[Congressional Record Volume 152, Number 125 (Friday, September 29, 2006)]
[Senate]
[Pages S10618-S10632]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY APPROPRIATIONS ACT, 2007--CONFERENCE
REPORT
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senate will
proceed to the consideration of the conference report to accompany H.R.
5441, which the clerk will report.
The legislative clerk read as follows:
The committee of conference on the disagreeing votes of the
two Houses on the amendment of the Senate to the bill (H.R.
5441) ``making appropriations for the Department of Homeland
Security for the fiscal year ending September 30th, 2007, and
for other purposes'', having met, have agreed that the House
recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate,
and agree to the same with an amendment, and the
[[Page S10619]]
Senate agree to the same, signed by a majority of the
conferees on the part of both Houses.
The Senate proceeded to consider the conference report.
(The conference report is printed in the House proceedings of the
Record of September 28, 2006.)
section 550
Mr. VOINOVICH. Mr. President, I rise to engage in a colloquy with my
good friends, Senator Pryor, Senator Domenici, and Senator Warner. To
my colleagues, it is my understanding that a question as to the intent
of the chemical facility security provision has arisen. Senator Pryor,
in your view, what is the meaning of section 550 with respect to its
effect on State laws or rules?
Mr. PRYOR. I thank the Senator from Ohio for raising this important
question. Section 550 does not contain any language regarding its
preemptive effect. I know there have been some in the other House who
believe that this silence means the legislation would have no effect on
State or local attempts to regulate chemical security--in other words,
that it gives them a green light to go farther. I want to state clearly
my belief to the contrary. As we all know, under well-established
Supreme Court precedent, a Federal law that is silent in this way can
still occupy the field and impliedly preempt any State legislation on
the same topic. Historically, Congress has done so in the security
area, whether it be nuclear security or aviation security.
Mr. VOINOVICH. I thank Senator Pryor for his statement because I
agree with it. I know my good friend from Virginia, Senator Warner,
also has views on this. Senator Warner, in your view, what is the
meaning of section 550 with respect to its effect on State laws or
rules.
Mr. WARNER. I also thank the Senator from Ohio for raising this
important question. I concur with the assessment of my good friend from
Arkansas regarding the preemptive effect of this chemical facility
provision. As the Senator noted, there is strong Supreme Court
precedent regarding the implied preemption of State laws, especially as
it relates to homeland security, homeland defense, and national
security. There are several examples of statutes that remain silent
with regard to the effect on State laws and it has been my belief
throughout the entire debate on chemical security legislation that this
precedent should hold true if we did not explicitly speak to the issue
to State preemption.
Mr. VOINOVICH. I thank Senator Warner for his statement. I strongly
agree with the assessment that Congress and the Federal Government have
the duty to provide for the security of our States and our people.
Further, the importance of a single, integrated set of comprehensive
national standards is vital to the security of this sector. I see my
good friend from New Mexico here as well. I ask the Senator from New
Mexico if he has further views on the meaning of section 550 with
respect to its effect on State laws or rules.
Mr. DOMENICI. I thank the Senator from Ohio for this important
discussion. I also concur with the assessment of my colleagues, Senator
Pryor and Senator Warner. This issue was discussed at length before the
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. The effect of
silence on the chemical security language in question is clear. Federal
law that is silent in this way can still occupy the field and impliedly
preempt any State legislation on the same topic. Further, the
precedence for Federal preemption in regulatory matters dealing with
security is clear. In the interest of national security, the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission was created to oversee the nuclear facilities.
Given the importance of this critical infrastructure and the clear
national security concerns, the Federal Government has exclusive
regulatory authority. I concur with my colleagues who have noted that
in matters of national security the Federal Government should perform
its constitutional duty to defend the homeland.
Mr. VOINOVICH. I thank my good friend from New Mexico for his
comments, and I strongly agree with his assessment. It is the Federal
Government's preeminent role when it comes to matters of national
security to set a uniform set of rules with which the regulated
community must comply. I feel strongly that this provision sets that
uniform set of rules and in so doing, impliedly preempts further
regulation by State rules or laws.
WARNING, ALERT, AND RESPONSE NETWORK ACT
Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I rise to ask my colleague from Alaska
about the Warning, Alert, and Response Network Act, or WARN Act, that
is part of the SAFE Port Act that is before the Senate. The WARN Act
will authorize a wireless alert capability to provide citizens with
emergency alerts on their wireless devices. This is an important
enhancement to the emergency alert system that FEMA currently operates.
I would note that the language in the WARN Act does not alter FEMA's
role in the emergency alert system. It is my understanding that this
language directing the FCC to develop the wireless capabilities will
not interfere with the Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
Committee considering and reporting legislation next year to further
clarify FEMA's role with respect to the emergency alert system and new
technologies. Is that correct?
Mr. STEVENS. The Senator's understanding is correct. The
Parliamentarian's office has indicated to my staff that the wireless
alert capability language in the act does not preclude the Homeland
Security and Governmental Affairs Committee from considering
legislation next year to address FEMA's role with respect to the
emergency alert system, and I commit to working with you to develop a
bill that will set forth FEMA's role with respect to new emergency
alert capabilities.
Ms. COLLINS. Thank you, Senator. I look forward to your support in
addressing FEMA's role in the emergency alert system in legislation
next year.
WESTERN HEMISPHERE TRAVEL INITIATIVE
Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, I rise today for the purpose of engaging in
a colloquy with my colleagues from the Senate Homeland Security
Appropriations Subcommittee, Senator Stevens, Subcommittee Chairman
Gregg and Subcommittee Ranking Member Byrd. We would like to discuss
the intent of section 546 of the fiscal year 2007 Department of
Homeland Security Appropriations conference report regarding the
Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative, WHTI.
In 2004, Congress passed and the President signed into law the
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act, which included a
provision creating WHTI as a means of better securing our borders. The
provisions require that all individuals, including U.S. citizens,
present a passport or its equivalent in order to verify identity and
citizenship when they enter the United States from neighboring
countries, including Canada or Mexico. As currently set out by the
administration, the law would take effect on January 1, 2007, for
airports and seaports and on January 1, 2008, for land crossings.
As those deadlines loom ever closer, my colleagues and I have grown
more and more concerned that the plan has been poorly planned and there
is a considerable lack of adequate coordination not only among the
Departments of Homeland Security and State, which are charged with
implementing the initiative but also with the governments of Canada and
Mexico. I fear that we face a train wreck on the horizon if the plan
steams along as is.
The senior senator from Alaska most definitely recognizes how
improper implementation of WHTI could impede the flow of people and
goods across our borders. The residents of his home State especially
would face unique challenges under WHTI because all Alaskans have to
cross into Canada before entering the continental United States by
land.
Mr. STEVENS. The Senator from Vermont is correct. The Department of
Homeland Security and the State Department are now in the process of
developing the rules needed to implement this initiative. The State
Department is proposing an alternate form of documentation to be
accepted for land border crossings known as a passcard. The passcard
would be slightly less expensive than a passport but would still
require the same adjudication and background check as a passport and
could only be used for land travel between our country, Canada and
Mexico.
Many of my constituents travel to Canada every day. I believe each
Senator from Idaho, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, New Hampshire,
[[Page S10620]]
New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Vermont and Washington will
agree it is imperative that the travel requirements between Canada and
the United States be implemented in a manner that does not adversely
affect Americans. To date, the construction and price of the passcards
have not been established. Passcards are essential to ensure the flow
of travel and business activities between the United States and other
countries is not hindered.
I am also concerned with the looming date of implementation for WHTI.
The administration's current plan is to implement the air and sea
portion of the initiative by January 2007, this coming January. This
means that in just 3 months all U.S. citizens traveling by air and sea
from Canada and Mexico or the Caribbean will need a passport to enter
this country.
The intent of language included in the Homeland bill is in no way
meant to indefinitely delay the implementation of this initiative.
Securing our borders is important, and I support these efforts. I want
to make sure the State Department is prepared to adjudicate the large
number of requests for passports and passcards this initiative will
produce.
Our language also creates a single implementation date for land and
sea crossings. Families often take a cruise to Alaska, and continue
their vacations in Canada. In order to avoid confusion to these
travelers, we must have one date in which they are expected to have new
documentation, rather than the current plan to implement sea this
January and land in January 2008. Further, they should be able to use
the passcard for both land and sea crossings, rather than requiring a
passport for the sea portion of a vacation.
I believe DHS and the State Department are operating under an
unrealistic timeframe. We must ensure they have enough time to properly
test and implement this system, which includes biometrics and new
border security equipment. We must also clearly set out guidelines we
expect to be met before this initiative can be implemented. This is
what we hope to achieve with the language we included in the Homeland
bill.
Mr. LEAHY. Like Alaskans, Vermonters have strong economic ties to
Canada and depend on the efficient movement of products across
international borders. Many Vermont families, including mine,
frequently travel to Canada to visit family members living there or to
spend a weekend in the beautiful cities of Montreal or Quebec City.
Similarly, our Canadian friends enjoy many Vermont treasures, including
our ski resorts and our own ``great lake,'' Lake Champlain. In 2003,
more than 2 million Canadians visited Vermont, spending $188 million
while here.
Additionally, Vermont has a number of small towns along the border
that depend on access to neighboring Canadian towns. In some cases,
these towns share emergency assistance, grocery stores, and other basic
services. Residents sometimes cross the border on foot several times a
day just to conduct routine business. Other northern border States
enjoy similar trade and tourism benefits with Canada and could face
significant downturns in their economies if this law is not implemented
properly.
At a cost of about $100, passports are an expensive hardship for
many, especially families would not otherwise travel abroad. The
proposed PASS Card is a less costly alternative but also raises a
number of new concerns, including issues of privacy and effectiveness.
On top of that, DHS and State are still arguing over what technology to
embed in the card. I find it highly unlikely that the State Department
will be able to process the flood of requests for passports and PASS
cards that will come from this initiative by the deadline when key
decisions have still not been made.
Mr. STEVENS. These are just some of the issues which must be
considered before implementing this plan. In addition, the lack of
public outreach to inform citizens of the new requirements concerns me.
I see the potential for a disaster at our borders if regulations are
hastily imposed. There is just too much at stake to implement a travel
system that has not been properly tested, and this is why Senators
Leahy, Gregg, Byrd, I worked together with House Homeland Security
Appropriations Subcommittee Chairman Rogers to craft bipartisan
language to extend the WHTI implementation date. Our language simply
gives the State Department and DHS more time to make sure this is done
right.
Mr. GREGG. I believe the proper implementation of WHTI is imperative.
I wish to emphasize that the Departments of Homeland Security and State
can move forward with the full implementation of WHTI before June I,
2009--but to do so they must comply with all legislated criteria. These
legislated criteria are designed to ensure that the PASS Card protects
the privacy of our citizens, that readers have been installed at all
ports of entry, that all employees have been properly trained--in
short, that the system works, before it is used by millions of
citizens. And I emphasize that implementation, meaning putting the
system into operation can occur at any time but no later than June 1,
2009, if the conditions, which are designed for proper operations, are
met.
Mr. BYRD. I, for one, will definitely be interested to see how the
Department of Homeland Security and the Department of State are
progressing on WHTI implementation. And we will be able to do so
because we mandate that the Departments provide quarterly briefings on
the progress being made on WHTI implementation and that the first
briefing should be no later than December 1, 2006.
Mr. LEAHY. My colleagues are both correct. While hasty implementation
could result in avoidable problems for all those who will be affected
by this Initiative, we also want to make sure that it is done on a
reasonable timetable. Our amendment requires a modest implementation
delay to June 1, 2009, and also requires that certain technological
goals are met in the design of the PASS Card to ensure that the
strictest standards are in place to protect personal information.
Though it has been two years since the Intelligence Act requirement
became law, the agencies have made little progress to implement WHTI.
This provision (Sec. 546) provides additional guidance to the agencies
to insure smooth implementation.
Our language also requires the Departments of Homeland Security and
State to certify prior to implementation that a cost for the PASS Card
has been agreed upon, that all border authorities are familiar with the
technology, and that the technology has been shared with the Canadian
and Mexican authorities. These are just a few of the steps we have
taken in this amendment to ensure that the transition to an increased
security environment is done without creating unnecessary obstacles.
And the Senate and House Appropriations Committees will most
certainly share the Homeland Security Department and the State
Department report to us on how they are progressing in meeting the
program criteria and moving toward implementation.
I thank my colleagues for all their hard work on reaching an
agreement on this language. With it, we greatly increase our chances
for the successful implementation of the Western Hemisphere Travel
Initiative.
Mr. LAUTENBERG. Mr. President, one of the most important parts of
this Department of Homeland Security appropriations bill is a section
that should not be in it at all. It is a perfect example of how the
majority has decided to legislate: make back room deals and pass phony
protections instead of real ones.
I am speaking about the section that purports to adopt chemical
security protections for our country.
To illustrate what chemical security means, and why it is so
important, let me tell you what happened on Tuesday in Elizabeth, NJ. A
worker at a trucking company accidentally ruptured a small pressurized
gas tank and released a cloud of sulfur dioxide into the air. Workers
at nearby storage and shipping facilities became ill. Truck drivers in
the area abandoned their vehicles as their lungs burned and they
couldn't breathe. People on the side of the road were vomiting. Fifty-
eight people--including a first responder--were taken to the hospital.
That was a small accident. Imagine if a terrorist blew up a large
chemical facility.
To understand the impact, all you have to do is drive 9 miles down
the
[[Page S10621]]
road from Elizabeth to Kearny, NJ, home to the Nation's most dangerous
chemical plant. Kearny is a blue-collar, working-class town. Forty-
thousand residents--men, women and children--make Kearney home. An act
of terror at the Kuehne chemical facility could put Kearny--and the
twelve million Americans who live within fourteen miles of the plant at
risk. No wonder that facilities storing large amounts of chemicals have
been called ``pre-positioned weapons of mass destruction'' by homeland
security experts.
One would think that the majority and the administration would do all
it can to stop an attack in Kearny--or at any of America's nearly
15,000 chemical facilities. Republican leaders have put together a
counterfeit bill that they are trying to pawn off as ``chemical
security,'' but we are not buying it, and neither should the American
people.
Recognizing that this was a problem even before 9/11, I introduced
the Nation's first chemical plant security bill in 1999. And earlier
this year, Senator Obama and I introduced a new comprehensive chemical
security bill that seeks to protect the American people--not the
chemical industry. The Republican leadership has brushed aside our
strong bill, and other legislation that has come out of the Homeland
Security committees in the Senate and the House.
Instead, the Republican leaders borrowed a page from the ``Dick
Cheney Energy Task Force'' playbook: lock the windows, bolt the doors
and meet with industry lobbyists. And what did the Republicans and
chemical industry lobbyists come up with? A fraudulent bill. The
chemical industry bill put forward by the Republicans fails to require
the safest practices at the highest-risk facilities. It is a bill that
fails to secure the nearly 15,000 facilities that store dangerous
chemicals. A bill that fails to protect drinking and waste water
facilities. And a bill that fails to make clear that states can adopt
stronger chemical security laws than the federal government.
So will this chemical security bill authored by the chemical
industry, the majority, and the administration make the Nation safer?
No. The public should not be fooled. Because this fake chemical
security bill has been attached to the Homeland Security appropriations
bill, most Senators will vote for it. But make no mistake, it is not
what we want or need.
We need a bill that requires all chemical plant owners to improve the
security of their sites, and when possible, replace toxic chemicals
with safer ones. We need a bill that makes perfectly clear that states
can adopt stronger laws than the toothless version the majority are
doing here. We don't need the majority, the White House, and the
chemical industry deciding the fate of towns like Kearny or Elizabeth
behind closed doors.
All of this is more reason we need a new direction in Washington.
Ms. CANTWELL. Mr. President, I come to the floor today to speak to
the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act of 2007.
Since 9/11, we have made significant progress in bolstering the
defense of our Nation against terrorism. Today, Americans are safer
than they were just 5 years ago. However, as we learned from the
recently released National Security Estimate, the threat of terrorism
continues.
As a border State and a major thoroughfare for trade, Washington
State faces incredible security challenges. Along our northern border,
official checkpoints are separated by miles of vast, rural and rugged
terrain
The Ports of Seattle and Tacoma make up the Nation's third largest
container center. Puget Sound is home to America's largest ferry
system, transporting more than 26 million passengers and 11 million
vehicles annually throughout the area.
The Homeland Security Appropriations Act of 2007 provides vital
resources to build on the progress we have made to make our Nation more
secure and citizens safer.
It contains specific provisions that I am very proud to have worked
on--provisions that I believe make a strong bill even stronger.
I will speak about those provisions in just a moment, but first, I
want to take a moment to acknowledge the steadfast leadership and
stalwart dedication of the bill's managers, Senator Gregg and Senator
Byrd.
This bill recognizes that as a Nation, we still need to make serious
investments in our National security.
That is why we're adding significant resources--more than $21
billion--to better secure our borders.
This includes $2.2 billion to add 1,500 agents to monitor and
apprehend criminals--criminal or people crossing the border--and $1.4
billion for detention facilities, including nearly 7,000 additional
detention beds to end our failed ``catch and release'' policy.
Using cutting edge technology is critical to securing our 4,000-mile-
long northern border. With vast, rural and rugged terrain, physical
barriers provide limited benefits along much of the northern border.
The right tools can provide critical intelligence about areas that
have previously gone unsecured for so long.
This legislation includes a provision, which I offered with Senator
Baucus, directing the Department of Homeland Security to work with the
Federal Aviation Administration to test the use of unmanned aerial
vehicles on the northern border.
UAVs with extended range can conduct prolonged surveillance sweeps
over remote border areas, relaying information to border agents on the
ground.
This will modernize our patrol capabilities and enable us to reach
hundreds of miles of previously unguarded border.
It is time to get serious, smart and practical by using the best
proven resources out there.
I have also sponsored a provision included in this legislation
directing the Department of Homeland Security and State Department to
work with Canadian officials and State and local first responders to
identify border security challenges--including interoperable
communications--in preparation for the 2010 Olympics.
Lastly, I was proud to join Senator Feinstein to secure a provision
criminalizing the construction of smuggling tunnels under our borders
and putting into law stiff penalties for anyone building or using such
tunnels.
In July 2005, we discovered a smuggling tunnel between Canada and
Washington State. It had been used to traffic drugs, but it's all too
clear that tunnels could just as easily be exploited by terrorists to
enter undetected into our country.
The legislation before us also provides more than $4.3 billion to
improve the security of our ports and the global supply chain.
This includes: More than $2 billion to the Coast Guard; $210 million
in port security grants; $420 million for radiation and gamma ray
inspection equipment for scanning cargo containers; and nearly $200
million to screen cargo containers at foreign ports and collaborate
with private entities to enhance supply chain security.
Focusing on security where cargo is loaded abroad, at the point of
origin, is vital to achieving security for our ports here at home.
I am proud to have cosponsored a provision with Senators Coleman and
Schumer, included in this legislation, which directs the Department of
Homeland Security to test a new integrated container inspection system
at three foreign ports.
This technology has already shown promise at the Port of Hong Kong.
And I believe that testing this system is the next important step to
move us toward 100 percent screening of containers.
From our borders to our ports, this legislation also represents a
significant investment in the security of our transportation systems.
In light of the foiled terrorist operation in the U.K. on August 10,
I remain especially concerned about aviation security.
As we all now know, a network of terrorist cells planned to down as
many as 10 U.S. airliners by smuggling liquid explosives onto flights.
The foiled plot provides a stark reminder of the serious gaps which
continue to impede our efforts to secure the commercial airline
industry.
In 1994, we learned the dangers of our inability to screen passengers
for liquid chemicals that could be combined to create an improvised
explosive device, when Ramzi Yousef successfully bombed Philippines
Airline flight 434. In 1995 they uncovered the infamous ``Bojinka''
plot in Manila.
[[Page S10622]]
Yet more than 10 years later, we still have not developed a
technology that can be deployed in airports to screen passengers for
these substances.
To fix this, we need to make a strong investment in research and
development.
The Senate version of this legislation--which passed before the
August U.K. terrorist threat--had only $5 million slated for research
and development of explosive countermeasures, under the Science and
Technology directorate at the Department of Homeland Security.
After the Senate returned from August recess, I wrote to Chairman
Gregg requesting that he work in conference to increase funding for
explosive detection research under the Science and Technology
directorate.
The conference report before us today includes nearly $87 million in
explosives research funding and I want to thank Senator Gregg for
working in conference to accommodate this request.
The explosives detection problem is both urgent and technically
challenging. Passenger screening technology must be efficient,
reliable, and effective.
The latest threats make it clear that we need to accelerate our work
to find innovative solutions to evolving challenges.
We must be smart and tough in our fight against global terrorism. Our
first priority must be ensuring that Americans are safe.
We have come a long way since 9/11. We have worked hard and made
progress and we are safer today.
But it is clear: We need to do more to stop terrorists and their
schemes.
We can't let down our guard--at our borders, at our ports, on our
passenger planes.
The legislation before us today builds on progress we have made and
delivers strong and serious investments so we can do even more.
Americans deserve to know that we are doing everything we can to
secure our country and keep them safe.
Again, I want to thank the managers of this bill for their efforts. I
look forward to working with them as we continue fighting to secure our
Nation.
Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, I wish to voice my strong support for
efforts to secure our Nation's borders, which remain porous. We must
immediately address this threat to our national security and make
certain that we allow local officials greater involvement as they work
with the Secretary of Homeland Security regarding the location of
border fencing.
I have consistently supported and voted in favor of border security
efforts--such as the installation of reinforced fencing in strategic
areas where high trafficking of narcotics, unlawful border crossings,
and other criminal activity exists. I have also supported installing
physical barriers, roads, lighting, cameras, and sensors where
necessary.
Throughout our debate on comprehensive immigration reform, I have
stressed the need to secure our Nation's borders--not only our
southwest border with Mexico, but also our northern border with Canada,
our maritime borders, coastlines and ports of entry. We must secure our
borders first, but we must also work toward a comprehensive solution
that addresses the needs of commerce and our economy.
The Secure Fence Act of 2006 is needed, and serves as our downpayment
with the American people on what we must do to address border
security--so that we can then move forward to address comprehensive
immigration reform.
To this date, we have hired, trained, deployed 11,300 Border Patrol
agents, ended catch and release, accelerated the deportation process,
and expanded the number of beds in detention centers to almost 23,000.
We have also provided an additional $1.9 billion in immediate funding
for border security to cover the first 1,000 of 6,000 new Border Patrol
agents who will be deployed in the next 2 years. These funds will
assist with the temporary deployment of up to 6,000 National Guard
troops aiding the Border Patrol with surveillance and logistics.
I will continue to champion border security measures and strongly
support the efforts of my colleagues to strengthen our southwest
border--protecting our citizens from threats of terrorism, narcotic
trafficking, and other unlawful entries. However, I am concerned about
Congress making decisions about the location of the border fencing
without the participation of State and local law enforcement
officials working with the Secretary of Homeland Security. These
locations should not be dictated by Congress.
Our border States have borne a heavy financial burden from illegal
immigration and their local officials are on the front lines. Their
knowledge and experience should not be ignored. Texas shares
approximately one-half of the land border between the United States of
America and the Republic of Mexico. As such, State and local officials
in California, Arizona, New Mexico, and Texas should not be excluded
from decisions about how to best protect our borders with their varying
topography, population, and geography.
Local officials in my home State of Texas--particularly in the areas
of El Paso, Del Rio to Eagle Pass, and Laredo to Brownville--cited in
the underlying bill, will not have an opportunity to participate in
decisions regarding the exact location of fencing and other physical
infrastructure near their communities. Because the time constraints
imposed by the pending adjournment will not permit a resolution of this
very important issue at this time, I asked for, and received, a
commitment from our Senate majority leader and the Speaker of the House
of Representatives promising to address these concerns.
The letter addressed to the chairs of the Senate and House Committees
on the Judiciary and Homeland Security states that prior to adjournment
of the 109th Congress, we will act on this issue.
Ours is a nation of laws and we must be a nation of secure borders. I
stand ready to work with my colleagues to enact meaningful legislation
in this session of Congress that addresses border security first and
that ensures our local communities will be involved in the decisions
that have such a dramatic impact on the lives of their constituents. I
appreciate the commitments of our Senate leader and the Speaker and
look forward to working with them on this important issue.
In addition, I have been given a separate letter on this subject from
Leader Frist, and I ask unanimous consent that both of these letters be
printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
U.S. Senate,
Office of the Majority Leader,
Washington, DC, September 29, 2006.
Hon. Kay Bailey Hutchison,
Russell Senate Office Building,
Washington, DC.
Dear Senator Hutchison: I am enclosing a copy of a letter
signed today by myself and Speaker Hastert in which we
outline a number of important additional border security
measures that we plan to take prior to adjournment.
In this letter, the Speaker and I have pledged to respond
to the concerns raised regarding the lack of opportunity for
local officials, such as those in the areas of El Paso, Del
Rio through Eagle Pass, and Laredo to Brownsville, to
participate in decisions related to location of border
fencing.
Thank you for taking the time to bring this important issue
to my attention and to that of our colleagues.
I look forward to working with you upon our return to
complete this action.
Sincerely,
William H. Frist,
Majority Leader.
____
Congress of the United States,
Washington, DC, September 29, 2006.
Hon. Peter King,
Chairman, House Homeland Security Committee, House of
Representatives, Washington, DC.
Hon. James Sensenbrenner,
Chairman, House Committee on the Judiciary, House of
Representatives, Washington, DC.
Hon. Susan Collins,
Chairman, Senate Homeland Security and Government Affairs
Committee, U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
Hon. Arlen Specter,
Chairman, Senate Judiciary Committee, U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC.
Dear Chairmen: Following passage of the Secure Fence Act of
2006, the following actions will be taken before adjournment
of the 109th Congress:
First we will work with the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) to ensure they consult with representatives of U.S.
state and local governments, including Native American
tribes, regarding the exact placement of fencing and other
physical infrastructure along the southwest border of the
United States.
Second, legislation should require the Secretary of
Homeland Security to put fencing
[[Page S10623]]
and physical barriers in areas of high illegal entry into the
United States, yet allow flexibility to use alternative
physical infrastructure and technology when fencing is
ineffective or impractical.
Third, the legislation should clarify the definition of
operational control of the border to ensure accountability
and a workable standard for the Department.
We have spoken to the Administration and know that they
fully support these proposals and we expect that they will
actively support our effort to make these changes before the
end of the year.
Sincerely,
J. Dennis Hastert,
Speaker, House of Representatives.
William H. Frist,
Majority Leader, U.S. Senate.
Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, for years, homeland security experts
have been warning that chemical facilities are one of our most glaring
homeland security vulnerabilities. Yet Congressional efforts to empower
the Department of Homeland Security to regulate such facilities have
foundered in the face of administration inaction and opposition from
some industry groups and their allies. That is why I am pleased that
Congress has at last authorized DHS to begin regulating some of the
most risky chemical facilities.
Specifically, the Department of Homeland Security appropriations
conference report directs the Secretary of Homeland Security to begin
regulating high risk chemical facilities. It gives DHS 6 months to
develop interim regulations for chemical site security and specifies
that the program should require chemical facilities to develop
vulnerability assessments and site security plans. DHS would have to
review such documents and approve or disapprove the security plans
based on whether they address the vulnerabilities identified for that
facility and meet security performance standards designed by the
Department. The Secretary would have authority to audit and inspect
facilities in the program and to seek civil penalties against those who
do not comply. The Secretary could also order the shutdown of a
facility that does not meet the standards until it comes into
compliance.
This is undoubtedly progress, and I hope DHS will fulfill its
responsibility to promptly and vigorously exercise this new authority
to address an extremely dangerous homeland security weakness.
But while this provision is an improvement on the status quo, it
falls well short of what we need to fully address this threat. That is
particularly disappointing because both the House and Senate Homeland
Security Committees have approved bipartisan, comprehensive chemical
security bills that could have and should have received floor debate
and become the basis for final legislation this fall. I deeply regret
that we were not able to advance the bipartisan committee bills or to
retain many of their provisions.
On the Senate side, Senator Collins and I introduced the Senate
chemical security bill, S. 2145, after holding four hearings on
chemical security this session and consulting with many interested
parties. Our legislation was marked up in the Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs Committee in mid-June, and reported out on a 15 to
0 vote. While that bill did not include everything I wished, it was a
balanced and comprehensive program for chemical security that was able
to garner broad support on the Committee. I wish to address a few
specific issues that were part of S. 2145 but which have been lost or
distorted in this chemical security provision.
First, let me speak to the issue of inherently safer technology or
IST. The bipartisan chemical security bill approved by the Senate
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee recognizes that
sometimes the best security will come not from adding guards and gates
but from reexamining the way chemical operations are carried out in
order to reduce the amount of hazardous substances on site, improve the
way they are stored or processed, or find safer substitutes for the
chemicals themselves. These changes limit the loss of life or other
damage in the event of an attack and therefore make a facility a less
inviting target for terrorists to begin with. They also have the added
benefit of limiting the harm from an accidental release. S. 2145
clearly requires facilities to look at the risks and consequences
related to the dangerous chemicals on site and address those specific
vulnerabilities in their security plan. And it includes these process
changes among the menu of security measures that chemical facilities
should examine when designing their security plans.
The House chemical security bill, H.R. 5695, goes further and would
require high risk chemical facilities to implement safer technologies
under certain conditions. That requirement is similar to an amendment I
offered at markup which, had it been adopted, would have required the
riskiest chemical facilities to consider such technologies and
implement them if feasible.
This is not a question of forcing industry to conduct its operations
off a government-issued play book. Companies would analyze for
themselves whether there are less dangerous ways to conduct their
business and would not be required to implement any changes that were
not feasible or merely shifted risk elsewhere. But given the
extraordinary risks involved, it is imperative that companies be
required to at least take a long hard look at some of the commonsense
solutions that have been advocated or already adopted by others within
the industry.
Unfortunately, the chemical security provision included in the DHS
appropriations conference report has no language to encourage safer
technologies, and actually includes language aimed at preventing the
Secretary from even urging a facility to consider such options.
Second, I regret that this chemical security provision includes
flawed language on information protection and judicial review. Of
course, none of us would want to release sensitive information about a
chemical plant that would be useful to a terrorist. However, excessive
secrecy in a Government security program can actually make us less, not
more safe. This is because some degree of transparency is necessary to
help us make Government programs more accountable and effective. Also,
local communities and their elected officials deserve to know whether
local facilities are being kept safe against a terrorist attack, and
the community's vigilance can help make us all safer.
I believe S. 2145 as introduced achieved the right combination of
protecting real security information, while allowing enough disclosure
to create accountability. Unfortunately, those carefully drafted
provisions have been replaced, in this measure, by a mechanism that
will impose undue secrecy on information submitted and developed in
relation to this program and could deny the ability of Congress and
affected communities to ensure that the program operates effectively.
This measure also puts cumbersome restrictions on the use of such
information in court enforcement proceedings and includes an ill-
considered provision that would limit court review of a chemical
facility's conduct.
Finally, I am extremely disappointed that this measure does not
include the provision from S. 2145 guaranteeing States and localities
the right to enact stronger chemical security measures. S. 2145
explicitly recognizes that Congress is not the only body that can and
should help ensure the safety and security of the Nation's chemical
facilities. States and localities have long regulated such facilities
for various safety and environmental concerns. Since 9/11, some States
have also moved to require security improvements at these facilities.
These State and local protections are critical companions to our effort
at the Federal level and should not be displaced unless there is an
absolute conflict, such that it is impossible for a facility to comply
with both the Federal law and a State or local law or regulation on
chemical security. S. 2145 also specifies that it does not disrupt
State and local safety and environmental law regarding chemical
facilities, and it does not seek to dislodge or alter the operation of
State common law with respect to such facilities.
Contrary to calls by industry, the chemical security language
Congress is approving does not affirmatively preempt State and local
chemical security rules and I do not believe it should or will have the
effect of preempting such laws. Nevertheless, it is preferable that
Congress speak clearly and decisively
[[Page S10624]]
on such an important security matter, and it is unfortunate that the
conference report does not retain the strong antipreemption language of
our bipartisan Senate bill.
These are only a few of the issues that must be revisited, or visited
anew, in a complete authorization bill. This chemical security
provision is clearly a stopgap measure, one which will expire as soon
as we can replace it with a permanent authorization or, at the latest,
three years after enactment. So while we have given DHS the authority
immediately to begin regulating chemical facilities, we must not let up
in our efforts to reach agreement on a permanent and comprehensive
chemical security bill as soon as possible.
Mr. President, I rise today in support of the fiscal year 2007
Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, which will direct
nearly $35 billion toward strengthening the homeland security of this
great Nation. The measure, though imperfect, addresses one of my top
priorities, particularly the recreation of our ineffectual Federal
emergency management system into an organization capable of preparing
for and effectively responding to disasters, whether caused by nature
or terrorists.
This month, we observed the fifth anniversary of September 11--a day
that changed the course of history for this Nation. We are all united
in our desire to defeat the threat of global terrorism and to prevent
any more families from having to experience the unfathomable sense of
loss that the survivors of 9/11 have experienced.
I believe we have made real progress in strengthening our homeland
security since 9/11, and I am privileged to have had a role in bringing
about that progress. I must add, however, that we are still a ways off
from assuring the American people they are as safe as they should be.
We continue to work toward that goal, and each day we get a little bit
closer.
This appropriations bill moves us in the right direction in large
part because of its provisions to refashion the Federal Emergency
Management Agency in the wake of its disastrous preparations for and
response to Hurricane Katrina, the worst natural disaster in our
country's history which took the lives of over 1,500 citizens and
permanently altered the lives of millions more.
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee Chairman Susan
Collins and I conducted an 8-month-long investigation into the
government's disgraceful response to Hurricane Katrina. We found
negligence, lack of resources, lack of capability, and lack of
leadership at all levels of government, which, as we know too well,
resulted in the failure to relieve the massive suffering that occurred
along the gulf coast.
To guarantee more effective planning and a more successful response
in the future, Chairman Collins and I made a number of recommendations
in our final report, entitled ``A Nation Still Unprepared.'' The most
prominent of these recommendations, a FEMA redesign, is in this
legislation before us today. With these changes, which add strength and
commonsense restructuring, the Federal Government will be better
prepared to protect its citizens in times of disaster.
Let me briefly describe the most important provisions. First, we
elevate FEMA to a special, independent status within the Department of
Homeland Security much like what the Coast Guard and Secret Service now
have--so that reorganizations could only occur by congressional action.
The FEMA Administrator will be the President's principal adviser in an
emergency and the administrator and top regional officials will have to
have appropriate experience and qualifications for the job.
This legislation also restores unity to FEMA's preparedness and
response functions. In other words, there will be one organization--
FEMA--responsible for both responding to a disaster and planning and
training for that response.
To strengthen the ties between Federal and local officials, we will
elevate FEMA's regional offices, taking the focus away from Washington
and putting it where the real work of preparedness is performed: on the
front lines, in the States, towns, and cities most affected by a
disaster. The goal is to familiarize Federal officials with regional
and local threats, vulnerabilities, and capabilities and ensure that
they are familiar with each of them and their State and local
counterparts before disaster strikes.
The legislation also creates a new Office for Emergency
Communications dedicated to achieving the operability and
interoperability of emergency communications among first responders
that is fundamental to any disaster response.
These mission changes will begin to be put into place by authorizing
a 10 percent increase in FEMA's operations budget in each of the next 3
years--above the much-needed increase in FEMA's fiscal year 2007
appropriations that is included in this bill. Of course, more is
needed, but this legislation makes a start. In addition, we authorize
additional funds for States to carry out their disaster preparedness
responsibilities, including doubling funding for critical emergency
management performance grants.
This bill also provides additional assistance to people and
communities struck by disaster. It will, for example, allow FEMA more
flexibility in the type of housing it can provide disaster victims to
find more cost-effective alternatives to the widely criticized FEMA
trailers. It establishes measures to assist with family reunification.
And it requires FEMA to better address the needs of those with
disabilities in disaster preparedness training and an actual disaster.
As is inevitably the case, there are things missing from this bill
that would have made it better--provisions that were included in the
bill that Senator Collins and I introduced and that was passed out of
the Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee but that were
lost in conference. These include funding for a dedicated grant program
to support and promote communications interoperability among first
responders and additional assistance for individuals and communities
that fall victim to catastrophic disasters.
This appropriations bill advances the safety of all Americans in
other important ways. For the first time ever, the Department of
Homeland Security would have the authority to regulate high risk
chemical facilities. I am disappointed; however, that the bill does not
preserve more of the comprehensive and bipartisan legislation passed
out of both House and Senate homeland security committees. The Senate
bill, for example, guaranteed the rights of states to enact stronger
chemical security provisions. And both bills encouraged the use of
safer chemicals and methods to lessen the vulnerability of chemical
facilities in the first place. These provisions are vital because, as
we most recently observed with the breech of security here at our own
heavily guarded Capitol complex, guards and gates alone are always
subject to failure. The American people will not be safe from attacks
on these facilities until we provide comprehensive security.
September 11 showed us the flaws in our ability to detect and avert
terrorist attacks. Hurricane Katrina showed we still haven't grasped
many of the lessons of 9/11 and so we remain unprepared. This spending
bill moves us toward better preparedness and response to the
catastrophes we know await our future.
But, unfortunately, there is no cheap way to be better prepared. It
takes money--more money than this budget offers. Too few dollars have
been set aside to secure our ports, our transit systems, our railways.
Our first responders--who need equipment, training, interoperable
communications--continue to be critically under funded. The cuts this
bill makes in State homeland security funding are far less deep than
those proposed by the President in his budget this year, but they are
cuts nonetheless, and they continue what has been a disturbing downward
trend over the last few years. Since 2004, for example, the state
homeland security grant program--which provides the central
preparedness assistance to states throughout the country--has been
slashed by 69 percent.
Additional resources are needed, and I will continue to advocate for
them as a wise investment in the greater protection it will provide the
American people. But overall, I think this bill is a significant step
toward ensuring that
[[Page S10625]]
we have a strong, capable agency to lead the country's response to
future disasters, whether natural disasters or terrorist attacks--and
that is primarily why I will vote for its passage and urge my
colleagues to do the same.
Lastly, I thank all of the staff on the Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs Committee, whose many months of work investigating
the Katrina response and overseeing the recovery process, formulating
recommendations, fashioning those recommendations into legislation, and
guiding that legislation through the Congress has resulted in the
important changes to our nation's emergency preparedness and response
capabilities included in this appropriations bill. The minority staff
members are: Joyce Rechtschaffen, Laurie Rubenstein, Robert Muse,
Michael Alexander, Eric Andersen, David Berick, Dan Berkovitz, Stacey
Bosshardt, Janet Burrell, Scott Campbell, William Corboy, Troy Cribb,
Heather Fine, Boris Fishman, Susan Fleming, Jeffrey Greene, Elyse
Greenwald, Beth Grossman, R. Denton Herring, Holly Idelson, Kristine
Lam, Kevin Landy, Joshua Levy, Alysha Liljeqvist, F. James McGee,
Lawrence Novey, Siobhan Oat-Judge, Leslie Phillips, Alistair Anagnostou
Reader, Patricia Rojas, Mary Beth Schultz, Adam Sedgewick, Todd Stein,
Traci Taylor, Donny Ray Williams, and Jason Yanussi.
Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, I rise today to thank my colleagues for
their hard work on the fiscal year 2007 Department of Homeland Security
appropriations bill. I also want to congratulate my friend from New
Hampshire, Chairman Gregg, for his leadership in putting together a
package of funding that will secure our country's ports and borders and
strengthen immigration and customs enforcement. During this session of
the 109th Congress, we have spent a good deal of time considering
measures that would strengthen our borders and reform our immigration
system. I believe this spending bill is a testament to the
administration and the Senate's commitment to these issues.
In this bill, the conference agreed to provide a total of $34.8
billion to secure our Nation's borders and infrastructure. This marks
an overall increase of $2.3 billion over the fiscal year 2006 enacted
level, including supplemental funding, and includes a $1.8 billion
emergency spending provision for border security.
This bill specifically sets aside over $8 billion for Customs and
Border Protection. I represent a State that is directly impacted by its
southern border with Mexico, and I laud the provisions that provide
funding for 1,500 new Border Patrol agents. My home State of New Mexico
is also home to the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center, FLETC, and
the addition of extra Border Patrol agents prompted the conference to
provide $275.25 million for new facilities, salaries, and additional
instructors.
The bill also provides a $602.2 million for the U.S. Customs and
Border Patrol to procure and maintain air assets. I thank the chairman
for supporting my request for $20 in funding for unmanned aerial
vehicles, UAV's, and related support systems. The conference report
also provides $232.98 million for a border construction program. Funds
from this program will be used to construct and maintain border
facilities, and $7.46 million will be used to build vehicle barriers
along my State's international border with Mexico. We have heard a
great deal from Immigrations and Customs Enforcement, ICE, about the
need for additional bed space for apprehended illegal immigrants. The
committee provides a total of $3.89 billion in funding for ICE, of
which $153.4 million is to be used for additional detention bed space.
Mr. President, it is no easy task to prioritize funding of programs
related to homeland security. I am proud of Chairman Gregg's leadership
in ensuring that our Government has provided the resources and moneys
necessary to secure our borders and strengthen our enforcement systems.
Under the chairman's leadership, we have increased funding for border
security each year, and I am proud that we have done so again this
year.
Mr. GRASSLEY. Mr. President, I rise today to express frustration and
disappointment with a provision included in the fiscal year 2007
Homeland Security appropriations bill. The provision would extend the
deadline for the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative from 2008 to
2009.
On August 2 Senate Finance Committee held a hearing to highlight the
problems at our Nation's borders. We heard testimony from the
Government Accountability Office, GAO, about their undercover border
crossings over the last 3 years. The GAO agents used fake documents,
phony driver's licenses, and claims of U.S. citizenship in order to
enter the United States. According to the GAO, their undercover agents
got past the U.S. Customs and Border Patrol 42 of 45 times. CBP failed
to catch the intruders 93 percent of the time, proving that anyone with
a fake identification and a tall tale can get waived right in the
United States.
The committee also heard some very strong evidence as to why the
Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative, WHTI/Initiative, is important and
why we should make sure this law is implemented by the deadline
established by Congress. In 2004, Congress passed the Intelligence
Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act to require the Departments of State
and Homeland Security to implement a plan requiring a passport or other
document for all travelers entering the United States. We passed this
initiative in order to reduce the free travel across our borders by
potential terrorists, as recommended unanimously after an extensive
investigation by the bipartisan, independent 9/11 Commission.
At the hearing in August, CBP agreed that the initiative is important
and told us that they were working to be prepared for the January 1,
2008 deadline. They said the initiative and its passport requirement is
the ``gold standard.'' In fact, they even stated that another similar
hearing could be held again in a few years if our country did not have
a mandatory, standardized document with security features such as
biometric identifiers. It was made very clear--border security, in
part, depends on secure documents.
Congress, through authorization bills, sets deadlines for a reason.
Without them, nothing would get done in Washington. Even with
deadlines, agency bureaucrats procrastinate. The US VISIT Program of
1996 is a classic example. The deadline we set for the WHTI is not
until January 1, 2008. Extending the deadline in this year's spending
bill is premature and foolish. We should have allowed the agency to try
to meet the deadline and implement a system that will close our borders
to potential terrorists as quickly as possible.
If the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative is delayed, then it is
even more critical that our Customs inspectors be equipped with the
tools and technology demonstrated at the Finance Committee's August 2
hearing. Only then can they have a better chance at catching people
crossing into the United States with fake versions of the currently
accepted documents, which are so easy to obtain.
Mr. ISAKSON. Mr. President, I rise today in support of the fiscal
year 2007 Department of Homeland Security conference report. I want to
begin by thanking Senator Judd Gregg for his tireless work on this
report, and for his commitment to funding the important initiatives in
this bill that are so critical to border security, and securing the
homeland. Through his leadership a conference report is before us that
is fiscally responsible while also implementing the necessary programs
to ensure that we continue defeating the threats to our homeland. I
would especially like to touch on a few issues that are especially
important to our homeland security initiatives and to my State of
Georgia.
I applaud the committee's continued reaffirmation of Public Law 106-
246, stipulating that any new Federal law enforcement training shall be
configured in a manner so as to not duplicate or displace any Federal
law enforcement program of FLETC.
This conference report contains $2 million for the Practical
Applications/ Counterterrorism Operations Training Facility--CTOTF--at
the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center--FLETC--at Glynco. Since
the terror attacks of 9/11, counterterrorism has become a core function
for Federal law enforcement agencies, and the CTOTF will provide
practical hands-on training in this new state-of-the-art facility. The
CTOTF will recreate various settings, both foreign and domestic, that
[[Page S10626]]
agents might encounter out in the field, including rural and urban
neighborhoods, subway stations, buildings, and roadways. Part of the
training site is now functioning, already making use of donated buses,
railway cars, and an airplane.
All 82 law enforcement agencies that train at FLETC will have access
to the new facility. We are preparing our Federal law enforcement
agents to meet their agencies' mission and I am pleased that this
conference report recognizes the need to provide them with a realistic
training environment. This practical training, in addition to other
tactics they learn at FLETC, will also save lives. The students' level
of awareness of potential dangers will be raised so that when they
encounter similar situations in the real world, they react correctly.
I also applaud the inclusion of an extension of the Rehired
Authority. Without the renewal of this authority, FLETC would not have
been able to schedule the full training requirements at Glynco and
Artesia to meet the initiative for Border Patrol at Artesia, and the
Immigration and Customs Enforcement and Detention Officer Training at
Glynco. FLETC has demonstrated the need for the authority to be
continued.
There were many strong reasons to justify this needed authority, but
perhaps the most compelling is that by using annuitants FLETC can save
dollars versus hiring--permanent full-time employees, FTE gain
demonstrated experience--the current average is 26 years of law
enforcement experience--and free up some of the instructors now
provided to FLETC by its partner agencies on a temporary basis to be
used instead in front line law enforcement operational functions. I
applaud the conference and Chairman Gregg for recognizing the
importance of this provision.
FLETC is the Federal Government's primary source of law enforcement
training. Eighty-two partner organizations subscribe to FLETC for their
law enforcement training at the basic--entry level--and advanced
training levels. During basic and advanced training, trainees and newly
commissioned law enforcement officers are molded into the culture of
law enforcement, much like basic trainees and young soldiers in the
armed forces. It takes instructors that have the ability to provide
realistic instruction to gain the respect of their students as they
immerse students into their law enforcement careers. These instructors
can come only from the ranks of Federal employees with many years of
current and relevant law enforcement experience. Subject areas taught
by these instructors include law enforcement techniques and topical
areas, such as counterterrorism prevention and detection and border
tracking procedures.
It is in the best interest of the Government to have Federal
Government employees with state-of-the-art knowledge and experience
regarding tactics, policies, and practices of the law enforcement
community to provide instruction to trainees, agents, and officers that
are beginning their careers. To outsource training for law enforcement
functions, even in a partial or fragmented manner, is counterproductive
to the overall security and enforcement of the laws of the United
States.
The conference report contains a provision making the activities of
the staff of FLETC inherently governmental. And while the words ``and
hereafter'' would have provided the desired result of keeping this from
becoming an annual issuance issue, I thank the conferees for the
inclusion of this language and look forward to working with them to
strengthen it in the future.
Finally, I commend Chairman Gregg for his commitment to the CBP P-3
program by providing $70 million to extend the life of these valuable
assets for another 15,000 to 20,000 hours. These aircraft are an
important component to our national law enforcement and homeland
security efforts. In addition, they have been critical for FEMA
disaster support.
Specifically modified for use in drug interdiction, these aircraft
have been invaluable for the homeland security mission as well. P-3 AEW
and P-3 Long-Range Tracker aircraft have a highly successful 20-year
record of detecting and tracking drug smugglers throughout the U.S.,
Canada, Mexico, Caribbean basin, and Central and South America. In
fact, in fiscal year 2005, CBP P-3s were instrumental in the seizure
and destruction of a record-breaking $1.7 billion worth of illegal
drugs and recognized by the U.S. Interdiction Coordinator for this
feat.
For years, the CBP P-3 AEW has provided surveillance of significant
national events which include support of Presidential and Vice
Presidential domestic travel; large, terrorism-vulnerable sporting
events--the Super Bowl, 2002 Winter Olympics, the Masters--and large
city and regional air surveillance during ``high level'' threat
status--AEW surveillance and anti-air coordination of the DC area
during State of the Union addresses.
The CBP P-3s have been unspoken heroes in providing FEMA disaster
support. There are CBP/FEMA plans to use the P-3s to provide post-
disaster assessment and monitoring. In addition, the CBP P-3s were very
active in hurricane relief efforts for Hurricanes Katrina and Rita last
year. For nearly 2 weeks, they were flying 20 hours a day providing
coordination of search and rescue missions, real-time communications
links and real-time video to the Homeland Security Operations Center,
the CBP Operations Center, and NORTHCOM. These images also were aired
on CNN.
These versatile aircraft and their crews have met, and continue to
meet, the needs of our country to address a variety of missions. I
thank Chairman Gregg for recognizing their important role by extending
their service life in a cost effective manner.
I also note the inclusion of funds for a CBP training facility in
Harper's Ferry, WV. Given my interest in border security, I look
forward to visiting that facility to see firsthand the training that
goes on there.
Mr. President, again, Chairman Gregg and his staff are to be
commended for their hard work and leadership during a very tough
conference negotiation. I appreciate the hard work of my friend, the
Senator from New Hampshire, and look forward to working with him in the
future on these and other issues.
Mr. JOHNSON. Mr. President, I applaud the progress we will soon make
in the Homeland Security appropriations bill to lower the cost of
prescription drugs for all Americans. While the prescription drug
reimportation provision included in this bill is certainly not a
complete solution to the ever-increasing cost of pharmaceuticals, it is
part of the answer.
This legislation includes a provision to allow Americans to bring a
90-day, personal supply of prescription drugs approved by the Food and
Drug Administration, for which they have a valid doctor's prescription,
into the country from Canada.
I commend Senators David Vitter and Bill Nelson, who introduced this
amendment to the Homeland Security appropriations bill during the
Senate debate, for their dedication to lowering prescription drug
prices.
We must reduce prescription drug prices so that Americans are not
forced to cut their pills in half or to choose between medicine and
groceries. Virtually all democracies in the world, except the United
States, negotiate drug prices for their citizens.
The pharmaceutical industry currently sells its Food and Drug
Administration, FDA, approved drugs to virtually every other
industrialized democracy in the world at prices that are typically 50
percent less than prices in the United States. Ours is an ``open
checkbook'' strategy, and the result is massive profits for the drug
companies but catastrophe for ordinary Americans.
The growth of prescription drug spending in recent years has outpaced
every other category of health care spending. According to the Centers
for Medicare and Medicaid Services, prescription drug costs grew at an
inflation-adjusted average annual rate of 14.5 percent from 1997 to
2002, reaching $162 billion in 2002. That amount is four times larger
than prescription drug costs were in 1990.
An analysis by the Congressional Budget Office found that average
prices for patented drugs in other industrialized nations are 35 to 55
percent lower than in the United States. In its 2002 annual report, the
Canadian Patented Medicine Prices Review Board
[[Page S10627]]
found that U.S.-patented drug prices were 67 percent higher, on
average, than those in Canada.
South Dakotans are painfully aware that their neighbors just a few
hundred miles to the north, in Manitoba and Saskatchewan, Canada, are
paying much less for the exact same prescription medication. One of my
constituents recently wrote me with his concerns about the huge
discrepancy between drug prices in Canada and the United States. The
generic version of his medication is not available in the United
States, but because he could obtain the generic from Canada, his
physician prescribed it and this man successfully used it for many
years.
He writes that in Canada, the price of his generic medication is
$0.46 per tablet, and the brand-name drug is $0.77 per tablet. After
enrolling in Medicare Part D, he was required to use the brand-name
drug, available in the United States for $1.19 per tablet--a 16 percent
increase over the Canadian brand-name price, and a 62-percent price
increase over the generic drug, which got the job done just fine.
This constituent writes:
It appears to me that the Medicare D plan is a ``gold
mine'' for the drug makers. . . at least for this one drug.
It is true that I probably should NOT complain because under
the Medicare D I only pay my co-payment. However, my concern
is not so much my drug cost but the fact that the American
taxpayer is being cheated because of the much higher cost per
tablet that is paid to the drug producer under the Medicare D
program than if the drugs were purchased on a competitive bid
procedure. . . After all, I am also an American taxpayer so
it does concern me.
Ehile reimportation is an important step forward, it is only a start
in our effort to improve access to necessary medications at affordable
prices. We need to go further and allow Americans access to Canadian
prices at their local pharmacy. They should not have to take buses to
Canada to access these savings.
To that end, I remain dedicated to enacting the provisions of
legislation I introduced with a bipartisan group of colleagues, the
Pharmaceutical Market Access and Drug Safety Act of 2005, S. 334. This
bill would provide for the safe importation of prescription drugs from
Canada that are both approved by the FDA and manufactured in an FDA-
approved plant. Eventually, once the FDA establishes the appropriate
safety protocols included in the legislation, this bill would allow
individuals to purchase drugs directly from Canadian and U.S.
wholesalers, and pharmacies could import drugs from facilities in
several countries that are registered, fully inspected, and approved by
the FDA.
So while I applaud the Senate on this small step forward in its
efforts to reduce prescription drug prices for Americans, I remain
committed to working with my colleagues to create additional
initiatives that will lower the cost of prescription drugs.
Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, I rise in support of the chemical security
provisions included in the DHS appropriations conference bill. I have
worked on this issue since 2002 and have always supported reasonable
chemical security legislation that provides DHS with the authority it
needs to protect chemical facilities from terrorists without
overreaching. I believe this compromise language achieves that balance.
I am pleased that this language specifically excludes water utilities
from coverage and focuses the efforts of DHS on private chemical
companies. The Nation's drinking water and wastewater systems are arms
of local government, not for profit industries. We in Congress
recognized the fundamental difference between the for profit private
sector and local government entities when we passed the Unfunded
Mandates Act. To have included water utilities in this language would
have imposed an enormous unfunded mandate on our local partners in
violation of that act.
Many here in Washington assume that local governments need to be
forced to protect their citizens. As a former mayor, I can tell you
that is simply not true. Local water utilities have been making
investments in security consistently since 9/11 and continue to do so.
I have offered a bill on wastewater facility security that provides
tools, incentives, and rewards, not mandates, for local governments to
continue to upgrade security. My legislation passed the Environment and
Public Works last Congress with a bipartisan vote and again this
Congress by voice vote. However, this week, for the second straight
Congress, when I tried to bring the measure before the full Senate, the
minority objected even to its consideration. My colleagues on the other
side of the aisle are holding this legislation up because it does not
impose needless mandates and does not include extraneous environmental
provisions.
For these same reasons, many will rise in opposition to the chemical
security compromise language included in the conference report.
They will argue that the bill needs to allow the Federal Government to
tell companies how to manufacture their products by requiring
facilities to switch the chemicals they use or change their operating
practices. This concept, known as ``inherently safer technology,'' is
not, nor has it ever been, about security. IST is an environmental
concept that dates back more than a decade when the extremist
environmental community were seeking bans on chlorine--the chemical
that is used to purify our Nation's water. It was only after 9/11 that
they decided to play upon the fears of the Nation and repackage IST as
a panacea to all of our security problems.
I find it very interesting that those arguing most vehemently for IST
in security legislation are not security experts but, rather,
environmental groups. This only underscores the fact that IST is not a
security measure; it is a backdoor attempt at increasing the regulation
of chemicals operating under the guise of security.
The legislation before us does not include these extraneous
environmental mandates but instead properly focuses efforts on
security. The language explicitly clarifies that the new regulatory
authorities given to the Department of Homeland Security do not include
any authorities to regulate the manufacture, distribution, use, sale,
treatment or disposal of chemicals. These authorities have been
properly provided to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency and other
agencies and departments under numerous environmental and workplace
safety laws, such as the Clean Air Act, the Clean Water Act, the Toxic
Substances Control Act, the Occupational Safety and Health Act, and a
host of others.
I believe the conference language achieves what those of us who have
been working on this issue for years have been trying to do--it
provides strong authorities to DHS to reasonably regulate private
sector entities without being hijacked by extraneous concepts that have
no place in the security debate.
Mr. DODD. Mr. President, I rise to discuss the fiscal year 2007
Homeland Security appropriations conference report. The Senate adopted
this measure earlier today, and I supported it.
I would like to begin by thanking the principal Senate authors of
this conference report: Senator Gregg and Senator Byrd. I commend my
colleagues and their staffs for the hard work they put into negotiating
with the House of Representatives and crafting this report.
The conference report adopted by the Senate today funds our country's
homeland security activities at $34.8 billion for the upcoming fiscal
year. These activities include supporting national and regional
emergency preparedness, first responders, and infrastructure
protection. Taken together, these initiatives form the foundation upon
which our country depends for its domestic security.
I feel compelled to speak today because notwithstanding the efforts
of our colleagues and notwithstanding the adoption of this conference
report, I have deep concerns about how this measure--like those that
preceded it--funds our country's vital homeland security and emergency
preparedness activities.
We all know that disasters--both natural and manmade--continue to
threaten our Nation's domestic security and prosperity. As Hurricane
Katrina tragically demonstrated last year and as the recent terrorist
plot uncovered by British authorities to destroy U.S.-bound aircraft
demonstrated last month, our domestic security--particularly our
critical infrastructure--remains dangerously prone to exploitation and
attack. In light of this unpleasant reality, one would think that the
Congress of the United States would do everything it could to shore
[[Page S10628]]
up the foundation of our domestic security--to make it as impregnable
as possible against the destructive forces of nature and man. Yet, as
we look at the measure adopted by the Senate, I do not believe it does
enough to protect Americans from natural disasters or acts of
terrorism.
I believe that the most important activities for ensuring our
domestic security include assisting local and regional emergency
preparedness activities, supporting first responders, and protecting
critical infrastructure. Taken together, these activities represent the
backbone of our efforts to plan for, respond to, and prevent disasters
on our soil. They encompass supporting firefighters, police officers,
emergency medical technicians; they encompass fully protecting all of
our ports and transit systems; and they encompass quickly and
effectively responding to real or perceived threats in all parts of our
country.
Over the past several years, experts in the national security and
public health issues relevant to our first responders, critical
infrastructure, and emergency preparedness have reported their domestic
security needs. I would like to remind my colleagues that these are
present needs--not future projected needs. For example, our
firefighters have identified more than $4 billion needed each year for
performing their critical duties safely and efficiently; our port
authorities have identified $8.4 billion required for meeting increased
Federal security requirements; and our transit systems have identified
$6 billion needed for making our trains and buses safer for passengers.
Regrettably, the conference report adopted by the Senate continues a
pattern of failure on the part of the present administration and
leadership of Congress to adequately meet these needs. Under this
measure, States receive $900 million from the State Homeland Security
Grant Program--a $350 million increase over the fiscal year 2006 level
but $250 million below the fiscal year 2005 level. Our
firefighters receive $662 million from the FIRE and SAFER grant
initiatives--vital firefighter assistance grants that I was pleased to
author with Senators DeWine, Warner, and Levin. This level of funding
is $7 million above last year's level but $1.338 billion below the most
recent combined authorization level. Our ports receive $210 million--
just over half of the amount authorized in the recently passed SAFE
Ports Act, which I was pleased to support. Finally, our transit systems
receive $175 million--a $25 million increase above last year's level.
While we have taken steps to boost our domestic security since the
attacks of September 11, 2001, our State and local governments largely
remain inadequately prepared, our first responders spread too thin, and
our critical infrastructure inadequately protected.
I would also like to discuss briefly another aspect of this
conference report. In addition to funding the Department of Homeland
Security for the upcoming fiscal year, the conference report makes
significant administrative changes to the Federal Emergency Management
Agency, FEMA. Many of these changes codify recommendations made by the
9/11 Commission and various reports issued in the wake of the Federal
response to Hurricane Katrina.
I would like to commend particularly the efforts of Senator Collins
and my fellow colleague from Connecticut, Senator Lieberman, in working
with conferees to incorporate these reforms to FEMA into the conference
report. In my view, these reforms promise ultimately to return FEMA to
being better empowered to manage mitigation, preparedness, response,
and recovery activities with respect to natural and man-made disasters.
Nevertheless, I would be remiss if I did not mention some concerns I
hold with respect to these reforms. More specifically, I remain
concerned these reforms open the possibility for, but do not guarantee,
input from all stakeholders involved with local, regional, and national
emergency preparedness efforts. I am also concerned that these reforms
do not offer, in my view, explicit guidelines with respect to resource
sharing, capability standards, and compliance benchmarks. I believe
that it is essential for FEMA, as it works to incorporate these
reforms, to develop and implement proper regulations that ensure equal
input from all local, regional, and national stakeholders, clear
guidance on adequate local, regional, and national levels of
investment, and clear direction on what activities need to be performed
by local, regional, and national preparedness systems.
Mr. President, we continue to live in an age when the threat of harm
to Americans on their own soil remains dangerously high. As world
events continue to remind us, we must remain vigilant about our
domestic security. We must proactively assess our weaknesses and
proactively work to do all we can to eliminate those weaknesses. Put
simply, the lives and the safety of all Americans hang in the balance.
On balance, I supported this legislation because the funding it
appropriates does take important steps toward meeting some of our
crucial domestic security needs. However, I look forward to working
with my colleagues in the coming years to find and provide the
resources necessary to make our Nation as safe and strong as it can
possibly be.
Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I will support final passage of the
Homeland Security appropriations bill today because it includes vital
funding for our first responders and our Nation's borders.
Unfortunately, the bill still does not go far enough.
In particular, I am disappointed that the Senate has again included
the small State funding formula for our largest first responder grant
program. We need to change our approach to allocating these scarce
resources by reducing the amount of funds allocated to States
regardless of need and increasing the funds available to States facing
the greatest threats and greatest need. I will continue to work with my
colleagues in coming months to make the allocation of these scarce
resources more equitable.
I am also disappointed that this bill does not take steps to
establish a Northern Border Air Wing in Detroit, MI, as the Senate bill
did. The Northern Border Air Wing, NBAW, initiative was launched by the
Department of Homeland Security, DHS, in 2004 to provide air and marine
interdiction and enforcement capabilities along the northern border.
Original plans called for DHS to open five NBAW sites in New York,
Washington, North Dakota, Montana, and Michigan. Michigan was
originally scheduled to be the third facility opened.
The New York and Washington NBAW sites have been operational since
2004. Unfortunately, not all of the sites have been established,
leaving large portions of our northern border unpatrolled from the air
and, in the case of my home State, the water. In the conference report
accompanying the fiscal year 2006 DHS appropriations bill, the
conferees noted that these remaining gaps in our air patrol coverage of
the northern border should be closed as quickly as possible. This bill
does not accomplish the goals set by Congress last year.
In testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, John Bates,
the Chief CBP official in the Detroit Sector said the Detroit area's
international border is ``an attractive site for criminal organizations
that traffic human cargo, contraband, and narcotics across our
border.'' Chief Bates also noted in his testimony that the ``natural
terrain and geographical nexus to the waterways'' presents a tremendous
challenge to border interdiction and Law Enforcement efforts, the
failure of which ``could have major national security implications.''
During Senate floor consideration, with the help of Senators Byrd and
Gregg, the Senate accepted my amendment related to establishing the
fifth and final Northern Border Wing. Unfortunately, this funding was
taken out in conference, and the gap along the northern border will
remain open for yet another year.
Given the serious threat from terrorists, drug traffickers, and
others who seek to enter our country illegally, I would hope the
Department uses its operating funds to open the Michigan site as soon
as possible. According to the Department, establishing the NBAW will
cost approximately $17 million. This would be consistent with an April
11, 2006, letter to me in which Secretary Chertoff indicated that it
was his Department's plan to open the Michigan site during the 2007
fiscal year. I hope he will follow through on that promise.
[[Page S10629]]
Although I wish the bill did more to make first responder funding
risk-based and to establish a Northern Border Wing in Michigan, there
are many provisions in the bill that I support.
I was pleased to learn of the appropriators' decision to retain the
Leahy-Stevens Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative deadline extension.
According to the Detroit Regional Chamber of Commerce, businesses in
Michigan are already being negatively impacted by concerns about
crossing land borders from Canada into the United States. Extension of
the implementation deadline will allow DHS and the State Department to
work through a variety of issues associated with REAL ID and the
proposed pass cards, as well as allow for a more effective public
information campaign.
I am also pleased that the final bill includes funding for 1,500 new
Border Patrol agents. I hope the Department will apportion these agents
in a manner that considers the threat along the northern border,
particularly in the areas around the northern border's busiest
crossings. I was pleased the conferees noted the lack of experienced
border agents on the northern border and that they have agreed to hold
the Secretary's feet to the fire on this issue. As a member of the
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, I look forward to
discussing this matter with Secretary Chertoff.
The conferees retained a provision regarding a pilot project for
unmanned aerial vehicles on the northern border. The Great Lakes are
almost completed unguarded at present, and UAVs are the perfect
technology for surveillance along these water borders. The Great Lakes
offer a unique opportunity for the Department, and I look forward to
working with the Department in the coming year on this issue.
I am pleased that the bill includes language that will strengthen the
Federal Emergency Management Agency, FEMA. The Federal Government's
bungled response to Hurricane Katrina demonstrated incompetence at the
highest levels of DHS and also demonstrated the need to strengthen our
Nation's emergency response capabilities. The FEMA provision will
restore the vital connection between emergency preparedness and
response that Secretary Chertoff had previously severed. The bill also
includes a provision for keeping families together during mass
evacuations and requires DHS to establish a National Emergency Child
Locator Center that will help families reunite more quickly in the
event they get separated during a disaster. I hope these provisions
will help prevent the reoccurrence of one of the most tragic
consequences of the Katrina disaster--the thousands of children who
were reported as missing in its aftermath. However, I am disappointed
that the bill did not include a $3.3 billion authorization for a
dedicated communications interoperability grant program. This provision
had previously been included in an emergency management reform bill
that we passed in the Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
Committee.
The bill also includes a provision that would authorize the Secretary
of Homeland Security to issue interim regulations for high-risk
chemical facilities. Although this authorization is long past due, I am
disappointed that such an important provision was drafted behind closed
doors, instead of being vetted with full transparency, as was the case
with the comprehensive chemical plant security legislation that passed
out of Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee
unanimously on June 15, 2006. I am glad that a 3-year sunset provision
was included in the bill so that the authorizing committees can make
any needed improvements to ensure that the threats from chemical plants
are fully addressed.
Mr. CHAMBLISS. Mr. President, I rise today in support of the fiscal
year 2007 Homeland Security conference report. It is important for me
to begin by thanking Senator Judd Gregg for his hard work and for his
dedication to producing a strong report. I commend Senator Gregg for
his leadership and for working with me to secure several important
initiatives that are so important for the State of Georgia and for
America's security.
The Federal Law Enforcement Training Center, FLETC, is located in
Glynco, GA. We have outstanding law-enforcement training which takes
place at this fine facility. The conference report restored $2 million
to FLETC's Counterterrorism Operations and Training Facility, COTF. I
am profoundly grateful for this funding and know that the men and women
of law-enforcement who operate and train at FLETC are grateful, also.
Since the attacks of 9/11, it has become vital that our law enforcement
receive the most up to date counterterrorism training that is
available, and FLETC provides it.
I also would like to commend Chairman Gregg for including language to
ensure that the training and programs being developed at the Advanced
Training Center at Harper's Ferry, WV, will not be duplicate or
displace any Federal law enforcement program at FLETC. I am pleased
that Senator Gregg referenced the language in Public Law 106-246 in
order to reaffirm Congress's longstanding commitment to protect the
programs and training at the FLETC. I look forward to continuing to
work with him to ensure that this language continues to be included in
the future.
Senator Gregg honored my request to protect and ensure the FLETC to
renew the Rehired Authority. Without the renewal of this authority,
FLETC will not be able to schedule the full training requirements at
Glynco and Artesia, NM, to meet the initiative for Border Patrol at
Artesia, and the Immigration and Customs Enforcement and Detention
Officer Training at Glynco. The FLETC has demonstrated the need for the
authority.
There are many strong reasons to justify this needed authority, but
perhaps the most compelling is that by using annuitants, FLETC can save
dollars, versus hiring permanent full-time employees, gain demonstrated
experience--the current average is 26 years of law enforcement
experience--and free up some of the instructors now provided to FLETC
by its partner agencies on a temporary basis to be used instead in
front line law enforcement operational functions.
The Federal Law Enforcement Training Center is the Federal
Government's primary source of law enforcement training. Eighty-two
partner organizations subscribe to FLETC for their law enforcement
training at the basic--entry level--and advanced training levels.
During basic and advanced training, trainees and newly commissioned law
enforcement officers are molded into the culture of law enforcement,
much like basic trainees and young soldiers in the Armed Forces. It
takes instructors that have the ability to provide realistic
instruction to gain the respect of their students as they immerse
students into their law enforcement careers. These instructors can come
only from the ranks of Federal employees with many years of very
relevant law enforcement experience. Subject areas taught by these
instructors include law enforcement techniques and topical areas, such
as counterterrorism prevention and detection and border tracking
procedures. It is in the best interest of the Government to have
Federal Government employees with state-of-the-art knowledge and
experience regarding tactics, policies, and practices of the law
enforcement community to provide instruction to trainees, agents, and
officers who are beginning their careers. To outsource training for law
enforcement functions, even in a partial or fragmented manner, is
counterproductive to the overall security and enforcement of the laws
of the United States.
The conference report contains language making the activities of the
staff of the FLETC inherently governmental. While it was my hope that
the provision would have been strengthened by the use of the words
``and hereafter'' to avoid the requirement of a renewal each year, I
look forward to working with the chairman to achieve this goal in the
future.
I am very proud of our employees at FLETC Glynco and the work that is
done there and am a very strong supporter of the FLETC. I look forward
to continuing to help strengthen the operations that are conducted
there so that we can offer the best possible training and protection to
our homeland.
Mr. CRAIG. Mr. President, let me first express my appreciation for
the hard work of the conferees in approving the legislation we will
vote on
[[Page S10630]]
shortly that contains an important provision addressing the security of
our Nation's chemical infrastructure.
I believe it is very important that our chemical infrastructure have
safeguards for the use and storage of chemical manufacturing and
distribution. There is no doubt that it is vital to our efforts to
ensure national security and the safety of the public. However, we
should remind ourselves that many in the regulated community have
already taken proactive actions, especially since September 11, 2001,
to address threats to their facilities and operations, and have adopted
a number of safeguards.
It is my hope that Congress in its oversight role, and the Department
of Homeland Security in its administrative and regulatory role, takes
those efforts into account and ensures that any new protections and
regulations are workable and appropriate.
I am concerned that while the intent of the chemical security
``compromise'' in this conference report is to address security
concerns associated with high-risk industrial chemical use, the bill
may also affect many low-risk facilities at a disproportionate level.
One of those low-risk industries that will certainly be affected is our
domestic dairy industry.
My State of Idaho is a leader in milk production and processing, and
our dairy industry is a major economic force. The industry employs the
latest technologies to provide high quality products to our consumers
and trading partners. What most people do not know is that dairy
farmers, dairy cooperatives, and milk processors use anhydrous ammonia
as a cooling agent to safely store milk and milk products as it makes
its way from farm to grocery store shelf.
Many in the food industry consider anhydrous ammonia to be one of the
most efficient refrigerants available and in a relatively low-risk
process. In accordance with Government regulations and guidelines, many
dairy facilities now use anhydrous ammonia refrigeration systems after
phasing out other chemicals that are less environmentally friendly.
The dairy industry in Idaho and nationwide has been extremely
diligent in taking actions to enhance the safety and security of their
facilities. Those actions include regularly working with the Department
of Homeland Security under Presidential Directives 7 and 9 along with
regularly conducted vulnerability assessments with the Food and Drug
Administration, FDA, the Department of Homeland Security, DHS, the
Federal Bureau of Investigation, FBI, and State and local officials.
Food facilities were some of the first industries we focused on in
our fight against terrorism. This sector of our economy is currently
regulated under the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism
Preparedness and Response Act of 2002 under the jurisdiction of the
FDA. The anhydrous ammonia in the refrigeration systems at these
facilities is already regulated by the Environmental Protection Agency,
EPA, under its Risk Management Program, RMP, regulations and by the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration, OSHA, under its Process
Safety Management, PSM, regulations.
I believe, that the intent of including language in this conference
report to strengthen the safety of our chemical production
infrastructure was to focus on high-risk chemical plants. However, the
language in the bill could impose serious burdens on what would
normally be considered low-risk operations like dairy farms,
cooperatives, and milk processors.
Clearly, there is substantial interest in ensuring the security of
our Nation's chemical infrastructure while not forcing onerous and
duplicative regulations on one of our most important food industries. I
hope some common sense will prevail on this issue, and I plan to
continue to work with my colleagues on both sides of the aisle and the
administration to see that happen.
Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, on the 5 year anniversary of the terrorist
attacks of 9/11, many our Nation's commentators asked the same
question: Are we safer today than we were on 9/11? Well, I must say to
my colleagues, that is the wrong question. America was not safe on 9/
11.
So in my book, being safer than we were on 9/11 is not saying much.
We must set a higher standard.
Regrettably, the President has set a very low standard. The President
is comfortable with cutting grants to first responders 3 years in a row
at the same time that our police, fire, and emergency medical personnel
still cannot talk to each other on their radio systems. The President
is comfortable with cutting grants to equip and train our heroic
firefighters by 46 percent and with proposing to eliminate the program
to hire more firefighters. The President is comfortable with a Homeland
Security Department that is so bureaucratically lethargic that $173
million approved by Congress to secure our ports sat in the Treasury
here in Washington for 11\1/2\ months.
This President is comfortable with a rob-Peter-to-pay-Paul approach
to homeland security. When the Department was faced with a shortfall in
funding for securing Federal buildings, the administration proposed to
cut funding for developing effective countermeasures for explosives. A
month later, Britain arrested potential terrorists who wanted to blow
up planes over the Atlantic with liquid explosive. What an
embarrassing, short-sighted proposal from the administration. I was
pleased to join Chairman Gregg in rejecting the proposal.
This administration was comfortable with shutting off federal funding
for the FEMA program that provides long-term healthcare to the brave
first responders who tried to save lives and look for survivors at the
World Trade Center on 9/11. It was the Congress that came forward with
funds to continue providing healthcare to our first responders.
Well, I am not comfortable with the state of our homeland security.
It has been 5 years since the 9/11 terrorist attacks. It has been
nearly 5 years since Richard tried to blow up a plane bound for Miami.
It has been 2\1/2\ years since hundreds were killed in the Madrid train
bombings. It has been over 1 year since 752 were killed or wounded in
the London train bombings. Just this summer, potential terrorists were
arrested in Britain, who were planning to blow up planes over the
Atlantic. Our aviation sector remains on high alert. There is no
question about a continuing risk of attack.
So, 5 years after 9/11, has the Department of Homeland Security taken
the steps that it needs to take to help make Americans safe?
Five years after the 9/11 attacks, 11 million cargo containers arrive
in the United States each year. Any one of them could carry a nuclear
bomb, or nuclear material to make a bomb. Yet only 5 percent of these
containers are opened and inspected. Only 17-19 percent are examined
with imaging equipment. Only 73 percent are screened for nuclear
material.
Five years after the 9/11 attacks, many of our first responders still
cannot communicate with each other on their radio systems.
Five years after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, we still have no system
for verifying the identities and backgrounds of the thousands of
workers who have access to our ports, boats, cargo containers, or air
cargo.
Five years after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, we still do not have a
reliable system for inspecting the 23 billion pounds of air cargo that
is placed on passenger aircraft every year.
Annually, 500 million people cross U.S. borders via ports of entry--
more than 330 million of them are noncitizens. One of the key findings
of the 9/11 Commission is that we do not have a system in this country
for tracking aliens who pose a risk and remain in this country
undetected. Five years after the terrorist attacks of 9/11, we still do
not have a system for knowing when, or if, aliens have left the
country. Nor do we have a 10-fingerprint system to reliably verify the
identity, or the criminal or terrorist background, of aliens coming
into this country.
The EPA has estimated that there are 123 chemical plants across the
country that could each endanger more than 1 million people if
attacked. Yet 5 years after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, we have no
regulations directing the chemical industry to improve security.
Five years after the terrorist attacks of 9/11, we have a Department
of Homeland Security, but it is a department rife with management
problems. The Department has become a contractor's dream. Over $11.5
billion of the Department's budget was executed through
[[Page S10631]]
contracts, a 60-percent increase over 2004. Yet only 18 of the 115
major DHS contracts are managed by certified program managers. What an
incredible opportunity for waste. It is no wonder that the GAO found
$1.4 billion of waste from Katrina spending.
The Department has the dubious distinction of being investigated 525
times by the GAO since its inception. The vast majority of the GAO
reports cited poor management and leadership practices.
According to the Rand Corporation, between 1998 and 2003, there were
approximately 181 terrorist attacks on rail targets worldwide. Five
years after the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the Department has no plan
for helping State and local governments to secure rail and transit
systems. $150 million that Congress appropriated for rail and transit
security sat at the Department for 11\1/2\ months. Since 2001, I have
offered eight different amendments to fund rail and transit security,
and all of them were opposed by the administration and defeated.
The recent terrorist plot to blow up commercial airplanes crossing
the Atlantic Ocean has highlighted a known vulnerability. Five years
after the terrorist attacks of 9/11, we do not have technologies that
can detect liquid explosives.
The Department recently published a Nationwide Plan Review that found
that the majority of State and local emergency operations plans are not
fully adequate, feasible, or acceptable. Can you imagine? Five years
after 9/11, the Department's own data indicates that State and local
governments are not ready to deal with a catastrophic event. The
Department has not even published a congressionally mandated National
Preparedness Goal.
The terrorist attacks of 9/11 should have been a wake-up call; but,
apparently, the Department of Homeland Security, which was created in
response to 9/11, somehow did not get the message.
Given these continuing vulnerabilities, I am pleased to say that the
conferees have set a higher standard than the White House or the
Department.
The conference agreement contains many improvements to the
President's request, particularly, with regard to border security and
port security. Were steadily increasing funding for Emergency
Management Preparedness Grants, despite the President's proposed cuts
each year. We have restored proposed cuts in grants to fire departments
for needed equipment, and for hiring firefighters. The conferees have
also mandated that grants be awarded within certain timeframes so that
dollars intended to make Americans safer do not sit in the Treasury for
an entire year.
The conference agreement also includes important reforms in the
organization of FEMA. Hurricane Katrina proved that the
Administration's approach to breaking FEMA into pieces was a failure.
This legislation will help put FEMA on sound footing.
In addition, the conference report contains many provisions that
provide clear guidance to the Department about how to improve its
operations.
I am particularly pleased with the improvements in funding for border
security. Over the pass 2 years, starting with an amendment I offered
with Senator Larry Craig to the fiscal year 2005 emergency
supplemental--with the support of my Subcommittee Chairman, Senator
Gregg--this Congress, and especially this Senate, has added 4,000 new
Border Patrol agents and 9,150 new detention beds to the fight for
border security. And, as a result of our efforts, there are 1,373 new
detention personnel and 526 new Customs and Border Protection officers
at our ports of entry.
With Congress leading the way in a bipartisan manner, this
administration has finally awakened and realized that this country
faces a true illegal immigration crisis. There are 12 million illegal
aliens currently living in this country--with more than 500,000 new
illegal entering each year. And, as of this past January, there were an
estimated 558,000 alien absconders--illegal aliens who have been
ordered to be removed from this country, but who have thus far escaped
detection. These individuals must be found and removed.
I am pleased that the conference report before us makes great strides
at achieving that goal. We are ending the short-sighted practice of
``catch and release'' and replacing it with ``catch and remove.'' This
conference report supports 27,500 detention beds.
We have increased the number of Fugitive Operations teams from 16 in
fiscal year 2005 to 75 teams in fiscal year 2007. In fiscal year 2005,
these teams apprehended over 15,000 illegal aliens including 270 sexual
predators and 11,200 fugitive aliens with judicial orders of removal
against them. Adding an additional 23 more teams--for a total of 75
teams--will make a real difference in removing from this country those
individuals who have been ordered removed and who are here illegally.
We are also increasing funding for the criminal alien program, which
identifies illegal aliens currently serving time in U.S. prisons and
begins removal proceedings against them while they are in jail. There
are an estimated 630,000 criminal aliens in all Federal, State, and
local prisons--of whom 551,000 have not yet been identified for removal
from the country. Of these, 275,000 are here illegally. Additional
attention is also focused on worksite enforcement.
I commend my excellent Chairman, Senator Judd Gregg, for his
outstanding knowledge of this bill and for his leadership. I thank him
and his able staff, and I thank my staff, for their work on this
legislation. This is a good agreement.
Mr. NELSON of Florida. Mr. President, every year, millions of
Americans who cannot otherwise afford their prescriptions at pharmacies
in the United States seek the same FDA-approved prescriptions from
Canada at significantly lower prices. However, on November 17, 2005,
U.S. Customs quietly implemented a new, stricter policy on prescription
drug importation. The new policy has resulted in over 37,000
prescription drug shipments being detained by Federal officials. The
new policy has limited the ability of American consumers to purchase
these legally prescribed medications from FDA-approved facilities in
Canada.
Mr. President, I can tell you that my constituents are extremely
disturbed by the actions being taken by our Federal Government.
Silently implementing a stricter policy without adequately informing
the public puts the health of those who have relied on the prompt
delivery of these medications at risk.
That is why I offered an amendment with Senator Vitter to the Senate
version of the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations bill. Our
amendment prohibits Customs from stopping the importation of FDA-
approved prescription drugs by American citizens. The amendment
received overwhelming bipartisan support when it was added to the
Senate bill.
Unfortunately, the language agreed to by a House-Senate conference
committee will only allow Americans to buy and carry home Canadian
prescription drugs for personal use, while continuing to prohibit
consumers from ordering their prescriptions from Canada by mail.
Although the original Nelson-Vitter provision would have given all
Americans greater access to affordable prescription drugs through the
mail, the diluted version that emerged from conference committee will
help only a few Americans from one part of the country. This language
helps almost no Floridians who live thousands of miles from the
Canadian border. While I am pleased that Americans living near the
border will now have greater access to low-cost prescription
medications, I believe that this provision discriminates against
Floridians and others who do not live near Canada.
However, this provision is a small step in the right direction. I
believe that its passage will open the door to expanding access to
lower-cost medications from Canada for all Americans, regardless of
where they live. We have made progress but I intend to keep pushing the
issue until all Americans can get the medications they need at an
affordable price.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. There are 5 minutes remaining equally divided
prior to the vote.
The Senator from New Hampshire.
Mr. GREGG. On behalf of myself and Senator Byrd, we yield back the
time.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the conference
report.
The conference report was agreed to.
[[Page S10632]]
Mr. GREGG. I move to reconsider the vote.
Mrs. MURRAY. I move to lay that motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Jersey.
Mr. LAUTENBERG. Mr. President, I will speak on the port security
conference report we are just passing. I am a conferee on that bill and
this conference has been a sham. It is shameful because the Democratic
members of the conference committee have not been allowed to offer
amendments to the conference report. We were sitting on our hands for
virtually an hour while the chairman of the conference committee was
absent, without a piece of paper in front of us about what was in the
port security bill. Nothing. There was no indication of what was there.
No guide, nothing--just sitting there wiling away the time.
Why, we asked, did the Republican leadership in the House and the
Senate allow this perversion of the democratic process? Why make
promises we would have a chance to offer amendments but never be able
to do so?
They wanted this conference to be a plain backroom deal. Their agenda
is to strip from this bill important provisions on rail security,
transit security and aviation security and replace them with
legislation that has nothing to do with our homeland security at all,
our port security.
I would like to understand from the majority what it is they were
trying to tell the American people. What was so objectionable about the
provisions Democratic conferees wanted to offer to bolster aviation,
transit, rail, truck, bus, and pipeline security?
The Senate has agreed to the rail security legislation and twice the
Senate has approved transit security legislation. Twice the Senate
agreed to my amendment to remove the arbitrary cap on the number of
airport screeners that can be hired, but each time these measures died
due to the inaction by the House of Representatives. Now Republican
leaders, once again, want to kill them.
Last night, the Republican chairman assured the Democratic conferees
that they could offer amendments to the conference report, but they put
obstacles in the way to permit it from happening. Republicans were
fearful of showing votes against common sense for rail, transit and
aviation security measures. This challenges logic beyond belief.
Last night, the House had actually approved, had voted 281-140, to
instruct their conferees to support the Senate provisions on rail,
transit and aviation security. Transit systems have always been
terrorist targets. They are open, accessible and teeming with innocent
people. Since we have not done what we need to do to protect them, they
are vulnerable.
Recent attacks in Madrid, London and Mumbai have shown just how
devastating these attacks can be. Hundreds of people have been killed
just commuting to and from their jobs in those cities.
The Senate rail security provision mandated measures to help protect
25 million Amtrak riders each year, but the House leadership dismissed
recent attacks on the rail systems as not significant enough to guard
against. It would protect millions more who live near rail tracks where
trains carrying hazardous materials pass by, with some very close to
this facility, on nearby tracks. Once again, logic failed.
The aviation security provision dealing with airport screeners was
approved in the Senate by a vote of 85-12. It would have removed the
arbitrary caps on hiring TSA airport screeners. I repeat, the Senate,
by a vote of 85-12, would have removed the arbitrary cap on hiring TSA
airport screeners even though burgeoning numbers of passengers are
flooding our airports. Lifting the cap could have made air travel
safer. And it would have reduced the amount of time passengers have to
wait in line at terminals to pass through security lines.
It is important for the American people to understand the enormous
opportunity taken away from them to protect themselves. It is important
for our people to understand the leadership in the Congress stood
against rail security, transit security or shorter airport-airline
passenger security.
We did not finish the conference on the port security bill. We
finished a sham. The majority ought to be embarrassed by their
thoughtless abandonment of essential security protection for the
American people as they travel.
The leadership stripped out--in the conference that never took
place--rail transit and aviation security but made sure that Texas
Hold'em Poker games are illegal to play on your computer.
I regret this took place. I hope America does not see in its near
future that they were foolishly careless in not protecting our citizens
as much as they could.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine is recognized for 3
minutes.
Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent since the Senator
from Alaska yields back his 5 minutes that I be permitted to speak for
up to 10 minutes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
____________________