[Congressional Record Volume 152, Number 82 (Thursday, June 22, 2006)]
[Senate]
[Pages S6411-S6412]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                        AMBASSADOR MAX KAMPELMAN

  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I rise today to call attention to an 
article published in the New York Times earlier this spring titled 
``Bombs Away,'' authored by my dear friend, Ambassador Max Kampelman, 
and to offer it into the Senate record. Ambassador Kampelman 
exemplifies the American tradition of bipartisan service in foreign 
affairs. After coming to Washington as an aide to Senator Hubert 
Humphrey, he was appointed by President Carter to serve as Ambassador 
and head of the U.S. Delegation to the Conference on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe. President Reagan reappointed him to that 
position.
  For his long and distinguished service, Ambassador Kampelman was 
awarded the Presidential Medal of Freedom from President Clinton and 
the Presidential Citizens Medal from President Reagan.
  Now Ambassador Kampelman has penned this insightful essay on the goal 
of globally eliminating all weapons of mass destruction. He believes 
that this goal is even important in an age of nuclear proliferation. He 
speaks from the heart and head and from his long experience as a 
hardnosed negotiator.
  Ambassador Kampelman argues that we can reach this objective by 
distinguishing between what ``is'' and what ``ought'' to be, utilizing 
both realism and idealism. He recalls President Regan's successful 
deployment of the MX missile in Europe to deter Soviet aggression and 
his ability to recognize new openings, such as the willingness of 
Mikhail Gorbachev to negotiate steep reductions in nuclear arsenals--
with the ultimate goal of eliminating nuclear weapons.
  We all recognize that the total elimination of nuclear weapons is an 
extraordinarily difficult journey in a world where nuclear technology 
continues to spread and distinction between civilian and military 
nuclear development can be opaque. Nonetheless, it is important that we 
envision this worthy goal, however idealistic it may seem today. 
Ambassador Kampelman stared down the very real prospect of nuclear 
annihilation during the Cold War. With this article, he offers us hope 
that with wisdom and constancy, we have a chance to make this world 
safer for our children and grandchildren.
  I therefore request unanimous consent that the attached article by 
Ambassador Max Kampelman be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                [From the New York Times, Apr. 24, 2006]

                               Bombs Away

                         (By Max M. Kampelman)

       In my lifetime, I have witnessed two successful titanic 
     struggles by civilized society against totalitarian 
     movements, those against Nazi fascism and Soviet communism. 
     As an arms control negotiator for Ronald Reagan, I had the 
     privilege of playing a role--a small role--in the second of 
     these triumphs.
       Yet, at the age of 85, I have never been more worried about 
     the future for my children and grandchildren than I am today. 
     The number of countries possessing nuclear arms is 
     increasing, and terrorists are poised to master nuclear 
     technology with the objective of using those deadly arms 
     against us.
       The United States must face this reality head on and 
     undertake decisive steps to prevent catastrophe. Only we can 
     exercise the constructive leadership necessary to address the 
     nuclear threat.
       Unfortunately, the goal of globally eliminating all weapons 
     of mass destruction--nuclear, chemical and biological arms--
     is today not an integral part of American foreign policy; it 
     needs to be put back at the top of our agenda.
       Of course, there will be those who will argue against this 
     bold vision. To these people I would say that there were 
     plenty who argued against it when it was articulated by Mr. 
     Reagan during his presidency.
       I vividly recall a White House national security meeting in 
     December 1985, at which the president reported on his first 
     ``get acquainted'' summit in Geneva with President Mikhail 
     Gorbachev of the Soviet Union the previous month.
       Sitting in the situation room, the president began by 
     saying: ``Maggie was right. We can do business with this 
     man'' His reference to Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher 
     prompted nods of assent. Then, in a remarkably matter-of-fact 
     tone, he reported that he had suggested to Mr. Gorbachev 
     that their negotiations could possibly lead to the United 
     States and the Soviet Union eliminating all their nuclear 
     weapons.
       When the president finished with his report, I saw uniform 
     consternation around that White House table. The concern was 
     deep, with a number of those present--from the secretary of 
     defense to the head of central intelligence to the chairman 
     of the Joint Chiefs of Staff--warning that our nuclear 
     missiles were indispensable. The president listened carefully 
     and politely without responding.
       In fact, we did not learn where he stood until October 
     1986, at his next summit meeting with Mr. Gorbachev, which 
     took place in Reykjavik, Iceland. There, in a stout 
     waterfront house, he repeated to Mr. Gorbachev his proposal 
     for the abolition of all nuclear weapons. Though no agreement 
     was reached, the statement had been made.
       More remarkably, it had been made by someone who understood 
     the importance of nuclear deterrence.
       In March 1985, before Reagan's first meeting with Mr. 
     Gorbachev, I received a telephone call on a Friday from the 
     president's chief legislative strategist telling me that the 
     administration's request for additional MX missiles was 
     facing defeat in the House of Representatives, and that the 
     president wanted me to return from Geneva (where I was posted 
     as his arms negotiator) for a brief visit. The hope was that 
     I might be able to persuade some of the Democrats to support 
     the appropriation.
       I was not and never have been a lobbyist, but I agreed to 
     return to Washington. I wanted my first meeting to be with 
     the speaker of the House, Tip O'Neill, who, I was informed, 
     was the leader of the opposition to the appropriation.
       So there I was on Monday morning in O'Neill's private 
     office. I briefed the speaker on the state of negotiations 
     with the Soviets. I made the point that I too would like to 
     live in a world without MX missiles, but that it was 
     dangerous for us unilaterally to reduce our numbers without 
     receiving reciprocal reductions from the Soviets. I then 
     proceeded with my round of talks on the Hill.
       At the end of the day, I met alone with the president and 
     told him that O'Neill said we were about 30 votes short. I 
     told the president of my conversation with the speaker and 
     shared with him my sense that O'Neill was quietly helping us, 
     suggesting to his fellow Democrats that he would not be 
     unhappy if they voted against his amendment.
       Without a moment's hesitation, the president telephoned 
     O'Neill, and I had the privilege of hearing one side of this 
     conversation between two tough Irishmen, cussing each other 
     out, but obviously friendly and respectful.
       I recall that the president's first words went something 
     like this: ``Max tells me that you may really be a patriot. 
     It's about time!'' Suffice it to say that soon after I 
     returned to Geneva I learned that the House had authorized 
     the MX missiles.
       There is a moral to these stories: you can be an idealist 
     and a realist at the same time.

[[Page S6412]]

       What is missing today from American foreign policy is a 
     willingness to hold these two thoughts simultaneously, to 
     find a way to move from what ``is''--a world with a risk of 
     increasing global disaster--to what ``ought'' to be, a 
     peaceful, civilized world free of weapons of mass 
     destruction.
       The ``ought'' is an integral part of the political process. 
     Our founding fathers proclaimed the ``ought'' of American 
     democracy in the Declaration of Independence at a time when 
     we had slavery, property qualifications for voting and 
     second-class citizenship for women.
       Yet we steadily moved the undesirable ``is'' of our society 
     ever closer to the ``ought'' and thereby strengthened our 
     democracy. When President Gerald Ford signed the Helsinki 
     Final Act in 1975, he was criticized for entering into a 
     process initiated by the Soviet Union. But the agreement 
     reflected a series of humanitarian ``oughts,'' and over the 
     course of the next 10 years, the Soviets were forced by our 
     European friends and us to live up to those ``oughts'' if 
     they were to attain international legitimacy.
       An appreciation of the awesome power of the ``ought'' 
     should lead our government to embrace the goal of eliminating 
     all weapons of mass destruction.
       To this end, President Bush should consult with our allies, 
     appear before the United Nations General Assembly and call 
     for a resolution embracing the objective of eliminating all 
     weapons of mass destruction.
       He should make clear that we are prepared to eliminate our 
     nuclear weapons if the Security Council develops an effective 
     regime to guarantee total conformity with a universal 
     commitment to eliminate all nuclear arms and reaffirm the 
     existing conventions covering chemical and biological 
     weapons.
       The council should be assigned the task of establishing 
     effective political and technical procedures for achieving 
     this goal, including both stringent verification and severe 
     penalties to prevent cheating.
       I am under no illusion that this will be easy. That said, 
     the United States would bring to this endeavor decades of 
     relevant experience, new technologies and the urgency of 
     self-preservation. The necessary technical solutions can be 
     devised. Now, as I can imagine President Reagan saying, let 
     us summon the will.

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