[Congressional Record Volume 152, Number 135 (Friday, December 8, 2006)]
[Senate]
[Pages S11743-S11744]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

      By Mr. HATCH (for himself, Mr. Levin, Ms. Collins, and Mr. 
        Biden):
  S. 4115. A bill to amend the Controlled Substances Act to increase 
the effectiveness of physician assistance for drug treatment; 
considered and passed.
  Ms. SNOWE. Mr. President, among the most consequential tasks Congress 
will undertake in the coming months is a potentially epoch-defining 
review of U.S. trade policy occasioned by the looming expiry of 
numerous trade preference programs, ``fast-track'' Trade Promotion 
Authority and the Doha Round of World Trade Organization negotiations. 
The fate of recent trade legislation, mirroring growing acrimony in the 
public debate over trade policy, portends that Congress will not simply 
be considering whether to reauthorize certain programs and processes 
affecting international trade--it will be setting forth a doctrine 
declaring America's position and powers in an irreversibly 
interdependent global economy.
  The complexity of the market forces that can bring both hope and 
hardship under the modern trade regime mean that few other issues cut 
across traditionally drawn party, geographic and ideological lines so 
dramatically. Where the usual political dichotomies don't apply, new 
ones have been framed to polarize the issue: free-trade versus fair-
trade, globalization versus protectionism, growth versus 
sustainability.
  Yet above this fray of competing economic theories and realities, a 
solid consensus has grown around the principle that whatever our trade 
laws may be, they should be consistently and vigorously enforced.
  The distressing reality is that U.S. industry and labor groups are 
often rebuffed in attempts to petition the United States Trade 
Representative to initiate a formal investigation or bring a dispute 
resolution action under the relevant multilateral or bilateral trade 
agreement, as there is considerable institutional momentum among senior 
officials at USTR and elsewhere in the administration against bringing 
formal enforcement action against certain trade partners, and China in 
particular.

[[Page S11744]]

  USTR's handling of the trade effects of China's currency manipulation 
practices is representative of the problem. In September 2004, a U.S. 
industry coalition filed a petition under section 301 of the Trade Act 
of 1974--the statute setting forth general procedures for the 
enforcement of U.S. trade rights--alleging that Chinese currency 
manipulation practices constituted a violation of China's obligations 
to the United States under World Trade Organization rules, and calling 
for USTR to conduct an investigation of such practices. USTR rejected 
the petition on the day it was filed, contending that ``an 
investigation would not be effective in addressing the acts, policies, 
and practices covered in the petition. The administration is currently 
involved in efforts to address with the Government of China the 
currency valuation issues raised in the petition. The USTR believes 
that initiation of an investigation under--the section 301 process--
would hamper, rather than advance, administration efforts to address 
Chinese currency valuation policies.'' Shortly thereafter, in November 
of 2004, a congressional coalition of 12 Senators and 23 
Representatives filed a similar section 301 petition, which was 
rejected by USTR on the same grounds.
  As noted in USTR's rejection of these petitions, current law allows 
the Executive to decline to initiate an industry-requested 
investigation where it determines that action under section 301 would 
be ineffective in addressing the offending act, policy or practice. The 
merits of USTR's determination are unreviewable under current law. USTR 
used this loophole to avoid having to even investigate industry's 
claim, let alone take formal action against China. And as we now know, 
the administration's ``soft'' approach to Chinese currency manipulation 
has itself proven ineffective in addressing the problem in the 2 years 
since these filings.
  It is to prevent further disregard for U.S. businesses and workers 
seeking a fair and consequential hearing of their concerns with foreign 
trade practices that I today introduce the Trade Complaint and 
Litigation Accountability Improvement Measures Act, or the ``Trade 
CLAIM Act''.
  The Trade CLAIM Act would amend the section 301 process to require 
the U.S. Trade Representative to act upon an interested party's 
petition to take formal action in cases where a U.S. trade right has 
been violated, except in instances where: the matter has already been 
addressed by the relevant trade dispute settlement body; the foreign 
country is taking imminent steps to end to ameliorate the effects of 
the practice; taking action would do more harm than good to the U.S. 
economy; or taking action would cause serious harm to the national 
security of the United States.
  The bill would also grant the Court of International Trade 
jurisdiction to review de novo USTR's denials of section 301 industry 
petitions to investigate and take enforcement action against unfair 
foreign trade laws or practices. Such jurisdiction would include the 
ability to review USTR determinations that U.S. trade rights have not 
been violated as alleged in industry petitions, and the sufficiency of 
formal actions taken by USTR in response to foreign trade laws or 
practices determined to violate U.S. trade rights.
  The Trade CLAIM Act would give U.S. businesses and workers a greater 
say in whether, when and how U.S. trade rights should be enforced. The 
bill would be particularly beneficial to small businesses, which--like 
other petitioners in section 301 cases--currently have no avenue to 
formally challenge the merits of USTR's decisions, and are often 
drowned out by large business interests in industry-wide section 301 
actions initiated by USTR.
  By providing for judicial review of USTR decisions not to enforce 
U.S. trade rights, the bill provides for impartial third party 
oversight by a specialty court not subject to political and diplomatic 
pressures. In delinking discreet trade disputes from the mercurial 
machinations of international relations, this act would end the 
sacrifice of individual industries on the negotiating table, and leave 
it to the free market--uniformly operating under the trade rules to 
which our trading partners have already agreed--to decide their fate.
  America's prosperity is due in no small part to its excellence in 
assuring the rule of law. It is fundamental to the success of worthy 
enterprises in a functioning market that the government--rather than 
choosing winners and losers--consistently and dispassionately enforce 
the rules that bind all actors. It is the extension of this 
foundational principle of the American economic tradition to the 
international trade regime that the Trade CLAIM Act seeks to 
accomplish--and which America's businesses and workers have long been 
promised.
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