[Congressional Record Volume 152, Number 96 (Thursday, July 20, 2006)]
[Senate]
[Pages S8039-S8041]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                    WATER RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT ACT

  Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, during yesterday's debate on the Water 
Resources Development Act, Senator Sarbanes, Senator Jeffords, and I 
agreed to submit for the Record a colloquy clarifying the intent of a 
provision authorizing the Poplar Island expansion project in Maryland. 
Unfortunately, this colloquy was inadvertently left out. I ask 
unanimous consent that the colloquy be printed in the Congressional 
Record at this point and that the permanent Record be corrected so that 
this colloquy appears with the rest of yesterday's debate on the bill.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

       Mr. SARBANES. Mr. President, I would like to engage the 
     distinguished chairman in a colloquy with respect to the 
     provisions in section 1001(a)(20), authorizing the Poplar 
     Island Expansion, Maryland.
       Mr. INHOFE. I would be happy to respond to the Senator from 
     Maryland.
       Mr. SARBANES. I would simply like to clarify that it is the 
     intent of the committee that this provision authorizes 
     construction of a 575-acre addition to the existing 1,140-
     acre Poplar Island, MD, beneficial use of dredged material 
     project which is presently under construction and authorizes 
     an additional $256.1 million for that expansion.
       Mr. INHOFE. The Senator from Maryland is correct. Section 
     1001(a)(20) authorizes the Secretary to construct the 
     expansion of the Poplar Island, MD, project in accordance 
     with the Report of the Chief of Engineers dated March 31, 
     2006, at an additional total cost of $256,100,000. This will 
     increase the overall environmental restoration project at 
     Poplar Island from 1,140 acres to approximately 1,715 acres 
     and bring the total cost of the existing project and the 
     expansion project to $643.4 million, with an estimated 
     Federal cost of $482.4 million and an estimated non-Federal 
     cost of $161 million.
       Mr. JEFFORDS. I concur that this is the committee's intent.
       Mr. SARBANES. I thank the chairman and ranking member for 
     this clarification and for including this provision which is 
     vitally important for the Port of Baltimore and the 
     Chesapeake Bay.

  Mr. COBURN. Mr. President, I thank you for having this important 
debate

[[Page S8040]]

regarding our Nation's aging infrastructure and for allowing this body 
to discuss the merits of Corps of Engineers reform.
  As you know, I supported allowing this bill to come to the Senate 
floor for consideration. Congress has not passed a water resources 
authorization bill since 2000, and particularly in the wake of 
Hurricane Katrina, this debate is long overdue. While many attempted to 
derail consideration of this debate, I did not because I believed that 
we must have this discussion in the open.
  That being said, I have deep concerns regarding the legislation that 
is before us today. Specifically, I am concerned that we are missing a 
historic opportunity to incorporate the many lessons learned since the 
last WRDA bill passed in 2000. Consider the following developments that 
highlight the critical need for reform of the Corps of Engineers:

       The Government Accountability Office (GAO) reported in 
     March 2006 that ``the cost benefit analyses performed by the 
     Corps to support decisions on Civil Works projects . . . were 
     generally inadequate to provide a reasonable basis for 
     deciding whether to proceed with the project . . .'' GAO-06-
     529T--Corps of Engineers: Observations on Planning and 
     Project Management Processes for the Civil Works Program 
     (March 15, 2006)
       In remarking on the fact that the Corps reprogrammed over 
     $2.1 billion through 7,000 reprogramming actions in fiscal 
     years 2003 and 2004, the GAO noted that the Corps' practice 
     was often ``not necessary'' and is ``reflect[ive] of poor 
     planning and an absence of Corps-wide priorities for its 
     Civil Works priorities.'' GAO-06-529T--Corps of Engineers: 
     Observations on Planning and Project Management Processes for 
     the Civil Works Program (March 15, 2006)
       In a report to Congress in 2003 regarding the Sacramento 
     flood protection project, the GAO found that the Corps used 
     ``an inappropriate methodology to calculate the value of 
     protected properties'' and failed to properly report expected 
     cost increases. Consider the projected costs for the three 
     primary Sacramento projects: the Common Features Project 
     increased from $57 million in 1996 to $370 million in 2002; 
     the American Features project increased from $44 million in 
     1996 to $143 million in 2002; and the Natomis Basin component 
     has ballooned from an early estimated cost of $13 million, to 
     $212 million in 2002. GAO-04-30--Corps of Engineers: Improved 
     Analysis of Costs & Benefits Needed for the Sacramento Flood 
     Control Project.
       Thanks to a Corps whistleblower and a subsequent 
     investigation by the Army inspector general, we know that the 
     Corps: ``manipulated the economic analyses of the feasibility 
     study being conducted on the Upper Mississippi lock expansion 
     project in order to steer the study to a specific outcome.'' 
     Furthermore, the investigation revealed that a Corps official 
     knowingly directed that ``mathematically flawed'' data be 
     used to justify the project. High-ranking Corps officials 
     also were criticized for giving ``preferential treatment to 
     the barge industry . . .'' by allowing industry 
     representatives to become direct participants in the economic 
     analysis.'' U.S. Office of Special Counsel: Statement of 
     Elaine Kaplan. Special Counsel, U.S. Office of Special 
     Counsel (December 2000).

  I could add several more examples, including the many lessons we have 
learned in the wake of Katrina, but my point is clear: the processes 
used for project justification, for long-term planning, for cost 
containment, and for project accountability are fundamentally flawed 
and do not serve the best interests of American taxpayers. For too 
long, we have allowed project costs to soar, routinely accepted 
inaccurate studies to justify large projects, and rarely, if ever, 
asked the tough questions of Corps officials.
  Congress plays a central role in the oversight of all Federal 
agencies, and with respect to the Corps, we have failed taxpayers 
miserably. Why? Perhaps a better question would be to ask who benefits 
most from lax congressional oversight. I would argue that Members 
themselves are the real winners. We get the projects we want, 
regardless of the cost or the overall impact on critical national 
infrastructure, and the Corps is allowed to operate as it pleases. This 
environment--with every incentive for construction and little or no 
incentive for accountability--is a recipe for disasters of all sorts.
  The only way to fix this problem in the long term is to bring fiscal 
transparency and oversight to this process.
  First and foremost, we have to develop our ability to prioritize 
authorized Corps projects. The Corps currently faces a $58 billion 
dollar project backlog that will take many decades to resolve, and this 
bill will add over $10 billion more to that backlog. Many worthwhile 
projects, already debated and authorized by previous Congresses, 
languish in the annual competition for appropriations. Taking their 
place in line are politically popular projects that rarely address 
vital national infrastructure needs. Again, we are failing taxpayers.
  I am pleased to see the amendment offered by my colleagues, Senators 
Feingold and McCain, that will squarely address this lack of 
prioritization. The tools that will be provided by this amendment will 
strengthen the ability of Members of Congress to analyze the hundreds 
of authorized Corps projects and determine which are in the 
best interests of our Nation. Congress maintains its discretion to fund 
whichever projects it deems most appropriate, but we will do so with an 
abundance of new data that will highlight critical national 
infrastructural needs. Funds are increasingly limited, and we have a 
responsibility to prioritize projects based on their impact.

  Second, in our efforts to improve this important process, Congress 
must consider ways to bring greater oversight to the Corps. The many 
instances of wrongdoing in the Corps project justification process make 
clear that we must do better. With billions of dollars at stake and 
often thousands of lives hanging in the balance, we simply cannot allow 
for manipulation and undue influence in the justification study 
process.
  Again, I am pleased to see the efforts of Senators McCain and 
Feingold in addressing this void. The Corps has proven itself incapable 
of mending these problems on its own, and nowhere is this more apparent 
than in the project justification process. It is imperative that 
outside experts, with no stake in large-scale construction proposals, 
be allowed to review these types of Corps studies. While I may have 
designed the amendment in a slightly different manner, I look forward 
to supporting the McCain-Feingold approach that will allow for a truly 
independent and time-sensitive review by a panel of experts. At the end 
of the day, Congress still makes the final decision on which projects 
to fund, and in no way will this amendment impact our constitutional 
obligations or slow project construction. We can still fund wasteful 
and inefficient spending if we so desire. If we pass this amendment, at 
least we will ensure that the studies we cite are accurate. We owe that 
to the American public.
  I am grateful to my colleagues for the countless hours they have 
spent in putting this bill together. I know the road that led to this 
debate today was not an easy one, and it has been a long and difficult 
journey. As we embark on this debate and in our legitimate desire to 
pass this legislation, however, we must not overlook the critical need 
for Corps reform. The many lessons we have learned since WRDA 2000 are 
as numerous as they are pressing. The Corps of Engineers is staffed by 
many dedicated and hard-working Americans, many of whom are in my 
State. The agency itself, however, is ailing and demands our attention. 
If the Corps is to continue to meet the mandate it has been given and 
serve the needs of the American taxpayer, we must not move forward 
without the incorporation of new oversight and transparency.
  America's waterways and flood control projects have played an 
important role in protecting our communities and in spurring 
agricultural and industrial commerce. Unless we can reform the Corps, 
though, their impact will increasingly diminish. As it stands today, 
the Corps is not accountable to Congress, and ultimately, it is not 
accountable to the American taxpayer. We have a historic opportunity to 
change this environment, and we must seize it.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I rise today in support of amendment 
No. 4684, the McCain-Feingold-Prioritization amendment, to the Water 
Resources Development Act.
  The city of New Orleans has been under a constant threat of flooding 
from the ``big one'' ever since it was founded in 1718. Though the city 
has survived, its flood control defenses have been tested and 
occasionally overwhelmed. There was the great flood of 1927 when the 
Mississippi River spilled into the city, and there was Hurricane Betsy 
in 1965, which, according to Senator Russell Long of Louisiana, 
``picked up ... [Lake Pontchartrain]

[[Page S8041]]

and put it inside New Orleans and Jefferson Parish.''
  In the same year that Betsy inundated the city, Congress authorized a 
hurricane protection project to protect the city. That project was 
supposed to take 13 years, cost $85 million, and, according to the Army 
Corps, protect greater New Orleans from the equivalent of a fast-moving 
category 3 hurricane.
  In the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee's 
investigation into the preparation for and response to Hurricane 
Katrina, our committee learned that that project was still a decade or 
more away from completion--close to 50 years after this body authorized 
its construction--and the total cost of the project had ballooned to 
more than $750 million. In addition, the project did not provide the 
level of protection for New Orleans and the region that it was expected 
to provide.
  There were many reasons for the delay, including natural ones such as 
the subsidence of the land in southeastern Louisiana. Building levees 
in this part of the country required the Army Corps to return time and 
time again to add additional layers to the levees, known as lifts, to 
accommodate for the sinking soils.
  But there were also manmade reasons for the delay, such as the 
absence of Federal funding. In recent years, local Army Corps officials 
have had to scramble to move these Louisiana hurricane protection 
projects forward. Local Army Corps officials had to urge local levee 
boards to contact their congressional delegation to ask for financial 
help to restore levees to their original design height, and on two 
recent occasions, the Army Corps had to rely on the local levee 
districts, which share in the cost of these projects, to advance them 
money so they could continue construction of segments of the hurricane 
protection system.
  As the Corps of Engineers' own Interagency Performance Evaluation 
Taskforce, or IPET, investigators observed, if one part of the levee 
system comes up short, it can compromise the entire protection system. 
Yet this levee system, which was supposed to be protecting one of 
America's most vulnerable cities, was never finished, and as a result, 
when Katrina hit last August, dire consequences ensued.
  We learned from Katrina that there is a need to focus limited Federal 
resources on finishing flood control projects that are critical to our 
Nation's health, safety, and welfare. The Army Corps' current process 
to do this is inadequate. As the GAO testified before the House in 
March, ``The Corps' planning and project management processes cannot 
ensure that national priorities are appropriately established across 
the hundreds of civil works projects that are competing for scarce 
federal resources.''
  The McCain-Feingold amendment on prioritization, which I am proud to 
cosponsor, will address this problem by requiring the Water Resources 
Planning Coordinating Committee, which the underlying WRDA Bill already 
establishes for other purposes to evaluate the importance of Corps 
projects in three different categories--storm damage reduction 
projects, navigation projects, and environmental restoration projects. 
The amendment also requires the committee to rank projects in each 
category so that Congress, and the Corps itself, can determine what 
projects are the most important to pursue and most worthy of funding. 
The Coordinating Committee will then submit its report to Congress and 
make the report available to the public.
  With that information, Congress can make better decisions about how 
to spend scarce Federal resources on critical infrastructure projects 
across the country. We have to learn from Katrina and we should never 
again allow a project that is so critical to the very livelihood of so 
many to languish because we did not give it the priority it deserved.
  I know many of my colleagues are concerned that this amendment will 
remove authority from individual Members about how to spend Army Corps 
dollars. I understand that concern, but the reality is that the Corps 
has more work to do than funding to do it. This WRDA bill will add 
another $10 to $12 billion in Army Corps projects on top of the 
estimated $58 billion in backlogged Army Corps projects that are 
authorized but not yet funded. Without some system of prioritizing 
projects, as this amendment would require, we run the risk of another 
Katrina-like situation where critical projects are not given the 
priority they deserve. On the other hand, by requiring the Corps to 
prioritize projects in each category--flood control, navigation, and 
environmental restoration--we can ensure that there is a balance among 
the types of projects that are funded and that the most important and 
cost-effective projects in each category get the attention they 
deserve.
  Water resources projects are important to each and every State, but 
we need to heed the lessons of Katrina and make sure that we spend our 
tax dollars where they are most needed.
  I urge my colleagues to support this critical amendment.

                          ____________________