[Congressional Record Volume 152, Number 133 (Wednesday, December 6, 2006)]
[Senate]
[Pages S11267-S11294]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
NOMINATION OF ROBERT M. GATES--Continued
Mr. THOMAS. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Order of Procedure
Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, on behalf of the leader, I ask unanimous
consent that at 2:30 p.m. tomorrow the majority leader be recognized to
speak.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The Senator from New Mexico is recognized.
The Appropriations Process
Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, I come to the floor here today to share
with my colleagues and my constituents my frustration with the inaction
of Congress on its most basic responsibility, to enact bills to make
appropriations for the Government for the coming year.
No money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in
Consequence of Appropriations made by Law; and a regular
Statement and Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all
public Money shall be published from time to time.
That is the Constitution of the United States. There is no
responsibility more fundamental than the one I
[[Page S11268]]
have just read. The American people pay taxes and they expect the
Congress to do something with those taxes every year. Part of it they
expect to be spent on the operations of Government--for the payments of
the Defense Department, for the payments of the Treasury Department,
for all things that go on in the Energy Department. All of those
functions of Government are put together and handled in appropriations
bills that have a committee chairman and a ranking member, and each
year, under our system, where it is annual, they are supposed to
produce an appropriations bill that goes from House to House and
becomes a final product when it has been passed in both Houses and gone
to conference between the two Houses and comes out as a final bill,
which goes to the President of the United States. That is the format.
There are 13 of those that cause the Government of the United States
to function. Can you believe that many publications have scorned
Congress? Some have blamed the House of Representatives, some have
blamed the Senate, some have blamed the administration for sending an
unrealistic budget last February. The blame game doesn't interest this
Senator. We all share in this quiet conspiracy to duck fulfilling the
most fundamental responsibility that we have and that is to vote on
appropriations bills, to confer between the House so they are the same
bill, the same package of requirements, requests, expenditures that we
ultimately call a bill.
Some media analysts contend that the Senate was afraid to cast votes
on appropriations bills, thinking these votes might be used against
incumbent Senators in recently held elections. All sorts of reasons
emerged that justified laying aside this appropriations bill or that
one. Some feared that amendments to the bills might take too long, too
much time. Amendments might be painful choices for Senators. Some of
the votes might slow down the process and some might show up later in
campaign commercials or propaganda.
This Senator has cast more than 12,000 votes, more than almost any
other Senator in the Senate history. There are maybe five or six who
have cast more. My votes may be characterized by my opponents in a
campaign, using commercials and whatever else they would like. They can
find almost any vote I have taken over the years I have been here.
I took this job knowing full well I would have to vote to decide, to
choose, and that these decisions would absolutely be second-guessed by
a whole host of people. So I reject the notion that the Senate saved
itself by avoiding so-called hard votes. We had not and we did not take
the votes, did we? And look at the results in November. If it were our
Republican approach to save ourselves, we lost ourselves.
Now we have the end of a Congress and here sit the appropriations
bills unattended, sitting over there on the various clerks' desks. All
the work has been done except the final work where they have to come to
each House and get approved.
What we will do, for and to the people of the United States, from
this day forward is terrible. Since we do not have the bills passed on
both sides, we will have a continuing resolution, named for another
document where we will pass the Government spending for a period of
time and say we will spend, and then we relate it to something. We
normally do it for 20 days out of the year. This time we will have a
continuing resolution with the bills that have not been passed. That
should be used very seldom, this continuing resolution, and it is
getting to be like apple pie around here. We use it all the time.
Rather than do our work, we do a continuing resolution. We continue it
by resolution, equating it most frequently to the work that has been
completed by the House, for they have done their work first. Therefore,
the Senate has little or no input into what the continuing resolution
ultimately says we are going to spend money on.
It used to be that a continuing resolution was not watched very well
and it was a way of putting all kinds of things on. That doesn't happen
much anymore. So what we are getting out of this as Senators is
nothing. We are getting little or no input into the appropriations
process. The bills we handle, if we are chairmen or ranking members,
are not going to get adopted at any time or even referred to at any
time unless we decide, in the next 6 or 7 weeks, to do something
together that will change that by reference or by adopting some new
bill.
There is much to be done and clearly we are not on the right course
at this point. We are not going to pass many of these bills except
perhaps a military construction bill, which is no longer a construction
bill, but it is a bill for the health and welfare of our soldiers, and
for many other things, and it is for building many new things that have
to be built here at home for them and, therefore, that Military
Construction bill will probably be a must and it will be around, and
people will be talking about it and the fact that it has to be done.
From my standpoint, this week, if this 109th Congress slinks into
history, as seems to be scheduled, it will have completed work on only
two appropriations bills, Defense and Homeland Security, and maybe the
one I have just referred to as Military Construction. In place of the
completed bills, we will have a continuing resolution through February
15, next year, about the time the President will send us a 2008 final
fiscal year budget. We will be getting a new one before we have done
anything about the old one. We will be getting a brandnew budget--
imagine--and we will not have done anything about all of those that are
sitting on the desks of clerks, waiting to do their part in
appropriately spending our money.
Next year, we will look at the remaining 2007 bills, the much
anticipated $100 billion Defense supplemental request that we all
expect the President to suggest, and all 13 of the 2008 bills.
Does someone think this kind of procedure serves the public interest
or some political interest? I believe it serves neither of the two.
For those Senators who are glad to see a continuing resolution
because they think it saves money, think again. Not only will this
continuing resolution not save money, but it will give reordering of
priorities to the 110th Congress. I predict that we will spend more,
not less, as a result of the strategy adopted by the Congress this
year. The upshot will be that we have both failed to fulfill our
constitutional responsibility and have spent more money.
What an outcome.
Who is to blame, then? Not the Senate Appropriations Committee, which
reported every single appropriations bill by the end of July, the
earliest such bills had been reported in 18 years. Not the subcommittee
chairman, of which I am one, who worked to meet the deadlines set by
the chairman and ranking member.
Those highly motivated members who wanted a full and open debate on
the appropriations bills certainly cannot be blamed, although the
outcome of their efforts will probably disappoint them by the middle of
next year. Each Senator has the obligation to pursue what he or she
believes is the correct policy, using any parliamentary means
appropriate. I cannot condemn my colleagues who, for one reason or the
other, find the appropriations process objectionable.
Here is what I suggest for the future. Let's vote. Let's report the
individual bills, as Chairman Cochran did this year, on time. Then,
let's bring the bills up on the floor. If members want to filibuster,
that is their privilege. We vote on that. If cloture prevails, we have
post cloture debate, and then vote again. Yes, it is time consuming,
but it's our job. Let's vote.
Let me close by discussing briefly my own Energy and Water
appropriations bill, which has awaited Senate action for almost 5
months now.
It is almost ludicrous that at this time in history, the 109th
Congress failed to act on this bill. We read daily about the growing
nuclear threat in North Korea; millions of words are written and spoken
on the threat of an Iran with a nuclear capability. Six Arab, Sunni
nations have now petitioned for a nuclear program through the
International Atomic Energy Agency, including Saudi Arabia, contending
that they need such programs for domestic energy purposes. Many
analysts believe that the Arab nations observe the growing threat of a
Shia Iran, with the potential for a nuclear weapon, and want nuclear
programs for weapons purposes. We listen to witnesses tell us
[[Page S11269]]
of their fears of nuclear terrorism and the failures of the present
nonproliferation programs.
For more than two decades now, these subjects have been the focus of
much of my work as a Senator. And much of the good work that this
Nation has done to address nonproliferation and nuclear terrorism is
funded by the Energy and Water appropriations bill.
Yet at this dangerous time, the 109th Congress couldn't find time to
take up the Energy and Water appropriations bill. In addition to
hundreds of millions, almost billions of dollars for disposing of
weapons grade nuclear material, and funding to try to stop nuclear
material from shipment to this Nation, the bill funded alternative
energy sources. It funds weatherization grants for Americans. It funds
a brand new approach to handling nuclear waste here and abroad.
Let me close by discussing several important items in the bill, which
languishes.
First, in the area of nuclear nonproliferation, the administration
has given careful thought to how to handle the growing Iran and North
Korea nuclear threat. Yet under the strategy adopted by this Congress
on my bill, the Nonproliferation and International Security Account
will be $53 million less than the House passed bill and the Senate
committee-reported bill recommend. Think about that, short-changing
that nonproliferation account because we were afraid to vote.
Second, and even more serious, one of the largest non-proliferation
projects ever will be delayed. The Fissile Materials Disposition
program, located in South Carolina, I add for the benefit of those two
Senators, is known by the short hand of MOX. That program now has
stopped construction, because the House passed bill eliminated all
funding. And, since we have no Senate-passed bill, we cannot even
negotiate levels on the continuing resolution. Think about this: the
United States and Russia have spent the last 10 years negotiating a
deal to eliminate 34 tons of plutonium from the nations' stockpiles and
now the future of this effort is in limbo because Congress couldn't
find the time to do its job.
As chairman of the Energy and Water subcommittee I was excited about
the new initiatives proposed by the President including energy
independence and to increase funding for science research in the Fiscal
Year '07 request.
The Fiscal Year '07 budget took bold steps and made significant
investment in nuclear power and alternative energy. Unfortunately,
enactment of a CR will delay our investment in to alternative energy
and maintain our increasing level of dependence on foreign energy
sources.
Building on Energy Policy Act passed in 2005, the President supported
increased funding for the research on cellulosic biomass, solar,
hydrogen and advanced battery research. The Senate also restored
funding geothermal development a renewable resources in the west with
great potential.
The Senate Energy and Water bill supported the implementation of a
loan guarantee program that was included in the Energy Policy Act of
2005. This is an innovative financial solution, which would not cost
the Federal Government a dime in appropriated funding.
The backing by the Federal Government supports the commercial
deployment of first-of-a-kind energy production technology. Without the
language in the Senate bill, this program will not go forward and our
Nation will not get closer to energy independence.
The Senate Energy and Water bill also fully funds the President's
request for the Department of Energy's Office of Science. Our future
economic growth and security will require our schools to train the next
generation of scientists and engineers. We haven't done enough and are
losing ground in scientific research. This budget will reverse that
trend with investments in basic scientific.
The Senate fully funds the President's request for the Office of
Science.
The Senate bill also provides important funding to support the
licensing of a new nuclear power reactor that will met our growing
energy demand without increasing greenhouse gases.
The bill closes the funding shortfall for the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission in order to hire and train additional technical staff that
will be needed to review the new license applications being developed
by utilities. These priorities will not be recognized with continued
delays with a CR.
This year the President outlined his plans for the Global Nuclear
Energy Partnership. This program invests makes a large investment in
addressing spent fuel stored at reactors all across the country by
recycling. As Yucca Mountain continues to face delays, the Senate bill
supports the administration's efforts to reduce, reuse and recycle
commercial spent fuel.
I understand the challenges the leadership of Congress faces. Any of
us who have served a chairman of the Budget Committee certainly
understand the cross-currents in this Chamber. But, putting aside hard
choices almost never leads to good results. We should remain in session
this month until we fund the 2007 bills. After all, that's our job.
Since it appears there are no Senators wishing to speak, I suggest
the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order
for the quorum call be dispensed with.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Appointment of Conferees--H.R. 5385
Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, as in legislative session, I ask
unanimous consent that the Senate proceed to the immediate
consideration of H.R. 5385, the Military Construction appropriations
bill, that the Senate insist upon its amendments, request a conference
with the House, and the Chair be authorized to appoint conferees.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
Mr. DeMINT. Mr. President, reserving the right to object. If the
Senator from Texas would allow me to discuss with her our conversation
with Leader Frist. As we talked about earlier today, both the Senator
from Texas, myself, and I believe the entire Senate and Congress want
this bill to pass.
Senator Hutchison and myself have had the opportunity to meet with
Leader Frist to talk about the importance of passing this bill, as well
as the importance of not adding additional appropriations and
additional earmarks which were not part of the Senate or the House
version of this bill or were not part of the President's budget.
If I could ask the Senator, is it her understanding that it is our
general agreement and also leadership's that this bill will be kept to
the basic bills which have been passed by the House and Senate and that
it will return to the Senate floor as a bill that we have discussed
with Leader Frist?
Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, there was never any other intention. I
have discussed this with Senator Cochran, chairman of the committee. I
discussed it with Senator Frist, our leader. I have discussed it with
the ranking member, Senator Feinstein. And most certainly we will bring
back a conference report that has either material in the President's
budget request, something that has passed the House or the Senate in
this bill, and all of the projects will be duly authorized on the
military construction side.
On the Veterans' Administration side, we worked very closely with the
authorization committee, Senator Craig, Senator Akaka, and others to
assure that we have the approval of the committee leaders for all of
the veterans' expenditures.
I have to say to the Senator from South Carolina that there are some
very important initiatives in the Veterans bill that would not be
covered in a continuing resolution. And there are very important
commitments for new starts in the Military Construction bill that are
necessary for us to keep pace with the BRAC project and with other
military housing and quality-of-life projects that are included in the
bill. It is going to be a Military Construction and Veterans Affairs
bill with the priorities of the Senate. This bill passed unanimously in
the Senate. We would go forward with the clear understanding that this
is going to be a military construction and veterans affairs and
military quality-of-life conference report.
Mr. DeMINT. Mr. President, I wish to thank the Senator for her
openness and
[[Page S11270]]
tenacity in helping to get the agreements we need to keep this bill
clean and focused on the needs of our military. I do not object.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The Presiding Officer (Mr. DeMint) appointed Mrs. Hutchison, Mr.
Burns, Mr. Craig, Mr. DeWine, Mr. Brownback, Mr. Allard, Mr. McConnell,
Mr. Cochran, Mr. Stevens, Mrs. Feinstein, Mr. Inouye, Mr. Johnson, Ms.
Landrieu, Mr. Byrd, Mrs. Murray, Mr. Leahy, and Mr. Harkin conferees on
the part of the Senate.
Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, this is a major step forward. I have
been working with Senator Feinstein to try to get conferees appointed
for our bill. There is time in this session for the House and the
Senate to come together and put a bill forward in the conference report
that will do what is right by our military who are serving our country
and protecting our freedom, who are in harm's way as we speak. There is
time for us to take care of those good people. There is most certainly
time for us to take care of our veterans and to make sure that the
priorities which we have set this year, for heaven's sake, are passed
in this session of Congress.
If anyone says to me we don't have time to have a conference, they
are wrong. It is 12:40 in the afternoon. It is Wednesday. I will work
all night, if necessary, and so will our great staff working with the
House, if the House will sit down with us. Our military personnel and
our veterans deserve what is in this bill. It is a bill which passed
unanimously. The House passed a bill overwhelmingly as well. It will
move our military quality of life up. That is certainly our intent.
This could not have been done without everyone's cooperation. I think
that is what the people of America expect from the Congress. They
deserve it. That is what we are going to give them.
I want to particularly say that Senator Frist and Senator Cochran
have been instrumental in allowing us to go forward. There has been a
lot of emotional talk and rhetoric around what we do in these last few
days of this session of Congress. I think everyone, including the
Senator from South Carolina and the Senators from Oklahoma, have all
risen above certain emotional feelings and have said: Yes, we are going
to work together. I am very pleased that we are.
I am going to yield the floor in one minute and roll up my sleeves
and try to get the Military Affairs, Quality of Life, Military
Construction and Veterans Affairs bill in shape for us to pass this
session of Congress and send a good conference report to the President
of the United States, who I know will sign the bill.
I yield the floor. I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order
for the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I ask consent that the vote on the
pending nomination occur at 5 p.m. today, with the time until the vote
equally divided between the chairman and the ranking member or their
designees; further, that 20 minutes of the chairman's time be allocated
to Senator Specter; provided further that immediately following the
vote, the President be immediately notified of the Senate's action and
the Senate then resume legislative session.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Ms. COLLINS. I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. DURBIN. I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum
call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. DURBIN. I ask unanimous consent to be recognized in morning
business.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
(The remarks of Mr. Durbin are printed in today's Record under
``Morning Business.'')
Mr. DURBIN. Mr. President, it has been my honor twice to sit down in
my office with the nominee to be our next Secretary of Defense, Robert
Gates. Both meetings have been very positive. The last was this
morning.
When Dr. Gates came in early this morning, I congratulated him on his
appearance before the Committee on Armed Services yesterday. He said:
It is amazing what a little candor will do. That is what endeared him
to the committee and resulted in this unanimous, bipartisan vote
bringing his nomination to the floor. Dr. Gates was honest with members
of the Committee on Armed Services. He will be honest with the American
people. He understands that our efforts in Iraq are not going well and
we need to change. He is a person who is dedicated to the kind of
change which will be consistent with our values in foreign policy.
He told me honestly he didn't know what we should do in Iraq, but we
need to examine the two primary missions we now face: establishing
conditions of security on the one hand, training and supporting the
Iraqis on the other. He said we may need to shift the balance between
the two missions. That is not unlike the recommendations of the Iraq
Study Group which were released today.
That commission delivered to the President a series of
recommendations.
In just a short time, in about 2 hours, the Senate is expected to
confirm Dr. Gates as the new Secretary of Defense with an overwhelming
bipartisan vote.
Those two developments today provide an opportunity to change the
course in Iraq. Of course, the ultimate responsibility is on our
Commander in Chief, the President of the United States. On November 7,
the American people spoke out clearly of the need for change.
Dr. Gates was an original member of the Baker-Hamilton group and
agrees that change is necessary. Today, that group confirmed the need
to change our policy and lay out a framework to redeploy American
forces. Redeployment means basically removing them from the dangers of
Iraq, placing them nearby to be called on if necessary but, more
importantly, starting to bring them home. Only the Commander in Chief
can make that happen.
The President has said he is not looking for a graceful exit from
Iraq. I would have to say that America should be looking for the right
exit from Iraq. The President was asked a few months ago: When will
American troops come home? He said he would have to leave that decision
to future Presidents. I don't believe America wants to see troops in
Iraq facing the dangers of war for the next 2 years and for many years
beyond. We believe we have done a great deed for the Iraqi people in
removing their dictator and giving them a chance to have their own
constitution and their own government. Now it is time for the Iraqis to
stand and defend their own nation.
According to the Iraq Study Group, the most professional and
proficient military in history has been stretched to the breaking point
because of repeated deployments to Iraq. As of today, I have been given
an updated figure: 2,907 American service men and women have been
killed and 21,000 have been wounded. We have about 140,000 troops in
Iraq today. We certainly owe it to these soldiers, these brave men and
women and their families to initiate this redeployment process as
quickly as possible.
The war in Iraq impacts our defense posture worldwide. Because of
Iraq, we have fewer options to respond to emerging threats in this
dangerous world.
In thinking about the war in Iraq recently, like many others I was
struck by how many comparisons there are to the situation of Vietnam
four decades ago. There are many differences, but there are many
parallels.
In October of 1964, running for President, Lyndon Johnson said:
We are not about to send American boys nine or ten thousand
miles away from home to do what Asian boys ought to be doing
for themselves.
In 1969, 5 years after that statement, there were over half a million
American troops in Vietnam.
That same year, Johnson's successor, President Nixon, who had run on
a campaign that he had a secret plan to end the war, said:
[[Page S11271]]
I'm not going to be the first American president to lose a
war.
Well, both Presidents made a series of decisions that prolonged and
expanded that war at enormous cost to our Nation. We have only to walk
just a few blocks from this Capitol to the Vietnam Memorial to see the
real cost of that war.
Perhaps like Presidents Johnson and Nixon, the Bush administration
has gone through several phases on this war. First was the time of
deception, when we were told there were weapons of mass destruction
that did not exist, a link with al-Qaida that did not exist, and other
claims about nuclear capabilities that did not exist.
Next came the phase of denial, where the President and some of his
key advisers refused to recognize or adapt to the realities on the
ground, dismissing the first signs of insurgency. You recall, I am
sure, as I do, Vice President Cheney saying the insurgency is in its
last throes, and denying its growing strength as we have seen the
casualties in Iraq mount by the day. Then they downplayed and denied
the outbreak of sectarian violence that now seems, for all intents and
purposes, a real civil war.
The third phase has been delusion. The President apparently continues
to delude himself about Iraq. I hope this Iraq Study Group will be a
turning point in his thinking.
For example, in a phrase that cannot help but remind us of Katrina
and FEMA Administrator Brown, President Bush recently said of Prime
Minister al-Maliki: He is the ``right guy for Iraq.'' What a contrast
from the memo by the President's National Security Adviser, Stephen
Hadley, which said:
The reality on the streets of Baghdad suggests al-Maliki is
either ignorant of what is going on, misrepresenting his
intentions or that his capabilities are not yet sufficient to
turn his good intentions into actions.
When asked in October if we were winning in Iraq, President Bush
said:
Absolutely, we're winning.
When Robert Gates was asked that question yesterday in his
confirmation hearing, he said very clearly: No.
That gives me hope that with this Gates nomination and with this Iraq
Study Group report we may have turned the corner. The Nation cannot
afford deception, denial, or delusion when it comes to the situation in
Iraq. Certainly, our soldiers and their families deserve better. They
deserve change.
We will now have a much needed change in the Pentagon. I know Members
on both sides of the aisle are eager to work with the new Secretary to
make more changes. But, ultimately, it is the President's
responsibility. The buck truly stops in the Oval Office. If the
President recognizes the urgent need for a new direction in Iraq, we
will see it happen, and soon.
The Baker-Hamilton commission has given the President a call to
action, a roadmap to engage in broader diplomacy, to transfer
responsibility to the Iraqis, and to redeploy American combat forces.
I hope President Bush, with the assistance of his new Secretary of
Defense, Mr. Gates, will begin that redeployment process this January.
Consider our challenge. The Baker study group said we should have,
basically, the combat forces of America gone by April 1 of 2008. With
about 140,000 or 150,000 15 months before that date, we need to start
seeing redeployment happen, and happen soon. Nothing could send a
clearer signal to the Iraqis, the American people, and the world that
we are truly moving down a new road in Iraq.
Mr. President, I yield the floor and suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Martinez). The clerk will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. CORNYN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. CORNYN. Mr. President, I wish to take a few minutes to speak on
the nomination of Robert Gates to be Secretary of Defense. It is my
honor to serve under Chairman John Warner on the Senate Armed Services
Committee. We are particularly proud of the fact that 1 out of every 10
persons in uniform in this country, or serving around the world, calls
Texas home. So we are very proud of the military. We are pro-military.
We believe in doing everything we can to support our men and women in
uniform and particularly their families.
So it is with great joy that I say the President has chosen someone
who currently serves as President of Texas A&M University to be the
next Secretary of Defense. Even though Bob Gates is from Kansas
originally, he has most recently become a Texan--at least we claim him
because he has been living in College Station as President of Texas A&M
these last few years.
I particularly commend the President for his selection and Mr. Gates
for answering the call, once again, to public service. He is not a new
face in this town. Having served as Director of the CIA, having served
on the National Security Council, he has a distinguished record of
public service. He has written extensively on military intelligence and
matters of diplomacy.
My meetings with Dr. Gates, preliminary to the hearings we had this
week on the Armed Services Committee, gave me great confidence that he
is of the temperament and ability to lead the Department of Defense in
what has to be the second most difficult job in Washington, DC; that
is, to deal with an agency with the budget of about a half-trillion
dollars a year and to perform what is the most important priority of
the Federal Government: provide safety and security to the American
people. That is a responsibility not only here at home, obviously, but
literally all around the world.
On the matter of Iraq, which was the subject matter of most of the
questions and comments of the committee during Dr. Gates' confirmation
hearing, I think he understands the challenges that face us in Iraq and
why it is that we must succeed. As he told me, and as he testified at
the hearing, a failure in Iraq would lead to increased activity by al-
Qaida, as well as regional instability in the Middle East. It could
even lead to a regional--I think he used the term ``conflagration,''
where additional States that are not currently involved in the conflict
in Iraq could find their interests at stake and could resort to
military force. First, dealing with al-Qaida, and the result of a
failed state in Afghanistan after the Soviet Union left there in 1989,
ultimately led to the rise of the Taliban and gave Osama bin Laden a
place to plot, plan, train, and then export terrorist attacks around
the world, including in Washington, DC, and New York City on September
11. Beyond the terrorist threat, it is also clear that Iran has
aspirations that will very much put the future of Iraq in jeopardy and
our own safety in America as well.
As is widely known, Iran is primarily a Shia majority population.
Iraq is composed of roughly three ethnic divisions--Kurds, Shia, and
Sunni--and, clearly, Iran is taking advantage of the instability in
Iraq to consolidate its position with the Shia in the south, which
happens to be an oil-rich region of that nation. But, in effect, if our
precipitous withdrawal from Iraq would leave a failed state and leave
opportunities for Iranian hegemony, it would create further de facto
partitions of Iraq which could perhaps cause the Saudis, as some
leaders have suggested, to have to go into Iraq to defend the Sunni
minority against ethnic cleansing by the Shia majority, perhaps in
combination with Iran, and it would create an opportunity, perhaps, for
the Kurds to create, in effect, a separate state in northern Iraq which
would cause Turkey a lot of concerns, as has been frequently expressed.
I am pleased that Dr. Gates understands the seriousness of this
challenge that confronts our Nation. This is one that is certainly
bigger than any election or any political party because, as I said at
the outset, it represents the single most solemn responsibility those
of us who serve in the Federal Government have, and that is to provide
for the safety and security of our own people at home.
Today, as everyone knows, the Iraq Study Group issued its report, and
I am hopeful we can work together in this body with a new course in
Iraq, working with the White House. Clearly, this is a job for the
Commander in Chief. He has expressed a willingness to work with this
bipartisan Iraq Study Group and work with Democrats and Republicans in
the Congress to achieve victory in Iraq.
[[Page S11272]]
I hope Robert Gates' confirmation, his manner and temperament, one
that earned him the support of a unanimous vote on the Armed Services
Committee, will serve him well as he works on behalf of the President
and the executive branch to deal with what is certainly the most
significant challenge of our time.
I do want to, however, point out a couple of items in the bipartisan
Iraq Study Group report because, obviously, there is a lot of public
interest in it. This volume is 142 pages, and not many people have read
every single page in it. So we have a number of people highlighting
different portions of this 142-page document, perhaps a point they want
to emphasize. I have a couple of points I want to emphasize because I
think they are entirely consistent with what Dr. Gates has said during
his confirmation hearing, and these points should be made clear.
On page 66 of the Iraq Study Group report--sometimes called the
Baker-Hamilton commission report--the study group says this:
The presence of U.S. forces in Iraq is a key topic of
interest in a national reconciliation dialog.
And this is the point I want to emphasize. They go on to say:
The point is not for the United States to set timetables or
deadlines for withdrawal, an approach that we oppose . . .
I think it is important to make the point that the Baker-Hamilton
study group, the Iraq Study Group, opposes timetables or deadlines for
withdrawal.
They go on to say:
The point is for the United States and Iraq to make clear
their shared interest in the orderly departure of U.S.
forces. As Iraqi forces take on the security mission, a
successful national reconciliation dialog will advance that
departure date.
I think what the Baker-Hamilton commission is saying is that
withdrawals ought not to be based upon an arbitrary timetable, in
effect, based on domestic political considerations but, rather, ought
to be based upon security considerations--how can we best provide for
the Iraqi people to be able to stand on their own to defend themselves
and to allow the political process in Iraq to go forward where people
can trade ballots and votes for bombs and bullets.
One other point I wish to raise. I am glad to see the Senator from
South Carolina on the floor because there is a point that I know he
agrees with and certainly one I think Senator McCain and others have
advocated which I happen to believe is an option the President ought to
consider at the top of his list in terms of the course forward in Iraq.
We have heard the study by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
General Pace, at the Pentagon summarized into three options. I believe
this was done by a newspaper or perhaps within the Pentagon itself.
They summarized for the course forward to go big, go long, or go home.
Clearly, one can tell from my comments that I believe we all want our
troops to come home. We are unified and of a single mind on that point.
The question is, based on what criteria? Is it based on politics in the
Congress or is it based on security, our long-term security, not just
the Iraqis' but our security at home, lest Iraq become a failed state
and a launching pad for future terrorist attacks.
The alternative ``go long,'' I believe, was explained as reducing the
size of our forces in Iraq but basically making a multiyear commitment,
a long-term commitment to have our troops there; frankly, an
alternative that I don't think holds out much hope for success.
The American people are clearly anxious to see the situation in Iraq
be stabilized, to see some improvement, and I think that brings us to
the last choice that has been mentioned as a result of these Pentagon
discussions: Go big. Let me explain what I mean.
I mean we need to surge American troops into the capital city of
Baghdad for a temporary period of time--not a long-term or open-ended
engagement--to provide the ability to back up the Iraqis to do what we
need to do to clear, to hold, and then to build on that effort in
Baghdad, to demonstrate not only that we can provide the security
backing up the Iraqi forces, but also to create the basic security
conditions that are necessary for the Iraqis to have that national
reconciliation process to work out their differences the best they can,
and then to provide for their own defense so we can bring our troops
home.
But I want to make sure--because this is an important point--some, I
believe, have represented this Iraq Study Group Report as an
endorsement of a withdrawal of troops not based on security conditions,
and I say this report does not endorse that approach, as I indicated.
With regard to the surging of troops in Baghdad on a temporary basis,
as advocated by the Senator from South Carolina and the Senator from
Arizona, and one that I find is the only really viable alternative we
have in Iraq, the Iraq Study Group says this on page 73:
We could, however, support a short-term redeployment or
surge of American combat forces to stabilize Baghdad or to
speed up the training and equipping mission if the U.S.
commander in Iraq determines that such steps would be
effective.
My hope is the President of the United States, the Commander in
Chief, having this worthwhile report which makes clear that every
option has been looked at without regard to ideology or partisan
politics, that the report of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
consulting with the leadership at the Pentagon, together with even
Secretary Rumsfeld's memo that was recently printed, a classified memo
of all the alternatives that was recently printed in the newspaper,
that the President has all of these various options available to him to
go forward in Iraq.
I think Secretary-to-be Gates was correct yesterday when he said
there are not any secret options. Basically, we know what the choices
are with this report and the other reports that have come out. Simply
stated, there is going to be a time for choosing. That choice and the
consequences of that choice are very important because, clearly, what
we are doing now is not working in Iraq and, clearly, there are dangers
in terms of terrorist activity, in terms of Iranian ambitions, a
country that is attempting to build, in defiance of the civilized
world, a nuclear weapon.
There are tremendous risks and consequences of not getting this done
right, and the American people deserve to know not only what the risk
is, what the threat is, and the consequences of failing to live up to
this challenge, but that we are doing everything we can in a bipartisan
fashion as a nation, looking to the best minds and the best experience
this Nation has to offer, to come up with a plan or an assortment of
choices and then to give the President the opportunity to make the very
best decision he can as Commander in Chief, a position conferred upon
him by the Constitution, to lead this course change in Iraq so we do
not have a failed state which would further endanger not only that
region, but would endanger us at home.
In conclusion, those who think America can simply pull the covers
over its head and the problem will go away or they simply think we can
withdraw our troops--even in a precipitous fashion--and there will be
no consequence to it, I cite the comments of GEN John Abizaid, the head
of Central Command, who acknowledged that, yes, we could bring our
troops home before security is established in Iraq, but the enemy would
follow us here.
Mr. President, I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Mexico.
Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I be
permitted to speak on an unrelated subject for 10 minutes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. DOMENICI. And that the distinguished Senator from South Carolina
be the Senator who follows.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Energy Security
Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, just last week the price of natural gas
was at $7.79 per million Btu's. That is nearly double the price it was
2 months ago. In October, natural gas was selling for $4.01 on the spot
market. This kind of price instability it brings harms consumers, harms
businesses, is devastating to manufacturers, and is a threat to our
economy.
On August 1, 71 Senators in this Chamber cast what I consider one of
the most important bipartisan votes of the year. We voted for the Gulf
of Mexico Energy Security Act, a bill that will open 8.3 million acres
in the Gulf
[[Page S11273]]
of Mexico for oil and gas exploration. The exploration could bring an
estimated 1.26 billion barrels of oil and 5.8 trillion cubic feet of
natural gas to market over the next several years.
That oil and that gas will be American. It will be extracted from
American territorial waters, will be extracted by American companies
and American workers, and will be on the coast of the Gulf of Mexico
and will also share the royalties with the adjoining States, which has
not been done before, sharing in a different way where they get much
more of the proceeds.
That is a precedent which we have never accomplished before and which
will do us good as we look around our other States to see if we can't
do more like this effort.
The support for this bill came from my colleagues from the Northwest,
the Southeast, and the Southwest, from the Northeast and the Midwest,
from both coasts, from areas in between, and from both parties. We all
acted to stem the rising tide of energy prices--something good for our
country.
Those who voted for it and helped us with it know that the prices
continue to rise for natural gas in our homes and our businesses, and
we are awaiting the passage of this bill to stabilize prices for the
next few years as this fountain full of natural gas descends upon the
United States as a result of this new proposal and proposition in the
Gulf of Mexico between our sovereign States and the U.S. Government to
proceed with drilling. We cast that vote for families worried about
high costs of energy. We cast that vote for American businesses, large
and small, which have been hit hard by rising energy costs. We cast
that vote for manufacturers who have been forced to shut down hundreds
of U.S. plants in the last several years and for millions of American
workers who lost their jobs when their plants closed. We heard the
stories of all of these in our Energy Committee as we proceeded on this
bill.
Occupying the chair is the distinguished new Senator from Florida. He
remembers this testimony and these facts, and he anxiously waits, as I
do as chairman and he as an active Member, for the House to take up
this bill and pass it. They have a few alternatives. They can lose the
bill and drop it and let it become dead; yes, indeed. But that seems to
me to be the worst option of all. They also can pass it just like we
sent it to them, and they will have a completed bill, and nothing
further. They can affix it to any bill they choose to pass over there--
the tax extenders--and send it to us, and, of course, if that is the
case, we will have to do further work on it as it gets here. But that
will be the rule as it applies to a bill which is not exactly the same
as the one we sent them.
So we cast our votes, as I said, in the manner I have described.
Natural gas prices climbed 400 percent from 2002 to 2005. In that
time, the chemical manufacturing industry alone closed 70 plants in
these United States and plans to close 40 more, largely because of
skyrocketing prices of natural gas. We joined together, Republicans and
Democrats, to tackle that problem, and we passed, by strong bipartisan
vote, a bill that is as important a step toward tackling our energy
challenges as we have around us anywhere in either body, a small but
meaningful step toward reducing our reliance upon foreign oil.
This week I hope, and I am confident, that the House will take up our
bill. I anticipate equally strong bipartisan support from the House.
This legislation is critically important for our consumers and our
economy, for housewives and homes, and as we go down the line, we know
natural gas is the life of America, and we will add a very significant
inventory to America's large inventory, and it will be American, it
will not be imported.
The legislation is critically important. The oil resources in this
region are impressive, but vast reserves of natural gas are the real
bonanza. We believe there is natural gas in lease sale 181 and lease
sale 181 south to heat 6 million homes for 15 years--6 million homes
for 15 years. Largely because of these gas services, the Wall Street
Journal has called this bill an ``easy victory'' for the U.S. economy.
On the other side of the political spectrum, the New York Times wrote:
``This bill meets an immediate need and is a reason to drill in the
gulf.'' How can you get more than those two ends of the spectrum
agreeing and 71 Senators from both sides of the aisle voting for it?
Now I cry out today to the House: Don't go out of session without
passing the bill I have just described to you which awaits action from
you. It is simple action: just an ``aye'' vote for a simple majority,
and that is it. It will be done. This rather gigantic resource will
then become available. It is in America, sitting there waiting for
somebody to use it. It will be usable with that vote.
As I just told my colleagues, for purposes of an explanation and
elaboration, 6 million homes--6 million homes--will have their gas for
their full season for 15 years just from what we are going to do there.
What an astounding achievement if we will just complete the work by
having a vote in the House.
I was saddened to read that we continue to lose businesses because
natural gas prices are too high. The National Association of
Manufacturers estimates that 3.1 million high-wage manufacturing jobs
have been lost since 2000, largely due to inadequate supplies of
natural gas. This week, the House can join us in doing something about
that, and I urge they do whichever they see as the best way to pass it.
If they think it is best to do it freestanding and send it to us as we
sent it to them, I wish them the best. If they choose to put it on the
tax bill, I hope it will not just make it more difficult and cause the
bill to be lost in the transit to the Senate, which appears simple but
becomes cumbersome, at least once it hits the House and hits the
Senate. It is nice and easy just coming over as it is walked over, but
it is very cumbersome once it gets here. That is what would happen. It
would then be discussed and perhaps debated, and it would have to have
a vote. That is the second approach and far less desirable.
But the House can see the writing on the wall--do it now or perhaps
never do it. What a shame. Do it now and you get the benefits I have
indicated or, believe it or not, it could be that you won't get it
ever. That is just not a good way to leave for this Christmas, as I see
it, and I hope it isn't.
I thank the Senate for permitting me to speak today.
Mr. President, I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from South Carolina is recognized.
Mr. GRAHAM. Mr. President, I want to echo what the Senator from New
Mexico said. He has a very good idea, and I hope the House will act on
his recommendations.
Very briefly, I rise in support of the nomination of Dr. Bob Gates
for Secretary of Defense. I believe he is the right guy at the right
time. He has the background to be successful. I know this body will
overwhelmingly confirm him. I wish him well in his very difficult but
important task that lies ahead for the country and particularly for Dr.
Gates.
Very briefly, here is what I expect from Dr. Gates and really
everyone involved in the war on terror: a winning strategy. He said at
the hearing in one of the answers to one of the questions I posed to
him that he believed the war in Iraq was one of the central
battlefronts of the war on terror. If you believe that, as he does and
I do and the President stated, then you have to throw everything you
have at winning because the outcome in Iraq really will affect the
outcome of the war on terror. If you believe that, you fight it to win.
He also said something I thought was equally true and very candid: We
are not winning. Our military has won every battle, but the extremists
are trumping the moderates, and extremism is winning out over
moderation in Iraq because we don't have enough security in place to
allow moderation to flourish.
My question to the country is, If we all agree we are not winning,
can we all agree that we must not lose? I hope the country will rally
around the concept that losing in Iraq will be devastating to our
efforts in the war on terror. It will be devastating to forces of
moderation in the region. It will empower extremists, religious
extremists, al-Qaida, and others who have as their goal to topple all
forms of moderation in the Middle East, to drive us out of the region--
not just Iraq--and one day
[[Page S11274]]
destroy the State of Israel. If you believe it is the central backbone
of the war on terror, I hope we can come together as a people in this
country to make sure we have the resources on the ground to win.
Dr. Gates said that we did not have enough troops after the fall of
Baghdad to bring about security. I think everybody believes that now.
If General Shinseki was right and we needed 200,000 to pacify the
country and secure the country after the fall of Baghdad, what has
happened in the intervening months and years to require less troops?
Nothing. It is far worse today in Baghdad than it was a year ago when I
last visited. I was there on election day in December. People were
walking around voting, very happy, very upbeat. Now people are afraid
to go outside, and their children are under attack when they go out for
the most simple things.
So I do hope that not only will he take over this job and start over
with the Congress and the American people, that he will commit himself
to winning this war, and the way to win, in my opinion, is to provide
security so the political process can be successful. No Prime Minister,
no historical figure or great politicians of the past could bring about
a democracy in Iraq with this level of violence. It is chicken-and-egg
stuff to me. You cannot have a political solution until you control the
violence. When you have a high-crime neighborhood, you don't send in
less police, you send in more. Our mistakes in the past have come back
to haunt us. We have never had enough troops. The situation on the
ground has gotten out of control. I do believe we can control it with a
surge of American troops.
The goal is to come home, but the goal is victory. History will judge
us not by when we left but what we left behind. The consequences of
winning or losing in Iraq are central in the war on terror, and we have
no other option, in my opinion, other than to win. The way to win over
extremists is you stand boldly with moderates, and the way you win
against people who could care less about humanity is to embrace the
better parts of humanity and show the people who are trying to drive us
out of Iraq that their agenda will lose to a better agenda, that their
idea is second to ours.
People in the Mideast are dying for their freedom. People in Iraq are
dying for their freedom. If you become a judge in Iraq, they try to
kill your family. If you are a politician in Iraq, they don't say bad
things about you, they try to kill your family. Let's stand with the
moderate forces in Iraq. Let's make sure we win this war which is
central to the war on terror, and the only way I know to win a war is
to fight it with overwhelming force.
Mr. President, I yield the floor.
Change of Vote
Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I wish to correct my vote on rollcall
271, the motion to waive the Congressional Budget Act point of order on
Senate amendment No. 5205.
I am recorded as ``yea'' to waive the Budget Act point of order. It
was my intent to uphold the point of order. Therefore, I ask unanimous
consent that the record be changed so I will be recorded as voting
against the motion to waive the budget point of order. The record
should reflect my vote as ``nay'' on amendment No. 5205. It would not
change the outcome of the vote.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Coburn). Without objection, it is so
ordered.
Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the clerk will call the
roll.
The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. MARTINEZ. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order
for the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. MARTINEZ. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to speak in
morning business for 5 minutes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. MARTINEZ. Mr. President, I rise this afternoon first of all for
the purpose of agreeing with my colleague from South Carolina and
previously my colleague from Texas, both distinguish Senators who spoke
in favor of the nomination of Dr. Gates to be our next Secretary of
Defense.
I intend to support his nomination. I believe he has served our
country well in the past, and we are fortunate that he is willing to
step into a difficult position at a very difficult time in our history.
I intend to support him. I commend the Armed Services Committee for
their show of unity and bipartisanship in unanimously supporting his
nomination. I hope there will be a strong vote in support of Dr. Gates
as he heads into this very difficult assignment.
I think it is important we note today two other things--one, the need
for us to look at this problem in Iraq with a sense of bipartisanship,
with a sense of unity as Americans, putting aside the stripes we
usually wear as Democrats and Republicans and looking at this problem
as Americans concerned about a difficult problem, one that has taxed us
but one in which we must succeed.
Today the President received the report of the Iraq study commission,
a group of distinguished Americans who came together to give us
recommendations. I commend the President for not only accepting their
report but also highlighting how clear he was and the seriousness that
will be given to the recommendations it makes.
Lastly, I wish to also take a moment to commend and thank Secretary
Rumsfeld for his service to our Nation. I had the pleasure of meeting
Secretary Rumsfeld when I was very inexperienced in the ways of
Washington, a person from Florida, and I came here to serve in the
President's Cabinet. During the time of the transition into this
administration, I met Secretary Rumsfeld as we jointly prepared for our
confirmation hearings before the Senate and proceeded to our jobs in
the Cabinet. I came to know and appreciate this great American patriot,
a man of incredible intellect and talent but also incredibly dedicated
to our Nation. I came to truly appreciate his leadership and his skill
as he led the Department of Defense initially through the treacherous
attacks of September 11 where he, with his bare hands, was helping to
dig the injured from the rubble of the Pentagon as that building was
attacked on that unforgettable morning of September 11, 2001. I saw him
next in our immediately following Cabinet meeting when the President
asked all of us to try to pull ourselves together to help lead our
Nation at this very difficult moment. He, in a certain and clear way,
showed us a way forward and how our military would respond to the
threats to our Nation--first of all, to secure the Capitol and New York
City but then in a very clear and direct way on how to respond to those
who had plotted these attacks in Afghanistan.
He led our country into a very successful and very clear and decisive
victory in Afghanistan and then prepared our country and led us into
the war in Iraq with a very difficult and still uncertain outcome.
In all of the debate and discussions that have ensued over the last
several months about this difficult struggle in which we find ourselves
today, I think too often we have been guided by the usual bickering and
partisan politics, but not often enough do we stop to recognize a
dedicated American who has served our Nation well. I am proud to call
Secretary Rumsfeld my friend. But I am equally proud to say today that
he has served our Nation with great distinction, that our Nation owes
him a great debt of thanks and to his family as well, to his wife Joyce
and to his children for the sacrifice that all of them have made so
Secretary Rumsfeld could serve our Nation once again. At a certain age
when many of us might be looking forward to retirement, he came to
Washington once again to serve in a very difficult job and has done it
with great distinction.
I thank Secretary Rumsfeld on behalf of Floridians, and I think a
grateful nation as well, and the men and women in uniform he has led
who I know thought so much of his leadership. I know he has given so
much of himself to the transformation of our military to prepare us for
the future. I, for one, rise today with a voice of thanks to a great
American for his service.
I yield the floor and suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
[[Page S11275]]
Mr. SALAZAR. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent the order for the
quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The Senator from Colorado is recognized.
Mr. SALAZAR. Mr. President, I rise to speak on behalf of the
confirmation of Robert Gates as Secretary of Defense. When I looked at
the testimony that was offered by Robert Gates yesterday in front of
the Armed Services Committee, I was impressed by the qualities that he
was proposing to bring to the job. I want to speak to some of those
qualities this afternoon before we get to a confirmation vote on his
nomination to be the next Secretary of Defense.
First, I was impressed with his candor. I think his sense of what is
happening in Iraq and his grasp of the facts, being straightforward
with the committee and straightforward with the Senate in terms of how
he views the picture of Iraq, is refreshing. I think what it tells all
of us is that Dr. Gates will bring in the fresh eyes we need to have on
the problem in Iraq so we can hopefully develop a new direction that is
one that will work for our country. So I appreciate the candor with
which he spoke yesterday in the Senate Armed Services Committee.
Second, I was also impressed with Dr. Gates and his openness with
regard to considering all options in respect to questions that were
asked of him by members of the committee. What he said, in effect, was
that all options are on the table. He did not simply say that he had a
specific course of action or that we were going to stay the course, but
he said that everything needed to be examined. I think that is a
refreshing attitude about this major problem in the Middle East that we
have and we share as Americans today.
Third, I was impressed also by the quality of collaboration he talked
about. I think in his statement to the committee, as he talked about
working with all agencies and working with the Members of Congress, he
was saying that this is an issue in Iraq that really is a problem that
belongs to all of America. How we move forward with the issue of Iraq
is something that is going to require all of us working together to be
successful in Iraq. In so doing, I think he was making a statement that
this is not just a Republican issue; it is not a Democratic issue; it
is an American issue and we need to find a strategy and a direction for
us to be successful.
I believe when you look at what has happened in the last 4, 5, or 6
weeks in America, what we see is a growing momentum for a new direction
in Iraq. I think that new direction is set forth with a lot of things
that are happening, developing a method that will hopefully bring this
country together as we look for solutions. But let me say the Iraq
Study Group in its own study, which I know is being heralded around the
country today, starts out with a very candid assessment of what is
happening in Iraq today and is set forth in the first paragraph of the
Iraq Study Group Report. It says:
The situation in Iraq is grave and deteriorating. There is
no path that can guarantee success but the prospects can be
improved.
When this study group says that the situation in Iraq is grave and
deteriorating, there is a sense of candor with respect to what is
happening on the ground in Iraq.
I had the honor and privilege of visiting Iraq with my friend from
Virginia, Senator Warner, for whom I have tremendous respect, and
Senator Levin from Michigan for whom I also have tremendous respect,
and that was in March of this last year.
I remember my conversations with my good friend from Virginia when he
talked about how things changed in Iraq from the first time he had
visited Baghdad to the time we were there in March. The fact is things
have gotten worse with respect to the violence we saw on the ground.
How we move forward is a very important challenge that we face in
America.
I strongly believe we need to move forward in a bipartisan manner in
developing new directions for our country with respect to Iraq. I
believe we need to succeed in Iraq. I believe that getting the regional
interests involved in helping us formulate a solution is very important
and we need to continue to send a message to the Iraqi people and the
Iraqi Government that they first and foremost have the responsibility
to bring about the security that will allow their Government to
function and the people of Iraq to have peace and stability, which is
something that is very essential.
I believe we have the people and the leadership here in this body of
the Senate to be able to chart that future bipartisan direction for the
United States of America, not only in Iraq but in the Middle East. As
was appropriately pointed out by the Iraq study commission, this is an
issue that goes beyond Iraq. It is an issue that involves the entire
Middle East and how we deal with this issue.
I will quote again another wonderful friend of mine, former President
Bill Clinton, when he says, ``The eggs have been broken and now we have
to make an omelet out of it.'' Or Secretary Colin Powell, who made the
comment at one point in time that, ``We broke it, we bought it.''
We have a problem in Iraq and in the Middle East. In order for us to
meet the challenges that face us, it is going to take tremendous
bipartisanship leadership from all of us here in this body. I look
forward to working with my colleagues as we move forward on this
agenda.
I yield the floor.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I say to our distinguished colleague from
Colorado that I had the privilege of being with the distinguished
ranking member, Senator Levin, Senator Biden, Senator Lugar, Senator
Lieberman--a group of us at the White House--Senator Rockefeller,
Senator Roberts, counseling with the President on these various issues.
It was an extraordinary meeting. I have had the privilege throughout my
28 years in the Senate to be in that Cabinet Room many times, but this
was a very historic moment. The President listened very carefully to
the perspectives and views of Members of the Senate, and we had an
equal number from the House of Representatives. I am encouraged for the
future. I am looking forward to our President assessing all of the
options related to Iraq. I commended the Baker-Hamilton report during
the course of our meeting. We talked about his interim study. We talked
about the Pentagon input and the input of the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs. I am optimistic that our President is going to carefully
consider all options. But we must wait and see as he, under the
Constitution, has to make that final decision with regard to such
changes that we may have in our policy.
I thank the Senator.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senator from
Pennsylvania is allotted 20 minutes. We will have to either revise that
previous agreement or take time.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I have to say that I think, colleagues, we
must maintain the 5 o'clock voting time. A lot of Senators rearranged
their schedule. I was unaware because I happened to be away from the
floor.
I yield the floor. I thank the courtesy of the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Pennsylvania is recognized.
Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I have sought recognition to express my
support for the nomination of Robert Gates to be Secretary of Defense
and to use this occasion to comment about the proposed changes in
policy of the United States in the conduct of the war in Iraq.
When Robert Gates was nominated to be Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency in 1987 and I was serving on the Intelligence
Committee at that time, concerns were expressed, including mine, that
Mr. Gates had not been forthright in the preparation of the testimony
of then-CIA Director Casey in disclosures about what happened in the
Iran-Contra affair. Mr. Gates withdrew as a nominee for CIA Director at
that time. However, he was again nominated in 1991 by President George
H.W. Bush, and at that time I supported his nomination, thinking that
whatever mistakes Mr. Gates had made in the past, he had learned from
those mistakes.
President George W. Bush has now nominated Robert Gates to be
Secretary of Defense. I believe he is well qualified to undertake this
position. He has testified before the Armed Services Committee that he
does not intend to be a bump on a log, has asserted his
[[Page S11276]]
independence, told me in a meeting which we had last week on November
30th that he would bring a fresh pair of eyes to the situation and
would be open to change. There is no doubt that change is in the wind,
considering the memorandum which has surfaced, written by Secretary of
Defense Donald Rumsfeld the day before the election, and from comments
made by National Security Adviser Stephen Hadley, and comments made by
the President himself. It is my view that had we known Saddam Hussein
did not have weapons of mass destruction, we would not have gone into
Iraq. Once we had made the decision to go into Iraq, I think it not
advisable to withdraw and leave Iraq in a condition of instability. But
the situation there cannot go on forever, interminably, without some
limitation and without change of policy because, as Robert Gates put
it, we are not winning there and the situation is not improving there.
So there has to be some change. Precisely what that change should be is
a matter yet to be resolved, and yet to be considered. But a long list
of alternatives has been proposed in a number of quarters.
Today, the commission, led jointly by James Baker and Lee Hamilton,
has issued a report calling for some very fundamental changes. The
Rumsfeld memorandum outlines a number of alternatives.
One of the important recommendations which was made by the Baker-
Hamilton commission is that there has to be involvement by other
nations in the region, especially Saudi Arabia, with all of its wealth,
maintaining a hands-off position, and they ought to be helping to
resolve the problems there. The Baker-Hamilton commission has further
recommended that the United States engage in negotiations with both
Iran and Syria perhaps on a multilateral basis.
My own view, which I expressed in an extended floor statement last
June, is that the United States ought to negotiate directly with Iran.
I also believe we ought to negotiate directly with Syria. In my June
statement I also broadened to consideration of direct negotiations with
North Korea. As I said at that time and reiterate, as has been pointed
out, we need to keep our friends close and our enemies closer; that if
we would undertake a dialog showing respect, showing courtesy to our
opponents--we do not have to agree with them--I think that diplomacy
and dialog have an excellent opportunity to lead to a solution; and,
certainly as a matter of first impression, it ought to be what is
undertaken.
It is my hope the President will move in the direction cited by the
Baker-Hamilton commission and will go even further and engage in direct
negotiations with Iran, Syria, and North Korea.
In October, I publicly urged that changes should be made promptly and
not wait until after the election because we were sustaining so many
casualties on an ongoing basis.
On October 22, during an interview with CNN, I was asked how much
time does the Iraqi Prime Minister have to get tough to deal with the
death squads and the militias before the United States has to reassess
its strategy. I replied that I would say the time is already past.
I was encouraged by a lead story in the New York Times that day that
the administration was considering some timetables. President Bush said
in his Saturday address the day before that he was prepared to be
flexible to make adjustments, if necessary, to be victorious. I said
then that I don't believe a shift in tactics ought to wait until after
the election; that there are too many casualties; and that if we had a
better course, we should adopt it sooner rather than later.
When Senator Warner came back from a trip to Iraq several weeks
before the election and was quoted to the effect that things were going
sideways, I called him and suggested to Senator Warner and to other of
my colleagues that it might be useful and appropriate to have a joint
statement to the President as to the views that we got from our travels
to our States and from our travels generally. It was apparent to me
weeks before the election--really months before the election--that
there was an ongoing descending pattern in which the American people
were not in support of United States policy in conducting the war in
Iraq. And the public opinion polls cited in my formal statement, which
I will introduce into the Record, have shown that. The attitude of the
troops in the field--again the specifics of my formal statement had
shown that. It was my view that the will of the American people would
be expressed at the election, and in no uncertain terms repudiating
what the United States was doing in Iraq. And, of course, that did
prove to be the case.
I had been concerned back in 2002 before the vote was taken on the
resolution for the use of force as to what the United States was
prepared to do once Saddam Hussein was toppled. What were the specifics
on the evidence of weapons of mass destruction; what will be the costs
in terms of casualties; and what will happen? I was speaking in 2002
about the conflicts among the Sunnis, the Shiites, and the Kurds.
Now we have a situation where it is up to the President to make the
decision as to what will be done specifically; and that is his role as
Commander in Chief. But the Congress also has a very definite, a very
precise, and a very important role as we undertake the appropriations
process.
From time to time there are comments by Members on a wide variety of
subjects that funding should be cut off from executive operations in
order to carry out Congress' will. That is done in the appropriations
bill. When a Secretary of a given department is about to undertake
something which the Members of Congress do not like, we provide that no
funds appropriated in the bill shall be used to carry out a specific
function. There has been a suggestion that funding ought to be cut off
for the activities in Iraq. Certainly we would not cut off funding to
leave our troops in harm's way, without adequate resources to carry out
their mission. However, there may develop a congressional consensus
which would reflect the will of the American people that there needs to
be something done in Iraq, perhaps even staged withdrawals. Cutting
down funding in stages to effectuate such staged withdrawals could
accomplish congressional objectives and not leave our troops exposed,
with sufficient planning in advance.
In light of the public opposition to the way we are conducting the
war in Iraq, and very significant agreement among Members with that
demonstrated public response, there remains the possibility that
Congress could act with respect to the appropriations function to
effectuate changes. That is certainly a course which I would not like
to see happen.
It would be vastly preferable if, as a result of what has happened,
including the Baker-Hamilton commission report and what Secretary
Rumsfeld has said and the new approach of Secretary-to-be Gates--I
think he will be confirmed later this afternoon--that the President
will make a sufficient change in policy which will lead us in a better
path.
Certainly the continued presence of U.S. troops in Iraq has two major
problems--at least two major problems. First, it incites the insurgents
to attack U.S. troops; second, it allows the Iraqis to continue to rely
upon the United States to provide a defense and to provide military
protection. They do not have the motivation to increase their police
force and their military to handle the jobs themselves. The public
opinion polls cited in my prepared statement are shocking in that the
people in Iraq approve of the attacks against U.S. soldiers. We are in
a very uncomfortable position.
In essence we may be on a watershed mark today with the confirmation
of Robert Gates to be Secretary of Defense on a day when the Baker-
Hamilton report has been filed which makes recommendations for changes.
Ultimately, the President will have to make the decision.
We debated earlier this year proposals to have a withdrawal by stages
in 2007 without a specification as to what there would be. We had a
vote on withdrawal by July of 2007 which was decisively defeated,
getting only 13 votes. The temper of the country is such that there is
widespread public opposition to what is being done by the United States
by way of military action in Iraq today. We learned the bitter
experience of the Vietnam war, that we cannot conduct a war which is
unpopular with the American people, which the American people reject.
[[Page S11277]]
In voting to confirm Mr. Gates, we will see the possibilities of a
new chapter. But it is up to the President, it is up to the Commander
in Chief to structure a change in policy which will ultimately take our
troops out of harm's way, which will be done in a way consistent with
maintaining stability in Iraq to the maximum extent possible to set the
stage for Iraq to continue to develop its incipient democracy and, as
per the Baker commission report, perhaps embed troops with the Iraqi
military and the Iraqi police so they can undertake their own defense.
But that will require the change in policy with all of the options
having been presented by the variety of sources which I have cited.
I ask unanimous consent that the full text of my prepared statement
be printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
Prepared Statement of Senator Arlen Specter on the Nomination of Robert
Gates to be Secretary of Defense and U.S. Policy in Iraq
Mr. President. I seek recognition to speak about the
nomination of Robert Gates to be the 22nd Secretary of
Defense and our policy as it pertains to Iraq.
Robert Gates was first nominated to lead the Central
Intelligence Agency in 1987 by President Ronald Reagan. At
that time, I, along with many of my colleagues, held
reservations about his nomination. Specifically, I was
concerned about his role as Deputy Director of the CIA in
helping to prepare former CIA Director William J. Casey for
testimony before the Congress in which he failed to disclose
the full details of the Iran-Contra Affair. I was also
concerned about Gates' failure to recognize the possible
impropriety of diverting funds from Iranian arms sales to the
Contras. Reservations expressed by other members of the
Senate and myself reportedly led to the withdrawal of his
nomination.
In 1991, when Gates was nominated by President George H.W.
Bush to lead the CIA, I supported his confirmation. In
explaining my support for Gates on the Senate floor, I
stated, ``To the extent that Mr. Gates has made mistakes, it
is my conclusion that he has learned from them. I believe
that as a matter of his personal qualifications he is an
astute, experienced intelligence officer'' and that ``Mr.
Gates is ready, willing and able to work with the Congress,
allowing the Congress its appropriate oversight capacity.''
The majority of Senators at that time came to similar
conclusions, resulting in his confirmation by the Senate. He
served admirably as Director of the CIA for fourteen months
and is the only career officer in the agency's history to
rise from entry-level employee to Director. As was reported
in a December 4, 2006 article in the Washington Post, ``even
his critics describe it as a reasonably successful,
modernizing tenure.''
At a time when our country is engaged in a world wide war
against terror and is searching for answers on how to deal
with the simmering civil war in Iraq, President George W.
Bush has nominated Gates to replace Donald Rumsfeld as
Secretary of Defense. During his confirmation hearing, Gates
offered refreshing testimony, stressing he would ``listen
closely'' to various sources of advice, form his ``own
conclusions'', ``speak candidly'' about what needs to be done
in Iraq and that he is not returning to service to ``be a
bump on the log.''
After meeting recently with Robert Gates, I believe he
will, as he told me in our meeting on November 30, 2006,
bring a fresh set of eyes to the Department of Defense and to
U.S. policy towards Iraq. My meeting, in conjunction with my
review of his testimony before the Armed Services Committee,
has led me to conclude Robert Gates can provide competent
leadership at the Pentagon at this critical juncture in our
nation's history.
The nomination of Robert Gates to head the Department of
Defense is an opportunity to chart a new course. His personal
relationships with Secretary Rice, a former subordinate, and
his three decade relationship with National Security Advisor
Stephen Hadley, will hopefully aid the transition and provide
a new dynamic in the Administration's national security team.
It is my hope that Gates will not only bring a fresh pair of
eyes to our policy in Iraq, but also to our dealings with
regional actors such as Syria and Iran.
In 2004, Gates co-chaired a task force of the Council on
Foreign Relations that concluded that ``it is in the
interests of the United States to engage selectively with
Iran to promote regional stability, dissuade Iran from
pursuing nuclear weapons, preserve reliable energy supplies,
reduce the threat of terror, and address the `democracy
deficit' that pervades the Middle East as a whole.'' In
response to a question submitted by the Senate Armed Services
Committee on Iran, Gates expressed his belief that ``no
option that could potentially benefit U.S. policy should be
off the table'' and noted that ``in the worst days of the
cold war the U.S. maintained a dialogue with the Soviet Union
and China.'' Most recently, during his testimony before the
Senate, he confirmed the position that ``our first option
should be diplomacy'' to deal with the problems Iran poses.
I have consistently urged the Administration to work with
Iraq's neighbors, including Iran and Syria, to develop
cooperative stabilization efforts. To that end, I have
personally met with Iran's Ambassador to the United Nations
and Syria's Ambassador to the United States in an attempt to
help facilitate such an effort. I have amplified my strong
belief that dialogue with nations such as Iran and Syria,
most recently in an essay ``Dialogue With Adversaries''
published in the winter edition of The Washington Quarterly.
I ask unanimous consent that it be printed in the record at
the conclusion of my remarks.
I have supported the Iraq Study Group, an independent,
bipartisan commission led by former Secretary of State James
Baker and former Congressman Lee Hamilton which was created
by Congress in order to deliver an assessment of the
situation in Iraq and recommend strategic options for the
future. I expressed my support and interest in the work of
group to CNN on October 22, 2006: ``Let's consider the
alternatives and what Jim Baker and Lee Hamilton and his
group are thinking about, sooner rather than later.''
The Iraq Study Group report, unveiled today, recommends
that, ``Given the ability of Iran and Syria to influence
events within Iraq and their interest in avoiding chaos in
Iraq, the United States should try to engage them
constructively.'' The report also notes that, ``The United
States cannot achieve its goals in the Middle East unless it
deals directly with the Arab-Israeli conflict and regional
instability. There must be a renewed and sustained commitment
by the United States to a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace on
all fronts: Lebanon, Syria, and President Bush's June 2002
commitment to a two-state solution for Israel and Palestine.
This commitment must include direct talks with, by, and
between Israel, Lebanon, Palestinians (those who accept
Israel's right to exist), and Syria.'' I am pleased that the
Iraq Study Group considered engaging in dialogue with
regional actors and I appreciate its recommendations on how
to move forward in Iraq.
Today, the Baker Commission concluded that ``stability in
Iraq remains elusive and the situation is deteriorating.''
Yesterday, in testimony before the Armed Services Committee,
Gates candidly responded ``No, sir'' when asked if we were
winning in Iraq. One month ago to date, Secretary Rumsfeld
drafted a memorandum declaring ``it is time for a major
adjustment.'' All of these call for a change in U.S. policy.
A shift in policy in Iraq is overdue and I have long-
expressed openness to considering any and all suggestions for
a change in course. When Senator Warner returned from Iraq on
October 5, 2006, he made a public statement to the effect
that things were ``drifting sideways'' in Iraq. I called him
to express my view that I had found in my travels in
Pennsylvania and elsewhere that the people were totally
opposed to the way the United States was conducting the war
in Iraq.
I expressed my concern to Senator Warner that we were
heading for an election debacle in the face of public
opposition to the way we were handling the war in Iraq if
modifications were not promptly made. I consulted with a
number of my colleagues in the Senate about jointly advising
the President of such concerns. There was a consensus that we
not do so on a joint basis. I then had an extended telephone
conversation with Presidential adviser Karl Rove to express
my misgivings.
Later that month, I publicly urged that changes should be
made promptly and not wait until after the election because
we were sustaining so many casualties on an ongoing basis. On
October 22, 2006, during an interview with CNN, I was asked:
``How much time does the Iraqi prime minister, Nouri al-
Maliki, have to get tough to deal with the death squads, the
militias, before the United States has to reassess its
strategy?'' I replied: ``I would say . . . that the time has
already passed. I was encouraged by a lead story in the New
York Times today that the Administration is considering some
timetables. President Bush said yesterday in his Saturday
address that he's going to be flexible and would make
adjustments if necessary to be victorious . . . We have James
Baker saying that there are alternatives besides staying the
course and cutting and running. I don't believe that a shift
in tactics ought to wait until after the election. There are
too many casualties there. If we have a better course, we
ought to adopt it sooner rather than later.''
I believe that had we known Saddam Hussein did not possess
weapons of mass destruction, the Congress would not have
authorized the invasion of Iraq. I told CNN on September 24,
2006, that, ``By hindsight, we operated on faulty
intelligence. And I think, had we known that Saddam Hussein
did not have weapons of mass destruction before the war was
started, I think the odds are very strong that it wouldn't
have been started.'' However, we entered that country and we
must to do everything in our power to not leave it in a
condition that will continue to precipitate violence.
Prior to the U.S. invasion of Iraq, I publicly stated my
concerns about the potential fallout from such action. On
February 13, 2002, I took to the Senate Floor to express my
belief that there should be a comprehensive analysis of the
threat posed by Saddam Hussein and what an invasion would
amount to in terms of U.S. casualties: ``We need to know,
with some greater precision, the threat posed by Saddam
Hussein with respect to weapons of mass destruction . . .
[[Page S11278]]
There also has to be an analysis of what the costs would be,
some appraisal in terms of casualties . . . Then there is the
issue as to what happens after Saddam Hussein is toppled.''
Eight months later, on October 7, 2002, I returned to the
floor to again express my concerns: ``What happens after
Saddam Hussein is toppled has yet to be answered in real
detail.''
``What was the extent of Saddam Hussein's control over
weapons of mass destruction? What would it cost by way of
casualties to topple Saddam Hussein? What would be the
consequence in Iraq? Who would govern after Saddam was
toppled? What would happen in the region, the impact on the
Arab world, and the impact on Israel?''
``In previous briefings, I have sought the administration
plan as to what will be done after Saddam Hussein is toppled,
and I think that is an area where a great deal more thought
needs to be given. The situation in Iraq would obviously be
contentious, with disputes between the Sunnis and the
Shi'ites, with the interests of the Kurds in an independent
state, and it means a very long-term commitment by the United
States.''
Nonetheless, now that we are there, I feel we should give
the Iraqis an opportunity to solidify a democratic government
and do our best to establish the capabilities of Iraq's army
and police forces to provide adequate security. However,
continuing violence and instability have made it apparent
that Iraq is in a state of civil war and that the current
policies of the U.S. and Iraqi governments need to be
reassessed. I believe the recent resignation of Secretary of
Defense Donald Rumsfeld and decision by Iraqi Prime Minister
Nuri al- Maliki to speed transition of security
responsibilities to Iraqi forces signal that the
Administration and Iraqi government are ready to make
changes.
The United States cannot prosecute a war which does not
enjoy the support of the American public. The election
results and other evidence demonstrate that the American
people do not support the war in Iraq. Support has dwindled
with those serving on the front lines. According to a
February 28, 2006 Zogby poll, 62 percent of Americans believe
that things are going badly in Iraq. Furthermore, 72 percent
of troops serving in Iraq favor a pull out within the year.
How much longer can we continue to prosecute this war that
has become increasingly unpopular both with the American
public and our troops? As I warned my colleagues on the
Senate Floor on February 13, 2002: ``We have seen the bitter
lesson from Vietnam that we cannot prosecute a war without
the public support.''
There is a broad consensus that our policy in Iraq is not
producing the desired results. A change in course is mandated
not only because of the events on the ground but by the
collective voice of the American people who spoke out during
the November elections. The situation has reached a critical
mass as we have recently seen the National Security Advisor,
the Secretary of Defense and the President all recognizing a
change is needed and, furthermore, indicating change will be
forthcoming.
I commend President Bush's decision to ``look at new
ideas'' and ``broaden the aperture of the debate'' as
National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley stated on Meet the
Press on December 3, 2006. The following day, the President
stated that he is ``not satisfied with the pace of progress
in Iraq.''
Further evidence that change is needed came from the
Administration's point person and architect of U.S. action in
Iraq, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, in a November 6,
2006 memorandum: ``In my view it is time for a major
adjustment. Clearly, what U.S. forces are currently doing in
Iraq is not working well enough or fast enough.''
National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley confirmed that
U.S. policy needs retooling when he restated the President's
position, ``that what is going on in Iraq is not going well
enough or fast enough'' and that ``some of those changes are
going to be significant.''
Most importantly, the incoming Secretary of Defense, in
response to a question posed by Senator Levin, the incoming
Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, ``Are we
winning in Iraq?'' Robert Gates responded, ``No, sir.''
The Iraq Study Group Report states that the ``primary
mission of U.S. forces in Iraq should evolve to one of
supporting the Iraqi army, which would take over primary
responsibility for combat operations. By the first quarter of
2008, subject to unexpected developments in the security
situation on the ground, all combat brigades not necessary
for force protection could be out of Iraq.'' I support this
recommendation and I am pleased that President Bush,
according to his National Security Advisor, is ``looking
forward to the report'' and that he ``wants to listen to
Republicans and Democrats in Congress.'' I would respectfully
suggest that the President heed the work of the Iraq Study
Group and the opinions of Congress.
From time to time, there are comments by Members that we
should cut off funding for executive operations to carry out
Congress's will. Certainly, we would not cut off funding to
leave our troops in harm's way without adequate resources to
carry out their mission. However, there may develop a
Congressional consensus on staged withdrawals if the
President does not initiate such a plan himself. Cutting down
funding in stages to effectuate such staged withdrawals could
accomplish Congressional objectives and not leave our troops
exposed with sufficient planning in advance. In light of
public opposition to the way we are conducting the war in
Iraq and widespread agreement among Members with the public
response, there is a significant possibility that Congress
would act to curtail expenditures to effectuate staged
withdrawals.
During a April 27, 2005 Defense Appropriations Subcommittee
hearing, I expressed my concern over federal spending
priorities directly to Secretary Rumsfeld: ``There is a lot
of disquiet out there among the people as to what is
happening in Iraq and disquiet as to what is happening to our
discretionary budget. I chair a subcommittee which is
responsible for education and health care and worker safety,
and it's been cut by almost a full percent and with the
inflation factor, I'm about $7 billion short. And that makes
it very, very tough to sell when you have NIH and health-care
program and Pell grants and education.'' I reiterated my
concern in a May 19, 2005 letter to Sec. Rumsfeld: ``There is
considerable angst in my state, and I suspect generally in
the country, concerning the cost of our military operations
in Iraq, especially when compared to the cuts in domestic
discretionary spending.''
Giving the Iraq government a virtual blank check on our
staying there is counter-productive in at least two important
respects: First, it encourages the insurgents to violence
against our troops there and against other Iraqis. Second, it
encourages the Iraqis to continue reliance on our presence
there to defend their stability.
Our presence in Iraq incites violence which results in
increased U.S. and Iraqi deaths. On September 24, 2006, I
told CNN, ``that the war in Iraq has intensified Islamic
fundamentalism and radicalism . . . That's the focal point
for inspiring more radical Islamic fundamentalism.''
According to the Department of Defense's Manpower Data
Center, 99 U.S. soldiers were killed in support of operations
in Iraq in October 2006. This represents the most U.S.
casualties in a month since November 2004.
Not only are U.S. troops being attacked on a regular basis,
but such action appears to be acceptable to the very populace
we are attempting to aid. According to a September 27, 2006
USA Today article, ``About six in 10 Iraqis say they approve
of attacks on U.S.-led forces, and slightly more than that
want their government to ask U.S. troops to leave within a
year, a poll finds.'' Further, The Washington Post reported
that a survey conducted by the State Department revealed two-
thirds of Iraqis in Baghdad favor an immediate withdrawal of
U.S. forces.
According to the USA Today article, ``About 61 percent
approved of the attacks--up from 47 percent in January. A
solid majority of Shiite and Sunni Arabs approved of the
attacks, according to the poll.'' Furthermore, ``Three-
fourths say they think the U.S. plans to keep military bases
in Iraq permanently.'' A consolidation of bases, as suggested
by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, in conjunction with
an indication to begin removing U.S. forces from Iraq, would
aid in alleviating this concern and potentially reduce
attacks.
Our presence, with no indication of departure, has allowed
the Iraqis to rely too heavily on the U.S. for security and
has not spurned them to stand up an organic security
capability. The Administration has deemed the rapid creation
of an effective Iraqi fighting force as key to stabilizing
Iraq and expediting the eventual withdrawal of U.S. forces.
The rationale for this effort is that a well-trained, well-
equipped Iraqi army can be effective in quelling the
insurgency and can help smooth the process of restoring full
and real sovereignty to the Iraqi government.
According to the Congressional Research Service, forty
percent of total U.S. appropriations for reconstruction--
nearly $14 billion--are aimed at building Iraqi security
forces. Most of these funds--$10.5 billion--have been added
since September 2004, as the security situation remained
unstable and efforts to train forces appeared inadequate.
According to the State Department, in mid-October 2006, there
were 128,000 trained and equipped conventional Iraqi police
and 129,700 army forces. Officials have stated that 325,000
security forces are needed to defeat the insurgency. In all,
about 312,400 security forces are currently defined as ready
for action.
However, various reports indicate that many fewer could be
said to be capable of the most demanding jobs. During the
past three years, poorly trained and equipped security
forces, no-shows and desertions, dismissals of police for
criminal behavior, bribe-taking for obtaining higher rank or
for release of insurgent suspects, and infiltration of police
and other units by sectarian militia groups have threatened
U.S. plans to increase security using Iraqi personnel.
I am optimistic that the Iraq Study Group's report will
usher in a new tone in the Iraq debate--one that will move
away from the extremes of ``cut and run'' versus ``stay the
course.'' I am hopeful that the convergence of this report
and a set of fresh eyes leading the Department of Defense
will produce an atmosphere allowing candid discussions on our
policy resulting in a pragmatic shift in our course.
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld provided the impetus
for change. In his November 6, 2006 memorandum ``Iraq--
Illustrative New Courses of Action'' he suggests one option
for the President to consider is to ``Begin modest
withdrawals of U.S. and Coalition forces (start ``taking our
hand off the
[[Page S11279]]
bicycle seat''), so Iraqis know they have to pull up their
socks, step up and take responsibility for their country.''
On October 22, 2006, I told CNN: ``The Unites Sates is
going to insist on a timetable from Iraq that we're not going
to be the guarantors forever . . . I like the report in the
[New York] Times . . . that the administration is considering
timetables to tell the Iraqis that they're going to have to
take a larger role in their own security, that they're going
to have to show some progress no sectarian violence, and
maybe even further consideration of the option of dividing
Iraq into three segments, Shiite, Sunni and Kurd, so these
warring factions will be less likely to kill each other''
The report issued by the Iraq Study Group states ``the
United States should significantly increase the number of
U.S. military personnel, including combat troops, imbedded in
and supporting Iraqi Army units. As these actions proceed, we
could begin to move combat forces out of Iraq. `` I concur
that a phased withdrawal of combat forces is the best course
of action at this juncture.
I am cognizant of what a premature departure may lead to in
Iraq. The Iraq Study Group concluded that, ``Because of the
importance of Iraq, the potential for catastrophe, and the
role and commitments of the United States in initiating
events that have led to the current situation, we believe it
would be wrong for the United States to abandon the country
through a precipitate withdrawal of troops and support.
In an interview with CNN on November 12, 2006, I concurred
by stating, ``We don't want to withdraw if we're going to
leave chaos. Troop withdrawals are definitely in the offing,
but it's a military decision to determine when there's
sufficient military force in the Iraqi army and in their
police to maintain stability.''
U.S. forces should not remain in Iraq any longer than
necessary. Iraqi government forces will ultimately be
responsible for securing their country. As ever increasing
numbers of Iraqi security forces are trained and able to
conduct operations on their own, U.S. forces should gradually
redeploy. According to NSA Stephen Hadley, Prime Minister
Maliki has said ``that his goal is to be able to take
responsibility of the security of his country middle of next
year.'' I would suggest that we hold Prime Minister Maliki to
his pledge and work to ensure that Iraqis are able to stand
up and provide security.
It is my hope that the President will respond to the strong
public reaction evidenced in the election results and
widespread opposition by Members of Congress to our current
military activities, the Baker Commission Report, the Gates
testimony and the Rumsfeld memorandum to change the direction
of our military efforts in Iraq. As Commander-in-chief under
the Constitution, the President has the options and
additional information to modify our military action in Iraq
to meet these concerns.
It is imperative that the United States change the course
in Iraq and I am optimistic that the confirmation of Robert
Gates will be the starting point for that action.
I yield the floor.
Mr. SPECTER. I further ask unanimous consent that an essay which
Christopher Bradish and I published in the current issue of the
Washington Quarterly which goes into some greater detail about my own
views as to the advisability of bilateral talks with Syria and Iran, as
well as North Korea, be printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
[From the Washington Quarterly, Winter 2006-07]
Dialogue With adversaries
(By Arlen Specter with Christopher Bradish)
Facing serious dangers from nuclear weapons from Iran and
North Korea, the United States should be willing to negotiate
bilaterally with those two nations. Success in diffusing
these threats will require multilateral assistance from other
world powers, but our willingness to treat Iran and North
Korea with dignity and respect could go a long way in
disarming those nations militarily and diplomatically.
My Senate assignments on the Intelligence Committee and
Appropriations Subcommittee on Foreign Operations have
provided me the opportunity to meet with Syrian President
Hafiz al-Asad, Palestinian Chairman Yasser Arafat, Iraqi
President Saddam Hussein, Cuban President Fidel Castro,
Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez, and others.
Those meetings have shown me that people are people, even
at the highest levels of government. They are interested in a
candid dialogue. They accept differences and disagreements as
long as the tone is courteous. Regrettably, the worldwide
``ugly Americans'' reputation is encouraged, in my opinion,
by our unwillingness to at least meet and talk one on one
without preconditions.
Sun-tzu's advice to ``keep your friends close and your
enemies closer'' is a good admonition to keep in mind as we
approach our relationships in the world. Admittedly, it is
difficult to accord respect and dignity to countries such as
Iran and North Korea, whom we have branded as part of the
axis of evil. President Ronald Reagan invited Soviet leader
Leonid Brezhnev to a dialogue weeks after labeling the Soviet
Union the ``Evil Empire.'' It may not work, but it is
certainly worth a try when the stakes are so high and our
other strenuous efforts are not bearing fruit.
Perhaps irrelevant, my first assignment as assistant
district attorney in Philadelphia was interviewing inmates
for commutation of sentences to life imprisonment from death
in the electric chair for first-degree murder. That
experience taught me that you can have a meaningful dialogue
with anyone.
Iran
There is no doubt that Iran has been trying to flex its
muscles since 1979 when the Shah was deposed. Iran is a proud
nation with a rich history. In asserting its right not to be
restrained in developing nuclear technology, Iran seeks to be
a world power, and its leaders think that status and respect
can be achieved by becoming a nuclear power. A good starting
point for U.S.-Iranian relations would be to treat them as
equals for the purpose of negotiations. It does not give them
the same status as being a nuclear power, but it could be a
good step forward if mighty America would treat them with
respect while negotiating.
I have tried to visit Iran since the Iran-Iraq War ended in
1988. I have not yet succeeded. For many years, however, I
have reached out to Iranians such as the former ambassador to
the United Nations in New York, Seyed Muhammad Hadi Nejad
Hosseinian, and his successor, Muhammad Javad Zarif, in an
effort to foster an exchange of visits by Members of Congress
to Iran and Iranian parliamentarians to the United States to
try to open dialogue between our two countries. I thought my
efforts finally came to fruition in January 2004 when plans
were made for U.S. members of Congress to meet with Iranian
parliamentarians in Geneva. Unfortunately, Tehran later
rescinded the invitation, declaring it was ``not on their
agenda.''
Terrorism, military nuclear capabilities, energy, Iraq, and
the Israeli-Palestinian dilemma are all major issues
confronting the United States and the world. All of these
challenges are intrinsically linked with Iran, and none can
be addressed or resolved without an appreciation for Iran's
role in each. Undertaking this venture will not be easy, but
in the words of Ambassador L. Bruce Laingen, the senior U.S.
official held hostage in Tehran for 444 days, ``Diplomats
should talk, even with our foes. That's what we do. It
doesn't make sense for us not to talk to the Iranians. I'm
not saying that I would confidently predict a breakthrough,
but there must be some sort of dialogue.''
The Problem with Outsourcing Foreign Policy
The United States has responded to Iran's challenge by
correctly recounting Iran's dubious nuclear behavior and
disregard for the international community but has avoided
direct dialogue with Tehran. I commend the
administration's change in course, deciding to deal with
Iran through multilateral talks, and view it as
confirmation that a change in our tactics is overdue.
Prior U.S. policy committed to dealing with Iran via the
UN Security Council and the Europeans. Prospects are dim,
however, for garnering support from China and Russia for a
UN resolution with teeth. Russia's and China's significant
energy, military, and political interests restrict their
ability to support tough action against Iran and represent
a significant barrier to a successful resolution vis-a-vis
the UN.
Although the Europeans are supportive of tough action
against Iran, some are hesitant to continue down a path on
which they feel the United States is not fully committed and
not an active partner. Germany, France, the United Kingdom,
the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and UN
Secretary General Kofi Annan have all indicated that the
United States needs to be directly engaged in the Iranian
effort. My colleague, Senator Chuck Hagel (R-Neb.), in his
May 8, 2006, Financial Times op-ed, highlighted the
importance of U.S. involvement: ``U.S. allies will support
tough action against Iran only if they are confident the U.S.
is serious about achieving a negotiated, diplomatic solution.
Continued unwillingness of the United States to engage Iran
will make other states hesitate to support, and possibly
oppose, these tougher measures.''
Periodically, I read that military options are some of
these tougher actions that may be considered to confront
Iran. Although the option should not be removed from the
table, military engagement will do nothing to solve the
litany of problems between our nations. We should only
consider going to war when we have exhausted all options.
Today, we are not there. In that light, I commend President
George W Bush for his May 24, 2006, statement that ``our
primary objective is to solve this problem diplomatically.''
I believe diplomatic options remain, and it is precisely
these options that can prevent conflict.
Why has it taken so long to consider talking to the Iranian
regime? Richard Armitage, former deputy secretary of state,
told Time in a May 22, 2006, article that ``it appears that
the Administration thinks that dialogue equates with
weakness, that we've called these regimes ``evil'' and
therefore we won't talk to them. Some people say talking
would legitimize the regimes. But we're not trying to change
the regimes, and they're already legitimized in the eyes of
the international community. So we ought to have enough
confidence in our ability as diplomats to go eye to eye with
people--even though we disagree in the strongest possible
[[Page S11280]]
way--and come away without losing anything.''
To be certain, we find ourselves in this position in no
small part due to Tehran's deceit and arrogance toward the
international community. Nevertheless, U.S. policy toward
Iran has played into the hands of President Mahmoud
Ahmadinejad and the hard-line radicals in Tehran. Although
the extent of Ahmadinejad's power remains unclear, the U.S.
administration's discussions of regime change and refusal to
rule out using nuclear weapons against the Iranian regime
have bolstered its position. Such U.S. rhetoric, coupled with
other policies, enhances Tehran's ability to tap
nationalistic sentiments to solidify support for a nuclear
weapons program, effectively taking the focus away from its
constituents' discontent with failed domestic policies, most
notably Ahmadinejad's poor stewardship of the economy. To
some degree, we are the distraction buttressing his position.
In this perfect storm, Ahmadinejad's rise on the wave of oil
revenues and growing global discontent with U.S. policies has
afforded him the forum, confidence, and leverage to challenge
the United States and the international community.
Deciphering and Reaching beyond Tehran
It is still unknown what level of power and influence
Ahmadinejad holds within Iran. Some accounts indicate that
Iran's elite, and even some hardline officials, are critical
of Ahmadinejad's aggressive handling of the nuclear issue,
whereas others report that he has amassed significant power.
Nevertheless, it is important to remember that much of the
power in Tehran does not rest with the president, but with
Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and the mullahs.
Khamenei installed Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, an
advocate of rapprochement with the United States, as chairman
of the Expediency Council, a senior position as arbiter
between the legislature and constitutional court. Rafsanjani,
Ahmadinejad's adversary in the 2005 election, is thought to
have been given the position to act as a counterweight to
Ahmadinejad. Some accounts suggest that Rafsanjani has taken
an increased profile in Iranian diplomacy, a move not likely
done without the coordination and approval of Khamenei.
Despite the many factions within Iran's leadership,
Ahmadinejad, former president Muhummad Khatami, Khamenei, and
Rafsanjani all advocate a nuclear Iran. In addition, although
Rafsanjani is considered to be a relative moderate, he has
still labeled Israel as ``the most hideous occurrence in
history,'' which the Muslim world ``will vomit out from its
midst.'' Regrettably, these are the views held by those with
whom we must engage.
Notwithstanding Iran's leadership, we must constantly
remind ourselves of those over whom they rule. The United
States should effectively communicate our desire for a
prosperous Middle East, free of tyranny and oppression, that
respects human rights and rule of law and where
governments represent and ref1ect the desires of those
they govern. Further, we should be frank when conveying
our concerns and those of the world to the Iranian people
over specific problems threatening peace and security.
Nearly three-quarters of Iran's 70 million people are
under the age of 30. Placing our disagreements with Iran's
leadership aside, not letting these people know what we
stand for and what we value would be irresponsible. The
United States should focus on this emerging population and
those who yearn for increased freedom and reform.
According to the Washington Institute for Near East Policy,
a 2002 poll conducted by the Majlis, Iran's legislature,
revealed that three-quarters of Iranians favored
rapprochement with the United States and that nearly one-half
believed U.S. policy was ``to some extent correct.'' In
typical Iranian fashion, the two pollsters were later
sentenced to nine years for ``publishing nonscientific
research.'' It is precisely examples such as this that fuel
disdain amongst Iranians for their leadership. Bush
poignantly illustrated the plight and underscored the hopes
of the Iranian people in a July 12, 2002, statement: ``The
people of Iran want the same freedoms, human rights, and
opportunities as people around the world. Their government
should listen to their hopes. * * * As Iran's people move
towards a future defined by greater freedom, greater
tolerance, they will have no better friend than the United
Stares of America.''
When Ahmadinejad or any Iranian leader calls into question
the virtue and value of liberal democracy, we should respond
by touting its successes. We should talk about our commitment
to rule of law, individual liberties, and freedom of press
and speech. Are not freedom of speech, press, and association
liberties that the Iranian people would enjoy? Would those
incarcerated in Iran for criticizing the government not wish
to be freed? Most importantly, liberal democracy has better
arguments than theocracy, and we should not shy away from
this debate. Perhaps a crash course in the history of
authoritarian failures would be the best place to start.
An Opportunity for Dialogue
The concept of dialogue with Iran is not unfamiliar to this
debate. Both sides have previously taken one step toward the
table and one step back. Reports indicate that, in 2003,
Iran, with the blessing of Khamenei, secretly proposed talks
with the United States on Iraq and Iranian nuclear ambitions.
That same year, the United States offered to send a high-
level delegation to Tehran following the earthquake in Bam,
only to be rebuffed by Iran. Unfortunately, this tentative
shuffle never amounted to anyone sitting down at the table at
the same time.
There are some indications, vague as they may be, that
Tehran may again be interested in establishing dialogue with
Washington. For example, on May 8, 2006, Ahmadinejad sent an
18-page letter to Bush. Following that letter, USA Today
reported that Ali Larijani, Iran's top nuclear negotiator,
said in a television interview that I ``[p]erhaps, it could
lead to a new diplomatic opening. It needs to be given some
time.'' Further, according to Time, a senior Iranian official
described the letter as being designed to offer ``new ways
for getting out of the current, fragile international
situation.''
Muhammad Nahavandian, a close adviser to Iran's top nuclear
negotiator, was reportedly in the United States for a few
weeks during that same month. According to Newsweek, he told
Robert Malley, a former Clinton administration official, that
Khamenei was eager to broaden Tehran's tentative cooperation
with Washington on Iraq and other subjects and that he was
``putting out feelers.'' In addition to these developments, I
agreed with Bush's decision to authorize the U.S. ambassador
to Iraq, Zalmay Khalilzad, to engage in discussions with
Tehran, even if they were initially restricted to Iraq. In
time, it is my hope that such discussions will lead to a
broader dialogue.
What is most significant in our recent dealings with Iran
is the offer for dialogue and how the offer in itself
outweighs any terms set by either side. Although Tehran
responded to our interest in joining talks by dismissing our
conditions that enrichment be suspended, the offer clearly
had an impact. On June 2, 2006, Saeed Laylaz, an Iran analyst
living in Tehran, confirmed these sentiments to the
Washington Post: ``The fact that [Secretary of State
Condoleezza] Rice has announced the United States'
willingness to hold talks with Iran is more important than
the conditions she set.'' The administration's decision to
consider dialogue has had a great impact in moving our
countries closer to resolving our issues. As reported in that
Washington Post article, ``Javad Vaeidi, the Iranian Supreme
Council's deputy head for international affairs, agreed that
the United States' overture was, in itself, a positive
step.''
The consequences of an Iran with nuclear weapons would be
grave. Tehran does not seem willing to cease uranium
enrichment voluntarily or submit to the IAEA. The Europeans
are running into walls in the form of China and Russia in the
UN Security Council, and it is apparent that the UN has not
been able to alter Iran's behavior. It is precisely Iran's
ambitions that may drive regional powers such as Egypt,
Turkey, and Saudi Arabia to pursue nuclear ambitions. The
Middle East is already a volatile neighborhood. The phrase
``adding fuel to the fire'' does not approach describing
what the introduction of nuclear weapons would mean, not
only for the fate of the region but for the world.
The United States is not to blame for Iran's devious and
deceptive behavior, nor their arrogance and defiance of the
international community. I have called on the international
community to act aggressively in dealing with Iran's
involvement in the crisis in southern Lebanon. As I stated on
the floor of the U.S. Senate on July 20, 2006, ``The United
Nations ought to call Iran and Syria on the carpet to explain
their conduct in backing Hezbollah, in providing personnel to
do more than train Hezbollah, more than advisers being
integral parts of the military offensive of Hezbollah.''
Twenty-seven years of silence broken only by a few
whispers, however, has not worked and has left us in the
dangerous predicament in which we find ourselves today. All
the while, the United States has been watching from the
sidelines. Something has to give. Current U.S. policy does
not include direct talks with Iran with no preconditions.
Perhaps it is time to stop passing notes to Tehran via the
Swiss and to sit down and start talking.
North Korea
Just as the United States has been criticized by its
European allies for not dealing directly with Iran, we have
encountered similar criticism from Russia, China, and South
Korea for not directly engaging North Korea. It is clear, as
pointed out by John McLaughlin, former deputy director of the
Central Intelligence Agency, that ``the North seems sure to
engage us. It could be across a table. It could be with the
consequences of its negative behavior or its own ability.''
The United States should focus on the table in hopes of
preventing the consequences.
Today, North Korea exists in the dark, both literally and
figuratively. The regime of Kim Jong-il actively pursues an
unsupervised and unregulated nuclear program. This program
and its long-range missiles pose a grave threat to regional
security and represent a hostile posture toward the United
States. Meanwhile, the 23 million residents of North Korea
remain among the poorest and most repressed in the world.
A satellite photo taken of the earth at night reveals
lights across much of the populated world. Yet North Korea,
with the exception of a tiny dot denoting Pyongyang, is
totally black. Ironically, this blank spot is symbolic for
just about everything about
[[Page S11281]]
this country. It is a massive blind spot with very little
known in the United States or elsewhere about exactly what is
going on inside its borders. Even Kim's nuclear progress was
unverified until recently.
What we do know, as Esther Pan of the Council on Foreign
Relations observes, is that North Korea has ``developed a
nuclear arsenal of an estimated six to eight nuclear weapons
and continued to enrich nuclear fuel; removed its nuclear
program from all international treaties, obligations, and
safeguards; decided when to negotiate and when to drop out,
and then set the terms for returning to negotiations; [and]
steadily increased the amount of unconditional aid it
receives from international sources,'' including more than $1
billion from the United States over the last 10 years. On
October 9, 2006, North Korea claimed to have conducted an
underground nuclear test. Given this disconcerting state of
affairs, it may be appropriate for the United States to deal
directly with North Korea.
I commend the administration for enlisting North Korea's
neighbors to engage Pyongyang. Regrettably, that regime has
refused to return to the six-party talks with China, Japan,
Russia, South Korea, and the United States. On May 17, 2006,
I was pleased to read in the New York Times that ``Bush's top
advisers have recommended a broad new approach to dealing
with North Korea that would include beginning negotiations on
a peace treaty, even while efforts to dismantle the country's
nuclear program are still under way.'' As reported, such a
deal would be contingent on North Korea returning to the six-
party talks, something I hope the North will do. Regardless,
it is possible to address North Korea both in multilateral
and bilateral fora.
On June 1, 2006, Pyongyang extended an invitation to the
United States for talks, which Washington declined. This may
have been an opportunity worth taking. As Kevin O'Neill and
David Albright conclude in their book, Solving the North
Korea Nuclear Puzzle, ``Serious misunderstandings, missed
opportunities, and false expectations have often plagued the
U.S.-North Korean relationship.'' In my opinion, dialogue is
one way to avoid these pitfalls in the future.
The problems in our bilateral relationship do not end with
North Korea's nuclear ambitions. North Korea's human rights
record is deplorable. The Department of State reported on
March 8, 2006, that ``the government's human rights record
remained extremely poor, and the regime continued to commit
numerous serious abuses. The regime [has] subjected citizens
to rigid controls over many aspects of their lives.'' The
report cited extrajudicial killings, arbitrary detention,
life-threatening prison conditions, torture, and forced
abortions and infanticide, as well as denial of freedom of
speech, press, religion, assembly, and association. The North
is one of the world's preeminent counterfeiters and has long
been suspected of trafficking drugs. While we work to quell
the North's desire to be a nuclear state, we must not simply
trade resolving the nuclear issue for another nefarious vice.
A repressed, corrupt, and hungry North Korea is not a
healthy, stable, and secure North Korea.
The complexities in our bilateral relationship with Iran
and North Korea are different. On both accounts, however, we
have failed to grasp the correlation between U.S. policy and
nationalism and how it leads to support those in power. U.S.
saber rattling and threats of regime change have permitted
unsavory leaders in each nation to incite nationalist
sentiments, leading them to strengthen their grip on power.
As Henry Kissinger wrote in his May 16, 2006, Washington Post
op-ed, ``Focusing on regime change as the road to
denuclearization confuses the issue.'' I would go one step
further and submit that it hinders our ability to
denuclearize either North Korea or Iran. Hostile rhetoric and
disengagement will not move us closer to the negotiating
table nor a solution.
Dialogue, Even with Foes, Can Be Constructive
Involvement in foreign policy matters is a time-honored
role for members of the Senate and one in which I have
enjoyed participating during my quarter century in this body.
Active involvement in these issues by members of the Senate
is not meant to supplant the roles of the president,
secretary of state, or their designees. Our foreign policy
priorities are set by the executive branch.
Yet, my own experiences in this area, even with leaders
such as Arafat or Saddam and on issues such as human rights
with China, have convinced me that maintaining a dialogue and
allowing cooperation in areas of common interest, even with
our most pronounced foes, should be one of our nation's
priorities because of its potential to yield positive
results. I offer my own experiences, having traveled to 95
different countries, including Syria, Cuba, and Venezuela, as
examples of why I believe maintaining an active dialogue and
open lines of communication preserve the potential to find
peaceful solutions to resolve differences with our
adversaries.
My first opportunity to promote dialogue in the face of an
international crisis came in the spring of 1982 when serving
my first term. Following a Saturday radio address by Reagan,
which noted that the Soviet Union and the United States had
enough nuclear weapons to destroy the other, I proposed a
Senate resolution calling for a summit between the leaders of
each nation. Relying on the doctrine of mutually assured
destruction was not a sufficient way to provide security for
either nation. The obvious solution to this standoff was to
have a negotiated arms control agreement.
Upon calling for a vote on my resolution during
consideration of the annual Department of Defense
authorization bill, I was sharply challenged by Senator John
Tower (Tex.), a fellow Republican and chairman of the Armed
Services Committee. Citing my short tenure, Tower questioned
my authority and knowledge on the issue. Senator Paul Laxalt
(R-Nev.), one of the first members to vote, supported my
resolution. Tower told Laxalt, ``Specter's trying to tell the
president what to do.'' He replied, ``Well, what's wrong with
that? . . . Everyone else is too, but Specter's right.''
Following a lively debate, after which Tower was confident
his position would prevail, my resolution was adopted by a
vote of 90-8. It did not produce immediate talks between the
United States and the Soviet Union, but it showed the support
of the Senate for dialogue and may have given a little
impetus for the summits during the 1980s.
Syria
I first traveled to the Middle East in 1964. In the
intervening 42 years, I have made 24 trips to the region
before and after election to the Senate. Since 1984, I have
visited Syria 15 times, had nine lengthy meetings with Asad,
attended his funeral on the only congressional delegation to
Syria in 2000, and met with his son and successor, Bashar al-
Asad, on three occasions. I have spent much of my time in the
region shuffling between Damascus and Jerusalem, which led me
to coin the term ``shuffle diplomacy,'' similar perhaps to
Henry Kissinger's ``shuttle diplomacy,'' to describe my
efforts to bring resolution to issues confronting these
neighbors.
In 1988 I urged Asad to permit Syrian Jewish women to
emigrate because the limited number of Jewish men in Syria
presented them with limited opportunities for marriage. Asad
resisted, citing that Syria was ``at war'' with Israel and
that emigration had the potential to strengthen Syria's
enemy. I continued to press this issue in subsequent meetings
with him. As I reported in an article I wrote for the New
York Post in 1994, after I continued to press the issue,
``Asad responded with a romantic offer that he would allow
any Jewish woman to leave when a suitor came to Syria and
took her to the United States to marry. That offer was
relayed to the active Syrian Jewish community in Brooklyn and
elsewhere.'' Ultimately, Syrian policy was altered to permit
Jews to emigrate.
As a result of my many lengthy conversations with Asad, we
developed a congenial relationship. In August 1995, I told
Asad that when Yitzak Rabin, Shimon Perez, and Arafat
received the Nobel peace prize for the Oslo accords, if Asad
made peace with Israel, he too would be honored. Asad replied
by laughing, saying that he might be well received in
Stockholm but probably would not be permitted to return to
Damascus. Nevertheless, I continued to urge Syria to
participate in discussions with Israel in hopes of
alleviating tensions between the two neighbors.
Asad had initially rebuffed offers to open talks with
Israel, stating that Syria would only participate in talks
sponsored by all five permanent members of the UN Security
Council. Israel was opposed to this format, believing that
only the United States would support Israel in such
negotiations. When I pressed Asad on this issue again in
1990, he indicated that he had changed his position on the
proposal and that Syria would be willing to participate in
meetings organized by the United States and the Soviet
Union. As I reported in a floor statement, this change was
significant because it appeared to be part of a broader
Syrian initiative. ``In our January 1989 meeting, I asked
on three separate occasions, separated by respectable
periods of time, what it would take for Syria and Israel
to become friends. President Asad answered, after a third
query, that it was not a question of friendship, but that
`normalizing' a relationship between Syria and Israel
might be possible under certain circumstances.''
I relayed this offer to Israeli Prime Minister Yirzhak
Shamir, who was ``surprised'' and ``pleased'' with Asad's
overture. One year later, in October 1991, Syria participated
in the Madrid peace conference cosponsored by Washington and
Moscow. Although the three days of talks did not yield a
peace agreement, the summit marked the first bilateral talks
between Israel and Syria. It is preferable to have the
Syrians, Lebanese, Jordanians, Israelis, and Palestinians
airing their grievances over coffee at a negotiating table in
Spain than through violence in the streets of the Middle
East.
Five years later, during my 1996 visit to the region, I
served as a line of communication between Jerusalem and
Damascus. Prior to my visit, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin
Netanyahu indicated that his government would hold Syria
accountable for the actions of Hizballah along the Lebanese
border. This caused Syria to realign its troops in a posture
hostile to Israel, resulting in a dramatic rise in tensions
between the two countries. On one side, Syria's four-million-
man army amassed, and on the other side lay Israel's
sophisticated and combat-tested military of 1.5 million.
On August 27, 1996, I met with Netanyahu in Israel. During
my report to the Senate, I informed my colleagues that ``Mr.
[[Page S11282]]
Netanyahu said he wanted to begin peace negotiations with his
Arab neighbors,'' that he ``was eager to get to the
negotiation table with Syrian President Asad,'' and that he
``asked me to carry a message to President Asad, whom I was
scheduled to meet with the next day.'' The following day, I
traveled to Damascus and met with Asad for three and a half
hours. As I reported in a floor statement, ``I conveyed
Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu's message that Israel had
only peaceful intentions toward Syria, that both sides should
move immediately to reduce military tensions, and that Mr.
Netanyahu wanted to reopen direct negotiations between Israel
and Syria.''
Asad did not seem interested in the offer and told me that
``Syria would not go back to the table until Prime Minister
Netanyahu reaffirms the land-for-peace basis of negotiations,
and agrees to pick up where Israel's Labor Government left
off.'' Asad further asked me to convey that Syria's troop
movements along the border were routine and not intended to
threaten Israel. I returned later that evening to meet with
Netanyahu and relayed Asad's comments that the military
action on the border was not to be interpreted by Jerusalem
as aggressive.
Upon my return to the United States, I met Walid al-
Moualem, Syrian ambassador to the United States, to get an
update on the situation between Syria and Israel from his
perspective. As reported in a floor statement at the time,
``Ambassador Al-Moualem told me that his government viewed my
August round of talks between Prime Minister Netanyahu and
President Asad as having been helpful in deescalating the
dangerous tensions . . . and the Ambassador encouraged me to
return to the region for another round of meetings aimed at
helping the parties find a basis to reopen their peace
negotiations.'' Moualem later told me that I had ``gained the
trust and confidence and personal relationship with President
Asad'' because I was ``objective'' even though ``nobody could
question [my] support of Israel.'' I later received a similar
suggestion from Netanyahu during a phone conversation.
As a result of this encouragement, I returned to the region
three months later, in November 1996. During my November 20
meeting with Netanyahu, he informed me ``that tensions with
Syria [have] been reduced since the August/September time
period and that he wants to continue to de-escalate the saber
rattling. He asked me to convey this and specifically that
Israel has no aggressive intent against Syria.'' Netanyahu
also told me to tell Asad ``that he wishes to [reopen peace
talks] as soon as possible and that he is ready, willing, and
able to be personally involved in such talks.''
I flew to Damascus after my meeting with Netanyahu to
transmit the message to Asad. As reported in a floor
statement, ``President Asad did generally seem to share Prime
Minister Netanyahu's desire to continue to ease and avoid
military tensions which could lead to unintended hostilities.
. . . Asad received this portion of Prime Minister
Netanyahu's message positively and reiterated his own return
message to the same effect.''
Seven years later, on my 2003 trip to the Middle East,
Prime Minister Ariel Sharon denounced Syria's harboring of
terrorist organizations and its support for Hizballah in
Lebanon. I asked him if he would be willing to enter into
peace negotiations with Damascus, brokered by the United
States, similar to those in which Prime Minister Rabin had
participated in the 1990s. He acquiesced with the
assurances that there would be no preconditions. I
conveyed his response directly to President Bashar al-Asad
three days later. Asad responded favorably, saying he was
willing to participate in peace talks with Israel. He said
he did not think it appropriate to conclude a treaty
before Israel and the Palestinian Authority had reached a
final settlement but that Syrian-Israeli talks could
proceed on a separate track. Although other events in the
region have eclipsed this opportunity, I believe we should
continue aggressively to advocate peace between these
nations so its failure does not become the lead story
tomorrow.
Cuba
My experience with Syria provided an opportunity to reduce
hostility between a U.S. adversary and one of our allies. My
travels have also included three trips to Cuba and meetings
with Castro since June 1999, most recently in August 2005.
These sessions have given me the opportunity to understand
how our nations' confrontational history has been viewed from
the perspective of Cuba's leader. They have also proven to me
that it is possible to find some areas of common ground, even
with our most ardent foes. In time, it is my belief that
small cooperative efforts can help to break down the barriers
that divide us, leading to expanded cooperation and better
relations.
Since the early 1960s, Cuba has been viewed as a Communist
stronghold 90 miles off the coast of Florida. The Cuban
missile crisis, suspicions of Cuban complicity in the
assassination of President John F Kennedy, and rumored
assassination attempts on Castro by the CIA have complicated
our relationship. As a result, U.S. policy has consisted
largely of isolating the island nation through comprehensive
economic sanctions. During my first meeting with Castro in
1999, we talked about a number of the issues that have
divided our countries for so long. I was particularly
interested to hear him speak on the assassination of Kennedy
because of my work as an assistant counsel on the Warren
Commission. As I reported in a floor statement, Castro
``maintained that the Cuban government played no role in the
assassination, and that it would have been insane for it to
have become involved, given that the United States, by his
reckoning, was looking for provocation or pretence to invade
Cuba. . . . President Castro was relieved that the Warren
Commission concluded Cuba was not involved with Oswald.''
On the Cuban missile crisis, Castro related how Premier
Nikita Khrushchev had mistakenly revealed to him a promise by
Kennedy to withdraw U.S. missiles from Turkey and Italy. As a
result, Castro was told, Moscow would breach its agreement
with Havana by removing its own missiles from Cuba, leaving
the island vulnerable to a U.S. invasion in Castro's view.
Castro saw a bright side to the Soviet withdrawal. As I
reported in a floor statement, Castro stated, ``We preferred
the risk of invasion to the presence of Soviet troops,
because it would have established [the] image [of Cuba] as a
Soviet base.''
Prior to that first meeting with Castro, I had examined the
records of the Church Committee and found that there was
evidence of eight or nine attempts by the United States to
assassinate him. When presented with this number, Castro
scoffed and said the actual number was more than 300. When
asked how it felt to be the subject of so many attempts on
his life, he responded by asking if I had a sport. When I
told him I was a squash player, Castro retorted that
``avoiding assassination is a sport for me.''
In all of my three meetings with Castro, I pressed him on
Cuba's deprivation of human rights and the failure to have
contested elections. I also met with a delegation of human
rights activists, many of whom had been jailed for expressing
anti-Castro sentiments. As I reported in a floor statement,
``Having just come from a meeting with dissidents, I pressed
Castro to release the political prisoners in his jails.
Castro tried to shift the topic of conversation from his
prisoners by bringing up the case of five Cubans convicted of
spying in the U.S. whose convictions were recently
overturned.'' In reply, I suggested to Castro that ``far from
being an example of American wrongdoing, this kind of fair
process is exactly the type of justice he should be offering
to his own people. I also pressed Castro to open his country
to democracy and dissent. He listened, but my exhortations
obviously had no effect.'' I conveyed to Castro that if the
Cuban government initiated some reforms on democratization or
freedom of speech, U.S. policymakers would be more favorable
to modifying trade policy toward Cuba.
These meetings have left me with the conviction that,
before giving consideration to any modification of the U.S.
embargo, relations between our two countries can be
immediately strengthened in areas such as drug interdiction
in the Caribbean and medical research. I proposed to Castro
the possibility of U.S.-Cuban cooperation in drug
interdiction efforts. Cuba occupies a strategic location for
combating the flow of drugs from Latin America to the United
States and could be very helpful to U.S. law enforcement
efforts. In 1999, Castro said, ``[W]e are willing to
cooperate''; and as I reported in a floor statement, he
``suggested a formal relationship with the United States in
order to make progress on drug interdiction in efforts in the
area.'' In my view, this remains an offer the United States
should not only accept but robustly support.
To that end, I have introduced amendments to provide
funding for such collaboration in the foreign operations
appropriations bills each year since fiscal year 2001. I have
been successful in convincing my Senate colleagues to support
the provision. Regrettably, the House of Representatives was
insistent on dropping the language because of anti-Cuban
sentiment among a number of House members, which was
supported by the Speaker of the House. Yet, when there were
more material issues involved, such as farm trade, Congress
was supportive.
Nonetheless, at my insistence, the FY 2002 Foreign
Operations Appropriations Conference Report, H.R. 2506,
included a provision directing the secretary of state to
report on how U.S. counternarcotics assistance to Cuba would
decrease the flow of drugs in the region. In July 2002, the
State Department reported that, ``should Cuba make increased
seizures and arrests, it could help impede the drug traffic
through the Jamaica-Cuba-Bahamas corridor.''
Another area in which closer relations may be mutually
beneficial is medical research. Scientists in Cuba have shown
promise in developing a meningitis B vaccine. During my visit
to Cuba in January 2002, I met with a team of researchers at
the Finlay Institute in Havana, which entered into a
cooperative agreement with GlaxoSmithKline in 1999 to develop
this vaccine. Based in part on what I learned from these
conversations, I remain convinced that a better relationship
with Cuba and the erosion of existing barriers would benefit
both countries.
Venezuela
After traveling to Havana last year, I had the opportunity
to meet with Chavez on August 17, 2005. It is clear that the
United States and Venezuela are at odds over many different
issues, but there are areas of interest, such as drug
interdiction, where our two countries can work together.
These common interests can perhaps serve as a catalyst to
construct a dialogue on our differences.
On August 7, 2005, 10 days before I arrived, Chavez
suspended cooperation with U.S.
[[Page S11283]]
counternarcotics officials after accusing U.S. Drug
Enforcement Administration agents of conducting intelligence
operations. Prior to my meeting with Chavez, all efforts by
the U.S. ambassador to Venezuela to secure meetings with
high-level Venezuelan officials to resolve the dispute had
been unsuccessful. After being briefed on the situation by
our diplomats in Caracas, I met with Chavez and requested
that he direct his ministers to meet with the U.S.
ambassador. As I reported in a t100r statement, ``At the
conclusion of our meeting, President Chavez agreed that it
would be useful for his Foreign Minister and Minister of
Interior to meet with our Ambassador the following week to
try to resolve [U.S.-Venezuelan] differences on drug
enforcement.''
After our discussion on narcotics policy, Chavez further
suggested that consideration ought to be given to forging a
new drug interdiction agreement. Although the State
Department's ``2006 International Narcotics Control Strategy
Report'' determined that Venezuela can no longer be certified
as an ally in the war on drugs, the report noted that
continued U.S. work with Venezuelan law enforcement: led to
record cocaine seizures in 2005. The report also states that
the United States is committed to renewing cooperation with
its Venezuelan counterparts at all levels in the war on drugs
in 2006.
During our meeting, Chavez expressed his concern about
statements from the United States portraying Venezuela as a
destabilizing force in Latin America. Specifically, Chavez
mentioned comments made in Peru by Secretary of Defense
Donald Rumsfeld in which the secretary referred to Chavez as
``a guy who seemed like a comic figure a year ago [that] is
turning into a real strategic menace.'' I responded by
calling on both sides to cease the harsh rhetoric that I
believe is counterproductive to enhancing our bilateral
relationship. On August 19, 2005, I wrote to Rumsfeld,
stating that ``I believe there is a window of opportunity at
this time to resolve the disagreement on drug interdiction
policies'' and that ``it may well be helpful to, at least,
have a moratorium on adverse comments on Venezuela.''
Talking Pays
These examples highlight but one senator's efforts to forge
a dialogue with foreign leaders. The full weight of the White
House and our diplomatic corps can accomplish much more. I
encourage the administration to authorize more dialogue with
those we consider combative or enemies. The United States
will be in a better position when it is engaged in long, hard
diplomatic slogs than military conflicts.
It is clear that isolation has not been successful on many
fronts. It did not prevent Saddam from repressing his people,
it has not crushed the government of Castro, and it certainly
does not appear to be working in dealing with Chavez,
Ahmadinejad, or Kim. It has been my experience that dialogue,
even with pronounced foes, can lead to constructive results.
This is particularly true if the conversation starts on areas
of common interest and works up to the main areas of
disagreement. Such an investment takes time and hard work to
see results on our most critical national security interests.
The United States should treat each country and its
leaders, no matter how horrific their views, with some form
of dignity and respect for their sovereignty. The United
States, perhaps more than any other nation in history, has a
great capacity to serve as a conduit of peace. It is my hope
that we take every opportunity to ensure this capacity is not
wasted.
Mr. SPECTER. I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Rhode Island.
Mr. REED. Mr. President, I rise to express my support for Dr. Robert
Gates to be the next Secretary of Defense. Dr. Gates is poised to take
an extraordinarily difficult job at one of the most dangerous times in
U.S. history. He will face a number of pressing problems. Clearly, the
most pressing problem facing Dr. Gates is determining the next step of
U.S. operations in Iraq.
Today the Iraq Study Group released its report. It begins:
The situation in Iraq is grave and deteriorating [and]
there is no path that can guarantee success.
The study group makes a series of recommendations that are strikingly
similar to the Levin-Reed amendment that was offered last June. These
recommendations include engaging Iraq's neighbors, including Iran and
Syria, encouraging the Iraqi Government to increase their efforts to
bring security to their people, reconciliation and governance reforms
to their nation, and the transition of the mission of our troops from
combat operations to training; also, the recommendation that there be a
complete redeployment of most of these combat forces by the beginning
of 2008.
These recommendations are realistic but they are also very difficult
and, I presume, not well liked--at least initially--by this
administration. Evaluating and implementing these recommendations will
be the daunting but necessary task of Dr. Gates.
Dr. Gates also needs to focus his attention on Afghanistan, the
initial and proper focus on the war on terror. Reports make it
increasingly clear that we are losing ground. The Taliban has regrouped
and rearmed. This spring, they mounted the toughest resistance since
2001. Suicide attacks, which were once unknown in Afghanistan, have
more than doubled this year. Lieutenant General Eikenberry, formerly
the commanding general of Combined Forces Command Afghanistan, believes
the fiercest fighting yet will be next spring.
NATO'S International Security Assistance Force has assumed control of
forces in Afghanistan, but this force is only at 85 percent strength.
Almost 5 years after the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan, only half of the
money pledged by the international community to rebuild Afghanistan has
been delivered and spent. Sixty percent of the country is still without
electricity, 80 percent without potable water, and the unemployment
rate is 40 percent. Without viable alternatives, residents of
Afghanistan return to what ensures they will survive and,
unfortunately, in many cases, that is growing poppies.
Last week, the U.N. and World Bank released a report stating that
poppy cultivation increased 59 percent and opium production by 49
percent over the last year. It concludes that international efforts to
combat opium production, which includes $400 million in U.S.
counternarcotics funding, have failed. Dr. Gates will have to pay
immediate attention to these issues in Afghanistan, a linchpin in our
war against terror.
One of the unintended consequences of U.S. operations in Iraq is the
enhanced strategic position of Iran. With the election of Iranian
President Ahmadinezhad, the nation has become increasingly belligerent
to the United States and Israel, a key ally of the United States. The
Iranians continue to press for what they describe as a nonmilitary
nuclear program. Despite the threat of international sanctions, they
are developing their ability to enrich uranium, a necessary step for
both a civilian nuclear program and a military weapon. The fear, which
I believe is justified, is that with access to enriched uranium in the
context of a nuclear power program, the Iranians would be unable or
unwilling to avoid the temptation to use this material to construct a
nuclear device.
Then there is North Korea, the actions of which have also become
increasingly belligerent over the last 2 years. They have walked away
from the agreed upon framework, ejected international inspectors, and
now likely have enough plutonium to build 10 nuclear weapons. On the
4th of July they provocatively tested a long-range missile. The test
was a failure, but it underscored their determination to challenge the
international community. Finally, on October 9, they tested a nuclear
device.
I argue that Iranian and North Korean nuclear aspirations raise the
most serious strategic issues we face today. If these countries are not
checked, then there is a significant probability of a regional arms
race.
All of these international engagements, all of these international
challenges, are creating enormous strains on our military, particularly
our ground forces. Recent studies have shown that two-thirds of our
Active-Duty Army and more than two-thirds of the National Guard are
rated as ``nondeployable'' ``noncombat ready'' principally because of
equipment shortages. This is a shocking and scandalous record.
This administration has allowed two-thirds of our Army forces to
essentially be denied the equipment--in some cases, the personnel--to
be fully represented for combat. Virtually every active brigade not
currently deployed is not prepared to meet its mission if called upon.
One of the reasons these brigades are not ready is because of
equipment shortages. Over a year ago, the Army estimated that in order
to reset equipment being used in theaters of operation, it will require
approximately $12 billion in funding every year of ongoing operations
until 2 years after operations cease in Iraq and Afghanistan. The
Marines have been slowly coming back from a $16 billion reset, but they
still need $3 billion to draw even and will still incur annual
operating costs.
[[Page S11284]]
Besides equipment, the Army and Marines must worry about their
personnel. The present Active-Duty Army end strength is approximately
504,000. About 400,000 soldiers have done one tour of combat duty, and
a third have deployed twice. In order to meet recruiting goals, the
Army has increased the maximum age for enlistment and lowered the
physical, academic, and ethical standards. To meet retention goals, the
Army has implemented stop loss measures and offered increasingly large
reenlistment bonuses. There are presently 184,952 Active and Reserve
Marines on duty. Over the past 4 years, 169,558 have been deployed, a
significant number of Active and Reserve Marines. This operational
tempo simply cannot be sustained. Again, Dr. Gates will have to address
this issue or risk the future health of the Army and Marine Corps.
Dr. Gates also faces extraordinary budget challenges. The fiscal year
2007 Defense Appropriations Act was $366 billion, the largest Defense
bill in history. Still, it is not enough. The Army's share of the
fiscal year 2007 budget was $98.2 billion. Secretary Rumsfeld set the
Army's fiscal year 2008 budget at $114 billion, an increase but
insufficient. In response, Army Chief of Staff GEN Peter Schoomaker
took the unprecedented step of refusing to submit the 2008 budget plan
by the August 15 deadline. General Schoomaker has determined in fiscal
year 2008 the Army needs $138.8 billion just to continue to operate.
Again, it is an unprecedented step in which a Chief of Staff, a
uniformed officer, would not submit his budget to the Secretary of
Defense.
The Navy, which is not significantly involved in the Iraqi and
Afghanistan theaters, is still key to our foreign presence around the
world. Today's Navy fleet numbers 278 ships. The Chief of Naval
Operations' 5-year shipbuilding plan calls for new ship construction
with necessary funding of $14.1 billion beginning in fiscal year 2008
and rising to $19.1 billion in fiscal year 2012. This is a huge number,
but without this critical funding our fleet will be in jeopardy. And,
again, the Secretary of Defense has to respond to this request by the
Chief of Naval Operations.
All of this is in the context of the regular budget. But as we all
know, we have been funding operations in Afghanistan and in Iraq
through supplementals. To date, $495 billion has been appropriated
through these supplementals for our efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq.
Press reports indicate that the Pentagon is preparing a new
supplemental. The request is in the range of $127 to $150 billion just
for an additional year of operations in these theaters of war.
There are several problems with these supplementals. They contribute
directly to our Nation's deficit, which is $248 trillion. They do not
allow the military to effectively and efficiently plan for the
maintenance of troops, equipment, and operations because none of this
spending can be counted upon in terms of the exact number and the
timing of the passage of the supplemental. The supplementals, as large
as they are, still are insufficient. The Army, even with supplementals,
is citing billions of dollars in shortfalls, particularly with respect
to equipment resets. They will not last forever, since I can
anticipate, we all can anticipate, the reaction of the American public
to another request for $100 billion or more.
Finally, when the supplementals do cease, either totally or in
significant numbers of dollars, the Army and Marine Corps will still
have troops and equipment in the field, with no funding. They will face
a precipice, if you will: They still have a responsibility, they still
have the personnel, they still have the equipment, but where is the
funding? These are extraordinary problems that Dr. Gates is facing,
most of them a direct result of poor decisions made by the
administration and the Department of Defense.
Most of these issues were raised with Dr. Gates in yesterday's
confirmation hearing. Although there were some issues that Dr. Gates
did not yet have in-depth knowledge of, he was frank in his responses
and open to the ideas and open to the advice of all who asked him
questions.
For months, I and many of my colleagues have called for a change in
our course in Iraq and in the rest of our foreign policy. I believe
that Dr. Gates is a signal of that change. I do not believe that he is
invested in the decisions, many of them bad, that have been made in the
Department of Defense over the last 5 years. I also believe he will
have a completely different management style from Secretary Rumsfeld,
allowing civilians and military personnel to speak more freely. I
believe these differences will allow honest, albeit difficult,
discussions to take place and changes to be made.
I have had the opportunity to get to know Dr. Gates over the past 5
years. I have found that he is a thoughtful, experienced, and realistic
voice on foreign policy. He is a good listener, and I think he will
draw on a cross-section of views when making decisions. I commend him
for leaving private life and a job he clearly loved to take on a very
public job that will be thanklessly demanding.
Perhaps the most difficult task that Dr. Gates faces is bringing
unvarnished reports of bad news to a President and inner circle who do
not like to hear such things. However, I believe that Dr. Gates has the
stature and the wherewithal and the will to do what needs to be done.
The months ahead are going to be difficult, not only for Bob Gates
but also for our military. However, I have confidence that Dr. Gates
will be an able leader and, therefore, I will support his nomination
and wish him well in a very daunting task.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Florida.
Mr. NELSON of Florida. Mr. President, while my colleague from Rhode
Island is here, I want to ask him a couple questions. He is my friend,
and he is one of the truly knowledgeable Members of the Senate on
matters having to do with the defense of our country.
With all the things that the Senator has outlined, which are
certainly true--the lack of equipment; the wearing out of equipment;
the fact that some of our troops went into Iraq and did not have the
proper equipment, even body armor; the fact that, as the Senator has
stated, the recruitment goals are not being met; the fact that more and
more of the load is being put on the Reserves and the National Guard,
which is taking particularly the National Guard away from its initial
responsibility with regard to the States--my question to the Senator
would be, since these two Senators were quite impressed with the candor
of Dr. Gates, is he going to be able to make a difference in his advice
to the President? Will the President listen?
Mr. REED. Mr. President, I think the Senator from Florida has put his
finger on a critical issue, perhaps the most critical. I believe Dr.
Gates will give good, sound advice. He will listen. But the real
question is, Will that advice be accepted by the President? And will
the President be able to redefine policy in such a way that is
realistic and achievable? And also, will he be able to articulate this
policy and rally the support of the American public as we go forward--
and not only the American public but the international community? But
my sense, my hope is that Dr. Gates will take that first important step
of speaking truth to power, even though it is unpopular truth.
Mr. NELSON of Florida. That is well said. Let me ask my colleague one
further question of his opinion, Mr. President.
My question would be that one of the things this Senator was struck
with yesterday in hearings, basically all day, was that he came to the
table refreshingly open in a nonpartisan way, much more in a bipartisan
way. We certainly have not seen a lot of the conduct of this war in the
past several years being done in a bipartisan way.
I ask the Senator: How do you think Dr. Gates, as the new Secretary
of Defense, is going to be able to involve that process, where those of
us on both sides of the aisle will be able to participate and assist
him in his role as Secretary of Defense?
Mr. REED. I have always been impressed by the fact that Bob Gates
evaluates the quality of the idea, not just the source of the idea. I
got to know Bob Gates in that same context of bipartisan foreign policy
deliberation at the Aspen Strategy Group with a group of individuals.
Some of our colleagues were there, including Senator Feinstein and
others. But it is chaired
[[Page S11285]]
by Brent Scowcroft, who was the National Security Adviser for President
George Herbert Walker Bush, and cochaired by Joe Nye, who was in the
Clinton administration.
Bob Gates is someone who brings to the foreign policy arena this
sense of reaching out to both sides. In fact, as he pointed out
yesterday--and I think the Senator heard--one of the tasks he sees that
he must perform is to create a bipartisan consensus to sustain the long
war against terror beyond Iraq, beyond the current dilemmas we are
facing. He will do that by reaching out, by listening, again,
ultimately, by evaluating the ideas, not simply the source of those
ideas.
Mr. NELSON of Florida. I say to the Senator, thank you. I thank the
Senator for his responses. And his responses mirror the feelings of
this Senator from Florida.
Mr. President, I wanted to come to the floor and announce that I had
voted for Dr. Gates in the committee because I was impressed by a
number of these attributes that the Senator from Rhode Island and I
have discussed. And among them, clearly, are that this Senator grew up
in an era in which it was understood that partisanship stopped at the
water's edge. In other words, when it became matters of the defense of
this country, that partisanship was over, that we came together in a
bipartisan way.
Sadly, I can say that I do not think that is the way this war has
been conducted with regard to reaching out across the aisle and
involving both sides, who all have the constitutional responsibility of
reflecting and representing the will of the American people. It is very
hard to sustain a war unless you have the support of the American
people. If that is not done in a bipartisan way, then sooner or later
that good will is going to run out.
That is one of the things I was impressed with and pressed Dr. Gates
about yesterday in the hearings: not only what appeared to be
refreshing candor from him but also his approach, in a nonpartisan way,
to these issues of war and peace. When we talked to him--as in the
discussion recently in this Chamber, in the colloquy with the Senator
from Rhode Island about the Guard and Reserves--he recognizes that is a
problem. And he recognizes that what he is going to have to do is have
a more responsible and direct way of utilizing existing forces because,
in the short run, he is not going to be able to increase the forces
considerably.
And he ruled out, in my question to him, any return to the draft. So
that means he has to make the military, particularly the Army and the
Marines, attractive in order to get the reenlistments and the
enlistments. Certainly, he has his hands full there, while being able
to keep the Guard's ability to respond to their respective States in
those times of emergency.
Clearly, he had a refreshing candor about the question of what was
the size force that was going to be needed, not only in Iraq but around
the world. He recognizes that we have a problem right now in Al Anbar
Province, that General Abizaid recently had told us he was going to
increase the presence there by 2,200 marines in a Marine expeditionary
unit, that that is a part of the country that is clearly not under
control.
So I found our deliberations with him to be refreshing, direct, with
the candor that ought to be forthcoming from a member of the
President's Cabinet in his interaction with the Members of Congress.
After all, this is a constitutional government, one in which there are
shared powers--some powers with the executive branch but some powers
with the legislative branch. The way to have this machine humming is to
have those branches cooperating with each other. My first impression of
Dr. Gates is he is going to be that kind of Secretary of Defense to
help us continue to work together.
Mr. President, I yield the floor.
Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, today I rise in support of the nomination
of Dr. Robert Gates to become the next Secretary of Defense.
I have had the opportunity to work with Dr. Gates on numerous
occasions and must note that he was an excellent member of President
George H.W. Bush's national security team during the first gulf war.
This was highlighted by the fact he was nominated and confirmed to
become Director of the Central Intelligence Agency shortly thereafter.
Dr. Gates adds intelligence and diplomatic experience to a war that
increasingly requires its leaders to go beyond tactical military
expertise. Further, he is a pragmatist, who will work with allies and
make necessary changes to our tactics and initiatives.
I was impressed by Dr. Gates' candid assessment of the war in
yesterday's confirmation hearing. He asserted, correctly in my view,
that the United States is not winning the war, but we are not losing,
either. The status quo is not acceptable, and that is why the President
has tapped him to do whatever it takes to bring a successful end to our
efforts in Iraq. He spoke openly about our failures and our successes
so far, and he underscored what is at stake: If we are not successful,
it could ignite ``a regional conflagration'' in the region.
Dr. Gates understands that we need to refine not the objectives of
our strategy but how we achieve our goals. The President and Dr. Gates
remain committed to a course of action that achieves the goals best
articulated by Dr. Zalmay Khalilzad, United States Ambassador to Iraq.
He stated: ``Our goal is to enable Iraqis to develop a multi-ethnic,
multi-sectarian representative democracy . . .'' that can fully meet is
security obligations.
I appreciate his comments that he is ``open to a wide range of ideas
and proposals.'' I know that he is a leader who will review the options
and advise the President on what he believes is the best way to
proceed.
Some of those innovative ideas will be found in the New Army Field
Manual for Counterinsurgency Warfare. This is a vital document that
will directly address what I have heard from many returning soldiers,
that the Army's culture is one that emphasizes the use of firepower and
conventional warfare rather stability and counterinsurgency operations.
This new doctrine will immediately begin to transform our tactics and
training, thereby being enormously helpful to our troops in Iraq and
Afghanistan.
Dr. Gates has my full support. These are trying times for our Nation.
Our resolve is being tested. I know that Dr. Gates is the right man to
advise the President on the means to achieve our goals and help the
Iraqi people usher in a new era in that country.
I yield the floor.
Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, I rise today in support of the
nomination of Robert Gates to succeed Donald Rumsfeld as the next
Secretary of Defense.
I applaud the Senate Armed Services Committee and Senators Warner and
Levin for moving this nomination to the floor in a prompt but
thoughtful manner.
I was heartened to see the forthrightness and candidness employed by
Dr. Gates at his confirmation hearing yesterday.
He fully admitted the need for a ``change of approach'' in Iraq,
stating his view that we are not currently winning the war and that the
``status quo'' is unacceptable.
Additionally, he expressed a willingness to use ``fresh eyes'' in
looking for solutions and promised to keep all options on the table.
He committed to cooperating with the Congress in pursuing its
oversight responsibilities and said he would always speak boldly and
candidly about what he believed.
Finally, Dr. Gates talked about the complexities of the situation in
Iraq, acknowledging that a number of major mistakes had been made,
including: the lack of appreciation for how ``broken'' Iraq was
economically, socially, and politically, and the costs associated when
we invaded and the problems created by the mobilization of the Iraqi
Army and the role that our deBaathification policy played in stoking
the current insurgency.
It is my sincere hope that Dr. Gates' nomination signals that the
administration intends to pursue a new direction in Iraq, and the
Middle East region as a whole. The President should see the strong
support for Dr. Gates as a call from Congress for moving away from the
``stay the course'' strategy he has pursued.
I hope that Dr. Gates will work with Congress to establish a clear-
eyed and
[[Page S11286]]
pragmatic approach toward our Nation's defense policy and seek to
restore the morale of our military.
I hope Dr. Gates will be open to dissenting views and allow the
military personnel around him to share unvarnished, independent advice.
Dr. Gates is a well-qualified candidate for this critical position.
His service at the top levels of the CIA and the National Security
Council has provided close insights into the Pentagon's operations and
policies.
As a former member of the Iraq Study Group, ISG, Dr. Gates
understands the complex challenges our Nation faces. He will be in a
unique position to implement the recommendations in the ISG report, and
other options for pursuing a new strategy.
It is clear to me that during the recent midterm elections the
American people voiced their disapproval with this administration's
Iraq policies and voted for a change of course.
And the time for changing the course is now.
The Iraq War has now lasted longer than the United States involvement
in World War II. More than 2,900 troops have been killed since March
19, 2003. More than 3,000 Iraqis are being killed in sectarian violence
every month.
Today our military is stretched thin and its readiness diminished.
Some of our troops are now on their third and fourth rotations. And,
over in Iraq and Afghanistan, our military's equipment is wearing out
or being destroyed at a cost of nearly $20 billion a year.
Ultimately, this war can only be won politically.
Our Nation must make it clear to the Iraqi government that this is
not an open-ended commitment. Iraqis must step forward and take
responsibility for their own security. Only they can make their country
a stable state.
The administration's war planning was shortsighted and ill-conceived.
By failing to provide adequate troops to secure Iraq, its
infrastructure, its weapons depots, and its streets, this
administration placed the entire mission in Iraq in jeopardy.
Dr. Gates has stated that he intends to improve the Department of
Defense's planning efforts in regards to postcombat operations--a
capability sorely missing from the current leadership.
I am also encouraged by Dr. Gates apparent willingness to involve
Iran and Syria in diplomatic dialogue--a stark contrast from the Bush
administration's current policy.
I hope that President Bush will accept the advice of the Iraq Study
Group and Dr. Gates to engage in diplomacy to solve this crisis.
Additionally, Dr. Gates has expressed concerns regarding the
Pentagon's continued expansion of intelligence activities since the
September 11, 2001, attacks.
I share these concerns and look forward to working with Dr. Gates and
Ambassador Negroponte to ensure that there is an appropriate and
transparent division of responsibilities between military and civilian
intelligence agencies.
Fifteen years ago, Dr. Gates came before the Senate as President
George H.W. Bush's nominee to become the Director of Central
Intelligence, DCI.
During 4 days of hearings, a number of questions were raised
regarding his involvement and knowledge of the Iran-Contra scandal. In
addition, allegations were aired regarding the manipulation of
intelligence for political purposes.
These are serious concerns.
But what is critical to me today is that he shows an independent mind
and willingness to eschew ideology and partisanship to do what is best
for our men and women in uniform.
It is clearly time for instituting new leadership at the Pentagon--
something I first called for almost a year ago. But such a change will
only matter if the President himself is willing to pursue a different
course.
I am looking forward to working with Dr. Gates on defense matters, to
address the needs of our troops and their families, and to finally
bring about a change in our Iraq policy--certainly the time is far past
due.
Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, I rise today in support of Dr. Robert M.
Gates to be Secretary of Defense.
The position of Secretary of Defense has always been one of the most
important Cabinet positions in our country. Never has that importance
been more clear than now, as we must decide on a path forward in the
global war on terror, including Iraq.
I share my colleagues' concerns about the deteriorating conditions in
Iraq. We must carefully assess the current situation in that country as
well as our future involvement in Iraq. I am hopeful that Dr. Gates
will help us accomplish these goals. He has experience with the current
situation in Iraq as a former member of the bipartisan Baker-Hamilton
Iraq Study Group. As part of that group, he has traveled to Iraq and
met with Iraqi leaders and U.S. military commanders. I am optimistic
that he will use this experience and knowledge to help chart a course
in Iraq that results in the stabilization of that country.
I also hope that as a former member of the Baker-Hamilton Iraq Study
Group, Dr. Gates will carefully review and analyze the Iraq Study
Group's report, which was released this morning. I believe that report
makes some very good recommendations and can serve as a vehicle for
some changes relating to our policy in Iraq. I look forward to
discussing those recommendations further in this Chamber.
The report recommends ``new and enhanced diplomatic and political
efforts in Iraq and the region, and a change in the primary mission of
U.S. forces in Iraq that will enable the United States to begin to move
its combat forces out of Iraq responsibly.'' Renewed diplomatic and
political efforts in the region make sense so that we can work with
Iraqis to stabilize their country in the spirit of reconciliation. As
the Baker-Hamilton report points out, ``if the Iraqi government moves
forward with national reconciliation, Iraqis will have an opportunity
for a better future, terrorism will be dealt a blow, stability will be
enhanced in an important part of the world, and America's credibility,
interests and values will be protected.'' In my mind, these have always
been our goals in Iraq, and I look forward to working with Dr. Gates
and my colleagues to accomplish those goals in a responsible way.
There are other recommendations in the report that are equally
important. One such recommendation is that ``[t]he primary mission of
U.S. forces in Iraq should evolve to one of supporting the Iraqi army .
. .'' While I have never supported setting an artificial timetable for
withdrawing U.S. troops from Iraq, I believe the Iraqi Government must
take responsibility for their country. As such this recommendation
regarding our troops' future role in Iraq makes sense, and I will work
with Dr. Gates on this recommendation.
One other recommendation that I want to briefly reference is that
``the United States should provide additional political, economic and
military support for Afghanistan . . .'' The global war on terror is a
multifront war, and we must continue to focus on each of those fronts.
I hope Dr. Gates will use his knowledge and experience to help Congress
and the President make decisions about the full global war on terror,
including operations in Afghanistan. Our work in Afghanistan is
important, and I hope Dr. Gates will help us ensure that we do not lose
sight of our near- and long-term goals in the overall global war on
terror.
Dr. Gates has a long record of service in the area of national
security, which I believe will serve him well as Secretary of Defense.
He has 26 years of national security experience, including serving as
an intelligence adviser to six different Presidents. He has worked at
both the Central Intelligence Agency, CIA, and the National Security
Council, including serving as the Director of the CIA.
Dr. Gates also has a distinguished career in public service. That
service began almost 40 years ago when he was commissioned as an
officer in the Air Force in 1967. He has received the Presidential
Citizens Medal and the National Security Medal, as well as two National
Intelligence Distinguished Service Medals and three Distinguished
Intelligence Medals.
Mr. President, for all of these reasons, I support the nomination of
Dr. Robert M. Gates to be Secretary of Defense. I look forward to
working with him in the coming years on issues relating to Iraq, the
entire global war on terror, and other issues important to our
country's defense.
[[Page S11287]]
Mr. JOHNSON. Mr. President, yesterday the Senate Armed Services
Committee voted unanimously in favor of Robert Gates' nomination to be
Secretary of Defense. Following robust debate in the Senate, I plan to
vote in favor of Dr. Gates' nomination.
During Dr. Gates' testimony before the Senate Armed Services
Committee, I was encouraged by his candid assessment of the situation
in Iraq. Dr. Gates acknowledged that we are not winning in Iraq and the
status quo is unacceptable. He signaled his willingness to actively
solicit the advice of military leaders on the ground and to work with
members of both parties to develop a coherent strategy for Iraq. Dr.
Gates' testimony was straightforward and refreshing. It is a step in
the right direction toward resolving the crisis in Iraq.
At the same time the full Senate began debate on Dr. Gates'
nomination, the Iraq Study Group released their recommendations for
overhauling our policy in Iraq. The commission's report was stark and
sobering and described the current situation in Iraq as grave and
deteriorating.
I wholeheartedly agree with the Iraq Study Group's assessment that
our commitment to Iraq should not be open-ended. U.S. support for the
Iraqi government is strong, but Iraqi leaders must immediately make the
necessary political decisions to create a sustainable political
settlement.
As a member of the Iraq Study Group prior to his nomination, it is my
hope Dr. Gates will heed the recommendations of the Iraq Study Group
and encourage the Bush administration to change course in Iraq.
Mrs. BOXER. Mr. President, I rise in support of the nomination of
Robert Gates to be Secretary of Defense. I believe that a change of
leadership at the Pentagon will signal a new course of action in Iraq.
During his nomination hearing yesterday before the Senate Armed
Services Committee, Dr. Gates spoke the truth about the war in Iraq. In
a very plain spoken way, he leveled with the American people when he
admitted that we are not winning in Iraq. His ability to admit that
Iraq is in chaos leads me to believe that he will provide independent
advice to the President and speak truth to power.
Our brave military men and women in uniform have done everything
asked of them in Iraq. The failure of this administration to develop a
realistic strategy for Iraq is the reason why we are not winning. Our
military defeated the armed forces of Iraq, captured Saddam Hussein,
and helped provide for three elections in Iraq. They cannot force a
national reconciliation in Iraq and they cannot impose a political
compromise.
The stress on our military is causing readiness to suffer and placing
our military families under tremendous strain. Today's Iraq Study Group
report says that ``U.S. military forces, especially our ground forces,
have been stretched nearly to the breaking point by the repeated
deployments in Iraq, with attendant casualties (almost 3,000 dead and
more than 21,000 wounded), greater difficulty in recruiting, and
accelerated wear on equipment.'' This is an unsustainable situation.
I look forward to working with Dr. Gates on improving the mental
health policies and programs of the Department of Defense. We must not
deploy military personnel with serious mental health conditions, such
as posttraumatic stress disorder, and we should ensure that proper
treatment is provided for those in need.
It is time for a change in course in Iraq and a change at the
Pentagon is a step in the right direction.
Ms. SNOWE. Mr. President, I rise today to support the nomination of
Robert Gates to be the 22nd Secretary of Defense.
Dr. Gates comes to this position with a lifetime of service to his
Nation and fellow Americans. He has served his country in uniform, as a
civil servant, a policymaker and as an adviser to six Presidents, both
Democrat and Republican. He has also served America by running one of
our top institutions of higher learning, Texas A&M University and by
serving on the boards of institutions such as the National Association
of State Universities and Land-Grant Colleges and the National
Executive Board of the Boy Scouts of America. It is no coincidence that
at his graduation from William and Mary, he was awarded the Algernon
Sydney Sullivan Award for making the greatest contributions to his
fellow man.
However, it is his character and ability to lead that will be most
critical during this time of sweeping and historic challenges facing
the Nation and the Department of Defense. We must satisfy ourselves
that Dr. Gates not only has a plan to overcome these challenges but the
personality, the drive and the skills to do so. That he once again
accepted the call to national service at a time of grave crisis,
requiring his departure from his beloved Texas A&M, to me speaks
volumes about his character and dedication to service.
As the Nation faces the imperative of charting a new course and
strategy in Iraq, rising violence in Afghanistan, global terrorism, the
threats posed by nuclear states such as North Korea and possibly Iran
and the increasing strains on our military, America requires a leader
of Bob Gates's caliber, who has the national security experience, the
political acumen and the managerial style necessary to mend rifts that
have resulted in the loss of America's certainty and optimism. He will
be responsible for ensuring a strong working relationship between the
Department of Defense and Congress, trust between the civilian and
military leadership in the Pentagon, and the credibility of the
Department with the American public.
To accomplish this in the relatively brief but critical tenure he
will have at the Pentagon, he will have to rely on his pragmatism and
his ability to work with others to develop consensus in order to create
the unified approach that is currently lacking in meeting our Nation's
challenges. In his previous service, he has shown he has the ability to
work with both sides with a high degree of competency and integrity--
and I believe this capacity to work in a bipartisan fashion is critical
to our ability to work through the challenges we face today.
One of his primary goals at the Department will be to foster mutual
respect between our senior military leaders and the civilian leadership
in the Pentagon. I look for him to provide our military leaders a clear
voice on military operations. I believe he will listen to them and take
their advice on such matters as planning for postcombat operations and
force structure considerations in a manner that has been too long
dormant.
As Dr. Gates assumes the helm at the Department of Defense he will be
responsible for a variety of challenges ranging from the ongoing
transformation of our forces, balancing operations, procurement and
modernization accounts so our military forces have the tools they need
to prevail now and in the future, to preparing those forces to meet
global challenges from the Taiwan Straits to the jungles of South
America.
Another issue of concern facing Dr. Gates is the Department of
Defense's relationship with other executive branch agencies such as the
Department of Homeland Security and the intelligence agencies. In Dr.
Gates' written answers to the questions posed by the Armed Service
Committee, he states that DHS and DOD have the common goal of
protecting the United States and that he will support any steps that
can be taken to improve and strengthen interagency cooperation so that
all agencies are prepared for and able to respond to threats facing the
U.S. homeland.
As a member of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, I have
witnessed egregious intelligence failures and a sweeping reorganization
of the entire community. I have also emphasized the need to improve
information sharing and strengthen interagency cooperation.
Dr. Gates has recently written that he was ``unhappy about the
dominance of the Defense Department in the intelligence arena and the
decline in the CIA's central role'' and that ``close cooperation
between the military and the CIA in both clandestine operations and
intelligence collection is essential.'' He also wrote that ``for the
last decade, intelligence authority has been quietly leaching from the
CIA to and to the Pentagon, not the other way around.'' During General
Hayden's nomination hearing, I noted that one of General Hayden's
primary challenges would be synchronizing the gears of our Nation's
[[Page S11288]]
intelligence collection capability. I believe Dr. Gates will now meet
the challenge of synchronizing those gears at the Defense Department.
As someone who has had worked in the intelligence community for more
than 27 years, I am confident that he is up to the task. I implore Dr.
Gates to maintain that close cooperation so that, in his words, ``all
agencies are prepared for and able to respond to the threats facing the
homeland.''
In fact, it was while he was the Director of Central Intelligence in
1992 that he testified before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, of
which I was a member, about the need for the Defense Department and the
Intelligence Community to cooperate saying, ``Our national security
institutions, especially defense and intelligence, must change--and
they are changing dramatically--to meet the new and different
challenges of this new and different world.'' At that hearing Dr. Gates
also warned us that aside from traditional issues of national security,
we should be alert to other dangers such as terrorism that cannot ``be
resolved simply through the application of military force or
diplomacy.''
Dr. Gates clearly understood then and understands now America's
preeminent role in leading the spread of democracy and performing
global policing, yet he also recognizes the regional and sectarian
nature of 21st century conflict. This sense of historical realism will
stand him in good stead as he grapples with what is and will be his
greatest and most pressing challenge--the U.S. involvement in Iraq.
Dr. Gates is well versed in Middle East affairs, especially in Iraq
and Afghanistan--having been the deputy national security adviser
during the 1991 gulf war and providing oversight of U.S.-sponsored
operations in Afghanistan under President Reagan. More recently, he
cochaired a study at the Council on Foreign Studies in 2004 on U.S.
relations towards Iran. Among the study's primary recommendations was
that the U.S. directly engage with Iran on a diplomatic level and
regarding Iranian nuclear programs.
He also recently served as part of the Iraq Study Group that is
releasing its recommendations regarding U.S. strategic options this
week. By all accounts, Dr. Gates spent considerable time in Iraq
talking to Iraqis, soldiers, military leaders and diplomats to
understand the myriad and intertwined complexities that will shape the
future of Iraq. This understanding will be critical as he will have to
proceed at full speed when he becomes Secretary--for we are long past
the point where time is of the essence.
I believe that Robert Gates understands that we are at a critical
juncture. As he said in his testimony yesterday, we are not winning the
war in Iraq. He is straightforward in his approach and his language,
and I believe he will offer a different and pragmatic approach. He
rightly said during his testimony that there is not a military solution
to Iraq--that this requires a political solution, and I believe he will
signal to the Iraqi government that they and the Iraqi people need to
decide if an Iraqi nation is more important to them than their
sectarian interests. Because we can't decide that for them, and we
can't make that happen for them.
There is no question that staying the course in Iraq is neither an
option nor a plan and that the patience of the Congress and the
American people is finite and our presence there is neither unlimited
nor unconditional. I urge him to seek the advice of his military
commanders regarding the roles and missions of our troops and to work
in a bipartisan fashion with Congress to implementing the findings and
recommendations of the Iraq Study Group.
In closing, it is critical is that this nomination represents a
commitment by the administration to unite our Nation to bring a lasting
resolution to the war in Iraq. A new perspective at the Pentagon from a
Defense Secretary confirmed on an overwhelmingly bipartisan basis,
coupled with the release of the bipartisan Iraq Study Group's consensus
recommendations, must serve as a catalyst for cooperation in
establishing a unified plan for progress and transition in Iraq. In
fact, with the confluence of these two events, this day must become a
pivot point for our presence in Iraq.
Bob Gates' temperament, reputation, and experience has prepared him
well for this challenging assignment and I have every faith that he
will serve our Nation well as the Secretary of Defense. I urge my
colleagues to vote to confirm Dr. Robert Gates to be our 22nd Secretary
of Defense.
Mr. SARBANES. Mr. President, this legislation, S. 2568 and its House
companion H.R. 5466, the Captain John Smith Chesapeake National
Historic Trail Designation Act, would create the Nation's first
national ``watertrail'' and honor one of America's earliest explorers,
Captain John Smith and the vital role he played in the founding of the
first permanent English settlement in North America at Jamestown, VA,
and in exploring the Chesapeake Bay region during the years 1607 to
1609.
Many Americans are aware of the upcoming 400th anniversary of
Jamestown next year. The celebration is expected to draw record numbers
of visitors to this area, including Queen Elizabeth II, as part of her
recently announced state visit. What may not be as well known is that
Jamestown and John Smith's voyages of exploration in present-day
Virginia and Maryland were our Nation's starting points. America has
its roots right here in the Chesapeake Bay region nearly 400 years
ago--13 years before the founding of the Plymouth colony--when the
Jamestown colonists disembarked from their three small ships on May 13,
1607. Under the leadership of Captain John Smith, the fledgling colony
not only survived but helped ignite a new era of discovery in the New
World.
With a dozen men in a 30-foot open boat, Smith's expeditions in
search of food for the new colony and the fabled Northwest Passage took
him nearly 3,000 miles around the Chesapeake Bay and its tributaries
from the Virginia capes to the mouth of the Susquehanna. On his voyages
and as president of the Jamestown Colony, Captain Smith became the
first point of contact for scores of Native-American leaders from
around the bay region. His friendship with Pocahontas is now an
important part of American folklore. Smith's notes describing the
indigenous people he met and the Chesapeake Bay ecosystem are still
widely studied by historians, environmental scientists, and
anthropologists. Chief Justice John Marshall wrote of the significance
of Smith's explorations: ``When we contemplate the dangers, and the
hardships he encountered, and the fortitude, courage and patience with
which he met them; when we reflect on the useful and important
additions which he made to the stock of knowledge respecting America,
then possessed by his countrymen; we shall not hesitate to say that few
voyages of discovery, undertaken at any time, reflect more honour on
those engaged in them, than this does on Captain Smith.''
What better way to commemorate this important part of our Nation's
history and honor John Smith's courageous voyages than by designating
the Captain John Smith Chesapeake National Historic Trail? The Congress
established the National Trails System ``to provide for the ever-
increasing outdoor recreation needs of an expanding population and in
order to promote the preservation of, public access to, travel within,
and enjoyment and appreciation of the open-air, outdoor areas and
historic resources of the Nation.'' National Historic Trails such as
the Lewis and Clark Trail, the Pony Express Trail, the Trail of Tears,
and the Selma to Montgomery Trail were authorized as part of this
system to identify and protect historic routes for public use and
enjoyment and to commemorate major events which shaped American
history. In my judgment, the Captain John Smith Chesapeake National
Historic Trail is a fitting addition to the 13 national historic trails
administered by the National Park Service.
Pursuant to legislation we enacted as part of the Fiscal 2006
Interior Appropriations Act, in September 2006 the National Park
Service completed a detailed study which found that the trail meets all
three criteria for designation as a national historic trail: it is
nationally significant, has a documented route through maps or
journals, and provides for recreational opportunities. Similar in
historic importance to the Lewis and Clark National Trail, this new
historic trail will inspire generations of Americans and visitors to
follow Smith's journeys, to learn about
[[Page S11289]]
the roots of our Nation, and to better understand the contributions of
the Native Americans who lived within the bay region. Equally
important, the Captain John Smith Chesapeake National Historic Trail
will serve as a national outdoor resource by providing rich
opportunities for education, recreation, and heritage tourism not only
for more than 16 million Americans living in the bay's watershed but
for visitors to this area. The water trail would allow voyagers in
small boats, cruising boats, kayaks, and canoes to travel from the
distant headwaters to the open bay--an accomplishment that will
generate national and international attention and participation. The
trail would complement the Chesapeake Bay Gateways and Watertrails
Program and help highlight the bay's remarkable maritime history, its
unique watermen and their culture, the diversity of its peoples, its
historical settlements, and our current efforts to restore and sustain
the world's most productive estuary.
This legislation enjoys strong bipartisan support in the Congress and
in the States through which the trail passes. The trail proposal has
been endorsed by the Governors of Virginia, Pennsylvania, Delaware,
Maryland, and numerous local governments throughout the Chesapeake Bay
region. The measure is also strongly supported by the National
Geographic Society, the Conservation Fund, the Garden Club of America,
the Izaak Walton League of America, the Chesapeake Bay Foundation and
the Chesapeake Bay Commission as well as scores of businesses, tourism
leaders, private groups, and intergovernmental bodies. I want to
especially recognize and commend Patrick Noonan, chairman emeritus of
the Conservation Fund, for his vision in conceiving this trail. I also
want to thank the cosponsors of this measure, Senators Warner,
Mikulski, Allen, Carper, Biden, Santorum, Specter, Representative Jo
Ann Davis, and the cosponsors of the House companion measure, as well
as the chairmen and ranking members of the Senate Committee on Energy
and Natural Resources and the Subcommittee on National Parks. Finally,
I want to recognize and thank Judy Pensabene and David Brooks of the
Senate Energy Committee staff and Ann Loomis in Senator Warner's office
for the tremendous assistance they provided in moving the measure
forward.
The Captain John Smith Chesapeake National Historic Trail Act comes
at a very timely juncture to educate Americans about historical events
that occurred 400 years ago right here in Chesapeake Bay, which were so
crucial to the formation of this great country and our democracy. I
urge my colleagues to support this measure.
Mr. ROCKEFELLER. Mr. President, I rise today in support of the
nomination of Robert M. Gates to be the next Secretary of the
Department of Defense.
I believe that the defense and security challenges that our Nation
faces at this moment are greater than we have faced in decades, and the
strains on our Active Duty and National Guard and Reserve forces are
commensurate with those challenges.
After much careful thought, going back to this body's consideration
of Dr. Gates' nomination to lead the Central Intelligence Agency in
1991, I am convinced that he will provide the Department of Defense and
our uniformed service members the competent leadership that they
deserve that he will approach the necessity to change course in Iraq
with great urgency and that he will provide the President with the
pragmatic advice that this country so desperately needs; that his
stewardship of the Department of Defense will include developing a
cooperative and productive relationship with Congress; and that his
career in the intelligence community will benefit the Government as the
reorganization of our intelligence community continues.
I have been impressed with Dr. Gates' sincerity in his comments
regarding the obligation we as policymakers owe the uniformed service
members who carry out the policies we make. His testimony yesterday
before the Senate Armed Services Committee included a moving statement
about his relationships with members and former members of the Corps of
Cadets at Texas A&M University, 12 of whom have lost their lives in the
wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Like Dr. Gates, I am moved by the extraordinary sense of duty and
service that our soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines possess and by
the extraordinary sacrifices they make willingly on our behalf. We must
meet the fundamental obligation to serve them as well as they serve us.
They deserve thoughtful and effective policies; they deserve to be set
up for success in their missions; they deserve to be properly trained
and equipped; and they deserve to be ever confident that their welfare
is never subject to partisan political considerations within their
civilian chain of command. Anything less is unworthy of these heroes.
I am strongly hopeful that Dr. Gates' long and distinguished career
in public service, particularly in critical national security roles,
gives him the proper perspective on the duties we owe our men and women
in uniform. I am confident he will exercise these duties with great
care and concern, particularly with regard to those service members who
are in harm's way in Iraq and Afghanistan.
I also note Dr. Gates' candor and independence of thought, both in
his public comments of recent years and in answering the questions of
the members of the Senate Armed Services Committee during the
confirmation process. Prior to his nomination as the next Secretary of
Defense, Dr. Gates served on two noteworthy bodies whose work is highly
relevant to the challenges he will undertake at the Department of
Defense. First, in 2004 he cochaired a Council on Foreign Relations
task force with former National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski
that resulted in a report entitled, ``Iran: Time for a New Approach.''
It is my hope that ``time for a new approach'' is a phrase that
characterizes Dr. Gates' overall approach to many of the issues he will
encounter at the Pentagon, but I would make special note of the fact
that in this report, he recommended that the United States engage in
direct talks with Iran. If this recommendation of engagement and
proactive diplomacy is characteristic of the advice he will provide to
the President in his new position, it will be a welcome change.
Second, prior to his nomination, Dr. Gates served on the Iraq Study
Group, whose recommendations for a major change in course in Iraq we
heard today. Dr. Gates' service on this body shows that he recognized
early on that the administration's policy in Iraq was not working and
needed a change in course. Since his nomination, I have been very
pleased with his comments, particularly in his written answers to the
Senate Armed Services Committee questions and in his testimony
yesterday, regarding the urgent need for change in our Iraq policy.
Unlike the previous Secretary of Defense and unlike the President
himself, Dr. Gates has acknowledged forthrightly that the number of
troops we sent to Iraq for the postwar period was insufficient. He
recognizes that the planning for the postwar period was both inadequate
and flawed and that the result now is a status quo that is absolutely
unacceptable and must be changed with great urgency.
As many of my colleagues have noted, this is a fresh and candid
perspective that has been sorely lacking in this administration for 6
years. It is my hope and expectation that Dr. Gates' independence of
thought and bold push for necessary change will mark his tenure as our
next Secretary of Defense.
In my capacity as chairman of the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence in the 110th Congress, I will be particularly interested
in how Dr. Gates will handle the relationship between the Department of
Defense and the intelligence community, which is still developing
following the recent intelligence reforms and which I will be focusing
on closely in the coming months.
This relationship is crucial to the production of accurate, unbiased
intelligence, which in turn is essential for the development of sound
national security policy for our country. As vice chairman of the
Senate Intelligence Committee, I have spent 3\1/2\ years reviewing
prewar intelligence on Iraq. We have found inadequate intelligence,
inaccurate intelligence, ignored intelligence, and distorted
intelligence, the sum of which led to a disastrous decision to take
this country to war. This is a situation which cannot be repeated.
[[Page S11290]]
One of the principal concerns throughout the Intelligence Committee's
Iraq inquiry has been the question of politicization of intelligence.
This is an issue well known to Dr. Gates because it was a charge
leveled at him in 1991 during his confirmation to be Director of
Central Intelligence. Unresolved questions about possible
politicization greatly influenced my opposition to confirming him for
that position, and I am even more keenly concerned about maintaining
the integrity of the analytic process based on my experience with the
Iraq inquiry.
Fortunately, his service as the Director of Central Intelligence and
his continuing contribution to the Nation since then have allayed the
concerns I had in 1991. While his tenure as DCI was short, he
accomplished a great deal. In a 1992 message to the CIA workforce he
wrote ``seeking truth is what we are all about as an institution, as
professionals and as individuals, the possibility--even the
perception--that the quest may be tainted deeply troubles us, as it
long has and as it should.'' While he disputed the specific accusations
of politicization, he learned from the process. He established a task
force to address politicization, and he implemented changes based on
the task forces recommendation. I am encouraged that he will bring that
experience to this new job as one of the primary consumers of
intelligence.
I also am encouraged by Dr. Gates' views on the proper role of the
Defense Department in relation to the CIA. Earlier this year he wrote
of his unhappiness with what he viewed as an inappropriate dominance by
the Defense Department. There is plenty of work for all of our
intelligence agencies, but that work needs to be properly distributed
and coordinated, and I think he understands the importance of that
balance. I look forward to working closely with Dr. Gates on this issue
if he is confirmed.
At his confirmation hearing, Dr. Gates demonstrated several qualities
that I think make him a good choice for this job. He is smart but not
arrogant. He is tough-minded without being closed-minded. And he is
clearly taking on this enormous responsibility out of a sense of public
service. I will support his nomination, and I hope he is confirmed.
Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, our next Secretary of Defense will face
unprecedented and wide-ranging challenges. Terrorist networks are
developing new capabilities and sources of support around the world,
the Taliban and al- Qaida are resurgent in Afghanistan, our military is
over-stretched--all while the administration continues to devote so
much of its resources to a self-defeating, Iraq-centric strategy.
I am not convinced that the President's nominee for this position,
Robert Gates, has the will or ability to fix our failed Iraq strategy.
Once confirmed, Mr. Gates will answer to the President, and the
President still fails to recognize the need for a new course--one that
includes a flexible timetable to redeploy troops from Iraq and re-focus
on the fight against terrorism. Until the President recognizes that his
Iraq policy is undermining our national security, simply changing one
advisor for another may not make that big a difference.
Nonetheless, I will vote to confirm Mr. Gates. I believe that a
president should be given great deference in selecting his cabinet. And
Mr. Gates showed a refreshing candor and humility in his testimony this
week--qualities that have been sorely lacking in this administration.
He acknowledged that the United States is not ``winning'' in Iraq and
that the status quo is not acceptable, and said that ``all options are
on the table.''
There remain serious questions stemming from his role in Iran/Contra
and charges that he politicized intelligence. I do not take these
lightly. However, Mr. Gates is intelligent, experienced and well
qualified for the position. And I am pleased that he indicated a
willingness to work with the Director of National Intelligence ``to
ensure that he has the authority that he needs to fulfill his
responsibilities.'' I am also encouraged by his statement that he
expects intelligence professionals to ``call the shots as they see them
and not try and shape their answers to meet a policy need.''
I hope that Mr. Gates will follow through on these and other
commitments. And I will continue working to change our Iraq policy so
that we can devote greater resources to our top national security
priority--going after the terrorists who attacked us on 9/11 and their
allies.
Mr. BUNNING. Mr. President, I rise today to voice my opposition to
the nomination of Robert Gates to be Secretary of Defense.
The safety and security of the American people must be our
Government's top priority. We need to continue to do everything we can
to protect our homeland. We cannot place our heads in the sand and
ignore the fact that we remain a nation at war. Daily we face brutal
enemies that despise the very principles that we stand for and our way
of life.
At this time of war, our President and our Nation rely on the
Secretary of Defense to provide sound advice and to lead our Armed
Forces as they continue to combat our enemies. The Secretary of Defense
has the responsibility of leading the strongest and most capable
military in the world. He must be a man of vision who can adequately
assess threats against our national security and formulate the best
response to these threats.
The President nominated Mr. Gates for a managerial post of great
difficulty and complexity, and I do not believe that he is the best
person to help us meet our Nation's critical challenges. Mr. Gates has
repeatedly criticized our efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan without
providing any viable solutions to the problems our troops currently
face. I am concerned with the message he is sending to our troops and
our allies around the world. We need a Secretary of Defense to think
forward with solutions and not backward on history we cannot change.
Mr. Gates also believes in directly engaging rogue nations such as
Iran and Syria that are known sponsors of terrorist groups in Iraq,
Lebanon and the West Bank and Gaza. I do not support inviting
terrorists to the negotiating table. Such a shift in our Nation's
foreign policy could have grave consequences for our national security.
Let me be clear that I am not here today to discredit Robert Gates'
record of public service to our Nation. I am here to raise concerns
with his nomination to be Secretary of Defense. It is a position of
immense importance and carries a great deal of responsibility.
It is for these reservations that I find myself unable to support the
nomination of Robert Gates for Secretary of Defense.
It is clear from following his Armed Services Committee nomination
hearing and my colleagues' speeches that Mr. Gates will be confirmed to
be the next Secretary of Defense. However, we cannot afford to fail in
Iraq, Afghanistan, and other areas in the war against radical
terrorists. I hope during Mr. Gates' tenure at the Department of
Defense that we are able to make peace and progress on all these
fronts. The future of our country depends on it.
Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, yesterday the Armed Services Committee
conducted a thorough hearing on the nomination of Dr. Robert Gates to
be the next Secretary of Defense. I commend Senator Warner and Senator
Levin for their leadership in holding a hearing which may be regarded
as one of the most informative, important hearings to take place before
that committee in recent years.
Dr. Gates also deserves credit for the forthright tone of the
hearing. His testimony to the committee was marked by candor and a
serious discussion of the complex challenges before our country. In a
refreshing change, rather than toeing the administration's line, Dr.
Gates's testimony appeared to reflect his own views on the situation in
Iraq, our Nation's approach to the Middle East, the difficulties facing
our military, and a number of other issues.
He sensibly acknowledged that real changes are needed in the
administration's policy toward Iraq, that long-rumored plans of an
attack on Iran or Syria would have dramatic consequences that would
further endanger the region and the world, and that our military is
being strained by the war in Iraq.
Dr. Gates appears to be set to be confirmed by the Senate as the next
Secretary of Defense, but he will be walking into a buzz saw. The
current leadership of the Pentagon, in its arrogance
[[Page S11291]]
and disdain for the Constitution, has alienated Congress and has
seriously undermined the credibility of the Defense Department in a
time of war. One of the first orders of business for the next Secretary
of Defense will be to demonstrate to Congress and to the American
people that the Defense Department is not a power unto itself, but it
is a servant of the people. I have urged Dr. Gates to take that mission
to heart and to make meaningful consultation with Congress, as the
people's branch of Government, an absolute priority.
I have worked with Dr. Gates before, during his years of service in
the Central Intelligence Agency. But this experience alone would not be
sufficient to secure my support of his nomination. My primary concern
with his nomination was not whether Dr. Gates had performed well in the
past, but how he would approach the challenges that are before him.
Mr. President, I will support the nomination of Dr. Gates based upon
the candor and independence that he displayed at his nomination
hearing. I caution, however, that Dr. Gates must be on guard against
becoming the moderate face of an administration which may yet be
reluctant to make any real change in its deeply flawed policies toward
Iraq. The American people need more than a pragmatic spokesman for
administration policies, the people deserve a leader who will work to
change the administration's dangerous course.
I urge Dr. Gates to carry out the candor and fresh thinking that he
demonstrated at his confirmation hearing, and I hope the administration
will follow Dr. Gates in this new approach.
Mr. DODD. Mr. President, I rise today to express my support for the
confirmation of Robert Gates to become our Nation's next Secretary of
Defense.
I recently had the opportunity to meet with Dr. Gates in my office. I
appreciated his frankness, both in my discussions with him as well as
during his confirmation hearing before the Senate Armed Services
Committee.
He demonstrated candor and pledged independence that the current
administration has been sorely lacking up until now. He also
acknowledged that at this point, our operations in Iraq must place far
more emphasis on finding a political solution rather than continuing to
place an undue burden on America's Armed Forces.
It is for these reasons that I hope that Dr. Gates will serve as a
critical voice for reason, leading our forces toward a proper exit from
major operations in Iraq and toward rebuilding our war-battered Armed
Forces.
Dr. Gates seemed to discern the cost of the war in Iraq, which has
been mainly measured in the number of lives lost and U.S. treasury
spent. Over 2,900 brave American servicemembers have now been killed in
Iraq and over $400 billion in appropriations have been approved by
Congress.
But there is another cost of war--our military's readiness. And,
apparently, unlike his presumed predecessor, who believes that ``you
have to go to war with the Army you have, not the Army you want,'' Dr.
Gates has promised to address this issue, if confirmed.
Some two-thirds of our Nation's combat brigades are currently unable
to report for duty according to current reports, largely due to battle-
worn and damaged equipment. Dr. Gates seems committed to restoring our
military's readiness and, I hope, will be willing to fully meet the
Army's request of $25 billion in fiscal year 2008 to fund the repair,
replacement, and recapitalization of this gear.
I concede that on a previous occasion I withheld my support for Dr.
Gates when he was nominated for the position of the Director of Central
Intelligence in 1991. At the time, I raised concerns over his past
tenure at the CIA, including prior allegations of politicized
intelligence. By all accounts Mr. Gates did a credible job as the
Director of the CIA. It is my hope that his past experience has
sensitized him to the danger that politicized intelligence can pose to
our Nation's national security and to the ability of our military
commanders to understand and carry out the mission on the ground in
Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere as they seek to advance United States
interests.
In addition, I am also hopeful that Mr. Gates will work with me to
revisit the administration's military commissions policy. During our
discussions, we talked about the bill that I introduced last month
called the Effective Terrorists Prosecution Act of 2006 which addresses
some of the most serious problems with the bill that the President
recently signed into law. I hope that Dr. Gates will consult with
outside military and legal experts, as well as J.A.G. staff regarding
the Military Commissions Act. I would further urge Dr. Gates to halt
the Defense Department's plan to award a $125 million contract to build
a new courthouse at Guantanamo Bay, to try detainees. This project was
neither authorized nor appropriated by the Congress, and in my view,
constitutes an egregious waste and abuse of taxpayers dollars on a
facility designed to circumvent public and legal scrutiny into the
treatment and trying of detainees.
Our Nation and our Armed Forces are facing significant challenges,
and, above all else, Dr. Gates needs to meet today's security concerns
head on, swiftly and effectively, without any ideological agenda.
Recognizing the hard truth, that we are not winning the war in Iraq,
was a good first step.
Understanding why we aren't winning was a good second step. As Dr.
Gates explained in his testimony, and as many of us have been saying
for quite some time, we failed to deploy enough troops in Iraq to win
the peace, we mistakenly disbanded the Iraqi Army, and we banned
thousands of Baath Party members from working in the Iraqi Government.
Only by recognizing and understanding that these specific policies have
caused so much damage can we begin the work of ameliorating the
situation in Iraq.
I look forward to working with Dr. Gates in a bipartisan and level-
headed manner to address these myriad problems, to adjust United States
policy in Iraq and to rebuild our Nation's Armed Forces. This fall, the
American people voted for change in our Government's policies,
particularly in Iraq, and I am hopeful that the confirmation of Dr.
Gates will represent one of these many vital changes.
Mr. OBAMA. Mr. President, my vote today for Robert Gates is a vote
for significant change in our Iraq policy.
Last month, the American people uniformly rejected the policy-by-
slogan approach to Iraq, rejected the false choice between ``cut-and-
run'' and ``stay the course'' rejected ideological, insular, and
wrongheaded leadership at the Pentagon. Dr. Gates' challenge will be to
help President Bush chart a new course that takes a realistic view of
the deteriorating situation in Iraq and makes the hard decisions to
salvage an acceptable outcome to this long and misguided war.
There are several signs that give me hope that Robert Gates is up to
this challenge. First and most important is the environment in which
Gates is taking the Pentagon's helm. Following the election, it is
clear the American people expect significant change in Iraq. President
Bush nominated Gates with a mandate to find ``fresh perspective and new
ideas'' for Iraq. And today's Iraq Study Group's report helped create a
framework to move forward, in a bipartisan fashion, with a shift in
U.S. policy. As I laid out in a speech 3 weeks ago, I believe this
shift must include a phased redeployment of U.S. forces in Iraq, a new
diplomatic effort that includes engagement with Iran and Syria and
other key nations, and a stance that conditions further assistance to
progress in Iraq. All of these were also proposed by the Iraq Study
Group.
Second, in his own congressional testimony and comments, Dr. Gates
has expressed openness to new ideas, saying that all options should be
on the table for Iraq. He expressed refreshing candor in admitting past
mistakes in Iraq. And Gates promised to work in a constructive,
respectful way with military commanders, the Iraq Study Group, and
Congress to find a new way forward.
Third is Gates' extensive experience. He served for 26 years in the
Central Intelligence Agency and the National Security Council, and he
was the only career officer in the CIA's history to rise from entry-
level employee to Director.
Everyone knows that Gates' job will not be easy. There are no good
options left in Iraq. There is no set of policy changes that can
guarantee a good outcome. There is a great resistance to
[[Page S11292]]
change in this administration, from the President down. Among
Presidential appointees, there still is significant danger in speaking
truth to power.
The President, Senate, and the American people are putting a great
deal on Dr. Gates' shoulders. I am voting for him with the hope that he
can make us proud.
Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, I rise to voice my strong support for
the nomination of Dr. Robert M. Gates to be the Nation's 22nd Secretary
of Defense. His intelligence, candor, and many years of national
security experience make him an excellent choice to lead the Pentagon
and our Nation's troops during this critical time in war on terror.
Dr. Gates wore his country's uniform as a U.S. Air Force officer; his
service includes time spent with the Strategic Air Command, the
prestigious unit once charged with protecting America from a nuclear
attack by the Soviet Union. Dr. Gates's career includes two decades
with the CIA, where he started as an entry-level employee and rose to
the top position. And he spent 9 years at the National Security
Council. Throughout his Government service, he has advised six
Presidents.
Having previously served as Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
from 1986 to 1989, Assistant to the President and Deputy National
Security Adviser from 1989 to 1991, and Director of Central
Intelligence from 1991 to 1993, Dr. Gates is one of the most qualified
national-security specialists in the country.
As DCI he led over 100,000 employees and managed the Agency at a
critical juncture at the end of the Cold War. And he has spent the last
13 years outside of government, giving him both a keen understanding of
best business practices and a fresh perspective to tackle America's
security challenges.
Dr. Gates has a proven record of bipartisan cooperation, demonstrated
most recently by his tenure with the Iraq Study Group. As a member of
that group, he has traveled to Iraq, met Iraqi leaders, and talked to
our military commanders on the ground. He is ready to hit the ground
running and lead the Pentagon from the day he is confirmed.
Five years into the war on terror, America has made great progress.
But much hard work still lies ahead, as we continue to defend Americans
here at home while fighting abroad the terrorists who would do us harm.
The position of Secretary of Defense is more important than ever, and I
believe the President has made an outstanding choice.
Dr. Gates has the wisdom and the ability to succeed. He will be a
strong leader for the Pentagon and our brave men and women in uniform.
I urge my colleagues to support his nomination, and I will
wholeheartedly vote for his confirmation.
Mr. REID. Mr. President, I intend to support the nomination of Dr.
Robert Gates as the new Secretary of Defense. I believe he will provide
the Department of Defense, and the President's senior team, the new
perspective and fresh ideas so desperately needed. He is a
distinguished and seasoned public servant, and his long experience will
serve him well in what will be a challenging post.
I want to thank Senators Warner and Levin for making sure Dr. Gates
received an expeditious and thorough hearing. With our Nation at war,
we could not afford to let his confirmation drag.
I am hopeful that, when confirmed, Dr. Gates will serve as an agent
of change in the administration--most importantly, on Iraq.
Yesterday, when asked if we are winning in Iraq, Dr. Gates said
``no.'' Today, the Iraq Study Group said the situation in Iraq is
``grave and deteriorating.''
The Iraq Study Group has done a tremendous and historic service to
the American people and to the troops serving in harm's way in Iraq.
Their report underscores the message the American people sent one month
ago: there must be change in Iraq, and there is no time to lose. It is
time for the Iraqis to build and secure their nation, and it is time
for American combat troops to be redeployed. Each day the situation in
Iraq continues to deteriorate. Time is not on our side.
This assessment rings particularly true today, as we learned that 10
U.S. troops were killed in fighting across Iraq, bringing the level of
U.S. deaths to 27 in only the first 6 days of December. On average,
almost three U.S. troops are killed each day. We do not have time for
finger-pointing and pontificating from politicians--it is time for
action and leadership.
Most experts agree that Iraq is now embroiled in a civil war, and our
troops are caught in the middle. Policing a civil war between Shia and
Sunni is not something for which our country or our military consented.
We must begin to transition our mission in Iraq, reduce our combat
footprint, and begin to extricate our troops from the middle of this
sectarian strife. In short, we need more than a change in personality
at the Defense Department, we need a change in policy. I urge the
President to reach out to Congress and work with us to change course.
If the administration reaches out in a meaningful way, it will find
Congress ready and willing to work as a partner. The Senate will do its
part next year and conduct strong oversight to ensure the President
carries out an effective change in policy. Our troops in Iraq,
including hundreds of Nevadans, have sacrificed so much. It is time for
President Bush to reward their effort by bringing the country together
around a new way forward.
Once Dr. Gates is confirmed, I look forward to the Senate working
with him and the President on this change of course in Iraq.
In addition, I look forward to working with Dr. Gates to change
course on the other key challenges we face. Dr. Gates must come to
Congress with a solid plan for addressing the readiness of our military
which is under strain and at risk because of the administration's Iraq
strategy.
Dr. Gates must help the administration develop an effective approach
for curbing Iran and North Korea's nuclear ambitions. And Dr. Gates
must spearhead a new effort to ensure a successful outcome for
Afghanistan, as part of a broader fresh look at our strategy for the
war on terror, the hunt for Usama bin Laden, and the struggle to
empower moderates and combat violent extremists. These are serious
issues that deserve to be addressed properly.
Hopefully, Dr. Gates can operate with the same level of candor and
realism as Secretary of Defense as he has during his nomination
process. The stakes for our Nation are high, and his task is a great
one, but today, he has our support and a commitment to work together to
solve this Nation's national security challenges.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I see no other Senators seeking
recognition, so I think we may as well--the standing order is the vote
begins at 5 o'clock?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. That is correct.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
There appears to be a sufficient second.
Is all time yielded back?
Without objection, all time is yielded back.
Mr. WARNER. I thank the Presiding Officer.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is, Will the Senate advise and
consent to the nomination of Robert M. Gates, of Texas, to be Secretary
of Defense?
The clerk will call the roll.
The legislative clerk called the roll.
Mr. McCONNELL. The following Senator was necessarily absent: the
Senator from North Carolina (Mrs. Dole).
Further, if present and voting, the Senator from North Carolina (Mrs.
Dole) would have voted ``yea.''
Mr. DURBIN. I announce that the Senator from Indiana (Mr. Bayh) and
the Senator from Delaware (Mr. Biden) are necessarily absent.
I further announce that if present and voting, the Senator from
Delaware (Mr. Biden) would vote ``yea.''
The result was announced--yeas 95, nays 2, as follows:
[Rollcall Vote No. 272 Ex.]
YEAS--95
Akaka
Alexander
Allard
Allen
Baucus
Bennett
Bingaman
Bond
Boxer
Brownback
Burns
Burr
Byrd
Cantwell
Carper
Chafee
Chambliss
Clinton
[[Page S11293]]
Coburn
Cochran
Coleman
Collins
Conrad
Cornyn
Craig
Crapo
Dayton
DeMint
DeWine
Dodd
Domenici
Dorgan
Durbin
Ensign
Enzi
Feingold
Feinstein
Frist
Graham
Grassley
Gregg
Hagel
Harkin
Hatch
Hutchison
Inhofe
Inouye
Isakson
Jeffords
Johnson
Kennedy
Kerry
Kohl
Kyl
Landrieu
Lautenberg
Leahy
Levin
Lieberman
Lincoln
Lott
Lugar
Martinez
McCain
McConnell
Menendez
Mikulski
Murkowski
Murray
Nelson (FL)
Nelson (NE)
Obama
Pryor
Reed
Reid
Roberts
Rockefeller
Salazar
Sarbanes
Schumer
Sessions
Shelby
Smith
Snowe
Specter
Stabenow
Stevens
Sununu
Talent
Thomas
Thune
Vitter
Voinovich
Warner
Wyden
NAYS--2
Bunning
Santorum
NOT VOTING--3
Bayh
Biden
Dole
The nomination was confirmed.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote, and I move
to lay that motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The President will be immediately notified of
the Senate's action on this nomination.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, at this time, I congratulate and express
my gratitude to the extraordinary staff of the Armed Services
Committee. My distinguished colleague, the senior Senator from
Michigan, and I have been together 28 years on this committee and have
worked with this staff, almost all of them, throughout my 6-year tenure
and many prior thereto when Senator Levin was chairman of the
committee.
I want today's Record to reflect our appreciation and that of many
Members of this Chamber who worked with the distinguished staff. I ask
unanimous consent to print in the Record the chronological history of
that staff, who were of great assistance to Senator Levin and me as we
prepared for this important nomination and held the hearing yesterday.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
Majority Staff and Non-Designated Staff--Senate Armed Services
Committee, October 2006
Staff Director: Charles S. Abell.
Chief Clerk: Marie Fabrizio Dickinson.
Assistant Chief Clerk and Security Manager: Cindy Pearson.
General Counsel: Scott W. Stucky.
Counsel: Richard F. Walsh and David M. Morriss.
Professional Staff Members: Ambrose R. Hock, Lynn F.
Rusten, Lucian L. Niemeyer, Gregory T. Kiley, Regina A.
Dubey, Elaine A. McCusker, Diana G. Tabler, Robert M. Soofer,
Stanley R. O'Connor, Jr., Kristine L. Svinicki, William M.
Caniano, Derek J. Maurer, and Sean G. Stackley.
Nominations and Hearings Clerk: Leah C. Brewer.
Systems Administrator. --Gary J. Howard
Printing and Documents Clerk. --June M. Borawski
Security Clerk.--John H. Quirk V.
Special Assistant. --Catherine E. Sendak
Staff Assistants.--Benjamin L. Rubin, Jessica L. Kingston,
Micah H. Harris, Jill L. Simodejka, and David G. Collins
Receptionist.--Fletcher L. Cork
Subcommitee on Airland:
Majority Professional Staff Members: Ambrose R. Hock
(Lead), Stanley R. O'Connor, Jr.
Staff Assistant: Micah H. Harris.
Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities:
Majority Professional Staff Members: Lynn F. Rusten (Lead),
William M. Caniano, Regina A. Dubey, Derek J. Maurer, Elaine
A. McCusker, Robert M. Soofer.
Staff Assistant: Jessica L. Kingston.
Subcommittee on Personnel:
Majority Professional Staff Members: Richard F. Walsh
(Lead), David M. Morriss, Diana G. Tabler.
Staff Assistant: David G. Collins.
Subcommittee on Readiness and Management Support:
Majority Professional Staff Members: Gregory T. Kiley
(Lead), Ambrose R. Hock, Derek J. Maurer, Elaine A. McCusker,
David M. Morriss, Lucian L. Niemeyer.
Staff Assistant: Benjamin L. Rubin.
Subcommittee on Seapower:
Majority Professional Staff Members: Sean G. Stackley
(Lead), Ambrose R. Hock, Stanley R. O'Connor, Jr.
Staff Assistant: Micah H. Harris.
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces:
Majority Professional Staff Members: Robert M. Soofer
(Lead), William M. Caniano, Stanley R. O'Connor, Jr.,
Kristine L. Svinicki.
Staff Assistant: Jill L. Simodejka.
Majority Professional Staff Members for:
Acquisition Policy.--Ambrose R. Hock.
Acquisition Workforce.--Diana G. Tabler.
Arms Control/Non-proliferation.--Lynn F. Rusten.
Army Programs.--Ambrose R. Hock.
Aviation Systems.--Stanley R. O'Connor, Jr.
Budget Tracking.--Gregory T. Kiley.
Buy America.--Ambrose R. Hock.
Chemical-Biological Defense.--Derek J. Maurer.
Chemical Demilitarization.--Lynn F. Rusten.
Civilian Nominations.--Scott W. Stucky/Richard F. Walsh.
Civilian Personnel Policy.--Diana G. Tabler.
Combatant Commands.--
CENTCOM--William M. Caniano.
EUCOM--Lynn F. Rusten .
(Africa)--Regina A. Dubey.
JFCOM--William M. Caniano .
NORTHCOM--Robert M. Soofer.
PACOM--Lynn F. Rusten.
SOCOM--Elaine A. McCusker.
SOUTHCOM--William M. Caniano.
STRATCOM--Robert M. Soofer.
TRANSCOM--Sean G. Stackley/Stanley R. O'Connor, Jr.
Combating Terrorism.--William M. Caniano.
Competition Policy/Mergers and Acquisitions.--Elaine A.
McCusker.
Competitive Sourcing/A-76.--Derek J. Maurer.
Contracting (including service contracts).--Elaine A.
McCusker.
Cooperative Threat Reduction Programs.--Lynn f. Rusten.
Counterdrug Programs.--William M. Caniano.
Defense Laboratory Management.--Elaine A. McCusker.
Defense Security Assistance.--Lynn F. Rusten.
Department of Defense Schools.--Diana G. Tabler.
Depot Maintenance Policy.--Derek J. Maurer.
Detainee Policy.--William M. Caniano/Scott Stucky/David M.
Morriss.
Department of Energy Issues.--Kristine L. Svinicki.
Environmental Issues.--David M. Morriss.
Export Controls.--Lynn F. Rusten.
Financial Management.--Gregory T. Kiley.
Foreign Language Policy.--Regina A. Dubey.
Foreign Policy/Geographical Region.--
Africa--Regina A. Dubey.
Asia/Pacific Region--Lynn F. Rusten.
Europe/Russia--Lynn F. Rusten.
Middle East--William M. Caniano.
South America--William M. Caniano.
Helicopters.--Ambrose R. Hock.
Homeland Security/Defense/Domestic Preparedness.--Robrt M.
Soofer.
Humanitarian and Civic Assistance.--Regina A. Dubey.
Information Assurance/Cyber Security.--Elaine A. McCusker.
Information Management.--Gregory T. Kiley.
Information Technology Systems.--
(Business Systems)--Gregory T. Kiley.
(Tactical Systems)--Ambrose R. Hock.
Intelligence Issues.--William M. Caniano.
International Defense Cooperation.--Lynn F. Rusten.
Inventory Management.--Derek J. Maurer.
Military Construction/Base Closures.--Lucian L. Niemeyer.
Military Family Policy.--Diana G. Tabler.
Military Health Care.--Diana G. Tabler.
Military Nominations.--Richard F. Walsh.
Military Space.--Robert M. Soofer.
Military Strategy.--William M. Caniano.
Missile Defense.--Robert M. Soofer.
Morale, Welfare and Recreation/Commissaries/Exchanges.--
Diana G. Tabler.
Nuclear Weapons Stockpile.--Kristine L. Svinicki.
Personnel Issues.--Richard F. Walsh/Diana G. Tabler/David
M. Morriss.
POW/MIA Issues.--David M. Morriss.
Readiness/O&M.--Derek J. Maurer/Gregory T. Kiley.
Reprogramming.--Gregory T. Kiley.
Science and Technology.--Elaine A. McCusker.
Sexual Harassment/Sexual Assault Policy.--David M. Morriss.
Shipbuilding Programs.--Sean G. Stackley.
Small Business.--Elaine A. McCusker.
Special Operations Forces.--Elaine A. McCusker.
Stability Operations.--Lynn F. Rusten/Regina A. Dubey.
Strategic Programs.--Robert M. Soofer.
Test and Evaluation.--Elaine A. McCusker.
Transportation and Logistics Policy.--Derek J. Maurer.
Unmanned Aircraft Systems.--Stanley R. O'Connor, Jr.
Women in Combat.--David M. Morriss.
Minority Staff--Senate Armed Services Committee, October 2006
Democratic Staff Director.--Richard D. DeBobes.
Administrative Assistant to the Minority.--Christine E.
Cowart.
Minority Counsel.--Peter K. Levine, Madelyn R. Creedon,
Gerald J. Leeling, William G.P. Monahan, and Jonathan D.
Clark.
Professional Staff Member.--Creighton Greene, Michael J.
McCord, Richard W.
[[Page S11294]]
Fieldhouse, Daniel J. Cox, Jr., Evelyn N. Farkas, Gabriella
Eisen, Arun A. Seraphin, and Michael J. Kuiken.
Research Assistant.--Michael J. Noblet.
Subcommittee on Airland:
Minority Professional Staff Members: Daniel J. Cox, Jr.
(Lead), Creighton Greene.
Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities:
Minority Professional Staff Members: Richard W. Fieldhouse
(Lead), Arun A. Seraphin, Evelyn N. Farkas, Madelyn R.
Creedon.
Subcommittee on Personnel:
Minority Professional Staff Members: Gerald J. Leeling
(Lead), Jonathan D. Clark.
Subcommittee on Readiness and Management Support:
Minority Professional Staff Members: Michael J. McCord
(Lead), Peter K. Levine.
Subcommittee on Seapower:
Minority Professional Staff Members: Creighton Greene
(Lead), Daniel J. Cox, Jr.
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces:
Minority Professional Staff Members: Madelyn R. Creedon
(Lead), Richard W. Fieldhouse, Creighton Greene.
Minority Professional Staff Members for:
Acquisition Policy.--Peter K. Levine.
Acquisition Workforce.--Peter K. Levine.
Arms Control/Non-proliferation.--Richard W. Fieldhouse/
Madelyn R. Creedon.
Army Programs.--Daniel J. Cox, Jr.
Aviation Systems.--Creighton Greene/Daniel J. Cox, Jr./
Madelyn R. Creedon.
Budget Tracking.--Michael J. McCord.
Buy America.--Peter K. Levine.
Chemical-Biological Defense.--Richard W. Fieldhouse.
Chemical Demilitarization.--Richard W. Fieldhouse.
Civilian Nominations.--Peter K. Levine.
Civilian Personnel Policy.--Gerald J. Leeling/Peter K.
Levine.
Combatant Commands.--
CENTCOM--Michael 1. Kuiken/Gabriella Eisen.
EUCOM--William G. P. Monahan.
JFCOM--Michael J. McCord/Arun A. Seraphin.
NORTHCOM--Evelyn N. Farkas.
PACOM--Evelyn N. Farkas.
SOCOM--Evelyn N. Farkas.
SOUTHCOM--Evelyn N. Farkas.
STRATCOM--Madelyn R. Creedon.
TRANSCOM--Creighton Greene.
Combating Terrorism/Domestic Preparedness.--Evelyn N.
Farkas.
Competition Policy/Mergers and Acquisitions.--Peter K.
Levine.
Competitive Sourcing/ A76.--Peter K. Levine.
Contracting (including service contracts).--Peter K.
Levine.
Cooperative Threat Reduction Programs.--Madelyn R. Creedon.
Counterdrug Programs.--Evelyn N. Farkas.
Defense Laboratory Management.--Peter K. Levine/Arun A.
Seraphin.
Defense Security Assistance.--Evelyn N. Farkas/William G.P.
Monahan
Department of Defense Schools.--Gerald J. Leeling/Jonathan
D. Clark
Department of Energy Issues.--Madelyn R. Creedon
Depot Maintenance Policy.--Michael J. McCord
Detainee Policy.--William G.P. Monahan/Peter K. Levine/
Jonathan D. Clark/Gabriella Eisen
Environmental Issues.--Peter K. Levine
Export Controls.--Evelyn N. Farkas/Peter K. Levine
Financial Management.--Peter K. Levine/Michael J. McCord
Foreign Language Policy.--Creighton Greene/Evelyn N. Farkas
Foreign Policy/Geographical Region.--
Afghanistan--Daniel J. Cox, Jr./Evelyn N. Farkas
Africa--Michael J. Kuiken/Gabriella Eisen William G.P.
Monahan
Asia/Pacific Region--Evelyn N. Farkas
Europe/Russia--William G.P. Monahan/Madelyn R. Creedon
Iraq--Daniel J. Cox, Jr./William G. P. Monahan
Middle East--Michael J. Kuiken/Gabriella Eisen
South America--Evelyn N. Farkas
Helicopters.--Daniel J. Cox, Jr./Creighton Greene
Homeland Security/Defense.--Richard W. Fieldhouse
Humanitarian and Civic Assistance.--Evelyn N. Farkas/
William G.P. Monahan
Information Assurance/Cyber Security.--Creighton Greene/
Arun A. Seraphin
Information Management.--Creighton Greene/Peter K. Levine
Information Technology Systems.--
(Business Systems)--Peter K. Levine
(Tactical Systems)--Creighton Greene/Arun A. Seraphin
Intelligence Issues.--Creighton Greene
International Defense Cooperation.--Evelyn N. Farkas/Peter
K. Levine/William G.P. Monahan
Inventory Management.--Peter K. Levine/Michael J. McCord
Military Personnel Issues.--Gerald J. Leeling/Jonathan D.
Clark
End Strength--Jonathan D. Clark/Gerald J. Leeling
Military Family Policy--Gerald J. Leeling/Jonathan D. Clark
Health Care--Gerald J. Leeling/Jonathan D. Clark
Pay and Benefits--Jonathan D. Clark/Gerald J. Leeling
Military Personnel Policy--Gerald J. Leeling/Jonathan D.
Clark
Military Construction/Base Closures.--Michael J. McCord
Military Nominations.--Gerald J. Leeling
Military Space.--Madelyn R. Creedon
Military Strategy.--Daniel J. Cox, Jr.
Missile Defense.--Richard W. Fieldhouse
Morale, Welfare and Recreation/Commissaries/Exchanges.--
Jonathan D. Clark/Gerald J. Leeling
Nuclear Weapons Stockpile.--Madelyn R. Creedon
POW/MIA Issues.--Jonathan D. Clark
Readiness/O&M.--Michael J. McCord
Reprogramming.--Michael J. McCord
Science and Technology.--Arun A. Seraphin
Sexual Harassment/Sexual Assault Policy.--Gerald J.
Leeling/Jonathan D. Clark
Shipbuilding Programs.--Creighton Greene
Small Business.--Peter K. Levine
Special Operations Forces.--Evelyn N. Farkas
Stability Operations.--Evelyn N. Farkas/William G.P.
Monahan
Strategic Programs.--Madelyn R. Creedon
Test and Evaluation.--Arun A. Seraphin/Peter K. Levine
Transportation and Logistics Policy.--Michael J. McCord/
Creighton Greene
Unmanned Aircraft Systems.--Creighton Greene/Daniel J. Cox,
Jr.
Women in Combat.--Jonathan D. Clark/Gerald J. Leeling
____________________