[Congressional Record Volume 153, Number 3 (Monday, January 8, 2007)]
[Senate]
[Pages S237-S239]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

      By Mr. LUGAR:
  S. 198. A bill to improve authorities to address urgent 
nonproliferation crises and United States nonproliferation operations; 
to the Committee on Foreign Relations.
  Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, today I am introducing the Nunn-Lugar 
Cooperative Threat Reduction Act of 2007. This legislation is based on 
a bill I first offered in 2005. It is focused on facilitating 
implementation of the Nunn-Lugar program and removing some of the self-
imposed restrictions that complicate or delay the destruction of 
weapons of mass destruction.
  In 2005, the Senate approved this legislation in the form of an 
amendment I offered to the National Defense Authorization Act by an 
overwhelming vote of 78 to 19. Last year, the Senate adopted a similar 
amendment by unanimous consent. Unfortunately, these provisions were 
not included in either conference agreement.
  While well-intentioned, the congressionally-imposed conditions on 
Nunn-Lugar have inhibited the amount of work that can be done to 
eliminate and safeguard weapons of mass destruction in the former 
Soviet Union. Each year, a six month, thirteen step certification and 
waiver process must be completed before appropriated funds can be 
obligated to eliminate weapons of mass destruction. This annual process 
wastes money and valuable time--time lost in the fight against 
proliferation. In the field, it can prevent the availability of funds 
already authorized and appropriated by Congress for the Nunn-Lugar 
Program, thus delaying critical dismantlement work.
  To date, the Nunn-Lugar program has deactivated for destroyed: 6, 934 
nuclear warheads; 637 ICBMs; 485 ICBM silos; 81 ICBM mobile missile 
lauchers; 155 bombers; 906 nuclear air-to-surface missiles; 436 
submarine missile launchers; 601 submarine launched missiles; 30 
nuclear submarines; and 194 nuclear test tunnels.
  Perhaps most importantly, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan emerged 
from the Soviet Union as the 3rd, 4th, and 8th largest nuclear weapons 
powers in the world. Today, all three are nuclear weapons free as a 
result of cooperative efforts under the Nunn-Lugar program.
  The Nunn-Lugar Program currently has a permanent waiver authority, to 
be used on an annual basis, for the congressionally-imposed 
certifications on the Nunn-Lugar program. While the waiver permits the 
program to continue its important work, the waiver does not solve the 
underlying problem.
  In 1991, concerns surrounding Russian commitments to nonproliferation 
led the original Nunn-Lugar legislation to require President to certify 
annually that each recipient is ``committed to'' meeting six 
conditions: 1. Making a substantial investment in dismantling or 
destroying such weapons; 2. forgoing any military modernization program 
that exceeds legitimate defense requirements and forgoing the 
replacement of destroyed weapons of mass destruction; 3. forgoing any 
use of fissionable and other components of destroyed nuclear weapons in 
new nuclear weapons; 4. facilitating United States verification of 
weapons destruction carried out under the program; 5. complying with 
all relevant arms control agreements; and 6. observing internationally 
recognized human rights, including the protection of minorities.
  At the time, these conditions were important to defining the U.S. 
strategic relationship with each Nunn-Lugar recipient. The question we 
must answer today is, what national security benefit do the 
certification requirements provide the American people? Do the 
conditions make it easier or harder to eliminate weapons of mass 
destruction in Russia or elsewhere? Do the conditions make it more 
likely or less likely that weapons are eliminated?
  Congress imposed an additional six conditions on construction of the 
chemical weapons destruction program at Shchuchye. These conditions 
include: 1. Full and accurate Russian declaration on the size of its 
chemical weapons stockpile; 2. allocation by Russia of at least 
$25,000,000 to chemical weapons elimination; 3. development by Russia 
of a practical plan for destroying its stockpile of nerve agents; 4. 
enactment of a law by Russia that provides for the elimination of all 
nerve agents at a single site; 5. an agreement by Russia to destroy or 
convert its chemical weapons production facilities at Volgograd and 
Novocheboksark; and 6. a demonstrated commitment from the international 
community to fund and build infrastructure needed to support and 
operate the facility.
  Some will suggest that the certification process is, at most, an 
annoyance, but not a serious programmatic threat. I disagree. While 
well intentioned, these conditions delay and complicate efforts to 
destroy weapons of mass destruction. If the proliferation of weapons of 
mass destruction is the number one national security threat facing our 
country, we cannot permit any delays in our response.
  The Bush Administration withheld Russia's certification in 2002 
because of concerns in the chemical and biological weapon arenas. 
President Bush recognized the predicament and requested waiver 
authority for the Congressionally-imposed conditions. While awaiting 
temporary waiver to be authorized in law, new Nunn-Lugar projects were 
stalled and no new contracts were finalized between April 16 to August 
9, 2002. This delay caused numerous disarmament projects in Russia to 
be put on hold, including: 1. Installation of security enhancements at 
ten nuclear weapons storage sites; 2. initiation of the dismantlement 
of two strategic missile submarines and thirty submarine-launched 
ballistic missiles; and 3. initiation of the dismantlement of SS-24 
rail-mobile and SS-25 road-mobile ICBMs and launchers. Clearly,

[[Page S238]]

these projects were in the national security interest of the United 
States, but they were delayed because of self-imposed conditions and 
bureaucratic red tape. A second period of delay began on October 1, 
2002, with the expiration of a temporary waiver. Again, U.S. national 
security suffered with the postponement of critical dismantlement and 
security activities for some six weeks until Congress acted.

  The events of 2002 are not the exceptions: They are the rule. In some 
years, Nunn-Lugar funds are not available for expenditure until more 
than half of the fiscal year has passed, and weapons of mass 
destruction slated for dismantlement await the U.S. bureaucratic 
process. This means that the program is denied access to these funds 
for large portions of the fiscal year in which they were intended to be 
spent while critical nonproliferation projects are put on hold. The 
bureaucracy generates reams of paper and yet ultimately produces an 
outcome that was never in doubt; namely, that it is in the national 
security interests of the United States to eliminate weapons of mass 
destruction in Russia and elsewhere.
  The certification and waiver processes consume hundreds of man-hours 
of work by the State Department, the Intelligence Community, the 
Pentagon, as well as other departments and agencies. This time could be 
better spent tackling the proliferation threats facing our country. 
Instead of interdicting WMD shipments, identifying the next AQ Khan, or 
locating hidden stocks of chemical and biological weapons, our 
nonproliferation experts spend their time compiling reports and 
assembling certification or waiver determinations. Even more 
frustrating is the fact that the majority of these reports are 
repetitive, in that the Department of State already reports on most of 
these issues in other formats.
  Some will argue that the certification process provides the 
Administration with leverage on Russian behavior. I disagree. I do not 
believe any of the certification subjects are a good reason to stop the 
destruction and safeguarding of weapons of mass destruction. I would 
argue just the opposite; these are reasons for us to accelerate our 
efforts and become more vigilant in our approach.
  These programmatic delays have given Russia, and others, cover to 
hide behind, pointing the finger of blame on the United States for slow 
program implementation and taking the spotlight off their failure to 
provide access and transparency. While we call on President Putin to 
speed up dismantlement and open more sites for security upgrades, 
congressionally-imposed conditions and funding delays are used as 
arguments against accelerating Nunn-Lugar projects.
  I have concluded that despite the best intentions of Congress, the 
certification requirements on the Nunn-Lugar program have outlasted 
their utility. While the goals of the conditions are pure, they simply 
do not belong on nonproliferation programs. I would point out that the 
equally important nonproliferation programs at the Departments of 
Energy and State do not have these conditions. They do not suffer from 
the annual certification and waiver process. Why should the Nunn-Lugar 
program, focused on the dismantlement of nuclear, chemical and 
biological weapons, be singled out for this treatment or need for 
leverage.
  I am pleased that a number of administration officials and groups 
have endorsed the elimination of the certification and waiver process. 
The 9/11 Commission Report weighed in with an important endorsement of 
the Nunn-Lugar program, saying that ``Preventing the proliferation of 
[weapons of mass destruction] warrants a maximum effort--by 
strengthening counter-proliferation efforts, expanding the 
Proliferation Security Initiative, and supporting the Cooperative 
Threat Reduction Program.'' The Report went on to say that ``Nunn-Lugar 
. . . is now in need of expansion, improvement and resources.'' More 
recently, the follow-on 9/11 Public Discourse Project wrote that the 
elimination of the certification requirements ``is an important step 
forward in protecting the United States against catastrophic attack.''
  Secretary Rice has testified that the Administration strongly 
supports my efforts pointing out that ``flexibility in being able to 
administer the program would be most welcome.'' Bob Joseph, the Under 
Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, also 
expressed his support saying pointedly to me that ``the fact that there 
are 13 steps that can take . . . six months or longer to get through 
certainly . . . underlines the rationale for [this legislation] . . . 
Whatever we can do, Senator, to improve the efficiency of the process, 
to reduce the time lines involved, and to provide greater flexibility 
for action, I would be in favor of.''
  Charles Boyd, USAF (Ret.) and Stanley Weiss, the Chief Executive 
Officer and Chairman, respectively, of the Business Executives for 
National Security, wrote to the Armed Services Committees of the House 
and Senate expressing support for the elimination of the certification 
requirements on the Nunn-Lugar program. They wrote in part: ``Even 
though conditions can be waived, doing so diverts time and effort that 
could otherwise be used to meet proliferation challenges. Relying on 
waivers also preserves the risk that funding delays could threaten 
existing projects and investments.''
  In sum, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is the 
number one national security threat facing the United States today. The 
Nunn-Lugar program is making tremendous contributions to the 
elimination of potentially vulnerable stockpiles. While the Congress' 
intentions in imposing annual certification requirements were pure, the 
process has evolved into a bureaucratic quagmire in to which months of 
work by numerous departments, agencies and bureaus are sunk. The 
Administration toils to produce a forgone conclusion; namely, that it 
is in U.S. interests to eliminate and secure weapons and materials of 
mass destruction. The funds for these operations are delayed while 
threats remain unaddressed. This is red-tape that we can do without. 
The only practical effect is unnecessary delays to our response to the 
number one national security threat facing the United States.
  There being no objection, the text of the bill was ordered to be 
printed in the Record, as follows:

                                 S. 199

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. GRANTS TO ALASKA TO IMPROVE SANITATION IN RURAL 
                   AND NATIVE VILLAGES.

       Section 303 of the Safe Drinking Water Act Amendments of 
     1996 (33 U.S.C. 1263a) is amended--
       (1) by redesignating subsection (e) as subsection (h);
       (2) by inserting after subsection (d) the following:
       ``(e) Requirements.--As a condition of receiving a grant 
     under this section, the State of Alaska shall--
       ``(1) require each applicant to clearly identify the scope 
     and the goal of the project for which funding is sought and 
     how the funds will be used to meet the specific, stated goal 
     of the project;
       ``(2) establish long-term goals for the program, including 
     providing water and sewer systems to Alaska Native villages; 
     and
       ``(3) carry out regular reviews of grantees to determine if 
     the stated scope and goals of each grant are being met.
       ``(f) Reporting.--Not later than December 31 of the 
     calendar year following the fiscal year in which this 
     subsection is enacted, and annually thereafter, the State of 
     Alaska shall submit to the Administrator of the Environmental 
     Protection Agency a report describing the information 
     obtained under subsection (e) during the fiscal year ending 
     the preceding September 30, including--
       ``(1) the specific goals of each project;
       ``(2) how funds were used to meet the goal; and
       ``(3) whether the goals were met.
       ``(g) Review.--
       ``(1) In general.--The Administrator of the Environmental 
     Protection Agency shall require the State of Alaska to 
     correct any deficiencies identified in a report under 
     subsection (f).
       ``(2) Failure to correct or reach agreement.--
       ``(A) In general.--If a deficiency in a project included in 
     a report under subsection (f) is not corrected within a 
     period of time agreed to by the Administrator and the State 
     of Alaska, the Administrator shall not permit additional 
     expenditures for that project.
       ``(B) Time agreement.--
       ``(i) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date 
     of submission to the Administrator of a report under 
     subsection (f), the Administrator and the State of Alaska 
     shall reach an agreement on a period of time referred to in 
     subparagraph (A).
       ``(ii) Failure to reach agreement.--If the State of Alaska 
     and the Administrator fail to reach an agreement on the 
     period of time to correct a deficiency in a project included

[[Page S239]]

     in a report under subsection (f) by the deadline specified in 
     clause (i), the Administrator shall not permit additional 
     expenditures for that project.''; and
       (3) in subsection (h) (as redesignated by paragraph (1))--
       (A) by striking ``$40,000,000'' and inserting 
     ``$42,000,000''; and
       (B) by striking ``2005'' and inserting ``2010''.
                                 ______