[Congressional Record Volume 152, Number 135 (Friday, December 8, 2006)]
[House]
[Pages H9146-H9155]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
CONFERENCE REPORT ON H.R. 5682, HENRY J. HYDE UNITED STATES-INDIA
PEACEFUL ATOMIC ENERGY COOPERATION ACT OF 2006
Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, pursuant to the rule, I call up the conference
report on the bill (H.R. 5682) to exempt from certain requirements of
the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 a proposed nuclear agreement for
cooperation with India.
The Clerk read the title of the bill.
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Rehberg). Pursuant to House Resolution
1101, the conference report is considered read.
(For conference report and statement, see proceedings of the House of
December 7, 2006, at page H8934.)
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Hyde) and
the gentleman from California (Mr. Lantos) each will control 30
minutes.
Mr. MARKEY. Mr. Speaker, I would like to claim the time in opposition
to the bill.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Does the gentleman from California oppose
the conference report?
Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Speaker, I do not oppose the bill.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 8(d) of rule XXII, the
gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Hyde), the gentleman from California (Mr.
Lantos), and the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Markey) each will
control 20 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Illinois.
General Leave
Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may
have 5 legislative days to revise and extend their remarks and include
any extraneous material on the conference report to H.R. 5682.
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Hayes). Is there objection to the
request of the gentleman from Illinois?
There was no objection.
Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Speaker, the President has said that legislation to permit the
establishment of civil nuclear trade with India is essential to
establishing a new global partnership between the United States and
India. The conference report before this House is the product of more
than a year of effort by Members and staff of the House International
Relations Committee and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. It is
based on the separate bills passed overwhelmingly in the House and the
Senate and preserves the key provisions of both.
The conferees believe that this report represents a judicious
balancing of competing priorities that encompass a broad range of
subjects from U.S. policy in South Asia to the highly technical and
complex world of nuclear export licenses. It is the product of months
of discussions with the administration regarding virtually every
section, and the conferees have gone to great lengths to accommodate
the administration on its issues of concern.
I would like to express my appreciation for the cooperation of the
Committee on Science, the Judiciary, Energy, Government Reform, Armed
Services and Rules in helping expedite
[[Page H9147]]
the consideration of this conference report. Their cooperation should
not be interpreted as having any impact on their rights under the
jurisdictional rules and precedents of the House.
I insert for the Record some correspondence related to this issue.
Committee on Energy and Commerce,
Washington, DC, December 5, 2006.
Hon. Henry J. Hyde,
Chairman, Committee on International Relations, House of
Representatives, Washington, DC.
Dear Chairman Hyde: I write concerning H.R. 5682, the Henry
J. Hyde United States and India Nuclear Cooperation Promotion
Act of 2006, as amended. As you know, the Committee on Energy
and Commerce has jurisdiction over Title II of the amended
text.
I recognize your desire to bring this legislation before
the House in an expeditious manner. Accordingly, I will not
exercise my Committee's right to a full referral on the bill.
By agreeing to waive its consideration of the bill, however,
the Committee on Energy and Commerce does not waive its
jurisdiction over H.R. 5682.
Thank you for your attention to these matters.
Sincerely,
Joe Barton,
Chairman.
____
Committee on
International Relations,
Washington, DC, December 5, 2006.
Hon. Duncan Hunter,
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: Thank you for your letter regarding H.R.
5682, relating to nuclear energy cooperation between the
United States and India. I agree that the Committee on Armed
Services has valid jurisdictional claims to certain
provisions in this important legislation, and I am most
appreciative of your decision not to seek appointment of
conferees in the interest of concluding the conference on
H.R. 5682. I agree that by foregoing the appointment of
conferees, the Committee on Armed Services is not waiving its
jurisdiction. Further, this exchange of letters will be
included in the Congressional Record during consideration of
the conference report on the House floor.
Sincerely,
Henry Hyde,
Chairman.
____
Committee on International
Relations,
Washington, DC, December 5, 2006.
Hon. Joe Barton,
Chairman, Committee on Energy and Commerce, House of
Representatives, Washington, DC.
Dear Chairman Barton: I write concerning H.R. 5682, the
Henry J. Hyde United States and India Nuclear Cooperation
Promotion Act of 2006, as amended.
I appreciate the fact that, although the Committee on
Energy and Commerce has jurisdiction over substantial parts
of Title II, you have been gracious enough not to exercise
your Committee's right to a full referral on the bill, in
order to expedite its consideration in the House
consideration.
I acknowledge that by agreeing to waive its consideration
of the bill, the Energy and Commerce Committee is not waiving
any of its jurisdiction over the bill.
Thank you for your cooperation in this matter.
Sincerely,
Henry J. Hyde,
Chairman.
____
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC, December 5, 2006.
Hon. Henry Hyde,
Chairman, Committee on International Relations, Washington,
DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: On November 16, 2006, the Senate passed
by unanimous consent S. 3709, the United States-India
Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act. As you know certain
provisions in S. 3709 fall within the jurisdiction of the
Committee on Armed Services.
Our Committee recognizes the importance of S. 3709 and the
need for the legislation to move expeditiously. Therefore,
while we have a valid claim to jurisdiction over certain
provisions and would otherwise be entitled to the appointment
of conferees, the Committee on Armed Services will not seek
appointment on S. 3709 given the time constraints.
I would appreciate the inclusion of this letter and a copy
of your response in the Congressional Record during
consideration of the conference report on the House floor.
With best wishes.
Sincerely,
Duncan Hunter,
Chairman.
____
Committee on Government Reform,
Washington, DC, December 8, 2006.
Hon. Henry. J. Hyde,
Chairman, Committee on International Relations, House of
Representatives, Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: The House is scheduled to consider today
the conference report on H.R. 5682, the ``United States-India
Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act.'' Thank you for
consulting with the Committee on Government Reform regarding
section 231 regarding the protection of confidentiality of
information.
While I am unable to support the policy set forth in
section 231, I will not object to H.R. 5682 moving to the
floor. I do so only with the understanding that this
procedural route will not prejudice the Committee's
jurisdictional interest and its prerogatives in this bill or
similar legislation in the future.
I request that you include our exchange of letters on this
matter in the Congressional Record during consideration, of
this bill on the House floor. Thank you for your attention to
these matters.
Sincerely,
Tom Davis,
Chairman.
____
Committee on International
Relations,
December 8, 2006.
Hon. Tom Davis,
Chairman, House Committee on Government Reform, Washington,
DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: I am writing to you concerning the
conference report for H.R. 5682, the ``United States-India
Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act.'' Section 231,
regarding the protection of confidentiality of information,
is within the jurisdiction of your Committee.
In the interest of permitting this House to proceed
expeditiously to consider the conference report for H.R.
5682, I appreciate your willingness to support this
conference report moving to the floor. I understand that such
a waiver only applies to this language in this bill, and not
to the underlying subject matter.
I appreciate you willingness to allow us to proceed. I will
insert this exchange of letters into the Congressional Record
during the debate on this bill.
Sincerely,
Henry J. Hyde,
Chairman.
____
Committee on Science
Washington, DC, December 8, 2006.
Hon. Henry J. Hyde,
Chairman, Committee on International Relations, Washington,
DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: I am writing regarding the
jurisdictional interest of the Science Committee in H.R. 5682
as amended by the Senate, and the Conference Report to the
Henry J. Hyde United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy
Cooperation Act of 2006 (H. Rpt. 109-721). The Science
Committee has jurisdiction over Title II, United States
Additional Protocol Implementation.
The Science Committee recognizes the importance of H.R.
5682 and the Conference Report and the need for the
legislation to move expeditiously. Therefore, I will not
stand in the way of floor consideration. This, of course, is
conditional on our mutual understanding that nothing in this
legislation or my decision to allow the bill to come to the
floor waives, reduces or otherwise affects the jurisdiction
of the Science Committee, and that a copy of this letter and
your letter in response will be included in the Congressional
Record when the Conference Report is considered on the House
Floor.
Thank you for your attention to this matter.
Sincerely,
Sherwood Boehlert,
Chairman.
____
Committee on International
Relations,
December 8, 2006.
Hon. Sherwood Boehlert,
Chairman, Committee on Science, Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: Thank you for your letter regarding the
jurisdictional interest of the Science Committee in H.R. 5682
as amended by the Senate, and the Conference Report to the
Henry J. Hyde United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy
Cooperation Act of2006 (H. Rpt. 109-721). I appreciate your
willingness to work with me so that is important legislation
can move expeditiously.
By allowing the Conference Report to be scheduled for floor
consideration, I agree that the Committee on Science has not
waived, reduced or otherwise affected the jurisdiction of the
Science Committee, nor should this action be taken as
precedent for other bills. I further agree that a copy of our
exchange of letters will be included in the Congressional
Record when the Conference Report is considered on the House
Floor.
Thank you for your attention to this matter.
Sincerely,
Henry Hyde,
Chairman.
Mr. Speaker, this legislation provides the President with the
authority he requires to permit the establishment of civil nuclear
cooperation with India while also protecting the traditional
congressional prerogatives in approving agreements of this type. It
also strengthens the global nonproliferation regime by ensuring that
India will become a full and active participant in efforts to prevent
the spread of nuclear weapons capability, especially regarding Iran.
The conferees believe this conference report will pass overwhelmingly
in both houses and quickly be signed by the President. Upon signing,
the President will be able to proceed with the negotiation of a civil
nuclear cooperation agreement with India that will become the
cornerstone of a new and cooperative partnership between the U.S.
[[Page H9148]]
and India, the world's two largest democracies.
Mr. Speaker, I strongly support this legislation and urge my
colleagues to vote for its passage.
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of this conference
report, and I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Speaker, India today is the preeminent state in South Asia. It is
becoming a political and economic powerhouse of over 1.1 billion people
with a thriving economy and a vibrant democracy. By these and other
measures, India is a state that should be at the very center of our
foreign policy and our attention. Regrettably, during the Cold War our
two countries were unnaturally estranged by the dynamics of the
international system. Slowly, during the 1990s our countries' interests
began to converge and our relationship warmed.
Then, Mr. Speaker, 6\1/2\ years ago President Clinton made a historic
trip to India and ushered in a new era of cooperation between our two
great democratic nations. Washington and New Delhi have wisely built
upon the foundations that President Clinton laid. Today they expand
this mighty architecture of cooperation and friendship by approving, on
a strongly bipartisan basis, the Henry J. Hyde United States-India
Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act of 2006.
With this legislation, the House of Representatives steps forth into
the spotlight to offer its judgment on one critical element of this new
relationship, civilian nuclear cooperation, and it establishes the
process by which Congress will in the near future review and vote on
the final agreement to implement such cooperation. This expansion of
peaceful nuclear trade with India will usher in a new partnership
between India and the United States based on our shared objective of
preventing the spread of dangerous nuclear technology to countries and
groups that would use it for evil purposes.
This is not the administration's bill, Mr. Speaker. Their original
proposal sought to give the President complete authority to waive all
restrictions under current law that would have complicated
implementation of the U.S.-India nuclear trade and to severely limit
congressional oversight by securing a preapproval for whatever
agreement the U.S. and India conclude. There would have been no
effective subsequent review by the Congress. By contrast, at our
insistence, this legislation strikes the right balance between giving
the President the necessary flexibility to negotiate the best agreement
possible with New Delhi while at the same time preserving congressional
oversight and the right of consent to the resulting agreement.
Mr. Speaker, this conference report follows the model laid out in the
Hyde-Lantos legislation overwhelmingly approved by the House last July.
It ensures that Congress will have the final word on whether or not the
final agreement for cooperation with India can become law. This
conference report will provide the President with only partial
authority to waive current provisions of U.S. law to allow peaceful
nuclear-related trade with India to take place. But cooperation could
only take place after Congress has approved the agreement of
cooperation itself.
Mr. Speaker, the legislation will help fashion a partnership with
India to further U.S. nonproliferation goals. The passage of the
conference report will also adopt the implementing legislation for the
U.S.-IAEA additional protocol. That legislation will finally allow us
to bring that protocol in force which will promote the U.S. goal of all
states adopting the enhanced safeguards contained in the additional
protocol.
Mr. Speaker, this is a historic day for this House and for the United
States. I urge all of my colleagues to give their full support to this
conference report and to help usher in a new day in U.S.-India
relations.
Mr. Speaker, it is only fitting that on the last day of this session
of Congress, Chairman Hyde is chairing a bipartisan agreement done with
cooperation in both Chambers. H.R. 5682 represents the right way of
legislating, ample preparation, consideration of all ideas, bipartisan
cooperation, cordial relations with the other body, and keen attention
to institutional prerogatives. It is especially fitting that it will be
forever identified with the outgoing chairman of the House
International Relations Committee. And if it weren't for his
astonishing array of accomplishments, the Henry J. Hyde United States-
India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act could easily become known
as the crowning achievement of the gentleman from Illinois.
{time} 2000
But the fact is, Mr. Speaker, this groundbreaking legislation is but
one of the innumerable milestones in Henry Hyde's impressive record of
public service. Henry is retiring from Congress after choosing not to
seek a 17th consecutive term. He would have loved to stay with us
longer, but as he recently told an interviewer, Father Time and Mother
Nature have a way of beating up on me.
By contrast, Mr. Speaker, I am confident that history will be kind to
Henry Hyde. A member of the International Relations Committee since
1982, Henry has been a key figure in crucial debates and decisions
about war and peace, international arms control, the expansion of NATO,
United Nation's reform, and halting the spread of HIV/AIDS, which he
has astutely compared to the bubonic plague in its tragic scope.
Henry has also served with great distinction on the Judiciary and the
Intelligence Committees, but I will let another speak to his
achievements there, and of course the continued, devoted support by his
constituents through 16 terms in Congress speak volumes about his work
on behalf of his district.
It was in the political caldron of Chicago that Henry Hyde became
entranced with politics early in life. He grew up as an Irish Catholic
Democrat, but strayed from the faith in time to vote for Dwight David
Eisenhower for President, so he became a Republican sometime in the
1940s.
But, Mr. Speaker, I prefer not to dwell on the things that divide me
from my dear friend, Henry Hyde. Rather, I would like to point out that
both of us came of age during the Second World War, and this has formed
our world views and forged our common value, and it is on this basis
that we have often seen eye to eye and found ourselves shoulder to
shoulder in struggles that consistently have been of service to our
national security from the intricacies of key institutional agreements
to the staggeringly complex issues involved in the fight against global
terrorism.
Henry has held a firm grip on the gavel in the International
Relations Committee these past 6 years, through some of the most
pivotal and riveting challenges of our times. He wielded his authority
with fairness, intellectual honesty and no small amount of wit. As The
Washington Post noted in 1998, he has managed to maintain a reputation
for evenhandedness, for patience and restraint, a remarkable feat for
someone known both for his savagely held beliefs and for his keen sense
which way the wind blows.
Mr. Speaker, the International Relations Committee flourished under
Henry Hyde's direction. It will be daunting for me to take up the gavel
as Henry Hyde leaves us, Mr. Speaker. Anyone who knows him will
understand how much Henry will be missed in our committee and in this
House.
Earlier this week, we commemorated Henry's contributions by lending
his name to a room in this very building of the Capitol. He will,
therefore, always have a place here, and what is far more important, he
will have a place in the hearts of his colleagues.
Some of us may disagree with some of his policies, but he is one of
the institutional treasures around here, a true gentleman of the House.
Mr. Speaker, section 104(b)(2) requires that the President determine
that India and the IAEA have completed all legal steps required prior
to signature for an IAEA-India safeguards. That agreement must apply
safeguards in perpetuity in accordance with IAEA standards, principles
and practices. It references IAEA Board of Governors Document GOV/1621
(1973) as one of the IAEA guiding documents relating to standards for
perpetuity of safeguards. I attach that document for the Record.
[[Page H9149]]
Safeguards
(b) THE FORMULATION OF CERTAIN PROVISIONS IN AGREEMENTS UNDER THE
AGENCY'S SAFEGUARDS SYSTEM (1965, AS PROVISIONALLY EXTENDED IN 1966 AND
1968)
Memorandum by the Director General
(1) A substantial number of Governors have urged that there
should be a greater degree of standardization than in the
past with respect to the duration and termination of such
agreements as henceforth be concluded under the Agency's
Safeguards System (1965, as Provisionally Extended in 1966
and 1968) for the application of safeguards in connection
with nuclear material, equipment, facilities or non-nuclear
material supplied to States by third parties. To achieve
this, it is recommended that the following two concepts
should be reflected in these agreements:
(a) That the duration of the agreement should be related to
the period of actual use of the items in the recipient State;
and
(b) That the provisions for terminating the agreement
should be formulated in such a way that the rights and
obligations of the parties continue to apply in connection
with supplied nuclear material and with special fissionable
material produced, processed or used in or in connection with
supplied nuclear material, equipment, facilities or non-
nuclear material, until such time as the Agency has
terminated the application of safeguards thereto, in
accordance with the provisions of paragraph 26 or 27 of the
Agency's Safeguards System.
A short exposition with respect to the application of these
concepts is annexed hereto.
(2) The proposed standardization would appear likely to
facilitate the uniform application of safeguards measures. It
is furthermore to be noted that the combined operation of the
two concepts would be consistent with the application of the
general principle embodied in paragraph 16 of the Agency's
Safeguards System.
REQUESTED ACTION BY THE BOARD
(3) In bringing this matter to the Board's attention, the
Director General seeks the views of the Board as to whether
it concurs with the two concepts set out in paragraph 1
above.
Annex
(1) In the case of receipt by a State of source or special
fissionable material, equipment, facilities or non-nuclear
material from a supplier outside that State, the duration of
the relevant agreement under the Agency's Safeguards System
would be related to the actual use in the recipient State of
the material or items supplied. This may be accomplished by
requiring, in accordance with present practice, that the
material or items supplied be listed in the inventory called
for by the agreement.
(2) The primary effect of termination of the agreement,
either by act of the parties or effluxion of time, would be
that no further supplied nuclear material, equipment,
facilities or non-nuclear material could be added to the
inventory. On the other hand, the rights and obligations of
the parties, as provided for in the agreement, would continue
to apply in connection with any supplied material or items
and with any special fissionable material produced, processed
or used in or in connection with any supplied material or
items which had been included in the inventory, until such
material or items had been removed from the inventory.
(3) With respect to nuclear material, conditions for
removal are those set out in paragraph 26 or 27 of the
Agency's Safeguards System; with respect to equipment,
facilities and non-nuclear material, conditions for removal
could be based on paragraph 26. A number of agreements
already concluded have prescribed such conditions in part, by
providing for deletion from the inventory of nuclear
material, equipment, and facilities which are returned to the
supplying State or transferred (under safeguards) to a third
State. The additional provisions contemplated would stipulate
that items or non-nuclear material could be removed from the
preview of the agreement if they had been consumed, were no
longer usable for any nuclear activity relevant from the
point of view of safeguards or had become practicably
irrecoverable.
(4) The effect of reflecting the two concepts in agreements
would be that special fissionable material which had been
produced, processed or used in or in connection with supplied
material or items before they were removed from the scope of
the agreement, would remain or be listed in the inventory,
and such special fissionable material, together with any
supplied nuclear material remaining in the inventory, would
be subject to safeguards until the Agency had terminated
safeguards on that special fissionable and nuclear material
in accordance with the provisions of the Agency's Safeguards
System. Thus, the actual termination of the operation of the
provisions of the agreement would take place only when
everything had been removed from the inventory.
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. MARKEY. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself as much time as I may
consume.
First, let me begin by complimenting the gentleman from Illinois, Mr.
Hyde. Like Mr. Hyde, I was born a Democrat and baptized a Catholic just
7 days later. So I know how big a decision it must have been to have
abandoned that Democratic birthright. But he has been a historic figure
in this institution. I want to associate myself with everything that
the gentleman from California said about you.
But I do believe that this bill is a historic mistake. The world is
looking at this institution this evening. It is wondering what in the
world the United States is thinking in giving an exemption to the
Nuclear Nonproliferation Act to a country which is a nonsignatory to
the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.
What is the signal that that will send to Pakistan? What is the
signal that that will send to Iran, to Syria, to Egypt, to Venezuela,
to North Korea? What is the signal that we are sending with regard to
the entire nuclear nonproliferation regime which has served this world
well since the 1960s?
I think that the message they are receiving is that there is going to
be a double standard, and a double standard which, unfortunately, from
my perspective, is going to lead to a rapid escalation of the
development of nuclear weapons programs in country after country around
the world.
Right now, India has a nuclear weapons program that experts estimate
produces approximately 7 per year. Because the nuclear fuel, which this
bill will make possible, frees up the domestic uranium supply in India,
experts estimate that it will increase to 40 to 50 the number of
nuclear weapons which India can produce per year, because we, the
United States, in passing this legislation, will ensure the supply of
their civilian nuclear energy needs.
Why should we care about that? Well, the reason that we should care
about that is that Pakistan is now developing and building their own
nuclear material production facility, which experts indicate will
increase from two to three nuclear bombs per year to 40 to 50 nuclear
bombs per year. That is what a nuclear arms race looks like. That is
what the nuclear arms race between the United States and Soviet Union
looked like in the 1950s, in the 1960s and in the 1970s, and what we
are doing out here is pouring fuel onto this fire, rather than calling
an international conference to bring together these parties and others
in order to put in place a real nuclear weapons control regime. Instead
we are turning a blind eye to the reality of what is going on in the
South Asian continent.
So, ladies and gentlemen, this is a historic moment, a moment that we
will look back on, not perhaps tomorrow, or next week, but 5 years from
now, 10 years from now. People will point back to this night, this last
night of the Republican control of Congress, this last night when the
Republican-controlled House and Senate can produce for President Bush
this anti-nuclear weapons control policy that he has been engaging in
for the last 6 years and say this was the moment that crossed the line
where ever country said to themselves, why should we, as signatories of
the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, abide by those rules when the
United States selectively gives exemptions to countries that are not
signatories to the nuclear nonproliferation policy.
You cannot preach temperance from a bar stool. The hypocrisy
coefficient is at historic heights when the United States believes that
the rest of the world will listen to us as we preach that they should
not be interested in nuclear weapons, even as they are helping to
facilitate the Indians in developing an ever greater capacity to
produce nuclear weapons inspect that country.
Why should we care? We should care because A. Q. Khan, the nuclear
Johnny Appleseed, the nuclear Pied Piper, who spread nuclear weapons
from North Korea through the Middle East, is still living in Pakistan,
living in a palace, still not in prison. His associates, his men, still
walking the streets of Pakistan. Al Qaeda is headquartered in Pakistan,
still unapprehended.
What is the message that we are sending? We are sending a message
that the nuclear arms sellers are back on the road, selling to anyone
who will purchase. That is the message that we are sending.
So tonight is a historic vote. It is a vote that will be looked back
at as one of the most important that we have ever cast here in
Congress. Sadly, it is
[[Page H9150]]
not going to receive even a fraction of the attention which it
deserves.
But I tell you this, ladies and gentlemen, when and if this nuclear
war breaks out, we will look back. At least we should be able to say we
tried, we really tried to put an end to the nuclear arms race on the
South Asian continent. This is what this debate tonight is all about.
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 4 minutes to the incoming ranking
Republican on the International Relations Committee, the gentlewoman
from Florida (Ms. Ros-Lehtinen).
Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, I thank my chairman for his leadership
and for his time.
Mr. Speaker, as an original cosponsor of this legislation, Mr.
Speaker, and as cochair of the Congressional Caucus on India and Indian
Americans, I rise in support of H.R. 5682, the Henry J. Hyde United
States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act of 2006. I would
like to thank Chairman Hyde, as well as Ranking Member Lantos, for
their dedicated work on this issue and for their willingness to work
with me and so many members of our House International Relations
Committee, as well as the House as a whole, to ensure that the
conference report before us tonight achieves the difficult balance of
expanding cooperation with our democratic ally, India, while also
promoting U.S. global nonproliferation policy.
Because the conference report closely tracks the bill which was
passed overwhelmingly by the House in July, I need not list its
specific provisions, other than to say that it preserves the central
features of the House text, such as ensuring that Congress retains its
traditional role in approving nuclear cooperation agreements.
{time} 2015
Also in reinforcing the indispensable role of the nuclear suppliers'
club in preventing proliferation and encouraging India's cooperation in
stopping Iran's efforts to develop their nuclear weapons capability. It
has been significantly strengthened by the inclusion of many important
sections from the companion legislation approved by the Senate.
Let me address the larger and more important context in which this
legislation should be viewed. By providing the legal foundation for
civilian nuclear cooperation between the United States and India, it
achieves a key step of the global partnership with India that was
announced on July 18 of last year by President Bush and Prime Minister
Singh. This far-sighted and historic initiative is a long-delayed
recognition that the two largest democracies share an extraordinary
array of common interests and that a closer and increasingly
cooperative relationship between them holds enormous potential to
promote the strategic partnerships and interests of both. If allowed to
grow, it will undoubtedly produce a major realignment of the
international system as a whole and an entirely positive one.
India and the United States have already traveled a long way toward
building that new relationship. India stands alongside the United
States in the effort to confront and eliminate the scourge of global
terrorism and to reduce the instability and the conflict in South Asia
and elsewhere. We look forward to expanding the areas of common
interest and joint action. Nowhere is that cooperation more important,
Mr. Speaker, than in stopping the spread of nuclear weapons.
I should note that this legislation affirms that India is a country
that has demonstrated responsible behavior with respect to
nonproliferation of technology related to weapons of mass destruction
programs and the means to deliver them and that it is working with the
United States in key foreign policy initiatives related to
nonproliferation.
To further that goal, this legislation establishes as U.S. policy
securing India's participation in the Proliferation Security
Initiative, which is a cooperative arrangement among the world's powers
to intercept the illicit movement of nuclear materials and other
dangerous items by sea or air. India's cooperation would be a major
addition to the world's efforts in this difficult but essential task. I
am confident that her government will move quickly to assume a more
prominent position among the initiative's growing ranks.
Lastly, Mr. Speaker, I am glad that this historic bill carries the
name of Henry Hyde; a leader of great proportions, a mentor to so many
of us, a man of principles, a living legend, our friend, Henry Hyde.
Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Speaker, I am very pleased to yield 5 minutes to the
gentleman from New York (Mr. Ackerman), a senior distinguished member
of the International Relations Committee and one of our outstanding
experts on U.S.-India relations.
Mr. ACKERMAN. Mr. Speaker, I thank Mr. Lantos, our soon-to-be
chairman of the committee.
Mr. Speaker, today is truly a historic day for U.S.-India relations.
Chairman Hyde, who deserves all of the accolades that he received
today, has worked very hard, and, together with Ranking Member Lantos,
they have done extraordinary work to bring before us a conference
report that will transform our relationship with India and bring
reality to the process of nuclear nonproliferation. I congratulate them
both for their tremendous efforts and for their tremendous and enormous
achievement.
Mr. Speaker, if you liked this bill in January, and you
overwhelmingly did, then you are going to love this conference report.
If you were worried about seeing the agreement before it was final,
then you will love this conference report, because it gives Congress
another chance to scrutinize and vote on approving the final deal.
If you wanted the IAEA to be able to inspect India's nuclear
facilities, then you are for this conference report, because two-thirds
of all of India's nuclear facilities will now be under IAEA safeguards.
It is a no-brainer. Without this, we get to inspect zero; with this,
two-thirds of India's nuclear facilities.
If you wanted India for the first time ever to commit to the MTCR
guidelines, then you get that in this conference report.
If you wanted India for the first time ever to adhere to the Nuclear
Suppliers Group guidelines, you get that in this conference report.
If you wanted to send a clear message to nuclear rogue states about
how to behave, then you are for this conference report. You are for it
because it shows that responsible nuclear powers are welcomed by the
international community and not sanctioned.
If you wanted a broad, deep, enduring strategic relationship with
India, then you are for this conference report.
For 30 years, U.S. policy towards India has been defined and
constrained by our insistence on punishing India for its sovereign
decision not to sign the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. Truth be
told, if India had conducted its nuclear tests a little earlier, it
would have been treated the way we treat China and Russia and France
and Britain and ourselves; in short, as a grandfathered member of the
nuclear weapons club. But they did not test earlier, and nothing we
have tried over the last 3 decades has convinced them to give up their
nuclear weapons program, and nothing we say over the next 3 decades
will convince them either.
India is a responsible nuclear power and deserves to be treated that
way. The conference report before us does just that.
Critics have expressed concerns regarding the bill's impact on our
nonproliferation policy, and clearly Iran and Pakistan and North Korea
are looking for clues about what this deal means for them and their
nuclear programs. Let them understand the message. If you want to be
treated like India, be like India. Be responsible. Be a good
international actor with regard to weapons of mass destruction
technology. Be like India. Don't sell your technology to the highest
bidder. Be like India. Don't provide it to terrorists. Be a democracy,
a real democracy, such as India, and work with us on important foreign
policy objectives, and not against us.
That is the message that we are going to send today.
Does it warm your heart and make you comfortable that Iran and North
Korea signed the NPT, but they are now running away from their fully
accepted and freely accepted obligations and away from IAEA
inspections? India
[[Page H9151]]
didn't sign the NPT, and yet it is embracing the IAEA and embracing
nonproliferation norms and is a democracy. India's attitude should be
recognized and commended, not criticized and condemned.
Practically speaking, there are only two options, and they are before
us today: One is to vote ``no'' and continue the status quo, which
means India goes on pursuing its national interests as it has been
doing outside of the nonproliferation mainstream, and we get to inspect
nothing. The other is to vote ``yes,'' make the deal with India and get
for the United States and the international community a window in
perpetuity into two-thirds of India's existing nuclear facilities and
all of its future civilian nuclear facilities.
The choice is clear. The conference report brings India into the
nonproliferation mainstream and gets the United States and
international community access to India's civilian nuclear facilities.
Mr. Speaker, it is time for a 21st century policy toward India, one
that supports and encourages India's emergence as a responsible global
power and solidifies the U.S.-India bilateral relationship for decades
to come.
Not that it needs it, but the bill gives a great name, that of Henry
Hyde, to this remarkable piece of legislation. We salute you, Mr.
Chairman.
I urge a ``yes'' vote on H.R. 5632.
Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I thank Mr. Ackerman for a brilliant
statement, as well as his cordial sentiments.
Mr. Speaker, I am delighted to yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from
California (Mr. Royce), the chairman of the Subcommittee on
International Terrorism and Nonproliferation, who has an awful lot to
do with the ultimate product that we are voting on today.
Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the Henry J. Hyde bill.
I want to address a concern raised earlier by the gentleman from
California. I share his concern about A.Q. Khan. But Dr. Khan is in
Pakistan, and we would not do this deal for Pakistan, because Pakistan
proliferates. India does not. The nuclear fuel and materials we and the
world may sell India will be for the civilian sector only, not the
military, and will be under strict international safeguards and
inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency.
While nuclear energy is controversial to us in the United States, it
is not controversial in India. As in several other countries, nuclear
energy is viewed as a critical technology, one that is central to
uplifting hundreds of millions of impoverished Indians, because they
need the electricity for their grid. So India will develop its nuclear
energy sector, not as easily or quickly as without this deal, but it
will nonetheless, and India will not relinquish its nuclear weapons at
this point in time, which is understandable given its security
situation.
Right now, because of existing restrictions, many Indians view the
U.S. as blocking India's technological and developmental aspirations by
opposing their acquiring nuclear material and technology for clean
energy. This position does not make for a strong partnership.
With its growing economy, India is consuming more and more oil. It is
competing on the world market, competing with American consumers, for
limited hydrocarbon resources. This gives Americans an interest in
helping India expand its nuclear power industry, which this legislation
does. It also encourages India to move away from burning its highly
polluting coal.
By passing this conference report, we take a big step towards
internationalizing India's nuclear industry, which I believe would make
it safer. Young Indian scientists and engineers in the nuclear field
are interested in collaborating with their American counterparts. Today
they are isolated. I would rather know more about India's nuclear work
than less.
We have two options: either continue to try to box in India and hope
for the best, and, as I mentioned, India will not relinquish its
nuclear weapons now; or we make this move, engage India, and use our
influence to move this increasingly important country in our direction,
making India a true partner as we enter what will be a decades-long
struggle against Islamic terrorism.
This is not an ideal agreement and the administration should be more
aggressively pursuing an international fissile material cutoff, but it
is a very good agreement, one that works through a very difficult
nonproliferation situation to strengthen an important relationship.
So I urge my colleagues to support the conference report. I would
also mention that during the course of the committee's five hearings on
this agreement, Members closely scrutinized India's relationship with
Iran, and I think it is fair to say that our committee helped influence
India's thinking on Iran. We got India's support for two IAEA votes,
voting twice at the IAEA to find Iran in noncompliance with its
safeguard obligations and to report Iran to the Security Council.
Importantly, this bill preserves congressional oversight, and that
was not the administration's preferred approach, and gives Congress
another bite at the apple, requiring a joint resolution of approval of
the nuclear cooperation agreement. So India knows that Congress is
continuing to watch.
Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me time. I again
commend Chairman Hyde. We honor him tonight with the title of this
bill.
Mr. MARKEY. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3\1/6\ minutes to the gentlelady
from California (Ms. Lee).
Ms. LEE. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding, and also
for his very clear presentation tonight as to why this is such a bad
bill and bad conference report.
First of all, let me just say, Mr. Speaker, that I had the privilege
to visit India a few years ago with my distinguished colleague from New
York (Mr. Crowley) and our distinguished colleague from Maryland (Mr.
Hoyer).
{time} 2030
I witnessed firsthand the brilliance and the spirit and the
commitment to democracy of the Indian people, and like many of my
colleagues, I strongly believe that it is in our country's interests to
strengthen our relationship with India economically, politically and
culturally.
But to suggest that we can do so only at the expense of the
international nonproliferation standards, as this conference report for
the India nuclear deal before us would, is really both dishonest and it
is dangerous.
Mr. Speaker, as far as I am concerned, there is no country, and I
mean no country, for which it should be acceptable to sacrifice our
international standards.
The problem with this deal as it is currently written is that it will
do lasting harm to more than 30 years of international efforts to stop
the spread of nuclear weapons. This deal creates a double standard
which undermines our efforts to stop countries like Iran and North
Korea from developing nuclear weapons.
This deal creates incentives for withdrawing from the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty. Why have countries like Brazil and South Korea
spend all these years playing by the rules and not building nuclear
weapons in exchange for civilian technology when India gets both?
This deal sets a dangerous precedent. In explaining Beijing's
rationale for potentially pursuing a deal with Pakistan, Professor Shen
Dingli of China's Fudan University has already argued and said, if the
U.S. can violate nuclear rules, then we can violate them also.
We should be fighting to save what is left of the international
nonproliferation framework, not discarding it. There is no need to rush
through with this conference report on the last day of this 109th
Congress. We must go back to the drawing board and make sure this
proposed nuclear cooperation agreement maintains international
nonproliferation goals, and we can do this when the 110th Congress
begins in January.
Ideally, India should formally commit to the goals and restrictions
on the international nonproliferation framework and sign the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty. Short of that, we must insist on specific
nonproliferation safeguards as specified in an amendment if you
remember which I offered in this bill when it was considered in July.
This amendment basically would have required India to commit to the
basic principles consistent with the NPT. Unfortunately, the amendment
was not made in order.
[[Page H9152]]
The world is a dangerous place, Mr. Speaker. Nuclear weapons are
pointed in all directions. Compliance with the Nuclear Nonproliferation
Treaty is a basic standard that we should require in all nuclear deals
and arrangements. This bill goes in the opposite direction. Without
these commitments, we should reject this nuclear deal.
Finally, Mr. Speaker, I would just like to thank the chairman, Mr.
Hyde, for his leadership and his fairness as chair of the International
Relations Committee and specifically as it relates to HIV and AIDS and
orphans and moms with children and the respect you have shown the
minority. I wish you happiness and good luck and good health in this
next chapter of your life.
Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Speaker, I am very pleased to yield 3\1/2\ minutes to
the gentleman from New York (Mr. Crowley), a distinguished member of
the International Relations Committee, my good friend, a recognized
expert on U.S.-India relations.
Mr. CROWLEY. Mr. Speaker, I thank my friend and colleague from
California (Mr. Lantos) for yielding me this time.
I, too, want to rise in strong support of the Henry Hyde India
Nuclear Energy Cooperation Act.
I want to commend my friend and chairman, who I have deep respect
for, Chairman Hyde, and my soon-to-be Chair of the International
Relations Committee, Mr. Lantos, for their work they put into crafting
this bipartisan conference report.
I would also like to commend the staff of both the House
International Relations Committee and the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee for the work they have done to reach a compromise on this
deal before we end this 109th Congress.
We here in Congress are not the only ones who have been engaged in
pushing forward this important cooperation agreement or this bilateral
relationship. I must also recognize the work of the Indian American
community for the incredible advocacy they have demonstrated and the
incredible support they have demonstrated for this legislation.
This legislation creates a two-step process, and by passing the
conference report today, we will have taken that very important first
step.
The second step rests upon negotiations between the United States and
India, as well as India and the International Atomic Energy Agency and
with the Nuclear Suppliers Group.
I would like to be clear that this vote sets the stage for allowing
cooperation, but the actual exchange of civilian nuclear cooperation
will not take place until Congress is provided with the details of
those relevant negotiations and takes a second up or down vote.
I urge my colleagues to end India's nuclear isolation and allow them
to be brought into the nonproliferation tent with the rest of the
responsible states who seek safe and efficient civilian nuclear
technology. I have held the belief that this bill is not about nuclear
weapons as much as it is about nuclear energy.
I urge my colleagues to begin building a pathway of cooperation in
energy with India that will help the economy of India grow and help
American business opportunities prosper.
India's booming and growing economy needs fuel, and plenty of it, to
uplift the lives of hundreds of millions who live in abject poverty.
There is not enough wood, enough gas or enough oil in this world to
sustain that growth. The greenhouse gases which have been produced by
expending those fuels would be an unwelcome byproduct.
Passing this legislation opens up a new pathway of opportunity for
energy development that will lower greenhouse gases, provide reliable
electricity and, strengthen India's economy.
I am proud that the U.S. will work with India to see India and the
Indian people reach their full potential. If we expect India to be our
ally in the 21st century, we must treat them as an equal, which is what
the cooperation will demonstrate.
I trust my colleagues will recognize what our future with India holds
and vote for final passage of this legislation.
I just want to point out to my good friend, the gentlewoman from
California (Ms. Lee), who spoke about her amendment, it is impossible
for India to sign the Nonproliferation Treaty because she has already
detonated that weapon in the early 1970s. She would have to put those
weapons away and say she would never develop them again and put them
beyond use and verifiable use before she can sign the treaty. It simply
is not going to happen.
They have demonstrated that they are a good player in this field, as
Mr. Ackerman said. If you want to be like India and get this deal, act
like India.
Mr. MARKEY. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman from
Oregon (Mr. Wu).
Mr. WU. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong opposition to this legislation.
Let the record show that if or when a mushroom cloud ever erupts over
an American city, it will be traced back to this unwise vote in the
United States Congress and to the bone-headed policy of this
administration towards treaty obligations for Nunn-Lugar safeguards and
the sale of nuclear materials to India.
When I was a boy, this country sold F-15s to Iran so that Iran could
offset Soviet power in South Asia. Because we sold F-15s and other arms
to Iran, we wound up selling chemical weapon precursor materials to
Iraq to offset Iranian power in the Middle East. Today, we have 135,000
troops in Iraq, in part because of that string of bad decisions.
Now we are told that to offset Chinese power in Asia, we should sell
nuclear materials to India which would free up Indian nuclear reactors
to produce many more nuclear weapons for the Indian nuclear weapons
program.
If we approve this deal with India, it would encourage China to
increase its nuclear arsenal. I submit to you that we Americans are one
of the potential targets of that enhanced Chinese nuclear arsenal.
Even more worrisome is that an Indian nuclear buildup would further
accelerate the Pakistani nuclear buildup.
While I have strong confidence in the stability of the Indian
Government and in the stability of Indian democracy, I have much less
faith in the stability of the Pakistani Government and of Pakistani
democracy, especially of the Pakistani Government's ability to keep
under control those nuclear weapons which it already has and the
additional weapons it would build because of this Indian nuclear
buildup.
If there is a military coup in Pakistan, we should be very, very
concerned, not only about the stability of South Asia, but of the whole
world. There have been three military coups in Pakistan since its
independence in 1947.
Rather than approving nonsignatory states in violation of the
nonproliferation treaties, the better course of action is to respect
international agreements and to immediately bring to the Senate a total
ban on nuclear testing and comprehensive treaties to curtail nuclear
proliferation.
On the last night before our July recess, there were only 68 of us in
this House who voted against approving the legislation to permit sales
of nuclear materials to India. Tonight, on the last night of the 109th
Congress, we are voting on the House-Senate conference report.
I ask, I implore more of my colleagues to join me to prevent adding
fuel to the fire of nuclear proliferation in South Asia. This
legislation, and the following sale of nuclear materials to India,
blows out of the water any hope we have of treaty constraints on the
proliferation of nuclear weapons.
I want to make it clear in this record and for history that the
actions of this administration in containing nuclear proliferation have
been patently irresponsible. This administration has underfunded the
Nunn-Lugar legislation, which takes nuclear materials out of the open
market which would otherwise have been available for sale to
terrorists.
This administration has failed to support international treaties
limiting nuclear weapons proliferation, and now it has proposed
treaties with India that would sell India nuclear materials that would
result in a nuclear arms race between India and China and India and
Pakistan.
Compared to this, the resolution to go to war in Iraq was a piker.
Let us
[[Page H9153]]
pull back from the brink of this nuclear precipice.
Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I would ask Mr. Lantos if he needs some
additional time.
Mr. LANTOS. Yes, we do.
Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 5 minutes to the
gentleman from California (Mr. Lantos), if that will help, for purposes
of control.
Mr. LANTOS. We are very grateful for your gesture. Mr. Speaker, I am
pleased to yield 3 minutes to the gentlewoman from Texas (Ms. Jackson-
Lee), my friend.
Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I thank the distinguished
ranking member of the committee, and I thank the distinguished chairman
of the committee, and I believe this may be Mr. Hyde's last time as
chairman on the International Relations Committee, and I want to offer
to him my sincerest appreciation for his service to America. I have had
the honor and privilege of serving with him on the Judiciary Committee,
and I thank him for his service.
I thank Mr. Lantos for the cooperative spirit that has been evidenced
by this conference report and certainly congratulate him on his
ascending to be Chair in this next Congress of the International
Relations Committee.
I listened to Lee Hamilton and Jim Baker as they began to try to
bridge the gap and the schism in the Iraq war. One of the most, or more
stranger, recommendations for many was the engagement of Syria and
Iran, for many were aghast that we would talk to those who have been so
reckless in their relationship with the United States. I believe in
engagement, but is it not interesting that a democracy, the largest, a
nation that has embedded itself in democracy since its birth, India, is
a friend of the United States, and yet we are hesitant to engage India.
{time} 2045
That is what this legislation represents. It is an engagement of a
friend, working with them on the civilian use of nuclear power,
addressing the concerns of enormous population and enormous poverty.
Although the middle class of India is growing, this legislation will
begin the engagement of a friend, and it will provide a fixture in the
South Asian community that has both the capabilities to use nuclear
materials in a friendly way and it will be an engagement of a friend
with the United States.
I happen to be, of course, engaged with the people of Pakistan, and I
am grateful that my amendment remained in this legislation that said
that we continue to engage in the South Asian region with India and
Pakistan. For even though there may be citing of the inequities or the
issues as it relates to Pakistan, they too should be engaged with.
But what we are doing today is a start. And I am very grateful, Mr.
Lantos, that there are bridges and firewalls in this legislation. This
legislation allows the vetting of India to begin. It allows the
International Atomic Energy Agency to vet this program. And before the
President goes forward, he must be convinced or she must be convinced
that this is an appropriate step to make. If we can engage with Iran
and Syria, though it is a difficult proposition for many, why not
engage with a democracy and a friend who will benefit by the
utilization of nuclear power? And so I would hope that we would look at
this in a manner that says this is a good step for there is control
over what is being utilized, unlike so many of those who have the
access to nuclear power. I hope my colleagues will support this forward
step and that they will see the checks and balances that are so
necessary and continue to support the South Asia region that includes
not only India but Pakistan.
Mr. MARKEY. Mr. Speaker, could you advise us how much time is
remaining?
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Hayes). The gentleman has 6\1/4\
minutes.
Mr. MARKEY. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman from
Ohio (Mr. Kucinich).
Mr. KUCINICH. A nuclear sword of Damocles hangs over the world. Fear
and ignorance have placed it there. Separation from our brothers and
sisters holds it there. Separation of our heads from our hearts leaves
it there.
We have a moral responsibility to our children, our grandchildren,
and the entire world to create a world free of nuclear weapons. We have
moral obligations to lead the way towards total nuclear disarmament and
nuclear abolition, to wrest from the unsteady hand of crass casualty
that nuclear sword of Damocles, and save this planet as a place where
we work out our destiny.
Only we can dissipate the advancing mushroom clouds by saying ``no''
to this bill, ``no'' to proliferation, ``no'' to nuclear testing,
``no'' to nuclear weapons, ``no'' to nuclear war, ``no'' to the
destruction of our planet.
The spirit of the Founders which inhabits this institution was a
spirit that believed in unity. We must believe in human unity as firmly
as we believe in the unity of the United States. We must believe in the
imperative of human unity as we believe in the imperative of our next
breath, the imperative of the first breath which issues from all new
life to come. And we do this by pursuing international cooperation
towards abandoning nuclear ambitions, not furthering them. For God's
sake, stop this sleepwalk into the nuclear valley of shadows. Wake up
and vote against this bill.
Mr. MARKEY. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from New
Jersey (Mr. Holt).
Mr. HOLT. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from Massachusetts, and
I join my colleagues in extending best wishes to Mr. Hyde on the new
phase of his life.
If we really believe that nuclear proliferation and loose nukes are
the greatest threat to world peace and security, as I do, as many of us
do, then we should be holding on to every tool that we can find to
prevent that threat. We should be working with India to strengthen the
nuclear nonproliferation regime, not collaborating to destroy it.
There will be a time when the history of the spread of nuclear
weapons of mass destruction is written, and we will look back and see
when the last thread of the nuclear nonproliferation regime was
shredded with this agreement.
We can talk at length about the details of this cooperative
agreement, we can talk about what a good friend India is and how
responsible they have been. We can talk about whether nuclear power is
environmentally benign. But history will say, mark my words, with this
agreement the world lost the last bit of an international tool to
control the spread of nuclear weapons of mass destruction. The regime
will have been killed. All we will have left is our ability to jaw-bone
with our allies and to threaten our enemies. Countries will work out
whatever deals they can, two by two. That is the future of the control
of nuclear weapons of mass destruction. Countries will work out
whatever deals they can, two by two. This is a very dangerous moment.
Mr. MARKEY. Could we get a final review here of where we are, Mr.
Speaker?
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. LaHood). There are 3\1/2\ minutes
remaining.
Mr. MARKEY. I am the last speaker, so I reserve my time.
Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I believe I have the right to close the
debate, so I am reserving my time. I have no further requests, so I
will close.
Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of our time.
I share my opponent's concern about the danger of nuclear
proliferation. This legislation is the exact opposite of nuclear
proliferation. It opens up for the first time in history all of India's
current civilian nuclear plants and all future nuclear plants to
international control. This is a control measure. It is a measure which
will dramatically enhance the historic strategic cooperation between
the democratic state of India and the United States of America. When
historians will look at this historic vote we are about to take, they
will view this as the most significant vote for democracy, peace, and
control of nuclear weapons in the 21st century.
The Senate voted 85 to 15 for this legislation. It passed the House
on a bipartisan basis, overwhelmingly. Tonight we have an opportunity
to reaffirm that vote, and I urge all of my colleagues to vote for this
legislation.
I yield back the balance of my time.
[[Page H9154]]
Mr. MARKEY. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time.
This is an historically bad deal. President Bush has done a far
better job in negotiating with the Congress to gain acceptance for this
deal than he did with the Indians and getting them to accept the
essentials of a real nuclear nonproliferation agreement.
In this agreement, as we send nuclear materials to India and free up
so that the Russians and others can do so as well, here is what is not
inspected: Six of India's plutonium-producing reactors will not be
inspected. Their heavy-water production facets, not inspected.
Plutonium separation facilities, not inspected. Uranium mines, not
inspected. Uranium enrichment facilities, not inspected. In other
words, their nuclear weapons program, not inspected.
This is the deal which we are cutting. This is the deal which the
Congress is being asked tonight to bless. Do you know who would accept
a deal like that? A.Q. Kahn would accept a deal like that for Pakistan.
In fact, President Musharraf of Pakistan said to President Bush on his
visit to Pakistan right after his visit to India, he said to President
Bush, ``I too would like that deal that you are offering to India.''
President Bush said, ``We cannot give you that deal.''
What are we going to say when China offers that deal to Pakistan?
Because they will, ladies and gentlemen. What will we say when all of
those plutonium-producing reactors are not inspected? What will we say
in 2 years when the Russians offer that same deal to the Iranians? What
will we say to the Russians, to the Iranians?
If we don't set the standard for nuclear nonproliferation here in the
United States in our negotiations with our allies, do not expect there
to be higher standards in the negotiations between the Chinese and
their allies or the Russians and their allies. Wherever we set the
standard, that is going to be the global standard. And when we turn to
these other countries and we tell them, no, your standards are not high
enough, they are going to call us hypocrites.
Ladies and gentlemen, it is an historic night, it is an historic
vote. People will look back at this as the moment when the nuclear
nonproliferation regime of the world was destroyed. Vote ``no''. Vote
``no'' for history. Vote ``no'' for your conscience. When you look
back, this will be one of those moments when you are glad that you
voted ``no.''
Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, the arguments that have been made so ably by
the gentleman from Massachusetts have been anticipated and, in my
judgment, well met by Mr. Ackerman, Mr. Lantos, Mr. Crowley, Ms. Ros-
Lehtinen, Mr. Royce, and others, so I will not consume the few moments
we have left repeating them; suffice to say this is an excellent step
forward. It recognizes the reality, the nuclear reality of India, and
is a very progressive step. It is the conference report of the House
bill and the Senate bill, both of which passed overwhelmingly, and so
it is truly bipartisan and is something that ought to pass.
I would like to take this final opportunity to express, inadequately,
I am afraid, my respect and admiration for Mr. Lantos. I congratulate
the Democratic Party in selecting him to head the International
Relations Committee, because foreign policy is going to be critical in
the coming months and the coming years, and the Congress could not be
in better hands in that area than it is with Mr. Lantos as chairman of
the committee. He brings a grasp of history that is unequaled because
he has lived through so much of it, as well as studied with high
scholarship. So it is an honor and privilege and experience and an
adventure to have served with him for so long and learned so much about
foreign policy at his hand.
{time} 2100
I also want to say the staffs, both the Democratic and Republican
staffs, are superior people.
In Camelot, King Arthur once said we are all of us tiny drops in a
vast ocean, but some of them sparkle. Well, we have a lot of sparklers
who are staffs of both Republicans and Democrats. Mr. Mooney, Tom
Mooney, who is not only my friend and my chief of staff, but a
brilliant administrator and student of foreign policy, has been
especially helpful. I couldn't begin to express my appreciation to him.
Horace Mann, a great educator, once said a man should be ashamed to
die until he has won some victory for humanity. I think every Member of
Congress attains a victory for humanity every time Congress is in
session and a vote is cast. Democracy is more than simply a set of
rules as to how we elect people or how we litigate against each other;
it ascribes individual worth to every human being, every member of the
human family, and you in Congress are custodians of democracy. That is
a very high calling.
To be in Washington as a representative of well over half a million
people and to stand in the shadow of Jefferson and Lincoln and
Washington is no small thing. I am proud to have had the honor and the
privilege to serve with so many people who are so dedicated to the
success and the flourishing of this great country.
I thank God for each one of you. My wish is that you all live to be a
thousand years old and the last voice you hear will be mine.
Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for
yielding. I thank the Rules Committee for making consideration of the
conference report to accompany H.R. 5682, the ``United States and India
Nuclear Cooperation Promotion Act of 2006'' in order.
The United States' relationship with India and Pakistan is of
paramount importance to our Nation's political and economic future.
With the receding of the Cold War's global divisions and the new
realities of globalization and trans-national terrorism, we have
embarked on a new era of promise, possibility and uncertainty. This
means the United States, the world's only superpower, bears an
especially heavy responsibility to remain engaged in all regions of the
world, with all nation-states. It is in the national interest for the
United States to continue our policy of engagement, collaboration, and
exchange which has served the Nation well in the past, particularly in
the South Asia region.
It is important that we are considering this conference report today.
I also want to thank my colleagues for adopting my amendment to H.R.
5682. My bipartisan amendment, which was endorsed and co-sponsored by
Congressman Burton, simply stated that the ``South Asia region is so
important that the United States should continue its policy of
engagement, collaboration, and exchanges with and between India and
Pakistan.''
Pakistan has been a critical ally in the global war on terror.
Pakistan has been a good friend to the people of the United States.
Although H.R. 5682 signals no change in this country's relationship
with Pakistan, it is not difficult to understand why it may give pause
to some supporters of Pakistan. This is another reason why it is vital
for the United States to continue to engage both Pakistan and India in
ongoing political engagement, economic and technological
collaborations, and personal exchanges, which will bring the United
States closer to these two vitally important democracies in the South
Asia region and will bring India and Pakistan closer to each other.
Peaceful nuclear cooperation with India can serve multiple U.S.
foreign policy objectives so long as it is undertaken in a manner that
minimizes potential risks to the nonproliferation regime. This will be
best achieved by sustained and active engagement and cooperation
between the India and the United States.
This landmark legislation serves both our strategic interests and our
long-standing nonproliferation objectives. We should heed the sage
words of the Iraq Study Group which recommends engaging rather than
abandoning the possibilities dialogue offers. Our engagement and
subsequent abandonment of Iran has resulted in their current pursuit of
nuclear technology. We should not make the same mistake in South Asia.
We need to remain engaged with India and Pakistan so that they remain
our most important allies rather than our adversaries.
We are on the path to fostering an enduring relationship of mutually
beneficial cooperation with India. The new realities of globalization
and interdependence have brought a convergence of interests between the
world's largest democracy and the world's most powerful one. I
accompanied President Clinton in his groundbreaking trip to India
marking a new phase in the bonds that bind our two countries. This
conference report builds on this relationship by permitting an
invigorated relationship in the field of nuclear cooperation, an area
of critical importance given India's increasing energy demands.
This conference report incorporates a host of important
nonproliferation measures that will anchor India in the international
nonproliferation framework by including: safeguards between India and
the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA); end use monitoring of
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U.S. exports to India; and strengthening the Nuclear Suppliers Group,
which are the group of countries that restrict nuclear proliferation
throughout the world.
In addition, this conference report maintains Congressional oversight
over the ongoing relationship of nuclear cooperation between U.S.-
India. By implementing this legislation, we are furthering our critical
nonproliferation objectives of advancing the IAEA's Additional Protocol
by allowing the U.S. to become a party to this critical
nonproliferation arrangement. We will enhance our nonproliferation
policy and bolster our argument that the rest of the world should agree
to this robust inspection regime.
In conclusion, I support the United States and India Nuclear
Cooperation Promotion Act of 2006 with my Amendment, and this
conference report. I urge my colleagues to do the same.
Mr. BARTON of Texas. Mr. Speaker, the conference report on H.R. 5682
includes language implementing the ``Additional Protocol'' to the U.S.
nuclear safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA). The other Body gave its advice and consent for the
Additional Protocol in 2004, but without enactment passage of this
implementing legislation the Additional Protocol cannot enter into
force.
Following the 1991 Gulf War, IAEA member states took steps to
strengthen the nuclear safeguards system. This led to the development
of a model ``Additional Protocol'' to supplement safeguards agreements
and amend verification arrangements. It is designed to improve the
ability of the IAEA to detect clandestine nuclear weapons programs in
non-nuclear-weapons states by providing the IAEA with increased
information and expanded inspection access. As of March of 2006, 110
countries had signed additional protocols, including all the nuclear
weapons states, and 78 countries have them in force.
The U.S. is not obligated to accept safeguards under the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty or the Additional Protocol. However, the U.S.
already allows safeguards to be placed on certain facilities and
materials under a voluntary agreement with the IAEA. This underscores
our support for the Nonproliferation Treaty. The U.S. signing the
Additional Protocol demonstrates that adherence will not commercially
disadvantage non-nuclear-weapons states. Under both the voluntary
agreement and the Additional Protocol, the U.S. maintains a national
security exclusion and the right to manage IAEA access to facilities or
information of direct national security significance.
Enactment of this implementing legislation provides the President
with authority to permit IAEA inspectors, accompanied by U.S.
representatives, access to certain facilities and to information on
activities in the U.S. It also authorizes the Department of Commerce
and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to develop implementing
regulations and conduct training and trial inspections. Finally, the
legislation sets forth procedures for the inspections, similar to those
for the Chemical Weapons Convention, and establishes civil and criminal
penalties for the failure of U.S. entities to provide such information.
Mr. Speaker, this legislation will strengthen our Nation's ability to
advance the cause of universal acceptance of increased safeguards and
for that reason I urge both Bodies to adopt the conference report and
send it on to the President for his signature.
Among the many tributes to our beloved colleague, Henry Hyde, this
bill and what it can do for global nuclear security is among the most
worthy.
Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Speaker, I'd like to commend Chairman Hyde, Ranking
Member Lantos and their excellent staffs for their hard work on his
legislation.
I'd like to offer special thanks for their efforts to ensure that the
conference agreement retains a provision I suggested, which would halt
nuclear cooperation if the Indian government exports sensitive
technologies that violate the guidelines of the Nuclear Suppliers Group
and Missile Technology Control Regime.
This conference agreement--and the underlying nuclear deal with
India--are far from perfect. I believe the Administration could have
and should have pressed for a much better deal.
But having said that, it's important to keep in mind that this
agreement is a major improvement over the Administration's original
legislative proposal.
That bill would have cut Congress out of the process and put the
nuclear deal with India on auto-pilot.
Among other things, this agreement preserves the right of Congress to
vote on the final nuclear cooperation agreement with India--which is
still under negotiation--before it goes into effect.
While I wish this conference agreement included some stronger
nonproliferation provisions--including an amendment on fissile material
I offered on the floor--I intend to vote ``yes'' because I believe the
U.S.-India relationship is extremely important, and rejecting the bill
at this point would be a major setback.
Mr. UDALL of New Mexico. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in opposition to
this legislation and I do so because I believe this bill undermines the
nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), lacks sufficient safeguards to
prevent India from continuing to produce nuclear weapons, and threatens
the stability of the region.
Mr. Speaker, there is no question that India is an important
relationship for the United States to cultivate. India's booming
economy, efforts to combat terrorism, and commitment to democracy means
they will be a key strategic partner of ours for years to come.
However, I do not believe the proper way to cultivate this relationship
is by lifting the moratorium on nuclear trade with India.
We all know that India is not a signatory to the NPT, and yet we
stand on the verge of rewarding a country operating outside the
parameters of this vitally important treaty. This agreement loosens
export control laws and clears the way to provide nuclear assistance.
It does so without requiring India to limit its fissile material
production and without establishing restrictions on the number of
weapons they plan to produce. Also under the framework, 8 of India's 22
nuclear plants would be protected from inspection. These 8 plants just
so happen to be the military facilities that will remain out of the
purview of international inspection.
The Administration maintains that nuclear proliferation and the fear
that terrorist organizations could acquire nuclear weapons, is the
greatest threat to our Nation's security. But Mr. Speaker, passing this
legislation today to allow the President to waive portions of the
Atomic Energy Act will shred the NPT, the most successful agreement we
have to guard against proliferation. If India, a nation operating their
nuclear programs outside the NPT, can strike an agreement of this
magnitude, allowing them this much flexibility and holding them to so
few hard and fast standards, why would any other nation not currently
party to the NPT wish to join?
Passing this legislation today sends the wrong signal. It makes very
real the threat of an arms race between Pakistan and India, an already
extremely fragile relationship between two long-time adversaries. Mr.
Speaker, passing this legislation today is an enormous step backwards
for global nonproliferation efforts and I urge my colleagues to reject
it.
Ms. WOOLSEY. Mr. Speaker, we are here to debate the India Nuclear
Bill. However, there seems to be something missing from the debate
today. It's like the elephant in the room no one wants to talk about.
Whatever happened to the United States' own commitment to
nonproliferation?
When the House considered its own version, I tried to submit an
amendment that was quite simple. It stated that until the President has
implemented and observed all of our NPT obligations and revised its own
policies relating to them, no nuclear-related item may be transferred
to India.
Unfortunately, my amendment was not included.
And yet another closed rule from the Republican leadership precludes
any compromise today.
As many of my colleagues have stated, this is not about the deal or
our alliances with India. This is about how the Bush administration has
made a mockery of the NPT and encouraged other countries to go around
the treaty. Basically, the bill says that if a country ignores the NPT,
the U.S. will cut a deal with them.
Where is our commitment to nonproliferation?
If anything, with this treaty the U.S. will contribute to global
nuclear proliferation.
In a world that is becoming more--not less--violent by the day, we
must face the facts: Until the U.S. lives up to its own
nonproliferation, obligations, we can't possibly ask others to do so.
Today, I will vote against this misguided bill and urge my colleagues
to do the same.
Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Without objection, the previous question is
ordered on the conference report.
There was no objection.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the conference report.
The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that
the ayes appeared to have it.
Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.
The yeas and nays were ordered.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 8 of rule XX, further
proceedings on this question will be postponed.
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