[Congressional Record Volume 152, Number 125 (Friday, September 29, 2006)]
[Senate]
[Pages S10618-S10632]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




 DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY APPROPRIATIONS ACT, 2007--CONFERENCE 
                                 REPORT

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senate will 
proceed to the consideration of the conference report to accompany H.R. 
5441, which the clerk will report.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The committee of conference on the disagreeing votes of the 
     two Houses on the amendment of the Senate to the bill (H.R. 
     5441) ``making appropriations for the Department of Homeland 
     Security for the fiscal year ending September 30th, 2007, and 
     for other purposes'', having met, have agreed that the House 
     recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate, 
     and agree to the same with an amendment, and the

[[Page S10619]]

     Senate agree to the same, signed by a majority of the 
     conferees on the part of both Houses.

  The Senate proceeded to consider the conference report.
  (The conference report is printed in the House proceedings of the 
Record of September 28, 2006.)


                              section 550

  Mr. VOINOVICH. Mr. President, I rise to engage in a colloquy with my 
good friends, Senator Pryor, Senator Domenici, and Senator Warner. To 
my colleagues, it is my understanding that a question as to the intent 
of the chemical facility security provision has arisen. Senator Pryor, 
in your view, what is the meaning of section 550 with respect to its 
effect on State laws or rules?
  Mr. PRYOR. I thank the Senator from Ohio for raising this important 
question. Section 550 does not contain any language regarding its 
preemptive effect. I know there have been some in the other House who 
believe that this silence means the legislation would have no effect on 
State or local attempts to regulate chemical security--in other words, 
that it gives them a green light to go farther. I want to state clearly 
my belief to the contrary. As we all know, under well-established 
Supreme Court precedent, a Federal law that is silent in this way can 
still occupy the field and impliedly preempt any State legislation on 
the same topic. Historically, Congress has done so in the security 
area, whether it be nuclear security or aviation security.
  Mr. VOINOVICH. I thank Senator Pryor for his statement because I 
agree with it. I know my good friend from Virginia, Senator Warner, 
also has views on this. Senator Warner, in your view, what is the 
meaning of section 550 with respect to its effect on State laws or 
rules.
  Mr. WARNER. I also thank the Senator from Ohio for raising this 
important question. I concur with the assessment of my good friend from 
Arkansas regarding the preemptive effect of this chemical facility 
provision. As the Senator noted, there is strong Supreme Court 
precedent regarding the implied preemption of State laws, especially as 
it relates to homeland security, homeland defense, and national 
security. There are several examples of statutes that remain silent 
with regard to the effect on State laws and it has been my belief 
throughout the entire debate on chemical security legislation that this 
precedent should hold true if we did not explicitly speak to the issue 
to State preemption.
  Mr. VOINOVICH. I thank Senator Warner for his statement. I strongly 
agree with the assessment that Congress and the Federal Government have 
the duty to provide for the security of our States and our people. 
Further, the importance of a single, integrated set of comprehensive 
national standards is vital to the security of this sector. I see my 
good friend from New Mexico here as well. I ask the Senator from New 
Mexico if he has further views on the meaning of section 550 with 
respect to its effect on State laws or rules.
  Mr. DOMENICI. I thank the Senator from Ohio for this important 
discussion. I also concur with the assessment of my colleagues, Senator 
Pryor and Senator Warner. This issue was discussed at length before the 
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. The effect of 
silence on the chemical security language in question is clear. Federal 
law that is silent in this way can still occupy the field and impliedly 
preempt any State legislation on the same topic. Further, the 
precedence for Federal preemption in regulatory matters dealing with 
security is clear. In the interest of national security, the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission was created to oversee the nuclear facilities. 
Given the importance of this critical infrastructure and the clear 
national security concerns, the Federal Government has exclusive 
regulatory authority. I concur with my colleagues who have noted that 
in matters of national security the Federal Government should perform 
its constitutional duty to defend the homeland.
  Mr. VOINOVICH. I thank my good friend from New Mexico for his 
comments, and I strongly agree with his assessment. It is the Federal 
Government's preeminent role when it comes to matters of national 
security to set a uniform set of rules with which the regulated 
community must comply. I feel strongly that this provision sets that 
uniform set of rules and in so doing, impliedly preempts further 
regulation by State rules or laws.


                WARNING, ALERT, AND RESPONSE NETWORK ACT

  Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I rise to ask my colleague from Alaska 
about the Warning, Alert, and Response Network Act, or WARN Act, that 
is part of the SAFE Port Act that is before the Senate. The WARN Act 
will authorize a wireless alert capability to provide citizens with 
emergency alerts on their wireless devices. This is an important 
enhancement to the emergency alert system that FEMA currently operates. 
I would note that the language in the WARN Act does not alter FEMA's 
role in the emergency alert system. It is my understanding that this 
language directing the FCC to develop the wireless capabilities will 
not interfere with the Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 
Committee considering and reporting legislation next year to further 
clarify FEMA's role with respect to the emergency alert system and new 
technologies. Is that correct?
  Mr. STEVENS. The Senator's understanding is correct. The 
Parliamentarian's office has indicated to my staff that the wireless 
alert capability language in the act does not preclude the Homeland 
Security and Governmental Affairs Committee from considering 
legislation next year to address FEMA's role with respect to the 
emergency alert system, and I commit to working with you to develop a 
bill that will set forth FEMA's role with respect to new emergency 
alert capabilities.
  Ms. COLLINS. Thank you, Senator. I look forward to your support in 
addressing FEMA's role in the emergency alert system in legislation 
next year.


                  WESTERN HEMISPHERE TRAVEL INITIATIVE

  Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, I rise today for the purpose of engaging in 
a colloquy with my colleagues from the Senate Homeland Security 
Appropriations Subcommittee, Senator Stevens, Subcommittee Chairman 
Gregg and Subcommittee Ranking Member Byrd. We would like to discuss 
the intent of section 546 of the fiscal year 2007 Department of 
Homeland Security Appropriations conference report regarding the 
Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative, WHTI.
  In 2004, Congress passed and the President signed into law the 
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act, which included a 
provision creating WHTI as a means of better securing our borders. The 
provisions require that all individuals, including U.S. citizens, 
present a passport or its equivalent in order to verify identity and 
citizenship when they enter the United States from neighboring 
countries, including Canada or Mexico. As currently set out by the 
administration, the law would take effect on January 1, 2007, for 
airports and seaports and on January 1, 2008, for land crossings.
  As those deadlines loom ever closer, my colleagues and I have grown 
more and more concerned that the plan has been poorly planned and there 
is a considerable lack of adequate coordination not only among the 
Departments of Homeland Security and State, which are charged with 
implementing the initiative but also with the governments of Canada and 
Mexico. I fear that we face a train wreck on the horizon if the plan 
steams along as is.
  The senior senator from Alaska most definitely recognizes how 
improper implementation of WHTI could impede the flow of people and 
goods across our borders. The residents of his home State especially 
would face unique challenges under WHTI because all Alaskans have to 
cross into Canada before entering the continental United States by 
land.
  Mr. STEVENS. The Senator from Vermont is correct. The Department of 
Homeland Security and the State Department are now in the process of 
developing the rules needed to implement this initiative. The State 
Department is proposing an alternate form of documentation to be 
accepted for land border crossings known as a passcard. The passcard 
would be slightly less expensive than a passport but would still 
require the same adjudication and background check as a passport and 
could only be used for land travel between our country, Canada and 
Mexico.
  Many of my constituents travel to Canada every day. I believe each 
Senator from Idaho, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, New Hampshire,

[[Page S10620]]

New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Vermont and Washington will 
agree it is imperative that the travel requirements between Canada and 
the United States be implemented in a manner that does not adversely 
affect Americans. To date, the construction and price of the passcards 
have not been established. Passcards are essential to ensure the flow 
of travel and business activities between the United States and other 
countries is not hindered.
  I am also concerned with the looming date of implementation for WHTI. 
The administration's current plan is to implement the air and sea 
portion of the initiative by January 2007, this coming January. This 
means that in just 3 months all U.S. citizens traveling by air and sea 
from Canada and Mexico or the Caribbean will need a passport to enter 
this country.
  The intent of language included in the Homeland bill is in no way 
meant to indefinitely delay the implementation of this initiative. 
Securing our borders is important, and I support these efforts. I want 
to make sure the State Department is prepared to adjudicate the large 
number of requests for passports and passcards this initiative will 
produce.
  Our language also creates a single implementation date for land and 
sea crossings. Families often take a cruise to Alaska, and continue 
their vacations in Canada. In order to avoid confusion to these 
travelers, we must have one date in which they are expected to have new 
documentation, rather than the current plan to implement sea this 
January and land in January 2008. Further, they should be able to use 
the passcard for both land and sea crossings, rather than requiring a 
passport for the sea portion of a vacation.
  I believe DHS and the State Department are operating under an 
unrealistic timeframe. We must ensure they have enough time to properly 
test and implement this system, which includes biometrics and new 
border security equipment. We must also clearly set out guidelines we 
expect to be met before this initiative can be implemented. This is 
what we hope to achieve with the language we included in the Homeland 
bill.
  Mr. LEAHY. Like Alaskans, Vermonters have strong economic ties to 
Canada and depend on the efficient movement of products across 
international borders. Many Vermont families, including mine, 
frequently travel to Canada to visit family members living there or to 
spend a weekend in the beautiful cities of Montreal or Quebec City. 
Similarly, our Canadian friends enjoy many Vermont treasures, including 
our ski resorts and our own ``great lake,'' Lake Champlain. In 2003, 
more than 2 million Canadians visited Vermont, spending $188 million 
while here.
  Additionally, Vermont has a number of small towns along the border 
that depend on access to neighboring Canadian towns. In some cases, 
these towns share emergency assistance, grocery stores, and other basic 
services. Residents sometimes cross the border on foot several times a 
day just to conduct routine business. Other northern border States 
enjoy similar trade and tourism benefits with Canada and could face 
significant downturns in their economies if this law is not implemented 
properly.
  At a cost of about $100, passports are an expensive hardship for 
many, especially families would not otherwise travel abroad. The 
proposed PASS Card is a less costly alternative but also raises a 
number of new concerns, including issues of privacy and effectiveness. 
On top of that, DHS and State are still arguing over what technology to 
embed in the card. I find it highly unlikely that the State Department 
will be able to process the flood of requests for passports and PASS 
cards that will come from this initiative by the deadline when key 
decisions have still not been made.
  Mr. STEVENS. These are just some of the issues which must be 
considered before implementing this plan. In addition, the lack of 
public outreach to inform citizens of the new requirements concerns me.
  I see the potential for a disaster at our borders if regulations are 
hastily imposed. There is just too much at stake to implement a travel 
system that has not been properly tested, and this is why Senators 
Leahy, Gregg, Byrd, I worked together with House Homeland Security 
Appropriations Subcommittee Chairman Rogers to craft bipartisan 
language to extend the WHTI implementation date. Our language simply 
gives the State Department and DHS more time to make sure this is done 
right.
  Mr. GREGG. I believe the proper implementation of WHTI is imperative. 
I wish to emphasize that the Departments of Homeland Security and State 
can move forward with the full implementation of WHTI before June I, 
2009--but to do so they must comply with all legislated criteria. These 
legislated criteria are designed to ensure that the PASS Card protects 
the privacy of our citizens, that readers have been installed at all 
ports of entry, that all employees have been properly trained--in 
short, that the system works, before it is used by millions of 
citizens. And I emphasize that implementation, meaning putting the 
system into operation can occur at any time but no later than June 1, 
2009, if the conditions, which are designed for proper operations, are 
met.
  Mr. BYRD. I, for one, will definitely be interested to see how the 
Department of Homeland Security and the Department of State are 
progressing on WHTI implementation. And we will be able to do so 
because we mandate that the Departments provide quarterly briefings on 
the progress being made on WHTI implementation and that the first 
briefing should be no later than December 1, 2006.
  Mr. LEAHY. My colleagues are both correct. While hasty implementation 
could result in avoidable problems for all those who will be affected 
by this Initiative, we also want to make sure that it is done on a 
reasonable timetable. Our amendment requires a modest implementation 
delay to June 1, 2009, and also requires that certain technological 
goals are met in the design of the PASS Card to ensure that the 
strictest standards are in place to protect personal information. 
Though it has been two years since the Intelligence Act requirement 
became law, the agencies have made little progress to implement WHTI. 
This provision (Sec. 546) provides additional guidance to the agencies 
to insure smooth implementation.
  Our language also requires the Departments of Homeland Security and 
State to certify prior to implementation that a cost for the PASS Card 
has been agreed upon, that all border authorities are familiar with the 
technology, and that the technology has been shared with the Canadian 
and Mexican authorities. These are just a few of the steps we have 
taken in this amendment to ensure that the transition to an increased 
security environment is done without creating unnecessary obstacles.
  And the Senate and House Appropriations Committees will most 
certainly share the Homeland Security Department and the State 
Department report to us on how they are progressing in meeting the 
program criteria and moving toward implementation.
  I thank my colleagues for all their hard work on reaching an 
agreement on this language. With it, we greatly increase our chances 
for the successful implementation of the Western Hemisphere Travel 
Initiative.
  Mr. LAUTENBERG. Mr. President, one of the most important parts of 
this Department of Homeland Security appropriations bill is a section 
that should not be in it at all. It is a perfect example of how the 
majority has decided to legislate: make back room deals and pass phony 
protections instead of real ones.
  I am speaking about the section that purports to adopt chemical 
security protections for our country.
  To illustrate what chemical security means, and why it is so 
important, let me tell you what happened on Tuesday in Elizabeth, NJ. A 
worker at a trucking company accidentally ruptured a small pressurized 
gas tank and released a cloud of sulfur dioxide into the air. Workers 
at nearby storage and shipping facilities became ill. Truck drivers in 
the area abandoned their vehicles as their lungs burned and they 
couldn't breathe. People on the side of the road were vomiting. Fifty-
eight people--including a first responder--were taken to the hospital. 
That was a small accident. Imagine if a terrorist blew up a large 
chemical facility.
  To understand the impact, all you have to do is drive 9 miles down 
the

[[Page S10621]]

road from Elizabeth to Kearny, NJ, home to the Nation's most dangerous 
chemical plant. Kearny is a blue-collar, working-class town. Forty-
thousand residents--men, women and children--make Kearney home. An act 
of terror at the Kuehne chemical facility could put Kearny--and the 
twelve million Americans who live within fourteen miles of the plant at 
risk. No wonder that facilities storing large amounts of chemicals have 
been called ``pre-positioned weapons of mass destruction'' by homeland 
security experts.
  One would think that the majority and the administration would do all 
it can to stop an attack in Kearny--or at any of America's nearly 
15,000 chemical facilities. Republican leaders have put together a 
counterfeit bill that they are trying to pawn off as ``chemical 
security,'' but we are not buying it, and neither should the American 
people.
  Recognizing that this was a problem even before 9/11, I introduced 
the Nation's first chemical plant security bill in 1999. And earlier 
this year, Senator Obama and I introduced a new comprehensive chemical 
security bill that seeks to protect the American people--not the 
chemical industry. The Republican leadership has brushed aside our 
strong bill, and other legislation that has come out of the Homeland 
Security committees in the Senate and the House.
  Instead, the Republican leaders borrowed a page from the ``Dick 
Cheney Energy Task Force'' playbook: lock the windows, bolt the doors 
and meet with industry lobbyists. And what did the Republicans and 
chemical industry lobbyists come up with? A fraudulent bill. The 
chemical industry bill put forward by the Republicans fails to require 
the safest practices at the highest-risk facilities. It is a bill that 
fails to secure the nearly 15,000 facilities that store dangerous 
chemicals. A bill that fails to protect drinking and waste water 
facilities. And a bill that fails to make clear that states can adopt 
stronger chemical security laws than the federal government.
  So will this chemical security bill authored by the chemical 
industry, the majority, and the administration make the Nation safer? 
No. The public should not be fooled. Because this fake chemical 
security bill has been attached to the Homeland Security appropriations 
bill, most Senators will vote for it. But make no mistake, it is not 
what we want or need.
  We need a bill that requires all chemical plant owners to improve the 
security of their sites, and when possible, replace toxic chemicals 
with safer ones. We need a bill that makes perfectly clear that states 
can adopt stronger laws than the toothless version the majority are 
doing here. We don't need the majority, the White House, and the 
chemical industry deciding the fate of towns like Kearny or Elizabeth 
behind closed doors.
  All of this is more reason we need a new direction in Washington.
  Ms. CANTWELL. Mr. President, I come to the floor today to speak to 
the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act of 2007.
  Since 9/11, we have made significant progress in bolstering the 
defense of our Nation against terrorism. Today, Americans are safer 
than they were just 5 years ago. However, as we learned from the 
recently released National Security Estimate, the threat of terrorism 
continues.
  As a border State and a major thoroughfare for trade, Washington 
State faces incredible security challenges. Along our northern border, 
official checkpoints are separated by miles of vast, rural and rugged 
terrain
  The Ports of Seattle and Tacoma make up the Nation's third largest 
container center. Puget Sound is home to America's largest ferry 
system, transporting more than 26 million passengers and 11 million 
vehicles annually throughout the area.
  The Homeland Security Appropriations Act of 2007 provides vital 
resources to build on the progress we have made to make our Nation more 
secure and citizens safer.
  It contains specific provisions that I am very proud to have worked 
on--provisions that I believe make a strong bill even stronger.
  I will speak about those provisions in just a moment, but first, I 
want to take a moment to acknowledge the steadfast leadership and 
stalwart dedication of the bill's managers, Senator Gregg and Senator 
Byrd.
  This bill recognizes that as a Nation, we still need to make serious 
investments in our National security.
  That is why we're adding significant resources--more than $21 
billion--to better secure our borders.
  This includes $2.2 billion to add 1,500 agents to monitor and 
apprehend criminals--criminal or people crossing the border--and $1.4 
billion for detention facilities, including nearly 7,000 additional 
detention beds to end our failed ``catch and release'' policy.
  Using cutting edge technology is critical to securing our 4,000-mile-
long northern border. With vast, rural and rugged terrain, physical 
barriers provide limited benefits along much of the northern border.
  The right tools can provide critical intelligence about areas that 
have previously gone unsecured for so long.
  This legislation includes a provision, which I offered with Senator 
Baucus, directing the Department of Homeland Security to work with the 
Federal Aviation Administration to test the use of unmanned aerial 
vehicles on the northern border.
  UAVs with extended range can conduct prolonged surveillance sweeps 
over remote border areas, relaying information to border agents on the 
ground.
  This will modernize our patrol capabilities and enable us to reach 
hundreds of miles of previously unguarded border.
  It is time to get serious, smart and practical by using the best 
proven resources out there.
  I have also sponsored a provision included in this legislation 
directing the Department of Homeland Security and State Department to 
work with Canadian officials and State and local first responders to 
identify border security challenges--including interoperable 
communications--in preparation for the 2010 Olympics.
  Lastly, I was proud to join Senator Feinstein to secure a provision 
criminalizing the construction of smuggling tunnels under our borders 
and putting into law stiff penalties for anyone building or using such 
tunnels.
  In July 2005, we discovered a smuggling tunnel between Canada and 
Washington State. It had been used to traffic drugs, but it's all too 
clear that tunnels could just as easily be exploited by terrorists to 
enter undetected into our country.
  The legislation before us also provides more than $4.3 billion to 
improve the security of our ports and the global supply chain.
  This includes: More than $2 billion to the Coast Guard; $210 million 
in port security grants; $420 million for radiation and gamma ray 
inspection equipment for scanning cargo containers; and nearly $200 
million to screen cargo containers at foreign ports and collaborate 
with private entities to enhance supply chain security.
  Focusing on security where cargo is loaded abroad, at the point of 
origin, is vital to achieving security for our ports here at home.
  I am proud to have cosponsored a provision with Senators Coleman and 
Schumer, included in this legislation, which directs the Department of 
Homeland Security to test a new integrated container inspection system 
at three foreign ports.
  This technology has already shown promise at the Port of Hong Kong.
  And I believe that testing this system is the next important step to 
move us toward 100 percent screening of containers.
  From our borders to our ports, this legislation also represents a 
significant investment in the security of our transportation systems.
  In light of the foiled terrorist operation in the U.K. on August 10, 
I remain especially concerned about aviation security.
  As we all now know, a network of terrorist cells planned to down as 
many as 10 U.S. airliners by smuggling liquid explosives onto flights.
  The foiled plot provides a stark reminder of the serious gaps which 
continue to impede our efforts to secure the commercial airline 
industry.
  In 1994, we learned the dangers of our inability to screen passengers 
for liquid chemicals that could be combined to create an improvised 
explosive device, when Ramzi Yousef successfully bombed Philippines 
Airline flight 434. In 1995 they uncovered the infamous ``Bojinka'' 
plot in Manila.

[[Page S10622]]

  Yet more than 10 years later, we still have not developed a 
technology that can be deployed in airports to screen passengers for 
these substances.
  To fix this, we need to make a strong investment in research and 
development.
  The Senate version of this legislation--which passed before the 
August U.K. terrorist threat--had only $5 million slated for research 
and development of explosive countermeasures, under the Science and 
Technology directorate at the Department of Homeland Security.
  After the Senate returned from August recess, I wrote to Chairman 
Gregg requesting that he work in conference to increase funding for 
explosive detection research under the Science and Technology 
directorate.
  The conference report before us today includes nearly $87 million in 
explosives research funding and I want to thank Senator Gregg for 
working in conference to accommodate this request.
  The explosives detection problem is both urgent and technically 
challenging. Passenger screening technology must be efficient, 
reliable, and effective.
  The latest threats make it clear that we need to accelerate our work 
to find innovative solutions to evolving challenges.
  We must be smart and tough in our fight against global terrorism. Our 
first priority must be ensuring that Americans are safe.
  We have come a long way since 9/11. We have worked hard and made 
progress and we are safer today.
  But it is clear: We need to do more to stop terrorists and their 
schemes.
  We can't let down our guard--at our borders, at our ports, on our 
passenger planes.
  The legislation before us today builds on progress we have made and 
delivers strong and serious investments so we can do even more.
  Americans deserve to know that we are doing everything we can to 
secure our country and keep them safe.
  Again, I want to thank the managers of this bill for their efforts. I 
look forward to working with them as we continue fighting to secure our 
Nation.
  Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, I wish to voice my strong support for 
efforts to secure our Nation's borders, which remain porous. We must 
immediately address this threat to our national security and make 
certain that we allow local officials greater involvement as they work 
with the Secretary of Homeland Security regarding the location of 
border fencing.
  I have consistently supported and voted in favor of border security 
efforts--such as the installation of reinforced fencing in strategic 
areas where high trafficking of narcotics, unlawful border crossings, 
and other criminal activity exists. I have also supported installing 
physical barriers, roads, lighting, cameras, and sensors where 
necessary.
  Throughout our debate on comprehensive immigration reform, I have 
stressed the need to secure our Nation's borders--not only our 
southwest border with Mexico, but also our northern border with Canada, 
our maritime borders, coastlines and ports of entry. We must secure our 
borders first, but we must also work toward a comprehensive solution 
that addresses the needs of commerce and our economy.
  The Secure Fence Act of 2006 is needed, and serves as our downpayment 
with the American people on what we must do to address border 
security--so that we can then move forward to address comprehensive 
immigration reform.
  To this date, we have hired, trained, deployed 11,300 Border Patrol 
agents, ended catch and release, accelerated the deportation process, 
and expanded the number of beds in detention centers to almost 23,000.
  We have also provided an additional $1.9 billion in immediate funding 
for border security to cover the first 1,000 of 6,000 new Border Patrol 
agents who will be deployed in the next 2 years. These funds will 
assist with the temporary deployment of up to 6,000 National Guard 
troops aiding the Border Patrol with surveillance and logistics.
  I will continue to champion border security measures and strongly 
support the efforts of my colleagues to strengthen our southwest 
border--protecting our citizens from threats of terrorism, narcotic 
trafficking, and other unlawful entries. However, I am concerned about 
Congress making decisions about the location of the border fencing 
without the participation of State and local law enforcement 
officials working with the Secretary of Homeland Security. These 
locations should not be dictated by Congress.

  Our border States have borne a heavy financial burden from illegal 
immigration and their local officials are on the front lines. Their 
knowledge and experience should not be ignored. Texas shares 
approximately one-half of the land border between the United States of 
America and the Republic of Mexico. As such, State and local officials 
in California, Arizona, New Mexico, and Texas should not be excluded 
from decisions about how to best protect our borders with their varying 
topography, population, and geography.
  Local officials in my home State of Texas--particularly in the areas 
of El Paso, Del Rio to Eagle Pass, and Laredo to Brownville--cited in 
the underlying bill, will not have an opportunity to participate in 
decisions regarding the exact location of fencing and other physical 
infrastructure near their communities. Because the time constraints 
imposed by the pending adjournment will not permit a resolution of this 
very important issue at this time, I asked for, and received, a 
commitment from our Senate majority leader and the Speaker of the House 
of Representatives promising to address these concerns.
  The letter addressed to the chairs of the Senate and House Committees 
on the Judiciary and Homeland Security states that prior to adjournment 
of the 109th Congress, we will act on this issue.
  Ours is a nation of laws and we must be a nation of secure borders. I 
stand ready to work with my colleagues to enact meaningful legislation 
in this session of Congress that addresses border security first and 
that ensures our local communities will be involved in the decisions 
that have such a dramatic impact on the lives of their constituents. I 
appreciate the commitments of our Senate leader and the Speaker and 
look forward to working with them on this important issue.
  In addition, I have been given a separate letter on this subject from 
Leader Frist, and I ask unanimous consent that both of these letters be 
printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                                                      U.S. Senate,


                                Office of the Majority Leader,

                               Washington, DC, September 29, 2006.
     Hon. Kay Bailey Hutchison,
     Russell Senate Office Building,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Senator Hutchison: I am enclosing a copy of a letter 
     signed today by myself and Speaker Hastert in which we 
     outline a number of important additional border security 
     measures that we plan to take prior to adjournment.
       In this letter, the Speaker and I have pledged to respond 
     to the concerns raised regarding the lack of opportunity for 
     local officials, such as those in the areas of El Paso, Del 
     Rio through Eagle Pass, and Laredo to Brownsville, to 
     participate in decisions related to location of border 
     fencing.
       Thank you for taking the time to bring this important issue 
     to my attention and to that of our colleagues.
       I look forward to working with you upon our return to 
     complete this action.
           Sincerely,
                                                 William H. Frist,
     Majority Leader.
                                  ____



                                Congress of the United States,

                               Washington, DC, September 29, 2006.
     Hon. Peter King,
     Chairman, House Homeland Security Committee, House of 
         Representatives, Washington, DC.
     Hon. James Sensenbrenner,
     Chairman, House Committee on the Judiciary, House of 
         Representatives, Washington, DC.
     Hon. Susan Collins,
     Chairman, Senate Homeland Security and Government Affairs 
         Committee, U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
     Hon. Arlen Specter,
     Chairman, Senate Judiciary Committee, U.S. Senate, 
         Washington, DC.
       Dear Chairmen: Following passage of the Secure Fence Act of 
     2006, the following actions will be taken before adjournment 
     of the 109th Congress:
       First we will work with the Department of Homeland Security 
     (DHS) to ensure they consult with representatives of U.S. 
     state and local governments, including Native American 
     tribes, regarding the exact placement of fencing and other 
     physical infrastructure along the southwest border of the 
     United States.
       Second, legislation should require the Secretary of 
     Homeland Security to put fencing

[[Page S10623]]

     and physical barriers in areas of high illegal entry into the 
     United States, yet allow flexibility to use alternative 
     physical infrastructure and technology when fencing is 
     ineffective or impractical.
       Third, the legislation should clarify the definition of 
     operational control of the border to ensure accountability 
     and a workable standard for the Department.
       We have spoken to the Administration and know that they 
     fully support these proposals and we expect that they will 
     actively support our effort to make these changes before the 
     end of the year.
           Sincerely,
     J. Dennis Hastert,
       Speaker, House of Representatives.
     William H. Frist,
       Majority Leader, U.S. Senate.

  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, for years, homeland security experts 
have been warning that chemical facilities are one of our most glaring 
homeland security vulnerabilities. Yet Congressional efforts to empower 
the Department of Homeland Security to regulate such facilities have 
foundered in the face of administration inaction and opposition from 
some industry groups and their allies. That is why I am pleased that 
Congress has at last authorized DHS to begin regulating some of the 
most risky chemical facilities.
  Specifically, the Department of Homeland Security appropriations 
conference report directs the Secretary of Homeland Security to begin 
regulating high risk chemical facilities. It gives DHS 6 months to 
develop interim regulations for chemical site security and specifies 
that the program should require chemical facilities to develop 
vulnerability assessments and site security plans. DHS would have to 
review such documents and approve or disapprove the security plans 
based on whether they address the vulnerabilities identified for that 
facility and meet security performance standards designed by the 
Department. The Secretary would have authority to audit and inspect 
facilities in the program and to seek civil penalties against those who 
do not comply. The Secretary could also order the shutdown of a 
facility that does not meet the standards until it comes into 
compliance.
  This is undoubtedly progress, and I hope DHS will fulfill its 
responsibility to promptly and vigorously exercise this new authority 
to address an extremely dangerous homeland security weakness.
  But while this provision is an improvement on the status quo, it 
falls well short of what we need to fully address this threat. That is 
particularly disappointing because both the House and Senate Homeland 
Security Committees have approved bipartisan, comprehensive chemical 
security bills that could have and should have received floor debate 
and become the basis for final legislation this fall. I deeply regret 
that we were not able to advance the bipartisan committee bills or to 
retain many of their provisions.
  On the Senate side, Senator Collins and I introduced the Senate 
chemical security bill, S. 2145, after holding four hearings on 
chemical security this session and consulting with many interested 
parties. Our legislation was marked up in the Homeland Security and 
Governmental Affairs Committee in mid-June, and reported out on a 15 to 
0 vote. While that bill did not include everything I wished, it was a 
balanced and comprehensive program for chemical security that was able 
to garner broad support on the Committee. I wish to address a few 
specific issues that were part of S. 2145 but which have been lost or 
distorted in this chemical security provision.
  First, let me speak to the issue of inherently safer technology or 
IST. The bipartisan chemical security bill approved by the Senate 
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee recognizes that 
sometimes the best security will come not from adding guards and gates 
but from reexamining the way chemical operations are carried out in 
order to reduce the amount of hazardous substances on site, improve the 
way they are stored or processed, or find safer substitutes for the 
chemicals themselves. These changes limit the loss of life or other 
damage in the event of an attack and therefore make a facility a less 
inviting target for terrorists to begin with. They also have the added 
benefit of limiting the harm from an accidental release. S. 2145 
clearly requires facilities to look at the risks and consequences 
related to the dangerous chemicals on site and address those specific 
vulnerabilities in their security plan. And it includes these process 
changes among the menu of security measures that chemical facilities 
should examine when designing their security plans.

  The House chemical security bill, H.R. 5695, goes further and would 
require high risk chemical facilities to implement safer technologies 
under certain conditions. That requirement is similar to an amendment I 
offered at markup which, had it been adopted, would have required the 
riskiest chemical facilities to consider such technologies and 
implement them if feasible.
  This is not a question of forcing industry to conduct its operations 
off a government-issued play book. Companies would analyze for 
themselves whether there are less dangerous ways to conduct their 
business and would not be required to implement any changes that were 
not feasible or merely shifted risk elsewhere. But given the 
extraordinary risks involved, it is imperative that companies be 
required to at least take a long hard look at some of the commonsense 
solutions that have been advocated or already adopted by others within 
the industry.
  Unfortunately, the chemical security provision included in the DHS 
appropriations conference report has no language to encourage safer 
technologies, and actually includes language aimed at preventing the 
Secretary from even urging a facility to consider such options.
  Second, I regret that this chemical security provision includes 
flawed language on information protection and judicial review. Of 
course, none of us would want to release sensitive information about a 
chemical plant that would be useful to a terrorist. However, excessive 
secrecy in a Government security program can actually make us less, not 
more safe. This is because some degree of transparency is necessary to 
help us make Government programs more accountable and effective. Also, 
local communities and their elected officials deserve to know whether 
local facilities are being kept safe against a terrorist attack, and 
the community's vigilance can help make us all safer.
  I believe S. 2145 as introduced achieved the right combination of 
protecting real security information, while allowing enough disclosure 
to create accountability. Unfortunately, those carefully drafted 
provisions have been replaced, in this measure, by a mechanism that 
will impose undue secrecy on information submitted and developed in 
relation to this program and could deny the ability of Congress and 
affected communities to ensure that the program operates effectively. 
This measure also puts cumbersome restrictions on the use of such 
information in court enforcement proceedings and includes an ill-
considered provision that would limit court review of a chemical 
facility's conduct.
  Finally, I am extremely disappointed that this measure does not 
include the provision from S. 2145 guaranteeing States and localities 
the right to enact stronger chemical security measures. S. 2145 
explicitly recognizes that Congress is not the only body that can and 
should help ensure the safety and security of the Nation's chemical 
facilities. States and localities have long regulated such facilities 
for various safety and environmental concerns. Since 9/11, some States 
have also moved to require security improvements at these facilities. 
These State and local protections are critical companions to our effort 
at the Federal level and should not be displaced unless there is an 
absolute conflict, such that it is impossible for a facility to comply 
with both the Federal law and a State or local law or regulation on 
chemical security. S. 2145 also specifies that it does not disrupt 
State and local safety and environmental law regarding chemical 
facilities, and it does not seek to dislodge or alter the operation of 
State common law with respect to such facilities.
  Contrary to calls by industry, the chemical security language 
Congress is approving does not affirmatively preempt State and local 
chemical security rules and I do not believe it should or will have the 
effect of preempting such laws. Nevertheless, it is preferable that 
Congress speak clearly and decisively

[[Page S10624]]

on such an important security matter, and it is unfortunate that the 
conference report does not retain the strong antipreemption language of 
our bipartisan Senate bill.
  These are only a few of the issues that must be revisited, or visited 
anew, in a complete authorization bill. This chemical security 
provision is clearly a stopgap measure, one which will expire as soon 
as we can replace it with a permanent authorization or, at the latest, 
three years after enactment. So while we have given DHS the authority 
immediately to begin regulating chemical facilities, we must not let up 
in our efforts to reach agreement on a permanent and comprehensive 
chemical security bill as soon as possible.
  Mr. President, I rise today in support of the fiscal year 2007 
Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, which will direct 
nearly $35 billion toward strengthening the homeland security of this 
great Nation. The measure, though imperfect, addresses one of my top 
priorities, particularly the recreation of our ineffectual Federal 
emergency management system into an organization capable of preparing 
for and effectively responding to disasters, whether caused by nature 
or terrorists.
  This month, we observed the fifth anniversary of September 11--a day 
that changed the course of history for this Nation. We are all united 
in our desire to defeat the threat of global terrorism and to prevent 
any more families from having to experience the unfathomable sense of 
loss that the survivors of 9/11 have experienced.
  I believe we have made real progress in strengthening our homeland 
security since 9/11, and I am privileged to have had a role in bringing 
about that progress. I must add, however, that we are still a ways off 
from assuring the American people they are as safe as they should be. 
We continue to work toward that goal, and each day we get a little bit 
closer.
  This appropriations bill moves us in the right direction in large 
part because of its provisions to refashion the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency in the wake of its disastrous preparations for and 
response to Hurricane Katrina, the worst natural disaster in our 
country's history which took the lives of over 1,500 citizens and 
permanently altered the lives of millions more.
  Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee Chairman Susan 
Collins and I conducted an 8-month-long investigation into the 
government's disgraceful response to Hurricane Katrina. We found 
negligence, lack of resources, lack of capability, and lack of 
leadership at all levels of government, which, as we know too well, 
resulted in the failure to relieve the massive suffering that occurred 
along the gulf coast.
  To guarantee more effective planning and a more successful response 
in the future, Chairman Collins and I made a number of recommendations 
in our final report, entitled ``A Nation Still Unprepared.'' The most 
prominent of these recommendations, a FEMA redesign, is in this 
legislation before us today. With these changes, which add strength and 
commonsense restructuring, the Federal Government will be better 
prepared to protect its citizens in times of disaster.
  Let me briefly describe the most important provisions. First, we 
elevate FEMA to a special, independent status within the Department of 
Homeland Security much like what the Coast Guard and Secret Service now 
have--so that reorganizations could only occur by congressional action. 
The FEMA Administrator will be the President's principal adviser in an 
emergency and the administrator and top regional officials will have to 
have appropriate experience and qualifications for the job.
  This legislation also restores unity to FEMA's preparedness and 
response functions. In other words, there will be one organization--
FEMA--responsible for both responding to a disaster and planning and 
training for that response.
  To strengthen the ties between Federal and local officials, we will 
elevate FEMA's regional offices, taking the focus away from Washington 
and putting it where the real work of preparedness is performed: on the 
front lines, in the States, towns, and cities most affected by a 
disaster. The goal is to familiarize Federal officials with regional 
and local threats, vulnerabilities, and capabilities and ensure that 
they are familiar with each of them and their State and local 
counterparts before disaster strikes.
  The legislation also creates a new Office for Emergency 
Communications dedicated to achieving the operability and 
interoperability of emergency communications among first responders 
that is fundamental to any disaster response.
  These mission changes will begin to be put into place by authorizing 
a 10 percent increase in FEMA's operations budget in each of the next 3 
years--above the much-needed increase in FEMA's fiscal year 2007 
appropriations that is included in this bill. Of course, more is 
needed, but this legislation makes a start. In addition, we authorize 
additional funds for States to carry out their disaster preparedness 
responsibilities, including doubling funding for critical emergency 
management performance grants.
  This bill also provides additional assistance to people and 
communities struck by disaster. It will, for example, allow FEMA more 
flexibility in the type of housing it can provide disaster victims to 
find more cost-effective alternatives to the widely criticized FEMA 
trailers. It establishes measures to assist with family reunification. 
And it requires FEMA to better address the needs of those with 
disabilities in disaster preparedness training and an actual disaster.
  As is inevitably the case, there are things missing from this bill 
that would have made it better--provisions that were included in the 
bill that Senator Collins and I introduced and that was passed out of 
the Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee but that were 
lost in conference. These include funding for a dedicated grant program 
to support and promote communications interoperability among first 
responders and additional assistance for individuals and communities 
that fall victim to catastrophic disasters.
  This appropriations bill advances the safety of all Americans in 
other important ways. For the first time ever, the Department of 
Homeland Security would have the authority to regulate high risk 
chemical facilities. I am disappointed; however, that the bill does not 
preserve more of the comprehensive and bipartisan legislation passed 
out of both House and Senate homeland security committees. The Senate 
bill, for example, guaranteed the rights of states to enact stronger 
chemical security provisions. And both bills encouraged the use of 
safer chemicals and methods to lessen the vulnerability of chemical 
facilities in the first place. These provisions are vital because, as 
we most recently observed with the breech of security here at our own 
heavily guarded Capitol complex, guards and gates alone are always 
subject to failure. The American people will not be safe from attacks 
on these facilities until we provide comprehensive security.
  September 11 showed us the flaws in our ability to detect and avert 
terrorist attacks. Hurricane Katrina showed we still haven't grasped 
many of the lessons of 9/11 and so we remain unprepared. This spending 
bill moves us toward better preparedness and response to the 
catastrophes we know await our future.
  But, unfortunately, there is no cheap way to be better prepared. It 
takes money--more money than this budget offers. Too few dollars have 
been set aside to secure our ports, our transit systems, our railways. 
Our first responders--who need equipment, training, interoperable 
communications--continue to be critically under funded. The cuts this 
bill makes in State homeland security funding are far less deep than 
those proposed by the President in his budget this year, but they are 
cuts nonetheless, and they continue what has been a disturbing downward 
trend over the last few years. Since 2004, for example, the state 
homeland security grant program--which provides the central 
preparedness assistance to states throughout the country--has been 
slashed by 69 percent.
  Additional resources are needed, and I will continue to advocate for 
them as a wise investment in the greater protection it will provide the 
American people. But overall, I think this bill is a significant step 
toward ensuring that

[[Page S10625]]

we have a strong, capable agency to lead the country's response to 
future disasters, whether natural disasters or terrorist attacks--and 
that is primarily why I will vote for its passage and urge my 
colleagues to do the same.
  Lastly, I thank all of the staff on the Homeland Security and 
Governmental Affairs Committee, whose many months of work investigating 
the Katrina response and overseeing the recovery process, formulating 
recommendations, fashioning those recommendations into legislation, and 
guiding that legislation through the Congress has resulted in the 
important changes to our nation's emergency preparedness and response 
capabilities included in this appropriations bill. The minority staff 
members are: Joyce Rechtschaffen, Laurie Rubenstein, Robert Muse, 
Michael Alexander, Eric Andersen, David Berick, Dan Berkovitz, Stacey 
Bosshardt, Janet Burrell, Scott Campbell, William Corboy, Troy Cribb, 
Heather Fine, Boris Fishman, Susan Fleming, Jeffrey Greene, Elyse 
Greenwald, Beth Grossman, R. Denton Herring, Holly Idelson, Kristine 
Lam, Kevin Landy, Joshua Levy, Alysha Liljeqvist, F. James McGee, 
Lawrence Novey, Siobhan Oat-Judge, Leslie Phillips, Alistair Anagnostou 
Reader, Patricia Rojas, Mary Beth Schultz, Adam Sedgewick, Todd Stein, 
Traci Taylor, Donny Ray Williams, and Jason Yanussi.
  Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, I rise today to thank my colleagues for 
their hard work on the fiscal year 2007 Department of Homeland Security 
appropriations bill. I also want to congratulate my friend from New 
Hampshire, Chairman Gregg, for his leadership in putting together a 
package of funding that will secure our country's ports and borders and 
strengthen immigration and customs enforcement. During this session of 
the 109th Congress, we have spent a good deal of time considering 
measures that would strengthen our borders and reform our immigration 
system. I believe this spending bill is a testament to the 
administration and the Senate's commitment to these issues.
  In this bill, the conference agreed to provide a total of $34.8 
billion to secure our Nation's borders and infrastructure. This marks 
an overall increase of $2.3 billion over the fiscal year 2006 enacted 
level, including supplemental funding, and includes a $1.8 billion 
emergency spending provision for border security.
  This bill specifically sets aside over $8 billion for Customs and 
Border Protection. I represent a State that is directly impacted by its 
southern border with Mexico, and I laud the provisions that provide 
funding for 1,500 new Border Patrol agents. My home State of New Mexico 
is also home to the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center, FLETC, and 
the addition of extra Border Patrol agents prompted the conference to 
provide $275.25 million for new facilities, salaries, and additional 
instructors.
  The bill also provides a $602.2 million for the U.S. Customs and 
Border Patrol to procure and maintain air assets. I thank the chairman 
for supporting my request for $20 in funding for unmanned aerial 
vehicles, UAV's, and related support systems. The conference report 
also provides $232.98 million for a border construction program. Funds 
from this program will be used to construct and maintain border 
facilities, and $7.46 million will be used to build vehicle barriers 
along my State's international border with Mexico. We have heard a 
great deal from Immigrations and Customs Enforcement, ICE, about the 
need for additional bed space for apprehended illegal immigrants. The 
committee provides a total of $3.89 billion in funding for ICE, of 
which $153.4 million is to be used for additional detention bed space.
  Mr. President, it is no easy task to prioritize funding of programs 
related to homeland security. I am proud of Chairman Gregg's leadership 
in ensuring that our Government has provided the resources and moneys 
necessary to secure our borders and strengthen our enforcement systems. 
Under the chairman's leadership, we have increased funding for border 
security each year, and I am proud that we have done so again this 
year.
  Mr. GRASSLEY. Mr. President, I rise today to express frustration and 
disappointment with a provision included in the fiscal year 2007 
Homeland Security appropriations bill. The provision would extend the 
deadline for the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative from 2008 to 
2009.
  On August 2 Senate Finance Committee held a hearing to highlight the 
problems at our Nation's borders. We heard testimony from the 
Government Accountability Office, GAO, about their undercover border 
crossings over the last 3 years. The GAO agents used fake documents, 
phony driver's licenses, and claims of U.S. citizenship in order to 
enter the United States. According to the GAO, their undercover agents 
got past the U.S. Customs and Border Patrol 42 of 45 times. CBP failed 
to catch the intruders 93 percent of the time, proving that anyone with 
a fake identification and a tall tale can get waived right in the 
United States.
  The committee also heard some very strong evidence as to why the 
Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative, WHTI/Initiative, is important and 
why we should make sure this law is implemented by the deadline 
established by Congress. In 2004, Congress passed the Intelligence 
Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act to require the Departments of State 
and Homeland Security to implement a plan requiring a passport or other 
document for all travelers entering the United States. We passed this 
initiative in order to reduce the free travel across our borders by 
potential terrorists, as recommended unanimously after an extensive 
investigation by the bipartisan, independent 9/11 Commission.
  At the hearing in August, CBP agreed that the initiative is important 
and told us that they were working to be prepared for the January 1, 
2008 deadline. They said the initiative and its passport requirement is 
the ``gold standard.'' In fact, they even stated that another similar 
hearing could be held again in a few years if our country did not have 
a mandatory, standardized document with security features such as 
biometric identifiers. It was made very clear--border security, in 
part, depends on secure documents.
  Congress, through authorization bills, sets deadlines for a reason. 
Without them, nothing would get done in Washington. Even with 
deadlines, agency bureaucrats procrastinate. The US VISIT Program of 
1996 is a classic example. The deadline we set for the WHTI is not 
until January 1, 2008. Extending the deadline in this year's spending 
bill is premature and foolish. We should have allowed the agency to try 
to meet the deadline and implement a system that will close our borders 
to potential terrorists as quickly as possible.
  If the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative is delayed, then it is 
even more critical that our Customs inspectors be equipped with the 
tools and technology demonstrated at the Finance Committee's August 2 
hearing. Only then can they have a better chance at catching people 
crossing into the United States with fake versions of the currently 
accepted documents, which are so easy to obtain.
  Mr. ISAKSON. Mr. President, I rise today in support of the fiscal 
year 2007 Department of Homeland Security conference report. I want to 
begin by thanking Senator Judd Gregg for his tireless work on this 
report, and for his commitment to funding the important initiatives in 
this bill that are so critical to border security, and securing the 
homeland. Through his leadership a conference report is before us that 
is fiscally responsible while also implementing the necessary programs 
to ensure that we continue defeating the threats to our homeland. I 
would especially like to touch on a few issues that are especially 
important to our homeland security initiatives and to my State of 
Georgia.
  I applaud the committee's continued reaffirmation of Public Law 106-
246, stipulating that any new Federal law enforcement training shall be 
configured in a manner so as to not duplicate or displace any Federal 
law enforcement program of FLETC.
  This conference report contains $2 million for the Practical 
Applications/ Counterterrorism Operations Training Facility--CTOTF--at 
the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center--FLETC--at Glynco. Since 
the terror attacks of 9/11, counterterrorism has become a core function 
for Federal law enforcement agencies, and the CTOTF will provide 
practical hands-on training in this new state-of-the-art facility. The 
CTOTF will recreate various settings, both foreign and domestic, that

[[Page S10626]]

agents might encounter out in the field, including rural and urban 
neighborhoods, subway stations, buildings, and roadways. Part of the 
training site is now functioning, already making use of donated buses, 
railway cars, and an airplane.
  All 82 law enforcement agencies that train at FLETC will have access 
to the new facility. We are preparing our Federal law enforcement 
agents to meet their agencies' mission and I am pleased that this 
conference report recognizes the need to provide them with a realistic 
training environment. This practical training, in addition to other 
tactics they learn at FLETC, will also save lives. The students' level 
of awareness of potential dangers will be raised so that when they 
encounter similar situations in the real world, they react correctly.

  I also applaud the inclusion of an extension of the Rehired 
Authority. Without the renewal of this authority, FLETC would not have 
been able to schedule the full training requirements at Glynco and 
Artesia to meet the initiative for Border Patrol at Artesia, and the 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement and Detention Officer Training at 
Glynco. FLETC has demonstrated the need for the authority to be 
continued.
  There were many strong reasons to justify this needed authority, but 
perhaps the most compelling is that by using annuitants FLETC can save 
dollars versus hiring--permanent full-time employees, FTE gain 
demonstrated experience--the current average is 26 years of law 
enforcement experience--and free up some of the instructors now 
provided to FLETC by its partner agencies on a temporary basis to be 
used instead in front line law enforcement operational functions. I 
applaud the conference and Chairman Gregg for recognizing the 
importance of this provision.
  FLETC is the Federal Government's primary source of law enforcement 
training. Eighty-two partner organizations subscribe to FLETC for their 
law enforcement training at the basic--entry level--and advanced 
training levels. During basic and advanced training, trainees and newly 
commissioned law enforcement officers are molded into the culture of 
law enforcement, much like basic trainees and young soldiers in the 
armed forces. It takes instructors that have the ability to provide 
realistic instruction to gain the respect of their students as they 
immerse students into their law enforcement careers. These instructors 
can come only from the ranks of Federal employees with many years of 
current and relevant law enforcement experience. Subject areas taught 
by these instructors include law enforcement techniques and topical 
areas, such as counterterrorism prevention and detection and border 
tracking procedures.
  It is in the best interest of the Government to have Federal 
Government employees with state-of-the-art knowledge and experience 
regarding tactics, policies, and practices of the law enforcement 
community to provide instruction to trainees, agents, and officers that 
are beginning their careers. To outsource training for law enforcement 
functions, even in a partial or fragmented manner, is counterproductive 
to the overall security and enforcement of the laws of the United 
States.

  The conference report contains a provision making the activities of 
the staff of FLETC inherently governmental. And while the words ``and 
hereafter'' would have provided the desired result of keeping this from 
becoming an annual issuance issue, I thank the conferees for the 
inclusion of this language and look forward to working with them to 
strengthen it in the future.
  Finally, I commend Chairman Gregg for his commitment to the CBP P-3 
program by providing $70 million to extend the life of these valuable 
assets for another 15,000 to 20,000 hours. These aircraft are an 
important component to our national law enforcement and homeland 
security efforts. In addition, they have been critical for FEMA 
disaster support.
  Specifically modified for use in drug interdiction, these aircraft 
have been invaluable for the homeland security mission as well. P-3 AEW 
and P-3 Long-Range Tracker aircraft have a highly successful 20-year 
record of detecting and tracking drug smugglers throughout the U.S., 
Canada, Mexico, Caribbean basin, and Central and South America. In 
fact, in fiscal year 2005, CBP P-3s were instrumental in the seizure 
and destruction of a record-breaking $1.7 billion worth of illegal 
drugs and recognized by the U.S. Interdiction Coordinator for this 
feat.
  For years, the CBP P-3 AEW has provided surveillance of significant 
national events which include support of Presidential and Vice 
Presidential domestic travel; large, terrorism-vulnerable sporting 
events--the Super Bowl, 2002 Winter Olympics, the Masters--and large 
city and regional air surveillance during ``high level'' threat 
status--AEW surveillance and anti-air coordination of the DC area 
during State of the Union addresses.
  The CBP P-3s have been unspoken heroes in providing FEMA disaster 
support. There are CBP/FEMA plans to use the P-3s to provide post-
disaster assessment and monitoring. In addition, the CBP P-3s were very 
active in hurricane relief efforts for Hurricanes Katrina and Rita last 
year. For nearly 2 weeks, they were flying 20 hours a day providing 
coordination of search and rescue missions, real-time communications 
links and real-time video to the Homeland Security Operations Center, 
the CBP Operations Center, and NORTHCOM. These images also were aired 
on CNN.
  These versatile aircraft and their crews have met, and continue to 
meet, the needs of our country to address a variety of missions. I 
thank Chairman Gregg for recognizing their important role by extending 
their service life in a cost effective manner.
  I also note the inclusion of funds for a CBP training facility in 
Harper's Ferry, WV. Given my interest in border security, I look 
forward to visiting that facility to see firsthand the training that 
goes on there.
  Mr. President, again, Chairman Gregg and his staff are to be 
commended for their hard work and leadership during a very tough 
conference negotiation. I appreciate the hard work of my friend, the 
Senator from New Hampshire, and look forward to working with him in the 
future on these and other issues.
  Mr. JOHNSON. Mr. President, I applaud the progress we will soon make 
in the Homeland Security appropriations bill to lower the cost of 
prescription drugs for all Americans. While the prescription drug 
reimportation provision included in this bill is certainly not a 
complete solution to the ever-increasing cost of pharmaceuticals, it is 
part of the answer.
  This legislation includes a provision to allow Americans to bring a 
90-day, personal supply of prescription drugs approved by the Food and 
Drug Administration, for which they have a valid doctor's prescription, 
into the country from Canada.
  I commend Senators David Vitter and Bill Nelson, who introduced this 
amendment to the Homeland Security appropriations bill during the 
Senate debate, for their dedication to lowering prescription drug 
prices.
  We must reduce prescription drug prices so that Americans are not 
forced to cut their pills in half or to choose between medicine and 
groceries. Virtually all democracies in the world, except the United 
States, negotiate drug prices for their citizens.
  The pharmaceutical industry currently sells its Food and Drug 
Administration, FDA, approved drugs to virtually every other 
industrialized democracy in the world at prices that are typically 50 
percent less than prices in the United States. Ours is an ``open 
checkbook'' strategy, and the result is massive profits for the drug 
companies but catastrophe for ordinary Americans.
  The growth of prescription drug spending in recent years has outpaced 
every other category of health care spending. According to the Centers 
for Medicare and Medicaid Services, prescription drug costs grew at an 
inflation-adjusted average annual rate of 14.5 percent from 1997 to 
2002, reaching $162 billion in 2002. That amount is four times larger 
than prescription drug costs were in 1990.
  An analysis by the Congressional Budget Office found that average 
prices for patented drugs in other industrialized nations are 35 to 55 
percent lower than in the United States. In its 2002 annual report, the 
Canadian Patented Medicine Prices Review Board

[[Page S10627]]

found that U.S.-patented drug prices were 67 percent higher, on 
average, than those in Canada.
  South Dakotans are painfully aware that their neighbors just a few 
hundred miles to the north, in Manitoba and Saskatchewan, Canada, are 
paying much less for the exact same prescription medication. One of my 
constituents recently wrote me with his concerns about the huge 
discrepancy between drug prices in Canada and the United States. The 
generic version of his medication is not available in the United 
States, but because he could obtain the generic from Canada, his 
physician prescribed it and this man successfully used it for many 
years.
  He writes that in Canada, the price of his generic medication is 
$0.46 per tablet, and the brand-name drug is $0.77 per tablet. After 
enrolling in Medicare Part D, he was required to use the brand-name 
drug, available in the United States for $1.19 per tablet--a 16 percent 
increase over the Canadian brand-name price, and a 62-percent price 
increase over the generic drug, which got the job done just fine.
  This constituent writes:

       It appears to me that the Medicare D plan is a ``gold 
     mine'' for the drug makers. . . at least for this one drug. 
     It is true that I probably should NOT complain because under 
     the Medicare D I only pay my co-payment. However, my concern 
     is not so much my drug cost but the fact that the American 
     taxpayer is being cheated because of the much higher cost per 
     tablet that is paid to the drug producer under the Medicare D 
     program than if the drugs were purchased on a competitive bid 
     procedure. . . After all, I am also an American taxpayer so 
     it does concern me.

  Ehile reimportation is an important step forward, it is only a start 
in our effort to improve access to necessary medications at affordable 
prices. We need to go further and allow Americans access to Canadian 
prices at their local pharmacy. They should not have to take buses to 
Canada to access these savings.
  To that end, I remain dedicated to enacting the provisions of 
legislation I introduced with a bipartisan group of colleagues, the 
Pharmaceutical Market Access and Drug Safety Act of 2005, S. 334. This 
bill would provide for the safe importation of prescription drugs from 
Canada that are both approved by the FDA and manufactured in an FDA-
approved plant. Eventually, once the FDA establishes the appropriate 
safety protocols included in the legislation, this bill would allow 
individuals to purchase drugs directly from Canadian and U.S. 
wholesalers, and pharmacies could import drugs from facilities in 
several countries that are registered, fully inspected, and approved by 
the FDA.
  So while I applaud the Senate on this small step forward in its 
efforts to reduce prescription drug prices for Americans, I remain 
committed to working with my colleagues to create additional 
initiatives that will lower the cost of prescription drugs.
  Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, I rise in support of the chemical security 
provisions included in the DHS appropriations conference bill. I have 
worked on this issue since 2002 and have always supported reasonable 
chemical security legislation that provides DHS with the authority it 
needs to protect chemical facilities from terrorists without 
overreaching. I believe this compromise language achieves that balance.
  I am pleased that this language specifically excludes water utilities 
from coverage and focuses the efforts of DHS on private chemical 
companies. The Nation's drinking water and wastewater systems are arms 
of local government, not for profit industries. We in Congress 
recognized the fundamental difference between the for profit private 
sector and local government entities when we passed the Unfunded 
Mandates Act. To have included water utilities in this language would 
have imposed an enormous unfunded mandate on our local partners in 
violation of that act.
  Many here in Washington assume that local governments need to be 
forced to protect their citizens. As a former mayor, I can tell you 
that is simply not true. Local water utilities have been making 
investments in security consistently since 9/11 and continue to do so. 
I have offered a bill on wastewater facility security that provides 
tools, incentives, and rewards, not mandates, for local governments to 
continue to upgrade security. My legislation passed the Environment and 
Public Works last Congress with a bipartisan vote and again this 
Congress by voice vote. However, this week, for the second straight 
Congress, when I tried to bring the measure before the full Senate, the 
minority objected even to its consideration. My colleagues on the other 
side of the aisle are holding this legislation up because it does not 
impose needless mandates and does not include extraneous environmental 
provisions.
  For these same reasons, many will rise in opposition to the chemical 
security compromise language included in the conference report. 
They will argue that the bill needs to allow the Federal Government to 
tell companies how to manufacture their products by requiring 
facilities to switch the chemicals they use or change their operating 
practices. This concept, known as ``inherently safer technology,'' is 
not, nor has it ever been, about security. IST is an environmental 
concept that dates back more than a decade when the extremist 
environmental community were seeking bans on chlorine--the chemical 
that is used to purify our Nation's water. It was only after 9/11 that 
they decided to play upon the fears of the Nation and repackage IST as 
a panacea to all of our security problems.

  I find it very interesting that those arguing most vehemently for IST 
in security legislation are not security experts but, rather, 
environmental groups. This only underscores the fact that IST is not a 
security measure; it is a backdoor attempt at increasing the regulation 
of chemicals operating under the guise of security.
  The legislation before us does not include these extraneous 
environmental mandates but instead properly focuses efforts on 
security. The language explicitly clarifies that the new regulatory 
authorities given to the Department of Homeland Security do not include 
any authorities to regulate the manufacture, distribution, use, sale, 
treatment or disposal of chemicals. These authorities have been 
properly provided to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency and other 
agencies and departments under numerous environmental and workplace 
safety laws, such as the Clean Air Act, the Clean Water Act, the Toxic 
Substances Control Act, the Occupational Safety and Health Act, and a 
host of others.
  I believe the conference language achieves what those of us who have 
been working on this issue for years have been trying to do--it 
provides strong authorities to DHS to reasonably regulate private 
sector entities without being hijacked by extraneous concepts that have 
no place in the security debate.
  Mr. DODD. Mr. President, I rise to discuss the fiscal year 2007 
Homeland Security appropriations conference report. The Senate adopted 
this measure earlier today, and I supported it.
  I would like to begin by thanking the principal Senate authors of 
this conference report: Senator Gregg and Senator Byrd. I commend my 
colleagues and their staffs for the hard work they put into negotiating 
with the House of Representatives and crafting this report.
  The conference report adopted by the Senate today funds our country's 
homeland security activities at $34.8 billion for the upcoming fiscal 
year. These activities include supporting national and regional 
emergency preparedness, first responders, and infrastructure 
protection. Taken together, these initiatives form the foundation upon 
which our country depends for its domestic security.
  I feel compelled to speak today because notwithstanding the efforts 
of our colleagues and notwithstanding the adoption of this conference 
report, I have deep concerns about how this measure--like those that 
preceded it--funds our country's vital homeland security and emergency 
preparedness activities.
  We all know that disasters--both natural and manmade--continue to 
threaten our Nation's domestic security and prosperity. As Hurricane 
Katrina tragically demonstrated last year and as the recent terrorist 
plot uncovered by British authorities to destroy U.S.-bound aircraft 
demonstrated last month, our domestic security--particularly our 
critical infrastructure--remains dangerously prone to exploitation and 
attack. In light of this unpleasant reality, one would think that the 
Congress of the United States would do everything it could to shore

[[Page S10628]]

up the foundation of our domestic security--to make it as impregnable 
as possible against the destructive forces of nature and man. Yet, as 
we look at the measure adopted by the Senate, I do not believe it does 
enough to protect Americans from natural disasters or acts of 
terrorism.
  I believe that the most important activities for ensuring our 
domestic security include assisting local and regional emergency 
preparedness activities, supporting first responders, and protecting 
critical infrastructure. Taken together, these activities represent the 
backbone of our efforts to plan for, respond to, and prevent disasters 
on our soil. They encompass supporting firefighters, police officers, 
emergency medical technicians; they encompass fully protecting all of 
our ports and transit systems; and they encompass quickly and 
effectively responding to real or perceived threats in all parts of our 
country.
  Over the past several years, experts in the national security and 
public health issues relevant to our first responders, critical 
infrastructure, and emergency preparedness have reported their domestic 
security needs. I would like to remind my colleagues that these are 
present needs--not future projected needs. For example, our 
firefighters have identified more than $4 billion needed each year for 
performing their critical duties safely and efficiently; our port 
authorities have identified $8.4 billion required for meeting increased 
Federal security requirements; and our transit systems have identified 
$6 billion needed for making our trains and buses safer for passengers.
  Regrettably, the conference report adopted by the Senate continues a 
pattern of failure on the part of the present administration and 
leadership of Congress to adequately meet these needs. Under this 
measure, States receive $900 million from the State Homeland Security 
Grant Program--a $350 million increase over the fiscal year 2006 level 
but $250 million below the fiscal year 2005 level. Our 
firefighters receive $662 million from the FIRE and SAFER grant 
initiatives--vital firefighter assistance grants that I was pleased to 
author with Senators DeWine, Warner, and Levin. This level of funding 
is $7 million above last year's level but $1.338 billion below the most 
recent combined authorization level. Our ports receive $210 million--
just over half of the amount authorized in the recently passed SAFE 
Ports Act, which I was pleased to support. Finally, our transit systems 
receive $175 million--a $25 million increase above last year's level. 
While we have taken steps to boost our domestic security since the 
attacks of September 11, 2001, our State and local governments largely 
remain inadequately prepared, our first responders spread too thin, and 
our critical infrastructure inadequately protected.

  I would also like to discuss briefly another aspect of this 
conference report. In addition to funding the Department of Homeland 
Security for the upcoming fiscal year, the conference report makes 
significant administrative changes to the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency, FEMA. Many of these changes codify recommendations made by the 
9/11 Commission and various reports issued in the wake of the Federal 
response to Hurricane Katrina.
  I would like to commend particularly the efforts of Senator Collins 
and my fellow colleague from Connecticut, Senator Lieberman, in working 
with conferees to incorporate these reforms to FEMA into the conference 
report. In my view, these reforms promise ultimately to return FEMA to 
being better empowered to manage mitigation, preparedness, response, 
and recovery activities with respect to natural and man-made disasters.
  Nevertheless, I would be remiss if I did not mention some concerns I 
hold with respect to these reforms. More specifically, I remain 
concerned these reforms open the possibility for, but do not guarantee, 
input from all stakeholders involved with local, regional, and national 
emergency preparedness efforts. I am also concerned that these reforms 
do not offer, in my view, explicit guidelines with respect to resource 
sharing, capability standards, and compliance benchmarks. I believe 
that it is essential for FEMA, as it works to incorporate these 
reforms, to develop and implement proper regulations that ensure equal 
input from all local, regional, and national stakeholders, clear 
guidance on adequate local, regional, and national levels of 
investment, and clear direction on what activities need to be performed 
by local, regional, and national preparedness systems.
  Mr. President, we continue to live in an age when the threat of harm 
to Americans on their own soil remains dangerously high. As world 
events continue to remind us, we must remain vigilant about our 
domestic security. We must proactively assess our weaknesses and 
proactively work to do all we can to eliminate those weaknesses. Put 
simply, the lives and the safety of all Americans hang in the balance.
  On balance, I supported this legislation because the funding it 
appropriates does take important steps toward meeting some of our 
crucial domestic security needs. However, I look forward to working 
with my colleagues in the coming years to find and provide the 
resources necessary to make our Nation as safe and strong as it can 
possibly be.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I will support final passage of the 
Homeland Security appropriations bill today because it includes vital 
funding for our first responders and our Nation's borders. 
Unfortunately, the bill still does not go far enough.
  In particular, I am disappointed that the Senate has again included 
the small State funding formula for our largest first responder grant 
program. We need to change our approach to allocating these scarce 
resources by reducing the amount of funds allocated to States 
regardless of need and increasing the funds available to States facing 
the greatest threats and greatest need. I will continue to work with my 
colleagues in coming months to make the allocation of these scarce 
resources more equitable.
  I am also disappointed that this bill does not take steps to 
establish a Northern Border Air Wing in Detroit, MI, as the Senate bill 
did. The Northern Border Air Wing, NBAW, initiative was launched by the 
Department of Homeland Security, DHS, in 2004 to provide air and marine 
interdiction and enforcement capabilities along the northern border. 
Original plans called for DHS to open five NBAW sites in New York, 
Washington, North Dakota, Montana, and Michigan. Michigan was 
originally scheduled to be the third facility opened.
  The New York and Washington NBAW sites have been operational since 
2004. Unfortunately, not all of the sites have been established, 
leaving large portions of our northern border unpatrolled from the air 
and, in the case of my home State, the water. In the conference report 
accompanying the fiscal year 2006 DHS appropriations bill, the 
conferees noted that these remaining gaps in our air patrol coverage of 
the northern border should be closed as quickly as possible. This bill 
does not accomplish the goals set by Congress last year.
  In testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, John Bates, 
the Chief CBP official in the Detroit Sector said the Detroit area's 
international border is ``an attractive site for criminal organizations 
that traffic human cargo, contraband, and narcotics across our 
border.'' Chief Bates also noted in his testimony that the ``natural 
terrain and geographical nexus to the waterways'' presents a tremendous 
challenge to border interdiction and Law Enforcement efforts, the 
failure of which ``could have major national security implications.''
  During Senate floor consideration, with the help of Senators Byrd and 
Gregg, the Senate accepted my amendment related to establishing the 
fifth and final Northern Border Wing. Unfortunately, this funding was 
taken out in conference, and the gap along the northern border will 
remain open for yet another year.
  Given the serious threat from terrorists, drug traffickers, and 
others who seek to enter our country illegally, I would hope the 
Department uses its operating funds to open the Michigan site as soon 
as possible. According to the Department, establishing the NBAW will 
cost approximately $17 million. This would be consistent with an April 
11, 2006, letter to me in which Secretary Chertoff indicated that it 
was his Department's plan to open the Michigan site during the 2007 
fiscal year. I hope he will follow through on that promise.

[[Page S10629]]

  Although I wish the bill did more to make first responder funding 
risk-based and to establish a Northern Border Wing in Michigan, there 
are many provisions in the bill that I support.
  I was pleased to learn of the appropriators' decision to retain the 
Leahy-Stevens Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative deadline extension. 
According to the Detroit Regional Chamber of Commerce, businesses in 
Michigan are already being negatively impacted by concerns about 
crossing land borders from Canada into the United States. Extension of 
the implementation deadline will allow DHS and the State Department to 
work through a variety of issues associated with REAL ID and the 
proposed pass cards, as well as allow for a more effective public 
information campaign.
  I am also pleased that the final bill includes funding for 1,500 new 
Border Patrol agents. I hope the Department will apportion these agents 
in a manner that considers the threat along the northern border, 
particularly in the areas around the northern border's busiest 
crossings. I was pleased the conferees noted the lack of experienced 
border agents on the northern border and that they have agreed to hold 
the Secretary's feet to the fire on this issue. As a member of the 
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, I look forward to 
discussing this matter with Secretary Chertoff.
  The conferees retained a provision regarding a pilot project for 
unmanned aerial vehicles on the northern border. The Great Lakes are 
almost completed unguarded at present, and UAVs are the perfect 
technology for surveillance along these water borders. The Great Lakes 
offer a unique opportunity for the Department, and I look forward to 
working with the Department in the coming year on this issue.
  I am pleased that the bill includes language that will strengthen the 
Federal Emergency Management Agency, FEMA. The Federal Government's 
bungled response to Hurricane Katrina demonstrated incompetence at the 
highest levels of DHS and also demonstrated the need to strengthen our 
Nation's emergency response capabilities. The FEMA provision will 
restore the vital connection between emergency preparedness and 
response that Secretary Chertoff had previously severed. The bill also 
includes a provision for keeping families together during mass 
evacuations and requires DHS to establish a National Emergency Child 
Locator Center that will help families reunite more quickly in the 
event they get separated during a disaster. I hope these provisions 
will help prevent the reoccurrence of one of the most tragic 
consequences of the Katrina disaster--the thousands of children who 
were reported as missing in its aftermath. However, I am disappointed 
that the bill did not include a $3.3 billion authorization for a 
dedicated communications interoperability grant program. This provision 
had previously been included in an emergency management reform bill 
that we passed in the Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 
Committee.
  The bill also includes a provision that would authorize the Secretary 
of Homeland Security to issue interim regulations for high-risk 
chemical facilities. Although this authorization is long past due, I am 
disappointed that such an important provision was drafted behind closed 
doors, instead of being vetted with full transparency, as was the case 
with the comprehensive chemical plant security legislation that passed 
out of Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee 
unanimously on June 15, 2006. I am glad that a 3-year sunset provision 
was included in the bill so that the authorizing committees can make 
any needed improvements to ensure that the threats from chemical plants 
are fully addressed.
  Mr. CHAMBLISS. Mr. President, I rise today in support of the fiscal 
year 2007 Homeland Security conference report. It is important for me 
to begin by thanking Senator Judd Gregg for his hard work and for his 
dedication to producing a strong report. I commend Senator Gregg for 
his leadership and for working with me to secure several important 
initiatives that are so important for the State of Georgia and for 
America's security.
  The Federal Law Enforcement Training Center, FLETC, is located in 
Glynco, GA. We have outstanding law-enforcement training which takes 
place at this fine facility. The conference report restored $2 million 
to FLETC's Counterterrorism Operations and Training Facility, COTF. I 
am profoundly grateful for this funding and know that the men and women 
of law-enforcement who operate and train at FLETC are grateful, also. 
Since the attacks of 9/11, it has become vital that our law enforcement 
receive the most up to date counterterrorism training that is 
available, and FLETC provides it.
  I also would like to commend Chairman Gregg for including language to 
ensure that the training and programs being developed at the Advanced 
Training Center at Harper's Ferry, WV, will not be duplicate or 
displace any Federal law enforcement program at FLETC. I am pleased 
that Senator Gregg referenced the language in Public Law 106-246 in 
order to reaffirm Congress's longstanding commitment to protect the 
programs and training at the FLETC. I look forward to continuing to 
work with him to ensure that this language continues to be included in 
the future.
  Senator Gregg honored my request to protect and ensure the FLETC to 
renew the Rehired Authority. Without the renewal of this authority, 
FLETC will not be able to schedule the full training requirements at 
Glynco and Artesia, NM, to meet the initiative for Border Patrol at 
Artesia, and the Immigration and Customs Enforcement and Detention 
Officer Training at Glynco. The FLETC has demonstrated the need for the 
authority.
  There are many strong reasons to justify this needed authority, but 
perhaps the most compelling is that by using annuitants, FLETC can save 
dollars, versus hiring permanent full-time employees, gain demonstrated 
experience--the current average is 26 years of law enforcement 
experience--and free up some of the instructors now provided to FLETC 
by its partner agencies on a temporary basis to be used instead in 
front line law enforcement operational functions.
  The Federal Law Enforcement Training Center is the Federal 
Government's primary source of law enforcement training. Eighty-two 
partner organizations subscribe to FLETC for their law enforcement 
training at the basic--entry level--and advanced training levels. 
During basic and advanced training, trainees and newly commissioned law 
enforcement officers are molded into the culture of law enforcement, 
much like basic trainees and young soldiers in the Armed Forces. It 
takes instructors that have the ability to provide realistic 
instruction to gain the respect of their students as they immerse 
students into their law enforcement careers. These instructors can come 
only from the ranks of Federal employees with many years of very 
relevant law enforcement experience. Subject areas taught by these 
instructors include law enforcement techniques and topical areas, such 
as counterterrorism prevention and detection and border tracking 
procedures. It is in the best interest of the Government to have 
Federal Government employees with state-of-the-art knowledge and 
experience regarding tactics, policies, and practices of the law 
enforcement community to provide instruction to trainees, agents, and 
officers who are beginning their careers. To outsource training for law 
enforcement functions, even in a partial or fragmented manner, is 
counterproductive to the overall security and enforcement of the laws 
of the United States.
  The conference report contains language making the activities of the 
staff of the FLETC inherently governmental. While it was my hope that 
the provision would have been strengthened by the use of the words 
``and hereafter'' to avoid the requirement of a renewal each year, I 
look forward to working with the chairman to achieve this goal in the 
future.
  I am very proud of our employees at FLETC Glynco and the work that is 
done there and am a very strong supporter of the FLETC. I look forward 
to continuing to help strengthen the operations that are conducted 
there so that we can offer the best possible training and protection to 
our homeland.
  Mr. CRAIG. Mr. President, let me first express my appreciation for 
the hard work of the conferees in approving the legislation we will 
vote on

[[Page S10630]]

shortly that contains an important provision addressing the security of 
our Nation's chemical infrastructure.
  I believe it is very important that our chemical infrastructure have 
safeguards for the use and storage of chemical manufacturing and 
distribution. There is no doubt that it is vital to our efforts to 
ensure national security and the safety of the public. However, we 
should remind ourselves that many in the regulated community have 
already taken proactive actions, especially since September 11, 2001, 
to address threats to their facilities and operations, and have adopted 
a number of safeguards.
  It is my hope that Congress in its oversight role, and the Department 
of Homeland Security in its administrative and regulatory role, takes 
those efforts into account and ensures that any new protections and 
regulations are workable and appropriate.
  I am concerned that while the intent of the chemical security 
``compromise'' in this conference report is to address security 
concerns associated with high-risk industrial chemical use, the bill 
may also affect many low-risk facilities at a disproportionate level. 
One of those low-risk industries that will certainly be affected is our 
domestic dairy industry.
  My State of Idaho is a leader in milk production and processing, and 
our dairy industry is a major economic force. The industry employs the 
latest technologies to provide high quality products to our consumers 
and trading partners. What most people do not know is that dairy 
farmers, dairy cooperatives, and milk processors use anhydrous ammonia 
as a cooling agent to safely store milk and milk products as it makes 
its way from farm to grocery store shelf.
  Many in the food industry consider anhydrous ammonia to be one of the 
most efficient refrigerants available and in a relatively low-risk 
process. In accordance with Government regulations and guidelines, many 
dairy facilities now use anhydrous ammonia refrigeration systems after 
phasing out other chemicals that are less environmentally friendly.
  The dairy industry in Idaho and nationwide has been extremely 
diligent in taking actions to enhance the safety and security of their 
facilities. Those actions include regularly working with the Department 
of Homeland Security under Presidential Directives 7 and 9 along with 
regularly conducted vulnerability assessments with the Food and Drug 
Administration, FDA, the Department of Homeland Security, DHS, the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation, FBI, and State and local officials.
  Food facilities were some of the first industries we focused on in 
our fight against terrorism. This sector of our economy is currently 
regulated under the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism 
Preparedness and Response Act of 2002 under the jurisdiction of the 
FDA. The anhydrous ammonia in the refrigeration systems at these 
facilities is already regulated by the Environmental Protection Agency, 
EPA, under its Risk Management Program, RMP, regulations and by the 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration, OSHA, under its Process 
Safety Management, PSM, regulations.
  I believe, that the intent of including language in this conference 
report to strengthen the safety of our chemical production 
infrastructure was to focus on high-risk chemical plants. However, the 
language in the bill could impose serious burdens on what would 
normally be considered low-risk operations like dairy farms, 
cooperatives, and milk processors.
  Clearly, there is substantial interest in ensuring the security of 
our Nation's chemical infrastructure while not forcing onerous and 
duplicative regulations on one of our most important food industries. I 
hope some common sense will prevail on this issue, and I plan to 
continue to work with my colleagues on both sides of the aisle and the 
administration to see that happen.
  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, on the 5 year anniversary of the terrorist 
attacks of 9/11, many our Nation's commentators asked the same 
question: Are we safer today than we were on 9/11? Well, I must say to 
my colleagues, that is the wrong question. America was not safe on 9/
11.
  So in my book, being safer than we were on 9/11 is not saying much. 
We must set a higher standard.
  Regrettably, the President has set a very low standard. The President 
is comfortable with cutting grants to first responders 3 years in a row 
at the same time that our police, fire, and emergency medical personnel 
still cannot talk to each other on their radio systems. The President 
is comfortable with cutting grants to equip and train our heroic 
firefighters by 46 percent and with proposing to eliminate the program 
to hire more firefighters. The President is comfortable with a Homeland 
Security Department that is so bureaucratically lethargic that $173 
million approved by Congress to secure our ports sat in the Treasury 
here in Washington for 11\1/2\ months.
  This President is comfortable with a rob-Peter-to-pay-Paul approach 
to homeland security. When the Department was faced with a shortfall in 
funding for securing Federal buildings, the administration proposed to 
cut funding for developing effective countermeasures for explosives. A 
month later, Britain arrested potential terrorists who wanted to blow 
up planes over the Atlantic with liquid explosive. What an 
embarrassing, short-sighted proposal from the administration. I was 
pleased to join Chairman Gregg in rejecting the proposal.
  This administration was comfortable with shutting off federal funding 
for the FEMA program that provides long-term healthcare to the brave 
first responders who tried to save lives and look for survivors at the 
World Trade Center on 9/11. It was the Congress that came forward with 
funds to continue providing healthcare to our first responders.
  Well, I am not comfortable with the state of our homeland security.
  It has been 5 years since the 9/11 terrorist attacks. It has been 
nearly 5 years since Richard tried to blow up a plane bound for Miami. 
It has been 2\1/2\ years since hundreds were killed in the Madrid train 
bombings. It has been over 1 year since 752 were killed or wounded in 
the London train bombings. Just this summer, potential terrorists were 
arrested in Britain, who were planning to blow up planes over the 
Atlantic. Our aviation sector remains on high alert. There is no 
question about a continuing risk of attack.
  So, 5 years after 9/11, has the Department of Homeland Security taken 
the steps that it needs to take to help make Americans safe?
  Five years after the 9/11 attacks, 11 million cargo containers arrive 
in the United States each year. Any one of them could carry a nuclear 
bomb, or nuclear material to make a bomb. Yet only 5 percent of these 
containers are opened and inspected. Only 17-19 percent are examined 
with imaging equipment. Only 73 percent are screened for nuclear 
material.
  Five years after the 9/11 attacks, many of our first responders still 
cannot communicate with each other on their radio systems.
  Five years after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, we still have no system 
for verifying the identities and backgrounds of the thousands of 
workers who have access to our ports, boats, cargo containers, or air 
cargo.
  Five years after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, we still do not have a 
reliable system for inspecting the 23 billion pounds of air cargo that 
is placed on passenger aircraft every year.
  Annually, 500 million people cross U.S. borders via ports of entry--
more than 330 million of them are noncitizens. One of the key findings 
of the 9/11 Commission is that we do not have a system in this country 
for tracking aliens who pose a risk and remain in this country 
undetected. Five years after the terrorist attacks of 9/11, we still do 
not have a system for knowing when, or if, aliens have left the 
country. Nor do we have a 10-fingerprint system to reliably verify the 
identity, or the criminal or terrorist background, of aliens coming 
into this country.
  The EPA has estimated that there are 123 chemical plants across the 
country that could each endanger more than 1 million people if 
attacked. Yet 5 years after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, we have no 
regulations directing the chemical industry to improve security.
  Five years after the terrorist attacks of 9/11, we have a Department 
of Homeland Security, but it is a department rife with management 
problems. The Department has become a contractor's dream. Over $11.5 
billion of the Department's budget was executed through

[[Page S10631]]

contracts, a 60-percent increase over 2004. Yet only 18 of the 115 
major DHS contracts are managed by certified program managers. What an 
incredible opportunity for waste. It is no wonder that the GAO found 
$1.4 billion of waste from Katrina spending.
  The Department has the dubious distinction of being investigated 525 
times by the GAO since its inception. The vast majority of the GAO 
reports cited poor management and leadership practices.
  According to the Rand Corporation, between 1998 and 2003, there were 
approximately 181 terrorist attacks on rail targets worldwide. Five 
years after the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the Department has no plan 
for helping State and local governments to secure rail and transit 
systems. $150 million that Congress appropriated for rail and transit 
security sat at the Department for 11\1/2\ months. Since 2001, I have 
offered eight different amendments to fund rail and transit security, 
and all of them were opposed by the administration and defeated.
  The recent terrorist plot to blow up commercial airplanes crossing 
the Atlantic Ocean has highlighted a known vulnerability. Five years 
after the terrorist attacks of 9/11, we do not have technologies that 
can detect liquid explosives.
  The Department recently published a Nationwide Plan Review that found 
that the majority of State and local emergency operations plans are not 
fully adequate, feasible, or acceptable. Can you imagine? Five years 
after 9/11, the Department's own data indicates that State and local 
governments are not ready to deal with a catastrophic event. The 
Department has not even published a congressionally mandated National 
Preparedness Goal.
  The terrorist attacks of 9/11 should have been a wake-up call; but, 
apparently, the Department of Homeland Security, which was created in 
response to 9/11, somehow did not get the message.
  Given these continuing vulnerabilities, I am pleased to say that the 
conferees have set a higher standard than the White House or the 
Department.
  The conference agreement contains many improvements to the 
President's request, particularly, with regard to border security and 
port security. Were steadily increasing funding for Emergency 
Management Preparedness Grants, despite the President's proposed cuts 
each year. We have restored proposed cuts in grants to fire departments 
for needed equipment, and for hiring firefighters. The conferees have 
also mandated that grants be awarded within certain timeframes so that 
dollars intended to make Americans safer do not sit in the Treasury for 
an entire year.
  The conference agreement also includes important reforms in the 
organization of FEMA. Hurricane Katrina proved that the 
Administration's approach to breaking FEMA into pieces was a failure. 
This legislation will help put FEMA on sound footing.
  In addition, the conference report contains many provisions that 
provide clear guidance to the Department about how to improve its 
operations.
  I am particularly pleased with the improvements in funding for border 
security. Over the pass 2 years, starting with an amendment I offered 
with Senator Larry Craig to the fiscal year 2005 emergency 
supplemental--with the support of my Subcommittee Chairman, Senator 
Gregg--this Congress, and especially this Senate, has added 4,000 new 
Border Patrol agents and 9,150 new detention beds to the fight for 
border security. And, as a result of our efforts, there are 1,373 new 
detention personnel and 526 new Customs and Border Protection officers 
at our ports of entry.
  With Congress leading the way in a bipartisan manner, this 
administration has finally awakened and realized that this country 
faces a true illegal immigration crisis. There are 12 million illegal 
aliens currently living in this country--with more than 500,000 new 
illegal entering each year. And, as of this past January, there were an 
estimated 558,000 alien absconders--illegal aliens who have been 
ordered to be removed from this country, but who have thus far escaped 
detection. These individuals must be found and removed.
  I am pleased that the conference report before us makes great strides 
at achieving that goal. We are ending the short-sighted practice of 
``catch and release'' and replacing it with ``catch and remove.'' This 
conference report supports 27,500 detention beds.
  We have increased the number of Fugitive Operations teams from 16 in 
fiscal year 2005 to 75 teams in fiscal year 2007. In fiscal year 2005, 
these teams apprehended over 15,000 illegal aliens including 270 sexual 
predators and 11,200 fugitive aliens with judicial orders of removal 
against them. Adding an additional 23 more teams--for a total of 75 
teams--will make a real difference in removing from this country those 
individuals who have been ordered removed and who are here illegally.
  We are also increasing funding for the criminal alien program, which 
identifies illegal aliens currently serving time in U.S. prisons and 
begins removal proceedings against them while they are in jail. There 
are an estimated 630,000 criminal aliens in all Federal, State, and 
local prisons--of whom 551,000 have not yet been identified for removal 
from the country. Of these, 275,000 are here illegally. Additional 
attention is also focused on worksite enforcement.
  I commend my excellent Chairman, Senator Judd Gregg, for his 
outstanding knowledge of this bill and for his leadership. I thank him 
and his able staff, and I thank my staff, for their work on this 
legislation. This is a good agreement.
  Mr. NELSON of Florida. Mr. President, every year, millions of 
Americans who cannot otherwise afford their prescriptions at pharmacies 
in the United States seek the same FDA-approved prescriptions from 
Canada at significantly lower prices. However, on November 17, 2005, 
U.S. Customs quietly implemented a new, stricter policy on prescription 
drug importation. The new policy has resulted in over 37,000 
prescription drug shipments being detained by Federal officials. The 
new policy has limited the ability of American consumers to purchase 
these legally prescribed medications from FDA-approved facilities in 
Canada.
  Mr. President, I can tell you that my constituents are extremely 
disturbed by the actions being taken by our Federal Government. 
Silently implementing a stricter policy without adequately informing 
the public puts the health of those who have relied on the prompt 
delivery of these medications at risk.
  That is why I offered an amendment with Senator Vitter to the Senate 
version of the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations bill. Our 
amendment prohibits Customs from stopping the importation of FDA-
approved prescription drugs by American citizens. The amendment 
received overwhelming bipartisan support when it was added to the 
Senate bill.
  Unfortunately, the language agreed to by a House-Senate conference 
committee will only allow Americans to buy and carry home Canadian 
prescription drugs for personal use, while continuing to prohibit 
consumers from ordering their prescriptions from Canada by mail.
  Although the original Nelson-Vitter provision would have given all 
Americans greater access to affordable prescription drugs through the 
mail, the diluted version that emerged from conference committee will 
help only a few Americans from one part of the country. This language 
helps almost no Floridians who live thousands of miles from the 
Canadian border. While I am pleased that Americans living near the 
border will now have greater access to low-cost prescription 
medications, I believe that this provision discriminates against 
Floridians and others who do not live near Canada.
  However, this provision is a small step in the right direction. I 
believe that its passage will open the door to expanding access to 
lower-cost medications from Canada for all Americans, regardless of 
where they live. We have made progress but I intend to keep pushing the 
issue until all Americans can get the medications they need at an 
affordable price.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. There are 5 minutes remaining equally divided 
prior to the vote.
  The Senator from New Hampshire.
  Mr. GREGG. On behalf of myself and Senator Byrd, we yield back the 
time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the conference 
report.
  The conference report was agreed to.

[[Page S10632]]

  Mr. GREGG. I move to reconsider the vote.
  Mrs. MURRAY. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Jersey.
  Mr. LAUTENBERG. Mr. President, I will speak on the port security 
conference report we are just passing. I am a conferee on that bill and 
this conference has been a sham. It is shameful because the Democratic 
members of the conference committee have not been allowed to offer 
amendments to the conference report. We were sitting on our hands for 
virtually an hour while the chairman of the conference committee was 
absent, without a piece of paper in front of us about what was in the 
port security bill. Nothing. There was no indication of what was there. 
No guide, nothing--just sitting there wiling away the time.
  Why, we asked, did the Republican leadership in the House and the 
Senate allow this perversion of the democratic process? Why make 
promises we would have a chance to offer amendments but never be able 
to do so?
  They wanted this conference to be a plain backroom deal. Their agenda 
is to strip from this bill important provisions on rail security, 
transit security and aviation security and replace them with 
legislation that has nothing to do with our homeland security at all, 
our port security.
  I would like to understand from the majority what it is they were 
trying to tell the American people. What was so objectionable about the 
provisions Democratic conferees wanted to offer to bolster aviation, 
transit, rail, truck, bus, and pipeline security?
  The Senate has agreed to the rail security legislation and twice the 
Senate has approved transit security legislation. Twice the Senate 
agreed to my amendment to remove the arbitrary cap on the number of 
airport screeners that can be hired, but each time these measures died 
due to the inaction by the House of Representatives. Now Republican 
leaders, once again, want to kill them.
  Last night, the Republican chairman assured the Democratic conferees 
that they could offer amendments to the conference report, but they put 
obstacles in the way to permit it from happening. Republicans were 
fearful of showing votes against common sense for rail, transit and 
aviation security measures. This challenges logic beyond belief.
  Last night, the House had actually approved, had voted 281-140, to 
instruct their conferees to support the Senate provisions on rail, 
transit and aviation security. Transit systems have always been 
terrorist targets. They are open, accessible and teeming with innocent 
people. Since we have not done what we need to do to protect them, they 
are vulnerable.
  Recent attacks in Madrid, London and Mumbai have shown just how 
devastating these attacks can be. Hundreds of people have been killed 
just commuting to and from their jobs in those cities.
  The Senate rail security provision mandated measures to help protect 
25 million Amtrak riders each year, but the House leadership dismissed 
recent attacks on the rail systems as not significant enough to guard 
against. It would protect millions more who live near rail tracks where 
trains carrying hazardous materials pass by, with some very close to 
this facility, on nearby tracks. Once again, logic failed.
  The aviation security provision dealing with airport screeners was 
approved in the Senate by a vote of 85-12. It would have removed the 
arbitrary caps on hiring TSA airport screeners. I repeat, the Senate, 
by a vote of 85-12, would have removed the arbitrary cap on hiring TSA 
airport screeners even though burgeoning numbers of passengers are 
flooding our airports. Lifting the cap could have made air travel 
safer. And it would have reduced the amount of time passengers have to 
wait in line at terminals to pass through security lines.

  It is important for the American people to understand the enormous 
opportunity taken away from them to protect themselves. It is important 
for our people to understand the leadership in the Congress stood 
against rail security, transit security or shorter airport-airline 
passenger security.
  We did not finish the conference on the port security bill. We 
finished a sham. The majority ought to be embarrassed by their 
thoughtless abandonment of essential security protection for the 
American people as they travel.
  The leadership stripped out--in the conference that never took 
place--rail transit and aviation security but made sure that Texas 
Hold'em Poker games are illegal to play on your computer.
  I regret this took place. I hope America does not see in its near 
future that they were foolishly careless in not protecting our citizens 
as much as they could.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine is recognized for 3 
minutes.
  Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent since the Senator 
from Alaska yields back his 5 minutes that I be permitted to speak for 
up to 10 minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

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