[Congressional Record Volume 152, Number 125 (Friday, September 29, 2006)]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Pages E1963-E1966]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                    A BLUEPRINT FOR LEAVING IRAQ NOW

                                 ______
                                 

                         HON. JAMES P. McGOVERN

                            of massachusetts

                    in the house of representatives

                       Friday, September 29, 2006

  Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. Speaker, former Senator George McGovern and William 
R. Polk, founder and director of the Center for Middle Eastern Studies 
at the University of Chicago, have co-authored a new book, Out of Iraq, 
that is being released in October 2006 by Simon & Schuster.
  I would like to share with my colleagues an excerpt published in the 
October edition of Harper's Magazine.

                           The Way Out of War

              (By George S. McGovern and William R. Polk)


                    a blueprint for leaving iraq now

       Staying in Iraq not an option. Many Americans who were 
     among the most eager to invade Iraq now urge that we find a 
     way out. These Americans include not only civilian 
     ``strategists'' and other ``hawks'' but also senior military 
     commanders and, perhaps most fervently, combat soldiers. Even 
     some of those Iraqis regarded by our senior officials as the 
     most pro-American are determined now to see American military 
     personnel leave their country. Polls show that as few as 2 
     percent of Iraqis consider Americans to be liberators. This 
     is the reality of the situation in Iraq. We must acknowledge 
     the Iraqis' right to ask us to leave, and we should set a 
     firm date by which to do so.
       We suggest that phased withdrawal should begin on or before 
     December 31, 2006, with the promise to make every effort to 
     complete it by June 30, 2007.
       Withdrawal is not only a political imperative but a 
     strategic requirement. As many retired American military 
     officers now admit, Iraq has become, since the invasion, the 
     primary recruiting and training ground for terrorists. The 
     longer American troops remain in Iraq, the more recruits will 
     flood the ranks of those who oppose America not only in Iraq 
     but elsewhere.
       Withdrawal will not be without financial costs, which are 
     unavoidable and will have to be paid sooner or later. But the 
     decision to withdraw at least does not call for additional 
     expenditures. On the contrary, it will effect massive 
     savings. Current U.S. expenditures run at approximately 
     $246 million each day, or more than $10 million an hour, 
     with costs rising steadily each year. Although its figures 
     do not include all expenditures, the Congressional 
     Research Service listed direct

[[Page E1964]]

     costs at $77.3 billion in 2004, $87.3 billion in 2005, and 
     $100.4 billion in fiscal year 2006. Even if troop 
     withdrawals begin this year, total costs (including those 
     in Afghanistan) are thought likely to rise by $371 billion 
     during the withdrawal period. Economist Joseph Stiglitz 
     and Linda Bilmes, a former assistant secretary of 
     commerce, have estimated that staying in Iraq another four 
     years will cost us at least $1 trillion.
       Let us be clear: there will be some damage. This is 
     inevitable no matter what we do. At the end of every 
     insurgency we have studied, there was a certain amount of 
     chaos as the participants sought to establish a new civic 
     order. This predictable turmoil has given rise to the 
     argument, still being put forward by die-hard hawks, that 
     Americans must, in President Bush's phrase, ``stay the 
     course.'' The argument is false. When a driver is on the 
     wrong road and headed for an abyss, it is a bad idea to 
     ``stay the course.'' A nation afflicted with a failing and 
     costly policy is not well served by those calling for more of 
     the same, and it is a poor idea to think that we can 
     accomplish in the future what we are failing to accomplish in 
     the present. We are as powerless to prevent the turmoil that 
     will ensue when we withdraw as we have been to stop the 
     insurgency. But we will have removed a major cause of the 
     insurgency once we have withdrawn. Moreover, there are ways 
     in which we can be helpful to the Iraqis--and protect our own 
     interests--by ameliorating the underlying conditions and 
     smoothing the edges of conflict. The first of these would be 
     a ``bridging'' effort between the occupation and complete 
     independence.
       To this end, we think that the Iraqi government would be 
     wise to request the temporary services of an international 
     stabilization force to police the country during and 
     immediately after the period of American withdrawal. Such a 
     force should itself have a firm date fixed for its removal. 
     Our estimate is that Iraq would need this force for no more 
     than two years after the American withdrawal is complete. 
     During this period, the force could be slowly but steadily 
     cut back in both personnel and deployment. Its purpose would 
     be limited to activities aimed at enhancing public security. 
     Consequently, the armament of this police force should be 
     restricted. It would have no need for tanks or artillery or 
     offensive aircraft but only light equipment. It would not 
     attempt, as have American troops, to battle the insurgents. 
     Indeed, after the withdrawal of American troops, as well as 
     British regular troops and mercenary forces, the insurgency, 
     which was aimed at achieving that objective, would almost 
     immediately begin to lose public support. Insurgent gunmen 
     would either put down their weapons or become publicly 
     identified as outlaws.
       We imagine that the Iraqi government, and the Iraqi people, 
     would find the composition of such a force most acceptable if 
     it were drawn from Arab or Muslim countries. Specifically, it 
     should be possible under the aegis of the United Nations to 
     obtain, say, five contingents of 3,000 men each from Morocco, 
     Tunisia, and Egypt. Jordan and Syria might also be asked to 
     contribute personnel. If additional troops were required, or 
     if any of these governments were deemed unacceptable to Iraq 
     or unwilling to serve, application could be made to such 
     Muslim countries as Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Indonesia. 
     Other countries might be included if the Iraqi government so 
     wished.
       It would benefit both Iraq and the United States if we were 
     to pay for this force. Assuming that a ballpark figure would 
     be $500 per man per day, and that 15,000 men would be 
     required for two years, the overall cost would be $5.5 
     billion. That is approximately 3 percent of what it 
     would cost to continue the war, with American troops, for 
     the next two years. Not only would this represent a great 
     monetary saving to us but it would spare countless 
     American lives and would give Iraq the breathing space it 
     needs to recover from the trauma of the occupation in a 
     way that does not violate national and religious 
     sensibilities.
       The American subvention should be paid directly to the 
     Iraqi government, which would then ``hire'' the police 
     services it requires from other governments. The vast amount 
     of equipment that the American military now has in Iraq, 
     particularly transport and communications and light arms, 
     should be turned over to this new multinational force rather 
     than shipped home or destroyed.
       As the insurgency loses its national justification, other 
     dangers will confront Iraq. One of these is ``warlordism,'' 
     as we have seen in Afghanistan, and other forms of large-
     scale crime. Some of this will almost certainly continue. But 
     the breakdown of public order will never be remedied by 
     American forces; it can only be addressed by a national 
     police force willing to work with neighborhood, village, and 
     tribal home guards. Ethnic and regional political divisions 
     in Iraq have been exacerbated by the occupation, and they are 
     unlikely to disappear once the occupation is over. They are 
     now so bitter as to preclude a unified organization, at least 
     for the time being. It is therefore paramount that the 
     national police force involve local leaders, so as to ensure 
     that the home guards operate only within their own territory 
     and with appropriate action. In part, this is why Iraq needs 
     a ``cooling off'' period, with multinational security 
     assistance, after the American withdrawal.
       While the temporary international police force completes 
     its work, the creation of a permanent national police force 
     is, and must be, an Iraqi task. American interference would 
     be, and has been, counterproductive. And it will take time. 
     The creation and solidification of an Iraqi national police 
     force will probably require, at a rough estimate, four to 
     five years to become fully effective. We suggest that the 
     American withdrawal package should include provision of $1 
     billion to help the Iraqi government create, train, and equip 
     such a force, which is roughly the cost of four days of the 
     present American occupation.
       Neighborhood, village, and tribal home guards, which are 
     found throughout Iraq, of course constitute a double-edged 
     sword. Inevitably, they mirror the ethnic, religious, and 
     political communities from which they are drawn.
       Insofar as they are restricted each to its own community, 
     and are carefully monitored by a relatively open and benign 
     government, they will enhance security; allowed to move 
     outside their home areas, they will menace public order. Only 
     a central government police and respected community leaders 
     can possibly hope to control these militias. America has no 
     useful role to play in these affairs, as experience has made 
     perfectly clear.
       It is not in the interests of Iraq to encourage the growth 
     and heavy armament of a reconstituted Iraqi army. The 
     civilian government of Iraq should be, and hopefully is, 
     aware that previous Iraqi armies have frequently acted 
     against Iraqi civic institutions. That is, Iraqi armies have 
     not been a source of defense but of disruption. We cannot 
     prevent the reconstitution of an Iraqi army, but we should 
     not, as we are currently doing, actually encourage this at a 
     cost of billions to the American taxpayer. If at all 
     possible, we should encourage Iraq to transfer what soldiers 
     it has already recruited for its army into a national 
     reconstruction corps modeled on the U.S. Army Corps of 
     Engineers. The United States could assist in the creation 
     and training of just such a reconstruction corps, which 
     would undertake the rebuilding of infrastructure damaged 
     by the war, with an allocation of, say, $500 million, or 
     roughly the cost of two days of the current occupation.
       Withdrawal of American forces must include immediate 
     cessation of work on U.S. military bases. Nearly half of the 
     more than 100 bases have already been closed down and turned 
     over, at least formally, to the Iraqi government, but as many 
     as fourteen ``enduring'' bases for American troops in Iraq 
     are under construction. The largest five are already massive, 
     amounting to virtual cities. The Balad Air Base, forty miles 
     north of Baghdad, has a miniature golf course, 2 PXs, a Pizza 
     Hut, a Burger King, and a jail. Another, under construction 
     at al-Asad, covers more than thirteen square miles. Although 
     Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld stated on December 23, 
     2005, that ``at the moment there are no plans for permanent 
     bases. . . . It is a subject that has not even been discussed 
     with the Iraqi government,'' his remarks are belied by action 
     on the ground, where bases are growing in size and being 
     given aspects of permanency. The most critical of these are 
     remote military bases. They should be stood down rapidly. 
     Closing these bases is doubly important: for America, they 
     are expensive and already redundant; for Iraqis, they both 
     symbolize and personify a hated occupation. With them in 
     place, no Iraqi government will ever feel truly independent. 
     It is virtually certain that absent a deactivation of U.S. 
     military bases, the insurgency will continue. The enormous 
     American base at Baghdad International Airport, ironically 
     named ``Camp Victory,'' should be the last of the military 
     bases to be closed, as it will be useful in the process of 
     disengagement.
       We should of course withdraw from the Green Zone, our vast, 
     sprawling complex in the center of Baghdad. The United States 
     has already spent or is currently spending $1.8 billion on 
     its headquarters there, which contains, or will contain, some 
     600 housing units, a Marine barracks, and more than a dozen 
     other buildings, as well as its own electrical, water, and 
     sewage systems. The Green Zone should be turned over to the 
     Iraqi government no later than December 31, 2007. By this 
     time, the U.S. should have bought, or rented, or built a 
     ``normal'' embassy for a considerably reduced complement of 
     personnel. Symbolically, it would be beneficial for the new 
     building not to be in the Green Zone. Assuming that a 
     reasonable part of the Green Zone's cost can be saved, there 
     should be no additional cost to create a new American embassy 
     for an appropriate number of not more than 500 American 
     officials, as opposed to the 1,000 or so Americans who today 
     staff the Green Zone. Insofar as is practical, the new 
     building should not be designed as though it were a 
     beleaguered fortress in enemy territory.
       Withdrawal from these bases, and an end to further 
     construction, should save American taxpayers billions of 
     dollars over the coming two years. This is quite apart from 
     the cost of the troops they would house. America should 
     immediately release all prisoners of war and close its 
     detention centers.
       Mercenaries, euphemistically known as ``Personal Security 
     Detail,'' are now provided by an industry of more than thirty 
     ``security'' firms, comprising at least 25,000 armed men. 
     These constitute a force larger than the British troop 
     contingent in the ``Coalition of the Willing'' and operate 
     outside the direct control--and with little interference from 
     the military justice systems--of the British and American 
     armies. They

[[Page E1965]]

     are, literally, the ``loose cannons'' of the Iraq war. They 
     should be withdrawn rapidly and completely, as the Iraqis 
     regard them as the very symbol of the occupation. Since the 
     U.S. pays for them either directly or indirectly, all we need 
     to do is stop payment.
       Much work will be necessary to dig up and destroy land 
     mines and other unexploded ordinance and, where possible, to 
     clean up the depleted uranium used in artillery shells. These 
     are dangerous tasks that require professional training, but 
     they should be turned over wherever possible to Iraqi 
     contractors. These contractors would employ Iraqi labor, 
     which would help jump-start a troubled economy and be of 
     immediate benefit to the millions of Iraqis who are now out 
     of work. The United Nations has gained considerable knowledge 
     about de-mining--from the Balkans, Afghanistan, and 
     elsewhere--that might be shared with the Iraqis. Although 
     cleanup will be costly, we cannot afford to leave this 
     dangerous waste behind. One day's wartime expenditure, 
     roughly $250 million, would pay for surveys of the damage and 
     the development of a plan to deal with it. Once the extent of 
     the problem is determined, a fund should be established to 
     eradicate the danger completely.
       These elements of the ``withdrawal package'' may be 
     regarded as basic. Without them, Iraqi society will have 
     little chance of recovering economically or governing itself 
     with any effectiveness. Without them, American interests in 
     the Middle East, and indeed throughout the world, will be 
     severely jeopardized. These measures are, we repeat, 
     inexpensive and represent an enormous savings over the cost 
     of the current war effort. Building on them are further 
     actions that would also help Iraq become a safe and habitable 
     environment. To these ``second tier'' policies we now turn.
       Property damage incurred during the invasion and occupation 
     has been extreme. The World Bank has estimated that at least 
     $25 billion will be required to repair the Iraqi 
     infrastructure alone--this is quite apart from the damage 
     done to private property. The reconstruction can be, and 
     should be, done by Iraqis, as this would greatly benefit the 
     Iraqi economy, but the United States will need to make a 
     generous contribution to the effort if it is to be a success. 
     Some of this aid should be in the form of grants; the 
     remainder can be in the form of loans. Funds should be paid 
     directly to the Iraqi government, as it would be sound policy 
     to increase the power and public acceptance of that 
     government once American troops withdraw. The Iraqis will 
     probably regard such grants or loans as reparations; some of 
     the money will probably be misspent or siphoned off by 
     cliques within the government. It would therefore benefit the 
     Iraqi people if some form of oversight could be exercised 
     over the funds, but this would tend to undercut the 
     legitimacy and authority of their government, which itself 
     will probably be reconstituted during or shortly after the 
     American occupation ends. Proper use of aid funds has been a 
     problem everywhere: America's own record during the 
     occupation has been reprehensible, with massive waste, 
     incompetence, and outright dishonesty now being investigated 
     for criminal prosecution. No fledgling Iraqi government is 
     likely to do better, but if reconstruction funds are 
     portioned out to village, town, and city councils, the 
     enhancement of such groups will go far toward the avowed 
     American aim of strengthening democracy, given that Iraqis at 
     the ``grass roots'' level would be taking charge of their own 
     affairs.
       We suggest that the United States allocate for the planning 
     and organization of the reconstruction the sum of $1 billion, 
     or roughly four days of current wartime expenditure; After a 
     planning survey is completed, the American government will 
     need to determine, in consultation with the Iraqi government 
     (and presumably with the British government, our only true 
     ``partner'' in the occupation), what it is willing to pay for 
     reconstruction. We urge that the compensation be generous, as 
     generosity will go a long way toward repairing the damage to 
     the American reputation caused by this war.
       Nearly as important as the rebuilding of damaged buildings 
     and other infrastructure is the demolition of the ugly 
     monuments of warfare. Work should be undertaken as soon as is 
     feasible to dismantle and dispose of the miles of concrete 
     blast walls and wire barriers erected around present 
     American installations. Although the Iraqi people can 
     probably be counted on to raze certain relics of the 
     occupation on their own, we should nonetheless, in good 
     faith, assist in this process. A mere two days' worth of 
     the current war effort, $500 million, would employ a good 
     many Iraqi demolition workers.
       Another residue of war and occupation has been the 
     intrusion of military facilities on Iraqi cultural sites. 
     Some American facilities have done enormous and irreparable 
     damage. Astonishingly, one American camp was built on top of 
     the Babylon archaeological site, where American troops 
     flattened and compressed ancient ruins in order to create a 
     helicopter pad and fueling stations. Soldiers filled sandbags 
     with archaeological fragments and dug trenches through 
     unexcavated areas while tanks crushed 2,600-year-old 
     pavements. Babylon was not the only casualty. The 5,000-year-
     old site at Kish was also horribly damaged. We need to 
     understand that Iraq, being a seedbed of Western 
     civilization, is a virtual museum. It is hard to put a spade 
     into the earth there without disturbing a part of our shared 
     cultural heritage. We suggest that America set up a fund of, 
     say, $750 million, or three days' cost of the war, to be 
     administered by an ad-hoc committee drawn from the Iraqi 
     National Museum of Antiquities or the State Board of 
     Antiquities and Heritage, the British Museum, the World 
     Monuments Fund, the Smithsonian Institution, and what is 
     perhaps America's most prestigious archaeological 
     organization, the Oriental Institute of the University of 
     Chicago, to assist in the restoration of sites American 
     troops have damaged. We should not wish to go down in history 
     as yet another barbarian invader of the land long referred to 
     as the cradle of civilization.
       Independent accounting of Iraqi funds is urgently required. 
     The United Nations handed over to the American-run Coalition 
     Provisional Authority (CPA) billions of dollars generated by 
     the sale of Iraq petroleum with the understanding that these 
     monies would be used to the benefit of the Iraqi people and 
     would be accounted for by an independent auditor. The CPA 
     delayed this audit month after month, and it was still not 
     completed by the time the CPA ceased to exist. Any funds 
     misused or misappropriated by U.S. officials should be repaid 
     to the proper Iraqi authority. What that amount is we cannot 
     predict at this time.
       Although the funds turned over to the CPA by the U.N. 
     constitute the largest amount in dispute, that is by no means 
     the only case of possible misappropriation. Among several 
     others reported, perhaps the most damaging to Iraq has been a 
     project allocated to Halliburton's subsidiary Kellogg, Brown 
     & Root as part of a $2.4 billion no-bid contract awarded in 
     2003. The $75.7 million project was meant to repair the 
     junction of some fifteen pipelines linking the oil fields 
     with terminals. Engineering studies indicated that as 
     conceived the project was likely to fail, but KBR forged 
     ahead and, allegedly, withheld news of the failure from 
     the Iraqi Ministry of Petroleum until it had either spent 
     or received all the money. Despite this, KBR was actually 
     awarded a bonus by the Army Corps of Engineers, even 
     though Defense Department auditors had found more than 
     $200 million of KBR's charges to be questionable. There 
     would seem to be more greed than prudence in the repeated 
     awards to Halliburton in the run-up to the war, during the 
     war itself, and in contracts to repair the war damages. 
     Especially given that Vice President Dick Cheney was 
     formerly CEO of Halliburton, the U.S. should make every 
     effort to investigate this wrongdoing, prosecute and 
     correct it, and depart from Iraq with clean hands.
       The United States should not object to the Iraqi government 
     voiding all contracts entered into for the exploration, 
     development, and marketing of oil during the American 
     occupation. These contracts clearly should be renegotiated or 
     thrown open to competitive international bids. The Iraqi 
     government and public believe that because Iraqi oil has been 
     sold at a discount to American companies, and because long-
     term ``production-sharing agreements'' are highly favorable 
     to the concessionaires, an unfair advantage has been taken. 
     Indeed, the form of concession set up at the urging of the 
     CPA's consultants has been estimated to deprive Iraq of as 
     much as $194 billion in revenues. To most Iraqis, and indeed 
     to many foreigners, the move to turn over Iraq's oil reserves 
     to American and British companies surely confirms that the 
     real purpose of the invasion was to secure, for American use 
     and profit, Iraq's lightweight and inexpensively produced 
     oil.
       It is to the long-term advantage of both Iraq and the 
     United States, therefore, that all future dealings in oil, 
     which, after all, is the single most important Iraqi national 
     asset, be transparent and fair. Only then can the industry be 
     reconstituted and allowed to run smoothly; only then will 
     Iraq be able to contribute to its own well-being and to the 
     world's energy needs. Once the attempt to create American-
     controlled monopolies is abandoned, we believe it should be 
     possible for investment, even American investment, to take 
     place in a rapid and orderly manner. We do not, then, 
     anticipate a net cost connected with this reform.
       Providing reparations to Iraqi civilians for lives and 
     property lost is a necessity. The British have already begun 
     to do so in the zone they occupy. According to Martin Hemming 
     of the Ministry of Defence, British policy ``has, from the 
     outset of operations in Iraq, been to recognize the duty to 
     provide compensation to Iraqis where this is required by the 
     law. . . . [B]etween June 2003 and 31 July 2006, 2,327 claims 
     have been registered . . .'' Although there is no precise 
     legal precedent from past wars that would require America to 
     act accordingly, American forces in Iraq have now provided 
     one: individual military units are authorized to make 
     ``condolence payments'' of up to $2,500. The United States 
     could, and should, do even more to compensate Iraqi victims 
     or their heirs. Such an action might be compared to the 
     Marshall Plan, which so powerfully redounded to America's 
     benefit throughout the world after the end of the Second 
     World War. As we go forward, the following points should be 
     considered.
       The number of civilians killed or wounded during the 
     invasion and occupation, particularly in the sieges of 
     Fallujah, Tal Afar, and Najaf, is unknown. Estimates run from 
     30,000 to well over 100,000 killed, with many more wounded or 
     incapacitated. Assuming the number of unjustified deaths to 
     be 50,000, and the compensation per person to be $10,000, our 
     outlay would run to only $500 million, or two days' cost 
     of the war. The number seriously wounded or incapacitated 
     might easily

[[Page E1966]]

     be 100,000. Taking the same figure as for death benefits, 
     the total cost would be $1 billion, or four days' cost of 
     the war. The dominant voice in this process should be that 
     of Iraq itself, but in supplying the funds the United 
     States could reasonably insist on the creation of a quasi-
     independent body, composed of both Iraqis and respected 
     foreigners, perhaps operating under the umbrella of an 
     internationally recognized organization such as the 
     International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent 
     Societies or the World Health Organization, to assess and 
     distribute compensation.
       In the meantime, a respected international body should be 
     appointed to process the claims of, and pay compensation to, 
     those Iraqis who have been tortured (as defined by the Geneva 
     Conventions) or who have suffered long-term imprisonment. The 
     Department of Defense admits that approximately 3,200 people 
     have been held for longer than a year, and more than 700 for 
     longer than two years, most of them without charge, a clear 
     violation of the treasured American right of habeas corpus. 
     The number actually subjected to torture remains unknown, but 
     it is presumed to include a significant portion of those 
     incarcerated. Unfortunately, there exists no consensus, legal 
     or otherwise, on how victims of state-sponsored torture 
     should be compensated, and so it is not currently possible to 
     estimate the cost of such a program. Given that this is 
     uncharted legal territory, we should probably explore it 
     morally and politically to find a measure of justifiable 
     compensation. The very act of assessing damages--perhaps 
     somewhat along the lines of the South African Truth and 
     Reconciliation Commission--would, in and of itself, be a part 
     of the healing process.
       America should also offer--not directly but through 
     suitable international or nongovernmental organizations--a 
     number of further financial inducements to Iraq's recovery. 
     These might include fellowships for the training of lawyers, 
     judges, journalists, social workers, and other civil-affairs 
     workers. Two days' cost of the current war, or $500 million, 
     would ably fund such an effort.
       In addition, assistance to ``grass roots'' organizations 
     and professional societies could help encourage the return to 
     Iraq of the thousands of skilled men and women who left in 
     the years following the first Gulf war. Relocation allowance 
     and supplementary pay might be administered by the Iraqi 
     engineers' union. Medical practitioners might receive grants 
     through the medical association. Teachers might be courted by 
     the teachers' union or the Ministry of Education. Assuming 
     that some 10,000 skilled workers could be enticed to return 
     for, say, an average of $50,000, this would represent a cost 
     to the American taxpayer of $500 million. Roughly two days' 
     cost of the war would be a very small price to pay to restore 
     the health and vigor of Iraqi society and to improve 
     America's reputation throughout the world.
       We should also encourage the World Health Organization, 
     UNICEF, and similarly established and proven nongovernmental 
     organizations to help with the rebirth of an Iraqi public-
     health system by rebuilding hospitals and clinics. One reason 
     for turning to respected international organizations to 
     supervise this program is that when the CPA undertook the 
     task, funds were squandered.
       At last count, some seventeen years ago Iraq possessed an 
     impressive health-care infrastructure: 1,055 health centers, 
     58 health centers with beds, 135 general hospitals, and 52 
     specialized hospitals. Many of these facilities were badly 
     damaged by a decade of sanctions and by the recent warfare 
     and looting. If we assume that fully half of Iraq's hospitals 
     and health centers need to be rebuilt, the overall outlay can 
     be estimated at $250 million, one day's cost of the current 
     war. Equipment might cost a further $170 million. These 
     figures, based on a study prepared for the United Nations 
     Millennium Development Goals project, throw into sharp 
     relief the disappointing results of the American 
     ``effort'': one American firm, Parsons Corporation, has 
     been investigated for having taken a generous ``cost 
     plus'' contract to rebuild 142 clinics at a cost of $200 
     million; although the company put in for and collected all 
     the money, only twenty clinics were built.
       Estimating the cost of staffing these facilities is more 
     complicated. Theoretically, Iraq has a highly professional, 
     well-trained, reasonably large corps of health workers at all 
     levels. Yet many of these people left the country in the 
     years following the 1991 war. The Iraqi Health Ministry has 
     estimated that about 3,000 registered doctors left Iraq 
     during the first two years of the American occupation. 
     Hopefully these workers will return to Iraq once the 
     occupation and the insurgency have ended, but even if they do 
     so, younger replacements for them need to be trained. The 
     UNMDG study suggests that the training period for specialists 
     is about eight years; for general practitioners, five years; 
     and for various technicians and support personnel, three 
     years. We suggest that a training program for a select 
     number, say 200 general practitioners and 100 advanced 
     specialists, be carried out under the auspices of the World 
     Health Organization or Medecins Sans Frontieres, especially 
     given that some of this training will have to be done in 
     Europe or America. Even if the estimated cost of building and 
     equipping hospitals turned out to be five times too low, even 
     if the American government had to cover the bulk of salaries 
     and operating costs for the next four years, and even if 
     additional hospitals had to be built to care for Iraqis 
     wounded or made ill by the invasion and occupation, the total 
     cost would still be under $5 billion. It is sobering to think 
     that the maximum cost of rebuilding Iraq's public-health 
     system would amount to less than what we spend on the 
     occupation every twenty days.
       The monetary cost of the basic set of programs outline 
     roughly $7.25 billion. The cost of the ``second tier'' 
     programs cannot be as accurately forecast, but the planning 
     and implementation of these is likely to cost somewhere in 
     the vicinity of $10 billion. Seventeen and a quarter billion 
     dollars is a lot of money, but assuming that these programs 
     cut short the American occupation by only two years, they 
     would save us at least $200 billion. Much more valuable, 
     though, are the savings to be measured in what otherwise are 
     likely to be large numbers of shattered bodies and lost 
     lives. Even if our estimates are unduly optimistic, and the 
     actual costs turn out to be far higher, the course of action 
     we recommend would be perhaps the best investment ever made 
     by our country.
       Finally, we as a nation should not forget the young 
     Americans who fought this war, often for meager pay and with 
     inadequate equipment. As of this writing, more than 2,600 of 
     our soldiers have been killed, and a far greater number 
     wounded or crippled. It is only proper that we be generous to 
     those who return, and to the families of those who will not.
       That said, we should find a way to express our condolences 
     for the large number of Iraqis incarcerated, tortured, 
     incapacitated, or killed in recent years. This may seem a 
     difficult gesture to many Americans. It may strike them as 
     weak, or as a slur on our patriotism. Americans do not like 
     to admit that they have done wrong. We take comfort in the 
     notion that whatever the mistakes of the war and occupation, 
     we have done Iraq a great service by ridding it of Saddam 
     Hussein's dictatorship. Perhaps we have, but in the process 
     many people's lives have been disrupted, damaged, or 
     senselessly ended. A simple gesture of conciliation would go 
     a long way toward shifting our relationship with Iraq from 
     one of occupation to one of friendship. It would be a gesture 
     without cost but of immense and everlasting value--and would 
     do more to assuage the sense of hurt in the world than all of 
     the actions above.

                          ____________________