Congressional Record, Volume 152 Issue 130 (Thursday, November 16, 2006)

[Congressional Record Volume 152, Number 130 (Thursday, November 16, 2006)]
[Senate]
[Pages S11010-S11034]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

RECESS SUBJECT TO THE CALL OF THE CHAIR

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Ensign amendment now being the pending
question, the Senate stands in recess subject to the call of the Chair.
Whereupon, the Senate, at 3:43 p.m, recessed subject to the call of
the Chair and reassembled at 4:59 p.m. when called to order by the
Presiding Officer (Ms. Murkowski.)
Mr. LUGAR. Madam President, we are now prepared to vote in relation
to the Ensign amendment. I ask unanimous consent that following that
vote, Senator Feingold be recognized to offer his amendment and that
there be 90 minutes equally divided on that amendment. I further ask
unanimous consent that following the use or yielding back of time on
that amendment, it be set aside, and Senator Boxer be recognized in
order to offer her amendment; provided further that there be 45 minutes
equally divided in relation to that amendment. Further, that following
that time the Senate proceed to a vote in relation to the Feingold
amendment, to be followed by a vote in relation to the Boxer amendment,
with no second-degrees in order, and following these votes, the bill be
read for a third time and the Senate proceed to a vote on passage of
the House bill as provided in the previous order. I would also ask that
there be 2 minutes equally divided for debate prior to each vote.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? Without objection, it is
so ordered.
Mr. LUGAR. I thank the Chair. We are now prepared to vote in relation
to the Ensign amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Do Senators yield time on the amendment?
Mr. LUGAR. Yes.

Vote on Amendment No. 5181

The PRESIDING OFFICER. All time is yielded. The question is on
agreeing to the amendment. The clerk will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk called the roll.
Mr. McCONNELL. The following Senator was necessarily absent: the
Senator from Wyoming (Mr. Thomas).
Mr. DURBIN. I announce that the Senator from Vermont (Mr. Jeffords)
is necessarily absent.
The result was announced--yeas 27, nays 71, as follows:

[Rollcall Vote No. 267 Leg.]

YEAS--27

Allard
Bunning
Coburn
Coleman
Collins
Conrad
Cornyn
DeMint
Dole
Dorgan
Ensign
Enzi
Frist
Grassley
Gregg
Hutchison
Inhofe
Johnson
Kyl
Lott
McConnell
Menendez
Santorum
Sessions
Smith
Snowe
Sununu

NAYS--71

Akaka
Alexander
Allen
Baucus
Bayh
Bennett
Biden
Bingaman
Bond
Boxer
Brownback
Burns
Burr
Byrd
Cantwell
Carper
Chafee
Chambliss
Clinton
Cochran
Craig
Crapo
Dayton
DeWine
Dodd
Domenici
Durbin
Feingold
Feinstein
Graham
Hagel
Harkin
Hatch
Inouye
Isakson
Kennedy
Kerry
Kohl
Landrieu
Lautenberg
Leahy
Levin
Lieberman
Lincoln
Lugar
Martinez
McCain
Mikulski
Murkowski
Murray
Nelson (FL)
Nelson (NE)
Obama
Pryor
Reed
Reid
Roberts
Rockefeller
Salazar
Sarbanes
Schumer
Shelby
Specter
Stabenow
Stevens
Talent
Thune
Vitter
Voinovich
Warner
Wyden

NOT VOTING--2

Jeffords
Thomas

The amendment (No. 5181) was rejected.
Mr. LUGAR. I move to reconsider the vote, and I move to lay that
motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Isakson). Under the previous order, the
Senator from Wisconsin is recognized. Will the Senator suspend?
Did the distinguished chairman wish to be recognized?
Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, just for clarification, I ask unanimous
consent that the Feingold and Boxer amendments be in order,
notwithstanding adoption of the Harkin amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. LUGAR. I thank the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Wisconsin.
Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a parliamentary
inquiry?
Mr. FEINGOLD. I yield.
Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, how long did we spend in that last 15-
minute rollcall?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. We spent approximately 39 minutes.
Mr. LEAHY. Thirty-nine?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Thirty-six. I apologize.
Mr. LEAHY. Thirty-six for a 15-minute rollcall. I am just curious,
for those of us who might actually have a life after dark around this
place, how much longer the rest will be.
I thank the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair would recognize that the
distinguished majority leader's retirement recognition with the Vice
President was being held, and that was probably the delay, for the
meeting.
The Senator from Wisconsin.
Mr. FEINGOLD. Thank you, Mr. President.

Amendment No. 5183

Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk, and I ask for its
immediate consideration.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

The Senator from Wisconsin [Mr. Feingold] proposes an
amendment numbered 5183.

[[Page S11011]]

Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of
the amendment be dispensed with.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The amendment is as follows:

(Purpose: To require as a precondition to United States-India peaceful
atomic energy cooperation determinations by the President that United
States nuclear cooperation with India does nothing to assist,
encourage, or induce India to manufacture or acquire nuclear weapons or
other nuclear explosive devices)

On page 8, beginning on line 17, strike ``Group; and'' and
all that follows through ``(8) the Nuclear'' on line 18 and
insert the following:

Group;
(8) the scope and content of United States nuclear
cooperation with India in the proposed nuclear cooperation
agreement pursuant to section 123 a. of the Atomic Energy Act
of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153(a)) does nothing to directly or
indirectly assist, encourage, or induce India to manufacture
or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear
explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive
devices, specifically that--
(A) India cannot use United States-origin equipment,
technology, or nuclear material in an unsafeguarded facility
or nuclear weapons-related complex; and
(B) India cannot replicate and subsequently use United
States-origin technology in an unsafeguarded nuclear facility
or unsafeguarded nuclear-related complex, or for any activity
related to the research, development, testing, or manufacture
of nuclear explosive devices;
(9) India has provided sufficient assurances that the
provision by the United States of nuclear fuel will not
facilitate the increased production by India of fissile
material in unsafeguarded nuclear facilities; and
(10) the Nuclear

Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, the relationship between the United
States and India is very important. As we look ahead to the coming
decades, it is clear that United States-India relations will be
integral to establishing a secure, sustainable, and prosperous
international system--not only in the Asian region but around the world
as India increasingly grows into its role as a global power.
And, of course, India, in many ways, is a natural ally of the United
States. We share a great deal in common as ethnically diverse,
religiously tolerant democratic societies. Our peoples are innovative,
driven, and eager to participate in the global economy. We both face
the threat of terrorism. India occupies an important position in an
important part of the world, and by itself represents over l7 percent
of the world's total population. We absolutely should be working to
strengthen our relationship with this important partner, and seeking
ways to deepen our strategic ties.
While I want to strengthen the relationship between the United States
and India, this bill would do more than simply bring our two nations
closer together. It would pave the way for civilian nuclear cooperation
between the United States and India for the first time since India
exploded a nuclear device in the 1970s. If this bill is passed, it will
dramatically shift 30 years of nonproliferation policy. Specifically,
this bill would have serious consequences for the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty, the international nonproliferation regime, and
U.S. national security. Such a fundamental change in policy should not
be undertaken lightly, which is why it is crucial that this body fully
discuss and understand the implications of this bill.
In my work on the Foreign Relations Committee, I have had a chance to
study this issue and this legislation closely. I have talked to a
number of people, on all sides of this issue: senior officials from the
administration, business groups, nonproliferation and arms control
experts, Indian officials, and concerned citizens in my home State of
Wisconsin. The committee held a number of hearings to examine the
issue, and the panelists we heard from represented a wide range of
opinions on the prospect of nuclear cooperation with India. And after
all of this careful consideration, I have to report that I am left with
some deep concerns regarding what this legislation means for United
States national security.
The primary consideration for us in the U.S. Senate as we debate this
bill should be this: will this legislation make the citizens of the
United States more secure or less? As we consider this fundamental
shift in the international nonproliferation regime, we must make sure
that we have adequate protections in place to guard against the further
spread of nuclear weapons and weapons technology.
The threat of nuclear weapons to the United States and the spread of
nuclear weapons and nuclear material are among the gravest dangers that
our country faces. It is crucial to our national security that the
nuclear non-proliferation framework remains strong. I want to make sure
that the United States, as a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty, is working to strengthen the international treaties and regimes
that have been designed to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. A
world with more nuclear weapons is, simply put, a more dangerous world.
So that is why I am offering an amendment to this bill that spells
out in greater detail that nuclear cooperation between the United
States and India will be only civilian in nature, and that none of the
assistance the United States provides will be used for strengthening or
further developing India's nuclear weapons arsenal. This is completely
in line with President Bush's and Secretary Rice's statements about the
deal, and is something the United States is already committed to under
article I of the NPT. My amendment simply makes it a binding
requirement: Before the nuclear cooperation agreement can go into
effect, the President of the United States must certify that the scope
and content of the agreement does nothing to contribute directly or
indirectly to the development of India's nuclear weapons arsenal. This
amendment will strengthen this bill. It will enhance transparency. And
it will send a clear message to the world that the United States will,
in fact, abide by its commitments and is working within the letter and
spirit of the agreements and treaties to which it is party.
Allow me to quote from article I of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty, because I think it will help to set forth the obligations of
the agreement the United States is a party to. Article I states that:

Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes
not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons
or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such
weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not
in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear
weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear
weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over
such weapons or explosive devices.

Let me repeat that second clause, because it is what my amendment
intends to address: ``not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce
any non-nuclear weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire
nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over
such weapons or explosive devices.''
India is considered to be a nonnuclear weapon state for the purposes
of the NPT, and we are therefore prohibited from assisting their
nuclear weapons program. My amendment will require the President to
make determinations to ensure that we are in line with that treaty
obligation. First, the President would have to certify to Congress that
the scope and content of the nuclear cooperation agreement that he
negotiates will not contribute to India's nuclear weapons program--
specifically that it does not: Allow for the use of U.S.-origin
equipment, technology, or material in an unsafeguarded Indian nuclear
facility; or allow for the replication and subsequent use of U.S.-
origin technology for any activity related to nuclear explosive
devices.
Second, the President would have to certify that he had received
sufficient assurances from the Government of India that nuclear fuel
provided by the United States will not facilitate the increased
production by India of fissile material for weapons use.
Both India and the United States should feel comfortable with this
amendment; it only requires that the United States certify that this
deal is in line with our current commitments. It will go a long way to
enhance transparency and reassure all sides that this civil nuclear
cooperation agreement does not have any military aspects.
This is particularly important now, as we face nuclear crises in
North Korea and Iran. While we are pressuring those countries to submit
to international inspections and abide by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty,

[[Page S11012]]

it is crucial that we not simultaneously be seen to undermine the NPT's
foundations by our actions. My amendment sends a clear message that the
United States stands by the spirit and the letter of the NPT. Rejecting
my amendment would send a dangerous signal to Iran, North Korea and
other states that we are not taking seriously our international
commitments, and that the NPT is no longer relevant.

As you can see, my amendment is quite detailed in spelling out
exactly how assistance to India's weapons program is defined, and what
activities should be prohibited under the terms of the agreement. The
second determination, which relates to the provision of nuclear fuel by
the United States, is particularly important, because it gets to the
heart of concerns about a possible buildup of nuclear weapons.
Currently, India's production of weapons grade plutonium is constrained
by its limited domestic supply of natural uranium. Experts, from former
Senator Sam Nunn former Assistant Secretary of State for
Nonproliferation Bob Einhorn, have expressed concern that by providing
nuclear fuel to India through this agreement, India's domestic supply
of uranium might be freed up in order to accelerate the production of
nuclear weapons materials.
And in fact, the Indians themselves have expressed this possibility.
Listen to the words of a former head of the Indian National Security
Advisory Board, less than a year ago:

Given India's uranium ore crunch and the need to build up
our minimum credible nuclear deterrent arsenal as fast as
possible, it is to India's advantage to categorize as many
power reactors as possible as civilian ones to be refueled bv
imported uranium and conserve our native uranium fuel for
weapons grade plutonium production.

This is from an article entitled ``India and the Nuclear Deal,'' in
the Times of India on December 12, 2005.
This is a former high-level Indian Government official, arguing less
than a year ago that India should increase its production of weapons
material through the provision of imported uranium. I am, frankly,
concerned by that prospect. India has said that its strategic nuclear
weapons program, and the production of fissile material, is unrelated
to this deal. Secretary Rice and other members of the administration
have assured us of the same thing. In fact, in its official response to
one of Senator Lugar's questions last year, the State Department noted
that ``nothing to be provided to India under the Initiative will be
used to enhance India's military capability or add to its military
stockpile.''

If that is truly the case--and I believe both sides when they say
that expanding India's nuclear weapons arsenal is not a goal of this
agreement--then my amendment should be absolutely uncontroversial. It
simply makes those claims binding, by requiring the President to make
such a determination.
Some of my colleagues might ask, if we are already committed to non-
assistance under the NPT, and if members of the administration have
assured us that this is the case, why is this amendment necessary?
After all, requiring a presidential determination is a big deal. My
response is that this issue is a big deal. Nonassistance to India's
nuclear weapons program is such a critical aspect of this agreement
that it must be spelled out within the legislation in clear, concrete
terms, leaving no question or ambiguity. It is an issue that demands
the high bar of a presidential determination to Congress.
And there is a significant precedent for such determination The 1985
Agreement for Nuclear Cooperation Between the United States and China
required a presidential determination on nonassistance to China's
nuclear weapons program--one of only two binding presidential
determinations included in that legislation. Specifically, the law
stated that the U.S.-China nuclear cooperation agreement could not go
into force until the President provided a certification to Congress
that the agreement was designed ``to be effective in ensuring that any
nuclear material, facilities, or components provided under the
Agreement shall be utilized solely for intended peaceful purposes as
set forth in the Agreement.''
In 1985, the Members of this body deemed that one of the two things
the President of the United States should have to make a certification
about prior to nuclear cooperation with another country was that our
civilian cooperation would in no way assist that country's weapons
program. My amendment is identical in scope and purpose, and should be
passed. If anything, there are even more reasons to push for such a
determination with regard to India, given that India is a nonsignatory
to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Some may argue that the President cannot make such a determination--
that the President cannot know in advance what India will do with
material we provide to them. But this amendment is about the scope and
content of the agreement, and about assurances received from the Indian
government. It is about our current actions, and the strength of the
agreement that the President negotiates. And in fact, the President
made exactly such a determination, in 1998, when he submitted
Presidential Determination 98-10 to the U.S. Congress to enable nuclear
cooperation with China to move forward under that agreement.
If this body is afraid that the President would be unable to make
such a determination with respect to India, I ask one question: why
then are we pursuing this deal? If we cannot be reasonably certain that
this agreement will not help India to expand its nuclear arsenal, how
good a deal is this? This should be a simple calculation based on the
best interests of the United States.
My colleagues are aware that I voted against this legislation in
committee. I stated at the time of my vote that I was not opposed to
the deal in principle, but was committed to working constructively to
strengthen this bill when it came to the floor, because I still had
concerns that had not been addressed. I stand by that statement. I
would like to see an agreement that brings our countries closer
together strategically, while preserving our national security
interests.
However, since the time of the committee hearing, more information
has come to light that further justifies the concerns I expressed
earlier, and which I would like to share with my colleagues.
First of all, since that time, the State Department released a report
sanctioning two Indian firms for illicit missile-related transactions
with Iran. This report was 10 months overdue and was not released until
1 day after the House voted on its version of this legislation. There
are a number of things that I find troubling about this report and the
way it was released, but the biggest is that it seems to contravene the
Bush administration's assertions that India has a stellar
nonproliferation record. At a minimum, this report demonstrates that
there continue to be legitimate concerns about the spread of dangerous
weapons technology, know-how, and equipment--in India and elsewhere.

Secondly, there have been troubling signals coming from the Indian
Government itself about its commitment to nonproliferation controls. In
an August 17 speech to the Indian Parliament, Prime Minister Singh
declared that India would not agree to any changes to the nuclear deal
imposed by the U.S. Congress: ``We will stick to the parameters of the
agreement signed in Washington last year and this alone will be the
basis of nuclear cooperation,'' he said. He specifically noted that
India would not allow ``external supervision'' of its strategic nuclear
programs, and argued that President Bush had committed to providing an
``uninterrupted supply of fuel''--presumably, even if India were to
detonate another nuclear device. Prime Minister Singh also stated that
``there is no question of India being bound by a law passed by a
foreign legislature.'' This raises significant concerns in my mind as
to whether India would accept the important elements of this
legislation that the U.S. Congress will put in place if it passes.
Finally, there have been signs of an increasingly warm official
relationship between India and Iran. I note the irony of the timing: at
the same time we are debating passage of a bill that will lend
considerable assistance to India's nuclear program, we are doing
everything in our power to prevent Iran from furthering its own nuclear
program. I would like to read a couple of quotes from Indian Prime
Minister Singh, who had a meeting with Iranian President Ahmadinejad on
the sidelines of the Non-Aligned Movement Summit

[[Page S11013]]

in Cuba in September. Following the meeting, Prime Minister Singh
stated that ``India is determined to consolidate cultural, economic,
and political ties with Iran,'' and he expressed regret over the
``misunderstanding caused about India's stance on Iran's peaceful
nuclear program,'' stressing that India would ``never join any efforts
against Iran.'' I don't think it takes very much reading between the
lines to doubt that India will support us in our efforts to curtail
Iran's nuclear program--one of the most important national security
challenges facing our country at this time.

As further evidence of the support for my amendment, I would like to
submit for the Record a letter that was recently signed by a wide range
of non-proliferation experts, former senior government officials, and
respected scientists. I ask unanimous consent that this letter be
printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:

Fix the Nuclear Trade Deal With India

November 13, 2006.
U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC,
Attn: Foreign Affairs Staff.
Dear Senator: We are writing again to urge you and your
colleagues to support amendments that would address serious
flaws that still plague the proposed U.S.-Indian nuclear
trade legislation (S. 3709), which may be considered this
month. Despite some important adjustments made to the
administration's original proposal by the Foreign Relations
Committee, the arrangement would have far-reaching and
adverse effects on U.S. nonproliferation and security
objectives. We believe the legislation must include further
improvements in several key areas, among them:
A determination, prior to resumption of full nuclear
cooperation, that India has stopped the production of fissile
material (plutonium and highly enriched uranium) for weapons
or else joined a multilateral fissile production cutoff
agreement;
A determination and annual certification that U.S. civil
nuclear trade does not in any way assist or encourage India's
nuclear weapons program;
Measures to ensure that the United States does not continue
to provide nuclear assistance directly or through other
suppliers in the event that India breaks the nonproliferation
commitments outlined on July 18, 2005; and
A determination that the Government of India (GOI) or GOI-
affiliated entities are not engaged in illicit procurement of
WMD-related items.
We believe these measures are necessary because India has
neither joined the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), nor
accepted safeguards on all of its nuclear facilities, and
India's nonproliferation policy is not fully consistent with
the nonproliferation practices and responsibilities expected
of the original nuclear-weapon states.
Under the proposed nuclear cooperation deal, India has
pledged to accept safeguards at only eight additional
``civilian'' nuclear facilities by 2014. India has not yet
agreed that safeguards on these facilities would be
permanent. Current and future military-related nuclear
reactors, enrichment and reprocessing facilities, and weapons
fabrication facilities would remain unsafeguarded. Partial
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards would do
nothing to prevent the continued production of fissile
material for weapons in unsafeguarded facilities.
Consequently, foreign supplies of nuclear fuel to India could
assist India's bomb program by freeing-up its existing
limited capacity to support the production of highly enriched
uranium and plutonium for weapons.

Fissile Material Production

To help ensure that U.S. civilian nuclear cooperation is
not in any way advancing India's weapons program and is not
contributing to nuclear arms competition with Pakistan and
China, Congress should require that the President determines
that India has stopped fissile material production for
weapons or has joined a multilateral production ban before
the United States resumes full civil nuclear assistance to
India. Four of the five original nuclear-weapon states--
France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States--
have publicly declared that they have stopped fissile
material production for weapons. China is also believed to
have stopped such production.
India's commitment to support U.S. efforts to negotiate a
global fissile material cutoff treaty (FMCT) is a laudable
but somewhat hollow promise. Differences between the United
States and most other states (including India) on whether
such a treaty should be verified and competing priorities at
the 65-nation Conference on Disarmament make the prospects
for the conclusion of an FMCT difficult.
If India is truly committed to a ``minimal credible
deterrent,'' India should be able to declare as a matter of
national policy that it has stopped fissile material
production for weapons, or else join the United States,
China, France, Pakistan, Russia, and the United Kingdom in a
multilateral fissile cutoff agreement, pending the completion
of a global, verifiable FMCT. The Congress should direct the
President to actively pursue the early conclusion of such an
interim cutoff agreement with India and other relevant
parties, pending the entry into force of a global FMCT.

Nonassistance to India's Nuclear Weapons Program

The Senate bill should also require that prior to
implementation of a U.S.-Indian nuclear cooperation
agreement, the President make a determination that the
proposed U.S. civil nuclear assistance will not, in any way,
assist India's nuclear weapons program. Such a determination
should take into account the possible replication and
subsequent use of any U.S.-origin technology in an
unsafeguarded nuclear facility and the provision of nuclear
fuel in such a manner as to facilitate the increased
production of highly enriched uranium or plutonium in
unsafeguarded nuclear facilities for weapons purposes. Such a
determination would help maintain confidence that the United
States is complying with its NPT Article I commitment not to
assist other states' nuclear weapons programs. The Senate
should also agree to provisions in the House bill (H.R. 5682)
requiring annual executive branch reports on whether any such
assistance has occurred, and on India's uranium mining and
fissile material production rates, and other related matters.

Termination of Trade and Fuel Supply Assurances

S. 3709 now makes clear that if India conducts another
nuclear test explosion or otherwise violates the terms of an
agreement for nuclear cooperation, U.S. nuclear assistance
would be jeopardized. The bill also states that it is the
policy of the United States not to facilitate nuclear trade
by other nations with India if U.S. exports are interrupted.
However, India is insisting that the United States help
provide an assured nuclear fuel supply, even in the event
that the New Delhi government conducts a nuclear test
explosion or otherwise violates the terms of a future
agreement for nuclear cooperation with the United States.
Such a guarantee would be unprecedented and unwise.
Congress should further clarify that the United States
shall not provide or facilitate the supply of nuclear fuel
to India if the Government of India resumes nuclear
testing or fails to meet other provisions in U.S. law.

guarding against illicit procurement

The Senate should also address the fact that some Indian
government-affiliated enterprises have a history of
attempting to bypass export laws designed to keep U.S. and
other foreign technology from contributing to its weapons
effort. Congress should require that before the
implementation of any U.S.-Indian agreement for civil nuclear
cooperation, the President must make a determination that the
Indian government or entities under its jurisdiction are not
engaged in the illicit procurement of commodities controlled
under the guidelines of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) or
the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR).

retain useful nonproliferation provisions

We also urge Congress to retain several important elements
already included in S. 3709 that would help reduce the
adverse impacts of the initiative. Among these are the
provisions requiring that a new safeguards agreement between
the IAEA and India has entered into force and that such
safeguards are consistent with IAEA standards, principles,
and practices, and that such safeguards are permanent before
any expanded nuclear cooperation can take place. To date,
India has not begun formal talks with the IAEA on such
safeguards and is reportedly seeking ``India-specific''
safeguards that would be contingent on continued fuel
supplies. This is not consistent with the IAEA safeguards
applicable in the Indian case, which are known as INFCIRC/
66.Rev.2 safeguards.
With respect to the Section 106 provision restricting the
transfer of enrichment and reprocessing technologies, for 30
years U.S. nonproliferation policy has sought to discourage
the spread of sensitive nuclear technology. As President Bush
said in February 2004, ``enrichment and reprocessing are not
necessary for nations seeking to harness nuclear energy for
peaceful purposes.'' Current U.S. nuclear cooperation
agreements, including those with EURATOM, Japan, and China,
expressly prohibit transfers of such technologies, which can
be used to make nuclear bomb material. India should not in
any way be an exception to that important policy.
To ensure that India is meeting other key obligations
outlined in the July 18, 2005 Joint Statement, the Senate
should retain language in the House bill requiring that a
U.S. Indian agreement for nuclear cooperation shall be
terminated if India makes a materially significant transfer
that does not conform with the guidelines of the NSG or MTCR.
Congress should recall that in the past 20 months, seven
Indian entities have been sanctioned by the U.S. Government
for transfers of weapons-related items to Iran, including
sanctions announced in July for transfers of chemicals useful
for missile propellant manufacture.
Finally, the legislation wisely codifies commitments made
by senior Bush administration officials that before the
United States may engage in wider nuclear trade with India,
it must also secure the consensus approval of the 45-nation
NSG. The group operates under guidelines established in 1992

[[Page S11014]]

that restrict trade with states (such as India) that do not
accept full-scope safeguards on all of their nuclear
facilities. If the United States or other states seek to
sidestep the NSG's consensus decision-making process, the NSG
may cease to function as an important barrier against the
transfer of nuclear material, equipment, and technologies for
weapons purposes.
Without the inclusion of the provisions we have described,
the legislation for renewed nuclear cooperation with India
will have far-reaching and adverse implications for U.S.
nuclear nonproliferation and international objectives.
While we agree that building upon the already strong U.S.-
Indian partnership is an important goal, we remain convinced
that it can and should be pursued without undermining the
U.S. leadership efforts to prevent the proliferation of the
world's most dangerous weapons.
Sincerely,
Harold Bengelsdorf, Consultant, and former Director of
the Office for Nonproliferation Policy at the Energy
Department and former Office Director for Nuclear
Affairs at the State Department; Joseph Cirincione,
Senior Vice President for National Security and
International Policy, Center for American Progress;
Ralph Earle II, Former Director, U.S. Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency; Robert J. Einhorn, Former Assistant
Secretary of State for Nonproliferation; Lt. General
Robert G. Gard, Jr. (USA, ret.); Ambassador Robert
Grey, Director, Bipartisan Security Working Group, and
Former U.S. Representative to the Conference on
Disarmament; Frank von Hippel, Professor of Public and
International Affairs, Program on Science and Global
Security Princeton University; John D. Holum, Former
Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and
International Security Affairs and Former director of
the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency; John D.
Isaacs, President, Council for a Livable World;
Spurgeon M. Keeny, Former Deputy Director U.S. Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency; Daryl G. Kimball,
Executive Director, Arms Control Association; Lawrence
Korb, Former Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Manpower, Reserve Affairs, Installations and Logistics;
Fred McGoldrick, Consultant, and Former Director of
Nonproliferation and Export Policy at the State
Department; Kelly Motz, Associate Director, Wisconsin
Project on Nuclear Arms Control; Christopher Paine,
Senior Nuclear Program Analyst, Natural Resources
Defense Council; William Potter, Institute Professor,
Monterey Institute of International Studies; Lawrence
Scheinman, Distinguished Professor at the Center for
Nonproliferation Studies, and former Assistant Director
of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency;
Leonard Weiss, Former Staff Director of the Senate
Subcommittee on Energy and Nuclear Proliferation and
the Committee on Governmental Affairs.

Mr. FEINGOLD. Briefly, the letter notes that there are still flaws
that remain in S. 3709, and urges the Senate to adopt at least four
measures to address them. The second of their four recommendations for
improvements is that there be ``a determination and annual
certification that U.S. civil nuclear policy does not in any way assist
or encourage India's nuclear weapons program.'' My amendment is
directly in line with the advice of these leading experts, and
addresses an important shortfall in the legislation as it stands now.
I acknowledge that the U.S. business community has come out strongly
in support of this legislation. I would only like to add a note of
caution to their optimism. There is nothing in this deal that would
secure U.S. contracts or guarantee an increase in U.S. business. The
U.S. is not the only one in the nuclear market. Australia and Russia
have already indicated they are working with India to sell fuel, and
companies from Great Britain, France, and Russia have viable civil
reactor technology that they will certainly pitch to India. It is far
from a foregone conclusion that U.S. companies will directly benefit
from the deal. In the 8 years that nuclear trade has been permitted
with China, the United States has sold exactly zero nuclear reactors to
China--zero. I bring this up to point out that some of the benefits of
this deal may be exaggerated, and we should remember the overriding
priority as we consider this legislation: whether it will make the
citizens of the United States more safe, or less.
Mr. President, in closing, I would like to put in a brief word of
appreciation for the substantial amount of work done on this bill by
Senator Lugar, Senator Biden, and their staffs. This bill is a real
improvement over the original proposal put forward by the
administration, but there are still a few shortcomings that remain. My
amendment would address what I, and many others, see as one of the main
outstanding concerns with the bill. It will ensure that this agreement
is in line with our non-proliferation obligations and protects U.S.
national security, without putting any undue burdens on the U.S. or our
Indian partners. It is a nonpartisan, commonsense amendment, in line
with previous legislation, and I hope that all of my colleagues will
consider voting in favor of it.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Indiana.
Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished Senator from
Wisconsin for his very important contributions to the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee and the specific contributions he has made to the
discussion of this legislation. Reluctantly, I rise in opposition to
his amendment.
In my judgment--and I don't use the term unadvisedly--this is truly a
killer amendment. If accepted, it would require the United States and
India to renegotiate the civilian nuclear agreement on which we are
having our debate this evening. I state categorically: India has
nuclear weapons. Let me repeat that: India has nuclear weapons and has
stated its intent to keep them. The critical issue we must consider in
examining each of the amendments that have come before us is whether
the U.S. national security is advanced by engaging India and by
increasing the IAEA oversight of the India nuclear program. I believe
the answer is yes, and as a result I support this agreement and I
oppose amendments such as the one now before us that would require
renegotiation or make implementation of the agreement impossible.

While the Feingold amendment appears harmless, it requires the
President to certify that no form of the U.S. civilian nuclear
cooperation with India will in any way assist, encourage, or induce
India to manufacture or otherwise acquire more nuclear weapons in the
future. This certification demanded by the amendment is impossible to
make, and even if it could be made, it would be ineffective. How do we
expect the President of the United States to predict the future?
Clearly we do not expect, plan, or intend for this agreement to aid
India's nuclear program. We have taken numerous steps to prevent this
from happening. We are confident that we have already put the necessary
provisions in place in this agreement.
A Presidential certification as required by the amendment is a legal
pledge to Congress. Senate bill 3709 requires a number of
certifications, but it does so based upon information in the
President's possession. We do not ask the President to predict the
future or make a judgment when the necessary information is
unavailable.
This is not the first time the Senator from Wisconsin has offered
this amendment. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee voted 13 to 5 to
defeat the same amendment during our markup of S. 3709. During the
markup, the administration strongly opposed the amendment and expressed
its view that it was a killer amendment.
Senator Biden and I do not believe this amendment is necessary. We
share the concerns Senator Feingold has expressed, but we believe we
have addressed them in the committee-passed bill in a manner consistent
with our agreement with India and in a way that avoids renegotiation.
First, the United States is obligated by article I of the
nonproliferation treaty not to engage in any nuclear cooperation that
would assist India's nuclear weapons program. Nothing in the United
States-India agreement violates this obligation. In reality, this
agreement encourages India to produce fewer nuclear weapons by
requiring more Indian facilities to be placed under IAEA safeguards. We
must remember that the United States will not cooperate with any Indian
facility, site, or location that is not under IAEA safeguards. In other
words, the IAEA will have inspection rights at those places where U.S.
exports are utilized.
Second, S. 3709 requires that the IAEA safeguards be supplemented by
bilateral end-use monitoring requirements under section 107. In other

[[Page S11015]]

words, if the IAEA were forced to suspend their oversight of India's
commitments, the administration is required to have a backup plan in
place to ensure that American technologies and materials are not
misused or misdirected to India's nuclear program.
Third, the bill requires the President of the United States to inform
Congress of any Indian violation of their commitments under the
agreement. This preserves Congress's oversight role and permits us to
act should Indian behavior require a reexamination of the cooperative
agreement.
Fourth, section 109 states that no authority under S. 3709 can be
used to violate U.S. commitments under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty. U.S. contributions to the Indian nuclear program would be a
blatant violation of this treaty commitment. Senator Biden and I
thought it was critically important to reinforce the Senate's strong
support for the NPT by insisting that our country continue to comply
with its requirements.
Lastly, sensitive transfers most likely to aid India's nuclear
programs are prohibited by this bill. Section 106 forbids trade in
enrichment, reprocessing, and heavy water technologies unless those
transfers are under international supervision and then only to create
proliferation-resistant versions. By prohibiting the transfer of these
technologies, we ensure that U.S. assistance does not inadvertently
assist India's weapons program.
India is not required to declare to the IAEA any information on the
production of highly enriched uranium or plutonium. Its nuclear
enrichment and processing plants will also be outside IAEA safeguards.
Without access to this information, it will be impossible for the
United States to evaluate Indian production of fissile material.
Consequently, it is impossible to determine whether an increase in
Indian military fissile material production occurred because of foreign
nuclear reactor fuel supply. In fact, India's own uranium mining and
milling will probably play a much larger role in any analysis on this
subject.
In sum, it is simply not possible to verify the relationship between
the delivery of foreign fuel exports to India and the possibility of
increases in Indian production of highly enriched uranium or separated
plutonium, nor is it possible to analyze the relationship between
future exports and domestic production. India is not required to share
this information. The IAEA does not have access to these facilities.
Requiring the President of the United States to certify something he
has insufficient information to determine is unwise and potentially
harmful, and the amendment clearly demands that the President make that
certification. Congress will be kept completely informed on
developments in this area through the existing reporting requirements
of S. 3709.
Mr. President, for all of these reasons, I oppose this amendment. I
ask Senators to vote no when the roll is called.
I thank the Chair, and I yield the floor.
Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Indiana. It is
late, and I think that people already have a sense of where they will
go with this amendment, but I do want to make a couple of points for
the record, given how important this amendment is and how important
this agreement is.
The chairman suggests that what we would do here with this amendment
would somehow force the renegotiation of the agreement. I don't accept
that notion. But I would say, given the importance of making sure this
isn't used for nuclear weapons, it is well worth renegotiating if it
actually required that. But I don't think it does.
More importantly, it just doesn't make any sense to me that such an
amendment would require the full renegotiation of the agreement when
you look at the fact that the bill before us today already, in section
105, requires eight different Presidential determinations. I am just
adding two additional ones. There are already Presidential
determinations that have to be made, so how can it be that the
additional requirement that there be determinations by the President of
the United States, not by Indian officials--how can that force the
renegotiation of this agreement? It doesn't direct the Indians to do
anything. So I reject the notion that somehow this would require the
renegotiation of the agreement, and if it did, I think it would be
better than not changing it.
Now, the biggest problem with the chairman's argument is that he is
relying on an earlier version of our amendment which we offered in
committee, which I thought was worth passing. But the chairman
correctly notes that we were defeated in the committee 13 to 5. One of
the criticisms was that somehow this amendment would force the
President to certify some facts, that he couldn't necessarily know for
sure what the Indians were exactly doing or what they might do in the
future. I recognize that point. That is why I drafted this amendment to
only relate to the scope and content of the agreement. There is nothing
in my amendment that requires the President to certify what might
happen in the future. And this is the critical distinction. This
amendment does not have the flaw that was argued in committee. It only
talks about the President certifying with regard to the scope and
content of this agreement and also getting assurances from the Indian
Government that the purpose of this agreement is not about nuclear
weapons but is about civil purposes. So it is, in fact, different from
the amendment in committee, and that is an important distinction as
Members think about whether they want to vote for this version on the
floor of the Senate. It is more modest, but it still accomplishes an
important goal.
This is not unheard of. This is exactly what was done in the China
agreement in the 1980s. I described it in my original statement. The
agreement called for a Presidential certification of this kind. It
worked, and the President, in fact, made such a certification. So this
is both necessary and practical from that point of view.
I believe I have responded to each of the arguments made by the
Senator from Indiana. Obviously, I have enormous respect for him and
his leadership of the committee, but I would urge my colleagues to join
me in supporting this amendment which would allow me to feel
comfortable supporting this agreement, because I do want us to have a
good agreement with India. I just think we need to have this sort of an
assurance that my amendment provides.
I yield the floor.
Mr. SCHUMER. Mr. President, would the Senator yield 4 minutes from
his time?
Mr. FEINGOLD. I yield the Senator from New York such time as he
needs.
Mr. SCHUMER. Mr. President, I rise to support the India nuclear trade
agreement because it strengthens America's relationship with a critical
ally, but it also creates strong incentives for other countries to
support our nonproliferation efforts by rewarding them with our
valuable nuclear technology.
Proliferation of nuclear technology is a very serious issue. Make no
mistake about that. India has a good nonproliferation record and will
be a true partner in our efforts to prevent nuclear weapons technology
from falling into the wrong hands. India's history of nonproliferation
of dual-use nuclear technology and its willingness to implement IAEA
guidelines and standards at nuclear facilities make India a welcome
member of the global nuclear community.
Of course, the devil is in the details. That is why it is so
important that this bill preserves congressional oversight of any
agreement the administration reaches with the Indian Government. It is
carefully crafted so that the U.S. agreement will not undermine the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty or our obligations to the Nuclear
Suppliers Group.
Under this bill, cooperation would end if India tests a nuclear
weapon, proliferates nuclear weapons or materials, or breaks an
agreement with the United States or the IAEA. India's access to nuclear
cooperation will depend on its continued participation as a good
citizen of the global nuclear community.
A close relationship with India in general will help us to align our
mutual goal of combating terrorism. Both our nations have been victims
of serious attacks of terrorism, and we know that the greatest danger
we face is a nuclear weapon falling into the wrong hands. Neither of us
wants al-Qaida to gain a nuclear weapon. Neither of us

[[Page S11016]]

wants Iran to go nuclear. The best way to ensure India's proper
handling of its nuclear technology is not by distancing it but by
working with it to address issues of mutual concern.
Economic ties continue to bind our two countries through an
increasing flow of goods, services, and cultural exchange. It is vital
that we recognize this improving relationship and work toward common
goals for international policy standards. The buildup of nuclear
weapons throughout the world is one of the most serious dangers
humanity faces. Especially in today's world, we must ensure that
nuclear technology is developed and used according to global standards
as set forth by the International Atomic Energy Association for
peaceful purposes. An agreement with the United States will also
provide an incentive for India to refrain from conducting future
nuclear weapon testing and to work with our Government to curtail
proliferation of nuclear weapons. Most important, this legislation
creates incentives for other countries that cooperate with our
nonproliferation efforts. It will encourage other countries around the
world to cooperate with the efforts of the United States to reduce the
threat of nuclear weapons by rewarding those countries that behave
responsibly with advanced American technology.

I yield the remainder of the time I have to my friend from Wisconsin.
Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, we have had a good debate. I note the
presence of the distinguished Senator from California on the floor,
which prompts me to inquire of the distinguished Senator from Wisconsin
whether he requires additional time? If the Senator is prepared to
yield back his time, I will yield back time on our side, and then we
could proceed to debate on the amendment of the Senator from California
and maybe to a closer time for final passage, for Members who are
requesting this of all of us.
Mr. FEINGOLD. I thank the Senator from Indiana. I yield back my time.
Mr. LUGAR. I will yield the time on our side.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Chafee). All time is yielded back. The
Senator from California is recognized.

Amendment No. 5187

Mrs. BOXER. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk and ask
for its immediate consideration.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
The legislative clerk read as follows:

The Senator from California (Mrs. Boxer) proposes an
amendment numbered 5187.

Mrs. BOXER. I ask unanimous consent the further reading of the
amendment be dispensed with. I wanted the beginning read because this
is a very simple amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The amendment is as follows:

(Purpose: To make the waiver authority of the President contingent upon
a certification that India has agreed to suspend military-to-military
cooperation with Iran, including training exercises, until such time as
Iran is no longer designated as a state sponsor of terrorism)

On page 8, beginning on line 8, strike ``Group; and'' and
all that follows through ``Nuclear'' on line 9 and insert the
following: ``Group;
(8) India has agreed to suspend military-to-military
cooperation with Iran, including training exercises, until
such time as the Government of Iran no longer supports acts
of international terrorism, as determined by the Secretary of
State under section 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act of
1961 (22 U.S.C. 2371) and section 6(j) of the Export
Administration Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. App. 2405(j)); and
(9) the Nuclear

Mrs. BOXER. Mr. President, this is a very simple amendment. What we
are saying is this deal should not go forward until India has agreed to
cut off military-to-military ties with Iran and that the President so
certifies.
The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty is the keystone of our efforts
to stop the spread of nuclear weapons throughout the world. Back in the
1960s, there was widespread concern that dozens of nations would have
nuclear weapons within a decade. Just months before his death,
President Kennedy warned of this dire threat, saying:

I ask you to stop and think for a moment, what it would
mean to have nuclear weapons in so many hands . . . that
there would be no rest for anyone then, no stability, no real
security, no chance of effective disarmament. There would
only be the increased chance of accidental war, and an
increased necessity for the great powers to involve
themselves in what otherwise would be local conflicts.

But thanks to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, there are less
than 10 nuclear weapons states in the world today. In fact, since the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty was first signed in 1968, more nations
have ended nuclear weapons programs than have begun them. Countries
such as Brazil, South Africa, and Japan decided to abandon their
nuclear weapons program and join the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
India did not sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, instead
choosing to develop nuclear weapons outside of the NPT regime. India
developed a nuclear weapon in 1974 using a research reactor and
materials provided by Canada and the United States of America in the
1950s. India had pledged to use the reactor only for peaceful purposes,
but it failed to keep that promise. So by giving India a special deal
to both possess nuclear weapons and receive civil nuclear assistance,
it will be harder to convince nonnuclear weapons states to keep their
commitment to forgo nuclear weapons.
The timing could not be worse. Right now, the international community
is trying to convince one nonnuclear member of the NPT, Iran, to cease
uranium enrichment because the IAEA cannot verify that its program is
for peaceful purposes. We are also trying to roll back North Korea's
nuclear program and convince them to rejoin the NPT.
India is becoming a recognized de facto nuclear power, but it is not
required to take on any of the commitments made by the five recognized
nuclear powers.
As The Economist reported earlier this year:

. . . the recognized nuclear powers--America, Russia,
Britain, France and China--are committed under the NPT to
curb their arsenals . . . on the way to eventual disarmament;
the deal with America lets India build as many bombs as it
chooses.

I think it is important to note what we are doing here. There is no
limit on the number of bombs that India could build in this deal.
The Economist goes on to say that the five nuclear powers have:

at least all signed the treaty banning further nuclear
tests and have stopped producing more highly enriched uranium
and plutonium; India flatly refuses to do either.

Experts believe that this deal could allow India to vastly increase
its production of nuclear weapons from about 6 a year to about 50 a
year. What a contribution this Senate is making to world peace. I am
absolutely stunned. We are going to have 50 nuclear weapons, perhaps,
made in India, touching off an arms race in the region. That would not
be in any country's interests, including our own.
Secretary Rice has argued that we are not helping India's nuclear
weapons program because only a small amount of India's indigenous
uranium would be needed for India's military weapons program. But
listen to what the Congressional Research Service says:

The question for the United States is not whether India
intends to ramp up its weapons program with freed-up uranium,
but whether the U.S. and other states' actions create a new
capability for India to do so.

We call this fungible--fungible uranium. This should concern every
single Senator, but unfortunately it doesn't appear to. It should
concern every Senator who believes that the proliferation of nuclear
materials is the most dangerous issue facing the country today and that
is why I have supported all the amendments. Unfortunately, these
amendments were defeated. They would have required the President to
certify that this deal does not assist or encourage India to produce
additional fissile material for weapons.
The amendment I am offering addresses a second area where the
administration has failed to receive commitments from India and that
has to do with India's military-to-military relationships with Iran.
Last spring, at the very same time that the President, our President,
was in India to sign the United States-India Civil Nuclear Cooperation
Agreement, two Iranian warships were visiting the headquarters of the
Indian Navy's Southern Command. At the very same time that President
Bush was in India to sign the United States-India Civil

[[Page S11017]]

Nuclear Cooperation Agreement, two Iranian warships were soliciting the
headquarters of the Indian Navy's Southern Command. These warships were
participating in a training program under the military cooperation
agreement with Tehran that was signed in 2003.
The fact that India would conduct training exercises with the world's
leading state sponsor of terrorism while the President of the United
States is visiting New Delhi is simply unbelievable. My amendment says
that the President may not provide civil nuclear assistance to India
until he certifies that India has agreed to suspend military-to-
military cooperation with Iran so long as the Government of Iran
continues to support international terrorism.
My amendment does not say they can never have this deal. But it says
they must not cooperate, military to military, with Iran until the day
Iran is taken off the list of terrorists.

According to a March 2006 Defense News article:

In 2003 India and Iran signed a strategic agreement to
cooperate in defense and other matters. The deal was cemented
by the visit of then Iran President Mohammed Khatami to the
Republic Day parade in New Delhi, an honor usually reserved
for key allies. India still considers Iran to be a key ally
and this agreement on military cooperation is still in place,
even though Iranian actions are leading to the deaths of
American soldiers in Iraq as we speak.

General Casey has said that Iran is using surrogates to conduct
terrorist operations, both against us and against the Iraqi people. He
went on to say:

We are quite confident that the Iranians, through the
special operations forces, are providing weapons, IED
technology and training to Shia extremist groups in Iraq.

Of particular concern is the fact that Iran is providing a type of
IED, or roadside bomb, that has a shaped charge and is particularly
deadly.
So don't you think that if we are giving India this deal of a
lifetime to receive nuclear technology from us, the least they could do
is sign an agreement not to have military-to-military exercises and
relationships with a country that is, in essence, bringing death and
destruction to our sons and daughters in the United States military?
For more than 20 years, Iran has been the world's leading state
sponsor of terrorism. It supports Hezbollah, several Palestinian terror
groups such as Hamas and, according to the State Department, Iran is
also:

. . . unwilling to bring to justice senior al-Qaida members
it detained in 2003 and has resisted numerous calls to
transfer custody of its al-Qaida detainees to their countries
of origin or to third countries for interrogation and/or
trial.

It seems to me we should convince our friend--India--to suspend its
military-to-military cooperation with Iran. The Boxer amendment will
have that result, because they want this deal and I believe they would
act to cut off these military-to-military relationships.
It is also very important to point out that the United States has
already sanctioned Indian entities and individuals for missiles and
WMD-related transfers to Iran. In 2004, the United States imposed
sanctions on two Indian scientists for nuclear-related transfers to
Iran. Both scientists were high-ranking officials in the Nuclear Power
Corporation of India, Limited. In December 2005, sanctions were imposed
on two Indian chemical companies for transfer of chemical-related items
to Iran, and as recently as last July, sanctions were imposed on two
more chemical manufacturers in India for transfers to Iran. In May
2005, India passed a law on weapons of mass destruction and their
delivery systems. But according to CRS, the administration has not yet
assessed India's export control law and regulation, and

. . . some observers have stated that India does not have
the necessary regulations in place to implement the law, and
that India's resources for implementation are remarkably
limited.

In other words, they have a Weapons Control Act, but experts believe
they are not enforcing it. History tells us that they, in fact, have
acted wrongly, to pass on technologies that are harmful, to Iran. So it
seems to me, with this history, my colleagues should be supporting this
amendment. I believe they should be and I regret that I need to offer
it. I thought it would be accepted. I thought it would not be a
problem. That it would be treated in many ways is obvious. The
President, it seems to me, should have made severing military ties with
Iran a precondition to civil nuclear cooperation. But, unfortunately,
the United States is giving away more than it received in this deal.

My friends who want to desperately see this passed tonight are voting
down amendment after amendment. And we are taking a deal in which, as
former Senator Nunn said, ``India was a lot better negotiator than we
were.''
That is Sam Nunn. We know how hard he worked with the current
chairman of this committee to stop nuclear proliferation. What did he
say of this agreement? ``India was a lot better negotiator than we
were.''
So those of us on the Senate floor who are trying to get a better
deal, who are trying to change this deal, are being voted down--boom,
boom, boom. We are taking a deal that Sam Nunn said essentially they
``bested'' us on.
I come from a State with a huge Indian population. Our Indo-Americans
are prominent in our State. I support strong relations with India.
India is the world's largest democracy. It is so important for us to
work together to promote our mutual interests.
I am proud to be a member of the Senate India Caucus and have nothing
but the utmost respect for the Indian people. But this deal is not a
good deal for America. This deal is not a good deal for the world.
Proponents of this legislation say our bilateral relationship with
India is important. I agree with them. I have great hopes for the
future of our two nations. It is so important that we work together.
But somebody tell me how we are better off when we have an India that
can build up to maybe 50 bombs.
Somebody explain to me how we are better off when we don't even have
a clause in here that says that India has to receive military-to-
military relationships with Iran before this goes ahead. Somebody
explain it to me. I don't think it has been explained.
I am happy the Harkin amendment was adopted. It says that India has
to work with us to make sure Iran doesn't get a nuclear capability, as
they are trying to do now. If we adopted that amendment, why can't you
adopt this amendment which simply says shut off those military-to-
military agreements between India and Iran before this goes forward?
I wish the administration would have worked harder to craft a better
deal, a more balanced deal that would have been a net win for
nonproliferation, while securing India's commitment to suspend its
military relationship with Iran.
As Robert Einhorn, a nonproliferation expert at the Center for
Strategic and International Studies, told the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee on which I am so proud to serve, ``the deal was concluded in
great haste, driven by the calendar of the Bush-Singh meetings rather
than by the seriousness and complexity of the task at hand.'' Everybody
knows it. We knew it at the time. And I had hoped we could then make
this a better deal.
I have worked hard. I have tried. We have lost amendment after
amendment after amendment. It is so regrettable. It is regrettable that
we rushed into this agreement. But we have a chance to improve this
agreement in behalf of the Boxer amendment. I urge its adoption.
I retain the remainder of my time.
Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I have listened carefully, as all Members
do, to the distinguished Senator from California, who is such a
valuable member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. And she has
expressed some of the views which are contained in her statement this
evening during the very important hearings the committee conducted.
I will just say very clearly that Members on both sides of the aisle
in committee felt that there were improvements that could occur with
regard to the agreement, even if the agreement was negotiated in a
fairly short period of time. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee has
taken ample time to work through this with the administration as well
as with each other. I regret that we did not have unanimity in the
committee on final passage. A vote of 16 to 2, however, indicated a
very strong coming together, which clearly

[[Page S11018]]

has been expressed on the floor of the Senate today in the votes on
various amendments.
But I must say that the amendment offered by the Senator from
California is, in my judgment, a killer amendment. It goes far beyond
the scope of the July 18 Joint Statement issued by President Bush and
Prime Minister Singh.
The amendment as written would not permit the U.S.-India agreement to
go into effect until India abandoned its military-to-military contacts
with Iran. This is a killer condition that, if adopted by Congress,
would require renegotiation of the agreement.
Few, if any, Members of Congress disagree with the sentiment
expressed in this amendment; namely, that Iran is a destabilizing force
in the Middle East. As former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger
recently wrote in the Washington Post:

Everything returns to the challenge of Iran. It trains,
finances and equips Hezbollah, the state within a state in
Lebanon. It finances and supports Moqtada al-Sadr's militia,
the state within a state in Iraq. It works on a nuclear
weapons program which would drive nuclear proliferation out
of control and provides a safety net for the systemic
destruction of at least the regional order.

Iran is a critical challenge to U.S. diplomacy and global security.
In this difficult environment the U.S. must cultivate a strong
multilateral response to Iran's pursuit of nuclear weapons and support
for terrorism. An effective solution to the Iranian threat must include
India. Holding New Delhi to a different standard than our closest
allies or other nations we engage in nuclear commerce does not appear
to be the best way to secure their support.
On April 5, 2006, Secretary Rice testified before the Committee on
Foreign Relations that India has ``low level military-to-military
contacts.'' She noted ``that there are a number of countries that have
relations with Iran, and it's, of course, the sovereign right of a
country to have relations with whomever they would like to have
relations.'' She argues that the U.S. ``is not going to do better in
pulling India toward us by insisting that they cut off relations with
other states.'' She concluded that she didn't ``think that's going to
work very effectively.''

The Secretary of State argues that the international community is
changing its approach to Iran. She cites the exodus of banking and
financial institutions. Perhaps most importantly she points out that
India was the only member of the non-a1igned movement to vote for
referral of the Iran to the U.N. Security Council for its illegal
nuclear program. This was an important development because India was a
founder and a longtime leader of the movement.
Let me be clear, this amendment will reverse the important trend of
countries distancing themselves from Tehran and future Indian
multilateral nonproliferation cooperation. Some experts have indicated
that this amendment could very well have the opposite effect, forcing
New Delhi away from the U.S.-Indian Agreement.
The administration has frequently made U.S. policy on Iran clear to
the Indian Government. The U.S. has consistently expressed our desire
for India's support of our efforts and policies. One of the unheralded
diplomatic accomplishments of the 2005 Joint Statement is India's
commitment to support international efforts to limit the spread of
enrichment and reprocessing technologies, including to states such as
Iran.
I emphasize that point. If, in fact, we are deeply concerned--and I
am, and the Senator from California certainly is--about the
developments in Iran of a nuclear program and the commitment of India
to work with us, to limit that spread of enrichment and reprocessing is
very important. To deliberately take action which scuttles this
agreement and indicates to the Indians that they can look elsewhere for
partnership is to court disaster.
l am pleased that India is committed to being a responsible member of
the international community and it has made the decision that it is in
its own national security interest to oppose Iran's weapons of mass
destruction program.
On a number of occasions the Indian-Iranian military relationship has
been greatly exaggerated. This year an article alleged that India was
providing military training for Iranian sailors. Secretary Rice
responded that while Iranian ships have made port calls at India ports,
she reported that New Dehli had denied that Iranian sailors had been
trained in India.
It is unfortunate that the Senator from California constructed the
amendment in this manner. It would be more appropriate to address this
issue in the sense of Congress section or as a statement of U.S.
policy. If the amendment was modified in this manner, I am prepared to
recommend that it be adopted by unanimous consent. Unfortunately, in
its current form it makes it impossible for the President to meet the
requirement and thus implementation is impossible.
If this amendment is adopted, in my judgment, the United States-India
agreement will be scuttled. That, I believe, would be a tragedy.
I urge Senators to vote against the Boxer amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, how much time remains?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Fourteen minutes.
Mr. BIDEN. I wonder if the Chair would give me 3 minutes.
Mr. LUGAR. I will yield whatever time the Senator will consume.
Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I will be very brief.
The Senator stated it well. And I don't like to argue with my friend
from California; I seldom ever win, and I am very uncomfortable because
I consider her one of my best friends in this body. So it is an
uncomfortable position to be in.
I want to make three points. The first is that right now, if India
were to engage in transferring any lethal weaponry to Iran, it would be
in violation of our law. It would damage the relationship and
fundamentally alter our relationship. It is existing U.S. law.
No country can transfer lethal weaponry to Iran and maintain our
support. That is No. 1.
The second point I would like to make is with the underlying
concern--I know it is much broader than this--of my friend from
California. I think if I read her correctly--and I may not be--somehow
this agreement is going to yield the prospect that India will be in a
better position to transfer some kind of technology in this military-
to-military relationship to Iran that will help Iran get the nuclear
capability.
The truth is, as the chairman has pointed out, they have entered into
an agreement with us not to do that. But, secondly, they have voted in
the IAEA with the Board of Governors to sanction Iran, to take issue
with Iran, to report it to the U.N., and they voted with us in the U.N.
So they are openly taking on Iran in terms of the thing of greatest
concern to us all.
I know my friend spoke eloquently about the support of terrorism by
Iran. The implication is that any military-to-military assistance goes
directly to helping the capability of the Iranians to help support
Hezbollah and other organizations that are terrorist organizations
around the world.
I will make the following observation: She also stated accurately
that Indian entities have been sanctioned for transferring materials to
Iran. I must point out, so has Germany, so has the Spanish, so have
European allies of ours. They also had entities sanctioned. It is not
unique to India that an organization would, in fact, provide assistance
to Iran in a way that would generate United States sanctions. Spain is
the most recent offender.

I conclude by saying this is the hardest piece to swallow--not what
the Senator said, but what I am about to say is the hardest piece to
swallow. Palmerston had the famous expression that countries don't have
permanent friends, they have permanent interests.
Look where India resides and look where Iran resides. One of the
countries they are most concerned about is Pakistan. Now, it is not
reasonable to assume that India and Iran would not want to have a
military relationship where they shared information and/or concerns
relative to Pakistan. So for them to forswear any kind of relationship
at all with India that has a military or quasi-military relationship is
to essentially suggest to them that they should not deal with a common
enemy.
Look what we are doing. We are dealing with a country that we
sanctioned

[[Page S11019]]

before, that we have clearly decided is not a democratic country, that
clearly has probably the largest percentage of jihadists residing in
it, with, arguably, the least significant effort to deal with these
jihadists--the country of Pakistan. What are we doing? Because we have
permanent interests, and our interests are that we have support in the
war against jihadists and al-Qaida and terrorist organizations, we are
cooperating with a country we otherwise probably would not cooperate
with.
How would we feel if a European country or any other country around
the world said--or India said--we will not trade with you, the United
States of America, as long as you continue to have a military-to-
military relationship with Pakistan, a country that is, in fact,
exporting--or if they are not exporting, at least cooperating with or
turning a blind eye to the terrorist organizations that reside within
their country? We would say, Wait a minute. You want to trade with us,
trade with us. You want to tell us whether out of our self-interest we
can cooperate with Pakistan--which is not what you call a model
democracy--then we would say no.
The only generic point I want to make, I know of no evidence--it may
exist, but I am unaware of it--where India is materially cooperating
with Iran in order for Iran to be able to better supply, support, and/
or encourage terrorism. I know of no such interest and no such
circumstance. Maybe my friend may know what I do not. She may have
gotten a recent briefing with the Intelligence Committee where somebody
said that, but I am unaware of any such cooperation that has the net
effect of promoting terror.
What I do know is we have built into the law now the ability to
sanction India if, in fact, India does supply lethal weapons or was in
any way cooperating with promoting Iran's nuclear program. Beyond that,
it would break the spirit of the entire agreement we have with India.
If it came to light that somehow there was evidence that India was in
any way cooperating with Iran's nuclear program, this deal is done.
This is over. It is finished. It is gone.
At the root of this overall agreement, which my colleague,
understandably, does not like, the underlying issue here is this
agreement between India and the United States. The underlying premise
is based upon a notion of a maturing relationship based on trust that
they will not only not violate the letter but will not violate the
spirit of this agreement.
Let me conclude by saying what the spirit of the agreement is. The
spirit of the agreement is we are not going to do anything, United
States of America, that we would not otherwise be able to do; we will
not do anything with what you provide for us that will increase our
capacity, our ability, our desire, or our intent to deal with our
nuclear program.
They have said straightforwardly at the same time, We are keeping our
nuclear program. We ain't giving it up.
It is a little bit like us saying now--and this will be my last
statement--you know, Pakistan violated the law, Pakistan violated our
law. It went out and it broke the deal and it did what India did. On
top of that, Pakistan was the largest proliferator in the history of
the world of nuclear capability through A.Q. Khan. And guess what. We
are going to bite our nose off to spite our face. Now that we need
Pakistan in dealing with this war on terror, we are going to sanction
Pakistan, we are not going to cooperate with Pakistan, we are going to
do nothing with Pakistan even though we acknowledge that might give
greater sustenance to al-Qaida, bin Laden, the Taliban, et cetera.
Countries make hard choices. They are not neat and clean. I suggest
if we are going to impose upon India a requirement to cease and desist
with any military-to-military relationships notwithstanding they have
common enemies and common concerns with Iran, as bad as Iran is,
notwithstanding the fact that there is no evidence that they are
promoting and/or giving the ability to support terrorism's greater
thrust, notwithstanding the fact they have agreed to do everything they
can to prevent Iran from becoming a nuclear power, if we are going to
sanction them this way, I ask the rhetorical question: Why wouldn't the
rest of the world sanction us for our relationship with Pakistan. And
why are we cooperating with Pakistan? If anybody in the deal is not the
ideal partner right now, it is Pakistan.
But what do we do? To steal a phrase from a former President that I
often hear, comments we hear on CNN all the time, his comment always is
``you got to accept life in the world as you find it.'' I am
paraphrasing a former President. I think it is close to a quote. We
have to accept the world as we find it, make the best out of it, and
promote our interest to the greatest extent. Sometimes it means we make
less than perfect deals.
Had Chairman Lugar been President Lugar, had Senator Boxer been
Senator Boxer, had I been their Secretary of State, I believe I could
have gotten a better deal than we got. But the fact is, we are where we
are, as the old trade expression goes, and I believe the downside of
rejecting this treaty is so much further down than any downside that
flows from supporting this changed law allowing this to go forward. In
that sense, it is not a close call.
I suggest to my friend, I think everything she says has merit in the
abstract. But we are living in the world we live in now based on the
parameters we are looking at. I think this amendment, which would kill
the agreement, is not worth the candle because it would do that--not
because it doesn't have underlying merit.
I yield the floor.
Mr. LUGAR. Do we have any time remaining on the opposition side?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Two minutes.
Mr. LUGAR. I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished Senator from
Missouri.
Mr. BOND. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished chairman. Let me
summarize by saying I visited Delhi in March right after the President
had signed the historic agreements. I walked into a meeting of
distinguished Indian officials asking if we could possibly confirm this
treaty, this agreement.
I knew nothing about it, so I did a tremendous amount of quick work
with our agency to check out what the dangers might be. They came back
and they told me India was the one most least likely to engage in
nuclear proliferation. They saw this as a tremendous opportunity for us
to improve on our relations with a country that had for too long been
in the Soviet/Russian sphere.
We have an opportunity to help them. They are a growing country. They
have many needs. Civil nuclear power is the one most important thing
they need because of their tremendous pollution problems. This enables
us to help them reduce pollution. Not only are we interested in nuclear
nonproliferation, we are interested in pollution nonproliferation. This
moves us forward.
Beyond that, securing a close relationship with India is one of our
most important steps toward developing a peaceful environment and
prosperity in south Asia. This opportunity cannot be wasted.
This particular amendment, as has been stated, which is well-
intentioned and reflects understandable concerns, is, nevertheless, a
poison pill. Many countries have relations with Iran. We do not like
them. But many of those countries with which we have good working
relationships don't like our relations with Israel. We are not going to
change our relations with Israel. We are not going to stop helping
them. But we are going to continue to work with those countries.
As the Senator from Delaware has pointed out, we have relations with
Pakistan and there are lots of questions about that. If we want to work
with the Indians and develop a good relationship so they will not deal
with Iran, the best thing we can do is to defeat these poison pill
amendments and confirm the treaty so we will bring India and the United
States together.
I urge my colleagues to oppose the amendments and to support the
treaty.
I yield the floor.
Mrs. BOXER. How much time do I have remaining?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Six minutes.
Mrs. BOXER. I will try not to take the full time, but I want to
respond to my colleagues.
The debate has been much ado about a very straightforward and simple

[[Page S11020]]

amendment. My amendment has nothing to do with the transfer of lethal
weapons. My colleague Senator Biden talked about that. Nothing to do
with that. My amendment, in the real world, I don't believe could be
seen as a killer amendment. It is a simple amendment.
My colleague Senator Bond is right. He says a lot of other countries
have relationships with Iran. No other country gets a deal like this
where we give nuclear technology and there is absolutely no control on
the number of bombs India could build. Experts tell us it could be as
many as 50 a year. I don't think that makes the world safer.
But to help me with this treaty, to give my constituents a feeling
that we are protecting them, at the least, say you are getting this
deal, you are going to be able to build a lot of weapons with it, then
cut off your military-to-military ties with the leading terrorist
nation in the world--Iran--a nation that is at this very moment hurting
our troops in the field in Iraq.
Now, my colleague Senator Biden, I agree with completely when he
says--and I do believe this--Senator Lugar, if President, would have
cut a better deal. I could say Senator Biden, if President, could have
cut a better deal, but we don't have a better deal. And I don't live in
a world where you sit back and say, oh, too bad. This isn't about
buying a piece of cake. We are not going to the store and buying a toy.
It is about giving nuclear technology to a country that has, in fact,
been called out by our own country because it has in the past
transferred information about WMDs, nuclear weapons, missiles, to Iran.
We have called them out on that. So why can't we ask them simply to
stop these military-to-military programs they have with Iran?
Again, when we stand up and say, gosh, this is a killer amendment,
they will walk away, it sounds weak to me. It does not sound as though
we are the strongest nation in the world. Who would walk away from this
deal? India is not a member of the NPT, not a signatory, and they are
getting all this information from the United States of America on
nuclear civilian technology, with no cap on the number of bombs they
can build, and they are going to walk away from this because we simply
ask them not to have military-to-military cooperation with the world's
leading sponsor of terrorism?
I don't get it. So I think my colleagues have made this complicated
when it is really very simple. We do this deal with India, the least
they can do is cut off their military-to-military cooperation with
Iran.
With that, Mr. President, I conclude my remarks. I yield back the
remainder of my time.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Indiana.
Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I would inquire of the Chair if the
existing order now calls for a 2-minute debate on the Feingold
amendment prior to a rollcall vote on that amendment?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is correct.
Mr. LUGAR. Further, I would ask the Chair for clarification: Does the
2-minute debate then occur on the Boxer amendment, after the rollcall
vote on Feingold?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is correct.
Mr. LUGAR. Then, finally, an additional 2-minute debate before final
passage of the bill, after the Boxer amendment is voted on?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is correct.
Mr. LUGAR. I thank the Chair for that clarification.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that--the first rollcall vote,
we understand, is 15 minutes--the subsequent rollcall votes be 10
minutes each.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Allen). Without objection, it is so
ordered.
Mr. LUGAR. I thank the Chair.
Senator Feingold is now recognized.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Wisconsin.

Amendment No. 5183

Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I would like to briefly recap what my
amendment does and why I believe it is important for the Senate to
adopt it.
The amendment is very simple. It will require the President to make
determinations that nothing in the nuclear cooperation agreement he
negotiates with India will contribute to India's nuclear weapons
program. Both the United States and India have stated that expanding
India's nuclear arsenal is not an objective of this agreement, and my
amendment simply makes those claims binding.
The United States is prohibited under our current obligations in the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty to directly or indirectly assist the
nuclear weapons programs of other states. My amendment simply makes
clear that the United States is actually abiding by its international
commitments. It does not require the President to guarantee what India
will do; he simply must certify that he is satisfied the agreement will
not contribute to India's nuclear weapons program.
I urge my colleagues to support the amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware.
Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, let me, in brief response, say I understand
the intent of the amendment. But the amendment uses the words, for
example, ``India cannot use United States-origin equipment . . . ,''
``India cannot replicate and subsequently use. . . .'' No one can
certify they cannot. It is possible they could. The question is whether
we are insisting that they not use it. We are insisting they are not
using it, and we have built into this agreement a requirement on the
part of the administration to look at whether they are, in fact, doing
it.
So the question is not whether they can or cannot. Anything can
happen. A President cannot certify it is not possible. That is what
``cannot'' says. But he can certify to the best of his knowledge it is
not occurring. That is what we require. ``Cannot'' makes this a deal-
breaker. No President could certify it. ``Cannot'' translates into ``it
is not possible to replicate, it is not possible to . . . ,'' and no
one can certify to that.
Mr. President, I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment.
Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second? There appears to
be a sufficient second.
The clerk will please call the roll.
The legislative clerk called the roll.
Mr. McCONNELL. The following Senators were necessarily absent: the
Senator from Oklahoma (Mr. Inhofe), the Senator from Arizona (Mr.
McCain) and the Senator from Wyoming (Mr. Thomas).
Mr. DURBIN. I announce that the Senator from Vermont (Mr. Jeffords)
is necessarily absent.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Are there any other Senators in the Chamber
desiring to vote?
The result was announced--yeas 25, nays 71, as follows:

[Rollcall Vote No. 268 Leg.]

YEAS--25

Akaka
Bingaman
Boxer
Byrd
Cantwell
Clinton
Conrad
Dayton
Dodd
Dorgan
Durbin
Feingold
Feinstein
Harkin
Johnson
Kennedy
Lautenberg
Leahy
Lincoln
Menendez
Mikulski
Obama
Pryor
Reed
Salazar

NAYS--71

Alexander
Allard
Allen
Baucus
Bayh
Bennett
Biden
Bond
Brownback
Bunning
Burns
Burr
Carper
Chafee
Chambliss
Coburn
Cochran
Coleman
Collins
Cornyn
Craig
Crapo
DeMint
DeWine
Dole
Domenici
Ensign
Enzi
Frist
Graham
Grassley
Gregg
Hagel
Hatch
Hutchison
Inouye
Isakson
Kerry
Kohl
Kyl
Landrieu
Levin
Lieberman
Lott
Lugar
Martinez
McConnell
Murkowski
Murray
Nelson (FL)
Nelson (NE)
Reid
Roberts
Rockefeller
Santorum
Sarbanes
Schumer
Sessions
Shelby
Smith
Snowe
Specter
Stabenow
Stevens
Sununu
Talent
Thune
Vitter
Voinovich
Warner
Wyden

NOT VOTING--4

Inhofe
Jeffords
McCain
Thomas
The amendment (No. 5183) was rejected.
Mr. LUGAR. I move to reconsider the vote, and I move to lay that
motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

Amendment No. 5187

The PRESIDING OFFICER. There is now 2 minutes equally divided on the
Boxer amendment.

[[Page S11021]]

The Senator from California.
Mrs. BOXER. Mr. President, I will be very brief. We are giving India
a one-of-a-kind deal that no one else gets: civilian nuclear technology
and no cap on the number of bombs they can build.
The least we can do is ask them to cut off their military ties with
the biggest state sponsor of terrorism--Iran. Iran is building the IEDs
that are killing our soldiers in Iraq. The least we can do is ask the
President to certify that they have cut off military-to-military
relationships with Iran.
Why is it important? Look at this Defense News: ``Indian Navy Trains
Iranian Sailors.''
We know they have these ties. If we really believe we are doing
something good, we should at least expect India to cut off military
ties with the leading state sponsor of terrorism--Iran. I urge an
``aye'' vote.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Indiana.
Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, Iran is a critical challenge to the United
States, our diplomacy, our global security, but in this very difficult
environment the United States must cultivate a strong multilateral
response to Iran's pursuit of nuclear weapons in support of terrorism.
I simply point out that India was the only member of the nonaligned
movement to vote for referral of Iran to the U.N. Security Council for
its illegal nuclear program. Holding India to a different standard than
all of our other closest allies or nations with whom we engage in
nuclear commerce does not appear to be a good way to secure their
support.
Let me be very clear: If this amendment is adopted, the India nuclear
agreement is kaput. This is it. This is a killer amendment, and I ask
for Senators to vote no.
Mrs. BOXER. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
There appears to be a sufficient second.
The question is on agreeing to amendment No. 5187. The clerk will
call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk called the roll.
Mr. McCONNELL. The following Senators were necessarily absent: the
Senator from Oklahoma (Mr. Inhofe) and the Senator from Wyoming (Mr.
Thomas).
Mr. DURBIN. I announce that the Senator from Vermont (Mr. Jeffords)
is necessarily absent.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Are there any other Senators in the Chamber
desiring to vote?
The result was announced--yeas 38, nays 59, as follows:

[Rollcall Vote No. 269 Leg.]

YEAS--38

Akaka
Bingaman
Boxer
Byrd
Cantwell
Clinton
Coleman
Collins
Conrad
Dayton
DeWine
Dorgan
Durbin
Ensign
Feingold
Feinstein
Harkin
Johnson
Kennedy
Kyl
Lautenberg
Leahy
Lincoln
Menendez
Mikulski
Murray
Nelson (FL)
Obama
Pryor
Reid
Salazar
Santorum
Schumer
Smith
Snowe
Specter
Stabenow
Wyden

NAYS--59

Alexander
Allard
Allen
Baucus
Bayh
Bennett
Biden
Bond
Brownback
Bunning
Burns
Burr
Carper
Chafee
Chambliss
Coburn
Cochran
Cornyn
Craig
Crapo
DeMint
Dodd
Dole
Domenici
Enzi
Frist
Graham
Grassley
Gregg
Hagel
Hatch
Hutchison
Inouye
Isakson
Kerry
Kohl
Landrieu
Levin
Lieberman
Lott
Lugar
Martinez
McCain
McConnell
Murkowski
Nelson (NE)
Reed
Roberts
Rockefeller
Sarbanes
Sessions
Shelby
Stevens
Sununu
Talent
Thune
Vitter
Voinovich
Warner

NOT VOTING--3

Inhofe
Jeffords
Thomas
The amendment (No. 5187) was rejected.
Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote, and I move
to lay that motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

nonproliferation consequences

Mr. OBAMA. Mr. President, I rise today to express my support for the
United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act, S. 3709. As
I have said before, I believe strengthening the relationship between
our two nations is an important strategic goal and this legislation
helps us take a dramatic step in this direction.
However, like many of my colleagues, I have concerns with potential
nonproliferation consequences of this agreement. Much to my
disappointment, the administration has done very little to address
these concerns, instead, sending draft legislation to the Congress that
was essentially a blank check.
The managers of the bill, Senators Lugar and Biden, have done a
tremendous job taking the administration's proposal and shaping it into
meaningful, bipartisan legislation. The bill now before the Senate
helps move us closer to India while addressing some key
nonproliferation issues.
However, I remain concerned about the issue of nuclear testing. A
decision by the Indian Government to conduct such a test could trigger
an arms race in South Asia that would be extremely dangerous and
destabilizing.
The good news is that the joint statement between President Bush and
Prime Minister Singh of July 18, 2005 declared that India's unilateral
moratorium on nuclear testing will continue. I take Prime Minister
Singh at his word, but also believe in following President Reagan's
mantra of ``trust but verify.''
To this end, I am wondering if the chairman will take a few moments
to clarify a couple matters concerning this legislation. Is it the
managers' belief that section 129 of the Atomic Energy Act, AEA, will
apply prospectively to India--aside from the sections of the AEA that
are explicitly amended by S. 3709?
Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, the Senator is correct. Under our bill, the
full force of section 129 would apply to any Indian detonation of a
nuclear explosive device, any termination or abrogation of IAEA
safeguards by India, and material violation of IAEA safeguards by
India, all would result under section 129 in the termination of nuclear
exports to India.
Mr. OBAMA. On a related note, is it the chairman's interpretation of
the legislation that, in the event of a future nuclear test by the
Government of India, nuclear power reactor fuel and equipment sales,
and nuclear technology cooperation would terminate; other elements of
the United States-India nuclear agreement would likely terminate; and
the United States would have the right to demand the return of nuclear
supplies?
Mr. LUGAR. Yes, under our bill, the only requirement which is waived
is that in section 123.a(2) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, for full-
scope safeguards. India's 123 agreement would still have to meet the
requirement of section 123.a(4), which requires that in the event of a
test by India of a nuclear explosive device the United States shall
have the right to request the return of supplies as you have
stipulated.

Mr. OBAMA. I offered an amendment that the managers have already
accepted pertaining to the supply of nuclear power reactor fuel in
safeguarded, civilian nuclear facilities. To further clarify this
issue, is it the managers' understanding that provision of a fuel to
the Government of India should be sized in a way to maintain a
deterrent to Indian nuclear testing, while also providing protections
against short-term fluctuations in the supply of nuclear fuel? In other
words, is it your understanding that providing a fuel reserve to India
is not intended to facilitate a resumption in nuclear testing?
Mr. LUGAR. Yes, that is our understanding.
Mr. OBAMA. Does the chairman believe that, as this agreement moves
forward to the Nuclear Suppliers Group, NSG, the United States should
work to ensure that other nations provide nuclear power reactor fuel in
a similar fashion?
Mr. LUGAR. Yes, I hope that would be the case.
Mr. OBAMA. Finally, would the managers agree that section 105 of S.
3709 requires that the President determine, prior to exercising the
waivers in section 104, that ``an agreement between India and the IAEA
requiring the application of safeguards in perpetuity in accordance
with IAEA standards, principles, and practices to civil nuclear
facilities, programs, and materials . . . has entered into force,'' and
that the

[[Page S11022]]

most logical approach, as U.S. officials have stated for the record,
would be to use the IAEA INFCIRC/66, Rev. 2 agreement as the model for
India's safeguards agreement?
Mr. LUGAR. My understanding is that the administration, the IAEA, and
participating governments in the NSG have all stated that they would
prefer that any new Indian safeguards agreement be modeled on INFCIRC/
66 Rev. 2.
Mr. OBAMA. I thank the managers.
Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I intend to oppose this legislation.
One of the many lessons of the tragedy of September 11 is that
America's overarching national security interest is keeping nuclear
material and weapons out of the hands of terrorists. Nothing is more
important for our national security than achieving this goal.
The international nuclear nonproliferation regime flawed though it
may be is our best hope of achieving this goal. While I believe America
has a clear interest in strengthening our relationship with India, I do
not believe it can, or should, be achieved by sidestepping nearly half
a century of international nonproliferation agreements. In the long
run, doing so will make America and the world more vulnerable to the
perils of nuclear weapons.
One of the defining goals of my years in the Senate has been to
support the important advances made by our country and the
international community in limiting the perils of nuclear weapons
across the globe.
President Kennedy considered the Limited Test Ban Treaty, which
represented an early and historic advance in nuclear nonproliferation,
as one of his greatest accomplishments. On signing the documents of
ratification on October 7, 1963, President Kennedy said, ``This small
step toward safety can be followed by others longer and less limited,
if also harder in the taking. With our courage and understanding
enlarged by this achievement, let us press onward in quest of man's
essential desire for peace.''
Since that agreement, further progress was made with the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty, NPT, the SALT and START agreements, as well as
the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. These agreements although far from
perfect are essential to limiting the spread and use of nuclear
weapons. They are the bedrock of our effort to ensure that the world
will never, ever again know the horrors of the use of nuclear weapons.
They took years to negotiate and implement, and we must be exceedingly
careful about dismantling or carving out exceptions to them for any
country.
Supporters of this agreement argue that the international
nonproliferation regime has not proved successful in every case--just
look at Iran and North Korea. And I accept the premise of the
administration's argument that the international arms control regime
may need to be modified or adapted to fit current times, and that we
need to find a way to address India.
However, we need to recognize that commitments under the NPT made by
virtually every nonnuclear state play an essential role in assisting
the international community in keeping a check on their nuclear
programs. And, before we make significant changes to the
nonproliferation regime, we must be absolutely confident that we are
doing more good than harm and that we will be more likely not less
likely to limit the spread of nuclear weapons across the globe. I do
not believe that running roughshod over these agreements by carving out
an exception for India is the way to achieve these goals.
General Brent Scowcroft cautioned that, ``I am concerned about a
trend that we see reflected in the United States-India nuclear deal
where we try to address proliferation risks by assessing the character
of regimes and governments. Such an approach also opens up divisions
among the world's nuclear powers, with each making a list of
``friends'' who can be trusted with nuclear technology and `foes' who
are dangerous risks.''
Further, Robert Gallucci, the Dean of Georgetown University's School
of Foreign Service, pointed out that, if we do approve this arrangement
with India, ``we will put at risk a world of very few nuclear weapon
states, and open the door to the true proliferation of nuclear weapons
in the years ahead.''
Certainly, there are some advantages to the nonproliferation regime
under the proposed agreement. India would place a majority of its
current and future civilian reactors under international safeguards.
India has agreed to abide by the guidelines of the Nuclear Suppliers
Group, and to abide by the Missile Technology Control Regime. India has
agreed not to test another nuclear device and has indicated that it
will work with the United States on concluding an international regime
to stop the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons. These
are definitely positive steps.
However, India will not sign the Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty and
subject its military facilities to international inspection, and this
remains a major concern. Until now, as part of an effort to limit the
spread of nuclear weapons across the globe, international arms control
agreements and U.S. law have required full international safeguards on
civilian and military reactors before civilian nuclear energy could be
provided. These requirements exist to ensure that by assisting a
country's civilian program, we are not freeing up supplies for an
unsafeguarded nuclear weapons program. Under this agreement, however,
none of India's military reactors would be put under international
safeguards, but it would receive civilian nuclear energy anyway. In
other words, India will obtain the benefits of the NPT, without the
obligations required by it.
Additionally, despite India's stated commitment to conclude an
international agreement to cut off the production of fissile material--
the essential component for making nuclear weapons--there is no
timeframe for concluding such an agreement, nor is there any binding
commitment for India to do so. United States, Russia, Great Britain,
and France have agreed to a fissile material production cut-off for
nuclear weapons, and India should as well. So we will knowingly permit
a country to benefit from civilian nuclear energy cooperation and
maintain an active, unsafeguarded program to construct, develop, and
build nuclear weapons.
If we provide India with the benefits of nuclear nonproliferation
agreements without requiring them to sign the NPT nuclear agreement or,
at least, cease the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons,
there would be significant and harmful consequences for our global
nonproliferation efforts.
It will embolden Iran to flout the will of the international
community. There could not be a worse moment to give India the green
light to build weapons with the blessing of the United States and the
international community. The Iranians see a clear double standard. As
Iran's national security adviser said in March, ``The United States is
imposing a contradictory theory of dual standards: though our NPT
membership entitles us to access to nuclear science and technology, it
claims that we will never have that right, whereas it cooperates with
India, which does have the bomb but is not an NPT member.'' The
Iranians will undoubtedly use the double standard of India in Iran's
efforts to break the will of the international community to achieve its
nuclear aims.
Former Senator Sam Nunn stated that ``the U.S. India deal will likely
make it more difficult to get other nations to join us in stopping
threatening nuclear programs in Iran and North Korea.'' Similarly,
Zbigniew Brzezinski, points out that this deal ``will complicate the
quest for a constructive resolution of the Iranian nuclear problem.''
Furthermore, this agreement will put the United States in the
position of indirectly supporting an arms race in South Asia. If the
Indians or the administration could assure us that India had agreed,
like the United States, Russia, Great Britain, and France, to a fissile
material production cut-off for nuclear weapons, the concern would
diminish. We know that India currently has very limited uranium
resources, which it now must dedicate to generating electric power. It
is so short of uranium that it can only run its reactors at about two-
thirds capacity. But that will change once India gains access to
foreign uranium supplies for its civilian uses. The agreement would
provide India with sufficient uranium to supply its civilian reactors,
freeing up domestic supplies for military purposes. Former Senator Sam
Nunn

[[Page S11023]]

warns that ``India will no longer be forced to choose whether its own
limited uranium stocks should be used to support its civilian nuclear
program or its nuclear weapons program.''
Some experts estimate that India could increase production from a
handful of weapons a year to 50 or more, if it could use its domestic
production for its weapons program. How will China and Pakistan react
to India's increasing nuclear stockpile, as well as to the enhanced
potential to produce fissile material as a result of this new
cooperation? India states it only wants to build up its nuclear arsenal
to the ``minimum credible deterrence'' level before it stops building
nuclear weapons, but we don't really know what India is likely to do.
How many more weapons will it need to reach that minimum credible
deterrence? 50? 100? 500? Will Pakistan and China respond by building
more weapons, too? Will the mad race for nuclear arms take on a life of
its own, continuing to escalate with reckless abandon?
And what will happen with our other allies who are members of the
nonproliferation regime? There is no doubt that the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty has played an essential role in the decisions
of countries such as South Africa, Brazil, Argentina, and South Korea
all allies of the United States--to stop pursuing their own nuclear
weapons programs. But if we allow India to build nuclear weapons and
enjoy civilian nuclear cooperation, will other U.S. friends and other
countries in the future follow India's lead and demand the same? If we
argue that the decision about India was based on trust, how on Earth
will we be able to argue otherwise with these allies? They will accuse
us rightly of having a double standard. I think we can all agree that
the fewer the countries with nuclear weapons the better for U.S.
national security, even if those aspiring countries are friendly toward
the United States.
President Jimmy Carter said in March that ``there is no doubt that
condoning avoidance of the NPT encourages the spread of nuclear
weaponry. Japan, Brazil, Indonesia, South Africa, Argentina and many
other technologically advanced nations have chosen to abide by the NPT
to gain access to foreign nuclear technology. Why should they adhere to
self-restraint if India rejects the same terms.''
And what will happen to the international supply of material to India
if it does test another weapon? While I am reasonably confident that
the United States would terminate supplying nuclear materials and
technology to India, there is a question whether the international
regime particularly the Nuclear Suppliers Group would cease
cooperation. Once the door to cooperation is opened to India, it may be
difficult to get other countries to agree to shut it again. The Indian
press has suggested that if India tests again it would likely lose the
United States as a supplier but would retain access to uranium from
other sources. In fact, Indian Prime Minister Singh told his Parliament
in August that if there were a disruption of uranium supplies to India,
such as in result of India testing another device, that ``the United
States and India would jointly convene a group of friendly supplier
countries, Russia, France and the United Kingdom, aimed at restoring
fuel supplies to India.'' This certainly should raise alarm bells. I
know Senator Obama has tried to address that problem with his amendment
to the Senate bill, but all should be asking whether we should open the
international spigot if we are uncertain about whether we can shut it
off.
Much has been made of the foreign policy benefit to America of this
agreement, but I reject fully--the notion that America's relationship
with India or the Indian American community--can or should be defined
by this vote.
The United States and India have a multitude of ties, which are
growing ever closer, ever stronger. In the last decade we have seen a
dramatic improvement in bilateral relations.
India and America are the two largest democracies in the world. We
share deeply held, common values, including respect for human rights,
the rule of law, promoting peace, and prosperity in the world.
My family and I have long had an interest in India. My brothers--John
and Bobby visited in 1951, and I am a friend of India. I work closely
with the Indian-American community to address hate crimes, immigration,
and other issues that affect their daily lives.

President Kennedy was right when he characterized India as a ``great
and vital hope of democracy in Asia.'' He rightfully exclaimed that
``no thoughtful citizen'' could fail to recognize that India was a
great and vital hope of democracy in Asia.
Today, India is the world's largest democracy and soon will be the
world's largest country. It has one of the fastest growing economies
and plays a leading role in global affairs.
The United States and India are seeking to improve trade and
investment ties. We are cooperating in key areas such as agriculture,
technology, energy, and the environment. India's green revolution came
from America and proved essential to ending massive starvation in
India. Today, our countries are cooperating on the next green
revolution, to increase agricultural productivity and to help the
environment.
Defense cooperation is increasing. Our militaries are conducting more
joint exercises, India is purchasing more U.S. counterterrorism and
defense equipment, and in June 2005, the United States and India signed
a 10-year defense pact.
India, in recent years, has been the leader in sending students to
study in the United States. Cultural links--whether food, movies, music
or literature--are growing, too.
After September 11, the United States cooperated with India in
dealing with international terrorism threats.
We are also working closely with India on public health threats,
including HIV/AIDS and avian influenza.
Our relationship is strong today and will continue to grow. These
ties can and should continue to grow regardless of this agreement
because it is in the interests of both of our countries.
But we need to be realistic about the foreign policy benefits of this
agreement.
Naturally, we want the Indian Government to work with the United
States to advance our foreign policy objectives. But we need to be
realistic enough to know that India will follow a foreign policy that
suits its interest. We should not and cannot expect India to pursue a
policy that diverges from its national interests or not to pursue a
policy that is in its national interests.
Fortunately, India's national interests converge with ours on the
vital national security issues. Neither country wants to see Iran
acquire nuclear weapons and both are profoundly concerned by the
terrorist threats. The tragic bombing in Mumbai in July where more than
200 people were killed by terrorists underscored to Indians that
terrorism is a real and present danger.
But we would be fooling ourselves if we thought that concluding a
nuclear cooperative agreement with India will make it adopt policies
regarding China, Iran, or others in the region or the world that are
contrary to its national interest.
Conversely, not concluding an agreement will not mean that India will
forsake its national interests to spite the United States. India will
not confront China or Iran or any other country merely because the
United States asks it to do so. India will do so only if it is in
India's national interests. This is independent of whether or not there
is nuclear cooperation in place.
Further, many have suggested that the U.S. nuclear industry will
benefit from this agreement with increased reactor sales to India.
However, this is not the case. Neither the United States nor India has
ratified an international agreement to limit the civil liability for
nuclear reactors.
Until both nations agree to limit the liability, the U.S. nuclear
industry will be hesitant to sell reactors to India. However, France
and Russia have no such hesitations. Both have state-owned nuclear
industries, so it is much less likely that victims of a nuclear reactor
failure would be able to successfully sue for damages.
As we have seen at Three Mile Island, Chernobyl, and Bhopal, the
liability exposure for such accidents can be overwhelming, resulting in
thousands of deaths and radiation exposure for millions of people.
Understandably, the U.S. nuclear industry is reluctant to

[[Page S11024]]

sell reactors to another country until their liability for such an
accident is limited.
If we support this agreement without accompanying limitations on
liability, we open the door for the French and the Russians to sell
nuclear reactors to India but not for our own industry.
I also do not believe this is an issue the Congress should be voting
on now.
President Bush is asking us to trust him that the risks of this
agreement will not materialize and that additional benefits will
follow--especially that India will cease fissile material production as
a result of a new treaty.
But with so many details unresolved and much up in the air, I see a
vote for this legislation, which will permanently change U.S. law, as
giving the administration a blank check in concluding the negotiations
with India on a nuclear cooperation agreement and with the terms of
safeguard agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency and
revisions to the Nuclear Suppliers Group's guidelines.
Nuclear nonproliferation is too important to our national security to
take unnecessary risks. We should wait until the whole package has been
negotiated and until we have better answers to the questions I have
raised about the implications of this agreement before we take this
step; for once we take the step of carving up the international
nonproliferation regime, it is no easy matter to return if we find out
we have erred. This genie cannot be put back in the bottle.
I am particularly concerned that unpleasant answers will come out
after we have voted on the legislation. In an action that was eerily
reminiscent of the White House's decision to withhold until after the
vote on the Iraq war North Korea's admission about its nuclear weapons
program, the State Department delayed a report on proliferation with
Iran until after the House had already approved this agreement. It
turned out that there were two Indian companies on that report.
Further, the administration kept quiet on Pakistan's constructing a
nuclear reactor that could be used in a regional arms race, making
India more likely to ramp up its production of fissile material, using
the domestic production freed up by this agreement. And, as we learned
this week, Ambassador Negroponte has not yet provided answers to the
Foreign Relations Committee's questions on India's nonproliferation
activities.
We have the time and we have the responsibility to get this right.
Let's be sure of what we are getting ourselves into.
If it can be shown with enough confidence that India will take steps
to become a full-fledged member of the nonproliferation community and
has agreed to cut off production of fissile material, then I would
certainly vote in favor of the cooperation agreement. Until then, I
will be reserving my vote, looking for answers, and waiting to see the
final agreement.
Mr. REED. Mr. President, today the Senate is undertaking an important
debate on the India Agreement for Civil Nuclear Cooperation.
On July 18, 2005, President Bush and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan
Singh signed an agreement to resume full civilian nuclear cooperation
for the first time since India conducted its initial nuclear test in
1974. Such an agreement will require changes to U.S. law and
accommodations with the international community.
The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 assures the proper management of
source, special nuclear, and byproduct material. Several sections of
the AEA are at issue in this agreement, so I would like to take a
moment to explain the pertinent provisions.
Section 123 of the AEA limits the ability of the United States to
enter into agreements with nonweapons states unless the agreement meets
a minimum of nine criteria, including a requirement that the recipient
country has in place an agreement with the International Atomic Energy
Agency, IAEA, to safeguard in perpetuity nuclear material, equipment,
and technology so that it will not be diverted for weapons use. This
type of agreement is known as a ``full-scope safeguards'' agreement. A
123 Agreement is the precursor to any export license for the nuclear
materials, equipment and technology.
Section 128 requires that any export license for nuclear materials,
technology or equipment contain a requirement that the recipient
nonnuclear weapons state maintain IAEA safeguards.
Section 129 of the AEA requires that any 123 Agreement or export
license be terminated if the nonnuclear weapons state recipient
detonates a nuclear explosive device, terminates, abrogates, or
violates IAEA safeguards, or engages in activities that support
development of a nuclear explosive device. Section 129 would also
prohibit entrance into a section 123 Agreement with any nonnuclear
weapons state that detonated a nuclear explosive device after 1978.
S. 3709, the bill we are considering today, establishes a mechanism
whereby the President may submit a 123 Agreement for civil nuclear
cooperation with India, a nonweapons state under the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty, to Congress for approval. However, this bill
would allow the President to waive certain requirements of section 123,
section 128, and portions of section 129, as long as the President
makes certain determinations that are set out in the bill.
India is the largest democracy in the world. Its economy is growing
by 8 percent annually. Since the beginning of this century, United
States-India relations on issues from trade to defense have been
growing stronger each year. The United States also benefits from a
large Indian-American population. Rhode Island is home to a vibrant
Indian community who contribute greatly to the State. I believe that
the United States should do all that it can to assist India and further
strengthen the partnership between the two countries.
However, this agreement does raise significant concerns. I believe
that proliferation of nuclear material is the greatest threat facing
our country today. North Korea recently conducted its first nuclear
test. Iran seems intent on pursuing a nuclear program. Even efforts to
reduce the overall size of the U.S. and Russian nuclear weapons
stockpiles have stalled. While there has been some small progress in
reducing the number of deployed nuclear warheads there has been no
progress in reducing the overall size of the U.S. nuclear weapons
stockpile. There is great concern, therefore, that this agreement
strikes a blow to what remains of the international nuclear
nonproliferation regime.
I, too, would share that concern, if the Senate had adopted the bill
the administration proposed. However, I believe that the Foreign
Relations Committee, under the leadership of Senators Lugar and Biden,
who are certainly experts on these matters, have crafted a bill which,
I believe, has sufficient safeguards. I think that they are trying to
adapt the nonproliferation regime, not destroy it.
First, section 105 of this bill sets out a series of determinations
the President must make in writing when he submits the 123 Agreement. I
believe these determinations will both provide a reasonable equivalent
of full-scope safeguards and address several other concerns with
respect to the Indian nuclear program, including concerns that the
agreement not facilitate or assist the Indian nuclear weapons program.
For the most part, the determinations reflect what India has committed
to do in the July 2005 joint statement.
Probably the most important of the determinations in section 105 is
the fifth, which states, ``India is working with the United States to
conclude a multilateral treaty on the cessation of the production of
fissile materials.'' This determination breathes new life into efforts
to achieve a Fissile Materials Cutoff Treaty, even driving the United
States back to the negotiating table. Determination number 5 is the one
single element in this bill that could prevent further growth in
India's nuclear weapons stockpile and could lead to real reductions. In
addition, this certification may also work to eliminate the impasse
between India and Pakistan whereby neither wants to be the first to
adopt a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty.
Section 106 of S. 3709 would prohibit the export of equipment,
materials and technologies related to uranium enrichment, spent nuclear
fuel reprocessing, and the production of heavy water, unless the user
is a multinational facility participating in IAEA approved reactor fuel
program or the President

[[Page S11025]]

``determines that the export or reexport will not improve India's
ability to produce nuclear weapons or fissile material for military
uses.'' On several occasions administration witnesses clearly stated to
the Foreign Relations Committee that the U.S. would not provide such
technologies to India. As a result, it is not anticipated that the
presidential exemption will be used.
Section 107 of the bill requires a program, which would include end-
use monitoring conditions as appropriate, to maintain accountability
with respect to nuclear materials, equipment, and technology sold,
leased and exported, or re-exported to India. This provision would
enhance confidence in India's efforts to ensure separation of its
civilian and military nuclear programs, facilities, materials and
personnel and also further ensure U.S. compliance with Article I of the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
S. 3709 also requires the President to provide the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee and the House International Relations Committee
with updated information regarding India's compliance with
nonproliferation commitments. Specifically, it would require the
President to keep these committees informed of any material violation
of India's nuclear nonproliferation commitments, the construction of
any nuclear facilities in India, any significant changes in India's
production of nuclear weapons or fissile materials, or changes in the
purpose or status of India's non-declared facilities. The bill also
requires the President to submit an annual report on the implementation
of civil nuclear commerce, India's compliance with its nonproliferation
commitments, and U.S. efforts and progress toward achieving India's
full participation in the Proliferation Security Initiative and
adherence to the guidelines and policies of the Australia Group and the
Wassenaar Arrangement.
It is important that this bill would waive section 129 applicability
for any actions taken before July 18, 2005. If India detonated a
nuclear device after the date of enactment the waiver authority would
cease to be effective and the exports would be prohibited.
Another vitally important provision of S. 3709 is that it follows
current law and requires Congress to have a vote to approve any final
123 Agreement. The House bill also has an approval process, but it is
not clear if that process requires a vote. The administration had
proposed that a 123 Agreement with India would only require
congressional notification and a waiting period.
Because of the provisions I have just discussed, I believe I can
support this bill. I would also note that passage of this bill is
simply the first step on a long road. If this bill passes the Senate,
it must be conferenced with the House bill, which has different
provisions. If the conference report comes back with the Senate
provisions weakened, or absent, I may be obligated to vote against that
report.
Much more important is the substance of the 123 statement the
President ultimately submits. I understand that this is an attempt to
adapt the nonproliferation regime to a changing world. I will carefully
examine any 123 Agreement to ensure that it adequately addresses vital
proliferation concerns.
But at this first step, I have hope that this agreement will lead to
greater cooperation on nonproliferation rather than less. With that
hope, I will support S. 3709.
Mr. ALEXANDER. Mr. President, I am here to support the Lugar-Biden
legislation that would implement changes in law necessary to secure our
Nation's civil-nuclear agreement with India.
This is very important to our future for two reasons: No. 1, India is
one of the great powers of the 21st century, and this agreement
represents an important step toward a new strategic partnership between
our two countries; and No. 2, nuclear power is a source of clean energy
that is good for us, and it is good for India.
As we look at the beginning of this new century, we have witnessed
the emergence of three great powers or influences in the world--three
major shifts that will help define the many years to come.
One is the rise of China. One is the emergence of a new political
Islam. And the third is the arrival of India as a great power.
I asked Secretary Rice about these three new forces shaping the
coming century at the Foreign Relations Committee hearing on the United
States-India Civil Nuclear Agreement, and she agreed with my
assessment.
And if you look at those three emerging forces, one presents the
greatest opportunity for us to be a partner, and that one is India:
India, the largest democracy in the world; India, where English is an
official language; India, where the legal system, like ours, is
descended from that of the British; and India, where a diverse ethnic
and religious population has joined together to form one nation with a
democratic government. India.
I was fortunate to travel to India earlier this year with a group of
Senators led by Senator Enzi. We went to look at what India is doing to
improve its economic standing by improving its brainpower through
better education and research and an emphasis on science and
technology. And we saw a country that is rapidly advancing.
Both our President and this Congress, in a bipartisan fashion, are
showing real vision by recognizing that in this new century there may
be no more important two-country relationship than the one between the
United States and India.
And we share an important strategic interest: we are facing the same
sort of energy and environmental issues. India's needs are even more
acute.
When I was there a few months ago, I was told that India hopes to
bring online 50,000 MW over the next 10 years in order to meet demand.
That is an incredible figure. If each power plant has a capacity of
500 MW, that is 100 new power plants. And they are going to build them
with us or without us.
The question for us is: What kind of power plants will they build?
From an environmental perspective, the only technology that is ready to
go, today, to provide large amounts of reliable power without emitting
noxious gases into the air is nuclear power.
As new studies are emerging that India's air pollution and China's
air pollution is also our air pollution because air pollution both
deposits locally and moves around the globe and that their greenhouse
gases cause just as much global warming as our greenhouse gases, then
it is in our interest for India to build nuclear power plants rather
than more dirty coal power plants that emit sulfur and nitrogen and
mercury and carbon.
Seventy-two percent of India's electricity needs are currently
provided by coal-burning plants. Gas provides 12 percent; oil, 2
percent; nuclear, 3 percent; hydro, 10 percent, and renewables, 1
percent.
This agreement won't radically shift those numbers overnight, but
each new nuclear powerplant is a powerplant that is not emitting
noxious gases into the air. It is one more powerplant that is not
putting out sulfur or nitrogen or mercury or even carbon.
So, Mr. President, before us is legislation to implement the United
States-India Civil Nuclear Agreement. This is not an agreement about
nuclear weapons--it is about cooperation for nuclear power. This is an
agreement that puts us on the path to a new strategic partnership with
India--one of the three great rising forces in this new century. And
this is an agreement that meets energy needs while being good for the
environment.
I am glad that we have taken this matter up in a bipartisan manner
and look forward to its passage today.
Mrs. CLINTON. Mr. President, today, the Senate has begun debate on S.
3709, the United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act,
which will help pave the way for our Nation to assist India in
fulfilling its energy needs. I intend to vote in support of this
legislation.
The United States and India are bound together by deep mutual respect
and our common efforts to work towards a democratic, free, and secure
world. As cochair of the Senate India Caucus, I have sought to
strengthen the ties that bind our two nations.
The legislation that emerged from the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee is a significant improvement over the implementing
legislation put forward by the administration in March. The
administration's initial proposal sought to undercut Congressional
authority by asking us to effectively approve an agreement before it

[[Page S11026]]

had even been negotiated with India and before India had reached its
nuclear safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy
Agency, IAEA.
I carefully followed the Senate Foreign Relations Committee's
consideration of this agreement. Senator Richard Lugar, the Foreign
Relations Committee chairman, and Senator Joseph Biden, the Foreign
Relations Committee ranking member, are to be commended for the
seriousness with which they exercised their jurisdiction over this
legislation. Because of the efforts of Chairman Lugar and Ranking
Member Biden, the bill before us today is much improved. This
legislation not only retains congressional prerogatives, but it also
ensures that Congress will not have to vote to approve a final
agreement until every single nation in the Nuclear Suppliers Group.
NSG, the global regime given the charge for ensuring the responsible
trade of nuclear technology, has agreed to permit the transfer of
peaceful nuclear technology to India. By working through the NSG, we
will help strengthen both that group, as well as the greater
international nonproliferation regime that is center stage as we
address the threats posed by the nuclear weapons programs of Iran and
North Korea.
As India continues to grow stronger and to shoulder more of the
responsibilities that come with being a leading nation in the world, we
must continue to work towards greater cooperation with our Indian
friends to deal with our common challenges in security, energy,
economics, and health. I hope that this agreement is just one step on
that journey that our countries, and our people, are taking together.
Mr. DODD. Mr. President, I rise today in full support of S. 3709. The
passage of this bill and the ultimate conclusion of the U.S.-India
nuclear agreement will be instrumental in bringing our countries closer
together after decades of estrangement. This outcome is not just
desirable but essential for U.S. national interests.
It is hard to overemphasize the importance of India's role in the
world today. Not only is India one of the most populous countries and
fastest growing economies in the world, it is also the world's largest
democracy that has long demonstrated a commitment to pluralism and rule
of law and a rich intellectual and civilization heritage.
I applaud the efforts of both the Clinton and Bush administration in
strengthening our ties with India. Their efforts reflect the bipartisan
spirit with which America extends its hand of friendship to India and
the importance that it places in getting this relationship right.
The U.S.-India nuclear deal significantly benefits both our
countries. It will help India meet its growing energy needs, fueling
its economic growth and reducing the global demand and cost of fossil
fuels. It will enhance U.S.-Indian technological and commercial
cooperation with significant dividends for U.S. companies. And it will
bolster our strategic partnership with India in Asia and beyond.
It also opens the window for greater oversight over India's civil
nuclear program, drawing an important non-signatory to the
Nonproliferation Treaty into the broader nonproliferation system. This
is a positive step for the U.S. in controlling the spread of nuclear
materials and weapons and gaining an important ally in that fight.
But the flip side of this coin is that we are doing business with a
non-nuclear weapon state as defined by the NPT that does not have full-
scope safeguards.
In doing so, the U.S. has overstepped domestic and international non-
proliferation laws and norms. It has sent a signal that countries can
pursue and test nuclear weapons, as India did in 1998, and wear out
U.S. opposition. And it may trigger a low-level arms race between India
and Pakistan as India's uranium reserves are freed up for diversion to
its weapons program.
Moreover, at a time when we are trying to roll back North Korea and
Iran's nuclear program, cutting a deal with India suggests that if you
are on America's side, you can keep your nuclear weapons. Such double
standards are detrimental to America's interests and image.
What we ultimately need is not a country-specific approach to civil
nuclear cooperation but a criteria-specific one. India has agreed to
meet some of these criteria but not all. Its nonproliferation record is
infinitely better than that of its neighbors, but far from perfect.
For now, the bill that is before the Senate carves out an exception
for India. As I said earlier, I will vote for this bill because I think
our relationship with India is critical.
It is also important to highlight what should be one vital outgrowth
of this relationship: halting the global production of fissile material
that can be used in a nuclear device.
S. 3709 calls for U.S.-Indian cooperation in pursuit of a
multilateral fissile material cutoff treaty. However, the reality is
that negotiations on such a treaty at the Geneva Conference on
Disarmament have long been at a standstill due to many factors. These
include linkages that countries have imposed with issues such as the
militarization of space.
The proliferation dangers of increased fissile material stockpiles
are well understood. Yet the current approach has failed to stop
production.
That is why the United States needs to sit down with India and the
other key handful of countries that have produced and are producing
fissile material, and make a hard push for an interim non-
discriminatory moratorium on fissile material production that is
applicable to this grouping of states. This moratorium would remain in
effect pending the entry into force of a multilateral treaty.
The advantage of this new format is that it allows for a smaller,
more relevant grouping with a singular agenda where the U.S. can
immediately introduce proposals it has already drafted for discussion.
If we are to seriously address the nuclear challenges we face today,
we need to break the deadlock in Geneva, think outside the box and
focus on this issue like a laser beam. We simply cannot have countries
churning out fissile material because it increases the chances of it
falling into the hands of terrorists and the buildup of nuclear
arsenals.
In this bill, the Senate calls for the President to make several
determinations on whether India has taken certain steps before we can
proceed with an agreement. The Senate must also set certain benchmarks
for our own government and ensure that it is upholding its
responsibilities as a global leader and a nuclear weapon state.
I can think of no better way of doing this than calling for fresh and
meaningful negotiations on halting fissile material production. Moving
in this direction will strengthen the U.S.-India nuclear deal and make
it a catalyst for positive change in the nonproliferation system.
In the end, the goal should be a strong U.S. India relationship and a
nuclear deal that provides momentum toward strengthening the nuclear
nonproliferation system.
Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, last year President Bush and Indian Prime
Minister Manmohan Singh ushered in a new era of cooperation between the
United States and India on civilian nuclear energy. President Bush
promised to seek the necessary changes in U.S. laws and policies to
allow full cooperation and commerce in this area. In return, Prime
Minister Singh has committed India to specific steps strengthening its
adherence to various elements of the global nonproliferation regime.
This agreement marks a historic milestone for U.S. relations with
India, one of our most important friends, a natural ally, and a country
that can be a close partner on a number of key issues including nuclear
nonproliferation.
The legislation pending before us today is critically important
because it sets the framework for Congress to consider a formal
peaceful nuclear cooperation agreement with India under section 123 of
the Atomic Energy Act. The Foreign Relations Committee passed this bill
with strong bipartisan support shortly before the July 4th recess, and
I hope the full Senate will follow suit. By passing this legislation,
we will not only move the United States and India one step closer to
energy cooperation but also send a clear message that a strong United
States-India relationship is vital to both of our nations.
More and more, this bond is built on the bedrock of natural
affinities--on

[[Page S11027]]

shared interests and shared values. And it is no wonder--our two
countries are natural partners. We should be partners in the war on
terror, in the spread of democracy, in religious tolerance, in
advancing technology, and in bringing stability and balance to Asia. In
the post-9/11 world, we share interests and we share threats. India
after all sees more terror attacks every year than any other country.
For a long time, South Asians and Americans have been extremely
close--thanks to so many families spilt between the two countries and
such a vibrant Indian-American community here at home. But now at last
our Governments are finally catching up to our people and bringing our
countries together.
I have long believed that it is in the interest of the United States
and India to expand our strategic relationship. In 1994 I took a trade
delegation from my home State of Massachusetts to India. It was clear
to me that Cold War tensions had created a gulf between our nations
that didn't serve either country. I believed then that India could and
should be a critical American partner in South Asia. My subsequent
trips in 1999 and again earlier this year have only reinforced that
view.
With its strategic location in South Asia and its experience in
maintaining a stable and religiously diverse democracy--India has
nearly 150 Muslim citizens--India can be an important partner on a
range of issues, from combating the threat of terrorism and
proliferation to promoting democracy and regional security. Cooperating
on the civilian nuclear front can help move this essential partnership
forward.
I know from my discussions in India this past January with Prime
Minister Singh and his National Security Adviser that they want our
help in meeting India's energy needs. This is crucial if India is to
continue to expand its economy and increase its stature as a major
regional and global power. And they see this nuclear initiative, as we
do, as an important foundation for our bilateral relationship.
And everywhere I went, I kept hearing from political leaders and
businessmen just how important they consider American investment in
India's economic future--and not just in technology. India wants our
help. They see this nuclear initiative as a cornerstone of economic
development and sensible energy policy, and I see it as a great chance
for our countries to work together.
Civil nuclear cooperation is in India's interest, but it is also in
ours. That is why during my trip to India in January I was one of the
first Senators to express my support for the civil nuclear initiative
in principle. Since then, I have been committed to working with my
colleagues to find a way to make this deal work for all our interests.
I am pleased that we have accomplished that with the legislation
approved by the committee.
Obviously, there are ramifications for our nonproliferation efforts
because for the first time we are agreeing to engage in nuclear
cooperation with a country that has a nuclear weapons program but is
not a party to the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty or bound by its
obligations. We cannot gloss over the fact that this is an
unprecedented step. But it is not one taken lightly. I am convinced
that this exception for India makes sense, despite its real costs,
given India's record as a trustworthy steward of nuclear materials and
technologies.
India can be an important ally in our global nonproliferation
efforts, as demonstrated by their voting with us in the International
Atomic Energy Agency to try to curb Iran's nuclear ambitions. And, of
course, India is critical to any regional effort to cap fissile
material production. India has made a number of positive commitments
with respect to its nuclear program, such as separating its civil and
military facilities, putting more of its civilian facilities under IAEA
safeguards, and working with the United States to achieve a
multilateral fissile material cutoff treaty.
I believe this bill we are considering today will encourage India to
fulfill these commitments while still allowing for timely consideration
by Congress of the bilateral nuclear cooperation agreement--the so-
called section 123 agreement--when it is concluded by Indian and
American negotiators. As I said when Secretary Rice testified before
the committee on this deal in early April, it is critical for us to see
the safeguards agreement that India reaches with the IAEA before taking
action on the section 123 agreement between us and India. This bill
ensures that we will. I am pleased that it includes my language
clarifying that India's safeguards agreement with the IAEA must provide
for safeguards ``in perpetuity,'' as India has said it would.
Arthur Vandenberg, a Republican Senator from Michigan, used to say
that partisan politics ought to stop at the water's edge. Crafting this
legislation was not easy, but I am pleased to say that we have thus far
met Vandenberg's challenge. And we must continue to do so.
To reach agreement, we had to balance a number of critically
important interests: building a strong and comprehensive relationship
with India, furthering our global nonproliferation efforts, and
protecting congressional prerogatives to act on nuclear cooperation
agreements between the United States and other countries. I recognize
that there are aspects of this legislation that some on both sides of
the debate wish had come out differently, but on the whole, I believe
the legislation the committee has sent to the Senate is a good-faith--
and ultimately successful--effort to meet those needs.
One of the most important aspects of the balance in the bill before
us is the requirement that Congress review the formal peaceful nuclear
cooperation agreement with India, which must be submitted under section
123 of the Atomic Energy Act. The bill passed by the House includes
procedures which would deny Congress a full right of review. Such an
approach would undermine the balance we have struck in this bill. I
believe it is essential that the Senate conferees insist upon the
procedures in the Senate bill for the consideration of the 123
agreement. The Senate bill is a good bill, and our goal should be to
enact as much of it as possible.
We have taken an important step forward for one of our most promising
and important relationships in the years to come.
Mr. ROCKEFELLER. Mr. President, I rise to express my strong support
for this bill.
The proposed agreement will mark a momentous change in U.S. and
global nuclear policy, in my view for the better. It will give India
due recognition as a global power, and it will deepen the bilateral
commercial and strategic relationship that the United States enjoys
with the world's largest democracy.
Beyond these commercial and strategic benefits, this deal will bring
India into the mainstream of the global nonproliferation system for the
first time in its nuclear history. This bill includes a number of
nonproliferation-related provisions, including a requirement that the
U.S.-India agreement will not enter into force unless and until India
and the International Atomic Energy Agency negotiate and conclude an
inspection agreement. It also includes a requirement that the U.S.-
India agreement will not enter into force unless and until India and
the IAEA negotiate and conclude a safeguards agreement. Further, it
requires that the U.S.-India agreement will not enter into force unless
and until the Nuclear Suppliers Group reaches consensus on nuclear
trade with India and bans U.S. export of uranium enrichment and
reprocessing technologies under any U.S.-India agreement.
This agreement will benefit the economic, strategic, and security
interests of the United States, and I offer my strong support for it
and congratulate my colleagues, Senator Lugar and Senator Biden, for
completing this important legislation.
Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, I rise in support of S. 3709, the
United States-India, Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act,
legislation which will permit the United States to export nuclear
material to India for peaceful purposes.
I applaud President George W. Bush and Secretary of State Condoleezza
Rice for taking this bold, new and welcome approach to America's
bilateral relations with India. For too long our relations with India
and Pakistan have resembled a zero-sum game--by helping one nation, we
have been perceived as hurting the other.

[[Page S11028]]

This agreement helps to liberate U.S. policy from this false choice;
the United States can and should enjoy positive relations with both
nations. This bill will broaden and deepen America's emerging strategic
partnership with India.
This legislation is also part of a broader framework for the United
States and India to work together on many issues, including energy,
defense cooperation, anti-terrorism efforts and the promotion of
democracy. S. 3709 will strengthen the world's security by expanding
the reach of international non-proliferation efforts, and will increase
transparency about India's civilian nuclear program.
In addition, this bill will boost America's energy security by
helping India meet its growing energy needs with nuclear power. With a
population over one billion, India has greatly increased the demand for
energy, helping to raise energy prices on the world market. The more
power India can get from other sources, the less Americans will have to
pay for energy here at home.
This bill will also foster economic growth in America by opening up
new opportunities for American companies to do business in India's
civilian nuclear sector. By passing this legislation, my colleagues
will help create new jobs for Americans and new markets for American
firms.
I want to commend my good friend from the neighboring State of
Indiana, Senator Lugar, for his sponsorship of this bill and his
successful shepherding of it through the Senate.
Mr. President, improving U.S.-Indian ties is long overdue. After all,
America and India are the worlds two largest democracies. As President
Bush continues to champion the spread of democracy abroad, it is
entirely fitting that our two countries should continue to strengthen
our strategic partnership, as a model for the world of what democracies
can accomplish when they work together in peace.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Indiana is recognized.
Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, the unanimous consent order provides for 1
minute on each side. I will forego my minute, but I would like to yield
to the distinguished leader, who is here. He wants to make a comment.
Mr. FRIST. Mr. President, just for the information of my colleagues,
this will be the last rollcall vote tonight. The plans will be on
Monday, December 4, to be back in session, and in all likelihood we
will not be voting until the late afternoon of December 5. Everybody
stay posted. We will keep you apprised of the future plans.
Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, we relinquish all time.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. If there is no further debate, the question is
on the engrossment and third reading of the bill.
The bill was ordered to be engrossed for a third reading and was read
the third time.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senate will now
proceed to the consideration of H.R. 5682, which the clerk will report.
The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

A bill (H.R. 5682) to exempt from certain requirements of
the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 a proposed nuclear agreement
for cooperation with India.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, all after the
enacting clause is stricken, and the text of S. 3709, as amended, is
inserted in lieu thereof.
The question is on third reading of the bill.
The bill (H.R. 5682), as amended, was ordered to a third reading and
was read the third time.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The bill having been read the third time, the
question is, Shall it pass?
The yeas and nays have been ordered.
The clerk will call the roll.
The legislative clerk called the roll.
Mr. McCONNELL. The following Senators were necessarily absent: the
Senator from Oklahoma (Mr. Inhofe) and the Senator from Wyoming (Mr.
Thomas).
Mr. DURBIN. I announce that the Senator from Vermont (Mr. Jeffords)
is necessarily absent.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Are there any other Senators in the Chamber
desiring to vote?
The result was announced--yeas 85, nays 12, as follows:

[Rollcall Vote No. 270 Leg.]

YEAS--85

Alexander
Allard
Allen
Baucus
Bayh
Bennett
Biden
Bond
Brownback
Bunning
Burns
Burr
Cantwell
Carper
Chafee
Chambliss
Clinton
Coburn
Cochran
Coleman
Collins
Cornyn
Craig
Crapo
DeMint
DeWine
Dodd
Dole
Domenici
Durbin
Ensign
Enzi
Feinstein
Frist
Graham
Grassley
Gregg
Hagel
Hatch
Hutchison
Inouye
Isakson
Kerry
Kohl
Kyl
Landrieu
Lautenberg
Levin
Lieberman
Lincoln
Lott
Lugar
Martinez
McCain
McConnell
Menendez
Mikulski
Murkowski
Murray
Nelson (FL)
Nelson (NE)
Obama
Pryor
Reed
Reid
Roberts
Rockefeller
Salazar
Santorum
Sarbanes
Schumer
Sessions
Shelby
Smith
Snowe
Specter
Stabenow
Stevens
Sununu
Talent
Thune
Vitter
Voinovich
Warner
Wyden

NAYS--12

Akaka
Bingaman
Boxer
Byrd
Conrad
Dayton
Dorgan
Feingold
Harkin
Johnson
Kennedy
Leahy

NOT VOTING--3

Inhofe
Jeffords
Thomas
The bill (H.R. 5682), as amended, was passed, as follows:

H.R. 5682

Resolved, That the bill from the House of Representatives
(H.R. 5682) entitled ``An Act to exempt from certain
requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 a proposed
nuclear agreement for cooperation with India.'', do pass with
the following amendment:
Strike out all after the enacting clause and insert:

TITLE I--UNITED STATES-INDIA PEACEFUL ATOMIC ENERGY COOPERATION

SECTION 101. SHORT TITLE.

This title may be cited as the ``United States-India
Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act''.

SEC. 102. SENSE OF CONGRESS.

It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) strong bilateral relations with India are in the
national interest of the United States;
(2) the United States and India share common democratic
values and the potential for increasing and sustained
economic engagement;
(3) commerce in civil nuclear energy with India by the
United States and other countries has the potential to
benefit the people of all countries;
(4) such commerce also represents a significant change in
United States policy regarding commerce with countries not
parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which
remains the foundation of the international non-proliferation
regime;
(5) any commerce in civil nuclear energy with India by the
United States and other countries must be achieved in a
manner that minimizes the risk of nuclear proliferation or
regional arms races and maximizes India's adherence to
international non-proliferation regimes, including, in
particular, the Guidelines of the Nuclear Suppliers Group
(NSG); and
(6) the United States should not seek to facilitate or
encourage the continuation of nuclear exports to India by any
other party if such exports are terminated under United
States law.

SEC. 103. DECLARATION OF POLICY CONCERNING UNITED STATES-
INDIA PEACEFUL ATOMIC ENERGY COOPERATION.

It shall be the policy of the United States with respect to
any peaceful atomic energy cooperation between the United
States and India--
(1) to achieve as quickly as possible a cessation of the
production by India and Pakistan of fissile materials for
nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices;
(2) to achieve as quickly as possible the Government of
India's adherence to, and cooperation in, the full range of
international non-proliferation regimes and activities,
including India's--
(A) full participation in the Proliferation Security
Initiative;
(B) formal commitment to the Statement of Interdiction
Principles;
(C) public announcement of its decision to conform its
export control laws, regulations, and policies with the
Australia Group and with the Guidelines, Procedures,
Criteria, and Controls List of the Wassenaar Arrangement; and
(D) demonstration of satisfactory progress toward
implementing the decision described in subparagraph (C);
(3) to ensure that India remains in full compliance with
its non-proliferation, arms control, and disarmament
agreements, obligations, and commitments;
(4) to ensure that any safeguards agreement or Additional
Protocol thereto to which India is a party with the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) can reliably
safeguard any export or reexport to India of any nuclear
materials and equipment;
(5) to meet the requirements set forth in subsections a.(1)
and a.(3)-a.(9) of section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of
1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153);
(6) to act in a manner fully consistent with the Guidelines
for Nuclear Transfers and the Guidelines for Transfers of
Nuclear-Related Dual-Use Equipment, Materials, Software and
Related Technology developed by the multilateral Nuclear
Suppliers Group and the rules and practices regarding NSG
decision-making;

[[Page S11029]]

(7) given the special sensitivity of equipment and
technologies related to the enrichment of uranium, the
reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel, and the production of
heavy water, to work with members of the Nuclear Suppliers
Group, individually and collectively, to further restrict the
transfers of such equipment and technologies, including to
India;
(8) to maintain the fullest possible international support
for, adherence to, and compliance with the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty; and
(9) that exports of nuclear fuel to India should not
contribute to, or in any way encourage, increases in the
production by India of fissile material for non-civilian
purposes.

SEC. 104. WAIVERS FOR COOPERATION WITH INDIA.

(a) Waiver Authority.--If the President submits a
determination under section 105 to the appropriate
congressional committees and makes available to such
committees the text of the agreement described in paragraph
(3) of such section, the President may--
(1) subject to subsection (b), exempt a proposed agreement
for cooperation with India arranged pursuant to section 123
of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153) from the
requirement of subsection a.(2) of such section;
(2) waive the application of section 128 of the Atomic
Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2157) with respect to exports
to India; and
(3) waive the application of any sanction with respect to
India under--
(A) section 129 a.(1)(D) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954
(42 U.S.C. 2158(a)(1)(D)); and
(B) section 129 of such Act (42 U.S.C. 2158) regarding any
actions that occurred before July 18, 2005.
(b) Joint Resolution of Approval Requirement.--An agreement
for cooperation exempted by the President pursuant to
subsection (a)(1) shall be subject to the second proviso in
subsection d. of section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954
(42 U.S.C. 2153(d)) applicable to agreements exempted by the
President pursuant to subsection (a) of such section.

SEC. 105. DETERMINATION REGARDING UNITED STATES-INDIA
PEACEFUL ATOMIC ENERGY COOPERATION.

The determination referred to in section 104 is a written
determination by the President, which shall be accompanied by
a report to the appropriate congressional committees, that--
(1) India has provided to the IAEA and the United States a
credible plan to separate its civil nuclear facilities,
materials, and programs from its military facilities,
materials, and programs;
(2) India has filed a complete declaration regarding its
civil nuclear facilities and materials with the IAEA;
(3) an agreement between India and the IAEA requiring the
application of safeguards in perpetuity in accordance with
IAEA standards, principles, and practices to civil nuclear
facilities, programs, and materials described in paragraph
(2) has entered into force;
(4) India and the IAEA are making substantial progress
toward implementing an Additional Protocol;
(5) India is working with the United States to conclude a
multilateral treaty on the cessation of the production of
fissile materials for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear
explosive devices;
(6) India is supporting international efforts to prevent
the spread of enrichment and reprocessing technology to any
state that does not already possess full-scale, functioning
enrichment or reprocessing plants;
(7) India has secured nuclear and other sensitive materials
and technology through the application of comprehensive
export control legislation and regulations, including through
effective enforcement actions, and through harmonization of
its control lists with, and adherence to, the guidelines of
the Missile Technology Control Regime and the Nuclear
Suppliers Group;
(8) India is fully and actively participating in United
States and international efforts to dissuade, sanction, and
contain Iran for its nuclear program consistent with United
Nations Security Council resolutions; and
(9) the Nuclear Suppliers Group has decided to permit civil
nuclear commerce with India pursuant to a decision taken by
the Nuclear Suppliers Group that--
(A) was made by consensus; and
(B) does not permit nuclear commerce with any non-nuclear
weapon state other than India that does not have IAEA
safeguards on all nuclear materials and all peaceful nuclear
activities within the territory of such state, under its
jurisdiction, or carried out under its control anywhere.

SEC. 106. PROHIBITION ON CERTAIN EXPORTS AND REEXPORTS.

(a) Prohibition.--
(1) Nuclear regulatory commission.--Except as provided in
subsection (b), the Nuclear Regulatory Commission may not
authorize pursuant to part 110 of title 10, Code of Federal
Regulations, licenses for the export or reexport to India of
any equipment, materials, or technology related to the
enrichment of uranium, the reprocessing of spent nuclear
fuel, or the production of heavy water.
(2) Secretary of energy.--Except as provided in subsection
(b), the Secretary of Energy may not authorize pursuant to
part 810 of title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, licenses
for the export or reexport to India of any equipment,
materials, or technology to be used for the enrichment of
uranium, the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel, or the
production of heavy water.
(b) Exceptions.--Exports or reexports otherwise prohibited
under subsection (a) may be approved if--
(1) the end user--
(A) is a multinational facility participating in an IAEA-
approved program to provide alternatives to national fuel
cycle capabilities; or
(B) is a facility participating in, and the export or
reexport is associated with, a bilateral or multinational
program to develop a proliferation-resistant fuel cycle; and
(2) the President determines that the export or reexport
will not improve India's ability to produce nuclear weapons
or fissile material for military uses.

SEC. 107. END-USE MONITORING PROGRAM.

(a) In General.--The President shall ensure that all
appropriate measures are taken to maintain accountability
with respect to nuclear materials, equipment, and technology
sold, leased, exported, or reexported to India and to ensure
United States compliance with Article I of the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty.
(b) Measures.--The measures taken pursuant to subsection
(a) shall include the following:
(1) Obtaining and implementing assurances and conditions
pursuant to the export licensing authorities of the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission and the Department of Commerce and the
authorizing authorities of the Department of Energy,
including, as appropriate, conditions regarding end-use
monitoring.
(2) A detailed system of reporting and accounting for
technology transfers, including any retransfers in India,
authorized by the Department of Energy pursuant to section 57
b. of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2077(b)). Such
system shall be capable of providing assurances that--
(A) the identified recipients of the nuclear technology are
authorized to receive the nuclear technology;
(B) the nuclear technology identified for transfer will be
used only for peaceful safeguarded nuclear activities and
will not be used for any military or nuclear explosive
purpose; and
(C) the nuclear technology identified for transfer will not
be retransferred without the prior consent of the United
States, and facilities, equipment, or materials derived
through the use of transferred technology will not be
transferred without the prior consent of the United States.
(3) In the event the IAEA is unable to implement safeguards
as required by an agreement between the United States and
India arranged pursuant to section 123 of the Atomic Energy
Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153), arrangements that conform with
IAEA safeguards standards, principles, and practices that
provide assurances equivalent to that intended to be secured
by the system they replace, including--
(A) review in a timely fashion of the design of any
equipment transferred pursuant to the agreement for
cooperation, or of any facility that is to use, fabricate,
process, or store any material so transferred or any special
nuclear material used in or produced through the use of such
material and equipment;
(B) maintenance and disclosure of records and of relevant
reports for the purpose of assisting in ensuring
accountability for material transferred pursuant to the
agreement and any source or special nuclear material used in
or produced through the use of any material and equipment so
transferred; and
(C) access to places and data necessary to account for the
material referred to in subparagraph (B) and to inspect any
equipment or facility referred to in subparagraph (A).
(c) Implementation.--The measures described in subsection
(b) shall be implemented to provide reasonable assurances
that the recipient is complying with the relevant
requirements, terms, and conditions of any licenses issued by
the United States regarding such exports, including those
relating to the use, retransfer, safe handling, secure
transit, and storage of such exports.

SEC. 108. IMPLEMENTATION AND COMPLIANCE.

(a) Information on Nuclear Activities of India.--The
President shall keep the appropriate congressional committees
fully and currently informed of the facts and implications of
any significant nuclear activities of India, including--
(1) any material non-compliance on the part of the
Government of India with--
(A) the non-proliferation commitments undertaken in the
Joint Statement of July 18, 2005, between the President of
the United States and the Prime Minister of India;
(B) the separation plan presented in the national
parliament of India on March 7, 2006, and in greater detail
on May 11, 2006;
(C) a safeguards agreement between the Government of India
and the IAEA;
(D) an Additional Protocol between the Government of India
and the IAEA;
(E) a peaceful nuclear cooperation agreement between the
Government of India and the United States Government pursuant
to section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C.
2153) or any subsequent arrangement under section 131 of such
Act (42 U.S.C. 2160);
(F) the terms and conditions of any approved licenses; and
(G) United States laws and regulations regarding the export
or reexport of nuclear material or dual-use material,
equipment, or technology;
(2) the construction of a nuclear facility in India after
the date of the enactment of this Act;
(3) significant changes in the production by India of
nuclear weapons or in the types or amounts of fissile
material produced; and
(4) changes in the purpose or operational status of any
unsafeguarded nuclear fuel cycle activities in India.
(b) Implementation and Compliance Report.--Not later than
180 days after the date on which an agreement between the
Government of India and the United States Government pursuant
to section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C.
2153) enters into force, and annually thereafter, the
President shall submit to

[[Page S11030]]

the appropriate congressional committees a report including--
(1) a description of any additional nuclear facilities and
nuclear materials that the Government of India has placed or
intends to place under IAEA safeguards;
(2) a comprehensive listing of--
(A) all licenses that have been approved by the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission and the Secretary of Energy for exports
and reexports to India under parts 110 and 810 of title 10,
Code of Federal Regulations;
(B) any licenses approved by the Department of Commerce for
the export or reexport to India of commodities, related
technology, and software which are controlled for nuclear
non-proliferation reasons on the Nuclear Referral List of the
Commerce Control List maintained under part 774 of title 15,
Code of Federal Regulations;
(C) any other United States authorizations for the export
or reexport to India of nuclear materials and equipment; and
(D) with respect to each such license or other form of
authorization described in subparagraphs (A), (B), and (C)--
(i) the number or other identifying information of each
license or authorization;
(ii) the name or names of the authorized end user or end
users;
(iii) the name of the site, facility, or location in India
to which the export or reexport was made;
(iv) the terms and conditions included on such licenses and
authorizations;
(v) any post-shipment verification procedures that will be
applied to such exports or reexports; and
(vi) the term of validity of each such license or
authorization;
(3) any significant nuclear commerce between India and
other countries, including any such trade that--
(A) does not comply with applicable guidelines or decisions
of the Nuclear Suppliers Group; or
(B) would not meet the standards applied to exports or
reexports of such material, equipment, or technology of
United States origin;
(4) either--
(A) a certification that India is in full compliance with
the commitments and obligations contained in the agreements
and other documents referenced in subparagraphs (A) through
(F) of subsection (a)(1); or
(B) if the President cannot make such certification, an
identification and assessment of all compliance issues
arising with regard to the adherence by India to its
commitments and obligations, including--
(i) the steps the United States Government has taken to
remedy or otherwise respond to such compliance issues;
(ii) the responses of the Government of India to such
steps; and
(iii) an assessment of the implications of any continued
noncompliance, including whether nuclear commerce with India,
if not already terminated under section 129 of the Atomic
Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2158), remains in the national
security interest of the United States;
(5) a detailed description of--
(A) United States efforts to promote national or regional
progress by India and Pakistan in disclosing, securing,
capping, and reducing their fissile material stockpiles,
pending creation of a world-wide fissile material cut-off
regime, including the institution of a Fissile Material Cut-
off Treaty;
(B) the reactions of India and Pakistan to such efforts;
and
(C) assistance that the United States is providing, or
would be able to provide, to India and Pakistan to promote
the objectives in subparagraph (A), consistent with its
obligations under international law and existing agreements;
(6) an estimate of--
(A) the amount of uranium mined in India during the
previous year;
(B) the amount of such uranium that has likely been used or
allocated for the production of nuclear explosive devices;
and
(C) the rate of production in India of--
(i) fissile material for nuclear explosive devices; and
(ii) nuclear explosive devices;
(7) an analysis as to whether imported uranium has affected
the rate of production in India of nuclear explosive devices;
and
(8) a detailed description of efforts and progress made
toward the achievement of India's--
(A) full participation in the Proliferation Security
Initiative;
(B) formal commitment to the Statement of Interdiction
Principles;
(C) public announcement of its decision to conform its
export control laws, regulations, and policies with the
Australia Group and with the Guidelines, Procedures,
Criteria, and Controls List of the Wassenaar Arrangement; and
(D) demonstration of satisfactory progress toward
implementing the decision described in subparagraph (C).
(c) Submittal With Other Annual Reports.--
(1) Report on proliferation prevention.--Each annual report
submitted under subsection (b) after the initial report may
be submitted together with the annual report on proliferation
prevention required under section 601(a) of the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Act of 1978 (22 U.S.C. 3281(a)).
(2) Report on progress toward regional non-proliferation.--
The information required to be submitted under subsection
(b)(5) after the initial report may be submitted together
with the annual report on progress toward regional non-
proliferation required under section 620F(c) of the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2376(c)).
(d) Form.--Each report submitted under this section shall
be submitted in unclassified form but may contain a
classified annex.

SEC. 109. UNITED STATES COMPLIANCE WITH ITS NUCLEAR NON-
PROLIFERATION TREATY OBLIGATIONS.

This title shall not be deemed to constitute authority for
any action in violation of any obligation of the United
States under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

SEC. 110. INOPERABILITY OF DETERMINATION AND WAIVERS.

A determination under section 105 and any waiver under
section 104 shall cease to be effective if the President
determines that India has detonated a nuclear explosive
device after the date of the enactment of this Act.

SEC. 111. MTCR ADHERENT STATUS.

Congress finds that India is not an MTCR adherent for the
purposes of Section 73 of the Arms Export Control Act (22
U.S.C. 2797b).

SEC. 112. TECHNICAL AMENDMENT.

Section 1112(c)(4) of the Arms Control and Nonproliferation
Act of 1999 (title XI of the Admiral James W. Nance and Meg
Donovan Foreign Relations Act, Fiscal Years 2000 and 2001 (as
enacted into law by section 1000(a)(7) of Public Law 106-113
and contained in appendix G of that Act; 113 Stat. 1501A-
486)) is amended--
(1) in subparagraph (B), by striking ``and'' after the
semicolon at the end;
(2) by redesignating subparagraph (C) as subparagraph (D);
and
(3) by inserting after subparagraph (B) the following new
subparagraph:
``(C) so much of the reports required under section 108 of
the United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation
Act as relates to verification or compliance matters; and''.

SEC. 113. DEFINITIONS.

In this title:
(1) The term ``Additional Protocol'' means a protocol
additional to a safeguards agreement with the IAEA, as
negotiated between a country and the IAEA based on a Model
Additional Protocol as set forth in IAEA information circular
(INFCIRC) 540.
(2) The term ``appropriate congressional committees'' means
the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the
Committee on International Relations of the House of
Representatives.
(3) The term ``atomic energy'' has the meaning given the
term in section 11 c. of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42
U.S.C. 2014(c)).
(4) The term ``dual-use material, equipment, or
technology'' means those items controlled by the Department
of Commerce pursuant to section 309(c) of the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Act of 1978.
(5) The term ``IAEA safeguards'' has the meaning given the
term in section 830(3) of the Nuclear Proliferation
Prevention Act of 1994 (22 U.S.C. 6305(3)).
(6) The term ``nuclear materials and equipment'' has the
meaning given the term in section 4(5) of the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Act of 1978 (22 U.S.C. 3203(3)).
(7) The term ``Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty'' means the
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, done at
Washington, London, and Moscow July 1, 1968, and entered into
force March 5, 1970 (21 UST 483).
(8) The terms ``nuclear weapon'' and ``nuclear explosive
device'' have the meaning given the term ``nuclear explosive
device'' in section 830(4) of the Nuclear Proliferation
Prevention Act of 1994 (22 U.S.C. 6305(4)).
(9) The terms ``reprocessing'' and ``reprocess'' refer to
the separation of nuclear materials from fission products in
spent nuclear fuel.
(10) The term ``source material'' has the meaning given the
term in section 11 z. of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42
U.S.C. 2014(z)).
(11) The term ``special nuclear material'' has the meaning
given the term in section 11 aa. of the Atomic Energy Act of
1954 (42 U.S.C. 2014(aa)).
(12) The term ``unsafeguarded nuclear fuel-cycle activity''
means research on, or development, design, manufacture,
construction, operation, or maintenance of--
(A) any existing or future reactor, critical facility,
conversion plant, fabrication plant, reprocessing plant,
plant for the separation of isotopes of source or special
fissionable material, or separate storage installation with
respect to which there is no obligation to accept IAEA
safeguards at the relevant reactor, facility, plant, or
installation that contains source or special fissionable
material; or
(B) any existing or future heavy water production plant
with respect to which there is no obligation to accept IAEA
safeguards on any nuclear material produced by or used in
connection with any heavy water produced therefrom.

SEC. 114. UNITED STATES POLICY REGARDING THE PROVISION OF
NUCLEAR POWER REACTOR FUEL RESERVE TO INDIA.

It is the policy of the United States that any nuclear
power reactor fuel reserve provided to the Government of
India for use in safeguarded civilian nuclear facilities
should be commensurate with reasonable reactor operating
requirements.

SEC. 115. UNITED STATES-INDIA SCIENTIFIC COOPERATIVE THREAT
REDUCTION PROGRAM.

(a) Establishment.--The Secretary of Energy, acting through
the Administrator of the National Nuclear Security
Administration, shall establish a cooperative threat
reduction program to pursue jointly with scientists from the
United States and India a program to further common
nonproliferation goals, including scientific research and
development efforts related to nuclear nonproliferation, with
an emphasis on nuclear safeguards (in this section referred
to as the ``program'').
(b) Consultation.--The program shall be carried out in
consultation with the Secretary of State and the Secretary of
Defense.
(c) National Academies Recommendations.--
(1) In general.--The Secretary of Energy shall enter into
an agreement with the National

[[Page S11031]]

Academies to develop recommendations for the implementation
of the program.
(2) Recommendations.--The agreement entered into under
paragraph (1) shall provide for the preparation by qualified
individuals with relevant expertise and knowledge and the
communication to the Secretary of Energy each fiscal year
of--
(A) recommendations for research and related programs
designed to overcome existing technological barriers to
nuclear nonproliferation; and
(B) an assessment of whether activities and programs funded
under this section are achieving the goals of the activities
and programs.
(3) Public availability.--The recommendations and
assessments prepared under this subsection shall be made
publicly available.
(d) Consistency With Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.--All
United States activities related to the program shall be
consistent with United States obligations under the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty.
(e) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized
to be appropriated such sums as may be necessary to carry out
this section for each of fiscal years 2007 through 2011.

TITLE II--UNITED STATES ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL IMPLEMENTATION

SEC. 201. SHORT TITLE.

This title may be cited as the ``United States Additional
Protocol Implementation Act''.

SEC. 202. FINDINGS.

Congress makes the following findings--
(1) The proliferation of nuclear weapons and other nuclear
explosive devices poses a grave threat to the national
security of the United States and its vital national
interests.
(2) The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty has proven
critical to limiting such proliferation.
(3) For the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty to be
effective, each of the non-nuclear-weapon State Parties must
conclude a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the IAEA,
and such agreements must be honored and enforced.
(4) Recent events emphasize the urgency of strengthening
the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of the
safeguards system. This can best be accomplished by providing
IAEA inspectors with more information about, and broader
access to, nuclear activities within the territory of non-
nuclear-weapon State Parties.
(5) The proposed scope of such expanded information and
access has been negotiated by the member states of the IAEA
in the form of a Model Additional Protocol to its existing
safeguards agreements, and universal acceptance of Additional
Protocols by non-nuclear weapons states is essential to
enhancing the effectiveness of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty.
(6) On June 12, 1998, the United States, as a nuclear-
weapon State Party, signed an Additional Protocol that is
based on the Model Additional Protocol, but which also
contains measures, consistent with its existing safeguards
agreements with its members, that protect the right of the
United States to exclude the application of IAEA safeguards
to locations and activities with direct national security
significance or to locations or information associated with
such activities.
(7) Implementation of the Additional Protocol in the United
States in a manner consistent with United States obligations
under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty may encourage
other parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty,
especially non-nuclear-weapon State Parties, to conclude
Additional Protocols and thereby strengthen the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty safeguards system and help reduce the
threat of nuclear proliferation, which is of direct and
substantial benefit to the United States.
(8) Implementation of the Additional Protocol by the United
States is not required and is completely voluntary given its
status as a nuclear-weapon State Party, but the United States
has acceded to the Additional Protocol to demonstrate its
commitment to the nuclear non-proliferation regime and to
make United States civil nuclear activities available to the
same IAEA inspections as are applied in the case of non-
nuclear-weapon State Parties.
(9) In accordance with the national security exclusion
contained in Article 1.b of its Additional Protocol, the
United States will not allow any inspection activities, nor
make any declaration of any information with respect to,
locations, information, and activities of direct national
security significance to the United States.
(10) Implementation of the Additional Protocol will conform
to the principles set forth in the letter of April 30, 2002,
from the United States Permanent Representative to the
International Atomic Energy Agency and the Vienna Office of
the United Nations to the Director General of the
International Atomic Energy Agency.

SEC. 203. DEFINITIONS.

In this title:
(1) Additional protocol.--The term ``Additional Protocol'',
when used in the singular form, means the Protocol Additional
to the Agreement between the United States of America and the
International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of
Safeguards in the United States of America, with Annexes,
signed at Vienna June 12, 1998 (T. Doc. 107-7).
(2) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term
``appropriate congressional committees'' means the Committee
on Armed Services, the Committee on Foreign Relations, and
the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate and the
Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on International
Relations, and the Committee on Appropriations of the House
of Representatives.
(3) Complementary access.--The term ``complementary
access'' means the exercise of the IAEA's access rights as
set forth in Articles 4 to 6 of the Additional Protocol.
(4) Executive agency.--The term ``executive agency'' has
the meaning given such term in section 105 of title 5, United
States Code.
(5) Facility.--The term ``facility'' has the meaning set
forth in Article 18i. of the Additional Protocol.
(6) IAEA.--The term ``IAEA'' means the International Atomic
Energy Agency.
(7) Judge of the united states.--The term ``judge of the
United States'' means a United States district judge, or a
United States magistrate judge appointed under the authority
of chapter 43 of title 28, United States Code.
(8) Location.--The term ``location'' means any geographic
point or area declared or identified by the United States or
specified by the International Atomic Energy Agency.
(9) Nuclear non-proliferation treaty.--The term ``Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty'' means the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, done at Washington, London,
and Moscow July 1, 1968, and entered into force March 5, 1970
(21 UST 483).
(10) Nuclear-weapon state party and non-nuclear-weapon
state party.--The terms ``nuclear-weapon State Party'' and
``non-nuclear-weapon State Party'' have the meanings given
such terms in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
(11) Person.--The term ``person'', except as otherwise
provided, means any individual, corporation, partnership,
firm, association, trust, estate, public or private
institution, any State or any political subdivision thereof,
or any political entity within a State, any foreign
government or nation or any agency, instrumentality or
political subdivision of any such government or nation, or
other entity located in the United States.
(12) Site.--The term ``site'' has the meaning set forth in
Article 18b. of the Additional Protocol.
(13) United states.--The term ``United States'', when used
as a geographic reference, means the several States of the
United States, the District of Columbia, and the
commonwealths, territories, and possessions of the United
States and includes all places under the jurisdiction or
control of the United States, including--
(A) the territorial sea and the overlying airspace;
(B) any civil aircraft of the United States or public
aircraft, as such terms are defined in paragraphs (17) and
(41), respectively, of section 40102(a) of title 49, United
States Code; and
(C) any vessel of the United States, as such term is
defined in section 3(b) of the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement
Act (46 U.S.C. App. 1903(b)).
(14) Wide-area environmental sampling.--The term ``wide-
area environmental sampling'' has the meaning set forth in
Article 18g. of the Additional Protocol.

SEC. 204. SEVERABILITY.

If any provision of this title, or the application of such
provision to any person or circumstance, is held invalid, the
remainder of this title, or the application of such provision
to persons or circumstances other than those as to which it
is held invalid, shall not be affected thereby.

Subtitle A--General Provisions

SEC. 211. AUTHORITY.

(a) In General.--The President is authorized to implement
and carry out the provisions of this title and the Additional
Protocol and shall designate through Executive order which
executive agency or agencies of the United States, which may
include but are not limited to the Department of State, the
Department of Defense, the Department of Justice, the
Department of Commerce, the Department of Energy, and the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, shall issue or amend and
enforce regulations in order to implement this title and the
provisions of the Additional Protocol.
(b) Included Authority.--For any executive agency
designated under subsection (a) that does not currently
possess the authority to conduct site vulnerability
assessments and related activities, the authority provided in
subsection (a) includes such authority.
(c) Exception.--The authority described in subsection (b)
does not supersede or otherwise modify any existing authority
of any Federal department or agency already having such
authority.

Subtitle B--Complementary Access

SEC. 221. REQUIREMENT FOR AUTHORITY TO CONDUCT COMPLEMENTARY
ACCESS.

(a) Prohibition.--No complementary access to any location
in the United States shall take place pursuant to the
Additional Protocol without the authorization of the United
States Government in accordance with the requirements of this
title.
(b) Authority.--
(1) In general.--Complementary access to any location in
the United States subject to access under the Additional
Protocol is authorized in accordance with this title.
(2) United states representatives.--
(A) Restrictions.--In the event of complementary access to
a privately owned or operated location, no employee of the
Environmental Protection Agency or of the Mine Safety and
Health Administration or the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration of the Department of Labor may participate in
the access.
(B) Number.--The number of designated United States
representatives accompanying IAEA inspectors shall be kept to
the minimum necessary.

SEC. 222. PROCEDURES FOR COMPLEMENTARY ACCESS.

(a) In General.--Each instance of complementary access to a
location in the United States under the Additional Protocol
shall be conducted in accordance with this subtitle.
(b) Notice.--

[[Page S11032]]

(1) In general.--Complementary access referred to in
subsection (a) may occur only upon the issuance of an actual
written notice by the United States Government to the owner,
operator, occupant, or agent in charge of the location to be
subject to complementary access.
(2) Time of notification.--The notice under paragraph (1)
shall be submitted to such owner, operator, occupant, or
agent as soon as possible after the United States Government
has received notification that the IAEA seeks complementary
access. Notices may be posted prominently at the location if
the United States Government is unable to provide actual
written notice to such owner, operator, occupant, or agent.
(3) Content of notice.--
(A) In general.--The notice required by paragraph (1) shall
specify--
(i) the purpose for the complementary access;
(ii) the basis for the selection of the facility, site, or
other location for the complementary access sought;
(iii) the activities that will be carried out during the
complementary access;
(iv) the time and date that the complementary access is
expected to begin, and the anticipated period covered by the
complementary access; and
(v) the names and titles of the inspectors.
(4) Separate notices required.--A separate notice shall be
provided each time that complementary access is sought by the
IAEA.
(c) Credentials.--The complementary access team of the IAEA
and representatives or designees of the United States
Government shall display appropriate identifying credentials
to the owner, operator, occupant, or agent in charge of the
location before gaining entry in connection with
complementary access.
(d) Scope.--
(1) In general.--Except as provided in a warrant issued
under section 223, and subject to the United States
Government's rights under the Additional Protocol to limit
complementary access, complementary access to a location
pursuant to this title may extend to all activities
specifically permitted for such locations under Article 6 of
the Additional Protocol.
(2) Exception.--Unless required by the Additional Protocol,
no inspection under this title shall extend to--
(A) financial data (other than production data);
(B) sales and marketing data (other than shipment data);
(C) pricing data;
(D) personnel data;
(E) patent data;
(F) data maintained for compliance with environmental or
occupational health and safety regulations; or
(G) research data.
(e) Environment, Health, Safety, and Security.--In carrying
out their activities, members of the IAEA complementary
access team and representatives or designees of the United
States Government shall observe applicable environmental,
health, safety, and security regulations established at the
location subject to complementary access, including those for
protection of controlled environments within a facility and
for personal safety.

SEC. 223. CONSENTS, WARRANTS, AND COMPLEMENTARY ACCESS.

(a) In General.--
(1) Procedure.--
(A) Consent.--Except as provided in paragraph (2), an
appropriate official of the United States Government shall
seek or have the consent of the owner, operator, occupant, or
agent in charge of a location prior to entering that location
in connection with complementary access pursuant to sections
221 and 222. The owner, operator, occupant, or agent in
charge of the location may withhold consent for any reason or
no reason.
(B) Administrative search warrant.--In the absence of
consent, the United States Government may seek an
administrative search warrant from a judge of the United
States under subsection (b). Proceedings regarding the
issuance of an administrative search warrant shall be
conducted ex parte, unless otherwise requested by the United
States Government.
(2) Expedited access.--For purposes of obtaining access to
a location pursuant to Article 4b.(ii) of the Additional
Protocol in order to satisfy United States obligations under
the Additional Protocol when notice of two hours or less is
required, the United States Government may gain entry to such
location in connection with complementary access, to the
extent such access is consistent with the Fourth Amendment to
the United States Constitution, without obtaining either a
warrant or consent.
(b) Administrative Search Warrants for Complementary
Access.--
(1) Obtaining administrative search warrants.--For
complementary access conducted in the United States pursuant
to the Additional Protocol, and for which the acquisition of
a warrant is required, the United States Government shall
first obtain an administrative search warrant from a judge of
the United States. The United States Government shall provide
to such judge all appropriate information regarding the basis
for the selection of the facility, site, or other location to
which complementary access is sought.
(2) Content of affidavits for administrative search
warrants.--A judge of the United States shall promptly issue
an administrative search warrant authorizing the requested
complementary access upon an affidavit submitted by the
United States Government--
(A) stating that the Additional Protocol is in force;
(B) stating that the designated facility, site, or other
location is subject to complementary access under the
Additional Protocol;
(C) stating that the purpose of the complementary access is
consistent with Article 4 of the Additional Protocol;
(D) stating that the requested complementary access is in
accordance with Article 4 of the Additional Protocol;
(E) containing assurances that the scope of the IAEA's
complementary access, as well as what it may collect, shall
be limited to the access provided for in Article 6 of the
Additional Protocol;
(F) listing the items, documents, and areas to be searched
and seized;
(G) stating the earliest commencement and the anticipated
duration of the complementary access period, as well as the
expected times of day during which such complementary access
will take place; and
(H) stating that the location to which entry in connection
with complementary access is sought was selected either--
(i) because there is probable cause, on the basis of
specific evidence, to believe that information required to be
reported regarding a location pursuant to regulations
promulgated under this title is incorrect or incomplete, and
that the location to be accessed contains evidence regarding
that violation; or
(ii) pursuant to a reasonable general administrative plan
based upon specific neutral criteria.
(3) Content of warrants.--A warrant issued under paragraph
(2) shall specify the same matters required of an affidavit
under that paragraph. In addition, each warrant shall contain
the identities of the representatives of the IAEA on the
complementary access team and the identities of the
representatives or designees of the United States Government
required to display identifying credentials under section
222(c).

SEC. 224. PROHIBITED ACTS RELATING TO COMPLEMENTARY ACCESS.

It shall be unlawful for any person willfully to fail or
refuse to permit, or to disrupt, delay, or otherwise impede,
a complementary access authorized by this subtitle or an
entry in connection with such access.

Subtitle C--Confidentiality of Information

SEC. 231. PROTECTION OF CONFIDENTIALITY OF INFORMATION.

Information reported to, or otherwise acquired by, the
United States Government under this title or under the
Additional Protocol shall be exempt from disclosure under
sections 552 of title 5, United States Code.

Subtitle D--Enforcement

SEC. 241. RECORDKEEPING VIOLATIONS.

It shall be unlawful for any person willfully to fail or
refuse--
(1) to establish or maintain any record required by any
regulation prescribed under this title;
(2) to submit any report, notice, or other information to
the United States Government in accordance with any
regulation prescribed under this title; or
(3) to permit access to or copying of any record by the
United States Government in accordance with any regulation
prescribed under this title.

SEC. 242. PENALTIES.

(a) Civil.--
(1) Penalty amounts.--Any person that is determined, in
accordance with paragraph (2), to have violated section 224
or section 241 shall be required by order to pay a civil
penalty in an amount not to exceed $25,000 for each
violation. For the purposes of this paragraph, each day
during which a violation of section 224 continues shall
constitute a separate violation of that section.
(2) Notice and hearing.--
(A) In general.--Before imposing a penalty against a person
under paragraph (1), the head of an executive agency
designated under section 211(a) shall provide the person with
notice of the order. If, within 15 days after receiving the
notice, the person requests a hearing, the head of the
designated executive agency shall initiate a hearing on the
violation.
(B) Conduct of hearing.--Any hearing so requested shall be
conducted before an administrative judge. The hearing shall
be conducted in accordance with the requirements of section
554 of title 5, United States Code. If no hearing is so
requested, the order imposed by the head of the designated
agency shall constitute a final agency action.
(C) Issuance of orders.--If the administrative judge
determines, upon the preponderance of the evidence received,
that a person named in the complaint has violated section 224
or section 241, the administrative judge shall state his
findings of fact and conclusions of law, and issue and serve
on such person an order described in paragraph (1).
(D) Factors for determination of penalty amounts.--In
determining the amount of any civil penalty, the
administrative judge or the head of the designated agency
shall take into account the nature, circumstances, extent,
and gravity of the violation or violations and, with respect
to the violator, the ability to pay, effect on ability to
continue to do business, any history of such violations, the
degree of culpability, the existence of an internal
compliance program, and such other matters as justice may
require.
(E) Content of notice.--For the purposes of this paragraph,
notice shall be in writing and shall be verifiably served
upon the person or persons subject to an order described in
paragraph (1). In addition, the notice shall--
(i) set forth the time, date, and specific nature of the
alleged violation or violations; and
(ii) specify the administrative and judicial remedies
available to the person or persons subject to the order,
including the availability of a hearing and subsequent
appeal.
(3) Administrative appellate review.--The decision and
order of an administrative judge shall be the recommended
decision and order and shall be referred to the head of the
designated executive agency for final decision and

[[Page S11033]]

order. If, within 60 days, the head of the designated
executive agency does not modify or vacate the decision and
order, it shall become a final agency action under this
subsection.
(4) Judicial review.--A person adversely affected by a
final order may, within 30 days after the date the final
order is issued, file a petition in the Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit or in the Court of Appeals
for the district in which the violation occurred.
(5) Enforcement of final orders.--
(A) In general.--If a person fails to comply with a final
order issued against such person under this subsection and--
(i) the person has not filed a petition for judicial review
of the order in accordance with paragraph (4), or
(ii) a court in an action brought under paragraph (4) has
entered a final judgment in favor of the designated executive
agency,
the head of the designated executive agency shall commence a
civil action to seek compliance with the final order in any
appropriate district court of the United States.
(B) No review.--In any such civil action, the validity and
appropriateness of the final order shall not be subject to
review.
(C) Interest.--Payment of penalties assessed in a final
order under this section shall include interest at currently
prevailing rates calculated from the date of expiration of
the 60-day period referred to in paragraph (3) or the date of
such final order, as the case may be.
(b) Criminal.--Any person who violates section 224 or
section 241 may, in addition to or in lieu of any civil
penalty which may be imposed under subsection (a) for such
violation, be fined under title 18, United States Code,
imprisoned for not more than five years, or both.

SEC. 243. SPECIFIC ENFORCEMENT.

(a) Jurisdiction.--The district courts of the United States
shall have jurisdiction over civil actions brought by the
head of an executive agency designated under section 211(a)--
(1) to restrain any conduct in violation of section 224 or
section 241; or
(2) to compel the taking of any action required by or under
this title or the Additional Protocol.
(b) Civil Actions.--
(1) In general.--A civil action described in subsection (a)
may be brought--
(A) in the case of a civil action described in paragraph
(1) of such subsection, in the United States district court
for the judicial district in which any act, omission, or
transaction constituting a violation of section 224 or
section 241 occurred or in which the defendant is found or
transacts business; or
(B) in the case of a civil action described in paragraph
(2) of such subsection, in the United States district court
for the judicial district in which the defendant is found or
transacts business.
(2) Service of process.--In any such civil action, process
shall be served on a defendant wherever the defendant may
reside or may be found.

Subtitle E--Environmental Sampling

SEC. 251. NOTIFICATION TO CONGRESS OF IAEA BOARD APPROVAL OF
WIDE-AREA ENVIRONMENTAL SAMPLING.

(a) In General.--Not later than 30 days after the date on
which the Board of Governors of the IAEA approves wide-area
environmental sampling for use as a safeguards verification
tool, the President shall notify the appropriate
congressional committees.
(b) Content.--The notification under subsection (a) shall
contain--
(1) a description of the specific methods and sampling
techniques approved by the Board of Governors that are to be
employed for purposes of wide-area sampling;
(2) a statement as to whether or not such sampling may be
conducted in the United States under the Additional Protocol;
and
(3) an assessment of the ability of the approved methods
and sampling techniques to detect, identify, and determine
the conduct, type, and nature of nuclear activities.

SEC. 252. APPLICATION OF NATIONAL SECURITY EXCLUSION TO WIDE-
AREA ENVIRONMENTAL SAMPLING.

In accordance with Article 1(b) of the Additional Protocol,
the United States shall not permit any wide-area
environmental sampling proposed by the IAEA to be conducted
at a specified location in the United States under Article 9
of the Additional Protocol unless the President has
determined and reported to the appropriate congressional
committees with respect to that proposed use of environmental
sampling that--
(1) the proposed use of wide-area environmental sampling is
necessary to increase the capability of the IAEA to detect
undeclared nuclear activities in the territory of a non-
nuclear-weapon State Party;
(2) the proposed use of wide-area environmental sampling
will not result in access by the IAEA to locations,
activities, or information of direct national security
significance; and
(3) the United States--
(A) has been provided sufficient opportunity for
consultation with the IAEA if the IAEA has requested
complementary access involving wide-area environmental
sampling; or
(B) has requested under Article 8 of the Additional
Protocol that the IAEA engage in complementary access in the
United States that involves the use of wide-area
environmental sampling.

SEC. 253. APPLICATION OF NATIONAL SECURITY EXCLUSION TO
LOCATION-SPECIFIC ENVIRONMENTAL SAMPLING.

In accordance with Article 1(b) of the Additional Protocol,
the United States shall not permit any location-specific
environmental sampling in the United States under Article 5
of the Additional Protocol unless the President has
determined and reported to the appropriate congressional
committees with respect to that proposed use of environmental
sampling that--
(1) the proposed use of location-specific environmental
sampling is necessary to increase the capability of the IAEA
to detect undeclared nuclear activities in a non-nuclear
weapons state;
(2) the proposed use of location-specific environmental
sampling will not result in access by the IAEA to locations,
activities, or information of direct national security
significance; and
(3) with respect to the proposed use of environmental
sampling, the United States--
(A) has been provided sufficient opportunity for
consultation with the IAEA if the IAEA has requested
complementary access involving location-specific
environmental sampling; or
(B) has requested under Article 8 of the Additional
Protocol that the IAEA engage in complementary access in the
United States that involves the use of location-specific
environmental sampling.

SEC. 254. RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.

As used in this subtitle, the term ``necessary to increase
the capability of the IAEA to detect undeclared nuclear
activities in the territory of a non-nuclear-weapon State
Party'' shall not be construed to encompass proposed uses of
environmental sampling that might assist the IAEA in
detecting undeclared nuclear activities in the territory of a
non-nuclear-weapon State Party by--
(1) setting a good example of cooperation in the conduct of
such sampling; or
(2) facilitating the formation of a political consensus or
political support for such sampling in the territory of a
non-nuclear-weapon State Party.

Subtitle F--Protection of National Security Information and Activities

SEC. 261. PROTECTION OF CERTAIN INFORMATION.

(a) Locations and Facilities of Direct National Security
Significance.--No current or former Department of Defense or
Department of Energy location, site, or facility of direct
national security significance shall be declared or be
subject to IAEA inspection under the Additional Protocol.
(b) Information of Direct National Security Significance.--
No information of direct national security significance
regarding any location, site, or facility associated with
activities of the Department of Defense or the Department of
Energy shall be provided under the Additional Protocol.
(c) Restricted Data.--Nothing in this title shall be
construed to permit the communication or disclosure to the
IAEA or IAEA employees of restricted data controlled by the
provisions of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2011
et seq.), including in particular ``Restricted Data'' as
defined under paragraph (1) of section 11 y. of such Act (42
U.S.C. 2014(y)).
(d) Classified Information.--Nothing in this Act shall be
construed to permit the communication or disclosure to the
IAEA or IAEA employees of national security information and
other classified information.

SEC. 262. IAEA INSPECTIONS AND VISITS.

(a) Certain Individuals Prohibited From Obtaining Access.--
No national of a country designated by the Secretary of State
under section 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22
U.S.C. 2371) as a government supporting acts of international
terrorism shall be permitted access to the United States to
carry out an inspection activity under the Additional
Protocol or a related safeguards agreement.
(b) Presence of United States Government Personnel.--IAEA
inspectors shall be accompanied at all times by United States
Government personnel when inspecting sites, locations,
facilities, or activities in the United States under the
Additional Protocol.
(c) Vulnerability and Related Assessments.--The President
shall conduct vulnerability, counterintelligence, and related
assessments not less than every 5 years to ensure that
information of direct national security significance remains
protected at all sites, locations, facilities, and activities
in the United States that are subject to IAEA inspection
under the Additional Protocol.

Subtitle G--Reports

SEC. 271. REPORT ON INITIAL UNITED STATES DECLARATION.

Not later than 60 days before submitting the initial United
States declaration to the IAEA under the Additional Protocol,
the President shall submit to Congress a list of the sites,
locations, facilities, and activities in the United States
that the President intends to declare to the IAEA.

SEC. 272. REPORT ON REVISIONS TO INITIAL UNITED STATES
DECLARATION.

Not later than 60 days before submitting to the IAEA any
revisions to the United States declaration submitted under
the Additional Protocol, the President shall submit to
Congress a list of any sites, locations, facilities, or
activities in the United States that the President intends to
add to or remove from the declaration.

SEC. 273. CERTIFICATION REGARDING VULNERABILITY AND RELATED
ASSESSMENTS.

Concurrently with the submission to Congress of the initial
declaration list under section 271 and each list update under
section 272, the President shall submit to Congress a report
certifying that--
(1) each site, location, facility, and activity included in
the list has been examined by each agency with national
security equities with respect to such site, location,
facility, or activity; and
(2) appropriate measures have been taken to ensure that
information of direct national security significance will not
be compromised at any such site, location, facility, or
activity in connection with an IAEA inspection.

[[Page S11034]]

SEC. 274. REPORT ON EFFORTS TO PROMOTE THE IMPLEMENTATION OF
ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS.

Not later than 180 days after the entry into force of the
Additional Protocol, the President shall submit to the
appropriate congressional committees a report on--
(1) measures that have been or should be taken to achieve
the adoption of additional protocols to existing safeguards
agreements signed by non-nuclear-weapon State Parties; and
(2) assistance provided by the United States to the IAEA in
order to promote the effective implementation of additional
protocols to existing safeguards agreements signed by non-
nuclear-weapon State Parties and the verification of the
compliance of such parties with IAEA obligations.

SEC. 275. NOTICE OF IAEA NOTIFICATIONS.

The President shall notify Congress of any notifications
issued by the IAEA to the United States under Article 10 of
the Additional Protocol.

Subtitle H--Authorization of Appropriations

SEC. 281. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

There are authorized to be appropriated such sums as may be
necessary to carry out this title.
Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote, and I move
to lay that motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senate insists
on its amendment and requests a conference with the House, and the
Chair is authorized to appoint conferees. S. 3709 is returned to the
calendar.
Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, the Senate has taken a historic step in
approving the United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation
Act. This is critically important. Passage of the bill takes one more
important step toward a vibrant and exciting relationship between our
two great democracies. I thank all Senators for their cooperation in
completing the Senate's consideration in such a short period of time. I
thank especially Senator Biden for his strong support and cooperation.
This has been truly a bipartisan effort from the beginning until final
passage. We are committed to continuing this effort through the
conference process.
Before yielding the floor, let me publicly thank Tom Moore of the
majority staff and Ed Levine of the minority staff. They have become
experts on the United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy and
Cooperation Act. They have assisted the committee professionally and
skillfully in helping craft the bill.
I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. BROWNBACK. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order
for the quorum call be dispensed with.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. BROWNBACK. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to make some
brief comments congratulating the chairman and ranking member.
I think this is a big deal. I think it will be seen as a big deal. I
think it is an enormously positive step forward on our relationships.
I commend the chairman and ranking member and the leader for bringing
up this topic. I believe this is going to help us cement the
relationship back and forth with us and India. It is important that we
do this. It will help environmentally and help energy-wise but, more
importantly, I believe it will be a very important strategic
relationship. This is a key movement forward. I hope we can move it
forward through the conference committee. I hope we can get it to the
President in short order and show India and the rest of the world this
budding, growing, strengthening relationship back and forth.
I commend Chairman Lugar for such insightful and supportive
leadership on such an important topic.
I suggest the absence of quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. CHAMBLISS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order
for the quorum call be dispensed with.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. CHAMBLISS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to speak as if
in morning business.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

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