[Congressional Record Volume 152, Number 125 (Friday, September 29, 2006)]
[Senate]
[Pages S10810-S10817]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




   SECURITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY FOR EVERY PORT ACT--CONFERENCE REPORT

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. If the majority leader will suspend, under the 
previous order, the Senate adopts the conference report to accompany 
H.R. 4954, the port security bill.
  Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, the passage of this port security 
legislation marks the first time three Senate committees and their 
House counterparts have merged their collective expertise and crafted a 
truly comprehensive approach to port security. A bipartisan group of 
Members from both Chambers of Congress dedicated several months to 
developing this bill to better secure America. It is a credit to the 
Senate and the House that each committee involved agreed to pool their 
resources, put aside jurisdictional issues, and reach consensus on this 
bill.
  This act strengthens security at our land and sea ports, improves our 
maritime transportation security strategy, and enhances communication 
between the Department of Homeland Security and transportation security 
stakeholders. It includes a plan to get our trade activities up and 
running again in the event of a transportation security incident. And 
it creates a pilot program which will study the feasibility of scanning 
each of the containers--100 percent of the containers--entering our 
ports.
  This legislation will enhance the collection and analysis of 
information about cargo destined for our ports, and this bill aims to 
increase awareness of the operations at domestic and foreign ports. 
Once those in industry share important information about cargo in the 
international supply chain, we must analyze it quickly. This 
legislation expedites that process and ensures it begins earlier in the 
supply chain--before containers even reach our shores. This act 
requires information about cargo be provided and analyzed before the 
cargo is loaded on a vessel in a foreign port and shipped here.
  This bill also expands several initiatives with a proven track record 
of success. There are currently five interagency operations centers up 
and running throughout our country. These centers bring together 
Federal, State, and local security enforcement officials to ensure 
communication among them. This act expands this effort to each of the 
major seaports, and places the Coast Guard in charge of these centers.
  This act also builds upon the Department of Homeland Security's, DHS, 
past cooperation with foreign governments. The container security 
initiative, CSI, contained within this bill enables the Department, 
working in partnership with host government customs services, to 
examine high-risk containerized cargo at foreign seaports before it is 
loaded on vessels destined for the United States.
  The Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-T PAT), a 
voluntary public-private partnership, is also strengthened in this 
bill. The Commissioner of Customs and border protection will now be 
able to certify that a business's supply chain is secure from the point 
of manufacture to the product's final U.S. destination. Under this 
legislation, whether cargo crosses our border at Laredo or arrives on a 
ship from Hong Kong, participating companies' supply chains will 
undergo a thorough security check. This will add another layer of 
security to the C-T PAT initiative. Since this is a voluntary system, 
we have also included provisions which encourage those in industry to 
go above and beyond the security requirements already in place. These 
new incentives include expedited clearance of cargo.
  Mr. President, while I was disappointed earlier this year by the 
negative public reaction to foreign investment in our Nation's port 
terminals, we learned a great deal from hearings held by the Commerce 
Committee on this matter. As a result of those hearings, this bill 
requires DHS to conduct background checks on all port personnel. 
Current law only requires the Transportation Security Administration to 
perform checks on those workers directly tied to transportation at the 
port, or involved in its security. From the Commerce Committee 
hearings, it was evident that a more stringent requirement was needed.
  To prevent future attacks, we must secure our ports. This bill is a 
major step forward in this effort. Senator Inouye is my co-chairman on 
the Commerce Committee, and I thank him and Senators Grassley, Baucus, 
Coleman, Collins and Lieberman for their leadership in drafting this 
bill, as well as the House committee leaders who were involved. I would 
also like to thank the staff members on each of the committees--they 
have worked tirelessly on this bill.
  Our country's ports have become enormous operations. To fully address 
security of our ports, it is important that we appreciate the impacts 
security requirements might have on economic efficiencies in 
transportation

[[Page S10811]]

and trade. We must strive to be a secure state without becoming a 
security state.
  Each of the Senate and House committees involved in this bill has 
jurisdiction over an area vital to the safety of our ports. Working 
together, our committees have developed a comprehensive bill which will 
help shield our Nation from future terrorist attacks. It is my hope our 
colleagues will support this act and move quickly to pass this bill.
  Mr. REID. Mr. President, the days before a long recess are always a 
hectic time as we scramble to complete our work. This conference took a 
lot longer then it needed to take, and the events leading up to the 
filing of this report represented an abuse of the process. The Senate 
passed this bill 3 weeks ago, but the House waited until yesterday to 
appoint conferees. The conferees conducted one perfunctory public 
meeting last night where no bill language was provided, no amendments 
allowed; and no votes taken in public. In fact, there seemed to be more 
interest by the majority conferees in determining what additional 
unrelated bills could be jammed into this conference overnight and not 
on improving our homeland security.
  These types of shenanigans really show a lack of respect for the 
members of this institution and a disregard for the serious task at 
hand.
  I was encouraged when this bill passed the Senate 3 weeks ago. 
Senators from both sides of the aisle worked together to pass a 
transportation security bill for seaports, mass transit, freight rail, 
and commercial aviation systems and actually extended expiring Customs 
fees in an attempt to pay for some of the new port security 
initiatives.
  Three weeks later after negotiations with the House, all but the port 
security initiatives were dropped at the insistence of the House 
Republicans, despite overwhelming support in the Senate. The new 
initiatives for the mass transit and freight rail system would have 
fulfilled an important recommendation of the 9/11 Commission Report, 
which recommended that the Federal Government address a much broader 
range of transportation security issues in addition to those undertaken 
in commercial aviation.
  A Democratic amendment adopted in the Senate also would have provided 
a source of funding to fund some of the new port initiatives in the 
bill, given the fact that we are not adequately funding current port 
security programs. This meager attempt to begin to fund these programs 
was also dropped at the insistence of the House Republicans.
  It has now been 5 years since the attack on the World Trade Center 
and little has been done to make our transportation systems more secure 
other then the obvious improvements in commercial aviation. There is no 
urgency by this administration. One gets the feeling that they believe 
these transportation security issues are really not a Federal 
responsibility and instead should be funded by State and local 
governments or the private sector. Homeland Security Secretary Chertoff 
scoffed at the idea of spending money to protect Americans who use mass 
transit, noting that a bomb in a subway car would kill only 30 people. 
Other Republicans, including Assistant Secretary of Homeland Security 
Henkey, have said that they think rail and transit security should be a 
State and local or private responsibility. 
  Democrats believe Government cannot `pass the buck' on protecting 
Americans from the threat of a deadly terrorist attack to the private 
sector or to our already-squeezed State and local governments.
  The U.S. mass transit industry has said it needs $5.2 billion in 
capital expenditures from the Federal Government to protect American 
citizens from deadly terrorist attacks. But, since 2003, the Federal 
Government has only invested a total of roughly $400 million in transit 
and rail security for the entire country, compared to $20 billion on 
aviation security during that same period. President Bush's Fiscal Year 
2007 budget completely eliminated rail and transit security grants and 
intercity bus grants, which were funded at paltry amounts in 2006.
  This is just another example of misplaced priorities. According to 
the RAND Corporation, there are about 30 terrorist attacks on trains 
and rail-related targets per year. Our close allies in Britian, Spain, 
and India have been the victims of deadly terrorist attacks on rail and 
transit targets in recent years. Yet Republicans stripped rail security 
out of this bill so they could add unrelated provisions.
  I am proud of the work of the Democratic caucus on this bill and on 
earlier homeland security measures. It was a Democratically controlled 
Senate that passed a landmark aviation security bill and a 
comprehensive port security bill immediately after 9/11--over the 
objections of the Republican-controlled House and the White House. 
These bills acknowledged for the first time that securing our maritime 
trade and our commercial air passenger system were national security 
responsibilities of the Federal Government and should not be relegated 
to contractors or the private sector. Similarly, Democrats have led the 
way in developing and pushing security measures during this Congress 
related to ports, freight rail, aviation and mass transit, and I am 
proud of the work the caucus has done on this bill. 
  The port security provisions in here reflect a lot of hard work and 
bipartisan effort, so are worthy of our support. But, I don't take a 
lot of pride in giving the American people half a loaf when it comes to 
security. I think all in all, this is another time that the Republican 
majority has let the American people down. And I hope that the American 
people are sick of half a loaf and will agree with me on the need for a 
new direction.
  Mr. INOUYE. Mr. President, just 2 weeks ago, the Senate considered 
comprehensive legislation to address the transportation security needs 
of this country. That bill was not written overnight. It was the 
culmination of 2 years of bipartisan work within the Commerce 
Committee, the Banking Committee, the Finance Committee, and the 
Homeland Security Committee.
  While we have had our jurisdictional debates during the past 2 years, 
this week we somberly observed the fifth anniversary of the attacks of 
September 11, 2001. We set aside those debates, and as a body, came 
together and passed a comprehensive bill improving security for all 
modes of transportation. The Senate passed that bill by a vote of 98 to 
0, and we took a huge step toward making our Nation a safer place to 
live, work, and travel.
  I had hoped that today I would be telling my colleagues that the 
House and Senate conferees had recognized they had the rare 
opportunity, for the first time in 5 years, to address transportation 
security in a comprehensive manner. I believed they would act in the 
same manner as we had here in the Senate just 2 weeks ago and would 
reach an agreement on the port security bill that truly reflects the 
best of our institution.
  Regrettably, that is not the case. Staff from the Senate and several 
House Committees sat down the past 2 weeks and went through hundreds of 
pages of text in what was suppose to be, and in fact, appeared to be a 
bipartisan, bicameral process. They did a good job, and the port 
security title reflects their hard work. However, several days ago, 
House leadership stymied our efforts to provide a real transportation 
security bill for America.
  The House leadership effectively hijacked the work of the Senate and 
refused to include or even discuss anything but the port security 
provisions of the Senate's bill.
  Despite this refusal, several of my colleagues came to last night's 
meeting of the conferees prepared to offer and debate amendments to 
restore the nonport related security provisions that had been included 
in the Senate-passed bill. As I stated then, while the port security 
provisions are sound and a big step in the right direction, we must 
take a comprehensive approach to securing our transportation 
infrastructure.
  I was prepared to work into the evening on efforts to restore the 
other provisions. My colleagues should be aware that we did not have 
the text of the conference report when we met for the first, and what 
has now become apparent, the only meeting. During the round of opening 
statements on the conference report, the Chairman of the conference was 
repeatedly asked when we would be able to offer amendments.

[[Page S10812]]

  In the end, the chairman indicated that we would reconvene in the 
morning when we had the text of the bill. Because of the chairman's 
assurances that we would meet again, and out of deference to the 
chairman's wishes, several of my colleagues agreed to not offer their 
amendments to restore the Senate provisions on rail and truck security.
  Late last night, we were told there would be no more meetings of the 
conferees, denying my colleagues the ability to have their amendments 
debated and voted upon.
  Last night's theater has ramifications for all of us today for three 
reasons. First, we have allowed a rare opportunity to enact 
comprehensive legislation that would improve the security of our 
transportation infrastructure to pass us by.
  Our colleagues who opposed the inclusion of the other transportation 
modes claim that this is a port security bill only. The fact is, other 
modes of transportation are just as important and worthy of protection. 
Like the port security provisions, the rail, truck, and transit 
provisions reflect several years of committee hearings and full Senate 
action.
  To pretend these provisions were written overnight is a disservice to 
the expert staff that have worked on these issues for years. It is also 
a disservice to our constituents who depend upon these modes of 
transportation for their livelihoods.
  The American public deserves better from us. We have waited 5 years 
for this opportunity and have been fortunate that attacks like those in 
London and Madrid have not occurred here in the United States. We 
should act now to prevent an attack rather than waiting until a tragedy 
occurs.
  Second, if we are to succeed as a democratic and open institution, 
our ability to work together and rely on the assurances of our 
colleagues is critical. My colleagues, particularly Senator Lautenberg, 
who has worked diligently on behalf of his constituents who rely on 
rail and transit and is an expert in the area of rail safety, deserve 
to be heard and be able to offer amendments.
  To assure him the opportunity but deny him the reality is a 
disservice to the institution and to the millions of people who rely 
upon the rail and transit systems each day.
  Third, it has come to my attention that the leadership has decided to 
include in the conference report provisions that are outside the scope 
of transportation security issues. These are provisions that our 
friends on the Armed Services conference refused to allow on their 
bill, and our friends on the Department of Homeland Security 
appropriations conference refused to allow on their bill.
  It does not bode well for the American public that with the stroke of 
one pen we jettison fully vetted rail, truck, and transit security 
provisions that would have provided enhanced security for the American 
public. Yet with the stroke of another pen, we add provisions that are 
not related to security nor fully debated by the Senate and House as a 
whole.
  Ultimately, the action of the last few days reflects a lack of 
leadership and a lack of vision about our responsibilities to the 
American people. As a result, what we have before this body today does 
so much less than what is possible and prudent to secure the Nation, as 
well as ignoring the will of both bodies. More importantly, it neglects 
the real needs of our transportation security.
  We have missed a rare opportunity to make our transportation 
infrastructure more secure. We have missed a rare opportunity to follow 
through with the promises we made on the Senate floor just 14 days ago.
  Mr. GRASSLEY. Mr. President, I rise in support of the conference 
report to accompany H.R. 4954, the SAFE Port Act. This legislation 
achieves some important objectives that I have been working on for some 
time.
  It will strengthen our port security operations and resources within 
the United States Customs and Border Protection.
  It authorizes and approves current programs for securing our Nation's 
trade, and it provides direction for further strengthening of these 
programs as technological advances permit.
  It requires our Federal agencies to cooperate and better coordinate 
their contingency planning in the event there is a security breach. In 
sum, this critical legislation will empower personnel in the Department 
of Homeland Security to stay one step ahead of the terrorists who seek 
to wreak economic havoc and physical destruction on our Nation.
  At the same time, this legislation strengthens our Nation's economic 
security by realigning resources to ensure better efficiency in the 
administration of customs laws within the United States Customs and 
Border Protection, as well as trade facilitation functions within the 
agency and elsewhere in the Department of Homeland Security. 
Unfortunately, this legislation falls short in one critical area. The 
Senate-passed bill included robust sections on rail and mass transit 
security. But objections from the House have prevented us from 
including those provisions in the conference report.
  I find this extremely shortsighted. It demonstrates a troubling lack 
of leadership. I want to make clear that I strongly supported the 
Senate-passed provisions on rail and mass transit security, and I 
strongly oppose their omission from this conference report.
  But because this legislation contains so many provisions critical to 
the security of our Nation, I will support the conference report. It is 
certainly better than the alternative. I hope my colleagues on the 
House side realize that we have lost an opportunity here. At a minimum, 
it would take another several months for us to be in a position to 
enact rail and mass transit security legislation into law. In the 
meantime, this important aspect of our Nation's security will not get 
the rightful attention that it needs.
  That being said, this legislation does significantly strengthen our 
Nation's security. I want to thank my colleagues, particularly the 
chairmen and ranking members of the Commerce and Homeland Security 
Committees in the Senate, as well as the chairman of the Permanent 
Subcommittee on Investigations of the Homeland Security Committee, 
Senator Coleman, for their constructive engagement with me and Senator 
Baucus these past few months. Together we produced a very good bill, 
much of which is retained in this conference report. I urge its support 
so that we can get this critical legislation to the President's desk as 
soon as possible.
  Mr. BAUCUS. Mr. President, I have mixed emotions about the SAFE Ports 
Act we pass today.
  On the one hand, I am deeply disappointed that the bill that does not 
include the essential rail and transit security measures passed by the 
Senate last month. I strongly disagree with the decision to drop these 
provisions from the conference report. The rail and transit tragedies 
we have witnessed in London, Madrid, and Mumbai should be evidence 
enough that we should not have passed up this chance to shore up our 
defenses.
  On the other hand, I am pleased that our hard work on land and 
seaport security has come to fruition. Working together, we have 
produced a bill that strengthens the security of our ports while 
ensuring the proper flow of trade on which all of our Nation's ports 
and our Nation's economy depends.
  The easiest way to secure our ports would have been to simply pass a 
bill that mandated fences around our ports and required opening every 
container coming across our borders. But these measures would bring the 
flow of port traffic to a grinding halt and cripple our Nation's 
economy. It is essential that we strike the right balance on port 
security. I am pleased that this legislation does so.
  This bill contains important provisions to screen workers coming 
through or working at the ports, establishes standards for container 
security devices, authorizes $400 million in port security grants 
annually, and requires a pilot program at three foreign ports to employ 
integrated container scanning technology on 100 percent of containers 
bound for the United States.
  The bill also directs the Commissioner of Customs to hire 1,000 more 
armed Customs and Border Protection officers for land and sea ports 
around the country. I have heard from ports big and small that they are 
woefully undermanned. In fact, in Montana, the port of Roosville 
finally received state-of-the-art container scanning equipment, but we 
didn't get the personnel

[[Page S10813]]

to run it, so it sits unused. This bill would ensure that every service 
port in the country, and the smaller ports in their area, won't be 
overlooked by Customs and Border Protection headquarters in Washington.
  The SAFE Ports Act also authorizes the Commissioner of Customs to 
nearly double the number of Customs and Border Protection specialists 
dedicated to validating the supply chains of participants in the 
Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism program. The quicker this 
program can process participants, the safer, and more prosperous, our 
Nation will be.
  This bill also contains a provision I wrote to direct U.S. Customs 
and Border to begin targeting methamphetamine and its associated 
precursor chemicals crossing our borders at ports or through the 
international mail, and share its findings with various border and drug 
enforcement agencies.
  I also saw a need to ensure the Customs and Border Protection 
Northern Border Airwing Branch based in Great Falls, Montana, will have 
support facilities needed to cover the 500-mile long border with 
Canada. Customs and Border Protection officials have proposed to expand 
the branch by adding facilities in Kalispell, Havre and Glasgow. A 
provision I authored in this bill gives them the ability to move 
forward with that plan. Including this provision was important to me, 
to ensure that Montana's border enforcement personnel have the backup 
they need to get the job done.
  All of these provisions I have mentioned are key to enhancing 
physical security at our ports and along our borders. But it was 
important that we do more than that.
  When Congress passed the Homeland Security Act of 2002, we strictly 
prohibited any diminution in the trade functions or personnel committed 
to trade functions at the Department of Homeland Security. Yet for 3 
years, the Department has not complied with the law. Trade resources 
have decreased by as much as 15 percent within both Customs and Border 
Protection and Immigration and Customs Enforcement. I fought hard to 
ensure that this bill requires the Commissioner of Customs to restore a 
proper focus on the traditional trade mission of his agency.
  So this act further ensures the Commissioner's commitment to Customs' 
trade mission by creating an Office of International Trade, headed by 
an Assistant Commissioner, who will be responsible for coordinating 
policy for all personnel dedicated to the agency's trade functions. The 
Commissioner will also now be assisted in trade policy oversight and 
operations by an International Trade Committee, comprised of the 
Assistant Commissioners of International Trade, Finance, Field 
Operations, International Affairs, and the Director of Trade Relations. 
Finally, we have also included a mandate for all U.S. agencies involved 
in the clearance of imports or exports to use a single-portal data 
collection system to streamline the clearance process. I look forward 
to seeing how all of these measures will improve the overall trade 
mission of U.S. Customs and Border Protection.
  While far from being the comprehensive transportation security 
legislation I had hoped the House would support, the bill before us is 
a positive step forward. I believe we have struck a good balance 
between security and trade. I thank my friend Senator Grassley, the 
Chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, for working with me so 
closely on this, as in so many things. And I want to thank my 
colleagues for working so hard with Senator Grassley and I to find the 
appropriate balance in this bill. It was a long, difficult journey, but 
we arrived there together in the end.
  Thanks and congratulations to Chairman Stevens and Ranking Member 
Inouye of the Commerce Committee, Chairman Collins and Ranking Member 
Lieberman of the Homeland Security and Government Affairs Committee, 
Chairman Shelby and Ranking Member Sarbanes of the Banking Committee, 
and of course, my good friends, Senator Murray and Senator Coleman.
  I also would like to recognize all of the hard-working staff who made 
the port security legislation before us today possible.
  On my Finance Committee staff, I credit the tenacity and hard work of 
Anya Landau French, International Trade Adviser. Anya dedicated long 
hours to the Customs Reauthorization and Trade Facilitation Act of 
2006, which served as the basis for many of the provisions in this Act. 
Brian Pomper, Chief International Trade Counsel; Bill Dauster, Chief 
Counsel and Deputy Democratic Staff Director; and Russ Sullivan, Staff 
Director, were all indispensable to this effort.
  I would be remiss if I did not also recognize the tireless efforts of 
Senator Grassley's talented, hardworking Finance Committee staff, who 
worked so closely and so well with my own staff. Tiffany McCullen 
Atwell and Stephen Schaefer put in long hours, and Kolan Davis, Staff 
Director, provided excellent guidance.
  I also want to thank the many other dedicated staff of the Commerce 
Committee and the Homeland Security and Government Affairs Committee, 
in particular, Dabney Hegg, Sam Whitehorn, Stephen Gardner, Gael 
Sullivan, Channon Hanna, Lisa Sutherland, Ken Nahigian, David 
Wonnenberg, Mark Delich, Jason Yanussi, Michael Alexander, Rob Strayer, 
Mark Winter, and Ray Shepard. This bill is a result of teamwork and 
commitment at its best.
  May the work we have all done keep us safe and strong.
  Mr. SARBANES. Mr. President, the conference report on H.R. 4954 takes 
important steps toward improving security at our Nation's seaports. It 
provides much needed funding to upgrade security at our ports, which 
are considered to be among our most vulnerable assets. Today, less than 
6 percent of the 11 million containers that come through our seaports 
are inspected. While we have made significant investments in upgrading 
airport security, the administration's budgets continue to shortchange 
the funding necessary to ensure that the containerized cargo that comes 
into our country is safe. This legislation takes an important step 
toward addressing that shortfall.
  While the need for action in the area of port security is clearly 
evident, we must not forget the other parts of our Nation's multimodal 
transportation network, at which the need is equally great. The 
legislation passed by the Senate included provisions aimed at 
addressing threats to public transit, rail, and intercity buses, among 
others. The Senate took a responsible, comprehensive approach toward 
securing our Nation's infrastructure. However, the conference report 
before us does not include those titles. While I support the effort to 
improve security at our ports, I cannot justify ignoring the needs of 
these other modes of transportation and continuing to leave Americans 
at risk.
  Moreover, the process by which the decision was made to jettison 
these critical provisions was sorely lacking in transparency and 
accountability. The conference committee held only a single public 
meeting, and conferees were not permitted to offer any amendments to 
the conference report. When the conference committee met, for the first 
and only time in a public venue, I observed that this conference 
presented us with a unique opportunity to address the pressing security 
needs of our transit systems and to protect the millions of Americans 
who ride transit every day. I expressed my view that failure to take 
advantage of this opportunity would be tragic. Unfortunately, this 
conference report adopts the House position on transit and rail 
security--which is that our Nation's transit and rail riders will have 
to wait for another day to see a meaningful Federal commitment to their 
safety.
  I want to focus my remaining remarks on public transportation, which 
is within the jurisdiction of the Committee on Banking, Housing, and 
Urban Affairs, on which I am the ranking member. The transit provisions 
in the Senate bill were based on legislation that passed the Senate 
unanimously in the 108th Congress, and passed again this Congress in 
the context of this legislation, again unanimously. The Senate bill 
would have provided grants to our Nation's transit systems to help 
protect the millions of riders who use subway trains, commuter rail, 
and buses every single day.
  If there is any question as to whether transit is at risk, one need 
only look at recent events. This summer, seven coordinated bomb blasts 
devastated commuter rail trains in Mumbai, India, leaving over 200 
people dead and 700 injured. Last year, the London subway

[[Page S10814]]

system was the target of a tragic attack that left 52 people dead, and 
in 2004, almost 200 people were killed when bombs exploded on commuter 
rail trains in Madrid.
  In the United States this past May, the Department of Homeland 
Security issued a specific warning to transit systems to remain alert 
against possible terrorist attacks. The warning said that four people 
had been arrested over several months in separate incidents involving 
videotaping of European subway stations and trains or similar activity, 
which, the Department went on to say, provides ``indications of 
continued terrorist interest in mass transit systems as targets.''
  The threat to transit is clear. In response, both the Federal Transit 
Administration and the Department of Homeland Security have worked with 
transit systems to identify steps that can be taken to help prevent and 
mitigate attacks. In fact, the greatest challenge to securing our 
Nation's transit systems is not a lack of knowledge of what to do, but 
rather lack of resources with which to do it. In the words of the 
Government Accountability Office: ``Obtaining sufficient funding is the 
most significant challenge in making transit systems as safe and secure 
as possible.''
  Despite the record of attacks against transit overseas and the 
identified vulnerabilities here at home, the Federal Government's 
response to the needs of America's transit systems--which provide 32 
million trips every weekday--has thus far been inadequate. In an 
editorial published shortly after the London subway bombings, the 
Baltimore Sun stated that, ``Since September 11, 2001, the Federal 
Government has spent $18 billion on aviation security. Transit systems, 
which carry 16 times more passengers daily, have received about $250 
million. That is a ridiculous imbalance.''
  To begin to address this issue, I worked closely with Chairman Shelby 
and with Senator Reed of Rhode Island, who have been leaders on this 
issue, on the Public Transportation Terrorism Prevention Act, which was 
incorporated into the Senate version of H.R. 4954. The Senate bill 
authorized $3.5 billion over 3 years in security grants for our 
Nation's public transportation systems. That money would have been 
available for projects designed to resist and deter terrorist attacks, 
including surveillance technologies; tunnel protection; chemical, 
biological, radiological, and explosive detection systems; perimeter 
protection; employee training; and other security improvements.
  Let me give one example of a critical need right here with respect to 
Washington's Metro. Their greatest security need is a backup operations 
control center. This need was identified by the Federal Transit 
Administration in its initial security assessment and then identified 
again by the Department of Homeland Security in its subsequent security 
assessment. This critical need remains unaddressed because it has been 
unfunded. The Senate bill would have authorized the funding to make 
this and other urgently needed security upgrades at transit systems 
around the country.
  We know that transit systems are potential targets for terrorist 
attacks. We know the vital role these systems play in our Nation's 
economic and security infrastructure. We can wait no longer to address 
the critical security needs of America's transit systems. The Senate 
has passed transit security legislation unanimously in each of the last 
two Congresses. By adopting the House of Representatives' do-nothing 
position on transit in this conference report, we have lost a unique 
opportunity to help protect the millions of Americans who use transit 
every day.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, the Security and Accountability for 
Every Port, or SAFE Port, Act marks a significant advancement for the 
security of our ports, authorizing $400 million for critical port 
security grant programs and enabling all ports--not merely a select 
few--to become eligible to apply for that funding. These improvements 
are desperately needed to help close one of our most dangerous security 
vulnerabilities.
  But when the Senate approved our version of this bill, it was a 
broader, comprehensive transportation security bill. It was not limited 
to the security of our ports but extended to several other modes of 
transportation--namely, rail, transit, trucking, and pipelines. It 
authorized over $4.5 billion for the security of mass transit systems, 
freight railroads, and passenger rail.
  Unfortunately, the Republican leadership, acting alone and without 
participation from the appointed Democratic conferees, stripped those 
provisions from the bill we are voting on tonight. I am deeply 
disappointed that conferees were never given an opportunity to frankly 
discuss and amend the conference report, even when Member after Member 
asked for that opportunity.
  This unilateral, partisan process also resulted in the eleventh hour 
insertion of a bill that purportedly outlaws Internet gambling but 
which may have unintended consequences. This issue clearly deserves 
more deliberation, and it is unfortunate that such a measure has been 
added to a critical bill designed to protect the Nation's ports, 
legislation which this Congress must pass. I hope that the Senate will 
return to this issue and give it the attention it deserves, in the 
future.
  On the issue which is what this bill is about, securing our homeland, 
we had a golden opportunity to present the President with legislation 
to enhance the security of our rail and transit systems. Fourteen 
million people ride the rails every day in America, and Connecticut is 
no different, where 110,000 people use the New Haven MTA line each day. 
Improving security for rail and transit is an enormous concern and it 
should have been addressed tonight, rather than in a future Congress.
  It is unfortunate that the bill no longer contains most of the well-
advised Senate provisions which would have strengthened our open and 
highly vulnerable rail and transit systems. While the rail and transit 
provisions authorized a large sum of money, it is but a fraction of 
what the experts say is needed to address rail and transit 
vulnerabilities--vulnerabilities which have been exploited time and 
again by terrorists in London, Madrid, and Mumbai. I regret that the 
money was stripped out of the bill and that I was prevented from even 
trying to reinstate it by offering an amendment in a conference that 
was never formally completed.
  Nevertheless, I am proud to be an original cosponsor of the port 
security legislation at the heart of this conference report and to have 
worked with my colleagues in the Senate and House to craft the port 
security provisions we will be voting on shortly.
  Let me thank Senators Collins, Murray, Coleman, Stevens, and Inouye 
for their hard work not only in bringing a comprehensive, bipartisan 
port security bill before the Senate but also for expertly guiding it 
toward a 98 to 0 vote, and now through conference. I would also like to 
tip my hat to Senators Grassley and Baucus of the Finance Committee for 
their hard work as well.
  Mr. President, 95 percent of our international trade flows through 
our ports. Prior to 9/11, the main goal was to move these goods through 
our ports efficiently. Since 9/11, we have come to realize we need to 
bring security into that equation but without harming our economy which 
depends on international trade.
  It is a tricky--but imperative--balancing act.
  The 9/11 Commission reported that ``major vulnerabilities still exist 
in cargo [security]'' and that, since aviation security has been 
significantly improved since 9/11, ``terrorists may turn their 
attention to other modes. Opportunities to do harm are as great, or 
greater, in maritime and surface transportation.''
  Just last month, RAND's Center for Terrorism Risk Management Policy 
published a report titled: ``Considering the Effects of a Catastrophic 
Terrorist Attack'' that considered the effects of a nuclear weapon 
smuggled in a shipping container sent to the Port of Long Beach and 
detonated on a pier.
  The potential short- and long-term effects truly are devastating. The 
report estimated that up to 60,000 people might die instantly from the 
blast or radiation poisoning, with 150,000 more exposed to hazardous 
levels of radiation.
  The blast and the fires could completely destroy both the Port of 
Long Beach and the Port of Los Angeles and every ship in the port. As 
many as 6

[[Page S10815]]

million people might have to be evacuated from the Los Angeles area and 
another 2 to 3 million from the surrounding area might have to relocate 
due to the fallout. Short-term costs could exceed $1 trillion.
  Besides the damage to the United States, such an attack would cause 
economic ripple effects across the globe.
  The dangerous little secret of port security--and why we need this 
bill--is that we still have very little idea about the contents of 
thousands of containers that are shipped into and across the heart of 
this Nation every day. Just 5 or 6 percent of those containers are 
physically inspected.
  While Senator Collins and I began working on port security 
legislation in late 2004, the truth is port security received a major 
shot of adrenaline after the Dubai Ports World controversy earlier this 
year.
  Looking back on it, perhaps we should be thankful for that uproar, 
since it raised the collective consciousness of the American people and 
Members of Congress to the vulnerabilities that we face at our ports.
  Following that skirmish, the Homeland Security and Governmental 
Affairs Committee marked up the GreenLane bill, and later, Senator 
Collins and I started working with the Senate Commerce and Finance 
Committees, as well as our House colleagues to craft the comprehensive 
legislation we are voting on today.
  The SAFE Port Act builds on the GreenLane foundation by providing 
both direction and much needed resources to port security. The bill 
moves us closer toward the goal of inspecting all of the containers 
entering the United States through our ports. The legislation requires 
DHS to establish a pilot program to inspect 100 percent of all 
containers bound for the United States from three foreign ports within 
1 year and then report to Congress on how DHS can expand that system. 
We should move toward 100 percent inspection as fast as we can, 
understanding that we are at cross purposes if commerce slows to a 
halt. This legislation will provide us critical information about how 
soon we can achieve this goal.
  This bill authorizes port security grant, training, and exercise 
programs, with a $400-million grant program for which all ports can 
apply. And it requires DHS to deploy both radiation detection and 
imaging equipment to improve our ability to find dangerous goods and 
people being smuggled into the United States.
  DHS says it will deploy radiation portal monitors at all of our 
largest seaports by the end of 2007. But this solution is only half of 
the equation. To provide real port security, radiation detection 
equipment must be paired with imaging equipment capable of seeing 
through dense materials that might shield radiation. This legislation 
requires DHS to develop a strategy for deploying both types of 
equipment, as does the three-port pilot program for screening 100 
percent of containers.
  Lastly, since most experts agree that the next terrorist attack is a 
matter of when, not if, this bill requires DHS to develop a plan to 
deal with the effects of a maritime security incident, including 
protocols for resuming trade and identifying specific responsibilities 
for different agencies. I cannot stress the importance of this 
provision enough. The private sector and our global partners must have 
confidence that we can mitigate an economic disruption with the least 
amount of harm to our trading partners and foil terrorism's chief goal, 
which is to instill chaos.
  Mr. President, again let me stress that the absence of funding for 
rail and transit security is a major omission that leaves wide open an 
entire transportation sector that we know from history is an appealing 
target for terrorists.
  Nevertheless, when it comes to our ports, the SAFE Port Act will move 
us one giant step closer to better security by building a robust 
security regime domestically and abroad and by providing the resources 
necessary to protect the American people and our global economy.
  Mr. REED. Mr. President, tonight the Senate is voting on the port 
security conference report. While the conference report contains 
important provisions to secure our Nation's ports, I am disappointed 
that the House of Representatives refused to accept the Senate bill's 
transit and rail security provisions. This is particularly troubling in 
light of the inclusion in the conference report of extraneous matter 
not debated by the full Senate and not related to our nation's 
security.
  While our Nation acted quickly after 9/11 to secure our airports and 
airplanes, major vulnerabilities remain in maritime and surface 
transportation. As the 9/11 Commission concluded ``opportunities to do 
harm are as great, or greater, in maritime and surface transportation'' 
as in commercial aviation. Unfortunately, this conference report will 
leave our surface transportation system vulnerable.
  Transit agencies around the country have identified in excess of $6 
billion in transit security needs--$5.2 billion in security-related 
capital investment and $800 million to support personnel and related 
operation security measures to ensure transit security and readiness.
  The Senate-passed port security bill contained a provision I 
coauthored with Banking Committee Chairman Shelby, Ranking Member 
Sarbanes, and Senator Allard that authorized a needs-based grant 
program within the Department of Homeland Security to identify and 
address the vulnerabilities of our Nation's transit systems. The Senate 
bill provided $3.5 billion over the next 3 years to transit agencies 
for projects designed to resist and deter terrorist attacks, including 
surveillance technologies, tunnel protection, chemical, biological, 
radiological, and explosive detection systems, perimeter protection, 
training, the establishment of redundant critical operations control 
systems, and other security improvements.
  Transit is the most common, and most vulnerable, target of terrorists 
worldwide, whether it is Madrid, London, Moscow, Tokyo, Israel, or 
Mumbai. According to a Brookings Institution study, 42 percent of all 
terrorist attacks between 1991 and 2001 were directed at mass transit 
systems.
  Transit is vital to providing mobility for millions of Americans and 
offers tremendous economic benefits to our Nation. In the United 
States, people use public transportation over 32 million each weekday 
compared to two million passengers who fly daily. Paradoxically, it is 
the very openness of the system that makes it vulnerable to terrorism. 
When one considers this and the fact that roughly $9 per passenger is 
invested in aviation security, but less than one cent is invested in 
the security of each transit passenger, the need for an authorized 
transit security program is clear.
  Transit agencies and the women and men who operate them have been 
doing a tremendous job to increase security in a post 9/11 world, but 
there is only so much they can do with the very limited resources at 
their disposal. Our Nation's 6,000 transit agencies face a difficult 
balancing act as they attempt to tighten security and continue to move 
people from home to work, school, shopping, or other locations 
efficiently and affordably. This conference report should have provided 
for these workers and transit riders' safety and it did not.
  With energy prices taking a larger chunk out of consumers' 
pocketbooks, public transit offers a solution to our national energy 
crisis and dependence on foreign oil. But, more Americans will not use 
transit unless they feel safe. When it comes to protecting our homeland 
against a terrorist attack, we can and must do more to fortify our 
ports, our transit systems, and our rail system. Our priorities must be 
to ensure that we are doing all we can to protect our most important 
asset our--citizens. Unfortunately, this conference report falls short 
by failing to include rail and transit security, and once again the 
Republican-led Congress has missed an important opportunity.
  Mr. JOHNSON. Mr. President, I have serious concerns about extraneous 
provision that was included in the port security conference report. The 
internet gaming prohibition which was included in the conference report 
at the eleventh hour has been opposed by banks, convenience stores, 
American Indian tribes, religious groups, and a Government agency--the 
National Indian Gaming Commission.
  There are several troublesome attributes to this legislation, but 
perhaps

[[Page S10816]]

none more so than how it became included in the port security 
conference report. This legislation was never approved by the Senate 
Banking Committee nor debated by the full Senate. Many unresolved 
concerns exist about this legislation regarding the impact it will have 
on the banking and gambling industry, an effect that could be in the 
billions of dollars.
  I strongly support firm regulation and oversight of the gambling 
industry, but this legislation is unequal in its treatment of gambling 
activities creating specific carve outs for horse racing while not 
providing similar treatment for other gambling entities. As expressed 
in the opposition letter of the National Indian Gaming Commission, the 
Federal agency charged with oversight of Indian Gaming, this 
legislation could have unintended consequences that will have negative 
and far reaching effects on the Indian Gaming industry. Moreover, this 
legislation charges banks with a responsibility for regulating the wire 
transfers that could potentially place an undue burden on the small 
independent banks that serve countless South Dakotans and others on 
main streets across the country.
  At the very least, the effects of this legislation needed to be 
studied and analyzed by the full Senate before final passage. While I 
now have no choice but to vote for Defense legislation at a time when 
our Nation is at war, I deeply resent the Republican leadership 
shopping this unrelated matter into a must pass bill. The inclusion of 
the Internet Gambling provision in a must pass bill at the last minute 
is irresponsible legislation.
  Mr. COLEMAN. Mr. President, I support the SAFE Port Act. Simply put--
this historic legislation will make us safer.
  The result of inaction will be disastrous. The stakes are just too 
high. In a recent estimate, a 10-to-20 kiloton nuclear weapon detonated 
in a major seaport would kill 50,000 to one million people and would 
result in direct property damage of $50 to $500 billion, losses due to 
trade disruption of $100 billion to $200 billion, and indirect costs of 
$300 billion to $1.2 trillion.
  FBI Director Robert Mueller, ominously assessed the terrorist threat 
at the annual Global Intelligence Briefing by stating he is very 
concerned ``with the growing body of sensitive reporting that continues 
to show al-Qa'ida's clear intention to obtain and ultimately use some 
form of chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear or high-energy 
explosives in its attacks against America.''
  Many terrorism experts believe that maritime container shipping may 
serve as an ideal platform to deliver these weapons to the United 
States. In fact, we recently saw that containers may also serve as 
ideal platforms to transport potential terrorists into the United 
States. This was demonstrated on January 15 and again on April 2 of 
this year when upwards of 30 Chinese immigrants were found emerging 
from containers arriving at the Port of Los Angeles. The Subcommittee's 
concern is that smuggled immigrants could include members of terrorist 
organizations--and/or--that the container could have contained a weapon 
of mass destruction.
  As the 9/11 Commission put it so succinctly, ``opportunities to do 
harm are as great, or greater, in maritime or surface transportation.'' 
Since 90 percent of global trade moves in maritime containers, we can 
not allow these containers to be utilized to transport weapons of mass 
destruction. The consequences of such an event would be devastating to 
our way of life and our economy.
  Instead, we must secure our supply chain before we pay the high price 
of an attack, and seek the appropriate balance between two often 
competing priorities: security and speed. This balancing act resulted 
in the creation of two prominent homeland security programs--the 
Container Security Initiative, or CSI, and the Customs-Trade 
Partnership Against Terrorism, or C-TPAT. CSI effectively pushed our 
borders out by placing CBP offices in foreign ports to inspect 
containers before they reach our shores. C-TPAT exemplified a true 
public-private partnership, in which the private sector took a leading 
role in securing its supply chain. These programs alone are laudable--
but due to the sheer magnitude of the challenge of securing the global 
supply chain--we must continue to improve upon these promising 
initiatives.
  With that in mind, as Chairman of the Permanent Subcommittee on 
Investigations, I have directed the Subcommittee's 3-year effort to 
bolster America's port security and supply chain security. We have 
identified numerous weaknesses in our programs that secure the global 
supply chain. A brief overview of these problems illustrates the 
challenges confronting these efforts:
  In CSI, the Subcommittee found that only a de minimus number of such 
high-risk containers are actually inspected. In fact, the vast majority 
of high-risk containers are simply not inspected overseas. To make 
matters worse, the U.S. Government has not established minimum 
standards for these inspections.
  The Subcommittee initially found that an overwhelming proportion of 
C-TPAT companies enjoy the benefits before DHS conducts a thorough on-
site inspection, called a validation. As of July 2006 this proportion 
has improved considerably to where 49 percent of the participating 
companies have been subjected to a validation. But this still leaves 51 
percent of companies that have not been subjected to any legitimate, 
on-site review to ensure that their security practices pass muster.
  The Subcommittee found that DHS uses a flawed system to identify 
high-risk shipping containers entering U.S. ports. According to CBP 
officials, the Automated Targeting System or ATS is largely dependent 
on ``one of the least reliable or useful types of information for 
targeting purposes,'' including cargo manifest data and bills of 
lading. Moreover, the Subcommittee found that this targeting system has 
never been tested or validated, and may not discern actual, realistic 
risks.
  Currently, only 70 percent of cargo containers entering U.S. ports 
are screened for nuclear or radiological materials. One part of the 
problem is that the deployment of radiation detection equipment is 
woefully behind schedule. As of August 29, 2006, the Department of 
Homeland Security has deployed only 43 percent of the necessary 
radiation monitors at priority seaports.
  These are just a handful of the significant problems discovered by 
the Subcommittee. In short, America's supply chain security remains 
vulnerable. Our enemies could compromise the global supply chain to 
smuggle a Weapon of Mass Destruction, WMD, or even terrorists, into 
this country. This legislation tackles these concerns--and many other 
weaknesses--in a coherent and comprehensive manner.
  The SAFE Port Act addresses the problem of inadequate nuclear and 
radiological screening, by requiring the Secretary of DHS to develop a 
strategy for deployment of radiatioction capabilities and mandating 
that, by December 2007, all containers entering the United States 
through the busiest 22 seaports shall be examined for radiation; 
requires DHS to develop, implement, and update a strategic plan improve 
the security of the international cargo supply chain. In particular the 
plan will identify and address gaps, provide improvements and goals, 
and establish protocols for the resumption of trade after a critical 
incident; requires DHS to identify and request reliable and essential 
information about containers moving through the international supply 
chain; requires DHS to promulgate a rule to establish minimum standards 
and procedures for securing containers in transit to the U.S.; provides 
Congressional authorization for the CSI program, empowering cap to 
identify, examine or search maritime containers before U.S.-bound cargo 
is loaded in a foreign port as well as establish standards for the use 
of scanning and radiation detection equipment at CSI ports; and 
authorizes C-TPAT and establishes certain minimum security and other 
requirements that applicants must meet to be eligible for C-TPAT 
benefits.

  Even if we pass this legislation, our job is not completed. We still 
need to look to the future and develop even more effective and advanced 
programs and technology. Effectively scanning containers with both an 
x-ray and a radiation scan is the only definitive answer to the 
perplexing and most important question of ``what's in the box?''
  However, in fiscal year 2005, only 0.38 percent of containers were 
screened

[[Page S10817]]

with a nonintrusive imaging device and only 2.8 percent of containers 
were screened for radiation prior to entering the United States. DHS' 
efforts have improved somewhat from last year's paltry numbers, but we 
have more work to do. To date, DHS still uses a risk-based approach 
that targets only high-risk containers. While this approach is 
fundamentally sound, the system used to target high-risk containers has 
yet to be validated or proven to accurately identify high-risk 
containers. Moreover, the validity of the intelligence used to enhance 
this system's targeting ability is increasingly in question. Thus, we 
need to both enhance our targeting capability and use technology to 
enhance our ability to increase inspections--without impeding the flow 
of commerce.
  While the United States currently inspects approximately 5 percent of 
all maritime containers, the partial pilot test in the Port of Hong 
Kong demonstrates the potential to scan 100 percent of all shipping 
containers. Each container in the Hong Kong port flows through an 
integrated system featuring an imaging machine, a radiation scan, and a 
system to identify the container. Coupling these technologies together 
allows for the most complete scan of a container currently available. 
The Hong Kong concept or similar technology holds great promise and 
could lead to a dramatic improvement in the efficacy of our supply 
chain security.
  I am pleased to say that this legislation develops a pilot program in 
three foreign seaports, each with unique features and varying levels of 
trade volume to test integrated scanning systems using non-intrusive 
inspected radiation detection equipment. It requires full-scale pilot 
implementation within 1 year after enactment and an evaluation report 
would be required to be submitted to Congress 120 days after full 
implementation of the pilot. If the pilot programs prove successful, 
then full-scale implementation would follow.
  The bottom line is this: we are safer now than we were yesterday, but 
we are not safe enough. The question then becomes: how do we get there? 
In the words of the hockey legend Wayne Gretzky, ``A good hockey player 
plays where the puck is. A great hockey player plays where the puck is 
going to be.'' In other words, we cannot safeguard a post 9/11 America 
by using pre-9/11 methods. If we think that the terrorists are not 
plotting their next move, we are mistaken. We must find where the gaps 
are in our Nation's homeland security and close them before an attack 
happens. That is the only way to guarantee our security.
  I agree with what Secretary Chertoff articulated at our full 
Committee DHS budget hearing, ``the worst thing would be this: to have 
a program for reliable cargo that was insufficiently robust so that 
people could sneak in and use it as a Trojan Horse. That would be the 
worst of all worlds.'' By reforming and strengthening C-TPAT, CSI, ATS, 
by expediting the, deployment of sophisticated radiation portal 
monitors and testing the ability to scan 100 percent of cargo before it 
enters the United States, the SAFE Port Act closes gaps in our homeland 
security and makes us safer.
  The conference report was agreed to.
  (The conference report is printed in the proceedings of the House in 
the Record of September 29, 2006).

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