[Congressional Record Volume 153, Number 4 (Tuesday, January 9, 2007)]
[House]
[Pages H132-H198]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
IMPLEMENTING THE 9/11 COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS ACT OF 2007
Mr. THOMPSON of Mississippi. Madam Speaker, pursuant to House
Resolution 6, and as the designee of the majority leader, I call up the
bill (H.R. 1) to provide for the implementation of the recommendations
of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States,
and ask for its immediate consideration.
The Clerk read the title of the bill.
The text of the bill is as follows:
H.R. 1
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``Implementing the 9/11
Commission Recommendations Act of 2007''.
SEC. 2. TABLE OF CONTENTS.
The table of contents for this Act is as follows:
Sec. 1. Short title.
Sec. 2. Table of contents.
TITLE I--RISK-BASED ALLOCATION OF HOMELAND SECURITY GRANTS
Sec. 101. First responders homeland security funding.
TITLE II--ENSURING COMMUNICATIONS INTEROPERABILITY FOR FIRST RESPONDERS
Sec. 201. Improve Communications for Emergency Response Grant Program.
TITLE III--STRENGTHENING USE OF A UNIFIED INCIDENT COMMAND DURING
EMERGENCIES
Sec. 301. National exercise program design.
Sec. 302. National exercise program model exercises.
Sec. 303. Responsibilities of Regional Administrators of the Federal
Emergency Management Agency.
TITLE IV--STRENGTHENING AVIATION SECURITY
Sec. 401. Installation of in-line baggage screening equipment.
Sec. 402. Aviation security capital fund.
Sec. 403. Airport checkpoint screening explosive detection.
Sec. 404. Strengthening explosive detection at airport screening
checkpoints.
Sec. 405. Extension of authorization of aviation security funding.
Sec. 406. Inspection of cargo carried aboard passenger aircraft.
Sec. 407. Appeal and redress process for passengers wrongly delayed or
prohibited from boarding a flight.
Sec. 408. Transportation Security Administration personnel management.
Sec. 409. Strategic plan to test and implement advanced passenger
prescreening system.
TITLE V--STRENGTHENING THE SECURITY OF CARGO CONTAINERS
Sec. 501. Requirements relating to entry of containers into the United
States.
TITLE VI--STRENGTHENING EFFORTS TO PREVENT TERRORIST TRAVEL
Subtitle A--Human Smuggling and Trafficking Center Improvements
Sec. 601. Strengthening the capabilities of the Human Smuggling and
Trafficking Center.
Subtitle B--International Collaboration to Prevent Terrorist Travel
Sec. 611. Report on international collaboration to increase border
security, enhance global document security, and exchange
terrorist information.
Subtitle C--Biometric Border Entry and Exit System
Sec. 621. Submittal of plan on biometric entry and exit verification
system implementation.
TITLE VII--IMPROVING INTELLIGENCE AND INFORMATION SHARING WITH LOCAL
LAW ENFORCEMENT AND FIRST RESPONDERS
Subtitle A--Fusion and Law Enforcement Education and Teaming (FLEET)
Grant Program
Sec. 701. Findings.
Sec. 702. FLEET Grant program.
Subtitle B--Border Intelligence Fusion Center Program
Sec. 711. Findings.
Sec. 712. Establishment of Border Intelligence Fusion Center Program.
Subtitle C--Homeland Security Information Sharing Enhancement
Sec. 721. Short title.
Sec. 722. Homeland Security Advisory System.
Sec. 723. Homeland security information sharing.
Subtitle D--Homeland Security Information Sharing Partnerships
Sec. 731. Short title.
Sec. 732. State, Local, and Regional Information Fusion Center
Initiative.
Sec. 733. Homeland Security Information Sharing Fellows Program.
Subtitle E--Homeland Security Intelligence Offices Reorganization
Sec. 741. Departmental reorganization.
Sec. 742. Intelligence components of Department of Homeland Security.
Sec. 743. Office of Infrastructure Protection.
TITLE VIII--PROTECTING PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES WHILE EFFECTIVELY
FIGHTING TERRORISM
Subtitle A--Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Boards
Sec. 801. Short title.
Sec. 802. Findings.
Sec. 803. Making the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board
independent.
Sec. 804. Requiring all members of the Privacy and Civil Liberties
Oversight Board be confirmed by the Senate.
Sec. 805. Subpoena power for the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight
Board.
Sec. 806. Reporting requirements.
Subtitle B--Enhancement of Privacy Officer Authorities
Sec. 811. Short title.
Sec. 812. Authorities of the privacy officer of the Department of
Homeland Security.
TITLE IX--IMPROVING CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY
Sec. 901. Vulnerability assessment and report on critical
infrastructure information.
Sec. 902. National Asset Database and the National At-Risk Database.
TITLE X--TRANSPORTATION SECURITY PLANNING AND INFORMATION SHARING
Sec. 1001. Strategic transportation security information sharing.
Sec. 1002. Transportation security strategic planning.
TITLE XI--PRIVATE SECTOR PREPAREDNESS
Sec. 1101. Participation of private sector organizations in emergency
preparedness and response activities.
TITLE XII--PREVENTING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION PROLIFERATION AND
TERRORISM
Sec. 1201. Findings.
Sec. 1202. Definitions.
Subtitle A--Repeal and Modification of Limitations on Assistance for
Prevention of WMD Proliferation and Terrorism
Sec. 1211. Repeal and modification of limitations on assistance for
prevention of weapons of mass destruction proliferation
and terrorism.
Subtitle B--Proliferation Security Initiative
Sec. 1221. Proliferation Security Initiative improvements and
authorities.
[[Page H133]]
Sec. 1222. Authority to provide assistance to cooperative countries.
Subtitle C--Assistance to Accelerate Programs to Prevent Weapons of
Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism
Sec. 1231. Findings; statement of policy.
Sec. 1232. Authorization of appropriations for the Department of
Defense Cooperative Threat Reduction Program.
Sec. 1233. Authorization of appropriations for the Department of Energy
programs to prevent weapons of mass destruction
proliferation and terrorism.
Subtitle D--Office of the United States Coordinator for the Prevention
of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism
Sec. 1241. Office of the United States Coordinator for the Prevention
of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and
Terrorism.
Sec. 1242. Request for corresponding Russian coordinator.
Subtitle E--Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction
Proliferation and Terrorism
Sec. 1251. Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction
Proliferation and Terrorism.
Sec. 1252. Purposes.
Sec. 1253. Composition.
Sec. 1254. Responsibilities.
Sec. 1255. Powers.
Sec. 1256. Nonapplicability of Federal Advisory Committee Act.
Sec. 1257. Report.
Sec. 1258. Termination.
TITLE XIII--NUCLEAR BLACK MARKET COUNTER-TERRORISM ACT
Sec. 1301. Short title.
Sec. 1302. Definitions.
Subtitle A--Sanctions for Transfers of Nuclear Enrichment,
Reprocessing, and Weapons Technology, Equipment, and Materials
Involving Foreign Persons and Terrorists
Sec. 1311. Authority to impose sanctions on foreign persons.
Sec. 1312. Presidential notification on activities of foreign persons.
Subtitle B--Further Actions Against Corporations Associated With
Sanctioned Foreign Persons
Sec. 1321. Findings.
Sec. 1322. Campaign by United States Government officials.
Sec. 1323. Coordination.
Sec. 1324. Report.
Subtitle C--Rollback of Nuclear Proliferation Networks
Sec. 1331. Nonproliferation as a condition of United States assistance.
Sec. 1332. Report on identification of nuclear proliferation network
host countries.
Sec. 1333. Suspension of arms sales licenses and deliveries to nuclear
proliferation host countries.
TITLE XIV--9/11 COMMISSION INTERNATIONAL IMPLEMENTATION
Sec. 1401. Short title; table of contents.
Subtitle A--Quality Educational Opportunities in Arab and Predominantly
Muslim Countries.
Sec. 1411. Findings; Policy.
Sec. 1412. International Arab and Muslim Youth Opportunity Fund.
Sec. 1413. Annual report to Congress.
Sec. 1414. Extension of program to provide grants to American-sponsored
schools in Arab and predominantly Muslim Countries to
provide scholarships.
Subtitle B--Democracy and Development in Arab and Predominantly Muslim
Countries
Sec. 1421. Promoting democracy and development in the Middle East,
Central Asia, South Asia, and Southeast Asia.
Sec. 1422. Middle East Foundation.
Subtitle C--Restoring United States Moral Leadership
Sec. 1431. Advancing United States interests through public diplomacy.
Sec. 1432. Expansion of United States scholarship, exchange, and
library programs in Arab and predominantly Muslim
countries.
Sec. 1433. United States policy toward detainees.
Subtitle D--Strategy for the United States Relationship With
Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia
Sec. 1441. Afghanistan.
Sec. 1442. Pakistan.
Sec. 1443. Saudi Arabia.
TITLE I--RISK-BASED ALLOCATION OF HOMELAND SECURITY GRANTS
SEC. 101. FIRST RESPONDERS HOMELAND SECURITY FUNDING.
(a) In General.--The Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Public
Law 107-296; 6 U.S.C. 361 et seq.) is amended--
(1) in section 1(b) in the table of contents by striking
the items relating to the second title XVIII, as added by
section 501(b)(3) of Public Law 109-347, and inserting the
following:
``TITLE XIX--DOMESTIC NUCLEAR DETECTION OFFICE
``Sec. 1901. Domestic Nuclear Detection Office.
``Sec. 1902. Mission of Office.
``Sec. 1904. Testing authority.
``Sec. 1905. Relationship to other Department entities and Federal
agencies.
``Sec. 1906. Contracting and grant making authorities.'';
(2) by redesignating the second title XVIII, as added by
section 501(a) of Public Law 109-347, as title XIX;
(3) in title XIX (as so redesignated)--
(A) by redesignating sections 1801 through 1806 as sections
1901 through 1906, respectively;
(B) in section 1904(a) (6 U.S.C. 594(a)), as so
redesignated, by striking ``section 1802'' and inserting
``section 1902''; and
(C) in section 1906 (6 U.S.C. 596), as so redesignated, by
striking ``section 1802(a)'' each place it appears and
inserting ``section 1902(a)'';
(4) in section 1(b) in the table of contents by adding at
the end the following:
``TITLE XX--FUNDING FOR FIRST RESPONDERS
``Sec. 2001. Definitions.
``Sec. 2002. Faster and Smarter Funding for First Responders.
``Sec. 2003. Covered grant eligibility and criteria.
``Sec. 2004. Risk-based evaluation and prioritization.
``Sec. 2005. Use of funds and accountability requirements.'';
and
(5) by adding at the end the following:
``TITLE XX--FUNDING FOR FIRST RESPONDERS
``SEC. 2001. DEFINITIONS.
``In this title:
``(1) Covered grant.--The term `covered grant' means any
grant to which this title applies under section 2002.
``(2) Directly eligible tribe.--The term `directly eligible
tribe' means any Indian tribe or consortium of Indian tribes
that--
``(A) meets the criteria for inclusion in the qualified
applicant pool for Self-Governance that are set forth in
section 402(c) of the Indian Self-Determination and Education
Assistance Act (25 U.S.C. 458bb(c));
``(B) employs at least 10 full-time personnel in a law
enforcement or emergency response agency with the capacity to
respond to calls for law enforcement or emergency services;
and
``(C)(i) is located on, or within 5 miles of, an
international border or waterway;
``(ii) is located within 5 miles of a facility designated
as high-risk critical infrastructure by the Secretary;
``(iii) is located within or contiguous to one of the 50
largest metropolitan statistical areas in the United States;
or
``(iv) has more than 1,000 square miles of Indian country,
as that term is defined in section 1151 of title 18, United
States Code.
``(3) Elevations in the threat alert level.--The term
`elevations in the threat alert level' means any designation
(including those that are less than national in scope) that
raises the homeland security threat level to either the
highest or second highest threat level under the Homeland
Security Advisory System referred to in section 201(d)(7).
``(4) First responder.--The term `first responder' shall
have the same meaning as the term `emergency response
provider'.
``(5) Indian tribe.--The term `Indian tribe' means any
Indian tribe, band, nation, or other organized group or
community, including any Alaskan Native village or regional
or village corporation as defined in or established pursuant
to the Alaskan Native Claims Settlement Act (43 U.S.C. 1601
et seq.), that is recognized as eligible for the special
programs and services provided by the United States to
Indians because of their status as Indians.
``(6) Region.--The term `region' means--
``(A) any geographic area consisting of all or parts of 2
or more contiguous States that have a combined population of
at least 1,650,000 or have an area of not less than 20,000
square miles, and that, for purposes of an application for a
covered grant, is represented by 1 or more governments or
governmental agencies within such geographic area, and that
is established by law or by agreement of 2 or more such
governments or governmental agencies in a mutual aid
agreement; or
``(B) any other combination of contiguous local government
units (including such a combination established by law or
agreement of two or more governments or governmental agencies
in a mutual aid agreement) that is formally certified by the
Secretary as a region for purposes of this Act with the
consent of--
``(i) the State or States in which they are located,
including a multi-State entity established by a compact
between two or more States; and
``(ii) the incorporated municipalities, counties, and
parishes that they encompass.
``(7) Terrorism preparedness.--The term `terrorism
preparedness' means any activity designed to improve the
ability to prevent, prepare for, respond to, mitigate
against, or recover from threatened or actual terrorist
attacks.
``(8) Capabilities.--The term `capabilities' shall have the
same meaning that term has under title VIII.
``SEC. 2002. FASTER AND SMARTER FUNDING FOR FIRST RESPONDERS.
``(a) Covered Grants.--This title applies to grants
provided by the Department to States, urban areas, regions,
or directly eligible tribes for the primary purpose of
improving the ability of first responders to prevent, prepare
for, respond to, mitigate
[[Page H134]]
against, or recover from threatened or actual terrorist
attacks, especially those involving weapons of mass
destruction, administered under the following:
``(1) State homeland security grant program.--The State
Homeland Security Grant Program of the Department, or any
successor to such grant program.
``(2) Urban area security initiative.--The Urban Area
Security Initiative of the Department, or any successor to
such grant program.
``(3) Law enforcement terrorism prevention program.--The
Law Enforcement Terrorism Prevention Program of the
Department, or any successor to such grant program.
``(b) Excluded Programs.--This title does not apply to or
otherwise affect the following Federal grant programs or any
grant under such a program:
``(1) Nondepartment programs.--Any Federal grant program
that is not administered by the Department.
``(2) Fire grant programs.--The fire grant programs
authorized by sections 33 and 34 of the Federal Fire
Prevention and Control Act of 1974 (15 U.S.C. 2229, 2229a).
``(3) Emergency management planning and assistance account
grants.--The Emergency Management Performance Grant program
and the Urban Search and Rescue Grants program authorized by
title VI of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and
Emergency Assistance Act (42 U.S.C. 5195 et seq.); the
Departments of Veterans Affairs and Housing and Urban
Development, and Independent Agencies Appropriations Act,
2000 (113 Stat. 1047 et seq.); and the Earthquake Hazards
Reduction Act of 1977 (42 U.S.C. 7701 et seq.).
``SEC. 2003. COVERED GRANT ELIGIBILITY AND CRITERIA.
``(a) Grant Eligibility.--
``(1) State, region, or directly eligible tribe.--Any
State, region, or directly eligible tribe shall be eligible
to apply for a covered grant under the programs referred to
in paragraphs (1) and (3) of section 1802(a).
``(2) High-threat urban areas.--Any urban area that is
determined by the Secretary to be a high-threat urban areas
shall be eligible to apply for a covered grant referred to in
paragraph (2) of section 1802(a).
``(b) Grant Criteria.--The Secretary shall award covered
grants to assist States and local governments in achieving,
maintaining, and enhancing the capabilities for terrorism
preparedness established by the Secretary.
``(c) Submission of State Preparedness Report.--
``(1) Submission required.--The Secretary shall require
that any State applying to the Secretary for a covered grant
must submit State Preparedness Report specified in section
652(c) of the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations
Act, 2007 (Public Law 109-295).
``(2) Consultation.--The State report submitted under
paragraph (1) shall be developed in consultation with and
subject to appropriate comment by local governments and first
responders within the State.
``(d) Consistency With State Plans.--
``(1) In general.--The Secretary shall ensure that each
covered grant is used to supplement and support, in a
consistent and coordinated manner, the applicable State
homeland security report or plan.
``(2) Approval of plan by secretary.--The Secretary may not
award any covered grant to a State unless the Secretary has
approved the applicable State homeland security plan.
``(3) Revisions.--A State may revise the applicable State
homeland security plan approved by the Secretary under this
subsection, subject to approval of the revision by the
Secretary.
``(e) Application for Grant.--
``(1) In general.--Except as otherwise provided in this
subsection, any State, urban area, region, or directly
eligible tribe may apply for a covered grant by submitting to
the Secretary an application at such time, in such manner,
and containing such information as is required under this
subsection, or as the Secretary may reasonably require.
``(2) Deadlines for applications and awards.--All
applications for covered grants must be submitted at such
time as the Secretary may reasonably require for the fiscal
year for which they are submitted. The Secretary shall award
covered grants pursuant to all approved applications for such
fiscal year as soon as practicable, but not later than March
1 of such year.
``(3) Availability of funds.--All funds awarded by the
Secretary under covered grants in a fiscal year shall be
available for obligation through the end of the subsequent
fiscal year.
``(4) Minimum contents of application.--The Secretary shall
require that each applicant include in its application, at a
minimum--
``(A) the purpose for which the applicant seeks covered
grant funds and the reasons why the applicant needs the
covered grant to meet the capabilities for terrorism
preparedness within the State, urban area, region, or
directly eligible tribe to which the application pertains;
``(B) a description of how, by reference to the applicable
State homeland security plan or plans under subsection (c),
the allocation of grant funding proposed in the application,
including, where applicable, the amount not passed through
under section 2005(g)(1), would assist in fulfilling the
capabilities for terrorism preparedness specified in such
plan or plans;
``(C) a statement of whether a mutual aid agreement applies
to the use of all or any portion of the covered grant funds;
``(D) if the applicant is a State, a description of how the
State plans to allocate the covered grant funds to local
governments and Indian tribes;
``(E) if the applicant is a region--
``(i) a precise geographical description of the region and
a specification of all participating and nonparticipating
local governments within the geographical area comprising
that region;
``(ii) a specification of what governmental entity within
the region will administer the expenditure of funds under the
covered grant; and
``(iii) a designation of a specific individual to serve as
regional liaison;
``(F) a capital budget showing how the applicant intends to
allocate and expend the covered grant funds;
``(G) if the applicant is a directly eligible tribe, a
designation of a specific individual to serve as the tribal
liaison; and
``(H) a statement of how the applicant intends to meet the
matching requirement, if any, that applies under section
2005(g)(2).
``(5) Regional applications.--
``(A) Relationship to state applications.--A regional
application--
``(i) shall be coordinated with an application submitted by
the State or States of which such region is a part;
``(ii) shall supplement and avoid duplication with such
State application; and
``(iii) shall address the unique regional aspects of such
region's terrorism preparedness needs beyond those provided
for in the application of such State or States.
``(B) State review and submission.--To ensure the
consistency required under subsection (d) and the
coordination required under subparagraph (A) of this
paragraph, an applicant that is a region must submit its
application to each State of which any part is included in
the region for review and concurrence prior to the submission
of such application to the Secretary. The regional
application shall be transmitted to the Secretary through
each such State within 30 days of its receipt, unless the
Governor of such a State notifies the Secretary, in writing,
that such regional application is inconsistent with the
State's homeland security plan and provides an explanation of
the reasons therefor.
``(C) Distribution of regional awards.--If the Secretary
approves a regional application, then the Secretary shall
distribute a regional award to the State or States submitting
the applicable regional application under subparagraph (B),
and each such State shall, not later than the end of the 45-
day period beginning on the date after receiving a regional
award, pass through to the region all covered grant funds or
resources purchased with such funds, except those funds
necessary for the State to carry out its responsibilities
with respect to such regional application: Provided, That in
no such case shall the State or States pass through to the
region less than 80 percent of the regional award.
``(D) Certifications regarding distribution of grant funds
to regions.--Any State that receives a regional award under
subparagraph (C) shall certify to the Secretary, by not later
than 30 days after the expiration of the period described in
subparagraph (C) with respect to the grant, that the State
has made available to the region the required funds and
resources in accordance with subparagraph (C).
``(E) Direct payments to regions.--If any State fails to
pass through a regional award to a region as required by
subparagraph (C) within 45 days after receiving such award
and does not request or receive an extension of such period
under section 2006(h)(2), the region may petition the
Secretary to receive directly the portion of the regional
award that is required to be passed through to such region
under subparagraph (C).
``(F) Regional liaisons.--A regional liaison designated
under paragraph (4)(E)(iii) shall--
``(i) coordinate with Federal, State, local, regional, and
private officials within the region concerning terrorism
preparedness;
``(ii) develop a process for receiving input from Federal,
State, local, regional, and private sector officials within
the region to assist in the development of the regional
application and to improve the region's access to covered
grants; and
``(iii) administer, in consultation with State, local,
regional, and private officials within the region, covered
grants awarded to the region.
``(6) Tribal applications.--
``(A) Submission to the state or states.--To ensure the
consistency required under subsection (d), an applicant that
is a directly eligible tribe must submit its application to
each State within the boundaries of which any part of such
tribe is located for direct submission to the Department
along with the application of such State or States.
``(B) Opportunity for state comment.--Before awarding any
covered grant to a directly eligible tribe, the Secretary
shall provide an opportunity to each State within the
boundaries of which any part of such tribe is located to
comment to the Secretary on the consistency of the tribe's
application with the State's homeland security plan. Any such
comments shall be submitted to the Secretary concurrently
with the submission of the State and tribal applications.
[[Page H135]]
``(C) Final authority.--The Secretary shall have final
authority to determine the consistency of any application of
a directly eligible tribe with the applicable State homeland
security plan or plans, and to approve any application of
such tribe. The Secretary shall notify each State within the
boundaries of which any part of such tribe is located of the
approval of an application by such tribe.
``(D) Tribal liaison.--A tribal liaison designated under
paragraph (4)(G) shall--
``(i) coordinate with Federal, State, local, regional, and
private officials concerning terrorism preparedness;
``(ii) develop a process for receiving input from Federal,
State, local, regional, and private sector officials to
assist in the development of the application of such tribe
and to improve the tribe's access to covered grants; and
``(iii) administer, in consultation with State, local,
regional, and private officials, covered grants awarded to
such tribe.
``(E) Limitation on the number of direct grants.--The
Secretary may make covered grants directly to not more than
20 directly eligible tribes per fiscal year.
``(F) Tribes not receiving direct grants.--An Indian tribe
that does not receive a grant directly under this section is
eligible to receive funds under a covered grant from the
State or States within the boundaries of which any part of
such tribe is located, consistent with the homeland security
plan of the State as described in subsection (c). If a State
fails to comply with section 2006(g)(1), the tribe may
request payment under section 2006(h)(3) in the same manner
as a local government.
``(7) Equipment standards.--If an applicant for a covered
grant proposes to upgrade or purchase, with assistance
provided under the grant, new equipment or systems that do
not meet or exceed any applicable national voluntary
consensus standards established by the Secretary, the
applicant shall include in the application an explanation of
why such equipment or systems will serve the needs of the
applicant better than equipment or systems that meet or
exceed such standards.
``SEC. 2004. RISK-BASED EVALUATION AND PRIORITIZATION.
``(a) Prioritization of Grant Applications.--
``(1) Factors to be considered.--The Secretary shall
evaluate and annually prioritize all pending applications for
covered grants based upon the degree to which they would, by
achieving, maintaining, or enhancing the capabilities of the
applicants on a nationwide basis, lessen the threat to,
vulnerability of, and consequences for persons (including
transient commuting and tourist populations) and critical
infrastructure. Such evaluation and prioritization shall be
based upon the most current risk assessment available by the
Office of Intelligence Analysis and the Office of
Infrastructure Protection of the threats of terrorism against
the United States. In establishing criteria for evaluating
and prioritizing applications for covered grants, the
Secretary shall coordinate with the National Advisory Council
established under section 508, the Director of the Federal
Emergency Management Agency, the United States Fire
Administrator, the Chief Intelligence Officer of the
Department, the Assistant Secretary for Infrastructure
Protection, and other Department officials as determined by
the Secretary.
``(2) Critical infrastructure sectors.--The Secretary
specifically shall consider threats of terrorism against the
following critical infrastructure sectors in all areas of the
United States, urban and rural:
``(A) Agriculture and food.
``(B) Banking and finance.
``(C) Chemical industries.
``(D) The defense industrial base.
``(E) Emergency services.
``(F) Energy.
``(G) Government facilities.
``(H) Postal and shipping.
``(I) Public health and health care.
``(J) Information technology.
``(K) Telecommunications.
``(L) Transportation systems.
``(M) Water.
``(N) Dams.
``(O) Commercial facilities.
``(P) National monuments and icons.
The order in which the critical infrastructure sectors are
listed in this paragraph shall not be construed as an order
of priority for consideration of the importance of such
sectors.
``(3) Types of threat.--The Secretary specifically shall
consider the following types of threat to the critical
infrastructure sectors described in paragraph (2), and to
populations in all areas of the United States, urban and
rural:
``(A) Biological threats.
``(B) Nuclear threats.
``(C) Radiological threats.
``(D) Incendiary threats.
``(E) Chemical threats.
``(F) Explosives.
``(G) Suicide bombers.
``(H) Cyber threats.
``(I) Any other threats based on proximity to specific past
acts of terrorism or the known activity of any terrorist
group.
The order in which the types of threat are listed in this
paragraph shall not be construed as an order of priority for
consideration of the importance of such threats.
``(4) Consideration of additional factors.--The Secretary
shall take into account any other specific threat to a
population (including a transient commuting or tourist
population) or critical infrastructure sector that the Board
has determined to exist. In evaluating the threat to a
population or critical infrastructure sector, the Secretary
shall give greater weight to threats of terrorism based upon
their specificity and credibility, including any pattern of
repetition.
``(5) Minimum amounts.--After evaluating and prioritizing
grant applications under paragraph (1), the Department shall
ensure that, for each fiscal year--
``(A) each of the States, other than the Virgin Islands,
American Samoa, Guam, and the Northern Mariana Islands, that
has an approved State homeland security plan receives no less
than 0.25 percent of the funds available for covered grants
for that fiscal year for purposes of implementing its
homeland security plan;
``(B) each of the States, other than the Virgin Islands,
American Samoa, Guam, and the Northern Mariana Islands, that
has an approved State homeland security plan and that meets
one or both of the additional high-risk qualifying criteria
under paragraph (6) receives no less than 0.45 percent of the
funds available for covered grants for that fiscal year for
purposes of implementing its homeland security plan;
``(C) the Virgin Islands, American Samoa, Guam, and the
Northern Mariana Islands each receives no less than 0.08
percent of the funds available for covered grants for that
fiscal year for purposes of implementing its approved State
plan; and
``(D) directly eligible tribes collectively receive no less
than 0.08 percent of the funds available for covered grants
for such fiscal year for purposes of addressing the needs
identified in the applications of such tribes, consistent
with the homeland security plan of each State within the
boundaries of which any part of any such tribe is located,
except that this clause shall not apply with respect to funds
available for a fiscal year if the Secretary receives less
than 5 applications for such fiscal year from such tribes or
does not approve at least one such application.
``(6) Additional high-risk qualifying criteria.--For
purposes of paragraph (5)(B), additional high-risk qualifying
criteria consist of--
``(A) having a significant international land border; or
``(B) adjoining a body of water within North America
through which an international boundary line extends.
``(b) Effect of Regional Awards on State Minimum.--Any
regional award, or portion thereof, provided to a State under
section 2003(e)(5)(C) shall not be considered in calculating
the minimum State award under subsection (a)(5) of this
section.
``(c) Relationship to Other Programs.--This section shall
be carried out in consultation with the Secretary of Health
and Human Services. Nothing in this section affects the scope
of authority of the Secretary of Health and Human Services,
including such authority under the Public Health Service Act.
``SEC. 2005. USE OF FUNDS AND ACCOUNTABILITY REQUIREMENTS.
``(a) In General.--A covered grant may be used for--
``(1) purchasing or upgrading equipment, including computer
hardware and software, to enhance terrorism preparedness;
``(2) exercises to strengthen terrorism preparedness;
``(3) training for prevention (including detection) of,
preparedness for, response to, or recovery from attacks
involving weapons of mass destruction, including training in
the use of equipment and computer software;
``(4) developing or updating State homeland security plans,
risk assessments, mutual aid agreements, and emergency
management plans to enhance terrorism preparedness;
``(5) establishing or enhancing mechanisms for sharing
terrorism threat information;
``(6) systems architecture and engineering, program
planning and management, strategy formulation and strategic
planning, life-cycle systems design, product and technology
evaluation, and prototype development for terrorism
preparedness purposes;
``(7) additional personnel costs resulting from--
``(A) elevations in the threat alert level of the Homeland
Security Advisory System by the Secretary, or a similar
elevation in threat alert level issued by a State, region, or
local government with the approval of the Secretary;
``(B) travel to and participation in exercises and training
in the use of equipment and on prevention activities;
``(C) the temporary replacement of personnel during any
period of travel to and participation in exercises and
training in the use of equipment and on prevention
activities; and
``(D) the hiring of staff to serve as intelligence analysts
to strengthen information and intelligence sharing
capabilities;
``(8) the costs of equipment (including software) required
to receive, transmit, handle, and store classified
information;
``(9) protecting critical infrastructure against potential
attack by the addition of barriers, fences, gates, and other
such devices that are constructed consistent with the
requirements of section 6(j)(9) of the Robert T. Stafford
Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (42 U.S.C.
5196(j)(9), except that the cost of such measures may not
exceed the greater of--
``(A) $1,000,000 per project; or
[[Page H136]]
``(B) such greater amount as may be approved by the
Secretary, which may not exceed 10 percent of the total
amount of the covered grant;
``(10) the costs of commercially available interoperable
communications equipment (that, where applicable, is based on
national, voluntary consensus standards) that the Secretary,
in consultation with the Assistant Secretary for Emergency
Communications, deems best suited to facilitate
interoperability, coordination, and integration between and
among emergency communications systems, and that complies
with prevailing grant guidance of the Department for
interoperable communications;
``(11) educational curricula development for first
responders to ensure that they are prepared for terrorist
attacks;
``(12) training and exercises to assist public elementary
and secondary schools in developing and implementing programs
to instruct students regarding age-appropriate skills to
prevent, prepare for, respond to, mitigate against, or
recover from an act of terrorism;
``(13) paying of administrative expenses directly related
to administration of the grant, except that such expenses may
not exceed 3 percent of the amount of the grant;
``(14) Public safety answering points;
``(15) paying for the conduct of any activity permitted
under the Law Enforcement Terrorism Prevention Program, or
any such successor to such program; and
``(16) other appropriate activities as determined by the
Secretary.
``(b) Prohibited Uses.--Funds provided as a covered grant
may not be used--
``(1) to supplant State or local funds;
``(2) to construct buildings or other physical facilities;
``(3) to acquire land; or
``(4) for any State or local government cost-sharing
contribution.
``(c) Intelligence Analysts.--An individual hired to serve
as an intelligence analyst under subsection (a)(7)(D) must
meet at least one of the following criteria:
``(1) The individual has successfully completed training
that meets the standards of the International Association of
Law Enforcement Intelligence Analysts to ensure baseline
proficiency in intelligence analysis and production.
``(2) The individual has previously served in a Federal
intelligence agency as an intelligence analyst for at least
two years.
``(d) Multiple-Purpose Funds.--Nothing in this section
shall be construed to preclude State and local governments
from using covered grant funds in a manner that also enhances
first responder preparedness for emergencies and disasters
unrelated to acts of terrorism, if such use assists such
governments in achieving capabilities for terrorism
preparedness established by the Secretary.
``(e) Reimbursement of Costs.--
``(1) Paid-on-call or volunteer reimbursement.--In addition
to the activities described in subsection (a), a covered
grant may be used to provide a reasonable stipend to paid-on-
call or volunteer first responders who are not otherwise
compensated for travel to or participation in training
covered by this section. Any such reimbursement shall not be
considered compensation for purposes of rendering such a
first responder an employee under the Fair Labor Standards
Act of 1938 (29 U.S.C. 201 et seq.).
``(2) Performance of federal duty.--An applicant for a
covered grant may petition the Secretary for the
reimbursement of the cost of any activity relating to
prevention (including detection) of, preparedness for,
response to, or recovery from acts of terrorism that is a
Federal duty and usually performed by a Federal agency, and
that is being performed by a State or local government (or
both) under agreement with a Federal agency.
``(f) Assistance Requirement.--The Secretary may not
require that equipment paid for, wholly or in part, with
funds provided as a covered grant be made available for
responding to emergencies in surrounding States, regions, and
localities, unless the Secretary undertakes to pay the costs
directly attributable to transporting and operating such
equipment during such response.
``(g) Flexibility in Unspent Homeland Security Grant
Funds.--Upon request by the recipient of a covered grant, the
Secretary may authorize the grantee to transfer all or part
of funds provided as the covered grant from uses specified in
the grant agreement to other uses authorized under this
section, if the Secretary determines that such transfer is in
the interests of homeland security.
``(h) State, Regional, and Tribal Responsibilities.--
``(1) Pass-through.--The Secretary shall require a
recipient of a covered grant that is a State to obligate or
otherwise make available to local governments, first
responders, and other local groups, to the extent required
under the State homeland security plan or plans specified in
the application for the grant, not less than 80 percent of
the grant funds, resources purchased with the grant funds
having a value equal to at least 80 percent of the amount of
the grant, or a combination thereof, by not later than the
end of the 45-day period beginning on the date the grant
recipient receives the grant funds.
``(2) Cost sharing.--
``(A) In general.--The Federal share of the costs of an
activity carried out with a covered grant to a State, region,
or directly eligible tribe awarded after the 2-year period
beginning on the date of the enactment of this section shall
not exceed 75 percent.
``(B) Interim rule.--The Federal share of the costs of an
activity carried out with a covered grant awarded before the
end of the 2-year period beginning on the date of the
enactment of this section shall be 100 percent.
``(C) In-kind matching.--Each recipient of a covered grant
may meet the matching requirement under subparagraph (A) by
making in-kind contributions of goods or services that are
directly linked with the purpose for which the grant is made,
including, but not limited to, any necessary personnel
overtime, contractor services, administrative costs,
equipment fuel and maintenance, and rental space.
``(3) Certifications regarding distribution of grant funds
to local governments.--Any State that receives a covered
grant shall certify to the Secretary, by not later than 30
days after the expiration of the period described in
paragraph (1) with respect to the grant, that the State has
made available for expenditure by local governments, first
responders, and other local groups the required amount of
grant funds pursuant to paragraph (1).
``(4) Quarterly report on homeland security spending.--The
Federal share described in paragraph (2)(A) may be increased
by up to 2 percent for any State, region, or directly
eligible tribe that, not later than 30 days after the end of
each fiscal quarter, submits to the Secretary a report on
that fiscal quarter. Each such report must include, for each
recipient of a covered grant or a pass-through under
paragraph (1)--
``(A) the amount obligated to that recipient in that
quarter;
``(B) the amount expended by that recipient in that
quarter; and
``(C) a summary description of the items purchased by such
recipient with such amount.
``(5) Annual report on homeland security spending.--Each
recipient of a covered grant shall submit an annual report to
the Secretary not later than 60 days after the end of each
Federal fiscal year. Each recipient of a covered grant that
is a region must simultaneously submit its report to each
State of which any part is included in the region. Each
recipient of a covered grant that is a directly eligible
tribe must simultaneously submit its report to each State
within the boundaries of which any part of such tribe is
located. Each report must include the following:
``(A) The amount, ultimate recipients, and dates of receipt
of all funds received under the grant during the previous
fiscal year.
``(B) The amount and the dates of disbursements of all such
funds expended in compliance with paragraph (1) or pursuant
to mutual aid agreements or other sharing arrangements that
apply within the State, region, or directly eligible tribe,
as applicable, during the previous fiscal year.
``(C) How the funds were utilized by each ultimate
recipient or beneficiary during the preceding fiscal year.
``(D) The extent to which capabilities identified in the
applicable State homeland security plan or plans were
achieved, maintained, or enhanced as the result of the
expenditure of grant funds during the preceding fiscal year.
``(E) The extent to which capabilities identified in the
applicable State homeland security plan or plans remain
unmet.
``(6) Inclusion of restricted annexes.--A recipient of a
covered grant may submit to the Secretary an annex to the
annual report under paragraph (5) that is subject to
appropriate handling restrictions, if the recipient believes
that discussion in the report of unmet needs would reveal
sensitive but unclassified information.
``(i) Incentives to Efficient Administration of Homeland
Security Grants.--
``(1) Penalties for delay in passing through local share.--
If a recipient of a covered grant that is a State fails to
pass through to local governments, first responders, and
other local groups funds or resources required by subsection
(g)(1) within 45 days after receiving funds under the grant,
the Secretary may--
``(A) reduce grant payments to the grant recipient from the
portion of grant funds that is not required to be passed
through under subsection (g)(1);
``(B) terminate payment of funds under the grant to the
recipient, and transfer the appropriate portion of those
funds directly to local first responders that were intended
to receive funding under that grant; or
``(C) impose additional restrictions or burdens on the
recipient's use of funds under the grant, which may include--
``(i) prohibiting use of such funds to pay the grant
recipient's grant-related overtime or other expenses;
``(ii) requiring the grant recipient to distribute to local
government beneficiaries all or a portion of grant funds that
are not required to be passed through under subsection
(g)(1); or
``(iii) for each day that the grant recipient fails to pass
through funds or resources in accordance with subsection
(g)(1), reducing grant payments to the grant recipient from
the portion of grant funds that is not required to be passed
through under subsection (g)(1), except that the total amount
of such reduction may not exceed 20 percent of the total
amount of the grant.
``(2) Extension of period.--The Governor of a State may
request in writing that the
[[Page H137]]
Secretary extend the 45-day period under section
2003(e)(5)(E) or paragraph (1) for an additional 15-day
period. The Secretary may approve such a request, and may
extend such period for additional 15-day periods, if the
Secretary determines that the resulting delay in providing
grant funding to the local government entities that will
receive funding under the grant will not have a significant
detrimental impact on such entities' terrorism preparedness
efforts.
``(3) Provision of non-local share to local government.--
``(A) In general.--The Secretary may upon request by a
local government pay to the local government a portion of the
amount of a covered grant awarded to a State in which the
local government is located, if--
``(i) the local government will use the amount paid to
expedite planned enhancements to its terrorism preparedness
as described in any applicable State homeland security plan
or plans;
``(ii) the State has failed to pass through funds or
resources in accordance with subsection (g)(1); and
``(iii) the local government complies with subparagraphs
(B) and (C).
``(B) Showing required.--To receive a payment under this
paragraph, a local government must demonstrate that--
``(i) it is identified explicitly as an ultimate recipient
or intended beneficiary in the approved grant application;
``(ii) it was intended by the grantee to receive a
severable portion of the overall grant for a specific purpose
that is identified in the grant application;
``(iii) it petitioned the grantee for the funds or
resources after expiration of the period within which the
funds or resources were required to be passed through under
subsection (g)(1); and
``(iv) it did not receive the portion of the overall grant
that was earmarked or designated for its use or benefit.
``(C) Effect of payment.--Payment of grant funds to a local
government under this paragraph--
``(i) shall not affect any payment to another local
government under this paragraph; and
``(ii) shall not prejudice consideration of a request for
payment under this paragraph that is submitted by another
local government.
``(D) Deadline for action by secretary.--The Secretary
shall approve or disapprove each request for payment under
this paragraph by not later than 15 days after the date the
request is received by the Department.
``(j) Reports to Congress.--The Secretary shall submit an
annual report to Congress by January 31 of each year covering
the preceding fiscal year--
``(1) describing in detail the amount of Federal funds
provided as covered grants that were directed to each State,
region, and directly eligible tribe in the preceding fiscal
year;
``(2) containing information on the use of such grant funds
by grantees; and
``(3) describing--
``(A) the Nation's progress in achieving, maintaining, and
enhancing the capabilities established by the Secretary as a
result of the expenditure of covered grant funds during the
preceding fiscal year; and
``(B) an estimate of the amount of expenditures required to
attain across the United States the essential capabilities
established by the Secretary.''.
TITLE II--ENSURING COMMUNICATIONS INTEROPERABILITY FOR FIRST RESPONDERS
SEC. 201. IMPROVE COMMUNICATIONS FOR EMERGENCY RESPONSE GRANT
PROGRAM.
(a) Establishment.--Title V of the Homeland Security Act of
2002 (6 U.S.C. 311 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end
the following new section:
``SEC. 522. IMPROVE COMMUNICATIONS FOR EMERGENCY RESPONSE
GRANT PROGRAM.
``(a) Establishment.--The Secretary, acting through the
Director of the Office of Grants and Training and in
coordination with the Director for Emergency Communications,
shall establish the Improve Communications for Emergency
Response Grant Program to make grants to States and regions
to carry out initiatives to improve interoperable emergency
communications, including initiatives to achieve solutions to
statewide, regional, national, and, where appropriate,
international interoperability.
``(b) Use of Grant Funds.--A State or region receiving a
grant under this section may use the grant for short-term or
long-term goals for improving interoperable emergency
communications, including interoperability within that State
or region, and to assist with--
``(1) statewide or regional communications planning;
``(2) design and engineering for interoperable emergency
communications systems;
``(3) procurement and installation of interoperable
emergency communications equipment;
``(4) interoperable emergency communications exercises;
``(5) modeling and simulation exercises for operational
command and control functions;
``(6) technical assistance and training for interoperable
emergency communications; and
``(7) other activities determined by the Secretary to be
integral to interoperable emergency communications.
``(c) Region Defined.--For the purposes of this section,
the term `region' means any combination of contiguous local
government units, including such a combination established by
law or mutual aid agreement between two or more local
governments or governmental agencies.''.
(b) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized
to be appropriated to the Secretary of Homeland Security for
grants under section 522 of the Homeland Security Act of
2002, as added by subsection (a)--
(1) such sums as may be necessary for the first fiscal year
that begins after the later of--
(A) the date on which the Secretary of Homeland Security
completes and submits to Congress the National Emergency
Communications Plan required under section 1802 of the
Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 572);
(B) the date on which the Secretary of Homeland Security
completes and submits to Congress the first baseline
interoperability assessment required under section 1803 of
such Act (6 U.S.C. 573); or
(C) the date on which the Secretary of Homeland Security,
after consultation with the Director of Emergency
Communications, determines and notifies Congress that
substantial progress has been made towards the development
and promulgation of voluntary consensus-based interoperable
communications standards pursuant to section 1801(c)(11) of
such Act (6 U.S.C. 571(c)(11)); and
(2) such sums as may be necessary for each subsequent
fiscal year.
(c) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents in section
1(b) of that Act is amended by inserting after the item
relating to section 521 the following:
``Sec. 522. Improve Communications for Emergency Response Grant
Program.''.
TITLE III--STRENGTHENING USE OF A UNIFIED INCIDENT COMMAND DURING
EMERGENCIES
SEC. 301. NATIONAL EXERCISE PROGRAM DESIGN.
Section 648(b)(2)(A) of the Department of Homeland Security
Appropriations Act, 2007 (Public Law 109-295) is amended by
striking clauses (iv) and (v) and inserting the following:
``(iv) designed to provide for systematic evaluation of
readiness and enhance operational understanding of the
Incident Command System and relevant mutual aid agreements;
``(v) designed to address the unique requirements of
populations with special needs; and
``(vi) designed to include the prompt development of after-
action reports and plans for quickly incorporating lessons
learned into future operations; and''.
SEC. 302. NATIONAL EXERCISE PROGRAM MODEL EXERCISES.
Section 648(b)(2)(B) of the Department of Homeland Security
Appropriations Act, 2007 (Public Law 109-295) is amended by
striking so much as precedes clause (i) and inserting the
following:
``(B) shall include a selection of model exercises that
State, local, and tribal governments can readily adapt for
use, and shall provide assistance to State, local, and tribal
governments with the design, implementation, and evaluation
of exercises, whether a model exercise program or an exercise
designed locally, that--''.
SEC. 303. RESPONSIBILITIES OF REGIONAL ADMINISTRATORS OF THE
FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY.
Section 507(c)(2) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002
(enacted by section 611 of the Department of Homeland
Security Appropriations Act, 2007 (Public Law 109-295)) is
amended by striking ``and'' after the semicolon at the end of
subparagraph (H), by redesignating subparagraph (I) as
subparagraph (J), and by inserting after subparagraph (H) the
following:
``(I) assisting State, local, or tribal governments, where
appropriate, to pre-identify and evaluate suitable sites
where a multi-jurisdictional unified command system can be
quickly established if the need for such a system arises;
and''.
TITLE IV--STRENGTHENING AVIATION SECURITY
SEC. 401. INSTALLATION OF IN-LINE BAGGAGE SCREENING
EQUIPMENT.
Not later than 30 days after the date of enactment of this
Act, the Secretary for Homeland Security shall submit to the
appropriate congressional committees the cost sharing study
described in section 4019(d) of the Intelligence Reform and
Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (118 Stat. 3722), together
with the Secretary's analysis of the study, a list of
provisions of the study the Secretary intends to implement,
and a plan and schedule for implementation of such listed
provisions.
SEC. 402. AVIATION SECURITY CAPITAL FUND.
(a) In General.--Section 44923(h)(1) of title 49, United
States Code, is amended in the second sentence by striking
``2007'' and inserting ``2011''.
(b) Discretionary Grants.--Section 44923(h)(3) of such
title is amended by striking ``for a fiscal year,
$125,000,000'' and inserting ``, $125,000,000 for each of
fiscal years
[[Page H138]]
2004, 2005, and 2006 and such sums as may be necessary for
each of fiscal years 2007 through 2011''.
SEC. 403. AIRPORT CHECKPOINT SCREENING EXPLOSIVE DETECTION.
Section 44940 of title 49, United States Code, is amended--
(1) in subsection (d)(4) by inserting ``, other than
subsection (i),'' before ``except to''; and
(2) by adding at the end the following:
``(i) Checkpoint Screening Security Fund.--
``(1) Establishment.--There is established in the
Department of Homeland Security a fund to be known as the
`Checkpoint Screening Security Fund'.
``(2) Deposits.--In fiscal year 2008, after amounts are
made available under section 44923(h), the next $250,000,000
derived from fees received under subsection (a)(1) shall be
available to be deposited in the Fund.
``(3) Fees.--The Secretary of Homeland Security shall
impose the fee authorized by subsection (a)(1) so as to
collect at least $250,000,000 in fiscal year 2008 for deposit
into the Fund.
``(4) Availability of amounts.--Amounts in the Fund shall
be available until expended for the research, development,
purchase, deployment, and installation of equipment to
improve the ability of security screening personnel at
screening checkpoints to detect explosives.''.
SEC. 404. STRENGTHENING EXPLOSIVE DETECTION AT AIRPORT
SCREENING CHECKPOINTS.
Not later than 7 days after the date of enactment of this
Act, the Assistant Secretary for Homeland Security
(Transportation Security Administration) shall submit to the
appropriate congressional committees the strategic plan
described in the section amended by section 4013(a) of the
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (118
Stat. 3719).
SEC. 405. EXTENSION OF AUTHORIZATION OF AVIATION SECURITY
FUNDING.
Section 48301(a) of title 49, United States Code, is
amended by striking ``and 2006'' and inserting ``2006, 2007,
2008, 2009, 2010, and 2011''.
SEC. 406. INSPECTION OF CARGO CARRIED ABOARD PASSENGER
AIRCRAFT.
(a) In General.--Section 44901 of title 49, United States
Code, is amended--
(1) by redesignating subsections (g) and (h) as subsections
(h) and (i), respectively; and
(2) by inserting after subsection (f) the following:
``(g) Air Cargo on Passenger Aircraft.--
``(1) In general.--Not later than 3 years after the date of
enactment of the Implementing the 9/11 Commission
Recommendations Act of 2007, the Secretary of Homeland
Security shall establish a system to inspect 100 percent of
cargo transported on passenger aircraft operated by an air
carrier or foreign air carrier in air transportation or
intrastate air transportation to ensure the security of all
such passenger aircraft carrying cargo.
``(2) Minimum standards.--The system referred to in
paragraph (1) shall require, at a minimum, that equipment,
technology, procedures, and personnel are used to inspect
cargo carried on passenger aircraft to provide a level of
security equivalent to the level of security for the
inspection of passenger checked baggage as follows:
``(A) 35 percent of such cargo is so inspected by the end
of fiscal year 2007.
``(B) 65 percent of such cargo is so inspected by the end
of fiscal year 2008.
``(C) 100 percent of such cargo is so inspected by the end
of fiscal year 2009.
``(3) Regulations.--
``(A) Interim final rule.--The Secretary of Homeland
Security may issue an interim final rule as a temporary
regulation to implement this subsection without regard to the
provisions of chapter 5 of title 5.
``(B) Final rule.--
``(i) In general.--If the Secretary issues an interim final
rule under subparagraph (A), the Secretary shall issue, not
later than one year after the effective date of the interim
final rule, a final rule as a permanent regulation to
implement this subsection in accordance with the provisions
of chapter 5 of title 5.
``(ii) Failure to act.--If the Secretary does not issue a
final rule in accordance with clause (i) on or before the
last day of the 1-year period referred to in clause (i), the
interim final rule issued under subparagraph (A) shall not be
effective after the last day of such period.
``(iii) Superceding of interim final rule.--The final rule
issued in accordance with this subparagraph shall supersede
the interim final rule issued under subparagraph (A).
``(4) Report.--Not later than 1 year after the date of
establishment of the system under paragraph (1), the
Secretary shall transmit to Congress a report that describes
the system.''.
(b) Assessment of Exemptions.--
(1) TSA assessment of exemptions.--
(A) In general.--Not later than 120 days after the date of
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Homeland Security
shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress and to
the Comptroller General a report regarding an assessment of
each exemption granted for inspection of air cargo and an
analysis to assess the risk of maintaining such exemption.
(B) Contents.--The report referred to in subparagraph (A)
shall include--
(i) the rationale for each exemption;
(ii) what percentage of cargo is not screened as a result
of each exemption;
(iii) the impact of each exemption on aviation security;
(iv) the projected impact on the flow of commerce of
eliminating each exemption, respectively, should the
Secretary choose to take such action; and
(v) plans and rationale for maintaining, changing, or
eliminating each exemption.
(2) GAO assessment.--Not later than 120 days after the date
on which the report under paragraph (1) is submitted, the
Comptroller General shall review the report and provide to
Congress an assessment of the methodology of determinations
made by the Secretary for maintaining, changing, or
eliminating an exemption.
SEC. 407. APPEAL AND REDRESS PROCESS FOR PASSENGERS WRONGLY
DELAYED OR PROHIBITED FROM BOARDING A FLIGHT.
(a) In General.--Subtitle C of title IV of the Homeland
Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 231 et. seq.) is amended by
adding at the end the following:
``SEC. 432. APPEAL AND REDRESS PROCESS FOR PASSENGERS WRONGLY
DELAYED OR PROHIBITED FROM BOARDING A FLIGHT.
``(a) In General.--The Secretary shall establish a timely
and fair process for individuals who believe they have been
delayed or prohibited from boarding a commercial aircraft
because they were wrongly identified as a threat under the
regimes utilized by the Transportation Security
Administration, the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection,
or any other Department entity.
``(b) Office of Appeals and Redress.--
``(1) Establishment.--The Secretary shall establish an
Office of Appeals and Redress to oversee the process
established by the Secretary pursuant to subsection (a).
``(2) Records.--The process established by the Secretary
pursuant to subsection (a) shall include the establishment of
a method by which the Office of Appeals and Redress, under
the direction of the Secretary, will be able to maintain a
record of air carrier passengers and other individuals who
have been misidentified and have corrected erroneous
information.
``(3) Information.--To prevent repeated delays of a
misidentified passenger or other individual, the Office of
Appeals and Redress shall--
``(A) ensure that the records maintained under this
subsection contain information determined by the Secretary to
authenticate the identity of such a passenger or individual;
and
``(B) furnish to the Transportation Security
Administration, the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection,
or any other appropriate Department entity, upon request,
such information as may be necessary to allow such agencies
to assist air carriers in improving their administration of
the advanced passenger prescreening system and reduce the
number of false positives.
``(4) Initiation of appeal and redress process at
airports.--The Office of Appeals and Redress shall establish
at each airport at which the Department has a significant
presence a process to allow air carrier passengers to begin
the appeals process established pursuant to subsection (a) at
the airport.''.
(b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents in section
1(b) of such Act is amended by inserting after the item
relating to section 430 the following:
``Sec. 432. Appeal and redress process for passengers wrongly delayed
or prohibited from boarding a flight.''.
SEC. 408. TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION PERSONNEL
MANAGEMENT.
(a) Elimination of Certain Personnel Management
Authorities.--Effective 90 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act--
(1) section 111(d) of the Aviation and Transportation
Security Act (49 U.S.C. 44935 note) is repealed and any
authority of the Secretary of Homeland Security derived from
such section 111(d) shall terminate;
(2) any personnel management system, to the extent
established or modified pursuant to such section 111(d)
(including by the Secretary through the exercise of any
authority derived from such section 111(d)) shall terminate;
and
(3) the Secretary shall ensure that all TSA employees are
subject to the same personnel management system as described
in subsection (e)(1) or (e)(2).
(b) Establishment of Certain Uniformity Requirements.--
(1) System under subsection (e)(1).--The Secretary shall,
with respect to any personnel management system described in
subsection (e)(1), take any measures which may be necessary
to provide for the uniform treatment of all TSA employees
under such system.
(2) System under subsection (e)(1).--Section 9701(b) of
title 5, United States Code, is amended--
(A) by striking ``and'' at the end of paragraph (4);
(B) by striking the period at the end of paragraph (5) and
inserting ``; and''; and
(C) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
``(6) provide for the uniform treatment of all TSA
employees (as defined in section 408(d) of the Implementing
the 9/11 Commission Recommendations Act of 2007).''.
(3) Effective date.--
(A) Provisions relating to a system under subsection
(e)(1).--Any measures necessary to carry out paragraph (1)
shall take
[[Page H139]]
effect 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act.
(B) Provisions relating to a system under subsection
(e)(2).--Any measures necessary to carry out the amendments
made by paragraph (2) shall take effect 90 days after the
date of the enactment of this Act or, if later, the
commencement date of the system involved.
(c) Report to Congress.--
(1) Report required.--Not later than 6 months after the
date of the enactment of this Act, the Government
Accountability Office shall submit to the Committee on
Homeland Security of the House of Representatives and the
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of
the Senate a report on--
(A) the pay system that applies with respect to TSA
employees as of the date of the enactment of this Act; and
(B) any changes to such system which would be made under
any regulations which have been prescribed under chapter 97
of title 5, United States Code.
(2) Matters for inclusion.--The report required under
paragraph (1) shall include--
(A) a brief description of each pay system described in
paragraphs (1)(A) and (1)(B), respectively;
(B) a comparison of the relative advantages and
disadvantages of each of those pay systems; and
(C) such other matters as the Government Accountability
Office considers appropriate.
(d) TSA Employee Defined.--In this section, the term ``TSA
employee'' means an individual who holds--
(1) any position which was transferred (or the incumbent of
which was transferred) from the Transportation Security
Administration of the Department of Transportation to the
Department of Homeland Security by section 403 of the
Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 203); or
(2) any other position within the Department of Homeland
Security the duties and responsibilities of which include
carrying out one or more of the functions that were
transferred from the Transportation Security Administration
of the Department of Transportation to the Secretary by such
section.
(e) Personnel Management System Described.--A personnel
management system described in this subsection is--
(1) any personnel management system, to the extent that it
applies with respect to any TSA employees by virtue of
section 114(n) of title 49, United States Code; and
(2) any human resources management system, established
under chapter 97 of title 5, United States Code.
SEC. 409. STRATEGIC PLAN TO TEST AND IMPLEMENT ADVANCED
PASSENGER PRESCREENING SYSTEM.
Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of
the Act, the Secretary of Homeland Security shall submit to
Congress a plan that--
(1) describes the system to be utilized for the Department
of Homeland Security to assume the performance of comparing
passenger information, as defined by the Assistant Secretary
of Homeland Security (Transportation Security
Administration), to the automatic selectee and no fly lists,
utilizing appropriate records in the consolidated and
integrated terrorist watchlist maintained by the Federal
Government;
(2) provides a projected timeline for each phase of testing
and implementation of the system;
(3) explains how the system will be integrated with the
prescreening system for passenger on international flights;
and
(4) describes how the system complies with section 552a of
title 5, United States Code.
TITLE V--STRENGTHENING THE SECURITY OF CARGO CONTAINERS
SEC. 501. REQUIREMENTS RELATING TO ENTRY OF CONTAINERS INTO
THE UNITED STATES.
(a) Requirements.--Section 70116 of title 46, United States
Code, is amended by adding at the end the following new
subsection:
``(c) Requirements Relating to Entry of Containers.--
``(1) In general.--A container may enter the United States,
either directly or via a foreign port, only if--
``(A) the container is scanned with equipment that meets
the standards established pursuant to paragraph (2)(A) and a
copy of the scan is provided to the Secretary; and
``(B) the container is secured with a seal that meets the
standards established pursuant to paragraph (2)(B), before
the container is loaded on the vessel for shipment to the
United States.
``(2) Standards for scanning equipment and seals.--
``(A) Scanning equipment.--The Secretary shall establish
standards for scanning equipment required to be used under
paragraph (1)(A) to ensure that such equipment uses the best-
available technology, including technology to scan a
container for radiation and density and, if appropriate, for
atomic elements.
``(B) Seals.--The Secretary shall establish standards for
seals required to be used under paragraph (1)(B) to ensure
that such seals use the best-available technology, including
technology to detect any breach into a container and identify
the time of such breach.
``(C) Review and revision.--The Secretary shall--
``(i) review and, if necessary, revise the standards
established pursuant to subparagraphs (A) and (B) not less
than once every two years; and
``(ii) ensure that any such revised standards require the
use of technology, as soon as such technology becomes
available, to--
``(I) identify the place of a breach into a container;
``(II) notify the Secretary of such breach before the
container enters the Exclusive Economic Zone of the United
States; and
``(III) track the time and location of the container during
transit to the United States, including by truck, rail, or
vessel.
``(D) Definition.--In subparagraph (C), the term `Exclusive
Economic Zone of the United States' has the meaning given the
term `Exclusive Economic Zone' in section 2101(10a) of this
title.''.
(b) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized
to be appropriated to carry out section 70116(c) of title 46,
United States Code, as added by subsection (a) of this
section, such sums as may be necessary for each of the fiscal
years 2008 through 2013.
(c) Regulations; Application.--
(1) Regulations.--
(A) Interim final rule.--Consistent with the results of and
lessons derived from the pilot system implemented under
section 231 of the SAFE Port Act (Public Law 109-347), the
Secretary of Homeland Security shall issue an interim final
rule as a temporary regulation to implement section 70116(c)
of title 46, United States Code, as added by subsection (a)
of this section, not later than 180 days after the date of
the submission of the report under section 231 of the SAFE
Port Act, without regard to the provisions of chapter 5 of
title 5, United States Code.
(B) Final rule.--The Secretary shall issue a final rule as
a permanent regulation to implement section 70116(c) of title
46, United States Code, as added by subsection (a) of this
section, not later than one year after the date of the
submission of the report under section 231 of the SAFE Port
Act, in accordance with the provisions of chapter 5 of title
5, United States Code. The final rule issued pursuant to that
rulemaking may supersede the interim final rule issued
pursuant to subparagraph (A).
(2) Phased-in application.--
(A) In general.--The requirements of section 70116(c) of
title 46, United States Code, as added by subsection (a) of
this section, apply with respect to any container entering
the United States, either directly or via a foreign port,
beginning on--
(i) the end of the 3-year period beginning on the date of
the enactment of this Act, in the case of a container loaded
on a vessel destined for the United States in a country in
which more than 75,000 twenty-foot equivalent units of
containers were loaded on vessels for shipping to the United
States in 2005; and
(ii) the end of the 5-year period beginning on the date of
the enactment of this Act, in the case of a container loaded
on a vessel destined for the United States in any other
country.
(B) Extension.--The Secretary may extend by up to one year
the period under clause (i) or (ii) of subparagraph (A) for
containers loaded in a port, if the Secretary--
(i) finds that the scanning equipment required under
section 70116(c) of title 46, United States Code, as added by
subsection (a) of this section, is not available for purchase
and installation in the port; and
(ii) at least 60 days prior to issuing such extension,
transmits such finding to the appropriate congressional
committees.
(d) International Cargo Security Standards.--The Secretary,
in consultation with the Secretary of State, is encouraged to
promote and establish international standards for the
security of containers moving through the international
supply chain with foreign governments and international
organizations, including the International Maritime
Organization and the World Customs Organization.
(e) International Trade and Other Obligations.--In carrying
out section 70116(c) of title 46, United States Code, as
added by subsection (a) of this section, the Secretary shall
consult with appropriate Federal departments and agencies and
private sector stakeholders to ensure that actions under such
section do not violate international trade obligations or
other international obligations of the United States.
TITLE VI--STRENGTHENING EFFORTS TO PREVENT TERRORIST TRAVEL
Subtitle A--Human Smuggling and Trafficking Center Improvements
SEC. 601. STRENGTHENING THE CAPABILITIES OF THE HUMAN
SMUGGLING AND TRAFFICKING CENTER.
(a) In General.--The Secretary, acting through the
Assistant Secretary of Homeland Security for United States
Immigration and Customs Enforcement, shall provide to the
Human Smuggling and Trafficking Center (in this section
referred to as the ``Center'') the administrative support and
funding required for its maintenance, including funding for
personnel, leasing of office space, supplies, equipment,
technology, training, and travel expenses necessary for the
Center to carry out its mission.
(b) Staffing of the Center.--
(1) In general.--Funding provided under subsection (a)
shall be used for the hiring of for not fewer than 30 full-
time equivalent staff for the Center, to include the
following:
(A) One Director.
(B) One Deputy Director for Smuggling.
(C) One Deputy Director for Trafficking.
(D) One Deputy Director for Terrorist Travel.
(E) Not fewer than 15 intelligence analysts or Special
Agents, to include the following:
[[Page H140]]
(i) Not fewer than ten such analysts or Agents shall be
intelligence analysts or law enforcement agents who shall be
detailed from entities within the Department of Homeland
Security with human smuggling and trafficking related
responsibilities, as determined by the Secretary.
(ii) Not fewer than one full time professional staff
detailee from each of the United States Coast Guard, United
States Immigration and Customs Enforcement, United States
Customs and Border Protection, Transportation Security
Administration, and the Office of Intelligence and Analysis.
(2) Requirements.--Intelligence analysts or Special Agents
detailed to the Center under paragraph (1)(E) shall have at
least three years experience related to human smuggling or
human trafficking.
(3) Duration of assignment.--An intelligence analyst or
Special Agent detailed to the Center under paragraph (1)(E)
shall be detailed for a period of not less than two years.
(c) Funding Reimbursement.--In operating the Center, the
Secretary of Homeland Security shall act in accordance with
all applicable requirements of the Economy Act (31 U.S.C.
1535), and shall seek reimbursement from the Attorney General
and the Secretary of State, in such amount or proportion as
is appropriate, for costs associated with the participation
of the Department of Justice and the Department of State in
the operation of the Center.
(d) Development of Plan.--The Secretary of Homeland
Security shall develop a plan for the Center that--
(1) defines the roles and responsibilities of each
Department participating in the Center;
(2) describes how the Department of Homeland Security shall
utilize its resources to ensure that the Center uses
intelligence to focus and drive its efforts;
(3) describes the mechanism for the sharing of information
from United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement and
United States Customs and Border Protection field offices to
the Center;
(4) describes the mechanism for the sharing of homeland
security information from the Center to the Office of
Intelligence and Analysis, including how such sharing shall
be consistent with section 1016(b) of the Intelligence Reform
and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (Public Law 108-458);
(5) establishes reciprocal security clearance status to
other participating agencies in the Center in order to ensure
full access to necessary databases;
(6) establishes or consolidates networked systems for the
Center; and
(7) ensures that the assignment of personnel to the Center
from agencies of the Department of Homeland Security is
incorporated into the civil service career path of such
personnel.
(e) Memorandum of Understanding.--The Secretary of Homeland
Security shall execute with the Attorney General a Memorandum
of Understanding in order to clarify cooperation and
coordination between United States Immigration and Customs
Enforcement and the Federal Bureau of Investigation regarding
issues related to human smuggling, human trafficking, and
terrorist travel.
(f) Coordination With the Office of Intelligence and
Analysis.--The Office of Intelligence and Analysis, in
coordination with the Center, shall submit to Federal, State,
local, and tribal law enforcement and other relevant agencies
periodic reports regarding terrorist threats related to human
smuggling, human trafficking, and terrorist travel.
Subtitle B--International Collaboration to Prevent Terrorist Travel
SEC. 611. REPORT ON INTERNATIONAL COLLABORATION TO INCREASE
BORDER SECURITY, ENHANCE GLOBAL DOCUMENT
SECURITY, AND EXCHANGE TERRORIST INFORMATION.
(a) Report Required.--Not later than 270 days after the
date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State and
the Secretary of Homeland Security, in conjunction with the
Director of National Intelligence and the heads of other
appropriate Federal departments and agencies, shall submit to
the appropriate congressional committees a report on efforts
of the Government of the United States to collaborate with
international partners and allies of the United States to
increase border security, enhance global document security,
and exchange terrorist information.
(b) Contents.--The report required by subsection (a) shall
outline--
(1) all presidential directives, programs, and strategies
for carrying out and increasing United States Government
efforts described in subsection (a);
(2) the goals and objectives of each of these efforts;
(3) the progress made in each of these efforts; and
(4) the projected timelines for each of these efforts to
become fully functional and effective.
(c) Definition.--In this section, the term ``appropriate
congressional committees'' means--
(1) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on
Homeland Security, the Committee on the Judiciary, and the
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of
Representatives; and
(2) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, the Committee on
the Judiciary, and the Select Committee on Intelligence of
the Senate.
Subtitle C--Biometric Border Entry and Exit System
SEC. 621. SUBMITTAL OF PLAN ON BIOMETRIC ENTRY AND EXIT
VERIFICATION SYSTEM IMPLEMENTATION.
Not later than 7 days after the date of the enactment of
this Act, the Secretary for Homeland Security shall submit to
the Committee on Homeland Security and the Committee on the
Judiciary and the Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs and the Committee on the Judiciary of
the Senate the plan developed by the Secretary under section
7208(c) of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention
Act of 2004 (8 U.S.C. 1365b(c)(2)) to accelerate the full
implementation of an automated biometric entry and exit data
system.
TITLE VII--IMPROVING INTELLIGENCE AND INFORMATION SHARING WITH LOCAL
LAW ENFORCEMENT AND FIRST RESPONDERS
Subtitle A--Fusion and Law Enforcement Education and Teaming (FLEET)
Grant Program
SEC. 701. FINDINGS.
Congress finds the following:
(1) The intelligence component of a State, local, or
regional fusion center (in this title referred to generally
as ``fusion centers'') focuses on the intelligence process,
in which information is collected, integrated, evaluated,
analyzed, and disseminated. The Federal Government and
nontraditional sources of intelligence information--such as
public safety entities at the State, local, and tribal
levels, and private sector organizations--all possess
valuable information that when ``fused'' with law enforcement
data and properly analyzed at fusion centers can provide law
enforcement officers with specific and actionable
intelligence about terrorist and related criminal activity.
(2) Participation by local and tribal law enforcement
officers and intelligence analysts in fusion centers helps
secure the homeland by involving such officers and analysts
in the intelligence process on a daily basis, by helping them
build professional relationships across every level and
discipline of government and the private sector, and by
ensuring that intelligence and other information, including
threat assessment, public safety, law enforcement, public
health, social service, and public works, is shared
throughout and among relevant communities. Such local and
tribal participation in fusion centers supports the efforts
of all law enforcement agencies and departments to
anticipate, identify, monitor, and prevent terrorist and
related criminal activity.
(3) Some local and tribal law enforcement agencies and
departments, however, lack resources to participate fully in
fusion centers.
(4) Needs-based grant funding will maximize the
participation of local and tribal law enforcement agencies
and departments in fusion centers by reducing the costs
associated with detailing officers and intelligence analysts
to fusion centers. Consequently, such grant funding will not
only promote the development of more effective, resourceful,
and situationally aware fusion centers, but will also advance
the cause of homeland security.
SEC. 702. FLEET GRANT PROGRAM.
(a) In General.--Subtitle A of title II of the Homeland
Security Act of 2002 is further amended by adding at the end
the following new section:
``SEC. 203. FLEET GRANT PROGRAM.
``(a) Implementation Plan and Establishment.--
``(1) Implementation plan.--Not later than 90 days after
the date of the enactment of the Implementing the 9/11
Commission Recommendations Act of 2007, the Secretary shall
develop a Fusion and Law Enforcement Education and Teaming
Grant Program (in this section referred to as the `FLEET
Grant program') implementation plan and submit to the
appropriate congressional committees a copy of such plan. In
developing such plan, the Secretary shall consult with the
Attorney General, the Bureau of Justice Assistance, and the
Office of Community Oriented Policing of the Department of
Justice and shall encourage the participation of fusion
centers and local and tribal law enforcement agencies and
departments in the development of such plan. Such plan shall
include--
``(A) a clear articulation of the purposes, goals, and
specific objectives for which the program is being developed;
``(B) an identification of program stakeholders and an
assessment of their interests in and expectations for the
program;
``(C) a developed set of quantitative metrics to measure,
to the extent possible, program output; and
``(D) a developed set of qualitative instruments (e.g.,
surveys and expert interviews) to assess the extent to which
stakeholders believe their needs and expectations are being
met by the program.
``(2) Establishment.--Not later than 180 days after the
enactment of the Implementing the 9/11 Commission
Recommendations Act of 2007, the Secretary shall implement
and carry out a FLEET Grant program under which the
Secretary, in consultation with the Attorney General, shall
make grants to local and tribal law enforcement agencies and
departments specified by the Secretary, in consultation with
the Attorney General, for the purposes described in
subsection (b). Subject to subsection (g), each such grant
shall be made for a two-year period.
[[Page H141]]
``(b) Use of Grant Amounts.--
``(1) In general.--A grant made to a local or tribal law
enforcement agency or department under subsection (a) shall
be used to enable such agency or department to detail
eligible law enforcement personnel to participate in a fusion
center that serves the geographic area in which such agency
or department is located, and may be used for the following
purposes:
``(A) To hire new personnel, or to pay existing personnel,
to perform the duties of eligible law enforcement personnel
who are detailed to a fusion center during the absence of
such detailed personnel.
``(B) To provide appropriate training, as determined and
required by the Secretary, in consultation with the Attorney
General, for eligible law enforcement personnel who are
detailed to a fusion center.
``(C) To establish communications connectivity between
eligible law enforcement personnel who are detailed to a
fusion center and the home agency or department of such
personnel in accordance with all applicable laws and
regulations.
``(2) Mandatory privacy and civil liberties training.--All
eligible law enforcement personnel detailed to a fusion
center under the FLEET Grant Program shall undergo
appropriate privacy and civil liberties training that is
developed, supported, or sponsored by the Privacy Officer and
the Officer for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties in
partnership with the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight
Board.
``(3) Limitation.--A local or tribal law enforcement agency
or department participating in the FLEET Grant program shall
continue to provide a salary and benefits to any eligible law
enforcement personnel detailed to a fusion center, in the
same amounts and under the same conditions that such agency
or department provides a salary and benefits to such
personnel when not detailed to a fusion center. None of the
funds provided by the FLEET grant program may be used to
carry out this paragraph.
``(4) Eligible law enforcement personnel defined.--For
purposes of this section, the term `eligible law enforcement
personnel' means any local or tribal law enforcement officer
or intelligence analyst who meets each eligibility
requirement specified by the Secretary. Such eligibility
requirements shall include a requirement that the officer or
analyst has at least two years of experience as a law
enforcement officer or intelligence analyst with the local or
tribal law enforcement agency or department selected to
participate in the FLEET Grant program.
``(c) Applications.--
``(1) In general.--No grant may be made under subsection
(a) unless an application for such grant has been submitted
to, and approved by, the Secretary, in consultation with the
Attorney General. Such an application shall be submitted in
such form, manner, and time, and shall contain such
information, as the Secretary, in consultation with the
Attorney General, may prescribe by regulation or guidelines.
``(2) Joint applications.--A local or tribal law
enforcement agency or department may file a joint grant
application to detail eligible law enforcement personnel to a
fusion center. Such application shall be--
``(A) for a single detailed officer or intelligence
analyst, who shall be detailed to work at a fusion center on
a full-time basis; or
``(B) in the case of participating local and tribal law
enforcement agencies or departments for which a detail
arrangement described in subparagraph (A) is likely to result
in hardship due to a staffing shortage (as determined by the
Secretary, in consultation with the Attorney General), for
several eligible law enforcement personnel from multiple
local or tribal law enforcement agencies or departments in
the same geographic area, who shall be detailed to a fusion
center, each on a part-time basis, as part of a shared detail
arrangement, as long as--
``(i) any hours worked by a detailed officer or analyst at
a fusion center in a shared detail arrangement shall be
counted toward the hourly shift obligations of such officer
or analyst at his or her local or tribal law enforcement
agency or department; and
``(ii) no detailed officer or analyst working at a fusion
center in a shared detail arrangement shall be required to
regularly work more hours than the officer or analyst would
otherwise work if the officer or analyst was not
participating in the shared detail arrangement.
``(d) Distribution of Grants.--In considering applications
for grants under subsection (a), the Secretary, in
consultation with the Attorney General, shall ensure that, to
the extent practicable--
``(1) entities that receive such grants are representative
of a broad cross-section of local and tribal law enforcement
agencies and departments;
``(2) an appropriate geographic distribution of grants is
made among urban, suburban, and rural communities; and
``(3) such grants are awarded based on consideration of any
assessments of risk by the Department of Homeland Security.
``(e) Priority.--The Secretary, in consultation with the
Attorney General, shall issue regulations regarding the use
of a sliding scale based on financial need to ensure that a
local or tribal law enforcement agency or department that is
eligible to receive a grant under subsection (a) and that
demonstrates to the satisfaction of the Secretary, in
consultation with the Attorney General, that it is in
financial need (as determined by the Secretary, in
consultation with the Attorney General) receives priority in
receiving funds under this section.
``(f) Matching Funds.--
``(1) In general.--Subject to paragraph (2), the portion of
the costs of a program, project, or activity funded by a
grant made to an entity under subsection (a) may not exceed
80 percent.
``(2) Exception.--The Secretary, in consultation with the
Attorney General, may waive, wholly or in part, the
requirement under paragraph (1) of a non-Federal contribution
to the costs of a program, project, or activity if the entity
receiving the grant for such program, project, or activity
can demonstrate to the satisfaction of the Secretary, in
consultation with the Attorney General, that it would be a
hardship for such entity to satisfy such requirement.
``(g) Renewal of Grants.--A grant made to a local or tribal
law enforcement agency or department under subsection (a) may
be renewed on an annual basis for an additional year after
the first two-year period during which the entity receives
its initial grant, if--
``(1) the entity can demonstrate to the satisfaction of the
Secretary, in consultation with the Attorney General,
significant progress in achieving the objectives of the
application for the initial grant involved; and
``(2) such renewal would not prevent another local or
tribal law enforcement agency or department that has applied
for a grant under subsection (a), has not previously received
such a grant, and that would otherwise qualify for such a
grant, from receiving such a grant, as determined by the
Secretary, in consultation with the Attorney General.
``(h) Revocation or Suspension of Funding.--If the
Secretary, in consultation with the Attorney General,
determines that a grant recipient under this section is not
in substantial compliance with the terms and requirements of
an approved grant application submitted under subsection (c),
the Secretary, in consultation with the Attorney General, may
revoke or suspend funding of that grant, in whole or in part.
In the case of a revocation or suspension of funds under this
subsection based on a determination of fraud, waste, or
abuse, with respect to a grant recipient, such grant
recipient shall be required to refund the grant funds
received under subsection (a) that are related to such fraud,
waste, or abuse, respectively.
``(i) Reports.--
``(1) Reports to secretary.--Each local or tribal law
enforcement agency or department that receives a grant under
subsection (a) shall submit to the Secretary and the Attorney
General a report for each year such agency or department is a
recipient of such grant. Each such report shall include a
description and evaluation of each program, project, or
activity funded by such grant.
``(2) Report to congress.--One year after the date of the
implementation of the FLEET grant program, and biannually
thereafter, the Secretary, in consultation with the Attorney
General, shall submit to the appropriate congressional
committees a report describing the implementation and
progress of the FLEET Grant Program. Each such report shall
include the following:
``(A) A list of the local and tribal law enforcement
agencies and departments receiving grants.
``(B) Information on the grant amounts awarded to each such
agency or department.
``(C) Information on the programs, projects, and activities
for which the grant funds are used.
``(D) An evaluation of the effectiveness of the FLEET Grant
program with respect to the cause of advancing homeland
security, including--
``(i) concrete examples of enhanced information sharing and
a description of any preventative law enforcement actions
taken based on such information sharing;
``(ii) an evaluation of the effectiveness of the detail
arrangements with FLEET Grant program grant recipients;
``(iii) an evaluation of how the FLEET Grant program
benefits the fusion centers;
``(iv) a description of how individual law enforcement
officers and intelligence analysts detailed to the fusion
centers benefit from the detail experience; and
``(v) an evaluation of how the detail of the law
enforcement officers and intelligence analysts assists the
fusion centers in learning more about criminal or terrorist
organizations operating within their areas of operation,
including a description of any homeland security information
requirements that were developed, or any homeland security
information gaps that were filled, as a result of the detail
arrangement.
``(E) An analysis of any areas of need, with respect to the
advancement of homeland security, that could be addressed
through additional funding or other legislative action.
``(j) Customer Satisfaction Surveys.--The Secretary, in
consultation with the Attorney General, shall create a
mechanism for State, local, and tribal law enforcement
officers and intelligence analysts who participate in the
FLEET Grant program to fill out an electronic customer
satisfaction survey, on an appropriate periodic basis, to
assess the effectiveness of the FLEET Grant program with
respect to improving information sharing. The results of
these voluntary surveys shall be provided electronically to
appropriate personnel at the Office of Grants and Training of
the Department and at the Bureau of Justice Assistance and
the Office
[[Page H142]]
of Community Oriented Policing of the Department of Justice.
The results of these customer satisfaction surveys shall also
be included in an appropriate format in the reports described
in subsection (i).
``(k) Continuation Assessment.--Five years after the date
of the implementation of the FLEET Grant program, the
Secretary, in consultation with the Attorney General, shall
submit to the appropriate congressional committees a FLEET
Grant program continuation assessment. Such continuation
assessment shall--
``(1) recommend whether Congress should continue to
authorize and fund the FLEET Grant program (as authorized
under this section or with proposed changes), and provide the
reasoning for such recommendation; and
``(2) if the Secretary recommends the continuation of the
FLEET Grant program--
``(A) recommend any changes to the program which the
Secretary, in consultation with the Attorney General, has
identified as necessary to improve the program, and the
reasons for any such changes;
``(B) list and describe legislative priorities for Congress
relating to the continuation of the program; and
``(C) provide recommendations for the amounts of funding
that should be appropriated for the continuation of the
program in future fiscal years, including justifications for
such amounts.
``(l) General Regulatory Authority.--The Secretary, in
consultation with the Attorney General, may promulgate
regulations and guidelines to carry out this section.
``(m) Definitions.--For the purposes of this section:
``(1) The term `local law enforcement agency or department'
means a local municipal police department or a county
sheriff's office in communities where there is no police
department.
``(2) The term `tribal law enforcement agency or
department' means the police force of an Indian tribe (as
such term is defined in section 4 of the Indian Self-
Determination and Education Assistance Act (25 U.S.C. 450b))
established and maintained by such a tribe pursuant to the
tribe's powers of self-government to carry out law
enforcement.''.
(b) Definition of Fusion Center.--Section 2 of such Act is
amended by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
``(17) The terms `State, local, or regional fusion center'
and `fusion center' mean a State intelligence center or a
regional intelligence center that is the product of a
collaborative effort of at least two qualifying agencies that
provide resources, expertise, or information to such center
with the goal of maximizing the ability of such intelligence
center and the qualifying agencies participating in such
intelligence center to provide and produce homeland security
information required to detect, prevent, apprehend, and
respond to terrorist and criminal activity. For purposes of
the preceding sentence, qualifying agencies include--
``(A) State, local, and tribal law enforcement authorities,
and homeland and public safety agencies;
``(B) State, local, and tribal entities responsible for the
protection of public health and infrastructure;
``(C) private sector owners of critical infrastructure, as
defined in section 1016(e) of the Uniting and Strengthening
America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept
and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of 2001 (42
U.S.C. 5195c(e));
``(D) Federal law enforcement and homeland security
entities; and
``(E) other appropriate entities specified by the
Secretary.''.
(c) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents in section
1(b) of such Act is amended by inserting after the item
relating to section 202 the following:
``Sec. 203. FLEET Grant Program.''.
Subtitle B--Border Intelligence Fusion Center Program
SEC. 711. FINDINGS.
Congress finds the following:
(1) The United States has 216 airports, 143 seaports, and
115 official land border crossings that are official ports of
entry. Screening all the people and goods coming through
these busy ports is an enormous resource challenge for the
men and women of the Department of Homeland Security
(``Department'') .
(2) Department personnel, including personnel from the
Bureau of Customs and Border Protection (``CBP'') and U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (``ICE''), cannot be
everywhere at all times to ensure that terrorists, weapons of
mass destruction, and other related contraband are not being
smuggled across the border in order to support attacks
against the United States.
(3) State, local, and tribal law enforcement personnel are
uniquely situated to help secure the border areas in their
respective jurisdictions by serving as ``force multipliers''.
To do so, however, law enforcement officers need access to
available border intelligence developed by the Department.
Such access shall help State, local, and tribal law
enforcement personnel deploy their resources most effectively
to detect and interdict terrorists, weapons of mass
destruction, and related contraband at United States borders.
(4) The Department has not yet developed a single, easily
accessible, and widely available system to consistently share
border intelligence and other information with its State,
local, and tribal law enforcement partners. It likewise has
failed to establish a process by which State, local, and
tribal law enforcement personnel can consistently share with
the Department information that they obtain that is relevant
to border security.
(5) As a result, State, local, and tribal law enforcement
personnel serving jurisdictions along the northern and
southern borders typically depend upon personal relationships
with CBP and ICE personnel in their respective jurisdictions
to get the information they need. While personal
relationships have helped in some locales, they have not in
others. This has led to an inconsistent sharing of border
intelligence from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.
(6) State, local, and regional fusion centers (``fusion
centers'') may help improve this situation.
(7) In the wake of the terrorist attacks of September 11,
2001, numerous State, local, and tribal authorities
responsible for the protection of the public and critical
infrastructure established fusion centers to help prevent
terrorist attacks while at the same time preparing to respond
to and recover from a terrorist attack should one occur.
(8) Most border States have some variation of a fusion
center.
(9) In general, while the Federal Government has helped to
establish fusion centers through the Department's grants, a
substantial percentage of the financial burden to support
ongoing fusion center operations is borne by States and
localities.
(10) The Department, and in particular, the Department's
Office of Intelligence and Analysis, has undertaken a program
through which it sends such office's personnel to fusion
centers to establish a Department presence at those centers.
In so doing, the hope is that such personnel will serve as a
point of contact for information being shared at fusion
centers by State, local, and tribal law enforcement
personnel. Personnel at fusion centers hopefully will also
act as a channel for information being shared by the
Department itself.
(11) Border State, local, and tribal law enforcement
officers anticipate that fusion centers will be a critical
source of border intelligence from the Department. While the
Department's border intelligence products generated in the
District of Columbia and disseminated to fusion centers will
undoubtedly be helpful, a far richer source of border
intelligence will likely come from CBP and ICE personnel
working locally in border jurisdictions themselves.
(12) Establishing a CBP and ICE presence at border State
fusion centers will help ensure the most consistent, timely,
and relevant flow of border intelligence to and from the
Department and State, local, and tribal law enforcement in
border communities. Border State fusion centers thus could
serve as a tool to build upon the personal relationships and
information sharing that exists in some, but not all,
jurisdictions between CBP, ICE, and State, local, and tribal
law enforcement.
SEC. 712. ESTABLISHMENT OF BORDER INTELLIGENCE FUSION CENTER
PROGRAM.
(a) In General.--Subtitle A of title II of the Homeland
Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 121 et seq.) is further
amended by adding at the end the following new section:
``SEC. 204. BORDER INTELLIGENCE FUSION CENTER PROGRAM.
``(a) Establishment.--
``(1) In general.--There is established in the Department
the Border Intelligence Fusion Center Program, to be
administered by the Under Secretary for Intelligence and
Analysis, for the purpose of stationing Bureau of Customs and
Border Protection and U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement officers or intelligence analysts in the fusion
centers of participating border States.
``(2) New hires.--Funding provided under the Border
Intelligence Fusion Center Program shall be available to hire
new CBP and ICE officers or intelligence analysts to replace
CBP and ICE officers or intelligence analysts who are
stationed at border State fusion centers under this section.
``(b) Participation.--
``(1) In general.--The Secretary may develop qualifying
criteria for a border state fusion center's participation in
the Border Intelligence Fusion Center Program.
``(2) Criteria.--Such criteria may include the following:
``(A) Whether the center focuses on a broad
counterterrorism and counter-criminal approach, and whether
that broad approach is pervasive through all levels of the
organization.
``(B) Whether the center has sufficient numbers of
adequately trained personnel to support a broad
counterterrorism and counter-criminal mission.
``(C) Whether the center has access to relevant law
enforcement, private sector, open source, and national
security data, as well as the ability to share and
analytically exploit such data for actionable ends in
accordance with all applicable laws and regulations.
``(D) The entity or entities providing financial support
for the center's funding.
``(E) Whether the center's leadership is committed to the
fusion center's mission, and how the leadership sees the
center's role in terrorism prevention, mitigation, response,
and recovery.
``(c) Assignment.--Wherever possible, not fewer than one
CBP officer or intelligence analyst and one ICE officer or
intelligence analyst shall be stationed at each participating
border State fusion center.
``(d) Prerequisite.--
[[Page H143]]
``(1) Prior work experience in area.--To be stationed at a
border State fusion center under this section, a CBP or ICE
officer shall have served as a CBP or ICE officer in the
State in which the fusion center where such officer shall be
stationed is located for not less than two years before such
assignment in order to ensure that such officer is familiar
with the geography and people living in border communities,
as well as the State, local, and tribal law enforcement
agencies serving those communities.
``(2) Intelligence analysis, privacy, and civil liberties
training.--Before being stationed at a border State fusion
center under this section, a CBP or ICE officer shall
undergo--
``(A) appropriate intelligence analysis training via an
intelligence-led policing curriculum that is consistent with
the standards and recommendations of the National Criminal
Intelligence Sharing Plan, the Department of Justice and
Department Fusion Center Guidelines, title 28, part 23, Code
of Federal Regulations, as well as any other training
prescribed by the Under Secretary for Intelligence and
Analysis; and
``(B) appropriate privacy and civil liberties training that
is developed, supported, or sponsored by the Privacy Officer
and the Officer for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties in
partnership with the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight
Board.
``(3) Expedited security clearance processing.--The Under
Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis shall ensure that
security clearance processing is expedited for each CBP and
ICE officer or intelligence analyst stationed at border State
fusion centers under this section and shall ensure that such
officer or analyst has the appropriate clearance to conduct
the work of the Border Intelligence Fusion Center Program.
``(4) Further qualifications.--Each CBP and ICE officer or
intelligence analyst stationed at a border State fusion
center under this section shall satisfy any other
qualifications the Under Secretary for Intelligence and
Analysis may prescribe.
``(e) Responsibilities.--
``(1) In general.--
``(A) Creation and dissemination of border intelligence
products.--CBP and ICE officers and intelligence analysts
assigned to border State fusion centers under this section
will help State, local, and tribal law enforcement in
jurisdictions along the northern and southern borders, and
border State fusion center staff, overlay threat and
suspicious activity with Federal homeland security
information in order to develop a more comprehensive and
accurate threat picture. Such CBP and ICE officers and
intelligence analysts accordingly shall have as their primary
mission the review of border security-relevant information
from State, local, and tribal law enforcement sources, and
the creation of border intelligence products derived from
such information and other border-security relevant
information provided by the Department, and the dissemination
of such products to border State, local, and tribal law
enforcement. CBP and ICE officers or intelligence analysts
assigned to border State fusion centers under this section
shall also provide such products to the Office of
Intelligence and Analysis of the Department for collection
and dissemination to other fusion centers in other border
States.
``(B) Database access.--In order to fulfill the objectives
described in subparagraph (A), CBP and ICE officers and
intelligence analysts stationed at border State fusion
centers under this section shall have direct access to all
relevant databases at their respective agencies.
``(C) Customer satisfaction surveys.--The Secretary shall
create a mechanism for State, local, and tribal law
enforcement officers who are consumers of the intelligence
products described in subparagraph (A) to fill out an
electronic customer satisfaction survey whenever they access
such a product. The results of these voluntary surveys should
be provided electronically to appropriate personnel of the
Department. The results of these customer satisfaction
surveys should also be included in an appropriate format in
the annual status reports described in subsection (h)(2)(A).
``(2) Cultivation of relationships.--CBP and ICE officers
and intelligence analysts stationed at border State fusion
centers under this section shall actively cultivate
relationships with State, local, and tribal law enforcement
personnel in border communities in order to satisfy the
mission described in paragraph (1), and shall make similar
outreach to Canadian and Mexican law enforcement authorities
serving neighboring communities across the northern and
southern borders. CBP and ICE officers and intelligence
analysts stationed at border State fusion centers under this
section may also serve as a conduit of border intelligence
products from the Department itself and shall ensure that
such products are provided to all appropriate law enforcement
agencies, departments, and offices in border States.
``(f) Rule of Construction.--Nothing in this section shall
be construed to require a border State fusion center to
participate in the Border Intelligence Fusion Center Program.
``(g) Reports.--
``(1) Development of implementation plan.--
``(A) In general.--Not later than 90 days after the date of
the enactment of the Implementing the 9/11 Commission
Recommendations Act of 2007, the Secretary shall develop a
Border Intelligence Fusion Center Program implementation plan
and submit to the appropriate congressional committees a copy
of such plan. In developing such plan, the Secretary shall
consult with State, local, and tribal authorities responsible
for border State fusion centers.
``(B) Contents.--The implementation plan should also
address the following elements for effective program
assessment:
``(i) A clear articulation of the purposes, goals, and
specific objectives for which the program is being developed.
``(ii) An identification of program stakeholders and an
assessment of their interests in and expectations of the
program.
``(iii) A developed set of quantitative metrics to measure,
to the extent possible, program output.
``(iv) A developed set of qualitative instruments (e.g.,
surveys and expert interviews) to assess the extent to which
stakeholders believe their needs and expectations are being
met.
``(2) Status reports and continuation assessment.--
``(A) Status reports.--
``(i) In general.--The Secretary shall submit to the
appropriate congressional committees status reports on the
Border Intelligence Fusion Center Program. The reports shall
address the elements described in paragraph (1)(B). The
reports shall also include the following:
``(I) A description of the training programs in place for
CBP and ICE officers and intelligence analysts participating
in the program.
``(II) A listing of the border State fusion centers where
CBP and ICE officers and intelligence analysts are deployed.
``(III) A representative survey of State, local, and tribal
law enforcement officers serving border jurisdictions
regarding the specificity and actionable nature of the border
intelligence provided by CBP and ICE officers at such fusion
centers.
``(IV) A description of the results of the customer
satisfaction surveys submitted by users of the products
described in subsection (e)(1).
``(ii) Deadlines.--Status reports under clause (i) shall be
submitted not later than--
``(I) one year after the date of the enactment of the
Implementing the 9/11 Commission Recommendations Act of 2007;
and
``(II) three and five years after the date on which the
Border Intelligence Fusion Center Program is established.
``(B) Continuation assessment.--Not later than the end of
the fifth year following the date on which the Border
Intelligence Fusion Center Program is established, the
Secretary shall submit to the appropriate congressional
committees a Border Intelligence Fusion Center Program
Continuation Assessment. The continuation assessment shall
accomplish the following:
``(i) Recommend whether the program should continue in its
present or some altered form or not.
``(ii) Provide the reasons for that recommendation.
``(iii) If the recommendation is that the program should
continue, list and describe legislative priorities for
Congress regarding the continuation of the program, and
provide recommended appropriations amounts and justifications
for them.
``(h) Definition of Border State Fusion Center.--The term
`border State fusion center' means a fusion center located in
the State of Washington, Idaho, Montana, North Dakota,
Minnesota, Wisconsin, Michigan, Ohio, Pennsylvania, New York,
Vermont, New Hampshire, Maine, California, Arizona, New
Mexico, or Texas.''.
(b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents in section
1(b) of such Act is amended by inserting after the item
relating to section 203 the following:
``Sec. 204. Border Intelligence Fusion Center Program.''.
Subtitle C--Homeland Security Information Sharing Enhancement
SEC. 721. SHORT TITLE.
This subtitle may be cited as the ``Homeland Security
Information Sharing Enhancement Act of 2007''.
SEC. 722. HOMELAND SECURITY ADVISORY SYSTEM.
(a) In General.--Subtitle A of title II of the Homeland
Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 121 et seq.) is amended by
adding at the end the following:
``SEC. 205. HOMELAND SECURITY ADVISORY SYSTEM.
``(a) Requirement.--The Under Secretary for Intelligence
and Analysis shall implement a Homeland Security Advisory
System in accordance with this section to provide public
advisories and alerts regarding threats to homeland security,
including national, regional, local, and economic sector
advisories and alerts, as appropriate.
``(b) Required Elements.--The Under Secretary, under the
System--
``(1) shall include, in each advisory and alert regarding a
threat, information on appropriate protective measures and
countermeasures that may be taken in response to the threat;
``(2) shall, whenever possible, limit the scope of each
advisory and alert to a specific region, locality, or
economic sector believed to be at risk; and
``(3) shall not, in issuing any advisory or alert, use
color designations as the exclusive means of specifying the
homeland security threat conditions that are the subject of
the advisory or alert.''.
(b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents in section
1(b) of such Act is
[[Page H144]]
amended by adding at the end of the items relating to
subtitle A of title II the following:
``Sec. 205. Homeland Security Advisory System.''.
SEC. 723. HOMELAND SECURITY INFORMATION SHARING.
(a) In General.--Subtitle A of title II of the Homeland
Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 121 et seq.) is further
amended by adding at the end the following:
``SEC. 206. HOMELAND SECURITY INFORMATION SHARING.
``(a) Information Sharing Environment.--Consistent with
section 1016 of the National Intelligence Reform and
Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (6 U.S.C. 485) and in
accordance with all other applicable laws and regulations,
the Secretary shall integrate and standardize the information
of the intelligence components of the Department into a
Department information sharing environment, to be
administered by the Under Secretary for Intelligence and
Analysis.
``(b) Information Sharing and Knowledge Management
Officers.--For each intelligence component of the Department,
the Secretary shall designate an information sharing and
knowledge management officer who shall report to the Under
Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis with respect to
coordinating the different systems used in the Department to
gather and disseminate homeland security information.
``(c) State, Local, and Private-Sector Sources of
Information.--
``(1) Establishment of business processes.--The Under
Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis shall establish
Department-wide procedures for the review and analysis of
information gathered from State, local, tribal, and private-
sector sources and, as appropriate, integrate such
information into the information gathered by the Department
and other department and agencies of the Federal Government.
``(2) Feedback.--The Secretary shall develop mechanisms to
provide analytical and operational feedback to any State,
local, tribal, and private-sector entities that gather
information and provide such information to the Secretary.
``(d) Training and Evaluation of Employees.--
``(1) Training.--The Under Secretary shall provide to
employees of the Department opportunities for training and
education to develop an understanding of the definition of
homeland security information, how information available to
them as part of their duties might qualify as homeland
security information, and how information available to them
is relevant to the Office of Intelligence and Analysis.
``(2) Evaluations.--The Under Secretary shall, on an
ongoing basis, evaluate how employees of the Office of
Intelligence and Analysis and the intelligence components of
the Department are utilizing homeland security information
and participating in the Department information sharing
environment.''.
(b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents in section
1(b) of such Act is further amended by adding at the end of
the items relating to such subtitle the following:
``Sec. 206. Homeland security information sharing.''.
(c) Establishment of Comprehensive Information Technology
Network Architecture.--
(1) In general.--Subtitle A of title II of the Homeland
Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 121 et seq.) is further
amended by adding at the end the following new section:
``SEC. 207. COMPREHENSIVE INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY NETWORK
ARCHITECTURE.
``(a) Establishment.--The Secretary, acting through the
Chief Intelligence Officer, shall establish a comprehensive
information technology network architecture for the Office of
Intelligence and Analysis.
``(b) Network Model.--The comprehensive information
technology network architecture established under subsection
(a) shall, to the extent possible, incorporate the
approaches, features, and functions of the network proposed
by the Markle Foundation in reports issued in October 2002
and December 2003, known as the System-wide Homeland Security
Analysis and Resource Exchange (SHARE) Network.
``(c) Comprehensive Information Technology Network
Architecture Defined.--the term `comprehensive information
technology network architecture' means an integrated
framework for evolving or maintaining existing information
technology and acquiring new information technology to
achieve the strategic goals and information resources
management goals of the Office of Intelligence and
Analysis.''.
(2) Clerical amendment.--The table of contents in section
1(b) of such Act is further amended by adding at the end of
the items relating to such subtitle the following:
``Sec. 207. Comprehensive information technology network
architecture.''.
(3) Reports.--
(A) Report on implementation of plan.--Not later than 360
days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the
Secretary of Homeland Security shall submit to the Committee
on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate
and the Committee on Homeland Security of the House of
Representatives a report containing a plan to implement the
comprehensive information technology network architecture for
the Office of Intelligence and Analysis of the Department of
Homeland Security required under section 205 of the Homeland
Security Act of 2002, as added by paragraph (1). Such report
shall include the following:
(i) Priorities for the development of the comprehensive
information technology network architecture and a rationale
for such priorities.
(ii) An explanation of how the various components of the
comprehensive information technology network architecture
will work together and interconnect.
(iii) A description of the technology challenges that the
Office of Intelligence and Analysis will face in implementing
the comprehensive information technology network
architecture.
(iv) A description of technology options that are available
or are in development that may be incorporated into the
comprehensive technology network architecture, the
feasibility of incorporating such options, and the advantages
and disadvantages of doing so.
(v) An explanation of any security protections to be
developed as part of the comprehensive information technology
network architecture.
(vi) A description of any safeguards for civil liberties
and privacy to be built into the comprehensive information
technology network architecture.
(vii) An operational best practices plan.
(B) Progress report.--Not later than 180 days after the
date on which the report is submitted under subparagraph (A),
the Secretary of Homeland Security shall submit to the
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of
the Senate and the Committee on Homeland Security of the
House of Representatives a report on the progress of the
Secretary in developing the comprehensive information
technology network architecture required under section 205 of
the Homeland Security Act of 2002, as added by paragraph (1).
(d) Intelligence Component Defined.--Section 2 of the
Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 101) is further
amended by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
``(18) The term `intelligence component of the Department'
means any directorate, agency, or element of the Department
that gathers, receives, analyzes, produces, or disseminates
homeland security information except--
``(A) a directorate, agency, or element of the Department
that is required to be maintained as a distinct entity under
this Act; or
``(B) any personnel security, physical security, document
security, or communications security program within any
directorate, agency, or element of the Department.''.
Subtitle D--Homeland Security Information Sharing Partnerships
SEC. 731. SHORT TITLE.
This subtitle may be cited as the ``Homeland Security
Information Sharing Partnerships Act of 2007''.
SEC. 732. STATE, LOCAL, AND REGIONAL INFORMATION FUSION
CENTER INITIATIVE.
(a) In General.--Subtitle A of title II of the Homeland
Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 121 et seq.) is further is
amended by adding at the end the following:
``SEC. 208. STATE, LOCAL, AND REGIONAL FUSION CENTER
INITIATIVE.
``(a) Establishment.--The Secretary shall establish a
State, Local, and Regional Fusion Center Initiative to
establish partnerships with State, local, and regional fusion
centers.
``(b) Duties.--Through the State, Local, and Regional
Fusion Center Initiative, the Secretary shall--
``(1) coordinate with the principal official of each State,
local, or regional fusion center and the official designated
as the Homeland Security Advisor of the State;
``(2) provide Department operational and intelligence
advice and assistance to State, local, and regional fusion
centers;
``(3) support efforts to include State, local, and regional
fusion centers into efforts to establish an information
sharing environment (as defined under section 1016(a)(2) of
the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004
(6 U.S.C. 485(a)(2))) in accordance with all applicable laws
and regulations;
``(4) conduct table-top and live training exercises to
regularly assess the capability of individual and regional
networks of State, local, and regional fusion centers to
integrate the efforts of such networks with the efforts of
the Department;
``(5) coordinate with other relevant Federal entities
engaged in homeland security-related activities;
``(6) provide analytic and reporting advice and assistance
to State, local, and regional fusion centers;
``(7) review homeland security information gathered by
State, local, and regional fusion centers and incorporate
relevant information with homeland security information of
the Department;
``(8) provide management assistance to State, local, and
regional fusion centers;
``(9) serve as a point of contact to ensure the
dissemination of relevant homeland security information.
``(10) facilitate close communication and coordination
between State, local, and regional fusion centers and the
Department;
``(11) provide State, local, and regional fusion centers
with expertise on Department resources and operations;
``(12) provide training to State, local, and regional
fusion centers and encourage such
[[Page H145]]
fusion centers to participate in terrorist threat-related
exercises conducted by the Department; and
``(13) carry out such other duties as the Secretary
determines are appropriate.''.
(b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents in section
1(b) of such Act is further amended by adding at the end of
the items relating to such subtitle the following:
``Sec. 208. State, Local, and Regional Information Fusion Center
Initiative.''.
(c) Reports.--
(1) Concept of operations.--Not later than 90 days after
the date of the enactment of this Act and before the State,
Local, and Regional Fusion Center Initiative under section
208 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002, as added by
subsection (a), has been implemented, the Secretary shall
submit to the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs of the Senate and the Committee on Homeland Security
of the House of Representatives a report that contains a
concept of operations for the Initiative, which shall include
a privacy and civil liberties impact assessment.
(2) Privacy and civil liberties.--
(A) Review of concept of operations.--Not later than 180
days after the date on which the report under paragraph (1)
is submitted, the Privacy Officer of the Department of
Homeland Security and the Officer for Civil Rights and Civil
Liberties of the Department of Homeland Security shall review
the privacy and civil liberties implications of the
Initiative and the concept of operations and report any
concerns to the Secretary of Homeland Security and the Under
Secretary of Homeland Security for Intelligence and Analysis.
The Secretary may not implement the Initiative until the
Privacy Officer and the Officer for Civil Rights and Civil
Liberties have certified that any privacy or civil liberties
concerns have been addressed.
(B) Review of privacy impact.--Under the authority of
section 222(5) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C.
142(5)), not later than one year after the date on which the
State, Local, and Regional Fusion Center Initiative is
implemented, the Privacy Officer of the Department of
Homeland Security, in consultation with the Officer for Civil
Rights and Civil Liberties of the Department of Homeland
Security, shall submit to Congress, the Secretary of Homeland
Security, and the Under Secretary of Homeland Security for
Intelligence and Analysis a report on the privacy and civil
liberties impact of the Initiative.
SEC. 733. HOMELAND SECURITY INFORMATION SHARING FELLOWS
PROGRAM.
(a) Establishment of Program.--Subtitle A of title II of
the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 121 et seq.) is
further amended by adding at the end the following:
``SEC. 209. HOMELAND SECURITY INFORMATION SHARING FELLOWS
PROGRAM.
``(a) Establishment.--
``(1) In general.--The Secretary, acting through the Under
Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis, shall establish a
fellowship program in accordance with this section for the
purpose of--
``(A) detailing State, local, and tribal law enforcement
officers and intelligence analysts to the Department to
participate in the work of the Office of Intelligence and
Analysis in order to become familiar with--
``(i) the mission and capabilities of the Office of
Intelligence and Analysis; and
``(ii) the role, programs, products, and personnel of the
Office of Intelligence and Analysis; and
``(B) promoting information sharing between the Department
and State, local, and tribal law enforcement officers and
intelligence analysts by stationing such officers and
analysts in order to--
``(i) serve as a point of contact in the Department to
assist in the representation of State, local, and tribal
homeland security information needs;
``(ii) identify homeland security information of interest
to State, local, and tribal law enforcement officers and
intelligence analysts; and
``(iii) assist Department analysts in preparing and
disseminating terrorism-related products that are tailored to
State, local, and tribal law enforcement officers and
intelligence analysts and designed to thwart terrorist
attacks.
``(2) Program name.--The program under this section shall
be known as the `Homeland Security Information Sharing
Fellows Program'.
``(b) Eligibility.--
``(1) In general.--In order to be eligible for selection as
an Information Sharing Fellow under the program, an
individual must--
``(A) have homeland security-related responsibilities or
law enforcement-related responsibilities;
``(B) be eligible for an appropriate national security
clearance;
``(C) possess a valid need for access to classified
information, as determined by the Under Secretary for
Intelligence and Analysis;
``(D) be an employee of an eligible entity; and
``(E) have undergone appropriate privacy and civil
liberties training that is developed, supported, or sponsored
by the Privacy Officer and the Officer for Civil Rights and
Civil Liberties in partnership with the Privacy and Civil
Liberties Oversight Board.
``(2) Eligible entities.--For purposes of this subsection,
the term `eligible entity' means--
``(A) a State, local, or regional fusion center;
``(B) a State or local law enforcement or other government
entity that serves a major metropolitan area, as determined
by the Secretary;
``(C) a State or local law enforcement or other government
entity that serves a suburban or rural area, as determined by
the Secretary;
``(D) a State or local law enforcement or other government
entity with port responsibilities, as determined by the
Secretary;
``(E) a State or local law enforcement or other government
entity with border responsibilities, as determined by the
Secretary;
``(F) a State or local law enforcement or other government
entity with agricultural responsibilities, as determined by
the Secretary;
``(G) a tribal law enforcement or other authority; or
``(H) such other entity as the Secretary determines is
appropriate.
``(c) Optional Participation.--No State, local, or tribal
law enforcement or other government entity shall be required
to participate in the Homeland Security Information Sharing
Fellows Program.
``(d) Procedures for Nomination and Selection.--
``(1) In general.--The Under Secretary shall establish
procedures to provide for the nomination and selection of
individuals to participate in the Homeland Security
Information Sharing Fellows Program.
``(2) Limitations.--The Under Secretary shall--
``(A) select law enforcement officers and intelligence
analysts representing a broad cross-section of State, local,
and tribal agencies; and
``(B) ensure that the number of Information Sharing Fellows
selected does not impede the activities of the Office of
Intelligence and Analysis.
``(e) Length of Service.--Information Sharing Fellows shall
serve for a reasonable period of time, as determined by the
Under Secretary. Such period of time shall be sufficient to
advance the information-sharing goals of the Under Secretary
and encourage participation by as many qualified nominees as
possible.
``(f) Condition.--As a condition of selecting an individual
as an Information Sharing Fellow under the program, the Under
Secretary shall require that the individual's employer agree
to continue to pay the individual's salary and benefits
during the period for which the individual is detailed.
``(g) Stipend.--During the period for which an individual
is detailed under the program, the Under Secretary shall,
subject to the availability of appropriations provide to the
individual a stipend to cover the individual's reasonable
living expenses for that period.
``(h) Security Clearances.--If an individual selected for a
fellowship under the Information Sharing Fellows Program does
not possess the appropriate security clearance, the Under
Secretary shall ensure that security clearance processing is
expedited for such individual and shall ensure that each such
Information Sharing Fellow has obtained the appropriate
security clearance prior to participation in the Program.''.
(b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents in section
1(b) of such Act is further amended by adding at the end of
the items relating to such subtitle the following:
``Sec. 209. Homeland Security Information Sharing Fellows Program.''.
(c) Reports.--
(1) Concept of operations.--Not later than 90 days after
the date of the enactment of this Act and before the
implementation of the Homeland Security Information Sharing
Fellows Program under section 209 of the Homeland Security
Act of 2002, as added by subsection (a), the Secretary shall
submit to the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs of the Senate and the Committee on Homeland Security
of the House of Representatives a report that contains a
concept of operations for the Program, which shall include a
privacy and civil liberties impact assessment.
(2) Privacy and civil liberties.--
(A) Review of concept of operations.--Not later than 180
days after the date on which the report under paragraph (1)
is submitted, the Privacy Officer of the Department of
Homeland Security and the Officer for Civil Rights and Civil
Liberties of the Department of Homeland Security shall review
the privacy and civil liberties implications of the Program
and the concept of operations and report any concerns to the
Secretary of Homeland Security and the Under Secretary of
Homeland Security for Intelligence and Analysis. The
Secretary may not implement the Program until the Privacy
Officer and the Officer for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties
have certified that any privacy or civil liberties concerns
have been addressed.
(B) Review of privacy impact.--Under the authority of
section 222(5) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C.
142(5)), not later than one year after the date on which the
Homeland Security Information Sharing Fellows Program is
implemented, the Privacy Officer of the Department of
Homeland Security, in consultation with the Officer for Civil
Rights and Civil Liberties of the Department of Homeland
Security, shall submit to Congress, the Secretary of Homeland
Security, and the Under Secretary of Homeland Security for
Intelligence and Analysis a
[[Page H146]]
report on the privacy and civil liberties impact of the
Program.
Subtitle E--Homeland Security Intelligence Offices Reorganization
SEC. 741. DEPARTMENTAL REORGANIZATION.
(a) Redesignation of Directorate for Information Analysis
and Infrastructure Protection.--Section 201 of the Homeland
Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 121) is amended--
(1) in subsection (a)(1)--
(A) by striking ``a Directorate for Information Analysis
and Infrastructure Protection'' and inserting ``an Office of
Intelligence and Analysis''; and
(B) by striking ``an Under Secretary for Information
Analysis and Infrastructure Protection'' and inserting ``an
Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis'';
(2) by striking subsection (b) and redesignating
subsections (c) through (g) as subsections (b) through (f),
respectively;
(3) in subsection (b), as so redesignated--
(A) by striking ``and infrastructure protection'' before
``are carried out'' and inserting ``and intelligence''; and
(B) by striking ``the Under Secretary for Information
Analysis and Infrastructure Protection'' and inserting ``the
Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis'';
(4) in subsection (c), as so redesignated--
(A) by striking ``the Under Secretary for Information
Analysis and Infrastructure Protection'' and inserting ``the
Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis'';
(B) by striking paragraphs (2), (5), and (6), and
redesignating paragraphs (3) through (17) as paragraphs (2)
through (14), respectively;
(C) by redesignating paragraphs (18) and (19) as paragraphs
(20) and (21), respectively;
(D) in paragraph (2), as so redesignated, by striking ``To
integrate'' and inserting ``To participate in the integration
of'';
(E) in paragraph (14), as so redesignated, by inserting
``the Assistant Secretary for Infrastructure Protection and''
after ``coordinate with''; and
(F) by inserting after paragraph (14), as redesignated by
subparagraph (B), the following new paragraphs:
``(15) To coordinate and enhance integration among
intelligence components of the Department.
``(16) To establish intelligence priorities, policies,
processes, standards, guidelines, and procedures for the
Department.
``(17) To establish a structure and process to support the
missions and goals of the intelligence components of the
Department.
``(18) To ensure that, whenever possible--
``(A) the Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis
produces and disseminates reports and analytic products based
on open-source information that do not require a national
security classification under applicable law; and
``(B) such unclassified open source reports are produced
and disseminated contemporaneously with reports or analytic
products concerning the same or similar information that the
Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis produces and
disseminates in a classified format.
``(19) To establish within the Office of Intelligence
Analysis an Internal Continuity of Operations (COOP) Plan
that--
``(A) assures that the capability exists to continue
uninterrupted operations during a wide range of potential
emergencies, including localized acts of nature, accidents,
and technological or attack-related emergencies, that is
maintained at a high level of readiness and is capable of
implementation with and without warning; and
``(B) includes plans and procedures governing succession to
office within the Office of Intelligence and Analysis,
including--
``(i) emergency delegations of authority (where
permissible, and in accordance with applicable law);
``(ii) the safekeeping of vital resources, facilities, and
records;
``(iii) the improvisation or emergency acquisition of vital
resources necessary for the performance of operations of the
Office; and
``(iv) the capability to relocate essential personnel and
functions to and to sustain the performance of the operations
of the Office at an alternate work site until normal
operations can be resumed.'';
(5) in subsections (d) and (e), as redesignated by
subsection (a)(2), by striking ``Directorate'' each place it
appears and inserting ``Office''; and
(6) in subsection (f), as redesignated by subsection
(a)(2)--
(A) by striking ``the Under Secretary for Information
Analysis and Infrastructure Protection'' and inserting ``the
Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis and the
Assistant Secretary for Infrastructure Protection''; and
(B) by inserting ``and section 203'' after ``under this
section''.
(b) Technical and Conforming Amendments.--
(1) Homeland security act of 2002.--The Homeland Security
Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 101 et seq.) is amended--
(A) in section 103(a), by adding at the end the following
new paragraph:
``(10) An Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis.'';
(B) in section 223, by striking ``Under Secretary for
Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection'' and
inserting ``Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis, in
cooperation with the Assistant Secretary for Infrastructure
Protection'';
(C) in section 224, by striking ``Under Secretary for
Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection'' and
inserting ``Assistant Secretary for Infrastructure
Protection''; and
(D) in section 302(3), by striking ``Under Secretary for
Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection'' and
inserting ``Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis and
the Assistant Secretary for Infrastructure Protection''.
(2) Headings.--
(A) Section 201.--The heading for section 201 of such Act
is amended to read as follows:
``SEC. 201. OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE AND ANALYSIS.''.
(B) Section 201(a).--The heading for subsection (a) of
section 201 of such Act is amended to read as follows:
``(a) Under Secretary of Homeland Security for Intelligence
and Analysis.--''.
(C) Section 201(b).--The heading for subsection (b) of
section 201 of such Act, as redesignated by subsection
(a)(2), is amended to read as follows:
``(b) Discharge of Intelligence and Analysis.--''.
(3) National security act of 1947.--Section 106(b)(2)(I) of
the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-6) is
amended to read as follows:
``(I) The Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis of
the Department of Homeland Security.''.
(4) Intelligence reform and terrorism prevention act of
2004.--Section 7306(a)(1) of the Intelligence Reform and
Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (Public Law 108-458; 118
Stat. 3848) is amended by striking ``Under Secretary for
Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection'' and
inserting ``Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis''.
SEC. 742. INTELLIGENCE COMPONENTS OF DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
SECURITY.
(a) Responsibilities.--Subtitle A of title II of the
Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 201 et seq.) is
further amended by adding at the end the following new
section:
``SEC. 210. INTELLIGENCE COMPONENTS.
``(a) Responsibilities.--Subject to the direction and
control of the Secretary, the responsibilities of the head of
each intelligence component of the Department are as follows:
``(1) To ensure that duties related to the acquisition,
analysis, and dissemination of homeland security information
are carried out effectively and efficiently in support of the
Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis.
``(2) To support and implement the goals established in
cooperation with the Under Secretary for Intelligence and
Analysis.
``(3) To incorporate the input of the Under Secretary for
Intelligence and Analysis with respect to performance
appraisals, bonus or award recommendations, pay adjustments,
and other forms of commendation.
``(4) To coordinate with the Under Secretary for
Intelligence and Analysis in the recruitment and selection of
intelligence officials of the intelligence component.
``(5) To advise and coordinate with the Under Secretary for
Intelligence and Analysis on any plan to reorganize or
restructure the intelligence component that would, if
implemented, result in realignments of intelligence
functions.
``(6) To ensure that employees of the intelligence
component have knowledge of and comply with the programs and
policies established by the Under Secretary for Intelligence
and Analysis and other appropriate officials of the
Department and that such employees comply with all applicable
laws and regulations.
``(7) To perform such other duties relating to such
responsibilities as the Secretary may provide.
``(b) Training of Employees.--The Secretary shall provide
training and guidance for employees, officials, and senior
executives of the intelligence components of the Department
to develop knowledge of laws, regulations, operations,
policies, procedures, and programs that are related to the
functions of the Department relating to the handling,
analysis, dissemination, and acquisition of homeland security
information.''.
(b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents in section
1(b) of such Act is further amended by adding at the end of
the items relating to such subtitle the following:
``Sec. 210. Intelligence components.''.
SEC. 743. OFFICE OF INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION.
(a) Establishment.--Subtitle A of title II of the Homeland
Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 201 et seq.) is further
amended by adding at the end the following new section:
``SEC. 210A. OFFICE OF INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION.
``(a) Assistant Secretary for Infrastructure Protection.--
``(1) In general.--There shall be in the Department an
Office of Infrastructure Protection headed by an Assistant
Secretary for Infrastructure Protection.
``(2) Responsibilities.--The Assistant Secretary shall
assist the Secretary in discharging the responsibilities
assigned by the Secretary.
``(b) Discharge of Infrastructure Protection.--The
Secretary shall ensure that the responsibilities of the
Department regarding infrastructure protection are carried
out through the Assistant Secretary for Infrastructure
Protection.
``(c) Responsibilities of Assistant Secretary.--Subject to
the direction and control of the Secretary, the
responsibilities of
[[Page H147]]
the Assistant Secretary for Infrastructure Protection shall
be as follows:
``(1) To carry out comprehensive assessments of the
vulnerabilities of the key resources and critical
infrastructure of the United States, including the
performance of risk assessments to determine the risks posed
by particular types of terrorist attacks within the United
States (including an assessment of the probability of success
of such attacks and the feasibility and potential efficacy of
various countermeasures to such attacks).
``(2) To participate in the integration of relevant
information, analyses, and vulnerability assessments (whether
such information, analyses, or assessments are provided or
produced by the Department or others) in order to identify
priorities for protective and support measures by the
Department, other agencies of the Federal Government, State
and local government agencies and authorities, the private
sector, and other entities.
``(3) To develop a comprehensive national plan for securing
the key resources and critical infrastructure of the United
States, including power production, generation, and
distribution systems, information technology and
telecommunications systems (including satellites), electronic
financial and property record storage and transmission
systems, emergency preparedness communications systems, and
the physical and technological assets that support such
systems.
``(4) To recommend measures necessary to protect the key
resources and critical infrastructure of the United States in
coordination with other agencies of the Federal Government
and in cooperation with State and local government agencies
and authorities, the private sector, and other entities.
``(5) To coordinate with the Under Secretary for
Intelligence and Analysis and elements of the intelligence
community and with Federal, State, and local law enforcement
agencies, and the private sector, as appropriate.
``(6) To perform such other duties as assigned by the
Secretary under this Act.
``(d) Staff.--
``(1) In general.--The Secretary shall provide the Office
with a staff having appropriate expertise and experience to
assist the Assistant Secretary in discharging
responsibilities under this section.
``(2) Private sector staff.--Staff under this subsection
may include staff from the private sector.
``(3) Security clearances.--Staff under this subsection
shall possess security clearances appropriate for their work
under this section.
``(e) Detail of Personnel.--
``(1) In general.--In order to assist the Office in
discharging responsibilities under this section, personnel of
other Federal agencies may be detailed to the Department for
the performance of analytic functions and related duties.
``(2) Cooperative agreements.--The Secretary and the head
of the agency concerned may enter into cooperative agreements
for the purpose of detailing personnel under this subsection.
``(3) Basis.--The detail of personnel under this subsection
may be on a reimbursable or non-reimbursable basis.''.
(b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents in section
1(b) of such Act is further amended by adding at the end of
the items relating to such subtitle the following:
``Sec. 210A. Office of Infrastructure Protection.''.
TITLE VIII--PROTECTING PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES WHILE EFFECTIVELY
FIGHTING TERRORISM
Subtitle A--Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Boards
SEC. 801. SHORT TITLE.
This subtitle may be cited as the ``Protection of Civil
Liberties Act''.
SEC. 802. FINDINGS.
Congress finds the following:
(1) On July 22, 2004 the National Commission on Terrorist
Attacks Upon the United States issued a report that included
41 specific recommendations to help prevent future terrorist
attacks, including details of a global strategy and
government reorganization necessary to implement that
strategy.
(2) One of the recommendations focused on the protections
of civil liberties. Specifically the following recommendation
was made: ``At this time of increased and consolidated
government authority, there should be a board within the
executive branch to oversee adherence to the guidelines we
recommend and the commitment the government makes to defend
our civil liberties.''.
(3) The report also states that ``the choice between
security and liberty is a false choice, as nothing is more
likely to endanger America's liberties than the success of a
terrorist attack at home. Our History has shown that the
insecurity threatens liberty at home. Yet if our liberties
are curtailed, we lose the values that we are struggling to
defend.''.
(4) On December 17, 2004, Public Law 108-458, the National
Intelligence Reform Act, was signed into law. This law
created a civil liberties board that does not have the
authority necessary to protect civil liberties.
SEC. 803. MAKING THE PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT
BOARD INDEPENDENT.
Section 1061(b) of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Prevention Act of 2004 (5 U.S.C. 601 note) is amended by
striking ``within the Executive Office of the President'' and
inserting ``as an independent agency within the Executive
branch''.
SEC. 804. REQUIRING ALL MEMBERS OF THE PRIVACY AND CIVIL
LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BOARD BE CONFIRMED BY THE
SENATE.
Subsection (e) of section 1061 of the Intelligence Reform
and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (5 U.S.C. 601 note) is
amended to read as follows:
``(e) Membership.--
``(1) Members.--The Board shall be composed of a full-time
chairman and 4 additional members, who shall be appointed by
the President by no later than 6 months after the date of the
enactment of the Protection of Civil Liberties Act, by and
with the advice and consent of the Senate, which shall move
expeditiously following each nomination.
``(2) Qualifications.--Members of the Board shall be
selected solely on the basis of their professional
qualifications, achievements, public stature, expertise in
civil liberties and privacy, and relevant experience, and
without regard to political affiliation, but in no event
shall more than 3 members of the Board be members of the same
political party. The President shall, before appointing an
individual who is not a member of the same political party as
the President consult with the leadership of that party, if
any, in the Senate and House of Representatives.
``(3) Incompatible office.--An individual appointed to the
Board may not, while serving on the Board, be an elected
official, officer, or employee of the Federal Government,
other than in the capacity as a member of the Board.
``(4) Term.--Each member of the Board shall serve a term of
six years, except that--
``(A) a member appointed to a term of office after the
commencement of such term may serve under such appointment
only for the remainder of such term;
``(B) upon the expiration of the term of office of a
member, the member shall continue to serve until the member's
successor has been appointed and qualified, except that no
member may serve under this subparagraph--
``(i) for more than 60 days when Congress is in session
unless a nomination to fill the vacancy shall have been
submitted to the Senate; or
``(ii) after the adjournment sine die of the session of the
Senate in which such nomination is submitted; and
``(C) the members initially appointed under this subsection
shall serve terms of two, three, four, five, and six years,
respectively, from the effective date of this Act, with the
term of each such member to be designated by the President.
``(5) Quorum and meetings.--The Board shall meet upon the
call of the chairman or a majority of its members. Three
members of the Board shall constitute a quorum.''.
SEC. 805. SUBPOENA POWER FOR THE PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES
OVERSIGHT BOARD.
Section 1061(d) of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Prevention Act of 2004 (5 U.S.C. 601 note) is amended--
(1) so that subparagraph (D) of paragraph (1) reads as
follows:
``(D) require, by subpoena issued at the direction of a
majority of the members of the Board, persons (other than
departments, agencies, and elements of the executive branch)
to produce any relevant information, documents, reports,
answers, records, accounts, papers, and other documentary or
testimonial evidence.''; and
(2) so that paragraph (2) reads as follows:
``(2) Enforcement of subpoena.--In the case of contumacy or
failure to obey a subpoena issued under paragraph (1)(D), the
United States district court for the judicial district in
which the subpoenaed person resides, is served, or may be
found may issue an order requiring such person to produce the
evidence required by such subpoena.''.
SEC. 806. REPORTING REQUIREMENTS.
(a) Duties of Board.--Paragraph (4) of section 1061(c) of
the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004
(5 U.S.C. 601 note) is amended to read as follows:
``(4) Reports.--
``(A) Receipt, review, and submission.--
``(i) In general.--The Board shall--
``(I) receive and review reports from privacy officers and
civil liberties officers described in section 212; and
``(II) periodically submit, not less than semiannually,
reports to the appropriate congressional committees,
including the Committees on the Judiciary of the Senate and
the House of Representatives, the Committee on Homeland
Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate, the
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform of the House of
Representatives, the Select Committee on Intelligence of the
Senate, and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of
the House of Representatives, the Committee on Homeland
Security of the House of Representatives, and to the
President.
Such reports shall be in unclassified form to the greatest
extent possible, with a classified annex where necessary.
``(ii) Contents.--Not less than 2 reports the Board submits
each year under clause (i)(II) shall include--
``(I) a description of the major activities of the Board
during the preceding period;
[[Page H148]]
``(II) information on the findings, conclusions, and
recommendations of the Board resulting from its advice and
oversight functions under subsection (c);
``(III) the minority views on any findings, conclusions,
and recommendations of the Board resulting from its advice
and oversight functions under subsection (c); and
``(IV) each proposal reviewed by the Board under subsection
(c)(1) that the Board advised against implementing, but that
notwithstanding such advice, was implemented.
``(B) Informing the public.--The Board shall--
``(i) make its reports, including its reports to Congress,
available to the public to the greatest extent that is
consistent with the protection of classified information and
applicable law; and
``(ii) hold public hearings and otherwise inform the public
of its activities, as appropriate and in a manner consistent
with the protection of classified information and applicable
law.''.
(b) Privacy and Civil Liberties Officers.--
(1) Designation of officers.--Section 1062 of the
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (118
Stat. 3688) is amended to read as follows:
``SEC. 1062. PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES OFFICERS.
``(a) Designation and Functions.--The Attorney General, the
Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, the Secretary
of the Treasury, the Secretary of Health and Human Services,
the Secretary of Homeland Security, the National Intelligence
Director, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency,
any other entity within the intelligence community (as
defined in section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50
U.S.C. 401a)), and the head of any other department, agency,
or element of the executive branch designated by the Privacy
and Civil Liberties Oversight Board to be appropriate for
coverage under this section shall designate not less than 1
senior officer to--
``(1) assist the head of such department, agency, or
element and other officials of such department, agency, or
element in appropriately considering privacy and civil
liberties concerns when such officials are proposing,
developing, or implementing laws, regulations, policies,
procedures, or guidelines related to efforts to protect the
Nation against terrorism;
``(2) periodically investigate and review department,
agency, or element actions, policies, procedures, guidelines,
and related laws and their implementation to ensure that such
department, agency, or element is adequately considering
privacy and civil liberties in its actions;
``(3) ensure that such department, agency, or element has
adequate procedures to receive, investigate, respond to, and
redress complaints from individuals who allege such
department, agency, or element has violated their privacy or
civil liberties; and
``(4) in providing advice on proposals to retain or enhance
a particular governmental power the officer shall consider
whether such department, agency, or element has established--
``(A) that the power actually enhances security and the
need for the power is balanced with the need to protect
privacy and civil liberties;
``(B) that there is adequate supervision of the use by such
department, agency, or element of the power to ensure
protection of privacy and civil liberties; and
``(C) that there are adequate guidelines and oversight to
properly confine its use.
``(b) Exception to Designation Authority.--
``(1) Privacy officers.--In any department, agency, or
element referred to in subsection (a) or designated by the
Board, which has a statutorily created privacy officer, such
officer shall perform the functions specified in subsection
(a) with respect to privacy.
``(2) Civil liberties officers.--In any department, agency,
or element referred to in subsection (a) or designated by the
Board, which has a statutorily created civil liberties
officer, such officer shall perform the functions specified
in subsection (a) with respect to civil liberties.
``(c) Supervision and Coordination.--Each privacy officer
or civil liberties officer described in subsection (a) or (b)
shall--
``(1) report directly to the head of the department,
agency, or element concerned; and
``(2) coordinate their activities with the Inspector
General of such department, agency, or element to avoid
duplication of effort.
``(d) Agency Cooperation.--The head of each department,
agency, or element shall ensure that each privacy officer and
civil liberties officer--
``(1) has the information, material, and resources
necessary to fulfill the functions of such officer;
``(2) is advised of proposed policy changes;
``(3) is consulted by decisionmakers; and
``(4) is given access to material and personnel the officer
determines to be necessary to carry out the functions of such
officer.
``(e) Reprisal for Making Complaint.--No action
constituting a reprisal, or threat of reprisal, for making a
complaint or for disclosing information to a privacy officer
or civil liberties officer described in subsection (a) or
(b), or to the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board,
that indicates a possible violation of privacy protections or
civil liberties in the administration of the programs and
operations of the Federal Government relating to efforts to
protect the Nation from terrorism shall be taken by any
Federal employee in a position to take such action, unless
the complaint was made or the information was disclosed with
the knowledge that it was false or with willful disregard for
its truth or falsity.
``(f) Periodic Reports.--
``(1) In general.--The privacy officers and civil liberties
officers of each department, agency, or element referred to
or described in subsection (a) or (b) shall periodically, but
not less than quarterly, submit a report on the activities of
such officers--
``(A)(i) to the appropriate congressional committees,
including the Committees on the Judiciary of the Senate and
the House of Representatives, the Committee on Homeland
Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate, the
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform of the House of
Representatives, the Select Committee on Intelligence of the
Senate, and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of
the House of Representatives;
``(ii) to the head of such department, agency, or element;
and
``(iii) to the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board;
and
``(B) which shall be in unclassified form to the greatest
extent possible, with a classified annex where necessary.
``(2) Contents.--Each report submitted under paragraph (1)
shall include information on the discharge of each of the
functions of the officer concerned, including--
``(A) information on the number and types of reviews
undertaken;
``(B) the type of advice provided and the response given to
such advice;
``(C) the number and nature of the complaints received by
the department, agency, or element concerned for alleged
violations; and
``(D) a summary of the disposition of such complaints, the
reviews and inquiries conducted, and the impact of the
activities of such officer.
``(g) Informing the Public.--Each privacy officer and civil
liberties officer shall--
``(1) make the reports of such officer, including reports
to Congress, available to the public to the greatest extent
that is consistent with the protection of classified
information and applicable law; and
``(2) otherwise inform the public of the activities of such
officer, as appropriate and in a manner consistent with the
protection of classified information and applicable law.
``(h) Savings Clause.--Nothing in this section shall be
construed to limit or otherwise supplant any other
authorities or responsibilities provided by law to privacy
officers or civil liberties officers.
``(i) Protections for Human Research Subjects.--The
Secretary of Homeland Security shall ensure that the
Department of Homeland Security complies with the protections
for human research subjects, as described in part 46 of title
45, Code of Federal Regulations, or in equivalent regulations
as promulgated by such Secretary, with respect to research
that is conducted or supported by such Department.''.
(2) Clerical amendment.--The table of contents in section
1(b) of such Act is amended by striking the item relating to
section 1062 and inserting the following:
``Sec. 1062. Privacy and civil liberties officers.''.
Subtitle B--Enhancement of Privacy Officer Authorities
SEC. 811. SHORT TITLE.
This subtitle may be cited as the ``Privacy Officer With
Enhanced Rights Act of 2007'' or the ``POWER Act''.
SEC. 812. AUTHORITIES OF THE PRIVACY OFFICER OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY.
Section 222 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C.
142) is amended--
(1) by inserting before the first sentence the following:
``(a) Appointment and Responsibilities.--''; and
(2) by adding at the end the following:
``(b) Authority to Investigate.--
``(1) In general.--The senior official appointed under this
section is specifically authorized--
``(A) to have access to all records, reports, audits,
reviews, documents, papers, recommendations, and other
materials available to the Department that relate to programs
and operations with respect to which the senior official has
responsibilities under this section;
``(B) to make such investigations and reports relating to
the administration of the programs and operations of the
Department as are, in the senior official's judgment,
necessary or desirable;
``(C) to require by subpoena the production, by persons
other than Federal agencies, of all information, documents,
reports, answers, records, accounts, papers, and other data
and documentary evidence necessary to performance of the
functions of the senior official under this section;
``(D) to administer to or take from any person an oath,
affirmation, or affidavit, whenever necessary to performance
of the functions of the senior official under this section;
and
``(E) to take any other action that may be taken by the
Inspector General of the Department, as necessary to require
employees of the Department to produce documents and answer
questions relevant to performance of the functions of the
senior official under this section.
``(2) Enforcement of subpoenas.--Any subpoena issued under
paragraph (1)(C) shall,
[[Page H149]]
in the case of contumacy or refusal to obey, be enforceable
by order of any appropriate United States district court.
``(3) Effect of oaths, etc.--Any oath, affirmation, or
affidavit administered or taken under paragraph (1)(D) by or
before an employee of the Privacy Office designated for that
purpose by the senior official appointed under subsection (a)
shall have the same force and effect as if administered or
taken by or before an officer having a seal of office.
``(c) Term of Office.--The term of appointment of a senior
official under subsection (a) shall be 5 years.
``(d) Reports to Congress.--The senior official appointed
under subsection (a) shall submit reports directly to
Congress regarding performance of the responsibilities of the
senior official under this section, without any prior comment
or amendment by the Secretary, Deputy Secretary, or any other
officer or employee of the Department or the Office of
Management and Budget.''.
TITLE IX--IMPROVING CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY
SEC. 901. VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT AND REPORT ON CRITICAL
INFRASTRUCTURE INFORMATION.
(a) In General.--Subtitle B of title II of the Homeland
Security Act of 2002 is amended by adding at the end the
following new section:
``SEC. 216. ANNUAL CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE VULNERABILITY
ASSESSMENT AND REPORT.
``(a) Vulnerability Assessment Required.--Except where a
vulnerability assessment is required under another provision
of law, for each fiscal year, the Secretary, acting through
the Assistant Secretary for Infrastructure Protection
pursuant to the responsibilities under section 210A, shall
prepare a vulnerability assessment of the critical
infrastructure information available to the Secretary with
respect to that fiscal year. Each vulnerability assessment
shall contain any actions or countermeasures proposed or
recommended by the Secretary to address security concerns
covered in the assessment. The information in each such
assessment shall be set forth separately for each critical
infrastructure sector, including the critical infrastructure
sectors named in Homeland Security Presidential Directive-7,
as in effect on January 1, 2006.
``(b) Annual Report to Congress.--
``(1) Report required.--Not later than six months after the
last day of a fiscal year, the Secretary shall submit to the
Committee on Homeland Security of the House of
Representatives and the Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs of the Senate a report containing a
summary and review of the vulnerability assessments prepared
by the Secretary under subsection (a) for that fiscal year
and the two preceding fiscal years. The information in the
report shall be set forth separately for each of the critical
infrastructure sectors described in subsection (a).
``(2) Contents of report.--The Secretary shall include in
the report required under paragraph (1)--
``(A) for each critical infrastructure sector covered by
the report, a summary comparison describing any changes
between the vulnerability assessment for the fiscal year
covered by the report and the vulnerability assessment for
the preceding fiscal year;
``(B) the explanation and comments of the Secretary with
respect to the greatest risks to critical infrastructure for
each such sector; and
``(C) the recommendations of the Secretary for mitigating
such risks.
``(3) Classified annex.--The report required under
paragraph (1) may contain a classified annex.''.
(b) Technical Amendment.--Section 212(3) of such Act (6
U.S.C. 131(3)) is amended--
(1) by inserting ``relating to'' after ``the security of
critical infrastructure or protected systems''; and
(2) in subparagraph (A), by inserting ``the'' after
``(A)''.
(c) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents in section
1(b) of such Act is amended by inserting after the item
relating to section 215 the following new item:
``Sec. 216. Annual critical infrastructure vulnerability assessment and
report.''.
SEC. 902. NATIONAL ASSET DATABASE AND THE NATIONAL AT-RISK
DATABASE.
(a) In General.--Subtitle A of title II of the Homeland
Security Act of 2002 is amended by adding at the end the
following new sections:
``SEC. 210C. NATIONAL ASSET DATABASE AND NATIONAL AT-RISK
DATABASE.
``(a) Establishment.--
``(1) National asset database.--The Secretary shall
establish and maintain a national database of nationwide
critical infrastructure assets to identify and prioritize
critical infrastructure and key resources and to protect them
from terrorist attack. The database shall be known as the
`National Asset Database'.
``(2) National at-risk database.--The Secretary shall
establish within the National Asset Database, a database
containing a list of the infrastructure the Secretary
determines is most at risk, to be known as the `National At-
Risk Database'.
``(3) National asset database consortium.--
``(A) Establishment.--The Secretary shall establish a
consortium to be known as the `National Asset Database
Consortium'. The Consortium shall advise the Secretary on the
best way to identify, generate, organize, and maintain the
databases described in paragraphs (1) and (2) and shall be
made up of at least two but not more than four national
laboratories and the heads of such other Federal agencies as
the Secretary deems appropriate.
``(B) Administration and consultation.--The Secretary
shall--
``(i) select as members of the National Asset Database
Consortium national laboratories or Federal agencies that
have demonstrated experience working with and identifying
critical infrastructure;
``(ii) enter into contracts, as necessary, with the members
of the National Asset Database Consortium to perform the
tasks required under this section; and
``(iii) solicit and receive comments from the National
Asset Database Consortium on--
``(I) the appropriateness of the protection and risk
methodologies in the National Infrastructure Protection Plan
or other nationwide infrastructure protection plan issued by
the Department; and
``(II) alternative means to define risk and identify
specific criteria to prioritize the most at-risk
infrastructure or key resources.
``(b) Use of Database.--The Secretary shall use the
database established under subsection (a)--
``(1) in the development, coordination, integration, and
implementation of plans and programs, including to identify,
catalog, prioritize, and protect critical infrastructure and
key resources in accordance with Homeland Security
Presidential Directive number 7, and in cooperation with all
levels of government and private sector entities that the
Secretary considers appropriate; and
``(2) in providing any covered grant to assist in
preventing, reducing, mitigating, or responding to terrorist
attack.
``(c) Maintenance of Database.--
``(1) In general.--The Secretary shall maintain and
annually update the database, including by--
``(A) annually defining and systematically examining assets
in the database that are described incorrectly or that do not
meet national assets guidelines used by the Secretary to
determine which assets should remain in the National Asset
Database and the National At-Risk Database;
``(B) annually providing a list to the States of assets
referred to in subparagraph (A) for review before finalizing
the decision of which assets to include in the National Asset
Database and the National At-Risk Database;
``(C) reviewing the guidelines to the States to ensure
consistency and uniformity for inclusion and how the
Department intends to use that data;
``(D) meeting annually with the States to provide guidance
and clarification of the guidelines to promote consistency
and uniformity in submissions;
``(E) utilizing on an ongoing basis the National Asset
Database and other expert panels established by the
Department to review and refine the National Asset Database
and the National At-Risk Database; and
``(F) utilizing the Department's National Infrastructure
Simulation and Analysis Center for the National Asset
Database taxonomy and asset information in the National Asset
Database and facilitating the future exchange of information
between the National Asset Database and such center.
``(2) Organization of information in database.--The
Secretary shall--
``(A) remove from the National Asset Database or the
National At-Risk Database any asset that the Secretary
determines to be unverifiable and as not meeting national
asset guidelines set forth by the Secretary in requests for
information from States; and
``(B) classify assets in the database according to the 17
sectors listed in National Infrastructure Protection Plan
developed pursuant to Homeland Security Presidential
Directive 7, to ensure that the assets in the National Asset
Database and the National At-Risk Database can be categorized
by State and locality, regionally, and in such a manner as is
effective for grants and other purposes.
``(3) Milestones and guidelines.--The Secretary shall--
``(A) identify and evaluate key milestones for the National
Asset Database and the National At-Risk Database, including
methods to integrate private sector assets and tasks that
must be completed to eventually allocate homeland security
grant programs based on the information contained in the
database; and
``(B) issue guidelines for--
``(i) States to submit uniform information for possible
inclusion in the National Asset Database or the National At-
Risk Database; and
``(ii) review of such submissions by the Department.
``(d) Reports.--
``(1) In general.--Not later than March 1 of each year, the
Secretary shall submit to the Committee on Homeland Security
of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Homeland
Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate a report on
the critical infrastructure included in the National Asset
Database that is most at risk to terrorism.
``(2) Contents.--Each report shall include the following:
``(A) The name, location, and sector classification of
assets in the National Asset Database that have been
identified or deemed critical infrastructure that is most at
risk to terrorism.
[[Page H150]]
``(B) Changes made in such database regarding such critical
infrastructure made during the period covered by the report
regarding--
``(i) defining and identifying critical infrastructure; and
``(ii) compiling a usable database.
``(C) The extent to which the database has been used as a
tool for allocating funds to prevent, reduce, mitigate, and
respond to terrorist attacks.
``(3) Classified information.--The Secretary shall provide
to the members of the committees to which the report required
under this subsection is required to be submitted under
paragraph (1) a classified briefing on the contents of such
report. The Secretary shall also submit with each report a
classified annex containing information required to be
submitted under this section that cannot be made public.
``(e) Covered Grant Defined.--In this section, the term
`covered grant' means any grant provided by the Department
under any of the following:
``(1) The Urban Area Security Initiative.
``(2) The Buffer Zone Protection Program.
``(3) Any other grant program administered by the
Department, as determined appropriate by the Secretary.
``(4) Any successor to a program referred to in this
paragraph.''.
(b) Deadlines for Implementation and Notification of
Congress.--
(1) Deadline for recommendations.--Not later than 60 days
after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of
Homeland Security shall secure recommendations on how to
identify, generate, organize, and maintain the list of assets
in the databases from the consortium of national
laboratories, as required under section 210C(a)(2) of the
Homeland Security Act of 2002, as added by subsection (a).
(2) Deadline for first report regarding use of the national
asset database.--Notwithstanding the date specified under
section 210C(d) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002, as
added by subsection (a), the Secretary of Homeland Security
shall submit the first report required under that section not
later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this
Act.
(c) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents in section
1(b) of such Act is further amended by inserting after the
item relating to section 210 the following:
``Sec. 210C. National Asset Database and National At-Risk Database.''.
(d) Submittal of Certain Reports.--Each report that is
authorized or required by this Act (or the amendments made by
this Act) to be prepared by the Secretary of Homeland
Security and that concerns a matter of the type carried out
under an program under the jurisdiction of the Committee on
Energy and Commerce of the House of Representatives shall be
submitted to the Committee on Energy and Commerce of the
House of Representatives, in addition to the other
congressional committees involved.
TITLE X--TRANSPORTATION SECURITY PLANNING AND INFORMATION SHARING
SEC. 1001. STRATEGIC TRANSPORTATION SECURITY INFORMATION
SHARING.
Section 114 of title 49, United States Code, is amended by
adding at the end the following:
``(u) Strategic Information Sharing.--
``(1) Establishment of plan.--The Secretary of Homeland
Security shall establish a Strategic Transportation Security
Information Sharing Plan.
``(2) Purpose of plan.--The plan shall ensure the robust
development of tactical and strategic intelligence products
for disseminating to public and private stakeholders security
information relating to threats to and vulnerabilities of
transportation modes, including aviation, bridge and tunnel,
commuter rail and ferry, highway, maritime, pipeline, rail,
mass transit, and over-the-road bus transportation.
``(3) Content of plan.--The plan shall include--
``(A) a description of how intelligence analysts in the
Transportation Security Administration are coordinating their
activities with other intelligence analysts in the Department
of Homeland Security and other Federal, State, and local
agencies;
``(B) reasonable deadlines for completing any
organizational changes within the Department of Homeland
Security required to accommodate implementation of the plan;
and
``(C) a description of resource needs for fulfilling the
plan.
``(4) Reports to congress.--
``(A) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date
of enactment of this subsection, the Secretary shall submit
to the appropriate congressional committees a report
containing the plan.
``(B) Updates.--
``(i) Certification of full implementation.--After
achieving full implementation of the plan, the Secretary
shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a
written certification of such implementation.
``(ii) Updates on implementation.--Not later than 90 days
after the date of submission of a report under subparagraph
(A), and every 90 days thereafter until the date of
submission of a written certification under clause (i), the
Secretary shall submit to the appropriate congressional
committees a report containing an update on implementation of
the plan.
``(C) Annual report.--Following the date of submission of a
written certification under subparagraph (B)(i), the
Secretary shall submit to the appropriate congressional
committees an annual report on the following:
``(i) The number of transportation intelligence reports
disseminated under the plan and a brief description of each
report.
``(ii) The security classification of each report.
``(iii) The number of public and private stakeholders who
were provided with each report.
``(5) Survey.--The Secretary shall conduct an annual survey
of the satisfaction of each of the recipients of
transportation intelligence reports disseminated under the
plan, and include the results of the survey as part of the
annual report to be submitted under paragraph (4)(C).
``(6) Security clearances.--The Secretary shall ensure that
public and private stakeholders have the security clearances
needed to receive classified information if information
contained in transportation intelligence reports cannot be
disseminated in an unclassified format.
``(7) Classification of material.--To the greatest extent
possible, the Secretary shall provide public and private
stakeholders with specific and actionable information in an
unclassified format.
``(8) Definitions.--In this subsection, the following
definitions apply:
``(A) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term
`appropriate congressional committees' has the meaning given
that term in subsection (t).
``(B) Plan.--The term `plan' means the Strategic
Transportation Security Information Sharing Plan established
under paragraph (1).
``(C) Public and private stakeholders.--The term `public
and private stakeholders' means Federal, State, and local
agencies, tribal governments, and appropriate private
entities, including nonprofit employee labor
organizations.''.
SEC. 1002. TRANSPORTATION SECURITY STRATEGIC PLANNING.
(a) In General.--Section 114(t)(1)(B) of title 49, United
States Code, is amended to read as follows:
``(B) transportation modal security plans addressing risks,
threats, and vulnerabilities for aviation, bridge and tunnel,
commuter rail and ferry, highway, maritime, pipeline, rail,
mass transit, over-the-road bus, and other public
transportation infrastructure assets.''.
(b) Role of Secretary of Transportation.--Section 114(t)(2)
of such title is amended by inserting before the period at
the end the following: ``and in carrying out all other
responsibilities set forth in this subsection''.
(c) Contents of National Strategy for Transportation
Security.--Section 114(t)(3) of such title is amended--
(1) in subparagraph (B) by inserting ``, based on
vulnerability assessments conducted by the Department of
Homeland Security,'' after ``risk-based priorities'';
(2) in subparagraph (D)--
(A) by striking ``and local'' and inserting ``, local, and
tribal''; and
(B) by striking ``private sector cooperation and
participation'' and inserting ``cooperation and participation
by private sector entities, including nonprofit employee
labor organizations,'';
(3) in subparagraph (E)--
(A) by striking ``response'' and inserting ``prevention,
response,''; and
(B) by inserting ``and outside of'' before ``the United
States''; and
(4) in subparagraph (F) by adding at the end the following:
``Research and development projects initiated by the
Department of Homeland Security shall be based on such
prioritization.''.
(d) Periodic Progress Report.--Section 114(t)(4)(C) is
amended--
(1) in clause (i) by inserting before the period at the end
the following: ``, including the transportation modal
security plans'';
(2) by striking clause (ii) and inserting the following:
``(ii) Content.--Each progress report submitted under this
subparagraph shall include, at a minimum, the following:
``(I) Recommendations for improving and implementing the
National Strategy for Transportation Security and the
transportation modal security plans that the Secretary, in
consultation with the Secretary of Transportation, considers
appropriate.
``(II) An accounting of all grants for transportation
security, including grants for research and development,
distributed by the Department of Homeland Security in the
previous year and a description of how the grants
accomplished the goals of the National Strategy for
Transportation Security.
``(III) An accounting of all funds (other than grants
referred in subclause (II)) expended by the Department of
Homeland Security on transportation security.
``(IV) Information on the number of employees of the
Department of Homeland Security, by agency, working on
transportation security issues. The listing shall be divided
by transportation mode, including aviation, bridge and
tunnel, commuter rail and ferry, highway, maritime, pipeline,
rail, mass transit, over-the-road bus, and other public
transportation modes. The listing shall include information,
by transportation mode, on the number of contractors hired by
the Department of Homeland Security to work on
transportation-related security.
[[Page H151]]
``(V) Information on the turnover in the previous year
among employees of the Department of Homeland Security
working on transportation security issues. Specifically, the
report shall provide information on the number of employees
who have left the Department, their agency, the area in which
they worked, and the amount of time that they worked for the
Department.
``(iii) Written explanation of transportation security
activities not delineated in the national strategy for
transportation security.--Before carrying out a
transportation security activity that is not clearly
delineated in the National Strategy for Transportation
Security, the Secretary shall submit to appropriate
congressional committees a written explanation of the
activity, including the amount of funds to be expended for
the activity.''.
(e) Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined.--Section
114(t)(4)(E) of such title is amended by striking ``Select''.
(f) Priority Status.--Section 114(t)(5)(B) of such title is
amended--
(1) by striking ``and'' at the end of clause (iii);
(2) by redesignating clause (iv) as clause (v); and
(3) by inserting after clause (iii) the following:
``(iv) the transportation sector specific plan required
under Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7; and''.
(g) Coordination; Plan Distribution.--Section 114(t) of
such title is amended by adding at the end the following:
``(6) Coordination.--In carrying out the responsibilities
set forth in this section, the Secretary of Homeland
Security, working with the Secretary of Transportation, shall
consult with Federal, State, and local agencies, tribal
governments, private sector entities (including nonprofit
employee labor organizations), institutions of higher
learning, and other appropriate entities.
``(7) Plan distribution.--The Secretary of Homeland
Security shall provide an unclassified version of the
National Strategy for Transportation Security to Federal,
State, and local agencies, tribal governments, private sector
entities (including nonprofit employee labor organizations),
institutions of higher learning, and other appropriate
entities.''.
TITLE XI--PRIVATE SECTOR PREPAREDNESS
SEC. 1101. PARTICIPATION OF PRIVATE SECTOR ORGANIZATIONS IN
EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE ACTIVITIES.
(a) Establishment of Preparedness Program.--Section 519 of
the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 318) is amended--
(1) by striking the section heading and inserting the
following:
``SEC. 519. PARTICIPATION OF PRIVATE SECTOR ORGANIZATIONS IN
EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE
ACTIVITIES.'';
(2) by inserting ``(a) Use of Private Sector Networks in
Emergency Response.--'' before ``To the maximum''; and
(3) by adding at the end the following:
``(b) Private Sector Emergency Preparedness Program.--
``(1) Preparedness program.--Not later than 90 days after
the date of enactment of this subsection, the Secretary shall
develop and implement a program to enhance private sector
preparedness for acts of terrorism and other emergencies and
disasters through the promotion of the use of voluntary
consensus standards.
``(2) Program elements.--In carrying out the program, the
Secretary shall develop guidance and identify best practices
to assist or foster action by the private sector in--
``(A) identifying hazards and assessing risks and impacts;
``(B) mitigating the impacts of a wide variety of hazards,
including weapons of mass destruction;
``(C) managing necessary emergency preparedness and
response resources;
``(D) developing mutual aid agreements;
``(E) developing and maintaining emergency preparedness and
response plans, as well as associated operational procedures;
``(F) developing and conducting training and exercises to
support and evaluate emergency preparedness and response
plans and operational procedures;
``(G) developing and conducting training programs for
security guards to implement emergency preparedness and
response plans and operations procedures; and
``(H) developing procedures to respond to external requests
for information from the media and the public.
``(3) Standards.--
``(A) In general.--The Secretary shall support the
development of, promulgate, and regularly update as necessary
national voluntary consensus standards for private sector
emergency preparedness that will enable private sector
organizations to achieve optimal levels of emergency
preparedness as soon as practicable. Such standards shall
include the National Fire Protection Association 1600
Standard on Disaster/Emergency Management and Business
Continuity Programs.
``(B) Consultation.--The Secretary shall carry out
paragraph (1) in consultation with the Assistant Secretary
for Infrastructure Protection, the Assistant Secretary for
Cyber Security and Communications, the Under Secretary for
Science and Technology, the Director of the Federal Emergency
Management Agency, and the Special Assistant to the Secretary
for the Private Sector.
``(4) Coordination.--The Secretary shall coordinate the
program with, and utilize to the maximum extent practicable--
``(A) the voluntary standards for disaster and emergency
management and business continuity programs accredited by the
American National Standards Institute and developed by the
National Fire Protection Association; and
``(B) any existing private sector emergency preparedness
guidance or best practices developed by private sector
industry associations or other organizations.''.
(b) Conforming Amendment.--The table of contents contained
in section 1(b) of such Act is amended by striking the item
relating to section 519 and inserting the following:
``Sec. 519. Participation of private sector organizations in emergency
preparedness and response activities.''.
TITLE XII--PREVENTING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION PROLIFERATION AND
TERRORISM
SEC. 1201. FINDINGS.
(a) Findings of the 9/11 Commission.--Congress finds that
the 9/11 Commission made the following determinations:
(1) The United States Government has made insufficient
progress, and receives a grade ``D'', on efforts to prevent
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferation and
terrorism.
(2) The Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program has made
significant accomplishments, but much remains to be done to
secure weapons-grade nuclear materials. The size of the
problem still dwarfs the policy response. Nuclear materials
in the former Soviet Union still lack effective security
protection, and sites throughout the world contain enough
highly-enriched uranium to fashion a nuclear device but lack
even basic security features.
(3) Preventing the proliferation of WMD and acquisition of
such weapons by terrorists warrants a maximum effort, by
strengthening counter-proliferation efforts, expanding the
Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), and supporting the
Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program.
(4) Preventing terrorists from gaining access to WMD must
be an urgent national security priority because of the threat
such access poses to the American people. The President
should develop a comprehensive plan to dramatically
accelerate the timetable for securing all nuclear weapons-
usable material around the world and request the necessary
resources to complete this task. The President should
publicly state this goal and ensure its fulfillment.
(5) Congress should provide the resources needed to secure
vulnerable materials as quickly as possible.
(b) Recommendations of 9/11 Commission.--Congress further
finds that the 9/11 Commission has made the following
recommendations:
(1) Strengthen ``counter-proliferation'' efforts.--The
United States should work with the international community to
develop laws and an international legal regime with universal
jurisdiction to enable any state in the world to capture,
interdict, and prosecute smugglers of nuclear material.
(2) Expand the proliferation security initiative.--In
carrying out the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), the
United States should--
(A) use intelligence and planning resources of the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) alliance;
(B) make participation open to non-NATO countries; and
(C) encourage Russia and the People's Republic of China to
participate.
(3) Support the cooperative threat reduction program.--The
United States should expand, improve, increase resources for,
and otherwise fully support the Cooperative Threat Reduction
(CTR) program.
SEC. 1202. DEFINITIONS.
In this title:
(1) The terms ``prevention of weapons of mass destruction
proliferation and terrorism'' and ``prevention of WMD
proliferation and terrorism'' include activities under--
(A) the programs specified in section 1501(b) of the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997
(Public Law 104-201; 110 Stat. 2731; 50 U.S.C. 2362 note);
(B) the programs for which appropriations are authorized by
section 3101(a)(2) of the Bob Stump National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 (Public Law 107-314;
116 Stat. 2458);
(C) programs authorized by section 504 of the Freedom for
Russia and Emerging Eurasian Democracies and Open Markets
Support Act of 1992 (the FREEDOM Support Act) (22 U.S.C.
5854) and programs authorized by section 1412 of the Former
Soviet Union Demilitarization Act of 1992 (22 U.S.C. 5902);
and
(D) a program of any agency of the Federal Government
having a purpose similar to that of any of the programs
identified in subparagraphs (A) through (C), as designated by
the United States Coordinator for the Prevention of Weapons
of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism and the head
of the agency.
(2) The terms ``weapons of mass destruction'' and ``WMD''
mean chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons, and chemical,
biological, and nuclear materials that can be used in the
manufacture of such weapons.
[[Page H152]]
(3) The term ``items of proliferation concern'' means
equipment or other materials that could be used to develop
WMD or for activities involving WMD.
Subtitle A--Repeal and Modification of Limitations on Assistance for
Prevention of WMD Proliferation and Terrorism
SEC. 1211. REPEAL AND MODIFICATION OF LIMITATIONS ON
ASSISTANCE FOR PREVENTION OF WEAPONS OF MASS
DESTRUCTION PROLIFERATION AND TERRORISM.
Consistent with the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission,
Congress repeals or modifies the limitations on assistance
for prevention of weapons of mass destruction (WMD)
proliferation and terrorism as follows:
(1) Soviet nuclear threat reduction act of 1991.--Section
211(b) of the Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act of 1991
(title II of Public Law 102-228; 22 U.S.C. 2551 note) is
repealed.
(2) Cooperative threat reduction act of 1993.--Section
1203(d) of the Cooperative Threat Reduction Act of 1993
(title XII of Public Law 103-160; 22 U.S.C. 5952(d)) is
repealed.
(3) Russian chemical weapons destruction facilities.--
Section 1305 of the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2000 (Public Law 106-65; 22 U.S.C. 5952 note) is
repealed.
(4) Authority to use cooperative threat reduction funds
outside the former soviet union--modification of
certification requirement; repeal of funding limitation;
congressional notice requirement.--Section 1308 of the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004
(Public Law 108-136; 22 U.S.C. 5963) is amended--
(A) in subsection (a)--
(i) by striking ``the President may'' and inserting ``the
Secretary of Defense may''; and
(ii) by striking ``if the President'' and inserting ``if
the Secretary of Defense, with the concurrence of the
Secretary of State,'';
(B) by striking subsection (c);
(C) in subsection (d)(1)--
(i) by striking ``The President may not'' and inserting
``The Secretary of Defense may not''; and
(ii) by striking ``until the President'' and inserting
``until the Secretary of Defense'';
(D) in subsection (d)(2)--
(i) by striking ``Not later than 10 days after'' and
inserting ``Not later than 15 days prior to'';
(ii) by striking ``the President shall'' and inserting
``the Secretary of Defense shall''; and
(iii) by striking ``Congress'' and inserting ``the
Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign
Affairs of the House of Representatives and the Committee on
Armed Services and Committee on Foreign Relations of the
Senate''; and
(E) in subsection (d) by adding at the end the following:
``(3) In the case of a situation that threatens human life
or safety or where a delay would severely undermine the
national security of the United States, notification under
paragraph (2) shall be made not later than 10 days after
obligating funds under the authority in subsection (a) for a
project or activity.''.
(5) Authority to use international nuclear materials
protection and cooperation program funds outside the former
soviet union--modification of certification requirement;
repeal of funding limitation; congressional notice
requirement.--Section 3124 of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 (Public Law 108-136;
117 Stat. 1747) is amended--
(A) in subsection (a)--
(i) by striking ``the President may'' and inserting ``the
Secretary of Energy may''; and
(ii) by striking ``if the President'' and inserting ``if
the Secretary of Energy, with the concurrence of the
Secretary of State,'';
(B) by striking subsection (c);
(C) in subsection (d)(1)--
(i) by striking ``The President may not'' and inserting
``The Secretary of Energy may not''; and
(ii) by striking ``until the President'' and inserting
``until the Secretary of Energy'';
(D) in subsection (d)(2)--
(i) by striking ``Not later than 10 days after'' and
inserting ``Not later than 15 days prior to'';
(ii) by striking ``the President shall'' and inserting
``the Secretary of Energy shall''; and
(iii) by striking ``Congress'' and inserting ``the
Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign
Affairs of the House of Representatives and the Committee on
Armed Services and Committee on Foreign Relations of the
Senate''; and
(E) in subsection (d) by adding at the end the following:
``(3) In the case of a situation that threatens human life
or safety or where a delay would severely undermine the
national security of the United States, notification under
paragraph (2) shall be made not later than 10 days after
obligating funds under the authority in subsection (a) for a
project or activity.''.
Subtitle B--Proliferation Security Initiative
SEC. 1221. PROLIFERATION SECURITY INITIATIVE IMPROVEMENTS AND
AUTHORITIES.
(a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress,
consistent with the 9/11 Commission's recommendations, that
the President should strive to expand and strengthen the
Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) announced by the
President on May 31, 2003, with a particular emphasis on the
following:
(1) Issuing a presidential directive to the relevant
government agencies and departments that establishes a
defined annual budget and clear authorities, and provides
other necessary resources and structures to achieve more
efficient and effective performance of United States PSI-
related activities.
(2) Working with the United Nations Security Council to
develop a resolution to authorize the PSI under international
law.
(3) Increasing PSI cooperation with non-NATO partners.
(4) Implementing the recommendations of the Government
Accountability Office (GAO) in the September 2006 report
titled ``Better Controls Needed to Plan and Manage
Proliferation Security Initiative Activities'' (GAO-06-937C),
including the following:
(A) The Department of Defense and the Department of State
should establish clear PSI roles and responsibilities,
policies and procedures, interagency communication
mechanisms, documentation requirements, and indicators to
measure program results.
(B) The Department of Defense and the Department of State
should develop a strategy to work with PSI-participating
countries to resolve issues that are impediments to
conducting successful PSI interdictions.
(5) Expanding and formalizing the PSI into a multilateral
regime to increase coordination, cooperation, and compliance
among its participating states in interdiction activities.
(b) Budget Submission.--The Secretary of State and the
Secretary of Defense shall submit a defined budget for the
PSI, beginning with the budget submissions for their
respective departments for fiscal year 2009.
(c) Implementation Report.--Not later than 180 days after
the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall
transmit to the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee
on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives and the
Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign
Relations of the Senate a report on the implementation of
this section. The report shall include--
(1) the steps taken to implement the recommendations
described in paragraph (4) of subsection (a); and
(2) the progress made toward implementing the matters
described in paragraphs (1), (2), (3), and (5) of subsection
(a).
(d) GAO Annual Report.--The Government Accountability
Office shall submit to Congress, beginning in fiscal year
2007, an annual report with its assessment of the progress
and effectiveness of the PSI, which shall include an
assessment of the measures referred to in subsection (a).
SEC. 1222. AUTHORITY TO PROVIDE ASSISTANCE TO COOPERATIVE
COUNTRIES.
(a) In General.--The President is authorized to provide, on
such terms as the President considers appropriate, assistance
under subsection (b) to any country that cooperates with the
United States and with other countries allied with the United
States to prevent the transport and transshipment of items of
proliferation concern in its national territory or airspace
or in vessels under its control or registry.
(b) Types of Assistance.--The assistance authorized under
subsection (a) consists of the following:
(1) Assistance under section 23 of the Arms Export Control
Act (22 U.S.C. 2763).
(2) Assistance under chapters 4 (22 U.S.C. 2346 et seq.)
and 5 (22 U.S.C. 2347 et seq.) of part II of the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961.
(3) Drawdown of defense excess defense articles and
services under section 516 of the Foreign Assistance Act of
1961 (22 U.S.C. 2321j).
(c) Congressional Notification.--Assistance authorized
under this section may not be provided until at least 30 days
after the date on which the President has provided notice
thereof to the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on
Foreign Affairs, and the Committee on Appropriations of the
House of Representatives and the Committee on Armed Services,
the Committee on Foreign Relations, and the Committee on
Appropriations of the Senate, in accordance with the
procedures applicable to reprogramming notifications under
section 634A(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22
U.S.C. 2394-1(a)), and has certified to such committees that
such assistance will be used in accordance with the
requirement of subsection (e) of this section.
(d) Limitation.--Assistance may be provided to a country
under section (a) in no more than three fiscal years.
(e) Use of Assistance.--Assistance provided under this
section shall be used to enhance the capability of the
recipient country to prevent the transport and transshipment
of items of proliferation concern in its national territory
or airspace, or in vessels under its control or registry,
including through the development of a legal framework in
that country, consistent with any international laws or legal
authorities governing the PSI, to enhance such capability by
criminalizing proliferation, enacting strict export controls,
and securing sensitive materials within its borders, and to
enhance the ability of the recipient country to cooperate in
operations conducted with other participating countries.
(f) Limitation on Ship or Aircraft Transfers to
Uncooperative Countries.--Notwithstanding any other provision
of law, the United States may not transfer any excess defense
article that is a vessel or an aircraft to a country that has
not agreed that it will
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support and assist efforts by the United States to interdict
items of proliferation concern until thirty days after the
date on which the President has provided notice of the
proposed transfer to the appropriate congressional committees
in accordance with the procedures applicable to reprogramming
notifications under section 634A(a) of the Foreign Assistance
Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2394-1(a)), in addition to any other
requirement of law.
Subtitle C--Assistance to Accelerate Programs to Prevent Weapons of
Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism
SEC. 1231. FINDINGS; STATEMENT OF POLICY.
(a) Findings.--Congress is aware that certain United States
threat reduction and nonproliferation programs have in past
years encountered obstacles to timely obligating and
executing the full amount of appropriated funds, and that
certain United States threat reduction and nonproliferation
programs currently encounter such obstacles and therefore
maintain unobligated and uncosted balances. Such obstacles
include lack of effective policy guidance, limits on program
scope, practical inefficiencies, lack of cooperation with
other countries, and lack of effective leadership to overcome
such obstacles.
(b) Statement of Policy.--It shall be the policy of the
United States, consistent with the 9/11 Commission's
recommendations, to eliminate the obstacles described in
subsection (a) with concrete measures, such as those
described in this title, to accelerate and strengthen
progress on preventing weapons of mass destruction (WMD)
proliferation and terrorism. Such measures described in this
title include the removal and modification of statutory
limits to executing funds, the expansion and strengthening of
the PSI, the establishment of the Office of the United States
Coordinator for the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction
Proliferation and Terrorism under subtitle D, and the
establishment of the Commission on the Prevention of Weapons
of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism under
subtitle E. As a result, Congress intends that any funds
authorized to be appropriated to programs for preventing WMD
proliferation and terrorism under this section will be
executed in a timely manner.
SEC. 1232. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS FOR THE DEPARTMENT
OF DEFENSE COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION
PROGRAM.
(a) Fiscal Year 2007.--In addition to any other amounts
authorized to be appropriated, there are authorized to be
appropriated to the Department of Defense Cooperative Threat
Reduction Program such sums as may be necessary for fiscal
year 2007 for the following purposes:
(1) Biological weapons proliferation prevention.
(2) Chemical weapons destruction at Shchuch'ye, Russia.
(3) Acceleration, expansion, and strengthening of all CTR
activities.
(b) Future Years.--It is the sense of Congress that in
fiscal year 2008 and future fiscal years, the President
should accelerate and expand funding for Cooperative Threat
Reduction programs administered by the Department of Defense
and such efforts should include, beginning upon enactment of
this Act, encouraging additional commitments by the Russian
Federation and other partner nations, as recommended by the
9/11 Commission.
SEC. 1233. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS FOR THE DEPARTMENT
OF ENERGY PROGRAMS TO PREVENT WEAPONS OF MASS
DESTRUCTION PROLIFERATION AND TERRORISM.
In addition to any other amounts authorized to be
appropriated, there are authorized to be appropriated to the
Department of Energy National Nuclear Security Administration
such sums as may be necessary for fiscal year 2007 for
programs to prevent weapons of mass destruction (WMD)
proliferation and terrorism, to be used as follows:
(1) To accelerate, expand, and strengthen the Global Threat
Reduction Initiative (GTRI), with a particular emphasis on--
(A) the Russian research reactor fuel return program;
(B) international radiological threat reduction;
(C) emerging threats and gap material; and
(D) development of quick response and short-term
capabilities to secure and remove WMD materials throughout
the world.
(2) To accelerate, expand, and strengthen the
Nonproliferation and International Security (NIS) program,
with a particular emphasis on--
(A) global security and engagement, and cooperation with
the People's Republic of China, India, and other states;
(B) activities to address emerging proliferation concerns
in North Korea, Iran, and elsewhere;
(C) participation in negotiations regarding North Korea's
nuclear programs;
(D) inter-agency participation in the Proliferation
Security Initiative (PSI);
(E) technical and other assistance to the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to support efforts to increase
the IAEA's capacity to secure vulnerable WMD materials
worldwide and prevent WMD proliferation and terrorism;
(F) efforts to increase United States ability to help
states around the world place the ``effective controls'' on
WMD and related materials and technology mandated by United
Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004);
(G) cooperation on international safeguards and export
controls in South Asia, the Middle East, and other regions;
(H) efforts to strengthen United States commitments to
international regimes and agreements; and
(I) establishment of a contingency fund for opportunities
to prevent WMD proliferation and terrorism that arise.
(3) To accelerate, expand, and strengthen the International
Materials Protection, Control and Accounting (MPC&A) program,
with a particular emphasis on--
(A) implementation of physical protection and material
control and accounting upgrades at sites;
(B) national programs and sustainability activities in
Russia;
(C) material consolidation and conversion (including
significant acceleration of the down-blending of highly-
enriched uranium to low-enriched uranium, the removal of
highly-enriched uranium from facilities, and international
participation in these efforts);
(D) efforts to strengthen cooperation with Russia;
(E) implementation of Second Line of Defense Megaports
agreements;
(F) implementation of Department of Energy actions under
the Security and Accountability for Every Port Act of 2006
(also known as the SAFE Port Act; Public Law 109-347); and
(G) promoting and facilitating worldwide the promulgation
of best practices for security of weapons usable and other
nuclear materials.
(4) To accelerate, expand, and strengthen the Research and
Development program, with a particular emphasis on--
(A) improvement of United States government capability for
both short and long-term, and innovative, research and
development that addresses emerging WMD proliferation and
terrorism concerns and will maintain United States
technological advantage, including the capacity to detect
nuclear material origin, uranium enrichment, and plutonium
reprocessing; and
(B) efforts to significantly expand the scientific research
and development skills and resources available to the
Department of Energy's programs to prevent WMD proliferation
and terrorism.
Subtitle D--Office of the United States Coordinator for the Prevention
of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism
SEC. 1241. OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COORDINATOR FOR THE
PREVENTION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION
PROLIFERATION AND TERRORISM.
(a) Establishment.--There is established within the
Executive Office of the President an office to be known as
the ``Office of the United States Coordinator for the
Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and
Terrorism'' (in this subtitle referred to as the ``Office'').
(b) Officers.--
(1) United states coordinator.--The head of the Office
shall be the United States Coordinator of the Office (in this
subtitle referred to as the ``Coordinator'').
(2) Deputy united states coordinator.--There shall be a
Deputy United States Coordinator of the Office (in this
subtitle referred to as the ``Deputy Coordinator''), who
shall--
(A) assist the Coordinator in carrying out the
responsibilities of the Coordinator under this subtitle; and
(B) serve as Acting Coordinator in the absence of the
Coordinator and during any vacancy in the office of
Coordinator.
(3) Appointment.--The Coordinator and Deputy Coordinator
shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice
and consent of the Senate, and shall be responsible on a
full-time basis for the duties and responsibilities described
in this section.
(4) Limitation.--No person shall serve as Coordinator or
Deputy Coordinator while serving in any other position in the
Federal Government.
(c) Duties.--The responsibilities of the Coordinator shall
include the following:
(1) Serving as the advisor to the President on all matters
relating to the prevention of weapons of mass destruction
(WMD) proliferation and terrorism.
(2) Formulating a comprehensive and well-coordinated United
States strategy and policies for preventing WMD proliferation
and terrorism, including--
(A) measurable milestones and targets to which departments
and agencies can be held accountable;
(B) identification of gaps, duplication, and other
inefficiencies in existing activities, initiatives, and
programs and the steps necessary to overcome these obstacles;
(C) plans for preserving the nuclear security investment
the United States has made in Russia, the former Soviet
Union, and other countries;
(D) prioritized plans to accelerate, strengthen, and expand
the scope of existing initiatives and programs, which include
identification of vulnerable sites and material and the
corresponding actions necessary to eliminate such
vulnerabilities;
(E) new and innovative initiatives and programs to address
emerging challenges and strengthen United States
capabilities, including programs to attract and retain top
scientists and engineers and strengthen the capabilities of
United States national laboratories;
(F) plans to coordinate United States activities,
initiatives, and programs relating to the prevention of WMD
proliferation and terrorism, including those of the
Department of
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Energy, Department of Defense, Department of State, and
Department of Homeland Security, and including the
Proliferation Security Initiative, the G-8 Global Partnership
Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass
Destruction, United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540,
and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism;
(G) plans to strengthen United States commitments to
international regimes and significantly improve cooperation
with other countries relating to the prevention of WMD
proliferation and terrorism, with particular emphasis on work
with the international community to develop laws and an
international legal regime with universal jurisdiction to
enable any state in the world to interdict and prosecute
smugglers of WMD material, as recommended by the 9/11
Commission; and
(H) identification of actions necessary to implement the
recommendations of the Commission on the Prevention of
Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism
established under subtitle E of this title.
(3) Leading inter-agency coordination of United States
efforts to implement the strategy and policies described in
this section.
(4) Conducting oversight and evaluation of accelerated and
strengthened implementation of initiatives and programs to
prevent WMD proliferation and terrorism by relevant
government departments and agencies.
(5) Overseeing the development of a comprehensive and
coordinated budget for programs and initiatives to prevent
WMD proliferation and terrorism, ensuring that such budget
adequately reflects the priority of the challenges and is
effectively executed, and carrying out other appropriate
budgetary authorities.
(d) Staff.--The Coordinator may appoint and terminate such
personnel as may be necessary to enable the Coordinator to
perform his or her duties.
(e) Consultation With Commission.--The Office and the
Coordinator shall regularly consult with and strive to
implement the recommendations of the Commission on the
Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and
Terrorism, established under subtitle E of this title.
(f) Annual Report on Strategic Plan.--For fiscal year 2009
and each fiscal year thereafter, the Coordinator shall submit
to Congress, at the same time as the submission of the budget
for that fiscal year under title 31, United States Code, a
report on the strategy and policies developed pursuant to
subsection (c)(2), together with any recommendations of the
Coordinator for legislative changes that the Coordinator
considers appropriate with respect to such strategy and
policies and their implementation or the Office of the
Coordinator.
SEC. 1242. REQUEST FOR CORRESPONDING RUSSIAN COORDINATOR.
It is the sense of the Congress that, as soon as practical,
the President should personally request the President of the
Russian Federation to designate an official of the Russian
Federation having authorities and responsibilities for
preventing weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferation
and terrorism commensurate with those of the Coordinator, and
with whom the Coordinator should coordinate planning and
implementation of activities in the Russian Federation having
the purpose of preventing WMD proliferation and terrorism.
Subtitle E--Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction
Proliferation and Terrorism
SEC. 1251. COMMISSION ON THE PREVENTION OF WEAPONS OF MASS
DESTRUCTION PROLIFERATION AND TERRORISM.
There is established the Commission on the Prevention of
Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism (in
this subtitle referred to as the ``Commission'').
SEC. 1252. PURPOSES.
(a) In General.--The purposes of the Commission are to--
(1) assess current activities, initiatives, and programs to
prevent WMD proliferation and terrorism; and
(2) provide a clear and comprehensive strategy and concrete
recommendations for such activities, initiatives, and
programs.
(b) In Particular.--The Commission shall give particular
attention to activities, initiatives, and programs to secure
all nuclear weapons-usable material around the world and to
significantly accelerate, expand, and strengthen, on an
urgent basis, United States and international efforts to
prevent, stop, and counter the spread of nuclear weapons
capabilities and related equipment, material, and technology
to terrorists and states of concern.
SEC. 1253. COMPOSITION.
(a) Members.--The Commission shall be composed of 9
members, of whom--
(1) 3 members shall be appointed by the President;
(2) 2 members shall be appointed by the majority leader of
the Senate;
(3) 1 member shall be appointed by the minority leader of
the Senate;
(4) 2 members shall be appointed by the Speaker of the
House of Representatives; and
(5) 1 member shall be appointed by the minority leader of
the House of Representatives.
(b) Co-Chairmen.--The Commission shall have two co-chairmen
designated from among the members of the Commission. Of the
co-chairmen--
(1) 1 shall be designated by the President; and
(2) 1 shall be designated jointly by the majority leader of
the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives.
(c) Deadline for Appointment.--All members of the
Commission shall be appointed within 90 days of the date of
the enactment of this Act.
(d) Initial Meeting.--The Commission shall meet and begin
the operations of the Commission as soon as practicable.
(e) Quorum; Vacancies.--After its initial meeting, the
Commission shall meet upon the call of the co-chairmen or a
majority of its members. Six members of the Commission shall
constitute a quorum. Any vacancy in the Commission shall not
affect its powers, but shall be filled in the same manner in
which the original appointment was made.
SEC. 1254. RESPONSIBILITIES.
(a) In General.--The Commission shall address--
(1) the roles, missions, and structure of all relevant
government departments, agencies, and other actors, including
the Office of the United States Coordinator for the
Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and
Terrorism established under subtitle D of this title;
(2) inter-agency coordination;
(3) United States commitments to international regimes and
cooperation with other countries; and
(4) the threat of weapons of mass destruction proliferation
and terrorism to the United States and its interests and
allies, including the threat posed by black-market networks,
and the effectiveness of the responses by the United States
and the international community to such threats.
(b) Follow-on Baker-Cutler Report.--The Commission shall
also reassess, and where necessary update and expand on, the
conclusions and recommendations of the report titled ``A
Report Card on the Department of Energy's Nonproliferation
Programs with Russia'' of January 2001 (also known as the
``Baker-Cutler Report'') and implementation of such
recommendations.
SEC. 1255. POWERS.
(a) Hearings and Evidence.--The Commission or, on the
authority of the Commission, any subcommittee or member
thereof, may, for the purpose of carrying out this subtitle,
hold such hearings and sit and act at such times and places,
take such testimony, receive such evidence, and administer
such oaths as the Commission or such designate subcommittee
or designated member may determine advisable.
(b) Contracting.--The Commission may, to such extent and in
such amounts as are provided in appropriations Acts, enter
into contracts to enable the Commission to discharge its
duties under this subtitle.
(c) Information From Federal Agencies.--
(1) In general.--The Commission is authorized to secure
directly from any executive department, bureau, agency,
board, commission, office, independent establishment, or
instrumentality of the Government, information, suggestions,
estimates, and statistics for the purposes of this subtitle.
Each department, bureau, agency, board, commission, office,
independent establishment, or instrumentality shall, to the
extent authorized by law, furnish such information,
suggestions, estimates, and statistics directly to the
Commission, upon request made by the co-chairmen, the
chairman of any subcommittee created by a majority of the
Commission, or any member designated by a majority of the
Commission.
(2) Receipt, handling, storage, and dissemination.--
Information shall only be received, handled, stored, and
disseminated by members of the Commission and its staff
consistent with all applicable statutes, regulations, and
Executive orders.
(d) Assistance From Federal Agencies.--
(1) General services administration.--The Administrator of
General Services shall provide to the Commission on a
reimbursable basis administrative support and other services
for the performance of the Commission's functions.
(2) Other departments and agencies.--In addition to the
assistance prescribed in paragraph (1), departments and
agencies of the United States may provide to the Commission
such services, funds, facilities, staff, and other support
services as they may determine advisable and as may be
authorized by law.
(e) Gifts.--The Commission may accept, use, and dispose of
gifts or donations of services or property.
(f) Postal Services.--The Commission may use the United
States mails in the same manner and under the same conditions
as departments and agencies of the United States.
SEC. 1256. NONAPPLICABILITY OF FEDERAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE
ACT.
(a) In General.--The Federal Advisory Committee Act (5
U.S.C. App.) shall not apply to the Commission.
(b) Public Meetings and Release of Public Versions of
Reports.--The Commission shall--
(1) hold public hearings and meetings to the extent
appropriate; and
(2) release public versions of the report required under
section 1257.
(c) Public Hearings.--Any public hearings of the Commission
shall be conducted in a
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manner consistent with the protection of information provided
to or developed for or by the Commission as required by any
applicable statute, regulation, or Executive order.
SEC. 1257. REPORT.
Not later than 180 days after the appointment of the
Commission, the Commission shall submit to the President and
Congress a final report containing such findings,
conclusions, and recommendations for corrective measures as
have been agreed to by a majority of Commission members.
SEC. 1258. TERMINATION.
(a) In General.--The Commission, and all the authorities of
this subtitle, shall terminate 60 days after the date on
which the final report is submitted under section 1257.
(b) Administrative Activities Before Termination.--The
Commission may use the 60-day period referred to in
subsection (a) for the purpose of concluding its activities,
including providing testimony to committees of Congress
concerning its report and disseminating the final report.
TITLE XIII--NUCLEAR BLACK MARKET COUNTER-TERRORISM ACT
SEC. 1301. SHORT TITLE.
This title may be cited as the ``Nuclear Black Market
Counter-Terrorism Act of 2007''.
SEC. 1302. DEFINITIONS.
In this title:
(1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term
``appropriate congressional committees'' means the Committee
on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Armed Services, the
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, and the Committee
on Appropriations of the House of Representatives, and the
Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Armed
Services, the Select Committee on Intelligence, and the
Committee on Appropriations of the Senate.
(2) Foreign person.--The term ``foreign person''--
(A) means any person who is not a citizen or national of
the United States or lawfully admitted to the United States
for permanent residence under the Immigration and Nationality
Act;
(B) includes any foreign corporation, international
organization, or foreign government; and
(C) includes, for purposes of subsections (a) and (b) of
section 1311, successors, assigns, subsidiaries, and subunits
of the person described in subparagraph (A) or (B) (as the
case may be), and other business organizations or
associations in which that person may be deemed to have a
controlling interest.
(3) Person.--The term ``person''--
(A) means a natural person as well as a corporation,
business association, partnership, society, trust, any other
nongovernmental entity, organization, or group, and any
governmental entity, or subsidiary, subunit, or parent entity
thereof, and any successor of any such entity; and
(B) in the case of a country where it may be impossible to
identify a specific governmental entity referred to in
subparagraph (A), means all activities of that government
relating to the development or production of any nuclear
equipment or technology.
(4) United states foreign assistance.--The term ``United
States foreign assistance'' means assistance under the
foreign operations, export financing, and related programs
appropriations Act for a fiscal year, and assistance under
the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.
Subtitle A--Sanctions for Transfers of Nuclear Enrichment,
Reprocessing, and Weapons Technology, Equipment, and Materials
Involving Foreign Persons and Terrorists
SEC. 1311. AUTHORITY TO IMPOSE SANCTIONS ON FOREIGN PERSONS.
(a) Determination of Nuclear Activities by Foreign
Persons.--
(1) Determination.--Notwithstanding any other provision of
law, the President shall impose the sanctions described in
subsection (b) whenever the President determines that a
foreign person, on or after the date of the enactment of this
Act, participated in the export, transfer or trade of--
(A) nuclear enrichment or reprocessing equipment,
materials, or technology to any non-nuclear-weapon state (as
defined in section 102(c) of the Arms Export Control Act)
that--
(i) does not possess functioning nuclear enrichment or
reprocessing plants as of January 1, 2004; and
(ii)(I) does not have in force an additional protocol with
the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of
safeguards (as derived from IAEA document INFCIRC/540 and
related corrections and additions); or
(II) is developing, manufacturing, or acquiring a nuclear
explosive device; or
(B) any nuclear explosive device, or design information or
component, equipment, materials, or other items or technology
that--
(i) is designated for national export controls under the
Nuclear Supplier Group Guidelines for the Export of Nuclear
Material, Equipment and Technology (published by the
International Atomic Energy Agency as IAEA document INFCIRC/
254/Rev. 6/Part 1 and subsequent revisions) and the
Guidelines for Transfers of Nuclear-Related Dual-Use
Equipment, Materials, Software and Related Technology
(published as IAEA document INFCIRC/254/Rev. 5/ Part 2 and
subsequent revisions); and
(ii) contributes to the development, manufacture, or
acquisition of a nuclear explosive device by--
(I) a non-nuclear weapon state; or
(II) a foreign person.
(2) Definition.--For purposes of paragraph (1), the term
``participated'' means sold, transferred, brokered, financed,
assisted, delivered, or otherwise provided or received, and
includes any conspiracy or attempt to engage in any of such
activities, as well as facilitating such activities by any
other person.
(b) Sanctions.--The sanctions referred to in subsection (a)
that are to be imposed on a foreign person are the following:
(1) No assistance may be provided to the foreign person
under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, and the foreign
person may not participate in any assistance program of the
United States Government. Any such assistance being provided
to the foreign person, and any participation in such
assistance program by the foreign person, on the date on
which the sanction under this paragraph is imposed shall be
terminated as of such date.
(2) The United States Government may not export to the
foreign person, or grant a license or other approval to
export to or import from the foreign person of, any defense
articles, defense services, or design or construction
services under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 or the Arms
Export Control Act. Any contract to export such articles or
services, or license or approval to export or import, under
either such Act, that is in effect on the date on which the
sanction under this paragraph is imposed shall be terminated
as of such date.
(3) Licenses or any other approval may not be issued for
the export to the foreign person of any goods or technology
subject to the jurisdiction of the Export Administration
Regulations under chapter VII of title 15, Code of Federal
Regulations (or successor regulations), other than food and
other agricultural commodities, medicines and medical
equipment. Any such license or approval that is in effect on
the on the date on which the sanction under this paragraph is
imposed, shall be terminated as of such date.
(4) No department or agency of the United States Government
may procure, or enter into any contract for the procurement
of, any goods or services from the foreign person. The
Secretary of the Treasury shall prohibit the importation into
the United States of goods, technology, or services produced
or provided by the foreign person, other than information or
informational materials within the meaning of section
203(b)(3) of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act
(50 U.S.C. 1702(b)(3)).
(c) Period Sanctions in Effect.--The sanctions referred to
in subsection (b) should be imposed for not less than two
years, but may be imposed for longer periods. The President
may suspend after one year any sanction imposed pursuant to
this section 15 days after submitting to the appropriate
congressional committees a report explaining--
(1) the reasons for suspending the sanction;
(2) how the purposes of this title and United States
national security are furthered by such suspension; and
(3) what measures the United States will take or is taking
to ensure that the foreign person will not engage in similar
activities in the future.
(d) Waiver Authority.--The President may waive the
imposition of any sanction under subsection (b) if the
President certifies to the appropriate congressional
committees that the waiver--
(1) is important to the national security interests of the
United States; and
(2) would further the purposes of this title.
SEC. 1312. PRESIDENTIAL NOTIFICATION ON ACTIVITIES OF FOREIGN
PERSONS.
(a) Reports to Congress.--Not later than 180 days after the
date of enactment of this Act, and not later than January 31
of each year thereafter, the President shall submit to the
appropriate congressional committees a report detailing any
activity by any foreign person described in section 1311.
This report shall also include a description of any sanctions
that have been imposed and their duration.
(b) Publication.--When the President imposes sanctions
under section 1311, the President shall, to the maximum
extent possible in unclassified form, publish in the Federal
Register, not later than 15 days after reporting such
sanctions to the appropriate congressional committees under
subsection (a), the identity of each sanctioned foreign
person, the period for which sanctions will be in effect, and
the reasons for the sanctions.
Subtitle B--Further Actions Against Corporations Associated With
Sanctioned Foreign Persons
SEC. 1321. FINDINGS.
The Congress finds the following:
(1) Foreign persons and corporations engaging in nuclear
black-market activities are motivated by reasons of
commercial gain and profit.
(2) Sanctions targeted solely against the business
interests of the sanctioned person or business concern may be
unsuccessful in halting these proliferation activities, as
the sanctions may be seen merely as the cost of doing
business, especially if the business interests of the parent
or subsidiary corporate entities are unaffected by the
sanctions.
(3) Such narrow targeting of sanctions creates the
incentive to create shell and ``carve-
[[Page H156]]
out'' corporate entities to perform the proliferation
activities and attract sanctions, leaving all other aspects
of the larger corporation unaffected.
(4) To dissuade corporations from allowing their associated
commercial entities or persons from engaging in proliferation
black-market activities, they must also be made to suffer
financial loss and commercial disadvantage, and parent and
subsidiary commercial enterprises must be held responsible
for the proliferation activities of their associated
entities.
(5) If a corporation perceives that the United States
Government will do everything possible to make its commercial
activity difficult around the world, then that corporation
has a powerful commercial incentive to prevent any further
proliferation activity by its associated entities.
(6) Therefore, the United States Government should seek to
increase the risk of commercial loss for associated corporate
entities for the proliferation actions of their subsidiaries.
SEC. 1322. CAMPAIGN BY UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS.
The President shall instruct all agencies of the United
States Government to make every effort in their interactions
with foreign government and business officials to persuade
foreign governments and relevant corporations not to engage
in any business transaction with a foreign person sanctioned
under section 1311, including any entity that is a parent or
subsidiary of the sanctioned foreign person, for the duration
of the sanctions.
SEC. 1323. COORDINATION.
The Secretary of State shall coordinate the actions of the
United States Government under section 1322.
SEC. 1324. REPORT.
Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of
this Act and annually thereafter, the Secretary of State
shall report to the appropriate congressional committees on
the actions taken by the United States to carry out section
1322.
Subtitle C--Rollback of Nuclear Proliferation Networks
SEC. 1331. NONPROLIFERATION AS A CONDITION OF UNITED STATES
ASSISTANCE.
United States foreign assistance should only be provided to
countries that--
(1) are not cooperating with any non-nuclear-weapon state
or any foreign group or individual who may be engaged in,
planning, or assisting any international terrorist group in
the development of a nuclear explosive device or its means of
delivery and are taking all necessary measures to prevent
their nationals and other persons and entities subject to
their jurisdiction from participating in such cooperation;
and
(2) are fully and completely cooperating with the United
States in its efforts to eliminate nuclear black-market
networks or activities.
SEC. 1332. REPORT ON IDENTIFICATION OF NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION
NETWORK HOST COUNTRIES.
(a) Report.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 90 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act and annually thereafter, the
President shall submit a report to the appropriate
congressional committees that--
(A) identifies any country in which manufacturing,
brokering, shipment, transshipment, or other activity
occurred in connection with the transactions of the nuclear
proliferation network that supplied Libya, Iran, North Korea,
and possibly other countries or entities; and
(B) identifies any country in which manufacturing,
brokering, shipment, transshipment, or other activity
occurred for the purpose of supplying nuclear technology,
equipment, or material to another country or foreign person
that could, in the President's judgment, contribute to the
development, manufacture, or acquisition, of a nuclear
explosive device by a country or foreign person of concern to
the United States
(2) Additional information.--The report under paragraph (1)
shall also include a description of the extent to which each
country described in the report is, in the opinion of the
President, fully cooperating with the United States in its
efforts to eliminate the nuclear proliferation network
described in paragraph (1)(A) or stopping the activities
described in paragraph (1)(B). The President shall base the
determination regarding a country's cooperation with the
United States in part on the degree to which the country has
satisfied United States requests for assistance and
information, including whether the United States has asked
and been granted direct investigatory access to key persons
involved in the nuclear proliferation network described in
paragraph (1)(A) or the activities described in paragraph
(1)(B).
(b) Classification.--Reports under this section shall be
unclassified to the maximum extent possible.
SEC. 1333. SUSPENSION OF ARMS SALES LICENSES AND DELIVERIES
TO NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION HOST COUNTRIES.
(a) Suspension.--Upon submission of the report and any
additional information under section 1332 to the appropriate
congressional committees, the President shall suspend all
licenses issued under the Arms Export Control Act, and shall
prohibit any licenses to be issued under that Act, for
exports to, or imports from, any country described in the
report, unless the President certifies to the appropriate
congressional committees that such country--
(1)(A) has fully investigated or is fully investigating the
activities of any person or entity within its territory that
has participated in the nuclear proliferation network
described in section 1332(a)(1)(A) or the activities
described in section 1332(a)(1)(B); and
(B) has taken or is taking effective steps to permanently
halt similar illicit nuclear proliferation activities;
(2) has been or is fully cooperating with the United States
and other appropriate international organizations in
investigating and eliminating the nuclear proliferation
network, any successor networks operating within its
territory, or other illicit nuclear proliferation activities;
and
(3) has enacted or is enacting new laws, promulgated
decrees or regulations, or established practices designed to
prevent future such activities from occurring within its
territory.
(b) Waiver.--The President may waive the requirements of
subsection (a) in a fiscal year if--
(1) the President has certified to the appropriate
congressional committees that the waiver is important to the
national security of the United States; and
(2) at least 5 days have elapsed since making the
certification under paragraph (1).
TITLE XIV--9/11 COMMISSION INTERNATIONAL IMPLEMENTATION
SEC. 1401. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.
This title may be cited as the ``9/11 Commission
International Implementation Act of 2007''.
Subtitle A--Quality Educational Opportunities in Arab and Predominantly
Muslim Countries.
SEC. 1411. FINDINGS; POLICY.
(a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
(1) The report of the National Commission on Terrorist
Attacks Upon the United States stated that ``[e]ducation that
teaches tolerance, the dignity and value of each individual,
and respect for different beliefs is a key element in any
global strategy to eliminate Islamic terrorism''.
(2) The report of the National Commission on Terrorist
Attacks Upon the United States concluded that ensuring
educational opportunity is essential to the efforts of the
United States to defeat global terrorism and recommended that
the United States Government ``should offer to join with
other nations in generously supporting [spending funds] ...
directly on building and operating primary and secondary
schools in those Muslim states that commit to sensibly
investing financial resources in public education''.
(3) While Congress endorsed such a program in the
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004
(Public Law 108-458), such a program has not been
established.
(b) Policy.--It is the policy of the United States--
(1) to work toward the goal of dramatically increasing the
availability of modern basic education through public schools
in Arab and predominantly Muslim countries, which will reduce
the influence of radical madrassas and other institutions
that promote religious extremism;
(2) to join with other countries in generously supporting
the International Arab and Muslim Youth Opportunity Fund
authorized under section 7114 of the Intelligence Reform and
Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, as amended by section 1412
of this Act, with the goal of building and operating public
primary and secondary schools in Arab and predominantly
Muslim countries that commit to sensibly investing the
resources of such countries in modern public education;
(3) to offer additional incentives to increase the
availability of modern basic education in Arab and
predominantly Muslim countries; and
(4) to work to prevent financing of educational
institutions that support radical Islamic fundamentalism.
SEC. 1412. INTERNATIONAL ARAB AND MUSLIM YOUTH OPPORTUNITY
FUND.
Section 7114 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Prevention Act of 2004 (22 U.S.C. 2228) is amended to read as
follows:
``SEC. 7114. INTERNATIONAL ARAB AND MUSLIM YOUTH OPPORTUNITY
FUND.
``(a) Findings.--Congress finds the following:
``(1) The United Nation's 2003 Arab Human Development
Report states that the quantitative expansion of Arab
education remains incomplete. The report asserts that high
rates of illiteracy, especially among women, persist.
Children continue to be denied their basic right to
elementary education. Higher education is characterized by
decreasing enrollment rates compared to developed countries,
and public expenditures on education has declined since 1985.
``(2) The UN report cities the decline in quality as the
most significant challenge in the educational arena in Arab
countries.
``(3) Researchers argue that curricula taught in Arab
countries seem to encourage submission, obedience,
subordination, and compliance, rather than free critical
thinking.
``(4) Despite major efforts to improve pre-school education
in some Arab countries, the quality of education provided in
kindergartens in the region does not fulfill the requirements
for advancing and developing children's capabilities in order
to help socialize a creative and innovative generation.
``(5) Many factors in Arab countries adversely affect
teachers' capabilities, such as
[[Page H157]]
low salaries (which force educators in to take on other jobs
that consume their energy and decrease the time they can
devote to caring for their students), lack of facilities,
poorly designed curricula, indifferent quality of teacher
training, and overcrowded classes.
``(6) Educational attainments in Arab and non-Arab Muslim
countries--from literacy rates to mathematical and science
achievements--are well below global standards.
``(7) It is estimated that there are 65,000,000 illiterate
adult Arabs, and two-thirds of them are women.
``(8) Educational enrollment for Arab countries rose from
31,000,000 children in 1980 to approximately 56,000,000
children in 1995. Yet despite this increase, 10,000,000
children between the ages of 6 and 15 are currently not in
school.
``(9) In the Middle East, roughly 10,000,000 children still
do not go to school.
``(10) Even though women's access to education has tripled
in Arab countries since 1970, gender disparities still
persist. Illiteracy in Arab countries affects women
disproportionately. Women make up two-thirds of illiterate
adults, with most living in rural areas.
``(11) The publication of books and other reading materials
in Arab countries faces many major challenges, including the
small number of readers due to high rates of illiteracy in
some such countries and the weak purchasing power of the Arab
reader. The limited readership in Arab countries is reflected
in the small number of books published in such countries,
which does not exceed 1.1 percent of world production,
although Arabs constitute five percent of the world
population.
``(12) The nexus between health and education in Arab
countries is very strong. Gains in women's education
accounted for an estimated 43 percent reduction in child
malnutrition between 1970 and 1995. Educated mothers are more
likely to better space births, to have adequate prenatal
care, and to immunize their children.
``(13) Many educational systems in Arab and non-Arab Muslim
countries widen the gap between rich and poor: while rich
students attend excellent private schools, poor children
receive grossly inadequate schooling.
``(b) Purpose.--The purpose of this section is to
strengthen the public educational systems in Arab and
predominantly Muslim countries by--
``(1) authorizing the establishment of an International
Arab and Muslim Youth Educational Fund through which the
United States dedicates resources, either through a separate
fund or through an international organization, to assist
those countries that commit to education reform; and
``(2) providing resources for the Fund to help strengthen
the public educational systems in those countries.
``(c) Establishment of Fund.--
``(1) Authority.--The President is authorized to establish
an International Arab and Muslim Youth Opportunity Fund.
``(2) Location.--The Fund may be established--
``(A) as a separate fund in the Treasury; or
``(B) through an international organization or
international financial institution, such as the United
Nations Educational, Science and Cultural Organization, the
United Nations Development Program, or the International Bank
for Reconstruction and Development.
``(3) Transfers and receipts.--The head of any department,
agency, or instrumentality of the United States Government
may transfer any amount to the Fund, and the Fund may receive
funds from private enterprises, foreign countries, or other
entities.
``(4) Activities of the fund.--The Fund shall support
programs described in this paragraph to improve the education
environment in Arab and predominantly Muslim countries.
``(A) Assistance to enhance modern educational programs.--
``(i) The establishment in Arab and predominantly Muslim
countries of a program of reform to create a modern education
curriculum in the public educational systems in such
countries.
``(ii) The establishment or modernization of educational
materials to advance a modern educational curriculum in such
systems.
``(iii) Teaching English to adults and children.
``(iv) The establishment in Arab and predominantly Muslim
countries of programs that enhance accountability,
transparency, and interaction on education policy in such
countries between the national government and the regional
and local governments through improved information sharing
and monitoring.
``(v) The establishment in Arab and predominantly Muslim
countries of programs to assist in the formulation of
administration and planning strategies for all levels of
government in such countries, including national, regional,
and local governments.
``(vi) The enhancement in Arab and predominantly Muslim
countries of community, family, and student participation in
the formulation and implementation of education strategies
and programs in such countries.
``(B) Assistance for training and exchange programs for
teachers, administrators, and students.--
``(i) The establishment of training programs for teachers
and educational administrators to enhance skills, including
the establishment of regional centers to train individuals
who can transfer such skills upon return to their countries.
``(ii) The establishment of exchange programs for teachers
and administrators in Arab and predominantly Muslim countries
and with other countries to stimulate additional ideas and
reform throughout the world, including teacher training
exchange programs focused on primary school teachers in such
countries.
``(iii) The establishment of exchange programs for primary
and secondary students in Muslim and Arab countries and with
other countries to foster understanding and tolerance and to
stimulate long-standing relationships.
``(C) Assistance targeting primary and secondary
students.--
``(i) The establishment in Arab and predominantly Muslim
countries of after-school programs, civic education programs,
and education programs focusing on life skills, such as
inter-personal skills and social relations and skills for
healthy living, such as nutrition and physical fitness.
``(ii) The establishment in Arab and predominantly Muslim
countries of programs to improve the proficiency of primary
and secondary students in information technology skills.
``(D) Assistance for development of youth professionals.--
``(i) The establishment of programs in Arab and
predominantly Muslim countries to improve vocational training
in trades to help strengthen participation of Muslims and
Arabs in the economic development of their countries.
``(ii) The establishment of programs in Arab and
predominantly Muslim countries that target older Muslim and
Arab youths not in school in such areas as entrepreneurial
skills, accounting, micro-finance activities, work training,
financial literacy, and information technology.
``(E) Other types of assistance.--
``(i) The translation of foreign books, newspapers,
reference guides, and other reading materials into local
languages.
``(ii) The construction and equipping of modern community
and university libraries.
``(5) Authorization of appropriations.--
``(A) In general.--There is authorized to be appropriated
to the President to carry out this section such sums as may
be necessary for fiscal years 2008, 2009, and 2010.
``(B) Availability.--Amounts appropriated pursuant to the
authorization of appropriations under subsection (a) are
authorized to remain available until expended.
``(C) Additional funds.--Amounts authorized to be
appropriated under subsection (a) shall be in addition to
amounts otherwise available for such purposes.
``(6) Report to congress.--Not later than 180 days after
the date of the enactment of this section and annually
thereafter, the President shall submit to the appropriate
congressional committees a report on United States efforts to
assist in the improvement of educational opportunities for
Arab and predominantly Muslim children and youths, including
the progress made toward establishing the International Arab
and Muslim Youth Opportunity Fund.
``(7) Appropriate congressional committees defined.--In
this subsection, the term `appropriate congressional
committees' means the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the
Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives
and the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on
Appropriations of the Senate.''.
SEC. 1413. ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS.
(a) In General.--Not later than June 1 of each year, the
Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate
congressional committees a report on the efforts of Arab and
predominantly Muslim countries to increase the availability
of modern basic education and to close educational
institutions that promote religious extremism and terrorism.
(b) Contents.--Each report shall include--
(1) a list of Arab and predominantly Muslim countries that
are making serious and sustained efforts to improve the
availability of modern basic education and to close
educational institutions that promote religious extremism and
terrorism;
(2) a list of such countries that are making efforts to
improve the availability of modern basic education and to
close educational institutions that promote religious
extremism and terrorism, but such efforts are not serious and
sustained;
(3) a list of such countries that are not making efforts to
improve the availability of modern basic education and to
close educational institutions that promote religious
extremism and terrorism; and
(4) an assessment for each country specified in each of
paragraphs (1), (2), and (3) of the role of United States
assistance with respect to the efforts made or not made to
improve the availability of modern basic education and close
educational institutions that promote religious extremism and
terrorism.
(c) Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined.--In this
section, the term ``appropriate congressional committees''
means the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on
Appropriations of the House of Representatives and the
Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on
Appropriations of the Senate.
[[Page H158]]
SEC. 1414. EXTENSION OF PROGRAM TO PROVIDE GRANTS TO
AMERICAN-SPONSORED SCHOOLS IN ARAB AND
PREDOMINANTLY MUSLIM COUNTRIES TO PROVIDE
SCHOLARSHIPS.
(a) Findings.--Congress finds the following:
(1) Section 7113 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Prevention Act of 2004 (Pub. Law 108-458) authorized the
establishment of a pilot program to provide grants to
American-sponsored schools in Arab and predominantly Muslim
countries so that such schools could provide scholarships to
young people from lower-income and middle-income families in
such countries to attend such schools, where they could
improve their English and be exposed to a modern education.
(2) Since the date of the enactment of that section, the
Middle East Partnership Initiative has pursued implementation
of that program.
(b) Extension of Program.--
(1) In general.--Section 7113 of the Intelligence Reform
and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 is amended--
(A) in the section heading--
(i) by striking ``PILOT''; and
(ii) by inserting ``ARAB AND'' before ``PREDOMINANTLY
MUSLIM'';
(B) in subsection (a)(2), by inserting ``Arab and'' before
``predominantly Muslim'';
(C) in subsection (b), in the matter preceding paragraph
(1), by inserting ``Arab and'' before ``predominantly
Muslim'';
(D) in subsection (c)--
(i) in the subsection heading, by striking ``Pilot'';
(ii) by striking ``pilot''; and
(iii) by striking ``countries with predominantly Muslim
populations'' and inserting ``Arab and predominantly Muslim
countries'';
(E) in subsection (d), by striking ``pilot'' each place it
appears;
(F) in subsection (f)--
(i) by striking ``pilot''; and
(ii) by inserting ``an Arab or'' before ``a predominantly
Muslim country'';
(G) in subsection (g), in the first sentence--
(i) by inserting ``and April 15, 2008,'' after ``April 15,
2006,''; and
(ii) by striking ``pilot''; and
(H) in subsection (h)--
(i) by striking ``2005 and 2006'' inserting ``2007 and
2008'' ; and
(ii) by striking ``pilot''.
(2) Conforming amendment.--Section 1(b) of such Act is
amended, in the table of contents, by striking the item
relating to section 7113 and inserting after section 7112 the
following new item:
``7113. Program to provide grants to American-sponsored schools in Arab
and predominantly Muslim countries to provide
scholarships.''.
Subtitle B--Democracy and Development in Arab and Predominantly Muslim
Countries
SEC. 1421. PROMOTING DEMOCRACY AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE MIDDLE
EAST, CENTRAL ASIA, SOUTH ASIA, AND SOUTHEAST
ASIA.
(a) Findings.--Congress finds the following:
(1) Al-Qaeda and affiliated groups have established a
terrorist network with linkages throughout the Middle East,
Central Asia, South Asia, and Southeast Asia.
(2) While political repression and lack of economic
development do not justify terrorism, increased political
freedoms, poverty reduction, and broad-based economic growth
can contribute to an environment that undercuts tendencies
and conditions that facilitate the rise of terrorist
organizations.
(3) It is in the national security interests of the United
States to promote democracy, the rule of law, good
governance, sustainable development, a vigorous civil
society, political freedom, protection of minorities,
independent media, women's rights, private sector growth, and
open economic systems in the countries of the Middle East,
Central Asia, South Asia, and Southeast Asia.
(b) Policy.--It is the policy of the United States to--
(1) promote over the long-term, seizing opportunities
whenever possible in the short term, democracy, the rule of
law, good governance, sustainable development, a vigorous
civil society, political freedom, protection of minorities,
independent media, women's rights, private sector growth, and
open economic systems in the countries of the Middle East,
Central Asia, South Asia, and Southeast Asia;
(2) provide assistance and resources to individuals and
organizations in the countries of the Middle East, Central
Asia, South Asia, and Southeast Asia that are committed to
promoting such objectives and to design strategies in
conjunction with such individuals and organizations; and
(3) work with other countries and international
organizations to increase the resources devoted to promoting
such objectives.
(c) Strategy.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall
submit to appropriate congressional committees a report with
a country-by-country five year strategy to promote the policy
of the United States described in subsection (b). Such report
shall contain an estimate of the funds necessary to implement
such a strategy.
(d) Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined.--In this
section, the term ``appropriate congressional committees''
means the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on
Appropriations of the House of Representatives and the
Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on
Appropriations of the Senate.
SEC. 1422. MIDDLE EAST FOUNDATION.
(a) Purposes.--The purposes of this section are to support,
through the provision of grants, technical assistance,
training, and other programs, in the countries of the Middle
East, the expansion of--
(1) civil society;
(2) opportunities for political participation for all
citizens;
(3) protections for internationally recognized human
rights, including the rights of women;
(4) educational system reforms;
(5) independent media;
(6) policies that promote economic opportunities for
citizens;
(7) the rule of law; and
(8) democratic processes of government.
(b) Middle East Foundation.--
(1) Designation.--The Secretary of State is authorized to
designate an appropriate private, nonprofit organization that
is organized or incorporated under the laws of the United
States or of a State as the Middle East Foundation (referred
to in this section as the ``Foundation'').
(2) Funding.--
(A) Authority.--The Secretary of State is authorized to
provide funding to the Foundation through the Middle East
Partnership Initiative of the Department of State. The
Foundation shall use amounts provided under this paragraph to
carry out the purposes specified in subsection (a), including
through making grants and providing other assistance to
entities to carry out programs for such purposes.
(B) Funding from other sources.--In determining the amount
of funding to provide to the Foundation, the Secretary of
State shall take into consideration the amount of funds that
the Foundation has received from sources other than the
United States Government.
(3) Notification to congressional committees.--The
Secretary of State shall notify the Committee on Foreign
Affairs and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of
Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations and
the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate prior to
designating an appropriate organization as the Foundation.
(c) Grants for Projects.--
(1) Foundation to make grants.--The Secretary of State
shall enter into an agreement with the Foundation that
requires the Foundation to use the funds provided under
subsection (b)(2) to make grants to persons or entities
(other than governments or government entities) located in
the Middle East or working with local partners based in the
Middle East to carry out projects that support the purposes
specified in subsection (a).
(2) Center for public policy.--Under the agreement
described in paragraph (1), the Foundation may make a grant
to an institution of higher education located in the Middle
East to create a center for public policy for the purpose of
permitting scholars and professionals from the countries of
the Middle East and from other countries, including the
United States, to carry out research, training programs, and
other activities to inform public policymaking in the Middle
East and to promote broad economic, social, and political
reform for the people of the Middle East.
(3) Applications for grants.--An entity seeking a grant
from the Foundation under this section shall submit an
application to the head of the Foundation at such time, in
such manner, and containing such information as the head of
the Foundation may reasonably require.
(d) Private Character of the Foundation.--Nothing in this
section shall be construed to--
(1) make the Foundation an agency or establishment of the
United States Government, or to make the officers or
employees of the Foundation officers or employees of the
United States for purposes of title 5, United States Code; or
(2) to impose any restriction on the Foundation's
acceptance of funds from private and public sources in
support of its activities consistent with the purposes
specified in subsection (a).
(e) Limitation on Payments to Foundation Personnel.--No
part of the funds provided to the Foundation under this
section shall inure to the benefit of any officer or employee
of the Foundation, except as salary or reasonable
compensation for services.
(f) Retention of Interest.--The Foundation may hold funds
provided under this section in interest-bearing accounts
prior to the disbursement of such funds to carry out the
purposes specified in subsection (a), and, only to the extent
and in the amounts provided for in advance in appropriations
Acts, may retain for use for such purposes any interest
earned without returning such interest to the Treasury of the
United States.
(g) Financial Accountability.--
(1) Independent private audits of the foundation.--The
accounts of the Foundation shall be audited annually in
accordance with generally accepted auditing standards by
independent certified public accountants or independent
licensed public accountants certified or licensed by a
regulatory authority of a State or other political
subdivision of the United States. The report of the
independent audit shall be included in the annual report
required by subsection (h).
[[Page H159]]
(2) GAO audits.--The financial transactions undertaken
pursuant to this section by the Foundation may be audited by
the Government Accountability Office in accordance with such
principles and procedures and under such rules and
regulations as may be prescribed by the Comptroller General
of the United States.
(3) Audits of grant recipients- .--
(A) In general.--A recipient of a grant from the Foundation
shall agree to permit an audit of the books and records of
such recipient related to the use of the grant funds.
(B) Recordkeeping.--Such recipient shall maintain
appropriate books and records to facilitate an audit referred
to in subparagraph (A), including--
(i) separate accounts with respect to the grant funds;
(ii) records that fully disclose the use of the grant
funds;
(iii) records describing the total cost of any project
carried out using grant funds; and
(iv) the amount and nature of any funds received from other
sources that were combined with the grant funds to carry out
a project.
(h) Annual Reports.--Not later than January 31, 2008, and
annually thereafter, the Foundation shall submit to the
appropriate congressional committees and make available to
the public a report that includes, for the fiscal year prior
to the fiscal year in which the report is submitted, a
comprehensive and detailed description of--
(1) the operations and activities of the Foundation that
were carried out using funds provided under this section;
(2) grants made by the Foundation to other entities with
funds provided under this section;
(3) other activities of the Foundation to further the
purposes specified in subsection (a); and
(4) the financial condition of the Foundation.
(i) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term
``appropriate congressional committees'' means the Committee
on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Appropriations of the
House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign
Relations and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate.
(2) Middle east.--The term ``Middle East'' means Algeria,
Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya,
Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, United
Arab Emirates, West Bank and Gaza, and Yemen.
(j) Expiration of Authority.--The authority provided under
this section shall expire on September 30, 2017.
(k) Repeal.--Section 534(k) of Public Law 109-102 is
repealed.
Subtitle C--Restoring United States Moral Leadership
SEC. 1431. ADVANCING UNITED STATES INTERESTS THROUGH PUBLIC
DIPLOMACY.
(a) Finding.--Congress finds that the report of the
National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United
States stated that, ``Recognizing that Arab and Muslim
audiences rely on satellite television and radio, the
government has begun some promising initiatives in television
and radio broadcasting to the Arab world, Iran, and
Afghanistan. These efforts are beginning to reach large
audiences. The Broadcasting Board of Governors has asked for
much larger resources. It should get them.''.
(b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) The United States needs to improve its communication of
information and ideas to people in foreign countries,
particularly in countries with significant Muslim
populations.
(2) Public diplomacy should reaffirm the paramount
commitment of the United States to democratic principles,
including preserving the civil liberties of all the people of
the United States, including Muslim-Americans.
(3) A significant expansion of United States international
broadcasting would provide a cost-effective means of
improving communication with countries with significant
Muslim populations by providing news, information, and
analysis, as well as cultural programming, through both radio
and television broadcasts.
(c) Special Authority for Surge Capacity.--The United
States International Broadcasting Act of 1994 (22 U.S.C. 6201
et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following new
section:
``SEC. 316. SPECIAL AUTHORITY FOR SURGE CAPACITY.
``(a) Emergency Authority.--
``(1) In general.--Whenever the President determines it to
be important to the national interests of the United States
and so certifies to the appropriate congressional committees,
the President, on such terms and conditions as the President
may determine, is authorized to direct any department,
agency, or other governmental entity of the United States to
furnish the Broadcasting Board of Governors with the
assistance of such department, agency, or entity based
outside the United States as may be necessary to provide
international broadcasting activities of the United States
with a surge capacity to support United States foreign policy
objectives during a crisis abroad.
``(2) Supersedes existing law.--The authority of paragraph
(1) shall supersede any other provision of law.
``(3) Surge capacity defined.--In this subsection, the term
`surge capacity' means the financial and technical resources
necessary to carry out broadcasting activities in a
geographical area during a crisis abroad.
``(b) Authorization of Appropriations.--
``(1) In general.--There are authorized to be appropriated
to the President such sums as may be necessary for the
President to carry out this section, except that no such
amount may be appropriated which, when added to amounts
previously appropriated for such purpose but not yet
obligated, would cause such amounts to exceed $25,000,000.
``(2) Availability of funds.--Amounts appropriated pursuant
to the authorization of appropriations in this subsection are
authorized to remain available until expended.
``(3) Designation of appropriations.--Amounts appropriated
pursuant to the authorization of appropriations in this
subsection may be referred to as the `United States
International Broadcasting Surge Capacity Fund'.
``(c) Report.--The annual report submitted to the President
and Congress by the Broadcasting Board of Governors under
section 305(a)(9) shall provide a detailed description of any
activities carried out under this section.
``(d) Authorization of Appropriations for United States
International Broadcasting Activities.--
``(1) In general.--In addition to amounts otherwise
available for such purposes, there are authorized to be
appropriated such sums as may be necessary to carry out
United States Government broadcasting activities under this
Act, including broadcasting capital improvements, the United
States Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948 (22
U.S.C. 1431 et seq.), and the Foreign Affairs Reform and
Restructuring Act of 1998 (as enacted in division G of the
Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental
Appropriations Act, 1999; Public Law 105-277), and to carry
out other authorities in law consistent with such purposes.
``(2) Availability of funds.--Amounts appropriated pursuant
to the authorization of appropriations in this section are
authorized to remain available until expended.''.
SEC. 1432. EXPANSION OF UNITED STATES SCHOLARSHIP, EXCHANGE,
AND LIBRARY PROGRAMS IN ARAB AND PREDOMINANTLY
MUSLIM COUNTRIES.
(a) Report; Certification.--Not later than 30 days after
the date of the enactment of this Act and every 180 days
thereafter, the Secretary of State shall submit to the
appropriate congressional committees a report on the
recommendations of the National Commission on Terrorist
Attacks Upon the United States and the policy goals described
in section 7112 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Prevention Act of 2004 (Public Law 108-458) for expanding
United States scholarship, exchange, and library programs in
Arab and predominantly Muslim countries. Such report shall
include--
(1) a certification by the Secretary of State that such
recommendations have been implemented and such policy goals
have been achieved; or
(2) if the Secretary of State is unable to make the
certification described in paragraph (1), a description of--
(A) the steps taken to implement such recommendations and
achieve such policy goals;
(B) when the Secretary of State expects such
recommendations to be implemented and such policy goals to be
achieved; and
(C) any allocation of resources or other actions by
Congress the Secretary of State considers necessary to
implement such recommendations and achieve such policy goals.
(b) Termination of Duty to Report.--The duty to submit a
report under subsection (a) shall terminate when the
Secretary of State submits a certification pursuant to
paragraph (1) of such subsection.
(c) GAO Review of Certification.--If the Secretary of State
submits a certification pursuant to subsection (a)(1), not
later than 30 days after the submission of such
certification, the Comptroller General of the United States
shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a
report on whether the recommendations referred to in
subsection (a) have been implemented and whether the policy
goals described in section 7112 of the Intelligence Reform
and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 have been achieved.
(d) Definition.--In this section, the term ``appropriate
congressional committees'' means--
(1) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on
Oversight and Government Reform of the House of
Representatives; and
(2) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate.
SEC. 1433. UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD DETAINEES.
(a) Findings.--Congress finds the following:
(1) The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the
United States (commonly referred to as the ``9/11
Commission'') declared that the United States ``should work
with friends to develop mutually agreed-on principles for the
detention and humane treatment of captured international
terrorists who are not being held under a particular
country's criminal laws'' and recommended that the United
States engage our allies ``to develop a common coalition
[[Page H160]]
approach toward the detention and humane treatment of
captured terrorists'', drawing from Common Article 3 of the
Geneva Conventions.
(2) Congress has passed several provisions of law that have
changed United States standards relating to United States
detainees, but such provisions have not been part of a common
coalition approach in this regard.
(3) A number of investigations remain ongoing by countries
who are close United States allies in the war on terrorism
regarding the conduct of officials, employees, and agents of
the United States and of other countries related to conduct
regarding detainees.
(b) Report; Certification.--Not later than 90 days after
the date of the enactment of this Act and every 180 days
thereafter, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the
Attorney General and the Secretary of Defense, shall submit
to the relevant congressional committees a report on any
progress towards implementing the recommendations of the 9/11
Commission for engaging United States allies to develop a
common coalition approach, in compliance with Common Article
3 of the Geneva Conventions, toward the detention and humane
treatment of individuals detained during Operation Iraqi
Freedom, Operation Enduring Freedom, or in connection with
United States counterterrorist operations. Such report shall
include--
(1) a certification by the Secretary of State that such
recommendations have been implemented and such policy goals
have been achieved; or
(2) if the Secretary of State is unable to make the
certification described in paragraph (1), a description of--
(A) the steps taken to implement such recommendations and
achieve such policy goals;
(B) when the Secretary of State expects such
recommendations to be implemented and such policy goals to be
achieved; and
(C) any allocation of resources or other actions by
Congress that the Secretary of State considers necessary to
implement such recommendations and achieve such policy goals.
(c) Termination of Duty to Report.--The duty to submit a
report under subsection (a) shall terminate when the
Secretary of State submits a certification pursuant to
subsection (a)(1).
(d) GAO Review of Certification.--If the Secretary of State
submits a certification pursuant to subsection (a)(1), not
later than 30 days after the submission of such
certification, the Comptroller General shall submit to the
relevant congressional committees a report on whether the
recommendations described in subsection (a) have been
implemented and whether the policy goals described in such
subsection have been achieved.
(e) Definition.--In this section, the term ``relevant
congressional committees'' means--
(1) with respect to the House of Representatives, the
Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Armed
Services, the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform,
the Committee on the Judiciary, and the Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence; and
(2) with respect to the Senate, the Committee on Foreign
Relations, the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, the Committee on
the Judiciary, and the Select Committee on Intelligence.
Subtitle D--Strategy for the United States Relationship With
Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia
SEC. 1441. AFGHANISTAN.
(a) Statements of Policy.--The following shall be the
policies of the United States:
(1) The United States shall vigorously support the
Government of Afghanistan as it continues on its path toward
a broad-based, pluralistic, multi-ethnic, gender-sensitive,
and fully representative government in Afghanistan and shall
maintain its long-term commitment to the people of
Afghanistan by increased assistance and the continued
deployment of United States troops in Afghanistan as long as
the Government of Afghanistan supports such United States
involvement.
(2) In order to reduce the ability of the Taliban and Al-
Qaeda to finance their operations through the opium trade,
the President shall engage aggressively with the Government
of Afghanistan and our NATO partners, and in consultation
with Congress, to assess the success of the Afghan
counternarcotics strategy in existence as of December 2006
and to explore all additional options for addressing the
narcotics crisis in Afghanistan, including possible changes
in rules of engagement for NATO and Coalition forces for
participation in actions against narcotics trafficking and
kingpins.
(b) Statement of Congress.--Congress strongly urges that
the Afghanistan Freedom Support Act of 2002 be reauthorized
and updated to take into account new developments in
Afghanistan and in the region so as to demonstrate the
continued support by the United States for the people and
Government of Afghanistan.
(c) Emergency Increase in Policing Operations.--
(1) In general.--The President shall make every effort, on
an emergency basis, to dramatically increase the numbers of
United States and international police trainers, mentors, and
police personnel operating in conjunction with Afghanistan
civil security forces and shall increase efforts to assist
the Government of Afghanistan in addressing the corruption
crisis that is threatening to undermine Afghanistan's future.
(2) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act and every six months thereafter until
September 31, 2010, the President shall submit to the
Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on
Appropriations of the House of Representatives and the
Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on
Appropriations of the Senate a report on United States
efforts to fulfill the requirements of this subsection.
(d) Emergency Energy Assistance.--
(1) Finding.--Congress finds that short-term shortages of
energy may destabilize the Government of Afghanistan and
undermine the ability of President Karzai to carry out
critically needed reforms.
(2) Authorization of assistance.--The President is
authorized to provide assistance for the acquisition of
emergency energy resources, including diesel fuel, to secure
the delivery of electricity to Kabul, Afghanistan, and other
major Afghan provinces and cities.
(3) Authorization of appropriations.--There are authorized
to be appropriated to the President to carry out paragraph
(2) such sums as may be necessary for each of fiscal years
2008 and 2009.
SEC. 1442. PAKISTAN.
(a) Findings.--Congress finds the following:
(1) Since September 11, 2001, the Government of Pakistan
has been an important partner in helping the United States
remove the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and combating
international terrorism in the frontier provinces of
Pakistan.
(2) There remain a number of critical issues that threaten
to disrupt the relationship between the United States and
Pakistan, undermine international security, and destabilize
Pakistan, including--
(A) curbing the proliferation of nuclear weapons
technology;
(B) combating poverty and corruption;
(C) building effective government institutions, especially
secular public schools;
(D) promoting democracy and the rule of law, particularly
at the national level;
(E) addressing the continued presence of Taliban and other
violent extremist forces throughout the country;
(F) maintaining the authority of the Government of Pakistan
in all parts of its national territory;
(G) securing the borders of Pakistan to prevent the
movement of militants and terrorists into other countries and
territories; and
(H) effectively dealing with Islamic extremism.
(b) Statements of Policy.--The following shall be the
policies of the United States:
(1) To work with the Government of Pakistan to combat
international terrorism, especially in the frontier provinces
of Pakistan, and to end the use of Pakistan as a safe haven
for forces associated with the Taliban.
(2) To establish a long-term strategic partnership with the
Government of Pakistan to address the issues described in
subparagraphs (A) through (H) of subsection (a)(2).
(3) To dramatically increase funding for programs of the
United States Agency for International Development and the
Department of State that assist the Government of Pakistan in
addressing such issues, if the Government of Pakistan
demonstrates a commitment to building a moderate, democratic
state, including significant steps towards free and fair
parliamentary elections in 2007.
(4) To work with the international community to secure
additional financial and political support to effectively
implement the policies set forth in this subsection and help
to resolve the dispute between the Government of Pakistan and
the Government of India over the disputed territory of
Kashmir.
(c) Strategy Relating to Pakistan.--
(1) Requirement for report on strategy.--Not later than 90
days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the
President shall submit to the appropriate congressional
committees a report, in classified form if necessary, that
describes the long-term strategy of the United States to
engage with the Government of Pakistan to address the issues
described in subparagraphs (A) through (F) of subsection
(a)(2) and carry out the policies described in subsection (b)
in order accomplish the goal of building a moderate,
democratic Pakistan.
(2) Appropriate congressional committees defined.--In this
subsection the term ``appropriate congressional committees''
means the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on
Appropriations of the House of Representatives and the
Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on
Appropriations of the Senate.
(d) Limitation on United States Security Assistance to
Pakistan.--
(1) Limitation.--
(A) In general.--For fiscal years 2008 and 2009, United
States assistance under chapter 2 of part II of the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2311 et seq.) or section 23
of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2763) may not be
provided to, and a license for any item controlled under the
Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2751 et seq.) may not be
approved for, Pakistan until 15 days after
[[Page H161]]
the date on which President determines and certifies to the
appropriate congressional committees that the Government of
Pakistan is making all possible efforts to prevent the
Taliban from operating in areas under its sovereign control,
including in the cities of Quetta and Chaman and in the
Northwest Frontier Province and the Federally Administered
Tribal Areas.
(B) Form.--The certification required by subparagraph (A)
shall be transmitted in unclassified form, but may contain a
classified annex.
(2) Waiver.--The President may waive the limitation on
assistance under paragraph (1) for a fiscal year if the
President determines and certifies to the appropriate
congressional committees that it is important to the national
security interest of the United States to do so.
(3) Sunset.--The limitation on assistance under paragraph
(1) shall cease to be effective beginning on the date on
which the President determines and certifies to the
appropriate congressional committees that the Taliban, or any
related successor organization, has ceased to exist as an
organization capable of conducting military, insurgent, or
terrorist activities in Afghanistan from Pakistan.
(4) Appropriate congressional committees defined.--In this
subsection, the term ``appropriate congressional committees''
means the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on
Appropriations of the House of Representatives and the
Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on
Appropriations of the Senate.
(e) Nuclear Proliferation.--
(1) Finding.--Congress finds that Pakistan's maintenance of
a network for the proliferation of nuclear and missile
technologies would be inconsistent with Pakistan being
considered an ally of the United States.
(2) Sense of congress.--It is the sense of Congress that
the national security interest of the United States will best
be served if the United States develops and implements a
long-term strategy to improve the United States relationship
with Pakistan and works with the Government of Pakistan to
stop nuclear proliferation.
(f) Authorization of Appropriations.--
(1) In general.--There are authorized to be appropriated to
the President for providing assistance for Pakistan for
fiscal year 2008--
(A) for ``Development Assistance'', such sums as may be
necessary to carry out the provisions of sections 103, 105,
and 106 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C.
2151a, 2151c, and 2151d,);
(B) for the ``Child Survival and Health Programs Fund'',
such sums as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of
sections 104 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C.
2151b);
(C) for the ``Economic Support Fund'', such sums as may be
necessary to carry out the provisions of chapter 4 of part II
of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2346 et
seq.);
(D) for ``International Narcotics Control and Law
Enforcement'', such sums as may be necessary to carry out the
provisions of chapter 8 of part I of the Foreign Assistance
Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2291 et seq.);
(E) for ``Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining and
Related Programs'', such sums as may be necessary;
(F) for ``International Military Education and Training'',
such sums as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of
chapter 5 of part II of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961
(22 U.S.C. 2347 et seq.); and
(G) for ``Foreign Military Financing Program'', such sums
as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of section 23
of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2763).
(2) Other funds.--Amounts authorized to be appropriated
under this subsection are in addition to amounts otherwise
available for such purposes.
(g) Extension of Waivers.--
(1) Amendments.--The Act entitled ``An Act to authorize the
President to exercise waivers of foreign assistance
restrictions with respect to Pakistan through September 30,
2003, and for other purposes'', approved October 27, 2001
(Public Law 107-57; 115 Stat. 403), is amended--
(A) in section 1(b)--
(i) in the heading, to read as follows:
``(b) Fiscal Years 2007 and 2008.--''; and
(ii) in paragraph (1), by striking ``any provision'' and
all that follows through ``that prohibits'' and inserting
``any provision of the foreign operations, export financing,
and related programs appropriations Act for fiscal year 2007
or 2008 (or any other appropriations Act) that prohibits'';
(B) in section 3(2), by striking ``Such provision'' and all
that follows through ``as are'' and inserting ``Such
provision of the annual foreign operations, export financing,
and related programs appropriations Act for fiscal years 2002
through 2008 (or any other appropriations Act) as are''; and
(C) in section 6, by striking ``the provisions'' and all
that follows and inserting ``the provisions of this Act shall
terminate on October 1, 2008.''.
(2) Effective date.--The amendments made by paragraph (1)
take effect on October 1, 2006.
(3) Sense of congress.--It is the sense of Congress that
determinations to provide extensions of waivers of foreign
assistance prohibitions with respect to Pakistan pursuant to
Public Law 107-57 for fiscal years after the fiscal years
specified in the amendments made by paragraph (1) to Public
Law 107-57 should be informed by the pace of democratic
reform, extension of the rule of law, and the conduct of the
parliamentary elections currently scheduled for 2007 in
Pakistan.
SEC. 1443. SAUDI ARABIA.
(a) Findings.--Congress finds the following:
(1) The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has an uneven record in the
fight against terrorism, especially with respect to terrorist
financing, support for radical madrassas, and a lack of
political outlets for its citizens, that poses a threat to
the security of the United States, the international
community, and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia itself.
(2) The United States has a national security interest in
working with the Government of Saudi Arabia to combat
international terrorists who operate within Saudi Arabia or
who operate outside Saudi Arabia with the support of citizens
of Saudi Arabia.
(b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that,
in order to more effectively combat terrorism, the Government
of Saudi Arabia must undertake and continue a number of
political and economic reforms, including increasing anti-
terrorism operations conducted by law enforcement agencies,
providing more political rights to its citizens, increasing
the rights of women, engaging in comprehensive educational
reform, enhancing monitoring of charitable organizations,
promulgating and enforcing domestic laws, and regulation on
terrorist financing.
(c) Statements of Policy.--The following shall be the
policies of the United States:
(1) To engage with the Government of Saudi Arabia to openly
confront the issue of terrorism, as well as other problematic
issues, such as the lack of political freedoms, with the goal
of restructuring the relationship on terms that leaders of
both countries can publicly support.
(2) To enhance counterterrorism cooperation with the
Government of Saudi Arabia, if the political leaders of such
government are committed to making a serious, sustained
effort to combat terrorism.
(3) To support the efforts of the Government of Saudi
Arabia to make political, economic, and social reforms
throughout the country.
(d) Strategy Relating to Saudi Arabia.--
(1) Requirement for report on strategy.--Not later than 90
days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the
President shall submit to the appropriate congressional
committees a report, in classified form if necessary, that
describes the progress on the Strategic Dialogue (established
by President George W. Bush and Crown Prince (now King)
Abdullah in April 2005) between the United States and Saudi
Arabia, including the progress made in such Dialogue toward
implementing the long-term strategy of the United States to--
(A) engage with the Government of Saudi Arabia to
facilitate political, economic, and social reforms that will
enhance the ability of the Government of Saudi Arabia to
combat international terrorism; and
(B) work with the Government of Saudi Arabia to combat
terrorism, including through effective prevention of the
financing of terrorism by Saudi institutions and citizens.
(2) Appropriate congressional committees defined.--In this
subsection the term ``appropriate congressional committees''
means the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on
Appropriations of the House of Representatives and the
Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on
Appropriations of the Senate.
General Leave
Mr. THOMPSON of Mississippi. Madam Speaker, I ask unanimous consent
that all Members may have 5 legislative days within which to revise and
extend their remarks on H.R. 1.
The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from
Mississippi?
There was no objection.
The SPEAKER. Pursuant to section 507 of House Resolution 6, the
gentleman from Mississippi (Mr. Thompson) and the gentleman from New
York (Mr. King) each will control 90 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Mississippi, chairman of the
Homeland Security Committee.
{time} 1300
Mr. THOMPSON of Mississippi. Madam Speaker, I yield myself such time
as I may consume.
Madam Speaker, we are here today considering this bill for one
reason: To protect America from terrorism and from those who advocate
hate and violence against our Nation and its values.
Let's be clear. The bill before us today does not contain Democratic
or Republican ideas on how to protect our Nation. It contains American
ideas.
Madam Speaker, it contains ideas formulated by the 9/11 Commission, a
bipartisan group of Americans chosen for their wisdom, expertise and
love of country; Americans who we tasked to tell us what happened on
September 11,
[[Page H162]]
2001, and how to avoid it happening again. That is why we are here
today.
I hope my colleagues will put rhetoric and political games aside to
do right by the American people, to do right by those whose lives were
affected by 9/11, including those whose memories we honor.
I have heard and read a lot of excuses about fulfilling the
recommendations, Madam Speaker. On one hand, many of my colleagues
across the aisle have publicly said for months they already fulfilled
the recommendations.
In the past week they have accused the Democratic leadership of
presenting a bill that doesn't fulfill the recommendation and leaves
gaps.
Madam Speaker, I am a bit baffled. Did the Republicans fulfill or not
fulfill the recommendations? I think we all know the answer, and that
is why we are here today.
To those who want to point out alleged gaps in the 9/11 bill, I say,
we can do better than the past. Here is a chance for Congress to stop
dragging its feet, to become the ``do something'' Congress. We can
stand around complaining and pointing fingers, or we can finally do the
job we are here and hired to do.
There is an old Irish proverb that says, ``You will never plow the
field if you only turn it over in your mind.''
Congress has spent 5 years turning over the 9/11 recommendations in
its mind. On the topics covered by this legislation, we have seen bills
introduced, amendments offered, hearings held, and investigative
reports written.
Don't be fooled by those who say that this bill is moving too
quickly. It has been 5 years since 9/11. It has been 3 years since the
9/11 Commission issued its report.
Now is the time, Mr. Speaker, to plow the field. Now is the time to
act on the 9/11 recommendations. The 9/11 Commission has told us that
we must provide Homeland Security grants to States and cities based on
risk, not a pork barrel formula. This bill meets that recommendation.
The 9/11 Commission told us many more people could die after a
terrorist attack or natural disaster if police, fire fighters and
paramedics can't communicate with each other.
Today, we will create a dedicated grant program to ensure State and
local first responders have communication systems that talk to one
another.
The 9/11 commissioners told us that more than 5 years after the
hijacked planes flew into our national landmarks, our aviation system
is still not secure enough.
We still do not spend our money cost-effectively to screen checked
baggage. Airport checkpoints are not equipped with the most modern
technologies, like those needed to detect liquid explosives, and cargo
that is stored under a passengers seat is still not adequately
inspected.
This bill extends funding for advanced baggage screening and creates
a novel new trust fund to strengthen checkpoint security.
Perhaps more importantly, Mr. Speaker, this bill requires TSA to
create a system of inspections to ensure that 100 percent of the cargo
shipped on passenger planes is screened within 3 years.
TSA will do this through a system that uses equipment, technology,
canines, inspectors and other means to ensure that the level of
security provided for air cargo is equivalent to the level of security
for checked baggage.
This bill also requires all cargo containers carried on ships to be
scanned and sealed before they leave for an American port. The scanning
requirement in this bill are put in place within a reasonable time
frame, 3 years for large ports and 5 years for smaller ports.
This bill takes other key steps to fulfill the 9/11 Commission's
recommendations, such as strengthening critical infrastructure security
and improving private sector preparedness.
Perhaps more importantly, this bill will create a strong independent
Privacy and Civil Liberties Board. It will also strengthen the
authority of privacy officers in Federal agencies.
We all know that securing our Nation will be of little use if we lose
our way of life. Our commitment to privacy and individual freedom is in
this process.
For too long, Mr. Speaker, many in this House have talked about
strengthening Homeland Security. But they are unwilling to pay the
necessary price or confront the waste and White House mismanagement.
Now is the time, Mr. Speaker, to put action into words. Supporting
the 9/11 Commission Fulfillment Act today will do just that.
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
PURPOSE AND SUMMARY
The purpose of H.R. 1 is to provide for the implementation of the
recommendations of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon
the United States.
BACKGROUND AND NEED FOR LEGISLATION
The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States
(also known as the 9/11 Commission) produced an independent and
comprehensive report evaluating the events and implications of the
terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001. Included in the
report were 41 recommendations on how to prevent such an attack from
occurring again. As of the conclusion of the 109th Congress, not all of
those recommendations had been fulfilled. Consequently, the United
States remains unprepared for a major emergency of that kind.
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita's destruction of the Gulf Coast region
further emphasized American vulnerability to national disasters,
whether they are caused by nature or terrorism.
In addition to the report, several members of the 9/11 Commission
participated in the ``9/11 Public Discourse Project,'' which issued a
series of report cards evaluating and ultimately grading the federal
government's progress on executing the Commission's recommendations as
they related to national security and preparedness. The final report
card, issued on December 5, 2005, gave an alarming number of failing or
nearly failing grades to key aspects of the government's policies,
procedures, and operations.
Areas that received failing grades included interoperable
communications for first responders, risk-based homeland security
funding, and airline passenger screening, all of which are addressed by
H.R. 1. Nearly-failing grades (D's) were used to describe the
government's progress toward realistic assessment of critical
infrastructure, checked bag and cargo screening for passenger aircraft,
providing incentives for information sharing, encouraging government-
wide information sharing, creating a meaningful Privacy and Civil
Liberties Oversight Board, a maximum effort to prevent terrorist from
acquiring weapons of mass destruction, cultivating international
scholarship and exchange programs with Arab and predominantly Muslim
countries, and thoughtful examination of the role played by Saudi
Arabia in the international community.
By enacting provisions that address key recommendations from the 9/11
Commission, H.R. 1 will make the United States more secure, closing
many of the security and preparedness gaps mentioned above that keep
Americans vulnerable to future national emergencies.
HEARINGS
This bill reflects the findings of many oversight hearings that have
taken place since the 9/11 Commission issued its recommendations in
2004.
On February 10, 2005, the Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness,
Science, and Technology held a hearing titled, ``The Proposed Fiscal
Year 2006 Budget: Enhancing Terrorism Preparedness for First
Responders.''
On February 16, 2005, the Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information
Sharing, and Terrorism Risk Assessment held a hearing titled, ``The
Proposed Fiscal Year 2006 Budget: Building the Information Analysis
Capabilities of DHS.''
On March 15, 2005, the Subcommittee on Prevention of Nuclear and
Biological Attack held a hearing titled, ``Nuclear Terrorism:
Protecting the Homeland.'' Witnesses included Charles E. McQueary,
Under Secretary for Science and Technology, Department of Homeland
Security; Paul McHale, Assistant Secretary for Homeland Defense,
Department of Defense; Paul M. Longsworth, Deputy Administrator for
Defense Nuclear Proliferation, Department of Energy; and Willie T.
Hulon, Assistant Director for Counterterrorism, FBI.
On April 12, 2005, the Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness,
Science, and Technology held a hearing titled, ``The Need for Grant
Reform and the Faster and Smarter Funding for First Responders Act of
2005.''
On April 19, 2005, the Subcommittee on Prevention of Nuclear and
Biological Attack held a hearing titled, ``DHS Coordination of Nuclear
Detection Efforts.'' Witnesses included Vayl Oxford, Acting Director of
the DNDO; Dr. Fred Ikle, Center for Strategic and International
Studies; Dr. Graham Allison, Director, Belfer Center for Science and
International Affairs, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard
University; and Col. Randy Larson, USAF (Ret.) CEO, Homeland Security
Associates.
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On May 26, 2005, the Subcommittee on Prevention of Nuclear and
Biological Attack held a hearing titled, ``Building A Nuclear Bomb:
Identifying Early Indicators of Terrorist Activity.'' Witnesses
included the Honorable Ronald F. Lehman, Director for Global Security
Research, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory; Mr. David Albright,
President, Institute for Science and International Security; and Ms.
Laura Holgate, Vice President for Russial/New Independent States,
Nuclear Threat Initiative.
On June 21, 2005, the Subcommittee on Prevention of Nuclear and
Biological Attack held a hearing titled, ``Detecting Nuclear Weapons
and Radiological Materials: How Effective Is Available Technology?''
Witnesses included Mr. Gene Aloise, Director, Natural Resources and
Environment, GAO; Dr. Richard L. Wagner, Chair, Defense Science Board
Task Force on Prevention of and Defense Against Clandestine Nuclear
Attack, Senior Staff Member Los Alamos National Laboratory; and Ms.
Bethann Rooney, Security Director, Port Authority of New York & New
Jersey, among others.
On June 22, 2005, the Subcommittee on Economic Security,
Infrastructure Protection, and Cybersecurity held a hearing titled,
``Ensuring the Security of America's Borders through the Use of
Biometric Passports and Other Identity Documents.'' Testimony was
received from Department of Homeland Security and State Department
officials.
On June 28, 2005, the Subcommittee on Prevention of Nuclear and
Biological Attack held a hearing titled, ``Pathways to the Bomb:
Security of Fissile Materials Abroad.''
On July 13, 2005, the Subcommittee on Economic Security,
Infrastructure Protection, and Cybersecurity held a hearing titled,
``Leveraging Technology to Improve Aviation Security.'' Members took
testimony from industry stakeholders, including firms with checkpoint
technologies that show promise at detecting explosives at TSA
checkpoints.
On July 19, 2005, the Subcommittee on Economic Security,
Infrastructure Protection, and Cybersecurity held a hearing titled,
``Leveraging Technology to Improve Aviation Security, Part II.''
Testimony was received from Cliff Wilke, the TSA Chief Technology
Officer.
On July 20, 2005, the Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information
Sharing, and Terrorism Risk Assessment held a hearing titled, ``A
Progress Report on Information Sharing for Homeland Security.''
On September 8, 2005, the Subcommittee on Prevention of Nuclear and
Biological Attack held a hearing titled, ``WMD Terrorism and
Proliferant States.'' Witnesses included Ray Takeyh, Senior Fellow,
Middle Eastern Studies, Council on Foreign Relations; Dr. Daniel Byman,
Director, Center for Peace and Security Studies, Georgetown University;
and Gregory Giles, National Security Consultant, Hicks and Associates.
On September 22, 2005, the Subcommittee on Prevention of Nuclear and
Biological Attack held a hearing titled, ``Trends in the Movement of
Illicit of Nuclear Materials.''
On September 29, 2005, the Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness,
Science, and Technology held a hearing titled, ``Incident Command,
Control, and Communications during Catastrophic Events.''
On October. 19, 2005, the full Committee held a hearing titled,
``Federalism and Disaster Response: Examining the Roles and
Responsibilities of Local, State, and Federal Agencies.'' The Committee
heard testimony from the governors of Arizona, Texas and Florida, as
well as three local elected officials.
On October 26, 2005, the Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness,
Science, and Technology held a hearing titled, ``Ensuring Operability
During Catastrophic Events.'' The Subcommittee heard testimony from Dr.
David Boyd, Director of project SAFECOM at the Department of Homeland
Security.
On November 8, 2005, the Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information
Sharing, and Terrorism Risk Assessment held a hearing titled, ``Federal
Support for Homeland Security Information Sharing: The Role of the
Information Sharing Program Manager.''
On November 17, 2005, the Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information
Sharing, and Terrorism Risk Assessment held a hearing titled,
``Terrorism Risk Assessment at the Department of Homeland Security.''
On November 17, 2005, the Subcommittee on Prevention of Nuclear and
Biological Attack held a hearing titled, ``International Efforts to
Promote Nuclear Security.'' Witnesses included Jerry Paul, Principal
Deputy Administrator, Acting Deputy Administrator for Nonproliferation
Programs, National Nuclear Security Administration, Department of
Energy, and Stephen Rademaker, Acting Assistant Secretary, Bureau of
International Security and Nonproliferation, Department of State.
On February 8, 2006, the Subcommittee on Prevention of Nuclear and
Biological Attack and the Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness,
Science, and Technology held a joint hearing titled, ``Protecting the
Homeland: Fighting Pandemic Flu from the Front Lines.''
On February 15, 2006, the Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information
Sharing, and Terrorism Risk Assessment held a hearing titled, ``The
President's Proposed Fiscal Year 2007 Budget for the Department of
Homeland Security: The Office of Intelligence and Analysis.''
On February 15, 2006, the Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness,
Science, and Technology held a hearing titled, ``The State of
Interoperable Communications: Perspectives from the Field.''
On March 1, 2006, the Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness,
Science, and Technology held a hearing titled, ``The State of
Interoperable Communications: Perspectives from State and Local
Government.''
On March 8, 2006, the Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness,
Science, and Technology held a hearing titled, ``Proposed Fiscal Year
2007 Budget: Enhancing Preparedness for First Responders.''
On March 8, 2006, the Subcommittee on Management, Integration, and
Oversight held a hearing titled, ``The 9/11 Reform Act: Examining the
Implementation of the Human Smuggling and Trafficking Center.''
On April 6, 2006 and May 10, 2006, the Subcommittee on Intelligence,
Information Sharing, and Terrorism Risk Assessment held hearings
titled, ``Protection of Privacy in the DHS Intelligence Enterprise.''
On April 12, 2006, the Committee held a field hearing titled,
``Emergency Planning and Preparedness: Federal, State, and Local
Coordination.''
On April 25, 2006, the Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness,
Science, and Technology held a hearing titled, ``The State of
Interoperable Communications: Perspectives on Federal Coordination of
Grants, Standards, and Technology.'' The Subcommittee heard testimony
from two panels. The first panel consisted of the principal Federal
agencies that are responsible for coordinating Federal communication
systems with state and local jurisdictions. The second panel included
Federal and non-governmental entities that develop the standards and
examined the impact of technology in the area of interoperable/
emergency communication.
On May 24, 2006, the Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information
Sharing, and Terrorism Risk Assessment held a hearing titled,
``Examining the Progress of the DHS Chief Intelligence Officer.'' The
Subcommittee heard testimony from Mr. Charles Allen, the Chief
Intelligence Officer at the Department of Homeland Security.
On May 25, 2006, the Subcommittee on Prevention of Nuclear and
Biological Attack held a hearing titled, ``Preventing Nuclear
Smuggling: Enlisting Foreign Cooperation.'' Witnesses included Mr. Vail
Oxford, Director, Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, Department of
Homeland Security; Mr. Jayson Ahearn, Assistant Commissioner for Field
Operations, Customs and Border Protection, Department of Homeland
Security; Mr. David Huizenga, Assistant Deputy Administrator for
International Materials Protection, Control and Accounting, National
Nuclear Security Administration, Department of Energy; and Mr. Frank
Record, Acting Assistant Secretary of State for International Security
and Nonproliferation, Department of State.
On June 15, 2006, the full Committee held a hearing titled, ``DHS
Terrorism Preparedness Grants: Risk-Based or Guess-Work.''
On June 22, 2006, the Subcommittee on Prevention of Nuclear and
Biological Attack held a hearing titled, ``International Efforts to
Promote Nuclear Security.'' Witnesses included Mr. Jerry Paul,
Principal Deputy Administrator, Acting Deputy Administrator for
Nonproliferation Programs, National Nuclear Security Administration,
Department of Energy; Mr. Frank Record, Acting Assistant Secretary,
Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation, Department of
State; and Mr. Jack David, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
International Security Policy, Office of the Secretary, Department of
Defense, among others.
On June 28, 2006, the Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information
Sharing, and Terrorism Risk Assessment held a hearing titled, ``DHS
Intelligence and Border Security: Delivering Operational
Intelligence.''
On July 26, 2006, the Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness,
Science, and Technology held a hearing titled, ``Emergency Care Crisis:
A Nation Unprepared for Public Health Disasters.''
On September 7, 2006, the Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information
Sharing, and Terrorism Risk Assessment held a hearing titled, ``State
and Local Fusion Centers and the Role of DHS.''
On September 13, 2006, the Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information
Sharing, and Terrorism Risk Assessment held a hearing titled, ``The
Homeland Security Information Network: An Update on DHS Information
Sharing Efforts.'' The Subcommittee heard testimony from the Inspector
General of the Department of Homeland Security.
[[Page H164]]
STATEMENT OF GENERAL PERFORMANCE GOALS AND OBJECTIVES
The purpose of H.R. 1, the ``Implementing the 9/11 Commission
Recommendations Act of 2007,'' is to strengthen national security and
emergency preparedness efforts by enacting recommendations made by the
National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (also
known as the 9/11 Commission) in their comprehensive report on the
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.
INFORMAL BUDGET ESTIMATE
While there was no formal analysis from the Congressional Budget
Office, it is estimated that with respect to Titles I through XI--those
titles that fall within the jurisdiction of the Committee on Homeland
Security--the only sections that would affect net direct spending are
sections 402 and 403.
Section 402, which would extend provisions related to the Aviation
Security Capital Fund through 2011, would have no net cost over time.
That provision would receive credit for triggering collection of the
first $250 million in passenger fees, which would offset the cost of
subsequent spending.
Section 403, which creates a new $250 million checkpoint screening
improvement fund for fiscal year 2008 that is funded through the
Aviation Security Capital Fund, would have no net overall cost,
although it would mean that the amount available to offset TSA's 2008
appropriation for aviation security would be reduced by $250 million.
CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY STATEMENT
Pursuant to clause 3(d)(1) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of
Representatives, the Constitutional authority for this legislation is
provided in Article I, section 8, clause 1 of the Constitution, which
grants Congress the power to provide for the common Defense of the
United States.
Section-by-Section Analysis of the Legislation
title i: risk-based allocation of homeland security grants
Sec. 101--First Responders Homeland Security Funding. This
section amends the Homeland Security Act of 2002, by
inserting Title XX (``Funding for First Responders'') to the
end of the Act, including the following new sections:
Sec. 2002--Faster and Smarter Funding for First Responders.
This section sets forth provisions governing Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) grant funding for first responders
pursuant to the State Homeland Security Grant Program, the
Urban Area Security Initiative, and the Law Enforcement
Terrorism Prevention Program. It specifically excludes non-
DHS programs, the FIRE Grant programs, and the Emergency
Management Performance Grant program and Urban Search and
Rescue Grants program authorized by specified Federal laws.
Sec. 2003--Covered Grant Eligibility and Criteria. This
section specifies that high threat urban areas are eligible
to apply for funding under the Urban Area Security Initiative
and that States, regions, and directly eligible tribes may
apply for funding under the State Homeland Security Grant
Program and the Law Enforcement Terrorism Prevention Program.
It also directs the Secretary of Homeland Security to require
any State applying for a covered grant to submit a State
Preparedness report, to be developed in consultation with
local governments and first responders. Additionally, this
section precludes a grant award to a State absent approval of
such plan. It sets forth minimum contents for grant
applications, including the designation of regional and
tribal liaisons (if the applicant is a region or directly
eligible tribe) and requires regional and tribal applications
to be coordinated with State applications. Finally, this
section requires applicants who purchase equipment that do
not meet or exceed any applicable national voluntary
consensus standards to include an explanation of why such
equipment or systems will serve the needs of the applicant
better than equipment or systems that meet or exceed such
standards.
Sec. 2004--Risk-Based Evaluation and Prioritization. This
section requires the Secretary to evaluate and annually
prioritize pending applications for covered grants based upon
the degree to which they would lessen the threat to,
vulnerability of, and consequences for persons (including
transient commuters and tourists) and critical
infrastructure. It also requires such evaluation and
prioritization to be coordinated with the National Advisory
Council (established as part of the recent FEMA Reform Bill),
the FEMA Administrator, the United States Fire Administrator,
the Chief Intelligence Officer of the Department, the
Assistant Secretary for Infrastructure Protection, and other
Department officials as determined by the Secretary. This
section also sets forth minimum amounts each state shall
receive (0.25%), providing for larger grant awards to
applicants that have a significant international land border
and/or adjoin a body of water within North America that
contains an international boundary line (0.45%).
Sec. 2005--Use of Funds and Accountability Requirements.
This section lists authorized uses of covered grants and
prohibits the use of grant funds to supplant State or local
funds, to construct physical facilities, to acquire land, or
for any State or local government cost sharing contribution.
It authorizes covered grant applicants to petition the
Secretary for reimbursement of the costs of any activity
relating to prevention of, preparedness for, response to, or
recovery from acts of terrorism that is a federal duty and
normally performed by a federal agency, and that is being
performed by a State and/or local government under agreement
with a federal agency. In addition, it sets the federal share
of the costs of activities carried out under covered grants
at 100 percent of the total for the two-year period following
enactment of this Act and at 75 percent thereafter. This
section also requires each covered grant recipient to submit
annual reports on homeland security spending and establishes
penalties for States that fail to pass through to local
governments within 45 days of receipt of grant funds.
Finally, this section requires the Secretary to report to
Congress on grant program activities annually.
title ii: ensuring communications interoperability for first responders
Sec. 201--Improve Communications for Emergency Response
Grant Program. This section would amend Title V of the
Homeland Security Act of 2002 by creating a stand-alone
interoperability grant program at the Department of Homeland
Security. This provision requires the Department of Homeland
Security's Office of Grants and Training to coordinate with
the Director of Emergency Communications to establish the
Improved Communications for Emergency Response (ICER) grant
program to improve emergency communications among state,
regional, national, and in some instances, along the
international border communities. The provision provides that
the ICER grant would be established the first fiscal year
following the Department's completion of and delivery to
Congress of the National Emergency Communication Plan (as
outlined in current law) and baseline operability and
interoperability assessment, and, upon the Secretary's
determination that substantial progress has been made with
regard to emergency communication equipment and technology
standards. Further, this section outlines the available use
of the ICER grants for planning, design and engineering,
training and exercise, technical assistance, and other
emergency communication activities deemed integral by the
Secretary.
title iii: strengthening use of a unified incident command during
emergencies
Sec. 301--National Exercise Program Design. This section
strengthens federal assistance to state, local, and tribal
governments both in implementing and in fully understanding
the National Incident Management System (NIMS), the Incident
Command System (ICS), any relevant mutual aid agreements, and
the broad concepts of a unified command system. It refines
and focuses some of the provisions of the Post Katrina
Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006 by expressly
requiring that the National Exercise Program include
practical exercises that reinforce the aforementioned subject
matters. Finally, it ensures that the utility of any exercise
is maximized by requiring that the exercise plans of state,
local, and tribal governments include the prompt creation of
an after-action report and the rapid incorporation of any
lessons learned into future operations.
Sec. 302--National Exercise Program Model Exercises. This
section amends the Post Katrina Emergency Management Reform
Act of 2006 to make it easier for state, local, and tribal
governments to conduct exercises meant to reinforce NIMS/ICS
training. It does so by requiring the Department of Homeland
Security to develop and make available to them pre-scripted,
preplanned exercise scenarios and materials that will need
minimal tailoring.
Sec. 303--Responsibilities of Regional Administrators of
the Federal Emergency Management Agency. This Section amends
the Homeland Security Act of 2002 and the Post Katrina
Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006 to require FEMA's
Regional Administrators to assist state, local, and tribal
governments in pre-identifying and evaluating sites where a
multijurisdictional unified command system can be quickly
established in the event of a terrorist attack or a natural
disaster.
title iv: strengthening aviation security
Sec. 401--Installation of In-Line Baggage Screening
Equipment. This provision directs the Department of Homeland
Security to issue, within thirty days of final passage of the
Act, a cost-sharing study required under the Intelligence
Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 that will provide
creative financing solutions to promote greater deployment of
in-line explosive detection systems. Additionally, the
Secretary is to provide analysis of the study, including a
list of provisions DHS supports and a schedule to implement
them. The 9/11 Public Discourse Project gave Congress and the
Administration a ``D'' on improving the security of checked
baggage.
Sec. 402--Aviation Security Capital Fund. The 9/11
Discourse Project gave ``checked bag and cargo screening a
`D,' stating that ``Improvements here have not been made a
priority by the Congress or the administration. Progress on
implementation of in-line screening has been slow. The main
impediment is inadequate funding.'' This provision renews
expiring authorization for TSA to issue letters of intent,
grants or other funding vehicles to airports to help support
in-line EDS projects through Fiscal Year 2011. Without this
provision, authorization to issue such grants
[[Page H165]]
would expire at the end of Fiscal Year 2007. The provision
also removes the $125 million cap on the level of support
that TSA can give airports under this fund.
Sec. 403--Airport Checkpoint Screening Explosive Detection.
This provision creates a Checkpoint Screening Security Fund
to support the research, development and deployment of EDS
checkpoint technologies. The provision provides a one-time
deposit of $250 million in FY 2008, from the revenues
collected from the passenger ticket fees. The 9/11
Commissioners continues to be concerned about the threat that
a would-be terrorist would get passed the TSA checkpoint with
explosives strapped to their bodies. The 9/11 Public
Discourse Project gave Congress a ``C'' on improving airline
screening checkpoints to detect explosives. The Commissioners
found that ``while more advanced screening technology is
being developed, Congress needs to provide the funding for,
and TSA needs to move as expeditiously as possible with the
appropriate installation of explosive detection trace portals
at more of the nation's airports.''
Sec. 404--Strengthening Explosive Detection at Airport
Screening Checkpoints. This provision directs the Department
of Homeland Security to issue, within seven days of
enactment, a strategic plan for the deployment of explosive
detection equipment at checkpoints that is long overdue under
the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004.
Sec. 405--Extending Authorization of Aviation Security
Funding. This provision reauthorizes the Aviation Security
Capital Fund, which expires in 2007, through 2011 to ensure
that TSA can continue to collect fees on tickets purchased by
the flying public to enhance aviation security. This language
would make available an additional $1 billion towards the
challenge of expanding in-line EDS deployment, that is $250
million per year from FY 2008 through 2011.
Sec. 406--Inspection of Cargo Carried Aboard Passenger
Aircraft. This provision directs the Department of Homeland
Security to establish and implement a system to inspect 100%
of cargo carried on passenger aircraft by 2009. The measure
directs the Department to develop a phased-in approach so
that by the end of fiscal year 2007, 35% of cargo carried on
passenger aircraft is inspected; by the end of fiscal year
2008, 65% percent of cargo is inspected; and by the end of
fiscal year 2009, 100% of cargo is inspected. Last December,
the 9/11 Commissioners gave a ``D'' grade to Congress and the
Administration for their efforts to enhance air cargo
screening.
Sec. 407--Appeal and Redress Process for Passengers Wrongly
Delayed or Prohibited from Boarding a Flight. This provision
directs the Secretary of Homeland Security to create the
Office of Appeals and Redress to establish and administer a
timely and fair process for airline passengers who believe
they have been delayed or prohibited from boarding a flight
because they have been misidentified against the ``No Fly''
or ``Selectee'' watch-lists. The 9/11 Commissioners
identified problems with airline passenger pre-screening as
an area that needs addressing. In the 9/11 Public Discourse
Project, the Commissioners stated that there has not been any
real progress on improving the watch-listing process. The
Department of Homeland Security was given an ``F'' in this
area.
Sec. 408--Transportation Security Administration Personnel
Management. This section provides for equal treatment for all
Transportation Security Administration employees, including
screeners. This provision requires the Department of Homeland
Security apply the same management system to all TSA
employees, including screeners. Under this provision, all TSA
employees, including screeners, would have collective
bargaining rights and whistleblower rights.
Sec. 409--Advanced Airline Passenger Prescreening. This
provision directs the Secretary to submit a plan with
milestones to test and implement a system to prescreen
passengers against the automatic selectee and no fly lists.
The plan is due 90 days after enactment of the Act and must
include (1) a description of the system; (2) a projected
timeline for each phase of testing and implementation of the
system; (3) an explanation of how the system integrates with
the prescreening system for passenger on international
flights; and (4) a description of how the system complies
with the Privacy Act.
TITLE V: STRENGTHENING THE SECURITY OF CARGO CONTAINERS
Sec. 1501--Requirements Relating to Entry of Containers
into the United States. This section amends 46 U.S.C.
Sec. 70116 to add a new subsection. Under the new subsection,
all containers must be scanned overseas using the best-
available technology, including scanning for radiation and
density, before they are loaded onto a ship destined for the
United States. The scans will be reviewed by American
security personnel before the container is loaded, and as
technology becomes available, containers will be sealed with
a device that will sound an alarm when it is tampered with,
and will notify U.S. officials of a breach before the
container enters the Exclusive Economic Zone of the United
States. This section also requires the Secretary of Homeland
Security to establish standards for scanning equipment and
seals. The Secretary is required to review and if necessary,
revise these standards not less than once every two years.
Moreover, this section authorizes to be appropriated such
sums as may be necessary to carry out this new requirement
for fiscal years 2008 through 2013.
Under this section, the Department of Homeland Security is
required to issue a final rule implementing this requirement
within one year after the Department issues the report on the
foreign pilot program required by Sec. 231 of the SAFE Ports
Act. In addition, this section mandates a phased-in
application. The new requirement shall apply to containers
loaded at larger ports (more than 75,000 TEUs loaded in 2005)
beginning on the end of the 3-year period beginning on the
date of the enactment of this act. The new requirement shall
apply to all other containers beginning on the end of the 5-
year period beginning on the date of enactment of this act.
This section encourages the Secretaries of Homeland Security
and State to promote and establish international standards
for the security of containers moving through the
international supply chain. The legislation also requires the
Secretary of Homeland Security to consult with the
appropriate public and private stakeholders when carrying out
this new subsection to ensure that actions taken by the
Department do not violate international trade obligations or
other international obligations of the United States.
TITLE VI: STRENGTHENING EFFORTS TO PREVENT TERRORIST TRAVEL
Subtitle A--Human smuggling and trafficking center
improvements
Sec. 601--Strengthening the Capabilities of the Human
Smuggling and Trafficking Center. This section would improve
the capabilities of the Human Smuggling and Trafficking
Center (HSTC) by authorizing the Assistant Secretary of
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) to provide
administrative and operational support to stem human
smuggling, human trafficking, and terrorism travel. This
provision would authorize the hiring of 30 FTEs, of which no
less than 15 detailed special agents and intelligence
analysts--with at least three years of experience in the
field of human smuggling and trafficking--would serve for at
least two years at HSTC. This provision requires the
Secretary to develop a plan whereby the responsibilities of
the participating agencies and departments would be clearly
defined, outline how the Department's resources would be used
to support the intelligence functions of HSTC, and describe
the information sharing mechanism with the Office of
Information and Analysis (I&A), ICE, and the U.S. Customs and
Border Protection. Under this provision, the plan must also
develop a reciprocal clearance status for participating
agencies and departments, establish coordinated networked
systems, and define efforts to incorporate HSTC personnel
into the civil service system. This provision also requires
SHA to execute a Memorandum of Understanding with the
Attorney General clarifying the responsibilities of the
participating departments regarding human smuggling,
trafficking, and terrorist travel. Finally, I&A, in
coordination with HSTC must produce periodic reports to
Federal, State, local, and tribal law enforcement and other
relevant agencies regarding the terrorists threats related to
human smuggling, human traveling, and terrorism travel.
Subtitle B--International collaboration to prevent terrorist
travel
Sec. 611--Report on International Collaboration to Increase
Border Security, Enhance Global Document Security, and
Exchange Terrorist Information.
Subtitle C--Entry and exit of foreign nationals into the
United States
Sec. 621--Biometric Entry and Exit Verification. This
section directs that the Secretary submit a plan, detailing
the manner in which the US-VISIT program meets the goals of a
comprehensive entry and exit screening system--including both
biometric entry and exit--and how it will fulfill statutory
obligations. As of October 2006, this plan was still under
review in the Office of the Secretary, according to US-VISIT
officials. Without such a plan, DHS cannot articulate how
entry/exit concepts fit together--including any interim
nonbiometric solutions--and neither DHS nor Congress is in a
good position to prioritize and allocate resources, including
funds for any facility modifications that might be needed,
for a US-VISIT exit capability, to plan for the program's
future, or to consider trade-offs between traveler
convenience and security.
TITLE VII: IMPROVING INTELLIGENCE AND INFORMATION SHARING WITH LOCAL
LAW ENFORCEMENT AND FIRST RESPONDERS
Subtitle A--Fusion and Law Enforcement Education and Teaming
(FLEET) grant program
Sec. 701--Findings.
Sec. 702--FLEET Grant Program. State, local, and tribal law
enforcement participation in state and local fusion centers
advances the cause of homeland security by involving officers
in the intelligence process on a daily basis; helping
officers build relationships across every level and
discipline of government and the private sector; and ensuring
that criminal intelligence and other information is shared
with their home communities. Unfortunately, the many local
and tribal police and sheriffs' officers who serve suburban,
rural, and tribal areas lack the resources to participate
fully in fusion centers. This section accordingly establishes
and authorizes funding for a program that will help them
detail officers and intelligence analysts to state fusion
centers by defraying the
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costs associated with details. Specifically, it will provide
local and tribal communities with the funding they need to
backfill positions vacated by detailees; to train detailees
in the intelligence cycle and privacy and civil liberties,
and to ensure effective communications between detailees
and their home departments and agencies. By encouraging
participation in state fusion centers by these lower
profile but equally critical law enforcement players--
regardless of resources--this program will promote the
development of more robust fusion centers nationally that
are better geared toward protecting the American people.
This section authorizes such sums as may be necessary for
each of fiscal years 2008 through 2013 in support of the
FLEET Grant Program.
Subtitle B--Border Intelligence Fusion Center Program
Sec. 711--Findings.
Sec. 712--Establishment of Border Intelligence Fusion
Center Program. Law enforcement officers speak highly of
fusion centers--entities that have been established at the
State and regional levels in order to make sense of the
millions of pieces of data available to them, state health
authorities, local first responders, the private sector, and
other homeland security players. One place where police and
sheriffs' officers have identified a need for such
intelligence ``fusion'' is at America's borders. As the June
2, 2006, arrest of suspected terrorists in Toronto, Canada,
and news that al Qaeda has considered crossing the Mexican
border to infiltrate the country both vividly demonstrate,
America needs a ``border intelligence'' capability. Having
situational awareness of the goings-on at our points of entry
and all places in between would help the Department of
Homeland Security make best use of its resources by
partnering more effectively with the state, local, and tribal
law enforcement officers that are the ``eyes and ears'' at
our borders. Although it is commonly accepted that officers
armed with that information could be effective lookouts for
terrorists, drug and human smugglers, and others who pose a
threat to the nation, no consistent and effective border
intelligence capability yet exists. This section accordingly
establishes and authorizes funding for a program that will
require the Department to deploy Customs and Border
Protection (CBP) and Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(ICE) officers to border state fusion centers in order to
generate border-related intelligence products that are
relevant to the policing communities in those states. This
section also provides for intelligence analysis, privacy, and
civil liberties training. This section authorizes such sums
as may be necessary for each of fiscal years 2008 through
2013 in support of the Border Intelligence Fusion Center
Program.
Subtitle C--Homeland Security information sharing enhancement
Sec. 721--Short Title.
Sec. 722--Homeland Security Advisory System. This section
directs the Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis to
implement an advisory system to relay advisories and alerts
to the public regarding threats to the homeland. This bill
likewise prescribes the contents of those advisories and
alerts, and it makes clear that the Under Secretary for
Intelligence and Analysis is not to use color designations as
the exclusive means warning the public of potential threat
conditions.
Sec. 723--Homeland Security Information Sharing. This
section directs the Secretary to integrate the various
intelligence components of the Department (CBP, ICE, TSA,
etc.) into a Departmental Information Sharing Environment
(ISE) to be administered by the Under Secretary for
Intelligence and Analysis. To support the development of the
ISE, this section:
(1) requires the Secretary to appoint ``Knowledge
Management Officers'' for each intelligence component in
order to promote a coordinated approach to gathering and
disseminating homeland security information;
(2) establishes business processes for the review of
information provided by State, local, tribal, and private
sector sources and related feedback mechanisms; and
(3) establishes a training program for Department employees
so they can better understand what ``homeland security
information'' is, how they can identify it as part of their
day-to-day work, and how it is relevant to the Office of
Intelligence and Analysis.
This section also directs the Secretary, acting through the
Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis, to establish a
comprehensive information technology network architecture
that will connect all of the databases within the Department
of Homeland Security to each other--promoting internal
information-sharing within the Department's Office of
Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) and among the Department's
various intelligence components. This section requires the
Secretary to submit an implementation plan and progress
report to Congress in order to monitor the development of the
architecture and encourages its developers to adopt the
functions, methods, policies, and network qualities
recommended by the Markle Foundation.
Subtitle D--Homeland Security information sharing
partnerships
Sec. 731--Short Title.
Sec. 732--State. Local. and Regional Information Fusion
Center Initiative. This section directs the Secretary to
establish an initiative to partner I&A with State, local, and
regional information fusion centers. Such fusion centers
analyze and disseminate potentially homeland security
relevant information to appropriate audiences in a given
community and are managed by a State, local, or regional
government entity. This section directs the Secretary to,
among other things, coordinate the Department's information
sharing efforts with these entities; provide intelligence and
other assistance to them; represent the interests of these
entities to the wider Intelligence Community; and provide
appropriate training. In addition, this section requires the
Secretary to submit a concept of operations for the fusion
center initiative before it can get underway. It also
requires the Secretary to address any privacy or civil
liberties concerns about the initiative raised by both the
Department's Privacy Officer and Officer for Civil Rights and
Civil Liberties before the initiative is implemented. This
section also requires a follow-up privacy impact assessment
within one year after the initiative commences.
Sec. 733--Homeland Security Information Sharing Fellows
Program. This section essentially creates a program by which
State, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies can
nominate officers to work alongside intelligence analysts in
I&A to accomplish three key goals for improving
information sharing: (1) identifying for Department
intelligence analysts what kinds of homeland security
information are actually of interest to law enforcement,
including information that can be used to help thwart
terrorist attacks; (2) assisting intelligence analysts to
write and disseminate intelligence reports in a shareable
format--providing officers with specific and actionable
information without disclosing sensitive sources and
methods; and (3) serving as a point of contact for
officers in the field who want to share information with
the Department but are unsure of where they should direct
that information. Moreover, this section directs the Under
Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis to solicit
nominations for the program from a wide range of urban,
suburban, and rural communities; provides a stipend to
participating officers when funding permits; and directs
the Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis to
expedite the security clearance process for any nominee
selected for the program who does not otherwise possess a
valid security clearance. This provision requires the
Secretary to submit a concept of operations for the
program before it can get underway. It also requires the
Secretary to address any privacy or civil liberties
concerns about the program raised by both the Department's
Privacy Officer and Officer for Civil Rights and Civil
Liberties before the program can begin. Additionally, this
section also requires a follow-up privacy impact
assessment within one year after the program commences.
Subtitle E--Homeland Security intelligence offices
reorganization
Sec. 741--Departmental Reorganization. This section
reflects the changes wrought by the Secretary's Second Stage
Review by redesignating the Directorate for Information
Analysis and Infrastructure Protection (IAIP) within the
Homeland Security Act of 2002 as I&A. It likewise
redesignates the ``Under Secretary for Information Analysis
and Infrastructure Protection'' as the ``Under Secretary for
Intelligence and Analysis.'' This section also takes the list
of responsibilities for the Under Secretary for Information
Analysis and Infrastructure Protection contained in Section
201 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 and divides them up
between the new Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis
and the new Assistant Secretary for Infrastructure Protection
who heads the new Office of Infrastructure Protection
(described in Section 763 below). This section also adds new
responsibilities for the Under Secretary for Intelligence and
Analysis, including (1) coordinating and enhancing
integration among the Department's intelligence components;
(2) establishing intelligence priorities; and (3) ensuring
that open-source information is used in I&A products whenever
possible. In addition, this section requires the Under
Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis to establish a
continuity of operations (COOP) plan in the event I&A's
operations are disrupted by a range of potential emergencies
and includes a variety of technical and conforming
amendments.
Sec. 742--Intelligence Components of the Department of
Homeland Security. This section defines ``intelligence
component''; requires the Secretary to provide training to
intelligence component staff regarding the handling,
analysis, dissemination, and collection of homeland security
information; and sets forth the responsibilities of the heads
of each of the Department's intelligence components. Those
responsibilities include: (1) ensuring that the work of their
component supports the Under Secretary for Intelligence and
Analysis and is consistent with his goals; (2) incorporating
the Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis's input
with regard to performance appraisals, bonus or award
recommendations, recruitment and selection of staff,
reorganization of the component, and other matters; and (3)
ensuring that staff has knowledge of and complies with the
programs and policies established by the Under Secretary for
Intelligence and Analysis.
Sec. 743--Office of Infrastructure Protection. This section
establishes the aforementioned Assistant Secretary for
Infrastructure Protection to head the new Office of
Infrastructure Protection. This section also lists six
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key responsibilities for this new Assistant Secretary,
including (1) conducting assessments of key resource and
critical infrastructure vulnerabilities; (2) identifying
priorities for Department protective and support measures;
(3) developing a comprehensive national plan for securing key
resources and critical infrastructure; (4) recommending
protective measures for key resources and critical
infrastructure; and (5) coordinating with the Undersecretary
for Intelligence and Analysis and the Department's homeland
security partners. The remainder of this section requires the
Secretary to provide the Office with an expert staff, some of
whom may hail from the private sector. It also requires staff
to have appropriate security clearances and provides that
personnel from other Federal agencies may be detailed to the
Office in order to meet staffing needs.
TITLE VIII: PROTECTING PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES WHILE EFFECTIVELY
FIGHTING TERRORISM
Subtitle A--Privacy and civil liberties oversight boards
Sec. 801--Short Title.
Sec. 802--Findings.
Sec. 803--Making: the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight
Board Independent. This provision removes the Board from the
Executive Office of the President and makes the Board an
independent agency. Under its current structure, the Board
acts under the direction of the President, its offices are
housed within the White House and its members serve at the
pleasure of the President. This section would grant the Board
autonomy and change its status to an independent agency.
Sec. 804--Requiring: All Members of the Privacy and Civil
Liberties Oversight Board to Be Confirmed by the Senate. This
section requires every member of the Board to be confirmed by
the U.S. Senate. The Board will be composed of a full-time
chairman and 4 additional members. The Board members shall be
determined to be qualified and selected on the basis of their
professional qualifications, achievements, public stature and
expertise in the areas of civil liberties and privacy.
Moreover, there shall never be more than three members of the
Board that are members of the same political party and those
individuals who are not of the same political party as the
President can only be appointed after the President has
consulted with the leadership of the nominee's party. Members
of the Board cannot serve as an elected official or an
employee of the Federal Government, other than in the
capacity as a Board member during their tenure of service.
All members will serve for a term of six years each.
Sec. 805--Subpoena Power for the Privacy and Civil
Liberties Oversight Board. This section states that the Board
will have subpoena powers that will be enforced by the U.S.
District Court in the judicial district where the subpoenaed
person resides. The subpoenas must be issued by the majority
of the members of the Board.
Sec. 806--Reporting: Requirements. This provision requires
the Board to submit no less than two reports each year to the
appropriate committees of Congress that shall include a
description of the Board's activities, information on its
findings, conclusions, minority views, and recommendations
resulting from its advice and oversight functions. The Board
will also receive and review reports from Privacy Officers
and Civil Liberties Officers from other executive branch
agencies. The reports shall be unclassified, to the greatest
extent possible, with a classified annex if necessary. The
general public shall be kept abreast of the Board's
activities through its reports, which shall be made public
and through public hearings.
SUBTITLE B--Enhancement of privacy officer authorities
Sec. 811--Short Title.
Sec. 812--Authorities of the Privacy Officer of the
Department of Homeland Security. This section vests the
designated privacy officer with the power to access any and
all records necessary to fulfill the obligations of the
office; undertake any privacy investigation that is deemed
appropriate; subpoena documents from the private sector,
where necessary; obtain sworn testimony; and take the same
action that the Department's Inspector General can take in
order to obtain answers to questions and responsive documents
in the course of an investigation. The term of appointment
shall be five years. Additionally, the Privacy Officer will
be required to submit reports directly to Congress regarding
the officer's performance without any prior comment of
amendment by the Secretary, Deputy Secretary, or any other
officer or employer of the Department of the Office of
Management and Budget.
TITLE IX: Improving Critical Infrastructure Security
Sec. 901--Vulnerability Assessment and Report on Critical
Infrastructure Information. This section requires the
Secretary to provide annual comprehensive reports on
vulnerability assessments for all critical infrastructure
sectors established in Homeland Security Presidential
Directive-7. This provision will require the Secretary to
provide the appropriate congressional committees with a
summary vulnerability report and a classified annex for each
industry sector. This provision also requires the Department
of Homeland Security to provide a summary report from the
preceding two years to compare with the current report to
show any changes in vulnerabilities, provide explanations and
comments on greatest risks to critical infrastructure for
each sector, and additional recommendations for mitigating
these risks.
Sec. 902--National Asset Database and the National At-Risk
Database. This section requires the Secretary of the
Department of Homeland Security to maintain two databases
addressing critical infrastructure: the National Asset
Database and, as a subset, the National at-risk Database.
These databases will list the nation's critical
infrastructure most at-risk of a terrorist attack. To develop
the National Asset Database and the At-Risk Database, the
Secretary will meet with a consortium of national
laboratories and experts. The Secretary is required to
annually update both databases and remove assets and
resources that are not verifiable or do not comply with the
database requirements. The Secretary will also meet with the
states and advise them as to the format for submitting assets
for the lists and notifying them as to deficiencies before
removing or not including assets on the lists. This provision
also requires the Secretary to consult the Databases for
purposes of allocating various Department grant programs.
Finally, the Secretary must provide an annual report to
Congress on the contents of the Databases.
TITLE X: Transportation Security Planning and Information Sharing
Sec. 1001--Strategic Transportation Security Information
Sharing. This section amends 49 U.S.C. Sec. 114 to add
subsection 114(u). This new subsection requires the
establishment of a Strategic Transportation Security
Information Sharing Plan. The purpose of this plan is to
ensure the robust development of tactical and strategic
intelligence products related to transportation security
for dissemination to public and private stakeholders. The
plan shall include a description of how intelligence
analysts in the Transportation Security Administration are
coordinating their activities with other Federal, State,
and Local analysts. In addition the plan shall include
reasonable deadlines for completing organizational changes
within the Department and a description of resources
needed to fulfill this plan.
Under this new subsection, the Secretary of the Department
of Homeland Security is required to submit a report
containing the plan to the appropriate Congressional
Committees within 180 days of enactment. The Secretary is
also required to submit an annual report and updates on
implementation
The Secretary of Homeland Security is required under the
new subsection to conduct an annual survey on the stakeholder
satisfaction concerning the transportation security
intelligence reports issued by the Department. To the
greatest extent possible, the Secretary shall provide
stakeholders with transportation security information in an
unclassified format. The Secretary is also required to ensure
that stakeholders have the security clearances needed to
receive classified information if the information can not be
disseminated in an unclassified format.
Sec. 1002--Transportation Security Strategic Planning. This
section amends 49 U.S.C. 114(t). This new legislation
specifically states that the Secretary of the Department of
Homeland Security is required to complete modal security
plans for aviation, bridge and tunnel, commuter rail and
ferry, highway, maritime, pipeline, rail, mass transit, over-
the-road bus, and other public transportation assets (the
National Strategy for Transportation Security is complete,
but its underlying modal plans have not yet been completed).
The Secretary of Homeland Security is responsible for
coordinating all efforts undertaken under this subsection
with the Secretary of Transportation. The development of
risk-based priorities required under this section shall be
based on vulnerability assessments conducted by the
Department of Homeland Security.
This section requires the Secretary to define the roles and
missions of tribal authorities. This section also requires
the Secretary to establish mechanisms for encouraging
employee organization cooperation and participation. Under
this new language, the Secretary is responsible for a
comprehensive delineation of prevention responsibilities. The
responsibilities and issues delineated under this section
have been expanded to include executed acts of terrorism
outside of the United States. Research and development
projects initiated by the Department shall be based on the
prioritization required by this subsection. This section
requires the Secretary, in conjunction with the submission of
the budget to Congress under 31 U.S.C. Sec. 1105(a), to
submit to the appropriate congressional committees an
assessment of the progress made on implementing the
transportation modal security plans.
The periodic progress report required under this subsection
shall include, at a minimum, recommendations for improving
and implementing the National Strategy for Transportation
Security and the transportation modal security plans that the
Secretary, in consultation with the Secretary of
Transportation, considers appropriate. The report shall
include an accounting of all grants, including those for
research and development, distributed by the Department of
Homeland Security the previous year and a description of how
these grants accomplished the goals of the National Strategy
for Transportation Security. The report shall include an
accounting of all funds spent by the Department on
transportation security. This
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accounting should not include the aforementioned grants. The
report shall include information on the number of employees,
by agency, working on transportation security issues. This
listing shall be divided by mode--aviation, bridge and
tunnel, commuter rail and ferry, highway, maritime, pipeline,
rail, mass transit, over-the-road bus, and other public
transportation modes. This list shall also include
information, by mode, on the number of contractors hired by
the Department to work on transportation-related security.
Finally, the report shall include information on the turnover
of transportation-security related employees at the
Department the previous year. Specifically, the report shall
provide information on the number of people who have left the
Department, their agency, the area in which they worked, and
the amount of time that they had worked at the Department. If
the Department initiates any transportation security
activities that are not clearly delineated in the National
Strategy for Transportation Security, the Department shall
provide an explanation to the appropriate congressional
committees; including the amount of funds expended for these
initiatives.
Finally, this section requires the National Strategy for
Transportation Security to include, as an integral part or as
an appendix, the Transportation Sector Specific Plan required
under Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7.
Additionally, the Secretary of Homeland Security, working
with the Secretary of Transportation, shall consult with
other Federal agencies; state, local, and tribal officials;
the private sector; employee organizations; institutions of
higher learning; and others, as applicable, when carrying out
the responsibilities outlined in this section. An
unclassified version of the National Strategy for
Transportation Security shall be provided to other Federal
agencies; state, local, and tribal officials; the private
sector; employee organizations; institutions of higher
learning; and others, as applicable.
TITLE XI: PRIVATE SECTOR PREPAREDNESS
Sec. 1101--Participation of Private Sector Organizations in
Emergency Preparedness and Response Activities. This
provision establishes a program by which the Secretary of
Homeland Security will establish a disaster and emergency
preparedness response program for the private sector. Under
this provision, within 90 days of passage, the Secretary will
create a program to enhance private sector preparedness and
response to terrorism and other emergencies and disasters.
Among other things, the program must establish guidelines to:
(1) identify hazards and assessing risks and impacts, (2)
mitigating hazards, (3) managing emergency preparedness and
response, and (4) developing training and response plans and
operational procedures. Among any such standards created, the
Department is required to use National Fire Protection
Association 1600 Standard on Disaster/Emergency Management
and Business Continuity Programs, which establishes a check-
list of best practices for disaster and emergency
preparedness and response. This standard was endorsed and
recommended by the 9/11 Commission.
TITLE XII: PREVENTING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION PROLIFERATION AND
TERRORISM
Sec. 1201--Findings.
Sec. 1202--Definitions.
Subtitle A--Repeal and modification of limitations on
assistance for prevention of WMD proliferation and
terrorism
Sec. 1211--Repeal and Modification of Limitations on
Assistance for Prevention of WMD Proliferation and Terrorism.
Consistent with the 9-11 Commission's recommendations, this
section repeals conditions on CTR assistance to Russia and
the former Soviet Union, as proposed by Senator Lugar in
amendments in prior Congresses. This provision also removes
limits on the use of CTR and Department of Energy funds
outside the former Soviet Union by modifying certification
requirements and repealing funding caps while providing
additional oversight over this program.
Subtitle B--Proliferation Security Initiative
Sec. 1221--Proliferation Security Initiative Improvements
and Authorities. This section expresses a Sense of Congress
that the President should expand and strengthen the PSI, with
a particular focus on implementing recent recommendations
from the Government Accountability Office, including
establishing a separate budget item for PSI. It also requires
the Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense to submit
defined annual budgets for the PSI. This provision further
requires a presidential report on the implementation of
Subtitle B and an annual GAO report on PSI progress and
effectiveness.
Sec. 1222--Authority to Provide Assistance to Cooperative
Countries. This section authorizes the President to provide
certain types of foreign military assistance to countries
that cooperate with the U.S. and its allies to achieve PSI
goals. It also requires the President to notify the Congress
30 days before transferring any ship or aircraft with
military applications to any country that does not support
U.S. interdiction efforts.
Subtitle C--Assistance to Accelerate Programs to Prevent WMD
Proliferation and Terrorism
Sec. 1231--Findings: Statement of Policy.
Sec. 1232--Authorization of Appropriations for the
Department of Defense Cooperative Threat Reduction Program.
This provision authorizes such additional appropriations as
may be necessary for fiscal year 2007 for the CTR Program,
particularly for biological weapons proliferation prevention;
chemical weapons destruction at Shchuch'ye; and to accelerate
and strengthen all Cooperative Threat Reduction programs.
This section also contains a sense of Congress that in future
fiscal years, the President should accelerate and expand
funding for Department of Defense CTR programs, and should
begin immediately to secure additional commitments from the
Russian Federation and other partner countries to facilitate
such efforts.
Sec. 1233--Authorization of Appropriations for Department
of Energy Programs to Prevent WMD Proliferation and
Terrorism. This provision authorizes appropriations for FY
2007 for the Department of Energy National Nuclear Security
Administration for the following programs and purposes:
To accelerate and strengthen the Global Threat Reduction
Initiative (GTRI or ``global cleanout''), with a particular
emphasis on the Russian research reactor fuel return program;
international radiological threat reduction; and development
of a quick response and short-term capabilities to secure and
remove nuclear materials throughout the world.
To accelerate and strengthen the Nonproliferation and
International Security program, with a particular emphasis on
global security and engagement with China, India, and other
states; activities to address emerging proliferation concerns
in North Korea, Iran and elsewhere; participation in
negotiations regarding North Korea's nuclear programs; inter-
agency participation in the PSI; technical and other
assistance to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
to increase the IAEA's capacity to secure vulnerable
materials worldwide and prevent nuclear terrorism; U.S.
efforts to help states around the world place the ``effective
controls'' on weapons of mass destruction and related
materials and technology mandated by UN Security Council
Resolution 1540; cooperation on export controls in South
Asia, the Middle East and other regions; efforts to
strengthen U.S. commitments to international regimes and
agreements; and establishment of a contingency fund for
opportunities that arise.
To accelerate and strengthen the International Materials
Protection, Control and Accounting program, with a particular
emphasis on implementation of physical protection and
material control and accounting upgrades at site; national
programs and sustainability activities in Russia; material
consolidation and conversion (including significant
acceleration of the down-blending of highly-enriched uranium
(HEU) to low-enriched uranium (LEU), the removal of HEU from
facilities, and international participation in these
efforts); efforts to strengthen cooperation with and access
to Russia; implementation of Second Line of Defense Megaports
agreements; and implementation of Department of Energy
actions under the Security and Accountability for Every
(SAFE) Port Act of 2006.
To accelerate and strengthen the Research and Development
program, with a particular emphasis on improvement of U.S.
government capability for both short and long-term, and
innovative, nonproliferation research and development that
addresses emerging proliferation concerns and will maintain
U.S. technological advantage, including the capacity to
detect nuclear material origin, uranium enrichment and
plutonium reprocessing; and efforts to significantly expand
the scientific research and development skills and resources
available to the Department of Energy's nonproliferation
programs.
Subtitle D--Office of the United States Coordinator for the
Prevention of WMD Proliferation and Terrorism
Sec. 1241--Office of the United States Coordinator for the
Prevention of WMD Proliferation and Terrorism. This section
establishes the executive office of the U.S. Coordinator for
the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation
and Terrorism. The U.S. Coordinator's duties include serving
as the advisor to the President on all matters relating to
the prevention of WMD proliferation and terrorism;
formulating a comprehensive and well-coordinated U.S.
strategy and policies (including department and agency
performance milestones, identification of program
inefficiencies, plans to coordinate and expand U.S.
activities, new initiatives and programs, and plans to
strengthen international cooperation); leading interagency
coordination; conducting oversight and evaluation; and
overseeing the development of a comprehensive and coordinated
budget and carrying out other budgetary authorities. This
section further requires an annual congressional report on
the strategy and policies described in Subtitle D, and
consultation with the Commission on the Prevention of WMD
Proliferation and Terrorism (established in Subtitle E).
Sec. 1242--Request for Corresponding Russian Coordinator.
This section expresses a sense of Congress that the President
should personally request the President of the Russian
Federation to designate an official of the Federation with
responsibilities for preventing WMD proliferation and
terrorism, commensurate with those of the U.S. Coordinator,
and with whom the U.S. Coordinator should work to plan and
implement activities in the Russian Federation.
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Subtitle E--Commission on the Prevention of WMD Proliferation
and Terrorism
Sec. 1251--Commission on the Prevention of WMD
Proliferation and Terrorism. This section directs the
President to convene a bipartisan blue-ribbon commission of
experts for the purpose of assessing current activities and
programs to prevent weapons of mass destruction (WMD)
proliferation and terrorism, and providing a clear and
comprehensive strategy and concrete recommendations for these
activities and programs.
Sec. 1252--Purposes. This section provides for the purposes
of the Commission, including assessing current activities,
initiatives, and programs to prevent WMD proliferation and
terrorism and providing a clear and comprehensive strategy
and concrete recommendations for such activities,
initiatives, and programs, with a particular emphasis on
significantly accelerating, expanding, and strengthening, on
an urgent basis, United States and international efforts to
prevent, stop, and counter the spread of nuclear weapons
capabilities and related equipment, material, and technology
to terrorists and states of concern.
Sec. 1253--Composition. This provision describes the
composition of the Commission, which will have three members
appointed by the President, three members appointed the by
the House and three members appointed by the Senate, and
establishes requirements for quorum and filling vacancies.
Sec. 1254--Responsibilities. This section requires the
Commission to address the structure and mission of relevant
government actors, including the Office of the U.S.
Coordinator for the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction
Proliferation and Terrorism (established in Subtitle D);
inter-agency coordination; U.S. commitments to international
regimes; and the threat of WMD proliferation and terrorism to
the U.S. and its interests. This section also requires the
Commission to reassess, and where necessary update and expand
upon, the conclusions and recommendations of the report
entitled ``A Report Card on the Department of Energy's
Nonproliferation Programs with Russia'' of January 2001 (also
known as the ``Baker-Cutler Report'').
Sec. 1255--Powers. This provision describes the powers of
the Commission.
Sec. 1256--Nonapplicability of Federal Advisory Committee
Act. This section clarifies that the Federal Advisory
Commission Act does not apply to the Commission but requires
the Commission to hold hearings as appropriate.
Sec. 1257--Report. This section requires that the
Commission report to Congress not later than 180 days after
appointment of the Commission.
Sec. 1258--Termination. This provision terminates the
Commission 60 days after completion of the report required
under Sec. 1257.
TITLE XIII: NUCLEAR BLACK MARKET COUNTER-TERRORISM ACT
Sec. 1301--Short Title.
Sec. 1302--Definitions.
Subtitle A--Sanctions for transfers of nuclear enrichment,
reprocessing, and weapons technology, equipment, and
materials involving foreign persons and terrorists
Sec. 1311--Authority to Impose Sanctions on Foreign
Persons. This section requires the President to impose
sanctions on any foreign person who trades nuclear enrichment
technology to any non-nuclear weapon state that does not
possess such technology as of January 1, 2004 and does not
have in force an IAEA Additional Protocol; or, is developing
nuclear weapons; or, who provides items controlled by the
Nuclear Suppliers Group that contributes to the development
of a nuclear weapon by a non-nuclear weapon state or any
foreign person. Sanctions include prohibiting foreign
assistance to such person, prohibiting the export of defense
articles, defense services, or dual use items (other than
food or medicine), and prohibiting contracts. Sanctions may
be waived if it is important to the national interest and
furthers the purposes of the Act.
Sec. 1312--Presidential Notification on Activities of
Foreign Persons. This provision requires a report from the
President on foreign persons who engage in the activities
described in Sec. 1311.
Subtitle B--Further actions against corporations associated
with sanctioned foreign persons
Sec. 1321--Findings.
Sec. 1322--Campaign by United States Government Officials.
This section requires the President to instruct U.S.
officials and agencies to persuade foreign governments and
relevant corporations not to enter into any business
transaction with foreign persons who engage in the activities
described in 1311.
Sec. 1323--Coordination. This section provides that the
Secretary of State coordinate the activities of U.S.
government agencies under 1322.
Sec. 1324--Report. This provision requires an annual report
on all activities described in this subtitle.
Subtitle C--Rollback of nuclear proliferation networks
Sec. 1331--Nonproliferation as a Condition of United States
Assistance. This section provides that U.S. assistance should
only be provided to countries that are not cooperating with
countries or foreign groups or individuals who are engaged
in, planning or assisting any international terrorist group
in the development of nuclear weapons or the means to deliver
them and are taking all necessary measures to prevent their
nationals or persons under their control from participating
in such cooperation and are fully and completely cooperating
with the United States in its efforts to eliminate nuclear
black-market networks.
Sec. 1332--Report on Identification of Nuclear
Proliferation Network Host Countries. This provision requires
an annual report that identifies any country in which
activities of the nuclear black market network that supplied
Libya, Iran and North Korea occurred and any country in which
such activities occur in the future. This section also
requires that the President submit information as to whether
such countries are fully cooperating with the United States,
including providing access to individuals involved in such
networks.
Sec. 1333--Suspension of Arms Sales Licenses and Deliveries
to Nuclear Proliferation Host Countries. This provision
directs the President to prohibit exports or other activities
under the Arms Export Control Act to any country unless the
President certifies that such country is fully investigating
the nuclear black market networks described in 1332, is
taking effective steps to halt such activities, and is fully
cooperating with the United States and other appropriate
international organizations in investigations regarding such
networks. These prohibitions may be waived if it is important
to the national security interest. 25
TITLE XIV: 9/11 COMMISSION INTERNATIONAL IMPLEMENTATION
Sec. 1401--Short Title: Table of Contents.
Subtitle A--Quality educational opportunities in Arab and
predominantly Muslim countries
Sec. 1411--Findings: Policy. This section declares that it
is the policy of the United States to: work toward the goal
of dramatically increasing the availability of modern basic
education through public schools in Arab and predominantly
Muslim countries, join with other countries in supporting the
International Arab and Muslim Youth Opportunity Fund, offer
additional incentives to increase the availability of basic
education in Arab and predominantly Muslim countries, and
work to prevent financing of education institutions that
support radical Islamic fundamentalism.
Sec. 1412--International Arab and Muslim Youth Opportunity
Fund. This section amends Sec. 7114 of the Intelligence
Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 by establishing
an International Arab and Muslim Youth Opportunity Fund. The
new Sec. 7114(a) contains findings on the United Nation's
2003 Arab Human Development Report on the lack of quality
public education, the high illiteracy, enrollment, and access
rates in Arab countries. The new Sec. 7114(b) states the
purpose is to strengthen the public educational systems in
Arab and predominantly Muslim countries by authorizing the
establishment of an International Arab and Muslim Youth
Opportunity Fund and providing resources for the Fund to help
strengthen the public educational systems in Arab and
predominantly Muslim countries. The new Sec. 7114(c)
authorizes the establishment of an International Arab and
Muslim Youth Opportunity Fund as either a separate fund in
the U.S. Treasury or through an international organization or
international financial institution; authorizes the Fund to
support specific activities, including assistance to enhance
modern educational programs; assistance for training and
exchange programs for teachers, administrators, and students;
assistance targeting primary and secondary students;
assistance for development of youth professionals; and other
types of assistance such as the translation of foreign books,
newspapers, reference guides, and other reading materials
into local languages and the construction and equipping of
modern community and university libraries; and authorizes
such sums as may be necessary for fiscal years 2008, 2009 and
2010 to carry out these activities. This subsection requires
the President to prepare a report on the United States
efforts to assist in the improvement of education
opportunities for Arab and predominantly Muslim children and
youths, including the progress in establishing the
International Arab and Muslim Youth Opportunity Fund. This
subsection also provides a definition for use in this
section.
Sec. 1413--Annual Report to Congress. This section directs
the Secretary of State to prepare an annual report on the
efforts of Arab and predominantly Muslim countries to
increase the availability of modern basic education and to
close educational institutions that promote religious
extremism and terrorism and provides the requirements for the
annual report.
Sec. 1414--Extension of Program to Provide Grants to
American-Sponsored Schools in Arab and Predominantly Muslim
Countries to Provide Scholarships. This section
provides findings regarding the pilot program established
by Sec. 7113 of the 9/11 Implementation Act of 2004,
stating that this program for outstanding students from
lower-income and middle-income program in Arab and
predominantly Muslim countries is being implemented. This
provision also amends Sec. 7113 to extend that program for
FY2007 and 2008, authorizes such sums as may be necessary
for such years, and requires a report in April 2008 about
the progress of the program.
Subtitle B--Democracy and development in Arab and
predominantly Muslim countries
Sec. 1421--Promoting Democracy and Development in the
Middle East, Central Asia, South
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Asia, and Southeast Asia. This section contains findings
describing the national security interests of the United
States to promote democracy, the rule of law, good
governance, sustainable development, a vigorous civil
society, political freedom, protection of minorities,
independent media, women's rights, private sector growth, and
open economic systems in the countries of the Middle East,
Central Asia, South Asia, and Southeast Asia. This provision
also declares that it is the policy of the United States to
promote in the short and long-term, democracy, the rule of
law, good governance, sustainable development, a vigorous
civil society, political freedom, protection of minorities,
independent media, women's rights, private sector growth, and
open economic systems in the countries of the Middle East,
Central Asia, South Asia, and Southeast Asia; and provide
assistance to individuals and organizations in the countries
of those regions that are committed to promoting those
objectives. Moreover, this section directs the Secretary of
State to prepare a report with a country-by-country five year
strategy to promote the policy of the United States described
in subsection (b), including an estimate of the funds
necessary to implement such a strategy.
Sec. 1422--Middle East Foundation. This provision
authorizes the Secretary of State to designate an appropriate
private, non-profit United States organization as the Middle
East Foundation and to provide funding to the Middle East
Foundation through the Middle East Partnership Initiative.
This subsection directs the Secretary of State to provide
notification prior to designating an appropriate organization
as the Middle East Foundation. It also requires the Middle
East Foundation to award grants to persons located in the
Middle East or working with local partners based in the
region to carry out projects that support the purposes
specified in subsection (a); and permits the Foundation to
make a grant to a Middle Eastern institution of higher
education to create a center for public policy. In addition,
this section prevents the funds provided to the Foundation
from benefiting any officer or employee of the Foundation,
except as salary or reasonable compensation for services, and
provides that the Foundation may hold funds provided in this
section in interest-bearing accounts, subject to
appropriations. This section requires annual independent
private audits, permits audits by the Government
Accountability Office, and requires audits of the use of
funds under this section by the grant recipient. This
provision also directs the Foundation to prepare an annual
report on the Foundation's activities and operations, the
grants awarded with funds provided under this section, and
the financial condition of the Foundation. Finally, this
section repeals 534(k) of P.L. 109-102.
Subtitle C--Restoring United States moral leadership
Sec. 431--Advancing United States Interests through Public
Diplomacy. This provision finds, via the National Commission
on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, that the U.S.
government has initiated some promising initiatives in
television and radio broadcasting to the Arab world, Iran,
and Afghanistan and that these efforts are beginning to reach
larger audiences. It also includes a sense of Congress that
the United States needs to improve its communication of ideas
and information to people in countries with significant
Muslim populations, that public diplomacy should reaffirm the
United States commitment to democratic principles, and that a
significant expansion of United States international
broadcasting would provide a cost-effective means of
improving communications with significant Muslim populations.
In addition, this section amends the United States
International Broadcasting Act of 1994 to include a provision
establishing special authority for surge capacity for U.S.
international broadcasting activities to support United
States foreign policy objectives during a crisis abroad, and
authorizes such sums to carry out the surge capacity
authority and directs the Broadcasting Board of Governors to
submit an annual report to the President and Congress. This
section also authorizes such sums as may be necessary for FY
2008 for U.S. broadcasting activities, including broadcasting
capital improvements.
Sec. 1432--Expansion of United States Scholarship.
Exchange, and Library Programs in Arab and Predominantly
Muslim Countries. This section directs the Secretary of State
to prepare a report on the recommendations of the National
Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States for
expanding U.S. scholarship, exchange, and library programs in
Arab and predominantly Muslim countries, including a
certification by the Secretary of State that such
recommendations have been implemented or if a certification
cannot be made, what steps have been taken to implement such
recommendations. This provision also directs the Comptroller
General of the United States to review the certification once
submitted.
Sec. 1433--United States policy toward Detainees. This
section restates the 9/11 Commission recommended that the
United States develop a common coalition approach toward
detention and humane treatment of captured terrorists, that
while the U.S. has passed a number of laws in this area, it
has not developed such a common coalition approach, and that
a number of U.S. allies are conducting investigations related
to treatment of detainees. It also requires a report 90 days
after enactment of the Act and 180 days thereafter on any
progress on developing such an approach, and a certification
that such an approach has been implemented or, if such
certification has not been made, the steps taken to implement
this recommendation. In addition, this provision terminates
the requirement of subsection (b) if the Secretary makes such
a certification, and requires a GAO review of the
certification.
Subtitle D--Strategy for the United States' relationship with
Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia
Sec. 1441--Afghanistan. This provision declares that it is
the policy of the United States to maintain its long-term
commitment to Afghanistan by increased assistance and the
continued deployment of United States troops in Afghanistan
and that the President shall engage aggressively with the
Government of Afghanistan and NATO to assess the success of
the Afghan December 2006 counternarcotics strategy and to
explore all additional options for addressing the narcotics
crisis in Afghanistan, including considering whether NATO
forces should change their rules of engagement regarding
counternarcotics operations. Moreover, this section declares
that the Afghanistan Freedom Support Act of 2002 should be
reauthorized and updated, and directs the President to make
every effort to dramatically increase the numbers of
United States and international police trainers, mentors,
and police personnel operating with Afghan civil security
forces and shall increase efforts to assist the Government
of Afghanistan in addressing corruption; and directs the
President to submit a report on the United States efforts
to fulfill the requirements in this subsection. This
section also authorizes such sums as may be necessary for
fiscal years 2008 and 2009 for the acquisition of
emergency energy resources, including diesel fuel, to
secure the deliver of electricity to Afghanistan.
Sec. 1442--Pakistan. This section declares that it is the
policy of the United States to work with the Government of
Pakistan to combat international terrorism, to end the use of
Pakistan as a safe haven for forces associated with the
Taliban, to establish a long-term strategic partnership with
Pakistan, to dramatically increase funding for programs of
the U.S. Agency for International Development and the
Department of State, and to work with the international
community to secure additional financial and political
support to assist the Government of Pakistan in building a
moderate, democratic state. This provision also requires the
President to submit a report on the long-term strategy of the
United States to engage with the Government of Pakistan to
address curbing the proliferation of nuclear weapons
technology, combating poverty and corruption, building
effective government institutions, promoting democracy and
the rule of law, addressing the continued presence of the
Taliban and other violent extremist forces throughout the
country, and effectively dealing with Islamic extremism. In
addition, this section prohibits the provision of United
States security assistance to Pakistan until the President
certifies that the Government of Pakistan is making all
possible efforts to prevent the Taliban from operating in
areas under its sovereign control but provides a national
security waiver to the President. The subsection includes a
sunset provision whereby the limitation of assistance will
cease to be effective once the President determines that the
Taliban cease to exist as an organization capable of
conducting military, insurgent, or terrorist activities in
Afghanistan from Pakistan. This provision also authorizes
such sums as may be necessary for assistance for Pakistan in
various different accounts, and extends waivers of foreign
assistance restrictions with respect to Pakistan through the
end of FY 2008 and includes a sense of congress that
extensions of these waivers beyond FY 2008 should be informed
by whether Pakistan makes progress in rule of law and other
democratic reforms and whether it holds a successful
parliamentary election.
Sec. 1443--Saudi Arabia. This provision states
Congressional findings that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia's
record in the fight against terrorism has been uneven and
that the United States has a national security interest in
working with the Government of Saudi Arabia to combat
international terrorists, and expresses a sense of congress
that the Government of Saudi Arabia must undertake a number
of political and economic reforms in order to more
effectively combat terrorism. This section also provides for
a number of statements of policies regarding the U.S.
relationship to Saudi Arabia, including engaging Saudi Arabia
to openly confront the issue of terrorism, to enhance
counterterrorism cooperation, and to support reform efforts
by the Government of Saudi Arabia. Finally, this provision
requires a report on the ongoing U.S.-Saudi Strategic
Dialogue and whether the Dialogue has promoted progress in
achieving the U.S. long term strategy to engage the
Government of Saudi Arabia to undertake reforms and to combat
terrorism.
Mr. KING of New York. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may
consume.
Mr. Speaker, at the outset, let me thank the gentleman from
Mississippi (Mr. Thompson), the new chairman of the Homeland Security
Committee, for the work that he did, certainly in the
[[Page H171]]
time that I was chairman of the Homeland Security Committee and he was
the ranking member.
Let me also wish him the very best as he embarks on his tenure as
chairman of the Homeland Security Committee. And even though we
certainly will have differences today and the debate will be strong at
times, I want to assure him that I share the same commitment he does. I
know that he shares the commitment that I have to work together in a
bipartisan way on the issue of Homeland Security and throughout the
next 2 years. I certainly look forward to working with him and
cooperating with him in every way that I can, and I know I speak for
the members of the committee on my side of the aisle.
Mr. Speaker, it is, to me, a very significant matter that Homeland
Security is listed as the top issue. I agree that it should be. I agree
that it is, and to that extent, I certainly commend the gentleman from
Mississippi (Mr. Thompson) for bringing forth this legislation.
However, I am extremely disappointed in the way it is being done. And
I say that not just as a matter of process or a matter of procedure,
but I say that as a person who, during the 15 months that I was the
chairman of the Homeland Security Committee, I did all I could to
ensure that every piece of legislation that came through our committee
was bipartisan from day one. Every piece of legislation went through a
complete subcommittee hearing. The Democratic minority, at the time,
were fully apprised of all that we were doing at all stages. Went to a
full committee hearing, and again, everyone was apprised of all that
was happening. It was an open book. And as a result of that, we passed
very, very significant bipartisan legislation in the most recent
Congress, the Port Security Act, chemical plant legislation, reforming
and restructuring FEMA. The interoperability legislation, which was
jointly sponsored and advanced by Mr. Reichert and Mr. Pascrell became
part of the FEMA restructuring legislation. And I say that because it
shows that, on an issue such as homeland security, we make the most
progress when we work together, and that this should not be a partisan
issue because terrorists don't care if you are Democrats, Republicans
or Independents. If we are Americans, they want to kill us. And that
has to be our guiding principle throughout this.
So I am disappointed today that such a piece of legislation, which
attempts to deal with such a vital issue in such an all-encompassing
way is going to be done without any benefit at all of going through the
committee, having committee hearings, getting testimony, of reaching
out. We, as Republicans, had no say whatsoever in this legislation.
Again, I emphasize, I can speak for the Homeland Security Committee.
That never happened during the 15 months that I was the chairman, nor
do I believe it ever happened under my predecessor, Mr. Cox.
Now, as far as the legislation today, as I said, parts of it are
disappointing. And I guess this even goes back to last week. If there
is one issue, one recommendation that the Homeland Security Committee
made was that we should centralize as much jurisdiction as possible in
one committee, rather than have such a multiplicity of committees and
subcommittees in both Houses requiring the Secretary and the assistants
and the undersecretaries to come up to the Hill to be testifying, and
also to get a much more coordinated policy. Nothing was done on that
whatsoever.
Now, the chairman pointed out that perhaps Republicans could have
done this in the past. Well, the fact is, this is a work in progress.
It was the Republican majority which set up and established, first as a
select committee for 2 years and then as a permanent committee since
January of 2005, the Committee on Homeland Security. I know in my
conversations with the leadership, it was certainly the intention to
centralize it more. Would they have? I believe they would have. If not,
I certainly would have fought to have it done because one thing I think
the former ranking member and the current chairman and I would agree
on, we saw last year what happened when you had legislation going from
one committee to the other, one committee trying to grab a small part
of it and slowing down the process.
Also, we found out how nuanced and how complicated these issues are,
and that very few of us ended up where we began. We saw, as the debate
went forward, as the hearings went forward, as the expert witnesses
came in, just how intricate these issues were and how vital they were
and how important it was not to jump ahead.
Now, the chairman mentioned, for instance, scanning 100 percent of
cargo within 3 years or most of it done within 3 years. Now, on its
face, that sounds very good. It is a good sound bite. It is good for a
100-hour scenario. But the fact is, we held extensive hearings on that.
The fact is that the legislation that was arrived at between the House
and the Senate, seeing the complexity of it, and realizing that there
is no technology in place right now that could bring that about, has
set up pilot projects around the world, and we will get a report back
on those projects with a sense of urgency and a need to implement
whatever can be implemented. But to set forth a 100-percent standard
when there is no evidence now that that can be achieved during that
time period, to me, gives a false hope to the American people, and it
is playing, to me, it is trivializing what should be the most important
issue that confronts the Nation today.
Now, also, on that and to show that our constructive criticism of
this issue is not done in a partisan way, the Washington Post today had
an editorial extremely critical of that provision in particular and the
process in general.
So with that I look forward to the debate today. As I said, I have
real problems with the process. I have certain specific problems with
parts of the legislation. But that can be all brought out in the debate
today. Unfortunately, there won't be an opportunity to offer amendments
on it. As I said, there were no committee hearings. But it is going to
be a long 2 years, long in the sense that we have a long period in
which to get a lot done. But, on the other hand, I assure Mr. Thompson
that once we get this behind us, I look forward to working with him in
as bipartisan a way as possible. And with the respect I have for him, I
think, at the end of that long 2 years, the American people will see
that we have achieved quite a bit.
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. THOMPSON of Mississippi. Mr. Speaker, I would like to assure the
ranking member that after today, and from this day forward, there will
be communication. We will work together. The jurisdictional issues that
we didn't resolve completely in the last 15 months or so, I assure you,
we will do our best to make sure that they don't come into impacting
the committee.
Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Virginia (Mr.
Moran).
Mr. MORAN of Virginia. Mr. Speaker, I thank the chairman of the
Homeland Security Committee.
Notwithstanding the remarks of the gentleman from New York (Mr.
King), the fact is that the bipartisan 9/11 Commission gave the last
Congress Fs and Ds in implementing its recommendations. This Congress
is determined to earn its As in implementing those recommendations, and
not just by inspecting the air and sea cargo but also by distributing
the funds that are available based upon risk, not just by population;
by preventing the spread of terrorism and, particularly, weapons of
mass destruction; by reducing the appeal of extremism through
international quality education and the expansion of democracy and
economic development.
But most of all, Mr. Speaker, this Congress is determined to
implement the principal recommendation of the 9/11 Commission, which
was to restore U.S. moral leadership. That is the intent of this bill.
I strongly urge support for it.
Mr. KING of New York. Mr. Speaker, I would just point out to the
gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Moran) that on the fairer funding, the
legislation which is in the bill today is exactly the legislation which
passed the previous Congress, and certainly, that part of the bill I
will support strongly.
Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Florida (Mr.
Mica).
[[Page H172]]
{time} 1315
Mr. MICA. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that the House resolve
into secret session as though pursuant to a motion by Mr. Mica, under
rule XVII, clause 9. Because there are 54 new Members of the House of
Representatives and a significant number of returning Members who have
not had access to critical classified information, it is extremely
vital to their understanding of the consequences of their vote in
regard to the impact of H.R. 1, which will affect this Nation, our
security, and pending terrorist threat.
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Murtha). Is there objection to the
request of the gentleman from Florida?
Mr. THOMPSON of Mississippi. Mr. Speaker, I object.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Objection is heard.
Mr. THOMPSON of Mississippi. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent
that the distinguished incoming chairman of Armed Services, Mr.
Skelton, be allowed to control the remainder of the time.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the gentleman from
Mississippi?
There was no objection.
Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
I thank the gentleman from Mississippi.
Mr. Speaker, during the Presidential debates of 2004, there was one
point of consensus between the two candidates that is important for us
in our debate today. In answer to the question of what is the single
most threat to the national security of the United States, both
candidates agree that nuclear proliferation and weapons of mass
destruction in the hands of terrorists was the biggest threat. This
view was shared by the 9/11 Commission, which recommended a vital
effort to prevent and counter the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction.
H.R. 1 will help put the United States much further down the path to
addressing the problem of weapons of mass destruction, proliferation,
and terrorism. It will strengthen the Cooperative Threat Reduction
program also, known as the Nunn-Lugar program, as well as the
Department of Energy's nonproliferation programs. It will strengthen
and expand the multinational Proliferation Security Initiative started
by this administration and will establish a new Coordinator for the
Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Proliferation, and
Terrorism.
The bill also establishes a new commission to follow up on the work
of the 9/11 Commission focused on the issue of weapons of mass
destruction, proliferation, and terrorism.
Specifically, the bill will repeal a set of limitations on
nonproliferation programs which threatens on an annual basis to shut
off access to program funding unless Congress or the President waives
them. It simplifies the authority to use those funds outside the
countries of the former Soviet Union when necessary and appropriate
while strengthening oversight. The bill authorizes such sums as are
necessary for these programs.
On the Proliferation Security Initiative, the bill calls upon the
President to continue and to expand it. It directs the administration
to develop and transmit to Congress a defined budget for this effort
and initiates a GAO review. The bill further authorizes the President
to use foreign assistance as an initiative to get more countries to
join.
The coordinator for the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction,
Proliferation, and Terrorism established by this bill will be a senior
aide close to the President who can give the nonproliferation programs
spread across the Federal Government the support they need and, of
course, deserve. The bill requires a comprehensive strategy to fully
use and coordinate these programs, and it calls for measurable goals
and milestones by which we can judge progress.
The commission established by this bill will build upon the excellent
work of the 9/11 Commission by examining in detail the existing
nonproliferation programs and also any new and creative ideas for
securing dangerous materials.
In addition, the commission would follow up on the work of the Baker/
Cutler Commission, which made a series of recommendations in this area
in 2001.
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. KING of New York. Mr. Speaker, I yield the remainder of my time
to the distinguished ranking member of the Foreign Affairs Committee,
the gentlelady from Florida (Ms. Ros-Lehtinen), and ask unanimous
consent that she be permitted to control that time.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the gentleman from New
York?
There was no objection.
Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may
consume.
Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from New York for yielding me the
time.
Mr. Speaker, it is truly a shame that the new Democratic leadership
has chosen to turn what was a bipartisan, carefully calibrated approach
to safeguarding our Nation's security in the aftermath of 9/11 into a
partisan political tool. This bill does have some good elements. In
fact, a big portion of the foreign policy titles in the bill mirror
what is already in law, with some minor additions or recommendations.
That said, the bill does raise concern, and it even includes drafting
errors that could have been avoided had we on the other side of the
aisle had in the committees been allowed to operate and been allowed to
contribute to the drafting, but we were not.
For example, the Nuclear Black Market section in this bill, Mr.
Speaker, is a legislative effort that I had the pleasure of working on
with the gentleman from California (Mr. Lantos) throughout the last few
years.
However, much has changed. Parts of it need revision. It needs to be
reedited and updated. But we will be unable to fix these provisions and
make these necessary corrections.
Far more troubling, Mr. Speaker, is the profound divergence between
our two parties that this legislation reveals. The divergence is
clearly most demonstrated in the provisions regarding the Proliferation
Security Initiative, known as the PSI.
Since its creation by this administration in the year 2002, the PSI
has quickly become one of this country's most valuable tools in helping
to stop the spread of weapons of mass destruction and preventing them
from falling into the hands of terrorists. Our PSI partners and others
at times have stopped the transshipment of material and equipment bound
for Iran's ballistic missiles programs and also prevented Iran from
procuring funds and the goods to support its weapons of mass
destruction programs, including its nuclear program; and it was PSI
cooperation between the U.S., the U.K., and other European partners
that began the demise of the Dr. A.Q. Khan network, an action that was
also instrumental in convincing the Libyan Government to stop its
nuclear weapons and longer-range missile programs.
Despite this success, Mr. Speaker, this legislation urges the
President to secure a resolution by the United Nations Security Council
that would authorize the PSI under international law. We have seen how
ineffective the U.N. Security Council has been in compelling Syria to
stop its support for terrorist activities in Lebanon, or at least in
keeping to its own deadlines regarding Iran's nuclear program. Giving
the United Nations the ability to define what is permissible under the
PSI will result in the imposition of unpredictable limitations,
unpredictable conditions, and unpredictable interpretations and would
result in a regulatory straightjacket overseen by the international
bureaucracy.
Frankly, Mr. Speaker, this is disturbing. I need only point out the
continuing efforts by Russia and China to hobble the efforts of the
United States at the United Nations to apply pressure to Iran to
abandon its nuclear weapons program. If this recommendation were
followed, the PSI would be undermined. The problem, however, is far
deeper than merely the threat to this vital and proven program. The
position of some of my colleagues across the aisle appears to be that
the PSI and similar efforts by the United States to defend its citizens
against terrorists and other threats require authorization under
international law by the United Nations. They believe that these so-
called
[[Page H173]]
multilateral regimes are credible substitutes for the efforts of the
United States.
We must oppose any efforts to substitute action by the U.N. and other
international organizations for those of the U.S. Government in
carrying out its fundamental responsibility to protect the American
people and advance American interests. I know that there are many of my
colleagues who are equally concerned that this proposal should be
adopted. I know their constituents will be, Mr. Speaker.
Therefore, I hope that all of our colleagues carefully think about
some of these provisions and that they put partisan politics aside when
it comes time to vote on the motion to recommit, a motion that
reaffirms a central tenet of the U.S. foreign policy, and that is that
it is the responsibility of the U.S. Government to protect the American
people. This responsibility must never be surrendered to the United
Nations or other multilateral institutions.
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from New
Jersey (Mr. Andrews), a member of the Armed Services Committee.
(Mr. ANDREWS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. ANDREWS. I thank my friend for yielding.
Mr. Speaker, colleagues, our country is living on borrowed time. A
quantity of highly enriched uranium or plutonium the size of a
grapefruit that could be put into a vehicle the size of a U-Haul truck
could result in the detonation of a nuclear weapon about the size of
that which leveled Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
Loose nuclear materials have been too loose and too free for too long
around the world. This was the first and most urgent recommendation of
the 9/11 Commission. Frankly, we have been moving at too slow of a pace
with too little of a focus and without sufficient funding to get this
problem under control.
Today's long overdue legislation is a necessary first step toward
protecting the American people against these egregious consequences.
This legislation properly focuses on the problem of loose nuclear
material, the origins of which and the whereabouts of which we do not
know. It focuses upon nuclear material that is in hands that are not
properly being secured, it focuses on nuclear materials that are being
properly secured, and it expedites the process of converting reactors
that use highly enriched uranium to reactors that would use low-
enriched uranium and, therefore, be much, much less of a risk.
For the first time, there will be a central point in the executive
branch where the diplomatic intelligence, research and development and
military responsibilities for bringing this problem under control will
be focused and centered in one place.
The job will not be done by the passage of this legislation. But for
too long we have lived on borrowed time waiting for the passage of this
legislation. I would urge my colleagues on both the majority and
minority side to vote ``yes'' and start us down the road toward solving
this egregious and urgent problem.
Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, I yield 9 minutes to the gentleman
from Florida (Mr. Mica), 5 minutes to the gentleman from Michigan (Mr.
Hoekstra), 10 minutes to the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Upton), 34
minutes to the gentleman from New York (Mr. King), and ask that each of
them be allowed to control that time.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the gentlewoman from
Florida?
There was no objection.
Mr. MICA. I thank the gentlelady for yielding me this time.
Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to come to the floor during what I consider
to be probably one of the most important issues that we will consider,
not only in this 100 hours, but in this entire session of Congress,
because this issue determines and will determine the very security, not
just the security as far as a terrorist attack on this Nation, but even
our economic security; and the actions that are taken here have great
implications.
While I believe that my good friends on the other side of the aisle
are very well intended in what they propose today, unfortunately I
believe they are misguided in what they are doing.
I have a copy of the 9/11 Commission report. I chaired for some 6
years the Aviation Subcommittee. I inherited it by fate of the good
Lord and circumstances here in Congress. I followed from the very
beginning the creation of TSA and all of the actions that we have taken
from day one in protecting this great Nation against a terrorist
attack.
{time} 1330
I have read the proposals that are brought forth here today.
Unfortunately, these proposals can result in turning in the wrong
direction at this time in our vulnerability against terrorist attack.
Let me be very frank, and I offered before, and I am sorry that the
other side did not accept it, unanimous consent requests that we
resolve into a committee for 1 hour, 1 hour of a secret session to
discuss the pending threats against this Nation and also the status of
our security systems in place to deal with those threats, and I was
denied it. As part of the record of this Congress, now, I was denied
that opportunity.
There are 54 Members who were elected, new Members, Republican and
Democrat, who have not had access to that classified information. They
will vote in a few hours on turning the direction of the system that we
have put in place and a system we are trying to make work to protect us
against a terrorist attack, and we have been denied the opportunity for
1 hour in closed session, with no cameras, no public, but the
classified reports.
Mr. Speaker, I am going to ask that the titles of each of the
classified reports that now are in possession of the Transportation
Committee be included in this part of the Record.
DHS OIG FINAL PENETRATION TEST RESULTS--March 30, 2004
______
AUDIT OF PASSENGER AND BAGGAGE SCREENING PROCEDURES AT DOMESTIC
AIRPORTS
______
AUDIT OF PASSENGER AND BAGGAGE SCREENING PROCEDURES AT DOMESTIC
AIRPORTS
______
FOLLOW-UP AUDIT OF PASSENGER AND BAGGAGE SCREENING PROCEDURES AT
DOMESTIC AIRPORTS (UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY)
______
FOLLOW-UP AUDIT OF PASSENGER AND BAGGAGE SCREENING PROCEDURES AT
DOMESTIC AIRPORTS (U)
______
AIRPORT PASSENGER SCREENING--PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS ON PROGRESS MADE
AND CHALLENGES REMAINING
______
BRIEFING TO THE CHAIRMAN, AVIATION SUBCOMMITTEE--HOUSE COMMITTEE ON
TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE--March 31, 2004
______
AVIATION SECURITY--SYSTEMATIC PLANNING NEEDED TO OPTIMIZE THE
DEPLOYMENT OF CHECKED BAGGAGE SCREENING SYSTEMS
______
AVIATION SECURITY--SCREENER TRAINING AND PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT
STRENGTHENED, BUT MORE WORK REMAINS
______
We have tried to make this work, and the good Lord and some efforts
on behalf of many people, maybe just sheer fate, have brought us to
this day and not being attacked. And last week on Thursday when I gave
up that responsibility of chairing Aviation, a great mantle came off my
shoulders, but I am telling you that you are headed in the wrong
direction today. We have a very fragile system of security,
particularly aviation security.
Now you come forth with recommendations. One recommendation dealing
with cargo security is not a recommendation in this 9/11 Report. I defy
anyone to find it. So what you are doing is taking our limited
resources that protect us and putting them in an area that does not
protect us.
We have had problems with TSA, yes. I have had four TSA
administrators in 5 years. That is a problem with TSA. We have a system
out there that screens passengers as they come through. And there are
some improvements, I must say, that you have provided in this, but they
are not the improvements we need. And now we are
[[Page H174]]
telling TSA, an agency across the Potomac here in Washington to head in
another direction.
We have taken the money for research and development that was first
authorized, we put it in the original TSA bill, $50 million, half of it
was taken by a Senator for a pet project. The next year $75 million,
this Congress failed to act, and $63 million was spent on salary
instead of research and development for the technology to protect us.
So here we go off in another direction on a recommendation I defy
anyone to find in here.
Another point here, and it is nice to throw your friends a bone but
this is not the time to do it. I am telling you, I am very serious
about this, folks, and listen to this. These words will be repeated
because this Nation is at risk, and you won't take 1 hour to even
listen to what that risk is or address that risk and what you are going
to do.
Nowhere in this 9/11 Commission does it say that we should give
collective bargaining rights to airport screeners, to TSA screener
personnel. Nowhere. We had a bipartisanship agreement when we created
TSA that we wouldn't do that and put us at risk, that we needed to move
people around, that we needed to fire people when we needed to do that.
This is taking big government; we have 43,000 screeners, 43,000
screeners, it is taking big government and it is doing the worst thing
we could possibly do is making it entrenched in big government.
We need to replace those people with technology. Here is the report:
78 percent of the personnel could be replaced that now conduct checked
baggage screening. You go to the airport, you check your bags. Check
your bags. The failure rate of that system that was forced into place,
I tried to get us to opt for technology; instead, we spent some $20
billion so far on this system that is reliant on people, human beings
who fail. We could save 78 percent of the personnel costs. There are
16,800 people checking those bags by hand. I visited some 50 airports
during August and September, and I am telling you, the system is
flawed. And you are changing now to a recommendation that isn't even in
this report? You are taking a big bureaucracy and making it an
entrenched bureaucracy? You are putting us at risk.
This isn't a game, a political game where we score a few points and
tell people we are doing something. This is about our women and
children, our wives and mothers and our loved ones being put on
aircraft and not having a secure system in place, and we aren't doing
that with these proposals.
So maybe I am a little bit too emotional on this subject, maybe I
have been too involved in this subject; but I am telling you for the
sake of this country and our security. And many of the Members here
have not had the opportunity to sit down and look at those classified
reports. When this report was written, liquid bombs, liquid explosives,
does it appear anywhere in here? The terrorists that we deal with now,
is it addressed anywhere here? I need to have these points in the
Record because this deals with our national security. And I am telling
you, and mark my words on this day, that our terrorist-hatred folks
know what is going on. They have tested the system, they test the
system, and they scope the system and they see these flaws, and they
would have to be laughing to see us change our resources to go in
another direction and put us at risk today.
Again, there are some good things in here. We have right now about a
dozen airports with in-line high-tech systems. One of the them is the
Speaker, Ms. Pelosi's, airport. It is the safest airport in the world.
It has private screeners, and it has automated in-line high-tech
equipment. Its capacity to find and detect threats is almost flawless.
That is the model that we need; instead, we have about a dozen
airports. Unfortunately, it will be 20 years at the current rate in
which you propose to protect us with even that basic protection.
Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Speaker, may I inquire how much time is remaining
for each side, please.
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Murtha). The gentleman from Missouri has
77\1/2\ minutes, and the gentlewoman from Florida has 69 minutes
remaining.
Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Speaker, in order to respond, I will yield 30
seconds to the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Pascrell).
Mr. PASCRELL. Mr. Speaker, I thank my good friend from Florida. Much
of what you say is correct. But I have to refer you to the 9/11 report
in the final recommendations: 9/11 public discourse project grades,
checked bag and cargo screening, D. And it says in the report, in the
final report, that improvements have not been made a priority by the
Congress or the administration.
It is about time. And while the terrorists may know or they may not
know, we have to do what we have to do, and we have to do it based upon
the record.
The 9/11 recommendations are very clear, Mr. Speaker. The 9/11
Commission is in black and white right here, says it right here,
received a D, and that is not acceptable to us.
Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 30 seconds.
My friend and colleague, the gentlewoman from Florida, reminds me of
a law school professor who would say when someone gave a fuzzy answer,
Well, read it. What does it say? And in looking at our resolution
regarding the issue she raises about U.N. resolution encourages the
administration to work to expand and formalize the PSI into a multi-
national regime, and let me quote for my friend from Florida, ``to
increase coordination, cooperation, and compliance among its
participating States in interdiction activities.''
Mr. Speaker, I yield at this time 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from
California.
Mrs. TAUSCHER. Mr. Speaker, I thank the chairman of the House Armed
Services Committee for yielding time.
Mr. Speaker I rise in strong support of the 9/11 Commission
Recommendations Act of 2007. Congress has reformed the intelligence
community to better identify global threats and defend the United
States, but for too long we have had a gaping hole in our security,
eliminating the threat of weapons of mass destruction. And for too long
the Bush administration and their congressional allies have left
nonproliferation on the back burner. The bill before us today provides
the tools we need to fight the threat of the world's most dangerous
weapons. In the last Congress, I introduced the 9/11 Commission
Combating Proliferation Implementation Act along with my colleagues
John Spratt and Marty Meehan.
The essential provision of our bill contained also in the bill before
us today creates a coordinator for the prevention of weapons of mass
destruction proliferation within the White House. The coordinator would
also have both the budget authority over all nonproliferation programs
and would also be responsible for designing and implementing a
strategic plan to address the current threat levels posed by weapons of
mass destruction.
Currently, nonproliferation efforts are overseen by the Departments
of Energy, Defense, and State. While they all have had some success,
these three large agencies are not guided by an overall plan or
supported by a single individual who has the ability to ensure
accountability. Because of the lack of high-level attention and
leadership, some programs have either lapsed or been burdened with
unrelated restrictions. Such a coordinating function has been
recommended several times, including in the 1999 Deutsche Commission,
to access the organization of the Federal Government to combat the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
As the 9/11 Commission warned: ``The greatest danger of another
catastrophic attack in the United States will materialize if the
world's most dangerous terrorists acquire the world's most dangerous
weapons.''
We know the threat; now we have to act. I urge my colleagues to join
me in support of this bill.
Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 2 minutes to the
gentleman from Alaska (Mr. Young), a former chairman of the Committee
on Transportation and an expert in that field.
(Mr. YOUNG of Alaska asked and was given permission to revise and
extend his remarks.)
Mr. YOUNG of Alaska. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentlelady for
yielding.
My colleagues and Mr. and Mrs. America, this is primarily a political
[[Page H175]]
gesture without a great deal of result, and that is unfortunate. The
hearings are necessary, especially in cargo screening. It has been
shown to us that the cargo screening port security cannot occur within
our ports themselves without total cooperation from the overseas
shippers to the United States.
What we are asking in this bill is expenditure of huge dollars for
really window dressing and not results. As the gentleman from Florida
said, we are not really in this legislation as being proposed giving us
any more security. We are expending dollars in the billions in the
airports, and it will be in the billions in the ports and the waterways
of our Nation. And the direct result will be, and keep this in mind,
Mr. and Mrs. America, a direct cost to you without any security. Every
product, everything you pick up that is imported to the United States
will add an additional cost, and it may make us noncompetitive. There
are other ports within our hemisphere that will be accepting without
the security that is being offered in this bill within our ports the
cargo that should be coming through our ports employing our people.
If you want true security, it will be done at the origin of shipping
to the United States, and that is where we should be putting our
efforts, not a charade of saying we are going to have our ports secure
because we are going to put millions of dollars, billions, into the
screening of everyone who works in the ports and setting up an
artificial barricade of security.
There is an old saying: If you want a secure area, don't let anybody
know how you secured it. What this proposal says is: national standards
shall be set, and thus you shall be secure. But if I am the bad guy, I
will figure around it to do good damage, bad damage to you, good damage
to me. I ask you to reconsider and let's go back to the hearing process
and do this job right.
Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from
Washington (Mr. Larsen).
{time} 1345
Mr. LARSEN of Washington. Mr. Speaker, I thank the chairman of the
House Armed Services Committee for yielding time.
I rise today in support of fully implementing the September 11
Commission recommendations. As a member of the House Armed Services
Committee, I can say that this bill creates a new foundation of
security here at home by protecting our borders, our infrastructure and
our freedoms. This legislation also plays an equally important role by
reenergizing our engagement abroad and creating a new foundation for
security in the international arena. These provisions, particularly
those dealing with the prevention of proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction, are what I would like to discuss today.
We will not be safe here at home as long as the worst weapons can
fall into the worst hands. Citizens around the world will not be safe
unless responsible nations work together to locate, secure and destroy
global nuclear stockpiles. Today we are rightfully strengthening the
leadership of the United States in these important areas.
The time for us to fully engage in the nonproliferation and counter
proliferation arenas is long overdue. This bill dramatically
strengthens the nonproliferation regime by both strengthening the best
programs of the last decade and creating a new coordination and
sanctions mechanism that will strengthen the nonproliferation mission
for the future. I am particularly pleased with the provisions that will
strengthen the Proliferation Security Initiative, or PSI, and the
Cooperative Threat Reduction Initiative, CTRI.
With the involvement of approximately 70 nations, PSI has become the
primary platform that allows us to work with our allies to search
planes and ships carrying suspect cargo and to seize illegal weapons or
missile technologies.
Unfortunately, until now, the future of this successful program was
uncertain. Without a dedicated funding source and without integration
into international law, this critical program could falter without
proper administration support. This legislation works to secure the
future of PSI by integrating it into both international law and to our
own budget process.
And, finally, this bill provides Congress with the ability to fully
support CTRI programs that are geared to lock up nuclear weapons and
nuclear materials around the world. By lifting funding limitations and
encouraging the program's expansion, this bill shows the world that our
Nation, the United States, will strengthen its role as the global
leader in combating proliferation.
Mr. UPTON. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 6 minutes.
Mr. Speaker, time moves on, but before some of us begin pretending
that we are legislating on a blank slate when it comes to 9/11, I am
going to take this moment in my time to remind everyone of the good
work that was indeed accomplished over the last 2 years. In fact, we
are also standing on the shoulders of giants who, in the face of the
tragic events of 9/11, actually took action to make this Nation a safer
place.
Congress's first responders were both Republicans and Democrats, and
some of them were here just last session writing laws to protect
America. America's firefighters, police officers, ambulance crews, the
ones who received $1 billion, ``B'' as in big, to help save American
lives surely haven't forgotten about Congress's efforts, and neither
should we.
The issue of our Nation's own security is too important to play
politics with. And while some on the other side perhaps would prefer to
give the impression that Congress has done little, nothing could be
further from the truth.
I am proud of what was accomplished and what we can do more. Indeed,
we succeeded in enacting within the Energy and Commerce Committee's
jurisdiction a number of provisions improving public safety
communications. For example, the digital television provisions of the
Deficit Reduction Act cleared 24 megahertz of spectrum in every market
in the Nation exclusively for use by its first responders.
The interoperable communications provisions provided in the Deficit
Reduction Act did not merely authorize funding but made $1 billion in
direct spending available for equipment to enable first responders to
more effectively communicate with each other in times of disaster.
The Call Home Act accelerated to September 30 of this year the
deadline for distribution of that $1 billion for interoperable
communications.
The Warning, Alert and Response Network, WARN Act, created a
framework through which wireless communication providers can transmit
emergency alerts to the public on a national, regional or local basis
and required that the Federal Communications Commission adopt technical
standards for that alert system.
The national alert provisions of the Deficit Reduction Act made $156
million in direct spending available for use with the national alert
system created under the WARN Act.
The E911 provisions of the Deficit Reduction Act made another $43
million in direct spending available to implement the Enhance 911 Act
of 2004, which provides grants to upgrade existing 911 systems for
advanced capabilities.
The Department of Homeland Security appropriations legislation
created an Office of Emergency Communications within the Energy and
Commerce Committee's oversight. That office is directed to develop a
national emergency communication plan and to report on the
communications capabilities and needs of emergency response providers
and relevant government officials.
These are all critical items that we have already enacted into law
over the last 2 years, better preparing our Nation to respond to
natural or manmade disasters.
From my own leadership spot as chairman of the Telecommunications and
Internet Subcommittee, I seized on one particular recommendation
offered by the 9/11 Commission. I wanted to help our first responders,
and I am proud of the work that we did on a very strong bipartisan
basis. First of all, we provided a slice of the spectrum for the first
responders, 24 megahertz, and we saw that with Katrina as well, that
our first responders in New York couldn't get the signal to evacuate
the building. We saw that our folks helping folks in Katrina couldn't
communicate between
[[Page H176]]
the Coast Guard helicopter and the sheriff boat down below. That is
going to change because we are going to give some of the responders
some of that spectrum.
Second, we know that the cost for this equipment is enormously high.
We provided $1 billion in the Upton amendment, which I helped shepherd
through our committee and through the conference, to provide the means
for our first responders so that they could purchase the equipment. It
was done. The President signed it into law.
As much as we would like to say that this could be effective today,
January 8, 2007, we cannot do that. First of all, we have to get the
spectrum. That means we have to retrieve it from those that are using
it, in this case, the broadcasters. They have to make the transition
from analog to digital. A lot of them have done that, but it is more
than $1 million often for some of these stations. We also have to think
about the consumers, the millions of Americans who do not have a
digital TV set. They can't receive the signal unless they have got that
converter box. They aren't made yet. We have a transition for that to
happen.
At the end of the day, we set a date, a hard date, when that all
would happen, February of 2009. There were many that took us on that
didn't want a hard date. They wanted to extend forever and a day,
perhaps. In fact, there were amendments offered to delay the date even
further. I would like to say that, at least on our side of the aisle,
we opposed every one of those amendments to extend the deadline, and
thank goodness we were successful because that date is now set. We had
to work and negotiate with the Senate, with ourselves, but it is now
set. It is a good thing.
We have an unmistakable record of results. Let us work together and
build on them.
Mr. Speaker, at this time I yield 2 minutes to my colleague on the
Energy and Commerce Committee, the honorable gentleman from Illinois
(Mr. Shimkus), a very valuable member of our subcommittee as we helped
shepherd this legislation.
(Mr. SHIMKUS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. SHIMKUS. Mr. Speaker, the gentleman from Michigan outlined
crucial actions we took in the last Congress to improve the use of
telecommunications technologies, and I appreciate those efforts,
especially as co-Chair of the E911 caucus. But our work for Homeland
Security was not confined to the telecommunications arena.
One of the most important issues Congress faced last year was
creating a program in the Department of Homeland Security to protect
chemical facilities from terrorist attacks. The challenge was to ensure
that our Nation's chemical plants could appropriately secure their
facilities by providing technical guidance and oversight by the
Department of Homeland Security but without being overzealous and
allowing DHS to take over the daily management of these facilities.
We needed to prevent terrorists from using our domestic disclosure
laws from obtaining roadmaps to our chemical plants' vulnerabilities.
Congress also clarified the distinct reach of existing environmental
and public health laws versus homeland security and chemical plant
securities.
While the more conscientious members of the American chemical
industry already had a head start on Congress by developing rigorous
security standards on their own, Congress has now ensured that good
security standards govern all significant chemical players, not just
the conscientious leaders.
DHS's chemical security program is not about using the threat of
terrorism as an excuse to drive American chemical factories offshore.
Its purpose is just the opposite: to make certain that chemical
facilities continue to be safe for these workers and communities, to
ensure the viability of employment in the chemical industry for
American workers, and to guarantee that all Americans can continue to
enjoy the benefits of these plant products.
As Chairman Barton said last year, America does not become safer with
greater levels of regulation. It just becomes more regulated.
DHS has recently proposed regulations to carry out this new chemical
plant security authority, and those regulations closely follow
Congress's intent in hammering out the compromise.
I look forward to working with the Department to ensure that the
program gets underway and measures up to the task that Congress gave it
in the Fiscal Year 2007 Homeland Security Appropriations Act.
Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Speaker, I yield 30 seconds to the gentleman from
New York (Mr. Nadler).
Mr. NADLER. Mr. Speaker, a few moments ago, the former chairman of
the Transportation and Infrastructure Committee, Mr. Young of Alaska,
was excoriating this side of the aisle and saying that our provisions
in this bill for 100 percent scanning of containers were impractical
and couldn't be done. I would simply point out that the provision in
this bill is word for word the same as the provision that was
negotiated by Mr. Oberstar and me with Mr. Young and Mr. LoBiondo and
included in the bill in the Transportation and Infrastructure Committee
last year by unanimous vote, supported by Mr. Young and Mr. LoBiondo,
who thought it was very practical last year.
It is not impractical this year if it was practical last year.
Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman
from South Carolina (Mr. Spratt).
Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding.
Mr. Speaker, this is a good bill, long past due, but a good bill in
many respects, particularly in the application of this bill to the
nonproliferation of nuclear materials and nuclear weapons and weapons
of mass destruction.
In the debates, Presidential debates, between President Bush and
Senator Kerry, there was one subject on which both candidates found
common ground: They both agreed that the gravest threat to the United
States is terrorists armed with nuclear weapons or crude radiological
weapons. That may be the gravest threat facing us, but you wouldn't
know it from the application of resources in the Defense budget today.
The 9/11 Commission, looking at what we have done, gave us a ``D,'' a
``D,'' on efforts to restrict access to weapons of mass destruction,
particularly nuclear weapons. There are tons of weapons-grade plutonium
and enriched uranium scattered about the world. For example, under the
Atoms for Peace program, enriched uranium was leased or lent to
countries around the world to be used in their research programs. Much
of that nuclear material, some of it fissile, is loosely secured, some
by no more than a chain link fence and a junkyard.
Graham Allison, who was the dean at the Kennedy School at Harvard,
wrote a book about this subject and entitled it ``Preventable
Catastrophe'' as if to emphasize, on one hand, the dire threat and, on
the other hand, the fact that we are not necessarily doomed to this
fate. The first thing he recommended is, we have got to keep nuclear
materials secure and away from the reach of terrorists and rogue
states.
This bill assembles the best of various bills and amendments that we
have debated in committee, sometimes on the floor and in conference,
occasionally with success, more often than not for one reason because
we haven't been able to get all of our members out of the Rules
Committee. But here in a nutshell is what we would do: Set up a
director for nonproliferation, we need somebody who can direct this
effort, oversee it, seek the funding for it and fight for it; speed up
the removal of nuclear research materials or, where they can't be
removed, enhance their security; expand the so-called Proliferation
Security Initiative, by which the United States can seize nuclear
materials on the high seas outside the United States and coordinate
such interdiction with other countries; and expand the so-called
Cooperative Threat Reduction program, better known as Nunn-Lugar. In
cost-benefit terms, this may be the best money we have spent.
{time} 1400
To date, we have deactivated 6,000 warheads, 500 ICBMs, 400 ICBM
silos.
Mr. UPTON. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from the
great State of Pennsylvania (Mr. Shuster).
Mr. SHUSTER. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to address the first responder
[[Page H177]]
and emergency management reforms in this 9/11 bill.
As the past chairman of the emergency management subcommittee, I am
very familiar with first responder reforms we enacted since the
September 11 attacks.
While there are some improvements in this bill, the major 9/11
reforms were made under Republican leadership. Since 9/11, we have
provided over $15 billion to prepare State and local first responders.
We increased funding for Fire Grants and created the SAFER grant
program for hiring firefighters. We also created a billion dollar grant
program for emergency communications.
Unlike the unfunded authorization in the Democrats' bill, Republican
leadership provided real money. But we have done much more than simply
throw money at first responders. We also enacted a comprehensive reform
bill that rebuilds FEMA's capabilities and establishes a truly national
preparedness system. We gave FEMA the authority and the tools they need
to manage all disasters. We strengthened FEMA's regions, response
teams, logistics, and communications capabilities. We established a
national preparedness goal and set clear preparedness standards for
State and local governments to coordinate their resources and focus on
their highest risk priorities.
We established a national incident command system so that all levels
of government can integrate their forces in a disaster. We created a
comprehensive training and exercise program so first responders will be
ready when the next big disaster strikes. And we created a
comprehensive assessment and lessons-learned program so that first
responders won't make the same mistakes again.
Unlike the bill before us, we made these reforms through a series of
committee hearings and markups with bipartisan support. While the press
releases are going to claim that this bill implements all of 9/11
Commission recommendations, the reality is that the vast majority of
legislative changes were made under Republican leadership.
This is no more than window dressing. It is not good policy; it is
politics.
Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Speaker, for the very first time for the gentleman
from Pennsylvania to address this body, I yield 2 minutes to Mr.
Sestak.
Mr. SESTAK. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support of this bill, H.R.
1.
If 9/11 taught us anything, it is that the leadership we most need in
this Nation today is not a leadership to lead us out of a crisis, but
rather a leadership that prevents such crises from ever happening.
Today is about offering such leadership. As a Nation, we have been
fortunate to have wars away from our shore, ``over there.'' But after
9/11, we saw that we now face a war here at home. And 2\1/2\ years ago
a bipartisan commission provided 41 recommendations to prevent another
attack on U.S. home soil.
Few argue that the commission's recommendations are wrong. But so far
their implementation generally rates Fs, Ds and incompletes. And so
this legislation ensures that we will win at home by having a homeland
defense that says to our adversaries, Today is not your day.
I had the honor while serving in the military of leading our youth in
harm's way overseas. But 5 days ago, I became responsible for a new set
of citizens, the constituents of my district. When I think about how to
serve them best, and to turn their hopes into accomplishment, our
foremost duty is to provide for their security this time here at home.
Our Nation needs the tools to be secure: training that can prevent a
crisis and first responders with seamless communications among Federal,
State, and local levels.
Today as we debate, we are reminded of what John F. Kennedy once
said: ``The hour is late, but the agenda is long,'' which is why we
must act now to implement these long overdue recommendations.
So as we look at ourselves in the national mirror and say we are
better than this, we can and we must change for a more secure America.
We then can look our constituents in the eyes, Mr. Speaker, knowing
that we did turn their hope into accomplishment here at home. I urge my
colleagues to support this resolution.
Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 4\1/2\ minutes
to the gentleman from California (Mr. Royce), who is an expert on
fighting international terrorism.
Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentlelady for yielding me this
time.
I must confess, I do not understand the compulsion to integrate PSI
into international law under the United Nations. I share my ranking
member's concern with the fact that weakening the Proliferation
Security Initiative is going to have grave consequences for the
security of this country. And it is going to have grave consequences
for the administration's ability to interdict weapons of mass
destruction material. This needlessly empowers the United Nations to
weaken our hand.
Right now the Proliferation Security Initiative is a Bush
administration multilateral initiative aimed at stopping the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, interdicting those
weapons of mass destruction on cargo, whether on land or in the air or
at sea. It has been around since 2003. It is an aggressive response
crafted by then-Under Secretary of Arms Control John Bolton, and it
checks increasingly sophisticated proliferators.
As the proliferation subcommittee I chaired in the last Congress
heard in hearings, PSI has produced results. It has served as a strong
deterrent to would-be proliferators, most recently conducting a joint
exercise in the Persian Gulf where Iran menaces. PSI cooperation has
stopped the transshipment of material and equipment bound for ballistic
missile programs in countries of concern, including Iran. It has had a
dozen successes, and it was critical in uncovering Libya's WMD program
and the A.Q. Khan proliferation network in 2003 in Pakistan.
The key to PSI is its flexibility. The key is the ability to
cooperate with other countries on a moment's notice. That is something
that an organization like the United Nations inherently cannot do. Yet
this bill before us instructs the President to pursue a U.N. Security
Council resolution to authorize the PSI under international law.
Putting a successful multilateral program up to a Chinese veto strikes
me as weakening PSI rather than strengthening it, as is called for by
the 9/11 Commission.
In 2005, then-Secretary Kofi Annan endorsed PSI as is, with no call
for a Security Council resolution. By keeping PSI flexible, it avoids
the lowest-common-denominator approach that U.N.-centered initiatives
inevitably take. If the majority really wanted to bolster PSI, the
other body should have kept its key champion, Ambassador Bolton, in
place at the United Nations.
Now, as for the legislation to authorize the President to establish
an International Arab and Muslim Youth Opportunity Fund to be located
as a separate fund in Treasury or through the international
organization or financial organization, naming UNESCO or the U.N.
Development Program as possibilities, why would we locate this fund in
UNESCO or UNDP, which would surely distort its goals and mismanage its
resources?
The UNDP in 2005, as Israel was withdrawing from the Gaza Strip,
financed the Palestinian Authority's production of propaganda
materials, banners, bumper stickers and T-shirts bearing the slogan:
``Today Gaza, Tomorrow the West Bank and Jerusalem.'' This rightly led
to protests from U.S. Representative John Bolton, who rightly called
this funding inappropriate and unacceptable.
And then there is the UNDP's long record of hostility toward economic
freedom. Has anyone thought through this fund? I do not think this fund
was thought through, and I think a chance to go through the committee
process would have allowed us the opportunity to raise these serious
concerns.
Nor do I understand, frankly, the compulsion to give the United
Nations this input and this ability to have the Security Council veto
the authority we right now have in order to effectively use our
Proliferation Security Initiative on the high seas.
Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Texas
(Mr. Doggett).
Mr. DOGGETT. Mr. Speaker, from the beginning, this Administration
obstructed independent review of the 9/11 tragedy. But for the courage
of the 9/11 families, we wouldn't have any recommendations to consider
here.
[[Page H178]]
We are not now moving ``too quickly'' by finally enacting
recommendations in 2007 that were issued in 2004 about a tragedy that
occurred in 2001.
Just as with the deepening quagmire in the Iraq civil war and the
aftermath of the Hurricane Katrina debacle, this Administration wastes
precious time and squanders precious dollars.
Many of those, who, by their neglect, have earned failing grades from
the independent 9/11 Commission, continue rejecting this long-overdue
legislation to make our families safer here at home, while at the same
time they urge us to engage in more misadventure abroad.
Security in our homes, at our borders, and in our air and seaports
must be given a top priority.
Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Speaker, I yield the balance of our time on this
side to the chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee, the gentleman
from California (Mr. Lantos), and I ask unanimous consent that he be
allowed to control the balance of the time.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the
gentleman from Missouri?
There was no objection.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from California (Mr. Lantos)
is recognized for 66\1/2\ minutes.
Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Speaker, we have a solemn commitment to those who lost their
lives in the 9/11 attacks, to the people who lived through those brutal
events, and to all of their loved ones. Honoring this commitment will
help spare others in our country from enduring similar pain and loss.
It is the right and responsible thing to do.
We need to apply the lessons learned from September 11, 2001,
including the recommendations of the bipartisan 9/11 Commission.
Mr. Speaker, until now we in the Congress have only partially met our
responsibility to assure that these recommendations are fully
implemented.
Today on this floor we are adopting the rest of those recommendations
as we promised. As the 9/11 Commission recognized, the struggle between
the forces of tolerance and pluralism and the forces of nihilism and
destruction is not confined to a single dimension. It is a war of ideas
as well as a war of arms. It is a challenge of diplomacy and
development as well as one of intelligence and ideology. Our bill
recognizes this fact in a number of ways.
It includes the commission's recommendation to establish an
International Arab and Muslim Youth Opportunity Fund to help expand,
improve, and modernize the public education system in the Muslim world,
an idea whose time surely has come.
Our legislation directs the Secretary of State to develop a 5-year
country-by-country strategy of promoting democracy, the rule of law,
sustainable development, private sector growth, and open economic
systems. This provision will focus on building democratic institutions
and not focus on elections alone.
We are establishing a Middle East Foundation in order to facilitate
the delivery of assistance to our friends in the region who are
involved in civil society, to increase political participation and to
foster independent media. We have sought to follow the commission's
advice to restore the moral leadership of the United States by
increasing our public diplomacy efforts, including the expansion of
U.S. scholarship, exchange, and library programs in the Muslim world.
{time} 1415
Mr. Speaker, the treatment of detainees in the war on terrorism has
undermined our national security. It has eroded our moral standing in
the world and made it more difficult for the intelligence services of
our friends and allies to work closely with us. Our bill will provide
additional review over what the administration has done to create a
common coalition approach on all these matters.
Mr. Speaker, our bill also addresses U.S. policy towards three
countries whose role is critical in the war on terrorism: Afghanistan,
Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. It reaffirms our commitment to a stable and
democratic Afghanistan so that no future terrorist acts may be launched
from that country, it provides that the United States must work with
Pakistan to end the use of its territory as a safe haven for Taliban
and al Qaeda, and it provides us additional oversight tools over our
relationship with Saudi Arabia.
Our legislation, Mr. Speaker, strengthens our efforts to keep nuclear
weapons out of the hands of terrorists. It addresses the emergence of a
black market in nuclear technology that has facilitated the development
of nuclear programs in Iran, North Korea, Libya and elsewhere. Our
legislation provides for sanctions against individuals and corporations
which deal in this illegal trade in nuclear materials and technology.
It will help us determine which countries are allowing such black
markets to operate from their territories.
Our legislation makes significant improvements in the effectiveness
of U.S. nonproliferation programs. Our bill removes all impediments to
securing and eliminating so-called ``loose nukes'' and the dangerous
nuclear material that terrorists could use one day against us.
Mr. Speaker, this is a comprehensive package that has been supported
by members of the 9/11 Commission. It is not the end of our work of
protecting our Nation's security, requiring constant vigilance by this
Congress.
I encourage all of our colleagues to look around this Chamber as we
conduct this debate. If not for the heroism of a dedicated handful of
Americans, this building, this Chamber and this shining monument to
democracy might well have been reduced to ashes on September 11, 2001.
We have a commitment to ensure that the lessons of that day are a
permanent part of their legacy.
Mr. Speaker, I yield the balance of my time to the gentleman from New
York (Mr. Ackerman), the chairman select of the Middle East and South
Asia Subcommittee, and I ask unanimous consent that he control the
balance of our time.
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Murtha). Is there objection to the
request of the gentleman from California?
There was no objection.
Mr. ACKERMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Speaker, I want to compliment the Chairs, particularly my friend,
the distinguished gentleman from California, for their hard work on
this legislation. This bill was not easy in getting ready, given its
size and scope, and the House owes all its thanks.
It is entirely proper that the first bill of this 110th Congress,
H.R. 1, be focused on the implementation of the 9/11 Commission Report.
Under the previous majority and under the leadership of the current
administration, America's common defense has been shortsighted,
irresponsible, poorly conceived and incompetently executed. There can
scarcely be any argument that our Nation's reputation is in tatters;
our finances are in disarray; our alliances are in poor repair; our
deterrent posture has been weakened; and our Armed Forces have been
overextended and are nearing exhaustion.
The Bush administration and the Republican Congress of the past have
combined, through a posture of belligerence and torpor, arrogance and
ineptitude, to make America less free, less strong and less safe. From
the party that has claimed ``peace through strength'' as its guiding
principle, we have unfortunately come to discover that ``war with
weakness'' has been their governing practice.
But a new day has dawned, and I am proud, Mr. Speaker, that we have
turned our attention so readily in this new Congress to cleaning up the
mess that has been made of our national security.
We all know that hindsight offers almost perfect vision. But the
great and bitter irony, indeed the great tragedy of the past 2 years,
is that, in contrast to the confused and inept policy the Bush
administration has pursued and that the previous Congress rubber
stamped, there was and there is a readily available, easily implemented
strategy waiting on the shelf.
From July 22, 2004, onward, a clear and compelling strategy for the
struggle against the radical Islamic terrorists who attacked our Nation
on September 11th has been waiting for us, shamefully gathering dust.
It is a bipartisan strategy. It is a thoughtful and insightful
strategy. And most significantly, it actually is a strategy. It is an
actual and realistic plan for applying all the tools of national power
[[Page H179]]
to achieve our national interests and protect our Nation from further
attack.
It does not depend on the metaphysical power of the word ``freedom''
to transform cultures or dissolve ancient hatreds. It does not assume
that elections are great sociological Band-Aids that will make
everything all better; and it is not faith-based. It is not a policy
which we simply announce and then hope and pray that it works.
It is a strategy that recognizes that our enemies are dangerous, but
they are also vulnerable. It is a strategy that sees the difference
between great nations with powerful industrial economies, and a league
of violent religious zealots living in caves and on the margins of
society. Our enemies are not all powerful, and it is about time that we
stop trying to terrify the public in order to justify and excuse bad
policy and infringements upon our civil rights.
We need to remember that whatever chaos, murder and destruction al
Qaeda's leadership and the global jihadi movement have perpetrated, in
truth they are not great leaders and theirs is not a great movement.
They are dangerous, for sure, but they are also failures. Virtually
every success the jihadist have celebrated since 9/11 have actually
been the work of our own badly guided hands.
What have they marked as signs of progress? Is the civil war in Iraq
the result of their unstoppable juggernaut of chaos or our recklessness
in tearing down the structures of law and order and our
incomprehensible unwillingness to match forces to the mission? Is the
collapse of security in Afghanistan the outcome of their mighty
offensive or our unconscionable passivity and penny-pinching? Is the
rise in violence in the Arab-Israeli conflict the product of their
clever tactics or our idiotic disengagement? And is the decline of our
reputation and prestige a consequence of their brilliant public
relations strategy or our fixed determination to treat Arab and Muslim
public opinion as irrelevant?
The truth is that our enemies face enormous handicaps. Their goals
and methods are broadly considered illegitimate, even in the countries
we have most alienated. Our enemies can destroy, but they cannot
create. They can impose, but they cannot inspire. Their vision of the
future is, in fact, utterly unpalatable to the great mass of their own
desired audience. Indeed, the grandiosity of their vision for a revived
caliphate generally inspires mockery and scorn, not support or
adherence.
Our enemies are a few thousand lunatics who want to put the entire
world in a straitjacket of 12th century Islamic law who shouldn't be
hard to defeat in a public relations war. If our situation wasn't so
tragic and dire, it would be hysterically funny. If it were a movie, it
would be ``The Jihadi Mouse that Roared.''
More than 5 years after 9/11, it is about time we put in place a
strategy that takes the threat as seriously as it deserves but doesn't
wrap our Nation around the twin axles of fear and ignorance. And just
because our military is readily available and highly effective doesn't
make it the right tool for every job.
The 9/11 Commission Report was explicit about the significance of the
foreign policy components of an effective national counter terrorism
strategy. Sadly, the Bush administration and previous Congress thought
little of this advice. Public diplomacy was equated with campaign-style
spin and flavor-of-the-month diplomatic initiatives designed to address
American critics but not Arab or Muslim public opinion.
This bill takes a different tact. Instead of broadcasting our
inability to steer events, this legislation will strengthen our ability
to create like-minded allies. Instead of alternately yelling at Arab
governments and giving them cash anyway, this legislation sets in
motion efforts to strengthen our allies at the roots of their
societies. Instead of sweeping bad behavior by allies under the carpet,
this bill demands that the administration come clean about what has
been happening in the key regions and what the United States has done
in response.
There is more that must be done to right our policy in the Arab and
Muslim world, and as a member of the Middle East and South Asia
Subcommittee, I am looking forward to getting to work.
This legislation to implement the recommendations of the 9/11
Commission is an appropriate starting point and hopefully marks a
welcome change of course. The fact that we have not been attacked since
September 11th should give us no more solace than the 8 years of quiet
between the first attack on the Twin Towers and the day that they were
destroyed.
We may only hope that our continuing efforts will hold the next
attack in abeyance indefinitely. As the President likes to remind us,
we are safer but not yet safe. Today's legislation implementing the 9/
11 Commission Report is not a panacea, but it will make us safer still.
I strongly encourage all Members of the House on both sides of the
aisle to support this bill.
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 3 minutes to the
gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Smith), who represents a district made
up of many families who lost loved ones on 9/11 and has a staff member
who also suffered a terrible loss on that horrific day.
(Mr. SMITH of New Jersey asked and was given permission to revise and
extend his remarks.)
Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. Speaker, I thank my good friend from
Florida for yielding.
Mr. Speaker, when terrorism crashed through our national borders and
claimed the lives of nearly 3,000 Americans, including over 50 men and
women from my district in New Jersey who were in the World Trade
buildings that day, I advocated early and consistently for a commission
to chronicle the lessons learned from the 9/11 tragedy and to develop a
well-informed, thoughtful strategy to reduce the risk of future
terrorist attacks.
The commission's report and subsequent legislation were thoroughly
examined by House committees, including the two hearings that I
chaired, one in the Committee on International Relations on visa reform
and recommendations for enhanced U.S. diplomacy, and the other in the
Committee on Veterans' Affairs on emergency medical preparedness.
The scrutiny given to the report by previous Congresses was robust,
thorough and fair, and although prior legislation implemented numerous
important measures that have bolstered our national security, indeed,
much has already been done, we must always be diligent in implementing
new and expanded means for responding to developing threats.
{time} 1430
Our enemies as we all know are constantly on the prowl searching for
our vulnerabilities, and our ability to remain ahead of them is
critical for our very survival.
Mr. Speaker, the legislation before us today is yet another attempt
in trying to distribute the majority of homeland security and first
responder grants based on the risk of terrorism. New Jersey is the most
densely populated State in the Nation with at least a dozen sites
placed on the FBI's national critical infrastructure list. I, along
with members of our delegation in New Jersey, have maintained, like a
majority of this House and like the Bush administration, that the
Department of Homeland Security's first responder grant system was
flawed and needed to focus on critical infrastructure rather than on
minimum guarantees and a simple population count. The risk formula
established by this bill, which will face tough sledding over on the
Senate side, will ensure that the Department of Homeland Security
thoroughly and accurately evaluates the risks that New Jersey and other
States and locales face rather than just doling it out like it's pork-
barrel money.
Mr. Speaker, I appreciate title VI's provisions that recognize and
address the often overlooked correlation between terrorism and human
trafficking and smuggling. In addition, like many here in this room, I
applauded the creation of the Privacy and Civil Liberties Board 2 years
ago. Unfortunately, it has not been implemented in a way that matched
the intent of the law nor in the way that the 9/11 Commission had
recommended.
H.R. 1 does include significant reforms that would strengthen the
efforts of that board by making it an
[[Page H180]]
independent agency and giving it subpoena power. These provisions will
ensure that the government is protecting America's privacy while still
doing everything in its power to protect our Nation from a terrorist
attack.
I support H.R. 1 and strongly recommend its passage.
Mr. ACKERMAN. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield to the distinguished
gentlewoman from California for a unanimous-consent request.
(Ms. HARMAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend her
remarks.)
Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of H.R. 1.
As I have said many times, terrorists won't check our party
registration before they blow us up. The American people know this. And
they expect us to protect them in spite of many barriers--personal,
institutional, and political--that often gridlock the legislative
process.
Mr. Speaker, keeping America secure is our sworn constitutional duty.
This bill, which includes measures considered over the past 2 years by
Chairman Thompson and the Homeland Security Committee, is important. If
it becomes law, it will make us safer.
Let me highlight a few items.
First, a strengthened Privacy and Civil Liberties Board. Originally
created as part of the Intelligence Reform Act of 2004, the Board is
reestablished as an independent agency with subpoena powers and all
five members are subject to Senate confirmation. That is a good thing,
and something Speaker Pelosi urged as the Intel Reform bill was
written.
Second, a greater allocation of Homeland Security grants based
primarily on risk, rather than the ``squeaky wheel'' theory. My own
District includes portions of LAX and the Port of Los Angeles. But
other cities and States are also subject to significant risk--from
obvious targets like New York and Washington, to smaller communities
with nuclear or chemical facilities. Congress must direct its limited
resources where threats are greatest, period.
Third, intelligence and information-sharing. I believe reforms at the
Federal level are beginning to take hold--though I wish the
Intelligence Committees in Congress would get budgetary authority, as
the 9/11 Commission recommended.
H.R. 1 focuses on providing State and local first responders more of
the intelligence tools they need. For example, it requires DHS to
deploy officers to border State fusion centers, and permits State and
local authorities to send detailees to DHS.
It is locals, after all, who will be most likely to know what's wrong
in their neighborhoods. And so we must trust and empower them to act.
Finally, interoperable communications. I salute our colleague
Representative Lowey for her persistence. Without interoperable
communications, we won't have the ability to stop or respond to major
attacks.
H.R. 1 is aptly numbered. It is this House's first responsibility.
Vote ``aye.''
Mr. ACKERMAN. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 3 minutes to the
gentlewoman, a member, the chairwoman actually of the House
Administration Committee, Ms. Millender-McDonald.
Ms. MILLENDER-McDONALD. Mr. Speaker, I thank my friend for giving me
this time.
Mr. Speaker, I am very pleased to rise and offer my support and brief
comments on this measure before the House today, the 9/11 Commission
Recommendations Implementation Act. This act reflects our determination
to strengthen the United States' efforts to combat terror on these
shores and as such is commendable and prescient.
It is clearly in our national best interest to pass this productive
legislation and fulfill yet another promise to the American people.
Productivity and focus of this kind were clearly demanded by the
American citizens in the 2006 national elections. The 9/11 Commission
Recommendations Implementation Act is far reaching, and it encompasses
a multitude of endeavors critical to ensuring our Nation's security.
We must pass this legislation, Mr. Speaker. This legislation is
critical. This legislation is important. This legislation is what the
American people have asked us to pass. One such endeavor that I
particularly am pleased to see in this legislation is the strengthening
of port security. In my district and in surrounding areas, we have the
largest port complex, the Los Angeles and the Long Beach port security.
This bill talks about, and we will put into place by phasing in the
requirement for 100 percent screening of cargo containers bound for
this United States.
Before this 110th Congress, the Congress before us did not put this
in any piece of legislation. This is important because if we are going
to safeguard and bring national security to this country, we must look
at the cargo that comes and passes through these ports.
The other thing, Mr. Speaker, is aviation security. This bill will
require and direct the Department of Homeland Security to establish a
system for inspecting 100 percent of cargo carried on our aircrafts. I
heard earlier on the floor that we need high tech. This is what this
bill is talking about, bringing about high technology that will screen
the cargo that is carried aboard our aircraft.
It is important that we pass this piece of legislation because this
legislation is important to ensuring that we have national security and
a secure America. I call on Congress to pass this legislation today and
to implement it as quickly as possible because of the importance of
this piece of legislation.
The other thing that we have here that requires our looking at and
passing this bill is that the 9/11 Commission gave us a C grade on
passenger screening at checkpoints to detect explosives. We must pass
this legislation so that the American people will be safe.
Mr. ACKERMAN. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield to the gentleman
from California (Mr. Sherman) 3 minutes.
Mr. SHERMAN. I thank the gentleman for yielding.
I would like to thank Speaker Pelosi and our leadership for putting
together an outstanding bill and thank Mr. Lantos and the leadership of
our committee for the provisions within the jurisdiction of the Foreign
Affairs committee. I expect to be the chair of the subcommittee of the
Foreign Affairs Committee that deals with terrorism and
nonproliferation, and I want to focus on those matters in my short
presentation here today.
The most important issue facing the United States and certainly the
most important part of this bill deals with preventing nuclear attack
on American cities. Since a nuclear bomb is about the size of a person,
it could be smuggled into the United States inside a bale of marijuana.
Now, I know that this bill will deal with port security, but we cannot
expect our ports or our borders to be airtight. The key is preventing
the worst people from getting their hands on the worst weapons. This
bill implements several provisions that will be helpful in that regard.
First, it authorizes all funds necessary for the Nunn-Lugar program
to help Russia get control over its thousands of potentially loose
nukes, the weapons left over from the Cold War. Second, it authorizes
all funds necessary for the Global Threat Reduction Initiative to get
control of the 20 tons of highly enriched uranium at various nuclear
reactor sites around the world, many of them unsecured. But I want to
emphasize, this bill only authorizes funds and it will be meaningless
unless we appropriate the funds, and I look forward to an appropriation
bill that does just that as quickly as possible.
This bill imposes sanctions limiting the sale of U.S. weapons to
those who provide centrifuges to Iran. I hope the administration will
be able to report to us, before they send the F-16s, that Pakistan has
verifiably and permanently halted its aid to the Iranian nuclear
weapons program. This bill will do a lot, but we have to do more to
prevent nuclear weapons from falling into the worst hands.
The bill also contains important provisions dealing with public
diplomacy and youth education. I think that the United States should
print the textbooks for the poorest nations in the world. In doing so,
we can help parents in such poor countries--that make only a dollar a
day or less--who are required to provide textbooks for their kids or
their kids can't go to school. At the same time we can assure American
taxpayers that our tax dollars are being used to help kids and not to
teach hate. I look forward to a foreign aid bill that focuses on the
textbook needs of those in the poorest countries in the world.
Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, I am now pleased to yield 3 minutes to
the gentleman from California (Mr. Rohrabacher), who understands the
dangers of turning over U.S. national security concerns to
international organizations.
Mr. ROHRABACHER. Mr. Speaker, there are positive, even necessary,
elements of this legislation; but nevertheless it is flawed. A major
flaw reflects
[[Page H181]]
what I believe, I think I state, a wrongheaded approach which is
favored perhaps by the new majority of this current Congress.
Mr. Speaker, today I rise in strong support of a motion that will be
offered later, the motion to recommit H.R. 1. That motion is aimed at
removing this damaging flaw that is currently part of the bill. The
Proliferation Security Initiative, or the PSI, is a vital program
created by the United States in which we team with 14 other partner
countries to catch terrorists who attempt to transfer weapons of mass
destruction. We created this program so that the United States and our
allies could operate independently and quickly without bureaucratic
interference to stop the world's most dangerous terrorists. The PSI has
been effective due to its independence as well as the member countries'
commitments to stop these weapons transfers.
This, as I say, has been an effective effort. It was created by
Americans. It was led by Americans. And the decisions made were
essentially under the leadership of Americans. The new majority in this
House seems to favor a more multilateral approach which would be led by
international organizations, in this case the United Nations.
If H.R. 1 passes in its current form, so will a sense of Congress
that says our Proliferation Security Initiative should be authorized by
the United Nations. Our new majority in Congress appears more
interested in catering to unelected bureaucrats at the United Nations
than in stopping proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. This is
not only a dangerous mistake; it runs totally counter to the principles
we have followed thus far in our country where Americans should be the
main determinants of those elements and those decisions that so much
affect our security.
Now, I understand that the new majority prefers a more global
approach which, of course, would leave us dependent on international
bodies like the United Nations. But that is not an approach that I
believe will make this country safer as reflected in this legislation.
A sense of Congress that says we want to cede our power to the United
Nations on any issue such as this but especially on matters of U.S.
national security is a mistake.
I encourage my colleagues on both sides of the aisle to correct this
harmful error in H.R. 1 and vote in favor of the motion to recommit.
And as we face these decisions in the future, as we make these very
important decisions and as we develop legislation like this, let's
remember our obligation is to the people of the United States. Our
obligation is not to curry favor with unelected bureaucrats at the
United Nations.
Mr. ACKERMAN. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 1 minute to the
gentleman from New York (Mr. Engel).
Mr. ENGEL. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support of H.R. 1, to
implement the 9/11 Commission recommendations. Unfortunately, the
Republican leadership in the last Congress refused to do so, and I am
glad we are doing it now.
As a New Yorker, I understand the serious concerns about homeland
security, and I have long argued in favor of a formula funding based on
risk. In the 109th Congress, Mr. Fossella and I introduced the
Responsible Bioterrorism Funding Act of 2006, which directed the
Department of Homeland Security to develop a funding formula based on
risk. Unfortunately, again the Republican Congress did not pass our
bill. So in 2006, as a result, New York's homeland security funding was
cut by 40 percent. Thus, per capita in New York we received $3 per
resident while other States received as much as $60 or more.
No State has a higher risk of terrorist attack than New York, so the
new funding formulas proposed in this bill will allocate funding based
on risk rather than an across-the-board funding level as established in
the PATRIOT Act. This is very, very important and this bill strikes the
balance between allocating most of the funding based on risk while
ensuring that each State has the proper funding to reach a level of
preparedness.
I also stand in strong support of title II of this bill, which
establishes a communications interoperability grant program. I have
worked on this as well. I believe this is a good part of this bill, and
I strongly urge my colleagues to vote for it.
Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, I am now pleased to yield 3 minutes to
the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Kirk), a proud vet who understands the
threat of terror internationally.
Mr. KIRK. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of this legislation,
especially its new security requirement for Pakistan to continue to
receive U.S. taxpayer subsidies.
{time} 1445
After September 11, the government of Pakistan performed admirably,
allowing U.S. Army supplies to help our campaign in Afghanistan to end
the Taliban dictatorship. The Pakistani military also moved into the
lawless tribal areas where Osama Bin Laden sought refuge.
But that record of cooperation against Bin Laden has dramatically
weakened over the last 9 months. In a set of two agreements, the
government of Pakistan has largely given up on the conflict against Bin
Laden and his Taliban allies. In two agencies along the Afghan borders,
North and South Waziristan, al Qaeda and the Taliban now have safe
havens immune from action by the regular Pakistani military. They are
now at rest, slumbering in garrison, marvelously inactive against
foreign terrorists operating on Pakistani soil.
This issue directly concerns the safety of Americans, both here and
abroad. Waziristan and Pakistan could now be called ``al Qaedastan,''
as terrorist leaders have led organization efforts in attacks against
Afghan territory.
Recently I accompanied Senators McCain and Lieberman to visit our
garrison in Khost, Afghanistan, where they reported a 500-percent
increase in attacks against their outpost organized from these regions
of Pakistan.
Mr. Speaker, we need to pass this legislation to send a message to
Pakistan that you must continue to work with the United States and our
NATO allies in Afghanistan against the Taliban and al Qaeda. A policy
of safe havens and sanctuary for these people will not work, has not
worked, is not working and represents a direct threat, first to
Americans in uniform stationed in Afghanistan and later to our allies
in Europe and America itself.
Mr. ACKERMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the distinguished
gentleman, Adam Schiff.
(Mr. SCHIFF asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Speaker, one of the most important findings of the 9/
11 Commission was that the failure to anticipate the attack was a
failure of imagination. The idea of such an assault was so abhorrent it
was difficult to think about.
We cannot know for sure what form a future attack may take, but as we
struggle to prevent it, we must be willing to consider the most
horrific possibility, a nuclear or biological attack on an American
city. The idea of 100,000 people killed in an instant is an idea too
terrible to contemplate. But to ignore this threat, or fail to act upon
it with the greatest urgency is to be grossly, criminally, negligent
with our Nation's security.
Osama Bin Laden has termed the acquisition of weapons of mass
destruction ``a religious duty.'' He has called for an American
Hiroshima. This is his Mein Kampf.
H.R. 1 includes many of the best ideas from around the country on how
to combat nuclear terrorism. But the one fundamental idea is, we must
prevent terrorists from acquiring nuclear weapons or material because
once it is acquired, it may be too late. This bill will strengthen the
Global Threat Reduction Program and accelerate the global clean-out of
the stockpiles around the world. And I urge everyone's support.
Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of this bill, which is long
overdue and I commend the Speaker and other members of the Leadership
for making this a priority.
One of the most important findings of the
9/11 Commission was that the failure to anticipate the attack was a
``failure of imagination.'' The idea of such an assault was so
abhorrent that it was difficult to think about. We cannot know for sure
what form a future attack may take, but as we struggle to prevent it,
we must be willing to consider the most horrific possibility: a nuclear
or biological attack on an American city. The idea of 100,000 people
killed in an instant, is an idea too terrible to
[[Page H182]]
contemplate, but to ignore this threat, or fail to act upon it with the
greatest urgency, is to be grossly, criminally neglegent with our
Nation's security. Osama bin Laden has termed the acquisition of
weapons of mass destruction ``a religious duty.'' He has called for an
American Hiroshima. This is his Mein Kampf.
H.R. 1 includes many of the best ideas from around the country on how
to combat nuclear terrorism. But the one fundamental idea is that we
must prevent terrorists from acquiring nuclear weapons or material,
because once they are acquired, it may be too late.
Programs throughout the government are struggling to secure nuclear
weapons and materials around the world, and prevent nuclear
trafficking. But there is little overall organization of these efforts.
That's why our bill establishes a Coordinator for the Prevention of
Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism in the Office
of the President. The Coordinator will formulate and coordinate a
comprehensive strategy for U.S. nonproliferation activities, oversee
all nonproliferation and nuclear terrorism prevention programs, and
advise the President and congress on the progress that each program is
making.
To assist the Coordinator, this bill establishes a bipartisan blue-
ribbon commission to assess the current state of U.S. nonproliferation
and nuclear terrorism prevention activities, develop a clear,
comprehensive strategy, and identify the areas in which accelerated
effort is most urgent.
Currently, the President must certify that Russia is meeting certain
conditions before authorizing the release of Cooperative Threat
Reduction funds. This has caused delays in shielding vulnerable weapons
when the President was unable to fully certify Russia. This bill
removes those restrictions, granting the President more flexibility in
negotiations with Russia. It also gives the President the flexibility
to direct Cooperative Threat Reduction funds outside of Russia when
necessary.
The bill will strengthen the Global Threat Reduction Program, to
accelerate the global clean-out of the most vulnerable stockpiles of
nuclear material. At the current pace, cleaning up the most vulnerable
nuclear sites around the globe will take more than a decade. Given AQ's
desire for these weapons, how can we be assured that we will have this
much time--we can't.
The bill also urges the President to expand the Proliferation
Security Initiative, an international program to intercept weapons of
mass destruction shipments. It encourages joint training exercises,
particularly with China and Russia, to strengthen our cooperation on
security issues, and encourage them to adopt strict standards for WMD
security. U.N. Security Council Resolution 1540 broached the idea of
international standards for securing nuclear material, but was brief on
the specifics. Now the U.S. must take the lead in establishing those
standards, through organizations like the Proliferation Security
Initiative.
I hope everyone can support this long-awaited overhaul to our anti-
nuclear-terrorism efforts.
Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman
from New York (Mr. Fossella), who has many families who lost loved ones
in
9/11 in his district.
(Mr. FOSSELLA asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. FOSSELLA. Mr. Speaker, at the outset, let me just thank the
majority for bringing this bill to the floor because I think most
Americans want Democrats and Republicans to ensure that all America
remains safe and secure, and not to repeat another September 11. And,
by and large, there are some very good elements in the legislation.
But let me, right at the outset, request that as we go forward, there
are some specific concerns that New York City has that I think need to
be addressed. First is the notion that the city itself cannot apply
directly. It must go through the State without any requirement for the
State to get the funds to the localities like New York City. We know by
now that New York City has specific needs, and therefore, I believe
should be addressed.
The same would apply to what could be a duplicative process whereby
the grant program, and as someone who was involved in the establishment
the first grant program under the Department of Commerce, where, as we
speak, the NTIA is in the process of preparing guidelines, my concern
is that we don't get into a situation where there are two different
agencies getting into a bureaucratic trap which will prevent the flow
of money.
Most important, however, is the fact that we know that one size does
not fit all. And I speak specifically that, under the current bill,
there could be, and I think will be, a problem with the restriction to
Section 306. And that is that over the last 10 years, New York City has
dedicated a lot of money and, in the last 5 years, since 9/11, almost
$1 billion to upgrade its interoperability capacity to allow
firefighters and police officers to talk with each other.
Now, under this bill, we are essentially saying that everyone must
use the 700 megahertz in the spectrum. New York City cannot. As I say,
they have developed and deployed $1 billion plus in the 400 and the 800
megahertz of the spectrum. Why? Because they found it easier to use
that for communicating into the subways, into high rise buildings. And
the last thing I think this Congress wants to be on the record for is
to essentially tie the hands of New York City, undo much of the good
work that has taken place over the last 5 years, and allow New York
City and other localities that have unique and specific needs to
continue to deploy and build on the networks that they have put in
place. I think it would be a big mistake. I encourage the majority to
consider this as the process goes forward.
I make no mistake and make no hesitation in suggesting that this will
hurt and punish New York City and the millions and tens of millions of
people who come there annually to visit the greatest city in the world.
Mr. ACKERMAN. Mr. Speaker, it is my pleasure to yield 1 minute to the
distinguished gentlewoman from Pennsylvania, Allyson Schwartz.
Ms. SCHWARTZ. Mr. Speaker, I am proud to stand here today as we
deliver on one of the most important campaign promises our party made
to the American people, implementing the 9/11 Commission
recommendations. Today we will take steps to improve our Nation's
aviation, port and transportation security. We will strengthen
government intelligence and information sharing, and we will prevent
terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction. And we will
create a dedicated source of funding to provide first responders with
communications interoperability equipment that will allow our first
responders to communicate across departmental and jurisdictional lines
during emergencies.
It was over 5 years ago when evacuation orders were not heard in the
towers of the World Trade Center because police and fire fighters and
other emergency personnel simply could not talk to each other. The
Federal Government failed to act. And these same communication problems
happened again during the failed response following Hurricane Katrina.
As a representative of the Philadelphia region, a major population,
commerce, and transportation hub, I share the opinion that we have to
do something about this. It is scandalous not to act.
Mr. Speaker, I am proud to stand with you as we deliver on one of the
most important campaign promises our party made to the American people.
Today, we will implement the bipartisan 9/11 Commission's
recommendations. And, today we will make our Nation safer.
We will: improve our Nation's aviation, port and transportation
security; strengthen government intelligence and information sharing;
help reduce the appeal of extremism abroad; and prevent terrorists from
acquiring Weapons of Mass Destruction.
We will also create a dedicated source of funding to provide first
responders with communications interoperability--the type of equipment
that allows local, state, and regional first responders to communicate
with one another during emergencies.
We know that the inability to communicate across department and
jurisdiction lines impedes first responder's ability to address
emergency situations. It was over five years ago when evacuation orders
were not heard in the towers of the World Trade Center because the
police, fire fighters and other emergency personnel simply could not
speak to each other.
Despite this, the Federal Government failed to act and these very
same communications problems happened again during the failed response
and recovery efforts in the Gulf region following Hurricane Katrina.
Prompting, in part, Thomas Kean, former chair of the 9/11 Commission,
to call the Republican-led Congress' lack of progress on this issue
scandalous.
However, local communities across the Nation have been moving
forward--despite little leadership from the Federal level. In my
region, the Philadelphia Police Department along with Southeastern
Pennsylvania Transit Authority are working to address the fact that
[[Page H183]]
their radio systems are not compatible--making it virtually impossible
for them to communicate should a coordinated response be necessary.
I have been working closely with city and transit officials to find
interim remedies to this problem. However, it has been a difficult
task, in large part, because of the lack of guidance and resources
provided by the Federal Government. In fact, when they applied for a
grant to help fund an interoperable communications system, the
Department of Homeland Security denied their request. This denial
leaves the city of Philadelphia, its transit system and the millions of
daily riders, residents and workers in the region vulnerable to attack.
It also leaves the city's first responders less prepared than need to
be to protect the fifth largest metropolitan region in the country.
But, Mr. Speaker, today is a new day. It is a day when Congress
acknowledges our Nation's first responders--police officers, fire
fighters, medics. It is a day when we give these brave women and men
the tools to properly aid their fellow Americans in need of help.
The aptly numbered bill--H.R. 1--will pass this body within the first
100 legislative hours of the 110th Congress, and it demonstrates that
the Democratic-led Congress' top priority is protecting and ensuring
the safety of the American people.
Thank you and I urge a ``yes'' vote on implementing the
recommendations of the 9/11 Commission.
Mr. ACKERMAN. Mr. Speaker, I am very pleased now to yield 2 minutes
to the gentleman from Queens and the Bronx, New York (Mr. Crowley).
Mr. CROWLEY. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from Queens and
Nassau County, Mr. Ackerman, for yielding me this time.
I listened very closely to my colleague from Staten Island, Mr.
Fossella, and his concerns about any disadvantage that New York may
suffer under passage of this legislation. It is not our intention or
anyone's intention to have New York be disadvantaged in any way, shape
or form. And I will continue to work with him, as we have done in
previous Congresses, to help make sure that New York is not
disadvantaged.
But Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of H.R. 1. After the awful
events of September 11, our Nation joined together to construct ways to
prevent this from happening again and for better protecting our
homeland.
But this administration, the Bush administration, and Congress then
refused to act or to listen properly. The Republicans refused to
implement commonsense recommendations ensuring Federal Homeland
Security dollars went to places where they were actually needed.
The Republicans did not take threat or risk assessment into account
for protecting our homeland. Rather, the Republicans took politics into
account.
Democrats are fixing these problems and providing real security to
all 300 million Americans, regardless of political persuasion.
Democrats are making sure all of our first responders in harm's way are
given the training they need to perform and protect our citizens.
Democrats are cracking down on loose nukes and strengthening nuclear
proliferation to keep weapons out of the wrong hands.
For over 5 years I have heard the Republicans play politics with
homeland security and with the lives and the memories of the 3,000
people who were murdered on 9/11. Their scare tactics expired this
November when the American people demanded real change.
Homeland security is about protecting the homeland and not politics
or 30-second ads. We Democrats recognize that.
After 6 years, America is moving in a new direction. It is moving
forward, Mr. Speaker. Let's protect America. Let's implement the 9/11
Commission's recommendations and let us move forward.
Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may
consume, the remaining time.
We have seen, Mr. Speaker, how ineffectively the United Nations
Security Council has been in compelling Syria to stop its support for
terrorist activities in Lebanon or at least keeping to its own
deadlines regarding Iran's nuclear program.
After decades of rampant anti-Americanism at the United Nations,
after decades of opposition and obstruction regarding virtually every
aspect of U.S. foreign policy, no one can truly believe that the United
Nations Security Council would draft its resolutions to advance the
interests of the United States or that any U.N. entity would help the
U.S. image in the Arab and Muslim world.
I need only point to the continuing efforts by Russia and China to
hobble U.S. efforts at the U.N. that would seek to apply pressure on
Iran to abandon its nuclear weapons program.
Let us consider the UNDP, for example. In 2005, as Israel was
withdrawing from Gaza, financed by the Palestinian Authority's
production of propaganda materials, it included banners, bumper
stickers, T-shirts bearing the slogan: ``Today, Gaza; tomorrow, the
West Bank and Jerusalem.'' This is the United Nations.
This rightly led to protests from then U.S. Ambassador to the United
Nations John Bolton who rightly called this funding inappropriate and
unacceptable.
And we know the record of the UNDP of hostility toward economic
freedom. Has anyone really thought this through? This needs to be
revamped, and the bill before us does not address that in a correct way
to have it be pro-U.S. and pro-U.S. national security.
Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. ACKERMAN. Mr. Speaker, I am delighted to yield 1 minute to the
gentlewoman from the Capital of the United States, Washington, DC, Ms.
Eleanor Holmes Norton.
Ms. NORTON. Mr. Speaker, 5 years after 9/11, we still have no
national security strategy for securing public transportation, the
principal form of transportation most Americans use, 9 billion
passenger trips annually. No wonder the 9/11 commission gave a C minus
grade.
This bill rescues us by requiring the Department of Homeland Security
to develop risk-based priorities for transportation security and,
finally, a strategic information plan so that the private sector, which
owns our modes of transportation, can share information with one
another.
Mr. Speaker, the terrorists have changed their focus, as Madrid and
London made clear. We have not.
I was the sponsor of the Secure Trains Act. It had no Republican
sponsors; many Democratic sponsors.
After 9/11, we promised we would never be caught flatfooted again.
This bill finally gets us up on our feet and rescues us from a zero
strategy on public transportation and public transportation from being
the stepchild of national security.
{time} 1500
Mr. HOEKSTRA. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself as much time as I may
consume.
Mr. Speaker, for a bill that is supposed to carry out a series of
partisan campaign promises on national security and homeland security
issues, what is most notable about this bill is actually the many areas
that it highlights where there has been bipartisan agreement, not only
on the provisions of the 9/11 Commission that should be implemented,
but just as importantly, those recommendations that should not be
implemented.
In the 109th Congress, the House acted to address many of the
recommendations of the 9/11 Commission. A number of these reforms were
included in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act, in
which the Intelligence Committee played a prominent role. Others were
addressed and refined in later legislation.
On intelligence matters, many of the items in this bill are
duplications or slight modifications to initiatives that were already
put into place during the preceding Congress, such as support to the
fusion of border intelligence and provisions to facilitate greater
information sharing on homeland security.
As another key example, this bill would create a new Office of the
United States Coordinator for the Prevention of Weapons of Mass
Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism. This duplicates and
complicates the work of the National Counterproliferation Center
created in the Intelligence Reform bill.
I also think it is important to point out that contrary to campaign
promises, this bill does not implement all of the recommendations of
the 9/11 Commission. Let me note a few, the intelligence budget, and
paramilitary activities, that it does not address at all.
This bill is following the lead of the previous Congress and not
implementing the two recommendations
[[Page H184]]
that were not warranted, declassifying the amount of the intelligence
budget and making the Department of Defense the lead for all
paramilitary operations. These decisions were right for our national
security on the merits in the last Congress, and they are still right
for our national security now.
I appreciate that this bill follows and reinforces Republican
positions on these issues where the 9/11 Commission recommendations
were not good policy. This bill also curiously omits another explicit
recommendation of the 9/11 Commission that the majority party's
representation on the intelligence oversight committee should never
exceed the minority's representation by one. If the new majority wants
to claim that it has implemented all of the 9/11 Commission
recommendations, it cannot pick and choose to implement all of its
recommendations except the ones that involve their own power.
Later today, the House will also consider a resolution that purports
to address the 9/11 Commission's recommendation to consolidate
intelligence oversight in Congress and enhance the influence of the
authorizing committee on the appropriations process. The proposal will
not accomplish the objectives sought by the 9/11 Commission.
The 9/11 Commission recommended that the authorizing committee also
become the Appropriations Committee. The last Congress thought that
that was a bad idea, and we didn't do it. The proposal in front of us
today will further add complication and confusion by creating a third
group in the House with responsibility for intelligence. Actually, in
the last Congress, we pretty much achieved what the 9/11 Commission was
trying to accomplish, where we had basically a seamless integration of
the Intelligence Committee authorizations bill reflected in the
appropriations bill.
I also want to point out that this bill was flawed in much more than
its failure to promise to fully implement the commission
recommendations. As ranking member and former chairman of the Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence, I am concerned that parts of it have
significant potential to impact our Nation's critical intelligence
programs and capabilities. Even worse, these provisions were developed
outside of regular order, without any participation from the relevant
committees.
I want to briefly note my concerns with two of these provisions.
Section 1433 of the bill would require the United States to ``develop a
common coalition approach'' with respect to detainees. This proposal is
much broader in scope and effect than the actual recommendation of the
9/11 Commission, and it is bad policy. I would hope that all Members of
the House would be in agreement that the law should not require the
United States of America to ask for the permission of other countries,
even our partners, to gather intelligence from and deal effectively and
appropriately with detainees and terrorists who threaten our national
security.
In addition, this proposal would significantly implicate an already
challenging area by requiring us to reconcile newly clarified detainee
authority with the policies of some nations whose legal authorities
protecting human rights are nowhere near as well developed as ours. In
addition, this bill would reopen previously negotiated and resolved
issues by making the Civil Liberties Board an independent body in
granting its subpoena authority. Overall, it would complicate
intelligence.
Mr. ACKERMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to one of our newest
Members, but very distinguished already, the gentleman from Iowa (Mr.
Braley).
Mr. BRALEY of Iowa. Mr. Speaker, as many of the new Members ran on a
promise of bringing change to Washington, one of the key areas of that
new direction was the responsibility of securing this Nation. In July
of 2004, the bipartisan 9/11 Commission issued a comprehensive series
of recommendations and urged this body and the leaders of this country
to take prompt action to implement those recommendations and make us
safer.
Today, in just the second week of our majority, the Democratic House
of Representatives will pass legislation that will address the 9/11
recommendations and make the American people safer and more secure.
Just yesterday, the 9/11 Commission Vice Chair, Lee Hamilton, a
former Member of this body, stated the bottom line is that if this
bill, H.R. 1, is enacted, funded and implemented, then the American
people will be safer because it carries out the recommendations of the
commission.
I am proud to be part of this effort to implement those
recommendations, and I am proud because that was a promise made to the
Members of our constituents last fall. Action on this critical issue of
securing our Nation is long past due. The citizens of our great Nation
are calling for change. In the area of national security, the time for
change has arrived.
Mr. ACKERMAN. Mr. Speaker, I am doubly pleased to yield 1\1/2\
minutes to the final speaker, the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Lampson).
Mr. LAMPSON. On 9/11, many of us were here in the Capitol. As we saw
smoke billowing from the Pentagon, we recognized the direct threat that
faced our country. We stood together on the steps of this buildings,
Republicans and Democrats together, and promised the American people
that we would do our best to secure this Nation.
But we have failed the American people. The 9/11 Commission graded
the administration in this Congress with five Fs, twelve Ds, and nine
Cs; and we must accept no less than straight As. Our Nation responded
with overwhelming support to the commission's recommendations, and that
is why I urge all of you to join me today in voting for H.R. 1.
This bill will make us safer, but it is just a first step. A TV
station in Houston recently uncovered serious security holes at the
Port of Houston. I mean that literally, holes. As they walked along the
perimeter, they found several holes in the fences. This security breach
at one of the Nation's largest ports is unacceptable.
Today this threat, this hole in our Nation's security, is being
patched. Our safety is nonnegotiable, and we can no longer shortchange
our ports. A vote for this bill today demonstrates our dedication to
securing our Nation. It is a first step towards truly securing the
Nation from threats, not only in our backyard, but to threats half a
world away.
When I go home this Friday and greet the hardworking men and women of
the 22nd Congressional District as they leave their plants and port
facilities where they work, I can thank them for the risk they take
every day and look them in the eye and finally tell them they will be
safe and so will our country.
Mr. Speaker, let us have no more smoke. Let us have no more holes.
Let us do the right thing and pass H.R. 1.
On September 11, 2001 many of us were here in the Capitol. As we saw
the smoke billowing from the Pentagon, we recognized the direct threat
that faced our country. We stood together on the steps of this
building, Republicans and Democrats together, and promised the American
people that we would do our best to secure this nation. But for far too
long we have failed the American people. In 2005 members of the 9/11
Commission graded both the Administration and Congress with 5 F's, 12
D's, 9 C's, and 2 Incompletes. We must accept no less than straight
A's. Our nation responded with overwhelming support of the Commission's
recommendations, and as their representatives, we should implement
them. That's why I urge all of you to join me today in voting for H.R.
1. This bill will make us safer, but it's just the first step.
For too long we have ignored the threat and been unwilling to meet
the challenge. This is a challenge that we ignore at our own peril. Our
Nation's seaports handle over 95 percent of our foreign trade worth
over $1 trillion a year. The 9/11 Commission report concluded that
terrorists have the ``opportunity to do harm as great or greater in
maritime and surface transportation'' than the 9/11 attacks. In 2003
the Coast Guard estimated that it would need $7.2 billion to fully
implement the security requirements of the Maritime Transportation
Security Act. Until recently, Congress had only provided $910 million
for port security since the 9/11 attacks. We must fulfill our
responsibility by fully funding these provisions, providing appropriate
oversight and ensuring that these measures are implemented efficiently
and effectively. Our safety is non-negotiable, and we can no longer
short-change our ports.
In fact, a local TV station in Houston recently uncovered serious
security holes at the Port of Houston, which borders the 22nd district.
And I literally mean holes. As they
[[Page H185]]
walked along the perimeter they found several holes in the fence. This
is a fence that is meant to deter terrorists, yet there it is helping
them gain access to these crucial facilities. This serious security
breach at one of the nation's largest ports in one of the nation's
largest cities is unacceptable. And today this threat, this hole in our
nation's security and my constituents' peace of mind, is being patched.
Our safety is non-negotiable, and we can no longer short-change our
ports. A vote for this bill today demonstrates our dedication to
securing our Nation. It even goes beyond the commission's
recommendations--requiring 100 percent of U.S.-bound shipping
containers to be scanned and sealed using the best available technology
over the next five years, among other provisions.
This is the first step towards truly securing our Nation, from
threats in our own backyard to threats half a world away. This bill
will enable us to improve our own security while fostering improved
relations across the globe. I urge all of you, my colleagues here in
the people's House, and I implore our colleagues in the Senate, to vote
for this important piece of legislation. And I urge the president to
sign it into law. And when I go home this Friday, and greet the
hardworking men and women of the 22nd Congressional District as they
leave the plants and port facilities where they work, I can thank them
for the risks they take everyday and look them in the eye and finally
tell them they will be safe and so will our country.
Mr. ACKERMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield the balance of my time to the
gentleman from Mississippi (Mr. Thompson), the honorable chairman of
the Homeland Security Committee, and ask unanimous consent that he
control the balance of our time.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Without objection, the gentleman from
Mississippi is recognized for 36 minutes.
There was no objection.
Mr. THOMPSON of Mississippi. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2\1/2\ minutes to
the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Pascrell).
Mr. PASCRELL. I want to commend, in the beginning, Chairman Thompson
and Ranking Member King for the work of your staff, everybody chipped
in; and I really want to commend the work that you have all done.
Mr. Speaker, it is about time. Three years ago, the commission put
forward a comprehensive evaluation of our Nation's vulnerabilities and
listed key recommendations toward making our Nation safer, more secure.
We finally passed landmark legislation to close many of the dangerous
security gaps, and we are going to do that today. We will address the
weaknesses that continue to leave this Nation at risk, and I say it is
about time.
More than a year ago, Hurricane Katrina and Hurricane Rita reminded
us all again how unprepared we still are to deal with catastrophes,
whether caused by nature or a terrorist attack. That is the politics.
That is the charade. And that charade has been a deadly charade. The
Congress will not wait another day to make the necessary improvements
to our Homeland Security. This landmark legislation includes many long
overdue steps.
Our ports and our critical infrastructure will be better protected.
Our borders will be harder to enter. Terrorists will confront greater
difficulty in obtaining nuclear materials, and our aviation will be
better defended, just to name a few.
I am particularly pleased with two major provisions. First, this bill
would substantially increase the share of homeland security grants that
are provided to States based on risk. I fought for this, the chairman
has fought for this, I think you fought for this, Mr. Ranking Member.
We want 100 percent risk on these grants.
It is crucial that we ensure that Federal money designed to better
equip and train our first responders actually reaches down to where it
is needed most.
I have long said that the current system of distributing grant
funding to local levels is fundamentally broken. In an era when
information can be sent instantaneously any way, any place in the
world, it is utterly nonsensical that our Nation's police, fire and EMS
personnel cannot consistently communicate with each other. Not another
day should pass without us addressing that. Anybody who says that we
have addressed it, look at how the administration tried to zero out the
interoperability part of the legislation. Tell the truth.
Mr. KING of New York. Mr. Speaker, I would just advise the gentleman
from New Jersey, my good friend, that as far as the threat and risk
funding, I was the prime cosponsor for that bill, and it did pass in
the last Congress by a vote of 409-10 in a bipartisan way.
Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from California (Mr.
Lewis), the ranking member and the past chairman of the Appropriations
Committee.
(Mr. LEWIS of California asked and was given permission to revise and
extend his remarks.)
Mr. LEWIS of California. Thank you very much, Mr. King and Mr.
Chairman.
Mr. Speaker, I might respond to the colleagues, this is the longest I
have seen you, your presence on the floor in many a year, and your
being in the podium. We will not let you get away as you would normally
choose to do.
But having said that, Mr. Speaker, you know it is not my intention to
speak on every authorizing bill that might come along. Indeed, we have
enough work to do on our Appropriations Committee, enough to take up
the time of our fine authorizers. But in the meantime, it is important
for us to say early on, in these first 100 hours, that there are issues
that will be brought to the floor that purport to reflect the interests
of authorizers that have huge implications in so far as appropriations
are concerned. So for this one time I would like to take just a moment
to discuss a bit of that.
First, as a member of the Appropriations Committee, I must mention
that this bill is full of new programs, policy directives, performance
directives, all kinds of authorizing suggestions, without any
indication as to where the money might really be coming from. It is one
thing to say that we want to establish a policy. It is another thing to
say that we are going to pay as we go. It is an entirely different
thing to say exactly where the money will come from.
It is very important for the Members to know that throughout this
package that purports to deal with the 9/11 Commission, and those
recommendations, that we have here to a very significant degree, within
the authorizing process, a statement of policy that is little more than
a press release. There really are no serious suggestions here as to how
we go about solving the problems that are implied by the presentation
of this legislation.
The tens of billions of dollars that would be required to implement
this general statement of policy should not be ignored. It is not good
enough to suggest that we are going to balance the budget and pay as we
go. The first bill before us provides an authorizing base that does
exactly the reverse.
We are not in this to confront the Appropriations Committee with
authorizers, but indeed it is about time that we begin to lay the
foundation for policy and appropriations work that actually reflects
the will of the House as well as the appropriations process.
{time} 1515
Mr. Speaker, I know that you agree with all of that because of your
appropriations background.
Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to this legislation before us
today. This is a bill full of feel-good promises and sound bites but no
realistic approach to becoming a reality. Let me provide just a few
illustrations of my concern.
First, as a member of the Appropriations Committee, I must mention
that this bill is full of new programs, policy directives and
performance directives authorized at ``such sums as necessary,'' the
total of which is likely to reach into the tens of billions of dollars.
It proposes carving out $250 million from passenger ticket security
fees as a ``one-time deposit'' for research, development, and
deployment of Explosive Detection System checkpoint technology. But,
because there is no guarantee this amount can be covered by current
collections, it will likely require a direct appropriation. In other
words, it proposes a new cost, with no offset.
While some of these programs are worthwhile I am unsure how the new
majority plans to actually fund them. This is a classic demonstration
that the majority's pledge to offset any new increases in funding is,
at this point, nothing more than an empty sound bite.
Absent new appropriations, there is little chance these programs,
policy directives, and performance objectives will see the light of
day. For example, this bill requires the inspection of 100 percent of
the over 11 million U.S.-bound seaborne cargo containers within five
years. While DHS currently inspects 100 percent of high-risk cargo,
estimates to physically inspect 100 percent of sea-bound cargo,
including those containers shipped by trusted
[[Page H186]]
partners, run in the tens of billions of dollars not counting
additional manpower and operational costs. Even the editorial section
of this morning's Washington Post describes the majority's container
security proposal as a ``waste of money'' with a ``marginal benefit''
and no ``realistic cost estimate''.
Additionally, estimates to physically inspect all cargo on passenger
planes for a single year exceed $500 million and may require up to an
additional 8,000 screeners at a cost of $400 million per year. And on
top of these annual costs, there is an upfront investment of over a
billion dollars for equipment installation and facility modifications.
Still, this legislation casually calls for 100 percent inspection by
the end of Fiscal Year 2009.
Mr. Speaker, throwing money at a problem is not the solution. In
fact, since 9/11, Congress has made steady and substantial, yet
realistic, progress in many of these areas. In Fiscal Year 2005, we
called for the tripling of the percentage of cargo screened on
passenger aircraft, required quarterly updates on meeting this goal,
and directed the development of standards and technology to reduce
manpower requirements.
We continue to target all high-risk cargo inbound for the United
States. We also support expansion of our Container Security Initiative,
which will place actual Customs and Border Protection employees at 58
of the world's largest ports, covering approximately 85 percent of the
U.S.-bound shipping containers by the end of this fiscal year. Last
year, the 109th Congress passed the SAFE Port Act, which, among other
things, created pilot programs, each designed to test the possibility
and viability of achieving 100 percent screening overseas. Through the
Secure Freight Initiative, the Administration has set up 9 of these
pilot programs.
While we appreciate the new majority's attempt, this bill is little
more than a press release full of unfunded mandates that has little
chance of becoming law. Real reform begins with committee and
subcommittee hearings and mark-ups, and ends with a negotiated product
that contains substantive yet realistic reform. This bill fails that,
and many other, tests.
Mr. THOMPSON of Mississippi. Mr. Speaker, I now yield 1 minute to the
majority leader, Mr. Hoyer.
Mr. HOYER. Mr. Speaker, it is no mere coincidence that this
legislation, which will implement the recommendations of the bipartisan
9/11 Commission, is designated as House Resolution No. 1 in this new
Congress. Our first and highest responsibility as Members of this
Congress is to protect the American people, to defend our homeland, and
to strengthen our national security. The fact is, our Nation today,
5\1/2\ years after the attacks of September 11th, is still not as safe
as it should and must be.
As Tom Kean, the former Republican Governor of New Jersey and cochair
of the 9/11 Commission observed just a few months ago, ``We're not
protecting our own people in this country. The government is not doing
its job.'' That is the former Republican Governor of New Jersey, the
cochair of the Commission.
Today, however, through this important legislation, this House will
take a vital step forward in protecting our people and our Nation. We
have taken steps, there is no doubt about that. We have taken steps
together in a bipartisan way, but we have not taken all the steps we
could take. And that is the point of the gentleman from Mississippi,
and I support his contention.
This legislation among other things will substantially improve our
homeland security by doing the following:
Significantly increasing the share of state homeland security grants
provided on the basis of risk. I know that my good friend, the former
chairman of the committee, agrees with that proposition. In fact, we
passed it through this House; unfortunately, the Senate did not.
Creating a stand-alone grant program for interoperable communications
for first responders. Curt Weldon and I have chaired for a long time
the Fire Service Caucus. Interoperability is a critical issue for our
country and for our security.
Phasing in the requirement of 100 percent inspection of air cargo
over the next 3 years and 100 percent scanning of U.S.-bound shipping
containers over the next 5 years. How can we have security in America
if literally thousands of tons of cargo is being shipped in either by
air or ship that we don't know its content?
Accelerating the installation of explosive detection systems for
checked baggage. A critical step.
Furthermore, H.R. 1 will help us prevent terrorists from acquiring
weapons of mass destruction. It will strengthen the cooperative threat
reduction or Nunn-Lugar programs; create a coordinator for the
prevention of weapons of mass destruction proliferation and terrorism;
and strengthen efforts to eliminate a nuclear black market network. I
would think all of us would want to see those objectives accomplished.
Additionally, Mr. Speaker, H.R. 1 seeks to reduce extremism by
enhancing the International Arab and Muslim Youth Opportunity Fund and
establishing a Middle East foundation that will promote economic
opportunities, education reform, human rights and democracy in the
Middle East, all of which was proposed by Governor Kean, Mr. Hamilton
and unanimously the 9/11 Commission.
It also bears noting, Mr. Speaker, that this bill will strengthen the
Privacy and Civil Liberties Board, removing the board from the
executive office of the President and making it an independent agency
and granting the board subpoena power.
I mention these provisions because I believe they demonstrate that we
can improve our security without compromising the democratic principles
upon which this great Nation was founded.
Let no one, however, be mistaken: This legislation alone, nor perhaps
any legislation, can immunize our Nation from attack. However, it
represents an important step forward for our national security. That is
why we wanted to accomplish it in the first 100 hours of our
deliberation.
As former Congressman Lee Hamilton, the other cochair of the 9/11
Commission noted, Mr. Speaker, just yesterday, ``The bottom line is, if
this bill, H.R. 1, is enacted, funded and implemented, then the
American people will be safer.''
That is our objective. I am confident that is the objective of every
Member of this House, Democrat or Republican. That is our
responsibility.
I urge my colleagues on both sides of the aisle, Mr. Speaker, to
support this critically important piece of legislation.
Mr. KING of New York. Mr. Speaker, as a tribute to the enormous
influence you wield over this House, you will notice that even though
we are the authorizing committee, the first two speakers are members of
your Appropriations Committee, and I yield 5\1/2\ minutes to the
ranking member of the Homeland Security Subcommittee, Mr. Rogers.
Mr. ROGERS of Kentucky. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for
yielding and thank the Speaker, and I particularly want to thank the
ranking member of the committee who yielded for all of his tremendous
efforts over the past years to prevent terrorism and secure the
country.
Mr. Speaker, there is not a more fundamental purpose of our
government than to provide for the safety and security of our people.
That was the guiding principle as we over the last several years have
provided almost $250 billion toward Federal homeland security programs
since 9/11. But, Mr. Speaker, the ideas and proposals contained within
this bill are overly costly and Draconian even. It is an effort by the
new Democrat majority to look aggressive on homeland security. This
bill will waste billions and possibly harm homeland security by gumming
up progress already under way.
Over the last 4 years, our Subcommittee on Homeland Security
Appropriations provided a significant combination of aggressive
oversight and vast resources to address our most critical homeland
security needs.
First, with port, cargo, and container security. We not only have
appropriated over $16 billion to fully support groundbreaking programs,
such as the Container Security Initiative, the Domestic Nuclear
Detection Office, we required DHS to double its inspection and
radiation screening efforts; target 100 percent of incoming cargo,
establish security standards for both land and sea cargo containers;
maintain 100 percent manifest review and trusted shipper validation
standards; and inspect 100 percent of all high-risk cargo. So rather
than take the costly and Draconian approach included in this bill
before us today, we put in place methodical, robust measures that
balance our security needs with legitimate trade.
You need look no further than this morning's Washington Post
editorial,
[[Page H187]]
and I want to quote from it because I think it says it better than
certainly I can. A quote from this Washington Post this morning:
``Given a limited amount of money and an endless list of programs and
procedures that could make Americans safer, it's essential to buy the
most homeland security possible with the cash available. That can be a
tough job. That's all the more reason not to waste money on the kind of
political shenanigan written into a sprawling Democratic bill, up for a
vote in the House this week, that would require the Department of
Homeland Security to ensure that every maritime cargo container bound
for the U.S. is scanned before it departs for American shores.''
Continuing to quote from the Washington Post: ``Container scanning
technology is improving, but it is not able to perform useful, speedy
inspections of cargo on the scale House Democrats envision. Congress
has already authorized pilot programs to study the feasibility of
scanning all maritime cargo. The sensible posture is to await the
results of those trials before buying port scanners, training the
thousands who would be needed to operate them and gumming up
international trade.''
Continuing to quote from the Washington Post this morning:
``The Democrats don't offer a realistic cost estimate for the mandate
they will propose today, but the cost to the government and the economy
is sure to be in the tens of billions and quite possibly hundreds of
billions annually. The marginal benefit isn't close to being worth the
price. Under recently expanded programs, all cargo coming into the
country is assessed for risk and, when necessary, inspected, all
without the cost of expensive scanning equipment, overseas staff and
long waits at foreign ports. Perhaps that's why the September 11th
Commission didn't recommend 100 percent cargo scanning.''
Quoting the Washington Post further:
``The newly installed House leadership will bring the bill, which
contains a range of other homeland security proposals both deserving
and undeserving, directly to the floor, bypassing the Homeland Security
Committee.''
No hearings, just bring it on. That is the Washington Post, and I
couldn't say it better than did the Post.
On the issue of aviation security, we took a strong stance towards
the implementation of security technologies by providing almost $17.3
billion towards aviation security programs, including almost $2 billion
for explosive detection systems.
On border security and immigration enforcement, we provided over $75
billion over the last 4 years and ended, yes ended, the practice of
catch-and-release once and for all. We have made progress on grants to
State and local first responders on issues surrounding intelligence.
In sum, Mr. Speaker, the bill before us today simply validates the
funding and policy initiatives of the past two Congresses. I believe
our record of accomplishments as well as the overwhelming bipartisan
support of each and every one of the four appropriations bills speaks
for itself. Now is the time to build upon the substantial work of the
last 4 years and seriously debate our homeland security needs rather
than recycle political ideas for political ends.
Mr. THOMPSON of Mississippi. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3\1/2\ minutes to
the new chairman of the House Homeland Security Appropriations
Subcommittee, Mr. Price.
(Mr. PRICE of North Carolina asked and was given permission to revise
and extend his remarks.)
Mr. PRICE of North Carolina. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for
yielding, and I commend him for his management of this legislation,
bringing this urgent matter to the floor, and expediting its
consideration. I rise in support of H.R. 1, legislation Congress should
have passed long ago to address the unfulfilled 9/11 Commission
recommendations.
As the incoming chair of the Homeland Security Appropriations
Subcommittee, I can tell you there is no time to waste in enacting and
implementing this legislation.
Now, no one should suppose that this will be easy. This is an
ambitious agenda for the Department, and based on the Department's
performance to date, it is going to have to rise considerably to meet
that challenge.
There will be challenges for us in Congress as well, as my friend the
immediate past chairman of our Appropriations Subcommittee has just
stressed. These are not going to be easy priorities to meet.
Many of the bill's programs are not currently funded, such as the
Interoperable Communications Grant Program. This means that the
Appropriations Committee and in particular our subcommittee will have
to find additional resources.
Congress will also have to provide rigorous oversight of the
Department's implementation of the bill. I look forward to working with
Chairman Thompson and other colleagues to hold the Department
accountable. The President must also do his part by requesting and
supporting the funding to get the job done.
This bill provides significant discretion for determining risk to the
Department of Homeland Security. Now, discretion is fine, but it must
be used fairly and wisely, backed by tested assumptions and rigorous
methodology and firm data. This is a critical area for stringent
oversight by Congress.
As we move to a more risk-based approach, there are two important
points to make: First, as we have funded new homeland security grant
programs dedicated to helping State and local governments prepare for
and respond to terrorism, the President and Congress have at the same
time reduced funding for the broadly targeted programs our first
responders have depended on.
Department of Justice programs that support police received a total
of $1.5 billion in 2003, but by 2006, that was reduced to $559 million.
{time} 1530
Fire grants received $745 million in 2003 but only $662 million for
2007.
For many State and local governments, this is simply robbing Peter to
pay Paul, because their homeland security grant dollars have to be
stretched to fill gaps left by the defunding of these other programs.
It should not be an either/or proposition. We need healthy funding
levels for both homeland security grants and for the more broadly based
fire grants and COPS and Byrne and other Department of Justice grants.
The second important point is that homeland security means more than
security from man-made disasters. No matter where a disaster occurs and
whether it is natural or man-made, our local police and firefighters
and EMTs will be the first on the scene to help the public. The
Department's risk assessments should do more to take that into account.
In closing, Mr. Speaker, this bill is a critical first step in the
process of making real security improvements, but there are many, many
more steps we are going to have to take. I look forward to working with
colleagues on both sides of the aisle as we travel down this critical
path.
Mr. KING of New York. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman
from Alabama (Mr. Rogers), who did such an outstanding job in the past
Congress as chairman of the Management, Integration and Oversight
Subcommittee.
Mr. ROGERS of Alabama. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to associate myself
with the remarks of the ranking member of the Appropriations
Subcommittee on Homeland Security, Mr. Rogers.
As the gentleman stated, homeland security is too important an issue
not to have any oversight. And the 279-page bill we consider today is
too encompassing not to have any jurisdiction consideration by the
committees of jurisdiction.
On such an important issue as protecting our country from terrorist
attacks, we should have the opportunity to offer and debate amendments
on the specific provisions of this bill. For example, the bill contains
provisions authorizing billions of dollars in spending for new programs
that have not been approved by the Committee on Homeland Security. The
bill misses the opportunity to continue our consolidation of committee
jurisdiction started in the 109th Congress over DHS and called for by
the 9/11 Commission.
The bill also contains revisions to many initiatives developed under
the
[[Page H188]]
Republican leadership. For example, Section 812 of the bill expands the
authorities of the Privacy Officer of the Department of Homeland
Security. This vital position was established by the Homeland Security
Act of 2002, a Republican bill, signed by President Bush into law. This
was the first statutory mandate for a Privacy Officer in the executive
branch.
Another Republican bill which the President signed into law, the
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, elevated the
position of the Privacy Officer authorizing its direct reporting to the
Secretary.
Concerns have been raised that the pending bill would turn the
Privacy Officer into an investigating officer. In fact, this proposal
was specifically rejected last year during a markup in the Subcommittee
on Management, Integration and Oversight, which I chaired. The DHS
Inspector General stated that this provision would interfere with his
role and would ``create duplicative investigations and overlapping
demands for documents involved in investigations of privacy
violations.''
And, Mr. Speaker, I will include this letter in the Record.
Office of Inspector General,
Department of Homeland Security,
Washington, DC, December 28, 2006.
Hon. Mike D. Rogers,
Chairman, Subcommittee on Management, Integration and
Oversight,
Committee on Homeland Security, House of Representatives,
Washington, DC.
Dear Chairman Rogers: Thank you for the opportunity to
comment on two proposed amendments to the authority of the
U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Privacy Officer--
H.R. 3041 and S. 2827, both titled as the ``Privacy Officer
with Enhanced Rights Act'' or ``POWER Act.'' The Office of
Inspector General (OIG) opposes these amendments because they
would interfere with OIG's jurisdiction and create
duplicative investigations and overlapping demands for
documents involved in investigations of privacy violations.
Therefore, should either proposal be considered for further
review, OIG strongly recommends that specific language be
included to clearly state that the DHS OIG has primary
authority over investigations, audits, and other inquiries
that might be conducted by the Privacy Officer.
As currently drafted, H.R. 3041 and S. 2827 would grant the
DHS Privacy Officer authority to investigate; issue reports;
administer or require oaths, affirmations or affidavits;
issue subpoenas (except to Federal agencies); and access
records and other materials related to programs and
operations within the Chief Privacy Officer's jurisdiction.
These authorities are, as stated above, duplicative. With
respect to the proposed investigatory authority, the DHS
Inspector General already has authority to investigate
violations of law and regulations, including privacy-related
violations relating to DHS programs and operations. Granting
parallel authority to the Privacy Officer to investigate and
issue subpoenas would unnecessarily and inefficiently
duplicate and disrupt the established and working authority
of the Inspector General to conduct such investigations and
issue subpoenas as needed. In addition, the Privacy Officer
can already make referrals on privacy-related violations to
the DHS Inspector General for investigation and review.
Therefore, there is no need to confer additional authority to
the Privacy Officer.
Regarding the proposed subpoena authority for the Privacy
Officer, each branch of the Federal government already has
extensive subpoena authorities that are regularly exercised
to obtain documents or testimony to investigate misconduct
such as civil rights violations. In the event of a
significant allegation concerning such a violation, there
would already be overlapping and likely immediate demands
for documents and testimony by the Executive Branch, by
the Congress, and through the Courts. Adding a set of
competing subpoenas from the DHS Privacy Officer would
unnecessarily increase the burden on subpoenaed parties by
requiring them to respond to multiple requests.
The OIG therefore strongly recommends that the following
new subsection be added under section (b)(2) of both
amendments:
(2) DHS OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL AUTHORITY--The exercise
of authority by the senior official appointed under this
section shall be subject to, and shall not interfere with,
the authority of the DHS Office of Inspector General. Prior
to initiating any investigation under this section, the
senior official shall refer the allegation to be investigated
to the Inspector General. If the Inspector General initiates
an audit, investigation, or inspection relating to the
allegation, the Inspector General may provide notice that it
has initiated an inquiry. If the Inspector General issues
such a notice, no other audit or investigation shall be
initiated into the matter by the senior official appointed
under this section, and any other audit, investigation, or
other inquiry of the matter shall cease.
This provision will ensure the OIG's ability to perform its
independent statutory responsibilities under the Inspector
General Act.
Regarding variations between H.R. 3041 and S. 2827, the
amendments differ in three respects:
H.R. 3041 includes a vaguely-worded provision, tying the
Privacy Officer's authority to that of the Inspector General.
The bill authorizes the Privacy Officer to: ``take any other
action that may be taken by the Inspector General of the
Department, as necessary to require employees of the
Department to produce documents and answer questions relevant
to performance of the functions of the senior official under
this section.'' H.R. 304l(B)(l)(E). S. 2827 does not have a
similar provision.
H.R. 3041 includes a five-year term limit for the Privacy
Officer. S. 2827 has no such limit.
S. 2827 places the Privacy Officer under the general
supervision of the Secretary and requires the Secretary to
report to Congress ``promptly'' if the Officer is removed or
transferred to another position. S. 2827 does not have a
similar provision.
With respect to H.R. 304l's provision tying the Privacy
Officer's authority to that of the DHS Inspector General, it
is not clear what authority would be granted by this
provision. It appears to be designed to incorporate certain
Inspector General authorities into the Privacy
Officer's statutory authorities. As drafted, it is not
clear whether the scope of the Privacy Officer's
authorities under this provision is limited to privacy
issues and if it is so limited, how ``privacy issues'' are
defined, and by whom.
Regarding the term of office provision included in H.R.
3041, but not in S. 2827, and placement under the Secretary's
general supervision (included in H.R. 3041, but not in S.
2827), OIG does not believe these two variations
significantly distinguish the proposed amendments.
In summary, OIG opposes the proposed amendments because
they would create duplication in investigations and
overlapping demands for documents involved in investigations
of privacy violations. If either proposal be enacted, it
should include an additional provision stating that any
exercise of authority by the Privacy Officer should not
interfere with, and should not be construed as limiting, the
authority of the Inspector General.
Thank you for the opportunity to comment on this
legislation. Questions regarding these comments may be
addressed to Richard N. Reback, Counsel to the Inspector
General, on (202) 254-4100.
Sincerely,
Richard L. Skinner,
Inspector General.
The pending bill would also grant the Privacy Officer access to ``all
records'' and other materials available to DHS. Such sweeping access
could have a chilling effect on intelligence agencies sharing vital
information with DHS.
The Inspector General has urged amendments to protect his independent
responsibilities under the Inspector General Act. DHS has also
requested amendments.
But we don't have that option. It is ironic that on the same day this
bill is being considered in the House under a closed rule, the Senate
is holding a hearing on the same topic. And Senators will have an
opportunity later to offer amendments.
The bill before us today should be subject to the same bipartisanship
and open process. The stakes are too high, and we need to get it right.
Mr. THOMPSON of Mississippi. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the
gentlewoman from the Virgin Islands, Dr. Donna Christensen.
(Mrs. CHRISTENSEN asked and was given permission to revise and extend
her remarks.)
Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. Mr. Speaker, it is with great pride and a sense of
hope for the future that I rise in strong support of H.R. 1,
legislation which fulfills an important promise we Democrats made to
fully implement the 9/11 Commission's recommendations.
Before continuing, I want to commend the Honorable Bennie Thompson on
his ascension to the chairmanship of the House Committee on Homeland
Security. Congressman Thompson served as a first-rate ranking member of
the committee during the last Congress, and I look forward to working
with him and our now Ranking Member King to further strengthen our
Nation's security.
Mr. Speaker, it has been a matter of great consternation that today,
5-plus years after 9/11, our first responders still do not have the
capacity to communicate consistently with each other during
emergencies. It was one of the tragic failures in Katrina as late as
2005.
H.R. 1 will create a national Emergency Communication Plan and a
stand-alone emergency communications grant program that will finally
provide first responders with the kind of standards and equipment they
need.
Another provision that has been long fought for is 100 percent
inspection of cargo on passenger planes as well as 100
[[Page H189]]
percent screening of containers bound for this country and improved
explosive detection systems at passenger checkpoints at our Nation's
airports. One of the ``F'' grades the administration and the last
Congress received was failure to implement risk-based funding. The new
formula is a great step forward and would provide more funding for
States and territories that adjoin a body of water within North America
that contains an international boundary line. This can assist the U.S.
Virgin Islands in providing the additional border patrol needed to
protect our residents and our country.
Lastly, in March of 2001, a member of the Hart Commission told a
bipartisan group that the greatest threat to us was the growing
animosity towards the United States. Today we are more hated than ever.
Changing this and protecting privacy and civil liberties as provided in
H.R. 1 is critical to making America not only safer but better.
Mr. Speaker, we owe H.R. 1 to those who died on 9/11 and their
families. Its passage is critical to the future of our great Nation,
and I urge my colleagues to support it.
Mr. Speaker, it is with great pride and a sense of hope for the
future security of our Nation that I rise in strong support of H.R. 1--
legislation which fulfills an important promise we Democrats made to
the American people last fall--to pass legislation within the first 100
hours of our assuming the majority in the House of Representatives, to
make the Nation safer by fully implementing the 9/11 Commission's
recommendations.
Before continuing with my remarks in support of this bill, Mr.
Speaker, I want to applaud you for the inspired principled and strong
leadership which enabled you to become speaker of this great Body and
to commend my Chairman, the Honorable Bennie Thompson on his ascension
as to the Chairmanship of the Homeland Security in the House.
Bennie served as a first-rate ranking member of the Homeland Security
Committee during the last Congress and I look forward to working with
him to further strengthen the state of our homeland security and in
fact to pass today many of the measures that he championed and
Democrats supported in the preceding Congress but could not get passed.
Mr. Speaker and my colleagues, last year the bipartisan 9/11
Commissioners gave Congress and the administration a number of very
poor grades including 5 Fs, 12 Ds and 2 incompletes on implementing
their recommendations. These woeful grades were a call for action and
today Democrats are answering that call.
Mr. Speaker, it has been a matter of great consternation that today,
5 plus years after
9/11, our first responders do not have the capacity to communicate
consistently with each other during emergencies. It was one of the
tragic failures in Katrina in 2005.
Among the long overdue steps included in H.R. 1 that will
substantially improve homeland security is the creation of a stand-
alone emergency communications grant program that will provide first
responders with the standards and type of equipment they need.
I am sure that we have wasted not only time, but a lot of money in
funding the purchasing of equipment that cannot talk to each other
because we have not had standards or a plan. Most importantly, today
with this legislation, we create a national Emergency Communication
Plan that will guide the implementation of the grant program. I want to
applaud my colleague Congresswoman Lowey for her persistence on this
issue.
Another group of provisions that have been long fought for and are
now included in H.R. 1, will be the requirement that Ed Markey of
Massachusetts has championed for 100 percent inspection of cargo in
passenger planes by 2009. This bill will also provide for 100 percent
screening of containers bound for this country and improve explosive
detection systems at passenger checkpoints at our Nation's airports
such as we have seen already implemented in other countries such as
Canada.
I cannot leave this floor without speaking about another issue that
is very important to my constituents and that relates to our need for
strengthened border security.
One of the F grades the administration and the last Congress received
was on failure to implement risk-based funding. Over the past year we
have seen increased border crossings using the USVI to enter the United
States. The new formula would provide for a larger minimum for States--
and that includes territories according to the definition--that adjoin
a body of water within North America that contains an international
boundary line which we do. This can assist us in providing the
additional border patrol needed to protect not just our residents in
the U.S. Virgin Islands but our entire Nation.
I don't have time to speak to all of the important provisions
included in H.R. 1, but in closing let me mention one more that I
believe gets to the heart of what is needed to protect the United
States and all who live here--and that is the provisions that help to
restore the moral authority and leadership of our country in the world.
I recall that a bipartisan retreat in March of 2001, a member of the
Hart Commission told us that the Commission had determined that the
greatest threat to us was the growing animosity toward the United
States.
While some steps have been taken since that report and the terrible
events that took place 7 months later to protect us from terrorist
attacks, nothing has been done to improve our relationships with our
global neighbors. In fact we are more hated now than ever.
H.R. 1 takes steps to begin to heal the rift that has been widening
between the United States and Arab and Muslim communities and between
us and the rest of the world.
It is also my hope that along with the provisions for stronger
protections for privacy and civil liberties, we can also mitigate some
of the unintended consequences of the broad brush approaches that have
been taken thus far.
These are critical components of setting a new direction for our
country and making America not only safer but better!
Mr. Speaker, implementing the 9/11 Commission's recommendations is
supported by most Americans and by several bipartisan and nonpartisan
groups and we owe H.R. 1 to those who died on 9/11 and their families
and loved ones.
As a member of the House Homeland Security Committee, this is a proud
day for me and for all Americans as we take this action to improve
homeland security by preventing terrorists from acquiring WMD's, by
improving our intelligence mechanisms and prevention and protection
programs, and by developing strategies for preventing the growth and
spread of terrorism, while safeguarding the rights of all and the
integrity of our Constitution.
This is a bill that is critical to the future of our great Nation and
I urge my colleagues to support it.
Mr. KING of New York. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman
from Texas (Mr. McCaul), the former chairman of the Investigation
Subcommittee of the Homeland Security Committee.
Mr. McCAUL of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I thank the ranking member of the
Homeland Security Committee, on which I am proud to serve, for
yielding.
Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support of H.R. 1, but I also rise to
express my disappointment.
Despite the importance of a bipartisan approach to homeland security
and promises made to the contrary, the new majority has chosen to
prevent even their own rank and file members from participating in the
debate over this bill. This stands in stark contrast to how Republicans
implemented 39 of the 41 9/11 Commission recommendations when we were
in the majority.
This bill raises several concerns. It proposes to require the
Department of Homeland Security to screen 100 percent of maritime cargo
containers bound for the United States. And while well intentioned,
this is not possible with current technology. Under the SAFE Port Act
passed in the last Congress, we started a pilot project to determine
the feasibility of such a program. We should continue and await the
results of this study.
This new unfunded mandate would cost the government and the economy
billions of dollars per year and bring commerce to a crashing halt. And
even the Washington Post today called this a ``bad investment.'' H.R. 1
also gives foreign port terminal operators a role in the screening of
cargo containers bound for U.S. seaports.
Most disturbing of all, H.R. 1 proposes to hand over control of the
Proliferation Security Initiative, a system which works to protect
Americans against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, to
the United Nations. This is the same United Nations of which Syria and
Iran are members. As a former counter terrorism official in the U.S.
Department of Justice, I know first hand the threat of terrorism. It is
very much alive and well. And while I am overall supportive of this
bill and the 9/11 Commission recommendations, Congress can and should
do better.
Mr. THOMPSON of Mississippi. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as she
may consume for the purpose of a colloquy to the gentlewoman from
California (Ms. Eshoo).
Ms. ESHOO. Mr. Speaker, I thank our distinguished chairman.
Mr. Murtha, it is wonderful to see you in the chair.
[[Page H190]]
I rise as a proud cosponsor of this legislation, which is really
going to complete the outstanding work of the 9/11 Commission.
The issue that I want to focus my remarks on today is one that my
colleagues and I have worked very hard on on a bipartisan basis on the
Energy and Commerce Committee for many years, and that is how to
guarantee real communication interoperability between first responders.
This is a very, very important issue for all of our first responders
and our communities. The fact is that interoperability can be solved
today. Advanced technology developed across the United States and
certainly in my district in the Silicon Valley can successfully enable
first responders and others to communicate using disparate
communication devices and networks. The problem up to this point has
been a lack of resources and guidance from the Federal Government as to
where and how local first responders should invest their scarce dollars
to achieve this solution.
The bill before us addresses this problem by establishing a stand-
alone grant program within the Department of Homeland Security devoted
to establishing an interoperability framework that local authorities
can work from. What is of utmost importance in creating this new grant
program is the need to ensure technology neutrality so that the best
available solution, whether it be radio, software or IP network-based,
can be implemented as soon as possible.
So with this in mind, Mr. Speaker, I would like to at this time yield
to my colleague, the chairman of the Homeland Security Committee, to
ask if he agrees that the goal and the intent of this legislation is to
guarantee that our efforts to fund interoperability solutions are
indeed technology neutral. Specifically, the term ``equipment'' as used
in the legislation should not be interpreted to exclude important
technology such as software, middleware or network-based IP solutions.
Mr. THOMPSON of Mississippi. Mr. Speaker, I can assure the
gentlewoman that the goal of this legislation is to be technologically
neutral.
Ms. ESHOO. Mr. Speaker, I thank the chairman, and I encourage my
colleagues to help promote full communications interoperability by
supporting the bill before us.
Mr. KING of New York. Mr. Speaker, I am proud to yield 5 minutes to
the Republican whip, the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. Blunt).
Mr. BLUNT. Mr. Speaker, I thank Mr. King for yielding.
Mr. Speaker, I rise today, in fact, in support of most of the efforts
that are in this bill because most of the efforts in this bill were
things that the Republicans in control of the Congress worked to pass
on the House side of the building just in the last 2 years.
The most important responsibility of the Federal Government is to
protect the American people. House Republicans recognized that and
moved to enact important recommendations from the 9/11 Commission
during the 109th Congress. We enacted, I believe, 39 of those 41
recommendations. And I would suggest to my colleagues that there is
probably a reason we didn't enact the other two, because we didn't
think they were the right thing to do.
Despite the fact that we have already taken this action before in the
House by overwhelming majorities, the bill on the floor today has
bypassed the committee process. There has been no opportunity to offer
amendments. And, in fact, I want to talk in a minute about one new and
I think particularly bad idea. These ideas are proposed in a way that
talks about putting risk-based funding in place when, in fact, every
single Democrat failed to support an almost identical initiative in the
109th Congress. That initiative passed in the 109th Congress. And
amazingly, this initiative starts when that one ended. I am puzzled by
what was so wrong with that initiative in the 109th Congress, now in
the 110th Congress. It is an initiative that just simply takes up where
the bill we passed last year left off.
{time} 1545
We can't prevent terror attacks in this country by adding other
layers of bureaucracy. We can't prevent terror attacks by making public
information about our intelligence budget and other budgets that
shouldn't be made public. Homeland security is too important to play
politics when American lives are at stake. As a body, both Democrats
and Republicans, we need to be committed to that.
We have an enemy that has vowed to exploit every weakness, every
piece of needless information we give them, every failure we have to
understand the kind of fight that we are in, Mr. Speaker.
Also in this legislation today, there is a sense of Congress that the
Proliferation Security Initiative initiated by the President in 2003
would need to be somehow authorized by the United Nations. I think that
doesn't make sense for this Congress. I don't believe that will ever be
in any legislation that makes it to the President's desk. I think it is
a particularly bad idea to suggest that our initiatives for
proliferation security would somehow now come under the auspices of the
United Nations.
This has been a successful program. We have 14 direct partners in
this program; over 70 countries have worked with us to follow-up on
specific pieces of information that we needed to check into to be sure
that proliferation was not a problem.
Mr. Speaker, I hope that the House votes later today to eliminate
that sense of the Congress that the United Nations would authorize this
program from this legislation. I look forward to bringing this issue to
the floor as the majority has promised with debate in the future. We
didn't have committee debate on this bill today. I hope that we quickly
get to the promises of the majority to debate these bills in committee,
bring them to the floor, and work together to do the right thing for
the American people.
Mr. THOMPSON of Mississippi. Mr. Speaker, before yielding to the next
speaker, I would like to make note of the fact that I submitted remarks
related to jurisdictional interest by the gentleman from Michigan (Mr.
Conyers) on H.R. 1.
Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from New York (Mrs.
Lowey).
Mrs. LOWEY. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of the bill, and I
want to thank the chairman for your important work on this bill.
I am very pleased that one of the first acts of the Democratic
Congress is to finally enact the long overdue recommendations of the 9/
11 Commission.
This bill contains language I first proposed in the 108th Congress to
create a dedicated grant program for emergency communications, which
the Republican-controlled Congress rejected at least five times,
including in stand-alone amendments.
Communications failures that forced first responders to use runners
to relay messages on September 11 and following Hurricane Katrina more
closely resemble the time of Paul Revere than the technology available
in 2007. The post-September 11 world demands 21st-century preparedness.
Many of us have long recognized that we are not prepared to respond
to the next emergency until our first responders can communicate with
one another. The legislation addresses this massive gap in our Nation's
communications capabilities and will improve safety for hundreds of
thousands of first responders who protect our communities each day.
In addition to the interoperability provisions, I am very pleased
that this bill includes my proposals to fix the flawed grant funding
formula, improve airport screening by providing important rights for
screeners, and overhauls the troubled National Asset Database.
I urge your support for this vital piece of legislation that includes
long-overdue improvements for first responders. I thank the gentleman
again for his leadership, and I look forward to working together with
the people on the other side of the aisle to get this done.
Mr. KING of New York. Mr. Speaker, I am privileged to yield 2 minutes
to the gentleman from California who played such a prominent leadership
role in the last Congress, including port security legislation and
chemical plant legislation, both of which passed the floor, Mr. Daniel
E. Lungren.
Mr. DANIEL E. LUNGREN of California. Mr. Speaker, I thank the ranking
member.
Mr. Speaker, I say this not in anger but in sadness about the missing
bipartisanship here by the way this was
[[Page H191]]
brought to the floor. If there was any committee in the last Congress
that worked harder on bipartisanship than our committee, I don't know
what it was. We worked very closely with the new chairman of the full
committee on so many things. We were cosponsors together on the
chemical security bill, the port security bill. We managed to have a
29-0 vote in committee after many, many different committee hearings,
consultation with the Democratic side as well as the Republican side.
And we passed it out 29-0 and passed it off the floor 421-2.
And in response to that, we have presented to us this bill which is
basically take it or leave it. That's not the way to do these sorts of
things.
They say we have already dealt with these things. By my count, over
12 percent of the membership of this House has never been here before.
So maybe they don't count. Maybe they ought not to have the opportunity
to consider these things. It doesn't seem to me that is the way we
ought to be doing things.
Everybody is talking about the 9/11 Commission. What is the biggest
thing that we haven't done with the 9/11 Commission which the
commissioners have pointed out? We haven't consolidated jurisdiction in
this House for homeland security.
Now, we started to on our side, and I admit we didn't do everything
we ought to have done. When is the greatest opportunity, the golden
opportunity you have to do it? When your party takes over, when you
don't have any chairmen. Everybody is looking to be a chairperson for
the first time. That is when you can do it. You have lost the golden
opportunity to do what the 9/11 Commission said was the greatest thing
we hadn't done in following their recommendations, and it isn't done.
And then we have in here 100 percent screening of ocean-going and
aviation cargo. Instead of doing it smartly and instead of doing it
efficiently, instead of doing it effectively, instead of doing it
successfully, instead of using that which we have better than any place
in the world, both intelligence gathering and the use of technology,
and apply it with sophisticated algorithms, we say we want to cover
everything.
Mr. THOMPSON of Mississippi. Mr. Speaker, I include for the Record
three letters of support for this bill from the International
Association of Chiefs of Police, the National Sheriffs' Association,
and the National Association of Police Organizations.
National Association of Police
Organizations, Inc.,
Washington, DC, January 8, 2007.
Hon. Bennie Thompson,
Committee on Homeland Security,
House of Representatives, Washington, DC.
Dear Chairman Thompson: On behalf of the National
Association of Police Organizations (NAPO) representing more
than 238,000 law enforcement officers throughout the United
States, I would like to thank you for introducing H.R. 1, the
``Implementing the 9/11 Commission Recommendations Act of
2007,'' and advise you of our support, particularly in
regards to Subtitles A and B under Title VII of the
legislation. If enacted, this bill will establish a Fusion
and Law Enforcement Education and Teaming (FLEET) grant
program, as well as a Border Intelligence Fusion Center
program to assist state and local law enforcement in
protecting our nation's borders from terrorist and related
criminal activity.
This legislation recognizes the importance of consistent
coordination and communication between the country's local,
state, and federal law enforcement in preventing acts of
terrorism within the United States. The creation of the FLEET
and the Border Intelligence Fusion Center programs will help
ensure that state and local law enforcement in border regions
are properly supported, trained and informed in order to
prevent terrorism before it occurs. Most importantly, these
provisions will allow law enforcement agencies to maximize
their participation in the fusion centers by providing funds
to allow them to assign officers and intelligence analysts to
the centers without having to reduce daily neighborhood crime
protection.
NAPO believes that homeland security funding greatly
assists local law enforcement. However, we also believe that
the continuation and full funding of the Community Oriented
Policing Services (COPS) program and Byrne-Justice Assistance
Grant (JAG) program is imperative.
The ``Implementing the 9/11 Commission Recommendations Act
of 2007'' ensures that state and local first responders along
our nation's borders are properly supported, trained and
equipped to prevent terrorism before it occurs. I thank you
for your continued support of law enforcement. If you have
any questions, please feel free to contact me, or NAPO's
Legislative Assistant, Andrea Mournighan.
Sincerely,
William J. Johnson,
Executive Director.
____
International Association of
Chiefs of Police,
Alexandria, VA, January 8, 2007.
Hon. Bennie Thompson,
Chairman, Committee on Homeland Security,
House of Representatives, Washington, DC.
Dear Chairman Thompson: On behalf of the International
Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP), I am writing to
express our strong support for the proposed Fusion and Law
Enforcement Education and Teaming (FLEET) Grant Program and
the Border Intelligence Fusion Center Program that are
contained in H.R. 1, Implementing the 9/11 Commission
Recommendations Act of 2007. The IACP believes that the
adoption of these two provisions would represent a major step
forward in enabling the law enforcement community to better
detect, disrupt, and prevent future acts of terrorism.
These provisions reflect the reality that while planning,
conducting surveillance, or securing the resources necessary
to mount their attacks, terrorists often live in our
communities, travel on our highways, and shop in our stores.
As we discovered in the aftermath of September 11th, several
of the terrorists involved in those attacks had routine
encounters with state and local law enforcement officials in
the weeks and months before the attack. If state, tribal, and
local law enforcement officers are adequately equipped and
trained and fully integrated into an information and
intelligence sharing network, they can be invaluable assets
in efforts to identify and apprehend suspected terrorists
before they strike.
These two provisions emphasize the vital role that state,
local, and tribal law enforcement must play in the
development and dissemination of critical intelligence in
order to detect, prevent, prepare for, and respond to acts of
terrorism. It is IACP's belief that they will also help
ensure that law enforcement agencies at all levels of
government are equal partners, and that the experience and
capabilities of all parties are realized, by allowing state,
local, and tribal law enforcement to participate more
actively in the intelligence gathering and sharing process.
Thank you for continuing support of our nation's law
enforcement community. The IACP stands ready to assist in any
way possible.
Sincerely,
Joseph C. Carter,
President.
____
National Sheriffs' Association,
Alexandria, Virginia, January 8, 2007.
Hon. Bennie Thompson,
Chairman, Committee on Homeland Security,
House of Representatives, Washington, DC.
Dear Chairman Thompson: On behalf of the National Sheriffs'
Association (NSA), I write to you to express our strong
support for the provisions contained under Title VII of H.R.
1, ``Implementing the 9/11 Commission Recommendations Act of
2007,'' that would establish Fusion and Law Enforcement
Education and Teaming (FLEET) Grant Program and the Border
Intelligence Fusion Center Program. NSA believes that the
FLEET and Border Intelligence Fusion Center programs would
provide the necessary resources and framework for integration
to greatly enhance holistic and geographic approaches in
homeland security intelligence and infonnation gathering and
sharing between federal, state and local law enforcement
agencies.
However, our position is contingent upon amending the
definition of ``local law enforcement agency or department''
in Title VII, Subtitle A of the bill--to include all
sheriffs' office across the country rather than just those
``sheriffs office in communities where there is no police
department'' to ensure that sheriffs' offices where police
department is present are not excluded from grant eligibility
under the FLEET Grant Program. As you may be aware, a sheriff
is the chief law enforcement officer in their respective
county and have jurisdiction over all cities within that
county. Thus, we respectfully request that the language of
the bill be amended to appropriately reflect and recognize
the proper authority of the office of sheriff.
As the voice of 3,087 elected sheriffs across the country
and the largest association of law enforcement professionals
in the nation, the communication and integration of federal
homeland security efforts with state and local fusion centers
is an important priority for NSA. Since the events of
September 11, the significance of how local law enforcement
information might protect national security and the
importance of homeland security intelligence and information
gathering and sharing have increased substantially. As
recognized by your committee, homeland security intelligence
and information pertains not only to terrorist intentions and
capabilities to attack people and infrastructure within the
United States but also to U.S. abilities to detect, prevent,
prepare for and respond to potential terrorist attacks.
Sheriffs and their deputies play a critical role in
homeland security intelligence and information efforts as the
nation's counterterrorism ``eyes and ears.'' Local law
enforcement personnel will almost always be the first to
experience first hand suspicious activities and first to
respond to any terrorist event. Clearly, there is a national
intelligence role for state and local law enforcement in
which they make contributions
[[Page H192]]
to preventing attacks or other inimical acts directed against
the United States. NSA believes that the proposed programs
would facilitate change in the organizational culture barrier
thereby establishing state and local law enforcement entities
as equal partners in homeland security intelligence efforts.
Moreover, these programs would help build an integrated
intelligence capability to address threats to the homeland,
consistent with U.S. laws and the protection of privacy and
civil liberties.
Sheriffs across the nation share a common counterterrorism
interest. The proliferation of intelligence and fusion
centers across the country reflect the importance and the
value to gathering and sharing information that assists local
law enforcement agencies in preventing and responding to
local manifestations of threats to their community. We want
to thank you for your efforts in addressing this important
issue and look forward to working with you to ensure the
enactment of these provisions as well as other proposed
initiatives in your ``LEAP: A Law Enforcement Assistance and
Partnership Strategy'' report.
Sincerely,
Sheriff Ted Kamatchus,
President.
Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Oregon (Mr.
DeFazio).
Mr. DeFAZIO. Mr. Speaker, on our side of the aisle the Democrats over
the last 3 years have identified some gaping holes in our Nation's
security, even in aviation where we have spent the most money. You can
do it in two ways: you can have state-of-the-art equipment and not a
lot of people, or a lot of people and not very good equipment, or a mix
of the two.
The Republicans have chosen to do neither. They haven't been willing
to buy the equipment we need: state-of-the-art explosives detection
equipment at passenger checkpoints. They haven't been willing to invest
in the inline screening for baggage, and they put a totally arbitrary
cap on the number of screeners. There are gaping holes. We are going to
plug those. A quarter of a billion dollars for explosives screening at
passenger checkpoints, a known threat. A billion dollars for inline
screening which the Republicans have refused to fund.
For 4 years, airports across America have begged for inline screening
grants. None have been forthcoming from the Republicans. They are
saying they have taken care of everything in such a great bipartisan
way.
Now my friend from Florida got up and waxed poetic about San
Francisco and said it was due to two things: private screeners and
inline screening. Well, the inline equipment I agree with him, and we
are going to fund it, unlike the majority. We will install it in every
airport in America.
But I disagree on the privatized screening because actually it turns
out now that the private screeners at San Francisco were tipped off
before the inspectors came through. They don't do any better, and maybe
would do worse without those tips, than our public employees. We are
going to give them the tools they need.
On containers, Assistant Secretary Michael Jackson said they want to
screen every container before they leave a U.S. port for the interior.
Why? Because they might contain threats.
And we said, What does that make our ports, a sacrifice zone if they
have a nuclear weapon contained in them?
We want to screen containers on the other side of the ocean. Now we
hear people on that side get up and say hundreds of billions of dollars
to screen these containers. Actually, it is 30 to $50 per container.
There are 11 million containers. That is somewhere between 300 and $500
million a year, paid for by a modest fee on the shippers, not by the
taxpayers of America.
We are going to make America more secure. We are going to plug the
holes you left in our security and fix the problem.
Mr. THOMPSON of Mississippi. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the
gentlewoman from New York (Mrs. Gillibrand), a new Member of Congress.
Mrs. GILLIBRAND. Mr. Speaker, I thank Chairman Thompson for this
opportunity to address this crucial issue.
I am proud that the 110th Congress has put homeland security as its
highest priority and will ensure that our country will finally get the
security investment it needs.
In 2004, the 9/11 Commission provided us with a nonpartisan
assessment of our current state of readiness. And while a few of their
recommendations have been enacted, this administration and the previous
congressional leadership did not make these recommendations a funding
priority.
The bill we will pass today addresses many of the concerns of the 9/
11 Commission, including one of the biggest for New York State, which
is port security. Two of the busiest ports in the world, both in Hong
Kong, already scan 100 percent of their cargo containers. There is no
reason that all ships destined for the United States shouldn't be held
to the same standard.
The bill we are voting on today gives the largest ports in the world
3 years to implement a system to scan for radiation and density on all
containers coming into this country. This impacts my district, in
particular, because my district geographically surrounds the port of
Albany. If a container with radioactive materials came up the Hudson
River from New York City and was unloaded in Albany, it would devastate
our entire region. Such a risk will be addressed by this legislation.
This bill is also important to me as a mother and to all parents in
my district and in our Nation. Every time we travel by airplane and
bring our children, we are concerned about safety. This bill will allow
parents and grandparents to know that our children will be safer when
we travel by plane by requiring 100 percent of air cargo to be scanned
by the end of 2009, as well as providing funding for anti-bomb
detection for bags and passengers.
I am also pleased that this bill reflects the fact that our first
responders are indeed ``first preventers.'' As we all remember, on 9/11
many firemen and police officers gave up their lives because they
couldn't communicate. Up until now, we have not yet invested
sufficiently to improve such communication capabilities. This bill will
do just that.
Finally, I am very pleased that this bill includes investments
against terrorist attacks by securing nuclear materials from the former
Soviet Union. If you ask any terrorist expert in the world, they will
tell you this is their gravest concern. And, finally, I am extremely
pleased this funding will be based on risk. For New York State, that
means increased funding for my State, including my district.
The U.S. Congress must always make the safety of the American people
its number one concern. I am confident this bill will do just that.
Mr. THOMPSON of Mississippi. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the
gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Markey), a member of the Homeland
Security Committee.
Mr. MARKEY. Mr. Speaker, I thank the chairman very much.
In this bill there are two provisions which have been blocked for 4
years by the White House and by Republican leadership. They are going
to be included in this bill and passed this afternoon.
One is to require that all cargo which is placed on passenger planes
in the United States is screened so that there is no bomb, there is
nothing that can lead to a catastrophic event in the air, does in fact
pass through security. This is a huge change. Each of us has our bags
screened, our shoes screened; but the cargo on that same plane placed
next to our bags is not screened. This bill will make that possible. I
have been working with Mr. Shays from Connecticut on this for the last
4 years. Today is a historic day.
Secondly, there is an amendment in this bill which will ensure the
screening of all ships, all cargo overseas before it departs for the
United States to determine whether or not there is a nuclear bomb on
that plane. We know that is al Qaeda's highest objective: to obtain a
nuclear weapon from the former Soviet Union or from some other rogue
state, to then transport it to a port somewhere around the world, put
it on a ship and bring it to a port in the United States. When it is in
the port of New York or Boston or Long Beach, it is already too late.
{time} 1600
The bomb will be detonated by remote on the ship, causing the
catastrophic event, not as the cargo is being taken off. So this
amendment requires the screening of all that cargo overseas. This is
long overdue. It is al Qaeda's dream to have a nuclear explosion in a
major American city, and now, finally, today we do this.
I want to compliment Mr. Nadler on all of his work over the years on
this
[[Page H193]]
issue, for his leadership. I thank the chairman, the ranking member,
Mr. King, for all of their courtesies over the last several years.
Mr. THOMPSON of Mississippi. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my
time.
Mr. SMITH of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to control
the time on this side in the temporary absence of the ranking member,
Mr. King.
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Murtha). Is there objection to the
request of the gentleman from Texas?
There was no objection.
Mr. SMITH of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman
from Washington (Mr. Reichert), a member of the committee.
Mr. REICHERT. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman.
Mr. Speaker, last year as chairman of the Homeland Security
Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, I oversaw many of the
committee's accomplishments in addressing recommendations of the 9/11
Commission. Among them were the successful passage of the 21st Century
Emergency Communications Bill, the Faster, Smarter Funding Act, and
comprehensive bipartisan FEMA reform legislation. My subcommittee, as
well as the entire Homeland Security Committee, was successful last
year because of our willingness and ability to work across the aisle to
find solutions to problems. As a result, I am disappointed in the way
that H.R. 1 is coming before the House today.
I remain a strong supporter of certain aspects of this legislation,
such as the language that makes first responder funding risk-based.
Unfortunately, I have many concerns about other language included in
this bill and believe that H.R. 1 would be better public policy had the
bill been considered in committee and a rule allowed for an open
amendment process.
This legislation, Mr. Speaker, includes a new grant program that is
intended to make grants to local law enforcement to pay personnel costs
of officers serving in intelligence fusion centers. As a former sheriff
of a major metropolitan county encompassing the City of Seattle, I
certainly agree with and understand the need for this authority.
One of my major goals in Congress is to continue to fund local law
enforcement as their responsibility grows and grows to protect this
homeland. So I support the direction of the this bill. However, as it
is written, the language in this bill is unclear as to whether or not
it may not apply to all police agencies, all Sheriff's departments,
across the country. This problem could have been resolved if we had a
bipartisan bill, and I would have been glad to work with my friends
across the aisle on this issue.
In addition, I have grave concerns for section 408, which includes
the TSA personnel management provision. This provision removes the
flexibility of TSA to move employees where they are needed most. This
provision was not a 9/11 Commission recommendation and has no place in
a bill that is described as enacting those recommendations. Including
this provision without hearings or examining its potential impact is
irresponsible.
Last summer, during the U.K. liquid explosives scare, the Department
of Homeland Security was able to retrain and rapidly deploy TSA
officers to address this new threat. Section 408 of this legislation
would remove that authority. This provision warrants a full debate in
committee and also on the House floor.
Mr. THOMPSON of Mississippi. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to
the gentlelady from Texas (Ms. Jackson-Lee).
(Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas asked and was given permission to revise
and extend her remarks.)
Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas. Mr. Murtha, thank you for your leadership.
It is good to see you in the Speaker's Chair. Let me thank the chairman
of the committee, Mr. Thompson, for his vision and his leadership.
Very quickly, let me remind my colleagues of the tragic incident
where we saw the massive loss of life on September 11, 2001. Today we
stand on the floor in 2007 finishing the work that was not done by this
part Republican Congress since 2001. So I applaud the leadership of
this committee for moving forward on responding to the tragedy that
changed the lives of so many Americans and those who are still
suffering because of the deaths of their loved ones.
This is an important step and an important day, and I quickly
acknowledge the fact that we will now have 100 percent scanning of
containers bound for the United States. We will have the effectiveness
of making sure that the best technology will be used; and also we will
tell America that all of the critical infrastructure will be updated
and current so we will know those most vulnerable assets.
In addition, we will have for the first time a transportation
security planning strategy, and I compliment the gentleman from
Mississippi whose bill authored in the last session establishes the
importance of having a strategy for transportation security.
Need I remind you of the recent incident with the Metro here in
Washington, D.C. Although it was labeled as an accident, we know that
the transportation system of America is enormously vulnerable.
I am grateful that we have now a Civil Liberties and Privacy Board
that has been languishing in the White House, but now it is under the
jurisdiction of the United States Congress. And, yes, the work I have
done in the past on anti-smuggling legislation was reaffirmed by the
restrictions on terrorists freely traveling without real protection
against this danger.
This is a good bill. It is long overdue, and I ask my colleagues to
support H.R. 1.
introduction
Mr. Speaker, September 11, 2001, is a day that is indelibly etched in
the psyche of every American and most of the world. Much like the
unprovoked attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, September 11, is
a day that will live in infamy. And as much as Pearl Harbor changed the
course of world history by precipitating the global struggle between
totalitarian fascism and representative democracy, the transformative
impact of September 11 in the course of American and human history is
indelible. September 11 was not only the beginning of the Global War on
Terror, but moreover, it was the day of innocence lost for a new
generation of Americans.
Just like my fellow Americans, I remember September 11 as vividly as
if it was yesterday. In my mind's eye, I can still remember being
mesmerized by the television as the two airliners crashed into the Twin
Towers of the World Trade Center, and I remember the sense of terror we
experienced when we realized that this was no accident, that we had
been attacked, and that the world as we know it had changed forever.
The moment in which the Twin Towers collapsed and the nearly 3,000
innocent Americans died haunts me until this day.
At this moment, I decided that the protection of our homeland would
be at the forefront of my legislative agenda. I knew that all of our
collective efforts as Americans would all be in vain if we did not
achieve our most important priority: the security of our Nation.
Accordingly, I became then and continue to this day to be an active and
engaged Member of the Committee on Homeland Security who considers our
national security paramount.
Our Nation's collective response to the tragedy of September 11
exemplified what has been true of the American people since the
inception of our Republic--in times of crisis, we come together and
always persevere. Despite the depths of our anguish on the preceding
day, on September 12, the American people demonstrated their compassion
and solidarity for one another as we began the process of response,
recovery, and rebuilding. We transcended our differences and came
together to honor the sacrifices and losses sustained by the countless
victims of September 11. Let us honor their sacrifices by implementing
the bipartisan recommendations of the 9/11 Commission in order to
ensure that the tragedy of 9/11 is never repeated. Let us learn from
the lessons offered by our history so that we are not destined to
repeat them.
9/11 Commission Recommendations
Madam Speaker, I wish to pay tribute to the distinguished chair of
the Homeland Security Committee, the gentleman from Mississippi, Bennie
Thompson. Under Mr. Thompson's visionary leadership, the Democrats on
the Committee have performed yeoman service in developing a framework
needed to protect the homeland. Unlike the previous Republican
leadership, we Democrats embrace wholeheartedly the recommendations of
the 9/11 Commission, a body comprised of ten of the most distinguished
citizens in this country.
Madam Speaker, I want to talk about several of the key provisions of
H.R. 1, the bill implementing the bipartisan 9/11 Commission's
recommendations.
[[Page H194]]
Improving Homeland Security--Risk-Based Funding
The importance of providing risk-based allocation of Homeland
Security grants cannot be overemphasized. Last December, the 9/11
Commissioners gave an ``F'' grade to the Administration and Congress on
providing risk-based homeland security funding. This bill would
substantially increase the share of homeland security grants that are
provided to States based on risk, rather than population. Under the
bill, a Department of Homeland Security risk assessment would determine
each state's funding and most states would be guaranteed a minimum of
0.25 percent. The bill would provide for a larger minimum (0.45
percent) for states that have a significant international land border
and/or adjoin a body of water within North America that contains an
international boundary line.
First Responders--Ensuring Communications Interoperability for First
Responders
Last December, the 9/11 Commissioners also gave an ``F'' grade to the
Administration and Congress on communications interoperability for
first responders. This bill would improve the communications
capabilities of first responders by establishing a stand-alone
communications interoperability grant program at the Department of
Homeland Security to provide first responders with the type of
equipment that allows them to communicate with one another during
emergencies.
Aviation Security--Inspecting Cargo Carried Aboard Passenger Aircraft
The 9/11 Commissioners gave a ``D'' grade to the Administration and
Congress for their efforts on enhancing air cargo screening. This bill
directs the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to establish a system
for inspecting 100 percent of cargo carried on passenger aircraft over
the next 3 years. The bill directs DHS to develop a phased-in approach
so that by the end of FY 2007, 35 percent of this cargo is inspected;
by the end of FY 2008, 65 percent is inspected; and by the end of FY
2009, 100 percent is inspected.
Improving the Explosive Screening of Checked Baggage on Aircraft
The 9/11 Commissioners also gave a ``D'' grade to the Administration
and Congress on improving the security of checked baggage. This bill
continues the dedication of $250 million per year currently collected
in airport security fees from the Aviation Security Capital Fund for
the installation of in-line explosive detection systems for checked
baggage at our Nation's airports for fiscal years 2008 through 2011.
Improving the Explosive Screening of Airline Passengers
The 9/11 Commissioners gave a ``C'' grade to the Administration and
Congress on improving airline passenger screening checkpoints to detect
explosives. This bill requires the Department of Homeland Security to
issue a strategic plan for the deployment of explosive detection
equipment at passenger checkpoints that is long overdue. The bill also
provides new funding in order to make rapid improvements to security
measures at passenger checkpoints.
Port Security--Requiring 100 percent Scanning of Containers Bound for
the U.S.
This bill goes beyond the 9/11 Commission's recommendations by
including provisions that would phase in a requirement for 100 percent
scanning of cargo containers bound for the United States. This
provision would require that 100 percent of cargo containers be scanned
and sealed using the best available technology before being loaded onto
ships destined for the United States. The containers must be scanned by
both X-ray machines and radiation detectors.
Large ports would be given 3 years to comply and smaller ports 5
years. (Two of the busiest port terminals in the world--in Hong Kong--
already scan 100 percent of cargo containers). The Port of Houston
represents a substantial source of vulnerability. The Port is the
world's sixth largest seaport and the Nation's largest oil port; and
for the past 8 years, it has led the Nation in the amount of foreign
tonnage.
Critical infrastructure security--improving critical infrastructure
security
The 9/11 Commissioners gave a ``D'' grade to the Administration and
Congress for their efforts on critical infrastructure assessment. This
bill requires the Department of Homeland Security to conduct an annual
vulnerability assessment for all critical infrastructure sectors. It
also requires DHS to annually update the National Asset Database to
ensure that it is a current list of national assets and critical
infrastructure.
overall transportation security planning--improving transportation
security planning and information sharing
The 9/11 Commissioners gave a ``C-'' grade to the Administration and
Congress on the National Strategy for Transportation Security, arguing
that it was too vague to be useful. This bill requires improvements in
the National Strategy for Transportation Security, such as by requiring
DHS to develop risk-based priorities for transportation security
initiatives based on vulnerability assessments conducted by the
Department. It also requires DHS to develop a Strategic Information
Sharing Plan for transportation in order to significantly improve the
sharing of security information with all transportation stakeholders.
I introduced the Security Plans and Training for Rail and Mass
Transit Systems Amendment to H.R. 4439 on March 9, 2006. This
amendment, which mandated security plans and training for rail and mass
transit systems, was adopted by voice vote.
Information sharing--strengthening intelligence and information sharing
with local law enforcement
The 9/11 Commissioners gave a ``D'' grade on government information
sharing. This bill contains several provisions to strengthen
intelligence and information sharing with local law enforcement. First,
it strengthens state and local intelligence ``fusion'' centers, which
have been established to gather, analyze and disseminate potentially
homeland security-relevant information to appropriate state and local
officials. Second, it strengthens the presence of federal agencies,
such as the Border Patrol, at fusion centers in border states. Thirdly,
it improves the Department of Homeland Security's Information Sharing
Programs.
Terrorist Travel--strengthening Efforts to Prevent Terrorist Travel
The 9/11 Commissioners gave an ``Incomplete'' grade on preventing
terrorist travel. This bill improves the capabilities of the Human
Smuggling and Trafficking Center by authorizing additional funding to
stem human smuggling, human trafficking, and terrorism travel,
including requiring the hiring of experienced intelligence analysts in
the field of human trafficking and terrorist travel.
During my tenure as the ranking member of the Immigration and Claims
Subcommittee in the Judiciary Committee, I have stressed that alien
smuggling will not stop until we establish an immigration policy that
substantially reduces the need for illegal entry into the United
States. In the meantime, our highest priority should be to do what we
can to reduce the deaths from reckless, help in achieving that
objective, the Commercial Alien Smuggling Elimination Act (The CASE
Act). It would do this by establishing an informant program which has
been designed to facilitate the investigation and prosecution, or
disruption, of reckless commercial smuggling operations.
Finally, the CASE Act would require the Secretary of Homeland
Security to develop and implement an outreach program to educate the
public here and abroad about the penalties for smuggling aliens. It
also would provide information about the financial rewards and the
immigration benefits that would be available for assisting in the
investigation, disruption, or prosecution of a commercial alien
smuggling operation.
Furthermore, Republicans on the Homeland Security Committee defeated
(11 to 16) my amendment (No. 16) to the Department of Homeland Security
Authorization Act of Fiscal Year 2006. This amendment required the
Secretary of Homeland Security to develop and implement a comprehensive
strategy to secure the land borders, based on threat and vulnerability
assessments of our ports-of-entry and the vast stretches of land
between them.
My Rapid Response Border Protection Act:
Increases in CBP Inspectors, Funding for Essential Equipment, Foreign
Language Training, and Incentives to Improve Morale (offered by Ms.
Jackson-Lee, H.R. 4312, Nov. 16, 2005).
The Committee on Homeland Security defeated (12 to 15) the Jackson-
(1H) to H.R. 4312, the Border Security and Terrorism Prevention Act of
2005. This amendment provided:
Funding to hire and train an additional 2,000 inspectors and Border
Patrol agents each year, beginning with $375 million for Fiscal Year
2006; $692 million in Fiscal Year 2007; $1.008 billion in Fiscal Year
2008; $1.324 billion in Fiscal Year 2009; and $1.641 billion in Fiscal
Year 2010. These numbers are identical to those authorized in the 9/11
Act.
Funding to provide agents with radios, night-vision equipment, and
weapons.
Enhanced foreign language training for border agents and inspectors.
Incentives to improve the morale of border inspectors, including new
student loan payments and retirement incentives.
Preventing Terrorists from Acquiring WMD--Preventing the Proliferation
of WMD and Terrorism
The 9/11 Commissioners gave a ``D'' to the Administration and
Congress on preventing the proliferation of WMD and terrorism. This
bill includes numerous provisions to address this issue, including:
strengthening DOD's Cooperative Threat Reduction (or ``Nunn-Lugar'')
program that focuses on nuclear materials in the former Soviet Union;
strengthening the Energy Department's Global Threat Reduction
Initiative; providing for reforms, increased tools and greater
oversight over the Proliferation Security Initiative, through which the
United
[[Page H195]]
States and participating countries interdict WMD; establishing a U.S.
Coordinator for the Prevention of WMD Proliferation and Terrorism, who
would serve as an advisor to the President on all WMD proliferation
issues; and requiring the establishment of a blue-ribbon Commission on
the Prevention of WMD Proliferation and Terrorism, consisting of
experts appointed by both Congress and the President and mandated to
develop a clear and comprehensive strategy on preventing WMD
proliferation.
Enacting ``The Nuclear Black Market Counter-Terrorism Act''
The bill includes ``The Nuclear Black Market Counter-Terrorism Act,''
which requires the President to impose sanctions on any foreign person
who trades nuclear enrichment technology to a non-nuclear weapons state
or provides items that contribute to the development of a nuclear
weapon by a non-nuclear weapons state or any foreign person. Sanctions
include prohibiting foreign assistance to such person; prohibiting the
export of defense articles, defense services, or dual use items; and
prohibiting contracts. These provisions also provide that U.S.
assistance should only be provided to countries that are not
cooperating with countries or individuals who are engaged in, planning
or assisting any terrorist group in the development of nuclear weapons;
and to countries that are completely cooperating with the U.S. in its
efforts to eliminate nuclear black-market networks. This title also
includes enhanced oversight over U.S. efforts to break up nuclear black
markets.
Strategies for Reducing the Appeal of Extremism--Quality Educational
Opportunities: Promoting Quality Educational Opportunities in Arab and
Predominantly Muslim Countries
The 9/11 Commissioners gave a ``D'' grade regarding increasing
secular educational opportunities in Muslim countries. This bill would
significantly enhance the International Arab and Muslim Youth
Opportunity Fund, which is designed to improve educational
opportunities for these youth, by calling for greater funding and
outlining specific purposes for the fund. Under the bill, the fund
would be used for such purposes as enhancing modem educational
programs; funding training and exchange programs for teachers,
administrators, and students; and providing other types of assistance
such as the translation of foreign books, newspapers and other reading
materials into local languages.
Democracy and Development--Promoting Democracy and Development in Arab
and Predominantly Muslim Countries
This bill would authorize the Secretary of State to designate an
appropriate private, non-profit U.S. organization as the Middle East
Foundation and to provide funding for the foundation through the Middle
East Partnership Initiative. The purpose of this foundation would be to
support, in the countries of the Middle East, the expansion of civil
society; opportunities for political participation of all citizens;
protections for internationally recognized human rights; reforms in
education; independent media; policies that promote economic
opportunities for all citizens; the rule of law; and democratic
processes of government. It also requires the Secretary to develop 5-
year strategies on fostering human rights and democracy in order to
require a long- term approach to the promotion of democracy.
Restoring U.S. Moral Leadership--Advancing U.S. Interests Through
Public Diplomacy
The 9/11 Commissioners gave a ``C'' grade for providing a clear U.S.
message abroad. This bill calls for the U.S. to improve its
communication of ideas and information to people in countries with
significant Muslim populations, for U.S. public diplomacy to reaffirm
U.S. commitment to democratic principles, and for a significant
expansion of U.S. international broadcasting that is targeted to
countries with significant Muslim populations. The measure also
provides for ``surge'' authority to allow the Broadcasting Board of
Governors to better address emerging situations and opportunities.
Expansion of U.S. Scholarship Exchange and Library Programs in Arab and
Predominantly Muslim Countries
The 9/11 Commissioners gave a ``D'' grade regarding expanding U.S.
scholarship, exchange and library programs in Muslim countries. This
bill requires the Secretary of State to prepare a report on the 9/11
Commission's recommendations on these U.S. scholarship, exchange and
library programs, including a certification by the Secretary that such
recommendations have been implemented, or if a certification cannot be
made, what steps have been taken to implement such recommendations. The
bill also requires the GAG to review the government's efforts in this
area.
Developing Common Coalition Standards for Terrorist Detention.
The 9/11 Commission recommended that the U.S. develop a common
coalition approach on standards for terrorist detention. Last December,
the 9/11 Commissioners then gave the Administration and Congress an
``F'' grade for failing to do so. This bill requires the Secretary of
State, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense and the Attorney
General, to submit to Congress a report on progress being made to
develop such an approach.
U.S. Relationship with Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Afghanistan--
Supporting Reform in Saudi Arabia
The 9/11 Commissioners gave a ``D'' grade to the Administration and
Congress on promoting reform in Saudi Arabia. This bill calls for the
U.S. to engage Saudi Arabia on openly confronting the issue of
terrorism; to enhance counterterrorism cooperation with Saudi Arabia;
and to support Saudi Arabia's efforts to make political, economic, and
social reforms throughout the country. The measure also requires the
President to report on whether the Administration's ``Strategic
Dialogue'' with Saudi Arabia is meeting these objectives.
Helping Pakistan Handle the Threats from Extremists
The 9/11 Commissioners gave a ``C+'' grade on supporting Pakistan
against extremists. This bill requires the President to submit a report
to Congress on the long-term U.S. strategy to engage with the
Government of Pakistan to address curbing the proliferation of nuclear
weapons technology; combating poverty and corruption; promoting
democracy and the rule of law; and effectively dealing with Islamic
extremism. The measure also requires a certification that Pakistan is
addressing the continued presence of the Taliban and other violent
extremist forces throughout the country as a condition of continued
assistance. In addition, it extends the waiver of sanctions on Pakistan
because of its military coup until after Pakistan's parliamentary
elections.
Maintaining a Long-Term Commitment to Afghanistan
This bill calls for the U.S. to maintain its long-term commitment to
Afghanistan by increased assistance and the continued deployment of
U.S. troops in Afghanistan. It also calls for the President to engage
aggressively with the Government of Afghanistan and NATO to explore all
options for addressing the narcotics crisis in Afghanistan. It also
directs the President to make every effort to dramatically increase the
numbers of U.S. and international police trainers, mentors and police
personnel operating with Afghan civil security forces; and to address
current short-term shortages of energy in Afghanistan, in order to
ensure the delivery of electricity to Afghanis.
Conclusion
Madam Speaker, as I stand here today, my heart still grieves for
those who perished on flights United Airlines 93, American Airlines 77,
American Airlines 11, and United Airlines 175. When the sun rose on the
morning of September 11, none of us knew that it would end in an
inferno in the magnificent World Trade Center Towers in New York City,
the Pentagon in Washington, D.C., and in the grassy fields of
Shanksville, Pennsylvania. How I wish we could have hugged and kissed
and held each of the victims one last time.
I stand here remembering those who still suffer, whose hearts still
ache over the loss of so many innocent and interrupted lives. My prayer
is that for those who lost a father, a mother, a husband, a wife, a
child, or a friend will in the days and years ahead take comfort in the
certain knowledge that they have gone on to claim the greatest prize, a
place in the Lord's loving arms. And down here on the ground, their
memory will never die so long as any of the many of us who loved them
lives.
Madam Speaker, the best way to honor the memory of those lost in the
inferno of 9/11, is to do all we can to ensure that it never happens
again. The way to do that is to pass H.R. 1 and implement the 9/11
Commission's recommendations.
Mr. SMITH of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 2 minutes.
Mr. Speaker, section 621 of H.R. 1 requires the Department of
Homeland Security to report to Congress how it plans to implement an
automated biometric entry-and-exit data system.
A decade ago, Senator Alan Simpson and I authored the Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 which
required the Federal Government to develop such an automated entry-and-
exit system. This would enable us to know who is entering the United
States and when they leave.
Forty percent of all illegal immigrants come to the United States
legally but overstay their temporary visas. We can never begin to solve
the illegal immigration problem if we don't deal with overstays, and we
can never deal with overstays until we have a functioning exit control
system.
Instead of mandating completion of the exit component of a U.S.
visit, this bill simply requires that the administration submit a
report, a report already required by the Intelligence Reform and
Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004. The failure to fully implement an
[[Page H196]]
exit control system is more evidence that it will be a long time before
our country has secure borders. Instead of helping to change that, this
bill only requires a report.
Mr. Speaker, I am disappointed that we have missed an opportunity to
better secure our homeland.
Mr. THOMPSON of Mississippi. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to
the gentlelady from California (Ms. Loretta Sanchez).
Mr. LORETTA SANCHEZ of California. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and it
feels great to call you Mr. Chairman.
I rise today in support of H.R. 1, the Implementing the 9/11
Recommendations Act of 2007, and as a Member who has been on the
Homeland Security Committee since its inception and a ranking member on
one of its major committees, I am really thrilled that we are bringing
this legislation on the real first day of legislative business.
There are some really essential things in this. One major thing would
be to achieve real security by implementing and distributing most
homeland security grant funding on the basis of risk. After the
Department of Homeland Security's completion of a comprehensive risk
assessment, States with lower risks will be guaranteed 25 percent
funding, or 45 percent if that State has an international land or sea
border. This is important because, as we know, there are many States
that need that money, and they need it now.
Another important provision of this will be the infrastructure
database, one that I have been talking about for the last 4 years and
trying to get together. Let's just get that done. These requirements
would satisfy the 9/11 Commission recommendation for the development of
a reliable and complete list of the Nation's critical infrastructure to
be used so we can help to assess the threats and allocate the limited
resources that we have.
Of course, I am particularly pleased we are going to have an Office
of Appeals and Redress. This is something that I offered as an
amendment in committee which is included in this legislation so that
people who are on the terrorist list have some way to get off if they
are innocent.
I rise today in support of H.R. 1, the Implementing the 9/11
Recommendations Act of 2007.
Over the last several Congresses, my work as the ranking member of
the Economic Security, Infrastructure Security and Cyber Security
Subcommittee of the Homeland Security Committee has focused on the
threats to our Nation's security and how we can best protect ourselves
from those threats.
This legislation is an essential step towards achieving real security
by implementing outstanding 9/11 Commission recommendations.
One major security enhancement in this legislation is the move to
distribute most homeland security grant funding on the basis of risk.
After the Department of Homeland Security's completion of
comprehensive risk assessments, States with lower risk will be
guaranteed 25 percent of all homeland security funding, or 45 percent
if the State has an international land or sea border.
This provision strikes an appropriate balance between allocating most
of the funding based on risk, while ensuring that every State will have
the funding to maintain the necessary level of preparedness.
Another important provision in this legislation requires annual
updates of the National Asset Database, and the creation of a subset,
the National At-Risk Database which will list the infrastructure most
at risk to terrorist attacks.
In addition, the provision requires the Department of Homeland
Security to consult each State annually to discuss their assets, and
confer with them before removing a State asset from the Database.
These requirements satisfy the 9/11 Commission recommendation for the
development of a reliable and complete list of the Nation's critical
infrastructure to be used to assess threats and allocate infrastructure
protection grants.
I am also particularly pleased that a provision to establish an
Office of Appeals and Redress that I offered as an amendment in
Committee was included in this legislation.
I drafted this provision in response to my constituents' frustrations
when they were held up because they had the same name as someone on the
no-fly list, a frustration that I experienced personally several months
ago.
The establishment of this DHS-wide office will ensure a timely and
fair process for individuals that are wrongly identified, to seek
redress, correct their records and reduce, or end, repeated delays and
missed flights.
These are just a few of the important provisions in H.R. 1 that will
improve our Nation's security. I urge my colleagues to support this
important legislation.
Mr. SMITH of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the
gentleman from New Mexico (Mr. Pearce), a member of the committee.
Mr. PEARCE. Mr. Speaker, I appreciate our colleague's efforts to
secure the Nation. We join in that effort. Protecting our homeland
requires diligence, resolve and common sense, and I salute my
colleagues who drafted the bill. However, since we had no process in
committee to discuss or amend the bill, we are simply left with asking
rhetorical questions here on the floor.
We were told earlier that for $30 to $40 per container we were going
to secure America. I hold in front of me my passport. I am about to get
that renewed. Every 10 years we do that, and it is going to cost $82. I
will tell you that we had secure communications, secure briefings in
homeland security, how they cannot secure even our passports for $82,
yet we are going to secure containers that are coming from the Middle
East full of oil; we are going to secure containers full of vegetables;
and we are not going to interrupt commerce.
We cannot even count on some of our friends to protect the
intellectual property rights on compact discs, and yet we are going to
trust them to offer the security of this Nation.
These are the questions that should have come up in committee. These
are the questions that should come up today. These are the questions
that are being ignored, and we are being asked to look the other way
and declare the Nation safer.
I join with my colleagues in saying it is awfully important for us to
make the Nation safe. The way we do that is to prosecute the war on
terror, to take the will away from those people who would strike this
country, to ensure that intelligence will provide us with the resources
and the application of the resources to the areas of greatest threat.
We cannot secure containers for $30 apiece when we can't secure the
passport for $82.
Mr. THOMPSON of Mississippi. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to
the gentleman from Rhode Island (Mr. Langevin), a member of the
Homeland Security Committee.
(Mr. LANGEVIN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. LANGEVIN. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you for yielding.
Mr. Speaker, I rise today to commend this body for getting us back on
track to fully implementing all the recommendations made by the
bipartisan 9/11 Commission. The 9/11 Commission provided an objective
and eye-opening assessment of how terrorists were able to exploit our
security vulnerabilities on September 11 and made 41 key
recommendations to address these shortcomings. Unfortunately, 2\1/2\
years after the Commission's report, glaring threats still remain.
Just over a year ago, the 9/11 Discourse Project issued a report card
that gave the administration Ds and Fs in some of the most critical
areas. Today, we finally have an opportunity to ensure that the 9/11
Commission's tireless efforts were not in vain. H.R. 1 would shore up
remaining vulnerabilities and implement recommendations that have been
ignored completely or have been only partially addressed until now.
As the ranking member of the Subcommittee on the Prevention of
Nuclear and Biological Attack in the 109th Congress, I am pleased that
this bill makes it more difficult for terrorists to obtain nuclear
materials. It strengthens our global nonproliferation programs, which
have proven successful in securing the most dangerous nuclear material
abroad.
To further protect our homeland from nuclear threats, H.R. 1 also
requires 100 percent screening of cargo.
Finally, this legislation will help our first responders, who place
their lives on the line each and every day, by funding State and local
interoperable communications systems essential for emergency response.
H.R. 1 also significantly improves information sharing, which is our
first line of defense.
This is a good bill, and I urge passage.
Mr. THOMPSON of Mississippi. Mr. Speaker, I yield for the purpose of
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unanimous consent to the gentlewoman from New York (Ms. Clarke).
(Ms. CLARKE asked and was given permission to revise and extend her
remarks.)
Ms. CLARKE. Mr. Speaker, I rise as a proud New Yorker and a new
member of the Homeland Security Committee in enthusiastic support of
H.R. 1.
Mr. Speaker, I rise in full support of H.R. 1, Implementing the 9/11
Commission's Recommendations. As a New Yorker and a member of the
Homeland Security Committee, this bill will implement very important
recommendations that will ensure countries' citizens are more secure.
During the attacks of September 11, the lives of nearly 400 persons
from Brooklyn, New York, came to an abrupt end due to terrorists who
used commercial airliners as guided missiles and crashed them into both
of the World Trade Center Towers in lower Manhattan. In accordance with
the attacks, more innocent lives were lost due to an adequately
communication infrastructure. This bill will help to address this
shortfall in our first responders' ability to coordinate future rescue
efforts.
I cannot think of a better way of honoring the memories, sacrifice
and dedication of New York City's first responders: Fire Department of
New York--FDNY; Emergency Medical Service--EMS; New York Police
Department--NYPD; and the Port Authority Police Department--PAPD.
Terrorism is not an Islamic issue or a Muslim issue, it is a human
issue. No matter what form or by whom it is perpetrated, terrorism is a
direct threat to our civil society. I believe that these
recommendations will help restore civility in our world. We must
continue to demonstrate that Americans are good people, and overall, we
want to help each other. Our diplomatic efforts will become more
robust, our presence will be more visible and our day to day activities
with our neighbors around the world, more meaningful. The bill's
provisions include requiring major improvements in aviation security,
border security, and infrastructure security; providing first
responders the equipment and training they need; beefing up efforts to
prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction; and
significantly expanding diplomatic, economic, educational, and other
strategies designed to counter terrorism.
Overall, Mr. Speaker, I believe the recommendations will help make
our nation safer and will limit the likelihood of a similar attack on
our country. I fully support this legislation and encourage all of my
colleagues to do the same.
Mr. KING of New York. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2\1/2\ minutes to the
gentleman from Georgia (Mr. Gingrey).
Mr. GINGREY. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman.
Mr. Speaker, I heard all during the fall campaign from the Democratic
side of the aisle, the new majority, how they were going to fully
implement, fully implement, the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission
and talk about how the then Republican majority failed miserably, and
the 9/11 Commission gave the Republicans failing grades, failing grades
for passing 39 out of 41 recommendations by the bipartisan commission.
{time} 1615
Now, when I do the math on that, that is 95 percent. I do not know
about your school, Mr. Speaker, but at Georgia Tech, 95 percent was a
solid A.
But the point I want to make is that in no way, shape, or form is the
new majority coming forward with full implementation of the
recommendations of the 9/11 Commission. And I hope the media and I hope
the 9/11 families do not give you a pass on this.
When you look at those 41 recommendations, a couple that we were not
able to pass, that we did not pass, and I think we probably should
have, one of them was especially in regard to the House Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence, having that as a balanced committee,
almost like the House Committee on Standards of Official Behavior, the
ethics committee, where you have an equal balance between the two
sides, the commission has called for a one-vote margin, a one-person
margin for the majority. You have structured that committee with a 12-9
majority for the Democrats.
Also, the commission has called for open disclosure, Mr. Speaker, in
regard to the funding for intelligence, that every Member of this body
should have an opportunity to see what each of 15 agencies, not just
the CIA but all those agencies embedded within the Department of
Defense and under the control of the Deputy Secretary of Intelligence
within the Department, we need to know what that spending is. So let us
tell the truth and be honest with the American people.
Mr. Speaker, a little earlier, the distinguished majority leader, who
I have great respect for, and I know you have great respect for Mr.
Hoyer, said that the Democratic co-Chair of the 9/11 Commission, Mr.
Hamilton, said: ``If H.R. 1 is implemented and fully funded, the
American people will be safer.'' No, duh. But at what cost?
And, Mr. Speaker, what the former Republican majority has done in
regard to container security initiatives, we screen every container.
Mr. THOMPSON of Mississippi. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the
former sheriff from southern Indiana, who is now a Member of Congress,
Mr. Ellsworth.
Mr. ELLSWORTH. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding.
When the 9/11 Commission completed their extensive investigation,
they reported an inability of the public safety organizations at the
local, State, and Federal levels to establish compatible and adequate
communications. According to the report, a commitment had to be made to
improve the interoperability of emergency communications and
capabilities for first responders.
With nearly 25 years of law enforcement experience, I understand the
essential need for effective emergency communications. When a
devastating tornado ripped through my community in November of 2005,
our local first responders were equipped to communicate with each
other. However, the much-needed help we needed from other agencies was
difficult during this time because they were unable to speak to us when
they came on the scene.
For too long Congress has been decidedly ineffective in addressing
our country's most pressing security needs. The 9/11 Commission gave
Congress an F on ensuring communication interoperability for first
responders. We need to rectify this. Congress and the Federal
Government can and must do better, and that is why I stand in support
and strongly endorse the implementation of the 9/11 Commission's
recommendations.
Mr. KING of New York. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman
from Connecticut, who has been on this issue for so many years,
including before September 11, Mr. Shays.
Mr. SHAYS. I thank the gentleman for yielding, and I just want to say
to Peter King, as chairman you ran this committee in such a bipartisan
way and worked well with the now-chairman, and I just hope and pray
that this continues on a bipartisan basis.
I want to say as well that I am excited to be back for 2 years to
wrestle with the people's business, and these are very important
issues.
As co-chairman of the 9/11 Commission Caucus, I could tell you
reasons why you might want to vote against the bill. It does not
provide the total amount spent on intelligence. It does not address
recommendations to shift covert operations from CIA to defense. It does
not create a separate appropriation subcommittee on intelligence. It
does not make a select permanent committee a full committee, nor does
it address the jurisdictions of the Department of Homeland Security.
I could tell you those would be reasons why you could be
disappointed. But why you should like this bill is that it deals with
expanding risk-based funding, and it deals more with interoperability,
which is a huge issue.
I am particularly concerned about screening all cargo on passenger
planes within 3 years, and I am happy this bill does that. Cargo
screening, I am not sure if it will screen 100 percent of cargo, but I
do think it moves us towards doing what we need to do to identify
radiation and potential nuclear weapons. I particularly like making the
Privacy and Civil Liberties Board an independent agency and giving it
subpoena power.
These are things that I think move the ball forward. I think
Republicans did it in the last session, and I think this legislation is
a good step forward. So we can find reasons why we may not like it; but
I would hope, in the end, on a bipartisan basis, we can recognize that
it does a lot more good and therefore deserves our support.
Again, I thank Mr. King for his leadership as chairman, and I welcome
our new chairman.
Mr. THOMPSON of Mississippi. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may
[[Page H198]]
consume to the distinguished member of the Committee on Energy and
Commerce, the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Stupak).
Mr. STUPAK. Mr. Speaker, on behalf of Mr. Dingell, who unfortunately
is delayed at the White House, I want to enter into a colloquy with the
gentleman from Mississippi.
I appreciate the gentleman's yielding to me to consider the aspects
of H.R. 1 that are of jurisdictional interests to the Committee on
Energy and Commerce. I regret that time will not allow for a full
discussion on the floor of the areas where clarification and
collaboration are warranted.
Earlier today, Mr. Dingell sent a letter to you, Mr. Chairman,
outlining areas where the Energy and Commerce Committee would like to
work together with your committee in a meaningful manner as the bill
moves forward. The response received was that you recognize the
Committee on Energy and Commerce has jurisdictional interest in a
number of aspects of the bill. Mr. Dingell wishes to get assurances
from you that you will work with us and members of the Energy and
Commerce Committee as this legislation moves forward to ensure that the
bill does not result in the private sector being subjected to
conflicting or inconsistent rules or guidance. Does the gentleman from
Mississippi agree?
Mr. THOMPSON of Mississippi. I agree we should avoid conflicting or
inconsistent rules or guidance.
Mr. STUPAK. I thank the chairman, and I hereby submit both letters
for the Record to ensure the record is complete on this matter.
House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Washington, DC, January 9, 2007.
Hon. John D. Dingell,
Rayburn House Office Building,
Washington, DC.
Dear Chairman Dingell: I appreciate your letter regarding
certain aspects of H.R. 1, the ``Implementing the 9/11
Commission Recommendations Act of 2007.''
While it is important to note that I do not control the
entire process, as there are other House Committees involved
and the Senate will likely have its own positions on a
variety of these issues, I would be glad to work with you as
the legislation moves forward. I agree we should avoid
conflicting or inconsistent rules and guidance. As for the
specific areas of interest that you raise in your letter, I
am pleased to respond to each issue, point by point, as
raised in your letter.
First, I would say that it is the my intention that the
Secretary of Homeland Security, in developing risk-based
funding criteria for first responder programs, coordinate
with the Secretary of Health and Human Services.
Additionally, I am pleased to work with you to ensure that
issues regarding the Department of Energy's Megaports program
and the cargo scanning requirement contained in the bill are
addressed.
Your letter also seeks clarification on the intended impact
of the word ``except'' in section 901 of the bill and how it
would relate to activities underway by the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA). In answer to your question, I do
agree that the effect of the ``except'' clause is that there
is no requirement that for the Department of Homeland
Security to perform vulnerability assessments at drinking
water utilities. However, I note that the Department of
Homeland Security does use the drinking water vulnerability
assessments conducted under the Safe Drinking Water Act for a
number of purposes, and it works with the EPA on these
issues. It is not the intention of this legislation to affect
that relationship either. Additionally, it is not my
intention that the voluntary program outlined in Title XI of
the bill interfere with the mandatory Clean Air Act program.
As for energy, I am pleased to work with you to clarify that
the bill does not intend to conflict with respect to the
types of energy-related regulatory or administrative regimes
identified in your letter.
Finally, with respect to your questions on
telecommunications and cybersecurity, I am pleased to work
with you on the matters raised and agree that the bill does
not attempt in any way to diminish or dilute any authority or
resources of the Assistant Secretary for Cyber Security or of
other Federal agencies engaged in efforts to secure cyber
space. I would note that Rep. Zoe Lofgren, a Member of the
Homeland Security Committee, was one of the original sponsors
of H.R. 285, the bill to create the Assistant Secretary of
Cyber Security, during the 109th Congress. I have been glad
to work to create this position, and I agree that is not the
intention of the bill to weaken that position. I also do not
intend to weaken other federal cyber security efforts.
I appreciate the cooperation in this manner and look
forward to working with you, as this bill moves through the
legislative process.
Sincerely,
Bennie G. Thompson,
Chairman.
____
Congress of the United States,
House of Representatives,
Washington, DC, January 9, 2007.
Hon. Bennie G. Thompson,
Chairman, Committee on Homeland Security,
House of Representatives, Washington, DC.
Dear