[Congressional Record Volume 152, Number 135 (Friday, December 8, 2006)]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Pages E2153-E2155]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                     SEARCHING FOR VICTORY IN IRAQ

                                 ______
                                 

                          HON. JOHN B. SHADEGG

                               of arizona

                    in the house of representatives

                       Thursday, December 7, 2006

  Mr. SHADEGG. Mr. Speaker, I recommend to the American public an 
editorial by former Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich and request that 
it be included in the Record.
  Published in the Weekly Standard on November 28, Mr. Gingrich's piece 
makes some very important points about the significance and necessity 
of our victory in Iraq. In comparing our current situation in Iraq to 
that which George Washington faced during the winter of 1776, Mr. 
Gingrich concludes that Washington's motto ``Victory or Death'' is the 
motto we must apply to Iraq.
  As we review the Iraq Study Group's (ISG) recommendations, Mr. 
Gingrich is wise to urge that we examine them closely and ask 
questions. Most essentially, we must ask whether or not the suggestions 
will ``make a real contribution in helping us win the war against the 
fanatical wing of Islam. Or will it be simply one more establishment 
effort to hide defeat so the American political system can resume its 
comfortable insider games without having to solve real problems in the 
larger world?''
  As I have argued for some time now, Iraq is a pivotal juncture in the 
Global War on Terror. Iraq is about the larger global war against 
Islamo-fascists that want to destroy America. Like our former Speaker, 
I realize that our current approach to Iraq is not working. However, we 
must disregard any ISG recommendations to abandon Iraq or set a 
timeline for withdrawal, both of which will only serve to inspire 
violence from our enemies and distrust from our allies. This is not the 
time, nor the place to try to save political face. A retreat at this 
time would have consequences beyond what we can imagine. This is the 
time and the place to decisively win, to work together as Americans, 
and defeat terrorists on their turf before they can return the fight to 
ours.
  I urge my colleagues and the American people to read Mr. Gingrich's 
insightful piece.

               [From the Weekly Standard, Nov. 28, 2006]

                           (By Newt Gingrich)

Searching for Victory in Iraq--Why the Baker-Hamilton Commission Ought 
                         to Visit Mount Vernon.

       The Sunday before Thanksgiving Callista and I took some 
     friends to Mount Vernon to see the new education center. It 
     is an amazing tribute to George Washington and the creation 
     of America.
       We watched a movie about George Washington crossing the 
     Delaware on Christmas

[[Page E2154]]

     Eve and surprising the Hessians (German mercenaries) on 
     Christmas Day in Trenton. As I watched, I wa struck by the 
     amazing difference between the attitude of the father of 
     our country and the current attitudes in the city that 
     bears his name.
       General Washington had had a long and painful summer and 
     autumn of defeat in 1776. His American Army had been defeated 
     across New York--in Brooklyn, in Manhattan, and in White 
     Plains--and then driven across New Jersey and forced to flee 
     across the Delaware River into Pennsylvania.
       Washington's Night Crossing: ``Victory or Death''
       Washington's forces had dwindled until he had only about 
     4,000 effective soldiers left. There were another 6,000 men 
     present but they were so sick they were unable to go into 
     battle.
       Faced with declining morale, rising desertions, the 
     collapse of political will in the country at large, and a 
     sense of despair, Washington decided to gamble everything on 
     a surprise attack. It would require a night crossing of an 
     icy river against a formidable professional opponent.
       But the most telling sign of Washington's mood as he 
     embarked on the mission was his choice of a password. His men 
     said ``victory or death'' to identify themselves.
       What if There Had Been a Baker-Hamilton Commission Advising 
     General Washington?
       That night crossing, immortalized in paintings of 
     Washington standing in the boat as Marblehead Fishermen rowed 
     him across the ice strewn river, led to an amazing victory on 
     Christmas Day. That victory led to a surge in American morale 
     and a doubling in the size of the American forces under 
     Washington within two weeks. And that gave Washington the 
     strength to win a second surprise victory at Princeton.
       Within two weeks, Washington had gone from defeated, 
     hopeless bungler to victorious American hero and 
     personification of the American cause.
       Imagine there had been a Baker-Hamilton commission--the 
     group charged with assessing our options in Iraq--advising 
     Washington that cold Christmas Eve. What ``practical, 
     realistic,'' advice would they have given him? Eleven Key 
     Tests for the Baker-Hamilton Report.
       Will the Baker Hamilton Commission make a real contribution 
     in helping us win the war against the fanatic wing of Islam? 
     Or will it be simply one more establishment effort to hide 
     defeat so the American political system can resume its 
     comfortable insider games without having to solve real 
     problems in the larger world? Here are some key things to 
     look for in its report:
       (1) Does the commission have a vision for success in the 
     larger war against the dictatorships and fanatics who want to 
     destroy us?
       If Iraq were only a one-step process, the answer would be 
     to leave. But the reality is that Iraq is a single campaign 
     within a much bigger war and within a power struggle both 
     over the evolution of Islam and over the rise of 
     dictatorships seeking nuclear and biological weapons to 
     enable them to destroy America and her allies. If the Baker-
     Hamilton commission does not take this into account, it is 
     a dangerously misleading report.
       (2) Does the commission recognize that the second campaign 
     in Iraq has been a failure?
       This is the hardest thing for Washington-centric 
     bureaucracies to accept. There was a very successful 23-day 
     campaign to drive Saddam out of power. It used America's 
     strengths and it worked. The second campaign has been an 
     abject failure. We and our Iraqi allies do not have control 
     of Iraq. We cannot guarantee security. There is not enough 
     economic activity to keep young males employed. If the Baker-
     Hamilton commission cannot bring itself to recognize a defeat 
     as a defeat, then it cannot recommend the scale of change 
     needed to develop a potentially successful third campaign.
       (3) Does the commission recognize the scale of change we 
     will need to be effective in a world of enemies willing to 
     kill themselves in order to kill us?
       We need fundamental change in our military doctrine, 
     training, and structures, our intelligence capabilities, and 
     our integration of civilian and military activities. The 
     instruments of American power simply do not work at the speed 
     and detail needed to defeat the kind of enemies we are 
     encountering. The American bureaucracies would rather claim 
     the problem is too hard and leave because being forced to 
     change this deeply will be very painful and very 
     controversial. Yet we have to learn to win. Learning. to win 
     requires much more than changes in the military. It requires 
     changes in how our intelligence, diplomatic, information, and 
     economic institutions work. It requires the development of an 
     integrated approach in which all the aspects of American 
     power can be brought to bear to achieve victory. Furthermore 
     this strategy for victory has to be doubly powerful because 
     for three years we have failed to build an effective Iraqi 
     government and we now have a shattered local system with many 
     players using violence in desperate bids to maximize their 
     positions. The plan has to be powerful enough to succeed 
     despite Iraqi weaknesses and not by relying on a clearly 
     uncertain and unstable Iraqi political system.
       (4) Does the commission describe the consequences of defeat 
     in Iraq?
       What would the withdrawal of U.S. troops in Iraq look like? 
     Frederick Kagan of the American Enterprise Institute recently 
     offered this chilling picture: ``The pullback of U.S. forces 
     to their bases will not reduce the sectarian conflict, which 
     their presence did not generate--it will increase it. Death 
     squads on both sides will become more active. Large-scale 
     ethnic and sectarian cleansing will begin as each side 
     attempts to establish homogeneous enclaves where there are 
     now mixed communities. Atrocities will mount, as they always 
     do in ethnic cleansing operations. Iraqis who have cooperated 
     with the Americans will be targeted by radicals on both 
     sides. Some of them will try to flee with the American units. 
     American troops will watch helplessly as death squads execute 
     women and children. Pictures of this will play constantly on 
     Al Jazeera. Prominent 'collaborators,' with whom our soldiers 
     and leaders worked, will be publicly executed. Crowds of 
     refugees could overwhelm not merely Iraq's neighbors but also 
     the [Forward Operating Bases] themselves. Soldiers will have 
     to hold off fearful, tearful, and dangerous mobs.''
       (5) Does the commission understand the importance of 
     victory? Winning is key. We are in a power struggle on a 
     worldwide basis with dictators who want to defeat us (Iran, 
     Syria, Venezuela, Cuba, North Korea) and with fanatic 
     organizations that want to kill us (al Qaeda, Hezbollah, 
     Hamas, etc.). In a struggle like this, the goal has to be to 
     win. Anything less than victory is very dangerous because it 
     allows our enemies to gather more capabilities and prepare 
     for more dangerous campaigns. Time is not on our side. Time 
     is on the side of those seeking nuclear and biological 
     weapons to use against the civilized world.
       (6) Does the commission define what it means to win or 
     simply find a face-saving way to lose?
       Winning is very definable. Can we protect our friends and 
     hurt our enemies? Are they more afraid of us or are we more 
     afraid of them? The recent Syrian assassination of a Lebanese 
     Christian leader who was pro-Western is a signal that they 
     are not afraid of us. The North Korean decision to launch 
     seven missiles on our Independence Day and to set off a 
     nuclear weapon were signs they have contempt for our 
     warnings. The statements of Ahmadinejad and Hugo Chavez 
     indicate how confident they are. Today the enemy thinks they 
     are winning and our elites seem to be seeking face-saving 
     cover behind which to accept defeat. Does the Baker-Hamilton 
     commission have a proposal for victory or a proposal for 
     accepting defeat gracefully? Will it offer a diplomatic deal 
     allowing us to pretend we are okay while our enemies gather 
     strength?
       (7) Does the commission acknowledge that winning requires 
     thinking regionally and even globally?
       In Afghanistan we are engaged in an Afghanistan-Waziristan 
     war in which our enemies retreat into Waziristan in northwest 
     Pakistan and rearm, reequip, retrain, and rest before coming 
     back into Afghanistan. We will never win that war by engaging 
     only in Afghanistan. In Iraq, the problems may require much 
     more direct confrontation with Iran and Syria. In Lebanon, it 
     is impossible to create a stable democratic government and 
     disarm Hezbollah as long as Syria and Iran are deeply 
     involved in killing Lebanese leaders and supplying Hezbollah.
       (8) Any proposal to ask Iran and Syria to help is a sign of 
     defeat. Does the commission suggest this?
       Iran and Syria are the wolves in the region. They are the 
     primary troublemakers. You don't invite wolves into the 
     kitchen to help with dinner or you become dinner. The State 
     Department Report on Terrorism in April 2006 said: ``Iran and 
     Syria routinely provide unique safe haven, substantial 
     resources and guidance to terrorist organizations.'' It went 
     on to say, ``Iran remained the most active state sponsor of 
     terrorism.'' It noted that in Iraq the Islamic Revolutionary 
     Guard Corps (an arm of the Iranian dictatorship) ``was 
     increasingly involved in supplying lethal assistance to Iraqi 
     militant groups which destabilize Iraq.'' How can the Baker-
     Hamilton commission seriously suggest that two dictatorships 
     described like this are going to be ``helpers'' in achieving 
     American goals in the Middle East?
       (9) Does the commission believe we can ``do a deal'' with 
     Iran?
       The clear effort by the Iranians to acquire nuclear 
     weapons, and Ahmadinejad's assertion that it is easy to 
     imagine a time in the near future when the United States and 
     Israel have both disappeared, should be adequate proof that 
     the Iranian dictatorship is the active enemy of America. 
     Couple that with the fact that the Iranians lied to the 
     International Atomic Energy Agency for 18 years while trying 
     to develop a nuclear weapon. Either this is a dangerous 
     regime we need to fundamentally change, or it is a reasonable 
     regime with which we can deal. Presidential speeches and 
     State Department documents clearly indicate it is a dangerous 
     regime yet, there is a permanent Washington establishment 
     desire to avoid conflict and confrontation by ``doing a 
     deal.'' In the 1930s, that model was called appeasement, not 
     realism, and it led to a disaster. We need a Churchill not a 
     Chamberlain policy for the Middle East.
       (10) Does the commission believe we are more clever than 
     our enemies?
       The al-Assad family has run Syria since 1971. Hafiz Assad 
     arranged for his son Bashar to succeed him. This family and 
     its Alawite supporters represent a small minority of the 
     Syrian people, but they maintain a relentlessly tough 
     internal dictatorship which keeps power in their hands. In 
     some ways,

[[Page E2155]]

     there are parallels between Bashar Assad and Kim Jong Il--
     they both maintain family dictatorships with the support of a 
     key system of internal controls. After 35 years of defying 
     the United States, there is no reason to believe our 
     diplomats are more clever than their ruthlessly survivor-
     oriented systems. Negotiating with them is an invitation to 
     be taken to the cleaners and to extend the power and prestige 
     and influence of our mortal enemies in the region. Recent 
     talk of reaching out to Syria has been met by the 
     assassination of a Lebanese minister and the intensifying of 
     the Hezbollah blackmail tactics in Lebanon. Weakness from 
     America leads to greater aggression from our enemies. The 
     Baker-Hamilton commission should focus on how to contain or 
     defeat Syria not on how to rely on them for help.
       (11) Does the commission recognize the importance of 
     working with the Democratic majorities on a strategy for 
     victory?
       The Democratic victory in the 2006 election should not be 
     used as an excuse to do the wrong thing. The Democrats are 
     now confronting the responsibility and burden of power. Given 
     the right information about Iran, Syria, and Iraq there is 
     every reason to believe a bipartisan majority can be formed 
     in both the House and Senate for a rational strategy for 
     victory. Opposition to continuing the failed second campaign 
     should not be translated into opposition to an American 
     victory. The Bush administration should reach out to moderate 
     Democrats and forge a bipartisan agenda for victory and by 
     March 2007 pass a bipartisan resolution for victory in Iraq 
     and for stopping Iranian efforts to get nuclear weapons. That 
     will then set the basis for appropriations to continue the 
     effort. The passage of a solid bipartisan bill in March would 
     send a signal to the world that Americans are overwhelmingly 
     in favor of defeating terrorism and defending America. That 
     will dramatically lower the morale and confidence of our 
     enemies.
       These 11 steps would be a powerful basis on which to move 
     forward in Iraq and in the world. What's more, they reflect 
     the spirit of General Washington when he chose ``victory or 
     death'' as the motto of the campaign which led to the 
     founding of America despite overwhelming odds.

                          ____________________