[Congressional Record Volume 152, Number 133 (Wednesday, December 6, 2006)]
[Senate]
[Pages S11267-S11294]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                NOMINATION OF ROBERT M. GATES--Continued

  Mr. THOMAS. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.


                           Order of Procedure

  Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, on behalf of the leader, I ask unanimous 
consent that at 2:30 p.m. tomorrow the majority leader be recognized to 
speak.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The Senator from New Mexico is recognized.


                       The Appropriations Process

  Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, I come to the floor here today to share 
with my colleagues and my constituents my frustration with the inaction 
of Congress on its most basic responsibility, to enact bills to make 
appropriations for the Government for the coming year.

       No money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in 
     Consequence of Appropriations made by Law; and a regular 
     Statement and Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all 
     public Money shall be published from time to time.

  That is the Constitution of the United States. There is no 
responsibility more fundamental than the one I

[[Page S11268]]

have just read. The American people pay taxes and they expect the 
Congress to do something with those taxes every year. Part of it they 
expect to be spent on the operations of Government--for the payments of 
the Defense Department, for the payments of the Treasury Department, 
for all things that go on in the Energy Department. All of those 
functions of Government are put together and handled in appropriations 
bills that have a committee chairman and a ranking member, and each 
year, under our system, where it is annual, they are supposed to 
produce an appropriations bill that goes from House to House and 
becomes a final product when it has been passed in both Houses and gone 
to conference between the two Houses and comes out as a final bill, 
which goes to the President of the United States. That is the format.
  There are 13 of those that cause the Government of the United States 
to function. Can you believe that many publications have scorned 
Congress? Some have blamed the House of Representatives, some have 
blamed the Senate, some have blamed the administration for sending an 
unrealistic budget last February. The blame game doesn't interest this 
Senator. We all share in this quiet conspiracy to duck fulfilling the 
most fundamental responsibility that we have and that is to vote on 
appropriations bills, to confer between the House so they are the same 
bill, the same package of requirements, requests, expenditures that we 
ultimately call a bill.
  Some media analysts contend that the Senate was afraid to cast votes 
on appropriations bills, thinking these votes might be used against 
incumbent Senators in recently held elections. All sorts of reasons 
emerged that justified laying aside this appropriations bill or that 
one. Some feared that amendments to the bills might take too long, too 
much time. Amendments might be painful choices for Senators. Some of 
the votes might slow down the process and some might show up later in 
campaign commercials or propaganda.
  This Senator has cast more than 12,000 votes, more than almost any 
other Senator in the Senate history. There are maybe five or six who 
have cast more. My votes may be characterized by my opponents in a 
campaign, using commercials and whatever else they would like. They can 
find almost any vote I have taken over the years I have been here.
  I took this job knowing full well I would have to vote to decide, to 
choose, and that these decisions would absolutely be second-guessed by 
a whole host of people. So I reject the notion that the Senate saved 
itself by avoiding so-called hard votes. We had not and we did not take 
the votes, did we? And look at the results in November. If it were our 
Republican approach to save ourselves, we lost ourselves.
  Now we have the end of a Congress and here sit the appropriations 
bills unattended, sitting over there on the various clerks' desks. All 
the work has been done except the final work where they have to come to 
each House and get approved.
  What we will do, for and to the people of the United States, from 
this day forward is terrible. Since we do not have the bills passed on 
both sides, we will have a continuing resolution, named for another 
document where we will pass the Government spending for a period of 
time and say we will spend, and then we relate it to something. We 
normally do it for 20 days out of the year. This time we will have a 
continuing resolution with the bills that have not been passed. That 
should be used very seldom, this continuing resolution, and it is 
getting to be like apple pie around here. We use it all the time. 
Rather than do our work, we do a continuing resolution. We continue it 
by resolution, equating it most frequently to the work that has been 
completed by the House, for they have done their work first. Therefore, 
the Senate has little or no input into what the continuing resolution 
ultimately says we are going to spend money on.
  It used to be that a continuing resolution was not watched very well 
and it was a way of putting all kinds of things on. That doesn't happen 
much anymore. So what we are getting out of this as Senators is 
nothing. We are getting little or no input into the appropriations 
process. The bills we handle, if we are chairmen or ranking members, 
are not going to get adopted at any time or even referred to at any 
time unless we decide, in the next 6 or 7 weeks, to do something 
together that will change that by reference or by adopting some new 
bill.
  There is much to be done and clearly we are not on the right course 
at this point. We are not going to pass many of these bills except 
perhaps a military construction bill, which is no longer a construction 
bill, but it is a bill for the health and welfare of our soldiers, and 
for many other things, and it is for building many new things that have 
to be built here at home for them and, therefore, that Military 
Construction bill will probably be a must and it will be around, and 
people will be talking about it and the fact that it has to be done.
  From my standpoint, this week, if this 109th Congress slinks into 
history, as seems to be scheduled, it will have completed work on only 
two appropriations bills, Defense and Homeland Security, and maybe the 
one I have just referred to as Military Construction. In place of the 
completed bills, we will have a continuing resolution through February 
15, next year, about the time the President will send us a 2008 final 
fiscal year budget. We will be getting a new one before we have done 
anything about the old one. We will be getting a brandnew budget--
imagine--and we will not have done anything about all of those that are 
sitting on the desks of clerks, waiting to do their part in 
appropriately spending our money.
  Next year, we will look at the remaining 2007 bills, the much 
anticipated $100 billion Defense supplemental request that we all 
expect the President to suggest, and all 13 of the 2008 bills.
  Does someone think this kind of procedure serves the public interest 
or some political interest? I believe it serves neither of the two.
  For those Senators who are glad to see a continuing resolution 
because they think it saves money, think again. Not only will this 
continuing resolution not save money, but it will give reordering of 
priorities to the 110th Congress. I predict that we will spend more, 
not less, as a result of the strategy adopted by the Congress this 
year. The upshot will be that we have both failed to fulfill our 
constitutional responsibility and have spent more money.
  What an outcome.
  Who is to blame, then? Not the Senate Appropriations Committee, which 
reported every single appropriations bill by the end of July, the 
earliest such bills had been reported in 18 years. Not the subcommittee 
chairman, of which I am one, who worked to meet the deadlines set by 
the chairman and ranking member.
  Those highly motivated members who wanted a full and open debate on 
the appropriations bills certainly cannot be blamed, although the 
outcome of their efforts will probably disappoint them by the middle of 
next year. Each Senator has the obligation to pursue what he or she 
believes is the correct policy, using any parliamentary means 
appropriate. I cannot condemn my colleagues who, for one reason or the 
other, find the appropriations process objectionable.
  Here is what I suggest for the future. Let's vote. Let's report the 
individual bills, as Chairman Cochran did this year, on time. Then, 
let's bring the bills up on the floor. If members want to filibuster, 
that is their privilege. We vote on that. If cloture prevails, we have 
post cloture debate, and then vote again. Yes, it is time consuming, 
but it's our job. Let's vote.
  Let me close by discussing briefly my own Energy and Water 
appropriations bill, which has awaited Senate action for almost 5 
months now.
  It is almost ludicrous that at this time in history, the 109th 
Congress failed to act on this bill. We read daily about the growing 
nuclear threat in North Korea; millions of words are written and spoken 
on the threat of an Iran with a nuclear capability. Six Arab, Sunni 
nations have now petitioned for a nuclear program through the 
International Atomic Energy Agency, including Saudi Arabia, contending 
that they need such programs for domestic energy purposes. Many 
analysts believe that the Arab nations observe the growing threat of a 
Shia Iran, with the potential for a nuclear weapon, and want nuclear 
programs for weapons purposes. We listen to witnesses tell us

[[Page S11269]]

of their fears of nuclear terrorism and the failures of the present 
nonproliferation programs.
  For more than two decades now, these subjects have been the focus of 
much of my work as a Senator. And much of the good work that this 
Nation has done to address nonproliferation and nuclear terrorism is 
funded by the Energy and Water appropriations bill.
  Yet at this dangerous time, the 109th Congress couldn't find time to 
take up the Energy and Water appropriations bill. In addition to 
hundreds of millions, almost billions of dollars for disposing of 
weapons grade nuclear material, and funding to try to stop nuclear 
material from shipment to this Nation, the bill funded alternative 
energy sources. It funds weatherization grants for Americans. It funds 
a brand new approach to handling nuclear waste here and abroad.
  Let me close by discussing several important items in the bill, which 
languishes.
  First, in the area of nuclear nonproliferation, the administration 
has given careful thought to how to handle the growing Iran and North 
Korea nuclear threat. Yet under the strategy adopted by this Congress 
on my bill, the Nonproliferation and International Security Account 
will be $53 million less than the House passed bill and the Senate 
committee-reported bill recommend. Think about that, short-changing 
that nonproliferation account because we were afraid to vote.
  Second, and even more serious, one of the largest non-proliferation 
projects ever will be delayed. The Fissile Materials Disposition 
program, located in South Carolina, I add for the benefit of those two 
Senators, is known by the short hand of MOX. That program now has 
stopped construction, because the House passed bill eliminated all 
funding. And, since we have no Senate-passed bill, we cannot even 
negotiate levels on the continuing resolution. Think about this: the 
United States and Russia have spent the last 10 years negotiating a 
deal to eliminate 34 tons of plutonium from the nations' stockpiles and 
now the future of this effort is in limbo because Congress couldn't 
find the time to do its job.
  As chairman of the Energy and Water subcommittee I was excited about 
the new initiatives proposed by the President including energy 
independence and to increase funding for science research in the Fiscal 
Year '07 request.
  The Fiscal Year '07 budget took bold steps and made significant 
investment in nuclear power and alternative energy. Unfortunately, 
enactment of a CR will delay our investment in to alternative energy 
and maintain our increasing level of dependence on foreign energy 
sources.
  Building on Energy Policy Act passed in 2005, the President supported 
increased funding for the research on cellulosic biomass, solar, 
hydrogen and advanced battery research. The Senate also restored 
funding geothermal development a renewable resources in the west with 
great potential.
  The Senate Energy and Water bill supported the implementation of a 
loan guarantee program that was included in the Energy Policy Act of 
2005. This is an innovative financial solution, which would not cost 
the Federal Government a dime in appropriated funding.
  The backing by the Federal Government supports the commercial 
deployment of first-of-a-kind energy production technology. Without the 
language in the Senate bill, this program will not go forward and our 
Nation will not get closer to energy independence.
  The Senate Energy and Water bill also fully funds the President's 
request for the Department of Energy's Office of Science. Our future 
economic growth and security will require our schools to train the next 
generation of scientists and engineers. We haven't done enough and are 
losing ground in scientific research. This budget will reverse that 
trend with investments in basic scientific.
  The Senate fully funds the President's request for the Office of 
Science.
  The Senate bill also provides important funding to support the 
licensing of a new nuclear power reactor that will met our growing 
energy demand without increasing greenhouse gases.
  The bill closes the funding shortfall for the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission in order to hire and train additional technical staff that 
will be needed to review the new license applications being developed 
by utilities. These priorities will not be recognized with continued 
delays with a CR.
  This year the President outlined his plans for the Global Nuclear 
Energy Partnership. This program invests makes a large investment in 
addressing spent fuel stored at reactors all across the country by 
recycling. As Yucca Mountain continues to face delays, the Senate bill 
supports the administration's efforts to reduce, reuse and recycle 
commercial spent fuel.
  I understand the challenges the leadership of Congress faces. Any of 
us who have served a chairman of the Budget Committee certainly 
understand the cross-currents in this Chamber. But, putting aside hard 
choices almost never leads to good results. We should remain in session 
this month until we fund the 2007 bills. After all, that's our job.
  Since it appears there are no Senators wishing to speak, I suggest 
the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.


                  Appointment of Conferees--H.R. 5385

  Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, as in legislative session, I ask 
unanimous consent that the Senate proceed to the immediate 
consideration of H.R. 5385, the Military Construction appropriations 
bill, that the Senate insist upon its amendments, request a conference 
with the House, and the Chair be authorized to appoint conferees.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Mr. DeMINT. Mr. President, reserving the right to object. If the 
Senator from Texas would allow me to discuss with her our conversation 
with Leader Frist. As we talked about earlier today, both the Senator 
from Texas, myself, and I believe the entire Senate and Congress want 
this bill to pass.
  Senator Hutchison and myself have had the opportunity to meet with 
Leader Frist to talk about the importance of passing this bill, as well 
as the importance of not adding additional appropriations and 
additional earmarks which were not part of the Senate or the House 
version of this bill or were not part of the President's budget.
  If I could ask the Senator, is it her understanding that it is our 
general agreement and also leadership's that this bill will be kept to 
the basic bills which have been passed by the House and Senate and that 
it will return to the Senate floor as a bill that we have discussed 
with Leader Frist?
  Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, there was never any other intention. I 
have discussed this with Senator Cochran, chairman of the committee. I 
discussed it with Senator Frist, our leader. I have discussed it with 
the ranking member, Senator Feinstein. And most certainly we will bring 
back a conference report that has either material in the President's 
budget request, something that has passed the House or the Senate in 
this bill, and all of the projects will be duly authorized on the 
military construction side.
  On the Veterans' Administration side, we worked very closely with the 
authorization committee, Senator Craig, Senator Akaka, and others to 
assure that we have the approval of the committee leaders for all of 
the veterans' expenditures.
  I have to say to the Senator from South Carolina that there are some 
very important initiatives in the Veterans bill that would not be 
covered in a continuing resolution. And there are very important 
commitments for new starts in the Military Construction bill that are 
necessary for us to keep pace with the BRAC project and with other 
military housing and quality-of-life projects that are included in the 
bill. It is going to be a Military Construction and Veterans Affairs 
bill with the priorities of the Senate. This bill passed unanimously in 
the Senate. We would go forward with the clear understanding that this 
is going to be a military construction and veterans affairs and 
military quality-of-life conference report.
  Mr. DeMINT. Mr. President, I wish to thank the Senator for her 
openness and

[[Page S11270]]

tenacity in helping to get the agreements we need to keep this bill 
clean and focused on the needs of our military. I do not object.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The Presiding Officer (Mr. DeMint) appointed Mrs. Hutchison, Mr. 
Burns, Mr. Craig, Mr. DeWine, Mr. Brownback, Mr. Allard, Mr. McConnell, 
Mr. Cochran, Mr. Stevens, Mrs. Feinstein, Mr. Inouye, Mr. Johnson, Ms. 
Landrieu, Mr. Byrd, Mrs. Murray, Mr. Leahy, and Mr. Harkin conferees on 
the part of the Senate.
  Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, this is a major step forward. I have 
been working with Senator Feinstein to try to get conferees appointed 
for our bill. There is time in this session for the House and the 
Senate to come together and put a bill forward in the conference report 
that will do what is right by our military who are serving our country 
and protecting our freedom, who are in harm's way as we speak. There is 
time for us to take care of those good people. There is most certainly 
time for us to take care of our veterans and to make sure that the 
priorities which we have set this year, for heaven's sake, are passed 
in this session of Congress.
  If anyone says to me we don't have time to have a conference, they 
are wrong. It is 12:40 in the afternoon. It is Wednesday. I will work 
all night, if necessary, and so will our great staff working with the 
House, if the House will sit down with us. Our military personnel and 
our veterans deserve what is in this bill. It is a bill which passed 
unanimously. The House passed a bill overwhelmingly as well. It will 
move our military quality of life up. That is certainly our intent.
  This could not have been done without everyone's cooperation. I think 
that is what the people of America expect from the Congress. They 
deserve it. That is what we are going to give them.
  I want to particularly say that Senator Frist and Senator Cochran 
have been instrumental in allowing us to go forward. There has been a 
lot of emotional talk and rhetoric around what we do in these last few 
days of this session of Congress. I think everyone, including the 
Senator from South Carolina and the Senators from Oklahoma, have all 
risen above certain emotional feelings and have said: Yes, we are going 
to work together. I am very pleased that we are.
  I am going to yield the floor in one minute and roll up my sleeves 
and try to get the Military Affairs, Quality of Life, Military 
Construction and Veterans Affairs bill in shape for us to pass this 
session of Congress and send a good conference report to the President 
of the United States, who I know will sign the bill.
  I yield the floor. I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I ask consent that the vote on the 
pending nomination occur at 5 p.m. today, with the time until the vote 
equally divided between the chairman and the ranking member or their 
designees; further, that 20 minutes of the chairman's time be allocated 
to Senator Specter; provided further that immediately following the 
vote, the President be immediately notified of the Senate's action and 
the Senate then resume legislative session.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Ms. COLLINS. I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. DURBIN. I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum 
call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. DURBIN. I ask unanimous consent to be recognized in morning 
business.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  (The remarks of Mr. Durbin are printed in today's Record under 
``Morning Business.'')
  Mr. DURBIN. Mr. President, it has been my honor twice to sit down in 
my office with the nominee to be our next Secretary of Defense, Robert 
Gates. Both meetings have been very positive. The last was this 
morning.
  When Dr. Gates came in early this morning, I congratulated him on his 
appearance before the Committee on Armed Services yesterday. He said: 
It is amazing what a little candor will do. That is what endeared him 
to the committee and resulted in this unanimous, bipartisan vote 
bringing his nomination to the floor. Dr. Gates was honest with members 
of the Committee on Armed Services. He will be honest with the American 
people. He understands that our efforts in Iraq are not going well and 
we need to change. He is a person who is dedicated to the kind of 
change which will be consistent with our values in foreign policy.
  He told me honestly he didn't know what we should do in Iraq, but we 
need to examine the two primary missions we now face: establishing 
conditions of security on the one hand, training and supporting the 
Iraqis on the other. He said we may need to shift the balance between 
the two missions. That is not unlike the recommendations of the Iraq 
Study Group which were released today.
  That commission delivered to the President a series of 
recommendations.
  In just a short time, in about 2 hours, the Senate is expected to 
confirm Dr. Gates as the new Secretary of Defense with an overwhelming 
bipartisan vote.
  Those two developments today provide an opportunity to change the 
course in Iraq. Of course, the ultimate responsibility is on our 
Commander in Chief, the President of the United States. On November 7, 
the American people spoke out clearly of the need for change.
  Dr. Gates was an original member of the Baker-Hamilton group and 
agrees that change is necessary. Today, that group confirmed the need 
to change our policy and lay out a framework to redeploy American 
forces. Redeployment means basically removing them from the dangers of 
Iraq, placing them nearby to be called on if necessary but, more 
importantly, starting to bring them home. Only the Commander in Chief 
can make that happen.
  The President has said he is not looking for a graceful exit from 
Iraq. I would have to say that America should be looking for the right 
exit from Iraq. The President was asked a few months ago: When will 
American troops come home? He said he would have to leave that decision 
to future Presidents. I don't believe America wants to see troops in 
Iraq facing the dangers of war for the next 2 years and for many years 
beyond. We believe we have done a great deed for the Iraqi people in 
removing their dictator and giving them a chance to have their own 
constitution and their own government. Now it is time for the Iraqis to 
stand and defend their own nation.
  According to the Iraq Study Group, the most professional and 
proficient military in history has been stretched to the breaking point 
because of repeated deployments to Iraq. As of today, I have been given 
an updated figure: 2,907 American service men and women have been 
killed and 21,000 have been wounded. We have about 140,000 troops in 
Iraq today. We certainly owe it to these soldiers, these brave men and 
women and their families to initiate this redeployment process as 
quickly as possible.

  The war in Iraq impacts our defense posture worldwide. Because of 
Iraq, we have fewer options to respond to emerging threats in this 
dangerous world.
  In thinking about the war in Iraq recently, like many others I was 
struck by how many comparisons there are to the situation of Vietnam 
four decades ago. There are many differences, but there are many 
parallels.
  In October of 1964, running for President, Lyndon Johnson said:

       We are not about to send American boys nine or ten thousand 
     miles away from home to do what Asian boys ought to be doing 
     for themselves.

  In 1969, 5 years after that statement, there were over half a million 
American troops in Vietnam.
  That same year, Johnson's successor, President Nixon, who had run on 
a campaign that he had a secret plan to end the war, said:


[[Page S11271]]


       I'm not going to be the first American president to lose a 
     war.

  Well, both Presidents made a series of decisions that prolonged and 
expanded that war at enormous cost to our Nation. We have only to walk 
just a few blocks from this Capitol to the Vietnam Memorial to see the 
real cost of that war.
  Perhaps like Presidents Johnson and Nixon, the Bush administration 
has gone through several phases on this war. First was the time of 
deception, when we were told there were weapons of mass destruction 
that did not exist, a link with al-Qaida that did not exist, and other 
claims about nuclear capabilities that did not exist.
  Next came the phase of denial, where the President and some of his 
key advisers refused to recognize or adapt to the realities on the 
ground, dismissing the first signs of insurgency. You recall, I am 
sure, as I do, Vice President Cheney saying the insurgency is in its 
last throes, and denying its growing strength as we have seen the 
casualties in Iraq mount by the day. Then they downplayed and denied 
the outbreak of sectarian violence that now seems, for all intents and 
purposes, a real civil war.
  The third phase has been delusion. The President apparently continues 
to delude himself about Iraq. I hope this Iraq Study Group will be a 
turning point in his thinking.
  For example, in a phrase that cannot help but remind us of Katrina 
and FEMA Administrator Brown, President Bush recently said of Prime 
Minister al-Maliki: He is the ``right guy for Iraq.'' What a contrast 
from the memo by the President's National Security Adviser, Stephen 
Hadley, which said:

       The reality on the streets of Baghdad suggests al-Maliki is 
     either ignorant of what is going on, misrepresenting his 
     intentions or that his capabilities are not yet sufficient to 
     turn his good intentions into actions.

  When asked in October if we were winning in Iraq, President Bush 
said:

       Absolutely, we're winning.

  When Robert Gates was asked that question yesterday in his 
confirmation hearing, he said very clearly: No.
  That gives me hope that with this Gates nomination and with this Iraq 
Study Group report we may have turned the corner. The Nation cannot 
afford deception, denial, or delusion when it comes to the situation in 
Iraq. Certainly, our soldiers and their families deserve better. They 
deserve change.
  We will now have a much needed change in the Pentagon. I know Members 
on both sides of the aisle are eager to work with the new Secretary to 
make more changes. But, ultimately, it is the President's 
responsibility. The buck truly stops in the Oval Office. If the 
President recognizes the urgent need for a new direction in Iraq, we 
will see it happen, and soon.
  The Baker-Hamilton commission has given the President a call to 
action, a roadmap to engage in broader diplomacy, to transfer 
responsibility to the Iraqis, and to redeploy American combat forces.
  I hope President Bush, with the assistance of his new Secretary of 
Defense, Mr. Gates, will begin that redeployment process this January.
  Consider our challenge. The Baker study group said we should have, 
basically, the combat forces of America gone by April 1 of 2008. With 
about 140,000 or 150,000 15 months before that date, we need to start 
seeing redeployment happen, and happen soon. Nothing could send a 
clearer signal to the Iraqis, the American people, and the world that 
we are truly moving down a new road in Iraq.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor and suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Martinez). The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. CORNYN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. CORNYN. Mr. President, I wish to take a few minutes to speak on 
the nomination of Robert Gates to be Secretary of Defense. It is my 
honor to serve under Chairman John Warner on the Senate Armed Services 
Committee. We are particularly proud of the fact that 1 out of every 10 
persons in uniform in this country, or serving around the world, calls 
Texas home. So we are very proud of the military. We are pro-military. 
We believe in doing everything we can to support our men and women in 
uniform and particularly their families.
  So it is with great joy that I say the President has chosen someone 
who currently serves as President of Texas A&M University to be the 
next Secretary of Defense. Even though Bob Gates is from Kansas 
originally, he has most recently become a Texan--at least we claim him 
because he has been living in College Station as President of Texas A&M 
these last few years.
  I particularly commend the President for his selection and Mr. Gates 
for answering the call, once again, to public service. He is not a new 
face in this town. Having served as Director of the CIA, having served 
on the National Security Council, he has a distinguished record of 
public service. He has written extensively on military intelligence and 
matters of diplomacy.
  My meetings with Dr. Gates, preliminary to the hearings we had this 
week on the Armed Services Committee, gave me great confidence that he 
is of the temperament and ability to lead the Department of Defense in 
what has to be the second most difficult job in Washington, DC; that 
is, to deal with an agency with the budget of about a half-trillion 
dollars a year and to perform what is the most important priority of 
the Federal Government: provide safety and security to the American 
people. That is a responsibility not only here at home, obviously, but 
literally all around the world.
  On the matter of Iraq, which was the subject matter of most of the 
questions and comments of the committee during Dr. Gates' confirmation 
hearing, I think he understands the challenges that face us in Iraq and 
why it is that we must succeed. As he told me, and as he testified at 
the hearing, a failure in Iraq would lead to increased activity by al-
Qaida, as well as regional instability in the Middle East. It could 
even lead to a regional--I think he used the term ``conflagration,'' 
where additional States that are not currently involved in the conflict 
in Iraq could find their interests at stake and could resort to 
military force. First, dealing with al-Qaida, and the result of a 
failed state in Afghanistan after the Soviet Union left there in 1989, 
ultimately led to the rise of the Taliban and gave Osama bin Laden a 
place to plot, plan, train, and then export terrorist attacks around 
the world, including in Washington, DC, and New York City on September 
11. Beyond the terrorist threat, it is also clear that Iran has 
aspirations that will very much put the future of Iraq in jeopardy and 
our own safety in America as well.

  As is widely known, Iran is primarily a Shia majority population. 
Iraq is composed of roughly three ethnic divisions--Kurds, Shia, and 
Sunni--and, clearly, Iran is taking advantage of the instability in 
Iraq to consolidate its position with the Shia in the south, which 
happens to be an oil-rich region of that nation. But, in effect, if our 
precipitous withdrawal from Iraq would leave a failed state and leave 
opportunities for Iranian hegemony, it would create further de facto 
partitions of Iraq which could perhaps cause the Saudis, as some 
leaders have suggested, to have to go into Iraq to defend the Sunni 
minority against ethnic cleansing by the Shia majority, perhaps in 
combination with Iran, and it would create an opportunity, perhaps, for 
the Kurds to create, in effect, a separate state in northern Iraq which 
would cause Turkey a lot of concerns, as has been frequently expressed.
  I am pleased that Dr. Gates understands the seriousness of this 
challenge that confronts our Nation. This is one that is certainly 
bigger than any election or any political party because, as I said at 
the outset, it represents the single most solemn responsibility those 
of us who serve in the Federal Government have, and that is to provide 
for the safety and security of our own people at home.
  Today, as everyone knows, the Iraq Study Group issued its report, and 
I am hopeful we can work together in this body with a new course in 
Iraq, working with the White House. Clearly, this is a job for the 
Commander in Chief. He has expressed a willingness to work with this 
bipartisan Iraq Study Group and work with Democrats and Republicans in 
the Congress to achieve victory in Iraq.

[[Page S11272]]

  I hope Robert Gates' confirmation, his manner and temperament, one 
that earned him the support of a unanimous vote on the Armed Services 
Committee, will serve him well as he works on behalf of the President 
and the executive branch to deal with what is certainly the most 
significant challenge of our time.
  I do want to, however, point out a couple of items in the bipartisan 
Iraq Study Group report because, obviously, there is a lot of public 
interest in it. This volume is 142 pages, and not many people have read 
every single page in it. So we have a number of people highlighting 
different portions of this 142-page document, perhaps a point they want 
to emphasize. I have a couple of points I want to emphasize because I 
think they are entirely consistent with what Dr. Gates has said during 
his confirmation hearing, and these points should be made clear.
  On page 66 of the Iraq Study Group report--sometimes called the 
Baker-Hamilton commission report--the study group says this:

       The presence of U.S. forces in Iraq is a key topic of 
     interest in a national reconciliation dialog.

  And this is the point I want to emphasize. They go on to say:

       The point is not for the United States to set timetables or 
     deadlines for withdrawal, an approach that we oppose . . .

  I think it is important to make the point that the Baker-Hamilton 
study group, the Iraq Study Group, opposes timetables or deadlines for 
withdrawal.
  They go on to say:

       The point is for the United States and Iraq to make clear 
     their shared interest in the orderly departure of U.S. 
     forces. As Iraqi forces take on the security mission, a 
     successful national reconciliation dialog will advance that 
     departure date.

  I think what the Baker-Hamilton commission is saying is that 
withdrawals ought not to be based upon an arbitrary timetable, in 
effect, based on domestic political considerations but, rather, ought 
to be based upon security considerations--how can we best provide for 
the Iraqi people to be able to stand on their own to defend themselves 
and to allow the political process in Iraq to go forward where people 
can trade ballots and votes for bombs and bullets.
  One other point I wish to raise. I am glad to see the Senator from 
South Carolina on the floor because there is a point that I know he 
agrees with and certainly one I think Senator McCain and others have 
advocated which I happen to believe is an option the President ought to 
consider at the top of his list in terms of the course forward in Iraq.
  We have heard the study by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
General Pace, at the Pentagon summarized into three options. I believe 
this was done by a newspaper or perhaps within the Pentagon itself. 
They summarized for the course forward to go big, go long, or go home.
  Clearly, one can tell from my comments that I believe we all want our 
troops to come home. We are unified and of a single mind on that point. 
The question is, based on what criteria? Is it based on politics in the 
Congress or is it based on security, our long-term security, not just 
the Iraqis' but our security at home, lest Iraq become a failed state 
and a launching pad for future terrorist attacks.
  The alternative ``go long,'' I believe, was explained as reducing the 
size of our forces in Iraq but basically making a multiyear commitment, 
a long-term commitment to have our troops there; frankly, an 
alternative that I don't think holds out much hope for success.
  The American people are clearly anxious to see the situation in Iraq 
be stabilized, to see some improvement, and I think that brings us to 
the last choice that has been mentioned as a result of these Pentagon 
discussions: Go big. Let me explain what I mean.
  I mean we need to surge American troops into the capital city of 
Baghdad for a temporary period of time--not a long-term or open-ended 
engagement--to provide the ability to back up the Iraqis to do what we 
need to do to clear, to hold, and then to build on that effort in 
Baghdad, to demonstrate not only that we can provide the security 
backing up the Iraqi forces, but also to create the basic security 
conditions that are necessary for the Iraqis to have that national 
reconciliation process to work out their differences the best they can, 
and then to provide for their own defense so we can bring our troops 
home.
  But I want to make sure--because this is an important point--some, I 
believe, have represented this Iraq Study Group Report as an 
endorsement of a withdrawal of troops not based on security conditions, 
and I say this report does not endorse that approach, as I indicated.
  With regard to the surging of troops in Baghdad on a temporary basis, 
as advocated by the Senator from South Carolina and the Senator from 
Arizona, and one that I find is the only really viable alternative we 
have in Iraq, the Iraq Study Group says this on page 73:

       We could, however, support a short-term redeployment or 
     surge of American combat forces to stabilize Baghdad or to 
     speed up the training and equipping mission if the U.S. 
     commander in Iraq determines that such steps would be 
     effective.

  My hope is the President of the United States, the Commander in 
Chief, having this worthwhile report which makes clear that every 
option has been looked at without regard to ideology or partisan 
politics, that the report of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
consulting with the leadership at the Pentagon, together with even 
Secretary Rumsfeld's memo that was recently printed, a classified memo 
of all the alternatives that was recently printed in the newspaper, 
that the President has all of these various options available to him to 
go forward in Iraq.
  I think Secretary-to-be Gates was correct yesterday when he said 
there are not any secret options. Basically, we know what the choices 
are with this report and the other reports that have come out. Simply 
stated, there is going to be a time for choosing. That choice and the 
consequences of that choice are very important because, clearly, what 
we are doing now is not working in Iraq and, clearly, there are dangers 
in terms of terrorist activity, in terms of Iranian ambitions, a 
country that is attempting to build, in defiance of the civilized 
world, a nuclear weapon.
  There are tremendous risks and consequences of not getting this done 
right, and the American people deserve to know not only what the risk 
is, what the threat is, and the consequences of failing to live up to 
this challenge, but that we are doing everything we can in a bipartisan 
fashion as a nation, looking to the best minds and the best experience 
this Nation has to offer, to come up with a plan or an assortment of 
choices and then to give the President the opportunity to make the very 
best decision he can as Commander in Chief, a position conferred upon 
him by the Constitution, to lead this course change in Iraq so we do 
not have a failed state which would further endanger not only that 
region, but would endanger us at home.
  In conclusion, those who think America can simply pull the covers 
over its head and the problem will go away or they simply think we can 
withdraw our troops--even in a precipitous fashion--and there will be 
no consequence to it, I cite the comments of GEN John Abizaid, the head 
of Central Command, who acknowledged that, yes, we could bring our 
troops home before security is established in Iraq, but the enemy would 
follow us here.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Mexico.
  Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I be 
permitted to speak on an unrelated subject for 10 minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. DOMENICI. And that the distinguished Senator from South Carolina 
be the Senator who follows.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.


                            Energy Security

  Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, just last week the price of natural gas 
was at $7.79 per million Btu's. That is nearly double the price it was 
2 months ago. In October, natural gas was selling for $4.01 on the spot 
market. This kind of price instability it brings harms consumers, harms 
businesses, is devastating to manufacturers, and is a threat to our 
economy.
  On August 1, 71 Senators in this Chamber cast what I consider one of 
the most important bipartisan votes of the year. We voted for the Gulf 
of Mexico Energy Security Act, a bill that will open 8.3 million acres 
in the Gulf

[[Page S11273]]

of Mexico for oil and gas exploration. The exploration could bring an 
estimated 1.26 billion barrels of oil and 5.8 trillion cubic feet of 
natural gas to market over the next several years.
  That oil and that gas will be American. It will be extracted from 
American territorial waters, will be extracted by American companies 
and American workers, and will be on the coast of the Gulf of Mexico 
and will also share the royalties with the adjoining States, which has 
not been done before, sharing in a different way where they get much 
more of the proceeds.
  That is a precedent which we have never accomplished before and which 
will do us good as we look around our other States to see if we can't 
do more like this effort.
  The support for this bill came from my colleagues from the Northwest, 
the Southeast, and the Southwest, from the Northeast and the Midwest, 
from both coasts, from areas in between, and from both parties. We all 
acted to stem the rising tide of energy prices--something good for our 
country.
  Those who voted for it and helped us with it know that the prices 
continue to rise for natural gas in our homes and our businesses, and 
we are awaiting the passage of this bill to stabilize prices for the 
next few years as this fountain full of natural gas descends upon the 
United States as a result of this new proposal and proposition in the 
Gulf of Mexico between our sovereign States and the U.S. Government to 
proceed with drilling. We cast that vote for families worried about 
high costs of energy. We cast that vote for American businesses, large 
and small, which have been hit hard by rising energy costs. We cast 
that vote for manufacturers who have been forced to shut down hundreds 
of U.S. plants in the last several years and for millions of American 
workers who lost their jobs when their plants closed. We heard the 
stories of all of these in our Energy Committee as we proceeded on this 
bill.
  Occupying the chair is the distinguished new Senator from Florida. He 
remembers this testimony and these facts, and he anxiously waits, as I 
do as chairman and he as an active Member, for the House to take up 
this bill and pass it. They have a few alternatives. They can lose the 
bill and drop it and let it become dead; yes, indeed. But that seems to 
me to be the worst option of all. They also can pass it just like we 
sent it to them, and they will have a completed bill, and nothing 
further. They can affix it to any bill they choose to pass over there--
the tax extenders--and send it to us, and, of course, if that is the 
case, we will have to do further work on it as it gets here. But that 
will be the rule as it applies to a bill which is not exactly the same 
as the one we sent them.
  So we cast our votes, as I said, in the manner I have described.
  Natural gas prices climbed 400 percent from 2002 to 2005. In that 
time, the chemical manufacturing industry alone closed 70 plants in 
these United States and plans to close 40 more, largely because of 
skyrocketing prices of natural gas. We joined together, Republicans and 
Democrats, to tackle that problem, and we passed, by strong bipartisan 
vote, a bill that is as important a step toward tackling our energy 
challenges as we have around us anywhere in either body, a small but 
meaningful step toward reducing our reliance upon foreign oil.
  This week I hope, and I am confident, that the House will take up our 
bill. I anticipate equally strong bipartisan support from the House. 
This legislation is critically important for our consumers and our 
economy, for housewives and homes, and as we go down the line, we know 
natural gas is the life of America, and we will add a very significant 
inventory to America's large inventory, and it will be American, it 
will not be imported.
  The legislation is critically important. The oil resources in this 
region are impressive, but vast reserves of natural gas are the real 
bonanza. We believe there is natural gas in lease sale 181 and lease 
sale 181 south to heat 6 million homes for 15 years--6 million homes 
for 15 years. Largely because of these gas services, the Wall Street 
Journal has called this bill an ``easy victory'' for the U.S. economy. 
On the other side of the political spectrum, the New York Times wrote: 
``This bill meets an immediate need and is a reason to drill in the 
gulf.'' How can you get more than those two ends of the spectrum 
agreeing and 71 Senators from both sides of the aisle voting for it?
  Now I cry out today to the House: Don't go out of session without 
passing the bill I have just described to you which awaits action from 
you. It is simple action: just an ``aye'' vote for a simple majority, 
and that is it. It will be done. This rather gigantic resource will 
then become available. It is in America, sitting there waiting for 
somebody to use it. It will be usable with that vote.
  As I just told my colleagues, for purposes of an explanation and 
elaboration, 6 million homes--6 million homes--will have their gas for 
their full season for 15 years just from what we are going to do there. 
What an astounding achievement if we will just complete the work by 
having a vote in the House.
  I was saddened to read that we continue to lose businesses because 
natural gas prices are too high. The National Association of 
Manufacturers estimates that 3.1 million high-wage manufacturing jobs 
have been lost since 2000, largely due to inadequate supplies of 
natural gas. This week, the House can join us in doing something about 
that, and I urge they do whichever they see as the best way to pass it. 
If they think it is best to do it freestanding and send it to us as we 
sent it to them, I wish them the best. If they choose to put it on the 
tax bill, I hope it will not just make it more difficult and cause the 
bill to be lost in the transit to the Senate, which appears simple but 
becomes cumbersome, at least once it hits the House and hits the 
Senate. It is nice and easy just coming over as it is walked over, but 
it is very cumbersome once it gets here. That is what would happen. It 
would then be discussed and perhaps debated, and it would have to have 
a vote. That is the second approach and far less desirable.
  But the House can see the writing on the wall--do it now or perhaps 
never do it. What a shame. Do it now and you get the benefits I have 
indicated or, believe it or not, it could be that you won't get it 
ever. That is just not a good way to leave for this Christmas, as I see 
it, and I hope it isn't.
  I thank the Senate for permitting me to speak today.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from South Carolina is recognized.
  Mr. GRAHAM. Mr. President, I want to echo what the Senator from New 
Mexico said. He has a very good idea, and I hope the House will act on 
his recommendations.
  Very briefly, I rise in support of the nomination of Dr. Bob Gates 
for Secretary of Defense. I believe he is the right guy at the right 
time. He has the background to be successful. I know this body will 
overwhelmingly confirm him. I wish him well in his very difficult but 
important task that lies ahead for the country and particularly for Dr. 
Gates.
  Very briefly, here is what I expect from Dr. Gates and really 
everyone involved in the war on terror: a winning strategy. He said at 
the hearing in one of the answers to one of the questions I posed to 
him that he believed the war in Iraq was one of the central 
battlefronts of the war on terror. If you believe that, as he does and 
I do and the President stated, then you have to throw everything you 
have at winning because the outcome in Iraq really will affect the 
outcome of the war on terror. If you believe that, you fight it to win. 
He also said something I thought was equally true and very candid: We 
are not winning. Our military has won every battle, but the extremists 
are trumping the moderates, and extremism is winning out over 
moderation in Iraq because we don't have enough security in place to 
allow moderation to flourish.
  My question to the country is, If we all agree we are not winning, 
can we all agree that we must not lose? I hope the country will rally 
around the concept that losing in Iraq will be devastating to our 
efforts in the war on terror. It will be devastating to forces of 
moderation in the region. It will empower extremists, religious 
extremists, al-Qaida, and others who have as their goal to topple all 
forms of moderation in the Middle East, to drive us out of the region--
not just Iraq--and one day

[[Page S11274]]

destroy the State of Israel. If you believe it is the central backbone 
of the war on terror, I hope we can come together as a people in this 
country to make sure we have the resources on the ground to win.
  Dr. Gates said that we did not have enough troops after the fall of 
Baghdad to bring about security. I think everybody believes that now. 
If General Shinseki was right and we needed 200,000 to pacify the 
country and secure the country after the fall of Baghdad, what has 
happened in the intervening months and years to require less troops? 
Nothing. It is far worse today in Baghdad than it was a year ago when I 
last visited. I was there on election day in December. People were 
walking around voting, very happy, very upbeat. Now people are afraid 
to go outside, and their children are under attack when they go out for 
the most simple things.
  So I do hope that not only will he take over this job and start over 
with the Congress and the American people, that he will commit himself 
to winning this war, and the way to win, in my opinion, is to provide 
security so the political process can be successful. No Prime Minister, 
no historical figure or great politicians of the past could bring about 
a democracy in Iraq with this level of violence. It is chicken-and-egg 
stuff to me. You cannot have a political solution until you control the 
violence. When you have a high-crime neighborhood, you don't send in 
less police, you send in more. Our mistakes in the past have come back 
to haunt us. We have never had enough troops. The situation on the 
ground has gotten out of control. I do believe we can control it with a 
surge of American troops.
  The goal is to come home, but the goal is victory. History will judge 
us not by when we left but what we left behind. The consequences of 
winning or losing in Iraq are central in the war on terror, and we have 
no other option, in my opinion, other than to win. The way to win over 
extremists is you stand boldly with moderates, and the way you win 
against people who could care less about humanity is to embrace the 
better parts of humanity and show the people who are trying to drive us 
out of Iraq that their agenda will lose to a better agenda, that their 
idea is second to ours.
  People in the Mideast are dying for their freedom. People in Iraq are 
dying for their freedom. If you become a judge in Iraq, they try to 
kill your family. If you are a politician in Iraq, they don't say bad 
things about you, they try to kill your family. Let's stand with the 
moderate forces in Iraq. Let's make sure we win this war which is 
central to the war on terror, and the only way I know to win a war is 
to fight it with overwhelming force.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor.


                             Change of Vote

  Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I wish to correct my vote on rollcall 
271, the motion to waive the Congressional Budget Act point of order on 
Senate amendment No. 5205.
  I am recorded as ``yea'' to waive the Budget Act point of order. It 
was my intent to uphold the point of order. Therefore, I ask unanimous 
consent that the record be changed so I will be recorded as voting 
against the motion to waive the budget point of order. The record 
should reflect my vote as ``nay'' on amendment No. 5205. It would not 
change the outcome of the vote.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Coburn). Without objection, it is so 
ordered.
  Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the clerk will call the 
roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. MARTINEZ. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. MARTINEZ. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to speak in 
morning business for 5 minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. MARTINEZ. Mr. President, I rise this afternoon first of all for 
the purpose of agreeing with my colleague from South Carolina and 
previously my colleague from Texas, both distinguish Senators who spoke 
in favor of the nomination of Dr. Gates to be our next Secretary of 
Defense.
  I intend to support his nomination. I believe he has served our 
country well in the past, and we are fortunate that he is willing to 
step into a difficult position at a very difficult time in our history. 
I intend to support him. I commend the Armed Services Committee for 
their show of unity and bipartisanship in unanimously supporting his 
nomination. I hope there will be a strong vote in support of Dr. Gates 
as he heads into this very difficult assignment.
  I think it is important we note today two other things--one, the need 
for us to look at this problem in Iraq with a sense of bipartisanship, 
with a sense of unity as Americans, putting aside the stripes we 
usually wear as Democrats and Republicans and looking at this problem 
as Americans concerned about a difficult problem, one that has taxed us 
but one in which we must succeed.
  Today the President received the report of the Iraq study commission, 
a group of distinguished Americans who came together to give us 
recommendations. I commend the President for not only accepting their 
report but also highlighting how clear he was and the seriousness that 
will be given to the recommendations it makes.
  Lastly, I wish to also take a moment to commend and thank Secretary 
Rumsfeld for his service to our Nation. I had the pleasure of meeting 
Secretary Rumsfeld when I was very inexperienced in the ways of 
Washington, a person from Florida, and I came here to serve in the 
President's Cabinet. During the time of the transition into this 
administration, I met Secretary Rumsfeld as we jointly prepared for our 
confirmation hearings before the Senate and proceeded to our jobs in 
the Cabinet. I came to know and appreciate this great American patriot, 
a man of incredible intellect and talent but also incredibly dedicated 
to our Nation. I came to truly appreciate his leadership and his skill 
as he led the Department of Defense initially through the treacherous 
attacks of September 11 where he, with his bare hands, was helping to 
dig the injured from the rubble of the Pentagon as that building was 
attacked on that unforgettable morning of September 11, 2001. I saw him 
next in our immediately following Cabinet meeting when the President 
asked all of us to try to pull ourselves together to help lead our 
Nation at this very difficult moment. He, in a certain and clear way, 
showed us a way forward and how our military would respond to the 
threats to our Nation--first of all, to secure the Capitol and New York 
City but then in a very clear and direct way on how to respond to those 
who had plotted these attacks in Afghanistan.

  He led our country into a very successful and very clear and decisive 
victory in Afghanistan and then prepared our country and led us into 
the war in Iraq with a very difficult and still uncertain outcome.
  In all of the debate and discussions that have ensued over the last 
several months about this difficult struggle in which we find ourselves 
today, I think too often we have been guided by the usual bickering and 
partisan politics, but not often enough do we stop to recognize a 
dedicated American who has served our Nation well. I am proud to call 
Secretary Rumsfeld my friend. But I am equally proud to say today that 
he has served our Nation with great distinction, that our Nation owes 
him a great debt of thanks and to his family as well, to his wife Joyce 
and to his children for the sacrifice that all of them have made so 
Secretary Rumsfeld could serve our Nation once again. At a certain age 
when many of us might be looking forward to retirement, he came to 
Washington once again to serve in a very difficult job and has done it 
with great distinction.
  I thank Secretary Rumsfeld on behalf of Floridians, and I think a 
grateful nation as well, and the men and women in uniform he has led 
who I know thought so much of his leadership. I know he has given so 
much of himself to the transformation of our military to prepare us for 
the future. I, for one, rise today with a voice of thanks to a great 
American for his service.
  I yield the floor and suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

[[Page S11275]]

  Mr. SALAZAR. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent the order for the 
quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The Senator from Colorado is recognized.
  Mr. SALAZAR. Mr. President, I rise to speak on behalf of the 
confirmation of Robert Gates as Secretary of Defense. When I looked at 
the testimony that was offered by Robert Gates yesterday in front of 
the Armed Services Committee, I was impressed by the qualities that he 
was proposing to bring to the job. I want to speak to some of those 
qualities this afternoon before we get to a confirmation vote on his 
nomination to be the next Secretary of Defense.
  First, I was impressed with his candor. I think his sense of what is 
happening in Iraq and his grasp of the facts, being straightforward 
with the committee and straightforward with the Senate in terms of how 
he views the picture of Iraq, is refreshing. I think what it tells all 
of us is that Dr. Gates will bring in the fresh eyes we need to have on 
the problem in Iraq so we can hopefully develop a new direction that is 
one that will work for our country. So I appreciate the candor with 
which he spoke yesterday in the Senate Armed Services Committee.
  Second, I was also impressed with Dr. Gates and his openness with 
regard to considering all options in respect to questions that were 
asked of him by members of the committee. What he said, in effect, was 
that all options are on the table. He did not simply say that he had a 
specific course of action or that we were going to stay the course, but 
he said that everything needed to be examined. I think that is a 
refreshing attitude about this major problem in the Middle East that we 
have and we share as Americans today.
  Third, I was impressed also by the quality of collaboration he talked 
about. I think in his statement to the committee, as he talked about 
working with all agencies and working with the Members of Congress, he 
was saying that this is an issue in Iraq that really is a problem that 
belongs to all of America. How we move forward with the issue of Iraq 
is something that is going to require all of us working together to be 
successful in Iraq. In so doing, I think he was making a statement that 
this is not just a Republican issue; it is not a Democratic issue; it 
is an American issue and we need to find a strategy and a direction for 
us to be successful.
  I believe when you look at what has happened in the last 4, 5, or 6 
weeks in America, what we see is a growing momentum for a new direction 
in Iraq. I think that new direction is set forth with a lot of things 
that are happening, developing a method that will hopefully bring this 
country together as we look for solutions. But let me say the Iraq 
Study Group in its own study, which I know is being heralded around the 
country today, starts out with a very candid assessment of what is 
happening in Iraq today and is set forth in the first paragraph of the 
Iraq Study Group Report. It says:

       The situation in Iraq is grave and deteriorating. There is 
     no path that can guarantee success but the prospects can be 
     improved.

  When this study group says that the situation in Iraq is grave and 
deteriorating, there is a sense of candor with respect to what is 
happening on the ground in Iraq.
  I had the honor and privilege of visiting Iraq with my friend from 
Virginia, Senator Warner, for whom I have tremendous respect, and 
Senator Levin from Michigan for whom I also have tremendous respect, 
and that was in March of this last year.
  I remember my conversations with my good friend from Virginia when he 
talked about how things changed in Iraq from the first time he had 
visited Baghdad to the time we were there in March. The fact is things 
have gotten worse with respect to the violence we saw on the ground. 
How we move forward is a very important challenge that we face in 
America.
  I strongly believe we need to move forward in a bipartisan manner in 
developing new directions for our country with respect to Iraq. I 
believe we need to succeed in Iraq. I believe that getting the regional 
interests involved in helping us formulate a solution is very important 
and we need to continue to send a message to the Iraqi people and the 
Iraqi Government that they first and foremost have the responsibility 
to bring about the security that will allow their Government to 
function and the people of Iraq to have peace and stability, which is 
something that is very essential.
  I believe we have the people and the leadership here in this body of 
the Senate to be able to chart that future bipartisan direction for the 
United States of America, not only in Iraq but in the Middle East. As 
was appropriately pointed out by the Iraq study commission, this is an 
issue that goes beyond Iraq. It is an issue that involves the entire 
Middle East and how we deal with this issue.
  I will quote again another wonderful friend of mine, former President 
Bill Clinton, when he says, ``The eggs have been broken and now we have 
to make an omelet out of it.'' Or Secretary Colin Powell, who made the 
comment at one point in time that, ``We broke it, we bought it.''
  We have a problem in Iraq and in the Middle East. In order for us to 
meet the challenges that face us, it is going to take tremendous 
bipartisanship leadership from all of us here in this body. I look 
forward to working with my colleagues as we move forward on this 
agenda.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I say to our distinguished colleague from 
Colorado that I had the privilege of being with the distinguished 
ranking member, Senator Levin, Senator Biden, Senator Lugar, Senator 
Lieberman--a group of us at the White House--Senator Rockefeller, 
Senator Roberts, counseling with the President on these various issues. 
It was an extraordinary meeting. I have had the privilege throughout my 
28 years in the Senate to be in that Cabinet Room many times, but this 
was a very historic moment. The President listened very carefully to 
the perspectives and views of Members of the Senate, and we had an 
equal number from the House of Representatives. I am encouraged for the 
future. I am looking forward to our President assessing all of the 
options related to Iraq. I commended the Baker-Hamilton report during 
the course of our meeting. We talked about his interim study. We talked 
about the Pentagon input and the input of the Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs. I am optimistic that our President is going to carefully 
consider all options. But we must wait and see as he, under the 
Constitution, has to make that final decision with regard to such 
changes that we may have in our policy.
  I thank the Senator.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senator from 
Pennsylvania is allotted 20 minutes. We will have to either revise that 
previous agreement or take time.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I have to say that I think, colleagues, we 
must maintain the 5 o'clock voting time. A lot of Senators rearranged 
their schedule. I was unaware because I happened to be away from the 
floor.
  I yield the floor. I thank the courtesy of the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Pennsylvania is recognized.
  Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I have sought recognition to express my 
support for the nomination of Robert Gates to be Secretary of Defense 
and to use this occasion to comment about the proposed changes in 
policy of the United States in the conduct of the war in Iraq.
  When Robert Gates was nominated to be Director of the Central 
Intelligence Agency in 1987 and I was serving on the Intelligence 
Committee at that time, concerns were expressed, including mine, that 
Mr. Gates had not been forthright in the preparation of the testimony 
of then-CIA Director Casey in disclosures about what happened in the 
Iran-Contra affair. Mr. Gates withdrew as a nominee for CIA Director at 
that time. However, he was again nominated in 1991 by President George 
H.W. Bush, and at that time I supported his nomination, thinking that 
whatever mistakes Mr. Gates had made in the past, he had learned from 
those mistakes.
  President George W. Bush has now nominated Robert Gates to be 
Secretary of Defense. I believe he is well qualified to undertake this 
position. He has testified before the Armed Services Committee that he 
does not intend to be a bump on a log, has asserted his

[[Page S11276]]

independence, told me in a meeting which we had last week on November 
30th that he would bring a fresh pair of eyes to the situation and 
would be open to change. There is no doubt that change is in the wind, 
considering the memorandum which has surfaced, written by Secretary of 
Defense Donald Rumsfeld the day before the election, and from comments 
made by National Security Adviser Stephen Hadley, and comments made by 
the President himself. It is my view that had we known Saddam Hussein 
did not have weapons of mass destruction, we would not have gone into 
Iraq. Once we had made the decision to go into Iraq, I think it not 
advisable to withdraw and leave Iraq in a condition of instability. But 
the situation there cannot go on forever, interminably, without some 
limitation and without change of policy because, as Robert Gates put 
it, we are not winning there and the situation is not improving there. 
So there has to be some change. Precisely what that change should be is 
a matter yet to be resolved, and yet to be considered. But a long list 
of alternatives has been proposed in a number of quarters.

  Today, the commission, led jointly by James Baker and Lee Hamilton, 
has issued a report calling for some very fundamental changes. The 
Rumsfeld memorandum outlines a number of alternatives.
  One of the important recommendations which was made by the Baker-
Hamilton commission is that there has to be involvement by other 
nations in the region, especially Saudi Arabia, with all of its wealth, 
maintaining a hands-off position, and they ought to be helping to 
resolve the problems there. The Baker-Hamilton commission has further 
recommended that the United States engage in negotiations with both 
Iran and Syria perhaps on a multilateral basis.
  My own view, which I expressed in an extended floor statement last 
June, is that the United States ought to negotiate directly with Iran. 
I also believe we ought to negotiate directly with Syria. In my June 
statement I also broadened to consideration of direct negotiations with 
North Korea. As I said at that time and reiterate, as has been pointed 
out, we need to keep our friends close and our enemies closer; that if 
we would undertake a dialog showing respect, showing courtesy to our 
opponents--we do not have to agree with them--I think that diplomacy 
and dialog have an excellent opportunity to lead to a solution; and, 
certainly as a matter of first impression, it ought to be what is 
undertaken.
  It is my hope the President will move in the direction cited by the 
Baker-Hamilton commission and will go even further and engage in direct 
negotiations with Iran, Syria, and North Korea.
  In October, I publicly urged that changes should be made promptly and 
not wait until after the election because we were sustaining so many 
casualties on an ongoing basis.
  On October 22, during an interview with CNN, I was asked how much 
time does the Iraqi Prime Minister have to get tough to deal with the 
death squads and the militias before the United States has to reassess 
its strategy. I replied that I would say the time is already past.
  I was encouraged by a lead story in the New York Times that day that 
the administration was considering some timetables. President Bush said 
in his Saturday address the day before that he was prepared to be 
flexible to make adjustments, if necessary, to be victorious. I said 
then that I don't believe a shift in tactics ought to wait until after 
the election; that there are too many casualties; and that if we had a 
better course, we should adopt it sooner rather than later.
  When Senator Warner came back from a trip to Iraq several weeks 
before the election and was quoted to the effect that things were going 
sideways, I called him and suggested to Senator Warner and to other of 
my colleagues that it might be useful and appropriate to have a joint 
statement to the President as to the views that we got from our travels 
to our States and from our travels generally. It was apparent to me 
weeks before the election--really months before the election--that 
there was an ongoing descending pattern in which the American people 
were not in support of United States policy in conducting the war in 
Iraq. And the public opinion polls cited in my formal statement, which 
I will introduce into the Record, have shown that. The attitude of the 
troops in the field--again the specifics of my formal statement had 
shown that. It was my view that the will of the American people would 
be expressed at the election, and in no uncertain terms repudiating 
what the United States was doing in Iraq. And, of course, that did 
prove to be the case.
  I had been concerned back in 2002 before the vote was taken on the 
resolution for the use of force as to what the United States was 
prepared to do once Saddam Hussein was toppled. What were the specifics 
on the evidence of weapons of mass destruction; what will be the costs 
in terms of casualties; and what will happen? I was speaking in 2002 
about the conflicts among the Sunnis, the Shiites, and the Kurds.
  Now we have a situation where it is up to the President to make the 
decision as to what will be done specifically; and that is his role as 
Commander in Chief. But the Congress also has a very definite, a very 
precise, and a very important role as we undertake the appropriations 
process.
  From time to time there are comments by Members on a wide variety of 
subjects that funding should be cut off from executive operations in 
order to carry out Congress' will. That is done in the appropriations 
bill. When a Secretary of a given department is about to undertake 
something which the Members of Congress do not like, we provide that no 
funds appropriated in the bill shall be used to carry out a specific 
function. There has been a suggestion that funding ought to be cut off 
for the activities in Iraq. Certainly we would not cut off funding to 
leave our troops in harm's way, without adequate resources to carry out 
their mission. However, there may develop a congressional consensus 
which would reflect the will of the American people that there needs to 
be something done in Iraq, perhaps even staged withdrawals. Cutting 
down funding in stages to effectuate such staged withdrawals could 
accomplish congressional objectives and not leave our troops exposed, 
with sufficient planning in advance.

  In light of the public opposition to the way we are conducting the 
war in Iraq, and very significant agreement among Members with that 
demonstrated public response, there remains the possibility that 
Congress could act with respect to the appropriations function to 
effectuate changes. That is certainly a course which I would not like 
to see happen.
  It would be vastly preferable if, as a result of what has happened, 
including the Baker-Hamilton commission report and what Secretary 
Rumsfeld has said and the new approach of Secretary-to-be Gates--I 
think he will be confirmed later this afternoon--that the President 
will make a sufficient change in policy which will lead us in a better 
path.
  Certainly the continued presence of U.S. troops in Iraq has two major 
problems--at least two major problems. First, it incites the insurgents 
to attack U.S. troops; second, it allows the Iraqis to continue to rely 
upon the United States to provide a defense and to provide military 
protection. They do not have the motivation to increase their police 
force and their military to handle the jobs themselves. The public 
opinion polls cited in my prepared statement are shocking in that the 
people in Iraq approve of the attacks against U.S. soldiers. We are in 
a very uncomfortable position.
  In essence we may be on a watershed mark today with the confirmation 
of Robert Gates to be Secretary of Defense on a day when the Baker-
Hamilton report has been filed which makes recommendations for changes. 
Ultimately, the President will have to make the decision.
  We debated earlier this year proposals to have a withdrawal by stages 
in 2007 without a specification as to what there would be. We had a 
vote on withdrawal by July of 2007 which was decisively defeated, 
getting only 13 votes. The temper of the country is such that there is 
widespread public opposition to what is being done by the United States 
by way of military action in Iraq today. We learned the bitter 
experience of the Vietnam war, that we cannot conduct a war which is 
unpopular with the American people, which the American people reject.

[[Page S11277]]

  In voting to confirm Mr. Gates, we will see the possibilities of a 
new chapter. But it is up to the President, it is up to the Commander 
in Chief to structure a change in policy which will ultimately take our 
troops out of harm's way, which will be done in a way consistent with 
maintaining stability in Iraq to the maximum extent possible to set the 
stage for Iraq to continue to develop its incipient democracy and, as 
per the Baker commission report, perhaps embed troops with the Iraqi 
military and the Iraqi police so they can undertake their own defense. 
But that will require the change in policy with all of the options 
having been presented by the variety of sources which I have cited.
  I ask unanimous consent that the full text of my prepared statement 
be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

Prepared Statement of Senator Arlen Specter on the Nomination of Robert 
        Gates to be Secretary of Defense and U.S. Policy in Iraq

       Mr. President. I seek recognition to speak about the 
     nomination of Robert Gates to be the 22nd Secretary of 
     Defense and our policy as it pertains to Iraq.
       Robert Gates was first nominated to lead the Central 
     Intelligence Agency in 1987 by President Ronald Reagan. At 
     that time, I, along with many of my colleagues, held 
     reservations about his nomination. Specifically, I was 
     concerned about his role as Deputy Director of the CIA in 
     helping to prepare former CIA Director William J. Casey for 
     testimony before the Congress in which he failed to disclose 
     the full details of the Iran-Contra Affair. I was also 
     concerned about Gates' failure to recognize the possible 
     impropriety of diverting funds from Iranian arms sales to the 
     Contras. Reservations expressed by other members of the 
     Senate and myself reportedly led to the withdrawal of his 
     nomination.
       In 1991, when Gates was nominated by President George H.W. 
     Bush to lead the CIA, I supported his confirmation. In 
     explaining my support for Gates on the Senate floor, I 
     stated, ``To the extent that Mr. Gates has made mistakes, it 
     is my conclusion that he has learned from them. I believe 
     that as a matter of his personal qualifications he is an 
     astute, experienced intelligence officer'' and that ``Mr. 
     Gates is ready, willing and able to work with the Congress, 
     allowing the Congress its appropriate oversight capacity.'' 
     The majority of Senators at that time came to similar 
     conclusions, resulting in his confirmation by the Senate. He 
     served admirably as Director of the CIA for fourteen months 
     and is the only career officer in the agency's history to 
     rise from entry-level employee to Director. As was reported 
     in a December 4, 2006 article in the Washington Post, ``even 
     his critics describe it as a reasonably successful, 
     modernizing tenure.''
       At a time when our country is engaged in a world wide war 
     against terror and is searching for answers on how to deal 
     with the simmering civil war in Iraq, President George W. 
     Bush has nominated Gates to replace Donald Rumsfeld as 
     Secretary of Defense. During his confirmation hearing, Gates 
     offered refreshing testimony, stressing he would ``listen 
     closely'' to various sources of advice, form his ``own 
     conclusions'', ``speak candidly'' about what needs to be done 
     in Iraq and that he is not returning to service to ``be a 
     bump on the log.''
       After meeting recently with Robert Gates, I believe he 
     will, as he told me in our meeting on November 30, 2006, 
     bring a fresh set of eyes to the Department of Defense and to 
     U.S. policy towards Iraq. My meeting, in conjunction with my 
     review of his testimony before the Armed Services Committee, 
     has led me to conclude Robert Gates can provide competent 
     leadership at the Pentagon at this critical juncture in our 
     nation's history.
       The nomination of Robert Gates to head the Department of 
     Defense is an opportunity to chart a new course. His personal 
     relationships with Secretary Rice, a former subordinate, and 
     his three decade relationship with National Security Advisor 
     Stephen Hadley, will hopefully aid the transition and provide 
     a new dynamic in the Administration's national security team. 
     It is my hope that Gates will not only bring a fresh pair of 
     eyes to our policy in Iraq, but also to our dealings with 
     regional actors such as Syria and Iran.
       In 2004, Gates co-chaired a task force of the Council on 
     Foreign Relations that concluded that ``it is in the 
     interests of the United States to engage selectively with 
     Iran to promote regional stability, dissuade Iran from 
     pursuing nuclear weapons, preserve reliable energy supplies, 
     reduce the threat of terror, and address the `democracy 
     deficit' that pervades the Middle East as a whole.'' In 
     response to a question submitted by the Senate Armed Services 
     Committee on Iran, Gates expressed his belief that ``no 
     option that could potentially benefit U.S. policy should be 
     off the table'' and noted that ``in the worst days of the 
     cold war the U.S. maintained a dialogue with the Soviet Union 
     and China.'' Most recently, during his testimony before the 
     Senate, he confirmed the position that ``our first option 
     should be diplomacy'' to deal with the problems Iran poses.
       I have consistently urged the Administration to work with 
     Iraq's neighbors, including Iran and Syria, to develop 
     cooperative stabilization efforts. To that end, I have 
     personally met with Iran's Ambassador to the United Nations 
     and Syria's Ambassador to the United States in an attempt to 
     help facilitate such an effort. I have amplified my strong 
     belief that dialogue with nations such as Iran and Syria, 
     most recently in an essay ``Dialogue With Adversaries'' 
     published in the winter edition of The Washington Quarterly. 
     I ask unanimous consent that it be printed in the record at 
     the conclusion of my remarks.
       I have supported the Iraq Study Group, an independent, 
     bipartisan commission led by former Secretary of State James 
     Baker and former Congressman Lee Hamilton which was created 
     by Congress in order to deliver an assessment of the 
     situation in Iraq and recommend strategic options for the 
     future. I expressed my support and interest in the work of 
     group to CNN on October 22, 2006: ``Let's consider the 
     alternatives and what Jim Baker and Lee Hamilton and his 
     group are thinking about, sooner rather than later.''
       The Iraq Study Group report, unveiled today, recommends 
     that, ``Given the ability of Iran and Syria to influence 
     events within Iraq and their interest in avoiding chaos in 
     Iraq, the United States should try to engage them 
     constructively.'' The report also notes that, ``The United 
     States cannot achieve its goals in the Middle East unless it 
     deals directly with the Arab-Israeli conflict and regional 
     instability. There must be a renewed and sustained commitment 
     by the United States to a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace on 
     all fronts: Lebanon, Syria, and President Bush's June 2002 
     commitment to a two-state solution for Israel and Palestine. 
     This commitment must include direct talks with, by, and 
     between Israel, Lebanon, Palestinians (those who accept 
     Israel's right to exist), and Syria.'' I am pleased that the 
     Iraq Study Group considered engaging in dialogue with 
     regional actors and I appreciate its recommendations on how 
     to move forward in Iraq.
       Today, the Baker Commission concluded that ``stability in 
     Iraq remains elusive and the situation is deteriorating.'' 
     Yesterday, in testimony before the Armed Services Committee, 
     Gates candidly responded ``No, sir'' when asked if we were 
     winning in Iraq. One month ago to date, Secretary Rumsfeld 
     drafted a memorandum declaring ``it is time for a major 
     adjustment.'' All of these call for a change in U.S. policy.
       A shift in policy in Iraq is overdue and I have long-
     expressed openness to considering any and all suggestions for 
     a change in course. When Senator Warner returned from Iraq on 
     October 5, 2006, he made a public statement to the effect 
     that things were ``drifting sideways'' in Iraq. I called him 
     to express my view that I had found in my travels in 
     Pennsylvania and elsewhere that the people were totally 
     opposed to the way the United States was conducting the war 
     in Iraq.
       I expressed my concern to Senator Warner that we were 
     heading for an election debacle in the face of public 
     opposition to the way we were handling the war in Iraq if 
     modifications were not promptly made. I consulted with a 
     number of my colleagues in the Senate about jointly advising 
     the President of such concerns. There was a consensus that we 
     not do so on a joint basis. I then had an extended telephone 
     conversation with Presidential adviser Karl Rove to express 
     my misgivings.
       Later that month, I publicly urged that changes should be 
     made promptly and not wait until after the election because 
     we were sustaining so many casualties on an ongoing basis. On 
     October 22, 2006, during an interview with CNN, I was asked: 
     ``How much time does the Iraqi prime minister, Nouri al-
     Maliki, have to get tough to deal with the death squads, the 
     militias, before the United States has to reassess its 
     strategy?'' I replied: ``I would say . . . that the time has 
     already passed. I was encouraged by a lead story in the New 
     York Times today that the Administration is considering some 
     timetables. President Bush said yesterday in his Saturday 
     address that he's going to be flexible and would make 
     adjustments if necessary to be victorious . . . We have James 
     Baker saying that there are alternatives besides staying the 
     course and cutting and running. I don't believe that a shift 
     in tactics ought to wait until after the election. There are 
     too many casualties there. If we have a better course, we 
     ought to adopt it sooner rather than later.''
       I believe that had we known Saddam Hussein did not possess 
     weapons of mass destruction, the Congress would not have 
     authorized the invasion of Iraq. I told CNN on September 24, 
     2006, that, ``By hindsight, we operated on faulty 
     intelligence. And I think, had we known that Saddam Hussein 
     did not have weapons of mass destruction before the war was 
     started, I think the odds are very strong that it wouldn't 
     have been started.'' However, we entered that country and we 
     must to do everything in our power to not leave it in a 
     condition that will continue to precipitate violence.
       Prior to the U.S. invasion of Iraq, I publicly stated my 
     concerns about the potential fallout from such action. On 
     February 13, 2002, I took to the Senate Floor to express my 
     belief that there should be a comprehensive analysis of the 
     threat posed by Saddam Hussein and what an invasion would 
     amount to in terms of U.S. casualties: ``We need to know, 
     with some greater precision, the threat posed by Saddam 
     Hussein with respect to weapons of mass destruction . . .

[[Page S11278]]

     There also has to be an analysis of what the costs would be, 
     some appraisal in terms of casualties . . . Then there is the 
     issue as to what happens after Saddam Hussein is toppled.''
       Eight months later, on October 7, 2002, I returned to the 
     floor to again express my concerns: ``What happens after 
     Saddam Hussein is toppled has yet to be answered in real 
     detail.''
       ``What was the extent of Saddam Hussein's control over 
     weapons of mass destruction? What would it cost by way of 
     casualties to topple Saddam Hussein? What would be the 
     consequence in Iraq? Who would govern after Saddam was 
     toppled? What would happen in the region, the impact on the 
     Arab world, and the impact on Israel?''
       ``In previous briefings, I have sought the administration 
     plan as to what will be done after Saddam Hussein is toppled, 
     and I think that is an area where a great deal more thought 
     needs to be given. The situation in Iraq would obviously be 
     contentious, with disputes between the Sunnis and the 
     Shi'ites, with the interests of the Kurds in an independent 
     state, and it means a very long-term commitment by the United 
     States.''
       Nonetheless, now that we are there, I feel we should give 
     the Iraqis an opportunity to solidify a democratic government 
     and do our best to establish the capabilities of Iraq's army 
     and police forces to provide adequate security. However, 
     continuing violence and instability have made it apparent 
     that Iraq is in a state of civil war and that the current 
     policies of the U.S. and Iraqi governments need to be 
     reassessed. I believe the recent resignation of Secretary of 
     Defense Donald Rumsfeld and decision by Iraqi Prime Minister 
     Nuri al- Maliki to speed transition of security 
     responsibilities to Iraqi forces signal that the 
     Administration and Iraqi government are ready to make 
     changes.
       The United States cannot prosecute a war which does not 
     enjoy the support of the American public. The election 
     results and other evidence demonstrate that the American 
     people do not support the war in Iraq. Support has dwindled 
     with those serving on the front lines. According to a 
     February 28, 2006 Zogby poll, 62 percent of Americans believe 
     that things are going badly in Iraq. Furthermore, 72 percent 
     of troops serving in Iraq favor a pull out within the year. 
     How much longer can we continue to prosecute this war that 
     has become increasingly unpopular both with the American 
     public and our troops? As I warned my colleagues on the 
     Senate Floor on February 13, 2002: ``We have seen the bitter 
     lesson from Vietnam that we cannot prosecute a war without 
     the public support.''
       There is a broad consensus that our policy in Iraq is not 
     producing the desired results. A change in course is mandated 
     not only because of the events on the ground but by the 
     collective voice of the American people who spoke out during 
     the November elections. The situation has reached a critical 
     mass as we have recently seen the National Security Advisor, 
     the Secretary of Defense and the President all recognizing a 
     change is needed and, furthermore, indicating change will be 
     forthcoming.
       I commend President Bush's decision to ``look at new 
     ideas'' and ``broaden the aperture of the debate'' as 
     National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley stated on Meet the 
     Press on December 3, 2006. The following day, the President 
     stated that he is ``not satisfied with the pace of progress 
     in Iraq.''
       Further evidence that change is needed came from the 
     Administration's point person and architect of U.S. action in 
     Iraq, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, in a November 6, 
     2006 memorandum: ``In my view it is time for a major 
     adjustment. Clearly, what U.S. forces are currently doing in 
     Iraq is not working well enough or fast enough.''
       National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley confirmed that 
     U.S. policy needs retooling when he restated the President's 
     position, ``that what is going on in Iraq is not going well 
     enough or fast enough'' and that ``some of those changes are 
     going to be significant.''
       Most importantly, the incoming Secretary of Defense, in 
     response to a question posed by Senator Levin, the incoming 
     Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, ``Are we 
     winning in Iraq?'' Robert Gates responded, ``No, sir.''
       The Iraq Study Group Report states that the ``primary 
     mission of U.S. forces in Iraq should evolve to one of 
     supporting the Iraqi army, which would take over primary 
     responsibility for combat operations. By the first quarter of 
     2008, subject to unexpected developments in the security 
     situation on the ground, all combat brigades not necessary 
     for force protection could be out of Iraq.'' I support this 
     recommendation and I am pleased that President Bush, 
     according to his National Security Advisor, is ``looking 
     forward to the report'' and that he ``wants to listen to 
     Republicans and Democrats in Congress.'' I would respectfully 
     suggest that the President heed the work of the Iraq Study 
     Group and the opinions of Congress.
       From time to time, there are comments by Members that we 
     should cut off funding for executive operations to carry out 
     Congress's will. Certainly, we would not cut off funding to 
     leave our troops in harm's way without adequate resources to 
     carry out their mission. However, there may develop a 
     Congressional consensus on staged withdrawals if the 
     President does not initiate such a plan himself. Cutting down 
     funding in stages to effectuate such staged withdrawals could 
     accomplish Congressional objectives and not leave our troops 
     exposed with sufficient planning in advance. In light of 
     public opposition to the way we are conducting the war in 
     Iraq and widespread agreement among Members with the public 
     response, there is a significant possibility that Congress 
     would act to curtail expenditures to effectuate staged 
     withdrawals.
       During a April 27, 2005 Defense Appropriations Subcommittee 
     hearing, I expressed my concern over federal spending 
     priorities directly to Secretary Rumsfeld: ``There is a lot 
     of disquiet out there among the people as to what is 
     happening in Iraq and disquiet as to what is happening to our 
     discretionary budget. I chair a subcommittee which is 
     responsible for education and health care and worker safety, 
     and it's been cut by almost a full percent and with the 
     inflation factor, I'm about $7 billion short. And that makes 
     it very, very tough to sell when you have NIH and health-care 
     program and Pell grants and education.'' I reiterated my 
     concern in a May 19, 2005 letter to Sec. Rumsfeld: ``There is 
     considerable angst in my state, and I suspect generally in 
     the country, concerning the cost of our military operations 
     in Iraq, especially when compared to the cuts in domestic 
     discretionary spending.''
       Giving the Iraq government a virtual blank check on our 
     staying there is counter-productive in at least two important 
     respects: First, it encourages the insurgents to violence 
     against our troops there and against other Iraqis. Second, it 
     encourages the Iraqis to continue reliance on our presence 
     there to defend their stability.
       Our presence in Iraq incites violence which results in 
     increased U.S. and Iraqi deaths. On September 24, 2006, I 
     told CNN, ``that the war in Iraq has intensified Islamic 
     fundamentalism and radicalism . . . That's the focal point 
     for inspiring more radical Islamic fundamentalism.'' 
     According to the Department of Defense's Manpower Data 
     Center, 99 U.S. soldiers were killed in support of operations 
     in Iraq in October 2006. This represents the most U.S. 
     casualties in a month since November 2004.
       Not only are U.S. troops being attacked on a regular basis, 
     but such action appears to be acceptable to the very populace 
     we are attempting to aid. According to a September 27, 2006 
     USA Today article, ``About six in 10 Iraqis say they approve 
     of attacks on U.S.-led forces, and slightly more than that 
     want their government to ask U.S. troops to leave within a 
     year, a poll finds.'' Further, The Washington Post reported 
     that a survey conducted by the State Department revealed two-
     thirds of Iraqis in Baghdad favor an immediate withdrawal of 
     U.S. forces.
       According to the USA Today article, ``About 61 percent 
     approved of the attacks--up from 47 percent in January. A 
     solid majority of Shiite and Sunni Arabs approved of the 
     attacks, according to the poll.'' Furthermore, ``Three-
     fourths say they think the U.S. plans to keep military bases 
     in Iraq permanently.'' A consolidation of bases, as suggested 
     by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, in conjunction with 
     an indication to begin removing U.S. forces from Iraq, would 
     aid in alleviating this concern and potentially reduce 
     attacks.
       Our presence, with no indication of departure, has allowed 
     the Iraqis to rely too heavily on the U.S. for security and 
     has not spurned them to stand up an organic security 
     capability. The Administration has deemed the rapid creation 
     of an effective Iraqi fighting force as key to stabilizing 
     Iraq and expediting the eventual withdrawal of U.S. forces. 
     The rationale for this effort is that a well-trained, well-
     equipped Iraqi army can be effective in quelling the 
     insurgency and can help smooth the process of restoring full 
     and real sovereignty to the Iraqi government.
       According to the Congressional Research Service, forty 
     percent of total U.S. appropriations for reconstruction--
     nearly $14 billion--are aimed at building Iraqi security 
     forces. Most of these funds--$10.5 billion--have been added 
     since September 2004, as the security situation remained 
     unstable and efforts to train forces appeared inadequate. 
     According to the State Department, in mid-October 2006, there 
     were 128,000 trained and equipped conventional Iraqi police 
     and 129,700 army forces. Officials have stated that 325,000 
     security forces are needed to defeat the insurgency. In all, 
     about 312,400 security forces are currently defined as ready 
     for action.
       However, various reports indicate that many fewer could be 
     said to be capable of the most demanding jobs. During the 
     past three years, poorly trained and equipped security 
     forces, no-shows and desertions, dismissals of police for 
     criminal behavior, bribe-taking for obtaining higher rank or 
     for release of insurgent suspects, and infiltration of police 
     and other units by sectarian militia groups have threatened 
     U.S. plans to increase security using Iraqi personnel.
       I am optimistic that the Iraq Study Group's report will 
     usher in a new tone in the Iraq debate--one that will move 
     away from the extremes of ``cut and run'' versus ``stay the 
     course.'' I am hopeful that the convergence of this report 
     and a set of fresh eyes leading the Department of Defense 
     will produce an atmosphere allowing candid discussions on our 
     policy resulting in a pragmatic shift in our course.
       Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld provided the impetus 
     for change. In his November 6, 2006 memorandum ``Iraq--
     Illustrative New Courses of Action'' he suggests one option 
     for the President to consider is to ``Begin modest 
     withdrawals of U.S. and Coalition forces (start ``taking our 
     hand off the

[[Page S11279]]

     bicycle seat''), so Iraqis know they have to pull up their 
     socks, step up and take responsibility for their country.''
       On October 22, 2006, I told CNN: ``The Unites Sates is 
     going to insist on a timetable from Iraq that we're not going 
     to be the guarantors forever . . . I like the report in the 
     [New York] Times . . . that the administration is considering 
     timetables to tell the Iraqis that they're going to have to 
     take a larger role in their own security, that they're going 
     to have to show some progress no sectarian violence, and 
     maybe even further consideration of the option of dividing 
     Iraq into three segments, Shiite, Sunni and Kurd, so these 
     warring factions will be less likely to kill each other''
       The report issued by the Iraq Study Group states ``the 
     United States should significantly increase the number of 
     U.S. military personnel, including combat troops, imbedded in 
     and supporting Iraqi Army units. As these actions proceed, we 
     could begin to move combat forces out of Iraq. `` I concur 
     that a phased withdrawal of combat forces is the best course 
     of action at this juncture.
       I am cognizant of what a premature departure may lead to in 
     Iraq. The Iraq Study Group concluded that, ``Because of the 
     importance of Iraq, the potential for catastrophe, and the 
     role and commitments of the United States in initiating 
     events that have led to the current situation, we believe it 
     would be wrong for the United States to abandon the country 
     through a precipitate withdrawal of troops and support.
       In an interview with CNN on November 12, 2006, I concurred 
     by stating, ``We don't want to withdraw if we're going to 
     leave chaos. Troop withdrawals are definitely in the offing, 
     but it's a military decision to determine when there's 
     sufficient military force in the Iraqi army and in their 
     police to maintain stability.''
       U.S. forces should not remain in Iraq any longer than 
     necessary. Iraqi government forces will ultimately be 
     responsible for securing their country. As ever increasing 
     numbers of Iraqi security forces are trained and able to 
     conduct operations on their own, U.S. forces should gradually 
     redeploy. According to NSA Stephen Hadley, Prime Minister 
     Maliki has said ``that his goal is to be able to take 
     responsibility of the security of his country middle of next 
     year.'' I would suggest that we hold Prime Minister Maliki to 
     his pledge and work to ensure that Iraqis are able to stand 
     up and provide security.
       It is my hope that the President will respond to the strong 
     public reaction evidenced in the election results and 
     widespread opposition by Members of Congress to our current 
     military activities, the Baker Commission Report, the Gates 
     testimony and the Rumsfeld memorandum to change the direction 
     of our military efforts in Iraq. As Commander-in-chief under 
     the Constitution, the President has the options and 
     additional information to modify our military action in Iraq 
     to meet these concerns.
       It is imperative that the United States change the course 
     in Iraq and I am optimistic that the confirmation of Robert 
     Gates will be the starting point for that action.
       I yield the floor.

  Mr. SPECTER. I further ask unanimous consent that an essay which 
Christopher Bradish and I published in the current issue of the 
Washington Quarterly which goes into some greater detail about my own 
views as to the advisability of bilateral talks with Syria and Iran, as 
well as North Korea, be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

            [From the Washington Quarterly, Winter 2006-07]

                       Dialogue With adversaries

              (By Arlen Specter with Christopher Bradish)

       Facing serious dangers from nuclear weapons from Iran and 
     North Korea, the United States should be willing to negotiate 
     bilaterally with those two nations. Success in diffusing 
     these threats will require multilateral assistance from other 
     world powers, but our willingness to treat Iran and North 
     Korea with dignity and respect could go a long way in 
     disarming those nations militarily and diplomatically.
       My Senate assignments on the Intelligence Committee and 
     Appropriations Subcommittee on Foreign Operations have 
     provided me the opportunity to meet with Syrian President 
     Hafiz al-Asad, Palestinian Chairman Yasser Arafat, Iraqi 
     President Saddam Hussein, Cuban President Fidel Castro, 
     Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez, and others.
       Those meetings have shown me that people are people, even 
     at the highest levels of government. They are interested in a 
     candid dialogue. They accept differences and disagreements as 
     long as the tone is courteous. Regrettably, the worldwide 
     ``ugly Americans'' reputation is encouraged, in my opinion, 
     by our unwillingness to at least meet and talk one on one 
     without preconditions.
       Sun-tzu's advice to ``keep your friends close and your 
     enemies closer'' is a good admonition to keep in mind as we 
     approach our relationships in the world. Admittedly, it is 
     difficult to accord respect and dignity to countries such as 
     Iran and North Korea, whom we have branded as part of the 
     axis of evil. President Ronald Reagan invited Soviet leader 
     Leonid Brezhnev to a dialogue weeks after labeling the Soviet 
     Union the ``Evil Empire.'' It may not work, but it is 
     certainly worth a try when the stakes are so high and our 
     other strenuous efforts are not bearing fruit.
       Perhaps irrelevant, my first assignment as assistant 
     district attorney in Philadelphia was interviewing inmates 
     for commutation of sentences to life imprisonment from death 
     in the electric chair for first-degree murder. That 
     experience taught me that you can have a meaningful dialogue 
     with anyone.


                                  Iran

       There is no doubt that Iran has been trying to flex its 
     muscles since 1979 when the Shah was deposed. Iran is a proud 
     nation with a rich history. In asserting its right not to be 
     restrained in developing nuclear technology, Iran seeks to be 
     a world power, and its leaders think that status and respect 
     can be achieved by becoming a nuclear power. A good starting 
     point for U.S.-Iranian relations would be to treat them as 
     equals for the purpose of negotiations. It does not give them 
     the same status as being a nuclear power, but it could be a 
     good step forward if mighty America would treat them with 
     respect while negotiating.
       I have tried to visit Iran since the Iran-Iraq War ended in 
     1988. I have not yet succeeded. For many years, however, I 
     have reached out to Iranians such as the former ambassador to 
     the United Nations in New York, Seyed Muhammad Hadi Nejad 
     Hosseinian, and his successor, Muhammad Javad Zarif, in an 
     effort to foster an exchange of visits by Members of Congress 
     to Iran and Iranian parliamentarians to the United States to 
     try to open dialogue between our two countries. I thought my 
     efforts finally came to fruition in January 2004 when plans 
     were made for U.S. members of Congress to meet with Iranian 
     parliamentarians in Geneva. Unfortunately, Tehran later 
     rescinded the invitation, declaring it was ``not on their 
     agenda.''
       Terrorism, military nuclear capabilities, energy, Iraq, and 
     the Israeli-Palestinian dilemma are all major issues 
     confronting the United States and the world. All of these 
     challenges are intrinsically linked with Iran, and none can 
     be addressed or resolved without an appreciation for Iran's 
     role in each. Undertaking this venture will not be easy, but 
     in the words of Ambassador L. Bruce Laingen, the senior U.S. 
     official held hostage in Tehran for 444 days, ``Diplomats 
     should talk, even with our foes. That's what we do. It 
     doesn't make sense for us not to talk to the Iranians. I'm 
     not saying that I would confidently predict a breakthrough, 
     but there must be some sort of dialogue.''


              The Problem with Outsourcing Foreign Policy

       The United States has responded to Iran's challenge by 
     correctly recounting Iran's dubious nuclear behavior and 
     disregard for the international community but has avoided 
     direct dialogue with Tehran. I commend the 
     administration's change in course, deciding to deal with 
     Iran through multilateral talks, and view it as 
     confirmation that a change in our tactics is overdue. 
     Prior U.S. policy committed to dealing with Iran via the 
     UN Security Council and the Europeans. Prospects are dim, 
     however, for garnering support from China and Russia for a 
     UN resolution with teeth. Russia's and China's significant 
     energy, military, and political interests restrict their 
     ability to support tough action against Iran and represent 
     a significant barrier to a successful resolution vis-a-vis 
     the UN.
       Although the Europeans are supportive of tough action 
     against Iran, some are hesitant to continue down a path on 
     which they feel the United States is not fully committed and 
     not an active partner. Germany, France, the United Kingdom, 
     the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and UN 
     Secretary General Kofi Annan have all indicated that the 
     United States needs to be directly engaged in the Iranian 
     effort. My colleague, Senator Chuck Hagel (R-Neb.), in his 
     May 8, 2006, Financial Times op-ed, highlighted the 
     importance of U.S. involvement: ``U.S. allies will support 
     tough action against Iran only if they are confident the U.S. 
     is serious about achieving a negotiated, diplomatic solution. 
     Continued unwillingness of the United States to engage Iran 
     will make other states hesitate to support, and possibly 
     oppose, these tougher measures.''
       Periodically, I read that military options are some of 
     these tougher actions that may be considered to confront 
     Iran. Although the option should not be removed from the 
     table, military engagement will do nothing to solve the 
     litany of problems between our nations. We should only 
     consider going to war when we have exhausted all options. 
     Today, we are not there. In that light, I commend President 
     George W Bush for his May 24, 2006, statement that ``our 
     primary objective is to solve this problem diplomatically.'' 
     I believe diplomatic options remain, and it is precisely 
     these options that can prevent conflict.
       Why has it taken so long to consider talking to the Iranian 
     regime? Richard Armitage, former deputy secretary of state, 
     told Time in a May 22, 2006, article that ``it appears that 
     the Administration thinks that dialogue equates with 
     weakness, that we've called these regimes ``evil'' and 
     therefore we won't talk to them. Some people say talking 
     would legitimize the regimes. But we're not trying to change 
     the regimes, and they're already legitimized in the eyes of 
     the international community. So we ought to have enough 
     confidence in our ability as diplomats to go eye to eye with 
     people--even though we disagree in the strongest possible

[[Page S11280]]

     way--and come away without losing anything.''
       To be certain, we find ourselves in this position in no 
     small part due to Tehran's deceit and arrogance toward the 
     international community. Nevertheless, U.S. policy toward 
     Iran has played into the hands of President Mahmoud 
     Ahmadinejad and the hard-line radicals in Tehran. Although 
     the extent of Ahmadinejad's power remains unclear, the U.S. 
     administration's discussions of regime change and refusal to 
     rule out using nuclear weapons against the Iranian regime 
     have bolstered its position. Such U.S. rhetoric, coupled with 
     other policies, enhances Tehran's ability to tap 
     nationalistic sentiments to solidify support for a nuclear 
     weapons program, effectively taking the focus away from its 
     constituents' discontent with failed domestic policies, most 
     notably Ahmadinejad's poor stewardship of the economy. To 
     some degree, we are the distraction buttressing his position. 
     In this perfect storm, Ahmadinejad's rise on the wave of oil 
     revenues and growing global discontent with U.S. policies has 
     afforded him the forum, confidence, and leverage to challenge 
     the United States and the international community.


                 Deciphering and Reaching beyond Tehran

       It is still unknown what level of power and influence 
     Ahmadinejad holds within Iran. Some accounts indicate that 
     Iran's elite, and even some hardline officials, are critical 
     of Ahmadinejad's aggressive handling of the nuclear issue, 
     whereas others report that he has amassed significant power. 
     Nevertheless, it is important to remember that much of the 
     power in Tehran does not rest with the president, but with 
     Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and the mullahs.
       Khamenei installed Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, an 
     advocate of rapprochement with the United States, as chairman 
     of the Expediency Council, a senior position as arbiter 
     between the legislature and constitutional court. Rafsanjani, 
     Ahmadinejad's adversary in the 2005 election, is thought to 
     have been given the position to act as a counterweight to 
     Ahmadinejad. Some accounts suggest that Rafsanjani has taken 
     an increased profile in Iranian diplomacy, a move not likely 
     done without the coordination and approval of Khamenei.
       Despite the many factions within Iran's leadership, 
     Ahmadinejad, former president Muhummad Khatami, Khamenei, and 
     Rafsanjani all advocate a nuclear Iran. In addition, although 
     Rafsanjani is considered to be a relative moderate, he has 
     still labeled Israel as ``the most hideous occurrence in 
     history,'' which the Muslim world ``will vomit out from its 
     midst.'' Regrettably, these are the views held by those with 
     whom we must engage.
       Notwithstanding Iran's leadership, we must constantly 
     remind ourselves of those over whom they rule. The United 
     States should effectively communicate our desire for a 
     prosperous Middle East, free of tyranny and oppression, that 
     respects human rights and rule of law and where 
     governments represent and ref1ect the desires of those 
     they govern. Further, we should be frank when conveying 
     our concerns and those of the world to the Iranian people 
     over specific problems threatening peace and security. 
     Nearly three-quarters of Iran's 70 million people are 
     under the age of 30. Placing our disagreements with Iran's 
     leadership aside, not letting these people know what we 
     stand for and what we value would be irresponsible. The 
     United States should focus on this emerging population and 
     those who yearn for increased freedom and reform.
       According to the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 
     a 2002 poll conducted by the Majlis, Iran's legislature, 
     revealed that three-quarters of Iranians favored 
     rapprochement with the United States and that nearly one-half 
     believed U.S. policy was ``to some extent correct.'' In 
     typical Iranian fashion, the two pollsters were later 
     sentenced to nine years for ``publishing nonscientific 
     research.'' It is precisely examples such as this that fuel 
     disdain amongst Iranians for their leadership. Bush 
     poignantly illustrated the plight and underscored the hopes 
     of the Iranian people in a July 12, 2002, statement: ``The 
     people of Iran want the same freedoms, human rights, and 
     opportunities as people around the world. Their government 
     should listen to their hopes. * * * As Iran's people move 
     towards a future defined by greater freedom, greater 
     tolerance, they will have no better friend than the United 
     Stares of America.''
       When Ahmadinejad or any Iranian leader calls into question 
     the virtue and value of liberal democracy, we should respond 
     by touting its successes. We should talk about our commitment 
     to rule of law, individual liberties, and freedom of press 
     and speech. Are not freedom of speech, press, and association 
     liberties that the Iranian people would enjoy? Would those 
     incarcerated in Iran for criticizing the government not wish 
     to be freed? Most importantly, liberal democracy has better 
     arguments than theocracy, and we should not shy away from 
     this debate. Perhaps a crash course in the history of 
     authoritarian failures would be the best place to start.


                      An Opportunity for Dialogue

       The concept of dialogue with Iran is not unfamiliar to this 
     debate. Both sides have previously taken one step toward the 
     table and one step back. Reports indicate that, in 2003, 
     Iran, with the blessing of Khamenei, secretly proposed talks 
     with the United States on Iraq and Iranian nuclear ambitions. 
     That same year, the United States offered to send a high-
     level delegation to Tehran following the earthquake in Bam, 
     only to be rebuffed by Iran. Unfortunately, this tentative 
     shuffle never amounted to anyone sitting down at the table at 
     the same time.
       There are some indications, vague as they may be, that 
     Tehran may again be interested in establishing dialogue with 
     Washington. For example, on May 8, 2006, Ahmadinejad sent an 
     18-page letter to Bush. Following that letter, USA Today 
     reported that Ali Larijani, Iran's top nuclear negotiator, 
     said in a television interview that I ``[p]erhaps, it could 
     lead to a new diplomatic opening. It needs to be given some 
     time.'' Further, according to Time, a senior Iranian official 
     described the letter as being designed to offer ``new ways 
     for getting out of the current, fragile international 
     situation.''
       Muhammad Nahavandian, a close adviser to Iran's top nuclear 
     negotiator, was reportedly in the United States for a few 
     weeks during that same month. According to Newsweek, he told 
     Robert Malley, a former Clinton administration official, that 
     Khamenei was eager to broaden Tehran's tentative cooperation 
     with Washington on Iraq and other subjects and that he was 
     ``putting out feelers.'' In addition to these developments, I 
     agreed with Bush's decision to authorize the U.S. ambassador 
     to Iraq, Zalmay Khalilzad, to engage in discussions with 
     Tehran, even if they were initially restricted to Iraq. In 
     time, it is my hope that such discussions will lead to a 
     broader dialogue.
       What is most significant in our recent dealings with Iran 
     is the offer for dialogue and how the offer in itself 
     outweighs any terms set by either side. Although Tehran 
     responded to our interest in joining talks by dismissing our 
     conditions that enrichment be suspended, the offer clearly 
     had an impact. On June 2, 2006, Saeed Laylaz, an Iran analyst 
     living in Tehran, confirmed these sentiments to the 
     Washington Post: ``The fact that [Secretary of State 
     Condoleezza] Rice has announced the United States' 
     willingness to hold talks with Iran is more important than 
     the conditions she set.'' The administration's decision to 
     consider dialogue has had a great impact in moving our 
     countries closer to resolving our issues. As reported in that 
     Washington Post article, ``Javad Vaeidi, the Iranian Supreme 
     Council's deputy head for international affairs, agreed that 
     the United States' overture was, in itself, a positive 
     step.''
       The consequences of an Iran with nuclear weapons would be 
     grave. Tehran does not seem willing to cease uranium 
     enrichment voluntarily or submit to the IAEA. The Europeans 
     are running into walls in the form of China and Russia in the 
     UN Security Council, and it is apparent that the UN has not 
     been able to alter Iran's behavior. It is precisely Iran's 
     ambitions that may drive regional powers such as Egypt, 
     Turkey, and Saudi Arabia to pursue nuclear ambitions. The 
     Middle East is already a volatile neighborhood. The phrase 
     ``adding fuel to the fire'' does not approach describing 
     what the introduction of nuclear weapons would mean, not 
     only for the fate of the region but for the world.
       The United States is not to blame for Iran's devious and 
     deceptive behavior, nor their arrogance and defiance of the 
     international community. I have called on the international 
     community to act aggressively in dealing with Iran's 
     involvement in the crisis in southern Lebanon. As I stated on 
     the floor of the U.S. Senate on July 20, 2006, ``The United 
     Nations ought to call Iran and Syria on the carpet to explain 
     their conduct in backing Hezbollah, in providing personnel to 
     do more than train Hezbollah, more than advisers being 
     integral parts of the military offensive of Hezbollah.''
       Twenty-seven years of silence broken only by a few 
     whispers, however, has not worked and has left us in the 
     dangerous predicament in which we find ourselves today. All 
     the while, the United States has been watching from the 
     sidelines. Something has to give. Current U.S. policy does 
     not include direct talks with Iran with no preconditions. 
     Perhaps it is time to stop passing notes to Tehran via the 
     Swiss and to sit down and start talking.


                              North Korea

       Just as the United States has been criticized by its 
     European allies for not dealing directly with Iran, we have 
     encountered similar criticism from Russia, China, and South 
     Korea for not directly engaging North Korea. It is clear, as 
     pointed out by John McLaughlin, former deputy director of the 
     Central Intelligence Agency, that ``the North seems sure to 
     engage us. It could be across a table. It could be with the 
     consequences of its negative behavior or its own ability.'' 
     The United States should focus on the table in hopes of 
     preventing the consequences.
       Today, North Korea exists in the dark, both literally and 
     figuratively. The regime of Kim Jong-il actively pursues an 
     unsupervised and unregulated nuclear program. This program 
     and its long-range missiles pose a grave threat to regional 
     security and represent a hostile posture toward the United 
     States. Meanwhile, the 23 million residents of North Korea 
     remain among the poorest and most repressed in the world.
       A satellite photo taken of the earth at night reveals 
     lights across much of the populated world. Yet North Korea, 
     with the exception of a tiny dot denoting Pyongyang, is 
     totally black. Ironically, this blank spot is symbolic for 
     just about everything about

[[Page S11281]]

     this country. It is a massive blind spot with very little 
     known in the United States or elsewhere about exactly what is 
     going on inside its borders. Even Kim's nuclear progress was 
     unverified until recently.
       What we do know, as Esther Pan of the Council on Foreign 
     Relations observes, is that North Korea has ``developed a 
     nuclear arsenal of an estimated six to eight nuclear weapons 
     and continued to enrich nuclear fuel; removed its nuclear 
     program from all international treaties, obligations, and 
     safeguards; decided when to negotiate and when to drop out, 
     and then set the terms for returning to negotiations; [and] 
     steadily increased the amount of unconditional aid it 
     receives from international sources,'' including more than $1 
     billion from the United States over the last 10 years. On 
     October 9, 2006, North Korea claimed to have conducted an 
     underground nuclear test. Given this disconcerting state of 
     affairs, it may be appropriate for the United States to deal 
     directly with North Korea.
       I commend the administration for enlisting North Korea's 
     neighbors to engage Pyongyang. Regrettably, that regime has 
     refused to return to the six-party talks with China, Japan, 
     Russia, South Korea, and the United States. On May 17, 2006, 
     I was pleased to read in the New York Times that ``Bush's top 
     advisers have recommended a broad new approach to dealing 
     with North Korea that would include beginning negotiations on 
     a peace treaty, even while efforts to dismantle the country's 
     nuclear program are still under way.'' As reported, such a 
     deal would be contingent on North Korea returning to the six-
     party talks, something I hope the North will do. Regardless, 
     it is possible to address North Korea both in multilateral 
     and bilateral fora.
       On June 1, 2006, Pyongyang extended an invitation to the 
     United States for talks, which Washington declined. This may 
     have been an opportunity worth taking. As Kevin O'Neill and 
     David Albright conclude in their book, Solving the North 
     Korea Nuclear Puzzle, ``Serious misunderstandings, missed 
     opportunities, and false expectations have often plagued the 
     U.S.-North Korean relationship.'' In my opinion, dialogue is 
     one way to avoid these pitfalls in the future.
       The problems in our bilateral relationship do not end with 
     North Korea's nuclear ambitions. North Korea's human rights 
     record is deplorable. The Department of State reported on 
     March 8, 2006, that ``the government's human rights record 
     remained extremely poor, and the regime continued to commit 
     numerous serious abuses. The regime [has] subjected citizens 
     to rigid controls over many aspects of their lives.'' The 
     report cited extrajudicial killings, arbitrary detention, 
     life-threatening prison conditions, torture, and forced 
     abortions and infanticide, as well as denial of freedom of 
     speech, press, religion, assembly, and association. The North 
     is one of the world's preeminent counterfeiters and has long 
     been suspected of trafficking drugs. While we work to quell 
     the North's desire to be a nuclear state, we must not simply 
     trade resolving the nuclear issue for another nefarious vice. 
     A repressed, corrupt, and hungry North Korea is not a 
     healthy, stable, and secure North Korea.
       The complexities in our bilateral relationship with Iran 
     and North Korea are different. On both accounts, however, we 
     have failed to grasp the correlation between U.S. policy and 
     nationalism and how it leads to support those in power. U.S. 
     saber rattling and threats of regime change have permitted 
     unsavory leaders in each nation to incite nationalist 
     sentiments, leading them to strengthen their grip on power. 
     As Henry Kissinger wrote in his May 16, 2006, Washington Post 
     op-ed, ``Focusing on regime change as the road to 
     denuclearization confuses the issue.'' I would go one step 
     further and submit that it hinders our ability to 
     denuclearize either North Korea or Iran. Hostile rhetoric and 
     disengagement will not move us closer to the negotiating 
     table nor a solution.


             Dialogue, Even with Foes, Can Be Constructive

       Involvement in foreign policy matters is a time-honored 
     role for members of the Senate and one in which I have 
     enjoyed participating during my quarter century in this body. 
     Active involvement in these issues by members of the Senate 
     is not meant to supplant the roles of the president, 
     secretary of state, or their designees. Our foreign policy 
     priorities are set by the executive branch.
       Yet, my own experiences in this area, even with leaders 
     such as Arafat or Saddam and on issues such as human rights 
     with China, have convinced me that maintaining a dialogue and 
     allowing cooperation in areas of common interest, even with 
     our most pronounced foes, should be one of our nation's 
     priorities because of its potential to yield positive 
     results. I offer my own experiences, having traveled to 95 
     different countries, including Syria, Cuba, and Venezuela, as 
     examples of why I believe maintaining an active dialogue and 
     open lines of communication preserve the potential to find 
     peaceful solutions to resolve differences with our 
     adversaries.
       My first opportunity to promote dialogue in the face of an 
     international crisis came in the spring of 1982 when serving 
     my first term. Following a Saturday radio address by Reagan, 
     which noted that the Soviet Union and the United States had 
     enough nuclear weapons to destroy the other, I proposed a 
     Senate resolution calling for a summit between the leaders of 
     each nation. Relying on the doctrine of mutually assured 
     destruction was not a sufficient way to provide security for 
     either nation. The obvious solution to this standoff was to 
     have a negotiated arms control agreement.
       Upon calling for a vote on my resolution during 
     consideration of the annual Department of Defense 
     authorization bill, I was sharply challenged by Senator John 
     Tower (Tex.), a fellow Republican and chairman of the Armed 
     Services Committee. Citing my short tenure, Tower questioned 
     my authority and knowledge on the issue. Senator Paul Laxalt 
     (R-Nev.), one of the first members to vote, supported my 
     resolution. Tower told Laxalt, ``Specter's trying to tell the 
     president what to do.'' He replied, ``Well, what's wrong with 
     that? . . . Everyone else is too, but Specter's right.'' 
     Following a lively debate, after which Tower was confident 
     his position would prevail, my resolution was adopted by a 
     vote of 90-8. It did not produce immediate talks between the 
     United States and the Soviet Union, but it showed the support 
     of the Senate for dialogue and may have given a little 
     impetus for the summits during the 1980s.


                                 Syria

       I first traveled to the Middle East in 1964. In the 
     intervening 42 years, I have made 24 trips to the region 
     before and after election to the Senate. Since 1984, I have 
     visited Syria 15 times, had nine lengthy meetings with Asad, 
     attended his funeral on the only congressional delegation to 
     Syria in 2000, and met with his son and successor, Bashar al-
     Asad, on three occasions. I have spent much of my time in the 
     region shuffling between Damascus and Jerusalem, which led me 
     to coin the term ``shuffle diplomacy,'' similar perhaps to 
     Henry Kissinger's ``shuttle diplomacy,'' to describe my 
     efforts to bring resolution to issues confronting these 
     neighbors.
       In 1988 I urged Asad to permit Syrian Jewish women to 
     emigrate because the limited number of Jewish men in Syria 
     presented them with limited opportunities for marriage. Asad 
     resisted, citing that Syria was ``at war'' with Israel and 
     that emigration had the potential to strengthen Syria's 
     enemy. I continued to press this issue in subsequent meetings 
     with him. As I reported in an article I wrote for the New 
     York Post in 1994, after I continued to press the issue, 
     ``Asad responded with a romantic offer that he would allow 
     any Jewish woman to leave when a suitor came to Syria and 
     took her to the United States to marry. That offer was 
     relayed to the active Syrian Jewish community in Brooklyn and 
     elsewhere.'' Ultimately, Syrian policy was altered to permit 
     Jews to emigrate.
       As a result of my many lengthy conversations with Asad, we 
     developed a congenial relationship. In August 1995, I told 
     Asad that when Yitzak Rabin, Shimon Perez, and Arafat 
     received the Nobel peace prize for the Oslo accords, if Asad 
     made peace with Israel, he too would be honored. Asad replied 
     by laughing, saying that he might be well received in 
     Stockholm but probably would not be permitted to return to 
     Damascus. Nevertheless, I continued to urge Syria to 
     participate in discussions with Israel in hopes of 
     alleviating tensions between the two neighbors.
       Asad had initially rebuffed offers to open talks with 
     Israel, stating that Syria would only participate in talks 
     sponsored by all five permanent members of the UN Security 
     Council. Israel was opposed to this format, believing that 
     only the United States would support Israel in such 
     negotiations. When I pressed Asad on this issue again in 
     1990, he indicated that he had changed his position on the 
     proposal and that Syria would be willing to participate in 
     meetings organized by the United States and the Soviet 
     Union. As I reported in a floor statement, this change was 
     significant because it appeared to be part of a broader 
     Syrian initiative. ``In our January 1989 meeting, I asked 
     on three separate occasions, separated by respectable 
     periods of time, what it would take for Syria and Israel 
     to become friends. President Asad answered, after a third 
     query, that it was not a question of friendship, but that 
     `normalizing' a relationship between Syria and Israel 
     might be possible under certain circumstances.''
       I relayed this offer to Israeli Prime Minister Yirzhak 
     Shamir, who was ``surprised'' and ``pleased'' with Asad's 
     overture. One year later, in October 1991, Syria participated 
     in the Madrid peace conference cosponsored by Washington and 
     Moscow. Although the three days of talks did not yield a 
     peace agreement, the summit marked the first bilateral talks 
     between Israel and Syria. It is preferable to have the 
     Syrians, Lebanese, Jordanians, Israelis, and Palestinians 
     airing their grievances over coffee at a negotiating table in 
     Spain than through violence in the streets of the Middle 
     East.
       Five years later, during my 1996 visit to the region, I 
     served as a line of communication between Jerusalem and 
     Damascus. Prior to my visit, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin 
     Netanyahu indicated that his government would hold Syria 
     accountable for the actions of Hizballah along the Lebanese 
     border. This caused Syria to realign its troops in a posture 
     hostile to Israel, resulting in a dramatic rise in tensions 
     between the two countries. On one side, Syria's four-million-
     man army amassed, and on the other side lay Israel's 
     sophisticated and combat-tested military of 1.5 million.
       On August 27, 1996, I met with Netanyahu in Israel. During 
     my report to the Senate, I informed my colleagues that ``Mr.

[[Page S11282]]

     Netanyahu said he wanted to begin peace negotiations with his 
     Arab neighbors,'' that he ``was eager to get to the 
     negotiation table with Syrian President Asad,'' and that he 
     ``asked me to carry a message to President Asad, whom I was 
     scheduled to meet with the next day.'' The following day, I 
     traveled to Damascus and met with Asad for three and a half 
     hours. As I reported in a floor statement, ``I conveyed 
     Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu's message that Israel had 
     only peaceful intentions toward Syria, that both sides should 
     move immediately to reduce military tensions, and that Mr. 
     Netanyahu wanted to reopen direct negotiations between Israel 
     and Syria.''
       Asad did not seem interested in the offer and told me that 
     ``Syria would not go back to the table until Prime Minister 
     Netanyahu reaffirms the land-for-peace basis of negotiations, 
     and agrees to pick up where Israel's Labor Government left 
     off.'' Asad further asked me to convey that Syria's troop 
     movements along the border were routine and not intended to 
     threaten Israel. I returned later that evening to meet with 
     Netanyahu and relayed Asad's comments that the military 
     action on the border was not to be interpreted by Jerusalem 
     as aggressive.
       Upon my return to the United States, I met Walid al-
     Moualem, Syrian ambassador to the United States, to get an 
     update on the situation between Syria and Israel from his 
     perspective. As reported in a floor statement at the time, 
     ``Ambassador Al-Moualem told me that his government viewed my 
     August round of talks between Prime Minister Netanyahu and 
     President Asad as having been helpful in deescalating the 
     dangerous tensions . . . and the Ambassador encouraged me to 
     return to the region for another round of meetings aimed at 
     helping the parties find a basis to reopen their peace 
     negotiations.'' Moualem later told me that I had ``gained the 
     trust and confidence and personal relationship with President 
     Asad'' because I was ``objective'' even though ``nobody could 
     question [my] support of Israel.'' I later received a similar 
     suggestion from Netanyahu during a phone conversation.
       As a result of this encouragement, I returned to the region 
     three months later, in November 1996. During my November 20 
     meeting with Netanyahu, he informed me ``that tensions with 
     Syria [have] been reduced since the August/September time 
     period and that he wants to continue to de-escalate the saber 
     rattling. He asked me to convey this and specifically that 
     Israel has no aggressive intent against Syria.'' Netanyahu 
     also told me to tell Asad ``that he wishes to [reopen peace 
     talks] as soon as possible and that he is ready, willing, and 
     able to be personally involved in such talks.''
       I flew to Damascus after my meeting with Netanyahu to 
     transmit the message to Asad. As reported in a floor 
     statement, ``President Asad did generally seem to share Prime 
     Minister Netanyahu's desire to continue to ease and avoid 
     military tensions which could lead to unintended hostilities. 
     . . . Asad received this portion of Prime Minister 
     Netanyahu's message positively and reiterated his own return 
     message to the same effect.''
       Seven years later, on my 2003 trip to the Middle East, 
     Prime Minister Ariel Sharon denounced Syria's harboring of 
     terrorist organizations and its support for Hizballah in 
     Lebanon. I asked him if he would be willing to enter into 
     peace negotiations with Damascus, brokered by the United 
     States, similar to those in which Prime Minister Rabin had 
     participated in the 1990s. He acquiesced with the 
     assurances that there would be no preconditions. I 
     conveyed his response directly to President Bashar al-Asad 
     three days later. Asad responded favorably, saying he was 
     willing to participate in peace talks with Israel. He said 
     he did not think it appropriate to conclude a treaty 
     before Israel and the Palestinian Authority had reached a 
     final settlement but that Syrian-Israeli talks could 
     proceed on a separate track. Although other events in the 
     region have eclipsed this opportunity, I believe we should 
     continue aggressively to advocate peace between these 
     nations so its failure does not become the lead story 
     tomorrow.


                                  Cuba

       My experience with Syria provided an opportunity to reduce 
     hostility between a U.S. adversary and one of our allies. My 
     travels have also included three trips to Cuba and meetings 
     with Castro since June 1999, most recently in August 2005. 
     These sessions have given me the opportunity to understand 
     how our nations' confrontational history has been viewed from 
     the perspective of Cuba's leader. They have also proven to me 
     that it is possible to find some areas of common ground, even 
     with our most ardent foes. In time, it is my belief that 
     small cooperative efforts can help to break down the barriers 
     that divide us, leading to expanded cooperation and better 
     relations.
       Since the early 1960s, Cuba has been viewed as a Communist 
     stronghold 90 miles off the coast of Florida. The Cuban 
     missile crisis, suspicions of Cuban complicity in the 
     assassination of President John F Kennedy, and rumored 
     assassination attempts on Castro by the CIA have complicated 
     our relationship. As a result, U.S. policy has consisted 
     largely of isolating the island nation through comprehensive 
     economic sanctions. During my first meeting with Castro in 
     1999, we talked about a number of the issues that have 
     divided our countries for so long. I was particularly 
     interested to hear him speak on the assassination of Kennedy 
     because of my work as an assistant counsel on the Warren 
     Commission. As I reported in a floor statement, Castro 
     ``maintained that the Cuban government played no role in the 
     assassination, and that it would have been insane for it to 
     have become involved, given that the United States, by his 
     reckoning, was looking for provocation or pretence to invade 
     Cuba. . . . President Castro was relieved that the Warren 
     Commission concluded Cuba was not involved with Oswald.''
       On the Cuban missile crisis, Castro related how Premier 
     Nikita Khrushchev had mistakenly revealed to him a promise by 
     Kennedy to withdraw U.S. missiles from Turkey and Italy. As a 
     result, Castro was told, Moscow would breach its agreement 
     with Havana by removing its own missiles from Cuba, leaving 
     the island vulnerable to a U.S. invasion in Castro's view. 
     Castro saw a bright side to the Soviet withdrawal. As I 
     reported in a floor statement, Castro stated, ``We preferred 
     the risk of invasion to the presence of Soviet troops, 
     because it would have established [the] image [of Cuba] as a 
     Soviet base.''
       Prior to that first meeting with Castro, I had examined the 
     records of the Church Committee and found that there was 
     evidence of eight or nine attempts by the United States to 
     assassinate him. When presented with this number, Castro 
     scoffed and said the actual number was more than 300. When 
     asked how it felt to be the subject of so many attempts on 
     his life, he responded by asking if I had a sport. When I 
     told him I was a squash player, Castro retorted that 
     ``avoiding assassination is a sport for me.''
       In all of my three meetings with Castro, I pressed him on 
     Cuba's deprivation of human rights and the failure to have 
     contested elections. I also met with a delegation of human 
     rights activists, many of whom had been jailed for expressing 
     anti-Castro sentiments. As I reported in a floor statement, 
     ``Having just come from a meeting with dissidents, I pressed 
     Castro to release the political prisoners in his jails. 
     Castro tried to shift the topic of conversation from his 
     prisoners by bringing up the case of five Cubans convicted of 
     spying in the U.S. whose convictions were recently 
     overturned.'' In reply, I suggested to Castro that ``far from 
     being an example of American wrongdoing, this kind of fair 
     process is exactly the type of justice he should be offering 
     to his own people. I also pressed Castro to open his country 
     to democracy and dissent. He listened, but my exhortations 
     obviously had no effect.'' I conveyed to Castro that if the 
     Cuban government initiated some reforms on democratization or 
     freedom of speech, U.S. policymakers would be more favorable 
     to modifying trade policy toward Cuba.
       These meetings have left me with the conviction that, 
     before giving consideration to any modification of the U.S. 
     embargo, relations between our two countries can be 
     immediately strengthened in areas such as drug interdiction 
     in the Caribbean and medical research. I proposed to Castro 
     the possibility of U.S.-Cuban cooperation in drug 
     interdiction efforts. Cuba occupies a strategic location for 
     combating the flow of drugs from Latin America to the United 
     States and could be very helpful to U.S. law enforcement 
     efforts. In 1999, Castro said, ``[W]e are willing to 
     cooperate''; and as I reported in a floor statement, he 
     ``suggested a formal relationship with the United States in 
     order to make progress on drug interdiction in efforts in the 
     area.'' In my view, this remains an offer the United States 
     should not only accept but robustly support.
       To that end, I have introduced amendments to provide 
     funding for such collaboration in the foreign operations 
     appropriations bills each year since fiscal year 2001. I have 
     been successful in convincing my Senate colleagues to support 
     the provision. Regrettably, the House of Representatives was 
     insistent on dropping the language because of anti-Cuban 
     sentiment among a number of House members, which was 
     supported by the Speaker of the House. Yet, when there were 
     more material issues involved, such as farm trade, Congress 
     was supportive.
       Nonetheless, at my insistence, the FY 2002 Foreign 
     Operations Appropriations Conference Report, H.R. 2506, 
     included a provision directing the secretary of state to 
     report on how U.S. counternarcotics assistance to Cuba would 
     decrease the flow of drugs in the region. In July 2002, the 
     State Department reported that, ``should Cuba make increased 
     seizures and arrests, it could help impede the drug traffic 
     through the Jamaica-Cuba-Bahamas corridor.''
       Another area in which closer relations may be mutually 
     beneficial is medical research. Scientists in Cuba have shown 
     promise in developing a meningitis B vaccine. During my visit 
     to Cuba in January 2002, I met with a team of researchers at 
     the Finlay Institute in Havana, which entered into a 
     cooperative agreement with GlaxoSmithKline in 1999 to develop 
     this vaccine. Based in part on what I learned from these 
     conversations, I remain convinced that a better relationship 
     with Cuba and the erosion of existing barriers would benefit 
     both countries.


                               Venezuela

       After traveling to Havana last year, I had the opportunity 
     to meet with Chavez on August 17, 2005. It is clear that the 
     United States and Venezuela are at odds over many different 
     issues, but there are areas of interest, such as drug 
     interdiction, where our two countries can work together. 
     These common interests can perhaps serve as a catalyst to 
     construct a dialogue on our differences.
       On August 7, 2005, 10 days before I arrived, Chavez 
     suspended cooperation with U.S.

[[Page S11283]]

     counternarcotics officials after accusing U.S. Drug 
     Enforcement Administration agents of conducting intelligence 
     operations. Prior to my meeting with Chavez, all efforts by 
     the U.S. ambassador to Venezuela to secure meetings with 
     high-level Venezuelan officials to resolve the dispute had 
     been unsuccessful. After being briefed on the situation by 
     our diplomats in Caracas, I met with Chavez and requested 
     that he direct his ministers to meet with the U.S. 
     ambassador. As I reported in a t100r statement, ``At the 
     conclusion of our meeting, President Chavez agreed that it 
     would be useful for his Foreign Minister and Minister of 
     Interior to meet with our Ambassador the following week to 
     try to resolve [U.S.-Venezuelan] differences on drug 
     enforcement.''
       After our discussion on narcotics policy, Chavez further 
     suggested that consideration ought to be given to forging a 
     new drug interdiction agreement. Although the State 
     Department's ``2006 International Narcotics Control Strategy 
     Report'' determined that Venezuela can no longer be certified 
     as an ally in the war on drugs, the report noted that 
     continued U.S. work with Venezuelan law enforcement: led to 
     record cocaine seizures in 2005. The report also states that 
     the United States is committed to renewing cooperation with 
     its Venezuelan counterparts at all levels in the war on drugs 
     in 2006.
       During our meeting, Chavez expressed his concern about 
     statements from the United States portraying Venezuela as a 
     destabilizing force in Latin America. Specifically, Chavez 
     mentioned comments made in Peru by Secretary of Defense 
     Donald Rumsfeld in which the secretary referred to Chavez as 
     ``a guy who seemed like a comic figure a year ago [that] is 
     turning into a real strategic menace.'' I responded by 
     calling on both sides to cease the harsh rhetoric that I 
     believe is counterproductive to enhancing our bilateral 
     relationship. On August 19, 2005, I wrote to Rumsfeld, 
     stating that ``I believe there is a window of opportunity at 
     this time to resolve the disagreement on drug interdiction 
     policies'' and that ``it may well be helpful to, at least, 
     have a moratorium on adverse comments on Venezuela.''


                              Talking Pays

       These examples highlight but one senator's efforts to forge 
     a dialogue with foreign leaders. The full weight of the White 
     House and our diplomatic corps can accomplish much more. I 
     encourage the administration to authorize more dialogue with 
     those we consider combative or enemies. The United States 
     will be in a better position when it is engaged in long, hard 
     diplomatic slogs than military conflicts.
       It is clear that isolation has not been successful on many 
     fronts. It did not prevent Saddam from repressing his people, 
     it has not crushed the government of Castro, and it certainly 
     does not appear to be working in dealing with Chavez, 
     Ahmadinejad, or Kim. It has been my experience that dialogue, 
     even with pronounced foes, can lead to constructive results. 
     This is particularly true if the conversation starts on areas 
     of common interest and works up to the main areas of 
     disagreement. Such an investment takes time and hard work to 
     see results on our most critical national security interests.
       The United States should treat each country and its 
     leaders, no matter how horrific their views, with some form 
     of dignity and respect for their sovereignty. The United 
     States, perhaps more than any other nation in history, has a 
     great capacity to serve as a conduit of peace. It is my hope 
     that we take every opportunity to ensure this capacity is not 
     wasted.

  Mr. SPECTER. I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Rhode Island.
  Mr. REED. Mr. President, I rise to express my support for Dr. Robert 
Gates to be the next Secretary of Defense. Dr. Gates is poised to take 
an extraordinarily difficult job at one of the most dangerous times in 
U.S. history. He will face a number of pressing problems. Clearly, the 
most pressing problem facing Dr. Gates is determining the next step of 
U.S. operations in Iraq.
  Today the Iraq Study Group released its report. It begins:

       The situation in Iraq is grave and deteriorating [and] 
     there is no path that can guarantee success.

  The study group makes a series of recommendations that are strikingly 
similar to the Levin-Reed amendment that was offered last June. These 
recommendations include engaging Iraq's neighbors, including Iran and 
Syria, encouraging the Iraqi Government to increase their efforts to 
bring security to their people, reconciliation and governance reforms 
to their nation, and the transition of the mission of our troops from 
combat operations to training; also, the recommendation that there be a 
complete redeployment of most of these combat forces by the beginning 
of 2008.
  These recommendations are realistic but they are also very difficult 
and, I presume, not well liked--at least initially--by this 
administration. Evaluating and implementing these recommendations will 
be the daunting but necessary task of Dr. Gates.
  Dr. Gates also needs to focus his attention on Afghanistan, the 
initial and proper focus on the war on terror. Reports make it 
increasingly clear that we are losing ground. The Taliban has regrouped 
and rearmed. This spring, they mounted the toughest resistance since 
2001. Suicide attacks, which were once unknown in Afghanistan, have 
more than doubled this year. Lieutenant General Eikenberry, formerly 
the commanding general of Combined Forces Command Afghanistan, believes 
the fiercest fighting yet will be next spring.
  NATO'S International Security Assistance Force has assumed control of 
forces in Afghanistan, but this force is only at 85 percent strength. 
Almost 5 years after the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan, only half of the 
money pledged by the international community to rebuild Afghanistan has 
been delivered and spent. Sixty percent of the country is still without 
electricity, 80 percent without potable water, and the unemployment 
rate is 40 percent. Without viable alternatives, residents of 
Afghanistan return to what ensures they will survive and, 
unfortunately, in many cases, that is growing poppies.
  Last week, the U.N. and World Bank released a report stating that 
poppy cultivation increased 59 percent and opium production by 49 
percent over the last year. It concludes that international efforts to 
combat opium production, which includes $400 million in U.S. 
counternarcotics funding, have failed. Dr. Gates will have to pay 
immediate attention to these issues in Afghanistan, a linchpin in our 
war against terror.
  One of the unintended consequences of U.S. operations in Iraq is the 
enhanced strategic position of Iran. With the election of Iranian 
President Ahmadinezhad, the nation has become increasingly belligerent 
to the United States and Israel, a key ally of the United States. The 
Iranians continue to press for what they describe as a nonmilitary 
nuclear program. Despite the threat of international sanctions, they 
are developing their ability to enrich uranium, a necessary step for 
both a civilian nuclear program and a military weapon. The fear, which 
I believe is justified, is that with access to enriched uranium in the 
context of a nuclear power program, the Iranians would be unable or 
unwilling to avoid the temptation to use this material to construct a 
nuclear device.
  Then there is North Korea, the actions of which have also become 
increasingly belligerent over the last 2 years. They have walked away 
from the agreed upon framework, ejected international inspectors, and 
now likely have enough plutonium to build 10 nuclear weapons. On the 
4th of July they provocatively tested a long-range missile. The test 
was a failure, but it underscored their determination to challenge the 
international community. Finally, on October 9, they tested a nuclear 
device.
  I argue that Iranian and North Korean nuclear aspirations raise the 
most serious strategic issues we face today. If these countries are not 
checked, then there is a significant probability of a regional arms 
race.
  All of these international engagements, all of these international 
challenges, are creating enormous strains on our military, particularly 
our ground forces. Recent studies have shown that two-thirds of our 
Active-Duty Army and more than two-thirds of the National Guard are 
rated as ``nondeployable'' ``noncombat ready'' principally because of 
equipment shortages. This is a shocking and scandalous record.
  This administration has allowed two-thirds of our Army forces to 
essentially be denied the equipment--in some cases, the personnel--to 
be fully represented for combat. Virtually every active brigade not 
currently deployed is not prepared to meet its mission if called upon.
  One of the reasons these brigades are not ready is because of 
equipment shortages. Over a year ago, the Army estimated that in order 
to reset equipment being used in theaters of operation, it will require 
approximately $12 billion in funding every year of ongoing operations 
until 2 years after operations cease in Iraq and Afghanistan. The 
Marines have been slowly coming back from a $16 billion reset, but they 
still need $3 billion to draw even and will still incur annual 
operating costs.

[[Page S11284]]

  Besides equipment, the Army and Marines must worry about their 
personnel. The present Active-Duty Army end strength is approximately 
504,000. About 400,000 soldiers have done one tour of combat duty, and 
a third have deployed twice. In order to meet recruiting goals, the 
Army has increased the maximum age for enlistment and lowered the 
physical, academic, and ethical standards. To meet retention goals, the 
Army has implemented stop loss measures and offered increasingly large 
reenlistment bonuses. There are presently 184,952 Active and Reserve 
Marines on duty. Over the past 4 years, 169,558 have been deployed, a 
significant number of Active and Reserve Marines. This operational 
tempo simply cannot be sustained. Again, Dr. Gates will have to address 
this issue or risk the future health of the Army and Marine Corps.
  Dr. Gates also faces extraordinary budget challenges. The fiscal year 
2007 Defense Appropriations Act was $366 billion, the largest Defense 
bill in history. Still, it is not enough. The Army's share of the 
fiscal year 2007 budget was $98.2 billion. Secretary Rumsfeld set the 
Army's fiscal year 2008 budget at $114 billion, an increase but 
insufficient. In response, Army Chief of Staff GEN Peter Schoomaker 
took the unprecedented step of refusing to submit the 2008 budget plan 
by the August 15 deadline. General Schoomaker has determined in fiscal 
year 2008 the Army needs $138.8 billion just to continue to operate. 
Again, it is an unprecedented step in which a Chief of Staff, a 
uniformed officer, would not submit his budget to the Secretary of 
Defense.
  The Navy, which is not significantly involved in the Iraqi and 
Afghanistan theaters, is still key to our foreign presence around the 
world. Today's Navy fleet numbers 278 ships. The Chief of Naval 
Operations' 5-year shipbuilding plan calls for new ship construction 
with necessary funding of $14.1 billion beginning in fiscal year 2008 
and rising to $19.1 billion in fiscal year 2012. This is a huge number, 
but without this critical funding our fleet will be in jeopardy. And, 
again, the Secretary of Defense has to respond to this request by the 
Chief of Naval Operations.
  All of this is in the context of the regular budget. But as we all 
know, we have been funding operations in Afghanistan and in Iraq 
through supplementals. To date, $495 billion has been appropriated 
through these supplementals for our efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq. 
Press reports indicate that the Pentagon is preparing a new 
supplemental. The request is in the range of $127 to $150 billion just 
for an additional year of operations in these theaters of war.
  There are several problems with these supplementals. They contribute 
directly to our Nation's deficit, which is $248 trillion. They do not 
allow the military to effectively and efficiently plan for the 
maintenance of troops, equipment, and operations because none of this 
spending can be counted upon in terms of the exact number and the 
timing of the passage of the supplemental. The supplementals, as large 
as they are, still are insufficient. The Army, even with supplementals, 
is citing billions of dollars in shortfalls, particularly with respect 
to equipment resets. They will not last forever, since I can 
anticipate, we all can anticipate, the reaction of the American public 
to another request for $100 billion or more.
  Finally, when the supplementals do cease, either totally or in 
significant numbers of dollars, the Army and Marine Corps will still 
have troops and equipment in the field, with no funding. They will face 
a precipice, if you will: They still have a responsibility, they still 
have the personnel, they still have the equipment, but where is the 
funding? These are extraordinary problems that Dr. Gates is facing, 
most of them a direct result of poor decisions made by the 
administration and the Department of Defense.
  Most of these issues were raised with Dr. Gates in yesterday's 
confirmation hearing. Although there were some issues that Dr. Gates 
did not yet have in-depth knowledge of, he was frank in his responses 
and open to the ideas and open to the advice of all who asked him 
questions.
  For months, I and many of my colleagues have called for a change in 
our course in Iraq and in the rest of our foreign policy. I believe 
that Dr. Gates is a signal of that change. I do not believe that he is 
invested in the decisions, many of them bad, that have been made in the 
Department of Defense over the last 5 years. I also believe he will 
have a completely different management style from Secretary Rumsfeld, 
allowing civilians and military personnel to speak more freely. I 
believe these differences will allow honest, albeit difficult, 
discussions to take place and changes to be made.
  I have had the opportunity to get to know Dr. Gates over the past 5 
years. I have found that he is a thoughtful, experienced, and realistic 
voice on foreign policy. He is a good listener, and I think he will 
draw on a cross-section of views when making decisions. I commend him 
for leaving private life and a job he clearly loved to take on a very 
public job that will be thanklessly demanding.
  Perhaps the most difficult task that Dr. Gates faces is bringing 
unvarnished reports of bad news to a President and inner circle who do 
not like to hear such things. However, I believe that Dr. Gates has the 
stature and the wherewithal and the will to do what needs to be done.
  The months ahead are going to be difficult, not only for Bob Gates 
but also for our military. However, I have confidence that Dr. Gates 
will be an able leader and, therefore, I will support his nomination 
and wish him well in a very daunting task.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Florida.
  Mr. NELSON of Florida. Mr. President, while my colleague from Rhode 
Island is here, I want to ask him a couple questions. He is my friend, 
and he is one of the truly knowledgeable Members of the Senate on 
matters having to do with the defense of our country.
  With all the things that the Senator has outlined, which are 
certainly true--the lack of equipment; the wearing out of equipment; 
the fact that some of our troops went into Iraq and did not have the 
proper equipment, even body armor; the fact that, as the Senator has 
stated, the recruitment goals are not being met; the fact that more and 
more of the load is being put on the Reserves and the National Guard, 
which is taking particularly the National Guard away from its initial 
responsibility with regard to the States--my question to the Senator 
would be, since these two Senators were quite impressed with the candor 
of Dr. Gates, is he going to be able to make a difference in his advice 
to the President? Will the President listen?
  Mr. REED. Mr. President, I think the Senator from Florida has put his 
finger on a critical issue, perhaps the most critical. I believe Dr. 
Gates will give good, sound advice. He will listen. But the real 
question is, Will that advice be accepted by the President? And will 
the President be able to redefine policy in such a way that is 
realistic and achievable? And also, will he be able to articulate this 
policy and rally the support of the American public as we go forward--
and not only the American public but the international community? But 
my sense, my hope is that Dr. Gates will take that first important step 
of speaking truth to power, even though it is unpopular truth.
  Mr. NELSON of Florida. That is well said. Let me ask my colleague one 
further question of his opinion, Mr. President.
  My question would be that one of the things this Senator was struck 
with yesterday in hearings, basically all day, was that he came to the 
table refreshingly open in a nonpartisan way, much more in a bipartisan 
way. We certainly have not seen a lot of the conduct of this war in the 
past several years being done in a bipartisan way.
  I ask the Senator: How do you think Dr. Gates, as the new Secretary 
of Defense, is going to be able to involve that process, where those of 
us on both sides of the aisle will be able to participate and assist 
him in his role as Secretary of Defense?
  Mr. REED. I have always been impressed by the fact that Bob Gates 
evaluates the quality of the idea, not just the source of the idea. I 
got to know Bob Gates in that same context of bipartisan foreign policy 
deliberation at the Aspen Strategy Group with a group of individuals. 
Some of our colleagues were there, including Senator Feinstein and 
others. But it is chaired

[[Page S11285]]

by Brent Scowcroft, who was the National Security Adviser for President 
George Herbert Walker Bush, and cochaired by Joe Nye, who was in the 
Clinton administration.
  Bob Gates is someone who brings to the foreign policy arena this 
sense of reaching out to both sides. In fact, as he pointed out 
yesterday--and I think the Senator heard--one of the tasks he sees that 
he must perform is to create a bipartisan consensus to sustain the long 
war against terror beyond Iraq, beyond the current dilemmas we are 
facing. He will do that by reaching out, by listening, again, 
ultimately, by evaluating the ideas, not simply the source of those 
ideas.

  Mr. NELSON of Florida. I say to the Senator, thank you. I thank the 
Senator for his responses. And his responses mirror the feelings of 
this Senator from Florida.
  Mr. President, I wanted to come to the floor and announce that I had 
voted for Dr. Gates in the committee because I was impressed by a 
number of these attributes that the Senator from Rhode Island and I 
have discussed. And among them, clearly, are that this Senator grew up 
in an era in which it was understood that partisanship stopped at the 
water's edge. In other words, when it became matters of the defense of 
this country, that partisanship was over, that we came together in a 
bipartisan way.
  Sadly, I can say that I do not think that is the way this war has 
been conducted with regard to reaching out across the aisle and 
involving both sides, who all have the constitutional responsibility of 
reflecting and representing the will of the American people. It is very 
hard to sustain a war unless you have the support of the American 
people. If that is not done in a bipartisan way, then sooner or later 
that good will is going to run out.
  That is one of the things I was impressed with and pressed Dr. Gates 
about yesterday in the hearings: not only what appeared to be 
refreshing candor from him but also his approach, in a nonpartisan way, 
to these issues of war and peace. When we talked to him--as in the 
discussion recently in this Chamber, in the colloquy with the Senator 
from Rhode Island about the Guard and Reserves--he recognizes that is a 
problem. And he recognizes that what he is going to have to do is have 
a more responsible and direct way of utilizing existing forces because, 
in the short run, he is not going to be able to increase the forces 
considerably.
  And he ruled out, in my question to him, any return to the draft. So 
that means he has to make the military, particularly the Army and the 
Marines, attractive in order to get the reenlistments and the 
enlistments. Certainly, he has his hands full there, while being able 
to keep the Guard's ability to respond to their respective States in 
those times of emergency.
  Clearly, he had a refreshing candor about the question of what was 
the size force that was going to be needed, not only in Iraq but around 
the world. He recognizes that we have a problem right now in Al Anbar 
Province, that General Abizaid recently had told us he was going to 
increase the presence there by 2,200 marines in a Marine expeditionary 
unit, that that is a part of the country that is clearly not under 
control.
  So I found our deliberations with him to be refreshing, direct, with 
the candor that ought to be forthcoming from a member of the 
President's Cabinet in his interaction with the Members of Congress. 
After all, this is a constitutional government, one in which there are 
shared powers--some powers with the executive branch but some powers 
with the legislative branch. The way to have this machine humming is to 
have those branches cooperating with each other. My first impression of 
Dr. Gates is he is going to be that kind of Secretary of Defense to 
help us continue to work together.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, today I rise in support of the nomination 
of Dr. Robert Gates to become the next Secretary of Defense.
  I have had the opportunity to work with Dr. Gates on numerous 
occasions and must note that he was an excellent member of President 
George H.W. Bush's national security team during the first gulf war. 
This was highlighted by the fact he was nominated and confirmed to 
become Director of the Central Intelligence Agency shortly thereafter. 
Dr. Gates adds intelligence and diplomatic experience to a war that 
increasingly requires its leaders to go beyond tactical military 
expertise. Further, he is a pragmatist, who will work with allies and 
make necessary changes to our tactics and initiatives.
  I was impressed by Dr. Gates' candid assessment of the war in 
yesterday's confirmation hearing. He asserted, correctly in my view, 
that the United States is not winning the war, but we are not losing, 
either. The status quo is not acceptable, and that is why the President 
has tapped him to do whatever it takes to bring a successful end to our 
efforts in Iraq. He spoke openly about our failures and our successes 
so far, and he underscored what is at stake: If we are not successful, 
it could ignite ``a regional conflagration'' in the region.
  Dr. Gates understands that we need to refine not the objectives of 
our strategy but how we achieve our goals. The President and Dr. Gates 
remain committed to a course of action that achieves the goals best 
articulated by Dr. Zalmay Khalilzad, United States Ambassador to Iraq. 
He stated: ``Our goal is to enable Iraqis to develop a multi-ethnic, 
multi-sectarian representative democracy . . .'' that can fully meet is 
security obligations.
  I appreciate his comments that he is ``open to a wide range of ideas 
and proposals.'' I know that he is a leader who will review the options 
and advise the President on what he believes is the best way to 
proceed.
  Some of those innovative ideas will be found in the New Army Field 
Manual for Counterinsurgency Warfare. This is a vital document that 
will directly address what I have heard from many returning soldiers, 
that the Army's culture is one that emphasizes the use of firepower and 
conventional warfare rather stability and counterinsurgency operations. 
This new doctrine will immediately begin to transform our tactics and 
training, thereby being enormously helpful to our troops in Iraq and 
Afghanistan.
  Dr. Gates has my full support. These are trying times for our Nation. 
Our resolve is being tested. I know that Dr. Gates is the right man to 
advise the President on the means to achieve our goals and help the 
Iraqi people usher in a new era in that country.
  I yield the floor. 
  Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, I rise today in support of the 
nomination of Robert Gates to succeed Donald Rumsfeld as the next 
Secretary of Defense.
  I applaud the Senate Armed Services Committee and Senators Warner and 
Levin for moving this nomination to the floor in a prompt but 
thoughtful manner.
  I was heartened to see the forthrightness and candidness employed by 
Dr. Gates at his confirmation hearing yesterday.
  He fully admitted the need for a ``change of approach'' in Iraq, 
stating his view that we are not currently winning the war and that the 
``status quo'' is unacceptable.
  Additionally, he expressed a willingness to use ``fresh eyes'' in 
looking for solutions and promised to keep all options on the table.
  He committed to cooperating with the Congress in pursuing its 
oversight responsibilities and said he would always speak boldly and 
candidly about what he believed.
  Finally, Dr. Gates talked about the complexities of the situation in 
Iraq, acknowledging that a number of major mistakes had been made, 
including: the lack of appreciation for how ``broken'' Iraq was 
economically, socially, and politically, and the costs associated when 
we invaded and the problems created by the mobilization of the Iraqi 
Army and the role that our deBaathification policy played in stoking 
the current insurgency.

  It is my sincere hope that Dr. Gates' nomination signals that the 
administration intends to pursue a new direction in Iraq, and the 
Middle East region as a whole. The President should see the strong 
support for Dr. Gates as a call from Congress for moving away from the 
``stay the course'' strategy he has pursued.
  I hope that Dr. Gates will work with Congress to establish a clear-
eyed and

[[Page S11286]]

pragmatic approach toward our Nation's defense policy and seek to 
restore the morale of our military.
  I hope Dr. Gates will be open to dissenting views and allow the 
military personnel around him to share unvarnished, independent advice.
  Dr. Gates is a well-qualified candidate for this critical position. 
His service at the top levels of the CIA and the National Security 
Council has provided close insights into the Pentagon's operations and 
policies.
  As a former member of the Iraq Study Group, ISG, Dr. Gates 
understands the complex challenges our Nation faces. He will be in a 
unique position to implement the recommendations in the ISG report, and 
other options for pursuing a new strategy.
  It is clear to me that during the recent midterm elections the 
American people voiced their disapproval with this administration's 
Iraq policies and voted for a change of course.
  And the time for changing the course is now.
  The Iraq War has now lasted longer than the United States involvement 
in World War II. More than 2,900 troops have been killed since March 
19, 2003. More than 3,000 Iraqis are being killed in sectarian violence 
every month.
  Today our military is stretched thin and its readiness diminished. 
Some of our troops are now on their third and fourth rotations. And, 
over in Iraq and Afghanistan, our military's equipment is wearing out 
or being destroyed at a cost of nearly $20 billion a year.
  Ultimately, this war can only be won politically.
  Our Nation must make it clear to the Iraqi government that this is 
not an open-ended commitment. Iraqis must step forward and take 
responsibility for their own security. Only they can make their country 
a stable state.
  The administration's war planning was shortsighted and ill-conceived. 
By failing to provide adequate troops to secure Iraq, its 
infrastructure, its weapons depots, and its streets, this 
administration placed the entire mission in Iraq in jeopardy.
  Dr. Gates has stated that he intends to improve the Department of 
Defense's planning efforts in regards to postcombat operations--a 
capability sorely missing from the current leadership.
  I am also encouraged by Dr. Gates apparent willingness to involve 
Iran and Syria in diplomatic dialogue--a stark contrast from the Bush 
administration's current policy.
  I hope that President Bush will accept the advice of the Iraq Study 
Group and Dr. Gates to engage in diplomacy to solve this crisis.
  Additionally, Dr. Gates has expressed concerns regarding the 
Pentagon's continued expansion of intelligence activities since the 
September 11, 2001, attacks.
  I share these concerns and look forward to working with Dr. Gates and 
Ambassador Negroponte to ensure that there is an appropriate and 
transparent division of responsibilities between military and civilian 
intelligence agencies.
  Fifteen years ago, Dr. Gates came before the Senate as President 
George H.W. Bush's nominee to become the Director of Central 
Intelligence, DCI.
  During 4 days of hearings, a number of questions were raised 
regarding his involvement and knowledge of the Iran-Contra scandal. In 
addition, allegations were aired regarding the manipulation of 
intelligence for political purposes.
  These are serious concerns.
  But what is critical to me today is that he shows an independent mind 
and willingness to eschew ideology and partisanship to do what is best 
for our men and women in uniform.
  It is clearly time for instituting new leadership at the Pentagon--
something I first called for almost a year ago. But such a change will 
only matter if the President himself is willing to pursue a different 
course.
  I am looking forward to working with Dr. Gates on defense matters, to 
address the needs of our troops and their families, and to finally 
bring about a change in our Iraq policy--certainly the time is far past 
due.
  Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, I rise today in support of Dr. Robert M. 
Gates to be Secretary of Defense.
  The position of Secretary of Defense has always been one of the most 
important Cabinet positions in our country. Never has that importance 
been more clear than now, as we must decide on a path forward in the 
global war on terror, including Iraq.
  I share my colleagues' concerns about the deteriorating conditions in 
Iraq. We must carefully assess the current situation in that country as 
well as our future involvement in Iraq. I am hopeful that Dr. Gates 
will help us accomplish these goals. He has experience with the current 
situation in Iraq as a former member of the bipartisan Baker-Hamilton 
Iraq Study Group. As part of that group, he has traveled to Iraq and 
met with Iraqi leaders and U.S. military commanders. I am optimistic 
that he will use this experience and knowledge to help chart a course 
in Iraq that results in the stabilization of that country.
  I also hope that as a former member of the Baker-Hamilton Iraq Study 
Group, Dr. Gates will carefully review and analyze the Iraq Study 
Group's report, which was released this morning. I believe that report 
makes some very good recommendations and can serve as a vehicle for 
some changes relating to our policy in Iraq. I look forward to 
discussing those recommendations further in this Chamber.
  The report recommends ``new and enhanced diplomatic and political 
efforts in Iraq and the region, and a change in the primary mission of 
U.S. forces in Iraq that will enable the United States to begin to move 
its combat forces out of Iraq responsibly.'' Renewed diplomatic and 
political efforts in the region make sense so that we can work with 
Iraqis to stabilize their country in the spirit of reconciliation. As 
the Baker-Hamilton report points out, ``if the Iraqi government moves 
forward with national reconciliation, Iraqis will have an opportunity 
for a better future, terrorism will be dealt a blow, stability will be 
enhanced in an important part of the world, and America's credibility, 
interests and values will be protected.'' In my mind, these have always 
been our goals in Iraq, and I look forward to working with Dr. Gates 
and my colleagues to accomplish those goals in a responsible way.
  There are other recommendations in the report that are equally 
important. One such recommendation is that ``[t]he primary mission of 
U.S. forces in Iraq should evolve to one of supporting the Iraqi army . 
. .'' While I have never supported setting an artificial timetable for 
withdrawing U.S. troops from Iraq, I believe the Iraqi Government must 
take responsibility for their country. As such this recommendation 
regarding our troops' future role in Iraq makes sense, and I will work 
with Dr. Gates on this recommendation.
  One other recommendation that I want to briefly reference is that 
``the United States should provide additional political, economic and 
military support for Afghanistan . . .'' The global war on terror is a 
multifront war, and we must continue to focus on each of those fronts. 
I hope Dr. Gates will use his knowledge and experience to help Congress 
and the President make decisions about the full global war on terror, 
including operations in Afghanistan. Our work in Afghanistan is 
important, and I hope Dr. Gates will help us ensure that we do not lose 
sight of our near- and long-term goals in the overall global war on 
terror.
  Dr. Gates has a long record of service in the area of national 
security, which I believe will serve him well as Secretary of Defense. 
He has 26 years of national security experience, including serving as 
an intelligence adviser to six different Presidents. He has worked at 
both the Central Intelligence Agency, CIA, and the National Security 
Council, including serving as the Director of the CIA.
  Dr. Gates also has a distinguished career in public service. That 
service began almost 40 years ago when he was commissioned as an 
officer in the Air Force in 1967. He has received the Presidential 
Citizens Medal and the National Security Medal, as well as two National 
Intelligence Distinguished Service Medals and three Distinguished 
Intelligence Medals.
  Mr. President, for all of these reasons, I support the nomination of 
Dr. Robert M. Gates to be Secretary of Defense. I look forward to 
working with him in the coming years on issues relating to Iraq, the 
entire global war on terror, and other issues important to our 
country's defense.

[[Page S11287]]

  Mr. JOHNSON. Mr. President, yesterday the Senate Armed Services 
Committee voted unanimously in favor of Robert Gates' nomination to be 
Secretary of Defense. Following robust debate in the Senate, I plan to 
vote in favor of Dr. Gates' nomination.
  During Dr. Gates' testimony before the Senate Armed Services 
Committee, I was encouraged by his candid assessment of the situation 
in Iraq. Dr. Gates acknowledged that we are not winning in Iraq and the 
status quo is unacceptable. He signaled his willingness to actively 
solicit the advice of military leaders on the ground and to work with 
members of both parties to develop a coherent strategy for Iraq. Dr. 
Gates' testimony was straightforward and refreshing. It is a step in 
the right direction toward resolving the crisis in Iraq.
  At the same time the full Senate began debate on Dr. Gates' 
nomination, the Iraq Study Group released their recommendations for 
overhauling our policy in Iraq. The commission's report was stark and 
sobering and described the current situation in Iraq as grave and 
deteriorating.
  I wholeheartedly agree with the Iraq Study Group's assessment that 
our commitment to Iraq should not be open-ended. U.S. support for the 
Iraqi government is strong, but Iraqi leaders must immediately make the 
necessary political decisions to create a sustainable political 
settlement.
  As a member of the Iraq Study Group prior to his nomination, it is my 
hope Dr. Gates will heed the recommendations of the Iraq Study Group 
and encourage the Bush administration to change course in Iraq.
  Mrs. BOXER. Mr. President, I rise in support of the nomination of 
Robert Gates to be Secretary of Defense. I believe that a change of 
leadership at the Pentagon will signal a new course of action in Iraq.
  During his nomination hearing yesterday before the Senate Armed 
Services Committee, Dr. Gates spoke the truth about the war in Iraq. In 
a very plain spoken way, he leveled with the American people when he 
admitted that we are not winning in Iraq. His ability to admit that 
Iraq is in chaos leads me to believe that he will provide independent 
advice to the President and speak truth to power.
  Our brave military men and women in uniform have done everything 
asked of them in Iraq. The failure of this administration to develop a 
realistic strategy for Iraq is the reason why we are not winning. Our 
military defeated the armed forces of Iraq, captured Saddam Hussein, 
and helped provide for three elections in Iraq. They cannot force a 
national reconciliation in Iraq and they cannot impose a political 
compromise.
  The stress on our military is causing readiness to suffer and placing 
our military families under tremendous strain. Today's Iraq Study Group 
report says that ``U.S. military forces, especially our ground forces, 
have been stretched nearly to the breaking point by the repeated 
deployments in Iraq, with attendant casualties (almost 3,000 dead and 
more than 21,000 wounded), greater difficulty in recruiting, and 
accelerated wear on equipment.'' This is an unsustainable situation.
  I look forward to working with Dr. Gates on improving the mental 
health policies and programs of the Department of Defense. We must not 
deploy military personnel with serious mental health conditions, such 
as posttraumatic stress disorder, and we should ensure that proper 
treatment is provided for those in need.
  It is time for a change in course in Iraq and a change at the 
Pentagon is a step in the right direction.
  Ms. SNOWE. Mr. President, I rise today to support the nomination of 
Robert Gates to be the 22nd Secretary of Defense.
  Dr. Gates comes to this position with a lifetime of service to his 
Nation and fellow Americans. He has served his country in uniform, as a 
civil servant, a policymaker and as an adviser to six Presidents, both 
Democrat and Republican. He has also served America by running one of 
our top institutions of higher learning, Texas A&M University and by 
serving on the boards of institutions such as the National Association 
of State Universities and Land-Grant Colleges and the National 
Executive Board of the Boy Scouts of America. It is no coincidence that 
at his graduation from William and Mary, he was awarded the Algernon 
Sydney Sullivan Award for making the greatest contributions to his 
fellow man.
  However, it is his character and ability to lead that will be most 
critical during this time of sweeping and historic challenges facing 
the Nation and the Department of Defense. We must satisfy ourselves 
that Dr. Gates not only has a plan to overcome these challenges but the 
personality, the drive and the skills to do so. That he once again 
accepted the call to national service at a time of grave crisis, 
requiring his departure from his beloved Texas A&M, to me speaks 
volumes about his character and dedication to service.
  As the Nation faces the imperative of charting a new course and 
strategy in Iraq, rising violence in Afghanistan, global terrorism, the 
threats posed by nuclear states such as North Korea and possibly Iran 
and the increasing strains on our military, America requires a leader 
of Bob Gates's caliber, who has the national security experience, the 
political acumen and the managerial style necessary to mend rifts that 
have resulted in the loss of America's certainty and optimism. He will 
be responsible for ensuring a strong working relationship between the 
Department of Defense and Congress, trust between the civilian and 
military leadership in the Pentagon, and the credibility of the 
Department with the American public.
  To accomplish this in the relatively brief but critical tenure he 
will have at the Pentagon, he will have to rely on his pragmatism and 
his ability to work with others to develop consensus in order to create 
the unified approach that is currently lacking in meeting our Nation's 
challenges. In his previous service, he has shown he has the ability to 
work with both sides with a high degree of competency and integrity--
and I believe this capacity to work in a bipartisan fashion is critical 
to our ability to work through the challenges we face today.
  One of his primary goals at the Department will be to foster mutual 
respect between our senior military leaders and the civilian leadership 
in the Pentagon. I look for him to provide our military leaders a clear 
voice on military operations. I believe he will listen to them and take 
their advice on such matters as planning for postcombat operations and 
force structure considerations in a manner that has been too long 
dormant.
  As Dr. Gates assumes the helm at the Department of Defense he will be 
responsible for a variety of challenges ranging from the ongoing 
transformation of our forces, balancing operations, procurement and 
modernization accounts so our military forces have the tools they need 
to prevail now and in the future, to preparing those forces to meet 
global challenges from the Taiwan Straits to the jungles of South 
America.
  Another issue of concern facing Dr. Gates is the Department of 
Defense's relationship with other executive branch agencies such as the 
Department of Homeland Security and the intelligence agencies. In Dr. 
Gates' written answers to the questions posed by the Armed Service 
Committee, he states that DHS and DOD have the common goal of 
protecting the United States and that he will support any steps that 
can be taken to improve and strengthen interagency cooperation so that 
all agencies are prepared for and able to respond to threats facing the 
U.S. homeland.
  As a member of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, I have 
witnessed egregious intelligence failures and a sweeping reorganization 
of the entire community. I have also emphasized the need to improve 
information sharing and strengthen interagency cooperation.
  Dr. Gates has recently written that he was ``unhappy about the 
dominance of the Defense Department in the intelligence arena and the 
decline in the CIA's central role'' and that ``close cooperation 
between the military and the CIA in both clandestine operations and 
intelligence collection is essential.'' He also wrote that ``for the 
last decade, intelligence authority has been quietly leaching from the 
CIA to and to the Pentagon, not the other way around.'' During General 
Hayden's nomination hearing, I noted that one of General Hayden's 
primary challenges would be synchronizing the gears of our Nation's

[[Page S11288]]

intelligence collection capability. I believe Dr. Gates will now meet 
the challenge of synchronizing those gears at the Defense Department.
  As someone who has had worked in the intelligence community for more 
than 27 years, I am confident that he is up to the task. I implore Dr. 
Gates to maintain that close cooperation so that, in his words, ``all 
agencies are prepared for and able to respond to the threats facing the 
homeland.''
  In fact, it was while he was the Director of Central Intelligence in 
1992 that he testified before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, of 
which I was a member, about the need for the Defense Department and the 
Intelligence Community to cooperate saying, ``Our national security 
institutions, especially defense and intelligence, must change--and 
they are changing dramatically--to meet the new and different 
challenges of this new and different world.'' At that hearing Dr. Gates 
also warned us that aside from traditional issues of national security, 
we should be alert to other dangers such as terrorism that cannot ``be 
resolved simply through the application of military force or 
diplomacy.''
  Dr. Gates clearly understood then and understands now America's 
preeminent role in leading the spread of democracy and performing 
global policing, yet he also recognizes the regional and sectarian 
nature of 21st century conflict. This sense of historical realism will 
stand him in good stead as he grapples with what is and will be his 
greatest and most pressing challenge--the U.S. involvement in Iraq.
  Dr. Gates is well versed in Middle East affairs, especially in Iraq 
and Afghanistan--having been the deputy national security adviser 
during the 1991 gulf war and providing oversight of U.S.-sponsored 
operations in Afghanistan under President Reagan. More recently, he 
cochaired a study at the Council on Foreign Studies in 2004 on U.S. 
relations towards Iran. Among the study's primary recommendations was 
that the U.S. directly engage with Iran on a diplomatic level and 
regarding Iranian nuclear programs.
  He also recently served as part of the Iraq Study Group that is 
releasing its recommendations regarding U.S. strategic options this 
week. By all accounts, Dr. Gates spent considerable time in Iraq 
talking to Iraqis, soldiers, military leaders and diplomats to 
understand the myriad and intertwined complexities that will shape the 
future of Iraq. This understanding will be critical as he will have to 
proceed at full speed when he becomes Secretary--for we are long past 
the point where time is of the essence.
  I believe that Robert Gates understands that we are at a critical 
juncture. As he said in his testimony yesterday, we are not winning the 
war in Iraq. He is straightforward in his approach and his language, 
and I believe he will offer a different and pragmatic approach. He 
rightly said during his testimony that there is not a military solution 
to Iraq--that this requires a political solution, and I believe he will 
signal to the Iraqi government that they and the Iraqi people need to 
decide if an Iraqi nation is more important to them than their 
sectarian interests. Because we can't decide that for them, and we 
can't make that happen for them.
  There is no question that staying the course in Iraq is neither an 
option nor a plan and that the patience of the Congress and the 
American people is finite and our presence there is neither unlimited 
nor unconditional. I urge him to seek the advice of his military 
commanders regarding the roles and missions of our troops and to work 
in a bipartisan fashion with Congress to implementing the findings and 
recommendations of the Iraq Study Group.
  In closing, it is critical is that this nomination represents a 
commitment by the administration to unite our Nation to bring a lasting 
resolution to the war in Iraq. A new perspective at the Pentagon from a 
Defense Secretary confirmed on an overwhelmingly bipartisan basis, 
coupled with the release of the bipartisan Iraq Study Group's consensus 
recommendations, must serve as a catalyst for cooperation in 
establishing a unified plan for progress and transition in Iraq. In 
fact, with the confluence of these two events, this day must become a 
pivot point for our presence in Iraq.
  Bob Gates' temperament, reputation, and experience has prepared him 
well for this challenging assignment and I have every faith that he 
will serve our Nation well as the Secretary of Defense. I urge my 
colleagues to vote to confirm Dr. Robert Gates to be our 22nd Secretary 
of Defense.
  Mr. SARBANES. Mr. President, this legislation, S. 2568 and its House 
companion H.R. 5466, the Captain John Smith Chesapeake National 
Historic Trail Designation Act, would create the Nation's first 
national ``watertrail'' and honor one of America's earliest explorers, 
Captain John Smith and the vital role he played in the founding of the 
first permanent English settlement in North America at Jamestown, VA, 
and in exploring the Chesapeake Bay region during the years 1607 to 
1609.
  Many Americans are aware of the upcoming 400th anniversary of 
Jamestown next year. The celebration is expected to draw record numbers 
of visitors to this area, including Queen Elizabeth II, as part of her 
recently announced state visit. What may not be as well known is that 
Jamestown and John Smith's voyages of exploration in present-day 
Virginia and Maryland were our Nation's starting points. America has 
its roots right here in the Chesapeake Bay region nearly 400 years 
ago--13 years before the founding of the Plymouth colony--when the 
Jamestown colonists disembarked from their three small ships on May 13, 
1607. Under the leadership of Captain John Smith, the fledgling colony 
not only survived but helped ignite a new era of discovery in the New 
World.
  With a dozen men in a 30-foot open boat, Smith's expeditions in 
search of food for the new colony and the fabled Northwest Passage took 
him nearly 3,000 miles around the Chesapeake Bay and its tributaries 
from the Virginia capes to the mouth of the Susquehanna. On his voyages 
and as president of the Jamestown Colony, Captain Smith became the 
first point of contact for scores of Native-American leaders from 
around the bay region. His friendship with Pocahontas is now an 
important part of American folklore. Smith's notes describing the 
indigenous people he met and the Chesapeake Bay ecosystem are still 
widely studied by historians, environmental scientists, and 
anthropologists. Chief Justice John Marshall wrote of the significance 
of Smith's explorations: ``When we contemplate the dangers, and the 
hardships he encountered, and the fortitude, courage and patience with 
which he met them; when we reflect on the useful and important 
additions which he made to the stock of knowledge respecting America, 
then possessed by his countrymen; we shall not hesitate to say that few 
voyages of discovery, undertaken at any time, reflect more honour on 
those engaged in them, than this does on Captain Smith.''
  What better way to commemorate this important part of our Nation's 
history and honor John Smith's courageous voyages than by designating 
the Captain John Smith Chesapeake National Historic Trail? The Congress 
established the National Trails System ``to provide for the ever-
increasing outdoor recreation needs of an expanding population and in 
order to promote the preservation of, public access to, travel within, 
and enjoyment and appreciation of the open-air, outdoor areas and 
historic resources of the Nation.'' National Historic Trails such as 
the Lewis and Clark Trail, the Pony Express Trail, the Trail of Tears, 
and the Selma to Montgomery Trail were authorized as part of this 
system to identify and protect historic routes for public use and 
enjoyment and to commemorate major events which shaped American 
history. In my judgment, the Captain John Smith Chesapeake National 
Historic Trail is a fitting addition to the 13 national historic trails 
administered by the National Park Service.
  Pursuant to legislation we enacted as part of the Fiscal 2006 
Interior Appropriations Act, in September 2006 the National Park 
Service completed a detailed study which found that the trail meets all 
three criteria for designation as a national historic trail: it is 
nationally significant, has a documented route through maps or 
journals, and provides for recreational opportunities. Similar in 
historic importance to the Lewis and Clark National Trail, this new 
historic trail will inspire generations of Americans and visitors to 
follow Smith's journeys, to learn about

[[Page S11289]]

the roots of our Nation, and to better understand the contributions of 
the Native Americans who lived within the bay region. Equally 
important, the Captain John Smith Chesapeake National Historic Trail 
will serve as a national outdoor resource by providing rich 
opportunities for education, recreation, and heritage tourism not only 
for more than 16 million Americans living in the bay's watershed but 
for visitors to this area. The water trail would allow voyagers in 
small boats, cruising boats, kayaks, and canoes to travel from the 
distant headwaters to the open bay--an accomplishment that will 
generate national and international attention and participation. The 
trail would complement the Chesapeake Bay Gateways and Watertrails 
Program and help highlight the bay's remarkable maritime history, its 
unique watermen and their culture, the diversity of its peoples, its 
historical settlements, and our current efforts to restore and sustain 
the world's most productive estuary.
  This legislation enjoys strong bipartisan support in the Congress and 
in the States through which the trail passes. The trail proposal has 
been endorsed by the Governors of Virginia, Pennsylvania, Delaware, 
Maryland, and numerous local governments throughout the Chesapeake Bay 
region. The measure is also strongly supported by the National 
Geographic Society, the Conservation Fund, the Garden Club of America, 
the Izaak Walton League of America, the Chesapeake Bay Foundation and 
the Chesapeake Bay Commission as well as scores of businesses, tourism 
leaders, private groups, and intergovernmental bodies. I want to 
especially recognize and commend Patrick Noonan, chairman emeritus of 
the Conservation Fund, for his vision in conceiving this trail. I also 
want to thank the cosponsors of this measure, Senators Warner, 
Mikulski, Allen, Carper, Biden, Santorum, Specter, Representative Jo 
Ann Davis, and the cosponsors of the House companion measure, as well 
as the chairmen and ranking members of the Senate Committee on Energy 
and Natural Resources and the Subcommittee on National Parks. Finally, 
I want to recognize and thank Judy Pensabene and David Brooks of the 
Senate Energy Committee staff and Ann Loomis in Senator Warner's office 
for the tremendous assistance they provided in moving the measure 
forward.
  The Captain John Smith Chesapeake National Historic Trail Act comes 
at a very timely juncture to educate Americans about historical events 
that occurred 400 years ago right here in Chesapeake Bay, which were so 
crucial to the formation of this great country and our democracy. I 
urge my colleagues to support this measure.
  Mr. ROCKEFELLER. Mr. President, I rise today in support of the 
nomination of Robert M. Gates to be the next Secretary of the 
Department of Defense.
  I believe that the defense and security challenges that our Nation 
faces at this moment are greater than we have faced in decades, and the 
strains on our Active Duty and National Guard and Reserve forces are 
commensurate with those challenges.
  After much careful thought, going back to this body's consideration 
of Dr. Gates' nomination to lead the Central Intelligence Agency in 
1991, I am convinced that he will provide the Department of Defense and 
our uniformed service members the competent leadership that they 
deserve that he will approach the necessity to change course in Iraq 
with great urgency and that he will provide the President with the 
pragmatic advice that this country so desperately needs; that his 
stewardship of the Department of Defense will include developing a 
cooperative and productive relationship with Congress; and that his 
career in the intelligence community will benefit the Government as the 
reorganization of our intelligence community continues.
  I have been impressed with Dr. Gates' sincerity in his comments 
regarding the obligation we as policymakers owe the uniformed service 
members who carry out the policies we make. His testimony yesterday 
before the Senate Armed Services Committee included a moving statement 
about his relationships with members and former members of the Corps of 
Cadets at Texas A&M University, 12 of whom have lost their lives in the 
wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.
  Like Dr. Gates, I am moved by the extraordinary sense of duty and 
service that our soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines possess and by 
the extraordinary sacrifices they make willingly on our behalf. We must 
meet the fundamental obligation to serve them as well as they serve us. 
They deserve thoughtful and effective policies; they deserve to be set 
up for success in their missions; they deserve to be properly trained 
and equipped; and they deserve to be ever confident that their welfare 
is never subject to partisan political considerations within their 
civilian chain of command. Anything less is unworthy of these heroes.
  I am strongly hopeful that Dr. Gates' long and distinguished career 
in public service, particularly in critical national security roles, 
gives him the proper perspective on the duties we owe our men and women 
in uniform. I am confident he will exercise these duties with great 
care and concern, particularly with regard to those service members who 
are in harm's way in Iraq and Afghanistan.
  I also note Dr. Gates' candor and independence of thought, both in 
his public comments of recent years and in answering the questions of 
the members of the Senate Armed Services Committee during the 
confirmation process. Prior to his nomination as the next Secretary of 
Defense, Dr. Gates served on two noteworthy bodies whose work is highly 
relevant to the challenges he will undertake at the Department of 
Defense. First, in 2004 he cochaired a Council on Foreign Relations 
task force with former National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski 
that resulted in a report entitled, ``Iran: Time for a New Approach.'' 
It is my hope that ``time for a new approach'' is a phrase that 
characterizes Dr. Gates' overall approach to many of the issues he will 
encounter at the Pentagon, but I would make special note of the fact 
that in this report, he recommended that the United States engage in 
direct talks with Iran. If this recommendation of engagement and 
proactive diplomacy is characteristic of the advice he will provide to 
the President in his new position, it will be a welcome change.
  Second, prior to his nomination, Dr. Gates served on the Iraq Study 
Group, whose recommendations for a major change in course in Iraq we 
heard today. Dr. Gates' service on this body shows that he recognized 
early on that the administration's policy in Iraq was not working and 
needed a change in course. Since his nomination, I have been very 
pleased with his comments, particularly in his written answers to the 
Senate Armed Services Committee questions and in his testimony 
yesterday, regarding the urgent need for change in our Iraq policy. 
Unlike the previous Secretary of Defense and unlike the President 
himself, Dr. Gates has acknowledged forthrightly that the number of 
troops we sent to Iraq for the postwar period was insufficient. He 
recognizes that the planning for the postwar period was both inadequate 
and flawed and that the result now is a status quo that is absolutely 
unacceptable and must be changed with great urgency.

  As many of my colleagues have noted, this is a fresh and candid 
perspective that has been sorely lacking in this administration for 6 
years. It is my hope and expectation that Dr. Gates' independence of 
thought and bold push for necessary change will mark his tenure as our 
next Secretary of Defense.
  In my capacity as chairman of the Senate Select Committee on 
Intelligence in the 110th Congress, I will be particularly interested 
in how Dr. Gates will handle the relationship between the Department of 
Defense and the intelligence community, which is still developing 
following the recent intelligence reforms and which I will be focusing 
on closely in the coming months.
  This relationship is crucial to the production of accurate, unbiased 
intelligence, which in turn is essential for the development of sound 
national security policy for our country. As vice chairman of the 
Senate Intelligence Committee, I have spent 3\1/2\ years reviewing 
prewar intelligence on Iraq. We have found inadequate intelligence, 
inaccurate intelligence, ignored intelligence, and distorted 
intelligence, the sum of which led to a disastrous decision to take 
this country to war. This is a situation which cannot be repeated.

[[Page S11290]]

  One of the principal concerns throughout the Intelligence Committee's 
Iraq inquiry has been the question of politicization of intelligence. 
This is an issue well known to Dr. Gates because it was a charge 
leveled at him in 1991 during his confirmation to be Director of 
Central Intelligence. Unresolved questions about possible 
politicization greatly influenced my opposition to confirming him for 
that position, and I am even more keenly concerned about maintaining 
the integrity of the analytic process based on my experience with the 
Iraq inquiry.
  Fortunately, his service as the Director of Central Intelligence and 
his continuing contribution to the Nation since then have allayed the 
concerns I had in 1991. While his tenure as DCI was short, he 
accomplished a great deal. In a 1992 message to the CIA workforce he 
wrote ``seeking truth is what we are all about as an institution, as 
professionals and as individuals, the possibility--even the 
perception--that the quest may be tainted deeply troubles us, as it 
long has and as it should.'' While he disputed the specific accusations 
of politicization, he learned from the process. He established a task 
force to address politicization, and he implemented changes based on 
the task forces recommendation. I am encouraged that he will bring that 
experience to this new job as one of the primary consumers of 
intelligence.
  I also am encouraged by Dr. Gates' views on the proper role of the 
Defense Department in relation to the CIA. Earlier this year he wrote 
of his unhappiness with what he viewed as an inappropriate dominance by 
the Defense Department. There is plenty of work for all of our 
intelligence agencies, but that work needs to be properly distributed 
and coordinated, and I think he understands the importance of that 
balance. I look forward to working closely with Dr. Gates on this issue 
if he is confirmed.
  At his confirmation hearing, Dr. Gates demonstrated several qualities 
that I think make him a good choice for this job. He is smart but not 
arrogant. He is tough-minded without being closed-minded. And he is 
clearly taking on this enormous responsibility out of a sense of public 
service. I will support his nomination, and I hope he is confirmed.
  Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, our next Secretary of Defense will face 
unprecedented and wide-ranging challenges. Terrorist networks are 
developing new capabilities and sources of support around the world, 
the Taliban and al- Qaida are resurgent in Afghanistan, our military is 
over-stretched--all while the administration continues to devote so 
much of its resources to a self-defeating, Iraq-centric strategy.
  I am not convinced that the President's nominee for this position, 
Robert Gates, has the will or ability to fix our failed Iraq strategy. 
Once confirmed, Mr. Gates will answer to the President, and the 
President still fails to recognize the need for a new course--one that 
includes a flexible timetable to redeploy troops from Iraq and re-focus 
on the fight against terrorism. Until the President recognizes that his 
Iraq policy is undermining our national security, simply changing one 
advisor for another may not make that big a difference.
  Nonetheless, I will vote to confirm Mr. Gates. I believe that a 
president should be given great deference in selecting his cabinet. And 
Mr. Gates showed a refreshing candor and humility in his testimony this 
week--qualities that have been sorely lacking in this administration. 
He acknowledged that the United States is not ``winning'' in Iraq and 
that the status quo is not acceptable, and said that ``all options are 
on the table.''
  There remain serious questions stemming from his role in Iran/Contra 
and charges that he politicized intelligence. I do not take these 
lightly. However, Mr. Gates is intelligent, experienced and well 
qualified for the position. And I am pleased that he indicated a 
willingness to work with the Director of National Intelligence ``to 
ensure that he has the authority that he needs to fulfill his 
responsibilities.'' I am also encouraged by his statement that he 
expects intelligence professionals to ``call the shots as they see them 
and not try and shape their answers to meet a policy need.''
  I hope that Mr. Gates will follow through on these and other 
commitments. And I will continue working to change our Iraq policy so 
that we can devote greater resources to our top national security 
priority--going after the terrorists who attacked us on 9/11 and their 
allies.
  Mr. BUNNING. Mr. President, I rise today to voice my opposition to 
the nomination of Robert Gates to be Secretary of Defense.
  The safety and security of the American people must be our 
Government's top priority. We need to continue to do everything we can 
to protect our homeland. We cannot place our heads in the sand and 
ignore the fact that we remain a nation at war. Daily we face brutal 
enemies that despise the very principles that we stand for and our way 
of life.
  At this time of war, our President and our Nation rely on the 
Secretary of Defense to provide sound advice and to lead our Armed 
Forces as they continue to combat our enemies. The Secretary of Defense 
has the responsibility of leading the strongest and most capable 
military in the world. He must be a man of vision who can adequately 
assess threats against our national security and formulate the best 
response to these threats.
  The President nominated Mr. Gates for a managerial post of great 
difficulty and complexity, and I do not believe that he is the best 
person to help us meet our Nation's critical challenges. Mr. Gates has 
repeatedly criticized our efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan without 
providing any viable solutions to the problems our troops currently 
face. I am concerned with the message he is sending to our troops and 
our allies around the world. We need a Secretary of Defense to think 
forward with solutions and not backward on history we cannot change.
  Mr. Gates also believes in directly engaging rogue nations such as 
Iran and Syria that are known sponsors of terrorist groups in Iraq, 
Lebanon and the West Bank and Gaza. I do not support inviting 
terrorists to the negotiating table. Such a shift in our Nation's 
foreign policy could have grave consequences for our national security.
  Let me be clear that I am not here today to discredit Robert Gates' 
record of public service to our Nation. I am here to raise concerns 
with his nomination to be Secretary of Defense. It is a position of 
immense importance and carries a great deal of responsibility.
  It is for these reservations that I find myself unable to support the 
nomination of Robert Gates for Secretary of Defense.
  It is clear from following his Armed Services Committee nomination 
hearing and my colleagues' speeches that Mr. Gates will be confirmed to 
be the next Secretary of Defense. However, we cannot afford to fail in 
Iraq, Afghanistan, and other areas in the war against radical 
terrorists. I hope during Mr. Gates' tenure at the Department of 
Defense that we are able to make peace and progress on all these 
fronts. The future of our country depends on it.
  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, yesterday the Armed Services Committee 
conducted a thorough hearing on the nomination of Dr. Robert Gates to 
be the next Secretary of Defense. I commend Senator Warner and Senator 
Levin for their leadership in holding a hearing which may be regarded 
as one of the most informative, important hearings to take place before 
that committee in recent years.
  Dr. Gates also deserves credit for the forthright tone of the 
hearing. His testimony to the committee was marked by candor and a 
serious discussion of the complex challenges before our country. In a 
refreshing change, rather than toeing the administration's line, Dr. 
Gates's testimony appeared to reflect his own views on the situation in 
Iraq, our Nation's approach to the Middle East, the difficulties facing 
our military, and a number of other issues.
  He sensibly acknowledged that real changes are needed in the 
administration's policy toward Iraq, that long-rumored plans of an 
attack on Iran or Syria would have dramatic consequences that would 
further endanger the region and the world, and that our military is 
being strained by the war in Iraq.
  Dr. Gates appears to be set to be confirmed by the Senate as the next 
Secretary of Defense, but he will be walking into a buzz saw. The 
current leadership of the Pentagon, in its arrogance

[[Page S11291]]

and disdain for the Constitution, has alienated Congress and has 
seriously undermined the credibility of the Defense Department in a 
time of war. One of the first orders of business for the next Secretary 
of Defense will be to demonstrate to Congress and to the American 
people that the Defense Department is not a power unto itself, but it 
is a servant of the people. I have urged Dr. Gates to take that mission 
to heart and to make meaningful consultation with Congress, as the 
people's branch of Government, an absolute priority.
  I have worked with Dr. Gates before, during his years of service in 
the Central Intelligence Agency. But this experience alone would not be 
sufficient to secure my support of his nomination. My primary concern 
with his nomination was not whether Dr. Gates had performed well in the 
past, but how he would approach the challenges that are before him.
  Mr. President, I will support the nomination of Dr. Gates based upon 
the candor and independence that he displayed at his nomination 
hearing. I caution, however, that Dr. Gates must be on guard against 
becoming the moderate face of an administration which may yet be 
reluctant to make any real change in its deeply flawed policies toward 
Iraq. The American people need more than a pragmatic spokesman for 
administration policies, the people deserve a leader who will work to 
change the administration's dangerous course.
  I urge Dr. Gates to carry out the candor and fresh thinking that he 
demonstrated at his confirmation hearing, and I hope the administration 
will follow Dr. Gates in this new approach.
  Mr. DODD. Mr. President, I rise today to express my support for the 
confirmation of Robert Gates to become our Nation's next Secretary of 
Defense.
  I recently had the opportunity to meet with Dr. Gates in my office. I 
appreciated his frankness, both in my discussions with him as well as 
during his confirmation hearing before the Senate Armed Services 
Committee.
  He demonstrated candor and pledged independence that the current 
administration has been sorely lacking up until now. He also 
acknowledged that at this point, our operations in Iraq must place far 
more emphasis on finding a political solution rather than continuing to 
place an undue burden on America's Armed Forces.
  It is for these reasons that I hope that Dr. Gates will serve as a 
critical voice for reason, leading our forces toward a proper exit from 
major operations in Iraq and toward rebuilding our war-battered Armed 
Forces.
  Dr. Gates seemed to discern the cost of the war in Iraq, which has 
been mainly measured in the number of lives lost and U.S. treasury 
spent. Over 2,900 brave American servicemembers have now been killed in 
Iraq and over $400 billion in appropriations have been approved by 
Congress.
  But there is another cost of war--our military's readiness. And, 
apparently, unlike his presumed predecessor, who believes that ``you 
have to go to war with the Army you have, not the Army you want,'' Dr. 
Gates has promised to address this issue, if confirmed.
  Some two-thirds of our Nation's combat brigades are currently unable 
to report for duty according to current reports, largely due to battle-
worn and damaged equipment. Dr. Gates seems committed to restoring our 
military's readiness and, I hope, will be willing to fully meet the 
Army's request of $25 billion in fiscal year 2008 to fund the repair, 
replacement, and recapitalization of this gear.
  I concede that on a previous occasion I withheld my support for Dr. 
Gates when he was nominated for the position of the Director of Central 
Intelligence in 1991. At the time, I raised concerns over his past 
tenure at the CIA, including prior allegations of politicized 
intelligence. By all accounts Mr. Gates did a credible job as the 
Director of the CIA. It is my hope that his past experience has 
sensitized him to the danger that politicized intelligence can pose to 
our Nation's national security and to the ability of our military 
commanders to understand and carry out the mission on the ground in 
Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere as they seek to advance United States 
interests.
  In addition, I am also hopeful that Mr. Gates will work with me to 
revisit the administration's military commissions policy. During our 
discussions, we talked about the bill that I introduced last month 
called the Effective Terrorists Prosecution Act of 2006 which addresses 
some of the most serious problems with the bill that the President 
recently signed into law. I hope that Dr. Gates will consult with 
outside military and legal experts, as well as J.A.G. staff regarding 
the Military Commissions Act. I would further urge Dr. Gates to halt 
the Defense Department's plan to award a $125 million contract to build 
a new courthouse at Guantanamo Bay, to try detainees. This project was 
neither authorized nor appropriated by the Congress, and in my view, 
constitutes an egregious waste and abuse of taxpayers dollars on a 
facility designed to circumvent public and legal scrutiny into the 
treatment and trying of detainees.
  Our Nation and our Armed Forces are facing significant challenges, 
and, above all else, Dr. Gates needs to meet today's security concerns 
head on, swiftly and effectively, without any ideological agenda. 
Recognizing the hard truth, that we are not winning the war in Iraq, 
was a good first step.
  Understanding why we aren't winning was a good second step. As Dr. 
Gates explained in his testimony, and as many of us have been saying 
for quite some time, we failed to deploy enough troops in Iraq to win 
the peace, we mistakenly disbanded the Iraqi Army, and we banned 
thousands of Baath Party members from working in the Iraqi Government. 
Only by recognizing and understanding that these specific policies have 
caused so much damage can we begin the work of ameliorating the 
situation in Iraq.
  I look forward to working with Dr. Gates in a bipartisan and level-
headed manner to address these myriad problems, to adjust United States 
policy in Iraq and to rebuild our Nation's Armed Forces. This fall, the 
American people voted for change in our Government's policies, 
particularly in Iraq, and I am hopeful that the confirmation of Dr. 
Gates will represent one of these many vital changes.
  Mr. OBAMA. Mr. President, my vote today for Robert Gates is a vote 
for significant change in our Iraq policy.
  Last month, the American people uniformly rejected the policy-by-
slogan approach to Iraq, rejected the false choice between ``cut-and-
run'' and ``stay the course'' rejected ideological, insular, and 
wrongheaded leadership at the Pentagon. Dr. Gates' challenge will be to 
help President Bush chart a new course that takes a realistic view of 
the deteriorating situation in Iraq and makes the hard decisions to 
salvage an acceptable outcome to this long and misguided war.
  There are several signs that give me hope that Robert Gates is up to 
this challenge. First and most important is the environment in which 
Gates is taking the Pentagon's helm. Following the election, it is 
clear the American people expect significant change in Iraq. President 
Bush nominated Gates with a mandate to find ``fresh perspective and new 
ideas'' for Iraq. And today's Iraq Study Group's report helped create a 
framework to move forward, in a bipartisan fashion, with a shift in 
U.S. policy. As I laid out in a speech 3 weeks ago, I believe this 
shift must include a phased redeployment of U.S. forces in Iraq, a new 
diplomatic effort that includes engagement with Iran and Syria and 
other key nations, and a stance that conditions further assistance to 
progress in Iraq. All of these were also proposed by the Iraq Study 
Group.
  Second, in his own congressional testimony and comments, Dr. Gates 
has expressed openness to new ideas, saying that all options should be 
on the table for Iraq. He expressed refreshing candor in admitting past 
mistakes in Iraq. And Gates promised to work in a constructive, 
respectful way with military commanders, the Iraq Study Group, and 
Congress to find a new way forward.
  Third is Gates' extensive experience. He served for 26 years in the 
Central Intelligence Agency and the National Security Council, and he 
was the only career officer in the CIA's history to rise from entry-
level employee to Director.
  Everyone knows that Gates' job will not be easy. There are no good 
options left in Iraq. There is no set of policy changes that can 
guarantee a good outcome. There is a great resistance to

[[Page S11292]]

change in this administration, from the President down. Among 
Presidential appointees, there still is significant danger in speaking 
truth to power.
  The President, Senate, and the American people are putting a great 
deal on Dr. Gates' shoulders. I am voting for him with the hope that he 
can make us proud.
  Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, I rise to voice my strong support for 
the nomination of Dr. Robert M. Gates to be the Nation's 22nd Secretary 
of Defense. His intelligence, candor, and many years of national 
security experience make him an excellent choice to lead the Pentagon 
and our Nation's troops during this critical time in war on terror.
  Dr. Gates wore his country's uniform as a U.S. Air Force officer; his 
service includes time spent with the Strategic Air Command, the 
prestigious unit once charged with protecting America from a nuclear 
attack by the Soviet Union. Dr. Gates's career includes two decades 
with the CIA, where he started as an entry-level employee and rose to 
the top position. And he spent 9 years at the National Security 
Council. Throughout his Government service, he has advised six 
Presidents.
  Having previously served as Deputy Director of Central Intelligence 
from 1986 to 1989, Assistant to the President and Deputy National 
Security Adviser from 1989 to 1991, and Director of Central 
Intelligence from 1991 to 1993, Dr. Gates is one of the most qualified 
national-security specialists in the country.
  As DCI he led over 100,000 employees and managed the Agency at a 
critical juncture at the end of the Cold War. And he has spent the last 
13 years outside of government, giving him both a keen understanding of 
best business practices and a fresh perspective to tackle America's 
security challenges.
  Dr. Gates has a proven record of bipartisan cooperation, demonstrated 
most recently by his tenure with the Iraq Study Group. As a member of 
that group, he has traveled to Iraq, met Iraqi leaders, and talked to 
our military commanders on the ground. He is ready to hit the ground 
running and lead the Pentagon from the day he is confirmed.
  Five years into the war on terror, America has made great progress. 
But much hard work still lies ahead, as we continue to defend Americans 
here at home while fighting abroad the terrorists who would do us harm. 
The position of Secretary of Defense is more important than ever, and I 
believe the President has made an outstanding choice.
  Dr. Gates has the wisdom and the ability to succeed. He will be a 
strong leader for the Pentagon and our brave men and women in uniform. 
I urge my colleagues to support his nomination, and I will 
wholeheartedly vote for his confirmation.
  Mr. REID. Mr. President, I intend to support the nomination of Dr. 
Robert Gates as the new Secretary of Defense. I believe he will provide 
the Department of Defense, and the President's senior team, the new 
perspective and fresh ideas so desperately needed. He is a 
distinguished and seasoned public servant, and his long experience will 
serve him well in what will be a challenging post.
  I want to thank Senators Warner and Levin for making sure Dr. Gates 
received an expeditious and thorough hearing. With our Nation at war, 
we could not afford to let his confirmation drag.
  I am hopeful that, when confirmed, Dr. Gates will serve as an agent 
of change in the administration--most importantly, on Iraq.
  Yesterday, when asked if we are winning in Iraq, Dr. Gates said 
``no.'' Today, the Iraq Study Group said the situation in Iraq is 
``grave and deteriorating.''
  The Iraq Study Group has done a tremendous and historic service to 
the American people and to the troops serving in harm's way in Iraq. 
Their report underscores the message the American people sent one month 
ago: there must be change in Iraq, and there is no time to lose. It is 
time for the Iraqis to build and secure their nation, and it is time 
for American combat troops to be redeployed. Each day the situation in 
Iraq continues to deteriorate. Time is not on our side.
  This assessment rings particularly true today, as we learned that 10 
U.S. troops were killed in fighting across Iraq, bringing the level of 
U.S. deaths to 27 in only the first 6 days of December. On average, 
almost three U.S. troops are killed each day. We do not have time for 
finger-pointing and pontificating from politicians--it is time for 
action and leadership.
  Most experts agree that Iraq is now embroiled in a civil war, and our 
troops are caught in the middle. Policing a civil war between Shia and 
Sunni is not something for which our country or our military consented. 
We must begin to transition our mission in Iraq, reduce our combat 
footprint, and begin to extricate our troops from the middle of this 
sectarian strife. In short, we need more than a change in personality 
at the Defense Department, we need a change in policy. I urge the 
President to reach out to Congress and work with us to change course.
  If the administration reaches out in a meaningful way, it will find 
Congress ready and willing to work as a partner. The Senate will do its 
part next year and conduct strong oversight to ensure the President 
carries out an effective change in policy. Our troops in Iraq, 
including hundreds of Nevadans, have sacrificed so much. It is time for 
President Bush to reward their effort by bringing the country together 
around a new way forward.
  Once Dr. Gates is confirmed, I look forward to the Senate working 
with him and the President on this change of course in Iraq.
  In addition, I look forward to working with Dr. Gates to change 
course on the other key challenges we face. Dr. Gates must come to 
Congress with a solid plan for addressing the readiness of our military 
which is under strain and at risk because of the administration's Iraq 
strategy.
  Dr. Gates must help the administration develop an effective approach 
for curbing Iran and North Korea's nuclear ambitions. And Dr. Gates 
must spearhead a new effort to ensure a successful outcome for 
Afghanistan, as part of a broader fresh look at our strategy for the 
war on terror, the hunt for Usama bin Laden, and the struggle to 
empower moderates and combat violent extremists. These are serious 
issues that deserve to be addressed properly.
  Hopefully, Dr. Gates can operate with the same level of candor and 
realism as Secretary of Defense as he has during his nomination 
process. The stakes for our Nation are high, and his task is a great 
one, but today, he has our support and a commitment to work together to 
solve this Nation's national security challenges.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I see no other Senators seeking 
recognition, so I think we may as well--the standing order is the vote 
begins at 5 o'clock?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. That is correct.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
  There appears to be a sufficient second.
  Is all time yielded back?
  Without objection, all time is yielded back.
  Mr. WARNER. I thank the Presiding Officer.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is, Will the Senate advise and 
consent to the nomination of Robert M. Gates, of Texas, to be Secretary 
of Defense?
  The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk called the roll.
  Mr. McCONNELL. The following Senator was necessarily absent: the 
Senator from North Carolina (Mrs. Dole).
  Further, if present and voting, the Senator from North Carolina (Mrs. 
Dole) would have voted ``yea.''
  Mr. DURBIN. I announce that the Senator from Indiana (Mr. Bayh) and 
the Senator from Delaware (Mr. Biden) are necessarily absent.
  I further announce that if present and voting, the Senator from 
Delaware (Mr. Biden) would vote ``yea.''
  The result was announced--yeas 95, nays 2, as follows:

                      [Rollcall Vote No. 272 Ex.]

                                YEAS--95

     Akaka
     Alexander
     Allard
     Allen
     Baucus
     Bennett
     Bingaman
     Bond
     Boxer
     Brownback
     Burns
     Burr
     Byrd
     Cantwell
     Carper
     Chafee
     Chambliss
     Clinton

[[Page S11293]]


     Coburn
     Cochran
     Coleman
     Collins
     Conrad
     Cornyn
     Craig
     Crapo
     Dayton
     DeMint
     DeWine
     Dodd
     Domenici
     Dorgan
     Durbin
     Ensign
     Enzi
     Feingold
     Feinstein
     Frist
     Graham
     Grassley
     Gregg
     Hagel
     Harkin
     Hatch
     Hutchison
     Inhofe
     Inouye
     Isakson
     Jeffords
     Johnson
     Kennedy
     Kerry
     Kohl
     Kyl
     Landrieu
     Lautenberg
     Leahy
     Levin
     Lieberman
     Lincoln
     Lott
     Lugar
     Martinez
     McCain
     McConnell
     Menendez
     Mikulski
     Murkowski
     Murray
     Nelson (FL)
     Nelson (NE)
     Obama
     Pryor
     Reed
     Reid
     Roberts
     Rockefeller
     Salazar
     Sarbanes
     Schumer
     Sessions
     Shelby
     Smith
     Snowe
     Specter
     Stabenow
     Stevens
     Sununu
     Talent
     Thomas
     Thune
     Vitter
     Voinovich
     Warner
     Wyden

                                NAYS--2

     Bunning
     Santorum
       

                             NOT VOTING--3

     Bayh
     Biden
     Dole
  The nomination was confirmed.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote, and I move 
to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The President will be immediately notified of 
the Senate's action on this nomination.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, at this time, I congratulate and express 
my gratitude to the extraordinary staff of the Armed Services 
Committee. My distinguished colleague, the senior Senator from 
Michigan, and I have been together 28 years on this committee and have 
worked with this staff, almost all of them, throughout my 6-year tenure 
and many prior thereto when Senator Levin was chairman of the 
committee.
  I want today's Record to reflect our appreciation and that of many 
Members of this Chamber who worked with the distinguished staff. I ask 
unanimous consent to print in the Record the chronological history of 
that staff, who were of great assistance to Senator Levin and me as we 
prepared for this important nomination and held the hearing yesterday.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

    Majority Staff and Non-Designated Staff--Senate Armed Services 
                        Committee, October 2006

       Staff Director: Charles S. Abell.
       Chief Clerk: Marie Fabrizio Dickinson.
       Assistant Chief Clerk and Security Manager: Cindy Pearson.
       General Counsel: Scott W. Stucky.
       Counsel: Richard F. Walsh and David M. Morriss.
       Professional Staff Members: Ambrose R. Hock, Lynn F. 
     Rusten, Lucian L. Niemeyer, Gregory T. Kiley, Regina A. 
     Dubey, Elaine A. McCusker, Diana G. Tabler, Robert M. Soofer, 
     Stanley R. O'Connor, Jr., Kristine L. Svinicki, William M. 
     Caniano, Derek J. Maurer, and Sean G. Stackley.
       Nominations and Hearings Clerk: Leah C. Brewer.
       Systems Administrator. --Gary J. Howard
       Printing and Documents Clerk. --June M. Borawski
       Security Clerk.--John H. Quirk V.
       Special Assistant. --Catherine E. Sendak
       Staff Assistants.--Benjamin L. Rubin, Jessica L. Kingston, 
     Micah H. Harris, Jill L. Simodejka, and David G. Collins
       Receptionist.--Fletcher L. Cork
     Subcommitee on Airland:
       Majority Professional Staff Members: Ambrose R. Hock 
     (Lead), Stanley R. O'Connor, Jr.
       Staff Assistant: Micah H. Harris.
     Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities:
       Majority Professional Staff Members: Lynn F. Rusten (Lead), 
     William M. Caniano, Regina A. Dubey, Derek J. Maurer, Elaine 
     A. McCusker, Robert M. Soofer.
       Staff Assistant: Jessica L. Kingston.
     Subcommittee on Personnel:
       Majority Professional Staff Members: Richard F. Walsh 
     (Lead), David M. Morriss, Diana G. Tabler.
       Staff Assistant: David G. Collins.
     Subcommittee on Readiness and Management Support:
       Majority Professional Staff Members: Gregory T. Kiley 
     (Lead), Ambrose R. Hock, Derek J. Maurer, Elaine A. McCusker, 
     David M. Morriss, Lucian L. Niemeyer.
       Staff Assistant: Benjamin L. Rubin.
     Subcommittee on Seapower:
       Majority Professional Staff Members: Sean G. Stackley 
     (Lead), Ambrose R. Hock, Stanley R. O'Connor, Jr.
       Staff Assistant: Micah H. Harris.
     Subcommittee on Strategic Forces:
       Majority Professional Staff Members: Robert M. Soofer 
     (Lead), William M. Caniano, Stanley R. O'Connor, Jr., 
     Kristine L. Svinicki.
       Staff Assistant: Jill L. Simodejka.
     Majority Professional Staff Members for:
       Acquisition Policy.--Ambrose R. Hock.
       Acquisition Workforce.--Diana G. Tabler.
       Arms Control/Non-proliferation.--Lynn F. Rusten.
       Army Programs.--Ambrose R. Hock.
       Aviation Systems.--Stanley R. O'Connor, Jr.
       Budget Tracking.--Gregory T. Kiley.
       Buy America.--Ambrose R. Hock.
       Chemical-Biological Defense.--Derek J. Maurer.
       Chemical Demilitarization.--Lynn F. Rusten.
       Civilian Nominations.--Scott W. Stucky/Richard F. Walsh.
       Civilian Personnel Policy.--Diana G. Tabler.
       Combatant Commands.--
       CENTCOM--William M. Caniano.
       EUCOM--Lynn F. Rusten .
       (Africa)--Regina A. Dubey.
       JFCOM--William M. Caniano .
       NORTHCOM--Robert M. Soofer.
       PACOM--Lynn F. Rusten.
       SOCOM--Elaine A. McCusker.
       SOUTHCOM--William M. Caniano.
       STRATCOM--Robert M. Soofer.
       TRANSCOM--Sean G. Stackley/Stanley R. O'Connor, Jr.
       Combating Terrorism.--William M. Caniano.
       Competition Policy/Mergers and Acquisitions.--Elaine A. 
     McCusker.
       Competitive Sourcing/A-76.--Derek J. Maurer.
       Contracting (including service contracts).--Elaine A. 
     McCusker.
       Cooperative Threat Reduction Programs.--Lynn f. Rusten.
       Counterdrug Programs.--William M. Caniano.
       Defense Laboratory Management.--Elaine A. McCusker.
       Defense Security Assistance.--Lynn F. Rusten.
       Department of Defense Schools.--Diana G. Tabler.
       Depot Maintenance Policy.--Derek J. Maurer.
       Detainee Policy.--William M. Caniano/Scott Stucky/David M. 
     Morriss.
       Department of Energy Issues.--Kristine L. Svinicki.
       Environmental Issues.--David M. Morriss.
       Export Controls.--Lynn F. Rusten.
       Financial Management.--Gregory T. Kiley.
       Foreign Language Policy.--Regina A. Dubey.
       Foreign Policy/Geographical Region.--
       Africa--Regina A. Dubey.
       Asia/Pacific Region--Lynn F. Rusten.
       Europe/Russia--Lynn F. Rusten.
       Middle East--William M. Caniano.
       South America--William M. Caniano.
       Helicopters.--Ambrose R. Hock.
       Homeland Security/Defense/Domestic Preparedness.--Robrt M. 
     Soofer.
       Humanitarian and Civic Assistance.--Regina A. Dubey.
       Information Assurance/Cyber Security.--Elaine A. McCusker.
       Information Management.--Gregory T. Kiley.
       Information Technology Systems.--
       (Business Systems)--Gregory T. Kiley.
       (Tactical Systems)--Ambrose R. Hock.
       Intelligence Issues.--William M. Caniano.
       International Defense Cooperation.--Lynn F. Rusten.
       Inventory Management.--Derek J. Maurer.
       Military Construction/Base Closures.--Lucian L. Niemeyer.
       Military Family Policy.--Diana G. Tabler.
       Military Health Care.--Diana G. Tabler.
       Military Nominations.--Richard F. Walsh.
       Military Space.--Robert M. Soofer.
       Military Strategy.--William M. Caniano.
       Missile Defense.--Robert M. Soofer.
       Morale, Welfare and Recreation/Commissaries/Exchanges.--
     Diana G. Tabler.
       Nuclear Weapons Stockpile.--Kristine L. Svinicki.
       Personnel Issues.--Richard F. Walsh/Diana G. Tabler/David 
     M. Morriss.
       POW/MIA Issues.--David M. Morriss.
       Readiness/O&M.--Derek J. Maurer/Gregory T. Kiley.
       Reprogramming.--Gregory T. Kiley.
       Science and Technology.--Elaine A. McCusker.
       Sexual Harassment/Sexual Assault Policy.--David M. Morriss.
       Shipbuilding Programs.--Sean G. Stackley.
       Small Business.--Elaine A. McCusker.
       Special Operations Forces.--Elaine A. McCusker.
       Stability Operations.--Lynn F. Rusten/Regina A. Dubey.
       Strategic Programs.--Robert M. Soofer.
       Test and Evaluation.--Elaine A. McCusker.
       Transportation and Logistics Policy.--Derek J. Maurer.
       Unmanned Aircraft Systems.--Stanley R. O'Connor, Jr.
       Women in Combat.--David M. Morriss.

     Minority Staff--Senate Armed Services Committee, October 2006

       Democratic Staff Director.--Richard D. DeBobes.
       Administrative Assistant to the Minority.--Christine E. 
     Cowart.
       Minority Counsel.--Peter K. Levine, Madelyn R. Creedon, 
     Gerald J. Leeling, William G.P. Monahan, and Jonathan D. 
     Clark.
       Professional Staff Member.--Creighton Greene, Michael J. 
     McCord, Richard W.

[[Page S11294]]

     Fieldhouse, Daniel J. Cox, Jr., Evelyn N. Farkas, Gabriella 
     Eisen, Arun A. Seraphin, and Michael J. Kuiken.
       Research Assistant.--Michael J. Noblet.
     Subcommittee on Airland:
       Minority Professional Staff Members: Daniel J. Cox, Jr. 
     (Lead), Creighton Greene.
     Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities:
       Minority Professional Staff Members: Richard W. Fieldhouse 
     (Lead), Arun A. Seraphin, Evelyn N. Farkas, Madelyn R. 
     Creedon.
     Subcommittee on Personnel:
       Minority Professional Staff Members: Gerald J. Leeling 
     (Lead), Jonathan D. Clark.
     Subcommittee on Readiness and Management Support:
       Minority Professional Staff Members: Michael J. McCord 
     (Lead), Peter K. Levine.
     Subcommittee on Seapower:
       Minority Professional Staff Members: Creighton Greene 
     (Lead), Daniel J. Cox, Jr.
     Subcommittee on Strategic Forces:
       Minority Professional Staff Members: Madelyn R. Creedon 
     (Lead), Richard W. Fieldhouse, Creighton Greene.
     Minority Professional Staff Members for:
       Acquisition Policy.--Peter K. Levine.
       Acquisition Workforce.--Peter K. Levine.
       Arms Control/Non-proliferation.--Richard W. Fieldhouse/
     Madelyn R. Creedon.
       Army Programs.--Daniel J. Cox, Jr.
       Aviation Systems.--Creighton Greene/Daniel J. Cox, Jr./
     Madelyn R. Creedon.
       Budget Tracking.--Michael J. McCord.
       Buy America.--Peter K. Levine.
       Chemical-Biological Defense.--Richard W. Fieldhouse.
       Chemical Demilitarization.--Richard W. Fieldhouse.
       Civilian Nominations.--Peter K. Levine.
       Civilian Personnel Policy.--Gerald J. Leeling/Peter K. 
     Levine.
       Combatant Commands.--
       CENTCOM--Michael 1. Kuiken/Gabriella Eisen.
       EUCOM--William G. P. Monahan.
       JFCOM--Michael J. McCord/Arun A. Seraphin.
       NORTHCOM--Evelyn N. Farkas.
       PACOM--Evelyn N. Farkas.
       SOCOM--Evelyn N. Farkas.
       SOUTHCOM--Evelyn N. Farkas.
       STRATCOM--Madelyn R. Creedon.
       TRANSCOM--Creighton Greene.
       Combating Terrorism/Domestic Preparedness.--Evelyn N. 
     Farkas.
       Competition Policy/Mergers and Acquisitions.--Peter K. 
     Levine.
       Competitive Sourcing/ A76.--Peter K. Levine.
       Contracting (including service contracts).--Peter K. 
     Levine.
       Cooperative Threat Reduction Programs.--Madelyn R. Creedon.
       Counterdrug Programs.--Evelyn N. Farkas.
       Defense Laboratory Management.--Peter K. Levine/Arun A. 
     Seraphin.
       Defense Security Assistance.--Evelyn N. Farkas/William G.P. 
     Monahan
       Department of Defense Schools.--Gerald J. Leeling/Jonathan 
     D. Clark
       Department of Energy Issues.--Madelyn R. Creedon
       Depot Maintenance Policy.--Michael J. McCord
       Detainee Policy.--William G.P. Monahan/Peter K. Levine/
     Jonathan D. Clark/Gabriella Eisen
       Environmental Issues.--Peter K. Levine
       Export Controls.--Evelyn N. Farkas/Peter K. Levine
       Financial Management.--Peter K. Levine/Michael J. McCord
       Foreign Language Policy.--Creighton Greene/Evelyn N. Farkas
       Foreign Policy/Geographical Region.--
       Afghanistan--Daniel J. Cox, Jr./Evelyn N. Farkas
       Africa--Michael J. Kuiken/Gabriella Eisen William G.P. 
     Monahan
       Asia/Pacific Region--Evelyn N. Farkas
       Europe/Russia--William G.P. Monahan/Madelyn R. Creedon
       Iraq--Daniel J. Cox, Jr./William G. P. Monahan
       Middle East--Michael J. Kuiken/Gabriella Eisen
       South America--Evelyn N. Farkas
       Helicopters.--Daniel J. Cox, Jr./Creighton Greene
       Homeland Security/Defense.--Richard W. Fieldhouse
       Humanitarian and Civic Assistance.--Evelyn N. Farkas/
     William G.P. Monahan
       Information Assurance/Cyber Security.--Creighton Greene/
     Arun A. Seraphin
       Information Management.--Creighton Greene/Peter K. Levine
       Information Technology Systems.--
       (Business Systems)--Peter K. Levine
       (Tactical Systems)--Creighton Greene/Arun A. Seraphin
       Intelligence Issues.--Creighton Greene
       International Defense Cooperation.--Evelyn N. Farkas/Peter 
     K. Levine/William G.P. Monahan
       Inventory Management.--Peter K. Levine/Michael J. McCord
       Military Personnel Issues.--Gerald J. Leeling/Jonathan D. 
     Clark
       End Strength--Jonathan D. Clark/Gerald J. Leeling
       Military Family Policy--Gerald J. Leeling/Jonathan D. Clark
       Health Care--Gerald J. Leeling/Jonathan D. Clark
       Pay and Benefits--Jonathan D. Clark/Gerald J. Leeling
       Military Personnel Policy--Gerald J. Leeling/Jonathan D. 
     Clark
       Military Construction/Base Closures.--Michael J. McCord
       Military Nominations.--Gerald J. Leeling
       Military Space.--Madelyn R. Creedon
       Military Strategy.--Daniel J. Cox, Jr.
       Missile Defense.--Richard W. Fieldhouse
       Morale, Welfare and Recreation/Commissaries/Exchanges.--
     Jonathan D. Clark/Gerald J. Leeling
       Nuclear Weapons Stockpile.--Madelyn R. Creedon
       POW/MIA Issues.--Jonathan D. Clark
       Readiness/O&M.--Michael J. McCord
       Reprogramming.--Michael J. McCord
       Science and Technology.--Arun A. Seraphin
       Sexual Harassment/Sexual Assault Policy.--Gerald J. 
     Leeling/Jonathan D. Clark
       Shipbuilding Programs.--Creighton Greene
       Small Business.--Peter K. Levine
       Special Operations Forces.--Evelyn N. Farkas
       Stability Operations.--Evelyn N. Farkas/William G.P. 
     Monahan
       Strategic Programs.--Madelyn R. Creedon
       Test and Evaluation.--Arun A. Seraphin/Peter K. Levine
       Transportation and Logistics Policy.--Michael J. McCord/
     Creighton Greene
       Unmanned Aircraft Systems.--Creighton Greene/Daniel J. Cox, 
     Jr.
       Women in Combat.--Jonathan D. Clark/Gerald J. Leeling

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