[Congressional Record Volume 152, Number 109 (Thursday, September 7, 2006)]
[Senate]
[Pages S9098-S9104]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
SECURITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY FOR EVERY PORT ACT
Mr. FRIST. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate now
proceed to Calendar No. 432, H.R. 4954, the port security bill.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so
ordered. The clerk will report the bill by title.
The legislative clerk read as follows:
A bill (H.R. 4954) to improve maritime and cargo security
through enhanced layered defenses, and for other purposes.
Amendment No. 4919
(Purpose: To provide a complete substitute)
Mr. FRIST. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the substitute
amendment at the desk be considered and agreed to and further that it
be considered as original text for the purpose of additional amendments
and for debate only this evening.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so
ordered.
The amendment (No. 4919) was agreed to.
(The amendment is printed in today's Record under ``Text of
Amendments.'')
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Maine.
Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I rise to present the Port Security
Improvement Act of 2006. This bill will help to close dangerous gaps in
our ability to protect our shipping lanes and seaports from attack.
A number of our colleagues have worked very hard on this bill. This
bill reflects not only bipartisan consultation and support but
coordination among the Senate Homeland Security Committee, the Commerce
Committee, and the Finance Committee. I thank our leader, Senator
Frist, for encouraging and facilitating those discussions.
I particularly wish to thank my colleague, Senator Murray, who joined
me in sponsoring the GreenLane cargo security bill in November of 2005,
which
[[Page S9099]]
has served as the basis for the legislation we debate tonight. Senator
Murray has been steadfast in her commitment to enhancing port security.
She has been working on it since the attacks on our country 5 years
ago. She has been a terrific partner.
Senator Stevens, Senator Inouye, Senator Grassley, Senator Lieberman,
Senator Baucus, Senator Coleman, and Senator Allen have also played
critical roles on this important legislation. Their support and
involvement have been invaluable in crafting a measure that I believe
is going to make a real difference and that will improve our protection
against terrorist threats without crippling the operations of our
ports. This is very important. We need to strengthen security at our
ports, but we need to do so in a way that does not cripple our system
of trade, that does not place barriers in the way of moving legitimate
goods.
This legislation will provide the structure and the resources needed
to better protect the American people from attack through seaports that
are both vulnerable points of entry and vital centers of economic
activity.
Our legislation, our joint legislation, which is the product of so
many weeks, months, and years of study and compromise, is a
comprehensive approach that addresses all major aspects of maritime
cargo security. It would require the Department of Homeland Security to
develop a comprehensive strategic plan for all transportation modes by
which cargo moves into, within, and out of American ports. It creates
an Office of Cargo Security Policy to coordinate departmental
activities and to be a central contact point for interagency, private
sector, and international partners in cargo security. It requires the
Department of Homeland Security to develop protocols for the resumption
of trade at seaports after an incident. That is necessary to minimize
economic losses. It authorizes risk-based grants, training, and
exercises for port security. It improves and expands several security
programs, such as the Container Security Initiative, known as CSI, and
the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism, or C-TPAT, and
establishes deadlines for DHS action on these programs. And it provides
incentives for shippers and importers who meet the highest levels of
cargo security standards.
Before commenting further on these provisions, let me offer a few
facts that illustrate the importance of strengthening the security of
our seaports.
America's 361 seaports are vital elements of our Nation's
transportation network. Our seaports move more than 95 percent of
overseas trade. In 2005 alone, U.S. ports logged 53,000 calls by
foreign-flagged vessels, including 16,000 container ship calls that
brought 11 million shipping containers to our shores.
The largest 22 ports, ranging from Los Angeles to Boston, handle 98
percent of the container traffic. Nearly half of all container ship
calls are made in just three States--California, New York, and
Virginia--but traffic arrives at many ports, from Maine to Hawaii,
including a port in my State, Portland, the largest port by tonnage in
new England. Coming from a State with three international cargo ports,
I am keenly aware of the importance of seaports to our national economy
and to the communities in which they are located.
In addition to our ports' economic significance, the link between
maritime security and our national security is obvious and the
vulnerabilities of our ports worrisome. Shipping containers are a
special source of concern. When we look at shipping containers, we
know, in most cases, they contain useful consumer goods. But shipping
containers could also be used to convey a squad of terrorists or a
dirty bomb. In some sense, containers could be the 21st century
``Trojan horse.''
The vulnerabilities of containers are evident when one considers a
recent incident that occurred in Seattle. In May, several Chinese
nationalists illegally smuggled themselves within a shipping container
that made its way to Seattle. Now, they were discovered, fortunately,
but think if that container had, instead of including illegal Chinese
immigrants seeking a better way of life, included individuals,
terrorists, who were dedicated to destroying our way of life.
The container has also been called ``the poor man's missile'' because
a low-budget terrorist could ship one across the Atlantic or the
Pacific to a U.S. port for just a few thousands dollars. And the
contents of a container do not have to be as complex as a nuclear or
chemical or biological weapon. As former Customs and Border Protection
Commissioner Robert Bonner told the New York Times last year, a single
container packed with readily available ammonium sulfate fertilizer and
a detonation system could produce 10 times the blast that destroyed the
Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City.
Whatever the type of weapon, an attack on an American port could
cause great loss of life, damage our energy supplies and
infrastructure, cripple retailers and manufacturers dependent on just-
in-time inventory, prevent farmers from exporting their crops, and
hamper our ability to move and supply American military forces.
Earlier this year, I visited the ports in L.A. and Long Beach and
Seattle. At the invitation of Senator Murray, I examined the Seattle
port. When one looks at the busy harbor in Seattle, one sees ferries
bringing thousands of passengers--a large urban population--in sight of
the port and two stadiums nearby. You realize immediately the depth and
destruction that a ship carrying a container with a weapon of mass
destruction could inflict at a single port.
Moreover, a successful port attack would likely trigger a security
lockdown of all of our ports, just as the attacks 5 years ago grounded
all commercial aircraft. So the economic damage would swiftly spread
across the entire country. The Pacific Coast has already given us a
glimpse of the economic damage that an attack on a port would cause.
The west coast dock strike of 2002 was peaceful and anticipated, unlike
any terror attack would be, but it cost an estimated $1 billion a day
in economic losses for each of the 10 days it lasted.
Of course, a port could also be a conduit for an attack as well as
being a target itself. A container with dangerous cargo could be loaded
on a truck or a railcar or have its contents unpacked at a port and
distributed to support an attack elsewhere--perhaps in the heartland of
this country.
For these reasons, and many others, including the risks of container
tampering or false documentation, the 9/11 Commission concluded that
``Opportunities to do harm are as great, or greater, in maritime and
surface transportation'' as in commercial aviation.
Some actions have been taken to improve security at our seaports. The
9/11 terror attacks prompted some useful moves toward better security
for vessel shipping lanes and the ports themselves. But, unfortunately,
many of these initiatives have not proceeded under a comprehensive,
strategic security plan. Some of them have lagged, and some of them
have not been effectively implemented.
The Senate Homeland Security Committee has conducted five hearings on
port security and the failures of DHS's cargo security programs. The
first hearing we held back in March of 2003 when the committee heard
testimony from several experts that cargo containers could well be the
next target of terrorists. Three of these hearings have been conducted
by the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, chaired by Senator
Coleman, and I thank him and Senator Levin for their efforts in this
area. Indeed, several provisions in our bill address concerns that were
identified through that joint investigative work.
Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, will the distinguished Senator from Maine
yield for just a brief comment or question or two?
Ms. COLLINS. I am happy to.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Mississippi.
Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, let me just take a moment to thank Senator
Collins for her leadership and the work of her committee in this area.
I say to the Senator, I have been listening to her remarks. I think it
is very important we outline the risks that are involved here and the
importance of our ports to the economy of America.
Like the Senator from Maine, I myself recently went around looking at
large and small ports, from the gulf all the way to Seattle and Tacoma.
I must
[[Page S9100]]
say, I was somewhat pleased with the amount of effort that has been put
in place in those ports.
But it also dramatizes how much more we need to do. We do need the
macro legislation to deal with this. One of the great concerns is, as
the Senator outlined, what would happen if we did have an event in one
of those West Coast ports? It would lock them all down. What would be
the process to restart them? I am also very much impressed with the
appearance of those ports and the volume of the training activities. It
is a critical area.
While a lot of work has been done and money has gone to our ports,
big and small, we need this legislation. There is a lot more to it than
just the restart protocols. It hasn't been easy because we have three
committees with interest and jurisdiction, including Commerce and
Finance. The Senator worked with the leadership of our Commerce
Committee and of the Finance Committee, and I thank the Senator for
that.
I urge my colleagues in the Senate that we move expeditiously on this
legislation and that we not play games with it in any way because this
is serious business. I feel for the person who would oppose this kind
of legislation, or delay it, if some incident occurs. We need to move
on it. This is the time to do it. It has been a real yeoman's task to
bring it to this point. I wanted to be on record early commending the
Senator from Maine, and I hope I will have an opportunity to talk later
about some of the substantive parts of this legislation, which is
critical for our country. I thank the Senator for yielding.
Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I thank the junior Senator from
Mississippi for his kind comments. He has been so helpful as a member
of the Commerce Committee and the Finance Committee in helping us weave
our way through a very difficult maze. Without his advice and support,
I doubt that we would be here tonight. I express my personal
appreciation to Senator Lott for his guidance and his assistance and
for keeping us all focused on the goal. We could never let turf battles
or jurisdictional disputes block us from accomplishing such a needed
and important task. He helped us keep our eye on the ball. I thank the
Senator very much for his comments.
Mr. President, I was talking about the hearings we were having. Our
most recent hearing was in April on the GreenLane Maritime Cargo
Security Act, which I mentioned Senator Murray and I had introduced. We
heard also from the House leaders on port security, including
Representative Dan Lungren and Representative Jane Harman, as well as
other experts on our Nation's ports. The following month, that bill was
reported out of the Homeland Security Committee.
The Port Security Improvement Act will clarify the roles,
responsibilities, and authorities of Government agencies at all levels
and of private sector stakeholders. It will establish clear and
measurable goals for better security of commercial operations from the
point of origin to the destination. It will also establish mandatory
baseline security standards and provide incentives for additional
voluntary measures.
Perhaps most importantly, the Secretary of Homeland Security would be
required to develop protocols for the resumption of trade in the wake
of an attack. Five years after the 9/11 attacks, the Federal Government
still has not established adequate protocols for resuming port
operations and setting cargo release priorities after an attack. I will
tell you, when I talk to port authority directors, every single one of
them brings this up as a major issue. If we don't have a plan for
restarting our ports and for releasing cargo, then our ports will be
closed far longer than they would need to be and economic losses would
multiply.
This legislation would also establish priorities for critical DHS
programs necessary to improve maritime cargo security and would set
clear timelines to ensure steady progress on their development and
expansion. Let me give another example of where DHS has languished in
some areas. They have made progress in others but languished in some.
For example, the Department has been working on a minimum standard
for mechanical seals on containers for more than 2 years but has yet to
issue it. Under our bill, the Department would have 6 months to
establish minimum standards for securing containers in transit to the
United States. All containers bound for U.S. ports of entry would have
to meet those standards no later than 2 years after they are
established.
The bill also provides guidance and deadlines for essential
improvements in the Automated Targeting System, the Radiation Portal
Monitor Program, the CSI and C-TPAT.
The Automated Targeting System, ATS, is a screening mechanism that
the Federal Government uses to help it determine which of the 11
million containers entering this country should receive further
scrutiny. The GAO has criticized ATS for utilizing inadequate
information to accurately assess the risk of cargo, and our legislation
will ensure that the DHS improves that program.
Another notable provision of the bill is the requirement that
radiation scanning be applied to 100 percent of the containers entering
the 22 largest U.S. ports by December 31, 2007. Now, the result of that
is that 98 percent of all cargo containers coming into U.S. ports will
be screened for radiation. That is in addition to the radiation
scanning that is done at foreign ports through the CSI and the
Megaports Programs.
The legislation also expands and enhances the C-TPAT program to ensue
the security of cargo from point of origin to destination. It creates a
GreenLane, a third tier of C-TPAT, offering additional benefits to
participants that voluntarily meet the highest level of security
standards. The cooperation of private industry is vital to securing
supply chains, and C-TPAT is a necessary tool for securing their active
cooperation in supply chain security efforts.
Another security measure that has languished for years is the vital
Transportation Workers Identification Card, or the TWIC Program. Again,
we would require DHS to publish a final rule on the implementation of
this program by the end of this year.
Finally, this comprehensive legislation would authorize the
competitive, risk-based Port Security Grants Program. It would have
stable, consistent funding set at $400 million each year for the next 5
years. This is a significant commitment of resources, and it will allow
our ports to plan and to undertake multiyear projects that require a
sustained investment.
The Port Security Improvement Act of 2006 will help us construct an
effective, layered, coordinated system that extends from the point of
origin to the point of destination. It will cover the people, the
vessels, the cargo, and the facilities involved in our maritime
commerce. And it addresses a major vulnerability identified time and
again by terrorism experts.
Mr. President, I do hope that we can proceed with all due haste to
enact this important legislation.
I yield the floor.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Hawaii is
recognized.
Mr. INOUYE. Mr. President, I rise to speak in support of the Port
Security Improvement Act of 2006. It reflects a bipartisan compromise
between the three committees that have jurisdiction over the security
of our Nation's ports, international intermodal supply chain and the
administration of the Department of Homeland Security.
This bill strikes the right balance between security and facilitating
the trade that is so important to our economy.
Our national economy depends on port security, yet amazingly, the
administration has not made it the priority that it needs to be. It has
consistently submitted inadequate funding requests and has routinely
missed critical security deadlines that were required by law. It was
not until the Dubai Ports World controversy hit the front pages of
local newspapers that many members of the Congress began to take port
security seriously.
I hope that Members of this body will give this important piece of
legislation the consideration it deserves. Lastly, we all know that you
cannot have a successful security policy without adequate funding.
Today is a good first step, but the administration and this Congress
must take the next step after we pass this legislation and fund these
initiatives as proposed here.
[[Page S9101]]
There are more than 360 ports in our Nation that serve as a
gatekeeper for our Nation's trade and commerce, bringing into the
country most of the merchandise and raw materials our businesses rely
upon. If an incident forced the shutdown of ports across the Nation,
the impact on our national economy would be devastating and have long-
term consequences.
The Coast Guard, through the National Maritime Transportation Act,
has taken important steps to create a plan to guarantee trade resumes
quickly after an attack. However, more needs to be done to enhance the
Coast Guard's plan and ensure effective implementation. Our economic
health depends on it.
Given the role our ports play in the economy, we cannot underestimate
the importance of ensuring that the containerized cargo that comes into
our country is safe and that the ships entering our borders do not
carry enemies of our Nation. Yet less than 6 percent of the cargo
coming into this country is inspected, a level that is unacceptable if
we are to take security seriously.
Making the current situation worse is the fact that current State
inspection and radiation scanning technologies are woefully inadequate.
The measure before us today addresses the shortfalls of the past 5
years. First, it enhances the examination of cargo domestically and
before it reaches our shores. Second, the bill improves interagency
cooperation. Third, it improves the sharing of intelligence information
with the creation of interagency port security command centers. Fourth,
it provides an additional director within to improve communication and
cooperation between the public and private sectors to quickly resume
trade should an incident occur. And fifth, the bill offers assistance
and technical training to our partners in the war on terror. These are
all simple fixes but fixes that have significant consequence in our
efforts to protect our ports.
As we consider this piece of legislation, we must not forget the
security needs of our other transportation systems. Amendments will be
offered to this bill that relate to securing other modes of
transportation and it is my intent to support those amendments as well
so that we have a comprehensive approach to securing our
infrastructure.
I am hopeful that the Senate will pass this bill as soon as possible.
Our approach has broad bipartisan support. The Senate Commerce, Science
and Transportation Committee has focused on the issues of
transportation security long before the events of September 11, 2001.
We have dedicated substantial time and resources to oversee and
investigate the security and safety of our Nation's systems of
transportation and this bill will mark the fourth landmark
transportation security related bill that has been brought before the
Senate. The time is right to pass these needed security improvements,
and I am hopeful that we can make it happen.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Washington.
Mrs. MURRAY. Mr. President, it has been 5 years since September 11,
and our country is still dangerously vulnerable. We have huge loopholes
at our ports and in our cargo container system, and none of us should
sleep well at night until we close those security holes and protect our
country.
That is why I am on the Senate floor once again pushing for us to
pass the bipartisan GreenLane bill. I am excited that after working for
a number of years, we are now on the verge of making our country more
secure.
The full House of Representatives passed our bill. The Senate
Homeland Security Committee passed our bill. We have worked with the
Commerce and Finance Committees to address the issues in the bill they
have raised. Now it is up to us, the full Senate, to finally pass this
bill.
Today I wish to explain why our ports are so vulnerable, how an
attack would affect our people and our economy, and finally, how this
bill will make us more secure and keep trade flowing.
To understand why our ports are so vulnerable, one just has to look
at something that happened in my home State of Washington 3 weeks ago.
On August 16, there was a big scare at the Port of Seattle. Two
containers that originated in Pakistan were offloaded at terminal 18.
They were targeted for inspection. They were first scanned by a gamma-
imaging machine, which is essentially a giant x-ray machine for cargo
containers. The initial images suggested what was supposed to be in the
container was different than what that x-ray scan showed. Next, the
port officials brought in two security dogs, and both dogs detected
what they thought were explosives in that cargo container at terminal
18.
To understand why that is such a scary incident in Seattle, one just
has to look at the Port of Seattle and what surrounds it.
This photograph shows the Port of Seattle. We can see the port very
clearly in the foreground. That is Seattle in the background. My
colleague, Senator Collins, was out there and remarked, tonight and
while she was out there, about the incredible closeness to where our
containers are brought into the Port of Seattle, to where our downtown
area is, where there are two sports stadiums that can have thousands
and thousands of people at one time sitting in them, and I-5 is over
here. That is the main highway that goes through the State of
Washington, right through downtown Seattle. As one can see, these cargo
containers sitting on these docks are within feet and yards of mass
people, infrastructure, our community, our railroads, our
transportation system, sports stadiums, and where people live and work.
During the scare I just mentioned, officials had to close the
terminal and establish a 500-yard safety zone surrounding the terminal,
and they had to create a 300-yard safety zone around the entire Seattle
waterfront. Fortunately, that day, after having the port closed down
for some time, further testing showed that what was in that container
was just a false alarm.
I wish to take a second to commend everyone on the ground for doing
an excellent job of immediately responding to a possibly very dangerous
incident.
Here is the problem: We did not know what was in that container. We
did not know. It could have posed a problem, and it was sitting right
on the dock, right within our sports stadiums, within all of downtown
Seattle, within our transportation systems, and where people live and
work.
That is why we are presenting this bill tonight. The main idea of
this bill is to push our country's borders out, to do the screening and
testing for these cargo containers overseas so that the container never
gets close to our shores if we think it is dangerous. But today, too
often we wait until that container is sitting on American soil,
dangerously close to our cities, before we find out whether it could
pose a danger.
Fortunately, that Seattle incident ended well, but that very same
week, we got a very stark warning about how it could have ended
differently.
In August around the same time, the RAND Center for Terrorism and
Risk Management Policy issued a very troubling report that showed what
could happen if there is a nuclear device in a cargo container.
The RAND Corporation looked at the following scenario: terrorists put
a 10-kiloton nuclear bomb inside a cargo container and detonated it at
the port of Long Beach, CA. The researchers chose that scenario
because, as they put it, ``analysts consider it feasible, it is highly
likely to have a catastrophic effect, and the target is both a key part
of the U.S. economic structure and a critical global shipping center.''
Here is what they said would have happened: Up to 60,000 people would
be killed instantly from the blast or from radiation poisoning; 150,000
people would be injured by radiation exposure; up to 6 million people
would flee Los Angeles; 2 to 3 million people would need to be
relocated because their land would be contaminated by radiation. And
finally, the economic loss simply would be about $1 trillion. That is
10 times worse than September 11. Those costs would include medical
care, insurance claims, workers' compensation, evacuation,
construction. Imagine that--the economic damage would be 10 times worse
than what happened on September 11.
How many more reports such as that is it going to take? How many port
evacuations and scares is it going to take before we get serious about
port
[[Page S9102]]
security? Time is not on our side. Each year, 6 million cargo
containers enter our U.S. seaports, and that number is expected to
quadruple in the next 20 years. These cargo containers carry the
building blocks of our economy, but without adequate security, they can
also provide an opportunity for terrorists to deliver a deadly one-two
punch to our country. The first punch would create untold number of
American casualties. The second punch would bring our economy to a
halt. Today we are not doing enough to keep America safe.
Standing in this Chamber, it can feel as if the dangers at our ports
are a distant concern, but given that our ports are connected to our
Nation's transportation system and are close to our major population
centers, the threat is never far away.
I want to share a very disturbing photo that shows us what a
terrorist attack could look like. On March 21, a container ship called
the Hyundai Fortune was traveling off the coast of Yemen when an
explosion occurred in the rear of the ship. This is a photo of what
happened. This is a container ship close to Yemen with an explosion at
the rear of the ship. Remember the picture I just showed of the port of
Seattle and where we are and imagine this happening in the Port of
Seattle.
What happened when this ship exploded was that 90 containers were
blown off the side of this ship and it created a debris field 5 miles
long. Thankfully, amazingly, there were no fatalities and the crew was
rescued.
This incident, by the way, did not appear to be terrorist related,
but it gives us an idea of what it would look like if a terrorist
incident occurred on a container ship in one of our seaports.
I want my colleagues to imagine the same burning ship sitting just a
few feet off our shores in New York Harbor or Puget Sound, off the
coast of Los Angeles or Charleston, Miami, Portland, Hampton Roads, the
Delaware Bay, or the Gulf of Mexico. Now imagine we are not dealing
with just a conventional explosion; we are dealing with a dirty bomb. I
want to walk through what would happen next.
Of course, there would be the immediate horrible loss of life. Many
of our ports, as I said, are located near major cities. If this were a
chemical weapon exploding in Seattle, the chemical plume could
contaminate the rail system, Interstate 5, SeaTac Airport, not to
mention, as I showed my colleagues, the downtown business and
residential areas. At the port, there would immediately be tremendous
confusion. People would try to contain the fire, but it is unclear
today who would be in charge. Then when word spread and chaos ensued,
panic would set in and there would be chaos as our first responders
tried to react and people who lived nearby would try to flee.
Next, what would happen is our Government would shut down every
single port in America to make sure there were no other bombs on any
other containers in any other city. That shutdown would be the
equivalent of driving our economy into a brick wall and, in fact, it
could spark a global recession. Day by day, we would feel the painful
economic impact of the attack. American factories in the middle of our
country would not be able to get the supplies they need. They would
have to shut their doors and lay off workers. Stores around our country
would not be able to get the products they need to put on their
shelves. Prices would spike, demand would outweigh supply, and
consumers would not be able to afford the simple items they rely on
every single day.
In 2002, we saw what the closure of just a few ports on the west
coast could do. It cost our economy $1 billion a day. Imagine if we
shut down all of our ports. One study, in fact, concluded that if U.S.
ports were shut down for just 9 days, it would cost our economy $58
billion.
The RAND report I mentioned earlier found the economic damage could
easily top more than $1 trillion. Of course, we would soon realize we
have no plan for resuming trade after an attack. We have no plan today
for how we would resume trade, no protocol for what would be searched.
We wouldn't know what would be allowed in or even who was in charge,
and there would be a mass scramble to create a new system in a crisis
atmosphere. Eventually, we would begin the slow process of manually
inspecting all the cargo waiting to enter the United States. One report
found it could take as long as 4 months to get all the cargo inspected
and moving again.
Finally, we would have to set up a new regime for port security. You
can bet that any kind of rushed plan we put together in this kind of
scenario would not balance strong security with efficient trade.
This is a realistic portrayal of events that could happen tomorrow.
Five years after September 11, we have not closed a major loophole that
threatens our lives and our economy. Time is not on our side. We have
to act, and we need to act now.
I approach this as someone who really understands the importance of
both improving our security and maintaining the flow of commerce. My
home State of Washington is the most trade-dependent State in the
entire country. We know what is at stake if there is an incident at one
of our ports. That is why I wrote and funded Operation Safe Commerce to
help us find where we are vulnerable and to evaluate the best security
practices. It is why I worked hard to boost funding for the Coast
Guard, and I fought to keep the Port Security Grant Program from being
eliminated year after year.
Right after September 11, 5 years ago, I started talking with
security and trade experts to find out what we needed to be doing to
both improve security and keep our commerce going. Last year, I sought
out Senator Collins as a partner in this effort. I approached Senator
Collins because I knew she cared about this issue. I knew she had done
a lot of work on it already, and I knew she was someone who could get
things done. Since that day, she and I have worked hand in hand to
develop this bill and to move it forward.
The reason we worked so hard on this bill is because we know how
vulnerable we are. Terrorists have a lot of opportunities to introduce
deadly cargo into a container. It can be tampered with at any time from
when it leaves a foreign factory overseas to when it arrives at a
consolidation warehouse and moves to a foreign port. It could even be
tampered with while it is en route to the United States. There are
several dangers. I outlined what would happen if terrorists exploded a
container, but they could just as easily use cargo containers to
transport weapons or personnel into the United States to launch an
attack anywhere on American soil. In fact, in April, 22 Chinese
stowaways were found at the Port of Seattle. They reached the United
States inside a cargo container. In that case, they were stowaways, but
they could easily have been terrorists sneaking into this country.
The programs we have in place today are totally inadequate. Last
year, thanks to the insistence of Senator Collins and Senator Coleman,
the Government Accountability Office found its C-TPAT was not even
checking to see if companies were doing what they promised they would
in their security plans. Even when U.S. Customs inspectors do find
something suspicious today at a foreign port, they can't force a
container to be inspected. So we have a clear and deadly threat, and we
know that current programs are inadequate. So what are we going to do
about it? We could manually inspect every container coming into our
ports, but that would cripple our economy.
The real challenge we face is how to make our trade more secure
without slowing it to a crawl. That is why the Homeland Security,
Commerce, and Finance Committees, through the leadership of Senators
Collins and Lieberman, Senators Stevens and Inouye, and Senators
Grassley and Baucus and I, have worked with stakeholders and experts to
strike the right balance. The result is the bill that we are now
considering. It provides a comprehensive blueprint for how we improve
security while keeping our trade efficient. At its heart, this
challenge is about keeping the good things about trade--speed and
efficiency--without being vulnerable to the bad things about trade,
which is the potential for terrorists to use our engines of commerce.
The GreenLane bill does five things. First of all, it creates tough
new standards for all cargo. Today, we don't have any standards for
cargo security.
Second, it creates a GreenLane option which provides for an even
higher level of security. Companies have the
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option to follow the higher standards of the GreenLane. Their cargo
will be tracked and monitored from the moment it leaves the factory
floor overseas until it reaches the United States. We will know
everywhere their cargo has been. We will know every person who has
touched it, and we will know whether it has been tampered with. The
GreenLane pushes our borders out by conducting inspections overseas
before cargo is even loaded into a ship bound for the United States,
and we will provide incentives for the companies that use this highest
standard of GreenLane.
Third, our bill sets up a plan to resume trade quickly and safely, to
minimize the impact of a terrorist attack on our economy.
Fourth, our bill will secure our ports here at home by authorizing
and funding port security grants. This funding will help our ports and
port operators to develop and implement security plans. They could use
this funding to strengthen their perimeter security, which would help
prevent a number of security lapses that were highlighted in a recent
Seattle Times article in which a reporter was able to enter a port and
walk around the containers without anybody stopping him.
Finally, our bill will hold DHS accountable for improving cargo
security. DHS is long overdue in establishing cargo security standards
and transportation worker credentials. We need to hold DHS accountable,
and our bill provides the infrastructure to ensure accountability and
coordination.
Let me take a few minutes to share a few ways that our bill does make
America safer. First of all, we close the loopholes that leave us
vulnerable today. Senator Collins and I have studied the 9/11
Commission Report and the various GAO reports and we worked very hard
to put their recommendations into this bill. The 9/11 Commission
examined what went wrong 5 years ago and how we can prevent another
terrorist attack. We listened to the 9/11 Commission and we worked very
hard to incorporate their recommendations and to close the loopholes
that the Commission identified. The 9/11 Commission said we needed a
layered security system. Our bill adopts that layered approach.
Here is what we envision as the Secretary of Homeland Security
implements this bill. Each step in the GreenLane system will have
multiple and redundant security layers. Cargo would be monitored and
secured starting at a foreign factory overseas. In addition, containers
will be sealed with high-tech container security devices, such as e-
seals, to protect against their being tampered with or compromised.
Then, before that container is ever loaded onto a ship, its manifest is
reviewed and the container is inspected for radiation, seal tampering,
and x-rayed. Finally, the cargo will be secured with access controls,
ensuring anyone with access to GreenLane cargo has undergone a
background check and possesses verifiable identification. Those
multiple layers provide the type of layered security that the 9/11
Commission called for.
Now, the 9/11 Commission also said we have to centralize authority
and responsibility so that there is finally someone accountable in our
Government. Our bill does that. It centralizes authority by
establishing the Office of Cargo Security Policy within the Department
of Homeland Security to coordinate Federal cargo security programs and
to advance security research and development.
The 9/11 Commission also said we need to do a better job sharing
information throughout our Government. Our bill promotes coordination
by establishing regional interagency operational centers to enhance
cooperation between our Federal agencies. So our bill is responsive to
the problems and the loopholes that the 9/11 Commission identified.
Our bill gives us new tools so we can approach cargo security in new
ways. It gives U.S. officials in foreign ports the authority to inspect
suspicious containers before they are loaded for departure into the
United States. Our bill makes the haystack of containers smaller. It
allows the Government to focus on suspicious cargo that enters our
ports, and it ensures that we are inspecting and stopping cargo that
poses a threat. And it cuts down on the smuggling of weapons, people,
drugs, and other illegal cargo.
This bill will also protect America's economy in the event of a
terror attack, and that is because it provides a secure, organized way
to quickly resume cargo operations after any emergency shutdown because
any shutdown of our ports has the potential to cost the U.S. economy
billions of dollars a day. Our bill would minimize the economic impact
of a terrorist attack.
So I am very proud of this bill, and I thank all of our partners and
all of our supporters. I especially thank Senator Collins for her
tremendous leadership and work on this very complex issue, and I
commend her for the job she has done. I thank Senator Coleman for his
work as chairman of the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations. I
thank Senator Lieberman and all of our cosponsors, and I thank the
Commerce and Finance Committees, especially Senator Stevens and Senator
Inouye, Senator Grassley and Senator Baucus.
We have also seen tremendous progress on the House side with the Safe
Port Act, and I want to thank Representatives Dan Lundgren and Jane
Harman for their leadership. Finally, I especially tonight thank the
numerous Federal, State and local officials and all of the industry
representatives for their tremendous assistance in helping us craft
this legislation. They truly are at the front lines of securing our
Nation's ports, and I have been very proud to work with all of them and
to get to know them and see their dedication and commitment to making
our country more secure.
Today, we have a choice in how we deal with the cargo security
challenges that face us, but if we wait for a disaster, our choices are
going to be pretty stark. So I think we have to make the changes now,
on our terms, before there is a deadly incident. Let's protect America
before an image like this appears on our television screens. Let's not
wait until a terrorist incident strikes again to protect our people and
to protect our economy.
Earlier this year, the American people woke up, and they spoke out
when they heard that a foreign government-owned company could be
running our ports. That sparked a very critical debate. Now we need to
set up a security regime that will actually make us safer. Until we do
so, none of us should sleep well at night. A terrible image like this
of a burning container ship with a dirty bomb in one of America's
harbors could be on our TV screens tomorrow. So this Congress needs to
act today. We only have a few days to get this right, and I hope that
all of our colleagues will work with all of us to move this bill
quickly and expeditiously and pass a GreenLane bill before it is too
late.
Mr. President, I yield the floor.
Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I again thank the Senator for her
excellent statement, for her leadership, and for getting us to where we
are today. It has been a long journey, but with her leadership we were
able to craft this bill, work out the many compromises, and come to the
floor. I hope we can do this bill relatively quickly. It has been the
subject of an awful lot of discussion and review, and it would be
terrific if we can show the American people that we can act in a
bipartisan way on an issue that really matters to their security.
It is appropriate that the Presiding Officer tonight is the Senator
from Virginia, Senator Allen. I know that port security has been a
major priority of his. Earlier in my statement, I mentioned that
California, New York, and Virginia are the three States that receive
the greatest number of containers, although actually I would think that
Washington State has to be in there, too, given the size of Seattle and
Tacoma's ports as well. So I know they should be in there as well. But
Virginia is a major player in port security, and I want to commend the
Senator from Virginia for his leadership on this issue. I know that
this has been of great concern to him. He has talked to me as this bill
has been making its way through the process, and I publicly thank him
for caring about this issue and making it a priority as well.
Mr. President, I am not aware of further Members who are seeking to
speak on my side, and I see no indication of further Members on the
other side. I am going to, very briefly, put in a quorum call so that
we can check, but
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I believe we are very close to concluding our business for tonight.
Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent the order for the
quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
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