed before they leave for an American port. The scanning 
requirement in this bill are put in place within a reasonable time 
frame, 3 years for large ports and 5 years for smaller ports.
  This bill takes other key steps to fulfill the 9/11 Commission's 
recommendations, such as strengthening critical infrastructure security 
and improving private sector preparedness.
  Perhaps more importantly, this bill will create a strong independent 
Privacy and Civil Liberties Board. It will also strengthen the 
authority of privacy officers in Federal agencies.
  We all know that securing our Nation will be of little use if we lose 
our way of life. Our commitment to privacy and individual freedom is in 
this process.
  For too long, Mr. Speaker, many in this House have talked about 
strengthening Homeland Security. But they are unwilling to pay the 
necessary price or confront the waste and White House mismanagement.
  Now is the time, Mr. Speaker, to put action into words. Supporting 
the 9/11 Commission Fulfillment Act today will do just that.
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.


                          PURPOSE AND SUMMARY

  The purpose of H.R. 1 is to provide for the implementation of the 
recommendations of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon 
the United States.


                  BACKGROUND AND NEED FOR LEGISLATION

  The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States 
(also known as the 9/11 Commission) produced an independent and 
comprehensive report evaluating the events and implications of the 
terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001. Included in the 
report were 41 recommendations on how to prevent such an attack from 
occurring again. As of the conclusion of the 109th Congress, not all of 
those recommendations had been fulfilled. Consequently, the United 
States remains unprepared for a major emergency of that kind. 
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita's destruction of the Gulf Coast region 
further emphasized American vulnerability to national disasters, 
whether they are caused by nature or terrorism.
  In addition to the report, several members of the 9/11 Commission 
participated in the ``9/11 Public Discourse Project,'' which issued a 
series of report cards evaluating and ultimately grading the federal 
government's progress on executing the Commission's recommendations as 
they related to national security and preparedness. The final report 
card, issued on December 5, 2005, gave an alarming number of failing or 
nearly failing grades to key aspects of the government's policies, 
procedures, and operations.
  Areas that received failing grades included interoperable 
communications for first responders, risk-based homeland security 
funding, and airline passenger screening, all of which are addressed by 
H.R. 1. Nearly-failing grades (D's) were used to describe the 
government's progress toward realistic assessment of critical 
infrastructure, checked bag and cargo screening for passenger aircraft, 
providing incentives for information sharing, encouraging government-
wide information sharing, creating a meaningful Privacy and Civil 
Liberties Oversight Board, a maximum effort to prevent terrorist from 
acquiring weapons of mass destruction, cultivating international 
scholarship and exchange programs with Arab and predominantly Muslim 
countries, and thoughtful examination of the role played by Saudi 
Arabia in the international community.
  By enacting provisions that address key recommendations from the 9/11 
Commission, H.R. 1 will make the United States more secure, closing 
many of the security and preparedness gaps mentioned above that keep 
Americans vulnerable to future national emergencies.


                                HEARINGS

  This bill reflects the findings of many oversight hearings that have 
taken place since the 9/11 Commission issued its recommendations in 
2004.
  On February 10, 2005, the Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, 
Science, and Technology held a hearing titled, ``The Proposed Fiscal 
Year 2006 Budget: Enhancing Terrorism Preparedness for First 
Responders.''
  On February 16, 2005, the Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information 
Sharing, and Terrorism Risk Assessment held a hearing titled, ``The 
Proposed Fiscal Year 2006 Budget: Building the Information Analysis 
Capabilities of DHS.''
  On March 15, 2005, the Subcommittee on Prevention of Nuclear and 
Biological Attack held a hearing titled, ``Nuclear Terrorism: 
Protecting the Homeland.'' Witnesses included Charles E. McQueary, 
Under Secretary for Science and Technology, Department of Homeland 
Security; Paul McHale, Assistant Secretary for Homeland Defense, 
Department of Defense; Paul M. Longsworth, Deputy Administrator for 
Defense Nuclear Proliferation, Department of Energy; and Willie T. 
Hulon, Assistant Director for Counterterrorism, FBI.
  On April 12, 2005, the Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, 
Science, and Technology held a hearing titled, ``The Need for Grant 
Reform and the Faster and Smarter Funding for First Responders Act of 
2005.''
  On April 19, 2005, the Subcommittee on Prevention of Nuclear and 
Biological Attack held a hearing titled, ``DHS Coordination of Nuclear 
Detection Efforts.'' Witnesses included Vayl Oxford, Acting Director of 
the DNDO; Dr. Fred Ikle, Center for Strategic and International 
Studies; Dr. Graham Allison, Director, Belfer Center for Science and 
International Affairs, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard 
University; and Col. Randy Larson, USAF (Ret.) CEO, Homeland Security 
Associates.

[[Page H163]]

  On May 26, 2005, the Subcommittee on Prevention of Nuclear and 
Biological Attack held a hearing titled, ``Building A Nuclear Bomb: 
Identifying Early Indicators of Terrorist Activity.'' Witnesses 
included the Honorable Ronald F. Lehman, Director for Global Security 
Research, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory; Mr. David Albright, 
President, Institute for Science and International Security; and Ms. 
Laura Holgate, Vice President for Russial/New Independent States, 
Nuclear Threat Initiative.
  On June 21, 2005, the Subcommittee on Prevention of Nuclear and 
Biological Attack held a hearing titled, ``Detecting Nuclear Weapons 
and Radiological Materials: How Effective Is Available Technology?'' 
Witnesses included Mr. Gene Aloise, Director, Natural Resources and 
Environment, GAO; Dr. Richard L. Wagner, Chair, Defense Science Board 
Task Force on Prevention of and Defense Against Clandestine Nuclear 
Attack, Senior Staff Member Los Alamos National Laboratory; and Ms. 
Bethann Rooney, Security Director, Port Authority of New York & New 
Jersey, among others.
  On June 22, 2005, the Subcommittee on Economic Security, 
Infrastructure Protection, and Cybersecurity held a hearing titled, 
``Ensuring the Security of America's Borders through the Use of 
Biometric Passports and Other Identity Documents.'' Testimony was 
received from Department of Homeland Security and State Department 
officials.
  On June 28, 2005, the Subcommittee on Prevention of Nuclear and 
Biological Attack held a hearing titled, ``Pathways to the Bomb: 
Security of Fissile Materials Abroad.''
  On July 13, 2005, the Subcommittee on Economic Security, 
Infrastructure Protection, and Cybersecurity held a hearing titled, 
``Leveraging Technology to Improve Aviation Security.'' Members took 
testimony from industry stakeholders, including firms with checkpoint 
technologies that show promise at detecting explosives at TSA 
checkpoints.
  On July 19, 2005, the Subcommittee on Economic Security, 
Infrastructure Protection, and Cybersecurity held a hearing titled, 
``Leveraging Technology to Improve Aviation Security, Part II.'' 
Testimony was received from Cliff Wilke, the TSA Chief Technology 
Officer.
  On July 20, 2005, the Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information 
Sharing, and Terrorism Risk Assessment held a hearing titled, ``A 
Progress Report on Information Sharing for Homeland Security.''
  On September 8, 2005, the Subcommittee on Prevention of Nuclear and 
Biological Attack held a hearing titled, ``WMD Terrorism and 
Proliferant States.'' Witnesses included Ray Takeyh, Senior Fellow, 
Middle Eastern Studies, Council on Foreign Relations; Dr. Daniel Byman, 
Director, Center for Peace and Security Studies, Georgetown University; 
and Gregory Giles, National Security Consultant, Hicks and Associates.
  On September 22, 2005, the Subcommittee on Prevention of Nuclear and 
Biological Attack held a hearing titled, ``Trends in the Movement of 
Illicit of Nuclear Materials.''
  On September 29, 2005, the Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, 
Science, and Technology held a hearing titled, ``Incident Command, 
Control, and Communications during Catastrophic Events.''
  On October. 19, 2005, the full Committee held a hearing titled, 
``Federalism and Disaster Response: Examining the Roles and 
Responsibilities of Local, State, and Federal Agencies.'' The Committee 
heard testimony from the governors of Arizona, Texas and Florida, as 
well as three local elected officials.
  On October 26, 2005, the Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, 
Science, and Technology held a hearing titled, ``Ensuring Operability 
During Catastrophic Events.'' The Subcommittee heard testimony from Dr. 
David Boyd, Director of project SAFECOM at the Department of Homeland 
Security.
  On November 8, 2005, the Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information 
Sharing, and Terrorism Risk Assessment held a hearing titled, ``Federal 
Support for Homeland Security Information Sharing: The Role of the 
Information Sharing Program Manager.''
  On November 17, 2005, the Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information 
Sharing, and Terrorism Risk Assessment held a hearing titled, 
``Terrorism Risk Assessment at the Department of Homeland Security.''
  On November 17, 2005, the Subcommittee on Prevention of Nuclear and 
Biological Attack held a hearing titled, ``International Efforts to 
Promote Nuclear Security.'' Witnesses included Jerry Paul, Principal 
Deputy Administrator, Acting Deputy Administrator for Nonproliferation 
Programs, National Nuclear Security Administration, Department of 
Energy, and Stephen Rademaker, Acting Assistant Secretary, Bureau of 
International Security and Nonproliferation, Department of State.
  On February 8, 2006, the Subcommittee on Prevention of Nuclear and 
Biological Attack and the Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, 
Science, and Technology held a joint hearing titled, ``Protecting the 
Homeland: Fighting Pandemic Flu from the Front Lines.''
  On February 15, 2006, the Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information 
Sharing, and Terrorism Risk Assessment held a hearing titled, ``The 
President's Proposed Fiscal Year 2007 Budget for the Department of 
Homeland Security: The Office of Intelligence and Analysis.''
  On February 15, 2006, the Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, 
Science, and Technology held a hearing titled, ``The State of 
Interoperable Communications: Perspectives from the Field.''
  On March 1, 2006, the Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, 
Science, and Technology held a hearing titled, ``The State of 
Interoperable Communications: Perspectives from State and Local 
Government.''
  On March 8, 2006, the Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, 
Science, and Technology held a hearing titled, ``Proposed Fiscal Year 
2007 Budget: Enhancing Preparedness for First Responders.''
  On March 8, 2006, the Subcommittee on Management, Integration, and 
Oversight held a hearing titled, ``The 9/11 Reform Act: Examining the 
Implementation of the Human Smuggling and Trafficking Center.''
  On April 6, 2006 and May 10, 2006, the Subcommittee on Intelligence, 
Information Sharing, and Terrorism Risk Assessment held hearings 
titled, ``Protection of Privacy in the DHS Intelligence Enterprise.''
  On April 12, 2006, the Committee held a field hearing titled, 
``Emergency Planning and Preparedness: Federal, State, and Local 
Coordination.''
  On April 25, 2006, the Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, 
Science, and Technology held a hearing titled, ``The State of 
Interoperable Communications: Perspectives on Federal Coordination of 
Grants, Standards, and Technology.'' The Subcommittee heard testimony 
from two panels. The first panel consisted of the principal Federal 
agencies that are responsible for coordinating Federal communication 
systems with state and local jurisdictions. The second panel included 
Federal and non-governmental entities that develop the standards and 
examined the impact of technology in the area of interoperable/
emergency communication.
  On May 24, 2006, the Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information 
Sharing, and Terrorism Risk Assessment held a hearing titled, 
``Examining the Progress of the DHS Chief Intelligence Officer.'' The 
Subcommittee heard testimony from Mr. Charles Allen, the Chief 
Intelligence Officer at the Department of Homeland Security.
  On May 25, 2006, the Subcommittee on Prevention of Nuclear and 
Biological Attack held a hearing titled, ``Preventing Nuclear 
Smuggling: Enlisting Foreign Cooperation.'' Witnesses included Mr. Vail 
Oxford, Director, Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, Department of 
Homeland Security; Mr. Jayson Ahearn, Assistant Commissioner for Field 
Operations, Customs and Border Protection, Department of Homeland 
Security; Mr. David Huizenga, Assistant Deputy Administrator for 
International Materials Protection, Control and Accounting, National 
Nuclear Security Administration, Department of Energy; and Mr. Frank 
Record, Acting Assistant Secretary of State for International Security 
and Nonproliferation, Department of State.
  On June 15, 2006, the full Committee held a hearing titled, ``DHS 
Terrorism Preparedness Grants: Risk-Based or Guess-Work.''
  On June 22, 2006, the Subcommittee on Prevention of Nuclear and 
Biological Attack held a hearing titled, ``International Efforts to 
Promote Nuclear Security.'' Witnesses included Mr. Jerry Paul, 
Principal Deputy Administrator, Acting Deputy Administrator for 
Nonproliferation Programs, National Nuclear Security Administration, 
Department of Energy; Mr. Frank Record, Acting Assistant Secretary, 
Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation, Department of 
State; and Mr. Jack David, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
International Security Policy, Office of the Secretary, Department of 
Defense, among others.
  On June 28, 2006, the Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information 
Sharing, and Terrorism Risk Assessment held a hearing titled, ``DHS 
Intelligence and Border Security: Delivering Operational 
Intelligence.''
  On July 26, 2006, the Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, 
Science, and Technology held a hearing titled, ``Emergency Care Crisis: 
A Nation Unprepared for Public Health Disasters.''
  On September 7, 2006, the Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information 
Sharing, and Terrorism Risk Assessment held a hearing titled, ``State 
and Local Fusion Centers and the Role of DHS.''
  On September 13, 2006, the Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information 
Sharing, and Terrorism Risk Assessment held a hearing titled, ``The 
Homeland Security Information Network: An Update on DHS Information 
Sharing Efforts.'' The Subcommittee heard testimony from the Inspector 
General of the Department of Homeland Security.

[[Page H164]]

         STATEMENT OF GENERAL PERFORMANCE GOALS AND OBJECTIVES

  The purpose of H.R. 1, the ``Implementing the 9/11 Commission 
Recommendations Act of 2007,'' is to strengthen national security and 
emergency preparedness efforts by enacting recommendations made by the 
National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (also 
known as the 9/11 Commission) in their comprehensive report on the 
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.


                        INFORMAL BUDGET ESTIMATE

  While there was no formal analysis from the Congressional Budget 
Office, it is estimated that with respect to Titles I through XI--those 
titles that fall within the jurisdiction of the Committee on Homeland 
Security--the only sections that would affect net direct spending are 
sections 402 and 403.
  Section 402, which would extend provisions related to the Aviation 
Security Capital Fund through 2011, would have no net cost over time. 
That provision would receive credit for triggering collection of the 
first $250 million in passenger fees, which would offset the cost of 
subsequent spending.
  Section 403, which creates a new $250 million checkpoint screening 
improvement fund for fiscal year 2008 that is funded through the 
Aviation Security Capital Fund, would have no net overall cost, 
although it would mean that the amount available to offset TSA's 2008 
appropriation for aviation security would be reduced by $250 million.


                   CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY STATEMENT

  Pursuant to clause 3(d)(1) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of 
Representatives, the Constitutional authority for this legislation is 
provided in Article I, section 8, clause 1 of the Constitution, which 
grants Congress the power to provide for the common Defense of the 
United States.

             Section-by-Section Analysis of the Legislation


       title i: risk-based allocation of homeland security grants

       Sec. 101--First Responders Homeland Security Funding. This 
     section amends the Homeland Security Act of 2002, by 
     inserting Title XX (``Funding for First Responders'') to the 
     end of the Act, including the following new sections:
       Sec. 2002--Faster and Smarter Funding for First Responders. 
     This section sets forth provisions governing Department of 
     Homeland Security (DHS) grant funding for first responders 
     pursuant to the State Homeland Security Grant Program, the 
     Urban Area Security Initiative, and the Law Enforcement 
     Terrorism Prevention Program. It specifically excludes non-
     DHS programs, the FIRE Grant programs, and the Emergency 
     Management Performance Grant program and Urban Search and 
     Rescue Grants program authorized by specified Federal laws.
       Sec. 2003--Covered Grant Eligibility and Criteria. This 
     section specifies that high threat urban areas are eligible 
     to apply for funding under the Urban Area Security Initiative 
     and that States, regions, and directly eligible tribes may 
     apply for funding under the State Homeland Security Grant 
     Program and the Law Enforcement Terrorism Prevention Program. 
     It also directs the Secretary of Homeland Security to require 
     any State applying for a covered grant to submit a State 
     Preparedness report, to be developed in consultation with 
     local governments and first responders. Additionally, this 
     section precludes a grant award to a State absent approval of 
     such plan. It sets forth minimum contents for grant 
     applications, including the designation of regional and 
     tribal liaisons (if the applicant is a region or directly 
     eligible tribe) and requires regional and tribal applications 
     to be coordinated with State applications. Finally, this 
     section requires applicants who purchase equipment that do 
     not meet or exceed any applicable national voluntary 
     consensus standards to include an explanation of why such 
     equipment or systems will serve the needs of the applicant 
     better than equipment or systems that meet or exceed such 
     standards.
       Sec. 2004--Risk-Based Evaluation and Prioritization. This 
     section requires the Secretary to evaluate and annually 
     prioritize pending applications for covered grants based upon 
     the degree to which they would lessen the threat to, 
     vulnerability of, and consequences for persons (including 
     transient commuters and tourists) and critical 
     infrastructure. It also requires such evaluation and 
     prioritization to be coordinated with the National Advisory 
     Council (established as part of the recent FEMA Reform Bill), 
     the FEMA Administrator, the United States Fire Administrator, 
     the Chief Intelligence Officer of the Department, the 
     Assistant Secretary for Infrastructure Protection, and other 
     Department officials as determined by the Secretary. This 
     section also sets forth minimum amounts each state shall 
     receive (0.25%), providing for larger grant awards to 
     applicants that have a significant international land border 
     and/or adjoin a body of water within North America that 
     contains an international boundary line (0.45%).
       Sec. 2005--Use of Funds and Accountability Requirements. 
     This section lists authorized uses of covered grants and 
     prohibits the use of grant funds to supplant State or local 
     funds, to construct physical facilities, to acquire land, or 
     for any State or local government cost sharing contribution. 
     It authorizes covered grant applicants to petition the 
     Secretary for reimbursement of the costs of any activity 
     relating to prevention of, preparedness for, response to, or 
     recovery from acts of terrorism that is a federal duty and 
     normally performed by a federal agency, and that is being 
     performed by a State and/or local government under agreement 
     with a federal agency. In addition, it sets the federal share 
     of the costs of activities carried out under covered grants 
     at 100 percent of the total for the two-year period following 
     enactment of this Act and at 75 percent thereafter. This 
     section also requires each covered grant recipient to submit 
     annual reports on homeland security spending and establishes 
     penalties for States that fail to pass through to local 
     governments within 45 days of receipt of grant funds. 
     Finally, this section requires the Secretary to report to 
     Congress on grant program activities annually.


title ii: ensuring communications interoperability for first responders

       Sec. 201--Improve Communications for Emergency Response 
     Grant Program. This section would amend Title V of the 
     Homeland Security Act of 2002 by creating a stand-alone 
     interoperability grant program at the Department of Homeland 
     Security. This provision requires the Department of Homeland 
     Security's Office of Grants and Training to coordinate with 
     the Director of Emergency Communications to establish the 
     Improved Communications for Emergency Response (ICER) grant 
     program to improve emergency communications among state, 
     regional, national, and in some instances, along the 
     international border communities. The provision provides that 
     the ICER grant would be established the first fiscal year 
     following the Department's completion of and delivery to 
     Congress of the National Emergency Communication Plan (as 
     outlined in current law) and baseline operability and 
     interoperability assessment, and, upon the Secretary's 
     determination that substantial progress has been made with 
     regard to emergency communication equipment and technology 
     standards. Further, this section outlines the available use 
     of the ICER grants for planning, design and engineering, 
     training and exercise, technical assistance, and other 
     emergency communication activities deemed integral by the 
     Secretary.


   title iii: strengthening use of a unified incident command during 
                              emergencies

       Sec. 301--National Exercise Program Design. This section 
     strengthens federal assistance to state, local, and tribal 
     governments both in implementing and in fully understanding 
     the National Incident Management System (NIMS), the Incident 
     Command System (ICS), any relevant mutual aid agreements, and 
     the broad concepts of a unified command system. It refines 
     and focuses some of the provisions of the Post Katrina 
     Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006 by expressly 
     requiring that the National Exercise Program include 
     practical exercises that reinforce the aforementioned subject 
     matters. Finally, it ensures that the utility of any exercise 
     is maximized by requiring that the exercise plans of state, 
     local, and tribal governments include the prompt creation of 
     an after-action report and the rapid incorporation of any 
     lessons learned into future operations.
       Sec. 302--National Exercise Program Model Exercises. This 
     section amends the Post Katrina Emergency Management Reform 
     Act of 2006 to make it easier for state, local, and tribal 
     governments to conduct exercises meant to reinforce NIMS/ICS 
     training. It does so by requiring the Department of Homeland 
     Security to develop and make available to them pre-scripted, 
     preplanned exercise scenarios and materials that will need 
     minimal tailoring.
       Sec. 303--Responsibilities of Regional Administrators of 
     the Federal Emergency Management Agency. This Section amends 
     the Homeland Security Act of 2002 and the Post Katrina 
     Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006 to require FEMA's 
     Regional Administrators to assist state, local, and tribal 
     governments in pre-identifying and evaluating sites where a 
     multijurisdictional unified command system can be quickly 
     established in the event of a terrorist attack or a natural 
     disaster.


               title iv: strengthening aviation security

       Sec. 401--Installation of In-Line Baggage Screening 
     Equipment. This provision directs the Department of Homeland 
     Security to issue, within thirty days of final passage of the 
     Act, a cost-sharing study required under the Intelligence 
     Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 that will provide 
     creative financing solutions to promote greater deployment of 
     in-line explosive detection systems. Additionally, the 
     Secretary is to provide analysis of the study, including a 
     list of provisions DHS supports and a schedule to implement 
     them. The 9/11 Public Discourse Project gave Congress and the 
     Administration a ``D'' on improving the security of checked 
     baggage.
       Sec. 402--Aviation Security Capital Fund. The 9/11 
     Discourse Project gave ``checked bag and cargo screening a 
     `D,' stating that ``Improvements here have not been made a 
     priority by the Congress or the administration. Progress on 
     implementation of in-line screening has been slow. The main 
     impediment is inadequate funding.'' This provision renews 
     expiring authorization for TSA to issue letters of intent, 
     grants or other funding vehicles to airports to help support 
     in-line EDS projects through Fiscal Year 2011. Without this 
     provision, authorization to issue such grants

[[Page H165]]

     would expire at the end of Fiscal Year 2007. The provision 
     also removes the $125 million cap on the level of support 
     that TSA can give airports under this fund.
       Sec. 403--Airport Checkpoint Screening Explosive Detection. 
     This provision creates a Checkpoint Screening Security Fund 
     to support the research, development and deployment of EDS 
     checkpoint technologies. The provision provides a one-time 
     deposit of $250 million in FY 2008, from the revenues 
     collected from the passenger ticket fees. The 9/11 
     Commissioners continues to be concerned about the threat that 
     a would-be terrorist would get passed the TSA checkpoint with 
     explosives strapped to their bodies. The 9/11 Public 
     Discourse Project gave Congress a ``C'' on improving airline 
     screening checkpoints to detect explosives. The Commissioners 
     found that ``while more advanced screening technology is 
     being developed, Congress needs to provide the funding for, 
     and TSA needs to move as expeditiously as possible with the 
     appropriate installation of explosive detection trace portals 
     at more of the nation's airports.''
       Sec. 404--Strengthening Explosive Detection at Airport 
     Screening Checkpoints. This provision directs the Department 
     of Homeland Security to issue, within seven days of 
     enactment, a strategic plan for the deployment of explosive 
     detection equipment at checkpoints that is long overdue under 
     the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004.
       Sec. 405--Extending Authorization of Aviation Security 
     Funding. This provision reauthorizes the Aviation Security 
     Capital Fund, which expires in 2007, through 2011 to ensure 
     that TSA can continue to collect fees on tickets purchased by 
     the flying public to enhance aviation security. This language 
     would make available an additional $1 billion towards the 
     challenge of expanding in-line EDS deployment, that is $250 
     million per year from FY 2008 through 2011.
       Sec. 406--Inspection of Cargo Carried Aboard Passenger 
     Aircraft. This provision directs the Department of Homeland 
     Security to establish and implement a system to inspect 100% 
     of cargo carried on passenger aircraft by 2009. The measure 
     directs the Department to develop a phased-in approach so 
     that by the end of fiscal year 2007, 35% of cargo carried on 
     passenger aircraft is inspected; by the end of fiscal year 
     2008, 65% percent of cargo is inspected; and by the end of 
     fiscal year 2009, 100% of cargo is inspected. Last December, 
     the 9/11 Commissioners gave a ``D'' grade to Congress and the 
     Administration for their efforts to enhance air cargo 
     screening.
       Sec. 407--Appeal and Redress Process for Passengers Wrongly 
     Delayed or Prohibited from Boarding a Flight. This provision 
     directs the Secretary of Homeland Security to create the 
     Office of Appeals and Redress to establish and administer a 
     timely and fair process for airline passengers who believe 
     they have been delayed or prohibited from boarding a flight 
     because they have been misidentified against the ``No Fly'' 
     or ``Selectee'' watch-lists. The 9/11 Commissioners 
     identified problems with airline passenger pre-screening as 
     an area that needs addressing. In the 9/11 Public Discourse 
     Project, the Commissioners stated that there has not been any 
     real progress on improving the watch-listing process. The 
     Department of Homeland Security was given an ``F'' in this 
     area.
       Sec. 408--Transportation Security Administration Personnel 
     Management. This section provides for equal treatment for all 
     Transportation Security Administration employees, including 
     screeners. This provision requires the Department of Homeland 
     Security apply the same management system to all TSA 
     employees, including screeners. Under this provision, all TSA 
     employees, including screeners, would have collective 
     bargaining rights and whistleblower rights.
       Sec. 409--Advanced Airline Passenger Prescreening. This 
     provision directs the Secretary to submit a plan with 
     milestones to test and implement a system to prescreen 
     passengers against the automatic selectee and no fly lists. 
     The plan is due 90 days after enactment of the Act and must 
     include (1) a description of the system; (2) a projected 
     timeline for each phase of testing and implementation of the 
     system; (3) an explanation of how the system integrates with 
     the prescreening system for passenger on international 
     flights; and (4) a description of how the system complies 
     with the Privacy Act.


        TITLE V: STRENGTHENING THE SECURITY OF CARGO CONTAINERS

       Sec. 1501--Requirements Relating to Entry of Containers 
     into the United States. This section amends 46 U.S.C. 
     Sec. 70116 to add a new subsection. Under the new subsection, 
     all containers must be scanned overseas using the best-
     available technology, including scanning for radiation and 
     density, before they are loaded onto a ship destined for the 
     United States. The scans will be reviewed by American 
     security personnel before the container is loaded, and as 
     technology becomes available, containers will be sealed with 
     a device that will sound an alarm when it is tampered with, 
     and will notify U.S. officials of a breach before the 
     container enters the Exclusive Economic Zone of the United 
     States. This section also requires the Secretary of Homeland 
     Security to establish standards for scanning equipment and 
     seals. The Secretary is required to review and if necessary, 
     revise these standards not less than once every two years. 
     Moreover, this section authorizes to be appropriated such 
     sums as may be necessary to carry out this new requirement 
     for fiscal years 2008 through 2013.
       Under this section, the Department of Homeland Security is 
     required to issue a final rule implementing this requirement 
     within one year after the Department issues the report on the 
     foreign pilot program required by Sec. 231 of the SAFE Ports 
     Act. In addition, this section mandates a phased-in 
     application. The new requirement shall apply to containers 
     loaded at larger ports (more than 75,000 TEUs loaded in 2005) 
     beginning on the end of the 3-year period beginning on the 
     date of the enactment of this act. The new requirement shall 
     apply to all other containers beginning on the end of the 5-
     year period beginning on the date of enactment of this act. 
     This section encourages the Secretaries of Homeland Security 
     and State to promote and establish international standards 
     for the security of containers moving through the 
     international supply chain. The legislation also requires the 
     Secretary of Homeland Security to consult with the 
     appropriate public and private stakeholders when carrying out 
     this new subsection to ensure that actions taken by the 
     Department do not violate international trade obligations or 
     other international obligations of the United States.


      TITLE VI: STRENGTHENING EFFORTS TO PREVENT TERRORIST TRAVEL

     Subtitle A--Human smuggling and trafficking center 
         improvements
       Sec. 601--Strengthening the Capabilities of the Human 
     Smuggling and Trafficking Center. This section would improve 
     the capabilities of the Human Smuggling and Trafficking 
     Center (HSTC) by authorizing the Assistant Secretary of 
     Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) to provide 
     administrative and operational support to stem human 
     smuggling, human trafficking, and terrorism travel. This 
     provision would authorize the hiring of 30 FTEs, of which no 
     less than 15 detailed special agents and intelligence 
     analysts--with at least three years of experience in the 
     field of human smuggling and trafficking--would serve for at 
     least two years at HSTC. This provision requires the 
     Secretary to develop a plan whereby the responsibilities of 
     the participating agencies and departments would be clearly 
     defined, outline how the Department's resources would be used 
     to support the intelligence functions of HSTC, and describe 
     the information sharing mechanism with the Office of 
     Information and Analysis (I&A), ICE, and the U.S. Customs and 
     Border Protection. Under this provision, the plan must also 
     develop a reciprocal clearance status for participating 
     agencies and departments, establish coordinated networked 
     systems, and define efforts to incorporate HSTC personnel 
     into the civil service system. This provision also requires 
     SHA to execute a Memorandum of Understanding with the 
     Attorney General clarifying the responsibilities of the 
     participating departments regarding human smuggling, 
     trafficking, and terrorist travel. Finally, I&A, in 
     coordination with HSTC must produce periodic reports to 
     Federal, State, local, and tribal law enforcement and other 
     relevant agencies regarding the terrorists threats related to 
     human smuggling, human traveling, and terrorism travel.
     Subtitle B--International collaboration to prevent terrorist 
         travel
       Sec. 611--Report on International Collaboration to Increase 
     Border Security, Enhance Global Document Security, and 
     Exchange Terrorist Information.
     Subtitle C--Entry and exit of foreign nationals into the 
         United States
       Sec. 621--Biometric Entry and Exit Verification. This 
     section directs that the Secretary submit a plan, detailing 
     the manner in which the US-VISIT program meets the goals of a 
     comprehensive entry and exit screening system--including both 
     biometric entry and exit--and how it will fulfill statutory 
     obligations. As of October 2006, this plan was still under 
     review in the Office of the Secretary, according to US-VISIT 
     officials. Without such a plan, DHS cannot articulate how 
     entry/exit concepts fit together--including any interim 
     nonbiometric solutions--and neither DHS nor Congress is in a 
     good position to prioritize and allocate resources, including 
     funds for any facility modifications that might be needed, 
     for a US-VISIT exit capability, to plan for the program's 
     future, or to consider trade-offs between traveler 
     convenience and security.


 TITLE VII: IMPROVING INTELLIGENCE AND INFORMATION SHARING WITH LOCAL 
                  LAW ENFORCEMENT AND FIRST RESPONDERS

     Subtitle A--Fusion and Law Enforcement Education and Teaming 
         (FLEET) grant program
       Sec. 701--Findings.
       Sec. 702--FLEET Grant Program. State, local, and tribal law 
     enforcement participation in state and local fusion centers 
     advances the cause of homeland security by involving officers 
     in the intelligence process on a daily basis; helping 
     officers build relationships across every level and 
     discipline of government and the private sector; and ensuring 
     that criminal intelligence and other information is shared 
     with their home communities. Unfortunately, the many local 
     and tribal police and sheriffs' officers who serve suburban, 
     rural, and tribal areas lack the resources to participate 
     fully in fusion centers. This section accordingly establishes 
     and authorizes funding for a program that will help them 
     detail officers and intelligence analysts to state fusion 
     centers by defraying the

[[Page H166]]

     costs associated with details. Specifically, it will provide 
     local and tribal communities with the funding they need to 
     backfill positions vacated by detailees; to train detailees 
     in the intelligence cycle and privacy and civil liberties, 
     and to ensure effective communications between detailees 
     and their home departments and agencies. By encouraging 
     participation in state fusion centers by these lower 
     profile but equally critical law enforcement players--
     regardless of resources--this program will promote the 
     development of more robust fusion centers nationally that 
     are better geared toward protecting the American people. 
     This section authorizes such sums as may be necessary for 
     each of fiscal years 2008 through 2013 in support of the 
     FLEET Grant Program.
     Subtitle B--Border Intelligence Fusion Center Program
       Sec. 711--Findings.
       Sec. 712--Establishment of Border Intelligence Fusion 
     Center Program. Law enforcement officers speak highly of 
     fusion centers--entities that have been established at the 
     State and regional levels in order to make sense of the 
     millions of pieces of data available to them, state health 
     authorities, local first responders, the private sector, and 
     other homeland security players. One place where police and 
     sheriffs' officers have identified a need for such 
     intelligence ``fusion'' is at America's borders. As the June 
     2, 2006, arrest of suspected terrorists in Toronto, Canada, 
     and news that al Qaeda has considered crossing the Mexican 
     border to infiltrate the country both vividly demonstrate, 
     America needs a ``border intelligence'' capability. Having 
     situational awareness of the goings-on at our points of entry 
     and all places in between would help the Department of 
     Homeland Security make best use of its resources by 
     partnering more effectively with the state, local, and tribal 
     law enforcement officers that are the ``eyes and ears'' at 
     our borders. Although it is commonly accepted that officers 
     armed with that information could be effective lookouts for 
     terrorists, drug and human smugglers, and others who pose a 
     threat to the nation, no consistent and effective border 
     intelligence capability yet exists. This section accordingly 
     establishes and authorizes funding for a program that will 
     require the Department to deploy Customs and Border 
     Protection (CBP) and Immigration and Customs Enforcement 
     (ICE) officers to border state fusion centers in order to 
     generate border-related intelligence products that are 
     relevant to the policing communities in those states. This 
     section also provides for intelligence analysis, privacy, and 
     civil liberties training. This section authorizes such sums 
     as may be necessary for each of fiscal years 2008 through 
     2013 in support of the Border Intelligence Fusion Center 
     Program.
     Subtitle C--Homeland Security information sharing enhancement
       Sec. 721--Short Title.
       Sec. 722--Homeland Security Advisory System. This section 
     directs the Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis to 
     implement an advisory system to relay advisories and alerts 
     to the public regarding threats to the homeland. This bill 
     likewise prescribes the contents of those advisories and 
     alerts, and it makes clear that the Under Secretary for 
     Intelligence and Analysis is not to use color designations as 
     the exclusive means warning the public of potential threat 
     conditions.
       Sec. 723--Homeland Security Information Sharing. This 
     section directs the Secretary to integrate the various 
     intelligence components of the Department (CBP, ICE, TSA, 
     etc.) into a Departmental Information Sharing Environment 
     (ISE) to be administered by the Under Secretary for 
     Intelligence and Analysis. To support the development of the 
     ISE, this section:
       (1) requires the Secretary to appoint ``Knowledge 
     Management Officers'' for each intelligence component in 
     order to promote a coordinated approach to gathering and 
     disseminating homeland security information;
       (2) establishes business processes for the review of 
     information provided by State, local, tribal, and private 
     sector sources and related feedback mechanisms; and
       (3) establishes a training program for Department employees 
     so they can better understand what ``homeland security 
     information'' is, how they can identify it as part of their 
     day-to-day work, and how it is relevant to the Office of 
     Intelligence and Analysis.
       This section also directs the Secretary, acting through the 
     Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis, to establish a 
     comprehensive information technology network architecture 
     that will connect all of the databases within the Department 
     of Homeland Security to each other--promoting internal 
     information-sharing within the Department's Office of 
     Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) and among the Department's 
     various intelligence components. This section requires the 
     Secretary to submit an implementation plan and progress 
     report to Congress in order to monitor the development of the 
     architecture and encourages its developers to adopt the 
     functions, methods, policies, and network qualities 
     recommended by the Markle Foundation.
     Subtitle D--Homeland Security information sharing 
         partnerships
       Sec. 731--Short Title.
       Sec. 732--State. Local. and Regional Information Fusion 
     Center Initiative. This section directs the Secretary to 
     establish an initiative to partner I&A with State, local, and 
     regional information fusion centers. Such fusion centers 
     analyze and disseminate potentially homeland security 
     relevant information to appropriate audiences in a given 
     community and are managed by a State, local, or regional 
     government entity. This section directs the Secretary to, 
     among other things, coordinate the Department's information 
     sharing efforts with these entities; provide intelligence and 
     other assistance to them; represent the interests of these 
     entities to the wider Intelligence Community; and provide 
     appropriate training. In addition, this section requires the 
     Secretary to submit a concept of operations for the fusion 
     center initiative before it can get underway. It also 
     requires the Secretary to address any privacy or civil 
     liberties concerns about the initiative raised by both the 
     Department's Privacy Officer and Officer for Civil Rights and 
     Civil Liberties before the initiative is implemented. This 
     section also requires a follow-up privacy impact assessment 
     within one year after the initiative commences.
       Sec. 733--Homeland Security Information Sharing Fellows 
     Program. This section essentially creates a program by which 
     State, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies can 
     nominate officers to work alongside intelligence analysts in 
     I&A to accomplish three key goals for improving 
     information sharing: (1) identifying for Department 
     intelligence analysts what kinds of homeland security 
     information are actually of interest to law enforcement, 
     including information that can be used to help thwart 
     terrorist attacks; (2) assisting intelligence analysts to 
     write and disseminate intelligence reports in a shareable 
     format--providing officers with specific and actionable 
     information without disclosing sensitive sources and 
     methods; and (3) serving as a point of contact for 
     officers in the field who want to share information with 
     the Department but are unsure of where they should direct 
     that information. Moreover, this section directs the Under 
     Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis to solicit 
     nominations for the program from a wide range of urban, 
     suburban, and rural communities; provides a stipend to 
     participating officers when funding permits; and directs 
     the Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis to 
     expedite the security clearance process for any nominee 
     selected for the program who does not otherwise possess a 
     valid security clearance. This provision requires the 
     Secretary to submit a concept of operations for the 
     program before it can get underway. It also requires the 
     Secretary to address any privacy or civil liberties 
     concerns about the program raised by both the Department's 
     Privacy Officer and Officer for Civil Rights and Civil 
     Liberties before the program can begin. Additionally, this 
     section also requires a follow-up privacy impact 
     assessment within one year after the program commences.
     Subtitle E--Homeland Security intelligence offices 
         reorganization
       Sec. 741--Departmental Reorganization. This section 
     reflects the changes wrought by the Secretary's Second Stage 
     Review by redesignating the Directorate for Information 
     Analysis and Infrastructure Protection (IAIP) within the 
     Homeland Security Act of 2002 as I&A. It likewise 
     redesignates the ``Under Secretary for Information Analysis 
     and Infrastructure Protection'' as the ``Under Secretary for 
     Intelligence and Analysis.'' This section also takes the list 
     of responsibilities for the Under Secretary for Information 
     Analysis and Infrastructure Protection contained in Section 
     201 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 and divides them up 
     between the new Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis 
     and the new Assistant Secretary for Infrastructure Protection 
     who heads the new Office of Infrastructure Protection 
     (described in Section 763 below). This section also adds new 
     responsibilities for the Under Secretary for Intelligence and 
     Analysis, including (1) coordinating and enhancing 
     integration among the Department's intelligence components; 
     (2) establishing intelligence priorities; and (3) ensuring 
     that open-source information is used in I&A products whenever 
     possible. In addition, this section requires the Under 
     Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis to establish a 
     continuity of operations (COOP) plan in the event I&A's 
     operations are disrupted by a range of potential emergencies 
     and includes a variety of technical and conforming 
     amendments.
       Sec. 742--Intelligence Components of the Department of 
     Homeland Security. This section defines ``intelligence 
     component''; requires the Secretary to provide training to 
     intelligence component staff regarding the handling, 
     analysis, dissemination, and collection of homeland security 
     information; and sets forth the responsibilities of the heads 
     of each of the Department's intelligence components. Those 
     responsibilities include: (1) ensuring that the work of their 
     component supports the Under Secretary for Intelligence and 
     Analysis and is consistent with his goals; (2) incorporating 
     the Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis's input 
     with regard to performance appraisals, bonus or award 
     recommendations, recruitment and selection of staff, 
     reorganization of the component, and other matters; and (3) 
     ensuring that staff has knowledge of and complies with the 
     programs and policies established by the Under Secretary for 
     Intelligence and Analysis.
       Sec. 743--Office of Infrastructure Protection. This section 
     establishes the aforementioned Assistant Secretary for 
     Infrastructure Protection to head the new Office of 
     Infrastructure Protection. This section also lists six

[[Page H167]]

     key responsibilities for this new Assistant Secretary, 
     including (1) conducting assessments of key resource and 
     critical infrastructure vulnerabilities; (2) identifying 
     priorities for Department protective and support measures; 
     (3) developing a comprehensive national plan for securing key 
     resources and critical infrastructure; (4) recommending 
     protective measures for key resources and critical 
     infrastructure; and (5) coordinating with the Undersecretary 
     for Intelligence and Analysis and the Department's homeland 
     security partners. The remainder of this section requires the 
     Secretary to provide the Office with an expert staff, some of 
     whom may hail from the private sector. It also requires staff 
     to have appropriate security clearances and provides that 
     personnel from other Federal agencies may be detailed to the 
     Office in order to meet staffing needs.


 TITLE VIII: PROTECTING PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES WHILE EFFECTIVELY 
                           FIGHTING TERRORISM

     Subtitle A--Privacy and civil liberties oversight boards
       Sec. 801--Short Title.
       Sec. 802--Findings.
       Sec. 803--Making: the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight 
     Board Independent. This provision removes the Board from the 
     Executive Office of the President and makes the Board an 
     independent agency. Under its current structure, the Board 
     acts under the direction of the President, its offices are 
     housed within the White House and its members serve at the 
     pleasure of the President. This section would grant the Board 
     autonomy and change its status to an independent agency.
       Sec. 804--Requiring: All Members of the Privacy and Civil 
     Liberties Oversight Board to Be Confirmed by the Senate. This 
     section requires every member of the Board to be confirmed by 
     the U.S. Senate. The Board will be composed of a full-time 
     chairman and 4 additional members. The Board members shall be 
     determined to be qualified and selected on the basis of their 
     professional qualifications, achievements, public stature and 
     expertise in the areas of civil liberties and privacy. 
     Moreover, there shall never be more than three members of the 
     Board that are members of the same political party and those 
     individuals who are not of the same political party as the 
     President can only be appointed after the President has 
     consulted with the leadership of the nominee's party. Members 
     of the Board cannot serve as an elected official or an 
     employee of the Federal Government, other than in the 
     capacity as a Board member during their tenure of service. 
     All members will serve for a term of six years each.
       Sec. 805--Subpoena Power for the Privacy and Civil 
     Liberties Oversight Board. This section states that the Board 
     will have subpoena powers that will be enforced by the U.S. 
     District Court in the judicial district where the subpoenaed 
     person resides. The subpoenas must be issued by the majority 
     of the members of the Board.
       Sec. 806--Reporting: Requirements. This provision requires 
     the Board to submit no less than two reports each year to the 
     appropriate committees of Congress that shall include a 
     description of the Board's activities, information on its 
     findings, conclusions, minority views, and recommendations 
     resulting from its advice and oversight functions. The Board 
     will also receive and review reports from Privacy Officers 
     and Civil Liberties Officers from other executive branch 
     agencies. The reports shall be unclassified, to the greatest 
     extent possible, with a classified annex if necessary. The 
     general public shall be kept abreast of the Board's 
     activities through its reports, which shall be made public 
     and through public hearings.
     SUBTITLE B--Enhancement of privacy officer authorities
       Sec. 811--Short Title.
       Sec. 812--Authorities of the Privacy Officer of the 
     Department of Homeland Security. This section vests the 
     designated privacy officer with the power to access any and 
     all records necessary to fulfill the obligations of the 
     office; undertake any privacy investigation that is deemed 
     appropriate; subpoena documents from the private sector, 
     where necessary; obtain sworn testimony; and take the same 
     action that the Department's Inspector General can take in 
     order to obtain answers to questions and responsive documents 
     in the course of an investigation. The term of appointment 
     shall be five years. Additionally, the Privacy Officer will 
     be required to submit reports directly to Congress regarding 
     the officer's performance without any prior comment of 
     amendment by the Secretary, Deputy Secretary, or any other 
     officer or employer of the Department of the Office of 
     Management and Budget.


          TITLE IX: Improving Critical Infrastructure Security

       Sec. 901--Vulnerability Assessment and Report on Critical 
     Infrastructure Information. This section requires the 
     Secretary to provide annual comprehensive reports on 
     vulnerability assessments for all critical infrastructure 
     sectors established in Homeland Security Presidential 
     Directive-7. This provision will require the Secretary to 
     provide the appropriate congressional committees with a 
     summary vulnerability report and a classified annex for each 
     industry sector. This provision also requires the Department 
     of Homeland Security to provide a summary report from the 
     preceding two years to compare with the current report to 
     show any changes in vulnerabilities, provide explanations and 
     comments on greatest risks to critical infrastructure for 
     each sector, and additional recommendations for mitigating 
     these risks.
       Sec. 902--National Asset Database and the National At-Risk 
     Database. This section requires the Secretary of the 
     Department of Homeland Security to maintain two databases 
     addressing critical infrastructure: the National Asset 
     Database and, as a subset, the National at-risk Database. 
     These databases will list the nation's critical 
     infrastructure most at-risk of a terrorist attack. To develop 
     the National Asset Database and the At-Risk Database, the 
     Secretary will meet with a consortium of national 
     laboratories and experts. The Secretary is required to 
     annually update both databases and remove assets and 
     resources that are not verifiable or do not comply with the 
     database requirements. The Secretary will also meet with the 
     states and advise them as to the format for submitting assets 
     for the lists and notifying them as to deficiencies before 
     removing or not including assets on the lists. This provision 
     also requires the Secretary to consult the Databases for 
     purposes of allocating various Department grant programs. 
     Finally, the Secretary must provide an annual report to 
     Congress on the contents of the Databases.


   TITLE X: Transportation Security Planning and Information Sharing

       Sec. 1001--Strategic Transportation Security Information 
     Sharing. This section amends 49 U.S.C. Sec. 114 to add 
     subsection 114(u). This new subsection requires the 
     establishment of a Strategic Transportation Security 
     Information Sharing Plan. The purpose of this plan is to 
     ensure the robust development of tactical and strategic 
     intelligence products related to transportation security 
     for dissemination to public and private stakeholders. The 
     plan shall include a description of how intelligence 
     analysts in the Transportation Security Administration are 
     coordinating their activities with other Federal, State, 
     and Local analysts. In addition the plan shall include 
     reasonable deadlines for completing organizational changes 
     within the Department and a description of resources 
     needed to fulfill this plan.
       Under this new subsection, the Secretary of the Department 
     of Homeland Security is required to submit a report 
     containing the plan to the appropriate Congressional 
     Committees within 180 days of enactment. The Secretary is 
     also required to submit an annual report and updates on 
     implementation
       The Secretary of Homeland Security is required under the 
     new subsection to conduct an annual survey on the stakeholder 
     satisfaction concerning the transportation security 
     intelligence reports issued by the Department. To the 
     greatest extent possible, the Secretary shall provide 
     stakeholders with transportation security information in an 
     unclassified format. The Secretary is also required to ensure 
     that stakeholders have the security clearances needed to 
     receive classified information if the information can not be 
     disseminated in an unclassified format.
       Sec. 1002--Transportation Security Strategic Planning. This 
     section amends 49 U.S.C. 114(t). This new legislation 
     specifically states that the Secretary of the Department of 
     Homeland Security is required to complete modal security 
     plans for aviation, bridge and tunnel, commuter rail and 
     ferry, highway, maritime, pipeline, rail, mass transit, over-
     the-road bus, and other public transportation assets (the 
     National Strategy for Transportation Security is complete, 
     but its underlying modal plans have not yet been completed). 
     The Secretary of Homeland Security is responsible for 
     coordinating all efforts undertaken under this subsection 
     with the Secretary of Transportation. The development of 
     risk-based priorities required under this section shall be 
     based on vulnerability assessments conducted by the 
     Department of Homeland Security.
       This section requires the Secretary to define the roles and 
     missions of tribal authorities. This section also requires 
     the Secretary to establish mechanisms for encouraging 
     employee organization cooperation and participation. Under 
     this new language, the Secretary is responsible for a 
     comprehensive delineation of prevention responsibilities. The 
     responsibilities and issues delineated under this section 
     have been expanded to include executed acts of terrorism 
     outside of the United States. Research and development 
     projects initiated by the Department shall be based on the 
     prioritization required by this subsection. This section 
     requires the Secretary, in conjunction with the submission of 
     the budget to Congress under 31 U.S.C. Sec. 1105(a), to 
     submit to the appropriate congressional committees an 
     assessment of the progress made on implementing the 
     transportation modal security plans.
       The periodic progress report required under this subsection 
     shall include, at a minimum, recommendations for improving 
     and implementing the National Strategy for Transportation 
     Security and the transportation modal security plans that the 
     Secretary, in consultation with the Secretary of 
     Transportation, considers appropriate. The report shall 
     include an accounting of all grants, including those for 
     research and development, distributed by the Department of 
     Homeland Security the previous year and a description of how 
     these grants accomplished the goals of the National Strategy 
     for Transportation Security. The report shall include an 
     accounting of all funds spent by the Department on 
     transportation security. This

[[Page H168]]

     accounting should not include the aforementioned grants. The 
     report shall include information on the number of employees, 
     by agency, working on transportation security issues. This 
     listing shall be divided by mode--aviation, bridge and 
     tunnel, commuter rail and ferry, highway, maritime, pipeline, 
     rail, mass transit, over-the-road bus, and other public 
     transportation modes. This list shall also include 
     information, by mode, on the number of contractors hired by 
     the Department to work on transportation-related security. 
     Finally, the report shall include information on the turnover 
     of transportation-security related employees at the 
     Department the previous year. Specifically, the report shall 
     provide information on the number of people who have left the 
     Department, their agency, the area in which they worked, and 
     the amount of time that they had worked at the Department. If 
     the Department initiates any transportation security 
     activities that are not clearly delineated in the National 
     Strategy for Transportation Security, the Department shall 
     provide an explanation to the appropriate congressional 
     committees; including the amount of funds expended for these 
     initiatives.
       Finally, this section requires the National Strategy for 
     Transportation Security to include, as an integral part or as 
     an appendix, the Transportation Sector Specific Plan required 
     under Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7. 
     Additionally, the Secretary of Homeland Security, working 
     with the Secretary of Transportation, shall consult with 
     other Federal agencies; state, local, and tribal officials; 
     the private sector; employee organizations; institutions of 
     higher learning; and others, as applicable, when carrying out 
     the responsibilities outlined in this section. An 
     unclassified version of the National Strategy for 
     Transportation Security shall be provided to other Federal 
     agencies; state, local, and tribal officials; the private 
     sector; employee organizations; institutions of higher 
     learning; and others, as applicable.


                 TITLE XI: PRIVATE SECTOR PREPAREDNESS

       Sec. 1101--Participation of Private Sector Organizations in 
     Emergency Preparedness and Response Activities. This 
     provision establishes a program by which the Secretary of 
     Homeland Security will establish a disaster and emergency 
     preparedness response program for the private sector. Under 
     this provision, within 90 days of passage, the Secretary will 
     create a program to enhance private sector preparedness and 
     response to terrorism and other emergencies and disasters. 
     Among other things, the program must establish guidelines to: 
     (1) identify hazards and assessing risks and impacts, (2) 
     mitigating hazards, (3) managing emergency preparedness and 
     response, and (4) developing training and response plans and 
     operational procedures. Among any such standards created, the 
     Department is required to use National Fire Protection 
     Association 1600 Standard on Disaster/Emergency Management 
     and Business Continuity Programs, which establishes a check-
     list of best practices for disaster and emergency 
     preparedness and response. This standard was endorsed and 
     recommended by the 9/11 Commission.


  TITLE XII: PREVENTING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION PROLIFERATION AND 
                               TERRORISM

       Sec. 1201--Findings.
       Sec. 1202--Definitions.
     Subtitle A--Repeal and modification of limitations on 
         assistance for prevention of WMD proliferation and 
         terrorism
       Sec. 1211--Repeal and Modification of Limitations on 
     Assistance for Prevention of WMD Proliferation and Terrorism. 
     Consistent with the 9-11 Commission's recommendations, this 
     section repeals conditions on CTR assistance to Russia and 
     the former Soviet Union, as proposed by Senator Lugar in 
     amendments in prior Congresses. This provision also removes 
     limits on the use of CTR and Department of Energy funds 
     outside the former Soviet Union by modifying certification 
     requirements and repealing funding caps while providing 
     additional oversight over this program.
     Subtitle B--Proliferation Security Initiative
       Sec. 1221--Proliferation Security Initiative Improvements 
     and Authorities. This section expresses a Sense of Congress 
     that the President should expand and strengthen the PSI, with 
     a particular focus on implementing recent recommendations 
     from the Government Accountability Office, including 
     establishing a separate budget item for PSI. It also requires 
     the Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense to submit 
     defined annual budgets for the PSI. This provision further 
     requires a presidential report on the implementation of 
     Subtitle B and an annual GAO report on PSI progress and 
     effectiveness.
       Sec. 1222--Authority to Provide Assistance to Cooperative 
     Countries. This section authorizes the President to provide 
     certain types of foreign military assistance to countries 
     that cooperate with the U.S. and its allies to achieve PSI 
     goals. It also requires the President to notify the Congress 
     30 days before transferring any ship or aircraft with 
     military applications to any country that does not support 
     U.S. interdiction efforts.
     Subtitle C--Assistance to Accelerate Programs to Prevent WMD 
         Proliferation and Terrorism
       Sec. 1231--Findings: Statement of Policy.
       Sec. 1232--Authorization of Appropriations for the 
     Department of Defense Cooperative Threat Reduction Program. 
     This provision authorizes such additional appropriations as 
     may be necessary for fiscal year 2007 for the CTR Program, 
     particularly for biological weapons proliferation prevention; 
     chemical weapons destruction at Shchuch'ye; and to accelerate 
     and strengthen all Cooperative Threat Reduction programs. 
     This section also contains a sense of Congress that in future 
     fiscal years, the President should accelerate and expand 
     funding for Department of Defense CTR programs, and should 
     begin immediately to secure additional commitments from the 
     Russian Federation and other partner countries to facilitate 
     such efforts.
       Sec. 1233--Authorization of Appropriations for Department 
     of Energy Programs to Prevent WMD Proliferation and 
     Terrorism. This provision authorizes appropriations for FY 
     2007 for the Department of Energy National Nuclear Security 
     Administration for the following programs and purposes:
       To accelerate and strengthen the Global Threat Reduction 
     Initiative (GTRI or ``global cleanout''), with a particular 
     emphasis on the Russian research reactor fuel return program; 
     international radiological threat reduction; and development 
     of a quick response and short-term capabilities to secure and 
     remove nuclear materials throughout the world.
       To accelerate and strengthen the Nonproliferation and 
     International Security program, with a particular emphasis on 
     global security and engagement with China, India, and other 
     states; activities to address emerging proliferation concerns 
     in North Korea, Iran and elsewhere; participation in 
     negotiations regarding North Korea's nuclear programs; inter-
     agency participation in the PSI; technical and other 
     assistance to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 
     to increase the IAEA's capacity to secure vulnerable 
     materials worldwide and prevent nuclear terrorism; U.S. 
     efforts to help states around the world place the ``effective 
     controls'' on weapons of mass destruction and related 
     materials and technology mandated by UN Security Council 
     Resolution 1540; cooperation on export controls in South 
     Asia, the Middle East and other regions; efforts to 
     strengthen U.S. commitments to international regimes and 
     agreements; and establishment of a contingency fund for 
     opportunities that arise.
       To accelerate and strengthen the International Materials 
     Protection, Control and Accounting program, with a particular 
     emphasis on implementation of physical protection and 
     material control and accounting upgrades at site; national 
     programs and sustainability activities in Russia; material 
     consolidation and conversion (including significant 
     acceleration of the down-blending of highly-enriched uranium 
     (HEU) to low-enriched uranium (LEU), the removal of HEU from 
     facilities, and international participation in these 
     efforts); efforts to strengthen cooperation with and access 
     to Russia; implementation of Second Line of Defense Megaports 
     agreements; and implementation of Department of Energy 
     actions under the Security and Accountability for Every 
     (SAFE) Port Act of 2006.
       To accelerate and strengthen the Research and Development 
     program, with a particular emphasis on improvement of U.S. 
     government capability for both short and long-term, and 
     innovative, nonproliferation research and development that 
     addresses emerging proliferation concerns and will maintain 
     U.S. technological advantage, including the capacity to 
     detect nuclear material origin, uranium enrichment and 
     plutonium reprocessing; and efforts to significantly expand 
     the scientific research and development skills and resources 
     available to the Department of Energy's nonproliferation 
     programs.
     Subtitle D--Office of the United States Coordinator for the 
         Prevention of WMD Proliferation and Terrorism
       Sec. 1241--Office of the United States Coordinator for the 
     Prevention of WMD Proliferation and Terrorism. This section 
     establishes the executive office of the U.S. Coordinator for 
     the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation 
     and Terrorism. The U.S. Coordinator's duties include serving 
     as the advisor to the President on all matters relating to 
     the prevention of WMD proliferation and terrorism; 
     formulating a comprehensive and well-coordinated U.S. 
     strategy and policies (including department and agency 
     performance milestones, identification of program 
     inefficiencies, plans to coordinate and expand U.S. 
     activities, new initiatives and programs, and plans to 
     strengthen international cooperation); leading interagency 
     coordination; conducting oversight and evaluation; and 
     overseeing the development of a comprehensive and coordinated 
     budget and carrying out other budgetary authorities. This 
     section further requires an annual congressional report on 
     the strategy and policies described in Subtitle D, and 
     consultation with the Commission on the Prevention of WMD 
     Proliferation and Terrorism (established in Subtitle E).
       Sec. 1242--Request for Corresponding Russian Coordinator. 
     This section expresses a sense of Congress that the President 
     should personally request the President of the Russian 
     Federation to designate an official of the Federation with 
     responsibilities for preventing WMD proliferation and 
     terrorism, commensurate with those of the U.S. Coordinator, 
     and with whom the U.S. Coordinator should work to plan and 
     implement activities in the Russian Federation.

[[Page H169]]

     Subtitle E--Commission on the Prevention of WMD Proliferation 
         and Terrorism
       Sec. 1251--Commission on the Prevention of WMD 
     Proliferation and Terrorism. This section directs the 
     President to convene a bipartisan blue-ribbon commission of 
     experts for the purpose of assessing current activities and 
     programs to prevent weapons of mass destruction (WMD) 
     proliferation and terrorism, and providing a clear and 
     comprehensive strategy and concrete recommendations for these 
     activities and programs.
       Sec. 1252--Purposes. This section provides for the purposes 
     of the Commission, including assessing current activities, 
     initiatives, and programs to prevent WMD proliferation and 
     terrorism and providing a clear and comprehensive strategy 
     and concrete recommendations for such activities, 
     initiatives, and programs, with a particular emphasis on 
     significantly accelerating, expanding, and strengthening, on 
     an urgent basis, United States and international efforts to 
     prevent, stop, and counter the spread of nuclear weapons 
     capabilities and related equipment, material, and technology 
     to terrorists and states of concern.
       Sec. 1253--Composition. This provision describes the 
     composition of the Commission, which will have three members 
     appointed by the President, three members appointed the by 
     the House and three members appointed by the Senate, and 
     establishes requirements for quorum and filling vacancies.
       Sec. 1254--Responsibilities. This section requires the 
     Commission to address the structure and mission of relevant 
     government actors, including the Office of the U.S. 
     Coordinator for the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction 
     Proliferation and Terrorism (established in Subtitle D); 
     inter-agency coordination; U.S. commitments to international 
     regimes; and the threat of WMD proliferation and terrorism to 
     the U.S. and its interests. This section also requires the 
     Commission to reassess, and where necessary update and expand 
     upon, the conclusions and recommendations of the report 
     entitled ``A Report Card on the Department of Energy's 
     Nonproliferation Programs with Russia'' of January 2001 (also 
     known as the ``Baker-Cutler Report'').
       Sec. 1255--Powers. This provision describes the powers of 
     the Commission.
       Sec. 1256--Nonapplicability of Federal Advisory Committee 
     Act. This section clarifies that the Federal Advisory 
     Commission Act does not apply to the Commission but requires 
     the Commission to hold hearings as appropriate.
       Sec. 1257--Report. This section requires that the 
     Commission report to Congress not later than 180 days after 
     appointment of the Commission.
       Sec. 1258--Termination. This provision terminates the 
     Commission 60 days after completion of the report required 
     under Sec. 1257.


         TITLE XIII: NUCLEAR BLACK MARKET COUNTER-TERRORISM ACT

       Sec. 1301--Short Title.
       Sec. 1302--Definitions.
     Subtitle A--Sanctions for transfers of nuclear enrichment, 
         reprocessing, and weapons technology, equipment, and 
         materials involving foreign persons and terrorists
       Sec. 1311--Authority to Impose Sanctions on Foreign 
     Persons. This section requires the President to impose 
     sanctions on any foreign person who trades nuclear enrichment 
     technology to any non-nuclear weapon state that does not 
     possess such technology as of January 1, 2004 and does not 
     have in force an IAEA Additional Protocol; or, is developing 
     nuclear weapons; or, who provides items controlled by the 
     Nuclear Suppliers Group that contributes to the development 
     of a nuclear weapon by a non-nuclear weapon state or any 
     foreign person. Sanctions include prohibiting foreign 
     assistance to such person, prohibiting the export of defense 
     articles, defense services, or dual use items (other than 
     food or medicine), and prohibiting contracts. Sanctions may 
     be waived if it is important to the national interest and 
     furthers the purposes of the Act.
       Sec. 1312--Presidential Notification on Activities of 
     Foreign Persons. This provision requires a report from the 
     President on foreign persons who engage in the activities 
     described in Sec. 1311.
     Subtitle B--Further actions against corporations associated 
         with sanctioned foreign persons
       Sec. 1321--Findings.
       Sec. 1322--Campaign by United States Government Officials. 
     This section requires the President to instruct U.S. 
     officials and agencies to persuade foreign governments and 
     relevant corporations not to enter into any business 
     transaction with foreign persons who engage in the activities 
     described in 1311.
       Sec. 1323--Coordination. This section provides that the 
     Secretary of State coordinate the activities of U.S. 
     government agencies under 1322.
       Sec. 1324--Report. This provision requires an annual report 
     on all activities described in this subtitle.
     Subtitle C--Rollback of nuclear proliferation networks
       Sec. 1331--Nonproliferation as a Condition of United States 
     Assistance. This section provides that U.S. assistance should 
     only be provided to countries that are not cooperating with 
     countries or foreign groups or individuals who are engaged 
     in, planning or assisting any international terrorist group 
     in the development of nuclear weapons or the means to deliver 
     them and are taking all necessary measures to prevent their 
     nationals or persons under their control from participating 
     in such cooperation and are fully and completely cooperating 
     with the United States in its efforts to eliminate nuclear 
     black-market networks.
       Sec. 1332--Report on Identification of Nuclear 
     Proliferation Network Host Countries. This provision requires 
     an annual report that identifies any country in which 
     activities of the nuclear black market network that supplied 
     Libya, Iran and North Korea occurred and any country in which 
     such activities occur in the future. This section also 
     requires that the President submit information as to whether 
     such countries are fully cooperating with the United States, 
     including providing access to individuals involved in such 
     networks.
       Sec. 1333--Suspension of Arms Sales Licenses and Deliveries 
     to Nuclear Proliferation Host Countries. This provision 
     directs the President to prohibit exports or other activities 
     under the Arms Export Control Act to any country unless the 
     President certifies that such country is fully investigating 
     the nuclear black market networks described in 1332, is 
     taking effective steps to halt such activities, and is fully 
     cooperating with the United States and other appropriate 
     international organizations in investigations regarding such 
     networks. These prohibitions may be waived if it is important 
     to the national security interest. 25


        TITLE XIV: 9/11 COMMISSION INTERNATIONAL IMPLEMENTATION

       Sec. 1401--Short Title: Table of Contents.
     Subtitle A--Quality educational opportunities in Arab and 
         predominantly Muslim countries
       Sec. 1411--Findings: Policy. This section declares that it 
     is the policy of the United States to: work toward the goal 
     of dramatically increasing the availability of modern basic 
     education through public schools in Arab and predominantly 
     Muslim countries, join with other countries in supporting the 
     International Arab and Muslim Youth Opportunity Fund, offer 
     additional incentives to increase the availability of basic 
     education in Arab and predominantly Muslim countries, and 
     work to prevent financing of education institutions that 
     support radical Islamic fundamentalism.
       Sec. 1412--International Arab and Muslim Youth Opportunity 
     Fund. This section amends Sec. 7114 of the Intelligence 
     Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 by establishing 
     an International Arab and Muslim Youth Opportunity Fund. The 
     new Sec. 7114(a) contains findings on the United Nation's 
     2003 Arab Human Development Report on the lack of quality 
     public education, the high illiteracy, enrollment, and access 
     rates in Arab countries. The new Sec. 7114(b) states the 
     purpose is to strengthen the public educational systems in 
     Arab and predominantly Muslim countries by authorizing the 
     establishment of an International Arab and Muslim Youth 
     Opportunity Fund and providing resources for the Fund to help 
     strengthen the public educational systems in Arab and 
     predominantly Muslim countries. The new Sec. 7114(c) 
     authorizes the establishment of an International Arab and 
     Muslim Youth Opportunity Fund as either a separate fund in 
     the U.S. Treasury or through an international organization or 
     international financial institution; authorizes the Fund to 
     support specific activities, including assistance to enhance 
     modern educational programs; assistance for training and 
     exchange programs for teachers, administrators, and students; 
     assistance targeting primary and secondary students; 
     assistance for development of youth professionals; and other 
     types of assistance such as the translation of foreign books, 
     newspapers, reference guides, and other reading materials 
     into local languages and the construction and equipping of 
     modern community and university libraries; and authorizes 
     such sums as may be necessary for fiscal years 2008, 2009 and 
     2010 to carry out these activities. This subsection requires 
     the President to prepare a report on the United States 
     efforts to assist in the improvement of education 
     opportunities for Arab and predominantly Muslim children and 
     youths, including the progress in establishing the 
     International Arab and Muslim Youth Opportunity Fund. This 
     subsection also provides a definition for use in this 
     section.
       Sec. 1413--Annual Report to Congress. This section directs 
     the Secretary of State to prepare an annual report on the 
     efforts of Arab and predominantly Muslim countries to 
     increase the availability of modern basic education and to 
     close educational institutions that promote religious 
     extremism and terrorism and provides the requirements for the 
     annual report.
       Sec. 1414--Extension of Program to Provide Grants to 
     American-Sponsored Schools in Arab and Predominantly Muslim 
     Countries to Provide Scholarships. This section 
     provides findings regarding the pilot program established 
     by Sec. 7113 of the 9/11 Implementation Act of 2004, 
     stating that this program for outstanding students from 
     lower-income and middle-income program in Arab and 
     predominantly Muslim countries is being implemented. This 
     provision also amends Sec. 7113 to extend that program for 
     FY2007 and 2008, authorizes such sums as may be necessary 
     for such years, and requires a report in April 2008 about 
     the progress of the program.
     Subtitle B--Democracy and development in Arab and 
         predominantly Muslim countries
       Sec. 1421--Promoting Democracy and Development in the 
     Middle East, Central Asia, South

[[Page H170]]

     Asia, and Southeast Asia. This section contains findings 
     describing the national security interests of the United 
     States to promote democracy, the rule of law, good 
     governance, sustainable development, a vigorous civil 
     society, political freedom, protection of minorities, 
     independent media, women's rights, private sector growth, and 
     open economic systems in the countries of the Middle East, 
     Central Asia, South Asia, and Southeast Asia. This provision 
     also declares that it is the policy of the United States to 
     promote in the short and long-term, democracy, the rule of 
     law, good governance, sustainable development, a vigorous 
     civil society, political freedom, protection of minorities, 
     independent media, women's rights, private sector growth, and 
     open economic systems in the countries of the Middle East, 
     Central Asia, South Asia, and Southeast Asia; and provide 
     assistance to individuals and organizations in the countries 
     of those regions that are committed to promoting those 
     objectives. Moreover, this section directs the Secretary of 
     State to prepare a report with a country-by-country five year 
     strategy to promote the policy of the United States described 
     in subsection (b), including an estimate of the funds 
     necessary to implement such a strategy.
       Sec. 1422--Middle East Foundation. This provision 
     authorizes the Secretary of State to designate an appropriate 
     private, non-profit United States organization as the Middle 
     East Foundation and to provide funding to the Middle East 
     Foundation through the Middle East Partnership Initiative. 
     This subsection directs the Secretary of State to provide 
     notification prior to designating an appropriate organization 
     as the Middle East Foundation. It also requires the Middle 
     East Foundation to award grants to persons located in the 
     Middle East or working with local partners based in the 
     region to carry out projects that support the purposes 
     specified in subsection (a); and permits the Foundation to 
     make a grant to a Middle Eastern institution of higher 
     education to create a center for public policy. In addition, 
     this section prevents the funds provided to the Foundation 
     from benefiting any officer or employee of the Foundation, 
     except as salary or reasonable compensation for services, and 
     provides that the Foundation may hold funds provided in this 
     section in interest-bearing accounts, subject to 
     appropriations. This section requires annual independent 
     private audits, permits audits by the Government 
     Accountability Office, and requires audits of the use of 
     funds under this section by the grant recipient. This 
     provision also directs the Foundation to prepare an annual 
     report on the Foundation's activities and operations, the 
     grants awarded with funds provided under this section, and 
     the financial condition of the Foundation. Finally, this 
     section repeals 534(k) of P.L. 109-102.
     Subtitle C--Restoring United States moral leadership
       Sec. 431--Advancing United States Interests through Public 
     Diplomacy. This provision finds, via the National Commission 
     on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, that the U.S. 
     government has initiated some promising initiatives in 
     television and radio broadcasting to the Arab world, Iran, 
     and Afghanistan and that these efforts are beginning to reach 
     larger audiences. It also includes a sense of Congress that 
     the United States needs to improve its communication of ideas 
     and information to people in countries with significant 
     Muslim populations, that public diplomacy should reaffirm the 
     United States commitment to democratic principles, and that a 
     significant expansion of United States international 
     broadcasting would provide a cost-effective means of 
     improving communications with significant Muslim populations. 
     In addition, this section amends the United States 
     International Broadcasting Act of 1994 to include a provision 
     establishing special authority for surge capacity for U.S. 
     international broadcasting activities to support United 
     States foreign policy objectives during a crisis abroad, and 
     authorizes such sums to carry out the surge capacity 
     authority and directs the Broadcasting Board of Governors to 
     submit an annual report to the President and Congress. This 
     section also authorizes such sums as may be necessary for FY 
     2008 for U.S. broadcasting activities, including broadcasting 
     capital improvements.
       Sec. 1432--Expansion of United States Scholarship. 
     Exchange, and Library Programs in Arab and Predominantly 
     Muslim Countries. This section directs the Secretary of State 
     to prepare a report on the recommendations of the National 
     Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States for 
     expanding U.S. scholarship, exchange, and library programs in 
     Arab and predominantly Muslim countries, including a 
     certification by the Secretary of State that such 
     recommendations have been implemented or if a certification 
     cannot be made, what steps have been taken to implement such 
     recommendations. This provision also directs the Comptroller 
     General of the United States to review the certification once 
     submitted.
       Sec. 1433--United States policy toward Detainees. This 
     section restates the 9/11 Commission recommended that the 
     United States develop a common coalition approach toward 
     detention and humane treatment of captured terrorists, that 
     while the U.S. has passed a number of laws in this area, it 
     has not developed such a common coalition approach, and that 
     a number of U.S. allies are conducting investigations related 
     to treatment of detainees. It also requires a report 90 days 
     after enactment of the Act and 180 days thereafter on any 
     progress on developing such an approach, and a certification 
     that such an approach has been implemented or, if such 
     certification has not been made, the steps taken to implement 
     this recommendation. In addition, this provision terminates 
     the requirement of subsection (b) if the Secretary makes such 
     a certification, and requires a GAO review of the 
     certification.
     Subtitle D--Strategy for the United States' relationship with 
         Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia
       Sec. 1441--Afghanistan. This provision declares that it is 
     the policy of the United States to maintain its long-term 
     commitment to Afghanistan by increased assistance and the 
     continued deployment of United States troops in Afghanistan 
     and that the President shall engage aggressively with the 
     Government of Afghanistan and NATO to assess the success of 
     the Afghan December 2006 counternarcotics strategy and to 
     explore all additional options for addressing the narcotics 
     crisis in Afghanistan, including considering whether NATO 
     forces should change their rules of engagement regarding 
     counternarcotics operations. Moreover, this section declares 
     that the Afghanistan Freedom Support Act of 2002 should be 
     reauthorized and updated, and directs the President to make 
     every effort to dramatically increase the numbers of 
     United States and international police trainers, mentors, 
     and police personnel operating with Afghan civil security 
     forces and shall increase efforts to assist the Government 
     of Afghanistan in addressing corruption; and directs the 
     President to submit a report on the United States efforts 
     to fulfill the requirements in this subsection. This 
     section also authorizes such sums as may be necessary for 
     fiscal years 2008 and 2009 for the acquisition of 
     emergency energy resources, including diesel fuel, to 
     secure the deliver of electricity to Afghanistan.
       Sec. 1442--Pakistan. This section declares that it is the 
     policy of the United States to work with the Government of 
     Pakistan to combat international terrorism, to end the use of 
     Pakistan as a safe haven for forces associated with the 
     Taliban, to establish a long-term strategic partnership with 
     Pakistan, to dramatically increase funding for programs of 
     the U.S. Agency for International Development and the 
     Department of State, and to work with the international 
     community to secure additional financial and political 
     support to assist the Government of Pakistan in building a 
     moderate, democratic state. This provision also requires the 
     President to submit a report on the long-term strategy of the 
     United States to engage with the Government of Pakistan to 
     address curbing the proliferation of nuclear weapons 
     technology, combating poverty and corruption, building 
     effective government institutions, promoting democracy and 
     the rule of law, addressing the continued presence of the 
     Taliban and other violent extremist forces throughout the 
     country, and effectively dealing with Islamic extremism. In 
     addition, this section prohibits the provision of United 
     States security assistance to Pakistan until the President 
     certifies that the Government of Pakistan is making all 
     possible efforts to prevent the Taliban from operating in 
     areas under its sovereign control but provides a national 
     security waiver to the President. The subsection includes a 
     sunset provision whereby the limitation of assistance will 
     cease to be effective once the President determines that the 
     Taliban cease to exist as an organization capable of 
     conducting military, insurgent, or terrorist activities in 
     Afghanistan from Pakistan. This provision also authorizes 
     such sums as may be necessary for assistance for Pakistan in 
     various different accounts, and extends waivers of foreign 
     assistance restrictions with respect to Pakistan through the 
     end of FY 2008 and includes a sense of congress that 
     extensions of these waivers beyond FY 2008 should be informed 
     by whether Pakistan makes progress in rule of law and other 
     democratic reforms and whether it holds a successful 
     parliamentary election.
       Sec. 1443--Saudi Arabia. This provision states 
     Congressional findings that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia's 
     record in the fight against terrorism has been uneven and 
     that the United States has a national security interest in 
     working with the Government of Saudi Arabia to combat 
     international terrorists, and expresses a sense of congress 
     that the Government of Saudi Arabia must undertake a number 
     of political and economic reforms in order to more 
     effectively combat terrorism. This section also provides for 
     a number of statements of policies regarding the U.S. 
     relationship to Saudi Arabia, including engaging Saudi Arabia 
     to openly confront the issue of terrorism, to enhance 
     counterterrorism cooperation, and to support reform efforts 
     by the Government of Saudi Arabia. Finally, this provision 
     requires a report on the ongoing U.S.-Saudi Strategic 
     Dialogue and whether the Dialogue has promoted progress in 
     achieving the U.S. long term strategy to engage the 
     Government of Saudi Arabia to undertake reforms and to combat 
     terrorism.
  Mr. KING of New York. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may 
consume.
  Mr. Speaker, at the outset, let me thank the gentleman from 
Mississippi (Mr. Thompson), the new chairman of the Homeland Security 
Committee, for the work that he did, certainly in the

[[Page H171]]

time that I was chairman of the Homeland Security Committee and he was 
the ranking member.
  Let me also wish him the very best as he embarks on his tenure as 
chairman of the Homeland Security Committee. And even though we 
certainly will have differences today and the debate will be strong at 
times, I want to assure him that I share the same commitment he does. I 
know that he shares the commitment that I have to work together in a 
bipartisan way on the issue of Homeland Security and throughout the 
next 2 years. I certainly look forward to working with him and 
cooperating with him in every way that I can, and I know I speak for 
the members of the committee on my side of the aisle.
  Mr. Speaker, it is, to me, a very significant matter that Homeland 
Security is listed as the top issue. I agree that it should be. I agree 
that it is, and to that extent, I certainly commend the gentleman from 
Mississippi (Mr. Thompson) for bringing forth this legislation.
  However, I am extremely disappointed in the way it is being done. And 
I say that not just as a matter of process or a matter of procedure, 
but I say that as a person who, during the 15 months that I was the 
chairman of the Homeland Security Committee, I did all I could to 
ensure that every piece of legislation that came through our committee 
was bipartisan from day one. Every piece of legislation went through a 
complete subcommittee hearing. The Democratic minority, at the time, 
were fully apprised of all that we were doing at all stages. Went to a 
full committee hearing, and again, everyone was apprised of all that 
was happening. It was an open book. And as a result of that, we passed 
very, very significant bipartisan legislation in the most recent 
Congress, the Port Security Act, chemical plant legislation, reforming 
and restructuring FEMA. The interoperability legislation, which was 
jointly sponsored and advanced by Mr. Reichert and Mr. Pascrell became 
part of the FEMA restructuring legislation. And I say that because it 
shows that, on an issue such as homeland security, we make the most 
progress when we work together, and that this should not be a partisan 
issue because terrorists don't care if you are Democrats, Republicans 
or Independents. If we are Americans, they want to kill us. And that 
has to be our guiding principle throughout this.
  So I am disappointed today that such a piece of legislation, which 
attempts to deal with such a vital issue in such an all-encompassing 
way is going to be done without any benefit at all of going through the 
committee, having committee hearings, getting testimony, of reaching 
out. We, as Republicans, had no say whatsoever in this legislation.
  Again, I emphasize, I can speak for the Homeland Security Committee. 
That never happened during the 15 months that I was the chairman, nor 
do I believe it ever happened under my predecessor, Mr. Cox.
  Now, as far as the legislation today, as I said, parts of it are 
disappointing. And I guess this even goes back to last week. If there 
is one issue, one recommendation that the Homeland Security Committee 
made was that we should centralize as much jurisdiction as possible in 
one committee, rather than have such a multiplicity of committees and 
subcommittees in both Houses requiring the Secretary and the assistants 
and the undersecretaries to come up to the Hill to be testifying, and 
also to get a much more coordinated policy. Nothing was done on that 
whatsoever.
  Now, the chairman pointed out that perhaps Republicans could have 
done this in the past. Well, the fact is, this is a work in progress. 
It was the Republican majority which set up and established, first as a 
select committee for 2 years and then as a permanent committee since 
January of 2005, the Committee on Homeland Security. I know in my 
conversations with the leadership, it was certainly the intention to 
centralize it more. Would they have? I believe they would have. If not, 
I certainly would have fought to have it done because one thing I think 
the former ranking member and the current chairman and I would agree 
on, we saw last year what happened when you had legislation going from 
one committee to the other, one committee trying to grab a small part 
of it and slowing down the process.
  Also, we found out how nuanced and how complicated these issues are, 
and that very few of us ended up where we began. We saw, as the debate 
went forward, as the hearings went forward, as the expert witnesses 
came in, just how intricate these issues were and how vital they were 
and how important it was not to jump ahead.
  Now, the chairman mentioned, for instance, scanning 100 percent of 
cargo within 3 years or most of it done within 3 years. Now, on its 
face, that sounds very good. It is a good sound bite. It is good for a 
100-hour scenario. But the fact is, we held extensive hearings on that. 
The fact is that the legislation that was arrived at between the House 
and the Senate, seeing the complexity of it, and realizing that there 
is no technology in place right now that could bring that about, has 
set up pilot projects around the world, and we will get a report back 
on those projects with a sense of urgency and a need to implement 
whatever can be implemented. But to set forth a 100-percent standard 
when there is no evidence now that that can be achieved during that 
time period, to me, gives a false hope to the American people, and it 
is playing, to me, it is trivializing what should be the most important 
issue that confronts the Nation today.
  Now, also, on that and to show that our constructive criticism of 
this issue is not done in a partisan way, the Washington Post today had 
an editorial extremely critical of that provision in particular and the 
process in general.
  So with that I look forward to the debate today. As I said, I have 
real problems with the process. I have certain specific problems with 
parts of the legislation. But that can be all brought out in the debate 
today. Unfortunately, there won't be an opportunity to offer amendments 
on it. As I said, there were no committee hearings. But it is going to 
be a long 2 years, long in the sense that we have a long period in 
which to get a lot done. But, on the other hand, I assure Mr. Thompson 
that once we get this behind us, I look forward to working with him in 
as bipartisan a way as possible. And with the respect I have for him, I 
think, at the end of that long 2 years, the American people will see 
that we have achieved quite a bit.
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. THOMPSON of Mississippi. Mr. Speaker, I would like to assure the 
ranking member that after today, and from this day forward, there will 
be communication. We will work together. The jurisdictional issues that 
we didn't resolve completely in the last 15 months or so, I assure you, 
we will do our best to make sure that they don't come into impacting 
the committee.
  Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. 
Moran).
  Mr. MORAN of Virginia. Mr. Speaker, I thank the chairman of the 
Homeland Security Committee.
  Notwithstanding the remarks of the gentleman from New York (Mr. 
King), the fact is that the bipartisan 9/11 Commission gave the last 
Congress Fs and Ds in implementing its recommendations. This Congress 
is determined to earn its As in implementing those recommendations, and 
not just by inspecting the air and sea cargo but also by distributing 
the funds that are available based upon risk, not just by population; 
by preventing the spread of terrorism and, particularly, weapons of 
mass destruction; by reducing the appeal of extremism through 
international quality education and the expansion of democracy and 
economic development.
  But most of all, Mr. Speaker, this Congress is determined to 
implement the principal recommendation of the 9/11 Commission, which 
was to restore U.S. moral leadership. That is the intent of this bill. 
I strongly urge support for it.
  Mr. KING of New York. Mr. Speaker, I would just point out to the 
gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Moran) that on the fairer funding, the 
legislation which is in the bill today is exactly the legislation which 
passed the previous Congress, and certainly, that part of the bill I 
will support strongly.
  Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Florida (Mr. 
Mica).

[[Page H172]]

                              {time}  1315

  Mr. MICA. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that the House resolve 
into secret session as though pursuant to a motion by Mr. Mica, under 
rule XVII, clause 9. Because there are 54 new Members of the House of 
Representatives and a significant number of returning Members who have 
not had access to critical classified information, it is extremely 
vital to their understanding of the consequences of their vote in 
regard to the impact of H.R. 1, which will affect this Nation, our 
security, and pending terrorist threat.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Murtha). Is there objection to the 
request of the gentleman from Florida?
  Mr. THOMPSON of Mississippi. Mr. Speaker, I object.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Objection is heard.
  Mr. THOMPSON of Mississippi. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent 
that the distinguished incoming chairman of Armed Services, Mr. 
Skelton, be allowed to control the remainder of the time.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the gentleman from 
Mississippi?
  There was no objection.
  Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  I thank the gentleman from Mississippi.
  Mr. Speaker, during the Presidential debates of 2004, there was one 
point of consensus between the two candidates that is important for us 
in our debate today. In answer to the question of what is the single 
most threat to the national security of the United States, both 
candidates agree that nuclear proliferation and weapons of mass 
destruction in the hands of terrorists was the biggest threat. This 
view was shared by the 9/11 Commission, which recommended a vital 
effort to prevent and counter the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction.
  H.R. 1 will help put the United States much further down the path to 
addressing the problem of weapons of mass destruction, proliferation, 
and terrorism. It will strengthen the Cooperative Threat Reduction 
program also, known as the Nunn-Lugar program, as well as the 
Department of Energy's nonproliferation programs. It will strengthen 
and expand the multinational Proliferation Security Initiative started 
by this administration and will establish a new Coordinator for the 
Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Proliferation, and 
Terrorism.
  The bill also establishes a new commission to follow up on the work 
of the 9/11 Commission focused on the issue of weapons of mass 
destruction, proliferation, and terrorism.
  Specifically, the bill will repeal a set of limitations on 
nonproliferation programs which threatens on an annual basis to shut 
off access to program funding unless Congress or the President waives 
them. It simplifies the authority to use those funds outside the 
countries of the former Soviet Union when necessary and appropriate 
while strengthening oversight. The bill authorizes such sums as are 
necessary for these programs.
  On the Proliferation Security Initiative, the bill calls upon the 
President to continue and to expand it. It directs the administration 
to develop and transmit to Congress a defined budget for this effort 
and initiates a GAO review. The bill further authorizes the President 
to use foreign assistance as an initiative to get more countries to 
join.
  The coordinator for the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction, 
Proliferation, and Terrorism established by this bill will be a senior 
aide close to the President who can give the nonproliferation programs 
spread across the Federal Government the support they need and, of 
course, deserve. The bill requires a comprehensive strategy to fully 
use and coordinate these programs, and it calls for measurable goals 
and milestones by which we can judge progress.
  The commission established by this bill will build upon the excellent 
work of the 9/11 Commission by examining in detail the existing 
nonproliferation programs and also any new and creative ideas for 
securing dangerous materials.
  In addition, the commission would follow up on the work of the Baker/
Cutler Commission, which made a series of recommendations in this area 
in 2001.
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. KING of New York. Mr. Speaker, I yield the remainder of my time 
to the distinguished ranking member of the Foreign Affairs Committee, 
the gentlelady from Florida (Ms. Ros-Lehtinen), and ask unanimous 
consent that she be permitted to control that time.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the gentleman from New 
York?
  There was no objection.
  Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may 
consume.
  Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from New York for yielding me the 
time.
  Mr. Speaker, it is truly a shame that the new Democratic leadership 
has chosen to turn what was a bipartisan, carefully calibrated approach 
to safeguarding our Nation's security in the aftermath of 9/11 into a 
partisan political tool. This bill does have some good elements. In 
fact, a big portion of the foreign policy titles in the bill mirror 
what is already in law, with some minor additions or recommendations.
  That said, the bill does raise concern, and it even includes drafting 
errors that could have been avoided had we on the other side of the 
aisle had in the committees been allowed to operate and been allowed to 
contribute to the drafting, but we were not.
  For example, the Nuclear Black Market section in this bill, Mr. 
Speaker, is a legislative effort that I had the pleasure of working on 
with the gentleman from California (Mr. Lantos) throughout the last few 
years.
  However, much has changed. Parts of it need revision. It needs to be 
reedited and updated. But we will be unable to fix these provisions and 
make these necessary corrections.
  Far more troubling, Mr. Speaker, is the profound divergence between 
our two parties that this legislation reveals. The divergence is 
clearly most demonstrated in the provisions regarding the Proliferation 
Security Initiative, known as the PSI.
  Since its creation by this administration in the year 2002, the PSI 
has quickly become one of this country's most valuable tools in helping 
to stop the spread of weapons of mass destruction and preventing them 
from falling into the hands of terrorists. Our PSI partners and others 
at times have stopped the transshipment of material and equipment bound 
for Iran's ballistic missiles programs and also prevented Iran from 
procuring funds and the goods to support its weapons of mass 
destruction programs, including its nuclear program; and it was PSI 
cooperation between the U.S., the U.K., and other European partners 
that began the demise of the Dr. A.Q. Khan network, an action that was 
also instrumental in convincing the Libyan Government to stop its 
nuclear weapons and longer-range missile programs.
  Despite this success, Mr. Speaker, this legislation urges the 
President to secure a resolution by the United Nations Security Council 
that would authorize the PSI under international law. We have seen how 
ineffective the U.N. Security Council has been in compelling Syria to 
stop its support for terrorist activities in Lebanon, or at least in 
keeping to its own deadlines regarding Iran's nuclear program. Giving 
the United Nations the ability to define what is permissible under the 
PSI will result in the imposition of unpredictable limitations, 
unpredictable conditions, and unpredictable interpretations and would 
result in a regulatory straightjacket overseen by the international 
bureaucracy.
  Frankly, Mr. Speaker, this is disturbing. I need only point out the 
continuing efforts by Russia and China to hobble the efforts of the 
United States at the United Nations to apply pressure to Iran to 
abandon its nuclear weapons program. If this recommendation were 
followed, the PSI would be undermined. The problem, however, is far 
deeper than merely the threat to this vital and proven program. The 
position of some of my colleagues across the aisle appears to be that 
the PSI and similar efforts by the United States to defend its citizens 
against terrorists and other threats require authorization under 
international law by the United Nations. They believe that these so-
called

[[Page H173]]

multilateral regimes are credible substitutes for the efforts of the 
United States.
  We must oppose any efforts to substitute action by the U.N. and other 
international organizations for those of the U.S. Government in 
carrying out its fundamental responsibility to protect the American 
people and advance American interests. I know that there are many of my 
colleagues who are equally concerned that this proposal should be 
adopted. I know their constituents will be, Mr. Speaker.
  Therefore, I hope that all of our colleagues carefully think about 
some of these provisions and that they put partisan politics aside when 
it comes time to vote on the motion to recommit, a motion that 
reaffirms a central tenet of the U.S. foreign policy, and that is that 
it is the responsibility of the U.S. Government to protect the American 
people. This responsibility must never be surrendered to the United 
Nations or other multilateral institutions.
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from New 
Jersey (Mr. Andrews), a member of the Armed Services Committee.
  (Mr. ANDREWS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. ANDREWS. I thank my friend for yielding.
  Mr. Speaker, colleagues, our country is living on borrowed time. A 
quantity of highly enriched uranium or plutonium the size of a 
grapefruit that could be put into a vehicle the size of a U-Haul truck 
could result in the detonation of a nuclear weapon about the size of 
that which leveled Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
  Loose nuclear materials have been too loose and too free for too long 
around the world. This was the first and most urgent recommendation of 
the 9/11 Commission. Frankly, we have been moving at too slow of a pace 
with too little of a focus and without sufficient funding to get this 
problem under control.
  Today's long overdue legislation is a necessary first step toward 
protecting the American people against these egregious consequences. 
This legislation properly focuses on the problem of loose nuclear 
material, the origins of which and the whereabouts of which we do not 
know. It focuses upon nuclear material that is in hands that are not 
properly being secured, it focuses on nuclear materials that are being 
properly secured, and it expedites the process of converting reactors 
that use highly enriched uranium to reactors that would use low-
enriched uranium and, therefore, be much, much less of a risk.
  For the first time, there will be a central point in the executive 
branch where the diplomatic intelligence, research and development and 
military responsibilities for bringing this problem under control will 
be focused and centered in one place.
  The job will not be done by the passage of this legislation. But for 
too long we have lived on borrowed time waiting for the passage of this 
legislation. I would urge my colleagues on both the majority and 
minority side to vote ``yes'' and start us down the road toward solving 
this egregious and urgent problem.
  Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, I yield 9 minutes to the gentleman 
from Florida (Mr. Mica), 5 minutes to the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. 
Hoekstra), 10 minutes to the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Upton), 34 
minutes to the gentleman from New York (Mr. King), and ask that each of 
them be allowed to control that time.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the gentlewoman from 
Florida?
  There was no objection.
  Mr. MICA. I thank the gentlelady for yielding me this time.
  Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to come to the floor during what I consider 
to be probably one of the most important issues that we will consider, 
not only in this 100 hours, but in this entire session of Congress, 
because this issue determines and will determine the very security, not 
just the security as far as a terrorist attack on this Nation, but even 
our economic security; and the actions that are taken here have great 
implications.
  While I believe that my good friends on the other side of the aisle 
are very well intended in what they propose today, unfortunately I 
believe they are misguided in what they are doing.
  I have a copy of the 9/11 Commission report. I chaired for some 6 
years the Aviation Subcommittee. I inherited it by fate of the good 
Lord and circumstances here in Congress. I followed from the very 
beginning the creation of TSA and all of the actions that we have taken 
from day one in protecting this great Nation against a terrorist 
attack.

                              {time}  1330

  I have read the proposals that are brought forth here today. 
Unfortunately, these proposals can result in turning in the wrong 
direction at this time in our vulnerability against terrorist attack. 
Let me be very frank, and I offered before, and I am sorry that the 
other side did not accept it, unanimous consent requests that we 
resolve into a committee for 1 hour, 1 hour of a secret session to 
discuss the pending threats against this Nation and also the status of 
our security systems in place to deal with those threats, and I was 
denied it. As part of the record of this Congress, now, I was denied 
that opportunity.
  There are 54 Members who were elected, new Members, Republican and 
Democrat, who have not had access to that classified information. They 
will vote in a few hours on turning the direction of the system that we 
have put in place and a system we are trying to make work to protect us 
against a terrorist attack, and we have been denied the opportunity for 
1 hour in closed session, with no cameras, no public, but the 
classified reports.
  Mr. Speaker, I am going to ask that the titles of each of the 
classified reports that now are in possession of the Transportation 
Committee be included in this part of the Record.

         DHS OIG FINAL PENETRATION TEST RESULTS--March 30, 2004

                                 ______
                                 

    AUDIT OF PASSENGER AND BAGGAGE SCREENING PROCEDURES AT DOMESTIC 
                                AIRPORTS

                                 ______
                                 

    AUDIT OF PASSENGER AND BAGGAGE SCREENING PROCEDURES AT DOMESTIC 
                                AIRPORTS

                                 ______
                                 

   FOLLOW-UP AUDIT OF PASSENGER AND BAGGAGE SCREENING PROCEDURES AT 
                DOMESTIC AIRPORTS (UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY)

                                 ______
                                 

   FOLLOW-UP AUDIT OF PASSENGER AND BAGGAGE SCREENING PROCEDURES AT 
                         DOMESTIC AIRPORTS (U)

                                 ______
                                 

AIRPORT PASSENGER SCREENING--PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS ON PROGRESS MADE 
                        AND CHALLENGES REMAINING

                                 ______
                                 

  BRIEFING TO THE CHAIRMAN, AVIATION SUBCOMMITTEE--HOUSE COMMITTEE ON 
           TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE--March 31, 2004

                                 ______
                                 

     AVIATION SECURITY--SYSTEMATIC PLANNING NEEDED TO OPTIMIZE THE 
            DEPLOYMENT OF CHECKED BAGGAGE SCREENING SYSTEMS

                                 ______
                                 

   AVIATION SECURITY--SCREENER TRAINING AND PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT 
                  STRENGTHENED, BUT MORE WORK REMAINS

                                 ______
                                 
  We have tried to make this work, and the good Lord and some efforts 
on behalf of many people, maybe just sheer fate, have brought us to 
this day and not being attacked. And last week on Thursday when I gave 
up that responsibility of chairing Aviation, a great mantle came off my 
shoulders, but I am telling you that you are headed in the wrong 
direction today. We have a very fragile system of security, 
particularly aviation security.
  Now you come forth with recommendations. One recommendation dealing 
with cargo security is not a recommendation in this 9/11 Report. I defy 
anyone to find it. So what you are doing is taking our limited 
resources that protect us and putting them in an area that does not 
protect us.
  We have had problems with TSA, yes. I have had four TSA 
administrators in 5 years. That is a problem with TSA. We have a system 
out there that screens passengers as they come through. And there are 
some improvements, I must say, that you have provided in this, but they 
are not the improvements we need. And now we are

[[Page H174]]

telling TSA, an agency across the Potomac here in Washington to head in 
another direction.
  We have taken the money for research and development that was first 
authorized, we put it in the original TSA bill, $50 million, half of it 
was taken by a Senator for a pet project. The next year $75 million, 
this Congress failed to act, and $63 million was spent on salary 
instead of research and development for the technology to protect us. 
So here we go off in another direction on a recommendation I defy 
anyone to find in here.
  Another point here, and it is nice to throw your friends a bone but 
this is not the time to do it. I am telling you, I am very serious 
about this, folks, and listen to this. These words will be repeated 
because this Nation is at risk, and you won't take 1 hour to even 
listen to what that risk is or address that risk and what you are going 
to do.
  Nowhere in this 9/11 Commission does it say that we should give 
collective bargaining rights to airport screeners, to TSA screener 
personnel. Nowhere. We had a bipartisanship agreement when we created 
TSA that we wouldn't do that and put us at risk, that we needed to move 
people around, that we needed to fire people when we needed to do that. 
This is taking big government; we have 43,000 screeners, 43,000 
screeners, it is taking big government and it is doing the worst thing 
we could possibly do is making it entrenched in big government.
  We need to replace those people with technology. Here is the report: 
78 percent of the personnel could be replaced that now conduct checked 
baggage screening. You go to the airport, you check your bags. Check 
your bags. The failure rate of that system that was forced into place, 
I tried to get us to opt for technology; instead, we spent some $20 
billion so far on this system that is reliant on people, human beings 
who fail. We could save 78 percent of the personnel costs. There are 
16,800 people checking those bags by hand. I visited some 50 airports 
during August and September, and I am telling you, the system is 
flawed. And you are changing now to a recommendation that isn't even in 
this report? You are taking a big bureaucracy and making it an 
entrenched bureaucracy? You are putting us at risk.
  This isn't a game, a political game where we score a few points and 
tell people we are doing something. This is about our women and 
children, our wives and mothers and our loved ones being put on 
aircraft and not having a secure system in place, and we aren't doing 
that with these proposals.
  So maybe I am a little bit too emotional on this subject, maybe I 
have been too involved in this subject; but I am telling you for the 
sake of this country and our security. And many of the Members here 
have not had the opportunity to sit down and look at those classified 
reports. When this report was written, liquid bombs, liquid explosives, 
does it appear anywhere in here? The terrorists that we deal with now, 
is it addressed anywhere here? I need to have these points in the 
Record because this deals with our national security. And I am telling 
you, and mark my words on this day, that our terrorist-hatred folks 
know what is going on. They have tested the system, they test the 
system, and they scope the system and they see these flaws, and they 
would have to be laughing to see us change our resources to go in 
another direction and put us at risk today.
  Again, there are some good things in here. We have right now about a 
dozen airports with in-line high-tech systems. One of the them is the 
Speaker, Ms. Pelosi's, airport. It is the safest airport in the world. 
It has private screeners, and it has automated in-line high-tech 
equipment. Its capacity to find and detect threats is almost flawless. 
That is the model that we need; instead, we have about a dozen 
airports. Unfortunately, it will be 20 years at the current rate in 
which you propose to protect us with even that basic protection.
  Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Speaker, may I inquire how much time is remaining 
for each side, please.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Murtha). The gentleman from Missouri has 
77\1/2\ minutes, and the gentlewoman from Florida has 69 minutes 
remaining.
  Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Speaker, in order to respond, I will yield 30 
seconds to the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Pascrell).
  Mr. PASCRELL. Mr. Speaker, I thank my good friend from Florida. Much 
of what you say is correct. But I have to refer you to the 9/11 report 
in the final recommendations: 9/11 public discourse project grades, 
checked bag and cargo screening, D. And it says in the report, in the 
final report, that improvements have not been made a priority by the 
Congress or the administration.
  It is about time. And while the terrorists may know or they may not 
know, we have to do what we have to do, and we have to do it based upon 
the record.
  The 9/11 recommendations are very clear, Mr. Speaker. The 9/11 
Commission is in black and white right here, says it right here, 
received a D, and that is not acceptable to us.
  Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 30 seconds.
  My friend and colleague, the gentlewoman from Florida, reminds me of 
a law school professor who would say when someone gave a fuzzy answer, 
Well, read it. What does it say? And in looking at our resolution 
regarding the issue she raises about U.N. resolution encourages the 
administration to work to expand and formalize the PSI into a multi-
national regime, and let me quote for my friend from Florida, ``to 
increase coordination, cooperation, and compliance among its 
participating States in interdiction activities.''
  Mr. Speaker, I yield at this time 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from 
California.
  Mrs. TAUSCHER. Mr. Speaker, I thank the chairman of the House Armed 
Services Committee for yielding time.
  Mr. Speaker I rise in strong support of the 9/11 Commission 
Recommendations Act of 2007. Congress has reformed the intelligence 
community to better identify global threats and defend the United 
States, but for too long we have had a gaping hole in our security, 
eliminating the threat of weapons of mass destruction. And for too long 
the Bush administration and their congressional allies have left 
nonproliferation on the back burner. The bill before us today provides 
the tools we need to fight the threat of the world's most dangerous 
weapons. In the last Congress, I introduced the 9/11 Commission 
Combating Proliferation Implementation Act along with my colleagues 
John Spratt and Marty Meehan.
  The essential provision of our bill contained also in the bill before 
us today creates a coordinator for the prevention of weapons of mass 
destruction proliferation within the White House. The coordinator would 
also have both the budget authority over all nonproliferation programs 
and would also be responsible for designing and implementing a 
strategic plan to address the current threat levels posed by weapons of 
mass destruction.
  Currently, nonproliferation efforts are overseen by the Departments 
of Energy, Defense, and State. While they all have had some success, 
these three large agencies are not guided by an overall plan or 
supported by a single individual who has the ability to ensure 
accountability. Because of the lack of high-level attention and 
leadership, some programs have either lapsed or been burdened with 
unrelated restrictions. Such a coordinating function has been 
recommended several times, including in the 1999 Deutsche Commission, 
to access the organization of the Federal Government to combat the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
  As the 9/11 Commission warned: ``The greatest danger of another 
catastrophic attack in the United States will materialize if the 
world's most dangerous terrorists acquire the world's most dangerous 
weapons.''
  We know the threat; now we have to act. I urge my colleagues to join 
me in support of this bill.
  Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 2 minutes to the 
gentleman from Alaska (Mr. Young), a former chairman of the Committee 
on Transportation and an expert in that field.
  (Mr. YOUNG of Alaska asked and was given permission to revise and 
extend his remarks.)
  Mr. YOUNG of Alaska. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentlelady for 
yielding.
  My colleagues and Mr. and Mrs. America, this is primarily a political

[[Page H175]]

gesture without a great deal of result, and that is unfortunate. The 
hearings are necessary, especially in cargo screening. It has been 
shown to us that the cargo screening port security cannot occur within 
our ports themselves without total cooperation from the overseas 
shippers to the United States.
  What we are asking in this bill is expenditure of huge dollars for 
really window dressing and not results. As the gentleman from Florida 
said, we are not really in this legislation as being proposed giving us 
any more security. We are expending dollars in the billions in the 
airports, and it will be in the billions in the ports and the waterways 
of our Nation. And the direct result will be, and keep this in mind, 
Mr. and Mrs. America, a direct cost to you without any security. Every 
product, everything you pick up that is imported to the United States 
will add an additional cost, and it may make us noncompetitive. There 
are other ports within our hemisphere that will be accepting without 
the security that is being offered in this bill within our ports the 
cargo that should be coming through our ports employing our people.
  If you want true security, it will be done at the origin of shipping 
to the United States, and that is where we should be putting our 
efforts, not a charade of saying we are going to have our ports secure 
because we are going to put millions of dollars, billions, into the 
screening of everyone who works in the ports and setting up an 
artificial barricade of security.
  There is an old saying: If you want a secure area, don't let anybody 
know how you secured it. What this proposal says is: national standards 
shall be set, and thus you shall be secure. But if I am the bad guy, I 
will figure around it to do good damage, bad damage to you, good damage 
to me. I ask you to reconsider and let's go back to the hearing process 
and do this job right.
  Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
Washington (Mr. Larsen).

                              {time}  1345

  Mr. LARSEN of Washington. Mr. Speaker, I thank the chairman of the 
House Armed Services Committee for yielding time.
  I rise today in support of fully implementing the September 11 
Commission recommendations. As a member of the House Armed Services 
Committee, I can say that this bill creates a new foundation of 
security here at home by protecting our borders, our infrastructure and 
our freedoms. This legislation also plays an equally important role by 
reenergizing our engagement abroad and creating a new foundation for 
security in the international arena. These provisions, particularly 
those dealing with the prevention of proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction, are what I would like to discuss today.
  We will not be safe here at home as long as the worst weapons can 
fall into the worst hands. Citizens around the world will not be safe 
unless responsible nations work together to locate, secure and destroy 
global nuclear stockpiles. Today we are rightfully strengthening the 
leadership of the United States in these important areas.
  The time for us to fully engage in the nonproliferation and counter 
proliferation arenas is long overdue. This bill dramatically 
strengthens the nonproliferation regime by both strengthening the best 
programs of the last decade and creating a new coordination and 
sanctions mechanism that will strengthen the nonproliferation mission 
for the future. I am particularly pleased with the provisions that will 
strengthen the Proliferation Security Initiative, or PSI, and the 
Cooperative Threat Reduction Initiative, CTRI.
  With the involvement of approximately 70 nations, PSI has become the 
primary platform that allows us to work with our allies to search 
planes and ships carrying suspect cargo and to seize illegal weapons or 
missile technologies.
  Unfortunately, until now, the future of this successful program was 
uncertain. Without a dedicated funding source and without integration 
into international law, this critical program could falter without 
proper administration support. This legislation works to secure the 
future of PSI by integrating it into both international law and to our 
own budget process.
  And, finally, this bill provides Congress with the ability to fully 
support CTRI programs that are geared to lock up nuclear weapons and 
nuclear materials around the world. By lifting funding limitations and 
encouraging the program's expansion, this bill shows the world that our 
Nation, the United States, will strengthen its role as the global 
leader in combating proliferation.
  Mr. UPTON. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 6 minutes.
  Mr. Speaker, time moves on, but before some of us begin pretending 
that we are legislating on a blank slate when it comes to 9/11, I am 
going to take this moment in my time to remind everyone of the good 
work that was indeed accomplished over the last 2 years. In fact, we 
are also standing on the shoulders of giants who, in the face of the 
tragic events of 9/11, actually took action to make this Nation a safer 
place.
  Congress's first responders were both Republicans and Democrats, and 
some of them were here just last session writing laws to protect 
America. America's firefighters, police officers, ambulance crews, the 
ones who received $1 billion, ``B'' as in big, to help save American 
lives surely haven't forgotten about Congress's efforts, and neither 
should we.
  The issue of our Nation's own security is too important to play 
politics with. And while some on the other side perhaps would prefer to 
give the impression that Congress has done little, nothing could be 
further from the truth.
  I am proud of what was accomplished and what we can do more. Indeed, 
we succeeded in enacting within the Energy and Commerce Committee's 
jurisdiction a number of provisions improving public safety 
communications. For example, the digital television provisions of the 
Deficit Reduction Act cleared 24 megahertz of spectrum in every market 
in the Nation exclusively for use by its first responders.
  The interoperable communications provisions provided in the Deficit 
Reduction Act did not merely authorize funding but made $1 billion in 
direct spending available for equipment to enable first responders to 
more effectively communicate with each other in times of disaster.
  The Call Home Act accelerated to September 30 of this year the 
deadline for distribution of that $1 billion for interoperable 
communications.
  The Warning, Alert and Response Network, WARN Act, created a 
framework through which wireless communication providers can transmit 
emergency alerts to the public on a national, regional or local basis 
and required that the Federal Communications Commission adopt technical 
standards for that alert system.
  The national alert provisions of the Deficit Reduction Act made $156 
million in direct spending available for use with the national alert 
system created under the WARN Act.
  The E911 provisions of the Deficit Reduction Act made another $43 
million in direct spending available to implement the Enhance 911 Act 
of 2004, which provides grants to upgrade existing 911 systems for 
advanced capabilities.
  The Department of Homeland Security appropriations legislation 
created an Office of Emergency Communications within the Energy and 
Commerce Committee's oversight. That office is directed to develop a 
national emergency communication plan and to report on the 
communications capabilities and needs of emergency response providers 
and relevant government officials.
  These are all critical items that we have already enacted into law 
over the last 2 years, better preparing our Nation to respond to 
natural or manmade disasters.
  From my own leadership spot as chairman of the Telecommunications and 
Internet Subcommittee, I seized on one particular recommendation 
offered by the 9/11 Commission. I wanted to help our first responders, 
and I am proud of the work that we did on a very strong bipartisan 
basis. First of all, we provided a slice of the spectrum for the first 
responders, 24 megahertz, and we saw that with Katrina as well, that 
our first responders in New York couldn't get the signal to evacuate 
the building. We saw that our folks helping folks in Katrina couldn't 
communicate between

[[Page H176]]

the Coast Guard helicopter and the sheriff boat down below. That is 
going to change because we are going to give some of the responders 
some of that spectrum.
  Second, we know that the cost for this equipment is enormously high. 
We provided $1 billion in the Upton amendment, which I helped shepherd 
through our committee and through the conference, to provide the means 
for our first responders so that they could purchase the equipment. It 
was done. The President signed it into law.
  As much as we would like to say that this could be effective today, 
January 8, 2007, we cannot do that. First of all, we have to get the 
spectrum. That means we have to retrieve it from those that are using 
it, in this case, the broadcasters. They have to make the transition 
from analog to digital. A lot of them have done that, but it is more 
than $1 million often for some of these stations. We also have to think 
about the consumers, the millions of Americans who do not have a 
digital TV set. They can't receive the signal unless they have got that 
converter box. They aren't made yet. We have a transition for that to 
happen.
  At the end of the day, we set a date, a hard date, when that all 
would happen, February of 2009. There were many that took us on that 
didn't want a hard date. They wanted to extend forever and a day, 
perhaps. In fact, there were amendments offered to delay the date even 
further. I would like to say that, at least on our side of the aisle, 
we opposed every one of those amendments to extend the deadline, and 
thank goodness we were successful because that date is now set. We had 
to work and negotiate with the Senate, with ourselves, but it is now 
set. It is a good thing.
  We have an unmistakable record of results. Let us work together and 
build on them.
  Mr. Speaker, at this time I yield 2 minutes to my colleague on the 
Energy and Commerce Committee, the honorable gentleman from Illinois 
(Mr. Shimkus), a very valuable member of our subcommittee as we helped 
shepherd this legislation.
  (Mr. SHIMKUS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. SHIMKUS. Mr. Speaker, the gentleman from Michigan outlined 
crucial actions we took in the last Congress to improve the use of 
telecommunications technologies, and I appreciate those efforts, 
especially as co-Chair of the E911 caucus. But our work for Homeland 
Security was not confined to the telecommunications arena.
  One of the most important issues Congress faced last year was 
creating a program in the Department of Homeland Security to protect 
chemical facilities from terrorist attacks. The challenge was to ensure 
that our Nation's chemical plants could appropriately secure their 
facilities by providing technical guidance and oversight by the 
Department of Homeland Security but without being overzealous and 
allowing DHS to take over the daily management of these facilities.
  We needed to prevent terrorists from using our domestic disclosure 
laws from obtaining roadmaps to our chemical plants' vulnerabilities. 
Congress also clarified the distinct reach of existing environmental 
and public health laws versus homeland security and chemical plant 
securities.
  While the more conscientious members of the American chemical 
industry already had a head start on Congress by developing rigorous 
security standards on their own, Congress has now ensured that good 
security standards govern all significant chemical players, not just 
the conscientious leaders.
  DHS's chemical security program is not about using the threat of 
terrorism as an excuse to drive American chemical factories offshore. 
Its purpose is just the opposite: to make certain that chemical 
facilities continue to be safe for these workers and communities, to 
ensure the viability of employment in the chemical industry for 
American workers, and to guarantee that all Americans can continue to 
enjoy the benefits of these plant products.
  As Chairman Barton said last year, America does not become safer with 
greater levels of regulation. It just becomes more regulated.
  DHS has recently proposed regulations to carry out this new chemical 
plant security authority, and those regulations closely follow 
Congress's intent in hammering out the compromise.
  I look forward to working with the Department to ensure that the 
program gets underway and measures up to the task that Congress gave it 
in the Fiscal Year 2007 Homeland Security Appropriations Act.
  Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Speaker, I yield 30 seconds to the gentleman from 
New York (Mr. Nadler).
  Mr. NADLER. Mr. Speaker, a few moments ago, the former chairman of 
the Transportation and Infrastructure Committee, Mr. Young of Alaska, 
was excoriating this side of the aisle and saying that our provisions 
in this bill for 100 percent scanning of containers were impractical 
and couldn't be done. I would simply point out that the provision in 
this bill is word for word the same as the provision that was 
negotiated by Mr. Oberstar and me with Mr. Young and Mr. LoBiondo and 
included in the bill in the Transportation and Infrastructure Committee 
last year by unanimous vote, supported by Mr. Young and Mr. LoBiondo, 
who thought it was very practical last year.
  It is not impractical this year if it was practical last year.
  Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman 
from South Carolina (Mr. Spratt).
  Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding.
  Mr. Speaker, this is a good bill, long past due, but a good bill in 
many respects, particularly in the application of this bill to the 
nonproliferation of nuclear materials and nuclear weapons and weapons 
of mass destruction.
  In the debates, Presidential debates, between President Bush and 
Senator Kerry, there was one subject on which both candidates found 
common ground: They both agreed that the gravest threat to the United 
States is terrorists armed with nuclear weapons or crude radiological 
weapons. That may be the gravest threat facing us, but you wouldn't 
know it from the application of resources in the Defense budget today.
  The 9/11 Commission, looking at what we have done, gave us a ``D,'' a 
``D,'' on efforts to restrict access to weapons of mass destruction, 
particularly nuclear weapons. There are tons of weapons-grade plutonium 
and enriched uranium scattered about the world. For example, under the 
Atoms for Peace program, enriched uranium was leased or lent to 
countries around the world to be used in their research programs. Much 
of that nuclear material, some of it fissile, is loosely secured, some 
by no more than a chain link fence and a junkyard.
  Graham Allison, who was the dean at the Kennedy School at Harvard, 
wrote a book about this subject and entitled it ``Preventable 
Catastrophe'' as if to emphasize, on one hand, the dire threat and, on 
the other hand, the fact that we are not necessarily doomed to this 
fate. The first thing he recommended is, we have got to keep nuclear 
materials secure and away from the reach of terrorists and rogue 
states.
  This bill assembles the best of various bills and amendments that we 
have debated in committee, sometimes on the floor and in conference, 
occasionally with success, more often than not for one reason because 
we haven't been able to get all of our members out of the Rules 
Committee. But here in a nutshell is what we would do: Set up a 
director for nonproliferation, we need somebody who can direct this 
effort, oversee it, seek the funding for it and fight for it; speed up 
the removal of nuclear research materials or, where they can't be 
removed, enhance their security; expand the so-called Proliferation 
Security Initiative, by which the United States can seize nuclear 
materials on the high seas outside the United States and coordinate 
such interdiction with other countries; and expand the so-called 
Cooperative Threat Reduction program, better known as Nunn-Lugar. In 
cost-benefit terms, this may be the best money we have spent.

                              {time}  1400

  To date, we have deactivated 6,000 warheads, 500 ICBMs, 400 ICBM 
silos.
  Mr. UPTON. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from the 
great State of Pennsylvania (Mr. Shuster).
  Mr. SHUSTER. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to address the first responder

[[Page H177]]

and emergency management reforms in this 9/11 bill.
  As the past chairman of the emergency management subcommittee, I am 
very familiar with first responder reforms we enacted since the 
September 11 attacks.
  While there are some improvements in this bill, the major 9/11 
reforms were made under Republican leadership. Since 9/11, we have 
provided over $15 billion to prepare State and local first responders. 
We increased funding for Fire Grants and created the SAFER grant 
program for hiring firefighters. We also created a billion dollar grant 
program for emergency communications.
  Unlike the unfunded authorization in the Democrats' bill, Republican 
leadership provided real money. But we have done much more than simply 
throw money at first responders. We also enacted a comprehensive reform 
bill that rebuilds FEMA's capabilities and establishes a truly national 
preparedness system. We gave FEMA the authority and the tools they need 
to manage all disasters. We strengthened FEMA's regions, response 
teams, logistics, and communications capabilities. We established a 
national preparedness goal and set clear preparedness standards for 
State and local governments to coordinate their resources and focus on 
their highest risk priorities.
  We established a national incident command system so that all levels 
of government can integrate their forces in a disaster. We created a 
comprehensive training and exercise program so first responders will be 
ready when the next big disaster strikes. And we created a 
comprehensive assessment and lessons-learned program so that first 
responders won't make the same mistakes again.
  Unlike the bill before us, we made these reforms through a series of 
committee hearings and markups with bipartisan support. While the press 
releases are going to claim that this bill implements all of 9/11 
Commission recommendations, the reality is that the vast majority of 
legislative changes were made under Republican leadership.
  This is no more than window dressing. It is not good policy; it is 
politics.
  Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Speaker, for the very first time for the gentleman 
from Pennsylvania to address this body, I yield 2 minutes to Mr. 
Sestak.
  Mr. SESTAK. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support of this bill, H.R. 
1.
  If 9/11 taught us anything, it is that the leadership we most need in 
this Nation today is not a leadership to lead us out of a crisis, but 
rather a leadership that prevents such crises from ever happening.
  Today is about offering such leadership. As a Nation, we have been 
fortunate to have wars away from our shore, ``over there.'' But after 
9/11, we saw that we now face a war here at home. And 2\1/2\ years ago 
a bipartisan commission provided 41 recommendations to prevent another 
attack on U.S. home soil.
  Few argue that the commission's recommendations are wrong. But so far 
their implementation generally rates Fs, Ds and incompletes. And so 
this legislation ensures that we will win at home by having a homeland 
defense that says to our adversaries, Today is not your day.
  I had the honor while serving in the military of leading our youth in 
harm's way overseas. But 5 days ago, I became responsible for a new set 
of citizens, the constituents of my district. When I think about how to 
serve them best, and to turn their hopes into accomplishment, our 
foremost duty is to provide for their security this time here at home.
  Our Nation needs the tools to be secure: training that can prevent a 
crisis and first responders with seamless communications among Federal, 
State, and local levels.
  Today as we debate, we are reminded of what John F. Kennedy once 
said: ``The hour is late, but the agenda is long,'' which is why we 
must act now to implement these long overdue recommendations.
  So as we look at ourselves in the national mirror and say we are 
better than this, we can and we must change for a more secure America. 
We then can look our constituents in the eyes, Mr. Speaker, knowing 
that we did turn their hope into accomplishment here at home. I urge my 
colleagues to support this resolution.
  Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 4\1/2\ minutes 
to the gentleman from California (Mr. Royce), who is an expert on 
fighting international terrorism.
  Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentlelady for yielding me this 
time.
  I must confess, I do not understand the compulsion to integrate PSI 
into international law under the United Nations. I share my ranking 
member's concern with the fact that weakening the Proliferation 
Security Initiative is going to have grave consequences for the 
security of this country. And it is going to have grave consequences 
for the administration's ability to interdict weapons of mass 
destruction material. This needlessly empowers the United Nations to 
weaken our hand.
  Right now the Proliferation Security Initiative is a Bush 
administration multilateral initiative aimed at stopping the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, interdicting those 
weapons of mass destruction on cargo, whether on land or in the air or 
at sea. It has been around since 2003. It is an aggressive response 
crafted by then-Under Secretary of Arms Control John Bolton, and it 
checks increasingly sophisticated proliferators.
  As the proliferation subcommittee I chaired in the last Congress 
heard in hearings, PSI has produced results. It has served as a strong 
deterrent to would-be proliferators, most recently conducting a joint 
exercise in the Persian Gulf where Iran menaces. PSI cooperation has 
stopped the transshipment of material and equipment bound for ballistic 
missile programs in countries of concern, including Iran. It has had a 
dozen successes, and it was critical in uncovering Libya's WMD program 
and the A.Q. Khan proliferation network in 2003 in Pakistan.
  The key to PSI is its flexibility. The key is the ability to 
cooperate with other countries on a moment's notice. That is something 
that an organization like the United Nations inherently cannot do. Yet 
this bill before us instructs the President to pursue a U.N. Security 
Council resolution to authorize the PSI under international law. 
Putting a successful multilateral program up to a Chinese veto strikes 
me as weakening PSI rather than strengthening it, as is called for by 
the 9/11 Commission.
  In 2005, then-Secretary Kofi Annan endorsed PSI as is, with no call 
for a Security Council resolution. By keeping PSI flexible, it avoids 
the lowest-common-denominator approach that U.N.-centered initiatives 
inevitably take. If the majority really wanted to bolster PSI, the 
other body should have kept its key champion, Ambassador Bolton, in 
place at the United Nations.
  Now, as for the legislation to authorize the President to establish 
an International Arab and Muslim Youth Opportunity Fund to be located 
as a separate fund in Treasury or through the international 
organization or financial organization, naming UNESCO or the U.N. 
Development Program as possibilities, why would we locate this fund in 
UNESCO or UNDP, which would surely distort its goals and mismanage its 
resources?
  The UNDP in 2005, as Israel was withdrawing from the Gaza Strip, 
financed the Palestinian Authority's production of propaganda 
materials, banners, bumper stickers and T-shirts bearing the slogan: 
``Today Gaza, Tomorrow the West Bank and Jerusalem.'' This rightly led 
to protests from U.S. Representative John Bolton, who rightly called 
this funding inappropriate and unacceptable.
  And then there is the UNDP's long record of hostility toward economic 
freedom. Has anyone thought through this fund? I do not think this fund 
was thought through, and I think a chance to go through the committee 
process would have allowed us the opportunity to raise these serious 
concerns.
  Nor do I understand, frankly, the compulsion to give the United 
Nations this input and this ability to have the Security Council veto 
the authority we right now have in order to effectively use our 
Proliferation Security Initiative on the high seas.
  Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Texas 
(Mr. Doggett).
  Mr. DOGGETT. Mr. Speaker, from the beginning, this Administration 
obstructed independent review of the 9/11 tragedy. But for the courage 
of the 9/11 families, we wouldn't have any recommendations to consider 
here.

[[Page H178]]

  We are not now moving ``too quickly'' by finally enacting 
recommendations in 2007 that were issued in 2004 about a tragedy that 
occurred in 2001.
  Just as with the deepening quagmire in the Iraq civil war and the 
aftermath of the Hurricane Katrina debacle, this Administration wastes 
precious time and squanders precious dollars.
  Many of those, who, by their neglect, have earned failing grades from 
the independent 9/11 Commission, continue rejecting this long-overdue 
legislation to make our families safer here at home, while at the same 
time they urge us to engage in more misadventure abroad.
  Security in our homes, at our borders, and in our air and seaports 
must be given a top priority.
  Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Speaker, I yield the balance of our time on this 
side to the chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee, the gentleman 
from California (Mr. Lantos), and I ask unanimous consent that he be 
allowed to control the balance of the time.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentleman from Missouri?
  There was no objection.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from California (Mr. Lantos) 
is recognized for 66\1/2\ minutes.
  Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Speaker, we have a solemn commitment to those who lost their 
lives in the 9/11 attacks, to the people who lived through those brutal 
events, and to all of their loved ones. Honoring this commitment will 
help spare others in our country from enduring similar pain and loss. 
It is the right and responsible thing to do.
  We need to apply the lessons learned from September 11, 2001, 
including the recommendations of the bipartisan 9/11 Commission.
  Mr. Speaker, until now we in the Congress have only partially met our 
responsibility to assure that these recommendations are fully 
implemented.
  Today on this floor we are adopting the rest of those recommendations 
as we promised. As the 9/11 Commission recognized, the struggle between 
the forces of tolerance and pluralism and the forces of nihilism and 
destruction is not confined to a single dimension. It is a war of ideas 
as well as a war of arms. It is a challenge of diplomacy and 
development as well as one of intelligence and ideology. Our bill 
recognizes this fact in a number of ways.
  It includes the commission's recommendation to establish an 
International Arab and Muslim Youth Opportunity Fund to help expand, 
improve, and modernize the public education system in the Muslim world, 
an idea whose time surely has come.
  Our legislation directs the Secretary of State to develop a 5-year 
country-by-country strategy of promoting democracy, the rule of law, 
sustainable development, private sector growth, and open economic 
systems. This provision will focus on building democratic institutions 
and not focus on elections alone.
  We are establishing a Middle East Foundation in order to facilitate 
the delivery of assistance to our friends in the region who are 
involved in civil society, to increase political participation and to 
foster independent media. We have sought to follow the commission's 
advice to restore the moral leadership of the United States by 
increasing our public diplomacy efforts, including the expansion of 
U.S. scholarship, exchange, and library programs in the Muslim world.

                              {time}  1415

  Mr. Speaker, the treatment of detainees in the war on terrorism has 
undermined our national security. It has eroded our moral standing in 
the world and made it more difficult for the intelligence services of 
our friends and allies to work closely with us. Our bill will provide 
additional review over what the administration has done to create a 
common coalition approach on all these matters.
  Mr. Speaker, our bill also addresses U.S. policy towards three 
countries whose role is critical in the war on terrorism: Afghanistan, 
Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. It reaffirms our commitment to a stable and 
democratic Afghanistan so that no future terrorist acts may be launched 
from that country, it provides that the United States must work with 
Pakistan to end the use of its territory as a safe haven for Taliban 
and al Qaeda, and it provides us additional oversight tools over our 
relationship with Saudi Arabia.
  Our legislation, Mr. Speaker, strengthens our efforts to keep nuclear 
weapons out of the hands of terrorists. It addresses the emergence of a 
black market in nuclear technology that has facilitated the development 
of nuclear programs in Iran, North Korea, Libya and elsewhere. Our 
legislation provides for sanctions against individuals and corporations 
which deal in this illegal trade in nuclear materials and technology. 
It will help us determine which countries are allowing such black 
markets to operate from their territories.
  Our legislation makes significant improvements in the effectiveness 
of U.S. nonproliferation programs. Our bill removes all impediments to 
securing and eliminating so-called ``loose nukes'' and the dangerous 
nuclear material that terrorists could use one day against us.
  Mr. Speaker, this is a comprehensive package that has been supported 
by members of the 9/11 Commission. It is not the end of our work of 
protecting our Nation's security, requiring constant vigilance by this 
Congress.
  I encourage all of our colleagues to look around this Chamber as we 
conduct this debate. If not for the heroism of a dedicated handful of 
Americans, this building, this Chamber and this shining monument to 
democracy might well have been reduced to ashes on September 11, 2001. 
We have a commitment to ensure that the lessons of that day are a 
permanent part of their legacy.
  Mr. Speaker, I yield the balance of my time to the gentleman from New 
York (Mr. Ackerman), the chairman select of the Middle East and South 
Asia Subcommittee, and I ask unanimous consent that he control the 
balance of our time.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Murtha). Is there objection to the 
request of the gentleman from California?
  There was no objection.
  Mr. ACKERMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Speaker, I want to compliment the Chairs, particularly my friend, 
the distinguished gentleman from California, for their hard work on 
this legislation. This bill was not easy in getting ready, given its 
size and scope, and the House owes all its thanks.
  It is entirely proper that the first bill of this 110th Congress, 
H.R. 1, be focused on the implementation of the 9/11 Commission Report. 
Under the previous majority and under the leadership of the current 
administration, America's common defense has been shortsighted, 
irresponsible, poorly conceived and incompetently executed. There can 
scarcely be any argument that our Nation's reputation is in tatters; 
our finances are in disarray; our alliances are in poor repair; our 
deterrent posture has been weakened; and our Armed Forces have been 
overextended and are nearing exhaustion.
  The Bush administration and the Republican Congress of the past have 
combined, through a posture of belligerence and torpor, arrogance and 
ineptitude, to make America less free, less strong and less safe. From 
the party that has claimed ``peace through strength'' as its guiding 
principle, we have unfortunately come to discover that ``war with 
weakness'' has been their governing practice.
  But a new day has dawned, and I am proud, Mr. Speaker, that we have 
turned our attention so readily in this new Congress to cleaning up the 
mess that has been made of our national security.
  We all know that hindsight offers almost perfect vision. But the 
great and bitter irony, indeed the great tragedy of the past 2 years, 
is that, in contrast to the confused and inept policy the Bush 
administration has pursued and that the previous Congress rubber 
stamped, there was and there is a readily available, easily implemented 
strategy waiting on the shelf.
  From July 22, 2004, onward, a clear and compelling strategy for the 
struggle against the radical Islamic terrorists who attacked our Nation 
on September 11th has been waiting for us, shamefully gathering dust. 
It is a bipartisan strategy. It is a thoughtful and insightful 
strategy. And most significantly, it actually is a strategy. It is an 
actual and realistic plan for applying all the tools of national power

[[Page H179]]

to achieve our national interests and protect our Nation from further 
attack.
  It does not depend on the metaphysical power of the word ``freedom'' 
to transform cultures or dissolve ancient hatreds. It does not assume 
that elections are great sociological Band-Aids that will make 
everything all better; and it is not faith-based. It is not a policy 
which we simply announce and then hope and pray that it works.
  It is a strategy that recognizes that our enemies are dangerous, but 
they are also vulnerable. It is a strategy that sees the difference 
between great nations with powerful industrial economies, and a league 
of violent religious zealots living in caves and on the margins of 
society. Our enemies are not all powerful, and it is about time that we 
stop trying to terrify the public in order to justify and excuse bad 
policy and infringements upon our civil rights.
  We need to remember that whatever chaos, murder and destruction al 
Qaeda's leadership and the global jihadi movement have perpetrated, in 
truth they are not great leaders and theirs is not a great movement. 
They are dangerous, for sure, but they are also failures. Virtually 
every success the jihadist have celebrated since 9/11 have actually 
been the work of our own badly guided hands.
  What have they marked as signs of progress? Is the civil war in Iraq 
the result of their unstoppable juggernaut of chaos or our recklessness 
in tearing down the structures of law and order and our 
incomprehensible unwillingness to match forces to the mission? Is the 
collapse of security in Afghanistan the outcome of their mighty 
offensive or our unconscionable passivity and penny-pinching? Is the 
rise in violence in the Arab-Israeli conflict the product of their 
clever tactics or our idiotic disengagement? And is the decline of our 
reputation and prestige a consequence of their brilliant public 
relations strategy or our fixed determination to treat Arab and Muslim 
public opinion as irrelevant?
  The truth is that our enemies face enormous handicaps. Their goals 
and methods are broadly considered illegitimate, even in the countries 
we have most alienated. Our enemies can destroy, but they cannot 
create. They can impose, but they cannot inspire. Their vision of the 
future is, in fact, utterly unpalatable to the great mass of their own 
desired audience. Indeed, the grandiosity of their vision for a revived 
caliphate generally inspires mockery and scorn, not support or 
adherence.
  Our enemies are a few thousand lunatics who want to put the entire 
world in a straitjacket of 12th century Islamic law who shouldn't be 
hard to defeat in a public relations war. If our situation wasn't so 
tragic and dire, it would be hysterically funny. If it were a movie, it 
would be ``The Jihadi Mouse that Roared.''
  More than 5 years after 9/11, it is about time we put in place a 
strategy that takes the threat as seriously as it deserves but doesn't 
wrap our Nation around the twin axles of fear and ignorance. And just 
because our military is readily available and highly effective doesn't 
make it the right tool for every job.
  The 9/11 Commission Report was explicit about the significance of the 
foreign policy components of an effective national counter terrorism 
strategy. Sadly, the Bush administration and previous Congress thought 
little of this advice. Public diplomacy was equated with campaign-style 
spin and flavor-of-the-month diplomatic initiatives designed to address 
American critics but not Arab or Muslim public opinion.
  This bill takes a different tact. Instead of broadcasting our 
inability to steer events, this legislation will strengthen our ability 
to create like-minded allies. Instead of alternately yelling at Arab 
governments and giving them cash anyway, this legislation sets in 
motion efforts to strengthen our allies at the roots of their 
societies. Instead of sweeping bad behavior by allies under the carpet, 
this bill demands that the administration come clean about what has 
been happening in the key regions and what the United States has done 
in response.
  There is more that must be done to right our policy in the Arab and 
Muslim world, and as a member of the Middle East and South Asia 
Subcommittee, I am looking forward to getting to work.
  This legislation to implement the recommendations of the 9/11 
Commission is an appropriate starting point and hopefully marks a 
welcome change of course. The fact that we have not been attacked since 
September 11th should give us no more solace than the 8 years of quiet 
between the first attack on the Twin Towers and the day that they were 
destroyed.
  We may only hope that our continuing efforts will hold the next 
attack in abeyance indefinitely. As the President likes to remind us, 
we are safer but not yet safe. Today's legislation implementing the 9/
11 Commission Report is not a panacea, but it will make us safer still. 
I strongly encourage all Members of the House on both sides of the 
aisle to support this bill.
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 3 minutes to the 
gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Smith), who represents a district made 
up of many families who lost loved ones on 9/11 and has a staff member 
who also suffered a terrible loss on that horrific day.
  (Mr. SMITH of New Jersey asked and was given permission to revise and 
extend his remarks.)
  Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. Speaker, I thank my good friend from 
Florida for yielding.
  Mr. Speaker, when terrorism crashed through our national borders and 
claimed the lives of nearly 3,000 Americans, including over 50 men and 
women from my district in New Jersey who were in the World Trade 
buildings that day, I advocated early and consistently for a commission 
to chronicle the lessons learned from the 9/11 tragedy and to develop a 
well-informed, thoughtful strategy to reduce the risk of future 
terrorist attacks.
  The commission's report and subsequent legislation were thoroughly 
examined by House committees, including the two hearings that I 
chaired, one in the Committee on International Relations on visa reform 
and recommendations for enhanced U.S. diplomacy, and the other in the 
Committee on Veterans' Affairs on emergency medical preparedness.
  The scrutiny given to the report by previous Congresses was robust, 
thorough and fair, and although prior legislation implemented numerous 
important measures that have bolstered our national security, indeed, 
much has already been done, we must always be diligent in implementing 
new and expanded means for responding to developing threats.

                              {time}  1430

  Our enemies as we all know are constantly on the prowl searching for 
our vulnerabilities, and our ability to remain ahead of them is 
critical for our very survival.
  Mr. Speaker, the legislation before us today is yet another attempt 
in trying to distribute the majority of homeland security and first 
responder grants based on the risk of terrorism. New Jersey is the most 
densely populated State in the Nation with at least a dozen sites 
placed on the FBI's national critical infrastructure list. I, along 
with members of our delegation in New Jersey, have maintained, like a 
majority of this House and like the Bush administration, that the 
Department of Homeland Security's first responder grant system was 
flawed and needed to focus on critical infrastructure rather than on 
minimum guarantees and a simple population count. The risk formula 
established by this bill, which will face tough sledding over on the 
Senate side, will ensure that the Department of Homeland Security 
thoroughly and accurately evaluates the risks that New Jersey and other 
States and locales face rather than just doling it out like it's pork-
barrel money.
  Mr. Speaker, I appreciate title VI's provisions that recognize and 
address the often overlooked correlation between terrorism and human 
trafficking and smuggling. In addition, like many here in this room, I 
applauded the creation of the Privacy and Civil Liberties Board 2 years 
ago. Unfortunately, it has not been implemented in a way that matched 
the intent of the law nor in the way that the 9/11 Commission had 
recommended.
  H.R. 1 does include significant reforms that would strengthen the 
efforts of that board by making it an

[[Page H180]]

independent agency and giving it subpoena power. These provisions will 
ensure that the government is protecting America's privacy while still 
doing everything in its power to protect our Nation from a terrorist 
attack.
  I support H.R. 1 and strongly recommend its passage.
  Mr. ACKERMAN. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield to the distinguished 
gentlewoman from California for a unanimous-consent request.
  (Ms. HARMAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend her 
remarks.)
  Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of H.R. 1.
  As I have said many times, terrorists won't check our party 
registration before they blow us up. The American people know this. And 
they expect us to protect them in spite of many barriers--personal, 
institutional, and political--that often gridlock the legislative 
process.
  Mr. Speaker, keeping America secure is our sworn constitutional duty. 
This bill, which includes measures considered over the past 2 years by 
Chairman Thompson and the Homeland Security Committee, is important. If 
it becomes law, it will make us safer.
  Let me highlight a few items.
  First, a strengthened Privacy and Civil Liberties Board. Originally 
created as part of the Intelligence Reform Act of 2004, the Board is 
reestablished as an independent agency with subpoena powers and all 
five members are subject to Senate confirmation. That is a good thing, 
and something Speaker Pelosi urged as the Intel Reform bill was 
written.
  Second, a greater allocation of Homeland Security grants based 
primarily on risk, rather than the ``squeaky wheel'' theory. My own 
District includes portions of LAX and the Port of Los Angeles. But 
other cities and States are also subject to significant risk--from 
obvious targets like New York and Washington, to smaller communities 
with nuclear or chemical facilities. Congress must direct its limited 
resources where threats are greatest, period.
  Third, intelligence and information-sharing. I believe reforms at the 
Federal level are beginning to take hold--though I wish the 
Intelligence Committees in Congress would get budgetary authority, as 
the 9/11 Commission recommended.
  H.R. 1 focuses on providing State and local first responders more of 
the intelligence tools they need. For example, it requires DHS to 
deploy officers to border State fusion centers, and permits State and 
local authorities to send detailees to DHS.
  It is locals, after all, who will be most likely to know what's wrong 
in their neighborhoods. And so we must trust and empower them to act.
  Finally, interoperable communications. I salute our colleague 
Representative Lowey for her persistence. Without interoperable 
communications, we won't have the ability to stop or respond to major 
attacks.
  H.R. 1 is aptly numbered. It is this House's first responsibility. 
Vote ``aye.''
  Mr. ACKERMAN. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 3 minutes to the 
gentlewoman, a member, the chairwoman actually of the House 
Administration Committee, Ms. Millender-McDonald.
  Ms. MILLENDER-McDONALD. Mr. Speaker, I thank my friend for giving me 
this time.
  Mr. Speaker, I am very pleased to rise and offer my support and brief 
comments on this measure before the House today, the 9/11 Commission 
Recommendations Implementation Act. This act reflects our determination 
to strengthen the United States' efforts to combat terror on these 
shores and as such is commendable and prescient.
  It is clearly in our national best interest to pass this productive 
legislation and fulfill yet another promise to the American people. 
Productivity and focus of this kind were clearly demanded by the 
American citizens in the 2006 national elections. The 9/11 Commission 
Recommendations Implementation Act is far reaching, and it encompasses 
a multitude of endeavors critical to ensuring our Nation's security.
  We must pass this legislation, Mr. Speaker. This legislation is 
critical. This legislation is important. This legislation is what the 
American people have asked us to pass. One such endeavor that I 
particularly am pleased to see in this legislation is the strengthening 
of port security. In my district and in surrounding areas, we have the 
largest port complex, the Los Angeles and the Long Beach port security. 
This bill talks about, and we will put into place by phasing in the 
requirement for 100 percent screening of cargo containers bound for 
this United States.
  Before this 110th Congress, the Congress before us did not put this 
in any piece of legislation. This is important because if we are going 
to safeguard and bring national security to this country, we must look 
at the cargo that comes and passes through these ports.
  The other thing, Mr. Speaker, is aviation security. This bill will 
require and direct the Department of Homeland Security to establish a 
system for inspecting 100 percent of cargo carried on our aircrafts. I 
heard earlier on the floor that we need high tech. This is what this 
bill is talking about, bringing about high technology that will screen 
the cargo that is carried aboard our aircraft.
  It is important that we pass this piece of legislation because this 
legislation is important to ensuring that we have national security and 
a secure America. I call on Congress to pass this legislation today and 
to implement it as quickly as possible because of the importance of 
this piece of legislation.
  The other thing that we have here that requires our looking at and 
passing this bill is that the 9/11 Commission gave us a C grade on 
passenger screening at checkpoints to detect explosives. We must pass 
this legislation so that the American people will be safe.
  Mr. ACKERMAN. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield to the gentleman 
from California (Mr. Sherman) 3 minutes.
  Mr. SHERMAN. I thank the gentleman for yielding.
  I would like to thank Speaker Pelosi and our leadership for putting 
together an outstanding bill and thank Mr. Lantos and the leadership of 
our committee for the provisions within the jurisdiction of the Foreign 
Affairs committee. I expect to be the chair of the subcommittee of the 
Foreign Affairs Committee that deals with terrorism and 
nonproliferation, and I want to focus on those matters in my short 
presentation here today.
  The most important issue facing the United States and certainly the 
most important part of this bill deals with preventing nuclear attack 
on American cities. Since a nuclear bomb is about the size of a person, 
it could be smuggled into the United States inside a bale of marijuana. 
Now, I know that this bill will deal with port security, but we cannot 
expect our ports or our borders to be airtight. The key is preventing 
the worst people from getting their hands on the worst weapons. This 
bill implements several provisions that will be helpful in that regard.
  First, it authorizes all funds necessary for the Nunn-Lugar program 
to help Russia get control over its thousands of potentially loose 
nukes, the weapons left over from the Cold War. Second, it authorizes 
all funds necessary for the Global Threat Reduction Initiative to get 
control of the 20 tons of highly enriched uranium at various nuclear 
reactor sites around the world, many of them unsecured. But I want to 
emphasize, this bill only authorizes funds and it will be meaningless 
unless we appropriate the funds, and I look forward to an appropriation 
bill that does just that as quickly as possible.
  This bill imposes sanctions limiting the sale of U.S. weapons to 
those who provide centrifuges to Iran. I hope the administration will 
be able to report to us, before they send the F-16s, that Pakistan has 
verifiably and permanently halted its aid to the Iranian nuclear 
weapons program. This bill will do a lot, but we have to do more to 
prevent nuclear weapons from falling into the worst hands.
  The bill also contains important provisions dealing with public 
diplomacy and youth education. I think that the United States should 
print the textbooks for the poorest nations in the world. In doing so, 
we can help parents in such poor countries--that make only a dollar a 
day or less--who are required to provide textbooks for their kids or 
their kids can't go to school. At the same time we can assure American 
taxpayers that our tax dollars are being used to help kids and not to 
teach hate. I look forward to a foreign aid bill that focuses on the 
textbook needs of those in the poorest countries in the world.
  Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, I am now pleased to yield 3 minutes to 
the gentleman from California (Mr. Rohrabacher), who understands the 
dangers of turning over U.S. national security concerns to 
international organizations.
  Mr. ROHRABACHER. Mr. Speaker, there are positive, even necessary, 
elements of this legislation; but nevertheless it is flawed. A major 
flaw reflects

[[Page H181]]

what I believe, I think I state, a wrongheaded approach which is 
favored perhaps by the new majority of this current Congress.
  Mr. Speaker, today I rise in strong support of a motion that will be 
offered later, the motion to recommit H.R. 1. That motion is aimed at 
removing this damaging flaw that is currently part of the bill. The 
Proliferation Security Initiative, or the PSI, is a vital program 
created by the United States in which we team with 14 other partner 
countries to catch terrorists who attempt to transfer weapons of mass 
destruction. We created this program so that the United States and our 
allies could operate independently and quickly without bureaucratic 
interference to stop the world's most dangerous terrorists. The PSI has 
been effective due to its independence as well as the member countries' 
commitments to stop these weapons transfers.
  This, as I say, has been an effective effort. It was created by 
Americans. It was led by Americans. And the decisions made were 
essentially under the leadership of Americans. The new majority in this 
House seems to favor a more multilateral approach which would be led by 
international organizations, in this case the United Nations.
  If H.R. 1 passes in its current form, so will a sense of Congress 
that says our Proliferation Security Initiative should be authorized by 
the United Nations. Our new majority in Congress appears more 
interested in catering to unelected bureaucrats at the United Nations 
than in stopping proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. This is 
not only a dangerous mistake; it runs totally counter to the principles 
we have followed thus far in our country where Americans should be the 
main determinants of those elements and those decisions that so much 
affect our security.
  Now, I understand that the new majority prefers a more global 
approach which, of course, would leave us dependent on international 
bodies like the United Nations. But that is not an approach that I 
believe will make this country safer as reflected in this legislation. 
A sense of Congress that says we want to cede our power to the United 
Nations on any issue such as this but especially on matters of U.S. 
national security is a mistake.
  I encourage my colleagues on both sides of the aisle to correct this 
harmful error in H.R. 1 and vote in favor of the motion to recommit. 
And as we face these decisions in the future, as we make these very 
important decisions and as we develop legislation like this, let's 
remember our obligation is to the people of the United States. Our 
obligation is not to curry favor with unelected bureaucrats at the 
United Nations.
  Mr. ACKERMAN. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 1 minute to the 
gentleman from New York (Mr. Engel).
  Mr. ENGEL. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support of H.R. 1, to 
implement the 9/11 Commission recommendations. Unfortunately, the 
Republican leadership in the last Congress refused to do so, and I am 
glad we are doing it now.
  As a New Yorker, I understand the serious concerns about homeland 
security, and I have long argued in favor of a formula funding based on 
risk. In the 109th Congress, Mr. Fossella and I introduced the 
Responsible Bioterrorism Funding Act of 2006, which directed the 
Department of Homeland Security to develop a funding formula based on 
risk. Unfortunately, again the Republican Congress did not pass our 
bill. So in 2006, as a result, New York's homeland security funding was 
cut by 40 percent. Thus, per capita in New York we received $3 per 
resident while other States received as much as $60 or more.
  No State has a higher risk of terrorist attack than New York, so the 
new funding formulas proposed in this bill will allocate funding based 
on risk rather than an across-the-board funding level as established in 
the PATRIOT Act. This is very, very important and this bill strikes the 
balance between allocating most of the funding based on risk while 
ensuring that each State has the proper funding to reach a level of 
preparedness.
  I also stand in strong support of title II of this bill, which 
establishes a communications interoperability grant program. I have 
worked on this as well. I believe this is a good part of this bill, and 
I strongly urge my colleagues to vote for it.
  Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, I am now pleased to yield 3 minutes to 
the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Kirk), a proud vet who understands the 
threat of terror internationally.
  Mr. KIRK. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of this legislation, 
especially its new security requirement for Pakistan to continue to 
receive U.S. taxpayer subsidies.

                              {time}  1445

  After September 11, the government of Pakistan performed admirably, 
allowing U.S. Army supplies to help our campaign in Afghanistan to end 
the Taliban dictatorship. The Pakistani military also moved into the 
lawless tribal areas where Osama Bin Laden sought refuge.
  But that record of cooperation against Bin Laden has dramatically 
weakened over the last 9 months. In a set of two agreements, the 
government of Pakistan has largely given up on the conflict against Bin 
Laden and his Taliban allies. In two agencies along the Afghan borders, 
North and South Waziristan, al Qaeda and the Taliban now have safe 
havens immune from action by the regular Pakistani military. They are 
now at rest, slumbering in garrison, marvelously inactive against 
foreign terrorists operating on Pakistani soil.
  This issue directly concerns the safety of Americans, both here and 
abroad. Waziristan and Pakistan could now be called ``al Qaedastan,'' 
as terrorist leaders have led organization efforts in attacks against 
Afghan territory.
  Recently I accompanied Senators McCain and Lieberman to visit our 
garrison in Khost, Afghanistan, where they reported a 500-percent 
increase in attacks against their outpost organized from these regions 
of Pakistan.
  Mr. Speaker, we need to pass this legislation to send a message to 
Pakistan that you must continue to work with the United States and our 
NATO allies in Afghanistan against the Taliban and al Qaeda. A policy 
of safe havens and sanctuary for these people will not work, has not 
worked, is not working and represents a direct threat, first to 
Americans in uniform stationed in Afghanistan and later to our allies 
in Europe and America itself.
  Mr. ACKERMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the distinguished 
gentleman, Adam Schiff.
  (Mr. SCHIFF asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Speaker, one of the most important findings of the 9/
11 Commission was that the failure to anticipate the attack was a 
failure of imagination. The idea of such an assault was so abhorrent it 
was difficult to think about.
  We cannot know for sure what form a future attack may take, but as we 
struggle to prevent it, we must be willing to consider the most 
horrific possibility, a nuclear or biological attack on an American 
city. The idea of 100,000 people killed in an instant is an idea too 
terrible to contemplate. But to ignore this threat, or fail to act upon 
it with the greatest urgency is to be grossly, criminally, negligent 
with our Nation's security.
  Osama Bin Laden has termed the acquisition of weapons of mass 
destruction ``a religious duty.'' He has called for an American 
Hiroshima. This is his Mein Kampf.
  H.R. 1 includes many of the best ideas from around the country on how 
to combat nuclear terrorism. But the one fundamental idea is, we must 
prevent terrorists from acquiring nuclear weapons or material because 
once it is acquired, it may be too late. This bill will strengthen the 
Global Threat Reduction Program and accelerate the global clean-out of 
the stockpiles around the world. And I urge everyone's support.
  Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of this bill, which is long 
overdue and I commend the Speaker and other members of the Leadership 
for making this a priority.
  One of the most important findings of the 
9/11 Commission was that the failure to anticipate the attack was a 
``failure of imagination.'' The idea of such an assault was so 
abhorrent that it was difficult to think about. We cannot know for sure 
what form a future attack may take, but as we struggle to prevent it, 
we must be willing to consider the most horrific possibility: a nuclear 
or biological attack on an American city. The idea of 100,000 people 
killed in an instant, is an idea too terrible to

[[Page H182]]

contemplate, but to ignore this threat, or fail to act upon it with the 
greatest urgency, is to be grossly, criminally neglegent with our 
Nation's security. Osama bin Laden has termed the acquisition of 
weapons of mass destruction ``a religious duty.'' He has called for an 
American Hiroshima. This is his Mein Kampf.
  H.R. 1 includes many of the best ideas from around the country on how 
to combat nuclear terrorism. But the one fundamental idea is that we 
must prevent terrorists from acquiring nuclear weapons or material, 
because once they are acquired, it may be too late.
  Programs throughout the government are struggling to secure nuclear 
weapons and materials around the world, and prevent nuclear 
trafficking. But there is little overall organization of these efforts. 
That's why our bill establishes a Coordinator for the Prevention of 
Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism in the Office 
of the President. The Coordinator will formulate and coordinate a 
comprehensive strategy for U.S. nonproliferation activities, oversee 
all nonproliferation and nuclear terrorism prevention programs, and 
advise the President and congress on the progress that each program is 
making.
  To assist the Coordinator, this bill establishes a bipartisan blue-
ribbon commission to assess the current state of U.S. nonproliferation 
and nuclear terrorism prevention activities, develop a clear, 
comprehensive strategy, and identify the areas in which accelerated 
effort is most urgent.
  Currently, the President must certify that Russia is meeting certain 
conditions before authorizing the release of Cooperative Threat 
Reduction funds. This has caused delays in shielding vulnerable weapons 
when the President was unable to fully certify Russia. This bill 
removes those restrictions, granting the President more flexibility in 
negotiations with Russia. It also gives the President the flexibility 
to direct Cooperative Threat Reduction funds outside of Russia when 
necessary.
  The bill will strengthen the Global Threat Reduction Program, to 
accelerate the global clean-out of the most vulnerable stockpiles of 
nuclear material. At the current pace, cleaning up the most vulnerable 
nuclear sites around the globe will take more than a decade. Given AQ's 
desire for these weapons, how can we be assured that we will have this 
much time--we can't.
  The bill also urges the President to expand the Proliferation 
Security Initiative, an international program to intercept weapons of 
mass destruction shipments. It encourages joint training exercises, 
particularly with China and Russia, to strengthen our cooperation on 
security issues, and encourage them to adopt strict standards for WMD 
security. U.N. Security Council Resolution 1540 broached the idea of 
international standards for securing nuclear material, but was brief on 
the specifics. Now the U.S. must take the lead in establishing those 
standards, through organizations like the Proliferation Security 
Initiative.
  I hope everyone can support this long-awaited overhaul to our anti-
nuclear-terrorism efforts.
  Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman 
from New York (Mr. Fossella), who has many families who lost loved ones 
in 
9/11 in his district.
  (Mr. FOSSELLA asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. FOSSELLA. Mr. Speaker, at the outset, let me just thank the 
majority for bringing this bill to the floor because I think most 
Americans want Democrats and Republicans to ensure that all America 
remains safe and secure, and not to repeat another September 11. And, 
by and large, there are some very good elements in the legislation.
  But let me, right at the outset, request that as we go forward, there 
are some specific concerns that New York City has that I think need to 
be addressed. First is the notion that the city itself cannot apply 
directly. It must go through the State without any requirement for the 
State to get the funds to the localities like New York City. We know by 
now that New York City has specific needs, and therefore, I believe 
should be addressed.
  The same would apply to what could be a duplicative process whereby 
the grant program, and as someone who was involved in the establishment 
the first grant program under the Department of Commerce, where, as we 
speak, the NTIA is in the process of preparing guidelines, my concern 
is that we don't get into a situation where there are two different 
agencies getting into a bureaucratic trap which will prevent the flow 
of money.
  Most important, however, is the fact that we know that one size does 
not fit all. And I speak specifically that, under the current bill, 
there could be, and I think will be, a problem with the restriction to 
Section 306. And that is that over the last 10 years, New York City has 
dedicated a lot of money and, in the last 5 years, since 9/11, almost 
$1 billion to upgrade its interoperability capacity to allow 
firefighters and police officers to talk with each other.
  Now, under this bill, we are essentially saying that everyone must 
use the 700 megahertz in the spectrum. New York City cannot. As I say, 
they have developed and deployed $1 billion plus in the 400 and the 800 
megahertz of the spectrum. Why? Because they found it easier to use 
that for communicating into the subways, into high rise buildings. And 
the last thing I think this Congress wants to be on the record for is 
to essentially tie the hands of New York City, undo much of the good 
work that has taken place over the last 5 years, and allow New York 
City and other localities that have unique and specific needs to 
continue to deploy and build on the networks that they have put in 
place. I think it would be a big mistake. I encourage the majority to 
consider this as the process goes forward.
  I make no mistake and make no hesitation in suggesting that this will 
hurt and punish New York City and the millions and tens of millions of 
people who come there annually to visit the greatest city in the world.
  Mr. ACKERMAN. Mr. Speaker, it is my pleasure to yield 1 minute to the 
distinguished gentlewoman from Pennsylvania, Allyson Schwartz.
  Ms. SCHWARTZ. Mr. Speaker, I am proud to stand here today as we 
deliver on one of the most important campaign promises our party made 
to the American people, implementing the 9/11 Commission 
recommendations. Today we will take steps to improve our Nation's 
aviation, port and transportation security. We will strengthen 
government intelligence and information sharing, and we will prevent 
terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction. And we will 
create a dedicated source of funding to provide first responders with 
communications interoperability equipment that will allow our first 
responders to communicate across departmental and jurisdictional lines 
during emergencies.
  It was over 5 years ago when evacuation orders were not heard in the 
towers of the World Trade Center because police and fire fighters and 
other emergency personnel simply could not talk to each other. The 
Federal Government failed to act. And these same communication problems 
happened again during the failed response following Hurricane Katrina.
  As a representative of the Philadelphia region, a major population, 
commerce, and transportation hub, I share the opinion that we have to 
do something about this. It is scandalous not to act.
  Mr. Speaker, I am proud to stand with you as we deliver on one of the 
most important campaign promises our party made to the American people.
  Today, we will implement the bipartisan 9/11 Commission's 
recommendations. And, today we will make our Nation safer.
  We will: improve our Nation's aviation, port and transportation 
security; strengthen government intelligence and information sharing; 
help reduce the appeal of extremism abroad; and prevent terrorists from 
acquiring Weapons of Mass Destruction.
  We will also create a dedicated source of funding to provide first 
responders with communications interoperability--the type of equipment 
that allows local, state, and regional first responders to communicate 
with one another during emergencies.
  We know that the inability to communicate across department and 
jurisdiction lines impedes first responder's ability to address 
emergency situations. It was over five years ago when evacuation orders 
were not heard in the towers of the World Trade Center because the 
police, fire fighters and other emergency personnel simply could not 
speak to each other.
  Despite this, the Federal Government failed to act and these very 
same communications problems happened again during the failed response 
and recovery efforts in the Gulf region following Hurricane Katrina. 
Prompting, in part, Thomas Kean, former chair of the 9/11 Commission, 
to call the Republican-led Congress' lack of progress on this issue 
scandalous.
  However, local communities across the Nation have been moving 
forward--despite little leadership from the Federal level. In my 
region, the Philadelphia Police Department along with Southeastern 
Pennsylvania Transit Authority are working to address the fact that

[[Page H183]]

their radio systems are not compatible--making it virtually impossible 
for them to communicate should a coordinated response be necessary.
  I have been working closely with city and transit officials to find 
interim remedies to this problem. However, it has been a difficult 
task, in large part, because of the lack of guidance and resources 
provided by the Federal Government. In fact, when they applied for a 
grant to help fund an interoperable communications system, the 
Department of Homeland Security denied their request. This denial 
leaves the city of Philadelphia, its transit system and the millions of 
daily riders, residents and workers in the region vulnerable to attack. 
It also leaves the city's first responders less prepared than need to 
be to protect the fifth largest metropolitan region in the country.
  But, Mr. Speaker, today is a new day. It is a day when Congress 
acknowledges our Nation's first responders--police officers, fire 
fighters, medics. It is a day when we give these brave women and men 
the tools to properly aid their fellow Americans in need of help.
  The aptly numbered bill--H.R. 1--will pass this body within the first 
100 legislative hours of the 110th Congress, and it demonstrates that 
the Democratic-led Congress' top priority is protecting and ensuring 
the safety of the American people.
  Thank you and I urge a ``yes'' vote on implementing the 
recommendations of the 9/11 Commission.
  Mr. ACKERMAN. Mr. Speaker, I am very pleased now to yield 2 minutes 
to the gentleman from Queens and the Bronx, New York (Mr. Crowley).
  Mr. CROWLEY. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from Queens and 
Nassau County, Mr. Ackerman, for yielding me this time.
  I listened very closely to my colleague from Staten Island, Mr. 
Fossella, and his concerns about any disadvantage that New York may 
suffer under passage of this legislation. It is not our intention or 
anyone's intention to have New York be disadvantaged in any way, shape 
or form. And I will continue to work with him, as we have done in 
previous Congresses, to help make sure that New York is not 
disadvantaged.
  But Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of H.R. 1. After the awful 
events of September 11, our Nation joined together to construct ways to 
prevent this from happening again and for better protecting our 
homeland.
  But this administration, the Bush administration, and Congress then 
refused to act or to listen properly. The Republicans refused to 
implement commonsense recommendations ensuring Federal Homeland 
Security dollars went to places where they were actually needed.
  The Republicans did not take threat or risk assessment into account 
for protecting our homeland. Rather, the Republicans took politics into 
account.
  Democrats are fixing these problems and providing real security to 
all 300 million Americans, regardless of political persuasion. 
Democrats are making sure all of our first responders in harm's way are 
given the training they need to perform and protect our citizens. 
Democrats are cracking down on loose nukes and strengthening nuclear 
proliferation to keep weapons out of the wrong hands.
  For over 5 years I have heard the Republicans play politics with 
homeland security and with the lives and the memories of the 3,000 
people who were murdered on 9/11. Their scare tactics expired this 
November when the American people demanded real change.
  Homeland security is about protecting the homeland and not politics 
or 30-second ads. We Democrats recognize that.
  After 6 years, America is moving in a new direction. It is moving 
forward, Mr. Speaker. Let's protect America. Let's implement the 9/11 
Commission's recommendations and let us move forward.
  Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may 
consume, the remaining time.
  We have seen, Mr. Speaker, how ineffectively the United Nations 
Security Council has been in compelling Syria to stop its support for 
terrorist activities in Lebanon or at least keeping to its own 
deadlines regarding Iran's nuclear program.
  After decades of rampant anti-Americanism at the United Nations, 
after decades of opposition and obstruction regarding virtually every 
aspect of U.S. foreign policy, no one can truly believe that the United 
Nations Security Council would draft its resolutions to advance the 
interests of the United States or that any U.N. entity would help the 
U.S. image in the Arab and Muslim world.
  I need only point to the continuing efforts by Russia and China to 
hobble U.S. efforts at the U.N. that would seek to apply pressure on 
Iran to abandon its nuclear weapons program.
  Let us consider the UNDP, for example. In 2005, as Israel was 
withdrawing from Gaza, financed by the Palestinian Authority's 
production of propaganda materials, it included banners, bumper 
stickers, T-shirts bearing the slogan: ``Today, Gaza; tomorrow, the 
West Bank and Jerusalem.'' This is the United Nations.
  This rightly led to protests from then U.S. Ambassador to the United 
Nations John Bolton who rightly called this funding inappropriate and 
unacceptable.
  And we know the record of the UNDP of hostility toward economic 
freedom. Has anyone really thought this through? This needs to be 
revamped, and the bill before us does not address that in a correct way 
to have it be pro-U.S. and pro-U.S. national security.
  Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. ACKERMAN. Mr. Speaker, I am delighted to yield 1 minute to the 
gentlewoman from the Capital of the United States, Washington, DC, Ms. 
Eleanor Holmes Norton.
  Ms. NORTON. Mr. Speaker, 5 years after 9/11, we still have no 
national security strategy for securing public transportation, the 
principal form of transportation most Americans use, 9 billion 
passenger trips annually. No wonder the 9/11 commission gave a C minus 
grade.
  This bill rescues us by requiring the Department of Homeland Security 
to develop risk-based priorities for transportation security and, 
finally, a strategic information plan so that the private sector, which 
owns our modes of transportation, can share information with one 
another.
  Mr. Speaker, the terrorists have changed their focus, as Madrid and 
London made clear. We have not.
  I was the sponsor of the Secure Trains Act. It had no Republican 
sponsors; many Democratic sponsors.
  After 9/11, we promised we would never be caught flatfooted again. 
This bill finally gets us up on our feet and rescues us from a zero 
strategy on public transportation and public transportation from being 
the stepchild of national security.

                              {time}  1500

  Mr. HOEKSTRA. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself as much time as I may 
consume.
  Mr. Speaker, for a bill that is supposed to carry out a series of 
partisan campaign promises on national security and homeland security 
issues, what is most notable about this bill is actually the many areas 
that it highlights where there has been bipartisan agreement, not only 
on the provisions of the 9/11 Commission that should be implemented, 
but just as importantly, those recommendations that should not be 
implemented.
  In the 109th Congress, the House acted to address many of the 
recommendations of the 9/11 Commission. A number of these reforms were 
included in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act, in 
which the Intelligence Committee played a prominent role. Others were 
addressed and refined in later legislation.
  On intelligence matters, many of the items in this bill are 
duplications or slight modifications to initiatives that were already 
put into place during the preceding Congress, such as support to the 
fusion of border intelligence and provisions to facilitate greater 
information sharing on homeland security.
  As another key example, this bill would create a new Office of the 
United States Coordinator for the Prevention of Weapons of Mass 
Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism. This duplicates and 
complicates the work of the National Counterproliferation Center 
created in the Intelligence Reform bill.
  I also think it is important to point out that contrary to campaign 
promises, this bill does not implement all of the recommendations of 
the 9/11 Commission. Let me note a few, the intelligence budget, and 
paramilitary activities, that it does not address at all.
  This bill is following the lead of the previous Congress and not 
implementing the two recommendations

[[Page H184]]

that were not warranted, declassifying the amount of the intelligence 
budget and making the Department of Defense the lead for all 
paramilitary operations. These decisions were right for our national 
security on the merits in the last Congress, and they are still right 
for our national security now.
  I appreciate that this bill follows and reinforces Republican 
positions on these issues where the 9/11 Commission recommendations 
were not good policy. This bill also curiously omits another explicit 
recommendation of the 9/11 Commission that the majority party's 
representation on the intelligence oversight committee should never 
exceed the minority's representation by one. If the new majority wants 
to claim that it has implemented all of the 9/11 Commission 
recommendations, it cannot pick and choose to implement all of its 
recommendations except the ones that involve their own power.
  Later today, the House will also consider a resolution that purports 
to address the 9/11 Commission's recommendation to consolidate 
intelligence oversight in Congress and enhance the influence of the 
authorizing committee on the appropriations process. The proposal will 
not accomplish the objectives sought by the 9/11 Commission.
  The 9/11 Commission recommended that the authorizing committee also 
become the Appropriations Committee. The last Congress thought that 
that was a bad idea, and we didn't do it. The proposal in front of us 
today will further add complication and confusion by creating a third 
group in the House with responsibility for intelligence. Actually, in 
the last Congress, we pretty much achieved what the 9/11 Commission was 
trying to accomplish, where we had basically a seamless integration of 
the Intelligence Committee authorizations bill reflected in the 
appropriations bill.
  I also want to point out that this bill was flawed in much more than 
its failure to promise to fully implement the commission 
recommendations. As ranking member and former chairman of the Permanent 
Select Committee on Intelligence, I am concerned that parts of it have 
significant potential to impact our Nation's critical intelligence 
programs and capabilities. Even worse, these provisions were developed 
outside of regular order, without any participation from the relevant 
committees.
  I want to briefly note my concerns with two of these provisions. 
Section 1433 of the bill would require the United States to ``develop a 
common coalition approach'' with respect to detainees. This proposal is 
much broader in scope and effect than the actual recommendation of the 
9/11 Commission, and it is bad policy. I would hope that all Members of 
the House would be in agreement that the law should not require the 
United States of America to ask for the permission of other countries, 
even our partners, to gather intelligence from and deal effectively and 
appropriately with detainees and terrorists who threaten our national 
security.
  In addition, this proposal would significantly implicate an already 
challenging area by requiring us to reconcile newly clarified detainee 
authority with the policies of some nations whose legal authorities 
protecting human rights are nowhere near as well developed as ours. In 
addition, this bill would reopen previously negotiated and resolved 
issues by making the Civil Liberties Board an independent body in 
granting its subpoena authority. Overall, it would complicate 
intelligence.
  Mr. ACKERMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to one of our newest 
Members, but very distinguished already, the gentleman from Iowa (Mr. 
Braley).
  Mr. BRALEY of Iowa. Mr. Speaker, as many of the new Members ran on a 
promise of bringing change to Washington, one of the key areas of that 
new direction was the responsibility of securing this Nation. In July 
of 2004, the bipartisan 9/11 Commission issued a comprehensive series 
of recommendations and urged this body and the leaders of this country 
to take prompt action to implement those recommendations and make us 
safer.
  Today, in just the second week of our majority, the Democratic House 
of Representatives will pass legislation that will address the 9/11 
recommendations and make the American people safer and more secure.
  Just yesterday, the 9/11 Commission Vice Chair, Lee Hamilton, a 
former Member of this body, stated the bottom line is that if this 
bill, H.R. 1, is enacted, funded and implemented, then the American 
people will be safer because it carries out the recommendations of the 
commission.
  I am proud to be part of this effort to implement those 
recommendations, and I am proud because that was a promise made to the 
Members of our constituents last fall. Action on this critical issue of 
securing our Nation is long past due. The citizens of our great Nation 
are calling for change. In the area of national security, the time for 
change has arrived.
  Mr. ACKERMAN. Mr. Speaker, I am doubly pleased to yield 1\1/2\ 
minutes to the final speaker, the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Lampson).
  Mr. LAMPSON. On 9/11, many of us were here in the Capitol. As we saw 
smoke billowing from the Pentagon, we recognized the direct threat that 
faced our country. We stood together on the steps of this buildings, 
Republicans and Democrats together, and promised the American people 
that we would do our best to secure this Nation.
  But we have failed the American people. The 9/11 Commission graded 
the administration in this Congress with five Fs, twelve Ds, and nine 
Cs; and we must accept no less than straight As. Our Nation responded 
with overwhelming support to the commission's recommendations, and that 
is why I urge all of you to join me today in voting for H.R. 1.
  This bill will make us safer, but it is just a first step. A TV 
station in Houston recently uncovered serious security holes at the 
Port of Houston. I mean that literally, holes. As they walked along the 
perimeter, they found several holes in the fences. This security breach 
at one of the Nation's largest ports is unacceptable.
  Today this threat, this hole in our Nation's security, is being 
patched. Our safety is nonnegotiable, and we can no longer shortchange 
our ports. A vote for this bill today demonstrates our dedication to 
securing our Nation. It is a first step towards truly securing the 
Nation from threats, not only in our backyard, but to threats half a 
world away.
  When I go home this Friday and greet the hardworking men and women of 
the 22nd Congressional District as they leave their plants and port 
facilities where they work, I can thank them for the risk they take 
every day and look them in the eye and finally tell them they will be 
safe and so will our country.
  Mr. Speaker, let us have no more smoke. Let us have no more holes. 
Let us do the right thing and pass H.R. 1.
  On September 11, 2001 many of us were here in the Capitol. As we saw 
the smoke billowing from the Pentagon, we recognized the direct threat 
that faced our country. We stood together on the steps of this 
building, Republicans and Democrats together, and promised the American 
people that we would do our best to secure this nation. But for far too 
long we have failed the American people. In 2005 members of the 9/11 
Commission graded both the Administration and Congress with 5 F's, 12 
D's, 9 C's, and 2 Incompletes. We must accept no less than straight 
A's. Our nation responded with overwhelming support of the Commission's 
recommendations, and as their representatives, we should implement 
them. That's why I urge all of you to join me today in voting for H.R. 
1. This bill will make us safer, but it's just the first step.
  For too long we have ignored the threat and been unwilling to meet 
the challenge. This is a challenge that we ignore at our own peril. Our 
Nation's seaports handle over 95 percent of our foreign trade worth 
over $1 trillion a year. The 9/11 Commission report concluded that 
terrorists have the ``opportunity to do harm as great or greater in 
maritime and surface transportation'' than the 9/11 attacks. In 2003 
the Coast Guard estimated that it would need $7.2 billion to fully 
implement the security requirements of the Maritime Transportation 
Security Act. Until recently, Congress had only provided $910 million 
for port security since the 9/11 attacks. We must fulfill our 
responsibility by fully funding these provisions, providing appropriate 
oversight and ensuring that these measures are implemented efficiently 
and effectively. Our safety is non-negotiable, and we can no longer 
short-change our ports.
  In fact, a local TV station in Houston recently uncovered serious 
security holes at the Port of Houston, which borders the 22nd district. 
And I literally mean holes. As they

[[Page H185]]

walked along the perimeter they found several holes in the fence. This 
is a fence that is meant to deter terrorists, yet there it is helping 
them gain access to these crucial facilities. This serious security 
breach at one of the nation's largest ports in one of the nation's 
largest cities is unacceptable. And today this threat, this hole in our 
nation's security and my constituents' peace of mind, is being patched. 
Our safety is non-negotiable, and we can no longer short-change our 
ports. A vote for this bill today demonstrates our dedication to 
securing our Nation. It even goes beyond the commission's 
recommendations--requiring 100 percent of U.S.-bound shipping 
containers to be scanned and sealed using the best available technology 
over the next five years, among other provisions.
  This is the first step towards truly securing our Nation, from 
threats in our own backyard to threats half a world away. This bill 
will enable us to improve our own security while fostering improved 
relations across the globe. I urge all of you, my colleagues here in 
the people's House, and I implore our colleagues in the Senate, to vote 
for this important piece of legislation. And I urge the president to 
sign it into law. And when I go home this Friday, and greet the 
hardworking men and women of the 22nd Congressional District as they 
leave the plants and port facilities where they work, I can thank them 
for the risks they take everyday and look them in the eye and finally 
tell them they will be safe and so will our country.
  Mr. ACKERMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield the balance of my time to the 
gentleman from Mississippi (Mr. Thompson), the honorable chairman of 
the Homeland Security Committee, and ask unanimous consent that he 
control the balance of our time.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Without objection, the gentleman from 
Mississippi is recognized for 36 minutes.
  There was no objection.
  Mr. THOMPSON of Mississippi. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2\1/2\ minutes to 
the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Pascrell).
  Mr. PASCRELL. I want to commend, in the beginning, Chairman Thompson 
and Ranking Member King for the work of your staff, everybody chipped 
in; and I really want to commend the work that you have all done.
  Mr. Speaker, it is about time. Three years ago, the commission put 
forward a comprehensive evaluation of our Nation's vulnerabilities and 
listed key recommendations toward making our Nation safer, more secure. 
We finally passed landmark legislation to close many of the dangerous 
security gaps, and we are going to do that today. We will address the 
weaknesses that continue to leave this Nation at risk, and I say it is 
about time.
  More than a year ago, Hurricane Katrina and Hurricane Rita reminded 
us all again how unprepared we still are to deal with catastrophes, 
whether caused by nature or a terrorist attack. That is the politics. 
That is the charade. And that charade has been a deadly charade. The 
Congress will not wait another day to make the necessary improvements 
to our Homeland Security. This landmark legislation includes many long 
overdue steps.
  Our ports and our critical infrastructure will be better protected. 
Our borders will be harder to enter. Terrorists will confront greater 
difficulty in obtaining nuclear materials, and our aviation will be 
better defended, just to name a few.
  I am particularly pleased with two major provisions. First, this bill 
would substantially increase the share of homeland security grants that 
are provided to States based on risk. I fought for this, the chairman 
has fought for this, I think you fought for this, Mr. Ranking Member. 
We want 100 percent risk on these grants.
  It is crucial that we ensure that Federal money designed to better 
equip and train our first responders actually reaches down to where it 
is needed most.
  I have long said that the current system of distributing grant 
funding to local levels is fundamentally broken. In an era when 
information can be sent instantaneously any way, any place in the 
world, it is utterly nonsensical that our Nation's police, fire and EMS 
personnel cannot consistently communicate with each other. Not another 
day should pass without us addressing that. Anybody who says that we 
have addressed it, look at how the administration tried to zero out the 
interoperability part of the legislation. Tell the truth.
  Mr. KING of New York. Mr. Speaker, I would just advise the gentleman 
from New Jersey, my good friend, that as far as the threat and risk 
funding, I was the prime cosponsor for that bill, and it did pass in 
the last Congress by a vote of 409-10 in a bipartisan way.
  Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from California (Mr. 
Lewis), the ranking member and the past chairman of the Appropriations 
Committee.
  (Mr. LEWIS of California asked and was given permission to revise and 
extend his remarks.)
  Mr. LEWIS of California. Thank you very much, Mr. King and Mr. 
Chairman.
  Mr. Speaker, I might respond to the colleagues, this is the longest I 
have seen you, your presence on the floor in many a year, and your 
being in the podium. We will not let you get away as you would normally 
choose to do.
  But having said that, Mr. Speaker, you know it is not my intention to 
speak on every authorizing bill that might come along. Indeed, we have 
enough work to do on our Appropriations Committee, enough to take up 
the time of our fine authorizers. But in the meantime, it is important 
for us to say early on, in these first 100 hours, that there are issues 
that will be brought to the floor that purport to reflect the interests 
of authorizers that have huge implications in so far as appropriations 
are concerned. So for this one time I would like to take just a moment 
to discuss a bit of that.
  First, as a member of the Appropriations Committee, I must mention 
that this bill is full of new programs, policy directives, performance 
directives, all kinds of authorizing suggestions, without any 
indication as to where the money might really be coming from. It is one 
thing to say that we want to establish a policy. It is another thing to 
say that we are going to pay as we go. It is an entirely different 
thing to say exactly where the money will come from.
  It is very important for the Members to know that throughout this 
package that purports to deal with the 9/11 Commission, and those 
recommendations, that we have here to a very significant degree, within 
the authorizing process, a statement of policy that is little more than 
a press release. There really are no serious suggestions here as to how 
we go about solving the problems that are implied by the presentation 
of this legislation.
  The tens of billions of dollars that would be required to implement 
this general statement of policy should not be ignored. It is not good 
enough to suggest that we are going to balance the budget and pay as we 
go. The first bill before us provides an authorizing base that does 
exactly the reverse.
  We are not in this to confront the Appropriations Committee with 
authorizers, but indeed it is about time that we begin to lay the 
foundation for policy and appropriations work that actually reflects 
the will of the House as well as the appropriations process.

                              {time}  1515

  Mr. Speaker, I know that you agree with all of that because of your 
appropriations background.
  Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to this legislation before us 
today. This is a bill full of feel-good promises and sound bites but no 
realistic approach to becoming a reality. Let me provide just a few 
illustrations of my concern.
  First, as a member of the Appropriations Committee, I must mention 
that this bill is full of new programs, policy directives and 
performance directives authorized at ``such sums as necessary,'' the 
total of which is likely to reach into the tens of billions of dollars. 
It proposes carving out $250 million from passenger ticket security 
fees as a ``one-time deposit'' for research, development, and 
deployment of Explosive Detection System checkpoint technology. But, 
because there is no guarantee this amount can be covered by current 
collections, it will likely require a direct appropriation. In other 
words, it proposes a new cost, with no offset.
  While some of these programs are worthwhile I am unsure how the new 
majority plans to actually fund them. This is a classic demonstration 
that the majority's pledge to offset any new increases in funding is, 
at this point, nothing more than an empty sound bite.
  Absent new appropriations, there is little chance these programs, 
policy directives, and performance objectives will see the light of 
day. For example, this bill requires the inspection of 100 percent of 
the over 11 million U.S.-bound seaborne cargo containers within five 
years. While DHS currently inspects 100 percent of high-risk cargo, 
estimates to physically inspect 100 percent of sea-bound cargo, 
including those containers shipped by trusted

[[Page H186]]

partners, run in the tens of billions of dollars not counting 
additional manpower and operational costs. Even the editorial section 
of this morning's Washington Post describes the majority's container 
security proposal as a ``waste of money'' with a ``marginal benefit'' 
and no ``realistic cost estimate''.
  Additionally, estimates to physically inspect all cargo on passenger 
planes for a single year exceed $500 million and may require up to an 
additional 8,000 screeners at a cost of $400 million per year. And on 
top of these annual costs, there is an upfront investment of over a 
billion dollars for equipment installation and facility modifications. 
Still, this legislation casually calls for 100 percent inspection by 
the end of Fiscal Year 2009.
  Mr. Speaker, throwing money at a problem is not the solution. In 
fact, since 9/11, Congress has made steady and substantial, yet 
realistic, progress in many of these areas. In Fiscal Year 2005, we 
called for the tripling of the percentage of cargo screened on 
passenger aircraft, required quarterly updates on meeting this goal, 
and directed the development of standards and technology to reduce 
manpower requirements.
  We continue to target all high-risk cargo inbound for the United 
States. We also support expansion of our Container Security Initiative, 
which will place actual Customs and Border Protection employees at 58 
of the world's largest ports, covering approximately 85 percent of the 
U.S.-bound shipping containers by the end of this fiscal year. Last 
year, the 109th Congress passed the SAFE Port Act, which, among other 
things, created pilot programs, each designed to test the possibility 
and viability of achieving 100 percent screening overseas. Through the 
Secure Freight Initiative, the Administration has set up 9 of these 
pilot programs.
  While we appreciate the new majority's attempt, this bill is little 
more than a press release full of unfunded mandates that has little 
chance of becoming law. Real reform begins with committee and 
subcommittee hearings and mark-ups, and ends with a negotiated product 
that contains substantive yet realistic reform. This bill fails that, 
and many other, tests.
  Mr. THOMPSON of Mississippi. Mr. Speaker, I now yield 1 minute to the 
majority leader, Mr. Hoyer.
  Mr. HOYER. Mr. Speaker, it is no mere coincidence that this 
legislation, which will implement the recommendations of the bipartisan 
9/11 Commission, is designated as House Resolution No. 1 in this new 
Congress. Our first and highest responsibility as Members of this 
Congress is to protect the American people, to defend our homeland, and 
to strengthen our national security. The fact is, our Nation today, 
5\1/2\ years after the attacks of September 11th, is still not as safe 
as it should and must be.
  As Tom Kean, the former Republican Governor of New Jersey and cochair 
of the 9/11 Commission observed just a few months ago, ``We're not 
protecting our own people in this country. The government is not doing 
its job.'' That is the former Republican Governor of New Jersey, the 
cochair of the Commission.
  Today, however, through this important legislation, this House will 
take a vital step forward in protecting our people and our Nation. We 
have taken steps, there is no doubt about that. We have taken steps 
together in a bipartisan way, but we have not taken all the steps we 
could take. And that is the point of the gentleman from Mississippi, 
and I support his contention.
  This legislation among other things will substantially improve our 
homeland security by doing the following:
  Significantly increasing the share of state homeland security grants 
provided on the basis of risk. I know that my good friend, the former 
chairman of the committee, agrees with that proposition. In fact, we 
passed it through this House; unfortunately, the Senate did not.
  Creating a stand-alone grant program for interoperable communications 
for first responders. Curt Weldon and I have chaired for a long time 
the Fire Service Caucus. Interoperability is a critical issue for our 
country and for our security.
  Phasing in the requirement of 100 percent inspection of air cargo 
over the next 3 years and 100 percent scanning of U.S.-bound shipping 
containers over the next 5 years. How can we have security in America 
if literally thousands of tons of cargo is being shipped in either by 
air or ship that we don't know its content?
  Accelerating the installation of explosive detection systems for 
checked baggage. A critical step.
  Furthermore, H.R. 1 will help us prevent terrorists from acquiring 
weapons of mass destruction. It will strengthen the cooperative threat 
reduction or Nunn-Lugar programs; create a coordinator for the 
prevention of weapons of mass destruction proliferation and terrorism; 
and strengthen efforts to eliminate a nuclear black market network. I 
would think all of us would want to see those objectives accomplished.
  Additionally, Mr. Speaker, H.R. 1 seeks to reduce extremism by 
enhancing the International Arab and Muslim Youth Opportunity Fund and 
establishing a Middle East foundation that will promote economic 
opportunities, education reform, human rights and democracy in the 
Middle East, all of which was proposed by Governor Kean, Mr. Hamilton 
and unanimously the 9/11 Commission.
  It also bears noting, Mr. Speaker, that this bill will strengthen the 
Privacy and Civil Liberties Board, removing the board from the 
executive office of the President and making it an independent agency 
and granting the board subpoena power.
  I mention these provisions because I believe they demonstrate that we 
can improve our security without compromising the democratic principles 
upon which this great Nation was founded.
  Let no one, however, be mistaken: This legislation alone, nor perhaps 
any legislation, can immunize our Nation from attack. However, it 
represents an important step forward for our national security. That is 
why we wanted to accomplish it in the first 100 hours of our 
deliberation.
  As former Congressman Lee Hamilton, the other cochair of the 9/11 
Commission noted, Mr. Speaker, just yesterday, ``The bottom line is, if 
this bill, H.R. 1, is enacted, funded and implemented, then the 
American people will be safer.''
  That is our objective. I am confident that is the objective of every 
Member of this House, Democrat or Republican. That is our 
responsibility.
  I urge my colleagues on both sides of the aisle, Mr. Speaker, to 
support this critically important piece of legislation.
  Mr. KING of New York. Mr. Speaker, as a tribute to the enormous 
influence you wield over this House, you will notice that even though 
we are the authorizing committee, the first two speakers are members of 
your Appropriations Committee, and I yield 5\1/2\ minutes to the 
ranking member of the Homeland Security Subcommittee, Mr. Rogers.
  Mr. ROGERS of Kentucky. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for 
yielding and thank the Speaker, and I particularly want to thank the 
ranking member of the committee who yielded for all of his tremendous 
efforts over the past years to prevent terrorism and secure the 
country.
  Mr. Speaker, there is not a more fundamental purpose of our 
government than to provide for the safety and security of our people. 
That was the guiding principle as we over the last several years have 
provided almost $250 billion toward Federal homeland security programs 
since 9/11. But, Mr. Speaker, the ideas and proposals contained within 
this bill are overly costly and Draconian even. It is an effort by the 
new Democrat majority to look aggressive on homeland security. This 
bill will waste billions and possibly harm homeland security by gumming 
up progress already under way.
  Over the last 4 years, our Subcommittee on Homeland Security 
Appropriations provided a significant combination of aggressive 
oversight and vast resources to address our most critical homeland 
security needs.
  First, with port, cargo, and container security. We not only have 
appropriated over $16 billion to fully support groundbreaking programs, 
such as the Container Security Initiative, the Domestic Nuclear 
Detection Office, we required DHS to double its inspection and 
radiation screening efforts; target 100 percent of incoming cargo, 
establish security standards for both land and sea cargo containers; 
maintain 100 percent manifest review and trusted shipper validation 
standards; and inspect 100 percent of all high-risk cargo. So rather 
than take the costly and Draconian approach included in this bill 
before us today, we put in place methodical, robust measures that 
balance our security needs with legitimate trade.
  You need look no further than this morning's Washington Post 
editorial,

[[Page H187]]

and I want to quote from it because I think it says it better than 
certainly I can. A quote from this Washington Post this morning:
  ``Given a limited amount of money and an endless list of programs and 
procedures that could make Americans safer, it's essential to buy the 
most homeland security possible with the cash available. That can be a 
tough job. That's all the more reason not to waste money on the kind of 
political shenanigan written into a sprawling Democratic bill, up for a 
vote in the House this week, that would require the Department of 
Homeland Security to ensure that every maritime cargo container bound 
for the U.S. is scanned before it departs for American shores.''
  Continuing to quote from the Washington Post: ``Container scanning 
technology is improving, but it is not able to perform useful, speedy 
inspections of cargo on the scale House Democrats envision. Congress 
has already authorized pilot programs to study the feasibility of 
scanning all maritime cargo. The sensible posture is to await the 
results of those trials before buying port scanners, training the 
thousands who would be needed to operate them and gumming up 
international trade.''
  Continuing to quote from the Washington Post this morning:
  ``The Democrats don't offer a realistic cost estimate for the mandate 
they will propose today, but the cost to the government and the economy 
is sure to be in the tens of billions and quite possibly hundreds of 
billions annually. The marginal benefit isn't close to being worth the 
price. Under recently expanded programs, all cargo coming into the 
country is assessed for risk and, when necessary, inspected, all 
without the cost of expensive scanning equipment, overseas staff and 
long waits at foreign ports. Perhaps that's why the September 11th 
Commission didn't recommend 100 percent cargo scanning.''
  Quoting the Washington Post further:
  ``The newly installed House leadership will bring the bill, which 
contains a range of other homeland security proposals both deserving 
and undeserving, directly to the floor, bypassing the Homeland Security 
Committee.''
  No hearings, just bring it on. That is the Washington Post, and I 
couldn't say it better than did the Post.
  On the issue of aviation security, we took a strong stance towards 
the implementation of security technologies by providing almost $17.3 
billion towards aviation security programs, including almost $2 billion 
for explosive detection systems.
  On border security and immigration enforcement, we provided over $75 
billion over the last 4 years and ended, yes ended, the practice of 
catch-and-release once and for all. We have made progress on grants to 
State and local first responders on issues surrounding intelligence.
  In sum, Mr. Speaker, the bill before us today simply validates the 
funding and policy initiatives of the past two Congresses. I believe 
our record of accomplishments as well as the overwhelming bipartisan 
support of each and every one of the four appropriations bills speaks 
for itself. Now is the time to build upon the substantial work of the 
last 4 years and seriously debate our homeland security needs rather 
than recycle political ideas for political ends.
  Mr. THOMPSON of Mississippi. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3\1/2\ minutes to 
the new chairman of the House Homeland Security Appropriations 
Subcommittee, Mr. Price.
  (Mr. PRICE of North Carolina asked and was given permission to revise 
and extend his remarks.)
  Mr. PRICE of North Carolina. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for 
yielding, and I commend him for his management of this legislation, 
bringing this urgent matter to the floor, and expediting its 
consideration. I rise in support of H.R. 1, legislation Congress should 
have passed long ago to address the unfulfilled 9/11 Commission 
recommendations.
  As the incoming chair of the Homeland Security Appropriations 
Subcommittee, I can tell you there is no time to waste in enacting and 
implementing this legislation.
  Now, no one should suppose that this will be easy. This is an 
ambitious agenda for the Department, and based on the Department's 
performance to date, it is going to have to rise considerably to meet 
that challenge.
  There will be challenges for us in Congress as well, as my friend the 
immediate past chairman of our Appropriations Subcommittee has just 
stressed. These are not going to be easy priorities to meet.
  Many of the bill's programs are not currently funded, such as the 
Interoperable Communications Grant Program. This means that the 
Appropriations Committee and in particular our subcommittee will have 
to find additional resources.
  Congress will also have to provide rigorous oversight of the 
Department's implementation of the bill. I look forward to working with 
Chairman Thompson and other colleagues to hold the Department 
accountable. The President must also do his part by requesting and 
supporting the funding to get the job done.
  This bill provides significant discretion for determining risk to the 
Department of Homeland Security. Now, discretion is fine, but it must 
be used fairly and wisely, backed by tested assumptions and rigorous 
methodology and firm data. This is a critical area for stringent 
oversight by Congress.
  As we move to a more risk-based approach, there are two important 
points to make: First, as we have funded new homeland security grant 
programs dedicated to helping State and local governments prepare for 
and respond to terrorism, the President and Congress have at the same 
time reduced funding for the broadly targeted programs our first 
responders have depended on.
  Department of Justice programs that support police received a total 
of $1.5 billion in 2003, but by 2006, that was reduced to $559 million.

                              {time}  1530

  Fire grants received $745 million in 2003 but only $662 million for 
2007.
  For many State and local governments, this is simply robbing Peter to 
pay Paul, because their homeland security grant dollars have to be 
stretched to fill gaps left by the defunding of these other programs. 
It should not be an either/or proposition. We need healthy funding 
levels for both homeland security grants and for the more broadly based 
fire grants and COPS and Byrne and other Department of Justice grants.
  The second important point is that homeland security means more than 
security from man-made disasters. No matter where a disaster occurs and 
whether it is natural or man-made, our local police and firefighters 
and EMTs will be the first on the scene to help the public. The 
Department's risk assessments should do more to take that into account.
  In closing, Mr. Speaker, this bill is a critical first step in the 
process of making real security improvements, but there are many, many 
more steps we are going to have to take. I look forward to working with 
colleagues on both sides of the aisle as we travel down this critical 
path.
  Mr. KING of New York. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman 
from Alabama (Mr. Rogers), who did such an outstanding job in the past 
Congress as chairman of the Management, Integration and Oversight 
Subcommittee.
  Mr. ROGERS of Alabama. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to associate myself 
with the remarks of the ranking member of the Appropriations 
Subcommittee on Homeland Security, Mr. Rogers.
  As the gentleman stated, homeland security is too important an issue 
not to have any oversight. And the 279-page bill we consider today is 
too encompassing not to have any jurisdiction consideration by the 
committees of jurisdiction.
  On such an important issue as protecting our country from terrorist 
attacks, we should have the opportunity to offer and debate amendments 
on the specific provisions of this bill. For example, the bill contains 
provisions authorizing billions of dollars in spending for new programs 
that have not been approved by the Committee on Homeland Security. The 
bill misses the opportunity to continue our consolidation of committee 
jurisdiction started in the 109th Congress over DHS and called for by 
the 9/11 Commission.
  The bill also contains revisions to many initiatives developed under 
the

[[Page H188]]

Republican leadership. For example, Section 812 of the bill expands the 
authorities of the Privacy Officer of the Department of Homeland 
Security. This vital position was established by the Homeland Security 
Act of 2002, a Republican bill, signed by President Bush into law. This 
was the first statutory mandate for a Privacy Officer in the executive 
branch.
  Another Republican bill which the President signed into law, the 
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, elevated the 
position of the Privacy Officer authorizing its direct reporting to the 
Secretary.
  Concerns have been raised that the pending bill would turn the 
Privacy Officer into an investigating officer. In fact, this proposal 
was specifically rejected last year during a markup in the Subcommittee 
on Management, Integration and Oversight, which I chaired. The DHS 
Inspector General stated that this provision would interfere with his 
role and would ``create duplicative investigations and overlapping 
demands for documents involved in investigations of privacy 
violations.''
  And, Mr. Speaker, I will include this letter in the Record.
                                      Office of Inspector General,


                              Department of Homeland Security,

                                Washington, DC, December 28, 2006.
     Hon. Mike D. Rogers,
     Chairman, Subcommittee on Management, Integration and 
         Oversight,
     Committee on Homeland Security, House of Representatives, 
         Washington, DC.
       Dear Chairman Rogers: Thank you for the opportunity to 
     comment on two proposed amendments to the authority of the 
     U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Privacy Officer--
     H.R. 3041 and S. 2827, both titled as the ``Privacy Officer 
     with Enhanced Rights Act'' or ``POWER Act.'' The Office of 
     Inspector General (OIG) opposes these amendments because they 
     would interfere with OIG's jurisdiction and create 
     duplicative investigations and overlapping demands for 
     documents involved in investigations of privacy violations. 
     Therefore, should either proposal be considered for further 
     review, OIG strongly recommends that specific language be 
     included to clearly state that the DHS OIG has primary 
     authority over investigations, audits, and other inquiries 
     that might be conducted by the Privacy Officer.
       As currently drafted, H.R. 3041 and S. 2827 would grant the 
     DHS Privacy Officer authority to investigate; issue reports; 
     administer or require oaths, affirmations or affidavits; 
     issue subpoenas (except to Federal agencies); and access 
     records and other materials related to programs and 
     operations within the Chief Privacy Officer's jurisdiction. 
     These authorities are, as stated above, duplicative. With 
     respect to the proposed investigatory authority, the DHS 
     Inspector General already has authority to investigate 
     violations of law and regulations, including privacy-related 
     violations relating to DHS programs and operations. Granting 
     parallel authority to the Privacy Officer to investigate and 
     issue subpoenas would unnecessarily and inefficiently 
     duplicate and disrupt the established and working authority 
     of the Inspector General to conduct such investigations and 
     issue subpoenas as needed. In addition, the Privacy Officer 
     can already make referrals on privacy-related violations to 
     the DHS Inspector General for investigation and review. 
     Therefore, there is no need to confer additional authority to 
     the Privacy Officer.
       Regarding the proposed subpoena authority for the Privacy 
     Officer, each branch of the Federal government already has 
     extensive subpoena authorities that are regularly exercised 
     to obtain documents or testimony to investigate misconduct 
     such as civil rights violations. In the event of a 
     significant allegation concerning such a violation, there 
     would already be overlapping and likely immediate demands 
     for documents and testimony by the Executive Branch, by 
     the Congress, and through the Courts. Adding a set of 
     competing subpoenas from the DHS Privacy Officer would 
     unnecessarily increase the burden on subpoenaed parties by 
     requiring them to respond to multiple requests.
       The OIG therefore strongly recommends that the following 
     new subsection be added under section (b)(2) of both 
     amendments:
       (2) DHS OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL AUTHORITY--The exercise 
     of authority by the senior official appointed under this 
     section shall be subject to, and shall not interfere with, 
     the authority of the DHS Office of Inspector General. Prior 
     to initiating any investigation under this section, the 
     senior official shall refer the allegation to be investigated 
     to the Inspector General. If the Inspector General initiates 
     an audit, investigation, or inspection relating to the 
     allegation, the Inspector General may provide notice that it 
     has initiated an inquiry. If the Inspector General issues 
     such a notice, no other audit or investigation shall be 
     initiated into the matter by the senior official appointed 
     under this section, and any other audit, investigation, or 
     other inquiry of the matter shall cease.
       This provision will ensure the OIG's ability to perform its 
     independent statutory responsibilities under the Inspector 
     General Act.
       Regarding variations between H.R. 3041 and S. 2827, the 
     amendments differ in three respects:
       H.R. 3041 includes a vaguely-worded provision, tying the 
     Privacy Officer's authority to that of the Inspector General. 
     The bill authorizes the Privacy Officer to: ``take any other 
     action that may be taken by the Inspector General of the 
     Department, as necessary to require employees of the 
     Department to produce documents and answer questions relevant 
     to performance of the functions of the senior official under 
     this section.'' H.R. 304l(B)(l)(E). S. 2827 does not have a 
     similar provision.
       H.R. 3041 includes a five-year term limit for the Privacy 
     Officer. S. 2827 has no such limit.
       S. 2827 places the Privacy Officer under the general 
     supervision of the Secretary and requires the Secretary to 
     report to Congress ``promptly'' if the Officer is removed or 
     transferred to another position. S. 2827 does not have a 
     similar provision.
       With respect to H.R. 304l's provision tying the Privacy 
     Officer's authority to that of the DHS Inspector General, it 
     is not clear what authority would be granted by this 
     provision. It appears to be designed to incorporate certain 
     Inspector General authorities into the Privacy 
     Officer's statutory authorities. As drafted, it is not 
     clear whether the scope of the Privacy Officer's 
     authorities under this provision is limited to privacy 
     issues and if it is so limited, how ``privacy issues'' are 
     defined, and by whom.
       Regarding the term of office provision included in H.R. 
     3041, but not in S. 2827, and placement under the Secretary's 
     general supervision (included in H.R. 3041, but not in S. 
     2827), OIG does not believe these two variations 
     significantly distinguish the proposed amendments.
       In summary, OIG opposes the proposed amendments because 
     they would create duplication in investigations and 
     overlapping demands for documents involved in investigations 
     of privacy violations. If either proposal be enacted, it 
     should include an additional provision stating that any 
     exercise of authority by the Privacy Officer should not 
     interfere with, and should not be construed as limiting, the 
     authority of the Inspector General.
       Thank you for the opportunity to comment on this 
     legislation. Questions regarding these comments may be 
     addressed to Richard N. Reback, Counsel to the Inspector 
     General, on (202) 254-4100.
           Sincerely,
                                               Richard L. Skinner,
                                                Inspector General.

  The pending bill would also grant the Privacy Officer access to ``all 
records'' and other materials available to DHS. Such sweeping access 
could have a chilling effect on intelligence agencies sharing vital 
information with DHS.
  The Inspector General has urged amendments to protect his independent 
responsibilities under the Inspector General Act. DHS has also 
requested amendments.
  But we don't have that option. It is ironic that on the same day this 
bill is being considered in the House under a closed rule, the Senate 
is holding a hearing on the same topic. And Senators will have an 
opportunity later to offer amendments.
  The bill before us today should be subject to the same bipartisanship 
and open process. The stakes are too high, and we need to get it right.
  Mr. THOMPSON of Mississippi. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the 
gentlewoman from the Virgin Islands, Dr. Donna Christensen.
  (Mrs. CHRISTENSEN asked and was given permission to revise and extend 
her remarks.)
  Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. Mr. Speaker, it is with great pride and a sense of 
hope for the future that I rise in strong support of H.R. 1, 
legislation which fulfills an important promise we Democrats made to 
fully implement the 9/11 Commission's recommendations.
  Before continuing, I want to commend the Honorable Bennie Thompson on 
his ascension to the chairmanship of the House Committee on Homeland 
Security. Congressman Thompson served as a first-rate ranking member of 
the committee during the last Congress, and I look forward to working 
with him and our now Ranking Member King to further strengthen our 
Nation's security.
  Mr. Speaker, it has been a matter of great consternation that today, 
5-plus years after 9/11, our first responders still do not have the 
capacity to communicate consistently with each other during 
emergencies. It was one of the tragic failures in Katrina as late as 
2005.
  H.R. 1 will create a national Emergency Communication Plan and a 
stand-alone emergency communications grant program that will finally 
provide first responders with the kind of standards and equipment they 
need.
  Another provision that has been long fought for is 100 percent 
inspection of cargo on passenger planes as well as 100

[[Page H189]]

percent screening of containers bound for this country and improved 
explosive detection systems at passenger checkpoints at our Nation's 
airports. One of the ``F'' grades the administration and the last 
Congress received was failure to implement risk-based funding. The new 
formula is a great step forward and would provide more funding for 
States and territories that adjoin a body of water within North America 
that contains an international boundary line. This can assist the U.S. 
Virgin Islands in providing the additional border patrol needed to 
protect our residents and our country.
  Lastly, in March of 2001, a member of the Hart Commission told a 
bipartisan group that the greatest threat to us was the growing 
animosity towards the United States. Today we are more hated than ever. 
Changing this and protecting privacy and civil liberties as provided in 
H.R. 1 is critical to making America not only safer but better.
  Mr. Speaker, we owe H.R. 1 to those who died on 9/11 and their 
families. Its passage is critical to the future of our great Nation, 
and I urge my colleagues to support it.
  Mr. Speaker, it is with great pride and a sense of hope for the 
future security of our Nation that I rise in strong support of H.R. 1--
legislation which fulfills an important promise we Democrats made to 
the American people last fall--to pass legislation within the first 100 
hours of our assuming the majority in the House of Representatives, to 
make the Nation safer by fully implementing the 9/11 Commission's 
recommendations.
  Before continuing with my remarks in support of this bill, Mr. 
Speaker, I want to applaud you for the inspired principled and strong 
leadership which enabled you to become speaker of this great Body and 
to commend my Chairman, the Honorable Bennie Thompson on his ascension 
as to the Chairmanship of the Homeland Security in the House.
  Bennie served as a first-rate ranking member of the Homeland Security 
Committee during the last Congress and I look forward to working with 
him to further strengthen the state of our homeland security and in 
fact to pass today many of the measures that he championed and 
Democrats supported in the preceding Congress but could not get passed.
  Mr. Speaker and my colleagues, last year the bipartisan 9/11 
Commissioners gave Congress and the administration a number of very 
poor grades including 5 Fs, 12 Ds and 2 incompletes on implementing 
their recommendations. These woeful grades were a call for action and 
today Democrats are answering that call.
  Mr. Speaker, it has been a matter of great consternation that today, 
5 plus years after
9/11, our first responders do not have the capacity to communicate 
consistently with each other during emergencies. It was one of the 
tragic failures in Katrina in 2005.
  Among the long overdue steps included in H.R. 1 that will 
substantially improve homeland security is the creation of a stand-
alone emergency communications grant program that will provide first 
responders with the standards and type of equipment they need.
  I am sure that we have wasted not only time, but a lot of money in 
funding the purchasing of equipment that cannot talk to each other 
because we have not had standards or a plan. Most importantly, today 
with this legislation, we create a national Emergency Communication 
Plan that will guide the implementation of the grant program. I want to 
applaud my colleague Congresswoman Lowey for her persistence on this 
issue.
  Another group of provisions that have been long fought for and are 
now included in H.R. 1, will be the requirement that Ed Markey of 
Massachusetts has championed for 100 percent inspection of cargo in 
passenger planes by 2009. This bill will also provide for 100 percent 
screening of containers bound for this country and improve explosive 
detection systems at passenger checkpoints at our Nation's airports 
such as we have seen already implemented in other countries such as 
Canada.
  I cannot leave this floor without speaking about another issue that 
is very important to my constituents and that relates to our need for 
strengthened border security.
  One of the F grades the administration and the last Congress received 
was on failure to implement risk-based funding. Over the past year we 
have seen increased border crossings using the USVI to enter the United 
States. The new formula would provide for a larger minimum for States--
and that includes territories according to the definition--that adjoin 
a body of water within North America that contains an international 
boundary line which we do. This can assist us in providing the 
additional border patrol needed to protect not just our residents in 
the U.S. Virgin Islands but our entire Nation.
  I don't have time to speak to all of the important provisions 
included in H.R. 1, but in closing let me mention one more that I 
believe gets to the heart of what is needed to protect the United 
States and all who live here--and that is the provisions that help to 
restore the moral authority and leadership of our country in the world.
  I recall that a bipartisan retreat in March of 2001, a member of the 
Hart Commission told us that the Commission had determined that the 
greatest threat to us was the growing animosity toward the United 
States.
  While some steps have been taken since that report and the terrible 
events that took place 7 months later to protect us from terrorist 
attacks, nothing has been done to improve our relationships with our 
global neighbors. In fact we are more hated now than ever.
  H.R. 1 takes steps to begin to heal the rift that has been widening 
between the United States and Arab and Muslim communities and between 
us and the rest of the world.
  It is also my hope that along with the provisions for stronger 
protections for privacy and civil liberties, we can also mitigate some 
of the unintended consequences of the broad brush approaches that have 
been taken thus far.
  These are critical components of setting a new direction for our 
country and making America not only safer but better!
  Mr. Speaker, implementing the 9/11 Commission's recommendations is 
supported by most Americans and by several bipartisan and nonpartisan 
groups and we owe H.R. 1 to those who died on 9/11 and their families 
and loved ones.
  As a member of the House Homeland Security Committee, this is a proud 
day for me and for all Americans as we take this action to improve 
homeland security by preventing terrorists from acquiring WMD's, by 
improving our intelligence mechanisms and prevention and protection 
programs, and by developing strategies for preventing the growth and 
spread of terrorism, while safeguarding the rights of all and the 
integrity of our Constitution.
  This is a bill that is critical to the future of our great Nation and 
I urge my colleagues to support it.
  Mr. KING of New York. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman 
from Texas (Mr. McCaul), the former chairman of the Investigation 
Subcommittee of the Homeland Security Committee.
  Mr. McCAUL of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I thank the ranking member of the 
Homeland Security Committee, on which I am proud to serve, for 
yielding.
  Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support of H.R. 1, but I also rise to 
express my disappointment.
  Despite the importance of a bipartisan approach to homeland security 
and promises made to the contrary, the new majority has chosen to 
prevent even their own rank and file members from participating in the 
debate over this bill. This stands in stark contrast to how Republicans 
implemented 39 of the 41 9/11 Commission recommendations when we were 
in the majority.
  This bill raises several concerns. It proposes to require the 
Department of Homeland Security to screen 100 percent of maritime cargo 
containers bound for the United States. And while well intentioned, 
this is not possible with current technology. Under the SAFE Port Act 
passed in the last Congress, we started a pilot project to determine 
the feasibility of such a program. We should continue and await the 
results of this study.
  This new unfunded mandate would cost the government and the economy 
billions of dollars per year and bring commerce to a crashing halt. And 
even the Washington Post today called this a ``bad investment.'' H.R. 1 
also gives foreign port terminal operators a role in the screening of 
cargo containers bound for U.S. seaports.
  Most disturbing of all, H.R. 1 proposes to hand over control of the 
Proliferation Security Initiative, a system which works to protect 
Americans against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, to 
the United Nations. This is the same United Nations of which Syria and 
Iran are members. As a former counter terrorism official in the U.S. 
Department of Justice, I know first hand the threat of terrorism. It is 
very much alive and well. And while I am overall supportive of this 
bill and the 9/11 Commission recommendations, Congress can and should 
do better.
  Mr. THOMPSON of Mississippi. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as she 
may consume for the purpose of a colloquy to the gentlewoman from 
California (Ms. Eshoo).
  Ms. ESHOO. Mr. Speaker, I thank our distinguished chairman.
  Mr. Murtha, it is wonderful to see you in the chair.

[[Page H190]]

  I rise as a proud cosponsor of this legislation, which is really 
going to complete the outstanding work of the 9/11 Commission.
  The issue that I want to focus my remarks on today is one that my 
colleagues and I have worked very hard on on a bipartisan basis on the 
Energy and Commerce Committee for many years, and that is how to 
guarantee real communication interoperability between first responders. 
This is a very, very important issue for all of our first responders 
and our communities. The fact is that interoperability can be solved 
today. Advanced technology developed across the United States and 
certainly in my district in the Silicon Valley can successfully enable 
first responders and others to communicate using disparate 
communication devices and networks. The problem up to this point has 
been a lack of resources and guidance from the Federal Government as to 
where and how local first responders should invest their scarce dollars 
to achieve this solution.
  The bill before us addresses this problem by establishing a stand-
alone grant program within the Department of Homeland Security devoted 
to establishing an interoperability framework that local authorities 
can work from. What is of utmost importance in creating this new grant 
program is the need to ensure technology neutrality so that the best 
available solution, whether it be radio, software or IP network-based, 
can be implemented as soon as possible.
  So with this in mind, Mr. Speaker, I would like to at this time yield 
to my colleague, the chairman of the Homeland Security Committee, to 
ask if he agrees that the goal and the intent of this legislation is to 
guarantee that our efforts to fund interoperability solutions are 
indeed technology neutral. Specifically, the term ``equipment'' as used 
in the legislation should not be interpreted to exclude important 
technology such as software, middleware or network-based IP solutions.
  Mr. THOMPSON of Mississippi. Mr. Speaker, I can assure the 
gentlewoman that the goal of this legislation is to be technologically 
neutral.
  Ms. ESHOO. Mr. Speaker, I thank the chairman, and I encourage my 
colleagues to help promote full communications interoperability by 
supporting the bill before us.
  Mr. KING of New York. Mr. Speaker, I am proud to yield 5 minutes to 
the Republican whip, the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. Blunt).
  Mr. BLUNT. Mr. Speaker, I thank Mr. King for yielding.
  Mr. Speaker, I rise today, in fact, in support of most of the efforts 
that are in this bill because most of the efforts in this bill were 
things that the Republicans in control of the Congress worked to pass 
on the House side of the building just in the last 2 years.
  The most important responsibility of the Federal Government is to 
protect the American people. House Republicans recognized that and 
moved to enact important recommendations from the 9/11 Commission 
during the 109th Congress. We enacted, I believe, 39 of those 41 
recommendations. And I would suggest to my colleagues that there is 
probably a reason we didn't enact the other two, because we didn't 
think they were the right thing to do.
  Despite the fact that we have already taken this action before in the 
House by overwhelming majorities, the bill on the floor today has 
bypassed the committee process. There has been no opportunity to offer 
amendments. And, in fact, I want to talk in a minute about one new and 
I think particularly bad idea. These ideas are proposed in a way that 
talks about putting risk-based funding in place when, in fact, every 
single Democrat failed to support an almost identical initiative in the 
109th Congress. That initiative passed in the 109th Congress. And 
amazingly, this initiative starts when that one ended. I am puzzled by 
what was so wrong with that initiative in the 109th Congress, now in 
the 110th Congress. It is an initiative that just simply takes up where 
the bill we passed last year left off.

                              {time}  1545

  We can't prevent terror attacks in this country by adding other 
layers of bureaucracy. We can't prevent terror attacks by making public 
information about our intelligence budget and other budgets that 
shouldn't be made public. Homeland security is too important to play 
politics when American lives are at stake. As a body, both Democrats 
and Republicans, we need to be committed to that.
  We have an enemy that has vowed to exploit every weakness, every 
piece of needless information we give them, every failure we have to 
understand the kind of fight that we are in, Mr. Speaker.
  Also in this legislation today, there is a sense of Congress that the 
Proliferation Security Initiative initiated by the President in 2003 
would need to be somehow authorized by the United Nations. I think that 
doesn't make sense for this Congress. I don't believe that will ever be 
in any legislation that makes it to the President's desk. I think it is 
a particularly bad idea to suggest that our initiatives for 
proliferation security would somehow now come under the auspices of the 
United Nations.
  This has been a successful program. We have 14 direct partners in 
this program; over 70 countries have worked with us to follow-up on 
specific pieces of information that we needed to check into to be sure 
that proliferation was not a problem.
  Mr. Speaker, I hope that the House votes later today to eliminate 
that sense of the Congress that the United Nations would authorize this 
program from this legislation. I look forward to bringing this issue to 
the floor as the majority has promised with debate in the future. We 
didn't have committee debate on this bill today. I hope that we quickly 
get to the promises of the majority to debate these bills in committee, 
bring them to the floor, and work together to do the right thing for 
the American people.
  Mr. THOMPSON of Mississippi. Mr. Speaker, before yielding to the next 
speaker, I would like to make note of the fact that I submitted remarks 
related to jurisdictional interest by the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. 
Conyers) on H.R. 1.
  Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from New York (Mrs. 
Lowey).
  Mrs. LOWEY. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of the bill, and I 
want to thank the chairman for your important work on this bill.
  I am very pleased that one of the first acts of the Democratic 
Congress is to finally enact the long overdue recommendations of the 9/
11 Commission.
  This bill contains language I first proposed in the 108th Congress to 
create a dedicated grant program for emergency communications, which 
the Republican-controlled Congress rejected at least five times, 
including in stand-alone amendments.
  Communications failures that forced first responders to use runners 
to relay messages on September 11 and following Hurricane Katrina more 
closely resemble the time of Paul Revere than the technology available 
in 2007. The post-September 11 world demands 21st-century preparedness.
  Many of us have long recognized that we are not prepared to respond 
to the next emergency until our first responders can communicate with 
one another. The legislation addresses this massive gap in our Nation's 
communications capabilities and will improve safety for hundreds of 
thousands of first responders who protect our communities each day.
  In addition to the interoperability provisions, I am very pleased 
that this bill includes my proposals to fix the flawed grant funding 
formula, improve airport screening by providing important rights for 
screeners, and overhauls the troubled National Asset Database.
  I urge your support for this vital piece of legislation that includes 
long-overdue improvements for first responders. I thank the gentleman 
again for his leadership, and I look forward to working together with 
the people on the other side of the aisle to get this done.
  Mr. KING of New York. Mr. Speaker, I am privileged to yield 2 minutes 
to the gentleman from California who played such a prominent leadership 
role in the last Congress, including port security legislation and 
chemical plant legislation, both of which passed the floor, Mr. Daniel 
E. Lungren.
  Mr. DANIEL E. LUNGREN of California. Mr. Speaker, I thank the ranking 
member.
  Mr. Speaker, I say this not in anger but in sadness about the missing 
bipartisanship here by the way this was

[[Page H191]]

brought to the floor. If there was any committee in the last Congress 
that worked harder on bipartisanship than our committee, I don't know 
what it was. We worked very closely with the new chairman of the full 
committee on so many things. We were cosponsors together on the 
chemical security bill, the port security bill. We managed to have a 
29-0 vote in committee after many, many different committee hearings, 
consultation with the Democratic side as well as the Republican side. 
And we passed it out 29-0 and passed it off the floor 421-2.
  And in response to that, we have presented to us this bill which is 
basically take it or leave it. That's not the way to do these sorts of 
things.
  They say we have already dealt with these things. By my count, over 
12 percent of the membership of this House has never been here before. 
So maybe they don't count. Maybe they ought not to have the opportunity 
to consider these things. It doesn't seem to me that is the way we 
ought to be doing things.
  Everybody is talking about the 9/11 Commission. What is the biggest 
thing that we haven't done with the 9/11 Commission which the 
commissioners have pointed out? We haven't consolidated jurisdiction in 
this House for homeland security.
  Now, we started to on our side, and I admit we didn't do everything 
we ought to have done. When is the greatest opportunity, the golden 
opportunity you have to do it? When your party takes over, when you 
don't have any chairmen. Everybody is looking to be a chairperson for 
the first time. That is when you can do it. You have lost the golden 
opportunity to do what the 9/11 Commission said was the greatest thing 
we hadn't done in following their recommendations, and it isn't done.
  And then we have in here 100 percent screening of ocean-going and 
aviation cargo. Instead of doing it smartly and instead of doing it 
efficiently, instead of doing it effectively, instead of doing it 
successfully, instead of using that which we have better than any place 
in the world, both intelligence gathering and the use of technology, 
and apply it with sophisticated algorithms, we say we want to cover 
everything.
  Mr. THOMPSON of Mississippi. Mr. Speaker, I include for the Record 
three letters of support for this bill from the International 
Association of Chiefs of Police, the National Sheriffs' Association, 
and the National Association of Police Organizations.

                                    National Association of Police


                                          Organizations, Inc.,

                                  Washington, DC, January 8, 2007.
     Hon. Bennie Thompson,
     Committee on Homeland Security,
     House of Representatives, Washington, DC.
       Dear Chairman Thompson: On behalf of the National 
     Association of Police Organizations (NAPO) representing more 
     than 238,000 law enforcement officers throughout the United 
     States, I would like to thank you for introducing H.R. 1, the 
     ``Implementing the 9/11 Commission Recommendations Act of 
     2007,'' and advise you of our support, particularly in 
     regards to Subtitles A and B under Title VII of the 
     legislation. If enacted, this bill will establish a Fusion 
     and Law Enforcement Education and Teaming (FLEET) grant 
     program, as well as a Border Intelligence Fusion Center 
     program to assist state and local law enforcement in 
     protecting our nation's borders from terrorist and related 
     criminal activity.
       This legislation recognizes the importance of consistent 
     coordination and communication between the country's local, 
     state, and federal law enforcement in preventing acts of 
     terrorism within the United States. The creation of the FLEET 
     and the Border Intelligence Fusion Center programs will help 
     ensure that state and local law enforcement in border regions 
     are properly supported, trained and informed in order to 
     prevent terrorism before it occurs. Most importantly, these 
     provisions will allow law enforcement agencies to maximize 
     their participation in the fusion centers by providing funds 
     to allow them to assign officers and intelligence analysts to 
     the centers without having to reduce daily neighborhood crime 
     protection.
       NAPO believes that homeland security funding greatly 
     assists local law enforcement. However, we also believe that 
     the continuation and full funding of the Community Oriented 
     Policing Services (COPS) program and Byrne-Justice Assistance 
     Grant (JAG) program is imperative.
       The ``Implementing the 9/11 Commission Recommendations Act 
     of 2007'' ensures that state and local first responders along 
     our nation's borders are properly supported, trained and 
     equipped to prevent terrorism before it occurs. I thank you 
     for your continued support of law enforcement. If you have 
     any questions, please feel free to contact me, or NAPO's 
     Legislative Assistant, Andrea Mournighan.
           Sincerely,
                                               William J. Johnson,
     Executive Director.
                                  ____

                                      International Association of


                                             Chiefs of Police,

                                  Alexandria, VA, January 8, 2007.
     Hon. Bennie Thompson,
     Chairman, Committee on Homeland Security,
     House of Representatives, Washington, DC.
       Dear Chairman Thompson: On behalf of the International 
     Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP), I am writing to 
     express our strong support for the proposed Fusion and Law 
     Enforcement Education and Teaming (FLEET) Grant Program and 
     the Border Intelligence Fusion Center Program that are 
     contained in H.R. 1, Implementing the 9/11 Commission 
     Recommendations Act of 2007. The IACP believes that the 
     adoption of these two provisions would represent a major step 
     forward in enabling the law enforcement community to better 
     detect, disrupt, and prevent future acts of terrorism.
       These provisions reflect the reality that while planning, 
     conducting surveillance, or securing the resources necessary 
     to mount their attacks, terrorists often live in our 
     communities, travel on our highways, and shop in our stores. 
     As we discovered in the aftermath of September 11th, several 
     of the terrorists involved in those attacks had routine 
     encounters with state and local law enforcement officials in 
     the weeks and months before the attack. If state, tribal, and 
     local law enforcement officers are adequately equipped and 
     trained and fully integrated into an information and 
     intelligence sharing network, they can be invaluable assets 
     in efforts to identify and apprehend suspected terrorists 
     before they strike.
       These two provisions emphasize the vital role that state, 
     local, and tribal law enforcement must play in the 
     development and dissemination of critical intelligence in 
     order to detect, prevent, prepare for, and respond to acts of 
     terrorism. It is IACP's belief that they will also help 
     ensure that law enforcement agencies at all levels of 
     government are equal partners, and that the experience and 
     capabilities of all parties are realized, by allowing state, 
     local, and tribal law enforcement to participate more 
     actively in the intelligence gathering and sharing process.
       Thank you for continuing support of our nation's law 
     enforcement community. The IACP stands ready to assist in any 
     way possible.
           Sincerely,
                                                 Joseph C. Carter,
     President.
                                  ____



                               National Sheriffs' Association,

                            Alexandria, Virginia, January 8, 2007.
     Hon. Bennie Thompson,
     Chairman, Committee on Homeland Security,
     House of Representatives, Washington, DC.
       Dear Chairman Thompson: On behalf of the National Sheriffs' 
     Association (NSA), I write to you to express our strong 
     support for the provisions contained under Title VII of H.R. 
     1, ``Implementing the 9/11 Commission Recommendations Act of 
     2007,'' that would establish Fusion and Law Enforcement 
     Education and Teaming (FLEET) Grant Program and the Border 
     Intelligence Fusion Center Program. NSA believes that the 
     FLEET and Border Intelligence Fusion Center programs would 
     provide the necessary resources and framework for integration 
     to greatly enhance holistic and geographic approaches in 
     homeland security intelligence and infonnation gathering and 
     sharing between federal, state and local law enforcement 
     agencies.
       However, our position is contingent upon amending the 
     definition of ``local law enforcement agency or department'' 
     in Title VII, Subtitle A of the bill--to include all 
     sheriffs' office across the country rather than just those 
     ``sheriffs office in communities where there is no police 
     department'' to ensure that sheriffs' offices where police 
     department is present are not excluded from grant eligibility 
     under the FLEET Grant Program. As you may be aware, a sheriff 
     is the chief law enforcement officer in their respective 
     county and have jurisdiction over all cities within that 
     county. Thus, we respectfully request that the language of 
     the bill be amended to appropriately reflect and recognize 
     the proper authority of the office of sheriff.
       As the voice of 3,087 elected sheriffs across the country 
     and the largest association of law enforcement professionals 
     in the nation, the communication and integration of federal 
     homeland security efforts with state and local fusion centers 
     is an important priority for NSA. Since the events of 
     September 11, the significance of how local law enforcement 
     information might protect national security and the 
     importance of homeland security intelligence and information 
     gathering and sharing have increased substantially. As 
     recognized by your committee, homeland security intelligence 
     and information pertains not only to terrorist intentions and 
     capabilities to attack people and infrastructure within the 
     United States but also to U.S. abilities to detect, prevent, 
     prepare for and respond to potential terrorist attacks.
       Sheriffs and their deputies play a critical role in 
     homeland security intelligence and information efforts as the 
     nation's counterterrorism ``eyes and ears.'' Local law 
     enforcement personnel will almost always be the first to 
     experience first hand suspicious activities and first to 
     respond to any terrorist event. Clearly, there is a national 
     intelligence role for state and local law enforcement in 
     which they make contributions

[[Page H192]]

     to preventing attacks or other inimical acts directed against 
     the United States. NSA believes that the proposed programs 
     would facilitate change in the organizational culture barrier 
     thereby establishing state and local law enforcement entities 
     as equal partners in homeland security intelligence efforts. 
     Moreover, these programs would help build an integrated 
     intelligence capability to address threats to the homeland, 
     consistent with U.S. laws and the protection of privacy and 
     civil liberties.
       Sheriffs across the nation share a common counterterrorism 
     interest. The proliferation of intelligence and fusion 
     centers across the country reflect the importance and the 
     value to gathering and sharing information that assists local 
     law enforcement agencies in preventing and responding to 
     local manifestations of threats to their community. We want 
     to thank you for your efforts in addressing this important 
     issue and look forward to working with you to ensure the 
     enactment of these provisions as well as other proposed 
     initiatives in your ``LEAP: A Law Enforcement Assistance and 
     Partnership Strategy'' report.
           Sincerely,
                                            Sheriff Ted Kamatchus,
                                                        President.

  Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Oregon (Mr. 
DeFazio).
  Mr. DeFAZIO. Mr. Speaker, on our side of the aisle the Democrats over 
the last 3 years have identified some gaping holes in our Nation's 
security, even in aviation where we have spent the most money. You can 
do it in two ways: you can have state-of-the-art equipment and not a 
lot of people, or a lot of people and not very good equipment, or a mix 
of the two.
  The Republicans have chosen to do neither. They haven't been willing 
to buy the equipment we need: state-of-the-art explosives detection 
equipment at passenger checkpoints. They haven't been willing to invest 
in the inline screening for baggage, and they put a totally arbitrary 
cap on the number of screeners. There are gaping holes. We are going to 
plug those. A quarter of a billion dollars for explosives screening at 
passenger checkpoints, a known threat. A billion dollars for inline 
screening which the Republicans have refused to fund.
  For 4 years, airports across America have begged for inline screening 
grants. None have been forthcoming from the Republicans. They are 
saying they have taken care of everything in such a great bipartisan 
way.
  Now my friend from Florida got up and waxed poetic about San 
Francisco and said it was due to two things: private screeners and 
inline screening. Well, the inline equipment I agree with him, and we 
are going to fund it, unlike the majority. We will install it in every 
airport in America.
  But I disagree on the privatized screening because actually it turns 
out now that the private screeners at San Francisco were tipped off 
before the inspectors came through. They don't do any better, and maybe 
would do worse without those tips, than our public employees. We are 
going to give them the tools they need.
  On containers, Assistant Secretary Michael Jackson said they want to 
screen every container before they leave a U.S. port for the interior. 
Why? Because they might contain threats.
  And we said, What does that make our ports, a sacrifice zone if they 
have a nuclear weapon contained in them?
  We want to screen containers on the other side of the ocean. Now we 
hear people on that side get up and say hundreds of billions of dollars 
to screen these containers. Actually, it is 30 to $50 per container. 
There are 11 million containers. That is somewhere between 300 and $500 
million a year, paid for by a modest fee on the shippers, not by the 
taxpayers of America.
  We are going to make America more secure. We are going to plug the 
holes you left in our security and fix the problem.
  Mr. THOMPSON of Mississippi. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the 
gentlewoman from New York (Mrs. Gillibrand), a new Member of Congress.
  Mrs. GILLIBRAND. Mr. Speaker, I thank Chairman Thompson for this 
opportunity to address this crucial issue.
  I am proud that the 110th Congress has put homeland security as its 
highest priority and will ensure that our country will finally get the 
security investment it needs.
  In 2004, the 9/11 Commission provided us with a nonpartisan 
assessment of our current state of readiness. And while a few of their 
recommendations have been enacted, this administration and the previous 
congressional leadership did not make these recommendations a funding 
priority.
  The bill we will pass today addresses many of the concerns of the 9/
11 Commission, including one of the biggest for New York State, which 
is port security. Two of the busiest ports in the world, both in Hong 
Kong, already scan 100 percent of their cargo containers. There is no 
reason that all ships destined for the United States shouldn't be held 
to the same standard.
  The bill we are voting on today gives the largest ports in the world 
3 years to implement a system to scan for radiation and density on all 
containers coming into this country. This impacts my district, in 
particular, because my district geographically surrounds the port of 
Albany. If a container with radioactive materials came up the Hudson 
River from New York City and was unloaded in Albany, it would devastate 
our entire region. Such a risk will be addressed by this legislation.
  This bill is also important to me as a mother and to all parents in 
my district and in our Nation. Every time we travel by airplane and 
bring our children, we are concerned about safety. This bill will allow 
parents and grandparents to know that our children will be safer when 
we travel by plane by requiring 100 percent of air cargo to be scanned 
by the end of 2009, as well as providing funding for anti-bomb 
detection for bags and passengers.
  I am also pleased that this bill reflects the fact that our first 
responders are indeed ``first preventers.'' As we all remember, on 9/11 
many firemen and police officers gave up their lives because they 
couldn't communicate. Up until now, we have not yet invested 
sufficiently to improve such communication capabilities. This bill will 
do just that.
  Finally, I am very pleased that this bill includes investments 
against terrorist attacks by securing nuclear materials from the former 
Soviet Union. If you ask any terrorist expert in the world, they will 
tell you this is their gravest concern. And, finally, I am extremely 
pleased this funding will be based on risk. For New York State, that 
means increased funding for my State, including my district.
  The U.S. Congress must always make the safety of the American people 
its number one concern. I am confident this bill will do just that.
  Mr. THOMPSON of Mississippi. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the 
gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Markey), a member of the Homeland 
Security Committee.
  Mr. MARKEY. Mr. Speaker, I thank the chairman very much.
  In this bill there are two provisions which have been blocked for 4 
years by the White House and by Republican leadership. They are going 
to be included in this bill and passed this afternoon.
  One is to require that all cargo which is placed on passenger planes 
in the United States is screened so that there is no bomb, there is 
nothing that can lead to a catastrophic event in the air, does in fact 
pass through security. This is a huge change. Each of us has our bags 
screened, our shoes screened; but the cargo on that same plane placed 
next to our bags is not screened. This bill will make that possible. I 
have been working with Mr. Shays from Connecticut on this for the last 
4 years. Today is a historic day.
  Secondly, there is an amendment in this bill which will ensure the 
screening of all ships, all cargo overseas before it departs for the 
United States to determine whether or not there is a nuclear bomb on 
that plane. We know that is al Qaeda's highest objective: to obtain a 
nuclear weapon from the former Soviet Union or from some other rogue 
state, to then transport it to a port somewhere around the world, put 
it on a ship and bring it to a port in the United States. When it is in 
the port of New York or Boston or Long Beach, it is already too late.

                              {time}  1600

  The bomb will be detonated by remote on the ship, causing the 
catastrophic event, not as the cargo is being taken off. So this 
amendment requires the screening of all that cargo overseas. This is 
long overdue. It is al Qaeda's dream to have a nuclear explosion in a 
major American city, and now, finally, today we do this.
  I want to compliment Mr. Nadler on all of his work over the years on 
this

[[Page H193]]

issue, for his leadership. I thank the chairman, the ranking member, 
Mr. King, for all of their courtesies over the last several years.
  Mr. THOMPSON of Mississippi. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my 
time.
  Mr. SMITH of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to control 
the time on this side in the temporary absence of the ranking member, 
Mr. King.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Murtha). Is there objection to the 
request of the gentleman from Texas?
  There was no objection.
  Mr. SMITH of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman 
from Washington (Mr. Reichert), a member of the committee.
  Mr. REICHERT. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman.
  Mr. Speaker, last year as chairman of the Homeland Security 
Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, I oversaw many of the 
committee's accomplishments in addressing recommendations of the 9/11 
Commission. Among them were the successful passage of the 21st Century 
Emergency Communications Bill, the Faster, Smarter Funding Act, and 
comprehensive bipartisan FEMA reform legislation. My subcommittee, as 
well as the entire Homeland Security Committee, was successful last 
year because of our willingness and ability to work across the aisle to 
find solutions to problems. As a result, I am disappointed in the way 
that H.R. 1 is coming before the House today.
  I remain a strong supporter of certain aspects of this legislation, 
such as the language that makes first responder funding risk-based. 
Unfortunately, I have many concerns about other language included in 
this bill and believe that H.R. 1 would be better public policy had the 
bill been considered in committee and a rule allowed for an open 
amendment process.
  This legislation, Mr. Speaker, includes a new grant program that is 
intended to make grants to local law enforcement to pay personnel costs 
of officers serving in intelligence fusion centers. As a former sheriff 
of a major metropolitan county encompassing the City of Seattle, I 
certainly agree with and understand the need for this authority.
  One of my major goals in Congress is to continue to fund local law 
enforcement as their responsibility grows and grows to protect this 
homeland. So I support the direction of the this bill. However, as it 
is written, the language in this bill is unclear as to whether or not 
it may not apply to all police agencies, all Sheriff's departments, 
across the country. This problem could have been resolved if we had a 
bipartisan bill, and I would have been glad to work with my friends 
across the aisle on this issue.
  In addition, I have grave concerns for section 408, which includes 
the TSA personnel management provision. This provision removes the 
flexibility of TSA to move employees where they are needed most. This 
provision was not a 9/11 Commission recommendation and has no place in 
a bill that is described as enacting those recommendations. Including 
this provision without hearings or examining its potential impact is 
irresponsible.
  Last summer, during the U.K. liquid explosives scare, the Department 
of Homeland Security was able to retrain and rapidly deploy TSA 
officers to address this new threat. Section 408 of this legislation 
would remove that authority. This provision warrants a full debate in 
committee and also on the House floor.
  Mr. THOMPSON of Mississippi. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to 
the gentlelady from Texas (Ms. Jackson-Lee).
  (Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas asked and was given permission to revise 
and extend her remarks.)
  Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas. Mr. Murtha, thank you for your leadership. 
It is good to see you in the Speaker's Chair. Let me thank the chairman 
of the committee, Mr. Thompson, for his vision and his leadership.
  Very quickly, let me remind my colleagues of the tragic incident 
where we saw the massive loss of life on September 11, 2001. Today we 
stand on the floor in 2007 finishing the work that was not done by this 
part Republican Congress since 2001. So I applaud the leadership of 
this committee for moving forward on responding to the tragedy that 
changed the lives of so many Americans and those who are still 
suffering because of the deaths of their loved ones.
  This is an important step and an important day, and I quickly 
acknowledge the fact that we will now have 100 percent scanning of 
containers bound for the United States. We will have the effectiveness 
of making sure that the best technology will be used; and also we will 
tell America that all of the critical infrastructure will be updated 
and current so we will know those most vulnerable assets.
  In addition, we will have for the first time a transportation 
security planning strategy, and I compliment the gentleman from 
Mississippi whose bill authored in the last session establishes the 
importance of having a strategy for transportation security.
  Need I remind you of the recent incident with the Metro here in 
Washington, D.C. Although it was labeled as an accident, we know that 
the transportation system of America is enormously vulnerable.
  I am grateful that we have now a Civil Liberties and Privacy Board 
that has been languishing in the White House, but now it is under the 
jurisdiction of the United States Congress. And, yes, the work I have 
done in the past on anti-smuggling legislation was reaffirmed by the 
restrictions on terrorists freely traveling without real protection 
against this danger.
  This is a good bill. It is long overdue, and I ask my colleagues to 
support H.R. 1.


                              introduction

  Mr. Speaker, September 11, 2001, is a day that is indelibly etched in 
the psyche of every American and most of the world. Much like the 
unprovoked attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, September 11, is 
a day that will live in infamy. And as much as Pearl Harbor changed the 
course of world history by precipitating the global struggle between 
totalitarian fascism and representative democracy, the transformative 
impact of September 11 in the course of American and human history is 
indelible. September 11 was not only the beginning of the Global War on 
Terror, but moreover, it was the day of innocence lost for a new 
generation of Americans.
  Just like my fellow Americans, I remember September 11 as vividly as 
if it was yesterday. In my mind's eye, I can still remember being 
mesmerized by the television as the two airliners crashed into the Twin 
Towers of the World Trade Center, and I remember the sense of terror we 
experienced when we realized that this was no accident, that we had 
been attacked, and that the world as we know it had changed forever. 
The moment in which the Twin Towers collapsed and the nearly 3,000 
innocent Americans died haunts me until this day.
  At this moment, I decided that the protection of our homeland would 
be at the forefront of my legislative agenda. I knew that all of our 
collective efforts as Americans would all be in vain if we did not 
achieve our most important priority: the security of our Nation. 
Accordingly, I became then and continue to this day to be an active and 
engaged Member of the Committee on Homeland Security who considers our 
national security paramount.
  Our Nation's collective response to the tragedy of September 11 
exemplified what has been true of the American people since the 
inception of our Republic--in times of crisis, we come together and 
always persevere. Despite the depths of our anguish on the preceding 
day, on September 12, the American people demonstrated their compassion 
and solidarity for one another as we began the process of response, 
recovery, and rebuilding. We transcended our differences and came 
together to honor the sacrifices and losses sustained by the countless 
victims of September 11. Let us honor their sacrifices by implementing 
the bipartisan recommendations of the 9/11 Commission in order to 
ensure that the tragedy of 9/11 is never repeated. Let us learn from 
the lessons offered by our history so that we are not destined to 
repeat them.


                    9/11 Commission Recommendations

  Madam Speaker, I wish to pay tribute to the distinguished chair of 
the Homeland Security Committee, the gentleman from Mississippi, Bennie 
Thompson. Under Mr. Thompson's visionary leadership, the Democrats on 
the Committee have performed yeoman service in developing a framework 
needed to protect the homeland. Unlike the previous Republican 
leadership, we Democrats embrace wholeheartedly the recommendations of 
the 9/11 Commission, a body comprised of ten of the most distinguished 
citizens in this country.
  Madam Speaker, I want to talk about several of the key provisions of 
H.R. 1, the bill implementing the bipartisan 9/11 Commission's 
recommendations.

[[Page H194]]

            Improving Homeland Security--Risk-Based Funding

  The importance of providing risk-based allocation of Homeland 
Security grants cannot be overemphasized. Last December, the 9/11 
Commissioners gave an ``F'' grade to the Administration and Congress on 
providing risk-based homeland security funding. This bill would 
substantially increase the share of homeland security grants that are 
provided to States based on risk, rather than population. Under the 
bill, a Department of Homeland Security risk assessment would determine 
each state's funding and most states would be guaranteed a minimum of 
0.25 percent. The bill would provide for a larger minimum (0.45 
percent) for states that have a significant international land border 
and/or adjoin a body of water within North America that contains an 
international boundary line.


 First Responders--Ensuring Communications Interoperability for First 
                               Responders

  Last December, the 9/11 Commissioners also gave an ``F'' grade to the 
Administration and Congress on communications interoperability for 
first responders. This bill would improve the communications 
capabilities of first responders by establishing a stand-alone 
communications interoperability grant program at the Department of 
Homeland Security to provide first responders with the type of 
equipment that allows them to communicate with one another during 
emergencies.


 Aviation Security--Inspecting Cargo Carried Aboard Passenger Aircraft

  The 9/11 Commissioners gave a ``D'' grade to the Administration and 
Congress for their efforts on enhancing air cargo screening. This bill 
directs the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to establish a system 
for inspecting 100 percent of cargo carried on passenger aircraft over 
the next 3 years. The bill directs DHS to develop a phased-in approach 
so that by the end of FY 2007, 35 percent of this cargo is inspected; 
by the end of FY 2008, 65 percent is inspected; and by the end of FY 
2009, 100 percent is inspected.


    Improving the Explosive Screening of Checked Baggage on Aircraft

  The 9/11 Commissioners also gave a ``D'' grade to the Administration 
and Congress on improving the security of checked baggage. This bill 
continues the dedication of $250 million per year currently collected 
in airport security fees from the Aviation Security Capital Fund for 
the installation of in-line explosive detection systems for checked 
baggage at our Nation's airports for fiscal years 2008 through 2011.


        Improving the Explosive Screening of Airline Passengers

  The 9/11 Commissioners gave a ``C'' grade to the Administration and 
Congress on improving airline passenger screening checkpoints to detect 
explosives. This bill requires the Department of Homeland Security to 
issue a strategic plan for the deployment of explosive detection 
equipment at passenger checkpoints that is long overdue. The bill also 
provides new funding in order to make rapid improvements to security 
measures at passenger checkpoints.


 Port Security--Requiring 100 percent Scanning of Containers Bound for 
                                the U.S.

  This bill goes beyond the 9/11 Commission's recommendations by 
including provisions that would phase in a requirement for 100 percent 
scanning of cargo containers bound for the United States. This 
provision would require that 100 percent of cargo containers be scanned 
and sealed using the best available technology before being loaded onto 
ships destined for the United States. The containers must be scanned by 
both X-ray machines and radiation detectors.
  Large ports would be given 3 years to comply and smaller ports 5 
years. (Two of the busiest port terminals in the world--in Hong Kong--
already scan 100 percent of cargo containers). The Port of Houston 
represents a substantial source of vulnerability. The Port is the 
world's sixth largest seaport and the Nation's largest oil port; and 
for the past 8 years, it has led the Nation in the amount of foreign 
tonnage.


  Critical infrastructure security--improving critical infrastructure 
                                security

  The 9/11 Commissioners gave a ``D'' grade to the Administration and 
Congress for their efforts on critical infrastructure assessment. This 
bill requires the Department of Homeland Security to conduct an annual 
vulnerability assessment for all critical infrastructure sectors. It 
also requires DHS to annually update the National Asset Database to 
ensure that it is a current list of national assets and critical 
infrastructure.


  overall transportation security planning--improving transportation 
               security planning and information sharing

  The 9/11 Commissioners gave a ``C-'' grade to the Administration and 
Congress on the National Strategy for Transportation Security, arguing 
that it was too vague to be useful. This bill requires improvements in 
the National Strategy for Transportation Security, such as by requiring 
DHS to develop risk-based priorities for transportation security 
initiatives based on vulnerability assessments conducted by the 
Department. It also requires DHS to develop a Strategic Information 
Sharing Plan for transportation in order to significantly improve the 
sharing of security information with all transportation stakeholders.
  I introduced the Security Plans and Training for Rail and Mass 
Transit Systems Amendment to H.R. 4439 on March 9, 2006. This 
amendment, which mandated security plans and training for rail and mass 
transit systems, was adopted by voice vote.


Information sharing--strengthening intelligence and information sharing 
                       with local law enforcement

  The 9/11 Commissioners gave a ``D'' grade on government information 
sharing. This bill contains several provisions to strengthen 
intelligence and information sharing with local law enforcement. First, 
it strengthens state and local intelligence ``fusion'' centers, which 
have been established to gather, analyze and disseminate potentially 
homeland security-relevant information to appropriate state and local 
officials. Second, it strengthens the presence of federal agencies, 
such as the Border Patrol, at fusion centers in border states. Thirdly, 
it improves the Department of Homeland Security's Information Sharing 
Programs.


  Terrorist Travel--strengthening Efforts to Prevent Terrorist Travel

  The 9/11 Commissioners gave an ``Incomplete'' grade on preventing 
terrorist travel. This bill improves the capabilities of the Human 
Smuggling and Trafficking Center by authorizing additional funding to 
stem human smuggling, human trafficking, and terrorism travel, 
including requiring the hiring of experienced intelligence analysts in 
the field of human trafficking and terrorist travel.
  During my tenure as the ranking member of the Immigration and Claims 
Subcommittee in the Judiciary Committee, I have stressed that alien 
smuggling will not stop until we establish an immigration policy that 
substantially reduces the need for illegal entry into the United 
States. In the meantime, our highest priority should be to do what we 
can to reduce the deaths from reckless, help in achieving that 
objective, the Commercial Alien Smuggling Elimination Act (The CASE 
Act). It would do this by establishing an informant program which has 
been designed to facilitate the investigation and prosecution, or 
disruption, of reckless commercial smuggling operations.
  Finally, the CASE Act would require the Secretary of Homeland 
Security to develop and implement an outreach program to educate the 
public here and abroad about the penalties for smuggling aliens. It 
also would provide information about the financial rewards and the 
immigration benefits that would be available for assisting in the 
investigation, disruption, or prosecution of a commercial alien 
smuggling operation.
  Furthermore, Republicans on the Homeland Security Committee defeated 
(11 to 16) my amendment (No. 16) to the Department of Homeland Security 
Authorization Act of Fiscal Year 2006. This amendment required the 
Secretary of Homeland Security to develop and implement a comprehensive 
strategy to secure the land borders, based on threat and vulnerability 
assessments of our ports-of-entry and the vast stretches of land 
between them.

  My Rapid Response Border Protection Act:
  Increases in CBP Inspectors, Funding for Essential Equipment, Foreign 
Language Training, and Incentives to Improve Morale (offered by Ms. 
Jackson-Lee, H.R. 4312, Nov. 16, 2005).
  The Committee on Homeland Security defeated (12 to 15) the Jackson- 
(1H) to H.R. 4312, the Border Security and Terrorism Prevention Act of 
2005. This amendment provided:
  Funding to hire and train an additional 2,000 inspectors and Border 
Patrol agents each year, beginning with $375 million for Fiscal Year 
2006; $692 million in Fiscal Year 2007; $1.008 billion in Fiscal Year 
2008; $1.324 billion in Fiscal Year 2009; and $1.641 billion in Fiscal 
Year 2010. These numbers are identical to those authorized in the 9/11 
Act.
  Funding to provide agents with radios, night-vision equipment, and 
weapons.
  Enhanced foreign language training for border agents and inspectors.
  Incentives to improve the morale of border inspectors, including new 
student loan payments and retirement incentives.


Preventing Terrorists from Acquiring WMD--Preventing the Proliferation 
                          of WMD and Terrorism

  The 9/11 Commissioners gave a ``D'' to the Administration and 
Congress on preventing the proliferation of WMD and terrorism. This 
bill includes numerous provisions to address this issue, including: 
strengthening DOD's Cooperative Threat Reduction (or ``Nunn-Lugar'') 
program that focuses on nuclear materials in the former Soviet Union; 
strengthening the Energy Department's Global Threat Reduction 
Initiative; providing for reforms, increased tools and greater 
oversight over the Proliferation Security Initiative, through which the 
United

[[Page H195]]

States and participating countries interdict WMD; establishing a U.S. 
Coordinator for the Prevention of WMD Proliferation and Terrorism, who 
would serve as an advisor to the President on all WMD proliferation 
issues; and requiring the establishment of a blue-ribbon Commission on 
the Prevention of WMD Proliferation and Terrorism, consisting of 
experts appointed by both Congress and the President and mandated to 
develop a clear and comprehensive strategy on preventing WMD 
proliferation.


      Enacting ``The Nuclear Black Market Counter-Terrorism Act''

  The bill includes ``The Nuclear Black Market Counter-Terrorism Act,'' 
which requires the President to impose sanctions on any foreign person 
who trades nuclear enrichment technology to a non-nuclear weapons state 
or provides items that contribute to the development of a nuclear 
weapon by a non-nuclear weapons state or any foreign person. Sanctions 
include prohibiting foreign assistance to such person; prohibiting the 
export of defense articles, defense services, or dual use items; and 
prohibiting contracts. These provisions also provide that U.S. 
assistance should only be provided to countries that are not 
cooperating with countries or individuals who are engaged in, planning 
or assisting any terrorist group in the development of nuclear weapons; 
and to countries that are completely cooperating with the U.S. in its 
efforts to eliminate nuclear black-market networks. This title also 
includes enhanced oversight over U.S. efforts to break up nuclear black 
markets.


 Strategies for Reducing the Appeal of Extremism--Quality Educational 
Opportunities: Promoting Quality Educational Opportunities in Arab and 
                     Predominantly Muslim Countries

  The 9/11 Commissioners gave a ``D'' grade regarding increasing 
secular educational opportunities in Muslim countries. This bill would 
significantly enhance the International Arab and Muslim Youth 
Opportunity Fund, which is designed to improve educational 
opportunities for these youth, by calling for greater funding and 
outlining specific purposes for the fund. Under the bill, the fund 
would be used for such purposes as enhancing modem educational 
programs; funding training and exchange programs for teachers, 
administrators, and students; and providing other types of assistance 
such as the translation of foreign books, newspapers and other reading 
materials into local languages.


Democracy and Development--Promoting Democracy and Development in Arab 
                   and Predominantly Muslim Countries

  This bill would authorize the Secretary of State to designate an 
appropriate private, non-profit U.S. organization as the Middle East 
Foundation and to provide funding for the foundation through the Middle 
East Partnership Initiative. The purpose of this foundation would be to 
support, in the countries of the Middle East, the expansion of civil 
society; opportunities for political participation of all citizens; 
protections for internationally recognized human rights; reforms in 
education; independent media; policies that promote economic 
opportunities for all citizens; the rule of law; and democratic 
processes of government. It also requires the Secretary to develop 5-
year strategies on fostering human rights and democracy in order to 
require a long- term approach to the promotion of democracy.


   Restoring U.S. Moral Leadership--Advancing U.S. Interests Through 
                            Public Diplomacy

  The 9/11 Commissioners gave a ``C'' grade for providing a clear U.S. 
message abroad. This bill calls for the U.S. to improve its 
communication of ideas and information to people in countries with 
significant Muslim populations, for U.S. public diplomacy to reaffirm 
U.S. commitment to democratic principles, and for a significant 
expansion of U.S. international broadcasting that is targeted to 
countries with significant Muslim populations. The measure also 
provides for ``surge'' authority to allow the Broadcasting Board of 
Governors to better address emerging situations and opportunities.


Expansion of U.S. Scholarship Exchange and Library Programs in Arab and 
                     Predominantly Muslim Countries

  The 9/11 Commissioners gave a ``D'' grade regarding expanding U.S. 
scholarship, exchange and library programs in Muslim countries. This 
bill requires the Secretary of State to prepare a report on the 9/11 
Commission's recommendations on these U.S. scholarship, exchange and 
library programs, including a certification by the Secretary that such 
recommendations have been implemented, or if a certification cannot be 
made, what steps have been taken to implement such recommendations. The 
bill also requires the GAG to review the government's efforts in this 
area.


     Developing Common Coalition Standards for Terrorist Detention.

  The 9/11 Commission recommended that the U.S. develop a common 
coalition approach on standards for terrorist detention. Last December, 
the 9/11 Commissioners then gave the Administration and Congress an 
``F'' grade for failing to do so. This bill requires the Secretary of 
State, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense and the Attorney 
General, to submit to Congress a report on progress being made to 
develop such an approach.


    U.S. Relationship with Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Afghanistan--
                   Supporting Reform in Saudi Arabia

  The 9/11 Commissioners gave a ``D'' grade to the Administration and 
Congress on promoting reform in Saudi Arabia. This bill calls for the 
U.S. to engage Saudi Arabia on openly confronting the issue of 
terrorism; to enhance counterterrorism cooperation with Saudi Arabia; 
and to support Saudi Arabia's efforts to make political, economic, and 
social reforms throughout the country. The measure also requires the 
President to report on whether the Administration's ``Strategic 
Dialogue'' with Saudi Arabia is meeting these objectives.


          Helping Pakistan Handle the Threats from Extremists

  The 9/11 Commissioners gave a ``C+'' grade on supporting Pakistan 
against extremists. This bill requires the President to submit a report 
to Congress on the long-term U.S. strategy to engage with the 
Government of Pakistan to address curbing the proliferation of nuclear 
weapons technology; combating poverty and corruption; promoting 
democracy and the rule of law; and effectively dealing with Islamic 
extremism. The measure also requires a certification that Pakistan is 
addressing the continued presence of the Taliban and other violent 
extremist forces throughout the country as a condition of continued 
assistance. In addition, it extends the waiver of sanctions on Pakistan 
because of its military coup until after Pakistan's parliamentary 
elections.


           Maintaining a Long-Term Commitment to Afghanistan

  This bill calls for the U.S. to maintain its long-term commitment to 
Afghanistan by increased assistance and the continued deployment of 
U.S. troops in Afghanistan. It also calls for the President to engage 
aggressively with the Government of Afghanistan and NATO to explore all 
options for addressing the narcotics crisis in Afghanistan. It also 
directs the President to make every effort to dramatically increase the 
numbers of U.S. and international police trainers, mentors and police 
personnel operating with Afghan civil security forces; and to address 
current short-term shortages of energy in Afghanistan, in order to 
ensure the delivery of electricity to Afghanis.


                               Conclusion

  Madam Speaker, as I stand here today, my heart still grieves for 
those who perished on flights United Airlines 93, American Airlines 77, 
American Airlines 11, and United Airlines 175. When the sun rose on the 
morning of September 11, none of us knew that it would end in an 
inferno in the magnificent World Trade Center Towers in New York City, 
the Pentagon in Washington, D.C., and in the grassy fields of 
Shanksville, Pennsylvania. How I wish we could have hugged and kissed 
and held each of the victims one last time.
  I stand here remembering those who still suffer, whose hearts still 
ache over the loss of so many innocent and interrupted lives. My prayer 
is that for those who lost a father, a mother, a husband, a wife, a 
child, or a friend will in the days and years ahead take comfort in the 
certain knowledge that they have gone on to claim the greatest prize, a 
place in the Lord's loving arms. And down here on the ground, their 
memory will never die so long as any of the many of us who loved them 
lives.
  Madam Speaker, the best way to honor the memory of those lost in the 
inferno of 9/11, is to do all we can to ensure that it never happens 
again. The way to do that is to pass H.R. 1 and implement the 9/11 
Commission's recommendations.
  Mr. SMITH of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 2 minutes.
  Mr. Speaker, section 621 of H.R. 1 requires the Department of 
Homeland Security to report to Congress how it plans to implement an 
automated biometric entry-and-exit data system.
  A decade ago, Senator Alan Simpson and I authored the Illegal 
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 which 
required the Federal Government to develop such an automated entry-and-
exit system. This would enable us to know who is entering the United 
States and when they leave.
  Forty percent of all illegal immigrants come to the United States 
legally but overstay their temporary visas. We can never begin to solve 
the illegal immigration problem if we don't deal with overstays, and we 
can never deal with overstays until we have a functioning exit control 
system.
  Instead of mandating completion of the exit component of a U.S. 
visit, this bill simply requires that the administration submit a 
report, a report already required by the Intelligence Reform and 
Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004. The failure to fully implement an

[[Page H196]]

exit control system is more evidence that it will be a long time before 
our country has secure borders. Instead of helping to change that, this 
bill only requires a report.
  Mr. Speaker, I am disappointed that we have missed an opportunity to 
better secure our homeland.
  Mr. THOMPSON of Mississippi. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to 
the gentlelady from California (Ms. Loretta Sanchez).
  Mr. LORETTA SANCHEZ of California. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and it 
feels great to call you Mr. Chairman.
  I rise today in support of H.R. 1, the Implementing the 9/11 
Recommendations Act of 2007, and as a Member who has been on the 
Homeland Security Committee since its inception and a ranking member on 
one of its major committees, I am really thrilled that we are bringing 
this legislation on the real first day of legislative business.
  There are some really essential things in this. One major thing would 
be to achieve real security by implementing and distributing most 
homeland security grant funding on the basis of risk. After the 
Department of Homeland Security's completion of a comprehensive risk 
assessment, States with lower risks will be guaranteed 25 percent 
funding, or 45 percent if that State has an international land or sea 
border. This is important because, as we know, there are many States 
that need that money, and they need it now.
  Another important provision of this will be the infrastructure 
database, one that I have been talking about for the last 4 years and 
trying to get together. Let's just get that done. These requirements 
would satisfy the 9/11 Commission recommendation for the development of 
a reliable and complete list of the Nation's critical infrastructure to 
be used so we can help to assess the threats and allocate the limited 
resources that we have.
  Of course, I am particularly pleased we are going to have an Office 
of Appeals and Redress. This is something that I offered as an 
amendment in committee which is included in this legislation so that 
people who are on the terrorist list have some way to get off if they 
are innocent.
  I rise today in support of H.R. 1, the Implementing the 9/11 
Recommendations Act of 2007.
  Over the last several Congresses, my work as the ranking member of 
the Economic Security, Infrastructure Security and Cyber Security 
Subcommittee of the Homeland Security Committee has focused on the 
threats to our Nation's security and how we can best protect ourselves 
from those threats.
  This legislation is an essential step towards achieving real security 
by implementing outstanding 9/11 Commission recommendations.
  One major security enhancement in this legislation is the move to 
distribute most homeland security grant funding on the basis of risk.
  After the Department of Homeland Security's completion of 
comprehensive risk assessments, States with lower risk will be 
guaranteed 25 percent of all homeland security funding, or 45 percent 
if the State has an international land or sea border.
  This provision strikes an appropriate balance between allocating most 
of the funding based on risk, while ensuring that every State will have 
the funding to maintain the necessary level of preparedness.
  Another important provision in this legislation requires annual 
updates of the National Asset Database, and the creation of a subset, 
the National At-Risk Database which will list the infrastructure most 
at risk to terrorist attacks.
  In addition, the provision requires the Department of Homeland 
Security to consult each State annually to discuss their assets, and 
confer with them before removing a State asset from the Database.
  These requirements satisfy the 9/11 Commission recommendation for the 
development of a reliable and complete list of the Nation's critical 
infrastructure to be used to assess threats and allocate infrastructure 
protection grants.
  I am also particularly pleased that a provision to establish an 
Office of Appeals and Redress that I offered as an amendment in 
Committee was included in this legislation.
  I drafted this provision in response to my constituents' frustrations 
when they were held up because they had the same name as someone on the 
no-fly list, a frustration that I experienced personally several months 
ago.
  The establishment of this DHS-wide office will ensure a timely and 
fair process for individuals that are wrongly identified, to seek 
redress, correct their records and reduce, or end, repeated delays and 
missed flights.
  These are just a few of the important provisions in H.R. 1 that will 
improve our Nation's security. I urge my colleagues to support this 
important legislation.
  Mr. SMITH of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the 
gentleman from New Mexico (Mr. Pearce), a member of the committee.
  Mr. PEARCE. Mr. Speaker, I appreciate our colleague's efforts to 
secure the Nation. We join in that effort. Protecting our homeland 
requires diligence, resolve and common sense, and I salute my 
colleagues who drafted the bill. However, since we had no process in 
committee to discuss or amend the bill, we are simply left with asking 
rhetorical questions here on the floor.
  We were told earlier that for $30 to $40 per container we were going 
to secure America. I hold in front of me my passport. I am about to get 
that renewed. Every 10 years we do that, and it is going to cost $82. I 
will tell you that we had secure communications, secure briefings in 
homeland security, how they cannot secure even our passports for $82, 
yet we are going to secure containers that are coming from the Middle 
East full of oil; we are going to secure containers full of vegetables; 
and we are not going to interrupt commerce.
  We cannot even count on some of our friends to protect the 
intellectual property rights on compact discs, and yet we are going to 
trust them to offer the security of this Nation.
  These are the questions that should have come up in committee. These 
are the questions that should come up today. These are the questions 
that are being ignored, and we are being asked to look the other way 
and declare the Nation safer.
  I join with my colleagues in saying it is awfully important for us to 
make the Nation safe. The way we do that is to prosecute the war on 
terror, to take the will away from those people who would strike this 
country, to ensure that intelligence will provide us with the resources 
and the application of the resources to the areas of greatest threat. 
We cannot secure containers for $30 apiece when we can't secure the 
passport for $82.
  Mr. THOMPSON of Mississippi. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to 
the gentleman from Rhode Island (Mr. Langevin), a member of the 
Homeland Security Committee.
  (Mr. LANGEVIN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. LANGEVIN. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you for yielding.
  Mr. Speaker, I rise today to commend this body for getting us back on 
track to fully implementing all the recommendations made by the 
bipartisan 9/11 Commission. The 9/11 Commission provided an objective 
and eye-opening assessment of how terrorists were able to exploit our 
security vulnerabilities on September 11 and made 41 key 
recommendations to address these shortcomings. Unfortunately, 2\1/2\ 
years after the Commission's report, glaring threats still remain.
  Just over a year ago, the 9/11 Discourse Project issued a report card 
that gave the administration Ds and Fs in some of the most critical 
areas. Today, we finally have an opportunity to ensure that the 9/11 
Commission's tireless efforts were not in vain. H.R. 1 would shore up 
remaining vulnerabilities and implement recommendations that have been 
ignored completely or have been only partially addressed until now.
  As the ranking member of the Subcommittee on the Prevention of 
Nuclear and Biological Attack in the 109th Congress, I am pleased that 
this bill makes it more difficult for terrorists to obtain nuclear 
materials. It strengthens our global nonproliferation programs, which 
have proven successful in securing the most dangerous nuclear material 
abroad.
  To further protect our homeland from nuclear threats, H.R. 1 also 
requires 100 percent screening of cargo.
  Finally, this legislation will help our first responders, who place 
their lives on the line each and every day, by funding State and local 
interoperable communications systems essential for emergency response. 
H.R. 1 also significantly improves information sharing, which is our 
first line of defense.
  This is a good bill, and I urge passage.
  Mr. THOMPSON of Mississippi. Mr. Speaker, I yield for the purpose of

[[Page H197]]

unanimous consent to the gentlewoman from New York (Ms. Clarke).
  (Ms. CLARKE asked and was given permission to revise and extend her 
remarks.)
  Ms. CLARKE. Mr. Speaker, I rise as a proud New Yorker and a new 
member of the Homeland Security Committee in enthusiastic support of 
H.R. 1.
  Mr. Speaker, I rise in full support of H.R. 1, Implementing the 9/11 
Commission's Recommendations. As a New Yorker and a member of the 
Homeland Security Committee, this bill will implement very important 
recommendations that will ensure countries' citizens are more secure.
  During the attacks of September 11, the lives of nearly 400 persons 
from Brooklyn, New York, came to an abrupt end due to terrorists who 
used commercial airliners as guided missiles and crashed them into both 
of the World Trade Center Towers in lower Manhattan. In accordance with 
the attacks, more innocent lives were lost due to an adequately 
communication infrastructure. This bill will help to address this 
shortfall in our first responders' ability to coordinate future rescue 
efforts.
  I cannot think of a better way of honoring the memories, sacrifice 
and dedication of New York City's first responders: Fire Department of 
New York--FDNY; Emergency Medical Service--EMS; New York Police 
Department--NYPD; and the Port Authority Police Department--PAPD.
  Terrorism is not an Islamic issue or a Muslim issue, it is a human 
issue. No matter what form or by whom it is perpetrated, terrorism is a 
direct threat to our civil society. I believe that these 
recommendations will help restore civility in our world. We must 
continue to demonstrate that Americans are good people, and overall, we 
want to help each other. Our diplomatic efforts will become more 
robust, our presence will be more visible and our day to day activities 
with our neighbors around the world, more meaningful. The bill's 
provisions include requiring major improvements in aviation security, 
border security, and infrastructure security; providing first 
responders the equipment and training they need; beefing up efforts to 
prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction; and 
significantly expanding diplomatic, economic, educational, and other 
strategies designed to counter terrorism.
  Overall, Mr. Speaker, I believe the recommendations will help make 
our nation safer and will limit the likelihood of a similar attack on 
our country. I fully support this legislation and encourage all of my 
colleagues to do the same.
  Mr. KING of New York. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2\1/2\ minutes to the 
gentleman from Georgia (Mr. Gingrey).
  Mr. GINGREY. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman.
  Mr. Speaker, I heard all during the fall campaign from the Democratic 
side of the aisle, the new majority, how they were going to fully 
implement, fully implement, the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission 
and talk about how the then Republican majority failed miserably, and 
the 9/11 Commission gave the Republicans failing grades, failing grades 
for passing 39 out of 41 recommendations by the bipartisan commission.

                              {time}  1615

  Now, when I do the math on that, that is 95 percent. I do not know 
about your school, Mr. Speaker, but at Georgia Tech, 95 percent was a 
solid A.
  But the point I want to make is that in no way, shape, or form is the 
new majority coming forward with full implementation of the 
recommendations of the 9/11 Commission. And I hope the media and I hope 
the 9/11 families do not give you a pass on this.
  When you look at those 41 recommendations, a couple that we were not 
able to pass, that we did not pass, and I think we probably should 
have, one of them was especially in regard to the House Permanent 
Select Committee on Intelligence, having that as a balanced committee, 
almost like the House Committee on Standards of Official Behavior, the 
ethics committee, where you have an equal balance between the two 
sides, the commission has called for a one-vote margin, a one-person 
margin for the majority. You have structured that committee with a 12-9 
majority for the Democrats.
  Also, the commission has called for open disclosure, Mr. Speaker, in 
regard to the funding for intelligence, that every Member of this body 
should have an opportunity to see what each of 15 agencies, not just 
the CIA but all those agencies embedded within the Department of 
Defense and under the control of the Deputy Secretary of Intelligence 
within the Department, we need to know what that spending is. So let us 
tell the truth and be honest with the American people.
  Mr. Speaker, a little earlier, the distinguished majority leader, who 
I have great respect for, and I know you have great respect for Mr. 
Hoyer, said that the Democratic co-Chair of the 9/11 Commission, Mr. 
Hamilton, said: ``If H.R. 1 is implemented and fully funded, the 
American people will be safer.'' No, duh. But at what cost?
  And, Mr. Speaker, what the former Republican majority has done in 
regard to container security initiatives, we screen every container.
  Mr. THOMPSON of Mississippi. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the 
former sheriff from southern Indiana, who is now a Member of Congress, 
Mr. Ellsworth.
  Mr. ELLSWORTH. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding.
  When the 9/11 Commission completed their extensive investigation, 
they reported an inability of the public safety organizations at the 
local, State, and Federal levels to establish compatible and adequate 
communications. According to the report, a commitment had to be made to 
improve the interoperability of emergency communications and 
capabilities for first responders.
  With nearly 25 years of law enforcement experience, I understand the 
essential need for effective emergency communications. When a 
devastating tornado ripped through my community in November of 2005, 
our local first responders were equipped to communicate with each 
other. However, the much-needed help we needed from other agencies was 
difficult during this time because they were unable to speak to us when 
they came on the scene.
  For too long Congress has been decidedly ineffective in addressing 
our country's most pressing security needs. The 9/11 Commission gave 
Congress an F on ensuring communication interoperability for first 
responders. We need to rectify this. Congress and the Federal 
Government can and must do better, and that is why I stand in support 
and strongly endorse the implementation of the 9/11 Commission's 
recommendations.
  Mr. KING of New York. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman 
from Connecticut, who has been on this issue for so many years, 
including before September 11, Mr. Shays.
  Mr. SHAYS. I thank the gentleman for yielding, and I just want to say 
to Peter King, as chairman you ran this committee in such a bipartisan 
way and worked well with the now-chairman, and I just hope and pray 
that this continues on a bipartisan basis.
  I want to say as well that I am excited to be back for 2 years to 
wrestle with the people's business, and these are very important 
issues.
  As co-chairman of the 9/11 Commission Caucus, I could tell you 
reasons why you might want to vote against the bill. It does not 
provide the total amount spent on intelligence. It does not address 
recommendations to shift covert operations from CIA to defense. It does 
not create a separate appropriation subcommittee on intelligence. It 
does not make a select permanent committee a full committee, nor does 
it address the jurisdictions of the Department of Homeland Security.
  I could tell you those would be reasons why you could be 
disappointed. But why you should like this bill is that it deals with 
expanding risk-based funding, and it deals more with interoperability, 
which is a huge issue.
  I am particularly concerned about screening all cargo on passenger 
planes within 3 years, and I am happy this bill does that. Cargo 
screening, I am not sure if it will screen 100 percent of cargo, but I 
do think it moves us towards doing what we need to do to identify 
radiation and potential nuclear weapons. I particularly like making the 
Privacy and Civil Liberties Board an independent agency and giving it 
subpoena power.
  These are things that I think move the ball forward. I think 
Republicans did it in the last session, and I think this legislation is 
a good step forward. So we can find reasons why we may not like it; but 
I would hope, in the end, on a bipartisan basis, we can recognize that 
it does a lot more good and therefore deserves our support.
  Again, I thank Mr. King for his leadership as chairman, and I welcome 
our new chairman.
  Mr. THOMPSON of Mississippi. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may

[[Page H198]]

consume to the distinguished member of the Committee on Energy and 
Commerce, the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Stupak).
  Mr. STUPAK. Mr. Speaker, on behalf of Mr. Dingell, who unfortunately 
is delayed at the White House, I want to enter into a colloquy with the 
gentleman from Mississippi.
  I appreciate the gentleman's yielding to me to consider the aspects 
of H.R. 1 that are of jurisdictional interests to the Committee on 
Energy and Commerce. I regret that time will not allow for a full 
discussion on the floor of the areas where clarification and 
collaboration are warranted.
  Earlier today, Mr. Dingell sent a letter to you, Mr. Chairman, 
outlining areas where the Energy and Commerce Committee would like to 
work together with your committee in a meaningful manner as the bill 
moves forward. The response received was that you recognize the 
Committee on Energy and Commerce has jurisdictional interest in a 
number of aspects of the bill. Mr. Dingell wishes to get assurances 
from you that you will work with us and members of the Energy and 
Commerce Committee as this legislation moves forward to ensure that the 
bill does not result in the private sector being subjected to 
conflicting or inconsistent rules or guidance. Does the gentleman from 
Mississippi agree?
  Mr. THOMPSON of Mississippi. I agree we should avoid conflicting or 
inconsistent rules or guidance.
  Mr. STUPAK. I thank the chairman, and I hereby submit both letters 
for the Record to ensure the record is complete on this matter.

                                         House of Representatives,


                               Committee on Homeland Security,

                                  Washington, DC, January 9, 2007.
     Hon. John D. Dingell,
     Rayburn House Office Building,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Chairman Dingell: I appreciate your letter regarding 
     certain aspects of H.R. 1, the ``Implementing the 9/11 
     Commission Recommendations Act of 2007.''
       While it is important to note that I do not control the 
     entire process, as there are other House Committees involved 
     and the Senate will likely have its own positions on a 
     variety of these issues, I would be glad to work with you as 
     the legislation moves forward. I agree we should avoid 
     conflicting or inconsistent rules and guidance. As for the 
     specific areas of interest that you raise in your letter, I 
     am pleased to respond to each issue, point by point, as 
     raised in your letter.
       First, I would say that it is the my intention that the 
     Secretary of Homeland Security, in developing risk-based 
     funding criteria for first responder programs, coordinate 
     with the Secretary of Health and Human Services. 
     Additionally, I am pleased to work with you to ensure that 
     issues regarding the Department of Energy's Megaports program 
     and the cargo scanning requirement contained in the bill are 
     addressed.
       Your letter also seeks clarification on the intended impact 
     of the word ``except'' in section 901 of the bill and how it 
     would relate to activities underway by the Environmental 
     Protection Agency (EPA). In answer to your question, I do 
     agree that the effect of the ``except'' clause is that there 
     is no requirement that for the Department of Homeland 
     Security to perform vulnerability assessments at drinking 
     water utilities. However, I note that the Department of 
     Homeland Security does use the drinking water vulnerability 
     assessments conducted under the Safe Drinking Water Act for a 
     number of purposes, and it works with the EPA on these 
     issues. It is not the intention of this legislation to affect 
     that relationship either. Additionally, it is not my 
     intention that the voluntary program outlined in Title XI of 
     the bill interfere with the mandatory Clean Air Act program. 
     As for energy, I am pleased to work with you to clarify that 
     the bill does not intend to conflict with respect to the 
     types of energy-related regulatory or administrative regimes 
     identified in your letter.
       Finally, with respect to your questions on 
     telecommunications and cybersecurity, I am pleased to work 
     with you on the matters raised and agree that the bill does 
     not attempt in any way to diminish or dilute any authority or 
     resources of the Assistant Secretary for Cyber Security or of 
     other Federal agencies engaged in efforts to secure cyber 
     space. I would note that Rep. Zoe Lofgren, a Member of the 
     Homeland Security Committee, was one of the original sponsors 
     of H.R. 285, the bill to create the Assistant Secretary of 
     Cyber Security, during the 109th Congress. I have been glad 
     to work to create this position, and I agree that is not the 
     intention of the bill to weaken that position. I also do not 
     intend to weaken other federal cyber security efforts.
       I appreciate the cooperation in this manner and look 
     forward to working with you, as this bill moves through the 
     legislative process.
           Sincerely,
                                               Bennie G. Thompson,
     Chairman.
                                  ____

                                    Congress of the United States,


                                     House of Representatives,

                                  Washington, DC, January 9, 2007.
     Hon. Bennie G. Thompson,
     Chairman, Committee on Homeland Security,
     House of Representatives, Washington, DC.
       Dear