[Congressional Record Volume 152, Number 83 (Friday, June 23, 2006)]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Pages E1259-E1260]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




  DECLARING THAT THE UNITED STATES WILL PREVAIL IN THE GLOBAL WAR ON 
                                 TERROR

                                 ______
                                 

                               speech of

                          HON. DAVID E. PRICE

                           of north carolina

                    in the house of representatives

                        Thursday, June 15, 2006

  Mr. PRICE of North Carolina. Mr. Speaker, we face a critical 
challenge in Iraq with no certain outcome. While those in the White 
House and the Majority may want to use this debate as an opportunity to 
gloss over the situation and cast aspersions at their opponents, now is 
the time for a serious and sustained conversation within our government 
and among the American people about how we can end the occupation and 
do so in a way that maximizes Iraq's chances to govern and defend 
itself.
  A brief survey of the status of our operations confirms the gravity 
of our position.
  First, consider our strategic interests in the conflict. The 
Administration's entire case for invading Iraq has proven false. The 
President's claims about nuclear weapons, chemical weapons, biological 
weapons, links to terrorism, an imminent threat--they were all wrong. 
CIA weapons inspectors followed every plausible lead to find weapons of 
mass destruction in Iraq, and came up empty. We might have known the 
outcome of this search had we showed more patience with international 
weapons inspections before the President launched the invasion. We have 
also confirmed what many of us suspected at the time, that the alleged 
links between Saddam Hussein and Al Qaeda terrorists were fabricated 
and false. In fact, with the CIA now calling Iraq the world's number 
one terrorist training ground, we have ironically created a problem 
that did not exist when we set out to solve it. And we diverted 
attention and assets from Afghanistan, which truly was ground zero in 
the anti-terrorist offensive.
  Indeed, we have engaged in a war of choice that has actually made our 
nation less safe. Congress has poured over $400 billion into Iraq that 
was entrusted to us by American taxpayers, dealing a serious blow both 
to our economy and to the many critical domestic programs that have 
been cut, essentially to help pay for the war effort. We have 
overextended our military, damaging recruiting and retention efforts 
and leaving our military units undermanned, underequipped, and 
exhausted from repeated deployments. We have created a terrorist 
breeding ground in Iraq that may threaten our security for years to 
come. And, by fueling tensions both between sectarian groups inside 
Iraq and between Iraq and its neighbors, like Iran, Syria, and Turkey, 
this war has stirred up a dangerous hornet's nest that could lead to 
significant regional conflict. In short, our national security is at 
far greater risk now than three years ago when the war began.
  Despite these shortcomings, the new ``unity government'' led by Prime 
Minister Nuri al-Maliki represents some progress in our political 
efforts, produced by the successful conduct of a handful of elections, 
a constitutional referendum, and sustained negotiations between major 
Shi'a, Sunni, and Kurdish political parties. These successes are the 
most positive story we have to tell in Iraq. If Iraq's leaders choose 
to work together to unite their nation and prevent sectarian agendas 
from tearing the Iraqi people apart, there will be hope for achieving 
stability and democracy in that country.
  Unfortunately, Iraqi leaders have not yet made clear what their 
choice will be. They have not yet shown the unity of purpose and 
political courage that will be necessary to hold their country together 
after the U.S. departs. They have not yet proven that they can set 
aside their sectarian agendas. Most importantly, they still must prove 
that they have the power to reach out beyond the green zone to 
influence Iraqi citizens and lead them toward unity and peace. Here, 
especially, the jury is still out on the extent of progress.

  U.S. taxpayers have spent $20 billion on reconstruction projects, but 
have only limited concrete results to show for their investment. Tens 
of millions of dollars were irresponsibly squandered through poor 
management and questionable contracts with companies like Halliburton. 
The Coalition Provisional Authority was unable to account for the use 
of nearly $9 billion in U.S. and Iraqi reconstruction funds. According 
to conservative estimates, up to a quarter of reconstruction funding 
has been diverted away from reconstruction activities to pay for 
associated security costs. Furthermore, much of the reconstruction work 
that has been carried out has been ineffective. In an October 2005 
audit of over $250 million in water and sanitation projects, the 
Government Accountability Office (GAO) found that over one-quarter of 
the projects were ``inoperable or were operating at lower than normal 
capacity.''
  The results of this mismanagement are striking. Over half of all 
Iraqi households still lack access to clean water, and 85 percent lack 
reliable electricity. Oil production remains well below pre-invasion 
levels. A quarter of Iraqi children suffer from chronic malnutrition. 
More than a quarter of Iraqis--possibly up to forty percent--remain 
unemployed. By any standard, the reconstruction effort has fallen 
disastrously short.
  Unfortunately, the Bush Administration appears to have learned the 
wrong lesson from these reconstruction failures, proposing no 
additional funding to rebuild Iraq and support the civilian population. 
Without additional funding, our reconstruction efforts will come to an 
end even though we remain far short of our goals. The Special Inspector 
General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) has reported that more than 
two-thirds of planned health care centers, over 60 percent of planned 
water sector projects, and a third of planned electricity projects will 
not be completed due to lack of funds. The answer is not to give up on 
Iraq reconstruction altogether, but to find effective ways to make 
reconstruction projects work.

[[Page E1260]]

  On the security front, some limited progress has been made. According 
to the State Department's most recent weekly update, approximately 
265,000 Iraqi troops have enlisted to secure and defend their homeland. 
In addition, American forces recently scored an important victory by 
killing the number one terrorist leader in Iraq, Abu Musab al Zarqawi.
  As Iraqi troops have stood up, however, American troops have not been 
able to stand down, despite promises to the contrary. The sheer number 
of Iraqi enlistees has neither translated into capability for 
independent operations nor improved the security situation. In fact, 
Iraq is more violent, more dangerous, and more divided than at any time 
since the war began.
  The security situation is increasingly complex. Instead of fighting 
one battle, we are fighting at least three: against largely Sunni 
insurgents who are fighting to recapture the power they enjoyed under 
Saddam Hussein; against growing sectarian violence; and against 
terrorists, some foreign-born, united under a banner of Islamic 
fundamentalism. Above all, we are fighting to prevent full-fledged 
civil war, and the outcome remains uncertain. The death of Zarqawi will 
help in our battle against the fundamentalist terrorists, but it will 
not markedly change the larger challenge we face in pacifying Sunni and 
Shiite extremists.
  This picture is not pretty, and it is not a picture the 
Administration has been willing to discuss frankly. But it is the 
reality. Crafting an effective Iraq strategy means facing this reality 
head-on. Unfortunately, the Administration has adamantly refused to do 
so. In fact, Middle East expert Anthony Cordesman of the Center for 
Strategic and International Studies called the Administration's most 
recent report on progress in Iraq, ``both dishonest and incompetent.'' 
Cordesman noted, ``the American people and the US Congress need an 
honest portrayal of what is happening, not lies by omission and 
``spin.''
  Most Americans now understand that this Administration has relied on 
spin and misinformation to carry out its Iraq policy from Day One. It 
led our nation into war based on false claims and insinuations. It 
misled the American public about the likely costs and duration of our 
operations. It has attempted to discredit critics of its post- invasion 
operation, including former military officials. And it has consistently 
refused to level with the American people about the significant 
obstacles we continue to face.
  The real question before us--the question most Americans are asking--
is how long must our troops stay in Iraq?
  The President has told us that, as Iraqi troops stand up, American 
troops can stand down. But that formula is backwards. Iraqi troops will 
not truly stand up until American troops begin standing down. Iraqi 
leaders will not make the necessary comprises and take charge of their 
own destiny until they know their dependence on American forces is 
coming to an end. As we stand down, they will have no choice but to 
stand up.
  While our military's valiant efforts have clearly facilitated 
important steps forward, including the formation of a democratically 
elected government, the troubling reality is that our continued 
presence makes success more elusive. It serves as a disincentive for 
Iraqi military and political leaders to take courageous risks to 
stabilize their country and assume responsibility for their government. 
Equally importantly, our presence is a magnet for international 
terrorists and an incitement for the insurgency. While the 
Administration argues that we must stay the course to help Iraqis 
accomplish key objectives, our very presence is actually detracting 
from progress toward those objectives. In order to jump-start progress, 
our troops must begin to come home.
  How we leave does matter. We must leave in a way that maximizes 
Iraq's chances to govern and defend itself. At the same time, we cannot 
become hostages to the failures of Administration policy, prolonging 
our stay in a situation where our very presence is a continuing 
provocation. That is why I joined with Rep. Brad Miller last fall in 
introducing H.J. Res. 70, which would require the President to deliver 
the exit strategy that the troops and the American people deserve. 
Today, I am renewing that call.
  Let me explain in clear terms what a responsible exit strategy means:
  We need to hear that that the President has a plan for reducing our 
presence in Iraq within a reasonable timeframe. ``As they stand up, we 
will stand down'' isn't a strategy; it is a slogan. A responsible exit 
strategy would set out, in clear and realistic terms, a plan to guide 
our troops through their departure from Iraq and a strategy for 
reducing our military commitment. We must be willing to adapt to 
changing conditions, but a responsible exit strategy must not hold our 
troops hostage to the Iraqi people's ability to resolve their own 
differences.
  We need to hear that such a plan would begin with an initial, near-
term drawdown of U.S. forces. The Administration has repeatedly hinted 
that a significant drawdown may be imminent, but has quietly backed 
away from such predictions over and over again. A near-term, initial 
drawdown of forces would send a message to Iraqis that we have no 
permanent designs on their country, that our presence is coming to an 
end, and that they need to step forward to take the reins of 
responsibility.
  We also need to hear a pledge from the President that we will not 
establish long-term bases on Iraqi soil. When I questioned General John 
Abizaid, commander of U.S. Central Command, in a recent subcommittee 
hearing, he refused to make a commitment not to establish permanent 
bases. In the wake of that exchange, the House has voted twice to force 
such a commitment. A House-passed amendment to the fiscal year 2006 
supplemental appropriations bill to prohibit permanent U.S. bases in 
Iraq was removed from the final version of the bill by the Republican 
congressional leadership. The House recently passed a similar provision 
as part of the fiscal year 2007 Defense Appropriations bill, but it is 
unclear if it will survive in the final version of the bill. The 
President must heed Congress's message and send a clear signal that the 
U.S. has no long-term military designs in Iraq.
  In addition, we need to hear that there is a plan to continue to 
support Iraq when our troops depart. Such a plan would mean ongoing 
U.S. assistance for the Iraqi government as it crafts policies to 
facilitate unity, security, and prosperity. This support will be 
particularly critical as Iraq revisits its constitution later this 
year. It also means support for the development of Iraqi institutions 
like its parliament, its judiciary, and its security forces.
  Such a plan would also involve increased and assertive engagement by 
the international community to increase its involvement. The 
international community has pledged billions of dollars in resources 
for Iraq that it has not yet delivered. Just as importantly, however, 
we need the international community to have a presence in Iraq, working 
with the Iraqi government, mediating disputes between sectarian 
parties, establishing greater ties with Iraq's economy, and supporting 
the development of civil society.
  Finally, this plan would require engaging Iraq's neighbors to play a 
constructive role in giving Iraq a chance to succeed. This means 
pledging not to interfere in Iraq's affairs. It also means securing 
borders, training Iraqi security forces, and welcoming Iraq into 
regional institutions. I was encouraged that the Administration 
tentatively agreed to conduct a dialogue with Iran on its involvement 
in Iraq. I hope that this effort will move forward and that similar 
efforts will engage other Gulf States.
  These are the elements of a responsible exit strategy. This is the 
type of leadership that the President owes our troops and the American 
people. After more than three years, the loss of more than 2,500 
American troops' lives, and $400 billion, this is the type of 
leadership that is long overdue.

                          ____________________