[Congressional Record Volume 152, Number 100 (Wednesday, July 26, 2006)]
[House]
[Pages H5902-H5930]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




   UNITED STATES AND INDIA NUCLEAR COOPERATION PROMOTION ACT OF 2006

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 947 and rule 
XVIII, the Chair declares the House in the Committee of the Whole House 
on the State of the Union for the consideration of the bill, H.R. 5682.

                              {time}  1731


                     In the Committee of the Whole

  Accordingly, the House resolved itself into the Committee of the 
Whole House on the State of the Union for the consideration of the bill 
(H.R. 5682) to exempt from certain requirements of the Atomic Energy 
Act of 1954 a proposed nuclear agreement for cooperation with India, 
with Mr. Duncan in the chair.
  The Clerk read the title of the bill.
  The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to the rule, the bill is considered read the 
first time.
  The gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Hyde) and the gentleman from 
California (Mr. Lantos) each will control 30 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Illinois.
  Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  (Mr. HYDE asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)

[[Page H5903]]

  Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of H.R. 5682, the U.S.-
India Nuclear Cooperation Promotion Act of 2006, which the Committee on 
International Relations ordered reported by a vote of 37-5 on June 28. 
This, therefore, is truly a bipartisan effort.
  This bill is based on the administration's original proposal, H.R. 
4974, which Mr. Lantos and I introduced last fall at the request of 
Secretary Rice. Current law does not permit civil nuclear trade with 
India. That legislation would have authorized the President to waive a 
number of provisions of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, to 
allow him to negotiate an agreement establishing civil nuclear 
cooperation with India.
  This agreement will permit the U.S. to sell technology to India for 
nuclear power development. In return, India will open up for inspection 
its civilian nuclear program to international inspections and also 
agree not to test nuclear weapons and abide by nuclear export controls.
  H.R. 5682 takes the President's bill as a starting point and amends 
it in several key ways. The most important of these is that the process 
of congressional consideration has been reversed, meaning that the 
agreement cannot go into effect unless Congress approves it. This 
seemingly small change actually has great ramifications for the role of 
Congress as it ensures that we will retain a substantive role in the 
negotiation and implementation of this historic and far-reaching 
agreement.
  Other major improvements in this bill include strengthening the 
conditions which the President must certify. The original, vague 
generalities have been made more specific and require a number of 
conditions to have already been met instead of being open-ended. The 
most important of these include:
  That India has provided the United States and the International 
Atomic Energy Agency with a credible plan to separate its civilian and 
military facilities;
  India has concluded a safeguards agreement with the IAEA regarding 
its civilian nuclear facilities;
  India and the IAEA are making ``substantial progress'' toward 
concluding an Additional Protocol, which is a set of enhanced 
safeguards and inspection measures that the United States is urging all 
countries to negotiate for themselves;
  India and the United States are working toward a multilateral Fissile 
Material Cutoff Treaty;
  India is working with the United States to prevent the spread of 
enrichment and reprocessing technology;
  India is taking steps to secure its nuclear and other sensitive 
materials and technology through enhanced export control legislation 
and harmonizing its export control laws, regulations and procedures 
with international standards; and the Nuclear Suppliers Group, also 
known as the NSG, has voted to change its guidelines to allow civil 
nuclear trade with India.
  As many of you know, the NSG is a voluntary group of countries that 
export nuclear materials and technology and that coordinate their 
export policies regarding other countries. Currently, those guidelines 
do not permit nuclear trade with India.
  In addition, the legislation requires detailed annual reports on the 
implementation of the U.S.-India agreement and on U.S. nonproliferation 
policy with respect to South Asia. There are also sections on Sense of 
Congress and Statements of Policy that, although containing many useful 
provisions, I will not take the time to describe in detail now.
  Taken together, the committee believes that this bill represents a 
judicious balancing of competing priorities and will help lay the 
foundation for an historic rapprochement between the United States and 
India, while also protecting the global nonproliferation regime.
  Having described the major components of the bill, let me take a 
brief moment to address some of the arguments made by supporters and 
opponents.
  I have yet to hear any objection raised by any Member regarding the 
desirability of improving U.S.-India relations in general. She is the 
largest democracy in the world, with 1.1 billion people.
  The announcement on July 18 of last year by President Bush and Indian 
Prime Minister Singh of a new global partnership between our two 
countries has been almost universally praised in this country and is 
rightly regarded as an historic achievement and one that is long 
overdue.
  That partnership embraces many elements, from combating the AIDS 
epidemic to collaboration on scientific research to closer cooperation 
and ensuring stability in South Asia and other regions. Among other 
benefits, the agreement on nuclear cooperation that this bill will make 
possible will help India address its pressing energy needs by allowing 
it to build several nuclear reactors to supply electricity and 
lessening the need for petroleum.
  A major argument in favor, however, is that a closer relationship 
with India is needed to offset the rising power of China. There is much 
to this view, and it is clear that the U.S. will need to draw upon new 
resources to handle the challenges of this new century.
  In the end, this is a good deal for both the U.S. and India. While 
the world has known that India possesses nuclear weapons, India has not 
had a seat at the table of nuclear stakeholders. The agreement calls 
for the U.S. to sell technology to India for nuclear power development. 
In return, India will open its 14 civilian nuclear reactors to 
international inspections, agree not to test nuclear weapons and abide 
by nuclear export controls. This brings India into the mainstream with 
other accountable countries, giving rise to the same benefits and 
responsibilities as such other countries.
  It is important to note that this deal would improve international 
nuclear security and at the same time expand relations between the U.S. 
and one of the most important emerging nations in the world. It will 
enable India to make energy cheaper, cleaner and more accountable. It 
would create more customers for U.S. firms and, in the end, both 
countries will benefit.
  I urge support of this important legislation.
  I want to acknowledge the indispensable collaboration of Mr. Lantos 
and his marvelous staff, matched only in talent and zeal by my 
marvelous staff. This is truly a product of very desirable 
bipartisanship, and I thank them and salute them for their 
contribution.
  Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the legislation. This is no 
ordinary vote. Historians will regard what we do today as a tidal shift 
in relations between India and the United States. This will be known as 
the day when Congress signaled definitively the end of the Cold War 
paradigm governing interactions between New Delhi and Washington.
  A few weeks ago, by a vote of 37-5, the International Relations 
Committee resoundingly approved this legislation backing the civilian 
nuclear accord with India. This was nothing short of a vote of 
confidence in the long-term future of relations between India and the 
United States.
  President Clinton laid the foundation for this process with his 
historic trip to India 6 years ago. He demonstrated that the United 
States was launching a new era of mutual respect and cooperation.
  A year ago, this vision was brought to full realization as the 
President and Prime Minister Singh issued a joint statement on an array 
of new initiatives spanning the fields of high technology, space 
exploration, counterterrorism, defense cooperation and energy security.
  Today, Mr. Chairman, the House of Representatives steps forth into 
the spotlight to offer its judgment on one critical element of this new 
relationship, the United States and India Nuclear Cooperation Promotion 
Act of 2006, the first key step to create the statutory authority to 
expand nuclear research, civilian nuclear power and nonproliferation 
cooperation New Delhi.
  Our legislation represents a nonproliferation victory for the United 
States. As part of the agreement, India has committed to continue its 
moratorium on its own nuclear tests. It will also adhere to 
international nuclear and missile control restrictions, and India has 
agreed to place its civil nuclear facilities for the first time under 
international safeguards.
  Mr. Chairman, this, of course, is not a perfect agreement. No 
agreement between two sovereign nations can ever

[[Page H5904]]

be perfect, because the agreements arise from hard negotiations. 
Compromise was necessary on all sides. But we must not let the siren 
song of perfection deafen us to this chance for dramatically 
strengthening an important and valued ally.

                              {time}  1745

  Mr. Chairman, I understand the criticisms of this agreement on 
nonproliferation grounds. But I would like to assure the House that the 
International Relations Committee has thoroughly examined these issues 
during our five extensive hearings since last September on this 
initiative.
  And, Mr. Chairman, our bill addresses those concerns thoroughly. It 
requires the President to make several determinations to Congress. 
Among these, the President must determine that India has concluded a 
credible plan to separate civilian and military nuclear facilities; 
that India has concluded a safeguards agreement with the International 
Atomic Energy Agency that will apply safeguards in perpetuity to 
India's civil nuclear facilities, materials, and programs; that India 
is harmonizing its export control laws and regulations to match those 
of the so-called Nuclear Suppliers Group, and that India is actively 
supporting U.S. efforts to conclude a fissile material cut-off treaty.
  It is worth repeating, Mr. Chairman, that the International Relations 
Committee came to the determination that this agreement advances our 
Nation's nonproliferation goals, and our committee approved the bill by 
an overwhelming, bipartisan vote of 37-5.
  Mr. Chairman, this legislation has been carefully crafted to protect 
our nonproliferation interests, and to ensure direct congressional 
oversight. Members will recall that the administration wanted Congress 
to approve the India deal in advance, without seeing the details of a 
still-to-be-negotiated nuclear cooperation agreement.
  There would have been no effective subsequent review by the Congress. 
We rejected that approach. Our agreement ensures that Congress will 
have the final word on whether or not the agreement for cooperation 
with India can become law. Under our approach, Congress must vote a 
second time before there can be any civilian nuclear cooperation with 
India.
  Congress must approve the completed cooperation agreement. But 
congressional oversight does not end there, Mr. Chairman. Our 
legislation also requires that the President make detailed annual 
reports on U.S. nonproliferation policy with respect to South Asia and 
the implementation of the U.S.-India agreement. And it includes certain 
guarantees that India will adhere to international standards for 
maintaining a safe civilian nuclear program.
  Mr. Chairman, it is my deep pleasure to see the United States and 
India finally emerging from decades of distrust and aloofness. Today, 
we are at the hinge of history, as we seek to build a fundamentally new 
relationship based on our common values and our common interests.
  Our legislation, which is before this House, is a concrete and 
meaningful element of this new and dynamic relationship. I urge my 
colleagues to give their full support to this legislation and to help 
usher in a new day in U.S.-India relations.
  Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the distinguished 
gentleman from Indiana (Mr. Burton).
  Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Mr. Chairman, I thank Mr. Hyde and Mr. Lantos 
for their hard work on this bill. I think they have covered the details 
of the bill rather well.
  The reason I wanted to take 1 minute was to say that I met with Prime 
Minister Singh in Delhi, India, along with some of his cabinet members, 
oh, a couple of months ago.
  And although I have not always been in accord with some of things 
India has done, I am sure that they want to work with us on this 
nuclear agreement. They have assured me, and I am confident they will 
keep their word, that there will be a clear demarcation between civil 
use of nuclear energy, nuclear technology we might sell to them and 
their nuclear weapons program.
  And there is about 800 million people in India that are living on 
less than $2 a day. And when you go through Delhi and you see how they 
are living, under horrible, horrible conditions, little children 
running around with no place to go, burning cow chips for the heat that 
they need to stay warm at night, you realize the need for energy that 
they have and they need it so badly.
  So this nuclear technology we are going to sell them for civil use 
will be very helpful, not only for job creation over there, but for 
making the quality of life better for all the people in India.
  Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. 
Davis) for the purpose of making a unanimous consent request.
  (Mr. DAVIS of Illinois asked and was given permission to revise and 
extend his remarks.)
  Mr. DAVIS of Illinois. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of H.R. 5682, 
the United States and India Nuclear Cooperation Promotion Act of 2006.
  Mr. Chairman, ``India,'' Mark Twain wrote, ``is the cradle of the 
human race, the birthplace of human speech, the mother of history, the 
grandmother of legend, and the great grandmother of tradition.'' Now, 
this remarkable country is asking for our assistance as it develops its 
civilian nuclear program.
  The possibilities for nuclear technological innovation in India are 
limitless. Domestic infrastructure improvements in water supply, power 
generation, and other industries will substantially improve the quality 
of life for over one billion Indian people.
  Cooperating with India as it develops stable nuclear technology will 
strengthen the bond between India and the United States. Offering our 
expertise will increase the environmental protections in production and 
promote the responsible discard of nuclear waste. Bringing India's 
nuclear program under international guidelines will ensure a safer 
nuclear program.
  The security and stability of India's nuclear program security is of 
the utmost importance. The International Atomic Energy Agency and the 
Indian Government have been working together to apply safeguards in 
accordance with International Atomic Energy Agency practices as well as 
formulating a plan to ensure the separation of civil and military 
facilities, materials, and programs. Furthermore, India is supporting 
international efforts to prevent the spread of enrichment and 
reprocessing technology. India is ensuring that the necessary steps are 
being taken to secure nuclear materials and technology through the 
application of comprehensive export control legislation and regulations 
through harmonization and adherence to Missile Technology Control 
Regime and Nuclear Suppliers Group guidelines.
  India is a flourishing democracy that seeks to develop its nuclear 
program for purely peaceful reasons. It should be congratulated for 
that. Cooperating with India as it develops a civilian nuclear program 
will help India fulfill its civilian energy needs while creating a 
strategic partner for the United States in a volatile region.
  Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2\1/4\ minutes to the gentleman 
from California (Mr. Berman) our distinguished colleague who has made 
invaluable contributions to the development of this legislation.
  (Mr. BERMAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Chairman, I want to commend the chairman and the 
ranking member of the committee, both Mr. Hyde and Mr. Lantos, and 
their staffs for their hard work on this legislation.
  There is no question that this bill is a major improvement over the 
administration's legislative proposal, as Mr. Lantos mentioned. Because 
of the changes they have made, we will have an opportunity to decide 
whether or not to approve the nuclear cooperation agreement by a 
majority vote after the agreement is negotiated, after we see the IAEA 
safeguards agreement with India, and after the Nuclear Suppliers Group 
has reached a consensus.
  Notwithstanding that, I do remain deeply concerned about this nuclear 
deal, because I fear that it will complicate our efforts to prevent the 
spread of weapons of mass destruction. Not because I think India is 
going to be a major proliferator, but because once you change the long-
established nonproliferation rules for the benefit of one country, even 
a friendly democracy like India, then it becomes much easier for the 
other countries to justify carve-outs for their special friends.
  I would not be so concerned about setting a bad precedent if there 
was some compelling nonproliferation gain, but I just do not see it 
here. Later today, Representative Tauscher and I will offer an 
amendment to provide

[[Page H5905]]

that missing piece of the proposal. Our amendment, based on a proposal 
by former Senator Sam Nunn, would allow exports of nuclear reactors and 
other technology to India after a nuclear cooperation agreement has 
been approved by the Congress.
  But it would restrict exports of uranium and other nuclear reactor 
fuel, until the President determines that India has halted the 
production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons. Otherwise, 
we incentivize this.
  Mr. Chairman, I come at this as someone who is unabashedly pro-India. 
I strongly support efforts to strengthen the U.S.-India strategic 
partnership. I also accept the fact that India has nuclear weapons, 
will never give up those weapons, and will probably never sign the 
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.
  Mr. Chairman, I welcome civilian nuclear cooperation with India, as 
long as it is done in a responsible way that does not undermine our 
credibility as a leader in the fight against proliferation. I believe 
the Tauscher-Berman amendment will help to achieve that goal.
  Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from 
California (Mr. Royce).
  Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of this 
legislation, allowing for a nuclear cooperation agreement with India. 
The last two administrations have forged closer ties with India. And 
India is a nation now of over 1 billion people. The last two 
administrations frankly have overcome the chilly relations of the Cold 
War with India.
  And last July's joint statement committed each country to a global 
partnership which has accelerated our cooperation on many issues, 
including on counterterrorism. As we saw 2 weeks ago, when a series of 
commuter train bombings hit Mumbai, killing over 200 Indian people, 
India is a frontline state in the struggle against Islamist terrorism.
  Congress has played a leading role promoting U.S.-India relations. 
There is an India Caucus which I cochaired in the 107th Congress. In 
2001, I led a congressional delegation to India's earthquake-shattered 
Gujarat region. Other Members have focused on India. But nothing we 
have done is as significant as the civilian nuclear cooperation 
agreement that we are debating today.
  As our distinguished chairman has noted, the International Relations 
Committee has given this agreement close and extensive review. We held 
five hearings, which is certainly warranted given the high stakes.
  Supporters and detractors alike recognize the great significance of 
this policy shift that the Bush administration has engineered. I would 
like to commend Chairman Hyde. He took a weak administration 
legislative proposal, one dismissive of congressional prerogative and 
turned it around. I want to commend Ranking Member Lantos, too, for his 
detailed work on this challenging issue.
  While nuclear energy is controversial in the United States, it is not 
in India. Like in several other countries, nuclear energy is widely 
viewed as a critical technology, one central to uplifting hundreds of 
millions of impoverished Indians. So India will develop its nuclear 
energy sector, not as easily or as quickly without this deal, but it 
will nonetheless. And India will not relinquish its nuclear weapons at 
this point in time, which is understandable, given its security 
situation.
  So right now, many Indians view the United States as blocking India's 
technological and developmental aspirations by our opposition to their 
acquiring nuclear material and technology. With its growing economy, 
India is consuming more and more oil. It is competing on the world 
market, competing with American consumers for limited hydrocarbon 
resources.
  This gives Americans an interest in helping India expand its nuclear 
power industry, which this legislation does. It also encourages India 
to move away from burning its abundance of highly polluting coal. By 
passing this legislation, we also take a step toward internationalizing 
India's nuclear industry, which I believe would make it safer.
  Young Indian scientists and engineers in the nuclear field are 
interested in collaborating with their American counterparts. Today 
they are isolated. I would rather know more rather than less about 
India's nuclear work. Some have raised legitimate concerns about the 
impact of this agreement upon the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and 
the Indian nuclear weapons arsenal. I am not prepared, at this point, 
to call this agreement a nonproliferation plus, as some do, but neither 
is it the clear setback some opponents describe.
  For one, this agreement forces a separation between India's civilian 
and military nuclear programs. This is a good step. The agreement also 
is likely to increase India's cooperation with us in confronting 
countries seeking to break their NPT commitment by developing nuclear 
weapons.
  In my view, this agreement is more likely a wash in the 
nonproliferation category, while its broad benefits, primarily 
cultivating a more influential relationship with India, are big pluses.
  Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to distinguished 
Democratic whip, my good friend from Maryland (Mr. Hoyer).

                              {time}  1800

  Mr. HOYER. I thank Mr. Lantos for yielding the time, Mr. Chairman. I 
support this important bipartisan legislation, and I urge my colleagues 
to do the same.
  It is critical to note that this bill creates a two-vote process for 
Congress to approve this Civil Nuclear Cooperation Agreement with 
India. While the bill allows the necessary waivers to the Atomic Energy 
Act for this pact, it also requires that the President submit a final 
agreement to Congress for a second up or down vote. I want to 
congratulate the gentleman from California for getting us a process 
that gives us that opportunity.
  In short, I believe a Civil Nuclear Cooperation Agreement with India 
will serve America's strategic interests and strengthen global 
nonproliferation regimes by bringing the majority of India's nuclear 
reactors under International Atomic Energy Agency oversight for the 
first time.
  In addition, this bill will strengthen the relationship between our 
two great democracies. A civilian nuclear agreement will help India's 
burgeoning economy continue to grow, and it will provide India with a 
clean source of energy.
  Now, it is true that India is not a signatory to the Nuclear 
Nonproliferation Treaty, an international accord that I strongly 
support. But it is also true that India has honored the spirit of that 
treaty and has been a responsible nuclear nation for the past 32 years, 
unlike Pakistan, North Korea and Iran, I might observe.
  Under this bill, the President is allowed to waive provisions of the 
Atomic Energy Act only after he sends Congress a determination that 
India has a credible plan to separate civil and military nuclear 
facilities. The President must also send to Congress a determination of 
an agreement between India and the IAEA requiring that agency to 
safeguard in perpetuity India's civil nuclear facilities, materials, 
and programs. In addition, the legislation requires detailed annual 
reports on the implementation of this agreement.
  Mr. Chairman, I believe the House bill represents a policy that 
recognizes our Indian allies' responsible actions over more than three 
decades and our two nations' strong and deepening relationship. I thank 
the gentleman from California and Mr. Royce for their work on this bill 
and rise, as I said at the outset, in support of it.
  Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
California (Mr. Rohrabacher).
  Mr. ROHRABACHER. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of this legislation 
which will further the cause of civilian nuclear cooperation with 
India, and I would like to thank Mr. Lantos and Chairman Hyde for the 
work that they put into this, again demonstrating the bipartisan 
cooperation that is possible even in the arena of international affairs 
which sometimes gets rather testy.
  Let me note that the United States-India relations got off to a very 
bad start shortly after India became independent of Great Britain. 
India basically sided with Russia in the Cold War. Well, the Cold War 
is over, and we should be making up for lost time, which is exactly 
what this bill is all about.
  This is dramatically in the interests of both of our countries. 
Economically,

[[Page H5906]]

a prosperous, democratic India with an expanding middle class is a 
dream market for American entrepreneurs, manufacturers and, yes, 
technologists. This agreement is designed to provide India the energy 
it needs to achieve its economic goals but in a way that will not 
damage America or other western democracies' economy by fencing off and 
consuming limited energy resources or using high-pollution energy 
resources of their own.
  The high-temperature gas reactor, my subcommittee had a hearing on 
this, noting that there are new nuclear alternatives like the high-
temperature gas reactor and other type of nuclear power systems that 
offer a safe method of providing India the energy it needs to uplift 
the standard of living of its people. This legislation is pro-
prosperity, pro-energy; and, if we are vigilant, it will not be 
contrary to the interests of the nonproliferation movement. But it is 
up to us to work with India to make sure that nonproliferation remains 
a high priority for our countries, both of us together.
  Finally, let me note, Mr. Chairman, that we need to have a strong 
relationship for it with India, yes, with Japan and, yes, with the 
former Soviet Union, if we are to have peace in this world. There is a 
danger looming in the future. Hopefully, China will some day 
democratize. Until then, we must have alliances with the world's 
democracies like India in order to preserve the peace of the world.
  Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Chairman, I am very pleased to yield 3 minutes to my 
good friend from New York (Mr. Ackerman), a distinguished colleague and 
valued member of the International Relations Committee.
  Mr. ACKERMAN. Mr. Chairman, today the House has an opportunity to 
make an historic choice of great proportions. For 30 years, Mr. 
Chairman, U.S. policy toward India has been defined and constrained by 
our insistence on punishing India for its sovereign decision not to 
sign the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.
  The truth be told, had India conducted its nuclear tests earlier, it 
would have been treated the way we treat France and Britain and Russia 
and China and ourselves. In short, it would have been grandfathered in 
as a member of the nuclear weapons club. But they did not test earlier, 
and they have been treated differently. And nothing that we have tried 
over the last three decades has convinced them to give up their nuclear 
status, and nothing that we would say over the next three decades would 
convince them, either.
  The time has come for the United States to deal with the reality of 
South Asia as it is and not as a fanciful wish. India lives in a 
difficult neighborhood, next to Pakistan, which continues to produce 
nuclear weapons unchecked, and China, whose commitment to a fissile 
material cutoff is suspect, at best. If India didn't exist in that 
neighborhood, we would have to invent them.
  India has been a responsible nuclear power and deserves to be treated 
that way. The bill before us does just that.
  Critics have expressed concerns regarding the bill's impact on our 
nonproliferation policy; and, clearly Iran, Pakistan and North Korea 
are looking for clues as to what it means for them and their nuclear 
programs.
  What do you tell Pakistan and Iran and North Korea? Well, you tell 
them this: If you want to be treated like India, be like India. Be a 
responsible international actor with regard to weapons of mass 
destruction technologies. Don't sell your nuclear technologies to the 
highest bidder. Don't provide it to terrorists. Be a democracy, a real 
democracy like India, and work with us on important foreign policy 
objectives and not against us.
  Iran and North Korea signed the NPT and are now running away from 
their freely entered into obligation and away from IAEA inspections. 
India did not sign the NPT, and yet is embracing the IAEA and embracing 
global nonproliferation. India's attitude should be recognized and 
commended and congratulated.
  There are two options before us today: One, don't pass the bill. We 
do that, and we allow India to pursue its national interests unimpeded, 
as it has been doing outside of the nonproliferation mainstream.
  The other is to make a deal with India and give to the United States 
and the international community a window in perpetuity into two-thirds 
of India's nuclear facilities and all of its future nuclear facilities, 
under safeguards, in compliance, transparent.
  I think the choice is clear: If you want the IAEA to inspect India's 
civilian nuclear facilities, then you are for the bill. If you want 
India to be obligated to adhere to the missile technologies control 
regime for the first time, then you are for the bill. If you want them 
to comply for the first time with the nuclear suppliers' groups 
guidelines for the first time, then you are for the bill. If you want 
to send a clear message to nuclear rogue states about how to behave, 
then you are for the bill. And, if you want a broad, deep, and enduring 
strategic relationship with India, then you are for the bill.
  Mr. Chairman, it is time for a 21st century policy towards India, one 
that supports and encourages India's emergence as a global, responsible 
power and solidifies U.S.-India bilateral relations for decades to 
come. The bill before us today is that new policy. I urge our 
colleagues to vote ``yes'' on H.R. 5682.
  Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
South Carolina (Mr. Wilson).
  Mr. WILSON of South Carolina. Mr. Chairman, I rise today as an 
original cosponsor of the civilian nuclear agreement. As a member of 
the International Relations Committee and past cochair of the 
Congressional Caucus on India and Indian Americans, this is an issue I 
have enthusiastically supported. I want to thank Chairman Henry Hyde, 
Ranking Member Tom Lantos, Chairman Ed Royce, Caucus Cochairs Gary 
Ackerman and Joe Crowley, and all other members of the committee who 
have crafted well-balanced, bipartisan legislation.
  Some incorrectly believe this agreement will have a negative impact 
on nonproliferation. In contrast, it will greatly strengthen our 
current nonproliferation system. India has long been outside of the 
international nonproliferation regimes. Under this agreement, India 
will place 14 of 22 existing and planned nuclear facilities under IAEA 
safeguards.
  For 30 years, India has protected its nuclear programs. It has not 
allowed proliferation of its nuclear technology. India is the world's 
largest democracy, with the 11th largest economy. It is treated 
uniquely because of its history of maintaining a successful nuclear 
nonproliferation regime. I saw firsthand on a visit to India in 
December the vibrant future of India as America's partner in the codel 
led by Dan Burton.
  Passage of this agreement promotes meaningful mutual economic 
benefits for India and America. Secretary Rice has noted that as many 
as 5,000 direct jobs and 15,000 indirect jobs could be created as a 
result of this agreement. In addition, India will be better positioned 
to compete in the global economy, and trade between our countries will 
continue to grow at a record pace, such as in 2005 when we recorded a 
30 percent increase in exports to India.
  In conclusion, God bless our troops and we will never forget 
September 11.
  Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Chairman, I am delighted to yield 2 minutes to my 
good friend from Nevada (Ms. Berkley) so she may engage in a colloquy.
  Ms. BERKLEY. Mr. Chairman, I would like to thank Mr. Lantos and Mr. 
Royce for engaging in this colloquy with me.
  I fully appreciate the importance and significance of this historic 
piece of legislation. However, I rise today to discuss two amendments 
that were adopted by the committee.
  I am sure that you are all aware that for over 20 years Nevada has 
fought to keep nuclear waste out of Yucca Mountain. This is a most 
compelling issue for the people of the State of Nevada. I am very 
pleased that the committee agreed with my arguments that, before we 
enter into any agreement to support a proliferation of nuclear power, 
we should know where the nuclear waste is going to be stored.
  Nevada certainly doesn't want to store the nuclear waste that is 
generated in our own country, much less the nuclear waste that is 
generated in other countries, and that includes India.
  I am pleased that an amendment that I sponsored ensuring that spent 
fuel

[[Page H5907]]

from India's civilian nuclear reactors cannot be transferred to the 
United States without congressional oversight, that was passed by the 
committee. Another amendment that requires the President to issue an 
annual report describing the disposal of nuclear waste from India's 
civilian nuclear program was also approved by the committee.
  I believe these are critical provisions that the final bill simply 
must contain. Both of these provisions passed without objection during 
the committee markup of this legislation. I would ask the chairman 
whether he can assure me that he will work to maintain these provisions 
in the final bill as the legislative process goes forward.
  I yield to the distinguished subcommittee chairman.
  Mr. ROYCE. I thank the gentlewoman for yielding.
  I supported the gentlewoman's amendment in committee. And while not 
necessarily concurring with all the views that she expressed in 
committee, I supported her amendment; and hers are helpful amendments 
which I will work to maintain in the final bill.
  Ms. BERKLEY. I thank the chairman.
  I yield to the ranking member of the committee.
  Mr. LANTOS. I want to thank the gentlewoman for her excellent work on 
this legislation. I will do my utmost to work to keep this provision in 
the legislation.
  Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time for 
closing.
  Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Chairman, I am delighted to yield 2\1/2\ minutes to 
my good friend from South Carolina (Mr. Spratt), the distinguished 
ranking member on our Budget Committee.

                              {time}  1815

  Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding.
  I would like to engage my colleagues and managers of this bill, Mr. 
Royce and Mr. Lantos, in a colloquy on the issue of India's nuclear 
testing moratorium.
  Section 129 of the Atomic Energy Act provides that, ``No nuclear 
materials and equipment or sensitive nuclear technology shall be 
exported to any non-nuclear weapon state that is found by the President 
to have detonated a nuclear device.'' It is my understanding that 
section 4(a)(3)(A) of H.R. 5682 waives this restriction for any nuclear 
test that occurred before July 18, 2005, effectively allowing nuclear 
cooperation in spite of India's past nuclear tests, but not for any 
detonation or tests after that day.
  Therefore, if India were to do so, continued nuclear cooperation 
would be in jeopardy. Is that an accurate assessment?
  Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. SPRATT. I yield to the gentleman from California.
  Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Chairman, the gentleman from South Carolina is indeed 
correct. It is our intent that section 129 of the Atomic Energy Act 
should apply prospectively to India. Should India conduct a nuclear 
test in the future, one likely consequence would be the discontinuation 
of nuclear fuel and technology sharing by the United States with India.
  Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. SPRATT. I yield to the gentleman from California.
  Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Chairman, I agree with my friend, Congressman Royce. 
Nuclear tests by India would put the U.S.-India nuclear cooperation 
agreement in serious jeopardy.
  Mr. SPRATT. I thank my colleagues for that clarification. As a 
further point of clarification, India's prime minister has reported to 
his parliament that, ``the United States will support an Indian effort 
to develop a strategic reserve of nuclear fuel to guard against any 
disruption of supply over the lifetime of India's reactor.'' A sizeable 
fuel reserve could conceivably minimize the impact of a U.S. decision 
to cut off fuel supplies should India conduct a nuclear test.
  Mr. Royce and Mr. Lantos, is it your understanding that aiding in the 
development of a fuel reserve is not intended to facilitate a decision 
by the government of India to resume nuclear testing? I yield to the 
gentleman.
  Mr. ROYCE. That is our understanding.
  Mr. LANTOS. And I agree with that interpretation.
  Mr. SPRATT. Finally, would the gentlemen then agree with me that any 
fuel reserve provided to the Indians for use in safeguarded, civilian 
nuclear facilities should be sized in a way that maintains continued 
fuel supply as a deterrent to Indian nuclear testing? I yield to the 
gentlemen.
  Mr. ROYCE. Any fuel reserve should be intended to give India 
protections against short-term fluctuations in the supply of nuclear 
fuel.
  Mr. LANTOS. I agree with Mr. Royce on this point.
  Mr. SPRATT. I thank Mr. Royce and Mr. Lantos for that clarification 
and commend you for your excellent work on this important legislation.
  Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Chairman, I am very pleased to yield 2\1/4\ minutes 
to our distinguished colleague from American Samoa (Mr. Faleomavaega), 
my good friend.
  (Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA asked and was given permission to revise and extend 
his remarks.)
  Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of H.R. 5682, the 
U.S. and India Nuclear Cooperation Promotion Act, and I want to 
certainly commend Chairman Henry Hyde and Ranking Member Tom Lantos for 
their leadership in moving this legislation forward. This proposed 
legislation is a classic example of what bipartisanship is all about, 
and I, again, commend our chairman and ranking member and their staffs 
for their statesmanship and initiative in bringing this bill to the 
floor for consideration.
  I also want to compliment my colleague from New York (Mr. Ackerman) 
for giving our colleagues a little historical perspective about this 
whole question of non-proliferation, and I want to share with my 
colleagues a historical perspective of why India did not and could not 
sign the nuclear non-proliferation treaty.
  Mr. Chairman, while some of our critics may argue that India has not 
signed the NPT, I submit that had it not been for our own country's 
indifference, I call it benign neglect, if you will, India may have 
been a member of the nuclear club and our discussion about the NPT 
would have been a moot point.
  In the early 1960s, despite having a civilian nuclear program, India 
called for a global disarmament, but nations with nuclear weapons 
turned a deaf ear. In 1962, China attacked India claiming it was 
responding to border provocation. The United States responded by saying 
it might protect India against a future attack, but when China exploded 
its first nuclear bomb in 1964, the U.S. welcomed China as a member of 
the nuclear club, and we also supported China becoming a permanent 
member of the United Nations Security Council.
  It may be of interest to our colleagues, Mr. Chairman, that India had 
a civilian nuclear program in place prior to the NPT being open for 
signatures in 1968, and at the time, India was only months away from 
possessing nuclear weapons. So while critics may argue that India has 
not signed the NPT, I agree with India's position that the NPT is, and 
has always been, flawed and discriminatory.
  Therefore, it is little wonder that India exploded its first nuclear 
device in 1974. Recent U.S. State Department declassified documents on 
U.S. foreign policy show that India had little choice given the hostile 
attitude assumed by our country towards India during the Nixon-
Kissinger years.
  I commend President Bush and Prime Minister Singh for bringing this 
initiative to the table. I also applaud the effort of Under Secretary 
of State Nicholas Burns who was our chief negotiator in development of 
this agreement. He did an outstanding job and showed true 
statesmanship.
  I also want to thank Mr. Sanjay Puri, a great leader in our Indian 
American community for all that he has done to rally support for this 
bill.
  I urge my colleagues to support this legislation.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of H.R. 5682, the U.S. and India 
Nuclear Cooperation Promotion Act and I commend Chairman Henry Hyde and 
Ranking Member Tom Lantos for their leadership in moving this 
legislation forward. This proposed legislation is a classic example of 
what bipartisanship is all about and I again commend our chairman and 
ranking member and their staffs for their statesmanship and initiative 
in bringing this bill

[[Page H5908]]

to the floor for consideration. I want to share with my colleagues a 
historical perspective why India did not and could not sign the Nuclear 
Non-proliferation Treaty.
  Mr. Chairman, while some of our critics may argue that India has not 
signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, NPS, I submit that had it 
not been for our country's indifference or, benign neglect, if you 
will, India may have been a member of the nuclear club and our 
discussion about the NPT would be a moot point. In the early 1960s, 
despite having a civilian nuclear program, India called for global 
disarmament but nations with nuclear weapons turned a deaf ear.
  In 1962, China attacked India claiming it was responding to border 
provocation. The U.S. responded by saying it might protect India 
against a future attack. But when China exploded its first nuclear bomb 
in 1964, the U.S. welcomed China as a member of the nuclear club and we 
also supported China to become a permanent member of the United Nations 
Security Council. It may be of interest to our colleagues that India 
had a civilian nuclear program in place prior to the NPT being opened 
for signature in 1968 and, at the time, India was only months away from 
possessing nuclear weapons. So while critics may argue that India has 
not signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, NPS, I agree with 
India's position that the NPT is, and has always been, flawed and 
discriminatory. Therefore, it is little wonder that India exploded its 
first nuclear device in 1974. Recent U.S. State Department declassified 
documents on U.S. foreign policy show that India had little choice 
given the hostile attitude assumed by the United States towards India 
during the Nixon/Kissinger years.
  In 1965, believing India was weakened from its war with China, 
Pakistan attacked India. In response, the U.S. remained neutral while 
China outspokenly supported Pakistan. Concerned for its own security 
and having little reason to rely on the U.S., India announced in 1966 
that it would produce nuclear weapons within 18 months. But, in 1967, 
the U.S. joined with the Soviet Union in crafting a nuclear non-
proliferation treaty which to this day states that only the United 
States, Russia, the United Kingdom, China, and France are permitted to 
own nuclear weapons because only these five nations possessed nuclear 
weapons at the time the treaty was open for signature in 1968.
  As we all can agree, India then and India today lives in one of the 
world's toughest regions and it is a bit Eurocentric for the U.S. to 
treat India as if she is beholden to us for the safety, protection, and 
well-being of her people. It is no grand gesture on our part that we 
now offer India civil nuclear cooperation. Instead, U.S.-India civil 
nuclear cooperation is long overdue and, quite frankly, the deal is as 
good for us as it is for India.
  Mr. Chairman, I commend President Bush and Prime Minister Singh for 
bringing this initiative to the table. I also applaud the efforts of 
Under Secretary of State Nicholas Burns who was our chief negotiator in 
the development of this agreement. As the lead negotiator, Secretary 
Burns has represented our Nation's interest with distinction and true 
statesmanship, and I am honored to have worked with him during these 
critical months leading up to today's historic deliberation of this 
important bill.
  I also want to thank Mr. Sanjay Puri, a great leader in our Indian-
American community for all that he has done to rally support for this 
bill.
  I urge my colleagues to vote in favor of H.R. 5682.
  Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
California (Mr. Schiff).
  Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding, and I 
rise in support of this legislation and of the growing strategic 
partnership between the United States, the world's oldest democracy, 
and India, the world's largest. The hard work by Members and the staff 
on the IR Committee under the leadership of the chairman and ranking 
member have produced a bill that better attempts to address legitimate 
nonproliferation concerns and respects congressional authority to 
approve agreements.
  During the markup, the committee adopted an amendment I offered to 
minimize the risk that our nuclear exports would assist India's nuclear 
weapons programs.
  Under this amendment, the President would be required to submit to 
Congress a report on the steps he is taking to ensure our exports do 
not contribute to India's nuclear weapons program. In addition, my 
amendment declared that it is U.S. policy to encourage India not to 
increase its production of fissile material in military facilities.
  Taken together with the other statements by the administration, this 
amendment makes clear that it is U.S. policy to promote the prompt 
negotiation of a fissile material production cutoff treaty; that 
pending entry into force of such a treaty, to press for the earliest 
possible achievement of a multilateral moratorium to accomplish this 
purpose; and to urge India to refrain from increasing its rate of 
production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons.
  Mr. Chairman, the final bill must contain these provisions, and I 
would ask my colleague and the manager of the bill, Mr. Royce, whether 
he can assure me that he will work to maintain these provisions and 
their stated intent in the final bill as the legislative process goes 
forward.
  Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. SCHIFF. I yield to the gentleman from California.
  Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Chairman, yes. I supported the gentleman's amendment 
in committee, and I will work with him to maintain it in the final 
bill.
  Mr. SCHIFF. I thank the gentleman.
  Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. SCHIFF. I yield to the gentleman from California.
  Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank the gentleman for his 
excellent work on this legislation, and I intend to work to keep this 
provision in the legislation.
  Mr. SCHIFF. I thank both of you gentlemen. I intend to support the 
legislation.
  Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Chairman, I am delighted to yield 2 minutes to the 
gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Markey), my very dear friend and our 
most distinguished colleague.
  Mr. MARKEY. Mr. Chairman, this agreement pours nuclear fuel on the 
fire of an India-Pakistan nuclear arms race. This agreement will free 
up 40 to 50 bombs worth of nuclear fuel for Indian nuclear bombs, and 
the consequence of that will be that Pakistan will respond, and 
Pakistan will respond with A.Q. Khan under house arrest in Islamabad, 
the Johnny Appleseed of nuclear weapons spread from Iran to Libya to 
North Korea.
  And how do we know that? We know that because in Monday's Washington 
Post we learned from an outside source that Pakistan is building a 
facility that can create 50 plutonium nuclear bombs a year. We should 
be debating that out here on the House floor tonight.
  This House has 2 days to reject a sale of 36 F-16 bombers that can 
take the 50 nuclear bombs which Pakistan can make each year in a radius 
of 1,500 kilometers, but we are not going to debate that. We are not 
going to debate Pakistan's nuclear program, which Congress was not told 
about, the American public was not told about.
  Who is in Pakistan? A.Q. Khan is in Pakistan. Osama bin Laden is in 
Pakistan. Al Qaeda is in Pakistan.
  This agreement is going to fuel an arms race, a nuclear arms race in 
southeast Asia, and it is going to spread across the world, and instead 
of debating an F-16 bill, 36 of them to Pakistan, with this abomination 
of a nuclear program which they have, we are instead fueling it with 
this India program which Pakistan knows is cynical because it will free 
up 50 bombs worth of civilian domestic Indian nuclear fuel for their 
bomb program.
  We must halt, we must stop this nuclear arms race in southeast Asia. 
We must vote ``no'' on this proposal. It is absurd. We should be 
debating Pakistan's nuclear program, Pakistan's F-16 program tonight, 
or else we will look back on this as an historic failure.
  Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  I think we are all very concerned about the reports on Pakistan's 
programs that appeared this week. I think it was Monday in the 
Washington Post, but I think it is important to also note that that 
report stated that the construction on this facility in Pakistan to 
make these bombs began sometime in the year 2000. So this is not 
something that I think can be characterized as a reaction to this new 
initiative with India.
  I do have concerns about a nuclear arms buildup in Asia. Again, this 
is something that the administration should be doing more on, working 
towards a fissile material cutoff treaty.
  However, I would just respond by pointing out that this agreement 
gives us a chance to be engaged with India on their program instead of 
being on the outside as we have been for decades.

[[Page H5909]]

  Mr. Chairman, I yield for the purposes of a unanimous consent request 
to the gentleman from Iowa (Mr. Leach), the chairman of the Asia 
Subcommittee.
  (Mr. LEACH asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. LEACH. Mr. Chairman, at the outset I would like to recognize 
Chairman Hyde and the distinguished Ranking Member, Mr. Lantos, for 
their leadership in improving the Administration's draft proposal for 
facilitating civil nuclear cooperation between the United States and 
India.
  In particular, I appreciate their efforts to lessen the 
nonproliferation risks inherent in this initiative and to ensure that 
Congress remains a full partner with the Executive Branch as we move 
forward with this endeavor.
  Nonetheless, while the issue at hand is a close call, in my judgment 
this particular initiative does not strike the right balance between 
two competing American national security interests: the important goal 
of improving relations with a rising India and the critical priority of 
preventing the spread of nuclear weapons and fissile material in an era 
hallmarked by the global threat of terrorism. Let me explain why.
  There is nothing more difficult than to attempt to put perspective on 
events of day because so many issues can only be understood clearly, if 
at all, with the passage of time. For example, if we ask what is new on 
the Asian landscape over the last several years there is a tendency to 
emphasize troubling developments: the scourge of terrorism, North 
Korea, tensions over Taiwan, and America's growing trade deficit with 
China. But on the positive side little is more consequential than 
America's deepening ties with India.
  The growing warmth between our two countries has its roots in the 
common values and the increasingly congruent interests of democratic 
societies committed to the ideal of liberty, social tolerance, 
representative government and the fight against terrorism, as well as 
other transnational threats--such as the spread of weapons of mass 
destruction, illicit narcotics, and the scourge of HIV/AIDS. In this 
regard all Americans condemn the recent horrific bomb attacks in 
Kashmir and Mumbai, and we stand with the people and government of 
India in their opposition to anarchistic acts of terror.
  Our deepening government-to-government relationship is complemented 
by a rich mosaic of expanding people-to-people ties. In many ways, the 
more than 2 million Indian-Americans have become a living bridge 
between our two great democracies, bringing together our two peoples, 
as well as greatly enlarging our understanding of one another.
  From a Congressional perspective, it should be underscored that 
America's commitment to this robust and multi-faceted relationship is 
fully bipartisan. As underscored by the debate on this measure, there 
is virtually no dissent in Washington from the precept that India and 
the United States should become increasingly close strategic partners 
with compelling incentives over time to develop convergent perspectives 
on a host of regional and global policy concerns.
  By any objective measure, U.S.-India relations have never been on 
more solid footing. From new agreements on defense cooperation to 
expanded high technology trade and space cooperation, the relationship 
has been moving forward in an impressive fashion. On the economic 
front, America is India's largest trading partner and largest foreign 
investor. In many ways, however, what is impressive is how marginal, 
not how significant, is our trade. Economic and commercial ties between 
the U.S. and India are at an incipient, not end stage, and arguably 
deserve priority emphasis at this point in our relationship.
  In this context, many in Washington and elsewhere around the world 
were caught by surprise with the Administration's offer last July to 
extend full civilian nuclear cooperation to India; a proposal which 
presented Congress with a fait accompli, notwithstanding the fact that 
implementation would require legislative action.
  By background, when Prime Minister Singh was set to visit Washington 
last summer, the Administration was weighing two policy options to help 
ensure maximum success for this important summit with the President.
  One option would have been to announce unequivocal U.S. support for 
India's claim to a permanent seat on the United Nations Security 
Council; a stance clearly in the interest of India and also compatible 
with the interests of the United States. Bizarrely, however, the 
Administration position then and now has been that Washington is 
unprepared to take a firm position in support of Indian membership 
until the U.S. achieves certain goals related to UN administrative and 
management reform, none of which are as critical as the case for 
Security Council enlargement to reflect the new balance of power in 
world affairs.
  Frankly, I am flabbergasted by the Administration's ideological 
rigidity, as well as its lack of preparation to support India on this 
issue. I regard the U.S. position as awkward philosophically, 
illogical, and incompatible with sound strategic judgment.
  Instead of supporting India's aspirations for Security Council 
membership, the Administration instead chose to peremptorily re-write 
the rules of the global nonproliferation that have well-served U.S. 
interests for over three decades.
  To be sure, I acknowledge that there are a number of credible 
rationales for this agreement: to earn trust and goodwill with 
policymakers in Delhi, and the Indian public; to help accelerate the 
development of a strategic partnership between our two countries; to 
promote the use of nuclear power as an environmentally-friendly 
alternative to the use of coal and other scarce fossil fuels; and to 
emulate an Eisenhower-style atoms-for-peace initiative.
  Nevertheless, as strong as the case for this initiative may be, I 
remain deeply concerned that the agreement negotiated by the 
Administration fundamentally undermines the Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
Treaty (NPT), the linchpin of U.S.led international efforts to stem the 
spread of nuclear weapons.
  Administration officials assert that the exceptional treatment being 
accorded to India is unique and un-replicable. Once an exception to 
treaty law is made, however, the door is opened for a whole spectrum of 
governments, including close friends and alliance partners, to come 
forward to make comparable claims for special treatment--whether they 
be Brazil, Egypt, Japan, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, Pakistan, and even 
Taiwan.
  If India were the only consideration, it would be a no-brainer to 
support this agreement. Unfortunately, at issue is the rule of law as 
it applies to us and others as well.
  In particular a number of other countries, with whom we currently do 
not have amicable relations, such as Iran and North Korea, can be 
expected to similarly press the international community to recognize 
their legitimacy as nuclear weapons states. And if we unilaterally 
declare the right to ignore international law, other countries, 
including nuclear weapon states, can not be expected to go along with 
an exclusive American right to take exception to treaties.
  This agreement thus creates opportunity for countries to use 
commercial or geopolitical rationales to expand forms of nuclear 
cooperation otherwise prohibited by existing international norms (such 
as the NPT) or procedures (such as those developed by the multilateral 
Nuclear Suppliers Group).
  For example, in the immediate wake of the President's announcement of 
a policy shift, before either the Congress or the multilateral NSG 
could consider the proposal, Moscow moved to preempt Washington by 
announcing it would provide New Delhi with uranium reactor fuel in 
contravention of NSG guidelines.
  In other words, the mere announcement of an Executive Branch-
initiated proposal has had the effect of undercutting the NPT and 
precipitated another nation-state to implement key aspects of 
Washington's initiative.
  Similarly, the government of Pakistan announced it would be obligated 
to match any expansion in India's nuclear weapons program.
  The reason we have an NPT is to restrain nuclear weapons development. 
Based on news reports this past week from Pakistan, it is clear that 
one of the consequences of breaking international law is the 
precipitation of an arms race on the Indian Subcontinent. But as 
unfortunate as this arms race is, the consequence of the U.S.-led 
unraveling of the NPT is the spiraling of nuclear weapons development 
elsewhere.
  Mr. Chairman, in a philosophical context this agreement is a 
reflection of an Administration approach to foreign policy rooted in 
the so-called doctrine of American Exceptionalism, which neo-cons do 
not define as refining a shining city on a Hill but as the right of a 
superpower to place itself above the legal and institutional restraints 
applied to others.
  In the neo-con world, values are synonymous with power. The implicit 
assumption in that American security can be bought and managed alone, 
in many cases without allies, and without consideration of contrasting 
international views or the effect of our policies on others. Treaties 
like a Comprehensive Test Ban, which every President since Eisenhower 
has propounded, have been rejected, as have negotiations to strengthen 
the verification provisions of the Biological Weapons Convention.
  Now the Administration proposes to weaken the NPT, perhaps fatally, 
which despite its weaknesses has helped limit the number of nuclear 
weapon states to a relative handful instead of 20 or 30 or even more.
  As much as I support the Administration's desire to more rapidly 
advance a warming of relations with India, I cannot in good conscience 
support a weakening of the global nonproliferation regime or the 
breaching of United States obligations under international law. I 
therefore cannot support the legislation in its current form.

[[Page H5910]]

  Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Chairman, I am delighted to yield 1 minute to the 
gentlewoman from California (Ms. Pelosi), the distinguished Democratic 
leader, my friend and neighbor.
  Ms. PELOSI. Mr. Chairman, I thank the distinguished gentleman from 
California for yielding, for his tremendous leadership in making our 
country strong and respected throughout the world.
  I am pleased to join him in paying tribute to the chairman of the 
committee, Henry Hyde. What a wonderful honor that this bill is named 
for him. He, too, has been a champion to promote a values-based 
diplomacy for our country. We have all fought many years with him in 
support of human rights throughout the world. This is probably one of 
the last bills that will be completed on issues that relate to national 
security and the respect with which we are held in the world. So 
appropriately, it is named for Mr. Hyde.
  Both Mr. Hyde and Mr. Lantos have presented the House with 
legislation that is a vast improvement, frankly, over the bill that the 
President requested earlier this year, and it is a tribute to their 
leadership that we can all come together on this legislation this 
evening.
  The bill before us establishes a two-step process for the India 
nuclear agreement. It is a process and legislation, which I support, 
that allows Congress to reserve final judgment on the agreement until 
the specifics are known. It requires that before Congress votes on the 
agreement, India and the International Atomic Energy Agency will have 
had to establish a process through which IAEA safeguards will be 
applied forever to India's civilian nuclear facilities, programs and 
materials.
  Therefore, if an agreement is ultimately approved, Congress will 
retain the ability to monitor it through the required annual reports on 
U.S. nonproliferation policies in South Asia and on the implementation 
of the U.S.-India nuclear deal.

                              {time}  1830

  This legislation is important because it recognizes that the prospect 
of greater nuclear cooperation with a nation that has not signed the 
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty raises serious concerns. As one who 
came to Congress intent on improving international nonproliferation 
regimes, I appreciate those concerns. One of the most significant, the 
issue of the production by India of fissile material, is addressed by 
an amendment to be offered by the gentleman from California (Mr. 
Berman).
  The Berman amendment, which I support, conditions the provision of 
nuclear fuel by the U.S. on a presidential determination that India has 
halted fissile material production. But even if the Berman amendment is 
not adopted, I hope that the agreement that will be presented to 
Congress for approval when negotiations are concluded contains a 
promise by India to halt the production of fissile material. Such a 
promise would improve the agreement and go a long way to convincing 
those who cannot support today's legislation that their concerns have 
been heard and that the Bush administration and the government of India 
has sought to respond to them.
  The legislation before us clearly endorses the philosophy behind 
India's nuclear initiative; a judgment that security would be promoted 
by bringing India into the nuclear nonproliferation mainstream. On 
balance, I believe that judgment to be correct, and I thank you, Mr. 
Lantos and Mr. Hyde, for putting that balance here.
  Although not bound by the NPT, India has a strong record of 
supporting nonproliferation goals. They have never ever violated the 
NPT. India has demonstrated by its actions a commitment to safeguarding 
nuclear technology. That commitment will be strengthened by India's 
adherence to the Nuclear Suppliers Group guidelines and the Missile 
Technology Control Regime guidelines as required by the nuclear 
initiative.
  A close relationship with the democratic India is critical for the 
United States. There is a wide range of significant issues on which our 
shared values and shared interests will enable productive collaboration 
for the betterment of the world. This legislation reflects the strength 
of our current relationship with India and our hopes for its future. It 
is an expression of trust on matters relating to nuclear technology 
based on 3 decades of experience.
  I urge my colleagues to support it. Even though there may be some 
questions and some amendments which may pass or not prevail today, on 
balance, I believe this legislation as presented here is worthy of our 
support.
  I hope that the agreement that comes back to us is one that will be 
without controversy and will again be a reflection of the close bond 
between India and America. It was but a week ago when we were all 
gathered here to extend our sympathy to the people and the government 
of India because of the tragedy at Mumbai. Many of us expressed the 
love that we have for India and appreciation for the gifts that India 
has given to America, a vibrant dynamic Indo-American community which 
has contributed enormously to the economic success of our country and 
to our competitiveness in the world.
  They have also contributed much to us in terms of our own social 
justice. We owe much to India as the source of nonviolence as a 
philosophy, espoused and practiced by Mahatma Gandhi. I said last week 
that when Reverend Martin Luther King, Jr. and Coretta Scott King went 
to India to study nonviolence, they received a gift from India that 
would serve our country well and be important and fundamental to our 
own civil rights movement; that nonviolence was a strength that again 
improved America, and for which we all should be indebted to India and 
we should never forget.
  I also personally join Mr. Lantos, because I know of his history on 
the subject in expressing appreciation to India for its hospitality to 
His Holiness the Dalai Lama, a great leader in the world. And I am 
enormously appreciative of the fact that his, I don't want to call it 
government in exile, but whatever the term of art is, in Darussalam in 
India.
  The list goes on and on, we can name them over and over, again 
whether it is again the contributions of the Indo-American community, 
the philosophy that sprang from India that is so important to us, or 
the support for human rights. But on target for today is India's 
commitment, which it has never violated, to support the principles of 
the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, which although it is not a party 
to that treaty, has been a supporter of its principles.
  Again, for that reason, I hope that all of our colleagues will vote 
in support of this legislation so that we can go to the next step and 
that we can go into the future continuing a long and beneficial 
relationship with India for us all.
  Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Chairman, before yielding time, I want to express my 
regret to all of my colleagues that the stringent requirements will 
enable me to yield no more than 1 minute to each of our speakers.
  Mr. Chairman, I am very pleased to yield 1 minute to a distinguished 
member of the committee, my good friend from California (Mr. Sherman).
  Mr. SHERMAN. Mr. Chairman, India is a democracy that understands the 
role of this Congress. They have negotiated a deal that dramatically 
loosens the controls on their nuclear weapons program, and they know 
that it is the role of this Congress to make that deal one step 
tighter.
  Our job is to protect the nonproliferation interests of the United 
States. The job of India is to say that any amendment we offer is a 
``killer amendment.'' Do not be fooled. They know and they expect that 
this Congress will do its job and make this deal one step better when 
it comes to controlling nuclear weapons.
  India did not sign the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. We should not 
punish India for becoming a nuclear power, but this deal in its present 
form facilitates building additional nuclear weapons by India. It will 
allow them to build twice as many nuclear weapons per year as they are 
doing now.
  That is why I will be offering an amendment that will help India's 
civilian nuclear program, without helping their military program.
  Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from New 
York (Mr. Crowley).
  Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to yield 1 minute to the 
gentleman.

[[Page H5911]]

  Mr. CROWLEY. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from California.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of the India Nuclear 
Cooperation Promotion Act, and I want to commend Chairman Hyde and 
Ranking Member Lantos for the work they put into crafting this 
bipartisan legislation that we have before us today. And I would like 
to thank the current chairs of the caucus on India and Indian 
Americans, Representative Gary Ackerman from Queens and my good friend 
Ileana Ros-Lehtinen from Florida for the support they have given to the 
passage of this agreement. I must also recognize the Indian-American 
community for the incredible advocacy work they have done to educate 
Members of Congress on the importance of this agreement.
  I want it to be clear that this vote sets the stage for allowing the 
cooperation, but the actual exchange of civilian nuclear cooperation 
will not take place until Congress is provided with the details of the 
relevant negotiations and takes a second up-or-down vote.
  We will be taking an historic step in our relations today by passing 
this agreement. This is about nuclear power access, not nuclear weapons 
enhancement. By passing this agreement, we will be bringing an India 
that has remained outside the nonproliferation regime for the past 32 
years under the nonproliferation tent.
  Some of my colleagues have argued we are destroying the Nuclear 
Nonproliferation Treaty, also known as the NPT, by passing this 
agreement. But while I have the deepest respect for the treaty and 
those who support it, we must be realistic in understanding why this 
deal needs to be done.
  India cannot sign the NPT unless it were to give up its nuclear 
weapons, which is unrealistic to ask a nation who finds themselves 
surrounded by nuclear-armed nations they have fought wars against. 
India has been punished for the past 32 years for testing a nuclear 
weapon, and during these 32 years of NPT limbo they have not externally 
proliferated, while remaining a true democracy with a strong rule of 
law.
  We need to use India as an example of what a nation should be doing 
to gain the respect and inclusion by the international community. I 
urge my colleagues to end India's nuclear isolation and allow them to 
be brought into the nonproliferation tent with the rest of the 
responsible states who seek safe and efficient civilian nuclear 
technology.
  I support this legislation because I support the relationship that 
our two countries should and will be sharing. If we expect India to be 
our ally in the 21st century, we must treat them as an equal, which is 
what this cooperation will provide. I trust my colleagues will 
recognize what our future with India holds and vote for final passage 
of this legislation.
  Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from New 
York (Mr. Meeks), our distinguished colleague.
  Mr. MEEKS of New York. Mr. Chairman, I too want to congratulate 
Chairman Hyde and Ranking Member Lantos for the strong bipartisan bill.
  This initiative really talks about and reflects confidence in India 
as a global strategic partner. You know, the world is flat, and we have 
to have these partners in the world. What this does is, it says to 
India, because it is one of the world's largest democracies, that we 
understand and we recognize that.
  Also, we have to remember that this is about civil nuclear power. 
India has over a billion people and we have to figure out how we also 
make sure that we protect and preserve our environment. So what this 
does is recognize that the production of clean energy can reduce 
further pollution of the environment and decrease dependency on fossil 
fuels.
  In fact, if you look at the Indian CO2 emission, a 
threefold increase in India nuclear capacity by 2015 would result in a 
reduction of over 170 million tons annually, or approximately the total 
current CO2 emissions of the Netherlands. So I strongly 
support this bill.
  Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Chairman, I am very pleased to yield the balance of 
my time to my good friend from California, Congresswoman Barbara Lee.
  The Acting CHAIRMAN (Mr. Gutknecht). The gentlewoman from California 
is recognized for 2\1/2\ minutes.
  Ms. LEE. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank the gentleman for yielding and 
for his leadership and for really crafting a bill that I think is much 
better than what it was prior to the hearing, but I must rise to oppose 
this bill.
  I had the privilege to visit India a few years ago with Mr. Crowley, 
and I witnessed firsthand the brilliance, the spirit, and the 
commitment to democracy of the Indian people. And like many of my 
colleagues, I strongly believe that it is in our country's best 
interest to strengthen our relationship with India. But to suggest that 
we can only do so at the expense of the international nonproliferation 
standards, as this legislation before us would, I think that is both 
dishonest and it is dangerous.
  Let us be clear. This is not about India. As far as I am concerned, 
there is no country, and I mean no country, for which it would be 
acceptable to sacrifice our international standards. The problem with 
the deal, as it is currently written, is that it will do lasting harm 
to more than 30 years of international efforts to stop the spread of 
nuclear weapons.
  This deal creates a double standard that undermines our efforts with 
countries like Iran and North Korea from developing nuclear weapons. It 
creates incentives for withdrawing from the Nuclear Nonproliferation 
Treaty. Why have countries like Brazil and South Korea spent all these 
years playing by the rules and not building nuclear weapons in exchange 
for civilian technology when India gets both?
  It sets a dangerous precedent. In explaining Beijing's rationale for 
potentially pursuing a deal with Pakistan, Professor Shen Dingli of 
China's Fudan University has already argued this. He said, ``If the 
United States can violate the nuclear rules, then we can violate them 
also.'' We should be fighting to save what is left of the international 
nonproliferation framework, not just throwing it away.
  We should insist that India formally commit to the goals and 
restrictions on the international nonproliferation framework and sign 
the Nonproliferation Treaty. Short of that, we should at least insist 
on specific nonproliferation safeguards, as specified in an amendment 
that I offered, which of course was not ruled in order. It would have 
required, however, India to commit to the basic principles consistent 
with the NPT. Again, unfortunately, this amendment was not made in 
order.
  We should not pass any type of a nuclear deal, a nuclear, quite 
frankly business deal, without these safeguards. I don't think we 
should throw them away. We need to go back to the drawing board and we 
need to make sure that international nonproliferation goals are adhered 
to.

                              {time}  1845

  Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Chairman, you know, while the United States is, in 
fact, leading the way on this agreement, it is a multilateral agreement 
in the sense that the NSG, 45 nations, must concur with this agreement; 
and Congress must approve a nuclear cooperation agreement that the 
administration is negotiating with India before technology is actually 
transferred.
  So I also want to make the point here that Congress is going to have 
a second crack at this agreement when it comes back. But here is the 
choice that we face: Either we continue to try to box in India and hope 
for the best, or we make this move, we engage India, and we hope to use 
our influence to move this increasingly important country in our 
direction. And this will help make India a true partner, a true partner 
as we enter what will be a decades-long struggle, I fear, against 
Islamist terrorism.
  This is not an ideal agreement, and the administration should be more 
aggressively pursuing an international fissile material cutoff. But 
this agreement is a good one which works through a difficult 
nonproliferation situation to strengthen an important relationship for 
us.
  That is why I ask my colleagues to approve this legislation. Frankly, 
it is a chance to strengthen an important relationship for us at a time 
when we need more strong relationships, especially with regional powers 
such as India; and, I will remind my colleagues, it strengthens a 
relationship with a democracy, based on the rule of law, a democracy 
that has a good record on nonproliferation.

[[Page H5912]]

  This deal is controversial in India. The coalition government of 
Prime Minister Singh has come under intense attack from the political 
extremes and from political opponents. He has been charged with selling 
out India, opening its nuclear facilities to international inspection, 
agreeing to check India's nuclear weapons production.
  So far the center has held. Let's not deliver India's Marxist and 
xenophobic forces a victory. They would like us to kill this deal. 
Let's pass this legislation. As Chairman Hyde argued and as the ranking 
member explained, let's pass this legislation. Let the administration 
negotiate a nuclear sharing agreement with India, and then look again 
and decide whether or not to proceed.
  I urge my colleagues to support this legislation.
  Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I oppose the India Nuclear Cooperation 
Promotion Act (H.R. 5682). The bill has substantially improved since it 
was first introduced in this body, but it still has a long way to go. I 
am particularly concerned about the failure of the bill to slow down a 
potentially catastrophic arms race in South Asia.
  This bill would allow the President to enter into a nuclear 
cooperation agreement with India, the world's largest democracy and an 
important strategic ally of the United States. Under the proposed 
agreement, the United States would transfer fissile material and 
nuclear technology to India in exchange for India's promise to separate 
its civilian and military nuclear programs, subject its civilian 
programs to a host of international inspections and controls, and 
continue its moratorium on nuclear weapons testing.
  As is an all too common habit of this administration, the key 
parameters of this agreement were negotiated with little or no 
congressional input. Congress was forced to add in protections against 
proliferation of nuclear technology and to ensure nuclear safety 
largely after the fact.
  To this end, the House International Relations Committee has done an 
outstanding job in reasserting Congress' constitutional prerogatives. 
Thanks to the hard work of the Committee, the bill now requires that 
the President report to Congress on the progress that India has taken 
toward separating its civilian and military programs, toward placing 
its civilian programs under international supervision, otherwise living 
up to its end of the bargain. Congress then must vote to grant the 
President the authority to enter into this agreement. I welcome these 
improvements.
  I also commend Congressman Howard Berman for his tireless efforts to 
give arms control protections in the agreement some teeth. Mr. Berman 
was instrumental in adding provisions that would automatically cease 
U.S. transfers of fissile material if India transferred missile or 
nuclear technology to third parties in violation of the Missile 
Technology Control Regime or the Nuclear Suppliers Group regulations. 
These provisions are vital to ensuring that U.S. nuclear technology and 
materials do not end up in the hands of terrorists or rogue nations.
  But as far as this bill has come, it has not come far enough. The 
bill still allows the President to transfer fissile material to India 
without ensuring that India first cease its domestic production. It 
would therefore allow India to use U.S.-provided uranium for its 
civilian programs, while diverting all of its domestic production of 
uranium to the development of nuclear weapons. If India chose to divert 
its domestic material to its military programs, some commentators have 
estimated that it could build an additional 50 nuclear weapons every 
year.
  This bill could thus fuel an already accelerating arms race in South 
Asia. India and Pakistan have engaged in intermittent hostilities for 
years, and both already have nuclear weapons. Adding hundreds of new 
nuclear weapons to this equation will unacceptably increase the risk of 
a nuclear exchange. Pakistan has already hinted that it would increase 
its production of nuclear weapons if this agreement is approved. We 
must do all in our power to stop this train while it is still in the 
station.
  I am sympathetic to India's needs for clean, affordable power. I also 
recognize that India is a crucial ally of the United States. But we 
cannot allow an arms race to spiral out of control.
  Both India and the administration have time to allay these concerns 
before Congress will hold its final vote on this agreement. I look 
forward to reviewing the President's report, and will withhold final 
judgment on this agreement until then.
  Mr. STARK. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to H.R. 5682, the 
United States and India Nuclear Cooperation Promotion Act.
  Were India to sign the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), the 
primary international tool for limiting the proliferation of nuclear 
weapons, I would gladly support the agreement. My district is home to a 
large Indian-American population, whose opinions I value and whose 
support I have long enjoyed. I regret having to disagree with many of 
them today.
  But I am--and have always been--an ardent proponent of nuclear 
nonproliferation. I believe that the fewer nuclear weapons that exist 
in the world, the better. Unfortunately, America's unilateral agreement 
will encourage an arms race on the Indian subcontinent, promote weak 
export controls around the world, and undermine the NPT.
  This week, it was revealed that Pakistan is constructing a new 
plutonium-production reactor that will massively increase its bomb-
making capacity. Rather than adding fuel to the fire by offering India 
a deal that will allow and encourage it to also increase weapons 
production, the United States should work to end the production of all 
fissile material in South Asia.
  A unilateral agreement with India could also undermine the 
cohesiveness of the Nuclear Suppliers Group. If the United States 
exempts India from nuclear nonproliferation controls, China would 
likely feel it appropriate to make a similar agreement and export 
civilian nuclear technology to Iran or North Korea.
  I am aware that as part of the agreement, India has opted to allow 
some of its reactors to be inspected. This concession, however, is 
largely symbolic. The reactors that will continue to be off limits 
could make more plutonium for weapons than India will ever need. 
Furthermore, the precedent of working outside the NPT is dangerous. If 
India can secure the benefits of NPT membership without adhering to the 
treaty's limitations, other countries will have little incentive to 
remain in the NPT.
  I urge my colleagues to stand up for non-proliferation and join me in 
voting ``no.''
  Mr. BLUMENAUER. Mr. Chairman, having visited India following the 
Southeast Asia tsunami, I am more convinced than ever of the benefits 
of a stronger U.S.-India partnership. There is no relationship more 
important than that between the world's largest democracy, India, and 
the world's oldest democracy, the United States. I believe that, as the 
world's largest democracy and a responsible regional power, India 
deserves a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. Support for such 
an arrangement would have been a sensible centerpiece to a new 
strategic partnership.
  However, I am skeptical about elements of the proposed nuclear 
cooperation agreement between the U.S. and India. I am particularly 
concerned that this attempt to create an exception to international 
nonproliferation norms for India may make our efforts in Iran more 
difficult, or even encourage other countries to make their own 
exceptions to the rules for assistance to the supposedly civilian 
nuclear programs of less responsible countries.
  I am pleased that the legislation crafted by the leadership of our 
House International Relations Committee minimizes the risks associated 
with this agreement and provides for close congressional oversight, 
though I support additional amendments to strengthen it. I do not wish 
to stand in the way of this legislation's progress and intend to follow 
developments closely for the up-or-down vote that this bill authorizes.
  I believe that the more pressing issue is developing an effective 
strategy for cooperation to address India's growing energy needs. 
Increased reliance on nuclear energy will only have a marginal impact 
on India's consumption of fossil fuels and levels of global warming 
pollution emitted. To make an immediate impact, we should be helping 
India with conservation, renewable energy technologies, and strategies 
to reduce pollution such as coal gasification.
  Mr. CARDIN. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of H.R. 5682, the U.S. 
and India Nuclear Cooperation Promotion Act.
  India is the largest democracy in the world today, and is rightly 
viewed as an emerging global power in the 21st century. I was pleased 
to listen to Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh address a Joint 
Session of Congress in July 2005 and describe his vision of future 
cooperation between India and the United States. I will continue to 
encourage our government to strengthen our ties to India, in areas such 
as high-technology, immigration, trade, space, and the military.
  Today the United States and India can take an important step to lay 
the foundation for our countries to greatly expand nuclear research, 
nuclear power, and nonproliferation cooperation with each other. India 
is facing enormous challenges in providing sufficient energy to its 
growing population. India has more people living in abject poverty than 
do Latin America and Africa combined.
  This legislation establishes a two-step process under which the 
United States may enter into a nuclear cooperation agreement with 
India. I am pleased that the Committee on International Relations has 
significantly amended this legislation, as compared to the version 
initially proposed by the Administration. The legislation today 
preserves the important oversight role of Congress. Under this

[[Page H5913]]

legislation, the President must make a number of determinations before 
India can be exempted from restrictions contained in the Atomic Energy 
Act of 1954 (AEA). Most notably, the President must determine that 
India has provided the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) with a 
credible plan to separate civilian and military nuclear programs, and 
that India and the IAEA have concluded an agreement requiring the 
permanent application of IAEA safeguards to India's civil nuclear 
facilities.
  Once the President has made the determinations required by this 
legislation, Congress must approve a joint resolution to ratify the 
final negotiated text of a nuclear cooperation agreement with India. I 
also support the provision in the bill that requires additional 
consultation between the Administration and Congress, including regular 
detailed reports on nonproliferation matters and the implementation of 
this agreement.
  I look forward to working with the Administration to implement this 
nuclear cooperation program between the United States and India, 
consistent with this legislation and the intent of Congress.
  Mr. HOLT. Mr. Chairman, I rise today to oppose H.R. 5682. I do this 
reluctantly, because I am a strong supporter of India. But I cannot 
turn my back on my life's work on nuclear non-proliferation.
  Prior to coming to Congress, I worked at the U.S. Department of State 
as an arms control expert. I spent each day there trying to reduce the 
threat our nation faced from proliferation of nuclear weapons. I also 
learned first hand how effectively the international non-proliferation 
regime monitors existing nuclear states and prevents sensitive nuclear 
technology from falling into the wrong hands. I also worked for 10 
years at the Princeton Plasma Physics Laboratory to research and 
develop fusion energy, because it would be an abundant source of energy 
that would not lead to the proliferation of nuclear weapons.
  I am also a lifelong supporter of India. In fact, I first traveled to 
India more than 30 years ago. When I came to Congress, the first caucus 
I joined was the Congressional Caucus on India and Indian-Americans. 
Since then, my interest in India and my respect for its citizens have 
only grown. That is why I believe it is essential that our nation 
increase its cooperation with India.
  India is our friend and a strong ally. The ties that bind our nations 
go to the core of our democratic values. India is the world's largest 
democracy, she possesses a vibrant economy, and she has an unwavering 
commitment to ending terrorism. America is fortunate to have an ally 
that shares our common vision and we need to grow our relationship by 
increasing cooperation on other economic, educational, and security 
concerns. But I have strong reservations about making individual 
exceptions in our nation's laws for nuclear export to India or any 
other state.
  The non-proliferation regime we have is far from perfect, but it has 
proven to be remarkably successful in deterring the spread of nuclear 
material. The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1970 is the 
centerpiece of international nuclear nonproliferation structure. The 
NPT ensured that today we are dealing with only a handful of 
problematic states, such as Iran, rather than the dozens of nuclear 
states that might have existed otherwise. These historical successes 
highlight the essential role that the international non-proliferation 
regime has played and why it must not be undermined.
  The United States was instrumental in creating the NPT, and now is 
not the time to stop our leadership on this important issue. The United 
States should not send the wrong message to the global community. We 
must continue to be a leader on nuclear non-proliferation if we hope to 
prevent Iran, North Korea, or others from acquiring nuclear weapons.

  During the 2004 presidential campaign, both President Bush and 
Senator Kerry agreed on one thing: nuclear proliferation and nuclear 
terrorism are the gravest threat that our country faces. The threat of 
nuclear terrorism is underscored today because of the recent actions of 
Iran and the continued work by North Korea to develop nuclear 
technology.
  That is why we need to be doing more to strengthen and support the 
international nuclear non-proliferation structure, not weaken it. Some 
non-proliferation experts have raised concerns that this bill would 
violate Article I of the NPT. Additionally this bill would create an 
exception to the rule, and thereby create a new rule.
  I have been impressed by India and I do believe that she has been one 
of the most responsible nuclear states in the world. And unlike her 
neighbor, India has not engaged in wholesale proliferation of nuclear 
technology.
  The bill before us today would make changes to the Atomic Energy Act 
which would allow for the transfer of U.S. nuclear technology and 
material to India. This would be the first time the conditions for 
nuclear cooperation in the Act were changed for an individual state. We 
should not make these changes lightly. We need to understand the 
implications of what we are doing for the international nuclear non-
proliferation regime.
  As well, we must also be clear. This is not the final vote the House 
will take on this important issue. Under the provisions contained in 
this bill, Congress will again have to review and vote to support 
nuclear cooperation once the final text of the cooperation agreement is 
finalized. For that reason, I remain unsure why Congress is considering 
or approving these significant changes to our nuclear non-proliferation 
structure. The Nuclear Suppliers Group still needs to give its approval 
to this proposed nuclear cooperation agreement. As well, India needs to 
complete its negotiations with the International Atomic Energy Agency 
on a new safeguards agreement. These are not just minor points, not 
just iotas in the agreement. They are central to the issue. What would 
be wrong with waiting for the final text to be negotiated and these 
important steps to be taken before we change our nation's laws to allow 
for nuclear material transfer?
  That said, I remain troubled that providing nuclear technology to 
India would create a double standard. Historically, the United States 
has only provided nuclear technology to states that are parties to the 
NPT. This bill would allow for cooperation with India, despite the fact 
the India has not signed or ratified the NPT, and had previously 
developed a secret nuclear weapons program.
  Additionally, I am worried that this legislation does not require 
India to cap or even limit its fissile material production. The United 
States, the United Kingdom, Russia, and France have all publicly 
announced that they are no longer producing fissile material for 
military use. Even China is believed to have stopped producing fissile 
material. Without a requirement to limit fissile material production, 
the United States is tacitly endorsing further production. We should 
not help any state in the world increase its stockpile of nuclear 
weapons, especially at a time when we are reducing our own stockpile.
  I am also concerned that this legislation does not require that all 
of India's nuclear reactors be placed under international safeguards. 
That means that some of India's reactors will be used for military 
purposes and kept outside safeguards and the nonproliferation regime. 
The whole purpose of safeguards is to ensure that fissile material is 
not diverted to build nuclear weapons secretly. We need full scope 
safeguards on all of India's reactors to ensure that U.S. technology or 
nuclear material is not being diverted for military purposes. In 
effect, we would be giving approval to the existence of undeclared, 
uninspected production of fissile material.
  Further, India is not required to classify her new reactors as 
civilian rather than military. Some have argued that nuclear 
cooperation is needed to help meet India's growing energy needs. If 
that is the case then every single new reactor should be civilian 
energy producing facilities. We should be doing more to discourage 
India from expanding her military nuclear program, rather than making 
it easier.
  This bill makes some improvements on the legislation that the 
Administration submitted, and I am glad that some of my colleagues who 
share my concerns tried to improve it. Yet, even with these changes I 
do not think it wise to shred one of the few nonproliferation 
instruments we have. I am sorry that before they came to us the 
Administration did not negotiate a better agreement which would not 
jeopardize decades of nonproliferation work. I am also sorry we have 
not approached this matter to obtain the active partnership of such a 
respected and important country as India in the effort to prevent 
nuclear proliferation around the world. India teamed with us and other 
countries could be a most influential leader in reducing the threat of 
nuclear weapons around the world. I remain convinced that nuclear 
cooperation could be achieved with India, however this is not the 
proper way to do so.
  For these reasons, I cannot support this bill which would undermine 
the NPT and our nation's long history of nuclear nonproliferation. I 
would oppose this deal if it was with any country outside of the NPT 
because I would have the same concerns. But I also know that despite my 
vote on this bill it will be approved by wide margins. I hope I am 
proven wrong, that this bill will not undermine our nation's 
nonproliferation efforts, but I regret that I cannot see how that can 
be.
  Mr. JINDAL. Mr. Chairman, I rise to speak in support of H.R. 5682, 
the United States and India Nuclear Cooperation Promotion Act of 2006. 
The bill would facilitate the sharing of civilian nuclear technology in 
an attempt to decrease competition for scarce energy resources and 
strengthen relations between the two nations.
  With the receding of the global divisions established during the Cold 
War era, there has been increasing recognition that significant 
benefits can be obtained from closer cooperation between the U.S. and 
India. H.R. 5682 reflects broad agreement that peaceful nuclear 
cooperation with India can serve U.S. foreign policy and national 
security objectives and also minimize potential risks to the 
nonproliferation regime. This ranges from shared

[[Page H5914]]

strategic interests, such as enhanced stability and security in South 
Asia and the international system as a whole, to more specific 
priorities, such as combating global terrorism.
  Today, the chief threat to our security and the security of our 
allies worldwide is posed by violent acts of terrorism by extremists 
and rogue nations engaged in nuclear experimentation to the detriment 
of the principles of freedom worldwide. As we witnessed recently by the 
bombing of Mumbai's subway system earlier this month, global terrorism 
is a threat that India shares with the United States. We need India's 
ongoing partnership in the fight against terrorism. Furthermore, by 
engaging in this agreement with India, we are able to strengthen the 
international nonproliferation regime by placing a majority of India's 
nuclear plants under international inspection. This is a more practical 
and realistic shift in U.S. nuclear policy that should be viewed as a 
victory for nonproliferation advocates compared to our previous policy 
of forced abandonment which yielded little towards achieving greater 
international security.
  For our own sake, if for no other reason, it is imperative that we 
help countries like India and China curb their increasing consumption 
of oil and natural gas for domestic and commercial use. This, in turn, 
will help us curtail the cost of oil and natural gas, while helping 
India develop its own nuclear power sources sufficient to meet their 
growing demand. The result is that prices worldwide will decrease as 
overall supply of oil and natural gas increase, thus helping our own 
economy by preserving many of the industries that have been forced to 
close their doors because of high production costs.
  Our relationship with India is unique--the United States and India 
are the oldest and largest democracies in the world. While we cannot 
foresee that China will share common political principles in the near 
future, because India's history is rooted in Democracy they are an 
ideal partner for achieving our goals of creating international and 
economic security. Passing H.R. 5682 is an important step toward 
cementing the great strides we have made in the past year in 
establishing this strategic partnership.
  Mr. TOM DAVIS of Virginia. Mr. Chairman, I rise today in support of 
H.R. 5682, the United States and India Nuclear Cooperation Promotion 
Act.
  India is a strategic friend and ally of the United States. Indian 
Americans have made an indelible mark upon the culture and diversity of 
our nation and I was proud to sponsor H. Res. 227 that recognized the 
contributions of Indian Americans to our nation, which the House passed 
earlier this year.
  India and the United States have a strong history of cooperation. 
Directly after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, India was one 
of the first countries to offer immediate aid to the United States. As 
the two largest pluralistic, free-market democracies in the world, it 
is only natural for the United States and India to seek to strengthen 
our bilateral relationship.
  Last July, President Bush and Prime Minister Sing issued a Joint 
Statement declaring a new era of respect, reciprocity and cooperation, 
spanning the fields of high technology, space exploration, counter-
terrorism, defense cooperation and energy security.
  This legislation lays the statutory foundation to expand nuclear 
research, nuclear power and nonproliferation cooperation with India 
that would allow full trade in civil nuclear energy. In exchange for 
such trade, India has agreed to separate its military and civilian 
nuclear programs over the next eight years, placing 14 of its 22 
reactors under permanent international safeguards, as well as all 
future civilian thermal and breeder reactors. It has also agreed to 
maintain its unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing and to work with 
the United States toward a fissile material cutoff treaty.
  Mr. Chairman, the United States should seize this opportunity to 
forge a strategic alliance with India to expand civil nuclear energy 
production in that country. In closing, I thank the leadership for 
allowing this legislation to come to the floor today and urge an aye 
vote.
  Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the 
United States and India Nuclear Cooperation Promotion Act of 2006. With 
the receding of the Cold War's global divisions and the new realities 
of globalization and trans-national terrorism, for more than a decade 
there has been increasing recognition in both countries of the 
significant benefits to be obtained from closer cooperation across a 
broad spectrum. To that end, on July 15, 2005 President Bush and Prime 
Minister Manmohan Singh issued a joint statement announcing a ``global 
partnership'' between the two countries that embraces cooperation 
across a wide range of subjects.
  I am in support of this bill because this legislation reflects broad 
agreement consensus among Members of Congress that peaceful nuclear 
cooperation with India can serve multiple U.S. foreign policy 
objectives, but must be approached in a manner that minimizes potential 
risks to the nonproliferation regime. Among the most important 
considerations are ensuring that Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) 
guidelines and consensus decision-making are upheld and that a U.S. 
nuclear cooperation agreement and subsequent U.S. nuclear exports are 
consistent with decisions, policies, and guidelines of the NSG. Equally 
important is the need to ensure that U.S. cooperation does not assist 
the Indian nuclear weapons program directly, or indirectly, in order to 
avoid contributing to a nuclear arms race in South Asia and because of 
U.S. obligations under the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).
  There are two other noteworthy provisions in this bill which I 
consider very crucial in the United States' relationship with India 
regarding nuclear weapons. The bill contains reporting requirements and 
a provision that calls for termination of exports in the event of 
violations of certain commitments and seeks to uphold existing 
statutory Congressional oversight of U.S. nuclear cooperation and 
exports. At a time when the world appears to be considering nuclear 
energy as a viable and desirable alternative to carbon-based energy 
sources, oversight of its expansion is crucial.
  The President took a bold step by cutting a deal with India on 
nuclear cooperation and it is now up to Congress to make the necessary 
fixes without undermining the deal. India has proven itself deserving 
of an understanding of cooperation with the United States regarding 
nuclear weapons. India has been punished for the last thirty-two years, 
but over that time they have shown a responsible foreign policy, and a 
commitment to democracy and rule of law. This deal would also provide 
India with some of its energy needs to continue to grow her economy and 
lower the use of coal burning power plants.
  We cannot forget about our Indian American citizens during our talks 
of a nuclear cooperation with India. There are about two million Indian 
Americans living in the United States and the majority of them support 
this nuclear deal. We must let the Indian American community know that 
we hear them, we stand with them, and are both working towards the 
mutual goals of democracy. This deal will strengthen our long term 
relationship with India in hopes that they will continue to be one of 
our strongest allies in the War on Terrorism. This agreement will 
benefit the United States as well as India in monitoring nuclear 
weapons in helping to stabilize our world's economy and safety and I 
urge my colleagues to support this bill.
  I will be introducing an amendment that urges Congress to continue 
its policies of engagement, collaborations, and exchanges with India 
and Pakistan. My bipartisan amendment is consistent with many U.S. 
foreign policy objectives. It will also draw the United States closer 
to this vitally important and strategic democracy.
  Mr. KNOLLENBERG. Mr. Chairman, I support the legislation before the 
House of Representatives today, H.R. 5682, the United States and India 
Nuclear Cooperation Promotion Act of 2006. A civil nuclear cooperation 
agreement will make citizens of America and India more safe and secure, 
while providing increased stability around the world.
  Since coming to Congress, I have felt that it is appropriate for the 
United States and India to have a close relationship. Last year, when 
President Bush and Indian Prime Minister Singh announced that the two 
countries would seek cooperation on its civil nuclear programs, I was 
immediately encouraged and supportive of their efforts. The improved 
relations stemming from this agreement will lead to untold benefits for 
the American and Indian people and enhance our mutual interests.
  The U.S.-India relationship is strong and growing stronger because of 
our shared principles and goals. We remain the two largest democracies 
in the world, committed to political freedom protected by a 
representative government, and we share a commitment to free-market 
principles. These principles--bolstered by one of the world's largest 
consumer markets and a growing skilled labor force--have helped India 
in its development into a global economic power.
  However, that growing economy depends on energy. Nuclear energy, 
unlike other energy sources, is truly a ``green'' energy source. It 
does not emit any carbon dioxide emissions or greenhouse gases. It also 
requires less geographic area to produce energy than other energy 
sources. Nuclear power is under-utilized and we should promote, not 
hamper, its growth.
  Since the establishment of the Indian nuclear program in 1974, there 
has been no international oversight of India's nuclear program. A 
civilian nuclear cooperation agreement will provide India with much of 
the energy it needs while also bringing their civilian nuclear program 
under international review. With this agreement, the majority of 
India's civilian program will be under supervision of the International 
Atomic Energy Agency.
  We always must be mindful of nuclear proliferation and nuclear 
materials falling into the

[[Page H5915]]

wrong hands. The Indian government remains committed to peace and 
stability in the region and the world and they realize the danger of 
allowing the proliferation of nuclear technology and material.
  Sadly, this danger is all too real to the people of India because--
like the U.S.--India has not been immune to terror attacks. The train 
bombing earlier this month and the attack on their parliament 5 years 
ago remains a constant reminder of terror and has forced them to 
reevaluate their civilian nuclear program and their status in the 
international community.
  Mr. Chairman, H.R. 5682 will strengthen the U.S.-India relationship, 
promote a clean energy source, and make global nuclear materials more 
secure. For all these reasons, I strongly support the bill and 
encourage my colleagues to do so as well.
  Mr. FOLEY. Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of H.R. 5682, the 
U.S. and India Nuclear Cooperation Promotion Act. At a time when world 
energy reserves and production are just barely keeping up with current 
capacity, I believe that this bill is the right policy for both our 
countries.
  India is currently the sixth largest energy consumer in the world and 
continues to grow exponentially in its population. With only 3 percent 
of India's energy consumption being derived from nuclear energy, it is 
depending heavily on foreign energy sources. By helping India with its 
civilian nuclear power industry, and thereby reducing its dependency on 
other fuel sources, Americans ultimately should experience lower energy 
costs as available fuel sources increase.
  This bill also will further strengthen India's commitment to nuclear 
nonproliferation. India has committed to following International Atomic 
Energy Agency safeguards, allowing for additional inspections, and has 
produced a plan to separate its civilian and military nuclear 
facilities.
  In this uncertain world, and with India in the middle of a volatile 
region, it is imperative that the world's largest democracy have access 
to a constant and inexpensive source of energy. Mr. Chairman, I believe 
this legislation will help solidify our ongoing and deepening 
relationship with our friends in India and I urge all of my colleagues 
to support it.
  Mr. HOLT. Mr. Chairman, there will be a time when the history of the 
spread of nuclear weapons of mass destruction is written and we will 
look back and see when the last thread of the nuclear non-proliferation 
regime was shredded. We can all talk at length about the details of 
this cooperative agreement. We can talk about what a good friend India 
is and how responsible they have been. We can talk about the so-called 
reality of an imperfect ability to control the militarization of 
nuclear reactions. But the history will say that with this agreement 
the world lost the last bit of an international tool to control the 
spread of nuclear weapons of mass destruction. The regime will have 
been killed. All we will have left is our ability to jawbone with our 
allies and threaten our enemies. Countries will work out whatever deals 
they can, two by two. This is a very dangerous moment.
  If we really believe that nuclear proliferation and loose nukes are 
the greatest threat to world peace and security, as I do, then we 
should be holding on to every tool we can find to prevent that threat. 
We should also be working with India to strengthen the nuclear non-
proliferation regime, not collaborating with India to destroy it.
  Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
  The Acting CHAIRMAN (Mr. Gutknecht). All time for general debate has 
expired.
  Pursuant to the rule, the amendment in the nature of a substitute 
printed in the bill, modified by the amendment printed in part A of 
House Report 109-599, is adopted. The bill, as amended, shall be 
considered as an original bill for the purpose of further amendment 
under the 5-minute rule and shall be considered read.
  The text of the bill, as amended, is as follows:

                               H.R. 5682

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

       This Act may be cited as the ``United States and India 
     Nuclear Cooperation Promotion Act of 2006''.

     SEC. 2. SENSE OF CONGRESS.

       It is the sense of Congress that--
       (1) preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons, other 
     weapons of mass destruction, the means to produce them, and 
     the means to deliver them are critical objectives for United 
     States foreign policy;
       (2) sustaining the NPT and strengthening its 
     implementation, particularly its verification and compliance, 
     is the keystone of United States nonproliferation policy;
       (3) the NPT has been a significant success in preventing 
     the acquisition of nuclear weapons capabilities and 
     maintaining a stable international security situation;
       (4) countries that have never become a party to the NPT and 
     remain outside that treaty's legal regime pose a potential 
     challenge to the achievement of the overall goals of global 
     nonproliferation, because those countries have not undertaken 
     the NPT's international obligation to prohibit the spread of 
     dangerous nuclear technologies;
       (5) it is in the interest of the United States to the 
     fullest extent possible to ensure that those countries that 
     are not NPT members are responsible with any nuclear 
     technology they develop;
       (6) it may be in the interest of the United States to enter 
     into an agreement for nuclear cooperation as set forth in 
     section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153) 
     with a country that has never been an NPT member with respect 
     to civilian nuclear technology if--
       (A) the country has demonstrated responsible behavior with 
     respect to the nonproliferation of technology related to 
     weapons of mass destruction programs and the means to deliver 
     them;
       (B) the country has a functioning and uninterrupted 
     democratic system of government, has a foreign policy that is 
     congruent to that of the United States, and is working with 
     the United States in key foreign policy initiatives related 
     to non-proliferation;
       (C) such cooperation induces the country to implement the 
     highest possible protections against the proliferation of 
     technology related to weapons of mass destruction programs 
     and the means to deliver them, and to refrain from actions 
     that would further the development of its nuclear weapons 
     program; and
       (D) such cooperation will induce the country to give 
     greater political and material support to the achievement of 
     United States global and regional nonproliferation 
     objectives, especially with respect to dissuading, isolating, 
     and, if necessary, sanctioning and containing states that 
     sponsor terrorism and terrorist groups, that are seeking to 
     acquire a nuclear weapons capability or other weapons of mass 
     destruction capability and the means to deliver such weapons; 
     and
       (7)(A) India meets the criteria described in this 
     subsection; and
       (B) it is in the national security interest of the United 
     States to deepen its relationship with India across a full 
     range of issues, including peaceful nuclear cooperation.

     SEC. 3. STATEMENTS OF POLICY.

       (a) In General.--The following shall be the policies of the 
     United States:
       (1) Oppose the development of a capability to produce 
     nuclear weapons by any non-nuclear weapon state, within or 
     outside of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
     Weapons (21 UST 483; commonly referred to as the ``Nuclear 
     Non-Proliferation Treaty'' or the ``NPT'').
       (2) Encourage states party to the NPT to interpret the 
     right to ``develop research, production and use of nuclear 
     energy for peaceful purposes'', as described in Article IV of 
     the NPT, as being a qualified right that is conditioned by 
     the overall purpose of the NPT to prevent the spread of 
     nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons capability, including by 
     refraining from all nuclear cooperation with any state party 
     that has not demonstrated that it is in full compliance with 
     its NPT obligations, as determined by the IAEA.
       (3) Strengthen the Nuclear Suppliers Group guidelines 
     concerning consultation by members regarding violations of 
     supplier and recipient understandings by instituting the 
     practice of a timely and coordinated response by NSG members 
     to all such violations, including termination of nuclear 
     transfers to an involved recipient, that discourages 
     individual NSG members from continuing cooperation with such 
     recipient until such time as a consensus regarding a 
     coordinated response has been achieved.
       (b) With Respect to South Asia.--The following shall be the 
     policies of the United States with respect to South Asia:
       (1) Achieve a moratorium on the production of fissile 
     material for nuclear explosive purposes by India, Pakistan, 
     and the People's Republic of China at the earliest possible 
     date.
       (2) Achieve, at the earliest possible date, the conclusion 
     and implementation of a treaty banning the production of 
     fissile material for nuclear weapons to which both the United 
     States and India become parties.
       (3) Secure India's--
       (A) full participation in the Proliferation Security 
     Initiative;
       (B) formal commitment to the Statement of Interdiction 
     Principles;
       (C) public announcement of its decision to conform its 
     export control laws, regulations, and policies with the 
     Australia Group and with the Guidelines, Procedures, 
     Criteria, and Control Lists of the Wassennaar Arrangement;
       (D) demonstration of satisfactory progress toward 
     implementing the decision described in subparagraph (C); and
       (E) ratification of or accession to the Convention on 
     Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage, done at Vienna 
     on September 12, 1997.
       (4) Secure India's full and active participation in United 
     States efforts to dissuade, isolate, and, if necessary, 
     sanction and contain Iran for its efforts to acquire weapons 
     of mass destruction, including a nuclear weapons capability 
     (including the capability to enrich or process nuclear 
     materials), and the means to deliver weapons of mass 
     destruction.
       (5) Seek to halt the increase of nuclear weapon arsenals in 
     South Asia, and to promote their reduction and eventual 
     elimination.
       (6) To ensure that spent fuel generated in India's civilian 
     nuclear power reactors is not transferred to the United 
     States except pursuant to the Congressional review procedures 
     required under section 131 f. of the Atomic Energy Act of 
     1954 (42 U.S.C. 2160 f.).

[[Page H5916]]

       (7) Pending implementation of a multilateral moratorium, 
     encourage India not to increase its production of fissile 
     material at unsafeguarded nuclear facilities.

     SEC. 4. WAIVER AUTHORITY AND CONGRESSIONAL APPROVAL.

       (a) In General.--Notwithstanding any other provision of 
     law, if the President makes the determination described in 
     subsection (b), the President may--
       (1) exempt a proposed agreement for nuclear cooperation 
     with India (arranged pursuant to section 123 of the Atomic 
     Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153)) from the requirement in 
     section 123 a.(2) of such Act, and such agreement for 
     cooperation may only enter into force in accordance with 
     subsection (f);
       (2) waive the application of section 128 of the Atomic 
     Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2157) with respect to India, 
     provided that such waiver shall cease to be effective if the 
     President determines that India has engaged in any activity 
     described section 129 of such Act (42 U.S.C. 2158), other 
     than section 129 a.(1)(D) or section 129 a.(2)(C) of such 
     Act, at any time after the date of the enactment of this Act; 
     and
       (3) with respect to India--
       (A) waive the restrictions of section 129 a.(1)(A) of the 
     Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2158 a.(1)(A)) for any 
     activity that occurred on or before July 18, 2005; and
       (B) section 129 a.(1)(D) of such Act.
       (b) Determination by the President.--The determination 
     referred to in subsection (a) is a determination by the 
     President that the following actions have occurred:
       (1) India has provided the United States and the 
     International Atomic Energy Agency with a credible plan to 
     separate civil and military nuclear facilities, materials, 
     and programs, and has filed a declaration regarding its civil 
     facilities with the IAEA.
       (2) India and the IAEA have concluded an agreement 
     requiring the application of IAEA safeguards in perpetuity in 
     accordance with IAEA standards, principles, and practices 
     (including IAEA Board of Governors Document GOV/1621 (1973)) 
     to India's civil nuclear facilities, materials, and programs 
     as declared in the plan described in paragraph (1), including 
     materials used in or produced through the use of India's 
     civil nuclear facilities.
       (3) India and the IAEA are making substantial progress 
     toward concluding an Additional Protocol consistent with IAEA 
     principles, practices, and policies that would apply to 
     India's civil nuclear program.
       (4) India is working actively with the United States for 
     the early conclusion of a multilateral Fissile Material 
     Cutoff Treaty.
       (5) India is working with and supporting United States and 
     international efforts to prevent the spread of enrichment and 
     reprocessing technology.
       (6) India is taking the necessary steps to secure nuclear 
     and other sensitive materials and technology, including 
     through--
       (A) the enactment and enforcement of comprehensive export 
     control legislation and regulations;
       (B) harmonization of its export control laws, regulations, 
     policies, and practices with the policies and practices of 
     the Missile Technology Control Regime and the Nuclear 
     Suppliers Group; and
       (C) adherence to the MTCR and the NSG in accordance with 
     the procedures of those regimes for unilateral adherence.
       (7) The NSG has decided by consensus to permit supply to 
     India of nuclear items covered by the guidelines of the NSG 
     and such decision does not permit civil nuclear commerce with 
     any other non-nuclear weapon state that does not have IAEA 
     safeguards on all nuclear materials within its territory, 
     under its jurisdiction, or carried out under its control 
     anywhere.
       (c) Submission to Congress.--
       (1) In general.--The President shall submit to the 
     Committee on International Relations of the House of 
     Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the 
     Senate information concerning any determination made pursuant 
     to subsection (b), together with a report detailing the basis 
     for the determination.
       (2) Information to be included.--To the fullest extent 
     available to the United States, the information referred to 
     in paragraph (1) shall include the following:
       (A) A summary of the plan provided by India to the United 
     States and the IAEA to separate India's civil and military 
     nuclear facilities, materials, and programs, and the 
     declaration made by India to the IAEA identifying India's 
     civil facilities to be placed under IAEA safeguards, 
     including an analysis of the credibility of such plan and 
     declaration, together with copies of the plan and 
     declaration.
       (B) A summary of the agreement that has been entered into 
     between India and the IAEA requiring the application of 
     safeguards in accordance with IAEA practices to India's civil 
     nuclear facilities as declared in the plan described in 
     subparagraph (A), together with a copy of the agreement, and 
     a description of the progress toward its full implementation.
       (C) A summary of the progress made toward conclusion and 
     implementation of an Additional Protocol between India and 
     the IAEA, including a description of the scope of such 
     Additional Protocol.
       (D) A description of the steps that India is taking to work 
     with the United States for the conclusion of a multilateral 
     treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear 
     weapons, including a description of the steps that the United 
     States has taken and will take to encourage India to identify 
     and declare a date by which India would be willing to stop 
     production of fissile material for nuclear weapons 
     unilaterally or pursuant to a multilateral moratorium or 
     treaty.
       (E) A description of the steps India is taking to prevent 
     the spread of nuclear-related technology, including 
     enrichment and reprocessing technology or materials that can 
     be used to acquire a nuclear weapons technology, as well as 
     the support that India is providing to the United States to 
     further United States objectives to restrict the spread of 
     such technology.
       (F) A description of the steps that India is taking to 
     secure materials and technology applicable for the 
     development, acquisition, or manufacture of weapons of mass 
     destruction and the means to deliver such weapons through the 
     application of comprehensive export control legislation and 
     regulations, and through harmonization and adherence to 
     Missile Technology Control Regime, the Nuclear Suppliers 
     Group, the Australia Group, Wassennaar guidelines, and United 
     Nations Security Council Resolution 1540, and participation 
     in the Proliferation Security Initiative.
       (G) A description of the decision taken within the Nuclear 
     Suppliers Group relating to nuclear cooperation with India, 
     including whether nuclear cooperation by the United States 
     under an agreement for cooperation arranged pursuant to 
     section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153) 
     is consistent with the decision, practices, and policies of 
     the NSG.
       (H) A description of the scope of peaceful cooperation 
     envisioned by the United States and India that will be 
     implemented under the Agreement for Nuclear Cooperation, 
     including whether such cooperation will include the provision 
     of enrichment and reprocessing technology.
       (I) A description of the steps taken to ensure that 
     proposed United States civil nuclear assistance to India will 
     not directly, or in any other way, assist India's nuclear 
     weapons program, including--
       (i) the use of any United States equipment, technology, or 
     nuclear material by India in an unsafeguarded nuclear 
     facility or nuclear-weapons related complex;
       (ii) the replication and subsequent use of any United 
     States technology in an unsafeguarded nuclear facility or 
     unsafeguarded nuclear weapons-related complex, or for any 
     activity related to the research, development, testing, or 
     manufacture of nuclear explosive devices; and
       (iii) the provision of nuclear fuel in such a manner as to 
     facilitate the increased production of highly-enriched 
     uranium or plutonium in unsafeguarded nuclear facilities.
       (d) Restrictions on Nuclear Transfers to India.--
       (1) In general.--Pursuant to the obligations of the United 
     States under Article I of the NPT, nothing in this Act, or 
     any agreement pursuant to this Act, shall be interpreted as 
     permitting any civil nuclear cooperation between the United 
     States and India that would in any way assist, encourage, or 
     induce India to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear 
     weapons or nuclear explosive devices.
       (2) NSG transfer guidelines.--Notwithstanding the entry 
     into force of an agreement for cooperation with India 
     pursuant to section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 
     U.S.C. 2153) and approved pursuant to this Act, no item 
     subject to such agreement or subject to the transfer 
     guidelines of the NSG may be transferred to India if such 
     transfer would violate the transfer guidelines of the NSG as 
     in effect on the date of the transfer.
       (3) Termination of nuclear transfers to india.--
     Notwithstanding the entry into force of an agreement for 
     nuclear cooperation with India (arranged pursuant to section 
     123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153)), 
     exports of nuclear and nuclear-related material, equipment, 
     or technology to India shall be terminated if India makes any 
     materially significant transfer of--
       (A) nuclear or nuclear-related material, equipment, or 
     technology that does not conform to NSG guidelines, or
       (B) ballistic missiles or missile-related equipment or 
     technology that does not conform to MTCR guidelines,

     unless the President determines that cessation of such 
     exports would be seriously prejudicial to the achievement of 
     United States nonproliferation objectives or otherwise 
     jeopardize the common defense and security.
       (4) Prohibition on nuclear transfers to india.--If nuclear 
     transfers to India are restricted pursuant to this Act, the 
     Atomic Energy Act of 1954, or the Arms Export Control Act, 
     the President should seek to prevent the transfer to India of 
     nuclear equipment, materials, or technology from other 
     participating governments in the NSG or from any other 
     source.
       (e) Approval of Agreement for Nuclear Cooperation 
     Required.--
       (1) In general.--Subject to subsection (h), an agreement 
     for nuclear cooperation between the United States and India 
     submitted pursuant to this section may become effective only 
     if--
       (A) the President submits to Congress the agreement 
     concluded between the United States and India, including a 
     copy of the safeguards agreement entered into between the 
     IAEA and India relating to India's declared civilian nuclear 
     facilities, in accordance with the requirements and 
     procedures of section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 
     (other than section 123 a.(2) of such Act) that are otherwise 
     not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act; and
       (B) after the submission under subparagraph (A), the 
     agreement is approved by a joint resolution that is enacted 
     into law.
       (2) Consultation.--Beginning one month after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act and every month thereafter until 
     the President submits to Congress the agreement referred to 
     in paragraph (1), the President should consult with the 
     Committee on International Relations of the House of 
     Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the 
     Senate regarding the status of the negotiations between the 
     United States and India with respect to civilian nuclear 
     cooperation and between the

[[Page H5917]]

     IAEA and India with respect to the safeguards agreement 
     described in subsection (b)(2).
       (f) Joint Resolution of Approval.--For purposes of this 
     section, a joint resolution referred to in subsection 
     (e)(1)(B) is a joint resolution of the two Houses of 
     Congress--
       (1) the matter after the resolving clause of which is as 
     follows: ``That the Congress hereby approves the Agreement 
     for Nuclear Cooperation Between the United States of America 
     and the Republic of India submitted by the President on 
     ___________.'', with the blank space being filled with the 
     appropriate date;
       (2) which does not have a preamble; and
       (3) the title of which is as follows: ``Joint Resolution 
     Approving an Agreement for Nuclear Cooperation Between the 
     United States and India''.
       (g) Consideration of Joint Resolution of Approval.--The 
     provisions of paragraphs (2) through (6) of section 130 i. of 
     the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2159 i.) shall apply 
     to a joint resolution under subsection (f) of this section to 
     the same extent as such provisions apply to a joint 
     resolution under section 130 i. of such Act. No amendment to, 
     or motion to recommit, a joint resolution under subsection 
     (f) of this section is in order.
       (h) Section 123 of Atomic Energy Act of 1954 Not 
     Affected.--Notwithstanding subsection (e)(1), this section 
     does not preclude the approval, under section 123 of the 
     Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153), of an agreement 
     for cooperation in which India is the cooperating party.
       (i) Sunset.--The procedures under this section shall cease 
     to be effective upon the enactment of a joint resolution 
     under this section.
       (j) Reports.--
       (1) Policy objectives.--The President shall, not later than 
     January 31, 2007, and not later than January 31 of each year 
     thereafter, submit to the Committee on International 
     Relations of the House of Representatives and the Committee 
     on Foreign Relations of the Senate a report on--
       (A) the extent to which each policy objective in section 
     3(b) has been achieved;
       (B) the steps taken by the United States and India in the 
     preceding calendar year to accomplish those objectives;
       (C) the extent of cooperation by other countries in 
     achieving those objectives; and
       (D) the steps the United States will take in the current 
     calendar year to accomplish those objectives.
       (2) Nuclear exports to india.--
       (A) In general.--Not later than one year after the date on 
     which an agreement for nuclear cooperation between the United 
     States and India is approved by Congress under section 4(f) 
     and every year thereafter, the President shall submit to the 
     Committee on International Relations of the House of 
     Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the 
     Senate a report describing United States exports to India for 
     the preceding year pursuant to such agreement and the 
     anticipated exports to India for the next year pursuant to 
     such agreement.
       (B) Nuclear fuel.--The report described in subparagraph (A) 
     shall also include (in a classified form if necessary)--
       (i) an estimate for the previous year of the amount of 
     uranium mined in India;
       (ii) the amount of such uranium that has likely been used 
     or allocated for the production of nuclear explosive devices;
       (iii) the rate of production of--

       (I) fissile material for nuclear explosive devices; and
       (II) nuclear explosive devices; and

       (iv) an analysis as to whether imported uranium has 
     affected such rate of production of nuclear explosive 
     devices.
       (C) Unsafeguarded nuclear facilities.--The report described 
     in subparagraph (A) shall also include (in a classified form 
     if necessary) a description of whether United States civil 
     nuclear assistance to India is directly, or in any other way, 
     assisting India's nuclear weapons program, including--
       (i) the use of any United States equipment, technology, or 
     nuclear material by India in an unsafeguarded nuclear 
     facility or nuclear-weapons related complex;
       (ii) the replication and subsequent use of any United 
     States technology in an unsafeguarded nuclear facility or 
     unsafeguarded nuclear weapons-related complex, or for any 
     activity related to the research, development, testing, or 
     manufacture of nuclear explosive devices; and
       (iii) the provision of nuclear fuel in such a manner as to 
     facilitate the increased production of highly-enriched 
     uranium or plutonium in unsafeguarded nuclear facilities.
       (3) New nuclear reactors or facilities.--Not later than one 
     year after the date of the enactment of this Act and annually 
     thereafter, the President shall submit to the Committee on 
     International Relations of the House of Representatives and 
     the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate a report 
     describing any new nuclear reactors or nuclear facilities 
     that the Government of India has designated as civilian and 
     placed under inspections or has designated as military.
       (4) Disposal of spent nuclear fuel.--Not later than one 
     year after the date on which an agreement for nuclear 
     cooperation between the United States and India is approved 
     by Congress under section 4(f) and every year thereafter, the 
     President shall submit to the Committee on International 
     Relations of the House of Representatives and the Committee 
     on Foreign Relations of the Senate a report describing the 
     disposal of spent nuclear fuel from India's civilian nuclear 
     program.
       (k) Definitions.--In this Act:
       (1) IAEA.--The term ``IAEA'' means the International Atomic 
     Energy Agency.
       (2) MTCR.--The term ``MTCR'' means the Missile Technology 
     Control Regime.
       (3) NPT.--The term ``NPT'' means the Treaty on the Non-
     Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.
       (4) NPT member.--The term ``NPT member'' means a country 
     that is a party to the NPT.
       (5) NSG.--The term ``NSG'' means the Nuclear Suppliers 
     Group.

  The Acting CHAIRMAN. No further amendment is in order except those 
printed in part B of the report. Each amendment may be offered only in 
the order printed in the report, by a Member designated in the report, 
shall be considered read, shall be debatable for the time specified in 
the report, equally divided and controlled by the proponent and an 
opponent, shall not be subject to amendment, and shall not be subject 
to a demand for division of the question.


                Preferential Motion Offered by Mr. Obey

  Mr. OBEY. Mr. Chairman, I have a preferential motion at the desk.
  The Clerk read as follows:

       Mr. OBEY moves that the Committee do now rise and report 
     the bill back to the House with the recommendation that the 
     enacting clause be stricken.

  The Acting CHAIRMAN. The gentleman is recognized for 5 minutes.
  Mr. OBEY. Mr. Chairman, I regret very much that this legislation is 
before us this afternoon. In my view, this is a badly conceived and 
most especially a badly timed action which will weaken the 
nonproliferation regime over the long haul and, in the end, wind up 
encouraging the production of more nuclear weapons by Pakistan, China 
and India.
  It also is, in my view, spectacularly badly timed because it will 
give Iran a greater excuse, as if they needed any, but it will give 
Iran a greater excuse than they now have to continue to proceed with 
their own nuclear program. I believe it is a profound mistake.
  I yield to the gentleman from Massachusetts.
  Mr. MARKEY. Mr. Chairman, we are being told that we shouldn't worry, 
that this won't lead to a nuclear arms race.
  Now, India is not a signatory to the nuclear nonproliferation treaty. 
This agreement is in violation of the Nonproliferation Act of 1978 here 
in Congress. All of their facilities are not being put under full-scope 
safeguards.
  Experts say that when we supply the nuclear fuel for their civilian 
program, it is going to free up nuclear fuel for their nuclear weapons 
program. It makes sense. But we are told, don't worry.
  Now, right now, India makes about seven nuclear bombs a year, on 
average. That is the magnitude. That is the scope of their program. But 
experts say it will free up 40 to 50 bombs' worth of nuclear material 
if they wanted to build more nuclear bombs. We are told, don't worry.
  But here is what else is going on. This week in the world, A.Q. Khan, 
under house arrest in Islamabad, this nuclear merchant that should be 
on trial in the world court for what he has done in spreading nuclear 
weapons materials around the world but yet the Bush administration has 
turned a blind eye to him and allowed Musharraf just to keep him under 
house arrest in a palace. Well, A.Q. Khan and his people now have a new 
program, it turns out, on the front page of the Washington Post this 
week, that will make it possible for them to build 40 to 50 plutonium 
nuclear bombs per year. Now they are going to do it. They are going to 
do it because they only have two to three nuclear bombs capacity per 
day right now, and they can scale up to 40 to 50.
  Now what is interesting about these two charts about India and 
Pakistan, they are each now going to be capable of going from between 
two and seven up to 40 to 50.
  We are told, don't worry. Well, I am worrying; and I think we should 
all worry. The Bush administration has not made public at all the fact 
that they have known for at least 2 years that Pakistan has this 
clandestine plutonium nuclear bomb program. It is the place where we 
should all be concerned that that al Qaeda operative buys a nuclear 
bomb and moves it into the Middle East, moves it to New York City, 
moves it to Washington, D.C. And instead we are told, don't worry.
  Well, what kind of signal are we sending to the world when Iran, 
which is a signatory to the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty, is on trial 
at the Security Council to comply with the nonproliferation treaty 
because they are violating it, and we are turning a blind eye to what 
India and Pakistan, nonsignatories to the nonproliferation

[[Page H5918]]

treaty, are doing or will do if this deal goes through? We will make a 
mockery of the nonproliferation regime in the world.
  And we know that President Bush doesn't care about it. Otherwise, we 
would know more about this Pakistani program which they have had 
satellite evidence of its existence for the last 2 years. We know that 
he doesn't care about it. Otherwise, he would be forcing India to put 
the full nuclear program in India under safeguards. He would be 
extracting a ban on the production of fissile material in India, in the 
same way that the United States and Russia and China and England and 
France now don't produce any more fissile material.
  But, no, the President is allowing an exemption. This deal is like 
throwing a tinder onto an already raging fire in the most dangerous 
part of the world and pretending that there is no relationship between 
what we do here today and the response of Pakistan and Iran and other 
nations around the world.
  Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the motion.
  The Acting CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from California is recognized for 
5 minutes.
  Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Chairman, I would make several points.
  One, in terms of the program that is being laid out in the Washington 
Post, I think it was this Monday, explaining Pakistan's ambitions with 
respect to its nuclear buildup, that is clearly not something that can 
be characterized as a reaction to this new initiative with India. The 
reason I say that is because a careful reading of that Washington Post 
report shows that the construction of this very facility site began in 
the year 2000. The construction of the facility began 6 years ago.
  I will also point out that the supposition that it could be used for 
40 to 50 nuclear bombs a year, the information we have is that is 
probably two or three. Yet the very existence of the facility itself 
shows why a fissile cutoff is, frankly, not practical to enforce, to 
attempt to enforce on India, except through negotiation.
  And I think, lastly, in conclusion, the attempt to equate Pakistan's 
efforts, now 6 years old, and tie that and say that that is in response 
to a deal that we are negotiating with India of less than a year old is 
clearly not germane to the argument that we have before us today.
  So I oppose the motion of the gentleman from Wisconsin.
  The Acting CHAIRMAN. The question is on the preferential motion 
offered by the gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. Obey).
  The preferential motion was rejected.


                  Amendment No. 1 Offered by Mr. Royce

  The Acting CHAIRMAN. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 1 
printed in part B of House Report 109-599.
  Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Chairman, as the designee of Mr. Hyde, I offer the 
Hyde-Lantos amendment which is made in order by the rule.
  The Acting CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Amendment No. 1 offered by Mr. Royce:
       Page 3, line 12, strike ``may be'' and insert ``is''.
       Page 4, beginning line 21, strike ``this subsection'' and 
     insert ``paragraph (6)''.
       Page 11, line 3, strike ``and'' and all that follows 
     through line 8 and insert a period.
       Page 15, line 22, insert ``nuclear'' before 
     ``cooperation''.
       Page 16, line 3, after ``violate'' insert ``or be 
     inconsistent with''.
       Page 16, beginning line 6, strike ``Notwithstanding the 
     entry into force of an agreement for nuclear cooperation with 
     India (arranged pursuant to section 123 of the Atomic Energy 
     Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153))'' and insert ``Notwithstanding 
     the entry into force of an agreement for nuclear cooperation 
     with India pursuant to section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act 
     of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153) and approved pursuant to this Act''.
       Page 17, line 8, strike ``Subject to subsection (m), an'' 
     and insert ``An''.


          Modification to Amendment No. 1 Offered by Mr. Royce

  Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the Hyde-Lantos 
amendment made in order by the rule be modified in the form which I 
have caused to be placed at the desk.
  The Acting CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will report the modification.
  The Clerk read as follows:

       Modification to amendment No. 1 offered by Mr. Royce:
       Page 2, line 4, strike ``United States'' and insert ``Henry 
     J. Hyde United States''.
       Page 3, line 12, strike ``may be'' and insert ``is''.
       Page 4, beginning line 21, strike ``this subsection'' and 
     insert ``paragraph (6)''.
       Page 11, line 3, strike ``and'' and all that follows 
     through line 8 and insert a period.
       Page 15, line 22, insert ``nuclear'' before 
     ``cooperation''.
       Page 16, line 3, after ``violate'' insert ``or be 
     inconsistent with''.
       Page 16, beginning line 6, strike ``Notwithstanding the 
     entry into force of an agreement for nuclear cooperation with 
     India (arranged pursuant to section 123 of the Atomic Energy 
     Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153))'' and insert ``Notwithstanding 
     the entry into force of an agreement for nuclear cooperation 
     with India pursuant to section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act 
     of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153) and approved pursuant to this Act''.
       Page 17, line 8, strike ``Subject to subsection (m), an'' 
     and insert ``An''.

  Mr. ROYCE (during the reading). Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent 
that the modification be considered as read and printed in the Record.
  The Acting CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentleman from California?
  Mr. MARKEY. Mr. Chairman, I object.
  The Acting CHAIRMAN. Objection is heard.
  The Clerk will continue reading.
  The Clerk continued to read.
  Mr. MARKEY. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to withdraw my 
objection.
  The Acting CHAIRMAN. Without objection, the reading is dispensed 
with.
  There was no objection.
  The Acting CHAIRMAN. Without objection, the amendment is modified.
  There was no objection.
  The Acting CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to House Resolution 947, the gentleman 
from California (Mr. Royce) and a Member opposed each will control 5 
minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California.
  Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Chairman, the only change in this amendment is to name 
this bill after our distinguished chairman, Henry Hyde. The underlying 
amendment contains a series of technical and conforming changes which 
were needed to ensure the bill was properly drafted.
  I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Chairman, I strongly support naming this historic 
legislation after our distinguished chairman as a small token of our 
respect and appreciation for his enormous contributions to the national 
security of the United States and to the sound conduct of U.S. foreign 
policy.

                              {time}  1900

  Mr. MARKEY. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment.
  The Acting CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Massachusetts is recognized 
for 5 minutes.
  Mr. MARKEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  If all that the manager's amendment included was the naming of this 
legislation after Henry Hyde, then I would be at the front of the line 
to ensure that I would be praising him to the heavens. And I want the 
gentleman from Illinois to understand that because he does deserve all 
the accolades which he is receiving.
  But there is just a little bit more in this manager's amendment than 
naming it after the distinguished gentleman from Illinois.
  The reason that I am opposed to this amendment is that it would 
strike part of one of the seven conditions being placed on the India 
nuclear deal.
  Here is the full language of the condition. It is No. 7: ``The 
Nuclear Suppliers Group has decided by consensus to permit supply to 
India of nuclear items covered by the guidelines of the NSG and such 
decision does not permit civil nuclear commerce with any other non-
nuclear weapon state that does not have IAEA,'' International Atomic 
Energy Agency, ``safeguards on all nuclear materials within its 
territory, under its jurisdiction, or carried out under its control 
anywhere.''
  The manager's amendment would strike the words ``and such decision 
does not permit civil nuclear commerce with any other non-nuclear 
weapon state that does not have International Atomic Energy Agency 
safeguards on all nuclear materials within its territory, under its 
jurisdiction, or carried out under its control anywhere.'' The impact 
of that change in the language is that it would free the

[[Page H5919]]

Nuclear Suppliers Group to also allow nuclear commerce with other 
nations that have not agreed to full-scope IAEA safeguards on their 
nuclear facilities, such as Pakistan.
  I see absolutely no justification for opening the door to China to 
come into the Nuclear Suppliers Group with a proposal to give Pakistan 
the same deal that the administration is proposing to give India. That 
is a bad idea. It invites a further weakening of the international 
nuclear nonproliferation regime and an expansion of commerce with 
countries that do not allow full-scope international safeguards. We 
should be very careful here. We should be very cautious.
  The ostensible justification for the initiation of the war in Iraq is 
that we did not want the next terrorist attack to come in the form of a 
mushroom cloud. As we make these changes, they seem slight. They are 
not. They are historic in terms of the safeguards that we have in place 
to ensure that we are securing these nuclear materials, that proper 
procedures are in place to make sure that countries and subnational 
groups that should not have them in their possession are denied them.
  This is a weakening amendment, and I urge the Members to oppose it.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself the balance of my time.
  It is my understanding that a member of the committee, the gentleman 
from California (Mr. Sherman) offered an amendment in committee that 
was passed on voice vote. However, upon further reflection, I 
understand the Member has asked that the amendment language be removed. 
And what is happening here is that the committee is honoring that 
request. I would note, however, that the heart of the section 4(b)(7), 
and this is the section that the gentleman is concerned about, which 
states that the President must determine that the Nuclear Suppliers 
Group has decided by consensus, that remains intact, and that is the 
practice at the NSG.
  And let me just quote from the bill: ``The NSG has decided by 
consensus to permit supply to India of nuclear items covered by the 
guidelines of the NSG.''
  So the heart of the determination remains intact. And, again, the 
removal of that particular language was at the request of a member of 
the committee, Mr. Sherman of California, who offered the original 
amendment that was accepted in committee.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
  The Acting CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment, as modified, 
offered by the gentleman from California (Mr. Royce).
  The amendment, as modified, was agreed to.


                 Amendment No. 2 Offered by Mr. Stearns

  The Acting CHAIRMAN. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 2 
printed in part B of House Report 109-599.
  Mr. STEARNS. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
  The Acting CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Amendment No. 2 offered by Mr. Stearns:
       In section 2(6)(D), strike ``and'' after the semicolon.
       In section 2(7)(B), strike the period at the end and insert 
     ``; and''.
       In section 2, add at the end the following new paragraph:
       (8) the United States Government, pursuant to the 
     restrictions in this Act, shall not participate in, or 
     contribute to, the manufacture or acquisition of nuclear 
     weapons or nuclear explosive devices.

  The Acting CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to House Resolution 947, the gentleman 
from Florida (Mr. Stearns) and a Member opposed each will control 5 
minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Florida.
  Mr. STEARNS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  My amendment to this bill would clarify and reinforce the intent of 
Congress that nuclear cooperation into which the governments of the 
United States and India would enter is for peaceful and productive 
purposes and not military purposes. And I think a lot of us who view 
this bill have some concerns.
  Now, the intent of this amendment is obviously woven throughout this 
legislation, but I thought an elevated position by a sense of Congress 
in what we are talking about perhaps would alleviate some of the 
colleagues, particularly the gentleman from Massachusetts. It bears 
reiterating that this country stands for peace and not war.
  While India has agreed to allow monitoring at 14 of their nuclear 
reactors to ensure fuel is not used for weapons, my colleagues, there 
are eight other reactors and an unknown number of future reactors that 
can produce material for military purposes, free of any oversight or 
control. It is, indeed, obviously, an improvement in the status quo for 
India to open up any of its reactors to oversight, but the dangers 
inherent in further assisting India's nuclear development are clear.
  These are unsettling times in nuclear proliferation. Iran and North 
Korea, for example, have violated their responsibilities under the 
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and are producing or attempting to 
produce significant arsenals of nuclear weapons. Pakistan was aided and 
abetted with nuclear capability.
  Support for today's legislation, and for broader cooperation with 
India, crosses party lines. We all understand that. We all support 
India. It is a burgeoning multiethnic, multireligious, free market 
democracy, has a firm rule of law and respect for personal liberties. 
These are all good. As such, India presents a hearty example, like the 
United States, for the world to follow. Clearly, the nation of India is 
and should be our friend, and we respect it.
  However, my colleagues, India has refused to sign, as mentioned 
before, the 1968 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. It refuses to accept 
full scope of the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards over 
all its nuclear facilities, and India continues to produce fissile 
materials for its growing nuclear arsenal. These have been brought to 
our attention.
  But, moreover, India is no stranger to violating international 
nuclear commitments to use nuclear assistance for civilian purposes. In 
1974, it detonated a nuclear bomb manufactured using plutonium from a 
Canadian-supplied nuclear reactor, with heavy water provided by the 
U.S. Both countries had provided India with nuclear technology based on 
commitment to peaceful use.
  Now, my colleagues, the former chairman of the Armed Services 
Committee, Sam Nunn, wrote recently in The Wall Street Journal: ``There 
is every reason to suspect that Pakistan and China will react to this 
deal by ratcheting up their own suspicions and nuclear activities, 
including making additional weapons material and weapons.''
  So, Mr. Chairman, we should avoid fanning the flames here of a 
regional nuclear arms race. I think all of us remember President 
Reagan's words when he mentioned in a radio address on April 17, 1982, 
``A nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought . . . ''
  So I think this amendment is basically a sense of Congress, a 
straightforward sense, to give us more assurance that what we are 
trying to do here is to help them in a peaceful way. We seek friendship 
and peace with all nations, particularly India, but we will not 
purchase this friendship with nuclear arms.
  Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. STEARNS. I yield to the gentleman from California.
  Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding, and I 
thank him for his amendment.
  During consideration of this agreement in committee, members 
expressed some of the same concerns raised by the gentleman from 
Florida, and we added language to the underlying bill to alleviate 
those concerns. I offered an amendment, a successful amendment, in 
committee that explicitly states that nothing in this bill shall 
violate our article I NPT obligation, not to, in any way, assist, 
encourage, or induce India to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear 
weapons or nuclear explosive devices.
  Now, the gentleman's amendment further clarifies that the aiding of 
India's strategic program is not Congress's intent. And with that, we 
are quite prepared to accept the gentleman's amendment.
  Mr. STEARNS. That is very good. I appreciate that. Can I just ask you 
a question? Nowhere in the bill does it

[[Page H5920]]

mention anything about private corporations or corporations in the 
United States of America.
  The Acting CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Florida's time has expired.
  Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to claim the time 
in opposition to the amendment.
  The Acting CHAIRMAN. Without objection, the gentleman from California 
is recognized for 5 minutes.
  There was no objection.
  Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to accept the gentleman's 
amendment.
  This amendment restates longstanding U.S. policy that the United 
States will not support the manufacture or acquisition of nuclear 
weapons. This is, of course, longstanding U.S. policy. And we all agree 
that it should continue.
  I urge all of my colleagues to support this amendment.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to my good friend from California, 
distinguished former ambassador of the United States, Congresswoman 
Diane Watson.
  Ms. WATSON. Mr. Chairman, I thank Congressman Lantos for yielding.
  The United States has few, if any, better friends than India. And I 
feel strongly that the United States and India are destined to be great 
partners as they seek to meet the challenges of the 21st century. One 
of these challenges is the need to develop new sources of energy. The 
Indian economy is growing by leaps and bounds, offering new 
opportunities not only for India itself but for India's partners as 
well. India will need to develop tens of thousands of megawatts of new 
power capacity in the next few years to meet this need and lift India's 
poorest from poverty.
  But there is another 21st century challenge that India and the United 
States must meet together, and that is the challenge of nuclear 
proliferation, particularly the threat of nuclear weapons in the hands 
of extremist governments and terrorist movements.
  India is, and has been, a trusted partner in meeting this challenge. 
As much as any ally of the United States, India knows the dangers posed 
by terrorism. We were so sadly reminded of this again, only a few weeks 
ago, when extremists murdered over 200 Indian commuters in Mumbai. My 
sincerest sympathies go out to the people of Mumbai and all of India. 
Together, I have no doubt we will eventually defeat the ideologies that 
spark such terror attacks as well as defeat the poverty and 
marginalization which fuels it.
  I have no doubt that India is a reliable steward of nuclear 
technology. But my concerns extends beyond India. I do not fear India 
with nuclear power. I do fear a world where both India and the United 
States must face a nuclear Iran or a nuclear North Korea. Our key tool 
for constraining the nuclear design of Iran and North Korea has been 
the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. But I fear that this legislation 
will damage the NPT to the point that we will make it harder to stop 
the Iranian and North Korea nuclear programs.
  The U.S./India partnership is too strong to be harmed by one piece of 
legislation. I believe that, if we continue working with India, we can 
find ways to address our mutual security concerns and energy needs. But 
I feel this legislation fails to meet either challenge.
  Furthermore, I have concerns about our own constitutional processes 
here in the United States. Acceptance or rejection of any arrangement 
with India must include a full role for the United States Congress. The 
President cannot change American law without Congress's consent. I 
believe any such agreement with any foreign country must be approved by 
Congress.

                              {time}  1915

  Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Chairman, I yield the balance of my time to our 
distinguished colleague, the gentleman from New York (Mr. Engel).
  The Acting CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from New York is recognized for 
2\1/2\ minutes.
  Mr. ENGEL. Mr. Chairman, I thank my good friend, Mr. Lantos. I want 
to commend you and Chairman Hyde for your leadership on this very, very 
important bill.
  I strongly support the bill. I support Mr. Stearns' amendment, 
because I think it dovetails very nicely with the bill, and I support a 
new strategic partnership with India. This is extremely important for 
the United States in the 21st century.
  India being the largest democracy and the United States being the 
oldest democracy have so much in common, and this is a chance for us to 
prove it. We have similar geopolitical interests in the region. We 
understand the fact that India and the United States have much in 
common. What may have kept us apart during the Cold War no longer is 
relevant.
  We have a strong Indian-American community in the United States, 
further strengthening the ties between our two great nations; and we 
have a common battle in the fight against terrorism. India, of course, 
experienced that terrible bombing on the railroad; and we in the United 
States understand what terrorism is as well.
  India is a nuclear power. It is a reality. It is a fact of life. And 
the fact that India is willing to cooperate with the United States with 
nuclear power is a plus for us.
  We should not treat friends and adversaries alike. People who say, 
well, you know, if you are going to help India, how can you tell Iran 
not to have nuclear power? That analogy is, frankly, ridiculous, 
because India has shown time and time again it is a peaceful, loving 
nation, with the same interests as the United States, whereas Iran is 
continuing its mischief. We know that Iran and North Korea should not 
be treated the same as India.
  So I think what the Congress is doing, what Mr. Lantos and Mr. Hyde 
have done with their bill, is a very tremendous asset to this country's 
future in working with India. India has more than a billion people, and 
India is growing in leaps and bounds in every step of the way.
  This strategic partnership will not only be with nuclear, but it will 
be with all things, because we will continue to build up trust with 
India, we will continue to build up a working relationship with India.
  Again, we don't have wishes to quarrel with any country, but when it 
comes to the region in Asia, India has the same concerns, and there are 
many, that we do, and that is why it pays to work with India and 
particularly with nuclear power.
  I support Mr. Stearns' amendment, I support the underlying bill, H.R. 
5682, and I urge my colleagues to vote ``yes'' on both.
  The Acting CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the 
gentleman from Florida (Mr. Stearns).
  The question was taken; and the Acting Chairman announced that the 
ayes appeared to have it.
  Mr. STEARNS. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.
  The Acting CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to clause 6 of rule XVIII, further 
proceedings on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Florida will 
be postponed.


          Amendment No. 3 Offered by Ms. Jackson-Lee of Texas

  The Acting CHAIRMAN. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 3 
printed in part B of House Report 109-599.
  Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
  The Acting CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Amendment No. 3 offered by Ms. Jackson-Lee of Texas:
       In section 2(6)(D), strike ``and'' after the semicolon.
       In section 2(7)(B), strike the period at the end and insert 
     ``; and''.
       In section 2, add at the end the following new paragraph:
       (8) the South Asia region is so important that the United 
     States should continue its policy of engagement, 
     collaboration, and exchanges with and between India and 
     Pakistan.

  The Acting CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to House Resolution 947, the 
gentlewoman from Texas (Ms. Jackson-Lee) and a Member opposed will each 
control 5 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentlewoman from Texas.
  Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I 
may consume.
  Mr. Chairman, I am proud to offer this amendment, along with my 
distinguished colleague, Mr. Burton of Indiana. Might I say that I also 
add my support for the manager's amendment which draws upon the change 
that focuses on naming the bill after Chairman Hyde. I add my 
appreciation for his service as well.

[[Page H5921]]

  Mr. Chairman, I also rise to speak on behalf of H.R. 5682 as I offer 
my amendment and offer the amendment with Mr. Burton, and that is that 
this particular legislation, the United States and India Nuclear 
Cooperation Promotion Act, is an opportunity. It is an opportunity for 
further negotiation. It is an opportunity for friendship and the 
continuation of that friendship. It is a recognition that even though 
India has not signed the nonproliferation agreement, it has peacefully 
utilized nuclear energy for the many years of its utilization. It is a 
democracy.
  So my amendment speaks to the whole concept of the importance of 
South Asia; and it says that former President Clinton got it right when 
we traveled with him to that region, Members of Congress, a small 
delegation of eight. We went to India and we went to Pakistan because 
we believed in the cohesion and the importance of that particular 
region.
  Might I note that in particular, as it relates to this legislation, 
the Nuclear Supply Group, NSG, still is maintained in this bill, and 
the guidelines and consensus decisionmaking are upheld. So, again, I 
emphasize that it is an opportunity.
  My amendment builds on that opportunity. Its language is direct. What 
it says is that South Asia is an important region and that it is in our 
national interests to continue our policy of engagement, collaboration, 
exchanges with and between India and Pakistan, particularly since this 
has served the Nation well. It goes on to emphasize the importance of 
that relationship.
  Why is that relationship important? Because we have seen in these 
latter years the working relationship between them and the United 
States. Pakistan has been a loyal and unwavering ally in our global war 
on terror and has played a decisive role in helping to remove the 
Taliban regime from Pakistan and the capture of hundreds of wanted al 
Qaeda terrorists. Pakistan has suffered thousands of casualties and has 
been a victim of numerous terrorist acts.
  In addition, the founder of Pakistan, Dr. Jinnah, premised the basis 
of this country on democratic principles. The alliance of the United 
States with the nation in South Asia should continue and the U.S. 
should emphasize in its foreign policy the importance of the region, 
India, Pakistan, Bangladesh. South Asia is important to the United 
States and the amendment further supports the need for encouraging 
celloboration and engagement with and between India and Pakistan by the 
U.S.
  Mr. Chairman, I am happy to yield to the distinguished gentleman from 
Indiana (Mr. Burton).
  Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Let me just say I support the amendment.
  I have been concerned about the problems between India and Pakistan 
for a long, long time, particularly in the area of Kashmir. They are 
talking now. Prime Minister Singh and President Musharraf have been 
trying to work out some differences. I know it is a very thorny issue 
and one that is going to take some time, but they are talking. They 
have opened up not only a dialogue but a small opening in the area 
between Pakistan and India in the Kashmiri area.
  This is a problem that must be solved. It should be solved. It could 
be a flash point for another war over there. Since India and Pakistan 
are both nuclear powers, anything we can do to reduce that threat and 
make sure peace reigns is very important.
  I support the gentlewoman's amendment and am proud to be a cosponsor.
  Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas. I yield to the gentleman from California.
  Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentlelady for yielding; and I 
just wanted to say I thank her and Mr. Burton for their amendment. I 
think it is very important that the United States be engaged on the 
subcontinent, and I think the gentlewoman from Texas and the gentleman 
from Indiana should be commended for their good work on this amendment. 
We are prepared to accept that amendment.
  Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentlewoman yield?
  Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas. I yield to the distinguished ranking member 
from California.
  Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Chairman, I want to commend my good friend from Texas 
for yet another constructive step. She makes so many in this body. I am 
strongly in support of her amendment and urge my colleagues to do 
likewise.
  Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas. Mr. Chairman, reclaiming my time, I thank 
the distinguished gentlemen.
  Just for the record, I know there has been mention of an arms race. 
We don't see an arms race with India. The recent comment of a 
spokesperson from Pakistan indicated they do not want an arms race in 
the region.
  So I would say that this is an important step. We need to engage. We 
need to work with India and Pakistan together. I ask my colleagues to 
support this amendment.
  Mr. Chairman, the United States' relationship with India and Pakistan 
is of paramount importance to our nations' political and economic 
future. With the receding of the Cold War's global divisions and the 
new realities of globalization and trans-national terrorism, we have 
embarked on a new era of promise, possibility and uncertainty. This 
means the United States, the world's only superpower, bears an 
especially heavy responsibility to remain engaged in all regions of the 
world, with all nation-states.
  Mr. Chairman, my amendment is simple. My amendment is important. My 
amendment is necessary. And my amendment is bipartisan. Due to the 
strategic political and economic importance of the South Asia region, 
it is imperative to our national interest to continue our policy of 
engagement collaboration, and exchanges with and between India and 
Pakistan, particularly since this has served the nation well in the 
past.
  My amendment, which is endorsed and co-sponsored by Congressman 
Burton, and which is not opposed by either the Majority or Minority of 
the Committee on International Relations, simply states that the 
``South Asia region is so important that the United States should 
continue its policy of engagement, collaboration, and exchanges with 
and between India and Pakistan.''
  Peaceful nuclear cooperation with India can serve multiple U.S. 
foreign policy objectives so long as it is undertaken in a manner that 
minimizes potential risks to the nonproliferation regime. This will be 
best achieved by sustained and active engagement and cooperation 
between India and the United States.
  Similarly, Pakistan has been a critical ally in the global war on 
terror. Pakistan has been a good friend to the people of the United 
States. Although H.R. 5682 signals no change in this country's 
relationship with Pakistan, it is not difficult to understand why it 
may give pause to some supporters of Pakistan. This is another reason 
why it is vital for the United States to continue to engage both 
Pakistan and India in ongoing political engagement, economic and 
technological collaborations, and personal exchanges, which will bring 
the United States closer to these two vitally important democracies in 
the South Asia region and will bring India and Pakistan closer to each 
other.
  As a founding Co-Chair of the Congressional Pakistan Caucus, I am 
wholeheartedly committed to the political, economic, and social 
amelioration of Pakistan for the Pakistani people and the ascendancy of 
Pakistan in the international community. Pakistan has been a loyal and 
unwavering ally in our global war on terror, which has played a 
decisive role in helping to remove the Taliban regime from Afghanistan 
and the capture of hundreds of wanted al-Qaeda terrorists. Pakistan has 
suffered thousands of casualties and has been a victim of numerous 
terrorist acts on their own soil because of their steadfast alliance 
with our nation in the global war on terror.
  In order to get a proper perspective on Pakistan, I believe we must 
take a look back at the luminary individual who is singularly 
responsible for its creation. Pakistan, one of the largest Muslim 
states in the world, is a living and exemplary monument of Muhammad Ali 
Jinnah. Becoming an architect of a dream first articulated by poet-
philosopher Muhammed Allama Iqbal, a brilliant young lawyer named 
Muhammad Ali Jinnah valiantly dedicated his life to achieving an 
independent Pakistan for Indian Muslims. Revered as the father of 
Pakistan, Muhammad Ali Jinnah inspired the adulation of his people 
through his eloquence, perseverance and dauntless courage. For over 30 
years, Muhammad Ali Jinnah was the prominent leader of Indian Muslims 
who articulately gave expression, coherence, and direction to their 
legitimate aspirations and transformed their dreams into a concrete 
reality. A visionary leader who was ahead of his time, Muhammad Ali 
Jinnah was a great constitutionalist and nation-builder who called for 
the equal rights of all Pakistani citizens without regard to their 
religion.
  In the past six decades, the people and nation of Pakistan has come a 
long way. The bonds of friendship which began with Muhammad Ali Jinnah 
continue today with President Musharraf. I am grateful to the people 
and government of Pakistan, who in the aftermath

[[Page H5922]]

of the devastation and loss of innocent life which occurred on 9/11, 
and on the eve of the 5 year anniversary of 9/11, continue to support 
our efforts to stamp out international terrorism. Similarly, I think it 
is critical that we continue our policy of engagement, collaboration, 
and exchanges with and between the people and the governments of 
Pakistan and India.
  I urge my colleagues to support my amendment.
  The Acting CHAIRMAN. Does anyone claim time in opposition to the 
amendment?
  If not, the question is on the amendment offered by the gentlewoman 
from Texas (Ms. Jackson-Lee).
  The amendment was agreed to.


                 Amendment No. 4 Offered by Mr. Sherman

  The Acting CHAIRMAN. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 4 
printed in part B of House Report 109-599.
  Mr. SHERMAN. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
  The Acting CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Amendment No. 4 offered by Mr. Sherman:
       In section 4(b), add at the end the following new 
     paragraph:
       (8) The amount of domestic uranium used in India's military 
     program during a 12-month period ending on the date of the 
     determination is equal to or less than the amount of domestic 
     uranium used in India's military program during the 12-month 
     period ending on July 18, 2005.
       In section 4, insert after subsection (o) the following new 
     subsection (and redesignate subsequent subsections 
     accordingly):

       (p) Annual Certification; Termination of Cooperation.--
     Nuclear cooperation with India shall be terminated unless one 
     year after making the determination described in subsection 
     (b)(8), and annually thereafter, the president certifies that 
     during the previous 12-month period the amount of domestic 
     uranium used in India's military program is equal to or less 
     than the amount of domestic uranium used in India's military 
     program during the 12-month period ending on July 18, 2005.

  The Acting CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to House Resolution 947, the gentleman 
from California (Mr. Sherman) and a Member opposed each will control 5 
minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California.
  Mr. SHERMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 3 minutes.
  Mr. Chairman, India is a democracy and it knows that this Congress 
has a role to play. They negotiated a deal which is better than the 
deal they need. That deal which they negotiated with our State 
Department is very loose on the issue of nonproliferation of nuclear 
weapons. India knows, or at least expects, that this Congress will do 
its job and make the agreement better, tighten the agreement so that it 
does not help India to build additional nuclear weapons.
  The question is whether this Congress will do its job or surprise the 
Indians and simply be a rubber stamp for the agreement that has already 
been negotiated. I hope we do our job, and here is why.
  India did not sign the Nonproliferation Treaty. They are not in 
violation of it. They exploded nuclear weapons. I do not believe that 
we should punish India for its decision to become a nuclear power, but 
we should not facilitate India in building additional nuclear weapons.
  India's problem is this: They can only produce a limited amount of 
uranium from domestic sources, basically 300 tons. What they get out of 
this deal is nuclear fuel and uranium.
  How does India use its 300 tons, which it produces domestically? They 
use half of it for their civilian reactors already existing. They 
certainly lose money if they fail to run those reactors as scheduled at 
full capacity. But they are doing just that. They are running their 
existing civilian reactors at less than capacity because they only use 
150 tons of uranium for that purpose. The other 150 tons goes to 
India's nuclear weapons program.
  What will this bill do if we fail to amend it? It will allow India to 
buy uranium for all of its civilian needs from other countries. The 
result will be that India will be able to use all 300 tons of its 
domestic production for the construction of nuclear weapons.
  That is not what we mean to do. We mean to help India develop its 
civilian program. But since uranium is fungible, we also do not mean 
that our help to India in giving it fuel for its civilian program is 
not supposed to, so we are told, help India double its production of 
nuclear weapons. That is why this bill needs an amendment.
  What my amendment would do is simply require that, for the deal to go 
forward, India keeps doing what it has been doing, using 150 tons of 
its uranium for its existing civilian plants instead of diverting that 
150 tons toward its military production. That is to say, we would make 
sure that this deal did not hamper, but did not help, India's nuclear 
weapons program.
  I hope the amendment will enjoy support.
  Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Chairman, I claim the time in opposition.
  The Acting CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from California is recognized for 
5 minutes.
  Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to the 
distinguished chairman of the International Relations Committee, the 
gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Hyde).
  Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, this is a killer amendment. If you vote for 
it, you vote to kill this entire initiative, because this imposes 
limits on India's nuclear weapons program, but India already possesses 
nuclear weapons and is extremely unlikely to give them up. Recognizing 
this fact is recognizing reality.
  This is a restriction imposed by the Sherman amendment that we impose 
on no other nuclear power, with the exception of North Korea, which may 
have nuclear weapons. This, as I have said, is a deal killer. Both 
India has said so and the administration has said so, and a vote for 
this amendment is a vote to kill the agreement.
  So, with respect, I urge defeat of this amendment.

                              {time}  1930

  Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
California (Mr. Lantos).
  Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Chairman, I thank my friend for yielding me time.
  Mr. Chairman, I oppose this amendment. Mr. Chairman, this amendment 
was presented to the Committee on International Relations and was 
overwhelmingly defeated because it is a killer amendment. It would kill 
the entire nuclear cooperation agreement with India.
  Legislation already provides that we should be proceeding with a 
multilateral moratorium or treaty to ban the production of fissile 
material. The legislation before us already states this. The underlying 
legislation requires detailed reporting on the steps India and the 
United States are taking to complete such a ban. It also requires 
reports on India's production of fissile material, so that we can try 
to conduct oversight over this important issue.
  The Fortenberry amendment that the House is considering today will 
strengthen this reporting even further. In reality, however, this 
amendment is intended as a deal killer. I urge all of my colleagues to 
rely on the underlying text, and I firmly oppose this amendment.
  Mr. SHERMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 30 seconds to the gentleman from 
Massachusetts (Mr. Markey).
  Mr. MARKEY. Mr. Chairman, this is a great amendment. Because right 
now this is how much nuclear material is needed by India to produce 
nuclear electricity in their country. It is used for electricity. 
However, once we provide them all of this nuclear material for their 
nuclear electricity, it is going to free up the same amount to make 
nuclear bombs.
  So they can go from 7 a year to 40 to 50 nuclear bombs a year. Well, 
they are saying they do not want to do that. And the proponents of this 
treaty are saying, they are not going to do that. What the Sherman 
amendment says is, the President must certify each year that they do 
not do that. That is why the Sherman amendment is the deal maker, 
because it proves what is being said is actually the truth.
  Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. SHERMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 30 seconds to the gentleman from 
Ohio (Mr. Kucinich).
  Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Chairman, as Congressman Markey just said, as this 
proposal now stands, there is nothing stopping India from using more 
and more of its domestic uranium for weapons program. Without the 
safeguards provided by the Sherman amendment, India could produce 
dozens more nuclear weapons per year under the U.S.-

[[Page H5923]]

India deal, which would surely lead to an arms race with neighboring 
rival Pakistan.
  Mr. Chairman, I am a great supporter of India and of stronger U.S.-
India relations. India is the world's largest democracy. It has 
contributed measurably to the legacy of peace of the great leader 
Mahatma Ghandi. India's long-standing goal of universal nuclear 
disarmament has not been acknowledged enough in this debate
  This proposal will be harmful to security in India, in the region and 
the world. And this proposal will be harmful to the people of India in 
that it could escalate an arms race between India and Pakistan.
  I support Representative Sherman's amendment, which requires the 
President to certify annually that India is not dedicating more 
domestic uranium to its weapons program, as a condition for the U.S. to 
cooperate with India on nuclear technology.
  Pakistan wants a deal with the U.S. on nuclear technology, but the 
U.S. has refused. Instead, Pakistan has turned to China for this 
technology. To add fuel to the fire, it was just reported that Pakistan 
has begun building a powerful new reactor for producing plutonium, 
signaling a major expansion of the country's nuclear weapons 
capabilities.
  Instead of giving India more uranium to develop nuclear weapons, the 
United States should take leadership in preventing an arms race in the 
region. A good first step would be to pass the Sherman amendment.
  Mr. SHERMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself the balance of my time.
  Mr. Chairman, let me respond to the arguments. They say that India 
claims this is a killer amendment. This a negotiating tactic. Any 
amendment I don't like is a killer amendment. I use the negotiating 
tactic myself.
  We are told this imposes a requirement on India that we do not impose 
on the other nuclear powers. All the other nuclear powers sign the 
nonproliferation treaty. India deliberately puts itself in a class by 
itself.
  We are told that this bill, this amendment is designed to be a killer 
amendment. I don't think the gentleman meant that as an attack on my 
belief and integrity. I voted for the bill. I do not intend to kill the 
bill.
  The Democratic leader was on this floor endorsing another amendment 
that India says is a killer amendment. I do not think she intends to 
kill the bill. She said she was going to vote for it. Those of us who 
want to improve the bill want to improve it. And if we are nothing more 
than a rubber stamp for a deal which by its terms will allow India to 
double its nuclear weapons production, all in the name of generating 
electricity, then we are not doing our job. Please vote for the 
amendment.
  Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to this amendment. I 
will note that the base text of this bill, in section 402, already asks 
for a classified report on India's domestic uranium usage. But the 
gentleman's amendment would make such a certification a condition for 
the deal.
  Let me also say that people recognize that India has great demand for 
expanding its energy grid to create electricity for its people. Let me 
say that the gentleman has taken a unique approach to this issue for 
which he should be commended. We sympathize with his concerns.
  However, I do not see the amendment as even workable. I do not know 
that such a determination with a high degree of confidence could even 
be made. So I am concerned about terminating the agreement with India 
on such a certification that cannot even be made with any certitude.
  Mr. Chairman, for some of these reasons, this amendment was defeated 
in committee by a vote of 10-32 when it was offered. I urge the House 
to do the same.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time
  The Acting CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the 
gentleman from California (Mr. Sherman).
  The question was taken; and the Acting Chairman announced that the 
noes appeared to have it.
  Mr. SHERMAN. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.
  The Acting CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to clause 6 of rule XVIII, further 
proceedings on the amendment offered by the gentleman from California 
will be postponed.


                 Amendment No. 5 Offered by Mr. Berman

  The Acting CHAIRMAN. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 5 
printed in part B of House Report 109-599.
  Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
  The Acting CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Amendment No. 5 offered by Mr. Berman
       In section 4(d), add at the end the following new 
     paragraph:
       (5) Limitation on nuclear transfers to india.--
     Notwithstanding any other provision of law, and 
     notwithstanding the entry into force of an agreement for 
     nuclear cooperation with India pursuant to section 123 of the 
     Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153) and approved 
     pursuant to this Act, nuclear transfers to India shall not 
     include source material and special nuclear material (as 
     defined in section 11 of such Act (42 U.S.C. 2014)) unless 
     the President determines that India--
       (A) is adhering to a unilateral moratorium on the 
     production of fissile material for nuclear weapons;
       (B) is adhering to a multilateral moratorium on the 
     production of fissile material for nuclear weapons; or
       (C) has signed and is adhering to a multilateral treaty 
     prohibiting the production of fissile material for nuclear 
     weapons.

  The Acting CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to House Resolution 947, the gentleman 
from California (Mr. Berman) and the gentleman from California (Mr. 
Royce) each will control 5 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California (Mr. Berman).
  Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2\1/2\ minutes to my co-author of 
this amendment, the gentlewoman from California (Mrs. Tauscher).
  Mrs. TAUSCHER. Mr. Chairman, I thank Mr. Berman for his hard work 
with me on this issue. I commend Chairman Hyde, for whom I have 
tremendous affection, for having this bill named after him.
  Mr. Chairman, the amendment that Mr. Berman and I are offering is the 
single strongest step Congress can take to ensure that the civilian 
nuclear cooperation agreement with India does not lead to a nuclear 
arms race in South Asia.
  Our amendment would allow exports of nuclear reactors and other 
technology to India, our good friend. But it would prevent the export 
of nuclear reactor fuel until India has ceased production of fissile 
material for use in nuclear weapons. The United States and the other 
original nuclear weapons states have all agreed to a voluntary 
moratorium on fissile material production.
  But under the bill as currently written, India will receive all of 
the benefits of a nuclear state under the nonproliferation treaty 
without being obligated to halt the production of fissile material, 
without having to sign a comprehensive test ban treaty, or to take 
other steps toward disarmament.
  Requiring that India commit to ceasing the production of bomb 
material, in exchange for all of the benefits of nuclear trade, without 
asking for it to take any other responsibilities of a nuclear power is 
the bare minimum we should require to improve United States' national 
security.
  The bill before us makes drastic exceptions to established 
nonproliferation rules. Currently India's production of weapons-grade 
plutonium is constrained by the requirements of its nuclear power 
reactors and its limited supply of natural uranium. But the civil-
military separation plan offered by India excludes from national 
international inspection military facilities and spent fuel.
  This provides India with a substantial capability to increase its 
nuclear weapons arsenal. If the bill goes ahead as is, the foreign 
supply of nuclear fuel to India would free up their existing limited 
capacity of highly enriched uranium and plutonium for weapons.
  It is therefore responsible and prudent for Congress to ensure 
through this legislation that as a simple price of having access to 
sensitive nuclear technology, India declare a moratorium on productions 
of fissile material, just as the U.S. and other nuclear powers have.
  Mr. Chairman, I urge my colleagues to support this amendment.
  Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished 
chairman of the International Relations Committee (Mr. Hyde).
  Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, I announce my difficulty in opposing my good

[[Page H5924]]

friends, Mr. Berman and Mrs. Tauscher. They are both very learned in 
this field.
  However, this amendment is very similar to Mr. Sherman's amendment 
and should be defeated for virtually the same reasons. India already 
possesses nuclear weapons, and is very unlikely to dispose of them or 
be divested of them.
  This is a restriction that the U.S. imposes on no other nuclear 
power. Therefore, instead of proliferating good will it would 
proliferate bad will to impose this on India.
  This is the proverbial deal killer, as the Sherman amendment was. A 
vote for this amendment is a vote to kill the agreement even if the 
bill passes. So, with considerable regret I must urge the defeat of 
this amendment
  Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from 
California (Mr. Lantos).
  Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Chairman, I regret but I must strongly oppose this 
amendment offered by my good friend from California. This amendment was 
carefully considered by the International Relations Committee and was 
overwhelming defeated on a bipartisan vote.
  It is a killer amendment, which would destroy this historic piece of 
legislation, and I think it would be irresponsible for us to hazard 
that strong probability.
  Mr. Chairman, I urge all of my colleagues to oppose this amendment.
  Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself the balance of my time.
  Mr. Chairman, first I point out that while this amendment was 
defeated decisively, it was not defeated overwhelming.
  Secondly, and I say this with great respect both to Chairman Hyde and 
Ranking Member Lantos, who not only do great work here, but made this a 
significantly better bill by virtue of their efforts.
  Let's review the bidding here. The U.S. went into this discussion 
saying, India, we want you to cut off fissile material production. 
India said no. The administration backed off its position.
  I now offer an amendment that simply denies the fuel until such time 
as they cut off their fissile material production. The administration 
says it is a killer amendment. The language that they proposed in a 
weakened form now, they call a killer amendment.
  Let's test the proposition here. Give a good vote to this amendment. 
As Mr. Sherman and Mr. Markey pointed out, we are incentivizing, if we 
provide the fuel, we are incentivizing a massive potential increases in 
India's nuclear weapon production.
  What is China going to do? I am not that worried about India. But 
India has minimal deterrent capabilities against China right now. What 
is China going to do? China right now has halted its fissile material 
production. Will they continue to do that once this passes?
  What will they do with Pakistan in the Nuclear Suppliers Group? At 
least, thank heavens, we will have a chance to see this agreement when 
it is finally negotiated after the Nuclear Suppliers Group has decided.

                              {time}  1945

  But don't just accept the words it is a killer amendment. Give this a 
good vote. Let India know we are very serious about this. Reinforce the 
administration's commitment to this issue which wavered in the 
negotiation of India. This issue goes far beyond U.S.-India 
relationships. It goes on with what happens with the nuclear powers and 
with the spread of nuclear weapons. It will have ramifications far 
beyond the U.S.-India relationship.
  This is a modest amendment. This is the amendment Sam Nunn proposes. 
This allows reactor technology and all of the other facets of a 
civilian nuclear cooperation to go ahead. It just says no fuel until 
you have decided to cut off fissile material production.
  Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Chairman, I would like to yield 1 minute to the 
chairman of the International Relations Committee.
  Mr. HYDE. I was simply going to suggest to my good friend, Mr. 
Berman, that while you are looking for patterns of conduct, think of 
the Libya example. Mr. Khadaffi might just turn in all their weapons. 
That is entirely possible.
  Mr. BERMAN. Well, I do. But it wasn't because we gave Libya civilian 
nuclear cooperation. But I wouldn't compare India and Libya. They are 
very different countries. And the gain for Libya was a great gain for 
nonproliferation, I agree. But now we are in a different situation. 
Think of China, think of Pakistan, think of Iran, think of North Korea.
  Mr. ROYCE. Reclaiming my time, Mr. Chairman.
  I rise in opposition to the Berman amendment. I would like to commend 
the gentleman from California for bringing this issue before the House 
today, and I know that he does so having studied this issue very 
closely.
  The gentleman's amendment would prevent the full realization of this 
agreement until India has put in place a cap, either unilaterally or 
multilateral, on its fissile material production. That is a highly 
unlikely or even an implausible scenario given the dynamics in the 
region in South Asia.
  This should, frankly, be a goal, and the administration should be 
doing more on that front. But it should not be a mandate for this 
agreement.
  This amendment is not without merit. I offered a successful amendment 
in committee that states that nothing in this bill shall violate our 
Article I NPT obligation not to in any way assist, encourage, or induce 
India to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or nuclear 
explosive devices. So I think Congress has made it clear that this is 
not the intent of the agreement.
  The gentleman is right that the language in the underlying bill is 
not as strenuous as his proposal, but there is also an international 
component to this agreement. We are opening the door for this 
cooperation with India not only for the United States but for other 
countries as well, and I don't see how the gentleman's amendment would 
prevent the nuclear supplier group from approving such trade for other 
countries, excluding only the U.S.
  Let me also say I do believe that fulfilling this relationship with 
India is in the interest of the United States. Indeed, and here is my 
final point, if this amendment were to pass, it could in fact be 
detrimental to U.S. interests from that perspective
  Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. ROYCE. I yield to the gentleman from California.
  Mr. BERMAN. I thank the gentleman for yielding.
  But the Nuclear Suppliers Group operates on a consensus. If this 
amendment is in the agreement, the United States will not support a 
consensus position that allows another country to send nuclear fuel to 
India
  The Acting CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the 
gentleman from California (Mr. Berman).
  The question was taken; and the Acting Chairman announced that the 
noes appeared to have it.
  Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.
  The Acting CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to clause 6 of rule XVIII, further 
proceedings on the amendment offered by the gentleman from California 
will be postponed.


               Amendment No. 6 Offered by Mr. Fortenberry

  The Acting CHAIRMAN. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 6 
printed in part B of House Report 109-599.
  Mr. FORTENBERRY. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
  The Acting CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Amendment No. 6 offered by Mr. Fortenberry
       In section 4(o), add at the end the following new 
     paragraph:
       (5) Growth in india's military fissile material 
     production.--
       (A) In general.--Not later than one year after the date on 
     which an agreement for nuclear cooperation between the United 
     States and India is approved by Congress under section 4(f) 
     and every year thereafter, the President shall submit to the 
     Committee on International Relations of the House of 
     Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the 
     Senate a report that--
       (i) measures the effectiveness of the civil nuclear 
     cooperation agreement in achieving the goals and objectives 
     described in section 2; and
       (ii) assesses the relative level of India's nuclear fissile 
     material production compared to the previous year.
       (B) Contents.--The report described in subparagraph (A) 
     shall also include information relating to--

[[Page H5925]]

       (i) the amount of natural uranium India has mined and 
     milled during the previous year;
       (ii) the  amount of electricity  India's civilian reactors 
     have produced during the previous year;
       (iii) the amount of  domestic natural uranium India has 
     used to produce electricity during the previous year;
       (iv) the amount of fissile material India has produced for 
     military purposes during the previous year;
       (v) the amount of domestic natural uranium and domestic 
     enrichment capacity  India has used to produce such fissile 
     material;
       (vi) the amount of  domestic  uranium India has otherwise 
     stockpiled  for possible civil or military use;
       (vii) an identification of any changes with regard to these 
     quantities from the previous year; and
       (viii) any additional qualitative factors determined to be 
     relevant with respect to subparagraph (A), as appropriate, 
     such as the location of production facilities.
       (C) Preparation; form of report.--The report should rely on 
     public information to the extent possible. The report shall 
     include a classified annex if necessary.
       (D) Hearings.--The Committees specified in subparagraph (A) 
     may, after consideration of each report under this paragraph, 
     hold hearings with government and non-government witnesses as 
     each Committee determines necessary to evaluate each report.


       Modification to Amendment No. 6 Offered by Mr. Fortenberry

  Mr. FORTENBERRY. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to modify the 
amendment with the modification placed at the desk.
  The Acting CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will report the modification.
  The Clerk read as follows:

       Modification to amendment No. 6 offered by Mr. Fortenberry:
       In section 4(o), add at the end the following new 
     paragraph:
       (5) Growth in india's military fissile material 
     production.--
       (A) In general.--Not later than one year after the date on 
     which an agreement for nuclear cooperation between the United 
     States and India is approved by Congress under section 4(f) 
     and every year thereafter, the President shall submit to the 
     Committee on International Relations of the House of 
     Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the 
     Senate a report that--
       (i) measures the effectiveness of the civil nuclear 
     cooperation agreement in achieving the goals and objectives 
     described in section 2; and
       (ii) assesses the relative level of India's nuclear fissile 
     material production compared to the previous year.
       (B) Contents.--The report described in subparagraph (A) 
     shall also include information relating to--
       (i) the amount of natural uranium India has mined and 
     milled during the previous year;
       (ii) the  amount of electricity  India's civilian reactors 
     have produced during the previous year;
       (iii) the amount of  domestic natural uranium India has 
     used in its declared civilian reactors to produce electricity 
     during the previous year;
       (iv) the amount of fissile material India has produced for 
     military purposes during the previous year;
       (v) the amount of domestic natural uranium and domestic 
     enrichment capacity  India has used to produce such fissile 
     material;
       (vi) the amount of  domestic  uranium India has otherwise 
     stockpiled  for possible civil or military use;
       (vii) an identification of any changes with regard to these 
     quantities from the previous year; and
       (viii) any additional qualitative factors determined to be 
     relevant with respect to subparagraph (A), as appropriate, 
     such as the location of production facilities.
       (C) Preparation; form of report.--The report should rely on 
     public information to the extent possible. The report shall 
     include a classified annex if necessary.

  Mr. FORTENBERRY (during the reading). Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous 
consent that the modification be considered as read and printed in the 
Record.
  The Acting CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentleman from Nebraska?
  There was no objection.
  The Acting CHAIRMAN. Without objection, the amendment is modified.
  There was no objection.
  The Acting CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to House Resolution 947, the gentleman 
from Nebraska (Mr. Fortenberry) and a Member opposed each will control 
5 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Nebraska.
  Mr. FORTENBERRY. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself as much time as I may 
consumed.
  (Mr. FORTENBERRY asked and was given permission to revise and extend 
his remarks.)
  Mr. FORTENBERRY. Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to offer 
this amendment to H.R. 5682, the United States and India Nuclear 
Cooperation Promotion Act of 2006. The purpose of this amendment is to 
provide Congress with the ability to assess, to the extent possible, 
whether U.S. civilian nuclear cooperation with India may potentially 
contribute to growth in India's military fissile material production. 
The amendment is straightforward. It simply calls for a report each 
year to ensure that the United States is not unintentionally complicit 
in the growth of India's nuclear weapons capabilities.
  First of all, let me express my appreciation to Chairman Hyde and 
Ranking Member Lantos and the House International Relations Committee 
staff for their efforts to address a wide variety of concerns expressed 
by members of the International Relations Committee.
  Given the global significance of this potential agreement, I believe 
it is important to remain diligent in the conduct of our oversight 
responsibilities.
  Mr. Chairman, civil nuclear cooperation with India is a bilateral 
initiative with wide-ranging multilateral implications. The 
nonproliferation, energy and environmental objectives of this proposed 
agreement with India are laudable; and the Committee on International 
Relations has emphasized the need to ensure that such an agreement 
would not result in unintended consequences which may undermine its 
purpose and directly or indirectly result in boosting India's military 
nuclear capabilities.
  It is my expectation that the International Relations Committee will 
avail itself of this opportunity to hold as many hearings as necessary 
to examine the content of this report and the potential implications 
for the U.S. compliance with Article I of the Treaty on the 
Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons as referenced in the bill.
  This is particularly important in light of the recent news regarding 
the discovery of a reactor project which would enable Pakistan to make 
many more nuclear weapons each year. This news highlights very real 
concerns about a potential arms race in South Asia. It is up to 
Congress to ensure that any U.S.-India civil nuclear agreement remains 
just that, a civil nuclear agreement which will have no impact on the 
production of nuclear weapons.
  Mr. Chairman, I understand that Chairman Hyde and Ranking Member 
Lantos are in support of this amendment, and I am grateful for their 
support.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentleman from California.
  Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding.
  As we have noted before, the underlying bill in section 402 already 
asks for a classified report on India's domestic uranium usage. The 
gentleman from Nebraska's amendment asks for an additional report 
building on the report in the underlying bill. We are willing to accept 
that amendment
  Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. FORTENBERRY. I yield to the gentleman from California.
  Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Chairman, I want to commend my friend from Nebraska. 
We are pleased to accept his amendment. It strengthens the underlying 
legislation. I urge all of my colleagues to support it.
  Mr. FORTENBERRY. I thank the gentleman and appreciate all of his hard 
work.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
  The Acting CHAIRMAN. Does anyone claim time in opposition to the 
amendment?
  The question is on the amendment, as modified, offered by the 
gentleman from Nebraska (Mr. Fortenberry).
  The amendment, as modified, was agreed to.


          Sequential Votes Postponed in Committee of the Whole

  The Acting CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to clause 6 of rule XVIII, proceedings 
will now resume on those amendments printed in part B of House Report 
109-599 on which further proceedings were postponed, in the following 
order:
  Amendment No. 2 by Mr. Stearns of Florida.
  Amendment No. 4 by Mr. Sherman of California.
  Amendment No. 5 by Mr. Berman of California.

[[Page H5926]]

  The first electronic vote will be conducted as a 15-minute vote. 
Remaining electronic votes will be conducted as 5-minute votes.


                 Amendment No. 2 Offered by Mr. Stearns

  The Acting CHAIRMAN. The pending business is the demand for a 
recorded vote on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Florida 
(Mr. Stearns) on which further proceedings were postponed and on which 
the ayes prevailed by voice vote.
  The Clerk will redesignate the amendment.
  The Clerk redesignated the amendment.


                             Recorded Vote

  The Acting CHAIRMAN. A recorded vote has been demanded.
  A recorded vote was ordered.
  The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 414, 
noes 0, not voting 18, as follows:

                             [Roll No. 407]

                               AYES--414

     Abercrombie
     Ackerman
     Aderholt
     Akin
     Alexander
     Allen
     Andrews
     Baca
     Bachus
     Baird
     Baker
     Baldwin
     Barrett (SC)
     Barrow
     Bartlett (MD)
     Barton (TX)
     Bass
     Bean
     Beauprez
     Becerra
     Berkley
     Berman
     Berry
     Biggert
     Bilbray
     Bilirakis
     Bishop (GA)
     Bishop (NY)
     Bishop (UT)
     Blackburn
     Blumenauer
     Blunt
     Boehlert
     Boehner
     Bonilla
     Bonner
     Bono
     Boozman
     Boren
     Boswell
     Boucher
     Boyd
     Bradley (NH)
     Brady (PA)
     Brady (TX)
     Brown (OH)
     Brown (SC)
     Brown, Corrine
     Brown-Waite, Ginny
     Burgess
     Burton (IN)
     Butterfield
     Buyer
     Calvert
     Camp (MI)
     Campbell (CA)
     Cannon
     Cantor
     Capito
     Capps
     Capuano
     Cardin
     Cardoza
     Carnahan
     Carson
     Carter
     Case
     Castle
     Chabot
     Chandler
     Chocola
     Clay
     Cleaver
     Clyburn
     Coble
     Cole (OK)
     Conaway
     Conyers
     Cooper
     Costa
     Costello
     Cramer
     Crenshaw
     Crowley
     Cubin
     Cuellar
     Culberson
     Cummings
     Davis (AL)
     Davis (CA)
     Davis (FL)
     Davis (IL)
     Davis (KY)
     Davis (TN)
     Davis, Tom
     DeFazio
     DeGette
     Delahunt
     DeLauro
     Dent
     Diaz-Balart, L.
     Diaz-Balart, M.
     Dicks
     Dingell
     Doggett
     Doolittle
     Doyle
     Drake
     Dreier
     Duncan
     Edwards
     Ehlers
     Emanuel
     Emerson
     Engel
     English (PA)
     Eshoo
     Etheridge
     Everett
     Farr
     Fattah
     Feeney
     Ferguson
     Filner
     Fitzpatrick (PA)
     Flake
     Foley
     Forbes
     Fortenberry
     Fossella
     Foxx
     Frank (MA)
     Franks (AZ)
     Frelinghuysen
     Gallegly
     Garrett (NJ)
     Gerlach
     Gibbons
     Gilchrest
     Gillmor
     Gingrey
     Gohmert
     Goode
     Goodlatte
     Gordon
     Granger
     Graves
     Green (WI)
     Green, Al
     Green, Gene
     Grijalva
     Gutierrez
     Gutknecht
     Hall
     Harman
     Harris
     Hart
     Hastings (FL)
     Hastings (WA)
     Hayes
     Hayworth
     Hefley
     Hensarling
     Herger
     Herseth
     Higgins
     Hinchey
     Hinojosa
     Hobson
     Hoekstra
     Holden
     Holt
     Honda
     Hooley
     Hostettler
     Hoyer
     Hulshof
     Hunter
     Hyde
     Inglis (SC)
     Inslee
     Israel
     Issa
     Jackson (IL)
     Jackson-Lee (TX)
     Jefferson
     Jenkins
     Jindal
     Johnson (CT)
     Johnson (IL)
     Johnson, E. B.
     Johnson, Sam
     Jones (NC)
     Kanjorski
     Kaptur
     Keller
     Kennedy (MN)
     Kennedy (RI)
     Kildee
     Kilpatrick (MI)
     Kind
     King (IA)
     King (NY)
     Kingston
     Kirk
     Kline
     Knollenberg
     Kolbe
     Kucinich
     Kuhl (NY)
     LaHood
     Langevin
     Lantos
     Larsen (WA)
     Larson (CT)
     Latham
     LaTourette
     Leach
     Lee
     Levin
     Lewis (CA)
     Lewis (GA)
     Lewis (KY)
     Linder
     Lipinski
     LoBiondo
     Lofgren, Zoe
     Lowey
     Lucas
     Lungren, Daniel E.
     Lynch
     Mack
     Maloney
     Manzullo
     Marchant
     Markey
     Marshall
     Matheson
     Matsui
     McCarthy
     McCaul (TX)
     McCollum (MN)
     McCotter
     McCrery
     McDermott
     McGovern
     McHugh
     McIntyre
     McKeon
     McMorris
     McNulty
     Meehan
     Meek (FL)
     Meeks (NY)
     Melancon
     Mica
     Michaud
     Millender-McDonald
     Miller (MI)
     Miller (NC)
     Miller, Gary
     Miller, George
     Mollohan
     Moore (KS)
     Moore (WI)
     Moran (KS)
     Moran (VA)
     Murtha
     Musgrave
     Myrick
     Nadler
     Napolitano
     Neal (MA)
     Neugebauer
     Ney
     Northup
     Norwood
     Nunes
     Oberstar
     Obey
     Ortiz
     Osborne
     Otter
     Owens
     Oxley
     Pallone
     Pascrell
     Pastor
     Paul
     Payne
     Pearce
     Pelosi
     Pence
     Peterson (MN)
     Peterson (PA)
     Petri
     Pickering
     Pitts
     Platts
     Poe
     Pombo
     Pomeroy
     Porter
     Price (GA)
     Price (NC)
     Putnam
     Radanovich
     Rahall
     Ramstad
     Rangel
     Regula
     Rehberg
     Reichert
     Renzi
     Reyes
     Reynolds
     Rogers (AL)
     Rogers (KY)
     Rogers (MI)
     Rohrabacher
     Ros-Lehtinen
     Ross
     Rothman
     Roybal-Allard
     Royce
     Ruppersberger
     Rush
     Ryan (OH)
     Ryan (WI)
     Ryun (KS)
     Sabo
     Salazar
     Sanchez, Linda T.
     Sanchez, Loretta
     Sanders
     Saxton
     Schakowsky
     Schiff
     Schmidt
     Schwartz (PA)
     Schwarz (MI)
     Scott (GA)
     Scott (VA)
     Sensenbrenner
     Serrano
     Sessions
     Shadegg
     Shaw
     Shays
     Sherman
     Sherwood
     Shimkus
     Shuster
     Simmons
     Simpson
     Skelton
     Slaughter
     Smith (NJ)
     Smith (TX)
     Smith (WA)
     Snyder
     Sodrel
     Solis
     Souder
     Spratt
     Stark
     Stearns
     Strickland
     Stupak
     Sullivan
     Tancredo
     Tanner
     Tauscher
     Taylor (MS)
     Taylor (NC)
     Terry
     Thomas
     Thompson (CA)
     Thompson (MS)
     Thornberry
     Tiahrt
     Tiberi
     Tierney
     Towns
     Turner
     Udall (CO)
     Udall (NM)
     Upton
     Van Hollen
     Velazquez
     Visclosky
     Walden (OR)
     Walsh
     Wamp
     Wasserman Schultz
     Waters
     Watson
     Watt
     Waxman
     Weiner
     Weldon (FL)
     Weldon (PA)
     Weller
     Westmoreland
     Whitfield
     Wicker
     Wilson (NM)
     Wilson (SC)
     Wolf
     Woolsey
     Wu
     Wynn
     Young (AK)
     Young (FL)

                             NOT VOTING--18

     Boustany
     Davis, Jo Ann
     Deal (GA)
     Evans
     Ford
     Gonzalez
     Istook
     Jones (OH)
     Kelly
     McHenry
     McKinney
     Miller (FL)
     Murphy
     Nussle
     Olver
     Pryce (OH)
     Sweeney
     Wexler

                              {time}  2017

  Mr. GEORGE MILLER of California changed his vote from ``no'' to 
``aye.''
  So the amendment was agreed to.
  The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
  Stated for:
  Mr. SWEENEY. Mr. Chairman, on rollcall No. 407, I was unavoidably 
detained. Had I been present, I would have voted ``aye.''
  Mr. MILLER of Florida. Mr. Chairman, on rollcall No. 407, I was 
unavoidably detained. Had I been present, I would have voted ``aye.''
  Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, on rollcall No. 407, I was unavoidably 
detained. Had I been present, I would have voted ``aye.''


                 Amendment No. 4 Offered by Mr. Sherman

  The Acting CHAIRMAN. The pending business is the demand for a 
recorded vote on the amendment offered by the gentleman from California 
(Mr. Sherman) on which further proceedings were postponed and on which 
the noes prevailed by voice vote.
  The Clerk will redesignate the amendment.
  The Clerk redesignated the amendment.


                             Recorded Vote

  The Acting CHAIRMAN. A recorded vote has been demanded.
  A recorded vote was ordered.
  The Acting CHAIRMAN. This will be a 5-minute vote.
  The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 155, 
noes 268, not voting 9, as follows:

                             [Roll No. 408]

                               AYES--155

     Abercrombie
     Allen
     Baca
     Baird
     Baldwin
     Barton (TX)
     Becerra
     Berman
     Berry
     Bishop (NY)
     Blumenauer
     Boucher
     Brady (PA)
     Brown (OH)
     Brown, Corrine
     Butterfield
     Capps
     Capuano
     Cardin
     Carson
     Clay
     Clyburn
     Coble
     Conyers
     Costello
     Cummings
     Davis (CA)
     DeFazio
     DeGette
     Delahunt
     DeLauro
     Dicks
     Dingell
     Doggett
     Eshoo
     Etheridge
     Farr
     Fattah
     Filner
     Fitzpatrick (PA)
     Fortenberry
     Garrett (NJ)
     Gerlach
     Gilchrest
     Gohmert
     Goode
     Green, Al
     Grijalva
     Gutierrez
     Harman
     Hefley
     Hinchey
     Holden
     Holt
     Honda
     Hooley
     Hostettler
     Hoyer
     Jefferson
     Johnson, E. B.
     Jones (NC)
     Jones (OH)
     Kanjorski
     Kaptur
     Kennedy (RI)
     Kildee
     Kilpatrick (MI)
     Kind
     Kucinich
     Langevin
     Larsen (WA)
     Larson (CT)
     Leach
     Lee
     Lewis (GA)
     LoBiondo
     Lofgren, Zoe
     Lowey
     Lynch
     Maloney
     Markey
     Marshall
     Matsui
     McCarthy
     McCollum (MN)
     McDermott
     McGovern
     McIntyre
     McNulty
     Meehan
     Michaud
     Millender-McDonald
     Miller, George
     Moore (KS)
     Moore (WI)
     Moran (KS)
     Murtha
     Nadler
     Napolitano
     Neal (MA)
     Oberstar
     Obey
     Olver
     Otter
     Owens
     Pascrell
     Pastor
     Paul
     Payne
     Pelosi
     Peterson (MN)
     Petri
     Pitts
     Platts
     Pomeroy
     Price (NC)
     Ramstad
     Ross
     Rothman
     Ryan (OH)
     Sabo
     Sanchez, Linda T.
     Sanchez, Loretta
     Sanders
     Saxton
     Schakowsky
     Schiff
     Schwartz (PA)
     Scott (GA)
     Serrano
     Sherman
     Slaughter
     Smith (NJ)
     Solis
     Spratt
     Stark
     Stupak
     Tauscher
     Taylor (MS)
     Thompson (CA)
     Tierney
     Udall (CO)
     Udall (NM)
     Upton
     Van Hollen
     Velazquez
     Visclosky
     Waters
     Watson
     Watt
     Waxman
     Weiner
     Weldon (PA)
     Woolsey
     Wu

                               NOES--268

     Ackerman
     Aderholt
     Akin
     Alexander
     Andrews
     Bachus
     Baker
     Barrett (SC)
     Barrow
     Bartlett (MD)
     Bass
     Bean
     Beauprez
     Berkley
     Biggert
     Bilbray
     Bilirakis
     Bishop (GA)
     Bishop (UT)
     Blackburn
     Blunt
     Boehlert
     Boehner
     Bonilla
     Bonner
     Bono
     Boozman

[[Page H5927]]


     Boren
     Boswell
     Boustany
     Boyd
     Bradley (NH)
     Brady (TX)
     Brown (SC)
     Brown-Waite, Ginny
     Burgess
     Burton (IN)
     Buyer
     Calvert
     Camp (MI)
     Campbell (CA)
     Cannon
     Cantor
     Capito
     Cardoza
     Carnahan
     Carter
     Case
     Castle
     Chabot
     Chandler
     Chocola
     Cleaver
     Cole (OK)
     Conaway
     Cooper
     Costa
     Cramer
     Crenshaw
     Crowley
     Cubin
     Cuellar
     Culberson
     Davis (AL)
     Davis (FL)
     Davis (IL)
     Davis (KY)
     Davis (TN)
     Davis, Tom
     Dent
     Diaz-Balart, L.
     Diaz-Balart, M.
     Doolittle
     Doyle
     Drake
     Dreier
     Duncan
     Edwards
     Ehlers
     Emanuel
     Emerson
     Engel
     English (PA)
     Everett
     Feeney
     Ferguson
     Flake
     Foley
     Forbes
     Fossella
     Foxx
     Frank (MA)
     Franks (AZ)
     Frelinghuysen
     Gallegly
     Gibbons
     Gillmor
     Gingrey
     Goodlatte
     Gordon
     Granger
     Graves
     Green (WI)
     Green, Gene
     Gutknecht
     Hall
     Harris
     Hart
     Hastings (FL)
     Hastings (WA)
     Hayes
     Hayworth
     Hensarling
     Herger
     Herseth
     Higgins
     Hinojosa
     Hobson
     Hoekstra
     Hulshof
     Hunter
     Hyde
     Inglis (SC)
     Inslee
     Israel
     Issa
     Jackson (IL)
     Jackson-Lee (TX)
     Jenkins
     Jindal
     Johnson (CT)
     Johnson (IL)
     Johnson, Sam
     Keller
     Kelly
     Kennedy (MN)
     King (IA)
     King (NY)
     Kingston
     Kirk
     Kline
     Knollenberg
     Kolbe
     Kuhl (NY)
     LaHood
     Lantos
     Latham
     LaTourette
     Levin
     Lewis (CA)
     Lewis (KY)
     Linder
     Lipinski
     Lucas
     Lungren, Daniel E.
     Mack
     Manzullo
     Marchant
     Matheson
     McCaul (TX)
     McCotter
     McCrery
     McHenry
     McHugh
     McKeon
     McMorris
     Meek (FL)
     Meeks (NY)
     Melancon
     Mica
     Miller (FL)
     Miller (MI)
     Miller (NC)
     Miller, Gary
     Mollohan
     Moran (VA)
     Murphy
     Musgrave
     Myrick
     Neugebauer
     Ney
     Northup
     Norwood
     Nunes
     Ortiz
     Osborne
     Oxley
     Pallone
     Pearce
     Pence
     Peterson (PA)
     Pickering
     Poe
     Pombo
     Porter
     Price (GA)
     Pryce (OH)
     Putnam
     Radanovich
     Rahall
     Rangel
     Regula
     Rehberg
     Reichert
     Renzi
     Reyes
     Reynolds
     Rogers (AL)
     Rogers (KY)
     Rogers (MI)
     Rohrabacher
     Ros-Lehtinen
     Roybal-Allard
     Royce
     Ruppersberger
     Rush
     Ryan (WI)
     Ryun (KS)
     Salazar
     Schmidt
     Schwarz (MI)
     Scott (VA)
     Sensenbrenner
     Sessions
     Shadegg
     Shaw
     Shays
     Sherwood
     Shimkus
     Shuster
     Simmons
     Simpson
     Skelton
     Smith (TX)
     Smith (WA)
     Snyder
     Sodrel
     Souder
     Stearns
     Strickland
     Sullivan
     Sweeney
     Tancredo
     Tanner
     Taylor (NC)
     Terry
     Thomas
     Thompson (MS)
     Thornberry
     Tiahrt
     Tiberi
     Towns
     Turner
     Walden (OR)
     Walsh
     Wamp
     Wasserman Schultz
     Weldon (FL)
     Weller
     Westmoreland
     Whitfield
     Wicker
     Wilson (NM)
     Wilson (SC)
     Wolf
     Wynn
     Young (AK)
     Young (FL)

                             NOT VOTING--9

     Davis, Jo Ann
     Deal (GA)
     Evans
     Ford
     Gonzalez
     Istook
     McKinney
     Nussle
     Wexler


                  Announcement by the Acting Chairman

  The Acting CHAIRMAN (during the vote). Members are advised there are 
2 minutes remaining in this vote.

                              {time}  2028

  Messrs. WU, GUTIERREZ, and POMEROY changed their vote from ``no'' to 
``aye.''
  So the amendment was rejected.
  The result of the vote was announced as above recorded


                 Amendment No. 5 Offered by Mr. Berman

  The Acting CHAIRMAN. The pending business is the demand for a 
recorded vote on the amendment offered by the gentleman from California 
(Mr. Berman) on which further proceedings were postponed and on which 
the noes prevailed by voice vote.
  The Clerk will redesignate the amendment.
  The Clerk redesignated the amendment.


                             Recorded Vote

  The Acting CHAIRMAN. A recorded vote has been demanded.
  A recorded vote was ordered.
  The Acting CHAIRMAN. This will be a 5-minute vote.
  The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 184, 
noes 241, not voting 7, as follows

                             [Roll No. 409]

                               AYES--184

     Abercrombie
     Allen
     Andrews
     Baca
     Baird
     Baldwin
     Barton (TX)
     Becerra
     Berman
     Berry
     Bishop (NY)
     Blumenauer
     Boehlert
     Boucher
     Boyd
     Brady (PA)
     Brown (OH)
     Brown-Waite, Ginny
     Butterfield
     Capps
     Capuano
     Cardin
     Cardoza
     Carson
     Case
     Chandler
     Clay
     Cleaver
     Clyburn
     Coble
     Conyers
     Cooper
     Costa
     Costello
     Cummings
     Davis (CA)
     Davis, Tom
     DeFazio
     DeGette
     Delahunt
     DeLauro
     Dent
     Dicks
     Dingell
     Doggett
     Doyle
     Edwards
     Emerson
     Eshoo
     Etheridge
     Farr
     Fattah
     Filner
     Fitzpatrick (PA)
     Fortenberry
     Frank (MA)
     Garrett (NJ)
     Gerlach
     Gilchrest
     Gohmert
     Gonzalez
     Goode
     Green, Al
     Green, Gene
     Grijalva
     Harman
     Hefley
     Herseth
     Hinchey
     Hinojosa
     Hobson
     Holden
     Holt
     Honda
     Hooley
     Hostettler
     Hoyer
     Inslee
     Jefferson
     Johnson, E. B.
     Jones (NC)
     Jones (OH)
     Kanjorski
     Kaptur
     Kennedy (RI)
     Kildee
     Kilpatrick (MI)
     Kind
     Kucinich
     Langevin
     Larsen (WA)
     Larson (CT)
     Leach
     Lee
     Lewis (CA)
     Lewis (GA)
     Lofgren, Zoe
     Lowey
     Lynch
     Maloney
     Markey
     Marshall
     Matsui
     McCarthy
     McCollum (MN)
     McDermott
     McGovern
     McIntyre
     McNulty
     Meehan
     Michaud
     Millender-McDonald
     Miller, George
     Moore (KS)
     Moore (WI)
     Moran (KS)
     Moran (VA)
     Murtha
     Nadler
     Napolitano
     Neal (MA)
     Nunes
     Oberstar
     Obey
     Olver
     Otter
     Owens
     Pascrell
     Pastor
     Paul
     Payne
     Pelosi
     Peterson (MN)
     Petri
     Pitts
     Platts
     Price (NC)
     Ramstad
     Ross
     Rothman
     Ryan (OH)
     Sabo
     Sanchez, Linda T.
     Sanchez, Loretta
     Sanders
     Schakowsky
     Schiff
     Schwartz (PA)
     Schwarz (MI)
     Scott (GA)
     Serrano
     Sherman
     Sherwood
     Skelton
     Slaughter
     Smith (NJ)
     Snyder
     Solis
     Souder
     Spratt
     Stark
     Stearns
     Stupak
     Tauscher
     Taylor (MS)
     Taylor (NC)
     Thompson (CA)
     Tierney
     Towns
     Udall (CO)
     Udall (NM)
     Upton
     Van Hollen
     Velazquez
     Visclosky
     Waters
     Watson
     Watt
     Waxman
     Weiner
     Weldon (PA)
     Wolf
     Woolsey
     Wu

                               NOES--241

     Ackerman
     Aderholt
     Akin
     Alexander
     Bachus
     Baker
     Barrett (SC)
     Barrow
     Bartlett (MD)
     Bass
     Bean
     Beauprez
     Berkley
     Biggert
     Bilbray
     Bilirakis
     Bishop (GA)
     Bishop (UT)
     Blackburn
     Blunt
     Boehner
     Bonilla
     Bonner
     Bono
     Boozman
     Boren
     Boswell
     Boustany
     Bradley (NH)
     Brady (TX)
     Brown (SC)
     Brown, Corrine
     Burgess
     Burton (IN)
     Buyer
     Calvert
     Camp (MI)
     Campbell (CA)
     Cannon
     Cantor
     Capito
     Carnahan
     Carter
     Castle
     Chabot
     Chocola
     Cole (OK)
     Conaway
     Cramer
     Crenshaw
     Crowley
     Cubin
     Cuellar
     Culberson
     Davis (AL)
     Davis (FL)
     Davis (IL)
     Davis (KY)
     Davis (TN)
     Diaz-Balart, L.
     Diaz-Balart, M.
     Doolittle
     Drake
     Dreier
     Duncan
     Ehlers
     Emanuel
     Engel
     English (PA)
     Everett
     Feeney
     Ferguson
     Flake
     Foley
     Forbes
     Ford
     Fossella
     Foxx
     Franks (AZ)
     Frelinghuysen
     Gallegly
     Gibbons
     Gillmor
     Gingrey
     Goodlatte
     Gordon
     Granger
     Graves
     Green (WI)
     Gutierrez
     Gutknecht
     Hall
     Harris
     Hart
     Hastings (FL)
     Hastings (WA)
     Hayes
     Hayworth
     Hensarling
     Herger
     Higgins
     Hoekstra
     Hulshof
     Hunter
     Hyde
     Inglis (SC)
     Israel
     Issa
     Jackson (IL)
     Jackson-Lee (TX)
     Jenkins
     Jindal
     Johnson (CT)
     Johnson (IL)
     Johnson, Sam
     Keller
     Kelly
     Kennedy (MN)
     King (IA)
     King (NY)
     Kingston
     Kirk
     Kline
     Knollenberg
     Kolbe
     Kuhl (NY)
     LaHood
     Lantos
     Latham
     LaTourette
     Levin
     Lewis (KY)
     Linder
     Lipinski
     LoBiondo
     Lucas
     Lungren, Daniel E.
     Mack
     Manzullo
     Marchant
     Matheson
     McCaul (TX)
     McCotter
     McCrery
     McHenry
     McHugh
     McKeon
     McMorris
     Meek (FL)
     Meeks (NY)
     Melancon
     Mica
     Miller (FL)
     Miller (MI)
     Miller (NC)
     Miller, Gary
     Mollohan
     Murphy
     Musgrave
     Myrick
     Neugebauer
     Ney
     Northup
     Norwood
     Ortiz
     Osborne
     Oxley
     Pallone
     Pearce
     Pence
     Peterson (PA)
     Pickering
     Poe
     Pombo
     Pomeroy
     Porter
     Price (GA)
     Pryce (OH)
     Putnam
     Radanovich
     Rahall
     Rangel
     Regula
     Rehberg
     Reichert
     Renzi
     Reyes
     Reynolds
     Rogers (AL)
     Rogers (KY)
     Rogers (MI)
     Rohrabacher
     Ros-Lehtinen
     Roybal-Allard
     Royce
     Ruppersberger
     Rush
     Ryan (WI)
     Ryun (KS)
     Salazar
     Saxton
     Schmidt
     Scott (VA)
     Sensenbrenner
     Sessions
     Shadegg
     Shaw
     Shays
     Shimkus
     Shuster
     Simmons
     Simpson
     Smith (TX)
     Smith (WA)
     Sodrel
     Strickland
     Sullivan
     Sweeney
     Tancredo
     Tanner
     Terry
     Thomas
     Thompson (MS)
     Thornberry
     Tiahrt
     Tiberi
     Turner
     Walden (OR)
     Walsh
     Wamp
     Wasserman Schultz
     Weldon (FL)
     Weller
     Westmoreland
     Whitfield
     Wicker
     Wilson (NM)
     Wilson (SC)
     Wynn
     Young (AK)
     Young (FL)

                             NOT VOTING--7

     Davis, Jo Ann
     Deal (GA)
     Evans
     Istook
     McKinney
     Nussle
     Wexler


                  Announcement by the Acting Chairman

  The Acting CHAIRMAN (during the vote). Members are advised that 2 
minutes remain in this vote.

                              {time}  2036

  Mr. MEEK of Florida changed his vote from ``aye'' to ``no.''

[[Page H5928]]

  So the amendment was rejected.
  The result of the vote was announced as above recorded
  The Acting CHAIRMAN. Under the rule, the Committee rises.
  Accordingly, the Committee rose; and the Speaker pro tempore (Mr. 
Bishop of Utah) having assumed the chair, Mr. Gutknecht, Acting 
Chairman of the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union, 
reported that that Committee, having had under consideration the bill 
(H.R. 5682) to exempt from certain requirements of the Atomic Energy 
Act of 1954 a proposed nuclear agreement for cooperation with India, 
pursuant to House Resolution 947, he reported the bill, as amended 
pursuant to that rule, back to the House with further sundry amendments 
adopted by the Committee of the Whole.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under the rule, the previous question is 
ordered.
  Is a separate vote demanded on any amendment? If not, the Chair will 
put them en gros.
  The amendments were agreed to.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the engrossment and third 
reading of the bill.
  The bill was ordered to be engrossed and read a third time, and was 
read the third time.


                Motion to Recommit Offered by Mr. Markey

  Mr. MARKEY. Mr. Speaker, I have a motion to recommit at the desk.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is the gentleman opposed to the bill?
  Mr. MARKEY. In its current form, I am opposed to the bill.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Clerk will report the motion to 
recommit.
  The Clerk read as follows:

       Mr. Markey moves to recommit the bill H.R. 5682 to the 
     Committee on International Relations with instructions to 
     report the same back to the House forthwith with the 
     following amendment:
       In section 4(b), add at the end the following new 
     paragraph:
       (8) India is fully and actively participating in United 
     States efforts to dissuade, isolate, and, if necessary, 
     sanction and contain Iran for its efforts to acquire weapons 
     of mass destruction, including a nuclear weapons capability 
     (including the capability to enrich or process nuclear 
     materials), and the means to deliver weapons of mass 
     destruction.

  Mr. MARKEY (during the reading). Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent 
that the motion to recommit be considered as read and printed in the 
Record.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentleman from Massachusetts?
  There was no objection.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman is recognized for 5 minutes
  Mr. MARKEY. Mr. Speaker, this recommittal motion requires that 
nuclear cooperation with India can only commence after the President 
has determined that India is fully and actively participating in United 
States' efforts to dissuade, isolate and, if necessary, sanction and 
contain Iran for its efforts to acquire weapons of mass destruction, 
including a nuclear weapons capability, including the capability to 
enrich or process nuclear materials and the means to deliver weapons of 
mass destruction.
  The motion does not kill or delay this bill in any way. If the House 
approves this motion, the Committee on International Relations will 
report the amended bill back to the House forthwith, meaning 
immediately. We will go to final passage of the legislation.
  As the Members know, the U.S. Government has made a determination 
that Iran's nuclear program is a cover for a military program; and the 
International Atomic Energy Agency has found Iran to be in violation of 
their international safeguards commitments. The U.N. Security Council 
is about to consider what action to take in response.
  Even Russia and China have now said that they would support action at 
the Security Council, potentially even sanctions, a position that could 
not have been imagined previously. India is now the only global power 
that has yet to get on board with the United States policy on Iran.
  Clearly, preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons is a 
paramount U.S. national security goal. A nuclear-armed Iran is a threat 
to our national security; and it is a threat to the security, indeed, 
the very survival of our closest ally in the Middle East, the State of 
Israel.
  Let me at this time, Mr. Speaker, yield 1 minute to the gentleman 
from Michigan (Mr. Upton).
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman has not been recognized for a 
period of controlled debate and may not allocate or reserve time. The 
gentleman may reclaim his time after 1 minute.
  Mr. UPTON. Mr. Speaker, I don't often speak or vote for motions to 
recommit, but occasionally they do pass. And I would note that if this 
motion to recommit does pass, the bill still comes to us in its final 
form.
  The gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Markey) and I tried to offer 
this amendment in the Rules Committee. I must say that in our testimony 
in the Rules Committee upstairs yesterday, I thought we had pretty good 
support on both sides of the aisle for this amendment from those that 
were there.
  Iran is a bad player. This bill helps India. Why don't we have India 
on our side as we work against Iran in the world community? That is 
what this motion to recommit says. It says that the President has to 
certify that India is on our side as they work for nuclear capability 
in the world community and to keep Iran on the other side. Why aren't 
we working together, India and the United States, as we look at Iran in 
terms of more of the mischief that they are promoting around the world?
  Mr. MARKEY. I thank the gentleman.
  I yield 30 seconds to the gentleman from California (Mr. Lantos).
  Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Speaker, I strongly support this motion. In committee 
deliberations, we have made it clear to India that they must make a 
choice between Tehran and Washington. They have done so twice at votes 
in Vienna at the International Atomic Energy Agency. This recommittal 
motion dramatically strengthens the underlying legislation. I urge all 
of my colleagues to vote for it.
  Mr. MARKEY. I thank the gentleman.
  Could I ask the Chair how much time is remaining.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Massachusetts has 1\1/2\ 
minutes remaining of the 5.
  Mr. MARKEY. I yield myself the remainder of my time.
  As the gentleman from Michigan and the gentleman from California have 
pointed out, there has been a series of statements made by the Indian 
government that have left a great deal of ambiguity with regard to how 
strong they will stand with us in our effort to take Iran to the 
Security Council to ensure that Iran does not use its uranium and 
plutonium programs in order to develop a clandestine nuclear weapons 
program.
  The recommittal motion that I am propounding here this evening just 
follows up on the statements that have been made out of the Indian 
government so that they can understand what we expect from them, and we 
will send a signal from this Congress to our negotiators as to what we 
expect from them in eliciting from the Indian government. So I hope on 
a bipartisan basis we can all agree that this Iranian nuclear program 
is the very top foreign policy and defense threat not only to our 
country but to countries throughout the Middle East.
  I urge an ``aye'' vote on the recommittal motion.

                              {time}  2045

  Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I rise to oppose the motion to recommit.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from California is recognized 
for 5 minutes.
  Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, during the course of the committee's five 
hearings on this agreement members closely scrutinized the relationship 
between India and Iran, and I think it is fair to say that our 
committee helped influence India's thinking on Iran. And I think we 
should all remember that we are getting India's cooperation on Iran. We 
got two IAEA votes out of India, including a critical vote to get the 
Iran file to New York. That is the fact about cooperation.
  We share the gentleman's concern about Iran, but our point is that 
India is cooperating on Iran. And as we continue to engage India, and 
this agreement is about India's growing energy needs, as we engage 
India, we move them away from states like Iran. Rejection of the 
agreement itself, frankly, could push India, theoretically, back 
towards countries like Iran.

[[Page H5929]]

  Also, we have Mr. Markey's theme in the bill itself. The bill itself 
says to ``secure India's full and active participation in United States 
efforts to dissuade, isolate, and, if necessary, sanction and contain 
Iran for its efforts to acquire weapons of mass destruction, including 
a nuclear weapons capability, and the means to deliver weapons of mass 
destruction.'' If India breaks this agreement, then we, the United 
States, will break our agreement with India.
  And I think also it is important to remember that India and the 
administration both say that they are cooperating on Iran quietly 
behind the scenes. Why? Because this is the most effective way to do 
it. And we have seen the positive results. But diplomacy cannot be 
certified. The purpose of this agreement is to help establish broad 
cooperation, to establish a partnership between India and the United 
States. You do not compel a partner to cooperate. So this amendment is 
both unworkable and contrary to the spirit of the new relationship we 
are trying to establish with India.
  How important is that relationship? Well, we have had two 
administrations, the Clinton administration and the Bush 
administration, forge closer ties with India and overcoming what we 
remember only too well, the chilly relations of the Cold War. And last 
July's joint statement committed each country to a global partnership 
which has accelerated our cooperation on many issues, including 
counterterrorism, including Iran.
  The International Relations Committee have given this agreement close 
and extensive review. While nuclear energy is controversial in the 
United States, it is not in India. Like in several other countries, 
nuclear energy is widely viewed as a critical technology for their 
electricity, one central to uplifting hundreds of millions of 
impoverished Indians. So India will develop its nuclear energy sector, 
not as easily or as quickly without this deal, but it will nonetheless. 
So this deal needs to go forward.
  With its growing economy, India is consuming more and more oil. It is 
competing on the world market, competing with American consumers, for 
limited hydrocarbon resources. This gives Americans an interest in 
helping India expand its nuclear power industry, which this legislation 
does. It also encourages India to move away from burning its highly 
polluting coal, which is in our interest.
  By passing this legislation, we also take a step toward 
internationalizing India's nuclear industry, which I believe would make 
it safer. The agreement also is likely to increase India's cooperation 
with us in confronting countries seeking to break their NPT commitment 
by developing nuclear weapons, as it already has with Iran.
  India must take more steps, including developing a credible plan to 
separate its civilians and military nuclear facilities under the 
agreement. Congress must approve a nuclear cooperation agreement that 
the administration is negotiating with the Indians before the 
technology is actually transferred. And as I said, should India break 
the conditions of the agreement, the U.S. breaks off the agreement 
itself.
  So either we continue to try to box in India and hope for the best, 
or we make this move, we engage India and hope to use our influence to 
move this increasingly important country in our direction, making India 
a true partner as we enter what will be a decades-long struggle against 
Islamist terrorism.
  That is why I ask my colleagues to please oppose this motion to 
recommit and please vote for the U.S. and India Nuclear Cooperation 
Promotion Act
  Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Without objection, the previous question is 
ordered on the motion to recommit.
  There was no objection.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion to recommit.
  The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that 
the noes appeared to have it.


                             Recorded Vote

  Mr. MARKEY. Mr. Speaker, I demand a recorded vote.
  A recorded vote was ordered.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 9 of rule XX, the Chair 
will reduce to 5 minutes the minimum time for any electronic vote on 
the question of passage.
  The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 192, 
noes 235, not voting 6, as follows

                             [Roll No. 410]

                               AYES--192

     Allen
     Andrews
     Baca
     Baird
     Baldwin
     Barrow
     Bean
     Becerra
     Berkley
     Berman
     Berry
     Bishop (GA)
     Bishop (NY)
     Blumenauer
     Boswell
     Boucher
     Boyd
     Brady (PA)
     Brown (OH)
     Brown, Corrine
     Butterfield
     Capps
     Capuano
     Cardin
     Carnahan
     Carson
     Case
     Clay
     Cleaver
     Clyburn
     Coble
     Conyers
     Costa
     Costello
     Cramer
     Cummings
     Davis (CA)
     Davis (FL)
     Davis (TN)
     DeFazio
     DeGette
     DeLauro
     Dicks
     Dingell
     Doggett
     Doyle
     Edwards
     Emanuel
     Emerson
     Eshoo
     Etheridge
     Farr
     Fattah
     Filner
     Fitzpatrick (PA)
     Ford
     Fortenberry
     Frank (MA)
     Gerlach
     Gilchrest
     Gonzalez
     Gordon
     Green, Al
     Green, Gene
     Grijalva
     Harman
     Hastings (FL)
     Hefley
     Herseth
     Higgins
     Hinchey
     Hinojosa
     Holden
     Holt
     Honda
     Hooley
     Hoyer
     Israel
     Jackson-Lee (TX)
     Jefferson
     Johnson (CT)
     Johnson (IL)
     Johnson, E. B.
     Jones (NC)
     Jones (OH)
     Kanjorski
     Kaptur
     Kennedy (RI)
     Kildee
     Kilpatrick (MI)
     Kind
     Kucinich
     Langevin
     Lantos
     Larsen (WA)
     Larson (CT)
     Leach
     Lee
     Levin
     Lewis (GA)
     Lipinski
     LoBiondo
     Lofgren, Zoe
     Lowey
     Lynch
     Maloney
     Markey
     Marshall
     Matsui
     McCarthy
     McCollum (MN)
     McDermott
     McGovern
     McIntyre
     McNulty
     Meehan
     Melancon
     Michaud
     Millender-McDonald
     Miller, George
     Moore (KS)
     Moore (WI)
     Moran (VA)
     Murtha
     Nadler
     Napolitano
     Neal (MA)
     Ney
     Oberstar
     Obey
     Olver
     Ortiz
     Otter
     Owens
     Pascrell
     Pastor
     Payne
     Pelosi
     Peterson (MN)
     Platts
     Pomeroy
     Price (NC)
     Rahall
     Ramstad
     Reyes
     Ross
     Rothman
     Roybal-Allard
     Ryan (OH)
     Sabo
     Salazar
     Sanchez, Linda T.
     Sanchez, Loretta
     Sanders
     Schakowsky
     Schiff
     Schwartz (PA)
     Scott (GA)
     Scott (VA)
     Serrano
     Shays
     Sherman
     Simmons
     Skelton
     Slaughter
     Smith (NJ)
     Snyder
     Solis
     Spratt
     Stark
     Stupak
     Sweeney
     Tanner
     Tauscher
     Taylor (MS)
     Thompson (CA)
     Tierney
     Udall (CO)
     Udall (NM)
     Upton
     Van Hollen
     Velazquez
     Visclosky
     Wasserman Schultz
     Waters
     Watson
     Watt
     Waxman
     Wilson (NM)
     Woolsey
     Wu
     Wynn

                               NOES--235

     Abercrombie
     Ackerman
     Aderholt
     Akin
     Alexander
     Bachus
     Baker
     Barrett (SC)
     Bartlett (MD)
     Barton (TX)
     Bass
     Beauprez
     Biggert
     Bilbray
     Bilirakis
     Bishop (UT)
     Blackburn
     Blunt
     Boehlert
     Boehner
     Bonilla
     Bonner
     Bono
     Boozman
     Boren
     Boustany
     Bradley (NH)
     Brady (TX)
     Brown (SC)
     Brown-Waite, Ginny
     Burgess
     Burton (IN)
     Buyer
     Calvert
     Camp (MI)
     Campbell (CA)
     Cannon
     Cantor
     Capito
     Cardoza
     Carter
     Castle
     Chabot
     Chandler
     Chocola
     Cole (OK)
     Conaway
     Cooper
     Crenshaw
     Crowley
     Cubin
     Cuellar
     Culberson
     Davis (AL)
     Davis (IL)
     Davis (KY)
     Davis, Tom
     Delahunt
     Dent
     Diaz-Balart, L.
     Diaz-Balart, M.
     Doolittle
     Drake
     Dreier
     Duncan
     Ehlers
     Engel
     English (PA)
     Everett
     Feeney
     Ferguson
     Flake
     Foley
     Forbes
     Fossella
     Foxx
     Franks (AZ)
     Frelinghuysen
     Gallegly
     Garrett (NJ)
     Gibbons
     Gillmor
     Gingrey
     Gohmert
     Goode
     Goodlatte
     Granger
     Graves
     Green (WI)
     Gutierrez
     Gutknecht
     Hall
     Harris
     Hart
     Hastert
     Hastings (WA)
     Hayes
     Hayworth
     Hensarling
     Herger
     Hobson
     Hoekstra
     Hostettler
     Hulshof
     Hunter
     Hyde
     Inglis (SC)
     Inslee
     Issa
     Jackson (IL)
     Jenkins
     Jindal
     Johnson, Sam
     Keller
     Kelly
     Kennedy (MN)
     King (IA)
     King (NY)
     Kingston
     Kirk
     Kline
     Knollenberg
     Kolbe
     Kuhl (NY)
     LaHood
     Latham
     LaTourette
     Lewis (CA)
     Lewis (KY)
     Linder
     Lucas
     Lungren, Daniel E.
     Mack
     Manzullo
     Marchant
     Matheson
     McCaul (TX)
     McCotter
     McCrery
     McHenry
     McHugh
     McKeon
     McMorris
     Meek (FL)
     Meeks (NY)
     Mica
     Miller (FL)
     Miller (MI)
     Miller (NC)
     Miller, Gary
     Mollohan
     Moran (KS)
     Murphy
     Musgrave
     Myrick
     Neugebauer
     Northup
     Norwood
     Nunes
     Nussle
     Osborne
     Oxley
     Pallone
     Paul
     Pearce
     Pence
     Peterson (PA)
     Petri
     Pickering
     Pitts
     Poe
     Pombo
     Porter
     Price (GA)
     Pryce (OH)
     Putnam
     Radanovich
     Rangel
     Regula
     Rehberg
     Reichert
     Renzi
     Reynolds
     Rogers (AL)
     Rogers (KY)
     Rogers (MI)
     Rohrabacher
     Ros-Lehtinen
     Royce
     Ruppersberger
     Rush
     Ryan (WI)
     Ryun (KS)
     Saxton
     Schmidt
     Schwarz (MI)
     Sensenbrenner
     Sessions
     Shadegg
     Shaw
     Sherwood
     Shimkus
     Shuster
     Simpson
     Smith (TX)
     Smith (WA)
     Sodrel
     Souder

[[Page H5930]]


     Stearns
     Strickland
     Sullivan
     Tancredo
     Taylor (NC)
     Terry
     Thomas
     Thompson (MS)
     Thornberry
     Tiahrt
     Tiberi
     Towns
     Turner
     Walden (OR)
     Walsh
     Wamp
     Weiner
     Weldon (FL)
     Weldon (PA)
     Weller
     Westmoreland
     Whitfield
     Wicker
     Wilson (SC)
     Wolf
     Young (AK)
     Young (FL)

                             NOT VOTING--6

     Davis, Jo Ann
     Deal (GA)
     Evans
     Istook
     McKinney
     Wexler

                              {time}  2108

  Mr. DENT changed his vote from ``aye'' to ``no.''
  Mr. JOHNSON of Illinois changed his vote from ``no'' to ``aye.''
  So the motion to recommit was rejected.
  The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the passage of the bill.
  The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that 
the ayes appeared to have it.


                             Recorded Vote

  Mr. MARKEY. Mr. Speaker, I demand a recorded vote.
  A recorded vote was ordered.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. This will be a 5-minute vote.
  The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 359, 
noes 68, not voting 6, as follows:

                             [Roll No. 411]

                               AYES--359

     Ackerman
     Aderholt
     Akin
     Alexander
     Allen
     Andrews
     Baca
     Bachus
     Baird
     Baker
     Barrett (SC)
     Barrow
     Bartlett (MD)
     Barton (TX)
     Bass
     Bean
     Beauprez
     Berkley
     Berman
     Berry
     Biggert
     Bilbray
     Bilirakis
     Bishop (GA)
     Bishop (NY)
     Bishop (UT)
     Blackburn
     Blunt
     Boehlert
     Boehner
     Bonilla
     Bonner
     Bono
     Boozman
     Boren
     Boswell
     Boucher
     Boustany
     Boyd
     Bradley (NH)
     Brady (PA)
     Brady (TX)
     Brown (OH)
     Brown (SC)
     Brown, Corrine
     Brown-Waite, Ginny
     Burgess
     Burton (IN)
     Butterfield
     Buyer
     Calvert
     Camp (MI)
     Campbell (CA)
     Cannon
     Cantor
     Capito
     Capuano
     Cardin
     Cardoza
     Carnahan
     Carson
     Carter
     Case
     Castle
     Chabot
     Chandler
     Chocola
     Clay
     Cleaver
     Clyburn
     Coble
     Cole (OK)
     Conaway
     Cooper
     Costa
     Cramer
     Crenshaw
     Crowley
     Cubin
     Cuellar
     Culberson
     Davis (AL)
     Davis (CA)
     Davis (FL)
     Davis (IL)
     Davis (KY)
     Davis (TN)
     Davis, Tom
     DeGette
     Delahunt
     Dent
     Diaz-Balart, L.
     Diaz-Balart, M.
     Dicks
     Doolittle
     Doyle
     Drake
     Dreier
     Duncan
     Edwards
     Ehlers
     Emanuel
     Emerson
     Engel
     English (PA)
     Eshoo
     Etheridge
     Everett
     Fattah
     Feeney
     Ferguson
     Filner
     Fitzpatrick (PA)
     Flake
     Foley
     Forbes
     Ford
     Fortenberry
     Fossella
     Foxx
     Frank (MA)
     Franks (AZ)
     Frelinghuysen
     Gallegly
     Garrett (NJ)
     Gerlach
     Gibbons
     Gilchrest
     Gillmor
     Gingrey
     Gohmert
     Gonzalez
     Goodlatte
     Gordon
     Granger
     Graves
     Green (WI)
     Green, Al
     Green, Gene
     Gutierrez
     Gutknecht
     Hall
     Harris
     Hart
     Hastert
     Hastings (FL)
     Hastings (WA)
     Hayes
     Hayworth
     Hensarling
     Herger
     Herseth
     Higgins
     Hinojosa
     Hobson
     Hoekstra
     Holden
     Honda
     Hostettler
     Hoyer
     Hulshof
     Hunter
     Hyde
     Inglis (SC)
     Inslee
     Israel
     Issa
     Jackson (IL)
     Jackson-Lee (TX)
     Jefferson
     Jenkins
     Jindal
     Johnson (CT)
     Johnson (IL)
     Johnson, E. B.
     Johnson, Sam
     Jones (OH)
     Kanjorski
     Keller
     Kelly
     Kennedy (MN)
     Kind
     King (IA)
     King (NY)
     Kingston
     Kirk
     Kline
     Knollenberg
     Kolbe
     Kuhl (NY)
     LaHood
     Lantos
     Larsen (WA)
     Larson (CT)
     Latham
     LaTourette
     Levin
     Lewis (CA)
     Lewis (KY)
     Linder
     Lipinski
     LoBiondo
     Lofgren, Zoe
     Lowey
     Lucas
     Lungren, Daniel E.
     Mack
     Maloney
     Manzullo
     Marchant
     Matheson
     McCarthy
     McCaul (TX)
     McCollum (MN)
     McCotter
     McCrery
     McGovern
     McHenry
     McHugh
     McIntyre
     McKeon
     McMorris
     Meehan
     Meek (FL)
     Meeks (NY)
     Melancon
     Mica
     Michaud
     Millender-McDonald
     Miller (FL)
     Miller (MI)
     Miller (NC)
     Miller, Gary
     Mollohan
     Moore (KS)
     Moran (VA)
     Murphy
     Murtha
     Musgrave
     Myrick
     Napolitano
     Neal (MA)
     Neugebauer
     Ney
     Northup
     Norwood
     Nunes
     Nussle
     Olver
     Ortiz
     Osborne
     Otter
     Oxley
     Pallone
     Pearce
     Pelosi
     Pence
     Peterson (PA)
     Petri
     Pickering
     Pitts
     Platts
     Poe
     Pombo
     Pomeroy
     Porter
     Price (GA)
     Price (NC)
     Pryce (OH)
     Putnam
     Radanovich
     Rahall
     Ramstad
     Rangel
     Regula
     Rehberg
     Reichert
     Renzi
     Reyes
     Reynolds
     Rogers (AL)
     Rogers (KY)
     Rogers (MI)
     Rohrabacher
     Ros-Lehtinen
     Ross
     Roybal-Allard
     Royce
     Ruppersberger
     Rush
     Ryan (OH)
     Ryan (WI)
     Ryun (KS)
     Sabo
     Salazar
     Sanchez, Linda T.
     Sanchez, Loretta
     Saxton
     Schakowsky
     Schiff
     Schmidt
     Schwarz (MI)
     Scott (GA)
     Scott (VA)
     Sensenbrenner
     Sessions
     Shadegg
     Shaw
     Shays
     Sherman
     Sherwood
     Shimkus
     Shuster
     Simmons
     Simpson
     Skelton
     Smith (TX)
     Smith (WA)
     Snyder
     Sodrel
     Souder
     Spratt
     Stearns
     Strickland
     Stupak
     Sullivan
     Sweeney
     Tancredo
     Tanner
     Terry
     Thomas
     Thompson (MS)
     Thornberry
     Tiahrt
     Tiberi
     Tierney
     Towns
     Turner
     Udall (CO)
     Upton
     Van Hollen
     Visclosky
     Walden (OR)
     Walsh
     Wamp
     Wasserman Schultz
     Watt
     Weiner
     Weldon (FL)
     Weller
     Westmoreland
     Whitfield
     Wicker
     Wilson (NM)
     Wilson (SC)
     Wolf
     Wynn
     Young (AK)
     Young (FL)

                                NOES--68

     Abercrombie
     Baldwin
     Becerra
     Blumenauer
     Capps
     Conyers
     Costello
     Cummings
     DeFazio
     DeLauro
     Dingell
     Doggett
     Farr
     Goode
     Grijalva
     Harman
     Hefley
     Hinchey
     Holt
     Hooley
     Jones (NC)
     Kaptur
     Kennedy (RI)
     Kildee
     Kilpatrick (MI)
     Kucinich
     Langevin
     Leach
     Lee
     Lewis (GA)
     Lynch
     Markey
     Marshall
     Matsui
     McDermott
     McNulty
     Miller, George
     Moore (WI)
     Moran (KS)
     Nadler
     Oberstar
     Obey
     Owens
     Pascrell
     Pastor
     Paul
     Payne
     Peterson (MN)
     Rothman
     Sanders
     Schwartz (PA)
     Serrano
     Slaughter
     Smith (NJ)
     Solis
     Stark
     Tauscher
     Taylor (MS)
     Taylor (NC)
     Thompson (CA)
     Udall (NM)
     Velazquez
     Waters
     Watson
     Waxman
     Weldon (PA)
     Woolsey
     Wu

                             NOT VOTING--6

     Davis, Jo Ann
     Deal (GA)
     Evans
     Istook
     McKinney
     Wexler

                              {time}  2117

  So the bill was passed.
  The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
  A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

                          ____________________