[Congressional Record Volume 152, Number 110 (Friday, September 8, 2006)]
[Senate]
[Pages S9230-S9240]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
SECURITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY FOR EVERY PORT ACT
The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Under the previous order, the Senate will
resume consideration of H.R. 4954, which the clerk will report.
The legislative clerk read as follows:
A bill (H.R. 4954) to improve maritime and cargo security
through enhanced layered defenses, and for other purposes.
The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Who seeks recognition?
The Senator from Maine.
Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, for the information of our colleagues, I
thought I would describe how we are going to be proceeding today.
Shortly, the President pro tempore, who is the comanager of the bill,
will be making his opening statement. It is my understanding he will
then move to lay down an amendment offered by Senator DeMint and a
substitute amendment offered by Senator Inouye relating to the WARN
Act, which is a Commerce Committee bill. We will not be voting on that
amendment today, it is my understanding, under the agreement that has
been previously reached.
We are open for business on other amendments for Members who may come
to the floor or Members who wish to speak on this bill.
Thank you, Mr. President.
Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The clerk will call the roll.
The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order
for the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Isakson). Without objection, it is so
ordered.
Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, as we all know, Monday marks the fifth
anniversary of September 11 and the terrorist attacks against this
country. Shortly after those attacks, during the 107th Congress, the
President signed into law the Maritime Transportation Security Act of
2002, which was developed by our Commerce Committee to enhance our
country's maritime security. Since then, our Commerce Committee has
worked as hard as possible to pass and implement a number of
initiatives which have made our ports and borders more secure.
Today we take up the Port Security Improvement Act of 2006. This bill
marks the first time three Senate committees have merged their
collective expertise and crafted a truly comprehensive approach to port
security. A bipartisan group of members from the Commerce Committee,
the Finance Committee, and the Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs Committee have worked together for several months on this bill.
As I know the Senate will realize, these three committees each have
tremendous knowledge about our ports and programs which protect and
secure our international supply chain. I believe it is a credit to the
Senate that each committee agreed to pool their resources, put aside
jurisdictional issues, and reach a consensus on this bill.
When enacted, this bill will strengthen our land and sea ports,
improve our maritime transportation security strategy, and enhance
communication between the Department of Homeland Security and
transportation security stakeholders.
It includes a plan to get our trade activities up and running again
in the event of a transportation security incident. And it creates a
pilot program which will study the feasibility of scanning each of the
containers--100 percent of the containers--entering our ports.
Mr. President, I spent considerable time in the last couple of years
examining our ports, and particularly the west coast, which is really
sort of the domain I know best. When I was a boy, the Port of Los
Angeles was three separate Ports of San Pedro, Long Beach, and Los
Angeles. The Port of Los Angeles is now an enormous area. Forty percent
of the seaborne trade of the U.S. comes through the Port of Los
Angeles, the Port of San Francisco, and of course, the Port of Seattle,
which is the home of our colleague, Senator Murray, but also is sort of
the stepping stone into my State of Alaska. It is a dynamic port and
one that has been experimenting to a great extent on how to bring about
container inspection, container scanning.
I personally went through each of the ports to see what was being
done. There are still a great many problems. I must say that the people
operating the ports, including those who are really the working people,
have gone out of their way to try to make certain that those ports are
safe and secure and that the containers are, in fact, scanned to the
best extent possible now. But we want to do this pilot program to see
if it is possible to tell our people that 100 percent of the containers
coming into the country are scanned.
This legislation will enhance the collection and analysis of
information about cargo destined for our ports. Those in the shipping
industry are our eyes and ears with respect to security, and this bill
aims to increase awareness of the operations at domestic and foreign
ports. Once those in industry share important information about cargo
in the international supply chain, we must analyze it quickly. This
legislation expedites that process and ensures it begins earlier in the
supply chain--before containers even reach our shores. This act
requires information about cargo be provided and analyzed before the
cargo is loaded on a vessel in a foreign port and shipped here. That
will be a significant change.
This bill also expands several initiatives with a proven track record
of success. There are currently five interagency operations centers up
and running throughout our country. These centers bring together
Federal, state, and local security enforcement officials to ensure
communication among them. This act expands this effort to each of the
major seaports, and places the Coast Guard in charge of these centers.
This act also builds upon the Department of Homeland Security's past
cooperation with foreign governments. The Container Security
Initiative, CSI, contained within this bill enables the department,
working in partnership with host government customs services, to
examine high-risk containerized cargo at foreign seaports before it is
loaded on vessels destined for the United States.
The Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism, C-TPAT, a voluntary
public-private partnership, is also strengthened in this bill. The
Commissioner of Customs and Border Protection will now be able to
certify that a business's supply chain is secure from the point of
manufacture to the product's final U.S. destination. Under this
legislation, whether cargo crosses our border at Laredo or arrives on a
ship from Hong Kong, participating companies' supply chains will
undergo a thorough security check. This will add another layer of
security to the C-TPAT initiative. Since this is a voluntary system, we
have also included provisions which encourage those in industry to go
above and beyond the security requirements already in place. These new
incentives include expedited clearance of cargo.
Mr. President, while I was disappointed earlier this year by the
negative public reaction to foreign investment in our Nation's port
terminals, we learned a great deal from hearings held by the Commerce
Committee on this matter. As a result of those hearings, this bill
requires DHS to conduct
[[Page S9231]]
background checks on all port personnel. Current law only requires the
Transportation Security Administration to perform checks on those
workers directly tied to transportation at the port, or involved in its
security. From the Commerce Committee hearings, it was evident that a
more stringent requirement was needed, and it is in the bill.
The events of September 11, 2001, forever altered the course of our
Nation. Senator Inouye and I traveled to ground zero shortly after the
attacks. It was a sad and terrible sight. It was also a stark reminder
that we must do everything possible to prevent those who wish to harm
Americans from carrying out their missions.
To prevent future attacks, we must secure our ports, and this bill is
a major step forward in this effort. Senator Inouye, my co-chairman on
the Commerce Committee, and I thank Senators Grassley, Baucus, Coleman,
Collins and Lieberman for their leadership in drafting this bill. I
would also like to thank the staff members on each of the committees;
they have worked tirelessly on this bill.
Each of the committees involved in this bill has jurisdiction over an
area vital to the safety of our ports. The Commerce Committee oversees
issues related to the shipping industry, transportation security, and
the Coast Guard. The Finance Committee oversees international trade and
customs. And greater security of our ports and borders is central to
the Homeland Security Committee's mission. Working together, our three
committees have developed a comprehensive bill which will help shield
our Nation from future terrorist attacks. It is my hope our colleagues
will support this act and move quickly to pass this bill.
I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record following my
statement a summary of the bill prepared by Ken Nahigian, who sits next
to me and is counsel for our Commerce Committee.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
Summary of Bill: Port Security Improvement Act of 2006
title I: Security of United States Seaports
Subtitle A: General Provisions
Section 101: Area maritime transportation security plan to
include salvage response plan. Ensures that following a
maritime transportation security incident waterways are
cleared, salvage equipment is identified, and the flow of
commerce is reestablished.
Section 102: Requirements relating to maritime facility
security plans. Authorizes qualified individuals to implement
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) approved security plans
for a maritime facility.
Section 103: Unannounced inspections of maritime
facilities. Verifies the effectiveness of facility security
plans on a periodic basis, including at least one unannounced
inspection annually.
Section 104: Transportation security card deadline.
Establishes a timeframe for Transportation Worker
Identification Credential (TWIC) implementation at all U.S.
seaports. Requires DHS to process applications simultaneously
for individuals needing both TWIC and merchant mariner
documents.
Section 105: Long-range vessel tracking. Encourages DHS to
issue regulations to establish a voluntary long-range
automated vessel tracking system for select vessels.
Section 106: Establishment of interagency operational
centers for port security. Expands existing interagency
operational/fusion centers to all high-priority ports within
three years to facilitate coordination and communication
among Federal, State, local and private sector stakeholders.
Requires DHS to submit a budget and cost-sharing analysis to
Congress within 180 days of this Act.
Subtitle B: Graut aud Training Programs
Section 111: Port security grants. Requires DHS to allocate
grants based on risk to port authorities, facility operators,
and State and local government agencies to enhance port
security activities. Authorizes appropriations of $400
million.
Section 112: Port security training program. Allows
establishment of a training program for seaports' prevention
of, preparation for, response to, and recovery from threats,
including terrorism, natural disasters and other emergencies.
The program would be coordinated with the Coast Guard.
Section 113: Port security exercise program. Allows
creation of an exercise program to test and evaluate the
capabilities of Federal, State, local and other relevant
stakeholders to coordinate appropriate response and recovery
from threats at commercial seaports. The program would be
coordinated with the Coast Guard.
Subtitle C: Port Operations
Section 121: Domestic radiation detection and imaging.
Requires the Secretary to develop a strategy for deployment
of radiation detection capabilities and ensures that by
December 2007, all containers entering the U.S., through the
busiest 22 seaports, shall be examined for radiation.
Requires DHS to submit a report of the strategic plan
developed and to implement the strategy nationwide within
three years. Requires DHS to submit a separate plan for the
development of equipment to detect WMD threats at all U.S.
ports of entry.
Section 122: Port security user fee study. Requires DHS to
study the need for and feasibility of oceanborne and port-
related transportation security user fees to be collected
for funding port security improvements. Requires DHS to
submit a report detailing the results of the study,
analysis of current customs fees and duties collected that
are dedicated to security, comparison of comparable fees
imposed in ports of Canada and Mexico, assessment of the
impact on competitiveness of U.S. ports, and
recommendations based on findings.
Section 123: Inspection of car ferries entering from
Canada: Requires DHS, in coordination with Department of
State, to develop a plan for the inspection of passengers and
vehicles before loading onto ferries bound for a U.S. port.
Section 124: Random searches of containers. Requires DHS to
develop and implement a plan, within one year after
enactment, for random physical inspection of shipping
containers. Random searches would not preclude additional
container searches.
Section 125: Work stoppages and employee-employer disputes.
Defines the term economic disruption, which does not include
a work stoppage or nonviolent employee related action not
related to terrorism and resulting from an employee-employer
dispute.
Title II: Security of the International Supply Chain
Subtitle A: General Provisions
Section 201: Strategic plan to enhance the security of the
international supply chain. Requires DHS to develop,
implement and update a strategic plan to improve the security
of the international cargo supply chain. The plan would be
required to identify and address gaps, provide improvements
and goals, establish protocols for the resumptions of trade
including identification of the initial incident commander,
consider international standards for container security, and
allow for communication with stakeholders.
Section 202: Post incident resumption of trade. Establishes
that following a maritime transportation security incident,
the initial incident commander and lead department carry out
the protocols of the international supply chain security
strategic plan. The Coast Guard would ensure the safe and
secure transit of vessels to U.S. ports. Preference would be
given to certain vessels and cargo (CSI/C-TPAT) in the
resumption of trade. The Secretary would ensure that there is
appropriate coordination among federal officials and
communication of revised procedures, not inconsistent with
security interests, to the private sector to provide for the
resumption of trade.
Section 203: Automated targeting system (ATS). Requires DHS
to identify, and allows it to request the submission of,
additional data (non-manifest and entry data elements) of
container cargo moving through the international supply
chain. Data would be analyzed to identify high-risk cargo for
inspection. Authorization of appropriations to fund ATS for
FY 2007-2009.
Section 204: Container security standards and procedures.
Requires DHS to promulgate a rule to establish minimum
standards and procedures for securing containers in transit
to the U.S. If the rulemaking deadline is not met, DHS would
have to provide a letter of explanatory rationale to
Congress. DHS and other federal agencies are encouraged to
promote international cargo security standards.
Section 205: Container security initiative (CSI).
Authorizes CSI program to identify, examine or search
maritime containers before U.S.-bound cargo is loaded in a
foreign port. Designates foreign ports as part of the CSI
program based upon select criteria including risk, trade
volume and value of cargo, Coast Guard assessments, and the
commitment of the host nation to comply with data sharing
requirements. DHS would establish standards for the use of
nonintrusive imaging and radiation detection equipment at CSI
ports. DHS would also develop a plan to ensure
adequate staffing at CSI ports. Requires DHS to submit a
report to Congress on the effectiveness of, and need for
improvements to, CSI. Authorizes appropriations for FY
2008-2010.
Subtitle B: Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-
TPAT)
Section 211: Establishment. Authorizes DHS to establish a
voluntary program (C-TPAT) to strengthen international supply
chain and border security, facilitate the movement of secure
cargo and provide benefits to eligible participants.
Section 212: Eligible entities. Allows importers, customs
brokers, forwarders, air, sea, and land carriers, contract
logistics providers, and other entities in the international
supply chain and intermodal transportation system to apply
for this voluntary program.
Section 213: Minimum requirements. Establishes minimum
security and other requirements that applicants must meet to
be eligible for C-TPAT.
Section 214: Tier 1 participants in C-TPAT. Allows for
limited benefits for participants,
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which may include a reduction of the ATS risk score, to those
C-TPAT participants that meet the minimum guidelines
established. To the extent practicable, DHS would complete
the Tier 1 certification process within 90 days of receipt of
a candidate's application.
Section 215: Tier 2 participants in C-TPAT. Allows for an
additional level of benefits--reduced cargo examinations and
priority processing--to those participants who meet a higher
level of C-TPAT security requirements. DHS would be required
to validate the security measures and supply chain practices
of C-TPAT participants, including on-site assessments, within
one year of certification.
Section 216: Tier 3 participants in C-TPAT. Establishes a
third-tier of C-TPAT offering increased benefits to
participants that demonstrate a sustained commitment to
security based on certain criteria. Benefits may include,
among others, expedited release of cargo, further reduced
examinations, reduced bonding requirements, and notification
of specific alerts and post-incident procedures as well as
inclusion in joint incident management exercises, as
appropriate.
Section 217: Consequences for lack of compliance. Allows
DHS to deny benefits in part or in whole, including
suspension or elimination for at least five years, of any
participant that fails to meet C-TPAT requirements or
knowingly provides false or misleading information: said
entities may appeal this decision.
Section 218: Revalidation. Establishes a process for
revalidating C-TPAT participants in tiers 2 and 3 and
requires an annual plan for revalidation, detailing
performance measures and necessary personnel requirements.
Section 219: Non-containerized cargo. Allows DHS to
consider including importers of noncontainerized cargo as
participants in C-TPAT, provided program requirements are
met.
Section 220: C-TPAT program management. Requires DHS to
establish sufficient internal quality controls and record
management of C-TPAT including development of a strategic
plan to identify goals, annual plans to match resources with
workload, a standardized work program to monitor progress, a
record management system, and a data protection program.
Section 221: Resource management staffing plan. Requires
development of a staffing plan to recruit, train and cross-
train C-TPAT personnel.
Section 222: Additional Personnel. Obliges DHS to increase,
by at least 50 positions annually for fiscal years 2007
through 2009, the number of personnel to validate and
revalidate C-TPAT members.
Section 223: Authorization of appropriations. Authorizes
appropriations to Customs and Border Protection in DHS to
carry out the C-TPAT provisions of sections 211 through 221.
In addition to any monies appropriated to Customs and Border
Protection, there are authorized to be appropriated funds
for the purpose of meeting the staffing requirement
provided in section 222.
Section 224: Report to Congress. Stipulates that DHS must
report on the progress of C-TPAT certifications, validations
and revalidations in conjunction with the President's annual
budget submission.
Subtitle C: Miscellaneous Provisions
Section 231: Pilot integrated scanning system. Develops a
pilot program in three foreign seaports, each with unique
features and varying levels of trade volume to test
integrated scanning systems using nonintrusive inspection and
radiation detection equipment. Requires full-scale pilot
implementation within one year after enactment. An evaluation
report would be required to be submitted to Congress 120 days
after full implementation of the pilot.
Section 232: International cooperation and coordination.
Allows DHS to provide assistance, equipment and training to
facilitate the implementation of supply chain security
measures at CSI designated ports. Requires DHS to identify
foreign assistance programs to encourage implementation of
port security antiterrorism measures at foreign ports, with
particular emphasis on foreign ports in the Caribbean Basin.
Requires GAO to submit a report on the security of Caribbean
ports within 180 days.
Title III: Administration
Section 301: Office of Cargo Security Policy. Establishes
an office within DHS to coordinate all cargo security policy
within the Department, coordinate DHS cargo security policies
with policies of other executive agencies, consult with
stakeholders, establish standards, and promote best
practices.
Section 302: Reauthorization of Homeland Security Science
and Technology Advisory Committee. Authorizes the Assistant
Secretary for Science and Technology to utilize the Homeland
Security Science and Technology Advisory Committee to provide
outside expertise in advancing cargo security technology.
Section 303: Research, development, test, and evaluation
efforts in furtherance of maritime and cargo security.
Assures coordination within DHS and with other public and
private sector entities for research and development of
maritime and cargo security innovations.
Title IV: Agency Resources and Oversight
Section 401: Office of International Trade. Creates within
the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection (CBP), an Office
of International Trade. Establishes an International Trade
Policy Committee to assist in coordinating with the DHS
Assistant Secretary for Policy regarding commercial customs
and trade facilitation functions. Establishes an
International Trade Finance Committee to coordinate and
oversee the implementation of programs involved in the
assessment and collection of duties on U.S. imported and
exported cargo.
Section 402: Resources. Requires CBP to complete a resource
allocation model, by June 2007 and every 2 years thereafter,
to determine optimal staffing for commercial and revenue
functions. Requires submission of models of Congress.
Authorizes appropriations to increase the number of CBP
personnel to perform commercial operations and customs
revenue functions: new hires would be based upon
aforementioned models and additional authorized 725 CBP
officers.
Section 403: Negotiations. Requires DHS to work with
appropriate Federal officials and international organizations
to harmonize customs procedures, standards, requirements and
commitments to facilitate the efficient flow of international
trade.
Section 404: International Trade Data System (ITDS).
Requires the Secretary of the Treasury to oversee the
establishment of an electronic trade data interchange system
to eliminate redundant information requirements, to
efficiently regulate the flow of commerce and enforce
regulations relating to international trade. All Federal
agencies that require documentation for clearing or licensing
the importation and exportation of cargo shall participate in
the ITDS, unless based on national security interests, the
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) waives the
participation requirement. Establishes an Interagency
Steering Committee to define the standard set of data
elements to be collected, stored and shared in the ITDS: said
committee would submit a report to Congress before the end of
each fiscal year.
Section 405: In-bond cargo. Requires DHS to submit a report
to Congress including analysis of various aspects of in-bond
cargo, such as tracking, technologies, evaluation criteria
for targeting and examining in-bond cargo and the feasibility
of reducing the transit time for in-bond shipments.
Section 406: Sense of the Senate. Delineates elements of
the bill that shall not affect the jurisdiction of standing
Senate committees.
Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I thank Senator Collins and Senator
Grassley for their cooperation, and our counterparts on the other side
of the aisle, my colleagues Senator Inouye, Senator Murray, and Senator
Baucus, those who are working with us to move this bill as quickly as
possible.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who seeks recognition?
Amendment No. 4921
Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I understand that there was a negotiation
going on concerning an amendment that is before the Senate now. I have
been asked to call up Senator DeMint's amendment. There is a
negotiation going on concerning a possible modification of it. He
called and asked that this be placed before the Senate. I wish to
comply with his request.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:
The Senator from Alaska [Mr. Stevens], for Mr. DeMint,
proposes an amendment numbered 4921.
(The amendment is printed in the Record of Thursday, September 7,
2006, under ``Text of Amendments.'')
Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. ALLARD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The Senator from Colorado is recognized.
Mr. ALLARD. Mr. President, I understand there is a pending amendment.
I ask unanimous consent that amendment be laid aside and that I be
allowed to speak for 7 minutes in morning business.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
(The remarks of Mr. Allard are printed in today's Record under
``Morning Business.'')
Mr. ALLARD. Mr. President, I yield the floor, and I suggest the
absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order
for the quorum call be rescinded.
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The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that a summary of
the Port Security Improvement Act of 2006 prepared by my staff be
printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
The Port Security Improvement Act of 2006--Summary
This legislation will provide the structure and the
resources needed to better protect the American people from
attack through our seaports that are both vulnerable points
of entry and vital centers of economic activity. Each year,
more than 11 million containers pass through the ports and
53,000 foreign-flagged vessels call at U.S. ports. This bill
is a comprehensive approach that addresses all major aspects
of maritime cargo security. The bill reflects not only
bipartisan consultation and support, but coordination among
the Senate Homeland Security, Commerce, and Finance
Committees.
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Must Establish Strategies and
Standards
Strategic Plan. The Secretary of Homeland Security must
develop a strategic plan to enhance international supply
chain security for all modes of transportation by which
containers arrive in, depart from or move through seaports of
the United States. The Secretary must clarify roles,
responsibilities, and authorities of all government agencies
at all levels and private sector stakeholders. The plan must
provide measurable goals for furthering the security of
commercial operations from point of origin to point of
destination, build on available resources and consider costs
and benefits; and identify response and recovery methods.
Container Security Standards. Because container security
standards have languished at the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS), the legislation requires the Secretary to
establish minimum standards for the movement and storage of
containers within 180 days of the enactment of the bill. It
can base these regulations on its experience with the cargo
security programs that it currently operates. In addition,
the Secretary is directed to seek to establish international
standards through multilateral agreements or international
bodies.
Resumption of Operations at Seaports. The Secretary shall
develop protocols for the resumption of trade in the event of
a security incident or a disruption to trade at seaports. To
handle the immediate response to an incident, the Secretary
must establish protocols that make clear who is the initial
incident commander and the lead agency that will execute and
coordinate the response so that there will be no confusion.
In reestablishing the flow of trade through U.S. ports,
preference shall be given to vessels with a valid security
plan that are manned with individuals who have undergone
background checks and are operated by validated C-TPAT
participants. Preference should be given to cargo that is
entering a U.S. port from a CSI port and handled by a
validated participant in C-TPAT.
Cargo Security Programs
Improved Automated Targeting System. A critical component
of the targeting of cargo for inspection is the Automated
Targeting System. This computer-based system helps DHS to
determine which cargo presents a high security risk. The
legislation requires the Secretary to identify and seek the
submission of data related to the importation of cargo in
order to improve the targeting of high-risk cargo. It also
requires the Secretary to establish an independent review of
the system.
Container Security Initiative (CSI). The bill establishes
CSI to identify and examine maritime containers that pose a
risk for terrorism at foreign ports in order to keep
potential threats far from America's shores. In CSI, U.S.
Customs and Border Protection (CBP) personnel work closely
with foreign government officials to target and inspect
cargo headed to the U.S. at foreign ports. Before the
Secretary may designate a foreign port under CSI, the
Secretary must conduct a full assessment of the risk of
terrorists compromising containers; the capabilities and
level of cooperation of the intended host country; and the
potential for validation of security practices by the
Department.
Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT). This
legislation establishes the C-TPAT program to strengthen and
improve the overall security of the international supply
chain. This voluntary program encourages participants to take
steps to ensure that their supply chains are secure. Based on
a participant's efforts in the program, they are placed on
one of three tiers. The legislation requires the Secretary to
validate the supply chain security practices of each
participant and offer benefits to participants based on their
levels of certification and validation.
C-TPAT Top Tier. The top tier (Tier 3) or GreenLane status
for C-TPAT participants provides the highest level of
benefits, which may include the following: reduced
examinations, priority examinations and searches, and the
expedited release of cargo during all threat levels.
Uniform Data for Government-Wide Usage. To simplify the
filing of documentation needed to import cargo and facilitate
the compilation of data, the Secretary of Treasury shall
complete the implementation of the International Trade Data
System, a single, uniform data system for the electronic
collection, dissemination, and sharing of import and export
information.
Radiation Detection and Radiation Safety. Radiation
detection equipment is critical to ensuring that no
radiological device leaves a U.S. port. The bill directs the
Secretary of DHS to install radiation portal monitors at the
22 largest U.S. ports by the end of 2007. This will cover 98
percent of incoming container traffic.
100 Percent Scanning Pilot Program. The Secretary shall
establish a pilot program at three foreign ports to test the
practicality and effectiveness of systems designed to scan
100 percent of cargo. The scanning systems must couple non-
intrusive imaging and radiation detection equipment.
In-Bond Cargo. Cargo that travels in-bond through the U.S.
from the ports is a major vulnerability because the final
destination of the cargo is not known. The bill requires a
report on in-bond cargo that would include whether additional
information should be required for in-bond cargo, a plan for
tracking in-bond cargo in the to-be-developed ACE system, and
an assessment of how to ensure 100 percent reconciliation
between the port of arrival and destination.
Resources and Coordination for Port Security
Port Security Grants and Training. The bill establishes
risk-based grants, training, and exercises for port security.
The legislation authorizes $400 million in appropriations for
port security grants.
Office of Cargo Security Policy. This legislation
establishes within the Department of Homeland Security an
Office of Cargo Security Policy to coordinate department-wide
efforts regarding cargo security policies and programs.
Interagency Operations Centers. The bill directs the
Secretary to establish Interagency Operation Centers for
Maritime and Cargo Security at all high-priority ports to
enhance information sharing and facilitate day-to-day
operational coordination, and incident management and
response between agencies. The agencies at the operations
centers include the Coast Guard, CBP, the FBI, Department of
Defense, state and local law enforcement or port security
personnel, and private sector stakeholders, as the Secretary
determines is appropriate.
Research. Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E). The
Secretary must direct RDT&E efforts in furtherance of
maritime and cargo security, encourage the ingenuity of the
private sector in developing and testing such technologies,
and evaiuate such technologies. The Secretary shall ensure
all Department RDT&E efforts are coordinated to avoid
duplicative efforts and share results.
Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, one of the issues that will undoubtedly
come up during the debate on the port security bill has to do with the
scanning of containers. Some people have asked: Why don't we scan 100
percent of the 11 million containers coming into this country? And the
answer is simply that it is not practical with the current technology.
The bill that is before us authorizes three pilot projects in three
foreign ports where we would take a look at the feasibility and
practicality and the implications of 100 percent scanning.
There is 100 percent screening. There is a difference between
screening a container, which means gathering information on each and
every container and doing a sophisticated computer analysis to
determine which are of higher risk, versus scanning each container with
an x-ray-type machine or some other method or a physical inspection.
The problem of trying to scan 100 percent of all containers is best
summed up by a letter that we recently received from the Supply Chain
Security Coalition. This is a coalition of some of the largest and most
knowledgeable stakeholders in the supply chain's system, including the
Retail Industry Leaders Association.
The letter says:
One hundred percent scanning proposals and amendments
advocating such a proposal could potentially actually
decrease security by forcing containers to sit for extended
periods of time, putting them at greater risk of tampering,
and would divert resources away from the current risk
assessment approach. In addition--
And this is the key point--
such a mandate has the potential to significantly impede the
flow of commerce and damage the U.S. and global economy.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the full text of that
letter be printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
Hon. Susan Collins,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC.
Dear Senator Collins: On behalf of the Retail Industry
Leaders Association, I am
[[Page S9234]]
writing to urge you to support strong and carefully crafted
port security legislation that builds on the current
multilayered, risk assessment approach that has effectively
protected our nation's seaports over the last several years.
I also urge you, in the strongest terms possible, to oppose
any legislation that would require all U.S. bound cargo
containers to be ``scanned'' for radiation and density, so
called 100% scanning legislation. While we strongly support
improving the security of our nation's seaports, 100%
scanning proposals have the potential to do more harm than
good.
The Retail Industry Leaders Association (RILA) is the trade
association of the largest and fastest growing companies in
the retail industry. Its members include retailers, product
manufacturers, and service suppliers, which together account
for more than $1.5 trillion in annual sales. RILA members
operate more than 100,000 stores, manufacturing facilities
and distribution centers, have facilities in all 50 states,
and provide millions of jobs domestically and worldwide.
We understand that key committees in the Senate has come to
an agreement on a port security bill that may be taken up as
soon as tomorrow, September 8th, 2006, and that the
legislation is based on provisions from earlier bills drafted
in the Homeland Security & Government Affairs Committee, the
Commerce, Transportation and Infrastructure Committee and the
Finance Committee. Each of those bills contain important
provisions that will help improve our nation's port security
laws by building upon and recognizing the effectiveness of
the well-established security measures our government
currently has in place. RILA supports legislation that builds
upon this proven approach, which is why we worked to help
pass port security legislation in the House, H.R. 4954, The
SAFE Ports Act. It is our hope that the Senate bill will
closely mirror the House legislation, which received
overwhelming bipartisan support.
However, I also strongly urge you to oppose any legislation
that would require that all U.S. bound cargo containers be
scanned for radiation and density, so called ``100%
scanning'' amendments. Such proposals may at first glance
appear to improve security, but in reality, they would impose
immense costs on our economy and foreign relations without
improving the security of our international trading systems.
First, a 100% scanning mandate is unrealistic since the
technology does not yet exist to do this efficiently and with
a high degree of accuracy. We are not aware of any credible
technology to actually analyze the millions of density images
that would be taken of outbound cargo containers, meaning
such images would have to be reviewed one by one by a port
official or Customs officer. Second, this mandate could
actually decrease security by forcing containers to sit for
extended periods of time, putting them at greater risk of
tampering.
In addition, forcing all containers to be scanned--
including the vast majority of those that pose no risk--would
divert scarce security resources away from the successful
risk assessment approach currently utilized by the
government. This approach uses sophisticated risk-analysis
tools to determine which containers pose a risk and ensures
those containers are handled appropriately. It is important
for Senators to remember that the Department of Homeland
Security currently uses a risk-based targeting approach to
inspect inbound cargo. All cargo manifests are submitted at
least 24 hours prior to loading on a vessel and the Automated
Targeting System (ATS) uses complex, rule-based formulas to
assign a numerical score and identify at-risk containers. CBP
then inspects 100% of all containers deemed high-risk.
Finally, a 100% scanning mandate has the potential to
significantly impede the flow of commerce and do damage to
the economy. According a June 2006 study conducted by the
RAND Corporation, 100% scanning would delay the movement
cargo containers by 5.5 hours per container. With 11 to 12
million containers entering the U.S. every year, it is
obvious that of 100% scanning mandate would bring global
commerce and the flow goods to a virtual standstill. This
would severely damage the U.S. economy, not only by denying
consumers access to thousands of products they need, but also
by preventing the delivery of material and other inputs that
U.S. manufactures need.
Rather than mandating 100% scanning, port security
legislation should authorize additional testing and
evaluation of scanning technology. Several of the relevant
port security bills address this issue by calling for pilot
projects and other evaluations to test the effectiveness and
operational capability to conduct increased container
scanning, including the ``GreenLane Maritime Cargo Security
Act'' passed by the Senate Homeland Security Committee and
the House SAFE Ports Act. These provisions represent the best
way to address this issue and answer important operational
and economic questions critical to understanding how to
effectively implement container scanning.
Retail companies are among the largest and most
knowledgeable stakeholders in the supply chain system and
administer the most extensive and efficient logistics
operations in the world. The industry has worked hand-in-hand
with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and
specifically with the Coast Guard and Customs and Border
Protection to ensure that our customers, employees, and the
nation's seaports remain safe and that the nation's economy
remains strong. We take a back seat to no industry in our
support for strong and carefully crafted port security
legislation, and we urge the Senate to move quickly to pass
such a bill as soon as possible.
Thank you for your consideration of our views. We look
forward to working with you on this critically important
issue. Should you have any questions, please contact Paul T.
Kelly, Senior Vice President for Government Affairs or Allen
Thompson, Vice President for Global Supply Chain Policy.
Sincerely,
Sandy Kennedy,
President.
Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, what we have tried to do with this bill
is very carefully balance the need for effective, improved security
with the need to ensure that we are not crippling our international
trading system. We now have 11 million shipping containers coming into
this country each year. This is a number that has grown substantially
in recent years. We know each one has the potential to be the Trojan
horse of the 21st century, to include not consumer goods but perhaps
terrorists themselves, the makings of a dirty bomb, a chemical,
biological, or even nuclear weapon.
That is why the legislation that we have authored proposes a strong,
effective, layered system of security. It focuses on the ports of
origin. It focuses on each container to make sure that it is
effectively evaluated, and it has a system for securing the entire
supply chain that is called the C-TPAT system.
The highest system of C-TPAT would be the GreenLane system, of which
Senator Murray is the author.
At that level, shippers would take steps to completely certify the
security of their supply chain from the factory where the good is
manufactured, all the way to the delivery to the retail store. Each
step of the supply chain would be certified as secure. In return, those
shippers or retailers that reach that highest level, the GreenLane,
would be given certain benefits. Their cargo would be expedited. Their
cargo would be subjected to fewer inspections. Their cargo would be
released more quickly in the event of an attack on our ports.
Our proposal addresses the people who work at our ports. It addresses
the shipping containers. It addresses the ports themselves and other
facilities. It takes the layered approach to security that is
recommended by the 9/11 Commission.
So I hope those of our colleagues who may be tempted to think that
the answer to port security is to do an x-ray of each and every
shipping container will take a closer look at the systems and the
security that would be provided by our legislation and would consider
the points that have been raised by the experts who point out the
dangers in delaying the transit of shipping containers. It might
actually decrease security rather than enhance it. And, also, that we
have to strike that right balance so we do not significantly impede the
flow of commerce and damage the U.S. and global economy.
Just think how many farmers rely on our ports to ship their crops
overseas. Think of how many factories and stores in our country rely on
just-in-time inventory. If you are reliant on just-in-time inventory
and your containers are delayed just 3 days, it can make a big
difference to your operations. So we need to make sure that we strike
the right balance.
I think the bill before us, which has been carefully worked out by
three committees, which has been in progress for years, does strike the
right balance.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona.
Amendment No. 4922
Mr. McCAIN. I call up amendment No. 4922 and ask for its immediate
consideration. I ask unanimous consent the pending amendment be set
aside.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to setting aside the
pending amendment? Without objection, it is so ordered.
The clerk will report.
The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:
The Senator from Arizona [Mr. McCain], for himself, Ms.
Snowe, Mr. DeWine, Mr. Biden, and Mr. Lieberman, proposes an
amendment numbered 4922.
Mr. McCAIN. I ask unanimous consent the reading of the amendment be
dispensed with.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
[[Page S9235]]
(The amendment is printed in today's Record under ``Text of
Amendments.'')
Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I congratulate the distinguished chairman
of the committee for the outstanding work that she and the ranking
member, Senator Lieberman, have done in bringing forth this very
important legislation. I believe the work that is done by these two
Members of the Senate, in a bipartisan fashion, in order to better
secure the safety of our citizens, is laudable and important. I
congratulate them on this legislation that we are considering today.
This amendment would ensure that in addition to our efforts to
improve port security, we also address another critical transportation
mode--rail transportation. I am pleased to be joined in this effort by
Senators DeWine, Snowe, and Biden.
Again, I want to say I am pleased the Senate has chosen to take up
the Port Security Act of 2006 to protect our Nation's ports and
waterways. I just listened carefully to the statement by the
distinguished chairwoman of the committee, outlining both the threat
and the way that this legislation will address these very important
aspects of our Nation's security at our ports.
I would also like to point out that the bill implements several
recommendations from the 9/11 Commission's final report, including
allocating security grants based on risk and comprehensive cargo
screening. Additionally, the bill would establish an office within the
Department of Homeland Security to coordinate all cargo security
policy, develop a strategy for deployment of radiation detection
capabilities in all ports, and establish a process to facilitate the
movement of secure cargo from international ports to our ports without
interrupting the international supply chain and delaying goods to
consumers in the United States.
Securing our ports is a crucial part of our efforts to protect
Americans at home. The amendment I am offering today would complement
the underlying legislation by providing essential funding and
additional tools to strengthen our Nation's rail system.
Two years ago the Senate passed by unanimous consent the Rail
Security Act of 2004, legislation that was almost identical to the
amendment I am offering today. Unfortunately, that bill died in the
House of Representatives. Last year I reintroduced the legislation
shortly after the London bombings of July 7 and language that is
similar to the provisions of the Rail Security Act is in a title of the
Transportation Security Bill that was reported by the Commerce
Committee in February. I sincerely hope that we will once again pass
this important legislation. Rail security must be made a top priority
of this Congress.
Look at the recent threats of attacks. We were all deeply saddened by
the tragic loss of lives caused by the 2004 terrorist attacks in
Madrid, the 2005 London attacks, and the terrorist attacks on commuter
trains in Mumbai this summer. Those incidents are a painful reminder of
the cruel nature of our enemies in our global war on terror and what we
must do to fight and win against those who wish to eradicate our way of
life. On many occasions we have said we cannot play just defense in
this war; that, instead, we must take the fight to the enemy. Still, we
must do what is possible and prudent to protect Americans at home.
The numerous attacks on rail systems abroad demonstrate all too
vividly the continuing need for this legislation.
There is little doubt that we have increased dramatically our
security capabilities over the past 5 years. However, there is just as
little doubt that we have much more to do. Since the attacks of 9/11,
only relatively modest resources have been dedicated to rail security.
In fact, I would be very curious if the distinguished chairman of the
committee knows the relative amounts of money that we have spent on
rail security as compared with airport security. I think you will find
it is minuscule.
Our Nation's transit system, Amtrak, and the freight railroads, I am
sad to say, remain vulnerable to terrorist threats. This lack of
funding exists despite the fact that the Department of Homeland
Security has identified as potential terrorist targets the freight and
passenger rail networks which are critical to the Nation's
transportation system and national defense.
The 9/11 Commission, too, in its report on the facts and
circumstances surrounding the 9/11 attacks called for improved security
in all modes of transportation, noting that `` . . . terrorists may
turn their attention to other modes.''
This amendment would authorize a total of almost $1.2 billion for
rail security. More than half of this funding would be authorized to
complete tunnel safety and security improvements at New York's
Pennsylvania station, which is used by over 500,000 transit, commuter,
and intercity passengers each workday.
I want to repeat that fact. Penn Station in New York City is used by
over 500,000 transit, commuter, and intercity passengers each workday.
Look at the amount of money we have spent to try to protect that
vulnerable target as opposed to literally every major airport in
America. This funding is all the more urgent given this summer's arrest
by the FBI of eight suspects tied to al-Qaida who were plotting attacks
on train tunnels connecting New York and New Jersey.
The legislation would also establish a grant program authorized at
$350 million to help increase security by the freight railroads,
Amtrak, shippers of hazardous materials, and local governments with
security responsibility for passenger stations not owned by Amtrak.
Further, DHS would be required to complete a vulnerability assessment
of the rail network to terrorist attack and make recommendations to
Congress for addressing security weaknesses. Importantly, to protect
the taxpayers' interests, all Amtrak authorizations would be managed by
the Department of Transportation through formal grant agreements.
We all know that we face a dedicated, focused, and intelligent foe in
the war on terrorism. This enemy will probe to find our weaknesses and
move against them. We have seen the vulnerabilities of rail to
terrorism in other countries and the devastating consequences of such
an attack. It is essential that we move expeditiously to protect all
the modes of transportation from potential attack.
I also note that this amendment is cosponsored by Senators DeWine,
Snowe, and Biden. I thank the Senators for their cosponsorship of this
critical measure.
I trust the Senate will once again pass this essential legislation.
We owe at least that much to the American people as we continue our
struggle against an enemy that wants nothing less than to destroy
everything we stand for and believe in.
I would like to mention to the distinguished manager of the bill that
I don't think this is probably the best away to address this issue.
Obviously, the bill should have stood on its own and been addressed
separately with amendments to the bill. But I think there is a
compelling case that can be made that, if port security is vital and
must be acted on, so must rail security. I do not diminish the
importance of this legislation. But, again, I would like to point out
railway stations all over America have received very little attention
and very little funding. Are we going to wait until there is an attack,
such as where we arrested eight subjects this summer who were planning
attacks on rail connections between New York and New Jersey or are we
going to get ahead of this?
I come from a State where very few of our passengers use rail. But I
think it is very important to point out that in places in the Northeast
this is a primary form of transportation. Just a couple of blocks from
here, if you did a rough assessment, you would find at Union Station
there are significant vulnerabilities.
By the way, I would like to mention that Senator Stevens has played a
key role in this effort on this legislation. We have worked together.
His leadership has been vital. I know his efforts have been very
important, and I want to express my appreciation.
Again, I say to the distinguished managers of the bill, if changes
need to be made to this legislation in conference we would certainly
welcome improvements. But I hope we can include this as part of this
legislation so we can begin making serious efforts to ensure rail
safety in America.
My thanks to the managers and my thanks to the distinguished chairman
[[Page S9236]]
of the Commerce Committee for all of his efforts on this legislation.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Alaska.
Mr. STEVENS. I thank the Senator from Arizona for his comments. I
might say on the visit that I made to Los Angeles Harbor, it is very
clear that rail is essential for the 40 percent of the cargo that comes
into the United States. The majority moves out of the Los Angeles
Harbor by rail, and currently that is very sensitive because there is
only one rail coming out of there and there should be multiple rails.
Senator McCain has offered S. 1052, which our committee reported in
November of 2005. That bill contained sections of aviation, rail,
trucking, and port security.
In addition, Senator McCain's bill passed the Senate in 2004. It is
not controversial. I will urge the Senate to let us pass it again
without amendment so we can take it to conference, and I do believe it
will become law.
It is very clear it is as essential as the port security section, and
I thank him for bringing it to the floor. I intend to support it
completely because I hope we can get back to both the aviation and
trucking portions of S. 1052 sometime. I don't think it will be in this
Congress, however, because it has become too controversial. But we
intend to take them up again, I believe, early next year whether there
is change of management or not in terms of the Commerce Committee. I do
hope we can realize the aviation and trucking areas need to change, as
far as security considerations are concerned, in terms of their basic
law. But I am here to urge the Senate very favorably to approve this,
and I am certainly urging the Senate to adopt the McCain amendment when
we start voting on this bill next Tuesday.
Is there anyone else who wishes to comment at this time?
Amendment No. 4922, as Modified
Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, if I may just make one additional comment,
I ask unanimous consent the amendment be modified with the changes at
the desk. They add the Homeland Security Committee as recipient of the
reporting requirements in the amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. The
amendment, as modified, is as follows;
At the appropriate place in the bill, insert the following:
TITLE__--RAIL SECURITY ACT OF 2006
SEC. __01. SHORT TITLE.
This title may be cited as the ``Rail Security Act of
2006''.
SEC. __02. RAIL TRANSPORTATION SECURITY RISK ASSESSMENT.
(a) In General.--
(1) Vulnerability assessment.--The Under Secretary of
Homeland Security for Border and Transportation Security
(referred to in this title as the ``Under Secretary''), in
consultation with the Secretary of Transportation, shall
conduct a vulnerability assessment of freight and passenger
rail transportation (encompassing railroads, as that term is
defined in section 20102(1) of title 49, United States Code),
which shall include--
(A) identification and evaluation of critical assets and
infrastructures;
(B) identification of threats to those assets and
infrastructures;
(C) identification of vulnerabilities that are specific to
the transportation of hazardous materials via railroad; and
(D) identification of security weaknesses in passenger and
cargo security, transportation infrastructure, protection
systems, procedural policies, communications systems,
employee training, emergency response planning, and any other
area identified by the assessment.
(2) Existing private and public sector efforts.--The
assessment conducted under this subsection shall take into
account actions taken or planned by both public and private
entities to address identified security issues and assess the
effective integration of such actions.
(3) Recommendations.--Based on the assessment conducted
under this subsection, the Under Secretary, in consultation
with the Secretary of Transportation, shall develop
prioritized recommendations for improving rail security,
including any recommendations the Under Secretary has for--
(A) improving the security of rail tunnels, rail bridges,
rail switching and car storage areas, other rail
infrastructure and facilities, information systems, and other
areas identified by the Under Secretary as posing significant
rail-related risks to public safety and the movement of
interstate commerce, taking into account the impact that any
proposed security measure might have on the provision of rail
service;
(B) deploying equipment to detect explosives and hazardous
chemical, biological, and radioactive substances, and any
appropriate countermeasures;
(C) training employees in terrorism prevention, passenger
evacuation, and response activities;
(D) conducting public outreach campaigns on passenger
railroads;
(E) deploying surveillance equipment; and
(F) identifying the immediate and long-term costs of
measures that may be required to address those risks.
(b) Consultation; Use of Existing Resources.--In carrying
out the assessment required by subsection (a), the Under
Secretary shall consult with rail management, rail labor,
owners or lessors of rail cars used to transport hazardous
materials, first responders, shippers of hazardous materials,
public safety officials (including those within other
agencies and offices within the Department of Homeland
Security), and other relevant parties.
(c) Report.--
(1) Contents.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Under Secretary shall submit
to the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation and
the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
of the Senate and the Committee on Transportation and
Infrastructure of the House of Representatives a report that
contains--
(A) the assessment and prioritized recommendations required
by subsection (a) and an estimate of the cost to implement
such recommendations;
(B) a plan, developed in consultation with the freight and
intercity passenger railroads, and State and local
governments, for the government to provide increased security
support at high or severe threat levels of alert; and
(C) a plan for coordinating rail security initiatives
undertaken by the public and private sectors.
(2) Format.--The Under Secretary may submit the report in
both classified and redacted formats if the Under Secretary
determines that such action is appropriate or necessary.
(d) 2-Year Updates.--The Under Secretary, in consultation
with the Secretary of Transportation, shall update the
assessment and recommendations every 2 years and transmit a
report, which may be submitted in both classified and
redacted formats, to the Committees named in subsection
(c)(1), containing the updated assessment and
recommendations.
(e) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized
to be appropriated to the Under Secretary $5,000,000 for
fiscal year 2007 to carry out this section.
SEC. __03. RAIL SECURITY.
(a) Rail Police Officers.--Section 28101 of title 49,
United States Code, is amended by striking ``the rail
carrier'' each place it appears and inserting ``any rail
carrier''.
(b) Review of Rail Regulations.--Not later than 1 year
after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of
Transportation, in consultation with the Under Secretary,
shall review existing rail regulations of the Department of
Transportation for the purpose of identifying areas in which
those regulations need to be revised to improve rail
security.
SEC. __04. STUDY OF FOREIGN RAIL TRANSPORT SECURITY PROGRAMS.
(a) Requirement for Study.--Not later than 1 year after the
date of the enactment of this Act, the Comptroller General of
the United States shall complete a study of the rail
passenger transportation security programs that are carried
out for rail transportation systems in Japan, member nations
of the European Union, and other foreign countries.
(b) Purpose.--The purpose of the study conducted under
subsection (a) shall be to identify effective rail
transportation security measures that are in use in foreign
rail transportation systems, including innovative measures
and screening procedures determined effective.
(c) Report.--The Comptroller General shall submit a report
on the results of the study conducted under subsection (a) to
the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation and
the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
of the Senate and the Committee on Transportation and
Infrastructure of the House of Representatives. The report
shall include the Comptroller General's assessment regarding
whether it is feasible to implement within the United States
any of the same or similar security measures that are
determined effective under the study.
SEC. __05. PASSENGER, BAGGAGE, AND CARGO SCREENING.
(a) Requirement for Study and Report.--The Under Secretary,
in cooperation with the Secretary of Transportation, shall--
(1) conduct a study to analyze the cost and feasibility of
requiring security screening for passengers, baggage, and
cargo on passenger trains; and
(2) not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment
of this Act, submit a report containing the results of the
study and any recommendations that the Under Secretary may
have for implementing a rail security screening program to--
(A) the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation
and the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs of the Senate; and
(B) the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure of
the House of Representatives.
[[Page S9237]]
(b) Pilot Program.--As part of the study conducted under
subsection (a), the Under Secretary shall complete a pilot
program of random security screening of passengers and
baggage at 5 passenger rail stations served by Amtrak, which
shall be selected by the Under Secretary. In conducting the
pilot program under this subsection, the Under Secretary
shall--
(1) test a wide range of explosives detection technologies,
devices, and methods;
(2) require that intercity rail passengers produce
government-issued photographic identification, which matches
the name on the passenger's tickets before the passenger
boarding a train; and
(3) attempt to give preference to locations at the highest
risk of terrorist attack and achieve a distribution of
participating train stations in terms of geographic location,
size, passenger volume, and whether the station is used by
commuter rail passengers and Amtrak passengers.
(c) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized
to be appropriated to the Under Secretary to carry out this
section $5,000,000 for fiscal year 2007.
SEC. __06. CERTAIN PERSONNEL LIMITATIONS NOT TO APPLY.
Any statutory limitation on the number of employees in the
Transportation Security Administration of the Department of
Transportation, before or after its transfer to the
Department of Homeland Security, does not apply to the extent
that any such employees are responsible for implementing the
provisions of this title.
SEC. __07. FIRE AND LIFE-SAFETY IMPROVEMENTS.
(a) Life-Safety Needs.--The Secretary of Transportation may
award grants to Amtrak for the purpose of making fire and
life-safety improvements to Amtrak tunnels on the Northeast
Corridor in New York, New York, Baltimore, Maryland, and
Washington, D.C.
(b) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized
to be appropriated to the Secretary of Transportation for the
purposes of carrying out subsection (a) the following
amounts:
(1) For the 6 New York tunnels, to provide ventilation,
electrical, and fire safety technology upgrades, emergency
communication and lighting systems, and emergency access and
egress for passengers--
(A) $100,000,000 for fiscal year 2007;
(B) $100,000,000 for fiscal year 2008;
(C) $100,000,000 for fiscal year 2009; and
(D) $170,000,000 for fiscal year 2010.
(2) For the Baltimore & Potomac tunnel and the Union
tunnel, together, to provide adequate drainage, ventilation,
communication, lighting, and passenger egress upgrades--
(A) $10,000,000 for fiscal year 2007;
(B) $10,000,000 for fiscal year 2008;
(C) $10,000,000 for fiscal year 2009; and
(D) $17,000,000 for fiscal year 2010.
(3) For the Washington, DC Union Station tunnels to improve
ventilation, communication, lighting, and passenger egress
upgrades--
(A) $8,000,000 for fiscal year 2007;
(B) $8,000,000 for fiscal year 2008;
(C) $8,000,000 for fiscal year 2009; and
(D) $8,000,000 for fiscal year 2010.
(c) Infrastructure Upgrades.--There are authorized to be
appropriated to the Secretary of Transportation $3,000,000
for fiscal year 2007 for the preliminary design of options
for a new tunnel on a different alignment to augment the
capacity of the existing Baltimore tunnels.
(d) Availability of Appropriated Funds.--Amounts
appropriated pursuant to this section shall remain available
until expended.
(e) Plans Required.--The Secretary of Transportation may
not make amounts available to Amtrak for obligation or
expenditure under subsection (a)--
(1) until Amtrak has submitted to the Secretary, and the
Secretary has approved, an engineering and financial plan for
such projects; and
(2) unless, for each project funded under this section, the
Secretary has approved a project management plan prepared by
Amtrak that appropriately addresses--
(A) project budget;
(B) construction schedule;
(C) recipient staff organization;
(D) document control and record keeping;
(E) change order procedure;
(F) quality control and assurance;
(G) periodic plan updates;
(H) periodic status reports; and
(I) such other matters the Secretary determines to be
appropriate.
(f) Review of Plans.--
(1) Completion.--The Secretary of Transportation shall
complete the review of the plans required under paragraphs
(1) and (2) of subsection (e) and approve or disapprove the
plans not later than 45 days after the date on which each
such plan is submitted by Amtrak.
(2) Incomplete plans.--If the Secretary determines that a
plan is incomplete or deficient--
(A) the Secretary shall notify Amtrak of the incomplete
items or deficiencies; and
(B) not later than 30 days after receiving the Secretary's
notification under subparagraph (A), Amtrak shall submit a
modified plan for the Secretary's review.
(3) Review of modified plans.--Not later than 15 days after
receiving additional information on items previously included
in the plan, and not later than 45 days after receiving items
newly included in a modified plan, the Secretary shall--
(A) approve the modified plan; or
(B) if the Secretary finds the plan is still incomplete or
deficient--
(i) submit a report to the Committee on Commerce, Science,
and Transportation and the Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs of the Senate and the Committee on
Transportation and Infrastructure of the House of
Representatives that identifies the portions of the plan the
Secretary finds incomplete or deficient;
(ii) approve all other portions of the plan;
(iii) obligate the funds associated with those other
portions; and
(iv) execute an agreement with Amtrak not later than 15
days thereafter on a process for resolving the remaining
portions of the plan.
(g) Financial Contribution From Other Tunnel Users.--The
Secretary of Transportation shall, taking into account the
need for the timely completion of all portions of the tunnel
projects described in subsection (a)--
(1) consider the extent to which rail carriers other than
Amtrak use the tunnels;
(2) consider the feasibility of seeking a financial
contribution from those other rail carriers toward the costs
of the projects; and
(3) obtain financial contributions or commitments from such
other rail carriers at levels reflecting the extent of their
use of the tunnels, if feasible.
SEC. __08. MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT.
(a) Memorandum of Agreement.--Not later than 60 days after
the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary of
Transportation and the Secretary of Homeland Security shall
execute a memorandum of agreement governing the roles and
responsibilities of the Department of Transportation and the
Department of Homeland Security, respectively, in addressing
railroad transportation security matters, including the
processes the departments will follow to promote
communications, efficiency, and nonduplication of effort.
(b) Rail Safety Regulations.--Section 20103(a) of title 49,
United States Code, is amended by striking ``railroad
safety'' and inserting ``railroad safety, including
security,''.
SEC. __09. AMTRAK PLAN TO ASSIST FAMILIES OF PASSENGERS
INVOLVED IN RAIL PASSENGER ACCIDENTS.
(a) In General.--Chapter 243 of title 49, United States
Code, is amended by adding at the end the following:
``Sec. 24316. Plans to address needs of families of
passengers involved in rail passenger accidents
``(a) Submission of Plan.--Not later than 6 months after
the date of the enactment of the Rail Security Act of 2006,
Amtrak shall submit to the Chairman of the National
Transportation Safety Board and the Secretary of
Transportation a plan for addressing the needs of the
families of passengers involved in any rail passenger
accident involving an Amtrak intercity train and resulting in
a loss of life.
``(b) Contents of Plans.--The plan to be submitted by
Amtrak under subsection (a) shall include, at a minimum, the
following:
``(1) A process by which Amtrak will maintain and provide
to the National Transportation Safety Board and the Secretary
of Transportation, immediately upon request, a list (which is
based on the best available information at the time of the
request) of the names of the passengers aboard the train
(whether or not such names have been verified), and will
periodically update the list. The plan shall include a
procedure, with respect to unreserved trains and passengers
not holding reservations on other trains, for Amtrak to use
reasonable efforts to ascertain the number and names of
passengers aboard a train involved in an accident.
``(2) A plan for creating and publicizing a reliable, toll-
free telephone number within 4 hours after such an accident
occurs, and for providing staff, to handle calls from the
families of the passengers.
``(3) A process for notifying the families of the
passengers, before providing any public notice of the names
of the passengers, by suitably trained individuals.
``(4) A process for providing the notice described in
paragraph (2) to the family of a passenger as soon as Amtrak
has verified that the passenger was aboard the train (whether
or not the names of all of the passengers have been
verified).
``(5) A process by which the family of each passenger will
be consulted about the disposition of all remains and
personal effects of the passenger within Amtrak's control;
that any possession of the passenger within Amtrak's control
will be returned to the family unless the possession is
needed for the accident investigation or any criminal
investigation; and that any unclaimed possession of a
passenger within Amtrak's control will be retained by the
rail passenger carrier for at least 18 months.
``(6) A process by which the treatment of the families of
nonrevenue passengers will be the same as the treatment of
the families of revenue passengers.
``(7) An assurance that Amtrak will provide adequate
training to its employees and agents to meet the needs of
survivors and family members following an accident.
``(c) Use of Information.--The National Transportation
Safety Board, the Secretary
[[Page S9238]]
of Transportation, and Amtrak may not release to any person
information on a list obtained under subsection (b)(1) but
may provide information on the list about a passenger to the
family of the passenger to the extent that the Board or
Amtrak considers appropriate.
``(d) Limitation on Liability.--Amtrak shall not be liable
for damages in any action brought in a Federal or State court
arising out of the performance of Amtrak in preparing or
providing a passenger list, or in providing information
concerning a train reservation, pursuant to a plan submitted
by Amtrak under subsection (b), unless such liability was
caused by Amtrak's conduct.
``(e) Limitation on Statutory Construction.--Nothing in
this section may be construed as limiting the actions that
Amtrak may take, or the obligations that Amtrak may have, in
providing assistance to the families of passengers involved
in a rail passenger accident.
``(f) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are
authorized to be appropriated to the Secretary of
Transportation for the use of Amtrak $500,000 for fiscal year
2007 to carry out this section. Amounts appropriated pursuant
to this subsection shall remain available until expended.''.
(b) Conforming Amendment.--The chapter analysis for chapter
243 of title 49, United States Code, is amended by adding at
the end the following:
``Sec. 24316. Plans to address needs of families of passengers involved
in rail passenger accidents.''.
SEC. __10. SYSTEMWIDE AMTRAK SECURITY UPGRADES.
(a) In General.--Subject to subsection (c), the Under
Secretary may award grants, through the Secretary of
Transportation, to Amtrak--
(1) to secure major tunnel access points and ensure tunnel
integrity in New York, Baltimore, and Washington, D.C.;
(2) to secure Amtrak trains;
(3) to secure Amtrak stations;
(4) to obtain a watch list identification system approved
by the Under Secretary;
(5) to obtain train tracking and interoperable
communications systems that are coordinated to the maximum
extent possible;
(6) to hire additional police and security officers,
including canine units; and
(7) to expand emergency preparedness efforts.
(b) Conditions.--The Secretary of Transportation may not
disburse funds to Amtrak for projects under subsection (a)
unless--
(1) the projects are contained in a systemwide security
plan approved by the Under Secretary, in consultation with
the Secretary of Transportation;
(2) capital projects meet the requirements under section
407(e)(2); and
(3) the plan includes appropriate measures to address
security awareness, emergency response, and passenger
evacuation training.
(c) Equitable Geographic Allocation.--The Under Secretary
shall ensure that, subject to meeting the highest security
needs on Amtrak's entire system, stations and facilities
located outside of the Northeast Corridor receive an
equitable share of the security funds authorized under this
section.
(d) Availability of Funds.--There are authorized to be
appropriated to the Under Secretary $63,500,000 for fiscal
year 2007 for the purposes of carrying out this section.
Amounts appropriated pursuant to this subsection shall remain
available until expended.
SEC. __11. FREIGHT AND PASSENGER RAIL SECURITY UPGRADES.
(a) Security Improvement Grants.--The Under Secretary may
award grants to freight railroads, the Alaska Railroad,
hazardous materials shippers, owners of rail cars used in the
transportation of hazardous materials, universities, colleges
and research centers, State and local governments (for
passenger facilities and infrastructure not owned by Amtrak),
and, through the Secretary of Transportation, to Amtrak, for
full or partial reimbursement of costs incurred in the
conduct of activities to prevent or respond to acts of
terrorism, sabotage, or other intercity passenger rail and
freight rail security threats, including--
(1) security and redundancy for critical communications,
computer, and train control systems essential for secure rail
operations;
(2) accommodation of cargo or passenger screening equipment
at the international border between the United States and
Mexico or the international border between the United States
and Canada;
(3) the security of hazardous material transportation by
rail;
(4) secure intercity passenger rail stations, trains, and
infrastructure;
(5) structural modification or replacement of rail cars
transporting high hazard materials to improve their
resistance to acts of terrorism;
(6) employee security awareness, preparedness, passenger
evacuation, and emergency response training;
(7) public security awareness campaigns for passenger train
operations;
(8) the sharing of intelligence and information about
security threats;
(9) to obtain train tracking and interoperable
communications systems that are coordinated to the maximum
extent possible;
(10) to hire additional police and security officers,
including canine units; and
(11) other improvements recommended by the report required
under section 402(c), including infrastructure, facilities,
and equipment upgrades.
(b) Accountability.--The Under Secretary shall adopt
necessary procedures, including audits, to ensure that grants
awarded under this section are expended in accordance with
the purposes of this title and the priorities and other
criteria developed by the Under Secretary.
(c) Equitable Allocation.--The Under Secretary shall
equitably distribute the funds authorized by this section,
taking into account geographic location, and shall encourage
non-Federal financial participation in awarding grants. With
respect to grants for passenger rail security, the Under
Secretary shall also take into account passenger volume and
whether a station is used by commuter rail passengers and
intercity rail passengers.
(d) Conditions.--The Secretary of Transportation may not
disburse funds to Amtrak under subsection (a) unless Amtrak
meets the conditions set forth in section 410(b).
(e) Allocation Between Railroads and Others.--Unless the
Under Secretary determines, as a result of the assessment
required by section 402, that critical rail transportation
security needs require reimbursement in greater amounts to
any eligible entity, a grant may not be awarded under this
section--
(1) in excess of $65,000,000 to Amtrak; or
(2) in excess of $100,000,000 for the purposes described in
paragraphs (3) and (5) of subsection (a).
(f) High Hazard Materials Defined.--In this section, the
term ``high hazard materials'' means poison inhalation hazard
materials, class 2.3 gases, class 6.1 materials, and
anhydrous ammonia.
(g) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized
to be appropriated to the Under Secretary $350,000,000 for
fiscal year 2007 to carry out the purposes of this section.
Amounts appropriated pursuant to this subsection shall remain
available until expended.
SEC. __12. OVERSIGHT AND GRANT PROCEDURES.
(a) Secretarial Oversight.--The Secretary of Transportation
may use not more than 0.5 percent of amounts made available
to Amtrak for capital projects under this title--
(1) to enter into contracts for the review of proposed
capital projects and related program management plans; and
(2) to oversee construction of such projects.
(b) Use of Funds.--The Secretary may use amounts available
under subsection (a) to make contracts for safety,
procurement, management, and financial compliance reviews and
audits of a recipient of amounts under subsection (a).
(c) Procedures for Grant Award.--The Under Secretary shall
prescribe procedures and schedules for the awarding of grants
under this title, including application and qualification
procedures (including a requirement that the applicant have a
security plan), and a record of decision on applicant
eligibility. The procedures shall include the execution of a
grant agreement between the grant recipient and the Under
Secretary. The Under Secretary shall issue a final rule
establishing the procedures not later than 90 days after the
date of the enactment of this Act.
SEC. __13. RAIL SECURITY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT.
(a) Establishment of Research and Development Program.--The
Under Secretary, in conjunction with the Secretary of
Transportation, shall carry out a research and development
program for the purpose of improving freight and intercity
passenger rail security that may include research and
development projects to--
(1) reduce the vulnerability of passenger trains, stations,
and equipment to explosives and hazardous chemical,
biological, and radioactive substances;
(2) test new emergency response techniques and
technologies;
(3) develop improved freight technologies, including--
(A) technologies for sealing rail cars;
(B) automatic inspection of rail cars;
(C) communication-based train controls; and
(D) emergency response training;
(4) test wayside detectors that can detect tampering with
railroad equipment; and
(5) support enhanced security for the transportation of
hazardous materials by rail, including--
(A) technologies to detect a breach in a tank car and
transmit information about the integrity of tank cars to the
train crew;
(B) research to improve tank car integrity, with a focus on
tank cars that carry high hazard materials (as defined in
section 411(g));
(C) techniques to transfer hazardous materials from rail
cars that are damaged or otherwise represent an unreasonable
risk to human life or public safety;
(6) other projects recommended in the report required under
section 402.
(b) Coordination With Other Research Initiatives.--The
Under Secretary shall ensure that the research and
development program under this section is coordinated with
other research and development initiatives at the Department
of Homeland Security and the Department of Transportation.
The Under Secretary shall carry out any research and
development project authorized under this section through a
reimbursable agreement with the Secretary of Transportation
if the Secretary--
[[Page S9239]]
(1) is already sponsoring a research and development
project in a similar area; or
(2) has a unique facility or capability that would be
useful in carrying out the project.
(c) Accountability.--The Under Secretary shall adopt
necessary procedures, including audits, to ensure that grants
made under this section are expended in accordance with the
purposes of this title and the priorities and other criteria
developed by the Under Secretary.
(d) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized
to be appropriated to the Under Secretary $50,000,000 in each
of fiscal years 2007 and 2008 to carry out the purposes of
this section. Amounts appropriated pursuant to this
subsection shall remain available until expended.
SEC. __14. WELDED RAIL AND TANK CAR SAFETY IMPROVEMENTS.
(a) Track Standards.--Not later than 90 days after the date
of the enactment of this Act, the Administrator of the
Federal Railroad Administration shall--
(1) require each track owner using continuous welded rail
track to include procedures to improve the identification of
cracks in rail joint bars in the procedures filed with the
Administration under section 213.119 of title 49, Code of
Federal Regulations;
(2) instruct Administration track inspectors to obtain
copies of the most recent continuous welded rail programs of
each railroad within the inspectors' areas of responsibility
and require that inspectors use those programs when
conducting track inspections; and
(3) establish a program to--
(A) periodically review continuous welded rail joint bar
inspection data from railroads and Administration track
inspectors; and
(B) require railroads to increase the frequency or improve
the methods of inspection of joint bars in continuous welded
rail, if the Administrator determines that such increase or
improvement is necessary or appropriate.
(b) Tank Car Standards.--The Administrator of the Federal
Railroad Administration shall--
(1) not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment
of this Act, validate the predictive model it is developing
to quantify the relevant dynamic forces acting on railroad
tank cars under accident conditions; and
(2) not later than 18 months after the date of the
enactment of this Act, initiate a rulemaking to develop and
implement appropriate design standards for pressurized tank
cars.
(c) Older Tank Car Impact Resistance Analysis and Report.--
Not later than 2 years after the date of the enactment of
this Act, the Administrator of the Federal Railroad
Administration shall--
(1) conduct a comprehensive analysis to determine the
impact resistance of the steels in the shells of pressure
tank cars constructed before 1989; and
(2) submit a report to the Committee on Commerce, Science,
and Transportation of the Senate and the Committee on
Transportation and Infrastructure of the House of
Representatives that contains recommendations for measures to
eliminate or mitigate the risk of catastrophic failure.
SEC. __15. NORTHERN BORDER RAIL PASSENGER REPORT.
Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of
this Act, the Under Secretary, in consultation with the heads
of other appropriate Federal departments and agencies and the
National Railroad Passenger Corporation, shall submit a
report to the Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation and Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs of the Senate and the Committee on
Transportation and Infrastructure of the House of
Representatives that contains--
(1) a description of the current system for screening
passengers and baggage on passenger rail service between the
United States and Canada;
(2) an assessment of the current program to provide
preclearance of airline passengers between the United States
and Canada as outlined in ``The Agreement on Air Transport
Preclearance between the Government of Canada and the
Government of the United States of America'', dated January
18, 2001;
(3) an assessment of the current program to provide
preclearance of freight railroad traffic between the United
States and Canada as outlined in the ``Declaration of
Principle for the Improved Security of Rail Shipments by
Canadian National Railway and Canadian Pacific Railway from
Canada to the United States'', dated April 2, 2003;
(4) information on progress by the Department of Homeland
Security and other Federal agencies towards finalizing a
bilateral protocol with Canada that would provide for
preclearance of passengers on trains operating between the
United States and Canada;
(5) a description of legislative, regulatory, budgetary, or
policy barriers within the United States Government to
providing pre-screened passenger lists for rail passengers
traveling between the United States and Canada to the
Department of Homeland Security;
(6) a description of the position of the Government of
Canada and relevant Canadian agencies with respect to
preclearance of such passengers; and
(7) a draft of any changes in existing Federal law
necessary to provide for pre-screening of such passengers and
providing pre-screened passenger lists to the Department of
Homeland Security.
SEC. __16. REPORT REGARDING IMPACT ON SECURITY OF TRAIN
TRAVEL IN COMMUNITIES WITHOUT GRADE SEPARATION.
(a) Study.--The Secretary of Homeland Security, in
consultation with State and local government officials, shall
conduct a study on the impact of blocked highway-railroad
grade crossings on the ability of emergency responders,
including ambulances and police, fire, and other emergency
vehicles, to perform public safety and security duties in the
event of a terrorist attack.
(b) Report.--Not later than 1 year after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Homeland Security
shall submit a report to the Committee on Commerce, Science,
and Transportation and Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs of the Senate and the Committee on
Transportation and Infrastructure of the House of
Representatives that contains--
(1) the findings of the study conducted under subsection
(a); and
(2) recommendations for reducing the impact of blocked
crossings on emergency response.
SEC. __17. WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTION PROGRAM.
(a) In General.--Subchapter I of chapter 201 of title 49,
United States Code, is amended by inserting after section
20115 the following:
``Sec. 20116. Whistleblower protection for rail security
matters
``(a) Discrimination Against Employee.--A rail carrier
engaged in interstate or foreign commerce may not discharge a
railroad employee or otherwise discriminate against a
railroad employee because the employee (or any person acting
pursuant to a request of the employee)--
``(1) provided, caused to be provided, or is about to
provide or cause to be provided, to the employer or the
Federal Government information relating to a perceived threat
to security; or
``(2) provided, caused to be provided, or is about to
provide or cause to be provided, testimony before Congress or
at any Federal or State proceeding regarding a perceived
threat to security; or
``(3) refused to violate or assist in the violation of any
law, rule or regulation related to rail security.
``(b) Dispute Resolution.--A dispute, grievance, or claim
arising under this section is subject to resolution under
section 3 of the Railway Labor Act (45 U.S.C. 153). In a
proceeding by the National Railroad Adjustment Board, a
division or delegate of the Board, or another board of
adjustment established under such section 3 to resolve the
dispute, grievance, or claim the proceeding shall be
expedited and the dispute, grievance, or claim shall be
resolved not later than 180 days after the filing date. If
the violation is a form of discrimination that does not
involve discharge, suspension, or another action affecting
pay, and no other remedy is available under this subsection,
the Board, division, delegate, or other board of adjustment
may award the employee reasonable damages, including punitive
damages, of not more than $20,000.
``(c) Procedural Requirements.--Except as provided in
subsection (b), the procedure set forth in section
42121(b)(2)(B), including the burdens of proof, applies to
any complaint brought under this section.
``(d) Election of Remedies.--An employee of a railroad
carrier may not seek protection under both this section and
another provision of law for the same allegedly unlawful act
of the carrier.
``(e) Disclosure of Identity.--
``(1) In general.--Except as provided in paragraph (2), the
Secretary of Transportation may not disclose the name of an
employee of a railroad carrier who has provided information
about an alleged violation of this section without the
written consent of the employee.
``(2) Enforcement.--The Secretary shall disclose to the
Attorney General the name of an employee described in
paragraph (1) if the matter is referred to the Attorney
General for enforcement.''.
(b) Conforming Amendment.--The chapter analysis for chapter
201 of title 49, United States Code, is amended by inserting
after the item relating to section 20115 the following:
``Sec. 20116. Whistleblower protection for rail security matters.''.
Mr. McCAIN. I also ask unanimous consent to add Senator Lieberman as
a cosponsor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The Senator from Hawaii.
Mr. INOUYE. Mr. President, I wish to associate myself with the
remarks of Mr. Stevens.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine.
Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I, too, commend the Senator from Arizona
for bringing this measure to the Senate floor. As Senator Stevens has
pointed out, it is directly relevant to port security because many of
the containers that come into our ports by ship are then deployed
throughout the country by rail. So I would argue this is directly
relevant to the goal of the legislation before us.
This is a Commerce Committee matter that Senator McCain has brought
[[Page S9240]]
up, but I did just want to let my colleagues know that it is very
relevant to our goal of securing our ports. I strongly support the
amendment and commend the Senator for his initiative.
Mr. GRASSLEY. Mr. President, I rise in strong support of the
amendment before the Senate that's been offered as a complete
substitute to H.R. 4954. This legislation could not be more timely. The
anniversary of September 11 is imminent, a stark reminder that our
Nation must remain vigilant in the global war on terror.
This amendment, the Port Security Improvement Act of 2006, is
critically important legislation. It strengthens port security
operations, both in the United States and abroad so we can prevent
threats from reaching our shores in the first place.
This legislation improves existing programs for targeting and
inspecting cargo containers so that a dangerous shipment doesn't enter
or threaten the Nation. It provides direction for further strengthening
of these programs as technological advances permit. And, it calls for
greater coordination and cooperation among Federal agencies in
contingency planning in the event there is a security breach.
This legislation represents a thoughtful reevaluation of how best to
meet the Nation's security interests at United States seaports. We have
taken a look at what has been done since 9/11. This legislation builds
upon that. Terrorists have proven that they will change their ways to
exploit perceived weaknesses in our defenses. We need to stay ahead of
them. This legislation empowers our personnel in the Department of
Homeland Security and United States Border and Customs Protection to do
just that.
At the same time, this legislation includes provisions to strengthen
the economic security of our Nation. It's important to remember that in
addition to killing innocent Americans, the 9/11 attacks were intended
to wreak economic havoc and injury upon our Nation. This legislation
includes provisions that realign resources to ensure better efficiency
in the administration of customs laws within the United States Customs
and Border Protection. It authorizes the International Trade Data
System, a forward-looking program to better utilize technology in order
to increase efficiency and facilitate trade. And, it provides for added
resources to better meet all of our economic and trade security
interests that are overseen by the U.S. Customs and Border Protection.
In sum, this legislation is the culmination of months of hard and
thoughtful work. I thank my ranking member on the Finance Committee,
Senator Baucus, my colleagues on the Commerce Committee, Senator
Stevens and Senator Inouye, and my colleagues on the Homeland Security
Committee, Senator Collins and Senator Lieberman, with whom I have
worked so closely to bring this legislation to the floor. I urge all of
my colleagues to join me in advancing this essential legislation
through the Senate in a timely manner.
Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I want to comment on the tremendous
efforts of the ranking member of the Homeland Security Committee,
Senator Lieberman, and the chairmen and ranking members of the Commerce
and Finance Committees, Senators Stevens, Inouye, Grassley and Baucus.
They along with their committee staffs have worked together for months
to develop the bill that is before us today.
Each of the committees has its own jurisdictional interests in this
bill. The Homeland Security Committee has jurisdiction over the
Department of Homeland Security with its primary mission of preventing
terrorist attacks against the United States and reducing
vulnerabilities to such attacks. Many of the programs in this bill,
including the Automated Targeting System, the Container Security
Initiative, and the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism, serve
the purpose of reducing vulnerabilities to terrorist attacks and are
operated by the U.S. Customs and Border Protection within the
Department of Homeland Security--squarely within the Homeland Security
Committee's jurisdiction. Moreover, it was the committee's
jurisdictional authority to study the effectiveness of government
agency programs that began the evaluation of the DHS' cargo security
initiatives that are improved by this bill.
The Commerce and Finance Committees also have significant
jurisdictional interests. The Commerce Committee has jurisdiction over
shipping and the Coast Guard. And the Finance Committee has
jurisdiction over the assessment of customs duties and compliance with
customs laws.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Alaska.
Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, it is my understanding that there is no
one else who wishes to speak on the bill or the McCain amendment at
this time.
____________________