[Congressional Record Volume 152, Number 124 (Thursday, September 28, 2006)]
[House]
[Pages H7695-H7706]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
IRAN FREEDOM SUPPORT ACT
Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and pass
the bill (H.R. 6198) to hold the current regime in Iran accountable for
its threatening behavior and to support a transition to democracy in
Iran, as amended.
The Clerk read as follows:
H.R. 6198
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``Iran Freedom Support Act''.
SEC. 2. TABLE OF CONTENTS.
The table of contents for this Act is as follows:
Sec. 1. Short title.
Sec. 2. Table of contents.
TITLE I--CODIFICATION OF SANCTIONS AGAINST IRAN
Sec. 101. Codification of sanctions.
TITLE II--AMENDMENTS TO THE IRAN AND LIBYA SANCTIONS ACT OF 1996 AND
OTHER PROVISIONS RELATED TO INVESTMENT IN IRAN
Sec. 201. Multilateral regime.
Sec. 202. Imposition of sanctions.
Sec. 203. Termination of sanctions.
Sec. 204. Sunset.
Sec. 205. Technical and conforming amendments.
TITLE III--PROMOTION OF DEMOCRACY FOR IRAN
Sec. 301. Declaration of policy.
Sec. 302. Assistance to support democracy for Iran.
TITLE IV--POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES TO FACILITATE THE NUCLEAR
NONPROLIFERATION OF IRAN
Sec. 401. Sense of Congress.
TITLE V--PREVENTION OF MONEY LAUNDERING FOR WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION
Sec. 501. Prevention of money laundering for weapons of mass
destruction.
TITLE I--CODIFICATION OF SANCTIONS AGAINST IRAN
SEC. 101. CODIFICATION OF SANCTIONS.
(a) Codification of Sanctions.--Except as otherwise
provided in this section, United States sanctions with
respect to Iran imposed pursuant to sections 1 and 3 of
Executive Order No. 12957, sections 1(e), (1)(g), and (3) of
Executive Order No. 12959, and sections 2, 3, and 5 of
Executive Order No. 13059 (relating to exports and certain
other transactions with Iran) as in effect on January 1,
2006, shall remain in effect. The President may terminate
such sanctions, in whole or in part, if the President
notifies Congress at least 15 days in advance of such
termination. In the event of exigent circumstances, the
President may exercise the authority set forth in the
preceding sentence without regard to the notification
requirement stated therein, except that such notification
shall be provided as early as practicable, but in no event
later than three working days after such exercise of
authority.
(b) No Effect on Other Sanctions Relating to Support for
Acts of International Terrorism.--Nothing in this Act shall
affect any United States sanction, control, or regulation as
in effect on January 1, 2006, relating to a determination
under section 6(j)(1)(A) of the Export Administration Act of
1979 (50 U.S.C. App. 2405(j)(1)(A)), section 620A(a) of the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2371(a)), or
section 40(d) of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C.
2780(d)) that the Government of Iran has repeatedly provided
support for acts of international terrorism.
TITLE II--AMENDMENTS TO THE IRAN AND LIBYA SANCTIONS ACT OF 1996 AND
OTHER PROVISIONS RELATED TO INVESTMENT IN IRAN
SEC. 201. MULTILATERAL REGIME.
(a) Waiver.--Section 4(c) of the Iran and Libya Sanctions
Act of 1996 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note) is amended to read as
follows:
``(c) Waiver.--
``(1) In general.--The President may, on a case by case
basis, waive for a period of not more than six months the
application of section 5(a) with respect to a national of a
country, if the President certifies to the appropriate
congressional committees at least 30 days before such waiver
is to take effect that such waiver is vital to the national
security interests of the United States.
``(2) Subsequent renewal of waiver.--If the President
determines that, in accordance with paragraph (1), such a
waiver is appropriate, the President may, at the conclusion
of the period of a waiver under paragraph (1), renew such
waiver for subsequent periods of not more than six months
each.''.
(b) Investigations.--Section 4 of such Act (50 U.S.C. 1701
note) is amended by adding at the end the following new
subsection:
``(f) Investigations.--
``(1) In general.--The President should initiate an
investigation into the possible imposition of sanctions under
section 5(a) against a person upon receipt by the United
States of credible information indicating that such person is
engaged in investment activity in Iran as described in such
section.
``(2) Determination and notification.--Not later than 180
days after an investigation is initiated in accordance with
paragraph (1), the President should determine, pursuant to
section 5(a), if a person has engaged in investment activity
in Iran as described in such section and shall notify the
appropriate congressional committees of the basis for any
such determination.''.
SEC. 202. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS.
(a) Sanctions With Respect to Development of Petroleum
Resources.--Section 5(a) of the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act
of 1996 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note) is amended in the heading, by
striking ``to Iran'' and inserting ``to the Development of
Petroleum Resources of Iran''.
(b) Sanctions With Respect to Development of Weapons of
Mass Destruction or Other Military Capabilities.--Section
5(b) of such Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 note) is amended to read as
follows:
``(b) Mandatory Sanctions With Respect to Development of
Weapons of Mass Destruction or Other Military Capabilities.--
The President shall impose two or more of the sanctions
described in paragraphs (1) through (6) of section 6 if the
President determines that a person has, on or after the date
of the enactment of this Act, exported, transferred, or
otherwise provided to Iran any goods, services, technology,
or other items knowing that the provision of such goods,
services, technology, or other items would contribute
materially to the ability of Iran to--
``(1) acquire or develop chemical, biological, or nuclear
weapons or related technologies; or
[[Page H7696]]
``(2) acquire or develop destabilizing numbers and types of
advanced conventional weapons.''.
(c) Effective Date.--The amendments made by this section
shall apply with respect to actions taken on or after June 6,
2006.
SEC. 203. TERMINATION OF SANCTIONS.
Section 8(a) of the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996
(50 U.S.C. 1701 note) is amended--
(1) in paragraph (1)(C), by striking ``and'' at the end;
(2) in paragraph (2), by striking the period at the end and
inserting ``; and''; and
(3) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
``(3) poses no significant threat to United States national
security, interests, or allies.''.
SEC. 204. SUNSET.
Section 13 of the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 (50
U.S.C. 1701 note) is amended by striking ``on September 29,
2006'' and inserting ``on December 31, 2011''.
SEC. 205. TECHNICAL AND CONFORMING AMENDMENTS.
(a) Findings.--Section 2 of the Iran and Libya Sanctions
Act of 1996 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note) is amended by striking
paragraph (4).
(b) Declaration of Policy.--Section 3 of the Iran and Libya
Sanctions Act of 1996 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note) is amended--
(1) in subsection (a), by striking ``(a) Policy With
Respect to Iran.--''; and
(2) by striking subsection (b).
(c) Termination of Sanctions.--Section 8 of the Iran and
Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note) is
amended--
(1) in subsection (a), by striking ``(a) Iran.--''; and
(2) by striking subsection (b).
(d) Duration of Sanctions; Presidential Waiver.--Section
9(c)(2)(C) of the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 (50
U.S.C. 1701 note) is amended to read as follows:
``(C) an estimate of the significance of the provision of
the items described in section 5(a) or section 5(b) to Iran's
ability to, respectively, develop its petroleum resources or
its weapons of mass destruction or other military
capabilities; and''.
(e) Reports Required.--Section 10(b)(1) of the Iran and
Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note) is amended
by striking ``and Libya'' each place it appears.
(f) Definitions.--Section 14 of the Iran and Libya
Sanctions Act of 1996 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note) is amended--
(1) in paragraph (9)--
(A) in the matter preceding subparagraph (A), by--
(i) striking ``, or with the Government of Libya or a
nongovernmental entity in Libya,''; and
(ii) by striking ``nongovenmental'' and inserting
``nongovernmental''; and
(B) in subparagraph (A), by striking ``or Libya (as the
case may be)'';
(2) by striking paragraph (12); and
(3) by redesignating paragraphs (13), (14), (15), (16), and
(17) as paragraphs (12), (13), (14), (15), and (16),
respectively.
(g) Short Title.--
(1) In general.--Section 1 of the Iran and Libya Sanctions
Act of 1996 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note) is amended by striking
``and Libya''.
(2) References.--Any reference in any other provision of
law, regulation, document, or other record of the United
States to the ``Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996'' shall
be deemed to be a reference to the ``Iran Sanctions Act of
1996''.
TITLE III--PROMOTION OF DEMOCRACY FOR IRAN
SEC. 301. DECLARATION OF POLICY.
(a) In General.--Congress declares that it should be the
policy of the United States--
(1) to support efforts by the people of Iran to exercise
self-determination over the form of government of their
country; and
(2) to support independent human rights and peaceful pro-
democracy forces in Iran.
(b) Rule of Construction.--Nothing in this Act shall be
construed as authorizing the use of force against Iran.
SEC. 302. ASSISTANCE TO SUPPORT DEMOCRACY FOR IRAN.
(a) Authorization.--
(1) In general.--Notwithstanding any other provision of
law, the President is authorized to provide financial and
political assistance (including the award of grants) to
foreign and domestic individuals, organizations, and entities
working for the purpose of supporting and promoting democracy
for Iran. Such assistance may include the award of grants to
eligible independent pro-democracy radio and television
broadcasting organizations that broadcast into Iran.
(2) Limitation on assistance.--In accordance with the rule
of construction described in subsection (b) of section 301,
none of the funds authorized under this section shall be used
to support the use of force against Iran.
(b) Eligibility for Assistance.--Financial and political
assistance under this section should be provided only to an
individual, organization, or entity that--
(1) officially opposes the use of violence and terrorism
and has not been designated as a foreign terrorist
organization under section 219 of the Immigration and
Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1189) at any time during the
preceding four years;
(2) advocates the adherence by Iran to nonproliferation
regimes for nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and
materiel;
(3) is dedicated to democratic values and supports the
adoption of a democratic form of government in Iran;
(4) is dedicated to respect for human rights, including the
fundamental equality of women;
(5) works to establish equality of opportunity for people;
and
(6) supports freedom of the press, freedom of speech,
freedom of association, and freedom of religion.
(c) Funding.--The President may provide assistance under
this section using--
(1) funds available to the Middle East Partnership
Initiative (MEPI), the Broader Middle East and North Africa
Initiative, and the Human Rights and Democracy Fund; and
(2) amounts made available pursuant to the authorization of
appropriations under subsection (g).
(d) Notification.--Not later than 15 days before each
obligation of assistance under this section, and in
accordance with the procedures under section 634A of the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2394-l), the
President shall notify the Committee on International
Relations and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of
Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations and
the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate.
(e) Sense of Congress Regarding Diplomatic Assistance.--It
is the sense of Congress that--
(1) support for a transition to democracy in Iran should be
expressed by United States representatives and officials in
all appropriate international fora;
(2) officials and representatives of the United States
should--
(A) strongly and unequivocally support indigenous efforts
in Iran calling for free, transparent, and democratic
elections; and
(B) draw international attention to violations by the
Government of Iran of human rights, freedom of religion,
freedom of assembly, and freedom of the press.
(f) Duration.--The authority to provide assistance under
this section shall expire on December 31, 2011.
(g) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized
to be appropriated to the Secretary of State such sums as may
be necessary to carry out this section.
TITLE IV--POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES TO FACILITATE THE NUCLEAR
NONPROLIFERATION OF IRAN
SEC. 401. SENSE OF CONGRESS.
(a) Sense of Congress.--It should be the policy of the
United States not to bring into force an agreement for
cooperation with the government of any country that is
assisting the nuclear program of Iran or transferring
advanced conventional weapons or missiles to Iran unless the
President has determined that--
(1) Iran has suspended all enrichment-related and
reprocessing-related activity (including uranium conversion
and research and development, manufacturing, testing, and
assembly relating to enrichment and reprocessing), has
committed to verifiably refrain permanently from such
activity in the future (except potentially the conversion of
uranium exclusively for export to foreign nuclear fuel
production facilities pursuant to internationally agreed
arrangements and subject to strict international safeguards),
and is abiding by that commitment; or
(2) the government of that country--
(A) has, either on its own initiative or pursuant to a
binding decision of the United Nations Security Council,
suspended all nuclear assistance to Iran and all transfers of
advanced conventional weapons and missiles to Iran, pending a
decision by Iran to implement measures that would permit the
President to make the determination described in paragraph
(1); and
(B) is committed to maintaining that suspension until Iran
has implemented measures that would permit the President to
make such determination.
(b) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Agreement for cooperation.--The term ``agreement for
cooperation'' has the meaning given that term in section 11
b. of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2014(b)).
(2) Assisting the nuclear program of iran.--The term
``assisting the nuclear program of Iran'' means the
intentional transfer to Iran by a government, or by a person
subject to the jurisdiction of a government, with the
knowledge and acquiescence of that government, of goods,
services, or technology listed on the Nuclear Suppliers Group
Guidelines for the Export of Nuclear Material, Equipment and
Technology (published by the International Atomic Energy
Agency as Information Circular INFCIRC/254/Rev. 3/Part 1, and
subsequent revisions) or Guidelines for Transfers of Nuclear-
Related Dual-Use Equipment, Material and Related Technology
(published by the International Atomic Energy Agency as
Information Circular INFCIRC/254/Rev. 3/Part 2 and subsequent
revisions).
(3) Transferring advanced conventional weapons or missiles
to iran.--The term ``transferring advanced conventional
weapons or missiles to Iran'' means the intentional transfer
to Iran by a government, or by a person subject to the
jurisdiction of a government, with the knowledge and
acquiescence of that government, of--
(A) advanced conventional weapons; or
(B) goods, services, or technology listed on the Missile
Technology Control Regime Equipment and Technology Annex of
June 11, 1996, and subsequent revisions.
[[Page H7697]]
TITLE V--PREVENTION OF MONEY LAUNDERING FOR WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION
SEC. 501. PREVENTION OF MONEY LAUNDERING FOR WEAPONS OF MASS
DESTRUCTION.
Section 5318A(c)(2) of title 31, United States Code, is
amended--
(1) in subparagraph (A)(i), by striking ``or both,'' and
inserting ``or entities involved in the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction or missiles''; and
(2) in subparagraph (B)(i), by inserting ``, including any
money laundering activity by organized criminal groups,
international terrorists, or entities involved in the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction or missiles''
before the semicolon at the end.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentlewoman from
Florida (Ms. Ros-Lehtinen) and the gentleman from Oregon (Mr.
Blumenauer) each will control 20 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentlewoman from Florida.
General Leave
Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all
Members may have 5 legislative days in which to revise and extend their
remarks and to include extraneous material on the bill now under
consideration.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the
gentlewoman from Florida?
There was no objection.
Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may
consume.
For decades, the Iranian regime, one of the world's most dangerous
political entities, has been pursuing a covert nuclear program.
According to multiple reports of the International Atomic Energy
Agency, the IAEA, Iran has been deceiving the world for two decades
about its nuclear ambitions and has breached its international
obligations dealing with the most sensitive aspects of the nuclear
cycle.
Iran's violation of the IAEA safeguards, the safe reporting to the
International Atomic Energy Agency, the denial of the agency's request
for access to individuals and locations, the involvement of its
military in parts of it nuclear program, as well as the Iranian
regime's continued support of terrorist activities around the globe
contradict any assertion of the peaceful intent of the program.
It would be a critical mistake to allow a regime with a track record
as bloody and as dangerous as Iran's to obtain nuclear weapons. Iran
drives Hezbollah extremist ideology and provides it with weapons and
funding, estimated by some at more than $80 million per year. In turn,
Hezbollah has helped advance Iranian interests through continued
terrorist attacks against the United States and our allies in the
region.
This bill before us, Mr. Speaker, H.R. 6198, as amended, will help
prevent Iran from acquiring the technical assistance, the financial
resources, and the political legitimacy to develop nuclear weapons and
to support terrorism. This bill requires the imposition of sanctions on
any entity that has exported, transferred, or otherwise provided to
Iran any goods, services, technology, or other items that would
materially contribute to Iran's ability to acquire or develop
unconventional weapons. This bill codifies U.S. sanctions imposed on
Iran by Executive Order.
The bill also amends the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act by extending the
authorities in the bill until December 31, 2011. It also requires the
President to certify to Congress that waiving the imposition of
sanctions is vital to the national security interests of the United
States.
Furthermore, the bill authorizes the provision of democracy
assistance to eligible human rights and pro-democracy groups and
broadcasting entities. Moreover, this legislation will allow the United
States to use the necessary tools against financial institutions which
are involved in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction or
missiles.
This bill provides a comprehensive approach, providing U.S. officials
with strong leverage to secure cooperation from our allies in order to
counter the Iranian threat. The sanctions under title II of this bill
seek to target the Iranian regime where it is most vulnerable: Its
energy sector. Knowledgable experts agree that for Iran, a fuel
importer, sanctions could be crippling.
Thus, Mr. Speaker, this bill is not an alternative to diplomacy, but
rather complementary to our multilateral efforts. We cannot afford to
wait any longer as the potential consequences of further inaction could
be catastrophic. I urge my colleagues to lend their support to this
legislation.
Mr. Speaker, I am attaching an exchange of letters between Chairman
Hyde and Chairmen Thomas and Oxley concerning the bill H.R. 6198 ``The
Iran Freedom Support Act'' for printing in the Record.
House of Representatives,
Committee on Ways and Means,
Washington, DC, September 27, 2006.
Hon. Henry J. Hyde,
Chairman, Committee on International Relations, Washington,
DC.
Dear Chairman Hyde: I am writing regarding H.R. 6198, the
``Iran Freedom Support Act,'' which is scheduled for floor
action on September 28.
As per the agreement between our Committees, the bill would
not codify the import sanctions contained in Executive Order
13059. However, Sections 202(a) and 202(b) of the bill would
give the President the statutory authority to ban imports
against Iran and would terminate that authority with respect
to Libya.
Because each of these provisions, as well as provisions
related to the waiver, termination, and sunset, have the
effect of modifying and altering the application of an import
ban, they fall within the jurisdiction of the Committee on
Ways and Means. However, in order to expedite this
legislation for floor consideration, the Committee will forgo
action on this bill. This is being done with the
understanding that it does not in any way prejudice the
Committee with respect to the appointment of conferees or its
jurisdictional prerogatives on this or similar legislation.
I would appreciate your response to this letter, confirming
this understanding with respect to H.R. 6198, and would ask
that a copy of our exchange of letters on this matter be
included in the record.
Best regards,
Bill Thomas,
Chairman.
____
House of Representatives, Committee on International
Relations,
Washington, DC, September 27, 2006.
Hon. William M. Thomas,
Chairman, Committee on Ways and Means, Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: Thank you for your letter regarding H.R.
6198, the ``Iran Freedom Support Act,'' which is scheduled
for floor action this week.
In recognition of the importance of this legislation and
based on our two Committees' agreement, the final text of the
bill would not codify the import sanctions contained in
Executive Order 13059. However, Sections 202(a) and 202(b) of
the bill would give the President the statutory authority to
ban imports against Iran and would terminate that authority
with respect to Libya.
I concur in your assessment that these provisions, as well
as provisions related to the waiver, tennination, and sunset,
have the effect of modifying and altering the application of
an import ban and fall within the Rule X jurisdiction of the
Committee on Ways and Means. I appreciate your willingness to
forgo action on this bill. I also agree that your forgoing
formal committee action does not in any way prejudice the
Ways and Means Committee with respect to the appointment of
conferees or its jurisdictional prerogatives on this or
similar legislation.
1As you have requested, I will insert a copy of our
exchange of letters on this bill into the Congressional
Record.
Sincerely,
Henry J. Hyde,
Chairman.
____
House of Representatives, Committee on International
Relations,
Washington, DC, September 28, 2006.
Hon. Michael G. Oxley,
Chairman, Committee on Financial Services, House of
Representatives, Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: Thank you for your letter concerning
H.R. 6198, the Iran Freedom Support Act. As indicated by the
referral of the bill to both of our committees, I concur that
the bill contains language which falls within the Rule X
jurisdiction of the Committee on Financial Services, This
language is contained in portions of title II and in title V
of the bill.
I agree that ordinarily the Committee on Financial Services
would be entitled to act on the bill. However, I thank you
for your support in moving this important legislation forward
by agreeing that it is not necessary for your Committee to
act further on the bill. Given the importance and timeliness
of the Iran Freedom Support Act, I appreciate your
willingness to work with us regarding these issues and to
permit the legislation to proceed. I understand that by doing
so, it should not be construed to prejudice the
jurisdictional interest of the Committee on Financial
Services on these provisions or any other similar legislation
and will not be considered as precedent for consideration of
matters of jurisdictional interest to your Committee in the
future. Furthermore, should these or similar provisions be
considered in a conference with the Senate, I will
[[Page H7698]]
request the Speaker to name members of the Committee on
Financial Services to the conference committee.
As you requested, I will be pleased to include a copy of
this exchange of letters in the Congressional Record during
the consideration of this bill if you have any questions
regarding this matter, please do not hesitate to call me. I
thank you for your consideration.
Sincerely,
Henry J. Hyde,
Chairman.
____
House of Representatives,
Committee on Financial Services,
Washington, DC, September 28, 2006.
Hon. Henry J. Hyde,
Committee on International Relations, House of
Representatives, Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: I am writing to confirm our mutual
understanding with respect to the consideration of H.R. 6198,
the Iran Freedom Support Act. This bill was introduced on
September 27, 2006, and was referred to the Committee on
International Relations as well as the Committee on Financial
Services. I understand that the bill will be considered by
the House in the near future.
Ordinarily, the Committee on Financial Services would be
entitled to act on those matters within its jurisdiction,
Title V and portions of title II. However, given the
importance and timeliness of the Iran Freedom Support Act,
and your willingness to work with us regarding the issues
within this Committee's jurisdiction, further action in this
Committee will not be necessary. I do so only with the
understanding that this procedural route should not be
construed to prejudice the jurisdictional interest of the
Committee on Financial Services on these provisions or any
other similar legislation and will not be considered as
precedent for consideration of matters of jurisdictional
interest to my committee in the future. Furthermore, should
these or similar provisions be considered in a conference
with the Senate, I would expect members of the Committee on
Financial Services be appointed to the conference committee
on these provisions.
Finally, I would ask that you include a copy of our
exchange of letters in the Committee Report on H.R. 6198 and
in the Congressional Record during the consideration of this
bill. If you have any questions regarding this matter, please
do not hesitate to call me. I thank you for your
consideration.
Yours truly,
Michael G. Oxley,
Chairman.
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. BLUMENAUER. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may
consume.
Mr. Speaker, in the years since we enacted our attack against Iraq,
the threat from Iran has only grown more difficult, and our capacity to
meet that threat actually has diminished. It is one of the reasons many
of us opposed that action against Iraq.
There is no question Iran's President is a thug, an anti-Semite, and
a dangerous man. He exploits Iranian national grievances to consolidate
power and has openly expressed his desire to wipe Israel off the map.
Well, our troops are bogged down in Iraq, placing them at risk should
Iran launch a wave of terrorism. We have done nothing to break our
global dependency on oil, the control of which gives Iran its greatest
ability to blackmail other countries.
Now, I appreciate the good will and passion of the sponsors of this
bill, bringing a critical issue before us. I rise in opposition,
however. We have been at this point before. We passed an earlier
version of this bill. The Senate rejected it as an amendment to the
defense authorization. I appreciate that there have been some positive
changes that have been made to this legislation. One is a sunset. The
earlier bill would have made it permanent.
And I appreciate that it contains a provision that I authored that
would prohibit assistance to groups who had appeared on the State
Department's list of terrorist groups in the last 4 years. However, the
problem is nothing in this legislation points us in the direction of a
solution. It is, if you will, a cruise missile aimed at a difficult
diplomatic effort just as they are reaching their most sensitive point.
The timing for this legislation could not be worse.
While the United States has largely been missing in action from the
diplomatic game, the European Union and Iran have been making progress
at developing a formula that would lead to the suspension of Iran's
nuclear enrichment program and the start of serious negotiations. This
bill specifically targets Russia, which may have some influence with
Iran and which is critical to a unified diplomatic front.
This bill has another fundamental flaw besides sanctioning people
whose help we need to reach a diplomatic solution. It gives equal
weight to overthrowing the Iranian government as it does to
nonproliferation. These two goals work against each other.
Yes, the regime's human rights record is atrocious, but preventing
them from developing nuclear weapons should be our first priority. By
not prioritizing behavior change over regime change, we pull the rug
out from anyone in the Iranian leadership who values survival over the
nuclear program and eliminates incentives for diplomatic solutions.
Now, in my opinion, Iran holds, if not the key, a key to many of the
issues that confound us in the Middle East. Their cooperation
ultimately is going to be critical if we are going to be able to deal
with the mess that our policies have created in Iraq, the problems that
we are facing in Afghanistan with a resurgence of the Taliban, and it
is going to play a key role on issues that deal with Israel, Hezbollah,
and Hamas. They are like a puzzle. And, sadly, Iran is one of the
missing pieces.
After September 11, when the United States took action to overthrow
the Taliban, our interests and Iran's aligned, and we were able to
coordinate quietly but effectively. They were partners with us at some
tough sessions in Bonn when we were having the negotiations that set up
the Afghanistan government. And in the midst of this tentative effort
at cooperation, President Bush decided to declare Iran part of the axis
of evil and most hope for progress disappeared.
Mr. Speaker, the irony is that Iran is one of the few nations in the
world where the majority of the people still have a positive view of
the United States.
This is difficult. It is not easy. But to simply sanction potential
partners and confuse what our priorities are, I am sad to say, is going
to be a step backward. We ought to make clear to Iran that they need to
stop their support for terrorism, end development of nuclear capacity,
and begin the process of free, fair, and open elections. But I am sorry
to say that this legislation in front of us ignores the opportunities
that we have incorporating the lessons we learned in our success with
Libya.
I respectfully suggest that this is legislation that we ought to
reject, and that we ought to instead prioritize what our goals are with
Iran, and we are going to. By all means, have our sanctions but not be
reckless in terms of the pressure we try to exert against the very
people who are going to be necessary to help us with a diplomatic
solution to prevent nuclear proliferation.
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to yield 10
minutes of my time to the gentleman from California (Mr. Lantos) and
that he may be permitted to control that time.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the
gentlewoman from Florida?
There was no objection.
Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, I am proud to yield 3 minutes to the
gentleman from Missouri (Mr. Blunt), our distinguished majority whip,
without whom we would not be here today considering a bill with strong
bipartisan support as well as administration support. Thank you, Mr.
Blunt.
{time} 1315
Mr. BLUNT. Thank you, Chairman Ros-Lehtinen, for yielding. I am
pleased to join you and join our friend Mr. Lantos in support of this
bill.
I think that Iran has more potential than any other country to
destabilize the world today. President Bush should be given the tools
necessary to work toward a diplomatic solution in the crisis that we
now face with Iran and that Iran, frankly, presents to the world.
I believe the solution to this problem is in this legislation. I
think this does point us in a direction that can work. The mandatory
sanctions for any entity that is assisting Iran to have the potential
for weapons of mass destruction are important. They don't have to be
targeted at a country, but those countries who are helping make that
happen need to get the attention of this Congress and this government.
This declares that we also intend as a Congress to avoid implementing
agreements with countries that cooperate in this area with Iran. This
provides new tools to the President to prevent money laundering that
can be used to
[[Page H7699]]
provide Iran and other dangerous countries with weapons that endanger
our people.
Passage of this bill today sends a powerful message to Iran and to
those who would support that country's weapons development, a program
that we need to be sure that we punish that behavior.
I hope the President fully utilizes the new authority provided to him
in this bill. I also urge not only that we approve this bill, but that
our allies and our partners around the world work along with us to
implement similar measures and convince Iran to peacefully abandon its
efforts to destabilize the world. We encourage the President in this
bill to work with those groups that have been mentioned that do support
openness and democracy in Iran.
I thank Ileana Ros-Lehtinen for her great leadership in this effort
and Tom Lantos for his leadership in this effort.
Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of this legislation. I first
want to thank my good friends Ileana Ros-Lehtinen and Gary Ackerman for
their tireless work on this critical legislation.
Mr. Speaker, the Iran Freedom Support Act will dramatically increase
the economic pressure on the regime in Tehran to abandon its headlong
pursuit of nuclear weapons. If we fail to use the economic and
diplomatic tools available to us, the world will face a nightmare that
knows no end, a despotic fundamentalist regime, wedded both to
terrorism and to the most terrifying weapons known to man.
Iran's desire, Iran's determination to acquire nuclear weapons, is
beyond dispute. For years it lied to the International Atomic Energy
Agency, and even today it continues to deny access for IAEA inspectors
to sensitive nuclear sites.
Mr. Speaker, a short while ago I had an extensive visit to IAEA
headquarters in Vienna where I had discussions with some of the leaders
of countries that are interested in this issue. They have no doubt that
Iran is determined to pursue a military nuclear program.
Tehran has also defied the U.N. Security Council, which has demanded
that it cease its enrichment of uranium. And now that Iran has been
offered an incredibly generous package of benefits by the United States
and our European allies in exchange for suspending uranium enrichment,
the regime in Tehran is playing its usual cynical game, stalling for
time.
Mr. Speaker, I meet with some frequency with Middle Eastern leaders,
and there is not one who isn't deeply worried by the prospect of Iran's
going nuclear. A nuclear Iran will touch off a bone-chilling arms race
in the Middle East. But long before that happens, before Iran threatens
to fire a shot, as it were, virtually every nation within reach of
Iranian missiles will recalibrate its foreign policies to make certain
that it doesn't offend the region's new nuclear power, Iran, and that,
Mr. Speaker, would be a disaster for U.S. foreign policy interests, for
the Middle East and for the entire civilized world.
Some argue that our legislation will undermine our relations with
European allies who invest in Iran. But that argument, Mr. Speaker, is
simply wrong-headed. Our legislation is intended to reinforce diplomacy
with economics. We ask our allies to do what the United States did over
a decade ago, divest from Iran's energy sector, the cash cow of the
ayatollah's nuclear aspirations.
Nor is this legislation, Mr. Speaker, all stick and no carrot. By
removing Libya from the list of the sanctioned, this legislation is an
implicit invitation to Iran: mend your ways and your support of
terrorism and your quest for weapons of mass destruction, and you will
be welcomed back into the family of nations. Refuse to do so, and you
will suffer accordingly.
The legislation before us will extend the Iran Sanctions Act for 5
years. It will boost congressional oversight over its implementation.
The clear message of this legislation is that the administration now
has to enforce the law fully.
Mr. Speaker, I would be delighted if our legislation were rendered
redundant by serious Security Council action to impose international
sanctions on Iran, but the attitudes shown by Russia and China thus far
strongly suggest that meaningful U.N.-imposed sanctions are a most
unlikely development.
In the meantime, we cannot shirk our responsibility to employ every
peaceful means possible to defeat Iran's reckless nuclear military
ambitions. That, in essence, is the reason for the urgency of passing
H.R. 6198 today.
Mr. Speaker, I strongly support this bill, and for the sake of
foiling a looming, long-term nuclear terrorist threat, I urge my
colleagues to do so as well.
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. BLUMENAUER. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from
Maryland (Mr. Gilchrest).
Mr. GILCHREST. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding, and I
thank the gentlewoman from Florida for allowing us to have this debate
today.
The human condition on the planet requires that there be strong
military power under certain circumstances, strong intelligence under
certain circumstances, strong sanctions under certain circumstances,
and strong dialogue.
The President recently spoke to the Iranian people through The
Washington Post. Here is what he said: ``I would like to say to the
Iranian people, we respect your history. We respect your culture. I
recognize the importance of your sovereignty, that you are a proud
nation. I understand that you believe it is in your interest, your
sovereign interest, to have nuclear power for energy. I would work for
a solution to meeting your rightful desires to have civilian nuclear
power. I will tell the Iranian people that we have no desire for
conflict.''
If we hope to convince our allies and the international community
that we are serious about resolving this matter diplomatically, the
U.S. must open direct diplomatic channels with Tehran.
Mr. BLUMENAUER. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from
Ohio (Mr. Kucinich).
Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman.
Mr. Speaker, it is important to go back a little bit in history here.
The Iraq Accountability Act of 1998 was about funding a media
propaganda machine which was, unfortunately, used to lay the groundwork
for a war against Iraq. That act was about encouraging and funding
opposition inside Iraq, unfortunately, to destabilize Iraq prior to a
war.
You could call this bill the ``Iran Accountability Act.'' This act
funds media propaganda machines to lay the groundwork for a war against
Iran. It encourages and funds opposition inside Iran for that same
purpose.
Notwithstanding what the words are in this bill, we have been here
before. This administration is trying to create an international crisis
by inflating Iran's nuclear development into an Iraq-type WMD hoax.
``Iran is not an imminent threat,'' this from Dr. Hans Blitz, former
Chief U.N. Weapons Inspector, speaking to our congressional oversight
subcommittee the other day.
The International Atomic Energy Agency points out that Iran has an
enrichment level of about 3.6 percent. You have to go to 90 percent to
have weapons quality enrichment. Iran is not an imminent threat. Iran
does not have nuclear weapons.
This is a time for us to engage Iran with direct talks, our President
to their President. This is the time to give assurance to Iran that we
are not going to attack them.
Unfortunately, this administration has chosen to conduct covert ops
in Iran. This administration has chosen to select 1,500 bombing targets
with the Strategic Air Command. This administration has chosen plans
for a naval blockade of the Strait of Hormuz. This administration
looked the other way when a congressional staff report basically
claimed that Iran was trying to engage in nuclear escalation.
We don't need war, we need to talk, and that is what we ought to
stand for here. No more Iraqs.
The End of the ``Summer of Diplomacy'': Assessing U.S. Military Options
on Iran
A CENTURY FOUNDATION REpORT
(By Sam Gardiner, Colonel, USAF (Ret.))
This report is part of a series commissioned by The Century
Foundation to inform the policy debate about Iran-related
issues.
The views expressed in this paper are those of the author.
Nothing written here is to be
[[Page H7700]]
construed as necessarily reflecting the views of The Century
Foundation or as an attempt to aid or hinder the passage of
any bill before Congress.
``The doctrine of preemption remains sound and must remain
an integral part of our national security strategy. We do not
rule out the use of force before the enemy strikes.''--
Stephen Hadley, March 16, 2006.
Introduction
The summer of diplomacy began with a dramatic announcement:
on May 31, 2006, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice declared
that if the Ahmadinejad government agreed to halt Iran's
nuclear enrichment program, the United States would talk
directly with Tehran. Secretary Rice crafted the statement
working alone at home. She called President Bush and received
his approval. The Bush administration announced it as a
significant initiative; it appeared to reflect a major change
in policy.
This shift was not uncontroversial within the
administration; Vice President Dick Cheney had opposed the
announcement. But the rationale that prevailed seems to have
been that if the United States were going to confront Iran,
the diplomacy box had to be checked. The secretary of state
was given the summer to try it.
Well, the summer is over. Diplomacy was given a chance, and
it now seems that the diplomatic activity of the past several
months was just a pretext for the military option.
Unfortunately, the military option does not make sense.
When I discuss the possibility of an American military strike
on Iran with my European friends, they invariably point out
that an armed confrontation does not make sense--that it
would be unlikely to yield any of the results that American
policymakers do want, and that it would be highly likely to
yield results that they do not. I tell them they cannot
understand U.S. policy if they insist on passing options
through that filter. The ``making sense'' filter was not
applied over the past four years for Iraq, and it is unlikely
to be applied in evaluating whether to attack Iran.
In order to understand the position of those within the
U.S. government who will make the final decision to execute a
military option against Iran, you must first consider the
seven key truths that they believe: Iran is developing
weapons of mass destruction--that is most likely true. Iran
is ignoring the international community--true. Iran supports
Hezbollah and terrorism--true. Iran is increasingly inserting
itself in Iraq and beginning to be involved in Afghanistan--
true. The people of Iran want a regime change--most likely an
exaggeration. Sanctions are not going to work--most likely
true. You cannot negotiate with these people--not proven.
If you understand these seven points as truth, you can see
why the administration is very close to being left with only
the military option. Administration officials say that they
want to give diplomacy a chance. But when they say that, we
need to remind ourselves that they do not mean a negotiated
settlement. They mean that Iran must do what we want as a
result of our nonmilitary leverage: suspend enrichment, and
we will talk. But enrichment appears to continue, and there
are no direct discussions between the two main parties.
Satisfied that nonmilitary leverage is not going to work,
those who believe the seven ``truths'' argue that the only
viable option remaining is a military one. The story,
however, is more complicated.
This report draws on my long experience of running military
war games to examine some of the complications of the current
situation: the various pressures and rationales for an attack
on Iran; the probable direct and indirect consequences of air
strikes; the significant gap between what proponents of the
military option want to achieve and what in fact such attacks
will achieve; and the likelihood that policymakers will
ignore those gaps and proceed to war despite them.
Timing and Uncertainty
Waiting makes it harder. The history of warfare is
dominated by attackers who concluded that it was better to
attack early than to wait. One source of the momentum in
Washington for a strike on Iran's nuclear program is the
strategic observation that if such an attack is in fact
inevitable, then it is better done sooner than later.
I conducted a war game for the Atlantic Monthly magazine
two years ago. On a chart prepared for a mock meeting of the
National Security Council, I identified thirteen nuclear-
related targets in Iran. I still do this kind of gaming. My
most recent chart reflects twenty-four potential nuclear-
related facilities. In the past few years we have seen Iran's
Natanz uranium enrichment facility buried under more than
fifteen meters of reinforced concrete and soil. There is
evidence that similar hardening is taking place at other
facilities, and there is some evidence of facilities being
placed inside populated areas. The longer the United States
waits, the harder the targets--and the harder the targeting.
Another major issue that affects timing is the conspicuous
absence of reliable intelligence about Iran. A report by the
House Intelligence Committee found that we have serious gaps
in our knowledge of the Iranian nuclear program.
Paradoxically, those gaps in intelligence produce not
caution, but further pressure to attack. U.S. intelligence
agencies do not know the locations of all of Iran's
facilities; they are not certain how far Iran has gone with
enrichment. They know that Iran's nuclear program bears a
striking resemblance to the Pakistani program, but they do
not know whether Iran has acquired technology that might put
it ahead of current estimates.
Some U.S. officials say that Iran is ten years from a
weapon. The Pentagon, we are told, is operating under the
assumption that Iran could have a weapon in five years. Some
Israeli estimates say that Iran could have a weapon in three
years. John Negroponte, the U.S. director of national
intelligence, recently said that Iran could not develop a
nuclear weapon until some time in the next decade. But the
next day, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld said he did
not trust estimates of the Iranian program.
The very ambiguity of the intelligence picture has become
another argument for military options, because even if U.S.
policymakers could agree on a firm policy red line, there
would be no way of determining if and when Iran crossed that
line. Vice President Cheney's espoused calculation for
dealing with global threats is that if there is even a 1
percent chance of a country passing WMD to a terrorist, the
United States must act. Because there is a 1 percent chance
Iran could pass WMD to a terrorist, the Bush administration
finds itself obliged to reject nonmilitary options.
Regional Pressures
Adding to the political momentum toward war with Iran is
significant pressure from the Israeli security establishment.
Israel says that it has a plan for attacking Iranian nuclear
facilities. Israel recently appointed an airman to be in
charge of the Iranian theater of operations. It was announced
that this major general would coordinate Israeli planning for
Iran. Israeli military planners have U.S. penetrating weapons
and a replica of the Natanz facility. They say that the
attack would resemble the kind of operation they used against
Egypt in 1967. They say that the plan involves more than just
air strikes from the ``Hammers'' of the Israeli Air Force's
69 Squadron. It would include Shaldag commando teams,
possibly some version of sea-launched missiles, and even
explosive-carrying dogs that would penetrate the underground
facilities.
Israel probably could hit most of the known nuclear
targets. But such an attack would leave Iran with significant
retaliatory options. That is a serious problem. U.S. forces
and interests in the region would be likely targets of
Iranian retaliation, so even an independent Israeli military
operation would have critical consequences for the United
States.
Part of the problem is that the two countries' red lines
for Iran are not the same. Israel's red line is enrichment.
The U.S. red line used to be the development of an Iranian
nuclear weapon. But over the past six months, America's red
line has drifted closer to Israel's. On March 21, the
president said that the United States could not allow Iran to
have the knowledge to make a weapon. He repeated the phrase
in August.
By redrawing the red line in this manner, U.S. policymakers
are creating pressure to go to war with Iran. In saying that
Iran could not be permitted to have the knowledge to develop
nuclear weapons, the president used almost the exact words
the Israeli Foreign Minister had used a year earlier. More
recently, a senior State Department official said that Iran
was near ``the point of no return'' on its nuclear program.
Again, this was an exact echo of the words of Israeli
officials. The Israeli pressure has worked.
Marketing the Military Option
I often hear from those who were strongly supportive of the
Iraq invasion that the targeting of the Iranian facilities
would be simple. If you understand the elements of the
nuclear process, all you have to do is go after a small
number of targets. The argument continues that Iran's nuclear
facilities could be devastated on a single night, in a single
strike, by a small number of U.S. B-2 bombers. The apparent
ease of the operation is another element of this pressure to
go now: If the Iranian nuclear program can be stopped in one
night by a simple strike, why should the United States wait?
But the elimination of Iran's nuclear capability, while it
might be the stated aim for the United States, is only part
of the objective. While the Iranian regime's weapons program
is a genuine source of concern, American policymakers are
also troubled by Iran's interference in Iraq. Despite U.S.
warnings, the Revolutionary Guard continues to supply
weapons, money, and training to insurgents inside Iraq. Some
proponents of attacking Iran feel that Tehran should be
punished for supporting militias and extremists in Iraq.
In addition to Iran's role as an aspiring nuclear rogue and
a supporter of the insurgency in Iraq, the country has been
repeatedly portrayed as a key adversary in the war on
terrorism. The United States has put Iran into a separate and
new terrorism category, dubbing it the ``Central Banker of
Terrorism.'' The new National Security Strategy says, ``Any
government that chooses to be an ally of terror, such as
Syria or Iran, has chosen to be an enemy of freedom, justice,
and peace. The world must hold those regimes to account.''
``Unnamed intelligence officials,'' citing evidence from
satellite coverage and electronic eavesdropping, have told
the press that Iran is hosting al Qaeda, granting senior
operatives freedom to communicate and plan terrorist
operations.
[[Page H7701]]
Indeed, the case against the regime is so forceful, and so
multifaceted, that it becomes clear that the goal is not
simply to do away with the regime's enrichment program. The
goal is to do away with the regime itself.
And on top of all of those pressures--pressure from Israel,
pressure from those worried about a nuclear Iran, Iran in
Iraq, and Iran in the war on terrorism--is another, decisive
piece of the puzzle: President George W. Bush. The argument
takes several forms: the president is said to see himself as
being like Winston Churchill, and to believe that the world
will only appreciate him after he leaves office; he talks
about the Middle East in messianic terms; he is said to have
told those close to him that he has got to attack Iran
because even if a Republican succeeds him in the White House,
he will not have the same freedom of action that Bush enjoys.
Most recently, someone high in the administration told a
reporter that the president believes that he is the only one
who can ``do the right thing'' with respect to Iran. One
thing is clear: a major source of the pressure for a military
strike emanates from the very man who will ultimately make
the decision over whether to authorize such a strike-the
president. And these various accounts of his motivations and
rationales have in common that the president will not allow
does-not-make-sense arguments to stand in the way of a good
idea.
Below the CNN Line
Stay below the ``CNN line.'' That was the guidance given to
the Air Component Commander, General Mike Mosley, as the
secret air strikes began against Iraq in operation SOUTHERN
FOCUS. It was July 2002. This classified bombing campaign
would involve strikes on almost 400 targets. It was initiated
just after the president visited Europe where he announced
numerous times, ``I have no war plans on my desk.''
There was no UN resolution. The congressional authorization
was not to come for four months. But the United States was
starting the war.
All of the pressures described above are pushing for war
with Iran, and increasingly, a public case for such a war is
being made. But behind the scenes, military operations are
already under way. (See Figure 1.) Most likely, the same
guidance has been given to military commanders. The pattern
is repeating.
When U.S. commandos began entering Iran--probably in the
summer of 2004--their mission appears to have been limited.
The objective was to find and characterize the Iranian
nuclear program. From press reports, we know that the task
force doing these operations was implanting sensors to detect
radioactivity. Intelligence for these early operations inside
Iran was coming from information provided by A.Q. Khan, the
Pakistani dealer in black market nuclear material. The
incursions were focused in the northeast, where the Iranian
nuclear facilities are concentrated. The base of these
incursions was most likely Camp War Horse in Iraq.
Israel also was conducting operations inside Iran in late
2003 or early 2004. The Israeli commandos reportedly were
operating from a base in Iraq. These commandos also were
implanting sensors. I would expect the U.S. and Israeli
operations to have been coordinated. At about this time the
United States began operating remotely piloted vehicles
inside Iran over nuclear facilities. (Although this was
certainly an embarrassment to the Iranians, they mentioned
the flights numerous times in their press.)
In 2005, the balance within the U.S. government shifted in
favor of those who were pushing for regime change in Iran.
This was to result in the eventual creation of the Iran/Syria
Operations Group inside the State Department, a request to
Congress for $75 million, and the creation of a robust
``democracy promotion'' program. Meanwhile the United States
moved from intelligence collection inside Iran, to
establishing contact with ethnic minorities, to being
involved in--and most likely conducting---direct action
missions. Reports suggest that the United States is
supporting militant groups in the Baluchistan region of Iran.
There have been killings and kidnappings in this region. Iran
Revolutionary Guard convoys have been attacked. In a New
Yorker article, Seymour Hersh confirmed that this region was
one of the areas where U.S. forces were operating. The
Iranian press also has accused the United States of operating
there. In addition, press reports suggest that the United
States may be sponsoring former members of the Iraq-based MEK
(Mojahedin-e Khalq) in Baluchistan.
I recently attended a Middle East security conference in
Berlin. At dinner one night, I sat next to the Iranian
ambassador to the International Atomic Energy Agency, Ali-
Asghar Soltanieh. I told him I had read that the Iranians
were accusing the United States of supporting elements in
Baluchistan. I asked him how they knew that. Without any
hesitation, Soltanieh told me that they have captured
militants who confessed that they were working with the
Americans.
The United States is also directly involved in supporting
groups inside the Kurdish area of Iran. According to both
western and Iranian press reports, the Iranian Party of Free
Life of Kurdistan (PJAK) has been allowed to operate from
Iraq into Iran and has killed Revolutionary Guard soldiers.
The Iranians have also accused the United States of being
involved in shooting down two of their aircraft, an old C-130
and a Fa1con jet, carrying Revolutionary Guard leaders.
NEXT STEPS: Above the CNN Line
How do we get from being below the CNN line to the next
step? The path is fairly clear. The United Nations Security
Council will fall short of imposing serious sanctions on
Iran. The United States, then, will look for a coalition of
the willing to implement smart sanctions, focused on the
Iranian leadership.
But the sanctions will be designed less to ensure
compliance from the Iranians than to generate domestic and
international support for the American position. I do not
know an Iranian specialist I trust who believes that the
sanctions would cause the Iranians to abandon their nuclear
program, any more than did the sanctions on India and
Pakistan after their nuclear tests in 1998. The sanctions
will be used to raise the collective conscience that Iran is
a threat, and to convince the world that the United States
has tried diplomatic solutions.
If the experience of 1979 and other sanctions scenarios is
a guide, sanctions will actually empower the conservative
leadership in Iran. There is an irony here. It is a pattern
that seems to be playing out in the selection of the military
option. From diplomacy to sanctions, the administration is
not making good-faith efforts to avert a war so much as going
through the motions, eliminating other possible strategies of
engagement, until the only option left on the table is the
military one.
When imposing the sanctions fails to alter Tehran's
position, policymakers will revert to a strike on Iran's
nuclear facilities. One can imagine the words of a planner in
the meeting: ``If we are going to do this, let's make certain
we get everything they have.'' I have done some rough
``targeting'' of nuclear facilities for which I can find
satellite photos on the Web. By my calculation, an attack of
relatively high certainty on nuclear targets would require
400 aim points. (An aim point is the specific location where
an individual weapon is directed. Most targets would have
multiple aim points.) I estimate seventy-five of these aim
points would require penetrating weapons. (See Table 1, page
12.)
But it is unlikely that a U.S. military planner would want
to stop there. Iran probably has two chemical weapons
production plants. He would want to hit those. He would want
to hit Iran's medium-range ballistic missiles that have just
recently been moved closer to Iraq. There are fourteen
airfields with sheltered aircraft. Although the Iranian Air
Force is not much of a threat, some of these airfields are
less than fifteen minutes flying time from Baghdad. Military
planners would want to eliminate that potential threat. The
Pentagon would want to hit the assets that could be used to
threaten Gulf shipping. That would mean targeting cruise
missile sites, Iranian diesel submarines, and Iranian naval
assets.
TABLE 1. TARGETS IN IRAN
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Initial strikes Follow-on strikes
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Nuclear facilities............... Revolutionary Guard bases.
Military air bases............... Command and governance assets:
Air defense command and control.. Intelligence
Terrorist training camps......... Military command
Chemical facilities.............. Radio and television
Medium-range ballistic missiles.. Communications
23rd Commando Division........... Security forces in Tehran.
Gulf-threatening assets:
Submarines....................... Leadership: targeted killing.
Anti-ship missiles...............
Naval ships......................
Small boats......................
------------------------------------------------------------------------
After going through the analysis, I believe that the United
States can and will conduct the operation by itself. There
may be low-visibility support from Israel and the U.K., and
France may be consulted. But it will be an American
operation.
What about casualties? Although the United States would
suffer casualties in the Iranian retaliation, the honest
answer to the president if he asks about losses during the
strike itself is that there probably will not be any. The
only aircraft penetrating deep
[[Page H7702]]
into Iranian airspace will be the B-2s at night. B-52s will
stand off, firing cruise missiles. Other missile attacks will
come from Navy ships firing at a safe distance.
Targeting the Nuclear Program? Or the Regime?
Air-target planners orchestrate strikes on the basis of
desired target destruction criteria. In the case of an attack
on Iran, after five nights of bombing, we can be relatively
certain of target destruction. It is even possible to project
the degree to which parts of the Iranian nuclear program
would be set back. For example, using Web pictures of the
Natanz enrichment facility, it is possible to see three years
worth of construction. An attack on that construction might
appear to set the program back three years. But it is hard to
judge. David Kay, the former top U.S. weapons inspector,
observed during our discussions that there is the program
we see, but there is also the program we do not see.
Because of the gaps in U.S. intelligence on Iran, and
specifically on Iran's nuclear program, American military
leaders are growing increasingly uneasy about the
reliability and comprehensiveness of target selection. In
other words, after the five-night military attack we would
not be able with any degree of certainty to say how we had
impacted the Iranian nuclear program.
If this uncertainty does not appear to worry the proponents
of air strikes in Iran it is in no small part because the
real U.S. policy objective is not merely to eliminate the
nuclear program, but to overthrow the regime. It is hard to
believe, after the misguided talk prior to Iraq of how
American troops would be greeted with flowers and welcomed as
liberators, but those inside and close to the administration
who are arguing for an air strike against Iran actually sound
as if they believe the regime in Tehran can be eliminated by
air attacks.
In this case, the concept is not a ground force Thunder Run
into Tehran of the sort used in Baghdad. It is a
decapitation-based concept. Kill the leadership and enable
the people of Iran to take over their government. More
reasonable leadership will emerge.
Under this concept, the air operation would take longer
than the five nights. The targets would be expanded. The
Revolutionary Guard units would be attacked since according
to the argument they are the primary force that keeps the
current regime in power. There are other regime protection
units in Tehran. Most important, the U.S. operation would
move into targeted killing, seeking to eliminate the
leadership of Iran.
It sounds simple. Air planners always tell a good story. By
the same token, they almost always fall short of their
promises, even in strictly military terms. That was true in
World War II. It was true in Korea. It was true in Vietnam.
It has just proved true with the Israeli attacks on
Hezbollah. No serious expert on Iran believes the argument
about enabling a regime change. On the contrary, whereas the
presumed goal is to weaken or disable the leadership and then
replace it with others who would improve relations between
Iran and the United States, it is far more likely that such
strikes would strengthen the clerical leadership and turn the
United States into Iran's permanent enemy.
Iran's Response
Having demonstrated that air strikes are unlikely either to
eliminate the nuclear program or to bring about the overthrow
of the Islamic regime in Iran, we must now turn to what,
precisely, they would achieve. It is important to remember
that some of Iran's threats, demonstrations of new weapons,
and military exercises are designed to have a deterrent
effect. As such we should not deduce too much about what Iran
would do in the event of an attack on the basis of what it
might say and do in advance of an attack. A former CIA Middle
East Station Chief told me once that predicting the
consequences of a strategic event in the Middle East was as
difficult as predicting how an Alexander Calder mobile would
come to rest after you flicked one of its hanging pieces.
It is possible, however, to identify some high probability
immediate consequences.
The Iranians would likely look to target Israel as a
response to a U.S. strike, using Hezbollah as the primary
vehicle for retaliation. For Tehran, there is the added
benefit that blaming Israel (even for a U.S. strike) would
play well at home, and probably throughout the region.
Moqtada al-Sadr has said publicly that if the United States
were to attack Iran, he would target U.S. forces in Iraq.
Iran could channel more individuals and weapons into Iraq.
Specifically, Iran could upgrade technology among Shiite
militias, with weapons like the laser-guided anti-tank
missiles Hezbollah had in Lebanon. We might even see more
direct operations like missile attacks against U.S. forces.
Moqtada al-Sadr controls the large Facilities Protection
Service forces in Iraq. Some estimates put this force as
large as 140,000. Among other missions, they guard the oil
pipelines. If Iran wants to cut the flow of oil, Iraq is the
best place to begin, and the means are in place to take on
the mission. The impact of severing Iraq's oil supplies would
be an immediate increase in its own oil revenue.
Iran is not going to wipe Israel from the map or force the
United States to leave Iraq with these operations. But in
causing these various complications, Iran can still achieve a
degree of success. As we recently witnessed in the clash
between Hezbollah and Israel, Iran can seem stronger just by
virtue of making the United States and Israel seem weaker.
Round Two
Once the nature of the Iranian retaliation becomes
apparent, the United States will not likely declare success
and walk away from the problem. Clearly, the pressure will be
to expand the targets and punish Iran even more. The
government of Iran is fragile, the thinking goes; it could
even be on the verge of falling; it is time to ``enable'' the
Iranian people. The Iranians will react with their own
horizontal escalation. (See Table 2, page 16.)
Iran has been sending mixed signals about whether or not it
would cut its own oil production or attempt to restrict the
flow of oil from the Gulf. A strike of five nights might not
push them to cut the flow of oil. But continued operations
probably would. Iran does have some flexibility to do without
oil revenues for a period because of surpluses from currently
high oil prices. In addition, it has plans for rationing
refined petroleum products that it must import.
Executing the oil option might not be limited to operations
against tankers moving in and out of the Gulf. Iran has the
capability, and we have seen some indications of the intent,
to attack facilities of other oil providers in the region.
It would be tougher for Iran and Hezbollah to attack UN
forces in Lebanon. If the UN forces were to become too
aggressive in response to Hezbollah attacks against Israel,
they would most likely become targets. In addition, at some
point in the expanding conflict, Iran might see a value to
making the war about attempts at Western domination of the
region and not just about the United States and Israel. In
that case, a focused attack on something like the Italian
headquarters would resonate in the region.
It took a while for the nations of the region to react to
the Israeli attack into Lebanon. That most likely would be
the case in the event of a U.S. strike against Iran. As
attacks continued and as the television coverage intensified,
however, we could see something similar to the reactions to
the Danish cartoons. We could see the ``Arab Street''
asserting itself.
Syria and Iran signed a defense agreement on June 15. Under
this agreement Syrian forces would be brought into a fight if
Iran were attacked. Syrian President Bashar Assad might be a
reluctant participant, but as the conflict expands, he might
not have a choice.
The Iranians could conduct targeted killing outside the
region. They have used this tactic in the past: in 1991,
Shapour Bakhtiar, the Shah's last prime minister, was
decapitated in his apartment in Paris.
Continued air strikes and demonstrations could have a
compounding effect. Weak governments in the Muslim world
could be threatened. The governments of Pakistan, Jordan,
Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia are vulnerable.
TABLE 2. CONSEQUENCES OF AN ATTACK
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Type of Operation
---------------------------------------
Short strike Regime change
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Hezbollah attacks on Israel..... High probability.. High probability.
Attacks on U.S. forces in Iraq.. High probability.. High probability.
Sabotage pipelines in Iraq...... High probability.. High probability.
Street demonstrations on a wide Possible.......... High probability.
scale.
Hezbollah attacks outside the Possible.......... High probability.
region.
Iran stopping its own oil Possible.......... High probability.
exports.
Iran blocking Gulf oil flow..... High probability.. High probability.
Iran attacking other regional Possible.......... Possible.
oil facilities.
Iran suicide attacks............ Not likely........ Possible.
Syria involved.................. Not likely........ Possible.
Threats to regional governments. Not likely........ Possible.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
As an obvious consequence of the instability resulting from
a U.S. strike, the price of oil almost certainly will spike.
The impact will depend on how high and how long. The longer
the conflict goes, the higher the price. A former Kuwaiti oil
minister privately suggested a plateau of $125 per barrel.
Confidential analysis by a major European bank suggests it
would level off at $130, and a very conservative estimate
would be over $200.
With prices surging to this level, third order consequences
become apparent. The most obvious would be a global,
synchronized recession, intensified by the existing U.S.
trade and fiscal imbalances. Another political consequence
would be that oil exporting countries outside the region
would enjoy significant surges in revenue from higher prices.
As a result, countries such as Venezuela and Russia would
enjoy expanded influence while the West would be reeling from
recession.
I should note that in the preceding discussion of the cycle
of action and reaction, I have not mentioned large U.S.
ground unit formations. That is because I do not believe we
will come to a point where that option will make sense to
policymakers. This is the one lesson the administration seems
to have learned from Iraq--occupation does not work. And that
realization brings us back to why the air strike option has
been so attractive to the administration from the beginning.
When Is the Strike?
When does it all come together? When could the United
States pull the trigger on the military option? The most
important point in understanding the window for an attack is
that the military preparations will not be the determining
factor. This operation will not resemble the six months of
[[Page H7703]]
preparations for Operation Desert Shield in 1990. The
preparations will be much less visible than the movements to
the region in early 2003. We will not read about discussions
with Turkey for basing permission. It will not be a major CNN
event.
Instead, preparations will involve the quiet deployment of
Air Force tankers to staging bases. We will see additional
Navy assets moved to the region. The more significant
indications will come from strategic influence efforts to
establish domestic political support. The round of
presidential speeches on terrorism is a beginning, but I
expect more. An emerging theme for the final marketing push
seems to be that Iran threatens Israel's existence. We can
expect the number of administration references to Iran to
significantly increase, and will see three themes--the
nuclear program, terrorism, and the threat to Israel's
existence.
The issue of congressional approval plays into the timing
question. Administration officials have been asked numerous
times if the president would require authorization by
Congress for a strike on Iran. Secretary Rice responded to
that question before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
in October 2005 by saying, ``I will not say anything that
constrains his authority as Command in Chief.'' Congressmen
Peter DeFazio and Maurice Hinchey offered an amendment to the
Defense Appropriations Bill in June that would have required
the president to get authorization from Congress before
taking military action against Iran. The amendment failed.
Over the past few months, we have seen numerous leaks and
administration documents that raise an Iran-al Qaeda
connection. In addition, the House Permanent Select Committee
report on the threat of Iran implied an al Qaeda connection.
This linkage of Iran and al Qaeda fits neatly into the
broader effort to sell a strike to the American people. But
more importantly, it opens the way for an argument that a
strike on Iran was part of the global war on terrorism
already authorized by Congress.
In other words, approval by Congress does not necessarily
have to be part of the calculation of when an attack could
take place. If the determining factor of timing is neither
the preparation of military forces nor congressional
approval, one question remains: How much public support do
decisionmakers believe they need before pulling the trigger?
And that question brings us back to the beginning of the
summer of diplomacy. Vice President Cheney had to be
convinced that it was necessary to give some lip service to
diplomacy, checking that box in order to secure public
support. President Bush seems to be convinced of the
rightness of his cause and vision. He repeats often that he
does not care about public opinion.
The window for a strike on Iran stands open.
Finally
Policymakers who begin with the seven ``truths'' of the
situation can easily proceed down a path that leaves the
military option as the only one on the table. There is a
certain inevitability to this path, a certain inexorability
to the momentum toward war. The policymakers will say that
the Iranians have forced us to go in this direction. But the
painful irony is that these policymakers are forcing the
direction on themselves.
At the end of the path that the administration seems to
have chosen, will the issues with Iran be resolved? No. Will
the region be better off? No. Is it clear Iran will abandon
its nuclear program? No. On the other hand, can Iran defeat
the United States militarily? No.
Will the United States force a regime change in Iran? In
all probability it will not. Will the economy of the United
States suffer? In all probability it will.
Will the United States have weakened its position in the
Middle East? Yes. Will the United States have reduced its
influence in the world? Yes.
When I finished the 2004 Iran war game exercise, I
summarized what I had learned in the process. After all the
effort, I am left with two simple sentences for policymakers.
``You have no military solution for the issues of Iran. You
have to make diplomacy work.'' I have not changed my mind.
That conclusion made sense then. It still makes sense today.
Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Speaker, I am delighted to yield 1-1/3 minutes to my
dear friend and distinguished colleague on the International Relations
Committee, the Congresswoman from Nevada (Ms. Berkley).
Ms. BERKLEY. Mr. Speaker, I thank my good friend Mr. Lantos for
yielding to me.
Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of this legislation. Each day
brings something new from Iran, a new boast, a new rant, a new threat.
Yet we have made little progress in convincing our allies that the
Iranian regime means business, and that business is funding and
supplying terrorist organizations like Hezbollah, wiping Israel off the
face of the map and denying the Holocaust.
We must not allow them to acquire the means to carry out their
ambitions. It would be difficult to overstate the danger Iran
represents. Unchecked Iranian nuclear proliferation, combined with
increasing support for international terrorism, poses a grave threat to
United States forces in the Middle East, moderate Islamic Arab
countries in the region, the State of Israel. And a nuclear Iran poses
just as much of a threat to Europe as it does to the countries in the
Middle East.
Incomprehensibly, many of our allies seem oblivious to these dangers.
Their strategy of negotiations, incentives, and concessions are not
working. Stronger measures are necessary. This bill will ramp up the
pressure on Iran to give up its nuclear ambitions and cooperate with
the international community.
Iran is a radical fundamentalist country headed by a President who I
believe is as dangerous to the world community in the 21st century as
Hitler was in the 20th century. Every time this man opens his mouth, he
proves it. We must deny Iran the technology and financial resources
that will enable this regime to carry out its threats.
I urge support of this bill.
Mr. BLUMENAUER. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from
Texas (Mr. Paul).
(Mr. PAUL asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
{time} 1330
Mr. PAUL. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong opposition to this bill, and
let me give you a few reasons why.
In the introduction to the bill, it says that its purpose is to hold
the current regime in Iran accountable for its threatening behavior and
to support a transition of its government; and I would just ask one
question: Could it be possible that others around the world and those
in Iran see us as participating in ``threatening behavior?'' We should
make an attempt to see things from other people's view as well.
I want to give you three quick reasons why I think we should not be
going at it this way:
First, this is a confrontational manner of dealing with a problem. A
country that is powerful and self-confident should never need to resort
to confrontation. If one is confident, one should be willing to use
diplomacy whether dealing with our friends or our enemies; I think the
lack of confidence motivates resolutions of this type.
The second reason that I will give you for opposing this is that this
is clearly seeking regime change in Iran. We are taking it upon
ourselves that we do not like the current regime. I don't like
Almadinyad, but do we have the responsibility and the authority to
orchestrate regime change? We approach this by doing two things:
Sanctions to penalize, at the same time giving aid to those groups that
we expect to undermine the government. Do you know if somebody came
into this country and paid groups to undermine our government, that is
illegal? Yet here we are casually paying money, millions of dollars,
unlimited sums of money to undermine that government. This is illegal.
The third point. This bill rejects the notion of the nonproliferation
treaty. The Iranians have never been proven to be in violation of the
nonproliferation treaty; and this explicitly says that they cannot
enrich, uranium even for private and commercial purposes.
For these three reasons we obviously should reconsider and not use
this confrontational approach. Why not try diplomacy? Oppose this
resolution.
Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 1\1/3\ minutes to Mr.
Sherman.
Mr. SHERMAN. Mr. Speaker, I rise in reluctant support of this bill
and in strong support of its authors--who got what they could from a
President who has a veto pen, and is determined to continue our
ineffectual policy toward Iran.
America has been blinded by the flash of this President's overly
aggressive response to Iraq's tiny ``weapons of mass destruction''
program. So, as a result, we have settled for a loud but pitifully
ineffectual effort, both toward North Korea's nuclear program and
toward Iran's.
In this bill, I had an amendment that would have prohibited U.S.
corporations from doing business with Iran through their foreign
subsidiaries. That amendment was stripped in conference. So Halliburton
is protected; the American people are not.
This bill extends the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act, which was so
effective,
[[Page H7704]]
along with other measures, in getting Khadaffi to change his policies.
However, as toward Iran, the last administration and this
administration has a policy of ignoring widely reported investments in
the Iran oil sector. The bill says we are supposed to sanction oil
companies that invest even $40 million in Iran's oil sector. When tens
of billions of dollars of investments are announced in the Wall Street
Journal, the President's response is, he didn't get that copy.
We have got to pass this bill, but we have got to do a lot more. And
we have got to make sure that, in our policy toward Russia and China
about Moldova, Abkhazia, and currency controls, that we make it clear
that support on Iran will lead to our change on those issues that are
so important to Russia and China. We need linkage, and we need an
effective policy.
Mr. BLUMENAUER. I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Washington
(Mr. McDermott).
Mr. McDERMOTT. Mr. Speaker, the American people need to know the
Republican majority today has created the House Failed Diplomacy
Caucus.
The Republicans need another press release before they go home, so we
have 20 minutes to offer our thoughts on a bad bill sent to the floor
by Republicans to show how tough they are.
Showing how smart we are would be a far better idea for dealing with
nations like Iran and Iraq. But global diplomacy isn't the stuff of
press releases; rhetoric is. So the Republicans have shut down debate
by bringing legislation to the floor under a closed rule. They don't
want ideas or improvements for making the world a safer place. They
want leaflets to drop during the campaign, and they are being printed
en mass right now. It is the Republican Iraq strategy all over again.
Different nation, same flawed approach.
Republicans have given us H.R. 6198, the We Run the World Act. There
is no need for other nations to actually have governments, actually. We
will send our press releases. Just follow along, Russia, Iraq, Iran,
Pakistan, Lebanon, and anywhere else where we think we run them.
Republicans want Americans to point the finger and send along
instructions. They are staging a campaign event right here on the
floor. You watch how quick it makes it into the ads of television.
This is not, not, going to help America chart a path to deal with
what is wrong with the Iranian government. No one disagrees with the
fact that it is not a government we want in control of that country. It
will only entrench and bolster those who are wrong.
The press release won't protect anybody. But, in fact, the Iranian
dissidents don't want the money. Do you know why? Just like many
Republicans today don't want Bush to come into their district and put
his arm around them in the midst of this campaign, the Iranian
dissidents know that, if it becomes American money, they are done. They
will not be able to do what they need to. We need to vote ``no'' on
this initiative.
Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, I am proud to yield time to my
colleague from Florida on this bipartisan bill, the essence of which
has been extensively debated on the floor several times and in
committees, as well.
I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Shaw).
Mr. SHAW. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentlewoman for yielding this time
to me and congratulate the committee on both sides of the aisle.
I think, however, when we look around and see some of the rhetoric
that is going on, let's take a look at what is happening.
We have probably one of the most dangerous countries in the world run
by fanatics that is in the process of producing a nuclear weapon. We
have the Iranians financing the terrorists in Iraq killing American
soldiers. We have the Iranians in Iraq killing innocent Iraqis. We have
the Iranians in Iraq killing innocent Lebanese with the Hezbollah. And
we are standing here today listening to people talk about press
releases.
Come on, guys. Isn't there something that can draw this Congress
together? It already has brought together responsible Democrats and
Republicans. But to come forward and talk of this nature is absolutely
counterproductive. It does not help us in our country, and we should
stop it now. We need to put up a unified force in this country.
We are aiding and abetting the enemy when we stress our division. Of
course we are going to disagree. That is healthy. That is what
democracy is all about. But on some of these items, such as what we are
talking about here today, when American soldiers are spilling their
blood and that blood is being spilt with Iranian money, can't we start
talking about America and quit talking about politics?
Mr. BLUMENAUER. I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from New York.
Mr. HINCHEY. Mr. Speaker, I thank my friend from Oregon for yielding
me this time and providing it to us in the context of this debate.
This proposed legislation is contrary to the best interest of Iran
and the United States. It is, unfortunately, reminiscent of the State
of the Union address which declared Iran, Iraq, and North Korea as part
of the Axis of Evil; and we are now very familiar with the consequences
of that statement. We have seen a disastrous situation develop in Iraq,
and we have also seen the revival of nuclear interest both in North
Korea and in Iran.
The attitude of our country toward Iran now for more than 50 years
has been overly aggressive and overbearing, and the consequences of it
have been very dangerous. We should be acting in a much more mature and
responsible way, particularly toward this country. This is a very
significant country, not only in the Middle East but in the world
generally. The people of this country are good, sound, solid,
reasonable people, and we need to be appealing to them on that basis,
not on the basis of the language of this resolution, which continues to
create this atmosphere of hostility which is, as I have indicated, has
been going on now for more than 50 years.
That needs to change. We need to change our attitude, change our
approach to this nation. We need to engage them more objectively, more
seriously, and in a much more filial way, a much more friendlier way.
And if we were to do that, we would find that this country would react
and respond to us in a similar fashion.
Unfortunately, this proposed legislation does exactly the opposite.
It places us, continues to place us in a difficult and dangerous,
antagonistic circumstance between ourselves and this country, and
unnecessarily so. So this legislation is contrary to our interests,
just as it is contrary to the interests of Iran, and so it should be
rejected by this body.
Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield the balance of our
time to the distinguished member of the International Relations
Committee, Mr. Engel, from New York.
Mr. ENGEL. I thank my distinguished friend from California for
yielding to me, and I rise in strong support of this bill.
My colleagues, we have to deal with things as they are, not as what
we wish them to be. I wish there was reasonableness among the
government of Iran today. I wish there were people that we could talk
to on a friendly basis and reason with them and come to some kind of a
compromise.
But that is not what we have here. We have a belligerent regime that
is pursuing nuclear weapons, that is hostile towards the United States,
that is hostile towards the West, that is hostile towards Israel. You
have a president of that country who has said every foul thing
imaginable, denies the Holocaust, says he wants to wipe Israel off the
face of the map, and says that Americans are his sworn enemy.
This bill makes sense. This bill extends the current law and
sanctions and provides important additional authorities to fight that
threat. It is the carrot and the stick. We are having democracy
building in this bill. We are being able to try to reach the Iranian
people, who are good friends of the American people, but they are
trapped by a repressive government and a government that doesn't have
their best interests at heart, let alone anybody else's best interest.
So this is sort of a carrot-and-stick approach. We slap sanctions
when sanctions are needed. We amend, also we expand it. It is expiring
if we don't amend it, and it does what we know needs to be done.
Iran needs to be challenged. It cannot be allowed to have nuclear
weapons.
[[Page H7705]]
This is the same policy, it is a centrist policy, it makes a lot of
sense, and I urge strong bipartisan support for this bill.
Mr. BLUMENAUER. I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Iowa.
Mr. LEACH. I thank the gentleman for yielding.
First, let me stress, this bill has strong bipartisan support. It
also has significant bipartisan opposition. And so it should be
considered in the category of individual judgment, not politics.
On the plus side of the bill, let me note that it does stress
sanctions, not military action, and it quite properly gives the
executive discretion to lift these sanctions.
On the minus side, and this is the compelling point, it represents an
escalation of tension, policy, and attitudinal friction with Iran.
{time} 1345
It is an escalation that is guaranteed to fail. You might ask, Why is
it guaranteed to fail? It is because unilateral sanctions don't work,
and there is no evidence that the other principal parties that are
dealing with Iran will follow this example.
We can pound our chest all we want to suggest that a Russia or a
China should follow our lead, but these kinds of suggestions from
Congress simply carry no weight.
Secondly, no one should doubt that this complicates problems for our
troops in Iraq today. That is an absolute utter circumstance that has
to be dealt with, and we have to think it through.
Thirdly, this step implicitly underscores and advances a diplomacy-
less strategy. That is, the United States of America has advanced a no-
talk-with-Iran strategy for more than this administration, for quite a
number of years, and the question is does it work, is it as hapless as
our strategy towards certain other countries in the world, including
Cuba.
In the backdrop is the issue of force, and also the issue of
dominoes, dominoes in the sense of decisionmaking. Often policies that
don't work implicitly are followed by other policies that we hope will
work. If this particular policy doesn't work, do we then have to go to
the force option?
There is a neocon desire, as has been written about extensively, to
consider the idea of a preemptive strike. All I would say is there is a
``3-3-100'' set of principles that we have to think through.
The first ``three'' is there are three ways of obtaining nuclear
weapons: one is to develop them; another is to steal them; and another
is to buy them.
If we bomb Iran, there is no doubt whatsoever we will put back their
capacity to develop. But it might also accelerate the capacity to steal
or purchase.
The second ``three'' principle is that there are three weapons of
mass destruction. We not only have nuclear; we have chemical and
biological. And knocking back their nuclear certainly will accelerate
the other two.
The third issue is the issue of a ``hundred.'' We have the idea that
we can do a preemptive strike quickly and it will be over. But the fact
is that the other side will respond. They might respond for 100 years.
I think it is time we talk about from the people's House the issue of
developing mutual self-interest, not antagonism, and we ought to move
in the direction of realism instead of taking ideological steps that
don't fit the times.
Mr. BLUMENAUER. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time to
close.
Mr. Speaker, I appreciate the gentlewoman's work because the bill
that we have before us, as I mentioned earlier, is, a substantial
improvement over the one that was approved by the House earlier this
year. I had hoped it would come back to our committee because I think
these issues are worthy of further discussion, and there is more fine-
tuning we could do.
For instance, dealing with the provisions for terms of the promotion
of democracy, reading the language that is in this bill, the Ayatollah
Khomeini, in exile in France, would have qualified for U.S. assistance.
We could have had a debacle like we had with Chalabi. I don't think it
is as tight and precise as we would like.
But most important, it fails to deal with the fundamental choice we
need to make between whether we want regime change or whether we want
to stop nuclear proliferation.
I deeply appreciate the points raised by the gentleman from Iowa (Mr.
Leach). We could end up actually making the situation worse.
I am deeply troubled that we are going to ratchet up the pressure on
the very people who we most need for a diplomatic solution, the people
like China and Russia who are going to be key to ultimately resolving
it.
Mr. Speaker, part of the problem that we have great difficulty with
is that some of the most disagreeable people, some of the most
dangerous people, are people that we ignore at our peril. We should not
do that. We should engage them directly, diplomatically and not under
the auspices of this bill, which I hope that the House will reject.
Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, as recently as last month, Iran
blatantly refused to respond to the August 31 deadline as set forth by
the United Nations Security Council to stop enriching its uranium in
exchange for a very generous incentives package.
We have tried to coax. We have tried to induce. We have tried to talk
the Iranians into cooperating. Enough with the carrots; it is time for
the stick.
We hope that all freedom-loving nations are allies in this struggle
for nonproliferation efforts and would, out of their own volition, take
the necessary steps to hold Iran accountable for its own behavior.
However, sometimes even friends need a little prodding.
Writer Charles Krauthammer points out the chilling reality of the
opportunity costs of not dealing effectively with Iran at this time. He
says, ``If we fail to prevent an Iranian regime run by apocalyptic
fanatics from going nuclear, we will have reached the point of no
return. It is not just Iran that might be the source of great concern,
but that we will have demonstrated to the world that for those
similarly inclined, there is no serious impediment.''
This bill will help contain the Iranian threat and will send a clear
message that we will not tolerate flagrant violations of international
nonproliferation obligations.
Mr. ACKERMAN. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of H.R. 6198,
legislation to hold the current regime in Iran accountable for its
threatening behavior and to support a transition to democracy in Iran.
As an original cosponsor of the legislation I am pleased that the House
is considering it today.
The threat from Iran is plain. The Iranian mullahs have lied to the
international community about their nuclear program for years. They
have, again and again and again, defied the clear will of the
international community that has demanded that they freeze their
efforts to enrich uranium. Iran has been, and remains today, the most
active state sponsor of terrorism in the world. Iran provides hundreds
of millions of dollars, shiploads of weapons, advanced military
training and substantial political cover to Hizballah, Hamas and other
radical, violent Islamist groups in the Middle East. Their most senior
officials continue to make pronouncements that call into question their
attachment to reality. Supreme Leader Khamenei has confirmed that Iran
would share its nuclear technology with other states. President
Ahmadinejad has made a hobby out of Holocaust denial and at every
opportunity violates the most fundamental tenet of international law by
calling for the annihilation of Israel, a sovereign member of the
international community.
In Iran, we have exactly what we thought we had in Iraq: a state with
enormous wealth in natural resources; significant WMD capabilities and
the means to deliver them; and the use of terrorist organizations as an
instrument of state policy. But what will amaze the historians who look
back on this period will be the stunning lack of urgency with which the
Bush Administration and this Congress has approached this problem.
I will be the first to admit that our policy options toward Iran are
unappetizing at best. We have little diplomatic leverage, since we
don't talk with Iran directly, except in very limited circumstances.
Any military operation beyond pinpoint air strikes is quite simply
beyond our capacity at the moment, given our situation in Iraq. And we
should honestly acknowledge that even a robust campaign of air strikes
targeted at Iran's nuclear facilities might have only a marginal effect
on Iran's nuclear program. We don't know where all of it is hidden and
many of the sites that we do know of can't be effectively attacked from
the air. Further, since our intelligence is so incomplete, we would
have a very limited ability to assess
[[Page H7706]]
how much damage our strikes had actually done to the Iranian program.
In addition to questions about the direct affects, a decision to strike
Iran, would have enormous diplomatic consequences for the United
States, and would likely lead to Iranian retaliation against our
already overextended troops in Iraq, and probably against our ally,
Israel.
So without a viable military option, we are left with maklng multi-
lateral diplomacy effective. This is the right course, but it is one
that the Bush administration has been extremely loathe to pursue, and
one at which they have shown little proficiency.
If a nuclear-armed Iran is ``very de-stabilizing,'' as the President
has said it is--and I do believe it is--then we need to make that view,
and the implications of that view, clear to Russia and China and even
to our partners in Europe. Fortunately, this legislation provides the
administration with new and useful tools that can be applied to help
make that case. Our message must be that this urgent problem can be
addressed if the will is there to do so.
In short, Iran needs to become urgent for the administration before
it will become urgent for anyone else. Only concerted, sustained
multilateral pressure has any chance of convincing Iran to change
course. And if Iran chooses not to change course, then the
international community must be prepared to pursue effective
multilateral sanctions against the regime. Unfortunately, while the EU-
3 shares our view that an Iran with nuclear weapons is not an
acceptable outcome, it seems that Russia and China do not. If the
administration can't convince those nations that it is in their
interest for Iran not to have nuclear weapons, then we need to start
considering what options remain to us unilaterally, what the cost of
the options would be and how we could go about containing a nuclear-
armed Iran.
One last point Mr. Speaker, I am disappointed that the bill we are
considering today does not contain the language regarding pension plans
and mutual funds that would require the managers of such funds to
notify investors if any of the assets of a particular fund are invested
in an entity which has invested in Iran and may be subject to sanctions
under ILSA. I think such notifications are consistent with the
fiduciary responsibilities of fund managers and would have prevented
Americans from unwittingly fueling Iran's drive to acquire nuclear
weapons, simply by contributing to their 401(k)'s. Nevertheless, I
strongly urge my colleagues to support the bill.
Mr. STARK. Mr. Speaker, I rise to oppose the march to war with Iran.
I am as concerned as the authors and supporters of this bill about
Iran's nuclear weapons program. But I do not believe that levying
additional sanctions and encouraging regime change is the correct
course. Instead, we should work with our allies to negotiate a
diplomatic solution.
The ``Iran Freedom Support Act'', H.R. 6198, will antagonize Iran's
government. Provisions calling for democracy promotion and ``the
exercise of self-determination'' will be interpreted as a direct
assault on Iran's sovereignty and may prompt Iran to discontinue
ongoing negotiations. Unilateral sanctions may also discourage France,
Germany, Italy, and Spain from working to broker an international
agreement. Our allies do not appreciate it when we ``go it alone.''
Dissidents will also be hurt by our offer of financial and political
assistance. As in Iraq, individuals and groups that ally with America
will see their integrity questioned and their reputations for
independence undermined.
Iranian families will be hurt by sanctions that prohibit foreign
investment in the country's petroleum industries. Sanctions already in
place have not impacted Iran's behavior. Why would new prohibitions on
investment succeed where old sanctions have failed?
Finally, the American people will be less secure. Antagonizing Iran
will not stop or even slow nuclear weapons development. Instead,
sanctions will prompt Iran to redouble its efforts as a means of saving
domestic and international face.
The Bush administration and Republicans in Congress have already made
a mess of Iraq and allowed warlords to gain control of much of
Afghanistan's countryside. This legislation takes us a step closer to
similar results in Iran. I urge my colleagues to vote ``no''.
Mr. CROWLEY. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of H.R. 6198,
introduced by my colleagues on the House International Relations
Committee.
The international community continues to look the other way as Iran
claims they will move forward in the process of enriching uranium.
The leaders of Iran decided the IAEA deadline did not apply to them
and I strongly believe have no interest in negotiating with the West.
The President of Iran was clear about his intentions to enrich
uranium at the United Nations General Assembly a few weeks ago.
His performance in New York and at the Council of Foreign Relations
was a display of insanity.
He continues to proudly defend his comments about the Holocaust being
a myth and how Iran is not trying to acquire nuclear weapons even as
more and more information comes out about their covert nuclear program
that was helped along by AQ Khan's black market nuclear network
This is a man who was basically appointed by the Mullahs in Tehran.
I say this because any reform minded candidate was removed from the
ballots. Iran is not a democracy; the government of Iran is run by
zealots using terrorism to meet their goals.
We need to support the people of Iran as they continue to be
repressed by the Mullahs.
The people of Iran deserve freedom and democracy.
I strongly support this bill and I urge all of my colleagues to
support this important piece of legislation.
Mr. MARKEY. Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to H.R. 6198, the Iran
Freedom Support Act, because this bill could very well derail the
diplomatic efforts currently underway that are our best hope for ending
the possibility of an Iranian nuclear weapon.
Let me be clear that I agree with the great majority of which this
bill would do. I believe that we should extend the Iran Libya Sanctions
Act. I believe that we should support human rights in Iran.
But as with so many things in life, Mr. Speaker, timing is
everything. And this is the wrong time to pass this bill.
Crucial negotiations between Iran and the European Union in Berlin
are reportedly closing in on a deal that would suspend Iran's uranium
enrichment program while multilateral talks commence. The Bush
administration has so botched the issue of containing Iran's nuclear
ambitions that we have few choices left. These negotiations were just
suspended for a week, and it would surprise no one if Iran did not
return to the table. But make no mistake: as bad as the negotiation
option may turn out to be, it remains our best chance of stopping Iran
from ever building a nuclear weapon.
We need to support these negotiations, not undermine them. For the
Congress to pass language which essentially makes regime change in Iran
the official policy of the United States would be counterproductive
while these negotiations in Berlin remain promising.
I could support this bill at another time, but not now, not when its
passage could kill the ongoing negotiations.
Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion offered by the
gentlewoman from Florida (Ms. Ros-Lehtinen) that the House suspend the
rules and pass the bill, H.R. 6198, as amended.
The question was taken; and (two-thirds having voted in favor
thereof) the rules were suspended and the bill, as amended, was passed.
A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.
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