[Congressional Record Volume 152, Number 135 (Friday, December 8, 2006)]
[House]
[Pages H9146-H9155]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




   CONFERENCE REPORT ON H.R. 5682, HENRY J. HYDE UNITED STATES-INDIA 
             PEACEFUL ATOMIC ENERGY COOPERATION ACT OF 2006

  Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, pursuant to the rule, I call up the conference 
report on the bill (H.R. 5682) to exempt from certain requirements of 
the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 a proposed nuclear agreement for 
cooperation with India.
  The Clerk read the title of the bill.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Rehberg). Pursuant to House Resolution 
1101, the conference report is considered read.
  (For conference report and statement, see proceedings of the House of 
December 7, 2006, at page H8934.)
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Hyde) and 
the gentleman from California (Mr. Lantos) each will control 30 
minutes.
  Mr. MARKEY. Mr. Speaker, I would like to claim the time in opposition 
to the bill.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Does the gentleman from California oppose 
the conference report?
  Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Speaker, I do not oppose the bill.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 8(d) of rule XXII, the 
gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Hyde), the gentleman from California (Mr. 
Lantos), and the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Markey) each will 
control 20 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Illinois.


                             General Leave

  Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may 
have 5 legislative days to revise and extend their remarks and include 
any extraneous material on the conference report to H.R. 5682.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Hayes). Is there objection to the 
request of the gentleman from Illinois?
  There was no objection.
  Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Speaker, the President has said that legislation to permit the 
establishment of civil nuclear trade with India is essential to 
establishing a new global partnership between the United States and 
India. The conference report before this House is the product of more 
than a year of effort by Members and staff of the House International 
Relations Committee and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. It is 
based on the separate bills passed overwhelmingly in the House and the 
Senate and preserves the key provisions of both.
  The conferees believe that this report represents a judicious 
balancing of competing priorities that encompass a broad range of 
subjects from U.S. policy in South Asia to the highly technical and 
complex world of nuclear export licenses. It is the product of months 
of discussions with the administration regarding virtually every 
section, and the conferees have gone to great lengths to accommodate 
the administration on its issues of concern.
  I would like to express my appreciation for the cooperation of the 
Committee on Science, the Judiciary, Energy, Government Reform, Armed 
Services and Rules in helping expedite

[[Page H9147]]

the consideration of this conference report. Their cooperation should 
not be interpreted as having any impact on their rights under the 
jurisdictional rules and precedents of the House.
  I insert for the Record some correspondence related to this issue.


                             Committee on Energy and Commerce,

                                 Washington, DC, December 5, 2006.
     Hon. Henry J. Hyde,
     Chairman, Committee on International Relations, House of 
         Representatives, Washington, DC.
       Dear Chairman Hyde: I write concerning H.R. 5682, the Henry 
     J. Hyde United States and India Nuclear Cooperation Promotion 
     Act of 2006, as amended. As you know, the Committee on Energy 
     and Commerce has jurisdiction over Title II of the amended 
     text.
       I recognize your desire to bring this legislation before 
     the House in an expeditious manner. Accordingly, I will not 
     exercise my Committee's right to a full referral on the bill. 
     By agreeing to waive its consideration of the bill, however, 
     the Committee on Energy and Commerce does not waive its 
     jurisdiction over H.R. 5682.
       Thank you for your attention to these matters.
           Sincerely,
                                                       Joe Barton,
     Chairman.
                                  ____

                                                      Committee on


                                      International Relations,

                                 Washington, DC, December 5, 2006.
     Hon. Duncan Hunter,
     Chairman, Committee on Armed Services,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. Chairman: Thank you for your letter regarding H.R. 
     5682, relating to nuclear energy cooperation between the 
     United States and India. I agree that the Committee on Armed 
     Services has valid jurisdictional claims to certain 
     provisions in this important legislation, and I am most 
     appreciative of your decision not to seek appointment of 
     conferees in the interest of concluding the conference on 
     H.R. 5682. I agree that by foregoing the appointment of 
     conferees, the Committee on Armed Services is not waiving its 
     jurisdiction. Further, this exchange of letters will be 
     included in the Congressional Record during consideration of 
     the conference report on the House floor.
           Sincerely,
                                                       Henry Hyde,
     Chairman.
                                  ____

                                        Committee on International


                                                    Relations,

                                 Washington, DC, December 5, 2006.
     Hon. Joe Barton,
     Chairman, Committee on Energy and Commerce, House of 
         Representatives, Washington, DC.
       Dear Chairman Barton: I write concerning H.R. 5682, the 
     Henry J. Hyde United States and India Nuclear Cooperation 
     Promotion Act of 2006, as amended.
       I appreciate the fact that, although the Committee on 
     Energy and Commerce has jurisdiction over substantial parts 
     of Title II, you have been gracious enough not to exercise 
     your Committee's right to a full referral on the bill, in 
     order to expedite its consideration in the House 
     consideration.
       I acknowledge that by agreeing to waive its consideration 
     of the bill, the Energy and Commerce Committee is not waiving 
     any of its jurisdiction over the bill.
       Thank you for your cooperation in this matter.
           Sincerely,
                                                    Henry J. Hyde,
     Chairman.
                                  ____



                                  Committee on Armed Services,

                                 Washington, DC, December 5, 2006.
     Hon. Henry Hyde,
     Chairman, Committee on International Relations, Washington, 
         DC.
       Dear Mr. Chairman: On November 16, 2006, the Senate passed 
     by unanimous consent S. 3709, the United States-India 
     Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act. As you know certain 
     provisions in S. 3709 fall within the jurisdiction of the 
     Committee on Armed Services.
       Our Committee recognizes the importance of S. 3709 and the 
     need for the legislation to move expeditiously. Therefore, 
     while we have a valid claim to jurisdiction over certain 
     provisions and would otherwise be entitled to the appointment 
     of conferees, the Committee on Armed Services will not seek 
     appointment on S. 3709 given the time constraints.
       I would appreciate the inclusion of this letter and a copy 
     of your response in the Congressional Record during 
     consideration of the conference report on the House floor.
       With best wishes.
           Sincerely,
                                                    Duncan Hunter,
     Chairman.
                                  ____



                               Committee on Government Reform,

                                 Washington, DC, December 8, 2006.
     Hon. Henry. J. Hyde,
     Chairman, Committee on International Relations, House of 
         Representatives, Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. Chairman: The House is scheduled to consider today 
     the conference report on H.R. 5682, the ``United States-India 
     Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act.'' Thank you for 
     consulting with the Committee on Government Reform regarding 
     section 231 regarding the protection of confidentiality of 
     information.
       While I am unable to support the policy set forth in 
     section 231, I will not object to H.R. 5682 moving to the 
     floor. I do so only with the understanding that this 
     procedural route will not prejudice the Committee's 
     jurisdictional interest and its prerogatives in this bill or 
     similar legislation in the future.
       I request that you include our exchange of letters on this 
     matter in the Congressional Record during consideration, of 
     this bill on the House floor. Thank you for your attention to 
     these matters.
           Sincerely,
                                                        Tom Davis,
     Chairman.
                                  ____

                                        Committee on International


                                                    Relations,

                                                 December 8, 2006.
     Hon. Tom Davis,
     Chairman, House Committee on Government Reform, Washington, 
         DC.
       Dear Mr. Chairman: I am writing to you concerning the 
     conference report for H.R. 5682, the ``United States-India 
     Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act.'' Section 231, 
     regarding the protection of confidentiality of information, 
     is within the jurisdiction of your Committee.
       In the interest of permitting this House to proceed 
     expeditiously to consider the conference report for H.R. 
     5682, I appreciate your willingness to support this 
     conference report moving to the floor. I understand that such 
     a waiver only applies to this language in this bill, and not 
     to the underlying subject matter.
       I appreciate you willingness to allow us to proceed. I will 
     insert this exchange of letters into the Congressional Record 
     during the debate on this bill.
           Sincerely,


                                                Henry J. Hyde,

     Chairman.
                                  ____



                                          Committee on Science

                                 Washington, DC, December 8, 2006.
     Hon. Henry J. Hyde,
     Chairman, Committee on International Relations, Washington, 
         DC.
       Dear Mr. Chairman: I am writing regarding the 
     jurisdictional interest of the Science Committee in H.R. 5682 
     as amended by the Senate, and the Conference Report to the 
     Henry J. Hyde United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy 
     Cooperation Act of 2006 (H. Rpt. 109-721). The Science 
     Committee has jurisdiction over Title II, United States 
     Additional Protocol Implementation.
       The Science Committee recognizes the importance of H.R. 
     5682 and the Conference Report and the need for the 
     legislation to move expeditiously. Therefore, I will not 
     stand in the way of floor consideration. This, of course, is 
     conditional on our mutual understanding that nothing in this 
     legislation or my decision to allow the bill to come to the 
     floor waives, reduces or otherwise affects the jurisdiction 
     of the Science Committee, and that a copy of this letter and 
     your letter in response will be included in the Congressional 
     Record when the Conference Report is considered on the House 
     Floor.
       Thank you for your attention to this matter.
           Sincerely,
                                                Sherwood Boehlert,
     Chairman.
                                  ____

                                        Committee on International


                                                    Relations,

                                                 December 8, 2006.
     Hon. Sherwood Boehlert,
     Chairman, Committee on Science, Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. Chairman: Thank you for your letter regarding the 
     jurisdictional interest of the Science Committee in H.R. 5682 
     as amended by the Senate, and the Conference Report to the 
     Henry J. Hyde United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy 
     Cooperation Act of2006 (H. Rpt. 109-721). I appreciate your 
     willingness to work with me so that is important legislation 
     can move expeditiously.
       By allowing the Conference Report to be scheduled for floor 
     consideration, I agree that the Committee on Science has not 
     waived, reduced or otherwise affected the jurisdiction of the 
     Science Committee, nor should this action be taken as 
     precedent for other bills. I further agree that a copy of our 
     exchange of letters will be included in the Congressional 
     Record when the Conference Report is considered on the House 
     Floor.
       Thank you for your attention to this matter.
           Sincerely,
                                                       Henry Hyde,
                                                         Chairman.

  Mr. Speaker, this legislation provides the President with the 
authority he requires to permit the establishment of civil nuclear 
cooperation with India while also protecting the traditional 
congressional prerogatives in approving agreements of this type. It 
also strengthens the global nonproliferation regime by ensuring that 
India will become a full and active participant in efforts to prevent 
the spread of nuclear weapons capability, especially regarding Iran.
  The conferees believe this conference report will pass overwhelmingly 
in both houses and quickly be signed by the President. Upon signing, 
the President will be able to proceed with the negotiation of a civil 
nuclear cooperation agreement with India that will become the 
cornerstone of a new and cooperative partnership between the U.S.

[[Page H9148]]

and India, the world's two largest democracies.
  Mr. Speaker, I strongly support this legislation and urge my 
colleagues to vote for its passage.
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of this conference 
report, and I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Speaker, India today is the preeminent state in South Asia. It is 
becoming a political and economic powerhouse of over 1.1 billion people 
with a thriving economy and a vibrant democracy. By these and other 
measures, India is a state that should be at the very center of our 
foreign policy and our attention. Regrettably, during the Cold War our 
two countries were unnaturally estranged by the dynamics of the 
international system. Slowly, during the 1990s our countries' interests 
began to converge and our relationship warmed.
  Then, Mr. Speaker, 6\1/2\ years ago President Clinton made a historic 
trip to India and ushered in a new era of cooperation between our two 
great democratic nations. Washington and New Delhi have wisely built 
upon the foundations that President Clinton laid. Today they expand 
this mighty architecture of cooperation and friendship by approving, on 
a strongly bipartisan basis, the Henry J. Hyde United States-India 
Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act of 2006.
  With this legislation, the House of Representatives steps forth into 
the spotlight to offer its judgment on one critical element of this new 
relationship, civilian nuclear cooperation, and it establishes the 
process by which Congress will in the near future review and vote on 
the final agreement to implement such cooperation. This expansion of 
peaceful nuclear trade with India will usher in a new partnership 
between India and the United States based on our shared objective of 
preventing the spread of dangerous nuclear technology to countries and 
groups that would use it for evil purposes.
  This is not the administration's bill, Mr. Speaker. Their original 
proposal sought to give the President complete authority to waive all 
restrictions under current law that would have complicated 
implementation of the U.S.-India nuclear trade and to severely limit 
congressional oversight by securing a preapproval for whatever 
agreement the U.S. and India conclude. There would have been no 
effective subsequent review by the Congress. By contrast, at our 
insistence, this legislation strikes the right balance between giving 
the President the necessary flexibility to negotiate the best agreement 
possible with New Delhi while at the same time preserving congressional 
oversight and the right of consent to the resulting agreement.
  Mr. Speaker, this conference report follows the model laid out in the 
Hyde-Lantos legislation overwhelmingly approved by the House last July. 
It ensures that Congress will have the final word on whether or not the 
final agreement for cooperation with India can become law. This 
conference report will provide the President with only partial 
authority to waive current provisions of U.S. law to allow peaceful 
nuclear-related trade with India to take place. But cooperation could 
only take place after Congress has approved the agreement of 
cooperation itself.
  Mr. Speaker, the legislation will help fashion a partnership with 
India to further U.S. nonproliferation goals. The passage of the 
conference report will also adopt the implementing legislation for the 
U.S.-IAEA additional protocol. That legislation will finally allow us 
to bring that protocol in force which will promote the U.S. goal of all 
states adopting the enhanced safeguards contained in the additional 
protocol.
  Mr. Speaker, this is a historic day for this House and for the United 
States. I urge all of my colleagues to give their full support to this 
conference report and to help usher in a new day in U.S.-India 
relations.
  Mr. Speaker, it is only fitting that on the last day of this session 
of Congress, Chairman Hyde is chairing a bipartisan agreement done with 
cooperation in both Chambers. H.R. 5682 represents the right way of 
legislating, ample preparation, consideration of all ideas, bipartisan 
cooperation, cordial relations with the other body, and keen attention 
to institutional prerogatives. It is especially fitting that it will be 
forever identified with the outgoing chairman of the House 
International Relations Committee. And if it weren't for his 
astonishing array of accomplishments, the Henry J. Hyde United States-
India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act could easily become known 
as the crowning achievement of the gentleman from Illinois.

                              {time}  2000

  But the fact is, Mr. Speaker, this groundbreaking legislation is but 
one of the innumerable milestones in Henry Hyde's impressive record of 
public service. Henry is retiring from Congress after choosing not to 
seek a 17th consecutive term. He would have loved to stay with us 
longer, but as he recently told an interviewer, Father Time and Mother 
Nature have a way of beating up on me.
  By contrast, Mr. Speaker, I am confident that history will be kind to 
Henry Hyde. A member of the International Relations Committee since 
1982, Henry has been a key figure in crucial debates and decisions 
about war and peace, international arms control, the expansion of NATO, 
United Nation's reform, and halting the spread of HIV/AIDS, which he 
has astutely compared to the bubonic plague in its tragic scope.
  Henry has also served with great distinction on the Judiciary and the 
Intelligence Committees, but I will let another speak to his 
achievements there, and of course the continued, devoted support by his 
constituents through 16 terms in Congress speak volumes about his work 
on behalf of his district.
  It was in the political caldron of Chicago that Henry Hyde became 
entranced with politics early in life. He grew up as an Irish Catholic 
Democrat, but strayed from the faith in time to vote for Dwight David 
Eisenhower for President, so he became a Republican sometime in the 
1940s.
  But, Mr. Speaker, I prefer not to dwell on the things that divide me 
from my dear friend, Henry Hyde. Rather, I would like to point out that 
both of us came of age during the Second World War, and this has formed 
our world views and forged our common value, and it is on this basis 
that we have often seen eye to eye and found ourselves shoulder to 
shoulder in struggles that consistently have been of service to our 
national security from the intricacies of key institutional agreements 
to the staggeringly complex issues involved in the fight against global 
terrorism.
  Henry has held a firm grip on the gavel in the International 
Relations Committee these past 6 years, through some of the most 
pivotal and riveting challenges of our times. He wielded his authority 
with fairness, intellectual honesty and no small amount of wit. As The 
Washington Post noted in 1998, he has managed to maintain a reputation 
for evenhandedness, for patience and restraint, a remarkable feat for 
someone known both for his savagely held beliefs and for his keen sense 
which way the wind blows.
  Mr. Speaker, the International Relations Committee flourished under 
Henry Hyde's direction. It will be daunting for me to take up the gavel 
as Henry Hyde leaves us, Mr. Speaker. Anyone who knows him will 
understand how much Henry will be missed in our committee and in this 
House.
  Earlier this week, we commemorated Henry's contributions by lending 
his name to a room in this very building of the Capitol. He will, 
therefore, always have a place here, and what is far more important, he 
will have a place in the hearts of his colleagues.
  Some of us may disagree with some of his policies, but he is one of 
the institutional treasures around here, a true gentleman of the House.
  Mr. Speaker, section 104(b)(2) requires that the President determine 
that India and the IAEA have completed all legal steps required prior 
to signature for an IAEA-India safeguards. That agreement must apply 
safeguards in perpetuity in accordance with IAEA standards, principles 
and practices. It references IAEA Board of Governors Document GOV/1621 
(1973) as one of the IAEA guiding documents relating to standards for 
perpetuity of safeguards. I attach that document for the Record.


[[Page H9149]]



                               Safeguards

   (b) THE FORMULATION OF CERTAIN PROVISIONS IN AGREEMENTS UNDER THE 
AGENCY'S SAFEGUARDS SYSTEM (1965, AS PROVISIONALLY EXTENDED IN 1966 AND 
                                 1968)


                   Memorandum by the Director General

       (1) A substantial number of Governors have urged that there 
     should be a greater degree of standardization than in the 
     past with respect to the duration and termination of such 
     agreements as henceforth be concluded under the Agency's 
     Safeguards System (1965, as Provisionally Extended in 1966 
     and 1968) for the application of safeguards in connection 
     with nuclear material, equipment, facilities or non-nuclear 
     material supplied to States by third parties. To achieve 
     this, it is recommended that the following two concepts 
     should be reflected in these agreements:
       (a) That the duration of the agreement should be related to 
     the period of actual use of the items in the recipient State; 
     and
       (b) That the provisions for terminating the agreement 
     should be formulated in such a way that the rights and 
     obligations of the parties continue to apply in connection 
     with supplied nuclear material and with special fissionable 
     material produced, processed or used in or in connection with 
     supplied nuclear material, equipment, facilities or non-
     nuclear material, until such time as the Agency has 
     terminated the application of safeguards thereto, in 
     accordance with the provisions of paragraph 26 or 27 of the 
     Agency's Safeguards System.
       A short exposition with respect to the application of these 
     concepts is annexed hereto.
       (2) The proposed standardization would appear likely to 
     facilitate the uniform application of safeguards measures. It 
     is furthermore to be noted that the combined operation of the 
     two concepts would be consistent with the application of the 
     general principle embodied in paragraph 16 of the Agency's 
     Safeguards System.


                     REQUESTED ACTION BY THE BOARD

       (3) In bringing this matter to the Board's attention, the 
     Director General seeks the views of the Board as to whether 
     it concurs with the two concepts set out in paragraph 1 
     above.


                                 Annex

       (1) In the case of receipt by a State of source or special 
     fissionable material, equipment, facilities or non-nuclear 
     material from a supplier outside that State, the duration of 
     the relevant agreement under the Agency's Safeguards System 
     would be related to the actual use in the recipient State of 
     the material or items supplied. This may be accomplished by 
     requiring, in accordance with present practice, that the 
     material or items supplied be listed in the inventory called 
     for by the agreement.
       (2) The primary effect of termination of the agreement, 
     either by act of the parties or effluxion of time, would be 
     that no further supplied nuclear material, equipment, 
     facilities or non-nuclear material could be added to the 
     inventory. On the other hand, the rights and obligations of 
     the parties, as provided for in the agreement, would continue 
     to apply in connection with any supplied material or items 
     and with any special fissionable material produced, processed 
     or used in or in connection with any supplied material or 
     items which had been included in the inventory, until such 
     material or items had been removed from the inventory.
       (3) With respect to nuclear material, conditions for 
     removal are those set out in paragraph 26 or 27 of the 
     Agency's Safeguards System; with respect to equipment, 
     facilities and non-nuclear material, conditions for removal 
     could be based on paragraph 26. A number of agreements 
     already concluded have prescribed such conditions in part, by 
     providing for deletion from the inventory of nuclear 
     material, equipment, and facilities which are returned to the 
     supplying State or transferred (under safeguards) to a third 
     State. The additional provisions contemplated would stipulate 
     that items or non-nuclear material could be removed from the 
     preview of the agreement if they had been consumed, were no 
     longer usable for any nuclear activity relevant from the 
     point of view of safeguards or had become practicably 
     irrecoverable.
       (4) The effect of reflecting the two concepts in agreements 
     would be that special fissionable material which had been 
     produced, processed or used in or in connection with supplied 
     material or items before they were removed from the scope of 
     the agreement, would remain or be listed in the inventory, 
     and such special fissionable material, together with any 
     supplied nuclear material remaining in the inventory, would 
     be subject to safeguards until the Agency had terminated 
     safeguards on that special fissionable and nuclear material 
     in accordance with the provisions of the Agency's Safeguards 
     System. Thus, the actual termination of the operation of the 
     provisions of the agreement would take place only when 
     everything had been removed from the inventory.

  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. MARKEY. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself as much time as I may 
consume.
  First, let me begin by complimenting the gentleman from Illinois, Mr. 
Hyde. Like Mr. Hyde, I was born a Democrat and baptized a Catholic just 
7 days later. So I know how big a decision it must have been to have 
abandoned that Democratic birthright. But he has been a historic figure 
in this institution. I want to associate myself with everything that 
the gentleman from California said about you.
  But I do believe that this bill is a historic mistake. The world is 
looking at this institution this evening. It is wondering what in the 
world the United States is thinking in giving an exemption to the 
Nuclear Nonproliferation Act to a country which is a nonsignatory to 
the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.
  What is the signal that that will send to Pakistan? What is the 
signal that that will send to Iran, to Syria, to Egypt, to Venezuela, 
to North Korea? What is the signal that we are sending with regard to 
the entire nuclear nonproliferation regime which has served this world 
well since the 1960s?
  I think that the message they are receiving is that there is going to 
be a double standard, and a double standard which, unfortunately, from 
my perspective, is going to lead to a rapid escalation of the 
development of nuclear weapons programs in country after country around 
the world.
  Right now, India has a nuclear weapons program that experts estimate 
produces approximately 7 per year. Because the nuclear fuel, which this 
bill will make possible, frees up the domestic uranium supply in India, 
experts estimate that it will increase to 40 to 50 the number of 
nuclear weapons which India can produce per year, because we, the 
United States, in passing this legislation, will ensure the supply of 
their civilian nuclear energy needs.
  Why should we care about that? Well, the reason that we should care 
about that is that Pakistan is now developing and building their own 
nuclear material production facility, which experts indicate will 
increase from two to three nuclear bombs per year to 40 to 50 nuclear 
bombs per year. That is what a nuclear arms race looks like. That is 
what the nuclear arms race between the United States and Soviet Union 
looked like in the 1950s, in the 1960s and in the 1970s, and what we 
are doing out here is pouring fuel onto this fire, rather than calling 
an international conference to bring together these parties and others 
in order to put in place a real nuclear weapons control regime. Instead 
we are turning a blind eye to the reality of what is going on in the 
South Asian continent.
  So, ladies and gentlemen, this is a historic moment, a moment that we 
will look back on, not perhaps tomorrow, or next week, but 5 years from 
now, 10 years from now. People will point back to this night, this last 
night of the Republican control of Congress, this last night when the 
Republican-controlled House and Senate can produce for President Bush 
this anti-nuclear weapons control policy that he has been engaging in 
for the last 6 years and say this was the moment that crossed the line 
where ever country said to themselves, why should we, as signatories of 
the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, abide by those rules when the 
United States selectively gives exemptions to countries that are not 
signatories to the nuclear nonproliferation policy.
  You cannot preach temperance from a bar stool. The hypocrisy 
coefficient is at historic heights when the United States believes that 
the rest of the world will listen to us as we preach that they should 
not be interested in nuclear weapons, even as they are helping to 
facilitate the Indians in developing an ever greater capacity to 
produce nuclear weapons inspect that country.
  Why should we care? We should care because A. Q. Khan, the nuclear 
Johnny Appleseed, the nuclear Pied Piper, who spread nuclear weapons 
from North Korea through the Middle East, is still living in Pakistan, 
living in a palace, still not in prison. His associates, his men, still 
walking the streets of Pakistan. Al Qaeda is headquartered in Pakistan, 
still unapprehended.
  What is the message that we are sending? We are sending a message 
that the nuclear arms sellers are back on the road, selling to anyone 
who will purchase. That is the message that we are sending.
  So tonight is a historic vote. It is a vote that will be looked back 
at as one of the most important that we have ever cast here in 
Congress. Sadly, it is

[[Page H9150]]

not going to receive even a fraction of the attention which it 
deserves.
  But I tell you this, ladies and gentlemen, when and if this nuclear 
war breaks out, we will look back. At least we should be able to say we 
tried, we really tried to put an end to the nuclear arms race on the 
South Asian continent. This is what this debate tonight is all about.
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 4 minutes to the incoming ranking 
Republican on the International Relations Committee, the gentlewoman 
from Florida (Ms. Ros-Lehtinen).
  Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, I thank my chairman for his leadership 
and for his time.
  Mr. Speaker, as an original cosponsor of this legislation, Mr. 
Speaker, and as cochair of the Congressional Caucus on India and Indian 
Americans, I rise in support of H.R. 5682, the Henry J. Hyde United 
States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act of 2006. I would 
like to thank Chairman Hyde, as well as Ranking Member Lantos, for 
their dedicated work on this issue and for their willingness to work 
with me and so many members of our House International Relations 
Committee, as well as the House as a whole, to ensure that the 
conference report before us tonight achieves the difficult balance of 
expanding cooperation with our democratic ally, India, while also 
promoting U.S. global nonproliferation policy.
  Because the conference report closely tracks the bill which was 
passed overwhelmingly by the House in July, I need not list its 
specific provisions, other than to say that it preserves the central 
features of the House text, such as ensuring that Congress retains its 
traditional role in approving nuclear cooperation agreements.

                              {time}  2015

  Also in reinforcing the indispensable role of the nuclear suppliers' 
club in preventing proliferation and encouraging India's cooperation in 
stopping Iran's efforts to develop their nuclear weapons capability. It 
has been significantly strengthened by the inclusion of many important 
sections from the companion legislation approved by the Senate.
  Let me address the larger and more important context in which this 
legislation should be viewed. By providing the legal foundation for 
civilian nuclear cooperation between the United States and India, it 
achieves a key step of the global partnership with India that was 
announced on July 18 of last year by President Bush and Prime Minister 
Singh. This far-sighted and historic initiative is a long-delayed 
recognition that the two largest democracies share an extraordinary 
array of common interests and that a closer and increasingly 
cooperative relationship between them holds enormous potential to 
promote the strategic partnerships and interests of both. If allowed to 
grow, it will undoubtedly produce a major realignment of the 
international system as a whole and an entirely positive one.
  India and the United States have already traveled a long way toward 
building that new relationship. India stands alongside the United 
States in the effort to confront and eliminate the scourge of global 
terrorism and to reduce the instability and the conflict in South Asia 
and elsewhere. We look forward to expanding the areas of common 
interest and joint action. Nowhere is that cooperation more important, 
Mr. Speaker, than in stopping the spread of nuclear weapons.
  I should note that this legislation affirms that India is a country 
that has demonstrated responsible behavior with respect to 
nonproliferation of technology related to weapons of mass destruction 
programs and the means to deliver them and that it is working with the 
United States in key foreign policy initiatives related to 
nonproliferation.
  To further that goal, this legislation establishes as U.S. policy 
securing India's participation in the Proliferation Security 
Initiative, which is a cooperative arrangement among the world's powers 
to intercept the illicit movement of nuclear materials and other 
dangerous items by sea or air. India's cooperation would be a major 
addition to the world's efforts in this difficult but essential task. I 
am confident that her government will move quickly to assume a more 
prominent position among the initiative's growing ranks.
  Lastly, Mr. Speaker, I am glad that this historic bill carries the 
name of Henry Hyde; a leader of great proportions, a mentor to so many 
of us, a man of principles, a living legend, our friend, Henry Hyde.
  Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Speaker, I am very pleased to yield 5 minutes to the 
gentleman from New York (Mr. Ackerman), a senior distinguished member 
of the International Relations Committee and one of our outstanding 
experts on U.S.-India relations.
  Mr. ACKERMAN. Mr. Speaker, I thank Mr. Lantos, our soon-to-be 
chairman of the committee.
  Mr. Speaker, today is truly a historic day for U.S.-India relations. 
Chairman Hyde, who deserves all of the accolades that he received 
today, has worked very hard, and, together with Ranking Member Lantos, 
they have done extraordinary work to bring before us a conference 
report that will transform our relationship with India and bring 
reality to the process of nuclear nonproliferation. I congratulate them 
both for their tremendous efforts and for their tremendous and enormous 
achievement.
  Mr. Speaker, if you liked this bill in January, and you 
overwhelmingly did, then you are going to love this conference report. 
If you were worried about seeing the agreement before it was final, 
then you will love this conference report, because it gives Congress 
another chance to scrutinize and vote on approving the final deal.
  If you wanted the IAEA to be able to inspect India's nuclear 
facilities, then you are for this conference report, because two-thirds 
of all of India's nuclear facilities will now be under IAEA safeguards. 
It is a no-brainer. Without this, we get to inspect zero; with this, 
two-thirds of India's nuclear facilities.
  If you wanted India for the first time ever to commit to the MTCR 
guidelines, then you get that in this conference report.
  If you wanted India for the first time ever to adhere to the Nuclear 
Suppliers Group guidelines, you get that in this conference report.
  If you wanted to send a clear message to nuclear rogue states about 
how to behave, then you are for this conference report. You are for it 
because it shows that responsible nuclear powers are welcomed by the 
international community and not sanctioned.
  If you wanted a broad, deep, enduring strategic relationship with 
India, then you are for this conference report.
  For 30 years, U.S. policy towards India has been defined and 
constrained by our insistence on punishing India for its sovereign 
decision not to sign the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. Truth be 
told, if India had conducted its nuclear tests a little earlier, it 
would have been treated the way we treat China and Russia and France 
and Britain and ourselves; in short, as a grandfathered member of the 
nuclear weapons club. But they did not test earlier, and nothing we 
have tried over the last 3 decades has convinced them to give up their 
nuclear weapons program, and nothing we say over the next 3 decades 
will convince them either.
  India is a responsible nuclear power and deserves to be treated that 
way. The conference report before us does just that.
  Critics have expressed concerns regarding the bill's impact on our 
nonproliferation policy, and clearly Iran and Pakistan and North Korea 
are looking for clues about what this deal means for them and their 
nuclear programs. Let them understand the message. If you want to be 
treated like India, be like India. Be responsible. Be a good 
international actor with regard to weapons of mass destruction 
technology. Be like India. Don't sell your technology to the highest 
bidder. Be like India. Don't provide it to terrorists. Be a democracy, 
a real democracy, such as India, and work with us on important foreign 
policy objectives, and not against us.
  That is the message that we are going to send today.
  Does it warm your heart and make you comfortable that Iran and North 
Korea signed the NPT, but they are now running away from their fully 
accepted and freely accepted obligations and away from IAEA 
inspections? India

[[Page H9151]]

didn't sign the NPT, and yet it is embracing the IAEA and embracing 
nonproliferation norms and is a democracy. India's attitude should be 
recognized and commended, not criticized and condemned.
  Practically speaking, there are only two options, and they are before 
us today: One is to vote ``no'' and continue the status quo, which 
means India goes on pursuing its national interests as it has been 
doing outside of the nonproliferation mainstream, and we get to inspect 
nothing. The other is to vote ``yes,'' make the deal with India and get 
for the United States and the international community a window in 
perpetuity into two-thirds of India's existing nuclear facilities and 
all of its future civilian nuclear facilities.
  The choice is clear. The conference report brings India into the 
nonproliferation mainstream and gets the United States and 
international community access to India's civilian nuclear facilities.
  Mr. Speaker, it is time for a 21st century policy toward India, one 
that supports and encourages India's emergence as a responsible global 
power and solidifies the U.S.-India bilateral relationship for decades 
to come.
  Not that it needs it, but the bill gives a great name, that of Henry 
Hyde, to this remarkable piece of legislation. We salute you, Mr. 
Chairman.
  I urge a ``yes'' vote on H.R. 5632.
  Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I thank Mr. Ackerman for a brilliant 
statement, as well as his cordial sentiments.
  Mr. Speaker, I am delighted to yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from 
California (Mr. Royce), the chairman of the Subcommittee on 
International Terrorism and Nonproliferation, who has an awful lot to 
do with the ultimate product that we are voting on today.
  Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the Henry J. Hyde bill.
  I want to address a concern raised earlier by the gentleman from 
California. I share his concern about A.Q. Khan. But Dr. Khan is in 
Pakistan, and we would not do this deal for Pakistan, because Pakistan 
proliferates. India does not. The nuclear fuel and materials we and the 
world may sell India will be for the civilian sector only, not the 
military, and will be under strict international safeguards and 
inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency.
  While nuclear energy is controversial to us in the United States, it 
is not controversial in India. As in several other countries, nuclear 
energy is viewed as a critical technology, one that is central to 
uplifting hundreds of millions of impoverished Indians, because they 
need the electricity for their grid. So India will develop its nuclear 
energy sector, not as easily or quickly as without this deal, but it 
will nonetheless, and India will not relinquish its nuclear weapons at 
this point in time, which is understandable given its security 
situation.
  Right now, because of existing restrictions, many Indians view the 
U.S. as blocking India's technological and developmental aspirations by 
opposing their acquiring nuclear material and technology for clean 
energy. This position does not make for a strong partnership.
  With its growing economy, India is consuming more and more oil. It is 
competing on the world market, competing with American consumers, for 
limited hydrocarbon resources. This gives Americans an interest in 
helping India expand its nuclear power industry, which this legislation 
does. It also encourages India to move away from burning its highly 
polluting coal.
  By passing this conference report, we take a big step towards 
internationalizing India's nuclear industry, which I believe would make 
it safer. Young Indian scientists and engineers in the nuclear field 
are interested in collaborating with their American counterparts. Today 
they are isolated. I would rather know more about India's nuclear work 
than less.
  We have two options: either continue to try to box in India and hope 
for the best, and, as I mentioned, India will not relinquish its 
nuclear weapons now; or we make this move, engage India, and use our 
influence to move this increasingly important country in our direction, 
making India a true partner as we enter what will be a decades-long 
struggle against Islamic terrorism.
  This is not an ideal agreement and the administration should be more 
aggressively pursuing an international fissile material cutoff, but it 
is a very good agreement, one that works through a very difficult 
nonproliferation situation to strengthen an important relationship.
  So I urge my colleagues to support the conference report. I would 
also mention that during the course of the committee's five hearings on 
this agreement, Members closely scrutinized India's relationship with 
Iran, and I think it is fair to say that our committee helped influence 
India's thinking on Iran. We got India's support for two IAEA votes, 
voting twice at the IAEA to find Iran in noncompliance with its 
safeguard obligations and to report Iran to the Security Council.
  Importantly, this bill preserves congressional oversight, and that 
was not the administration's preferred approach, and gives Congress 
another bite at the apple, requiring a joint resolution of approval of 
the nuclear cooperation agreement. So India knows that Congress is 
continuing to watch.
  Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me time. I again 
commend Chairman Hyde. We honor him tonight with the title of this 
bill.
  Mr. MARKEY. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3\1/6\ minutes to the gentlelady 
from California (Ms. Lee).
  Ms. LEE. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding, and also 
for his very clear presentation tonight as to why this is such a bad 
bill and bad conference report.
  First of all, let me just say, Mr. Speaker, that I had the privilege 
to visit India a few years ago with my distinguished colleague from New 
York (Mr. Crowley) and our distinguished colleague from Maryland (Mr. 
Hoyer).

                              {time}  2030

  I witnessed firsthand the brilliance and the spirit and the 
commitment to democracy of the Indian people, and like many of my 
colleagues, I strongly believe that it is in our country's interests to 
strengthen our relationship with India economically, politically and 
culturally.
  But to suggest that we can do so only at the expense of the 
international nonproliferation standards, as this conference report for 
the India nuclear deal before us would, is really both dishonest and it 
is dangerous.
  Mr. Speaker, as far as I am concerned, there is no country, and I 
mean no country, for which it should be acceptable to sacrifice our 
international standards.
  The problem with this deal as it is currently written is that it will 
do lasting harm to more than 30 years of international efforts to stop 
the spread of nuclear weapons. This deal creates a double standard 
which undermines our efforts to stop countries like Iran and North 
Korea from developing nuclear weapons.
  This deal creates incentives for withdrawing from the Nuclear 
Nonproliferation Treaty. Why have countries like Brazil and South Korea 
spend all these years playing by the rules and not building nuclear 
weapons in exchange for civilian technology when India gets both?
  This deal sets a dangerous precedent. In explaining Beijing's 
rationale for potentially pursuing a deal with Pakistan, Professor Shen 
Dingli of China's Fudan University has already argued and said, if the 
U.S. can violate nuclear rules, then we can violate them also.
  We should be fighting to save what is left of the international 
nonproliferation framework, not discarding it. There is no need to rush 
through with this conference report on the last day of this 109th 
Congress. We must go back to the drawing board and make sure this 
proposed nuclear cooperation agreement maintains international 
nonproliferation goals, and we can do this when the 110th Congress 
begins in January.
  Ideally, India should formally commit to the goals and restrictions 
on the international nonproliferation framework and sign the Nuclear 
Nonproliferation Treaty. Short of that, we must insist on specific 
nonproliferation safeguards as specified in an amendment if you 
remember which I offered in this bill when it was considered in July.
  This amendment basically would have required India to commit to the 
basic principles consistent with the NPT. Unfortunately, the amendment 
was not made in order.

[[Page H9152]]

  The world is a dangerous place, Mr. Speaker. Nuclear weapons are 
pointed in all directions. Compliance with the Nuclear Nonproliferation 
Treaty is a basic standard that we should require in all nuclear deals 
and arrangements. This bill goes in the opposite direction. Without 
these commitments, we should reject this nuclear deal.
  Finally, Mr. Speaker, I would just like to thank the chairman, Mr. 
Hyde, for his leadership and his fairness as chair of the International 
Relations Committee and specifically as it relates to HIV and AIDS and 
orphans and moms with children and the respect you have shown the 
minority. I wish you happiness and good luck and good health in this 
next chapter of your life.
  Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Speaker, I am very pleased to yield 3\1/2\ minutes to 
the gentleman from New York (Mr. Crowley), a distinguished member of 
the International Relations Committee, my good friend, a recognized 
expert on U.S.-India relations.
  Mr. CROWLEY. Mr. Speaker, I thank my friend and colleague from 
California (Mr. Lantos) for yielding me this time.
  I, too, want to rise in strong support of the Henry Hyde India 
Nuclear Energy Cooperation Act.
  I want to commend my friend and chairman, who I have deep respect 
for, Chairman Hyde, and my soon-to-be Chair of the International 
Relations Committee, Mr. Lantos, for their work they put into crafting 
this bipartisan conference report.
  I would also like to commend the staff of both the House 
International Relations Committee and the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee for the work they have done to reach a compromise on this 
deal before we end this 109th Congress.
  We here in Congress are not the only ones who have been engaged in 
pushing forward this important cooperation agreement or this bilateral 
relationship. I must also recognize the work of the Indian American 
community for the incredible advocacy they have demonstrated and the 
incredible support they have demonstrated for this legislation.
  This legislation creates a two-step process, and by passing the 
conference report today, we will have taken that very important first 
step.
  The second step rests upon negotiations between the United States and 
India, as well as India and the International Atomic Energy Agency and 
with the Nuclear Suppliers Group.
  I would like to be clear that this vote sets the stage for allowing 
cooperation, but the actual exchange of civilian nuclear cooperation 
will not take place until Congress is provided with the details of 
those relevant negotiations and takes a second up or down vote.
  I urge my colleagues to end India's nuclear isolation and allow them 
to be brought into the nonproliferation tent with the rest of the 
responsible states who seek safe and efficient civilian nuclear 
technology. I have held the belief that this bill is not about nuclear 
weapons as much as it is about nuclear energy.
  I urge my colleagues to begin building a pathway of cooperation in 
energy with India that will help the economy of India grow and help 
American business opportunities prosper.
  India's booming and growing economy needs fuel, and plenty of it, to 
uplift the lives of hundreds of millions who live in abject poverty. 
There is not enough wood, enough gas or enough oil in this world to 
sustain that growth. The greenhouse gases which have been produced by 
expending those fuels would be an unwelcome byproduct.
  Passing this legislation opens up a new pathway of opportunity for 
energy development that will lower greenhouse gases, provide reliable 
electricity and, strengthen India's economy.
  I am proud that the U.S. will work with India to see India and the 
Indian people reach their full potential. If we expect India to be our 
ally in the 21st century, we must treat them as an equal, which is what 
the cooperation will demonstrate.
  I trust my colleagues will recognize what our future with India holds 
and vote for final passage of this legislation.
  I just want to point out to my good friend, the gentlewoman from 
California (Ms. Lee), who spoke about her amendment, it is impossible 
for India to sign the Nonproliferation Treaty because she has already 
detonated that weapon in the early 1970s. She would have to put those 
weapons away and say she would never develop them again and put them 
beyond use and verifiable use before she can sign the treaty. It simply 
is not going to happen.
  They have demonstrated that they are a good player in this field, as 
Mr. Ackerman said. If you want to be like India and get this deal, act 
like India.
  Mr. MARKEY. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman from 
Oregon (Mr. Wu).
  Mr. WU. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong opposition to this legislation.
  Let the record show that if or when a mushroom cloud ever erupts over 
an American city, it will be traced back to this unwise vote in the 
United States Congress and to the bone-headed policy of this 
administration towards treaty obligations for Nunn-Lugar safeguards and 
the sale of nuclear materials to India.
  When I was a boy, this country sold F-15s to Iran so that Iran could 
offset Soviet power in South Asia. Because we sold F-15s and other arms 
to Iran, we wound up selling chemical weapon precursor materials to 
Iraq to offset Iranian power in the Middle East. Today, we have 135,000 
troops in Iraq, in part because of that string of bad decisions.
  Now we are told that to offset Chinese power in Asia, we should sell 
nuclear materials to India which would free up Indian nuclear reactors 
to produce many more nuclear weapons for the Indian nuclear weapons 
program.
  If we approve this deal with India, it would encourage China to 
increase its nuclear arsenal. I submit to you that we Americans are one 
of the potential targets of that enhanced Chinese nuclear arsenal.
  Even more worrisome is that an Indian nuclear buildup would further 
accelerate the Pakistani nuclear buildup.
  While I have strong confidence in the stability of the Indian 
Government and in the stability of Indian democracy, I have much less 
faith in the stability of the Pakistani Government and of Pakistani 
democracy, especially of the Pakistani Government's ability to keep 
under control those nuclear weapons which it already has and the 
additional weapons it would build because of this Indian nuclear 
buildup.
  If there is a military coup in Pakistan, we should be very, very 
concerned, not only about the stability of South Asia, but of the whole 
world. There have been three military coups in Pakistan since its 
independence in 1947.
  Rather than approving nonsignatory states in violation of the 
nonproliferation treaties, the better course of action is to respect 
international agreements and to immediately bring to the Senate a total 
ban on nuclear testing and comprehensive treaties to curtail nuclear 
proliferation.
  On the last night before our July recess, there were only 68 of us in 
this House who voted against approving the legislation to permit sales 
of nuclear materials to India. Tonight, on the last night of the 109th 
Congress, we are voting on the House-Senate conference report.
  I ask, I implore more of my colleagues to join me to prevent adding 
fuel to the fire of nuclear proliferation in South Asia. This 
legislation, and the following sale of nuclear materials to India, 
blows out of the water any hope we have of treaty constraints on the 
proliferation of nuclear weapons.
  I want to make it clear in this record and for history that the 
actions of this administration in containing nuclear proliferation have 
been patently irresponsible. This administration has underfunded the 
Nunn-Lugar legislation, which takes nuclear materials out of the open 
market which would otherwise have been available for sale to 
terrorists.
  This administration has failed to support international treaties 
limiting nuclear weapons proliferation, and now it has proposed 
treaties with India that would sell India nuclear materials that would 
result in a nuclear arms race between India and China and India and 
Pakistan.
  Compared to this, the resolution to go to war in Iraq was a piker. 
Let us

[[Page H9153]]

pull back from the brink of this nuclear precipice.
  Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I would ask Mr. Lantos if he needs some 
additional time.
  Mr. LANTOS. Yes, we do.
  Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 5 minutes to the 
gentleman from California (Mr. Lantos), if that will help, for purposes 
of control.
  Mr. LANTOS. We are very grateful for your gesture. Mr. Speaker, I am 
pleased to yield 3 minutes to the gentlewoman from Texas (Ms. Jackson-
Lee), my friend.
  Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I thank the distinguished 
ranking member of the committee, and I thank the distinguished chairman 
of the committee, and I believe this may be Mr. Hyde's last time as 
chairman on the International Relations Committee, and I want to offer 
to him my sincerest appreciation for his service to America. I have had 
the honor and privilege of serving with him on the Judiciary Committee, 
and I thank him for his service.
  I thank Mr. Lantos for the cooperative spirit that has been evidenced 
by this conference report and certainly congratulate him on his 
ascending to be Chair in this next Congress of the International 
Relations Committee.
  I listened to Lee Hamilton and Jim Baker as they began to try to 
bridge the gap and the schism in the Iraq war. One of the most, or more 
stranger, recommendations for many was the engagement of Syria and 
Iran, for many were aghast that we would talk to those who have been so 
reckless in their relationship with the United States. I believe in 
engagement, but is it not interesting that a democracy, the largest, a 
nation that has embedded itself in democracy since its birth, India, is 
a friend of the United States, and yet we are hesitant to engage India.

                              {time}  2045

  That is what this legislation represents. It is an engagement of a 
friend, working with them on the civilian use of nuclear power, 
addressing the concerns of enormous population and enormous poverty. 
Although the middle class of India is growing, this legislation will 
begin the engagement of a friend, and it will provide a fixture in the 
South Asian community that has both the capabilities to use nuclear 
materials in a friendly way and it will be an engagement of a friend 
with the United States.
  I happen to be, of course, engaged with the people of Pakistan, and I 
am grateful that my amendment remained in this legislation that said 
that we continue to engage in the South Asian region with India and 
Pakistan. For even though there may be citing of the inequities or the 
issues as it relates to Pakistan, they too should be engaged with.
  But what we are doing today is a start. And I am very grateful, Mr. 
Lantos, that there are bridges and firewalls in this legislation. This 
legislation allows the vetting of India to begin. It allows the 
International Atomic Energy Agency to vet this program. And before the 
President goes forward, he must be convinced or she must be convinced 
that this is an appropriate step to make. If we can engage with Iran 
and Syria, though it is a difficult proposition for many, why not 
engage with a democracy and a friend who will benefit by the 
utilization of nuclear power? And so I would hope that we would look at 
this in a manner that says this is a good step for there is control 
over what is being utilized, unlike so many of those who have the 
access to nuclear power. I hope my colleagues will support this forward 
step and that they will see the checks and balances that are so 
necessary and continue to support the South Asia region that includes 
not only India but Pakistan.
  Mr. MARKEY. Mr. Speaker, could you advise us how much time is 
remaining?
  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Hayes). The gentleman has 6\1/4\ 
minutes.
  Mr. MARKEY. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman from 
Ohio (Mr. Kucinich).
  Mr. KUCINICH. A nuclear sword of Damocles hangs over the world. Fear 
and ignorance have placed it there. Separation from our brothers and 
sisters holds it there. Separation of our heads from our hearts leaves 
it there.
  We have a moral responsibility to our children, our grandchildren, 
and the entire world to create a world free of nuclear weapons. We have 
moral obligations to lead the way towards total nuclear disarmament and 
nuclear abolition, to wrest from the unsteady hand of crass casualty 
that nuclear sword of Damocles, and save this planet as a place where 
we work out our destiny.
  Only we can dissipate the advancing mushroom clouds by saying ``no'' 
to this bill, ``no'' to proliferation, ``no'' to nuclear testing, 
``no'' to nuclear weapons, ``no'' to nuclear war, ``no'' to the 
destruction of our planet.
  The spirit of the Founders which inhabits this institution was a 
spirit that believed in unity. We must believe in human unity as firmly 
as we believe in the unity of the United States. We must believe in the 
imperative of human unity as we believe in the imperative of our next 
breath, the imperative of the first breath which issues from all new 
life to come. And we do this by pursuing international cooperation 
towards abandoning nuclear ambitions, not furthering them. For God's 
sake, stop this sleepwalk into the nuclear valley of shadows. Wake up 
and vote against this bill.
  Mr. MARKEY. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from New 
Jersey (Mr. Holt).
  Mr. HOLT. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from Massachusetts, and 
I join my colleagues in extending best wishes to Mr. Hyde on the new 
phase of his life.
  If we really believe that nuclear proliferation and loose nukes are 
the greatest threat to world peace and security, as I do, as many of us 
do, then we should be holding on to every tool that we can find to 
prevent that threat. We should be working with India to strengthen the 
nuclear nonproliferation regime, not collaborating to destroy it.
  There will be a time when the history of the spread of nuclear 
weapons of mass destruction is written, and we will look back and see 
when the last thread of the nuclear nonproliferation regime was 
shredded with this agreement.
  We can talk at length about the details of this cooperative 
agreement, we can talk about what a good friend India is and how 
responsible they have been. We can talk about whether nuclear power is 
environmentally benign. But history will say, mark my words, with this 
agreement the world lost the last bit of an international tool to 
control the spread of nuclear weapons of mass destruction. The regime 
will have been killed. All we will have left is our ability to jaw-bone 
with our allies and to threaten our enemies. Countries will work out 
whatever deals they can, two by two. That is the future of the control 
of nuclear weapons of mass destruction. Countries will work out 
whatever deals they can, two by two. This is a very dangerous moment.
  Mr. MARKEY. Could we get a final review here of where we are, Mr. 
Speaker?
  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. LaHood). There are 3\1/2\ minutes 
remaining.
  Mr. MARKEY. I am the last speaker, so I reserve my time.
  Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I believe I have the right to close the 
debate, so I am reserving my time. I have no further requests, so I 
will close.
  Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of our time.
  I share my opponent's concern about the danger of nuclear 
proliferation. This legislation is the exact opposite of nuclear 
proliferation. It opens up for the first time in history all of India's 
current civilian nuclear plants and all future nuclear plants to 
international control. This is a control measure. It is a measure which 
will dramatically enhance the historic strategic cooperation between 
the democratic state of India and the United States of America. When 
historians will look at this historic vote we are about to take, they 
will view this as the most significant vote for democracy, peace, and 
control of nuclear weapons in the 21st century.
  The Senate voted 85 to 15 for this legislation. It passed the House 
on a bipartisan basis, overwhelmingly. Tonight we have an opportunity 
to reaffirm that vote, and I urge all of my colleagues to vote for this 
legislation.
  I yield back the balance of my time.

[[Page H9154]]

  Mr. MARKEY. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time.
  This is an historically bad deal. President Bush has done a far 
better job in negotiating with the Congress to gain acceptance for this 
deal than he did with the Indians and getting them to accept the 
essentials of a real nuclear nonproliferation agreement.
  In this agreement, as we send nuclear materials to India and free up 
so that the Russians and others can do so as well, here is what is not 
inspected: Six of India's plutonium-producing reactors will not be 
inspected. Their heavy-water production facets, not inspected. 
Plutonium separation facilities, not inspected. Uranium mines, not 
inspected. Uranium enrichment facilities, not inspected. In other 
words, their nuclear weapons program, not inspected.
  This is the deal which we are cutting. This is the deal which the 
Congress is being asked tonight to bless. Do you know who would accept 
a deal like that? A.Q. Kahn would accept a deal like that for Pakistan. 
In fact, President Musharraf of Pakistan said to President Bush on his 
visit to Pakistan right after his visit to India, he said to President 
Bush, ``I too would like that deal that you are offering to India.'' 
President Bush said, ``We cannot give you that deal.''
  What are we going to say when China offers that deal to Pakistan? 
Because they will, ladies and gentlemen. What will we say when all of 
those plutonium-producing reactors are not inspected? What will we say 
in 2 years when the Russians offer that same deal to the Iranians? What 
will we say to the Russians, to the Iranians?
  If we don't set the standard for nuclear nonproliferation here in the 
United States in our negotiations with our allies, do not expect there 
to be higher standards in the negotiations between the Chinese and 
their allies or the Russians and their allies. Wherever we set the 
standard, that is going to be the global standard. And when we turn to 
these other countries and we tell them, no, your standards are not high 
enough, they are going to call us hypocrites.
  Ladies and gentlemen, it is an historic night, it is an historic 
vote. People will look back at this as the moment when the nuclear 
nonproliferation regime of the world was destroyed. Vote ``no''. Vote 
``no'' for history. Vote ``no'' for your conscience. When you look 
back, this will be one of those moments when you are glad that you 
voted ``no.''
  Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, the arguments that have been made so ably by 
the gentleman from Massachusetts have been anticipated and, in my 
judgment, well met by Mr. Ackerman, Mr. Lantos, Mr. Crowley, Ms. Ros-
Lehtinen, Mr. Royce, and others, so I will not consume the few moments 
we have left repeating them; suffice to say this is an excellent step 
forward. It recognizes the reality, the nuclear reality of India, and 
is a very progressive step. It is the conference report of the House 
bill and the Senate bill, both of which passed overwhelmingly, and so 
it is truly bipartisan and is something that ought to pass.
  I would like to take this final opportunity to express, inadequately, 
I am afraid, my respect and admiration for Mr. Lantos. I congratulate 
the Democratic Party in selecting him to head the International 
Relations Committee, because foreign policy is going to be critical in 
the coming months and the coming years, and the Congress could not be 
in better hands in that area than it is with Mr. Lantos as chairman of 
the committee. He brings a grasp of history that is unequaled because 
he has lived through so much of it, as well as studied with high 
scholarship. So it is an honor and privilege and experience and an 
adventure to have served with him for so long and learned so much about 
foreign policy at his hand.

                              {time}  2100

  I also want to say the staffs, both the Democratic and Republican 
staffs, are superior people.
  In Camelot, King Arthur once said we are all of us tiny drops in a 
vast ocean, but some of them sparkle. Well, we have a lot of sparklers 
who are staffs of both Republicans and Democrats. Mr. Mooney, Tom 
Mooney, who is not only my friend and my chief of staff, but a 
brilliant administrator and student of foreign policy, has been 
especially helpful. I couldn't begin to express my appreciation to him.
  Horace Mann, a great educator, once said a man should be ashamed to 
die until he has won some victory for humanity. I think every Member of 
Congress attains a victory for humanity every time Congress is in 
session and a vote is cast. Democracy is more than simply a set of 
rules as to how we elect people or how we litigate against each other; 
it ascribes individual worth to every human being, every member of the 
human family, and you in Congress are custodians of democracy. That is 
a very high calling.
  To be in Washington as a representative of well over half a million 
people and to stand in the shadow of Jefferson and Lincoln and 
Washington is no small thing. I am proud to have had the honor and the 
privilege to serve with so many people who are so dedicated to the 
success and the flourishing of this great country.
  I thank God for each one of you. My wish is that you all live to be a 
thousand years old and the last voice you hear will be mine.
  Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for 
yielding. I thank the Rules Committee for making consideration of the 
conference report to accompany H.R. 5682, the ``United States and India 
Nuclear Cooperation Promotion Act of 2006'' in order.
  The United States' relationship with India and Pakistan is of 
paramount importance to our Nation's political and economic future. 
With the receding of the Cold War's global divisions and the new 
realities of globalization and trans-national terrorism, we have 
embarked on a new era of promise, possibility and uncertainty. This 
means the United States, the world's only superpower, bears an 
especially heavy responsibility to remain engaged in all regions of the 
world, with all nation-states. It is in the national interest for the 
United States to continue our policy of engagement, collaboration, and 
exchange which has served the Nation well in the past, particularly in 
the South Asia region.
  It is important that we are considering this conference report today. 
I also want to thank my colleagues for adopting my amendment to H.R. 
5682. My bipartisan amendment, which was endorsed and co-sponsored by 
Congressman Burton, simply stated that the ``South Asia region is so 
important that the United States should continue its policy of 
engagement, collaboration, and exchanges with and between India and 
Pakistan.''
  Pakistan has been a critical ally in the global war on terror. 
Pakistan has been a good friend to the people of the United States. 
Although H.R. 5682 signals no change in this country's relationship 
with Pakistan, it is not difficult to understand why it may give pause 
to some supporters of Pakistan. This is another reason why it is vital 
for the United States to continue to engage both Pakistan and India in 
ongoing political engagement, economic and technological 
collaborations, and personal exchanges, which will bring the United 
States closer to these two vitally important democracies in the South 
Asia region and will bring India and Pakistan closer to each other.
  Peaceful nuclear cooperation with India can serve multiple U.S. 
foreign policy objectives so long as it is undertaken in a manner that 
minimizes potential risks to the nonproliferation regime. This will be 
best achieved by sustained and active engagement and cooperation 
between the India and the United States.
  This landmark legislation serves both our strategic interests and our 
long-standing nonproliferation objectives. We should heed the sage 
words of the Iraq Study Group which recommends engaging rather than 
abandoning the possibilities dialogue offers. Our engagement and 
subsequent abandonment of Iran has resulted in their current pursuit of 
nuclear technology. We should not make the same mistake in South Asia. 
We need to remain engaged with India and Pakistan so that they remain 
our most important allies rather than our adversaries.
  We are on the path to fostering an enduring relationship of mutually 
beneficial cooperation with India. The new realities of globalization 
and interdependence have brought a convergence of interests between the 
world's largest democracy and the world's most powerful one. I 
accompanied President Clinton in his groundbreaking trip to India 
marking a new phase in the bonds that bind our two countries. This 
conference report builds on this relationship by permitting an 
invigorated relationship in the field of nuclear cooperation, an area 
of critical importance given India's increasing energy demands.
  This conference report incorporates a host of important 
nonproliferation measures that will anchor India in the international 
nonproliferation framework by including: safeguards between India and 
the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA); end use monitoring of

[[Page H9155]]

U.S. exports to India; and strengthening the Nuclear Suppliers Group, 
which are the group of countries that restrict nuclear proliferation 
throughout the world.
  In addition, this conference report maintains Congressional oversight 
over the ongoing relationship of nuclear cooperation between U.S.-
India. By implementing this legislation, we are furthering our critical 
nonproliferation objectives of advancing the IAEA's Additional Protocol 
by allowing the U.S. to become a party to this critical 
nonproliferation arrangement. We will enhance our nonproliferation 
policy and bolster our argument that the rest of the world should agree 
to this robust inspection regime.
  In conclusion, I support the United States and India Nuclear 
Cooperation Promotion Act of 2006 with my Amendment, and this 
conference report. I urge my colleagues to do the same.
  Mr. BARTON of Texas. Mr. Speaker, the conference report on H.R. 5682 
includes language implementing the ``Additional Protocol'' to the U.S. 
nuclear safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA). The other Body gave its advice and consent for the 
Additional Protocol in 2004, but without enactment passage of this 
implementing legislation the Additional Protocol cannot enter into 
force.
  Following the 1991 Gulf War, IAEA member states took steps to 
strengthen the nuclear safeguards system. This led to the development 
of a model ``Additional Protocol'' to supplement safeguards agreements 
and amend verification arrangements. It is designed to improve the 
ability of the IAEA to detect clandestine nuclear weapons programs in 
non-nuclear-weapons states by providing the IAEA with increased 
information and expanded inspection access. As of March of 2006, 110 
countries had signed additional protocols, including all the nuclear 
weapons states, and 78 countries have them in force.
  The U.S. is not obligated to accept safeguards under the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty or the Additional Protocol. However, the U.S. 
already allows safeguards to be placed on certain facilities and 
materials under a voluntary agreement with the IAEA. This underscores 
our support for the Nonproliferation Treaty. The U.S. signing the 
Additional Protocol demonstrates that adherence will not commercially 
disadvantage non-nuclear-weapons states. Under both the voluntary 
agreement and the Additional Protocol, the U.S. maintains a national 
security exclusion and the right to manage IAEA access to facilities or 
information of direct national security significance.
  Enactment of this implementing legislation provides the President 
with authority to permit IAEA inspectors, accompanied by U.S. 
representatives, access to certain facilities and to information on 
activities in the U.S. It also authorizes the Department of Commerce 
and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to develop implementing 
regulations and conduct training and trial inspections. Finally, the 
legislation sets forth procedures for the inspections, similar to those 
for the Chemical Weapons Convention, and establishes civil and criminal 
penalties for the failure of U.S. entities to provide such information.
  Mr. Speaker, this legislation will strengthen our Nation's ability to 
advance the cause of universal acceptance of increased safeguards and 
for that reason I urge both Bodies to adopt the conference report and 
send it on to the President for his signature.
  Among the many tributes to our beloved colleague, Henry Hyde, this 
bill and what it can do for global nuclear security is among the most 
worthy.
  Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Speaker, I'd like to commend Chairman Hyde, Ranking 
Member Lantos and their excellent staffs for their hard work on his 
legislation.
  I'd like to offer special thanks for their efforts to ensure that the 
conference agreement retains a provision I suggested, which would halt 
nuclear cooperation if the Indian government exports sensitive 
technologies that violate the guidelines of the Nuclear Suppliers Group 
and Missile Technology Control Regime.
  This conference agreement--and the underlying nuclear deal with 
India--are far from perfect. I believe the Administration could have 
and should have pressed for a much better deal.
  But having said that, it's important to keep in mind that this 
agreement is a major improvement over the Administration's original 
legislative proposal.
  That bill would have cut Congress out of the process and put the 
nuclear deal with India on auto-pilot.
  Among other things, this agreement preserves the right of Congress to 
vote on the final nuclear cooperation agreement with India--which is 
still under negotiation--before it goes into effect.
  While I wish this conference agreement included some stronger 
nonproliferation provisions--including an amendment on fissile material 
I offered on the floor--I intend to vote ``yes'' because I believe the 
U.S.-India relationship is extremely important, and rejecting the bill 
at this point would be a major setback.
  Mr. UDALL of New Mexico. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in opposition to 
this legislation and I do so because I believe this bill undermines the 
nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), lacks sufficient safeguards to 
prevent India from continuing to produce nuclear weapons, and threatens 
the stability of the region.
  Mr. Speaker, there is no question that India is an important 
relationship for the United States to cultivate. India's booming 
economy, efforts to combat terrorism, and commitment to democracy means 
they will be a key strategic partner of ours for years to come. 
However, I do not believe the proper way to cultivate this relationship 
is by lifting the moratorium on nuclear trade with India.
  We all know that India is not a signatory to the NPT, and yet we 
stand on the verge of rewarding a country operating outside the 
parameters of this vitally important treaty. This agreement loosens 
export control laws and clears the way to provide nuclear assistance. 
It does so without requiring India to limit its fissile material 
production and without establishing restrictions on the number of 
weapons they plan to produce. Also under the framework, 8 of India's 22 
nuclear plants would be protected from inspection. These 8 plants just 
so happen to be the military facilities that will remain out of the 
purview of international inspection.
  The Administration maintains that nuclear proliferation and the fear 
that terrorist organizations could acquire nuclear weapons, is the 
greatest threat to our Nation's security. But Mr. Speaker, passing this 
legislation today to allow the President to waive portions of the 
Atomic Energy Act will shred the NPT, the most successful agreement we 
have to guard against proliferation. If India, a nation operating their 
nuclear programs outside the NPT, can strike an agreement of this 
magnitude, allowing them this much flexibility and holding them to so 
few hard and fast standards, why would any other nation not currently 
party to the NPT wish to join?
  Passing this legislation today sends the wrong signal. It makes very 
real the threat of an arms race between Pakistan and India, an already 
extremely fragile relationship between two long-time adversaries. Mr. 
Speaker, passing this legislation today is an enormous step backwards 
for global nonproliferation efforts and I urge my colleagues to reject 
it.
  Ms. WOOLSEY. Mr. Speaker, we are here to debate the India Nuclear 
Bill. However, there seems to be something missing from the debate 
today. It's like the elephant in the room no one wants to talk about. 
Whatever happened to the United States' own commitment to 
nonproliferation?
  When the House considered its own version, I tried to submit an 
amendment that was quite simple. It stated that until the President has 
implemented and observed all of our NPT obligations and revised its own 
policies relating to them, no nuclear-related item may be transferred 
to India.
  Unfortunately, my amendment was not included.
  And yet another closed rule from the Republican leadership precludes 
any compromise today.
  As many of my colleagues have stated, this is not about the deal or 
our alliances with India. This is about how the Bush administration has 
made a mockery of the NPT and encouraged other countries to go around 
the treaty. Basically, the bill says that if a country ignores the NPT, 
the U.S. will cut a deal with them.
  Where is our commitment to nonproliferation?
  If anything, with this treaty the U.S. will contribute to global 
nuclear proliferation.
  In a world that is becoming more--not less--violent by the day, we 
must face the facts: Until the U.S. lives up to its own 
nonproliferation, obligations, we can't possibly ask others to do so.
  Today, I will vote against this misguided bill and urge my colleagues 
to do the same.
  Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Without objection, the previous question is 
ordered on the conference report.
  There was no objection.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the conference report.
  The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that 
the ayes appeared to have it.
  Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.
  The yeas and nays were ordered.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 8 of rule XX, further 
proceedings on this question will be postponed.

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