[Congressional Record Volume 152, Number 98 (Monday, July 24, 2006)]
[Senate]
[Pages S8116-S8118]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                ENDING THE CRISIS IN ISRAEL AND LEBANON

  Mr. BINGAMAN. I have come to the Senate floor today to discuss what I 
believe are some necessities, steps to bring an end to the current 
crisis in Israel and Lebanon and to set us back on a course toward 
stability in the Middle East.
  I condemn the killing and the kidnapping of Israeli soldiers by Hamas 
and Hezbollah. I believe that was a deliberate act of provocation. It 
was intended to further rupture efforts at creating stability in the 
region, and it was carried out by groups who seek no less than the 
destruction of the nation of Israel. And I, I am sure along with my 
colleagues, support Israel's right to defend itself. However, I also 
believe the Israeli response has been excessive and the current crisis 
of escalating violence on both sides must be brought to an end so we 
can resume efforts at creating a lasting peace.
  My first point is I believe United States interests and Israeli 
interests will be furthered if we support the efforts of the Secretary 
General of the United Nations to bring about a cease-fire at the 
earliest possible date. Secretary General Kofi Annan has called for an 
immediate end to fighting between Israel and Hezbollah. He has pointed 
out the obvious, which is that as long as fighting continues, the 
number of civilian deaths both in Israel and Lebanon will increase. I 
also believe this may be the best way to ensure the safe return of 
kidnapped soldiers. Of course, the further destruction of civilian 
infrastructure in Lebanon is putting the future economic and political 
viability of that nation at serious risk. I think it is obvious to all 
that what is occurring in Israel and Lebanon is a disaster for many 
innocent civilians.
  Our own administration has chosen not to support Secretary General 
Annan's call for an end to hostilities. As I understand Ambassador 
Bolton's position, it is that allowing a continuation of hostilities 
will provide Israel the opportunity to eliminate Hezbollah's ability to 
attack Israel and that this degrading of Hezbollah's military 
capability will provide a better possibility for long-term peace. I 
support the goal of long-term peace, but I disagree with his view that 
continued combat is the best way to achieve it.
  Whatever additional military advantage might be achieved by delaying 
a cease-fire comes at a very high cost. First, there is the cost in the 
loss of additional civilian lives.
  Second, there is the additional support for Hezbollah in the Arab 
world which the continued attacks on Lebanon will almost certainly 
generate.
  Third, there is the increase in anti-Israeli and anti-American 
sentiment throughout the Middle East and more broadly which will result 
if the military conflict continues.
  While I understand the goal of these continued attacks is to bring an 
end to terror in the Middle East, and I strongly support that goal, I 
believe the result will be the opposite.
  The administration's unwillingness to join other nations in calling 
for a cessation of hostilities reinforces the belief in Arab countries 
that our Middle East policy is based on a double standard. The 
perception is we have one level of concern when innocent Israeli 
civilians are being killed and injured and much less concern when the 
injured or killed civilians live in Arab countries. Support by the U.S. 
for an immediate cease-fire would save lives on both sides and would 
help to counter that perception.
  There was an article in the Washington Post last week by Michael 
Abramowitz entitled ``In Mideast Strife, Bush Sees a Step to Peace.'' 
In the article, he states:

       In the administration's view, the new conflict is not just 
     a crisis to be managed. It is also an opportunity to 
     seriously degrade a big threat in the region, just as Bush 
     believes he is doing in Iraq.

  If this administration thinks it can succeed here in Lebanon with the 
same strategy that has brought us success in Iraq, then our foreign 
policy in Washington is even more out of touch with reality than I had 
thought.
  My second point is as part of our effort to bring about this cease-
fire, we need to talk directly with Syrians and others with whom we 
have disagreed.
  Robert Malley, who was President Clinton's special assistant for 
Arab-Israeli affairs, has written an article in the July 24 issue of 
Time magazine making that case persuasively. His article is entitled 
``Time to Start Talking.'' The thrust of his argument is this 
administration's policy of not talking to those with whom we disagree 
has not served us well. The same argument is made by John McLaughlin, 
the former Deputy Director of the CIA, in yesterday's Washington Post.
  In my view, both of these former officials are giving good advice and 
I urge the President and the Secretary of State to heed that advice.
  My final point is this current crisis should be a wake-up call to 
this administration that the United States needs to reengage 
diplomatically in the region.
  For the past several decades, United States administrations have seen 
our role in the Middle East as supporting the security of Israel but 
also as helping to resolve conflicts between Israel and its neighbors 
and supporting moderate governments in the region. There are many 
chapters in that history. Among the most remembered are Secretary of 
State Kissinger's efforts at shuttle diplomacy, President Carter's 
efforts at Camp David, President Clinton's efforts both in bringing 
Rabin and Arafat to the White House for a handshake, and his later 
efforts trying to broker a peace agreement at Camp David.
  This current administration has chosen a different course. It has 
chosen to disengage from that conflict resolution role. As evidence of 
this, Secretary Powell did not appoint a special Middle East envoy as 
his predecessor had. Secretary Rice also has not appointed a special 
envoy. Her statement was:

       Not every effort has to be an American effort. It is 
     extremely important that the parties themselves are taking 
     responsibility.

  My strong view is this policy of disengagement has not served the 
interests of the United States, the interests of Israel, or the 
interests of other countries in the region. We are by far the biggest 
provider of aid to the countries in the Middle East and if any outside 
nation is to play an effective and a constructive role, it needs to be 
the United States.
  I am glad the Secretary of State is in Beirut today, but progress on 
the diplomatic front cannot be postponed awaiting fly-ins by the 
Secretary of State. Secretary Rice should appoint a special envoy to 
work full time at resolving disputes and tensions in the region.
  Again, John McLaughlin states the point well:

       The chances of detecting and heading off imminent disaster 
     are enhanced when there is intense, unrelenting and daily 
     attention by a senior and respected U.S. figure who wakes up 
     every morning worrying about nothing else--the role Dennis 
     Ross played so effectively in the 1990s.

  Continuing with his quotation.

       Without constant tending to the concerns of all the 
     regional parties, rapid flagging of

[[Page S8117]]

     issues for decision in Washington and continuity of focus by 
     one individual with access we will lurch from crisis to 
     crisis.

  It is ironic that the President and Secretary of State acknowledge 
the need for an Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy. This was 
the job Karen Hughes was given, to burnish the U.S. image abroad, 
particularly in the Muslim world. Yet at the same time they refuse to 
appoint a special envoy to the Middle East which, in my view, would do 
far more with regard to perceptions in that part of the world.
  I urge the administration to reassert the historic role of the United 
States as a force for resolution of conflict in the Middle East. I 
believe that must begin by engaging in direct talks with the parties in 
the region. And I urge the President and our Secretary of State to help 
bring about an immediate cessation of hostilities.
  I ask unanimous consent that the two articles I have referred to, one 
by Robert Malley and the other by John McLaughlin, be printed in the 
Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                       [From Time, July 24, 2006]

                         Time to Start Talking

                           (By Robert Malley)

       The most alarming aspect of the unfolding crisis in the 
     Middle East isn't how many actors are jumping in. It's who is 
     opting to stay out. Hamas, Hizballah and Israel are directly 
     involved; Iran and Syria by proxy; Lebanon against its will. 
     The U.N. is dispatching its mediators; the European Union is 
     contemplating doing the same. But the U.S., despite colossal 
     strategic stakes, threats to its own security, potential 
     repercussions in Iraq, not to mention staggering loss of 
     life, remains on the sidelines. The world's sole superpower 
     is also its only no-show.
       This is by design. From early on, the diplomacy of the Bush 
     Administration has been guided by a straightforward logic: 
     engagement is a reward, misbehavior ought not be rewarded; 
     ergo, misbehaving parties are not to be engaged. The thinking 
     is that isolation, ostracism and, if need be, sanctions are 
     more likely to get troublesome actors to change their ways. 
     And so the list of diplomatic outcasts only grows. Today the 
     U.S. does not talk to Iran, Syria, Hamas, the elected 
     Palestinian government or Hizballah. And as the violence in 
     the region clearly shows, that has hardly been cause for 
     moderation. President Bush once famously observed that the 
     U.S. had sanctioned itself out of all leverage on Iran. In 
     truth, it has worked itself out of much influence on the 
     region.
       And that's only half the problem. Since 2000, with the 
     collapse of any Arab-Israeli peace process, the start of the 
     war on terrorism and the. U.S. invasion of Iraq, regional 
     actors have lacked a clear compass, rules of the road or a 
     referee. Syria is being told to clean up its act in Lebanon 
     and Iraq; Iran to drop its nuclear program and to stop 
     meddling in its neighbor's affairs; Hamas to undergo an 
     ideological revolution; Hizballah to disarm. All are 
     perfectly justifiable demands, but none are being accompanied 
     by a clear and appealing incentive for the parties' taking 
     such actions--other, that is, than avoiding retribution if 
     they do not.
       As a result of this diplomatic vacuum, the only factor 
     constraining the behavior of the various parties has been 
     their mutual fear. Israel has been worried that Hizballah 
     might launch Katyusha rockets on Haifa, Syria that Israel 
     might wipe out its army or regime, Hamas and Hizballah that 
     their entire leadership could become fair game. But such 
     apprehension always was at most a feeble restraint, because 
     in an unregulated environment, the only thing more costly 
     than disregarding one's fears is displaying them. In the past 
     weeks, that last and flimsy inhibition finally gave way. The 
     conflict no longer is about achieving a specific objective--
     it's about imposing new rules of conduct, re-establishing 
     one's deterrence, redesigning the region's strategic map. 
     Stopping such fighting is a tall order, precisely because the 
     protagonists' main goal is to demonstrate they are not afraid 
     to prolong it.
       It certainly won't be halted without robust, credible and 
     influential third-party involvement. None of the actors will 
     want to appear overly eager for a cease-fire, but more than a 
     few might--at the appropriate time--leap at an outsider's 
     proposed deal. That happened before, in the 1980s and 1990s, 
     when Lebanon was the arena for similar proxy wars and when 
     the U.S., then the energetic mediator, was the instrument of 
     diplomatic negotiations. Without U.S. support, it's doubtful 
     that the U.N.'s mediators will be able to muster similar 
     muscle.
       So is there any way out of the crisis? If the U.S. hopes to 
     find one, it will have to help put a comprehensive package on 
     the table, and some of its broad outlines can be divined. On 
     the Israeli-Palestinian side, it would include a reciprocal 
     and verifiable cease-fire, a prisoner swap and Israel's 
     allowing the Hamas government to govern. The Lebanese 
     equation is more complex. Here too a prisoner exchange and 
     cease-fire agreement will be necessary, but a broader deal, 
     involving steps toward Hizballah's disarmament and Israel's 
     withdrawal from the contested Shabaa farms, will probably be 
     required. On the latter issues at least, it is hard to 
     imagine much happening without addressing Syrian concerns; 
     for more sustainable stability, Iran will have to be included 
     as well.
       But then, such an approach would entail negotiating with 
     all the wrong people about all the wrong things. That, of 
     course, is precisely what the U.S. is adamant it will not do. 
     One does not talk to outlaw actors, let alone bargain with 
     them. The result has been a policy with all the appeal of a 
     moral principle and all the effectiveness of a tired 
     harangue.
                                  ____


                [From Washingtonpost.com, July 23, 2006]

                      We Have To Talk to Bad Guys

                          (By John McLaughlin)

       Although the fighting in the Middle East is still raging, 
     it is not too soon to start drawing lessons from these tragic 
     events. Even if this situation begins to cool, there are so 
     many other flashpoints in the Middle East and so many other 
     potential hot spots in the world that any respite from crisis 
     is bound to be short.
       Lesson No. 1 is that change occurs incrementally and almost 
     imperceptibly in the Middle East, but when it reaches 
     critical mass, the potential for surprise and disaster is 
     enormous. The current situation did not emerge overnight. The 
     death of Yasser Arafat presented a huge opportunity for the 
     international community to bolster Mahmoud Abbas and reform 
     the Palestinian Authority. But that effort largely stalled 
     despite strenuous efforts by the special envoy representing 
     the Quartet--the United States, the European Union, the 
     United Nations and Russia. This helped set the stage for the 
     Hamas victory in the Palestinian elections. Hamas's control 
     of the West Bank and Gaza and its estrangement from the 
     international community gave Hezbollah, in Lebanon, 
     unprecedented opportunities and reach into those areas. The 
     continuing weakness of the Lebanese government allowed 
     Hezbollah a free hand in its home base.
       Lesson No. 2 is that the chances of detecting and heading 
     off imminent disaster are enhanced when there is intense, 
     unrelenting and daily attention by a senior and respected 
     U.S. figure who wakes up every morning worrying about nothing 
     else--the role that Ambassador Dennis Ross played so 
     effectively in the 1990s. It is true that plenty of able 
     people in the U.S. government still focus on the Middle East. 
     But without constant tending to the concerns of all the 
     regional parties, rapid flagging of issues for decision in 
     Washington and continuity of focus by one individual with 
     access, we will lurch from crisis to crisis.
       Lesson No. 3, related to all of this, is that process 
     matters, especially in the Middle East, where the issues are 
     so contentious and the parties so divided. Without ongoing, 
     regular and near-continuous negotiation, there are few 
     reference points that all the parties can accept when 
     conflict breaks out. It may not even matter whether 
     perceptible progress is occurring continuously. The important 
     thing is that the table is always set, everyone has a chair 
     and someone is in charge. That has not been the case for some 
     time in the Middle East.
       Lesson No. 4 is that even superpowers have to talk to bad 
     guys. The absence of a diplomatic relationship with Iran and 
     the deterioration of the one with Syria--two countries that 
     bear enormous responsibility for the current crisis--leave 
     the United States with fewer options and levers than might 
     otherwise have been the case. Distasteful as it might have 
     been to have or to maintain open and normal relations with 
     such states, the absence of such relations ensures that we 
     will have more blind spots than we can afford and that we 
     will have to deal through surrogates on issues of vital 
     importance to the United States. We will have to get over the 
     notion that talking to bad guys somehow rewards them or is a 
     sign of weakness. As a superpower, we ought to be able to 
     communicate in a way that signals our strength and self-
     confidence.
       Lesson No. 5 is that there are no unilateral solutions to 
     today's international problems, not even for superpowers. 
     They have been rendered impossible by a host of factors 
     unique to this era--globalization, the Internet, the 
     technological revolution and the increasing role of non-state 
     actors with influence that spills across existing borders. 
     The disproportionate influence of Hezbollah at the moment 
     illustrates the point. This doesn't mean turning everything 
     over to international forums. But it is tempting to think 
     that successful passage through the current thicket might 
     have been eased by steps such as a series of regional 
     conferences, linked to our allies and to the United Nations, 
     at which all parties could have been forced--grudgingly and 
     slowly--to put their cards on the table regarding issues such 
     as Iraq, regionally based terrorism and the Israeli-
     Palestinian conflict. Would this have gotten us anywhere?
       In a region as complex as the Middle East, nothing 
     guarantees progress. But what is clear is that these problems 
     are intertwined, that all the states in the region have vital 
     interests at stake, and that approaching these issues 
     serially will only prolong the familiar cycle of one step 
     forward and two steps back.

  Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President, I yield the floor and suggest the 
absence of a quorum.

[[Page S8118]]

  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Warner). The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Allard). Without objection, it is so 
ordered.

                          ____________________