[Congressional Record Volume 152, Number 125 (Friday, September 29, 2006)]
[Senate]
[Pages S10810-S10817]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
SECURITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY FOR EVERY PORT ACT--CONFERENCE REPORT
The PRESIDING OFFICER. If the majority leader will suspend, under the
previous order, the Senate adopts the conference report to accompany
H.R. 4954, the port security bill.
Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, the passage of this port security
legislation marks the first time three Senate committees and their
House counterparts have merged their collective expertise and crafted a
truly comprehensive approach to port security. A bipartisan group of
Members from both Chambers of Congress dedicated several months to
developing this bill to better secure America. It is a credit to the
Senate and the House that each committee involved agreed to pool their
resources, put aside jurisdictional issues, and reach consensus on this
bill.
This act strengthens security at our land and sea ports, improves our
maritime transportation security strategy, and enhances communication
between the Department of Homeland Security and transportation security
stakeholders. It includes a plan to get our trade activities up and
running again in the event of a transportation security incident. And
it creates a pilot program which will study the feasibility of scanning
each of the containers--100 percent of the containers--entering our
ports.
This legislation will enhance the collection and analysis of
information about cargo destined for our ports, and this bill aims to
increase awareness of the operations at domestic and foreign ports.
Once those in industry share important information about cargo in the
international supply chain, we must analyze it quickly. This
legislation expedites that process and ensures it begins earlier in the
supply chain--before containers even reach our shores. This act
requires information about cargo be provided and analyzed before the
cargo is loaded on a vessel in a foreign port and shipped here.
This bill also expands several initiatives with a proven track record
of success. There are currently five interagency operations centers up
and running throughout our country. These centers bring together
Federal, State, and local security enforcement officials to ensure
communication among them. This act expands this effort to each of the
major seaports, and places the Coast Guard in charge of these centers.
This act also builds upon the Department of Homeland Security's, DHS,
past cooperation with foreign governments. The container security
initiative, CSI, contained within this bill enables the Department,
working in partnership with host government customs services, to
examine high-risk containerized cargo at foreign seaports before it is
loaded on vessels destined for the United States.
The Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-T PAT), a
voluntary public-private partnership, is also strengthened in this
bill. The Commissioner of Customs and border protection will now be
able to certify that a business's supply chain is secure from the point
of manufacture to the product's final U.S. destination. Under this
legislation, whether cargo crosses our border at Laredo or arrives on a
ship from Hong Kong, participating companies' supply chains will
undergo a thorough security check. This will add another layer of
security to the C-T PAT initiative. Since this is a voluntary system,
we have also included provisions which encourage those in industry to
go above and beyond the security requirements already in place. These
new incentives include expedited clearance of cargo.
Mr. President, while I was disappointed earlier this year by the
negative public reaction to foreign investment in our Nation's port
terminals, we learned a great deal from hearings held by the Commerce
Committee on this matter. As a result of those hearings, this bill
requires DHS to conduct background checks on all port personnel.
Current law only requires the Transportation Security Administration to
perform checks on those workers directly tied to transportation at the
port, or involved in its security. From the Commerce Committee
hearings, it was evident that a more stringent requirement was needed.
To prevent future attacks, we must secure our ports. This bill is a
major step forward in this effort. Senator Inouye is my co-chairman on
the Commerce Committee, and I thank him and Senators Grassley, Baucus,
Coleman, Collins and Lieberman for their leadership in drafting this
bill, as well as the House committee leaders who were involved. I would
also like to thank the staff members on each of the committees--they
have worked tirelessly on this bill.
Our country's ports have become enormous operations. To fully address
security of our ports, it is important that we appreciate the impacts
security requirements might have on economic efficiencies in
transportation
[[Page S10811]]
and trade. We must strive to be a secure state without becoming a
security state.
Each of the Senate and House committees involved in this bill has
jurisdiction over an area vital to the safety of our ports. Working
together, our committees have developed a comprehensive bill which will
help shield our Nation from future terrorist attacks. It is my hope our
colleagues will support this act and move quickly to pass this bill.
Mr. REID. Mr. President, the days before a long recess are always a
hectic time as we scramble to complete our work. This conference took a
lot longer then it needed to take, and the events leading up to the
filing of this report represented an abuse of the process. The Senate
passed this bill 3 weeks ago, but the House waited until yesterday to
appoint conferees. The conferees conducted one perfunctory public
meeting last night where no bill language was provided, no amendments
allowed; and no votes taken in public. In fact, there seemed to be more
interest by the majority conferees in determining what additional
unrelated bills could be jammed into this conference overnight and not
on improving our homeland security.
These types of shenanigans really show a lack of respect for the
members of this institution and a disregard for the serious task at
hand.
I was encouraged when this bill passed the Senate 3 weeks ago.
Senators from both sides of the aisle worked together to pass a
transportation security bill for seaports, mass transit, freight rail,
and commercial aviation systems and actually extended expiring Customs
fees in an attempt to pay for some of the new port security
initiatives.
Three weeks later after negotiations with the House, all but the port
security initiatives were dropped at the insistence of the House
Republicans, despite overwhelming support in the Senate. The new
initiatives for the mass transit and freight rail system would have
fulfilled an important recommendation of the 9/11 Commission Report,
which recommended that the Federal Government address a much broader
range of transportation security issues in addition to those undertaken
in commercial aviation.
A Democratic amendment adopted in the Senate also would have provided
a source of funding to fund some of the new port initiatives in the
bill, given the fact that we are not adequately funding current port
security programs. This meager attempt to begin to fund these programs
was also dropped at the insistence of the House Republicans.
It has now been 5 years since the attack on the World Trade Center
and little has been done to make our transportation systems more secure
other then the obvious improvements in commercial aviation. There is no
urgency by this administration. One gets the feeling that they believe
these transportation security issues are really not a Federal
responsibility and instead should be funded by State and local
governments or the private sector. Homeland Security Secretary Chertoff
scoffed at the idea of spending money to protect Americans who use mass
transit, noting that a bomb in a subway car would kill only 30 people.
Other Republicans, including Assistant Secretary of Homeland Security
Henkey, have said that they think rail and transit security should be a
State and local or private responsibility.
Democrats believe Government cannot `pass the buck' on protecting
Americans from the threat of a deadly terrorist attack to the private
sector or to our already-squeezed State and local governments.
The U.S. mass transit industry has said it needs $5.2 billion in
capital expenditures from the Federal Government to protect American
citizens from deadly terrorist attacks. But, since 2003, the Federal
Government has only invested a total of roughly $400 million in transit
and rail security for the entire country, compared to $20 billion on
aviation security during that same period. President Bush's Fiscal Year
2007 budget completely eliminated rail and transit security grants and
intercity bus grants, which were funded at paltry amounts in 2006.
This is just another example of misplaced priorities. According to
the RAND Corporation, there are about 30 terrorist attacks on trains
and rail-related targets per year. Our close allies in Britian, Spain,
and India have been the victims of deadly terrorist attacks on rail and
transit targets in recent years. Yet Republicans stripped rail security
out of this bill so they could add unrelated provisions.
I am proud of the work of the Democratic caucus on this bill and on
earlier homeland security measures. It was a Democratically controlled
Senate that passed a landmark aviation security bill and a
comprehensive port security bill immediately after 9/11--over the
objections of the Republican-controlled House and the White House.
These bills acknowledged for the first time that securing our maritime
trade and our commercial air passenger system were national security
responsibilities of the Federal Government and should not be relegated
to contractors or the private sector. Similarly, Democrats have led the
way in developing and pushing security measures during this Congress
related to ports, freight rail, aviation and mass transit, and I am
proud of the work the caucus has done on this bill.
The port security provisions in here reflect a lot of hard work and
bipartisan effort, so are worthy of our support. But, I don't take a
lot of pride in giving the American people half a loaf when it comes to
security. I think all in all, this is another time that the Republican
majority has let the American people down. And I hope that the American
people are sick of half a loaf and will agree with me on the need for a
new direction.
Mr. INOUYE. Mr. President, just 2 weeks ago, the Senate considered
comprehensive legislation to address the transportation security needs
of this country. That bill was not written overnight. It was the
culmination of 2 years of bipartisan work within the Commerce
Committee, the Banking Committee, the Finance Committee, and the
Homeland Security Committee.
While we have had our jurisdictional debates during the past 2 years,
this week we somberly observed the fifth anniversary of the attacks of
September 11, 2001. We set aside those debates, and as a body, came
together and passed a comprehensive bill improving security for all
modes of transportation. The Senate passed that bill by a vote of 98 to
0, and we took a huge step toward making our Nation a safer place to
live, work, and travel.
I had hoped that today I would be telling my colleagues that the
House and Senate conferees had recognized they had the rare
opportunity, for the first time in 5 years, to address transportation
security in a comprehensive manner. I believed they would act in the
same manner as we had here in the Senate just 2 weeks ago and would
reach an agreement on the port security bill that truly reflects the
best of our institution.
Regrettably, that is not the case. Staff from the Senate and several
House Committees sat down the past 2 weeks and went through hundreds of
pages of text in what was suppose to be, and in fact, appeared to be a
bipartisan, bicameral process. They did a good job, and the port
security title reflects their hard work. However, several days ago,
House leadership stymied our efforts to provide a real transportation
security bill for America.
The House leadership effectively hijacked the work of the Senate and
refused to include or even discuss anything but the port security
provisions of the Senate's bill.
Despite this refusal, several of my colleagues came to last night's
meeting of the conferees prepared to offer and debate amendments to
restore the nonport related security provisions that had been included
in the Senate-passed bill. As I stated then, while the port security
provisions are sound and a big step in the right direction, we must
take a comprehensive approach to securing our transportation
infrastructure.
I was prepared to work into the evening on efforts to restore the
other provisions. My colleagues should be aware that we did not have
the text of the conference report when we met for the first, and what
has now become apparent, the only meeting. During the round of opening
statements on the conference report, the Chairman of the conference was
repeatedly asked when we would be able to offer amendments.
[[Page S10812]]
In the end, the chairman indicated that we would reconvene in the
morning when we had the text of the bill. Because of the chairman's
assurances that we would meet again, and out of deference to the
chairman's wishes, several of my colleagues agreed to not offer their
amendments to restore the Senate provisions on rail and truck security.
Late last night, we were told there would be no more meetings of the
conferees, denying my colleagues the ability to have their amendments
debated and voted upon.
Last night's theater has ramifications for all of us today for three
reasons. First, we have allowed a rare opportunity to enact
comprehensive legislation that would improve the security of our
transportation infrastructure to pass us by.
Our colleagues who opposed the inclusion of the other transportation
modes claim that this is a port security bill only. The fact is, other
modes of transportation are just as important and worthy of protection.
Like the port security provisions, the rail, truck, and transit
provisions reflect several years of committee hearings and full Senate
action.
To pretend these provisions were written overnight is a disservice to
the expert staff that have worked on these issues for years. It is also
a disservice to our constituents who depend upon these modes of
transportation for their livelihoods.
The American public deserves better from us. We have waited 5 years
for this opportunity and have been fortunate that attacks like those in
London and Madrid have not occurred here in the United States. We
should act now to prevent an attack rather than waiting until a tragedy
occurs.
Second, if we are to succeed as a democratic and open institution,
our ability to work together and rely on the assurances of our
colleagues is critical. My colleagues, particularly Senator Lautenberg,
who has worked diligently on behalf of his constituents who rely on
rail and transit and is an expert in the area of rail safety, deserve
to be heard and be able to offer amendments.
To assure him the opportunity but deny him the reality is a
disservice to the institution and to the millions of people who rely
upon the rail and transit systems each day.
Third, it has come to my attention that the leadership has decided to
include in the conference report provisions that are outside the scope
of transportation security issues. These are provisions that our
friends on the Armed Services conference refused to allow on their
bill, and our friends on the Department of Homeland Security
appropriations conference refused to allow on their bill.
It does not bode well for the American public that with the stroke of
one pen we jettison fully vetted rail, truck, and transit security
provisions that would have provided enhanced security for the American
public. Yet with the stroke of another pen, we add provisions that are
not related to security nor fully debated by the Senate and House as a
whole.
Ultimately, the action of the last few days reflects a lack of
leadership and a lack of vision about our responsibilities to the
American people. As a result, what we have before this body today does
so much less than what is possible and prudent to secure the Nation, as
well as ignoring the will of both bodies. More importantly, it neglects
the real needs of our transportation security.
We have missed a rare opportunity to make our transportation
infrastructure more secure. We have missed a rare opportunity to follow
through with the promises we made on the Senate floor just 14 days ago.
Mr. GRASSLEY. Mr. President, I rise in support of the conference
report to accompany H.R. 4954, the SAFE Port Act. This legislation
achieves some important objectives that I have been working on for some
time.
It will strengthen our port security operations and resources within
the United States Customs and Border Protection.
It authorizes and approves current programs for securing our Nation's
trade, and it provides direction for further strengthening of these
programs as technological advances permit.
It requires our Federal agencies to cooperate and better coordinate
their contingency planning in the event there is a security breach. In
sum, this critical legislation will empower personnel in the Department
of Homeland Security to stay one step ahead of the terrorists who seek
to wreak economic havoc and physical destruction on our Nation.
At the same time, this legislation strengthens our Nation's economic
security by realigning resources to ensure better efficiency in the
administration of customs laws within the United States Customs and
Border Protection, as well as trade facilitation functions within the
agency and elsewhere in the Department of Homeland Security.
Unfortunately, this legislation falls short in one critical area. The
Senate-passed bill included robust sections on rail and mass transit
security. But objections from the House have prevented us from
including those provisions in the conference report.
I find this extremely shortsighted. It demonstrates a troubling lack
of leadership. I want to make clear that I strongly supported the
Senate-passed provisions on rail and mass transit security, and I
strongly oppose their omission from this conference report.
But because this legislation contains so many provisions critical to
the security of our Nation, I will support the conference report. It is
certainly better than the alternative. I hope my colleagues on the
House side realize that we have lost an opportunity here. At a minimum,
it would take another several months for us to be in a position to
enact rail and mass transit security legislation into law. In the
meantime, this important aspect of our Nation's security will not get
the rightful attention that it needs.
That being said, this legislation does significantly strengthen our
Nation's security. I want to thank my colleagues, particularly the
chairmen and ranking members of the Commerce and Homeland Security
Committees in the Senate, as well as the chairman of the Permanent
Subcommittee on Investigations of the Homeland Security Committee,
Senator Coleman, for their constructive engagement with me and Senator
Baucus these past few months. Together we produced a very good bill,
much of which is retained in this conference report. I urge its support
so that we can get this critical legislation to the President's desk as
soon as possible.
Mr. BAUCUS. Mr. President, I have mixed emotions about the SAFE Ports
Act we pass today.
On the one hand, I am deeply disappointed that the bill that does not
include the essential rail and transit security measures passed by the
Senate last month. I strongly disagree with the decision to drop these
provisions from the conference report. The rail and transit tragedies
we have witnessed in London, Madrid, and Mumbai should be evidence
enough that we should not have passed up this chance to shore up our
defenses.
On the other hand, I am pleased that our hard work on land and
seaport security has come to fruition. Working together, we have
produced a bill that strengthens the security of our ports while
ensuring the proper flow of trade on which all of our Nation's ports
and our Nation's economy depends.
The easiest way to secure our ports would have been to simply pass a
bill that mandated fences around our ports and required opening every
container coming across our borders. But these measures would bring the
flow of port traffic to a grinding halt and cripple our Nation's
economy. It is essential that we strike the right balance on port
security. I am pleased that this legislation does so.
This bill contains important provisions to screen workers coming
through or working at the ports, establishes standards for container
security devices, authorizes $400 million in port security grants
annually, and requires a pilot program at three foreign ports to employ
integrated container scanning technology on 100 percent of containers
bound for the United States.
The bill also directs the Commissioner of Customs to hire 1,000 more
armed Customs and Border Protection officers for land and sea ports
around the country. I have heard from ports big and small that they are
woefully undermanned. In fact, in Montana, the port of Roosville
finally received state-of-the-art container scanning equipment, but we
didn't get the personnel
[[Page S10813]]
to run it, so it sits unused. This bill would ensure that every service
port in the country, and the smaller ports in their area, won't be
overlooked by Customs and Border Protection headquarters in Washington.
The SAFE Ports Act also authorizes the Commissioner of Customs to
nearly double the number of Customs and Border Protection specialists
dedicated to validating the supply chains of participants in the
Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism program. The quicker this
program can process participants, the safer, and more prosperous, our
Nation will be.
This bill also contains a provision I wrote to direct U.S. Customs
and Border to begin targeting methamphetamine and its associated
precursor chemicals crossing our borders at ports or through the
international mail, and share its findings with various border and drug
enforcement agencies.
I also saw a need to ensure the Customs and Border Protection
Northern Border Airwing Branch based in Great Falls, Montana, will have
support facilities needed to cover the 500-mile long border with
Canada. Customs and Border Protection officials have proposed to expand
the branch by adding facilities in Kalispell, Havre and Glasgow. A
provision I authored in this bill gives them the ability to move
forward with that plan. Including this provision was important to me,
to ensure that Montana's border enforcement personnel have the backup
they need to get the job done.
All of these provisions I have mentioned are key to enhancing
physical security at our ports and along our borders. But it was
important that we do more than that.
When Congress passed the Homeland Security Act of 2002, we strictly
prohibited any diminution in the trade functions or personnel committed
to trade functions at the Department of Homeland Security. Yet for 3
years, the Department has not complied with the law. Trade resources
have decreased by as much as 15 percent within both Customs and Border
Protection and Immigration and Customs Enforcement. I fought hard to
ensure that this bill requires the Commissioner of Customs to restore a
proper focus on the traditional trade mission of his agency.
So this act further ensures the Commissioner's commitment to Customs'
trade mission by creating an Office of International Trade, headed by
an Assistant Commissioner, who will be responsible for coordinating
policy for all personnel dedicated to the agency's trade functions. The
Commissioner will also now be assisted in trade policy oversight and
operations by an International Trade Committee, comprised of the
Assistant Commissioners of International Trade, Finance, Field
Operations, International Affairs, and the Director of Trade Relations.
Finally, we have also included a mandate for all U.S. agencies involved
in the clearance of imports or exports to use a single-portal data
collection system to streamline the clearance process. I look forward
to seeing how all of these measures will improve the overall trade
mission of U.S. Customs and Border Protection.
While far from being the comprehensive transportation security
legislation I had hoped the House would support, the bill before us is
a positive step forward. I believe we have struck a good balance
between security and trade. I thank my friend Senator Grassley, the
Chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, for working with me so
closely on this, as in so many things. And I want to thank my
colleagues for working so hard with Senator Grassley and I to find the
appropriate balance in this bill. It was a long, difficult journey, but
we arrived there together in the end.
Thanks and congratulations to Chairman Stevens and Ranking Member
Inouye of the Commerce Committee, Chairman Collins and Ranking Member
Lieberman of the Homeland Security and Government Affairs Committee,
Chairman Shelby and Ranking Member Sarbanes of the Banking Committee,
and of course, my good friends, Senator Murray and Senator Coleman.
I also would like to recognize all of the hard-working staff who made
the port security legislation before us today possible.
On my Finance Committee staff, I credit the tenacity and hard work of
Anya Landau French, International Trade Adviser. Anya dedicated long
hours to the Customs Reauthorization and Trade Facilitation Act of
2006, which served as the basis for many of the provisions in this Act.
Brian Pomper, Chief International Trade Counsel; Bill Dauster, Chief
Counsel and Deputy Democratic Staff Director; and Russ Sullivan, Staff
Director, were all indispensable to this effort.
I would be remiss if I did not also recognize the tireless efforts of
Senator Grassley's talented, hardworking Finance Committee staff, who
worked so closely and so well with my own staff. Tiffany McCullen
Atwell and Stephen Schaefer put in long hours, and Kolan Davis, Staff
Director, provided excellent guidance.
I also want to thank the many other dedicated staff of the Commerce
Committee and the Homeland Security and Government Affairs Committee,
in particular, Dabney Hegg, Sam Whitehorn, Stephen Gardner, Gael
Sullivan, Channon Hanna, Lisa Sutherland, Ken Nahigian, David
Wonnenberg, Mark Delich, Jason Yanussi, Michael Alexander, Rob Strayer,
Mark Winter, and Ray Shepard. This bill is a result of teamwork and
commitment at its best.
May the work we have all done keep us safe and strong.
Mr. SARBANES. Mr. President, the conference report on H.R. 4954 takes
important steps toward improving security at our Nation's seaports. It
provides much needed funding to upgrade security at our ports, which
are considered to be among our most vulnerable assets. Today, less than
6 percent of the 11 million containers that come through our seaports
are inspected. While we have made significant investments in upgrading
airport security, the administration's budgets continue to shortchange
the funding necessary to ensure that the containerized cargo that comes
into our country is safe. This legislation takes an important step
toward addressing that shortfall.
While the need for action in the area of port security is clearly
evident, we must not forget the other parts of our Nation's multimodal
transportation network, at which the need is equally great. The
legislation passed by the Senate included provisions aimed at
addressing threats to public transit, rail, and intercity buses, among
others. The Senate took a responsible, comprehensive approach toward
securing our Nation's infrastructure. However, the conference report
before us does not include those titles. While I support the effort to
improve security at our ports, I cannot justify ignoring the needs of
these other modes of transportation and continuing to leave Americans
at risk.
Moreover, the process by which the decision was made to jettison
these critical provisions was sorely lacking in transparency and
accountability. The conference committee held only a single public
meeting, and conferees were not permitted to offer any amendments to
the conference report. When the conference committee met, for the first
and only time in a public venue, I observed that this conference
presented us with a unique opportunity to address the pressing security
needs of our transit systems and to protect the millions of Americans
who ride transit every day. I expressed my view that failure to take
advantage of this opportunity would be tragic. Unfortunately, this
conference report adopts the House position on transit and rail
security--which is that our Nation's transit and rail riders will have
to wait for another day to see a meaningful Federal commitment to their
safety.
I want to focus my remaining remarks on public transportation, which
is within the jurisdiction of the Committee on Banking, Housing, and
Urban Affairs, on which I am the ranking member. The transit provisions
in the Senate bill were based on legislation that passed the Senate
unanimously in the 108th Congress, and passed again this Congress in
the context of this legislation, again unanimously. The Senate bill
would have provided grants to our Nation's transit systems to help
protect the millions of riders who use subway trains, commuter rail,
and buses every single day.
If there is any question as to whether transit is at risk, one need
only look at recent events. This summer, seven coordinated bomb blasts
devastated commuter rail trains in Mumbai, India, leaving over 200
people dead and 700 injured. Last year, the London subway
[[Page S10814]]
system was the target of a tragic attack that left 52 people dead, and
in 2004, almost 200 people were killed when bombs exploded on commuter
rail trains in Madrid.
In the United States this past May, the Department of Homeland
Security issued a specific warning to transit systems to remain alert
against possible terrorist attacks. The warning said that four people
had been arrested over several months in separate incidents involving
videotaping of European subway stations and trains or similar activity,
which, the Department went on to say, provides ``indications of
continued terrorist interest in mass transit systems as targets.''
The threat to transit is clear. In response, both the Federal Transit
Administration and the Department of Homeland Security have worked with
transit systems to identify steps that can be taken to help prevent and
mitigate attacks. In fact, the greatest challenge to securing our
Nation's transit systems is not a lack of knowledge of what to do, but
rather lack of resources with which to do it. In the words of the
Government Accountability Office: ``Obtaining sufficient funding is the
most significant challenge in making transit systems as safe and secure
as possible.''
Despite the record of attacks against transit overseas and the
identified vulnerabilities here at home, the Federal Government's
response to the needs of America's transit systems--which provide 32
million trips every weekday--has thus far been inadequate. In an
editorial published shortly after the London subway bombings, the
Baltimore Sun stated that, ``Since September 11, 2001, the Federal
Government has spent $18 billion on aviation security. Transit systems,
which carry 16 times more passengers daily, have received about $250
million. That is a ridiculous imbalance.''
To begin to address this issue, I worked closely with Chairman Shelby
and with Senator Reed of Rhode Island, who have been leaders on this
issue, on the Public Transportation Terrorism Prevention Act, which was
incorporated into the Senate version of H.R. 4954. The Senate bill
authorized $3.5 billion over 3 years in security grants for our
Nation's public transportation systems. That money would have been
available for projects designed to resist and deter terrorist attacks,
including surveillance technologies; tunnel protection; chemical,
biological, radiological, and explosive detection systems; perimeter
protection; employee training; and other security improvements.
Let me give one example of a critical need right here with respect to
Washington's Metro. Their greatest security need is a backup operations
control center. This need was identified by the Federal Transit
Administration in its initial security assessment and then identified
again by the Department of Homeland Security in its subsequent security
assessment. This critical need remains unaddressed because it has been
unfunded. The Senate bill would have authorized the funding to make
this and other urgently needed security upgrades at transit systems
around the country.
We know that transit systems are potential targets for terrorist
attacks. We know the vital role these systems play in our Nation's
economic and security infrastructure. We can wait no longer to address
the critical security needs of America's transit systems. The Senate
has passed transit security legislation unanimously in each of the last
two Congresses. By adopting the House of Representatives' do-nothing
position on transit in this conference report, we have lost a unique
opportunity to help protect the millions of Americans who use transit
every day.
Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, the Security and Accountability for
Every Port, or SAFE Port, Act marks a significant advancement for the
security of our ports, authorizing $400 million for critical port
security grant programs and enabling all ports--not merely a select
few--to become eligible to apply for that funding. These improvements
are desperately needed to help close one of our most dangerous security
vulnerabilities.
But when the Senate approved our version of this bill, it was a
broader, comprehensive transportation security bill. It was not limited
to the security of our ports but extended to several other modes of
transportation--namely, rail, transit, trucking, and pipelines. It
authorized over $4.5 billion for the security of mass transit systems,
freight railroads, and passenger rail.
Unfortunately, the Republican leadership, acting alone and without
participation from the appointed Democratic conferees, stripped those
provisions from the bill we are voting on tonight. I am deeply
disappointed that conferees were never given an opportunity to frankly
discuss and amend the conference report, even when Member after Member
asked for that opportunity.
This unilateral, partisan process also resulted in the eleventh hour
insertion of a bill that purportedly outlaws Internet gambling but
which may have unintended consequences. This issue clearly deserves
more deliberation, and it is unfortunate that such a measure has been
added to a critical bill designed to protect the Nation's ports,
legislation which this Congress must pass. I hope that the Senate will
return to this issue and give it the attention it deserves, in the
future.
On the issue which is what this bill is about, securing our homeland,
we had a golden opportunity to present the President with legislation
to enhance the security of our rail and transit systems. Fourteen
million people ride the rails every day in America, and Connecticut is
no different, where 110,000 people use the New Haven MTA line each day.
Improving security for rail and transit is an enormous concern and it
should have been addressed tonight, rather than in a future Congress.
It is unfortunate that the bill no longer contains most of the well-
advised Senate provisions which would have strengthened our open and
highly vulnerable rail and transit systems. While the rail and transit
provisions authorized a large sum of money, it is but a fraction of
what the experts say is needed to address rail and transit
vulnerabilities--vulnerabilities which have been exploited time and
again by terrorists in London, Madrid, and Mumbai. I regret that the
money was stripped out of the bill and that I was prevented from even
trying to reinstate it by offering an amendment in a conference that
was never formally completed.
Nevertheless, I am proud to be an original cosponsor of the port
security legislation at the heart of this conference report and to have
worked with my colleagues in the Senate and House to craft the port
security provisions we will be voting on shortly.
Let me thank Senators Collins, Murray, Coleman, Stevens, and Inouye
for their hard work not only in bringing a comprehensive, bipartisan
port security bill before the Senate but also for expertly guiding it
toward a 98 to 0 vote, and now through conference. I would also like to
tip my hat to Senators Grassley and Baucus of the Finance Committee for
their hard work as well.
Mr. President, 95 percent of our international trade flows through
our ports. Prior to 9/11, the main goal was to move these goods through
our ports efficiently. Since 9/11, we have come to realize we need to
bring security into that equation but without harming our economy which
depends on international trade.
It is a tricky--but imperative--balancing act.
The 9/11 Commission reported that ``major vulnerabilities still exist
in cargo [security]'' and that, since aviation security has been
significantly improved since 9/11, ``terrorists may turn their
attention to other modes. Opportunities to do harm are as great, or
greater, in maritime and surface transportation.''
Just last month, RAND's Center for Terrorism Risk Management Policy
published a report titled: ``Considering the Effects of a Catastrophic
Terrorist Attack'' that considered the effects of a nuclear weapon
smuggled in a shipping container sent to the Port of Long Beach and
detonated on a pier.
The potential short- and long-term effects truly are devastating. The
report estimated that up to 60,000 people might die instantly from the
blast or radiation poisoning, with 150,000 more exposed to hazardous
levels of radiation.
The blast and the fires could completely destroy both the Port of
Long Beach and the Port of Los Angeles and every ship in the port. As
many as 6
[[Page S10815]]
million people might have to be evacuated from the Los Angeles area and
another 2 to 3 million from the surrounding area might have to relocate
due to the fallout. Short-term costs could exceed $1 trillion.
Besides the damage to the United States, such an attack would cause
economic ripple effects across the globe.
The dangerous little secret of port security--and why we need this
bill--is that we still have very little idea about the contents of
thousands of containers that are shipped into and across the heart of
this Nation every day. Just 5 or 6 percent of those containers are
physically inspected.
While Senator Collins and I began working on port security
legislation in late 2004, the truth is port security received a major
shot of adrenaline after the Dubai Ports World controversy earlier this
year.
Looking back on it, perhaps we should be thankful for that uproar,
since it raised the collective consciousness of the American people and
Members of Congress to the vulnerabilities that we face at our ports.
Following that skirmish, the Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs Committee marked up the GreenLane bill, and later, Senator
Collins and I started working with the Senate Commerce and Finance
Committees, as well as our House colleagues to craft the comprehensive
legislation we are voting on today.
The SAFE Port Act builds on the GreenLane foundation by providing
both direction and much needed resources to port security. The bill
moves us closer toward the goal of inspecting all of the containers
entering the United States through our ports. The legislation requires
DHS to establish a pilot program to inspect 100 percent of all
containers bound for the United States from three foreign ports within
1 year and then report to Congress on how DHS can expand that system.
We should move toward 100 percent inspection as fast as we can,
understanding that we are at cross purposes if commerce slows to a
halt. This legislation will provide us critical information about how
soon we can achieve this goal.
This bill authorizes port security grant, training, and exercise
programs, with a $400-million grant program for which all ports can
apply. And it requires DHS to deploy both radiation detection and
imaging equipment to improve our ability to find dangerous goods and
people being smuggled into the United States.
DHS says it will deploy radiation portal monitors at all of our
largest seaports by the end of 2007. But this solution is only half of
the equation. To provide real port security, radiation detection
equipment must be paired with imaging equipment capable of seeing
through dense materials that might shield radiation. This legislation
requires DHS to develop a strategy for deploying both types of
equipment, as does the three-port pilot program for screening 100
percent of containers.
Lastly, since most experts agree that the next terrorist attack is a
matter of when, not if, this bill requires DHS to develop a plan to
deal with the effects of a maritime security incident, including
protocols for resuming trade and identifying specific responsibilities
for different agencies. I cannot stress the importance of this
provision enough. The private sector and our global partners must have
confidence that we can mitigate an economic disruption with the least
amount of harm to our trading partners and foil terrorism's chief goal,
which is to instill chaos.
Mr. President, again let me stress that the absence of funding for
rail and transit security is a major omission that leaves wide open an
entire transportation sector that we know from history is an appealing
target for terrorists.
Nevertheless, when it comes to our ports, the SAFE Port Act will move
us one giant step closer to better security by building a robust
security regime domestically and abroad and by providing the resources
necessary to protect the American people and our global economy.
Mr. REED. Mr. President, tonight the Senate is voting on the port
security conference report. While the conference report contains
important provisions to secure our Nation's ports, I am disappointed
that the House of Representatives refused to accept the Senate bill's
transit and rail security provisions. This is particularly troubling in
light of the inclusion in the conference report of extraneous matter
not debated by the full Senate and not related to our nation's
security.
While our Nation acted quickly after 9/11 to secure our airports and
airplanes, major vulnerabilities remain in maritime and surface
transportation. As the 9/11 Commission concluded ``opportunities to do
harm are as great, or greater, in maritime and surface transportation''
as in commercial aviation. Unfortunately, this conference report will
leave our surface transportation system vulnerable.
Transit agencies around the country have identified in excess of $6
billion in transit security needs--$5.2 billion in security-related
capital investment and $800 million to support personnel and related
operation security measures to ensure transit security and readiness.
The Senate-passed port security bill contained a provision I
coauthored with Banking Committee Chairman Shelby, Ranking Member
Sarbanes, and Senator Allard that authorized a needs-based grant
program within the Department of Homeland Security to identify and
address the vulnerabilities of our Nation's transit systems. The Senate
bill provided $3.5 billion over the next 3 years to transit agencies
for projects designed to resist and deter terrorist attacks, including
surveillance technologies, tunnel protection, chemical, biological,
radiological, and explosive detection systems, perimeter protection,
training, the establishment of redundant critical operations control
systems, and other security improvements.
Transit is the most common, and most vulnerable, target of terrorists
worldwide, whether it is Madrid, London, Moscow, Tokyo, Israel, or
Mumbai. According to a Brookings Institution study, 42 percent of all
terrorist attacks between 1991 and 2001 were directed at mass transit
systems.
Transit is vital to providing mobility for millions of Americans and
offers tremendous economic benefits to our Nation. In the United
States, people use public transportation over 32 million each weekday
compared to two million passengers who fly daily. Paradoxically, it is
the very openness of the system that makes it vulnerable to terrorism.
When one considers this and the fact that roughly $9 per passenger is
invested in aviation security, but less than one cent is invested in
the security of each transit passenger, the need for an authorized
transit security program is clear.
Transit agencies and the women and men who operate them have been
doing a tremendous job to increase security in a post 9/11 world, but
there is only so much they can do with the very limited resources at
their disposal. Our Nation's 6,000 transit agencies face a difficult
balancing act as they attempt to tighten security and continue to move
people from home to work, school, shopping, or other locations
efficiently and affordably. This conference report should have provided
for these workers and transit riders' safety and it did not.
With energy prices taking a larger chunk out of consumers'
pocketbooks, public transit offers a solution to our national energy
crisis and dependence on foreign oil. But, more Americans will not use
transit unless they feel safe. When it comes to protecting our homeland
against a terrorist attack, we can and must do more to fortify our
ports, our transit systems, and our rail system. Our priorities must be
to ensure that we are doing all we can to protect our most important
asset our--citizens. Unfortunately, this conference report falls short
by failing to include rail and transit security, and once again the
Republican-led Congress has missed an important opportunity.
Mr. JOHNSON. Mr. President, I have serious concerns about extraneous
provision that was included in the port security conference report. The
internet gaming prohibition which was included in the conference report
at the eleventh hour has been opposed by banks, convenience stores,
American Indian tribes, religious groups, and a Government agency--the
National Indian Gaming Commission.
There are several troublesome attributes to this legislation, but
perhaps
[[Page S10816]]
none more so than how it became included in the port security
conference report. This legislation was never approved by the Senate
Banking Committee nor debated by the full Senate. Many unresolved
concerns exist about this legislation regarding the impact it will have
on the banking and gambling industry, an effect that could be in the
billions of dollars.
I strongly support firm regulation and oversight of the gambling
industry, but this legislation is unequal in its treatment of gambling
activities creating specific carve outs for horse racing while not
providing similar treatment for other gambling entities. As expressed
in the opposition letter of the National Indian Gaming Commission, the
Federal agency charged with oversight of Indian Gaming, this
legislation could have unintended consequences that will have negative
and far reaching effects on the Indian Gaming industry. Moreover, this
legislation charges banks with a responsibility for regulating the wire
transfers that could potentially place an undue burden on the small
independent banks that serve countless South Dakotans and others on
main streets across the country.
At the very least, the effects of this legislation needed to be
studied and analyzed by the full Senate before final passage. While I
now have no choice but to vote for Defense legislation at a time when
our Nation is at war, I deeply resent the Republican leadership
shopping this unrelated matter into a must pass bill. The inclusion of
the Internet Gambling provision in a must pass bill at the last minute
is irresponsible legislation.
Mr. COLEMAN. Mr. President, I support the SAFE Port Act. Simply put--
this historic legislation will make us safer.
The result of inaction will be disastrous. The stakes are just too
high. In a recent estimate, a 10-to-20 kiloton nuclear weapon detonated
in a major seaport would kill 50,000 to one million people and would
result in direct property damage of $50 to $500 billion, losses due to
trade disruption of $100 billion to $200 billion, and indirect costs of
$300 billion to $1.2 trillion.
FBI Director Robert Mueller, ominously assessed the terrorist threat
at the annual Global Intelligence Briefing by stating he is very
concerned ``with the growing body of sensitive reporting that continues
to show al-Qa'ida's clear intention to obtain and ultimately use some
form of chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear or high-energy
explosives in its attacks against America.''
Many terrorism experts believe that maritime container shipping may
serve as an ideal platform to deliver these weapons to the United
States. In fact, we recently saw that containers may also serve as
ideal platforms to transport potential terrorists into the United
States. This was demonstrated on January 15 and again on April 2 of
this year when upwards of 30 Chinese immigrants were found emerging
from containers arriving at the Port of Los Angeles. The Subcommittee's
concern is that smuggled immigrants could include members of terrorist
organizations--and/or--that the container could have contained a weapon
of mass destruction.
As the 9/11 Commission put it so succinctly, ``opportunities to do
harm are as great, or greater, in maritime or surface transportation.''
Since 90 percent of global trade moves in maritime containers, we can
not allow these containers to be utilized to transport weapons of mass
destruction. The consequences of such an event would be devastating to
our way of life and our economy.
Instead, we must secure our supply chain before we pay the high price
of an attack, and seek the appropriate balance between two often
competing priorities: security and speed. This balancing act resulted
in the creation of two prominent homeland security programs--the
Container Security Initiative, or CSI, and the Customs-Trade
Partnership Against Terrorism, or C-TPAT. CSI effectively pushed our
borders out by placing CBP offices in foreign ports to inspect
containers before they reach our shores. C-TPAT exemplified a true
public-private partnership, in which the private sector took a leading
role in securing its supply chain. These programs alone are laudable--
but due to the sheer magnitude of the challenge of securing the global
supply chain--we must continue to improve upon these promising
initiatives.
With that in mind, as Chairman of the Permanent Subcommittee on
Investigations, I have directed the Subcommittee's 3-year effort to
bolster America's port security and supply chain security. We have
identified numerous weaknesses in our programs that secure the global
supply chain. A brief overview of these problems illustrates the
challenges confronting these efforts:
In CSI, the Subcommittee found that only a de minimus number of such
high-risk containers are actually inspected. In fact, the vast majority
of high-risk containers are simply not inspected overseas. To make
matters worse, the U.S. Government has not established minimum
standards for these inspections.
The Subcommittee initially found that an overwhelming proportion of
C-TPAT companies enjoy the benefits before DHS conducts a thorough on-
site inspection, called a validation. As of July 2006 this proportion
has improved considerably to where 49 percent of the participating
companies have been subjected to a validation. But this still leaves 51
percent of companies that have not been subjected to any legitimate,
on-site review to ensure that their security practices pass muster.
The Subcommittee found that DHS uses a flawed system to identify
high-risk shipping containers entering U.S. ports. According to CBP
officials, the Automated Targeting System or ATS is largely dependent
on ``one of the least reliable or useful types of information for
targeting purposes,'' including cargo manifest data and bills of
lading. Moreover, the Subcommittee found that this targeting system has
never been tested or validated, and may not discern actual, realistic
risks.
Currently, only 70 percent of cargo containers entering U.S. ports
are screened for nuclear or radiological materials. One part of the
problem is that the deployment of radiation detection equipment is
woefully behind schedule. As of August 29, 2006, the Department of
Homeland Security has deployed only 43 percent of the necessary
radiation monitors at priority seaports.
These are just a handful of the significant problems discovered by
the Subcommittee. In short, America's supply chain security remains
vulnerable. Our enemies could compromise the global supply chain to
smuggle a Weapon of Mass Destruction, WMD, or even terrorists, into
this country. This legislation tackles these concerns--and many other
weaknesses--in a coherent and comprehensive manner.
The SAFE Port Act addresses the problem of inadequate nuclear and
radiological screening, by requiring the Secretary of DHS to develop a
strategy for deployment of radiatioction capabilities and mandating
that, by December 2007, all containers entering the United States
through the busiest 22 seaports shall be examined for radiation;
requires DHS to develop, implement, and update a strategic plan improve
the security of the international cargo supply chain. In particular the
plan will identify and address gaps, provide improvements and goals,
and establish protocols for the resumption of trade after a critical
incident; requires DHS to identify and request reliable and essential
information about containers moving through the international supply
chain; requires DHS to promulgate a rule to establish minimum standards
and procedures for securing containers in transit to the U.S.; provides
Congressional authorization for the CSI program, empowering cap to
identify, examine or search maritime containers before U.S.-bound cargo
is loaded in a foreign port as well as establish standards for the use
of scanning and radiation detection equipment at CSI ports; and
authorizes C-TPAT and establishes certain minimum security and other
requirements that applicants must meet to be eligible for C-TPAT
benefits.
Even if we pass this legislation, our job is not completed. We still
need to look to the future and develop even more effective and advanced
programs and technology. Effectively scanning containers with both an
x-ray and a radiation scan is the only definitive answer to the
perplexing and most important question of ``what's in the box?''
However, in fiscal year 2005, only 0.38 percent of containers were
screened
[[Page S10817]]
with a nonintrusive imaging device and only 2.8 percent of containers
were screened for radiation prior to entering the United States. DHS'
efforts have improved somewhat from last year's paltry numbers, but we
have more work to do. To date, DHS still uses a risk-based approach
that targets only high-risk containers. While this approach is
fundamentally sound, the system used to target high-risk containers has
yet to be validated or proven to accurately identify high-risk
containers. Moreover, the validity of the intelligence used to enhance
this system's targeting ability is increasingly in question. Thus, we
need to both enhance our targeting capability and use technology to
enhance our ability to increase inspections--without impeding the flow
of commerce.
While the United States currently inspects approximately 5 percent of
all maritime containers, the partial pilot test in the Port of Hong
Kong demonstrates the potential to scan 100 percent of all shipping
containers. Each container in the Hong Kong port flows through an
integrated system featuring an imaging machine, a radiation scan, and a
system to identify the container. Coupling these technologies together
allows for the most complete scan of a container currently available.
The Hong Kong concept or similar technology holds great promise and
could lead to a dramatic improvement in the efficacy of our supply
chain security.
I am pleased to say that this legislation develops a pilot program in
three foreign seaports, each with unique features and varying levels of
trade volume to test integrated scanning systems using non-intrusive
inspected radiation detection equipment. It requires full-scale pilot
implementation within 1 year after enactment and an evaluation report
would be required to be submitted to Congress 120 days after full
implementation of the pilot. If the pilot programs prove successful,
then full-scale implementation would follow.
The bottom line is this: we are safer now than we were yesterday, but
we are not safe enough. The question then becomes: how do we get there?
In the words of the hockey legend Wayne Gretzky, ``A good hockey player
plays where the puck is. A great hockey player plays where the puck is
going to be.'' In other words, we cannot safeguard a post 9/11 America
by using pre-9/11 methods. If we think that the terrorists are not
plotting their next move, we are mistaken. We must find where the gaps
are in our Nation's homeland security and close them before an attack
happens. That is the only way to guarantee our security.
I agree with what Secretary Chertoff articulated at our full
Committee DHS budget hearing, ``the worst thing would be this: to have
a program for reliable cargo that was insufficiently robust so that
people could sneak in and use it as a Trojan Horse. That would be the
worst of all worlds.'' By reforming and strengthening C-TPAT, CSI, ATS,
by expediting the, deployment of sophisticated radiation portal
monitors and testing the ability to scan 100 percent of cargo before it
enters the United States, the SAFE Port Act closes gaps in our homeland
security and makes us safer.
The conference report was agreed to.
(The conference report is printed in the proceedings of the House in
the Record of September 29, 2006).
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