[Congressional Record Volume 152, Number 82 (Thursday, June 22, 2006)]
[Senate]
[Pages S6324-S6401]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




        NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2007

  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Under the previous order, the 
Senate will resume consideration of S. 2766, which the clerk will 
report.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       A bill (S. 2766) to authorize appropriations for fiscal 
     year 2007 for military activities of the Department of 
     Defense, for military construction, and for defense 
     activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe 
     personnel strengths for such fiscal year for the Armed 
     Forces, and for other purposes.

  Pending:

       McCain amendment No. 4241, to name the Act after John 
     Warner, a Senator from Virginia.
       Levin amendment No. 4320, to state the sense of Congress on 
     the United States policy on Iraq.
       Kerry amendment No. 4442, to require the redeployment of 
     United States Armed Forces from Iraq in order to further a 
     political solution in Iraq, encourage the people of Iraq to 
     provide for their own security, and achieve victory in the 
     war on terror.

  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Under the previous order, there 
will be 60 minutes for debate, divided as follows: Senator Warner, 30 
minutes; Senator Levin, 15 minutes; and Senator Kerry, 15 minutes.
  Who yields time? The Senator from Arizona.
  Mr. KYL. Mr. President, on behalf of Senator Warner, would the Chair 
please advise me when I have consumed 10 minutes?
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so 
ordered.
  Mr. KYL. Mr. President, since last Tuesday, scores of my constituents 
have called my office and otherwise communicated with us, asking a very 
poignant question. Since last Tuesday, this country has mourned the 
deaths of two brave soldiers who were kidnapped and mutilated and 
killed, both Army PFC Kristian Menchaca, from Texas, and Thomas Tucker, 
of Oregon. The question my constituents are asking me is, How on Earth 
could the Senate be debating resolutions of withdrawal from Iraq in the 
same week that we discovered the mutilated bodies of these two American 
soldiers? Shouldn't our debate, rather, recall the famous words of 
Abraham Lincoln in his Gettysburg address, ``That they shall not have 
died in vain,'' and motivate us to redouble our efforts to support our 
troops in carrying out the unfinished business that remains in Iraq?
  There is unfinished business there, to bring to justice the people 
who committed these heinous acts and to rid that country and the region 
once and for all of the evildoers who support that kind of violence 
against both Americans and Iraqis and who promise in the future to 
commit that same kind of violence against us until they have become 
victorious. These are the terrorists.
  I found it interesting that one of our colleagues was arguing, 
wrongly, that there were no terrorists in Iraq before we invaded the 
country and eliminated Saddam Hussein. The evidence is overwhelming 
that is not true. But in any event, of what importance is it, given the 
fact that they are there now, mutilating and killing American soldiers 
and Iraqi citizens? What do the terrorists have in mind if we pull out?
  The President recently and succinctly described the plans of the 
terrorists, directly quoting from a letter that Ayman al-Zawahiri, who 
is the second in command of al-Qaida behind Osama bin Laden, wrote to 
Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi, who recently, of course, was brought to justice 
by American troops and was bin Laden's designated leader of al-Qaida in 
Iraq:

       Their objective is to drive the United States and coalition 
     forces out of Iraq, and use the vacuum that would be created 
     by an American retreat to gain control of that country. They 
     would then use Iraq as a base from which to launch attacks 
     against America, and overthrow moderate governments in the 
     Middle East, and try to establish a totalitarian Islamic 
     empire.

  In that same letter, Zawahiri stated that the battle in Iraq ``is now 
the place for the greatest battle of Islam in this era.''
  It doesn't matter if we are fighting them. They are going to fight 
us. The point is, they are going to fight us wherever the point of the 
battle is, based upon their choosing. Today they chose that battle to 
be in Iraq. In some respects, given the quality of American forces, 
that is a better place for us to be confronting this enemy, these 
evildoers, than waiting for them to come back and attack us in the 
United States. That is why we owe so much to the soldiers and to the 
sailors and to the airmen and to the Marines whom we have sent into 
harm's way to confront the enemy there. We owe them not just the best 
training and the best equipment and the best planning in the world to 
enable them to carry out their missions but support here at home.
  The question my constituents are asking me is, What message does it 
send to our troops, to our allies, and to our enemies, when we begin 
talk of withdrawal? You can sugarcoat it all you want. You can call it 
phased withdrawal, you can call it timelines, but whatever you call it, 
it pretty much amounts to the same thing.
  The distinguished minority leader, as a matter of fact, said just a 
couple of days ago, and I am quoting:

       I think that even though we have at least two positions, I 
     think if you look at them closely, they're both basically the 
     same, that there should be redeployment of troops. It's a 
     question of when.

  Indeed. One resolution says: Right away; it has to be done this year. 
That is a time certain, this year. And another one talks about 
submission of a plan with estimated dates. Dates, of course, are times 
certain. Whenever they are established, you have a specific time within 
which the withdrawal is to occur, whether it is in a phased way or all 
at once, right next door or 1,000 miles away. The bottom line, whatever 
you want to call it, is withdrawal of American troops within certain 
timeframes to no longer be able to perform their mission there.
  Why would you take that kind of position when there is work yet to be 
done? It has to be based upon the guess that by the time that time 
comes the work will be finished, that we will have done sufficient work 
in Iraq and training up the Iraqi soldiers and performing, ourselves, 
that we will no longer be needed. But nobody supporting these 
resolutions knows that. The military commanders on the ground will tell 
you that they do not know it. No one can know what the circumstances on 
the ground will be by the end of 2006 or by the middle of 2007.
  All wars are based upon the circumstances at a given time on the 
ground. It would have been folly, for example, simply because we were 
losing significant numbers of American soldiers in World War II, for 
the U.S. Congress to pass a resolution, sending it to President 
Roosevelt, saying you have to be out of Germany by a date certain and 
you have to begin a phased withdrawal of our Pacific troops by a date 
certain.
  At that time, America was committed to performing the mission, to 
getting the job done, to winning the war. What should the condition for 
withdrawal be? Victory; the ability to say we have accomplished our 
mission, we have pacified the country to a sufficient extent that we 
can leave without creating a power vacuum into which the Iranians and 
the Syrians and perhaps the Turks or others might come into Iraq 
because of their interests in the area, not sending a message to our 
allies in the region that, instead of being on the winning side, it 
turned out that they chose the wrong side, the side that wanted to 
leave the battlefield before the battle was won.
  Think about the Iraqis who are supplying intelligence to us right 
now. They have calculated that we are the winning side and that they 
can give us information to help get these evildoers without fear of 
retribution--that when we leave they are going to be vulnerable to 
attacks by the insurgents and the terrorists who remain. They calculate 
that we will stay long enough to do the job. The same thing for the 12 
million Iraqi people who elected their Government and the same thing 
for the

[[Page S6325]]

Government that has now stood up in that country that does not want us 
to leave precipitously. Yes, of course they get the message that they 
have to eventually be responsible for their own security. Yes, of 
course they are participating in the training of their army so that 
they can eventually do this job themselves. They don't need to receive 
a message from the United States that this is ultimately going to be 
their responsibility.
  They understand that. What we cannot do is send to the Iraqi people, 
who are now very increasingly cooperating with us, send a message to 
our allies in the region that they chose the wrong side, and send a 
message to our American troops that we are not willing to back them all 
the way to victory.
  That would be the way to lose this war. It has been said many times 
that the insurgents and terrorists cannot defeat our troops. The only 
way they can win the conflict is if they defeat us here at home by 
undermining our confidence, by undermining our credibility, and by 
undermining our support for our troops.
  Mr. President, this is the most serious business that the Senate 
could be debating. It has to do not just with the freedom of Iraqis in 
the future, or the lives of American soldiers, important as they are; 
it has to do with the security of the people of the United States of 
America from terrorists who are seeking places in the world from which 
to operate. We need to deny them that territory and that support and, 
in the process, persuade the neighbors of Iraq in the region that they 
need to stay with us, to continue to get the terrorists out of their 
country, continue to stop funding the terrorists, and to continue to 
support our efforts, so that the words of Osama bin Laden will be 
demonstrated as absolutely false. Remember what he said--that we are 
the weak horse, he's the strong horse. Where did he get that idea? 
Because of previous times in which we have withdrawn.
  We cannot make that same mistake again. I urge my colleagues to 
defeat both of these amendments when they are presented this morning.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Virginia is 
recognized.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I yield to myself such time as I may 
require. I thank the Senator from Arizona. He has been a very strong 
voice, not only in this debate but all debates.
  Once again, to me, the debate today hinges around getting this new 
Government, in which we have invested an awful lot over these 18 months 
in life and limb, dollars, and in every other way, up and running. It 
is now running, Mr. President. I have just left a meeting with the 
Secretary of Defense, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs, and General 
Casey, the field commander in Iraq, who were briefing a few of us this 
morning. Clearly, that Government is setting down its roots, getting 
stabilized, operating as a sovereign entity. We must give them that 
support and not send a signal that we are going to pull, possibly, the 
rug out from under them because it is our security environment, 
together with the coalition partners, that is enabling that Government 
to function.
  I reserve the remainder of my time.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Who yields time?
  Mr. REED. Mr. President, I yield myself 5 minutes from the time 
allotted.
  Mr. President, we should take heed of what the Government of Iraq is 
doing and saying. We should take heed of the fact that it has made 
progress in establishing itself and making significant steps forward. 
In this context, let me again remind my colleagues of what the National 
Security Adviser for Iraq has said. He suggested we should begin 
withdrawing troops by the end of this year. That is what the Reed-Levin 
amendment would require. He also suggests and predicts that by the end 
of 2007 most American combat forces would be out of the country. He 
says, in his words:

       The eventual removal of coalition troops from Iraqi streets 
     will help the Iraqis, who now see foreign troops as occupiers 
     rather than the liberators they were meant to be. Moreover, 
     the removal of foreign troops will legitimize Iraq's 
     government in the eyes of the people.

  I concur with Senator Warner that we should support the Iraqi 
Government, pay attention to what they are saying. I think we should 
pay particular attention to what Iraq's security advisor has said. This 
was not a casual off-the-cuff remark. He said it first on CNN, where he 
knew he was speaking to a world audience, particularly an American one. 
Then he crafted a very careful op ed opinion for the Washington Post. 
If that is what one of the key leaders of the Iraqi Government is 
saying, then I think that supports our efforts for the Reed-Levin 
amendment.
  Also, this amendment has been mischaracterized grotesquely. This is 
not some arbitrary fixed timetable. This is not something where dates 
mean dates specific. We say precisely that the President shall submit 
to the Congress a plan by the end of 2006, with estimated dates for the 
continued, phased redeployment of U.S. forces, with the understanding 
that unexpected contingencies may arise. I think my colleagues 
demonstrate a lack of confidence in the ability of the President, 
listening to his commanders in the field to prepare an estimate of our 
posture in Iraq over the next several years. There is no end point in 
our amendment because we recognize, as so many others, that this 
process could take an indefinite time but a time that at least could be 
estimated by the President.
  Let me also suggest that the Levin-Reed amendment recognizes there 
will be a residual force in Iraq of American trainers, American 
logisticians, and of special operations troops to seek out these 
terrorists, rather than having young Americans at checkpoints who are 
subject, because of a lack, apparently, of coordinated support, to 
being attacked successfully by Iraqis. That mission should be done by 
the Iraqis. But we cannot give up the right and capability of striking 
at terrorists in Iraq. This amendment clearly states that. It is 
something else, too, because we have a lot of people coming to the 
floor talking about we are going to stay the course and we are going to 
support them.
  We have done nothing virtually with respect to nonmilitary support, 
effectively, for Iraq. Where are the State Department teams? Months 
ago, with great fanfare, the President announced we are going to 
develop eventual reconstruction teams and put them in the provinces of 
Iraq. There are only four. They lack resources, they lack personnel, 
and they lack real support and emphasis. Unless we can fix some 
nonmilitary aspects of the reconstruction, redevelopment, political 
mentoring, our military efforts will buy us time that we will squander, 
as we have squandered to date.
  Now, the real test of the other side is not the rhetoric on the floor 
and the slogans that you cannot ``cut and run'' and appropriately 
recognizing the great sacrifices of our forces. It is coming down here 
with a plan--over many years, according to them--and the resources to 
support that plan--the billions and billions of dollars that we will 
need over the next several years, the personnel we need in the country, 
not just from our military forces but from our State Department, our 
Agency for International Development, and our Justice Department. If we 
are truly committed to this concept of complete victory, we need a 
plan. The President has to deliver such a plan. This amendment will 
require him, we hope, to sketch out that plan.
  At the heart of this, it is not about satisfying the Congress, it is 
about confiding in, with candor, the American people, telling them what 
the risks are, what the costs are and how we are going to pay for it. 
It is easy to come down here and say we are going to support our troops 
and do all these things. But then 2 weeks from today, or a week from 
today, we will have a bill to cut the estate tax. How do we pay for 
these troops and give them equipment and reset our equipment? How do we 
give resources for troops in the field and support this new Iraqi 
Government? With what?
  The real test of the other side will be when they come up with a plan 
and with money and with resources. I believe this approach is the most 
sound tactically, strategically, and politically, not to surrender but 
to succeed.
  I yield the floor.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator's time has expired.
  Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, I am disappointed that we are considering 
legislation that would force the United

[[Page S6326]]

States to withdraw our troops before we have finished the job in Iraq.
  It is ironic. Some of my friends on the other side of the aisle fight 
over judicial nominations, they fight the President while he is trying 
to protect our country, and they fight each other. Just about the only 
thing they are unwilling to fight is an actual war.
  Let me be clear: We got into the war committed to success, and I am 
never going to allow us to cut and run.
  Let me remind everyone that bin Laden inspired his followers with his 
view that America was easy to defeat. Let's not do anything to confirm 
his skewed vision. When we leave Iraq, let's make sure it is stable and 
secure enough to defend itself.
  Last Thursday, we had our first vote on pulling out the troops. We 
voted on a proposal by the distinguished Senator from Massachusetts who 
seeks to require the President to set a date for withdrawal by December 
31, 2006. Wisely, my colleagues voted down the proposal by a 93 to 6 
vote. Now that is a pretty telling vote in today's partisan atmosphere.
  The minority is now seeking a scheduled phaseout withdrawal, which 
would set an artificial deadline that would only encourage and embolden 
our Nation's enemies. I am sure this will get more votes than the 
previous proposal, but it clearly doesn't have the votes to pass, and 
it shouldn't. The enemy will use this estimate and tell the Iraqi 
population that the United States is leaving. This could have 
tremendously harmful repercussions.
  The United States clearly has a strategy for meeting this difficult 
challenge in Iraq. Some of those on the other side insist on focusing 
on the difficulties, while asserting that we have no strategy.
  Our goal is to stay in Iraq as long as necessary, but not one day 
longer.
  Our strategy is to ensure that the Iraqi people have developed a 
secure constitutional government that embodies a national compact 
between all Iraqi groups.
  And it is training their forces to provide for their own security.
  We have made significant progress. The Iraqis have formed a national 
government, and they are taking more and more responsibility for their 
security.
  In fact, Iraq has nearly 265,000 trained security forces now--
including 115,000 for defense--and that is building daily. Our troops 
are serving with Iraqi units and running joint combat operations.
  We also have--in conjunction with Iraqis--put Al-Qaida, the 
Saddamites and the Sunni insurgents on the defensive. They spend more 
time running from us than they do attacking us, although we all agree 
they are still lethal.
  I think it is shameful that we are even considering proposals to 
withdraw our troops before the job is done in Iraq.
  We have seen the cost of U.S. withdrawal before, and we should learn 
from our past history.
  If our Nation sets an artificial deadline for the removal of our 
forces, all our adversaries need to do is husband their resources until 
we leave and then emerge, possibly destroying all of the 
accomplishments to date.
  That is not a plan for success--that is a plan for failure.
  Mr. NELSON of Florida. Mr. President, the Senate's debate on U.S. 
policy with respect to the war in Iraq has been healthy. There is no 
question but that every Member of this Chamber is deeply proud of 
America's men and women in uniform and the magnificent job they have 
done and continue to do to bring peace and stability to that troubled 
land. Like all my colleagues, I want them all to come home to their 
loved ones and this grateful Nation as soon as possible. But our 
departure from Iraq must not leave a greater risk of terror taking hold 
there. We cannot afford to leave Iraq in a condition that terrorists 
could take over the country, as they did in Afghanistan before 
September 11.
  I have given the views of my colleagues on all sides of today's votes 
careful consideration. I have concluded that I cannot support any 
policy that would set an arbitrary timeline for the start, rate, or 
conclusion of the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq.
  The decision to drawdown American forces must be based on the 
application of our military commanders' professional judgment assessing 
actual security conditions on the ground. Withdrawal of U.S. forces 
must be based on the objective criteria of local stability and the 
capability of Iraqi forces.
  Setting a timeline for withdrawal limits our Commander in Chief's 
strategic options and denies our local commanders the operational 
flexibility necessary to sustain progress to stability and reduce the 
risks of the insurgency taking any tactical advantage.
  We all pray for the safe return of every one of our men and women in 
uniform, as soon as the mission of leaving Iraq in the hands of a 
stable government can be accomplished.
  Mr. JEFFORDS. Mr. President, all of Vermont is breathing a sigh of 
relief with the return from Iraq of 350 members of the Vermont National 
Guard, many of whom have spent most of the past year in Al Ramadi, one 
of the hot spots of the war. We are terribly proud of the outstanding 
job they have done, working in a dangerous area, attempting to root out 
insurgents, bring stability to the region, and provide a climate that 
will permit reconstruction and development. These brave men and women 
have set their private lives on hold for a year and a half, risking 
injury or death, in order to give Iraqi citizens a chance at a better 
life. I thank them and all Vermonters who have served and continue to 
serve in Iraq, Afghanistan and Kuwait.
  Vermont has lost 23 sons in the Iraq war, one of the highest per 
capita casualty rates of any State. As Task Force Saber returns, we 
hold particularly close the families of those members who are not 
returning: MSG Chris Chapin of Proctor, 1LT Mark Dooley of Wilmington, 
SPC Scott McLaughlin of Hardwick; 2LT Mark Procopio of Burlington; SGT 
Joshua Allen Johnson of Richford and SPC Christopher Merchant of 
Hardwick. My thoughts and prayers are with them.
  Vermont soldiers have performed admirably the job that was asked of 
them. Now it is incumbent upon us to determine what our role in Iraq 
should be and how that role should be carried out in the coming year.
  I opposed this war from the very beginning. I did not believe the 
administration's claims that Saddam Hussein was an immediate threat to 
the United States, and I believed that working through the United 
Nations would more effectively curtail Saddam Hussein's regime. At the 
start, in 2003, our presence was welcome, and we had an important 
obligation to the Iraqi people. But now we find that our presence is in 
part feeding the cycle of violence that is tearing Iraq apart. Foreign 
terrorists continue to be recruited to Iraq because that is where they 
can attack Americans. Iraqi groups are polarized over the American 
presence and how and when American forces should leave. American 
military actions continue to be controversial and continue to 
radicalize certain elements of the population. The newly established 
permanent Government of Iraq struggles to assert its sovereignty in the 
face of the heavy American military presence.
  It is time that we step back and hand more of the security functions 
over to the Iraqi security forces. We have been training Iraqi military 
and police for 3 years. Finally, significant numbers of Iraqi units are 
able to take over for American units and are doing so in many places 
across the country. We owe it to them to train, equip, and support 
Iraqi security forces. But the Iraqi security forces deserve the chance 
to independently establish the security required for reconstruction and 
development.
  Sectarian violence across Iraq seems to be exacerbated by the U.S. 
military presence. The presence of American forces makes it more 
difficult for moderates on all sides to keep out foreign jihadists who 
are anxious to alter the traditional secular orientation of Iraqi 
society. The presence of American forces makes it more difficult to 
shift the Iraqi national debate from conflict to the formation of a 
unified and effective government. The ongoing presence of American 
forces makes it harder for the new Iraqi government to take on primary 
responsibility for countering insurgents in the future.
  Ultimately, it must be the Iraqi people, working through their new 
institutions of government, who find solutions to the religious, 
ethnic, and cultural divisions that threaten to tear Iraq apart. The 
Shiite majority must realize that unless it incorporates strong Sunni 
representation into the

[[Page S6327]]

new Government, Sunni minorities will not feel that they can count on 
the protection of the Government. Kurdish groups want guarantees that 
their autonomy will be respected. Smaller ethnic and religious groups 
are worried that democracy means tyranny by the majority over minority 
populations. The Iraqi people must devise the solutions to these 
complex problems. They are not likely to look like American solutions. 
Some of these solutions may not even feel right to us. But our troops 
have fought for the right of the Iraqi people to decide these things 
for themselves. We must step back and let them do that.
  Getting American troops off the streets of Iraq will remove the sense 
of occupation that currently pervades parts of Iraq and makes Iraqis 
feel that their fate is not in their own hands. We may also increase 
our own security by reducing our visibility in Iraq. Images of American 
troops patrolling Iraqi streets continue to inflame conservative Arab 
elements all over the world. The struggle against American occupation 
is one of the biggest recruiting slogans for radical Muslim groups. If 
we are serious about fighting terrorism, then we must be mindful of 
where our own actions foster radicalism and strengthen the enemy.
  I will vote for the amendment by the Senator from Massachusetts, Mr. 
Kerry. The Kerry amendment calls for the withdrawal of the majority of 
American troops by this time next year, leaving in place those troops 
necessary to train Iraqi security forces, to conduct specialized 
counterterrorism operations, or to protect American facilities and 
personnel. This language would allow U.S. troops to stay in Iraq where 
absolutely necessary but would bring the bulk of our troops home.
  I will also support the Levin amendment, which requires that 
withdrawal of U.S. forces begin before the end of this year. It calls 
upon the administration to set up a timetable for the phased 
redeployment of U.S. troops. It makes clear to the Iraqi Government, 
the Bush administration, and the American people that we must start 
getting out of Iraq. While this amendment is not as firm as the Kerry 
amendment, I believe it is an improvement over the current policy of 
just staying the course with no clear guidance on withdrawal.
  Mr. President, we owe it to the men and women who are serving so 
nobly in Iraq to not leave them in harm's way 1 day longer than is 
necessary. We can and we must start drawing down the number of troops 
in Iraq and bringing our people home. This is the right move for our 
troops, and it is the right move for the Iraqi people. It takes 
political courage to change course. It is time the Congress showed a 
little courage in the face of the daily acts of valor displayed by our 
troops under fire. I call upon my colleagues to rise to the occasion 
and do what needs to be done. It is time to end a bad policy and focus 
our efforts on the reconstruction and development of Iraq.
  Mr. SARBANES. Mr. President, the Department of Defense authorization 
bill for fiscal year 2007 has now been under consideration on the 
Senate floor for more than a week. Much of that time has been devoted 
to discussion of Iraq, which casts a long shadow over every decision we 
are called to make. I regret that there has been such great 
unwillingness, until now, to have this issue freely debated on the 
floor of the Senate, and I commend the floor managers for allowing us 
to fulfill our constitutional responsibility. If ever there was a time 
for a resolute and reasoned assessment of our policy in Iraq, this is 
it.
  In undertaking unilateral military action to remove Saddam, the 
administration chose to pursue a costly policy that has seriously 
undermined our ability to focus on and deal effectively with the urgent 
national-security challenges we face. Turning its back on 50 years of 
bipartisan consensus on the need to work collectively and cooperatively 
through multilateral institutions--a consensus that carried us through 
the darkest years of the Cold War--this administration insisted on a 
go-it-alone strategy that made only minimal gestures toward diplomacy. 
Pushing aside the many diplomatic, economic and political resources at 
his disposal, the President squandered the vast outpouring of support 
that resulted from the tragic events of 9/11. His policies have divided 
us not only from the vast population of the Muslim and developing 
world, whose support is more important now than ever in the fight 
against terrorism, but also from many of our traditional friends and 
allies in Europe and Asia.
  More than 3 years ago I took the Senate floor and posed this 
question: ``Are we going to seek to exercise our power in cooperation, 
in coordination with others, which in the current context means working 
through the United Nations; or are we going to move down the path of 
asserting a unilateral preemptive prerogative, in effect, asserting our 
right to do what we want anywhere, anytime, to anyone?'' I say now that 
the administration made a grievous mistake in pursuing the second path, 
and thus today we find ourselves forced to deal with the consequences. 
Mr. President, I call to the attention of my colleagues my remarks of 
October 9, 2002.
  Had the United States taken that more prudent course, we would find 
ourselves in a different, and, I would argue, immeasurably stronger 
position than we are in today. Before the invasion began, we had 
investigators from the International Atomic Energy Agency on the ground 
in Iraq, where they were tracking down and following up all reports of 
weapons of mass destruction. U.S. and British aircraft were enforcing 
two U.N.-backed no-fly zones, one to protect the Kurds in the north, 
and another to protect Shiites in the south. In effect, we had Saddam 
Hussein in a corner, and we were keeping him there with the blessing of 
the international community.
  The President chose instead to take a reckless and irresponsible 
gamble. We can count up the number of deaths, we can count up the 
number of dollars, we can count up the number of injuries from which 
people will never recover, but none of this begins to account for the 
true costs to our Nation. We have lost more than 2,500 courageous and 
dedicated men and women--a tragedy for them and their families, and 
also for the nation, because they represented the promise and hope of 
our future. This is not to mention the tens of thousands of innocent 
Iraqi civilians, women and children alike, who were caught in the 
crossfire. We have diminished our standing in the eyes of the world, 
and having declined to use the tools of diplomacy at our disposal, we 
now find their effectiveness diminished. This military action has 
clouded our vision and distorted our priorities to the point that the 
entire question of national security must now be debated through the 
prism of Iraq.
  With our diplomatic resources focused overwhelmingly on Iraq, we have 
undermined our ability to achieve national security objectives we know 
to be critical. Today the challenge in Afghanistan is growing, not 
receding. More than in the past, al Qaida is an international 
phenomenon that adapts to local conditions, making its detection and 
destruction ever more difficult. The nuclear challenge posed by Iran is 
gaining momentum at the same time that our presence in Iraq 
immeasurably complicates the problems of dealing effectively with Iran, 
and North Korea has raised its own nuclear challenge to a new level.
  Our country's standing in the world community has been diminished on 
numerous fronts by the profoundly misguided invasion of Iraq and our 
continuing failure to meet the goals we set for ourselves. We have 
seriously undermined working relations with our traditional partners 
and allies, which the President's trip to Vienna has yet again put on 
vivid display. Sixteen of the original 37 members of the coalition 
which the administration touted have withdrawn their troops, Japan 
being only the most recent to announce its departure. Of those who 
remain, only the United Kingdom has more than 5,000 soldiers on the 
ground.
  This is to say nothing of the toll Iraq has taken at home. There are 
thousands who have been disabled by serious war-related injuries and 
trauma. Hundreds of thousands of families have been torn apart by 
lengthy and unplanned Guard and reserve duty, often creating 
substantial financial hardship. Our National Guard, thus stretched, is 
less able to render assistance in the situations it was designed to 
address. We have had to divert hard-pressed resources from urgent 
domestic priorities, the recovery from Hurricane Katrina among them.

[[Page S6328]]

  Yet the administration refuses to face these realities. When at a 
hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee last fall I asked 
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, referring to Iraq, ``Do you think 
five years from now, some American forces will have come out?'' She 
said, ``Senator, I don't want to speculate.'' Even when asked, ``What 
about 10 years from now?'' she refused to rule out the prospect that 
our troops would still be on the ground in Iraq. Her response revealed 
the administration's adamant refusal to think through to the 
consequences of the action, which has characterized our policy in Iraq 
from the beginning.
  It is long past time to face the situation squarely and undertake a 
fundamental redirection of the policy before more damage is done. The 
war not only has taken a terrible toll in terms of lives and hopes for 
the future; it has diverted our attention from the real and urgent 
threats to our national security and compromised our ability to deal 
with them. We should not be pursuing an open-ended commitment in Iraq. 
It was a war that need never have begun. By failing to offer to a 
viable strategy to bring it to an end, the administration does a grave 
disservice to our Nation.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, in fairness, we should give the sponsors 
of the Kerry-Feingold amendment the opportunity to speak to the Senate.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Who yields time?
  Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I ask to be informed when I have 
consumed up to 7 minutes.
  Mr. President, I thank my colleague from Massachusetts, Senator 
Kerry, for working together with me so well on this very important 
amendment. We understand that we are not going to get a majority. We 
know we are not going to get anywhere near a majority. The Senator and 
I know we represent the view of a majority of the American people, 
which has clearly been demonstrated in every indication, whether it be 
conversation, polling, or town meetings that I hold in Wisconsin. The 
people of this country know that we have to finish this Iraq mission, 
that it cannot be open-ended.
  To me, the most touching moment of the debate came when the senior 
Senator from Massachusetts quoted his own brother, Robert Kennedy, who 
for many of us was a central figure who inspired us to go into 
politics. I hope he doesn't mind my repeating Robert Kennedy's words in 
1968:

       Past error is no excuse for its own perpetuation.

  That is what the Iraq situation represents. Let's be clear. Every one 
of us, as the Senator from Massachusetts pointed out last night, voted 
for the Afghanistan invasion. We did not think that was a mistake. I 
ask my colleagues on the other side, if they believe we believe in cut-
and-run, why aren't we trying to cut-and-run from Afghanistan? Why is 
no Senator saying: Let's get the troops out of Afghanistan, as 
difficult as it is? Because that was not a mistake, because that was 
essential, because we had to go after the Taliban and al-Qaida. It was 
not a mistake.
  What is a mistake, though, is to continue indefinitely the Iraq 
invasion and Iraq situation with some 138,000 troops, without any 
realization or recognition that it is sapping our strength, it is 
sapping our credibility around the world, and it is sapping the 
resources of our military. It is sapping the recruitment ability of our 
military. In other words, it is weakening America.
  At the same time, as I mentioned on the floor yesterday, the 
situation appears to be slipping in places where we know al-Qaida was 
operating--such as Somalia or Mogadishu, now taken over by a radical 
Islamic government. We are trying to work with Indonesia's Government, 
but the fact is, in the area between the Philippines and Malaysia and 
Indonesia, there is an ungoverned area where groups sympathetic to al-
Qaida are operating. This is a threat of the exact kind that 9/11 
represents, and we know they have successfully pulled off attacks in 
Indonesia.
  Perhaps most compelling to me is the fact that we are losing ground 
in Afghanistan because we have stopped paying attention to the No. 1 
priority in the fight against terrorism.
  Let me quote from the Washington Post article from June 20, entitled 
``In Tribal Pakistan a Tide of Militancy.'' It says:

       In north Waziristan, barbers are ordered not to shave off 
     beards, and thieves have been swiftly beheaded. In Swat, 
     television sets and VCRs have been burned in public. In Dir, 
     religious groups openly recruit teenagers to fight U.S. 
     forces in Afghanistan. In the Khyber area, armed squads have 
     burst into rooming houses, forcing people to pledge to obey 
     Islamic law.
       . . . A tide of Islamic militancy is spreading across and 
     beyond the semiautonomous tribal areas of northwest Pakistan, 
     that hug the Afghan border.
       . . . Observers say the army's aggressive efforts since 
     2004 have backfired, alienating the populace with heavy-
     handed tactics and undermining the traditional authority of 
     tribal elders and officials.

  How did we lose focus on those who attacked us on 9/11? Does it make 
sense to continue to pour virtually all our resources into an Iraq war 
that is not working? It is time to tell the Iraqis that we have done 
what we can do militarily, that we will continue to help them in many 
ways, and we will continue to have special operations forces capacity 
in that region to take on situations, such as the al-Zarqawi situation. 
But the notion of continuing to put all of these resources just into 
Iraq on the absurd notion that that is the key to the fight against al-
Qaida is one of the worst mistakes in American foreign policy history. 
This is an enormous disservice to the American people, and it is 
especially a disservice to the families of those who have died, those 
who have been injured, and those who continue to serve. We owe it to 
those families to not be standing here when No. 3,000 soldier has died. 
It doesn't have to happen. It doesn't have to be. What is happening now 
is a horrible situation, not the imagined problems that the other side 
continually suggests will occur if we have a reasonable program to 
bring this to a conclusion within the coming year.
  Mr. President, how much time have I consumed?
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator has consumed 5 minutes.
  Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I have been a legislator for almost 25 
years now. I must say, this is one of the toughest moments of my 
career, to see the Senate not recognize that we were falsely led into a 
war, that we falsely led the American people into believing this had 
something to do with 9/11, and that many of the things that have 
happened simply didn't have to happen. That is water over the dam.
  What has happened after the mistake was made is that mistake after 
mistake has been compounded. Every day this myth that somehow Iraq is 
the central focus of the war on terrorism is being used as an excuse to 
send more and more Americans into harm's way, which is not necessary.
  Iraq is not the be all and end all of our national security. Iraq is 
not the situation that led to 9/11. The American people know it. It is 
time for this body to catch up and have a reasonable plan to finish the 
Iraq mission so we can focus on those who attacked us on 9/11.
  I reserve the remainder of our time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Ms. Murkowski). Who yields time?
  Mr. LEVIN. Madam President, how much time remains?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. There is 8 minutes 15 seconds remaining.
  Mr. LEVIN. How about Senator Warner's time?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Senator Warner has 18\1/2\ minutes remaining.
  Mr. LEVIN. Senator Kerry will go next.
  Mr. WARNER. My understanding, Madam President, is that Senator Kerry 
has approximately 7\1/2\ minutes; is that correct?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Massachusetts has 7 minutes 
15 seconds.
  The Senator from Massachusetts.
  Mr. KERRY. Madam President, this is obviously the most important 
issue facing the country today. I listened to my colleagues on the 
other side try to make this a debate about something that it is not 
about.
  All of us support the troops. The only question here is how do we 
most effectively support them. The best way to support the troops is to 
get this policy right. That is how we support the troops.
  There is nothing more disappointing than being a troop in the field 
and see you are doing missions that don't

[[Page S6329]]

make sense or that the overall strategy doesn't make sense. And the 
record here--as the Senator from Wisconsin has said in quoting Robert 
Kennedy about past error justifying a perpetuation of the same--the 
record here is not good.
  Prediction after prediction after prediction has been wrong. Policy 
choice after policy choice after policy choice has been wrong. Young 
men and women in the U.S. Armed Forces have been wounded and killed 
because of bad policy decisions, and it is not enough to come to the 
floor of the Senate and insist: Oh, we have to stay the course because 
otherwise what our troops are doing would be lost or be in vain.
  What would be lost and be in vain is not to look at and think about 
what is happening over there and to adjust appropriately. Our troops 
want us and deserve for us to get this policy right.
  What Senator Feingold and I are offering, along with Senator Leahy 
and Senator Boxer, is a plan that gets it right, that helps us get on a 
path where we demand accountability and where we still support Iraq.
  Sure, we can muddle along on this course. None of us have come to the 
floor and said the cause is lost. None of us have suggested that we 
just have to walk away and leave chaos. That is not what this plan 
does. This plan honors the investment of our troops, and, in fact, what 
it does is provide a better way of not only empowering the Iraqis but 
of empowering the United States of America to fight a more effective 
war on terror.
  Let me say it plainly. Redeploying U.S. troops is necessary for 
success in Iraq, and it is necessary to be able to fight a more 
effective war on terror. That is why we put this program forward.
  Our amendment requires redeployment of American combat forces with 
important exceptions. At the end of the year, if, in fact, it is 
necessary to continue to train in order to stand up the Iraqis, we 
allow for that. If we need to continue to fight al-Qaida because we 
haven't destroyed it completely in the next year, we allow for that. 
And we allow, obviously, for the protection of American facilities and 
forces. There is no other reason to be in Iraq a year from now, other 
than standing up the Iraqi forces or chasing al-Qaida or protecting our 
facilities.
  So, in fact, what we are providing for is exactly what our policy 
ought to be, but it begins the redeployment because the fact is--and 
our generals have said it and every expert has said it--the large 
presence of American forces in Iraq is contributing to the insurgency.
  Why on Earth would Senators want to come to the floor and argue, 
Let's just stay the course and do the same old thing, when our own 
generals have told us the same old thing is part of the problem, the 
same old thing is attracting terrorists, the same old thing is losing 
us allies, the same old thing is costing us unbelievable sums of money 
and costing us lives unnecessarily?
  Our plan believes there is a better way to fight the war on terror 
and a better way to be successful in Iraq. It is different from what 
Senator Levin and others are offering, but it is not different in that 
it has every component of the plan they offer.
  I have heard some Senators say we don't have a plan. We have exactly 
the same plan that is in the Levin amendment except we go further. We 
maintain an over-the-horizon force to protect our security interests in 
the region.
  In addition to that, we have a date, and it is binding. I don't 
believe at this point in time that our troops are well served by only 
having a sense-of-the-Senate resolution. We ought to make policy. We 
helped make policy that put them there, and we ought to help make the 
policy to help get them out of there.
  Let me also be clear about this, Madam President: This plan continues 
support for Iraq. There is no drop dead, no depart, no ultimatum. It 
gives them a deadline to stand up, but it provides the President the 
ability to continue to train if that hasn't completely happened. The 
fact is, this amendment permits us to accomplish the job.
  General Casey has said--how many times does the commanding general 
have to say it?--this war cannot be won militarily. The only way to do 
this is to bring parties together and resolve the political differences 
that are feeding the insurgency.
  How much time do I have remaining?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. There is 2\1/2\ minutes remaining.
  Mr. KERRY. Madam President, the National Security Adviser of Iraq 
said it this week. How many of our colleagues came over to the Senate 
the other day and argued about the sovereignty of Iraq? I am for the 
sovereignty of Iraq. The sovereignty of Iraq is respected by respecting 
what they are saying about themselves.
  Prime Minister Maliki says they will be able to take the security of 
16 out of 18 provinces by the end of this year. Let's honor that. Prime 
Minister Maliki said getting our troops out will, in fact, legitimize 
the Government, it will help them. Other Iraqis and Sunnis have said 
that. Madam President, 94 percent of the Sunnis say the United States 
should set a timetable; 90 percent of the Shia say the United States 
should set a timetable. Are the Iraqis cutting and running on 
themselves by saying that? Of course not.
  All these comparisons with World War II are absolutely ridiculous. Of 
course we wouldn't set a date when we are fighting a uniformed force 
that has invaded other countries and we can understand how to do it. 
But this is not a uniformed force. These are terrorists and these are 
insurgents and these are criminals. These are people whom we need to 
fight differently. And when our own presence is adding to their ability 
to recruit, if we are going to be smart, we ought to think about how we 
are going to turn around and fight differently.
  I remember what it was like when we fought in a war where we were 
bound by a policy without thinking about how we could change it and be 
more effective. An awful lot of lives were lost as a result of that 
when policy leaders failed to change the policy and do what was 
necessary to win.
  If the Iraqis themselves keep talking about a timetable and only 
deadlines have worked up until this point--the deadline for the 
transfer of authority for the provisional government, a deadline for 
the Constitution. The Iraqis wanted to let it slip. We said no. We held 
their feet to the fire. They did the Constitution. It was the same 
thing with the elections. We set a deadline. We said the date will be 
now. They wanted to let it slide. We said no. They held the elections.
  I believe it is a more effective way to put America in a position of 
strength, in a position to fight the war on terror in Somalia, in 
Afghanistan, and in the other places of the world where al-Qaida is 
growing. Iraq has been a diversion from the real war on terror, and 
Iraq has weakened the United States in the world. We deserve to take a 
position that supports our troops by getting this policy right.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's time has expired.
  Who yields time? The Senator from Virginia.
  Mr. WARNER. Madam President, before we start on the next speaker, as 
I understand it, the standing order recites that the Levin amendment 
would be the first vote. If I understand the request of the 
distinguished colleague from Michigan, there is a preference to have it 
switched so that the Kerry vote will be first. Is that a request being 
propounded?
  Mr. LEVIN. The Senator is correct. I asked both Senators Kerry and 
Feingold as to what their preference is. They do prefer to go first. 
That is fine with me, if it is OK with the manager of the bill.
  Mr. WARNER. Madam President, there will be no objection on this side 
to that request. So for the advice of all Senators, the first vote that 
will occur will be on the Kerry-Feingold amendment to be followed by 
the Levin-Reed amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Who yields time?
  Mr. WARNER. I yield such time as the distinguished Senator requires.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona.
  Mr. McCAIN. Madam President, I rise once again to oppose the 
amendment offered by the Senators from Michigan and Rhode Island and 
the amendment offered by the Senators from Massachusetts and Wisconsin.
  Before I speak about the problems I believe to be inherent in these 
amendments, I would like for a moment to discuss the nature of the 
debate upon which this body is engaged.

[[Page S6330]]

  The discussion over this war is perhaps the most consequential debate 
the Senate will engage in this year or perhaps in several years. The 
outcome of the war will impact the stability of the Middle East and the 
nature of U.S. foreign policy for a generation. It is that important.
  So our debate in this Chamber should be a serious weighing of the 
arguments. Sometimes, unfortunately, the debate seems to have 
deteriorated into sloganeering, but overall, I think this debate has 
been very helpful.
  I reiterate the fact that we should respect the views of those who 
disagree with us. I respect and have known my colleagues who are 
sponsors of these amendments, and I believe that a good, healthy, 
strong debate is what this Nation needs. In that spirit, I would like 
to discuss again my strong opposition to the two amendments.
  By calling for a withdrawal of American troops tied to arbitrary 
timetables rather than conditions in country, these amendments 
literally risk disaster for our intervention in Iraq.
  Madam President, the Iraqi security forces, I say to my friends, are 
clearly unable to maintain security on their own. All one has to do is 
look at every news story every morning or every evening. Even with the 
presence of coalition forces in Iraq today, the violence and 
instability remain at unacceptably high levels. To abandon the 
fledgling Iraqi Army and police to the insurgents, the militias and the 
terrorists would risk chaos in Iraq, and chaos in Iraq would mean 
disaster.
  Madam President, there is an old line about those of us who ignore 
the lessons and mistakes of history are doomed to repeat them. 
Afghanistan is the classic example of what could happen in Iraq. After 
years and years of incredible assistance to those who were seeking 
freedom from the then-Soviet Union occupation of Afghanistan, the 
Russians were driven out. Then, incredibly, the United States of 
America totally disengaged--totally disengaged--from Afghanistan. I 
commend to my colleagues a book called ``Ghost Wars'' by Steve Coll 
which won a Pulitzer prize. And in that vacuum, of course, came the 
Taliban, and the Taliban then obviously was not only a terribly 
oppressive, brutal, and cruel regime but became a hotbed of training 
for terrorists, al-Qaida and others.
  It is clear to me that if we abandon Iraq to that same chaos, there 
is no doubt who would come to power, at least in some parts of Iraq, 
and the consequences we would pay for that.
  We watched Afghanistan descend into chaos. There continues to be much 
debate about Saddam Hussein's connections to terrorists before our 
invasion, but there can be no doubt about the centrality of this 
conflict on the war on terror today. A failed state in Iraq would pose 
a clear, present, and enduring danger to the security of our country.
  Now, the sponsors of these amendments seem to base them on a premise 
that if we begin withdrawing, the Iraqi Government will somehow get 
serious and fight the insurgency on its own without our help. That 
makes the assumption, incredibly, that the present Government in Iraq 
and the military who are out there fighting all the time and their 
police are somehow not serious. Of course they are serious. They are 
just not capable. It is going to take more time and more effort and, I 
am sorry to say, more American sacrifice before they are capable of 
assuming those responsibilities. Rather than inducing the Government to 
crack down on the insurgency, beginning a U.S. withdrawal is more 
likely to induce average Iraqis to join a militia for protection rather 
than cast their lots with the Government.
  I would also ask the sponsors of the amendments what they advocate if 
we withdraw and the violence actually worsens and full-scale civil war 
ensues or terrorists then enjoy a safe haven to plan attacks against 
Americans and our friends. Do we then face the options only of 
tolerating this situation in perpetuity or reinvading the country?
  We have just one choice in Iraq, and that is to see our mission there 
through to victory. What does victory mean? It is the classic reduction 
and eventual elimination of any insurgency, an economy that works, a 
government that functions, and a military and police that are able to 
come back and eventually eliminate and destroy an insurgency. That is 
the way every insurgency in history was put down. There is no peace 
signing on board the USS Missouri. There are no Paris peace talks. It 
is an insurgency that has to be surrounded, contained, and eliminated.
  That is not to say this victory will be quick and easy. It is long 
and it is hard and it is tough, and many mistakes have been made and 
all of us have been frustrated by those mistakes. Many of us have been 
terribly frustrated by the inflated estimates and over-optimistic 
statements that so frustrated us and the American people when the 
conditions don't warrant it. It is still tough today. We can't fall 
prey to wishful thinking, that we can put the costs and the 
difficulties and the frustrations aside by ignoring our challenges and 
responsibilities. That is something we cannot do.
  Madam President, I congratulate my colleagues for their participation 
in this debate. The American people expect nothing less of us. I hope 
we are a better informed nation and a better informed body when we 
vote. It will probably not be the last time we address this issue, but 
I think it has been done in a comprehensive fashion.
  I would close by reminding my colleagues that it was the United 
States that led the invasion of Iraq, the United States led the 
occupation, and the United States, with our Iraqi partners, has the 
responsibility to see this through. It will take more time, more 
commitment, more support, and more brave Americans who will lose their 
lives in the service of this great cause. Despite our cajoling, 
nagging, and pleading, few other countries around the world will share 
much of our burden. Iraq is for us to do, for us to win or lose, for us 
to suffer the consequences or share in the benefits. But in the end, 
there is only one United States of America, and it is to us that 
history will look for courage and commitment.
  I urge my colleagues to vote against this amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  Mr. WARNER. Madam President, I commend my longtime friend from 
Arizona. He in a very succinct way looked at this debate in the context 
of what is going on today and tomorrow and the weeks and months to come 
in Iraq, but he is also looking at it in the context of the future, how 
generations that follow us will look back on this chapter and moment in 
history and how the Congress of the United States, hopefully, has given 
support to the Commander in Chief under the Constitution--our 
President--to direct the operations of the current conflicts.
  The Senator also touched on how we have conducted this debate. I wish 
to just repeat a few remarks of my opening remarks yesterday with 
respect to my colleague from Michigan in addressing his amendment. I 
said that I have studied it carefully. I did not denounce the 
amendment; I said it was a serious amendment, and it is a serious 
amendment. It deserves serious thought, and I, and I think others, have 
given that serious thought to our colleague on his amendment. But I 
strongly oppose it.
  Unlike last year where I sat down and was able to work out with him a 
conciliatory, bipartisan amendment which got three-quarters of the 
votes of the Senate, it just, in the form he presented it, was not an 
option this time. Therefore, regrettably, we approach these critically 
important votes with far greater partisanship than I had hoped. I had 
hoped we would have greater bipartisanship.
  But my basic message to America and to my colleagues is that we have 
put an enormous investment into these conflicts, both in Iraq and in 
Afghanistan. We are focusing today on Iraq, but we have to look at the 
others.
  Madam President, 2,500-plus Americans have lost their lives and left 
families and loved ones grieving, and 18,000 have survived their wounds 
and are working to reestablish themselves, many going back into uniform 
or having never left uniform, but remaining in, which is to their 
everlasting credit, but others receiving the love and the care of their 
families and their communities in which they live. There has been 
enormous sacrifice. We have dollars incalculable in amounts.
  Also, what we have on the line is the credibility of the United 
States of

[[Page S6331]]

America. The voice of this Senate will be recorded momentarily. I am 
optimistic it will be recorded in a way to support the President and 
his statements that we are there to work with the Iraqi people, to 
establish their democracy, which they have worked on these 18 months, 
now with a permanent, unified government, and to try to let this 
Government of only weeks establish itself, send its roots into the 
ground, derive its strength, and begin to govern and govern fully a 
sovereign nation and take on all of the responsibilities.
  Both of these amendments, the amendment of the Senator from Michigan 
and the amendment of the Senator from Massachusetts, would send a 
message which would indicate there is some wavering, some equivocation 
here at home in supporting our President, the Commander in Chief, and 
that goes to the basic credibility of the United States of America, 
which is on the line in these votes.
  There is not one of us here who doesn't desire to have our forces 
brought home at the earliest possible date, but the formulation by 
which they can come home rests on the ability of this Government to 
seize those reins, to establish that security, to rebuild that 
infrastructure, and gain the confidence and the respect of the Iraqi 
people. That is a tough job, given the strong dissent between the 
various religious factions, but this Government appears to be up to it. 
It must be given a chance. It cannot be crippled at this earliest stage 
by messages coming from this Chamber and elsewhere that we have less 
than full confidence in their ability to achieve the goals of a full 
democracy in Iraq, and they are taking the reins to direct their 
people. Our credibility is on the line, Madam President.
  So I say to my colleagues as you approach this vote, it will be one 
of the most important that you have ever cast. Future generations of 
Americans will look back upon this very moment to determine if two 
branches of our Government, the executive and the legislative, stood 
side by side in honoring those who have given their lives, their 
wounds, and the 1 million other men and women of the Armed Forces, plus 
untold American citizens who, in the years of the Iraqi conflict, have 
gone over and accepted the risks of serving there, be that in the 
military or civilian capacities. This is a very heavy investment which 
has been made by many thousands of courageous Americans to see that we 
have gotten to where we are today; namely, a new government, a unity 
government, and to give that government a chance to function without in 
any way jeopardizing that by sending a signal that we have less than 
full confidence in their ability to achieve their goals.
  Madam President, how much time do I have remaining?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. There is 3\1/2\ minutes remaining.
  Mr. WARNER. I reserve the remainder of the time.
  Mr. LEVIN. Madam President, I yield 3\1/2\ minutes to the Senator 
from North Dakota.
  Mr. CONRAD. Madam President, I do not believe it is a wise policy to 
set a specific date for withdrawal from Iraq. I do believe it makes 
sense to begin to redeploy our forces sometime this year. Therefore, I 
will support the Levin amendment. I believe that is the right policy 
for the following reasons:
  No. 1, our military commanders have made clear that is their 
intention. In fact, the news this morning says in a headline: ``U.S. 
Military to Send Equipment Home.'' The story goes on to say that the 
U.S. military has begun sending thousands of Humvees and other war 
equipment home as more Iraqi units join the fight. The move also 
anticipates that the number of American troops in Iraq will decline.
  Is anybody suggesting our military is engaged in a cut-and-run 
strategy? I don't think so. It is not a cut-and-run strategy. It has 
been the long-term plan to begin to redeploy this year.
  No. 2, the President has repeatedly said: We will stand down as the 
Iraqis stand up. Well, according to the administration, tens of 
thousands, even hundreds of thousands of Iraqis have now stood up. It 
is time for us to begin to redeploy. That does not constitute a cut-
and-run approach but simply common sense.
  No. 3, Iraq is ultimately the responsibility of the Iraqis. We cannot 
forever do the job for them. They must defend their own freedom.
  No. 4, there are other priority threats that require our attention, 
including the worldwide al-Qaida conspiracy, North Korea nuclear 
weapons and missile development, and Iranian nuclear development.
  For those reasons, I support a policy of beginning to redeploy our 
forces in Iraq this year but without a specific timetable or an 
arbitrary pace for reducing those troop commitments. That is the right 
policy. That is the policy outlined in the Levin amendment.
  Madam President, I yield the remainder of my time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  Mr. WARNER. Madam President, I had intended to reserve a brief period 
of time for the President pro tempore, Mr. Stevens, but in his absence, 
I will just once again conclude.
  The message today is whether we are here to uphold the credibility of 
the United States of America, as stated most eloquently by our 
President, as we have come to establish a new government in Iraq. That 
has been achieved. It has now been 18 months since the beginning of 
their elections, brave elections, followed by the establishment of a 
unity government. That Government is functioning, and we must give it 
an opportunity to govern.

  Our President said it most succinctly upon his return from Iraq:

       My message to the Iraqi people is this: Seize the moment. 
     Seize this opportunity to develop a government of and by and 
     for the people. And I also have a message to the Iraqi 
     people, that when America gives a commitment, America keeps 
     its commitment.

  I yield the floor and yield back any time remaining.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan.
  Mr. LEVIN. Madam President, the credibility of the United States has 
been proven with the loss of lives and the number of wounded we have 
suffered in Iraq. We have proven our credibility over 2,500 times 
because we have lost more than 2,500 of our troops. We have proven our 
credibility over 17,000 times in terms of the number of people who have 
been wounded in Iraq. We have proven our credibility with hundreds of 
billions of dollars to give the Iraqis an opportunity to have a nation. 
It is up to them to seize that opportunity. It is up to them to decide 
to make a choice. Do they want a civil war? Do they want to engage in 
more sectarian battles? Or do they want to reach the kind of political 
compromises which are essential if they are going to have a nation and 
end the insurgency and avoid an all-out civil war?
  Our credibility has been proven thousands of times and with billions 
of dollars. We have given a people an opportunity that is 
extraordinary. We cannot make the decision for them, whether they will 
seize that opportunity. Only they can make that decision.
  Last year we adopted, by an overwhelming vote, an amendment which 
said that 2006 would be a year of significant transition, with Iraqi 
security forces taking the lead for the security of a free and 
sovereign Iraq, thereby creating the conditions for a phased 
redeployment of U.S. forces in Iraq. Similar to last year's sense of 
the Congress, this year's sense of the Congress that we are offering is 
an attempt to change our policy from one of an open-ended commitment--a 
policy that, as the Secretary of State put it, we are there as long as 
they need us; as the President of Iraq, Mr. Talabani, put it, the 
Americans will stay with all the forces that we want for as long as we 
want them. That is a recipe, a formula for dependency. It is not the 
way in which Iraq can learn that it must, on its own, in a reasonable 
period of time, with reasonable notice and consultation, begin to ween 
itself, as General Casey put it, from overdependence on the American 
military.
  That is the issue. That is what our amendment would urge the 
President to do. Our amendment does not order the President, as some on 
that side have actually put it. This is a sense of the Senate. This is 
something where we, the authors of this amendment, believe that we have 
a responsibility to use our best efforts to give our best advice as to 
what our policy should be. It is not a policy of immediately 
redeploying forces. There is not a precipitous nature to this 
amendment. It says

[[Page S6332]]

by the end of this year, in the next 6 months, to begin the phased 
redeployment of American forces from Iraq.
  That is what the Iraqis say their policy is. That is what their 
security adviser says their policy is. Their own security adviser, Mr. 
Rubaie, in the Washington Post 2 days ago said: We envisage the U.S. 
troop presence by year's end to be under 100,000. That is a 
redeployment of 30,000 troops. Our amendment tells the Iraqis: Stay 
with that. Stick to that policy. It is the right policy. You must take 
over your own nation and make it work and make it happen.
  Then Mr. Rubaie, the National Security Adviser of Iraq, in a written 
document presented to the American people through our newspaper, says 
that ``the removal of coalition troops from Iraqi streets will help the 
Iraqis who now see foreign troops as occupiers rather than 
liberators.'' He says, ``The removal of foreign troops will legitimize 
Iraq's government in the eyes of its people.''
  Our amendment urging the President to end an open-ended commitment of 
our troops to Iraq and to begin the redeployment by year's end is a way 
of implementing what the Iraqis themselves have said they plan on 
doing.
  All Senators want Iraq to end as a success story, every one of us. 
There is not one Senator who wants anything other than to maximize the 
chances of success in Iraq. No matter how we voted on the original 
resolution authorizing force, every one of the 25 or so Senators who 
voted against that resolution--and I am one of them--wants to maximize 
the chances of success in Iraq. But to do that, we must prod the Iraqis 
to take the responsibility for their own nation.
  I thank the Presiding Officer and my dear friend from Virginia for 
the way in which this debate has proceeded. I hope we have made a 
contribution to the Senate and to the Nation.
  Mr. WARNER. Madam President, the order requires that the votes be 
taken. I ask for the yeas and nays on both amendments.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is in order to seek the 
yeas and nays on both amendments.
  Is there a sufficient second?
  There is a sufficient second with respect to both amendments.
  The yeas and nays were ordered.
  Mr. WARNER. At this time, the parliamentary situation is leader time, 
and I yield the floor to the distinguished Democratic leader.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Democratic leader is recognized.
  Mr. REID. Madam President, I would be certainly amiss if I didn't 
extend my appreciation for the civil nature of this debate to two of 
the Senate's finest, the distinguished Senator from Virginia and the 
distinguished Senator from Michigan, two of the finest the Senate has 
ever had. I thank them both very much for the civil nature of this very 
contentious debate.
  Mr. WARNER. I thank our colleague.
  Mr. REID. ``That we are to stand by the President, right or wrong, is 
not only unpatriotic and servile, but is morally treasonable to the 
American people.'' Let me repeat that. ``That we are to stand by the 
President, right or wrong, is not only unpatriotic and servile, but is 
morally treasonable to the American people.''
  That was Republican President Theodore Roosevelt who said that. It is 
an appropriate quote for the Senate to hear before we vote.
  Today we will decide on a way to move forward in Iraq. I speak in 
support of the Levin-Reed amendment. I believe it is long past time to 
change course in Iraq and start to end the President's open-ended 
commitment. It is time for sound policy, not more tired slogans 
designed to distort the facts and divide the American people. It is 
time for a strategy that honors the brave service of our troops. A 
majority of Americans recognize that we need a new strategy in Iraq. I 
am hopeful a bipartisan majority of this body will agree.
  Almost 4 years ago, we stood in this Chamber debating whether to give 
the President the authority to go to war in Iraq. Much has happened in 
Iraq since that fateful day, at a great price to our troops, our 
taxpayers, our country, and our security. The Iraq war will soon become 
the longest conflict in this Nation's history, longer than World War 
II, a war in which we fought across Europe, North Africa, and the 
Pacific. My own State of Nevada, a small, sparsely populated State, has 
paid an enormous price in this war. We have lost 39 soldiers in Iraq 
and Afghanistan, most of them in Iraq. That is 39 fathers, brothers, 
uncles, sons, daughters, and aunts who will never come home. Thousands 
of other Nevadans have sacrificed as well. Last year 70 percent of the 
National Guard of Nevada was deployed. These Nevadans deserve to know 
their sacrifices will be honored. They deserve to know their Government 
has a plan for success in Iraq that honors our troops and completes the 
mission. Just as important, they deserve an honest debate, not 
political slogans and not a President and a Republican Congress content 
with no plan and no end in sight.
  Today the real choice facing this body is a choice between doing 
nothing, the so-called ``stay the course'' option the President and his 
supporters advocate, or changing the course and providing our troops 
and the Iraqi people a way forward. After 4 long years, more than 2,500 
Americans have died, thousands have been grievously wounded. Hundreds 
of billions of dollars have been spent and threats ignored around the 
globe. Congress needs to offer a new direction. I believe we need to 
signal to the Iraqi Government that our patience and our presence in 
Iraq are not unlimited. We need to say to President Bush: You need a 
plan for the Iraqis to take responsibility for their own country, their 
own security, so that the phased redeployment of U.S. troops from Iraq 
can begin by year's end.
  Robert Taft, a great Republican Senator, said:

       Criticism in time of war is essential to the maintenance of 
     any kind of democratic government.

  Senator Taft was talking about World War II. But his words still ring 
true. There is nothing careless about pointing to the President's 
mistakes and missteps in Iraq. In fact, we must. His misjudgments have 
made America less safe. From the outset, administration blunders 
increased the costs and risks of confronting Saddam Hussein and 
securing Iraq: The administration built its case for war on faulty and 
cherry-picked intelligence. Smoking guns would become mushroom clouds. 
Al-Qaida and Saddam had a dangerous alliance. Nuclear weapons materials 
were flowing into Iraq from Africa. We could invade Iraq without 
diverting resources from the ongoing war on terror. The Iraq war would 
be over quickly, and the costs would be covered by the proceeds from 
Iraqi oil sales.
  All these assertions, every one of them, turned out to be false. By 
the start of 2003, U.S. troops and intelligence assets had already been 
diverted from the hunt for Osama bin Laden in order to prepare for an 
attack on Iraq. The President's war plan turned out to be as deficient 
as the prewar intelligence. He rejected the Powell Doctrine's key 
tenets: No. 1, that military force should be used as a last resort; No. 
2, that force, when used, should be overwhelming; and No. 3, that there 
must be a clear exit strategy from the conflict. And he rejected the 
advice of his senior military commanders who called for 4 to 500,000 
troops, a recommendation that was based on years of hard-learned and 
costly lessons.
  As a result, after the Iraqi Government fell, there were not enough 
forces to pacify the country, to control looting, to guard the ammo 
dumps, to secure the borders, and to restore civility. The seeds for 
the insurgency and the sectarian warfare that would soon plague Iraq 
had been sown. But this didn't stop the President from donning a flight 
suit and landing on an aircraft carrier to declare ``mission 
accomplished'' in May of 2003, more than 2 years ago.
  Since that date, 95 percent of our casualties have occurred in Iraq--
since the ``mission accomplished'' performance on that aircraft 
carrier.
  Meanwhile, his viceroy in Baghdad continued to execute a series of 
disastrous decisions, including disbanding the Iraqi Army, purging the 
Government of all Baath Party officials, and delaying the training of 
Iraqi security forces. These early missteps had far-reaching 
consequences that our troops must live with.
  Three and a half years after the start of the war, there is still not 
a single Iraq Army battalion that can operate

[[Page S6333]]

independently--not one. On the reconstruction front, things aren't any 
better. The President who campaigned on the pledge not to do nation 
building unfortunately stuck to that pledge. From the start, the 
rebuilding effort was plagued in Iraq by massive corruption and 
contracting abuses. The American taxpayer and the Iraqi people have 
paid the price.
  Power, water, and oil production all soon slipped below prewar 
levels. Today, oil production is still 400,000 barrels per day below 
prewar levels. And the availability of electricity in Baghdad dropped 
from 16 hours a day prior to the war to its current average of 4 hours 
a day.
  These Bush administration missteps have reduced Iraqi support for our 
presence and fueled anti-American sentiments and insurgent activity. As 
a result, the mission of our troops has become more difficult and 
certainly more dangerous.
  At the same time the President was sending too few troops for the 
mission in Iraq, he even failed to provide those he did send--those 
valiant troops--with armor and equipment which they need to do the job. 
Military families already stretched and burdened from multiple 
deployments were forced to buy armor and ship it to their loved ones 
serving in Iraq.
  They went out and bought equipment and sent it to their loved ones 
because the military wasn't providing it. Combat units had to jury-rig 
vehicles with scrap metal in order to get some extra degree of 
protection from the improvised explosive devices--and understandably 
so.
  A study by the Marine Corps last year found that 80 percent of upper-
body fatalities could have been prevented with proper armor. The 
greatest military in the world should not have to depend on scrap metal 
from Iraqi junk yards to protect its troops.
  Meanwhile, security problems in Iraq grow more dangerous every day. 
In April and May of this year alone, more than 160 U.S. troops have 
been killed in Iraq. Weekly insurgent attacks are higher than they have 
ever been. At least five troops were killed in Iraq yesterday. We don't 
know the exact number, but at least five were killed yesterday.
  The country has become what is was not before the war--a training 
ground and a launching pad for acts of international terror.
  The killing of terrorist Zarqawi was a step forward. But as we have 
seen, the killings have not ended. Sectarian violence has not ceased 
because the Iraqi Government has failed to make the political 
compromises necessary to create a stable government that can provide 
for the security of its people--people taken from buses, kidnapped, and 
likely will be killed.
  That is only part of what happened last night in Iraq. I recall 
vividly when the Senate paused for a moment of silence when we reached 
the grim milestone of 2,000 U.S. military killed in Iraq. But just last 
week on a date that arrived far too quickly, we paused again to honor 
the now 2,500 who have given their lives. And, of course, that figure 
has since passed and there is more.
  The Senate has an obligation to our troops and their families to do 
everything we can to delay indefinitely the next milestone. Are we 
going to have a moment of silence for 3,000 of our best?
  Twenty-five hundred dead Americans is not ``just a number,'' as Tony 
Snowe, the President's spokesman, said. These 2,500 are sons, 
daughters, mothers, fathers, husbands, and wives. They are PFC Thomas 
Tucker and PFC Kristian Menchaca, whose mutilated bodies were found in 
Iraq yesterday. These aren't just numbers.
  We owe it to these troops and all of our forces serving in Iraq to 
develop a sound policy. We hear a lot of rhetoric about ``supporting 
the troops.'' But the best way we can support them is with a smart 
strategy--not with more rhetoric or slogans. That is why the Levin-Reed 
amendment is so important.
  The Levin-Reed amendment recognizes that it is time to transform the 
U.S. mission in Iraq and to begin the responsible redeployment of U.S. 
forces this year. It builds upon the bipartisan Senate amendment which 
we passed overwhelmingly last year calling for ``2006 to be a year of 
significant transition in Iraq.'' With the midpoint of 2006 upon us, 
that transition must begin.
  The open-ended commitment advocated by the President and the 
majority--that is the Republicans in this body--is not the way to get 
the Iraqis to assume responsibility for governing and securing their 
country. They have trained 287,000 troops.

  The Levin-Reed amendment recognizes that there are only political 
solutions remaining in Iraq, not military solutions. This amendment 
rightfully focuses on the need to reconcile the sectarian differences, 
to regionalize the U.S. strategy, and to revitalize reconstruction 
efforts.
  Passage of this amendment would chart a new course, one that is well 
balanced between the military, the political, the regional, and the 
international solutions. An open-ended commitment is not sustainable, 
and the American people know that.
  The war is now costing the American people every month upwards of $2 
billion--$500 million each week. The military has been stretched so 
thin, with every available combat unit of the Army and Marine Corps 
serving multiple tours in Iraq.
  This war is not a matter for ``future Presidents'' as President Bush 
said. It is his war. It is the war of President George Bush. And the 
time to act is now, for as we are bogged down in Iraq, the threats to 
our freedom around the world only grow.
  An open-ended commitment in Iraq hurts our ability to address other 
national security challenges around the world. While beginning the 
phased redeployment this year will allow many of our troops to come 
home, it will also permit the President to redeploy forces so they can 
deal with other crises such as we now have in Afghanistan--where four 
or five were killed yesterday--where the resurgent Taliban threat must 
be eliminated and Osama bin Laden must be finally captured or killed.
  I watched the floor debate yesterday. The majority, instead of 
offering their vision for the future in Iraq, or even speaking to the 
merits of the Levin-Reed amendment, chose to resort to a familiar 
playbook straight from Karl Rove's book of partisan political tricks. 
They have engaged in these cheap political attacks saying Democrats 
want to ``surrender'' and ``cut and run.'' Not only are these attacks 
baseless, but they won't help Iraqis--and they certainly won't help our 
troops who are right now lugging 70-pound packs in 100-degree heat 
while trying to avoid roadside bombs and snipers.
  The Republicans in the Senate stand alone, insisting on ``no plan and 
no end.'' It isn't a position shared by the American people, and it 
isn't even a position shared by our military leaders.
  On today's morning news, it is reported that General Casey, commander 
of U.S. forces in Iraq, has stated that thousands of troops will likely 
be redeployed by year's end. That is General Casey.
  To my Republican colleagues, is General Casey surrendering? To my 
Republican colleagues, is General Casey cutting and running? To my 
Republican colleagues, is General Casey admitting defeat? I think not.
  Over at the White House, we see similar partisan games. The 
administration continues to mislead the American people. The Vice 
President continues to insist the insurgency is in its ``last throes,'' 
despite the headlines we read every day. The President continues to 
insist that we will ``stand down when Iraqis stand up.'' That has yet 
to occur.
  It is time to change from the slogans, the attacks, and the continual 
misleading nature of this administration as it relates to the war in 
Iraq. Demanding a change of course is not irresponsible, it is not 
unpatriotic, it is the right thing to do.
  Edward R. Murrow said:

       We must not confuse dissent with disloyalty. When the loyal 
     opposition dies, I think the soul of America dies with it.

  For all of those troops who are serving on their third and fourth 
tours of duty, for those who have served on their first and second 
tours of duty, for all those Iraqis who want to see an end to the civil 
war plaguing their nation, for all those people who want Iraq to 
succeed in delivering a free and democratic way of life, for those who 
believe we need to refocus on the larger global war on terror, we must 
vote for a change in policy and a change in direction. We must reject 
the ``stay the

[[Page S6334]]

course'' doctrine of the Bush administration. We must vote for the 
Levin-Reed amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The majority leader is recognized.
  Mr. FRIST. Madam President, I thank both managers for a superb debate 
and discussion over the course of the last several days--and really the 
last several weeks--as we have focused on an issue that is no more 
important to the American people than the safety and security of the 
American people.
  We can take great pride in what our Nation and our military men and 
women have accomplished in Iraq. We thank them. We thank their families 
for their commitment and for their dedication. But we did not go into 
Iraq in pursuit of oil or riches or some other national advantage. We 
went as a volunteer--as a nation willing to enforce the mandates of the 
you U.N. Security Council when others were content to allow Saddam 
Hussein to defy those mandates.
  Some critics accused us at the time of ``unilateralism,'' but in fact 
we acted to vindicate multilateralism--most importantly, the authority 
of the Security Council and the credibility of many resolutions it 
adopted with respect to Iraq between 1991 and 2003.
  We went into Iraq to end a cruel dictatorship and free a people that 
was no less deserving of freedom than any other. As a result of our 
efforts, the dictatorship has ended, and the people of Iraq are now 
embarked on a grand democratic project, seeking to build a pluralistic, 
multiethnic, multireligious democracy in the heart of the Arab world.
  This is a project without precedent in the Arab world. And because it 
is so novel, it has come under assault from religious fundamentalists, 
Sunni and Shiite extremists, and others whose narrow agendas are 
threatened by the prospect of democracy in that part of the world.
  We have made an enormous investment in the success of this project. 
It would be foolish to squander that investment just as we are seeing 
success.
  Last year, millions of Iraqis--half of them women--defied the threats 
of the terrorists and streamed to the polls in three national 
elections. Iraq's Sunni population participated in greater numbers each 
time.
  On June 8--just a couple of weeks ago--the new democratically elected 
Prime Minister Jawad al-Maliki named the last three Cabinet members, 
the Ministers of Defense, Interior, and Security, thereby completing 
formation of his unity government.
  That same day, the death of the foremost terrorist in Iraq, Abu Musab 
al-Zarqawi, was announced in Baghdad. That was huge progress.
  We made a commitment to the new government of Prime Minister Maliki, 
and it would be impossible to imagine a worse time than now, just 2 
weeks after that government was fully formed and its most ferocious 
enemy eliminated, to turn our backs on it.
  None of us know for sure exactly how the democratic reform in Iraq 
will turn out, as we stay committed, but we do know it will fail if it 
is abandoned prematurely by the United States.
  Withdrawal is not an option. Surrender is not a solution. Every 
Senator must make his own decision and live with his own conscience, 
but this Senator will not be responsible for condemning the 26 million 
people of Iraq to decades more of violence and repression--not when 
there is a democratic alternative before us that is so manifestly 
committed to creating the kind of pluralistic society that until now 
has been absent from the Arab world.
  Another reason we went into Iraq was because we were convinced that 
Saddam Hussein was continuing his pursuit of weapons of mass 
destruction--chemical weapons that he had developed and used before.
  And the events of 9/11 had taught us that there is no greater threat 
to us today than that posed by state sponsors of terrorism--such as 
Iraq under Saddam Hussein--working to acquire such weapons.
  After the war, of course, there emerged a big debate over whether 
Saddam Hussein really was working on weapons of mass destruction in 
2003.
  But there is no debate that there was a strong international 
consensus prior to 2003 that Saddam Hussein must be pursuing weapons of 
mass destruction.
  This was the view not only of the Bush administration, but also of 
the Clinton administration, as well as the opinion of most other 
governments around the world.
  It made sense for two reasons.
  First, Saddam Hussein had a long track record of not only seeking, 
but also of using, chemical weapons. He had used chemical weapons 
against his own people in the 1980s. And at the end of the first 
Persian Gulf war in 1991 he was found to have an advanced nuclear 
weapons program--a program that may have only been 1 to 2 years away 
from producing a nuclear weapon.
  Second, Saddam Hussein was acting like a man who had something to 
hide; he was obstructing the U.N.'s weapons inspectors and repeatedly 
defying U.S. disarmament mandates. No one can explain why Saddam acted 
this way if he in fact had no weapons of mass destruction programs to 
hide.
  And it is certainly true that if Saddam Hussein were still in power 
today, Iraq would remain on the list with Iran and North Korea of 
countries that we fear will develop weapons of mass destruction and 
pass them to terrorists.
  Because Saddam Hussein has been removed from power, Iraq is no longer 
on that list.
  But we must remember that many of Saddam's weapons scientist--those 
who produced the chemical weapons he used against the Kurds in the 
1980s and who came close to producing nuclear weapons in the early 
1990s--are still in Iraq.
  However, in a democratic Iraq these scientists pose no threat because 
a democratic Iraq would never seek to revive Saddam Hussein's weapons 
programs.
  If we were to cut and run from Iraq, and risk letting the terrorists 
take power, we would again have to fear that these scientists, and what 
remains of Saddam's weapons infrastructure, would once again be put to 
work producing weapons that in the hands of international terrorists 
could destroy our cities and decimate our population.
  Again, every Senator must live with his own conscience, but this 
Senator does not want to be complicit in a decision that could reverse 
the success we've achieved since 9/11 in keeping terrorism from our 
shores and weapons of mass destruction out of the hands of terrorists.
  The amendments before us are intentionally misleading. They are 
written in soft language and wrapped in reassuring concepts.
  They don't sue such terms as ``retreat'' or ``withdrawal,'' but 
instead call for ``redeployment'' of our Armed Forces from Iraq.
  They don't say that the withdrawal should take place on an artificial 
timetable and be concluded by an arbitrary date. Instead, they say that 
the ``redeployment'' should take place under a ``schedule,'' that the 
``schedule'' should be ``planned,'' that the ``plan'' should be 
``coordinated'' with the Government of Iraq, and that the Congress 
should be ``consulted'' at every stage.
  None of this artful language, however, can conceal what is really 
proposed and what really at stake.
  The proponents of these amendments want us to tell the new Government 
of Iraq that we're leaving--no matter what the implications for the 
future of their country; no matter how much they plead with us to stay; 
no matter how great the risk that the investment that we and they have 
made to date in building a new Iraq will be squandered and turned to 
naught.
  The amendments may differ in some of the details--how long we'll wait 
until we actually leave, how emphatically we tell the Iraqi people we 
really care about them as we walk out the door, but the bottom line is 
the same.
  The amendments tell us to set a deadline and leave by the deadline.
  This would be a dangerous policy, a reckless policy, and a shameful 
policy.
  The time to leave Iraq is when we have achieved our objectives. If we 
knew our objectives were unachievable then these amendments might make 
sense. But our objectives are achievable and we are achieving them.
  The brave men and women of our Armed Forces are fighting daily to win 
victory in Iraq, and it would dishonor them, to say nothing of their 
fallen comrades, to cut and run at a time as promising as now.
  The spirit of these amendments is the spirit of defeatism and 
surrender.
  This is not the spirit that made America the great Nation it is 
today, and I trust that when we vote we will

[[Page S6335]]

send the message that there is no room for defeatism in the United 
States.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Ensign). The question is on agreeing to 
the amendment No. 4442 offered by the Senator from Massachusetts.
  The yeas and nays have been ordered.
  The clerk will call the roll.
  The bill clerk called the roll.
  Mr. DURBIN. I announce that the Senator from West Virginia (Mr. 
Rockefeller) is necessarily absent.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Are there any other Senators in the Chamber 
desiring to vote?
  The result was announced--yeas 13, nays 86, as follows:

                      [Rollcall Vote No. 181 Leg.]

                                YEAS--13

     Akaka
     Boxer
     Durbin
     Feingold
     Harkin
     Inouye
     Jeffords
     Kennedy
     Kerry
     Lautenberg
     Leahy
     Menendez
     Wyden

                                NAYS--86

     Alexander
     Allard
     Allen
     Baucus
     Bayh
     Bennett
     Biden
     Bingaman
     Bond
     Brownback
     Bunning
     Burns
     Burr
     Byrd
     Cantwell
     Carper
     Chafee
     Chambliss
     Clinton
     Coburn
     Cochran
     Coleman
     Collins
     Conrad
     Cornyn
     Craig
     Crapo
     Dayton
     DeMint
     DeWine
     Dodd
     Dole
     Domenici
     Dorgan
     Ensign
     Enzi
     Feinstein
     Frist
     Graham
     Grassley
     Gregg
     Hagel
     Hatch
     Hutchison
     Inhofe
     Isakson
     Johnson
     Kohl
     Kyl
     Landrieu
     Levin
     Lieberman
     Lincoln
     Lott
     Lugar
     Martinez
     McCain
     McConnell
     Mikulski
     Murkowski
     Murray
     Nelson (FL)
     Nelson (NE)
     Obama
     Pryor
     Reed
     Reid
     Roberts
     Salazar
     Santorum
     Sarbanes
     Schumer
     Sessions
     Shelby
     Smith
     Snowe
     Specter
     Stabenow
     Stevens
     Sununu
     Talent
     Thomas
     Thune
     Vitter
     Voinovich
     Warner

                             NOT VOTING--1

       
     Rockefeller
       
  The amendment (No. 4442) was rejected.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote, and I move 
to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, the following two votes will each be 10 
minutes in duration.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the Levin 
amendment No. 4320.
  The yeas and nays have been ordered, and the clerk will call the 
roll.
  Mr. DURBIN. I announce that the Senator from West Virginia (Mr. 
Rockefeller) is necessarily absent.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Graham). Are there any other Senators in 
the Chamber desiring to vote?
  The result was announced--yeas 39, nays 60, as follows:

                      [Rollcall Vote No. 182 Leg.]

                                YEAS--39

     Akaka
     Baucus
     Bayh
     Biden
     Bingaman
     Boxer
     Byrd
     Cantwell
     Carper
     Chafee
     Clinton
     Conrad
     Dodd
     Dorgan
     Durbin
     Feingold
     Feinstein
     Harkin
     Inouye
     Jeffords
     Johnson
     Kennedy
     Kerry
     Kohl
     Lautenberg
     Leahy
     Levin
     Lincoln
     Menendez
     Mikulski
     Murray
     Obama
     Reed
     Reid
     Salazar
     Sarbanes
     Schumer
     Stabenow
     Wyden

                                NAYS--60

     Alexander
     Allard
     Allen
     Bennett
     Bond
     Brownback
     Bunning
     Burns
     Burr
     Chambliss
     Coburn
     Cochran
     Coleman
     Collins
     Cornyn
     Craig
     Crapo
     Dayton
     DeMint
     DeWine
     Dole
     Domenici
     Ensign
     Enzi
     Frist
     Graham
     Grassley
     Gregg
     Hagel
     Hatch
     Hutchison
     Inhofe
     Isakson
     Kyl
     Landrieu
     Lieberman
     Lott
     Lugar
     Martinez
     McCain
     McConnell
     Murkowski
     Nelson (FL)
     Nelson (NE)
     Pryor
     Roberts
     Santorum
     Sessions
     Shelby
     Smith
     Snowe
     Specter
     Stevens
     Sununu
     Talent
     Thomas
     Thune
     Vitter
     Voinovich
     Warner

                             NOT VOTING--1

       
     Rockefeller
       
  The amendment (No. 4320) was rejected.
  Mr. WARNER. I move to reconsider the vote.
  Mr. CRAIG. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
  Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I oppose cutting off debate on this 
important bill prematurely. I have two amendments that have not been 
considered by the Senate--one to help service members called to active 
duty, the other to cancel this year's automatic pay raise for Members 
of Congress--that will be shut out if we invoke cloture. We should be 
doing all that we can to help members of our armed services who are 
serving so courageously. And, with the Nation's deficits and the tab 
for the Iraq war at alarming levels, we should not be accepting another 
backdoor payraise. At a minimum, the Senate should consider and vote on 
those worthy amendments before completing work on the Defense 
authorization bill.


                             Cloture Motion

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, pursuant to rule 
XXII, the Chair lays before the Senate the pending cloture motion, 
which the clerk will report.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

                             Cloture Motion

       We the undersigned Senators, in accordance with the 
     provisions of rule XXII of the Standing Rules of the Senate, 
     do hereby move to bring to a close debate on S. 2766, the 
     National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2007.
         Bill Frist, John W. Warner, John E. Sununu, Jim Bunning, 
           George Allen, Lamar Alexander, Craig Thomas, Kay Bailey 
           Hutchison, Chuck Hagel, Ted Stevens, Judd Gregg, Robert 
           F. Bennett, Thad Cochran, Pat Roberts, Pete Domenici, 
           Jim Inhofe, Jeff Sessions.

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. By unanimous consent, the mandatory quorum 
call has been waived.
  The question is, Is it the sense of the Senate that debate on S. 
2766, the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2007, 
shall be brought to a close? The yeas and nays are mandatory under the 
rule. The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk called the roll.
  Mr. DURBIN. I announce that the Senator from West Virginia (Mr. 
Rockefeller) is necessarily absent.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Are there any other Senators in the Chamber 
desiring to vote?
  The yeas and nays resulted--yeas 98, nays 1, as follows:

                      [Rollcall Vote No. 183 Leg.]

                                YEAS--98

     Akaka
     Alexander
     Allard
     Allen
     Baucus
     Bayh
     Bennett
     Biden
     Bingaman
     Bond
     Boxer
     Brownback
     Bunning
     Burns
     Burr
     Byrd
     Cantwell
     Carper
     Chafee
     Chambliss
     Clinton
     Coburn
     Cochran
     Coleman
     Collins
     Conrad
     Cornyn
     Craig
     Crapo
     Dayton
     DeMint
     DeWine
     Dodd
     Dole
     Domenici
     Dorgan
     Durbin
     Ensign
     Enzi
     Feinstein
     Frist
     Graham
     Grassley
     Gregg
     Hagel
     Harkin
     Hatch
     Hutchison
     Inhofe
     Inouye
     Isakson
     Jeffords
     Johnson
     Kennedy
     Kerry
     Kohl
     Kyl
     Landrieu
     Lautenberg
     Leahy
     Levin
     Lieberman
     Lincoln
     Lott
     Lugar
     Martinez
     McCain
     McConnell
     Menendez
     Mikulski
     Murkowski
     Murray
     Nelson (FL)
     Nelson (NE)
     Obama
     Pryor
     Reed
     Reid
     Roberts
     Salazar
     Santorum
     Sarbanes
     Schumer
     Sessions
     Shelby
     Smith
     Snowe
     Specter
     Stabenow
     Stevens
     Sununu
     Talent
     Thomas
     Thune
     Vitter
     Voinovich
     Warner
     Wyden

                                NAYS--1

       
     Feingold
       

                             NOT VOTING--1

       
     Rockefeller
       
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. On this vote, the yeas are 98, the nays are 1. 
Three-fifths of the Senators duly chosen and sworn having voted in the 
affirmative, the motion is agreed to.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote, and I move 
to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, first, on behalf of Senator Levin and 
myself, I thank all the Members for the strong cooperation to 
procedurally move this series of amendments and to proceed with the 
bill. Speaking just for myself--my ranking member is absent for a 
moment--I believe very strongly that this bill can be completed today 
before sunset. Of course, this is one of the longest days of the year, 
so that might be a little longer than some might wish, but I do think 
it is achievable. I say that most respectfully.
  What we recommend to be done now--and I will ask unanimous consent--
is the Senate now turn to an

[[Page S6336]]

amendment by the distinguished Senator from Texas, and I am told by the 
Senator that she will seek a voice vote. That has been cleared on both 
sides. The next amendment will be offered by our distinguished 
colleague from Georgia, a member of the committee, Mr. Chambliss. That 
will take perhaps an hour or more and will require a record vote. 
Thereafter, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate then recognize the 
Senator from Minnesota, Mr. Dayton, to address the Senate with regard 
to amendments and the bill as a whole.
  I would also say to colleagues, subject to confirmation by the 
leadership, that I am recommending there be no votes from now until 
3:30. There are two very serious functions taking place, both of a 
religious nature, in our city, and Members are attending either the 
last rites of Philip Merrill, a personal friend of mine, a wonderful 
man who recently lost his life on the Chesapeake Bay, and then I 
understand a distinguished archbishop of the Catholic Church is being 
installed with a ceremony today.
  Therefore, the bill will continue its momentum in this period of 
time, and following those votes, I am certain the leadership will give 
the managers such guidance as to when we can conclude this bill, which 
again I hope will be today.
  So at this time, I yield the floor.
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, if the chairman will yield just for a 
second, we don't need an hour on this amendment, I say to my friend 
from Virginia. I think 40 minutes equally divided would be sufficient 
for my purposes. I don't know about the author of the amendment; he 
might want more time.
  Mr. CHAMBLISS. Mr. President, the only thing I would say is I have 
several folks who want to speak on it. If we could get an hour equally 
divided, my guess is we won't use it.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that there be an 
hour equally divided between the distinguished Senators from Georgia 
and Arizona on the Chambliss amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. WARNER. We have covered as much ground as we can procedurally at 
this point, and I yield the floor.


                           Amendment No. 4377

  Mrs. HUTCHISON. I call up amendment No. 4377 and ask for its 
immediate consideration.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the pending amendment is 
set aside.
  The clerk will report.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Texas [Mrs. Hutchison] proposes an 
     amendment numbered 4377.

  Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the 
reading of the amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

 (Purpose: To include a delineation of the homeland defense and civil 
support missions of the National Guard and Reserves in the Quadrennial 
                            Defense Review)

       At the end of subtitle C of title IX, add the following:

     SEC. 924. INCLUSION OF HOMELAND DEFENSE AND CIVIL SUPPORT 
                   MISSIONS OF THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES IN 
                   THE QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW.

       Section 118(d) of title 10, United States Code, is 
     amended--
       (1) by redesignating paragraph (15) as paragraph (16); and
       (2) by inserting after paragraph (14) the following new 
     paragraph (15):
       ``(15) The homeland defense mission and civil support 
     missions of the active and reserve components of the armed 
     forces, including the organization and capabilities required 
     for the active and reserve components to discharge each such 
     mission.''.

  Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, this amendment would require the 
Department of Defense to clarify in the Quadrennial Defense Review the 
homeland defense and civil support missions of the National Guard and 
Reserves.
  The QDR is a comprehensive examination of national defense strategy, 
force structure, force mobilization, and modernization plans, 
infrastructure, budget plans--all elements of the defense program. It 
is the planning that goes on every 4 years. The QDR is in process now 
for the next 4 years. The goal of the QDR is to determine the defense 
strategy of the United States and its established defense programs for 
the next 20 years, and it is updated every 4 years.
  For decades, homeland defense has been a mission of the Department of 
Defense. However, only after the 9/11 attacks in 2001 did this very 
important mission really come to the forefront in defense planning. 
Unfortunately, the present QDR lacks sufficient guidance for the Guard 
and Reserve components in this very important mission they have.
  The amendment I am proposing would require the Department of Defense 
to include in the QDR a definition of the homeland defense and civil 
support missions of the National Guard and Reserves. The Department has 
not really formalized the requirements for the role of the National 
Guard and Reserve in homeland security. We know the President has 
ordered the deployment of Guard and Reserve to our borders to try to 
secure our borders, so we need a really comprehensive look and guidance 
for the Reserve component, particularly the Guard, concerning their 
roles and how they will be able to train and equip for homeland 
security missions.
  Today, the National Guard and Reserve must debate the merits of their 
initiatives and their equipment procurement. That is not the way it 
should be. Our Guard and Reserve do a fabulous job. They are on active 
duty in Iraq and Afghanistan today. They have gone through several 
cycles of deployment to Iraq and Afghanistan. There is a Texas Guard 
unit in Bosnia in command and control today, continuing the 
peacekeeping mission there. They are doing their jobs, they are being 
called up at a level that is very high, but ambiguities remain in their 
homeland security mission.
  Competition for resources continues, and there is a lack of clarity 
about what role the Department actually expects them to have. This 
omission was painfully obvious after 9/11. After Hurricanes Rita and 
Katrina and now with the deployment to the border, which I totally 
support, their mission is once again expanding. This amendment will 
provide the DOD with the information it needs to determine the role the 
National Guard and Reserves should have, must have, and will continue 
to have, but with more clarification, in the defense of our country.
  This is a very important amendment. I believe it will add to their 
responsibilities, and they will be able to get the equipment and the 
training they need to do the jobs we are asking them to do in homeland 
defense and for the other civil emergencies we have.
  Mr. President, I ask for the support of my colleagues for this 
amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there further debate on the amendment?
  Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, I urge the adoption of the amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. There being no further debate, the question is 
on agreeing to the amendment.
  The amendment (No. 4377) was agreed to.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
  Mrs. HUTCHISON. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, we will turn to the distinguished Senator 
from Georgia for his amendment, with 1 hour equally divided.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Georgia.


                           Amendment No. 4261

  Mr. CHAMBLISS. I rise today to call up amendment No. 4261 and ask for 
its immediate consideration.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the pending amendment is 
set aside and the clerk will report.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Georgia [Mr. Chambliss], for himself, Mr. 
     Hatch, Mr. Isakson, Mr. Inhofe, Mr. Lieberman, Mr. Cornyn, 
     Mr. Thune, Mr. Bennett and Mr. Stevens, proposes an amendment 
     numbered 4261.

  Mr. CHAMBLISS. I ask unanimous consent that the reading of the 
amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

(Purpose: To authorize multiyear procurement of F-22A fighter aircraft 
                           and F-119 engines)

       On page 29, strike lines 6 through 15 and insert the 
     following:

     SEC. 146. FUNDING FOR PROCUREMENT OF F-22A FIGHTER AIRCRAFT.

       (a) Prohibition on Use of Incremental Funding.--The 
     Secretary of the Air Force shall not use incremental funding 
     for the procurement of F-22A fighter aircraft.

[[Page S6337]]

       (b) Multiyear Procurement.--The Secretary of the Air Force 
     may, in accordance with section 2306b of title 10, United 
     States Code, enter into a multiyear contract beginning with 
     the fiscal year 2007 program year for procurement of not more 
     than 60 F-22A fighter aircraft.

     SEC. 147. MULTIYEAR PROCUREMENT OF F-119 ENGINES FOR F-22A 
                   FIGHTER AIRCRAFT.

       The Secretary of the Air Force may, in accordance with 
     section 2306b of title 10, United States Code, enter into a 
     multiyear contract beginning with the fiscal year 2007 
     program year for procurement of the following:
       (1) Not more than 120 F-119 engines for F-22A fighter 
     aircraft.
       (2) Not more than 13 spare F-119 engines for F-22A fighter 
     aircraft.

  Mr. CHAMBLISS. Let me say, it is very difficult, any time you have to 
oppose your subcommittee chairman--and in this case the full committee 
chairman--on an issue, particularly two Senators whom I hold in such 
high esteem. But we do have a disagreement in a very professional way 
on this issue. At the end of the day, all of us intend to do what is in 
the best interests of the men and women who fight for America.
  The F-22A Raptor is the U.S. Air Force's top priority for providing a 
joint force with air dominance, operational access, homeland and cruise 
missile defense for the next 20-plus years. The F-22A is a first-of-a-
kind multimission fighter aircraft that combines Stealth, supercruise, 
advanced maneuverability, and integrated avionics to make it the 
world's most capable combat aircraft.
  This amendment authorizes a 3-year multiyear procurement contract for 
the F-22. This is not about spending money, it is about saving money, 
and it is about good acquisition practices and policy.
  This amendment will save approximately $235 million as a minimum 
amount, allowing DOD to use this money for other priorities or allow 
us, the Congress, to return these dollars to the taxpayers.
  An independent study, commissioned by the Office of the Secretary of 
Defense, is the only independent study yet to be done for the F-22 
multiyear contract. In that study, the Institute for Defense Analysis, 
or IDA, concluded that the proposed F-22A multiyear contract, first of 
all, meets all the criteria provided in the law and does, in fact, save 
the taxpayer a minimum of $235 million over the next 3 years.
  The study was not completed in time for the Senate Armed Services 
Committee markup back in early May, which is why it was not included in 
the Senate bill at that time, or at least we didn't have an amendment 
at that time. However, the study was submitted to the Armed Services 
Committee on the 16th of May.
  Since I have been on this committee, we have been talking about the 
need to conduct acquisitions better, cheaper, and more efficiently. 
This amendment does exactly that. We know we are going to buy 60 F-22s 
over the next 3 years. That is the current plan. The DOD budget 
provides for the funding, and I have heard no one in Congress question 
the need for the airplane. As a matter of fact, this airplane today is 
flying in rotation around the country and soon will be flying around 
the world as it is scheduled to go into rotation to Iraq shortly. As we 
are sitting here today, I suspect there is an F-22 flying over 
Washington, DC, protecting the skies over our Nation's Capital.
  The only question is how are we going to buy these airplanes? Are we 
going to buy them with 3 1-year contracts and pay more money, or are we 
going to buy them with a 3-year multiyear contract and save a quarter 
of a billion dollars?
  We need to have a high standard for what qualifies for a multiyear 
contract. As a matter of comparison, the F-414 engine for the F-18 
saved 2.8 percent and $51 million. The multiyear contract for two 
previous F-16 multiyears saved $246 million and $262 million 
respectively.
  By comparison, the proposed F-22A multiyear contract saves 2.6 
percent and a minimum of $235 million.
  The point is that the F-22 multiyear is in the same category in terms 
of percent savings and total savings of multiyear contracts that this 
body has previously approved.
  Also, the per-plane savings on the F-22 multiyear will be identical 
to the per-plane savings on the F/A-18 multiyear, that being $3.8 
million per plane. That is why the authors of the independent business 
case analysis at IDA judge this multiyear to have significant savings, 
and I agree with them.
  Much has been made over the old criteria for multiyear savings, which 
was a minimum of 10 percent. But, frankly, that was changed early on in 
law and now, instead of 10 percent the statute does say, ``substantial 
savings.''
  The 2005 QDR, which was provided to Congress in concert with the 
fiscal year 2007 budget request, restructures the F-22A program to 
extend production through the fiscal year 2010 with a multiyear 
acquisition contract to ensure the Department does not have a gap in 
fifth-generation Stealth capabilities. To obtain a more favorable cost, 
DOD's strategy requested authority for a 3-year multiyear procurement 
contract to buy 60 F-22s, 20 in each of the years 2007 through 2009. 
This strategy was outlined in a letter from Undersecretary of Defense 
Ken Krieg in a letter to the Senate Armed Services Committee on 
February 13, 2006.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to print that letter in the 
Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

         The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 
           Technology and Logistics,
                                Washington, DC, February 13, 2006.
     Hon. John W. Warner,
     Chairman, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, 
         Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. Chairman: Consistent with the Conference Report on 
     the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2006, Public 
     Law, 109-148, the Department has studied alternatives for the 
     continued acquisition of the F-22A aircraft beyond Fiscal 
     Year (FY) 2008. This has culminated in the procurement 
     strategy identified in the President's Budget for FY 2007 
     (PB07).
       The Quadrennial Defense Review Joint Air Dominance study 
     and budget deliberations addressed alternative procurement 
     quantities, rates, and force structure mixes. The 
     Department's PB07 plan provides for procurement of F-22A 
     aircraft through FY 2010. To obtain a favorable cost, the 
     strategy employs multiyear procurement of 20 aircraft each, 
     in Lots 7, 8, and 9, beginning in FY 2008, providing a total 
     force structure of 183 aircraft. FY 2007 funds will be used 
     to contract for delivery of economic-order-quantity items, 
     sub-assemblies and material required for Lot 7, advance 
     procurement for Lot 8 aircraft, and for other allowable costs 
     including, sustainment support, production engineering, 
     laboratories and combined test force infrastructure. This 
     strategy also procures titanium one-year earlier than normal 
     advanced procurement to accommodate the long-lead now 
     required to buy titanium. This plan substantially reduces the 
     F-22A procurement funds required by the Department in FY 
     2007, allowing the Department to meet other high-priority 
     requirements.
       Continuing the F-22A procurement through FY 2010 retains 
     fifth-generation tactical aircraft procurement options in the 
     event of delays in the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program. 
     These actions also benefit the JSF program by helping to 
     reduce overhead rates and by retaining technical expertise 
     across the tactical aircraft industrial base, including the 
     prime contractor, subcontractors, and suppliers.
       The Department is preparing the business case cost 
     comparison of multiyear and successive annual procurements 
     required by subsection 2306b(a)(1) of title 10, United States 
     Code. We intend to make the business case available to the 
     congressional defense committees by May 15, 2006, to support 
     FY 2007 Congressional budget deliberations.
       I appreciate the foresight of the Congress in directing the 
     Department to study alternatives for the continued 
     acquisition of the F-22A. I believe that we have developed a 
     fiscally responsible strategy that will allow us to sustain 
     this viable tactical aircraft production line.
       Similar letters have been sent to the chairmen and ranking 
     members of the other Congressional defense committees.
           Sincerely,
                                                 Kenneth J. Krieg.

  Mr. CHAMBLISS. The business case for the F-22 is clear and was 
validated during the QDR by the Joint Army Dominance Study. This study 
included any number of options of tactical air mixes, including various 
combinations of F-22s, FA-18s, and joint strike fighter and other 
airborne weapons systems, so we are not proceeding with a random plan 
but one that has been validated by careful analysis.
  The business plan was also validated by the IDA study, again the only 
independent organization that has looked at this multiyear plan.

[[Page S6338]]

  There are six criteria for meeting a multiyear contract. The 
independent IDA business case analysis judges the F-22 program 
according to each of these six criteria. I mention this because there 
is a GAO study that came out, coincidentally, this week relative to the 
multiyear procurement of the F-22. It is critical of the multiyear 
contract.
  The GAO study, though, contains, frankly, false factual information. 
For example, in the GAO study they talk about the cost of the airplane 
actually increasing under the multiyear contract. But what they fail to 
take into consideration is that originally, before the reprogramming to 
do 20 airplanes this year and 20 in the next budget and 20 in the next 
budget, the Air Force was going to ask for 29 planes in the next budget 
and 27 in the following budget.
  If you build 29 versus 20, it is going to be cheaper. But that is the 
factual information that the GAO plugged into their numbers--29 instead 
of 20. That is why there is a higher price cost that the GAO came up 
with.
  Second, the GAO report talks about the fact that under the Air Force 
proposal, there is not enough funding in the budget to pay for these 
airplanes. We are going to have to use what is called incremental 
funding.
  That was talked about early on in the process but abandoned. Here we 
are in the end of June of this year. The reprogramming took place the 
end of last year and the early part of this year. The facts were known 
at that time. GAO ignored those facts.
  Second, the incremental funding issue that was talked about early on 
was abandoned early in the year. GAO ignored that and included those 
false facts in its report. So the GAO study, frankly, is not correct 
because it is not based on the actual, as we say in the law--the facts 
in evidence.
  There is one other issue relative to the GAO that I am going to 
conclude with and that is this. It gives a list of the factors that it 
took into consideration in doing its report. There is one glaring 
factual statement, one factual provision that is left out of 
consideration by the GAO. That is talking to pilots that fly this 
airplane.
  I have talked to several of those guys. We had a red flag operation 
that was done several weeks ago by the Air Force. In talking to a 
couple of those pilots afterward, it was unbelievable what they had to 
say about flying the F-22.
  One of them said this:

       In the United States Air Force, we don't look to win 51-49. 
     We look to win 100-nothing, and that is what the Raptor gives 
     us.

  The Raptor is the follow-on for the F-15 and F-16. It is the fifth-
generation fighter. It is going to allow us to continue air superiority 
and air dominance against any potential threat that might be 
forthcoming. I urge my colleagues to support the multiyear proposal 
that is included in the President's budget, that is included in the 
authorization bill that comes to the Senate from the House, that will 
go into conference. We will save the taxpayer a minimum of $225 million 
over the next 3 years. I reserve the remainder of my time.
  Mr. DOMENICI. Will the Senator yield 5 minutes to the Senator from 
New Mexico?
  Mr. CHAMBLISS. I will be happy to yield 5 minutes to the Senator from 
New Mexico.
  Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, I say to Senator McCain, I understand he 
wants to speak in opposition to the amendment. I will not be long.
  Mr. McCAIN. No problem.
  Mr. DOMENICI. Understand, we will each speak our piece here. It is 
not a pleasure to come and oppose my colleague. Nonetheless, I must say 
that it seems to me we are always talking in the Senate about trying to 
do things that are more efficient; trying to do good business, do 
things in a way they ought to be done. Here we have an opportunity to 
do that.
  We have a situation where the new fighter, the world-class F-22--but 
I am not going to take the Senate's time praising its qualities. We 
have heard some of that from the distinguished Senator from Georgia. We 
could spend all afternoon talking about what a fantastic airplane it 
is. That is not the issue before us.
  The issue before us is that the Defense Department needs a multiyear 
procurement authority to acquire these airplanes. The administration 
requested a multiyear procurement authority for the F-22s. The House 
Defense Authorization bill granted the request. It makes plain, good 
business sense that the Senate do the same--that we give the Department 
what it needs.
  I also support this because, as indicated by the principal sponsor of 
the amendment, the distinguished senior Senator from Georgia, this 
authority will save money.
  We are going to hear something to the contrary, but the contrary 
evidence is from reports that do not apply to the 20-per-year 
acquisition of the F-22. That is what we are trying to do. That is what 
the Defense Department's final studies were based upon--acquisition of 
20 per year, for multiple years. A multiyear procurement of this nature 
would net a savings of between $225 million and $325 million.
  It seems to this Senator that this is precisely what we ought to be 
doing. We ought to be doing more of this, not less. Is anybody doubting 
we are going to buy this many of these Raptors? I don't hear that talk. 
I thought I was going to hear it 6 or 8 months ago when we were talking 
about a number of systems, some of which are on hold, but this one is 
not.
  Therefore, we ought to proceed and save millions of dollars that can 
be used for other needs. $300 million, for example, would pay for 4,200 
National Guard troops in active duty for 1 year. That is a lot of 
money. This is a monster bill, and one might say what is the difference 
here? $225 million to $325 million in savings doesn't amount to much. I 
submit it is a pretty big amount.
  There has been some talk this week about a new GAO report that is 
critical of this multiyear procurement. But this report rehashes old 
arguments and uses old data that is not relevant to the Department's 
data regarding the multiyear acquisition, which has been stated in 
detail by the senior Senator from Georgia.
  Therefore, I submit that the airplane we are going to rely on--which 
without question the Quadrennial Defense Review says we must have--we 
ought to go ahead and procure on a multiyear basis today when we vote 
on this amendment.
  I thank the Senator for yielding time. I believe he has a compelling 
argument, and I hope the Senate will follow his lead.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. CHAMBLISS. Mr. President, I yield 2 minutes to the Senator from 
Utah.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Utah is recognized.
  Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, I thank my colleague from Georgia and my 
colleague from Arizona.
  What is the bottom line here? Simply put, Senator Chambliss has 
offered an amendment that is supported by the ministration that will 
enable the Air Force to buy 20 F-22s Raptors a year for the next 3 
years. By entering into this multiple year contract, the independent 
Institute for Defense Analysis believes that the American taxpayer will 
save at least $225 million.
  Why are we buying the F-22? Because it is a war-winner. This fighter, 
which is also a very capable bomber, is now operational with the 1st 
Fighter Wing. The Raptor is stealthier than the famous F-117 Nighthawk, 
which dropped the first bombs during the first gulf war. But unlike the 
Nighthawk, that must fly at night in order to survive in a combat 
environment, the F-22 brings stealth capability out of the night, 
enabling operations in high threat areas 24 hours a day 7 days a week.
  I have been to the Air Force base where I have talked with the pilots 
and have seen this plane and have seen it fly. It is a marvel.
  The Raptor is the world's most lethal and maneuverable fighter 
aircraft. This is accomplished in no small part by its supercruise 
engines. Supercruise engines do not need to go to after-burner in order 
to achieve supersonic flight. This provides the F-22 with a strategic 
advantage by enabling supersonic speeds to be maintained for a far 
greater length of time. By comparison, all other fighters require their 
engines to go to after-burner to achieve supersonic speeds. This 
consumes a tremendous amount of fuel and greatly limits an aircraft's 
range.

[[Page S6339]]

  Another legitimate question is why not just rely on the aircraft we 
have today? Over the past 30 years, the United States has been able to 
maintain air superiority in every conflict largely due to the F-15C. 
However, with the great advancements in technology over the past 
several years, the F-15 has struggled to keep pace. For example, the F-
15 is not a stealth aircraft and its computer systems are based on 
obsolete technology. My colleagues should remember that the F-15 first 
flew in the early 1970s. During the ensuing years, nations have been 
consistently developing new aircraft and missile systems to defeat this 
fighter.
  Obviously, we need the F-22 and we have identified a means to save 
money while we are buying it.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona.
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I don't oppose the F-22 program. In fact, 
the Armed Services subcommittee provided and the Senate Armed Services 
Committee marked down an additional $1.4 billion for 20 F-22s.
  The issue is not, frankly, whether we support the F-22. Rightly or 
wrongly, we all do--and every member of the committee does. The 
question is, Are we going to act responsibly? The question is, Are we 
going to authorize a multiyear procurement of an aircraft that has--and 
it is not unusual--experienced time after time dramatic delays and cost 
overruns? Are we ready to do that? Not according to the GAO, not 
according to the OMB, not according to the Congressional Research 
Service, and not according to every outside observer of this program.
  Let me give a small example. The F-22 experienced an initial 
operational capability delay of 9 years 9 months; initial operational 
test and evaluation delayed 5 years 3 months; full rate production 
delay of 5 years 3 months; low rate initial production, 4 years 9 
months; first delivery of operational aircraft delayed 4 years 7 
months; first flight delayed 2 years; and completion of critical design 
review delayed 1 year 4 months. The record is not good. In fact, the 
record is terrible. In 1991, the estimated cost, according to the U.S. 
Air Force, for the aircraft was going to be $114 million--in then-year 
dollars; now, $354 million per copy.
  This program--not atypically--has experienced significant delays and 
cost overruns, which, by the way, maybe we will get into at some point. 
Then they received incentive bonuses, even for violations of Nunn-
McCurdy. We are not talking about the purchase of F-22s. What we are 
talking about is, are we going to violate the basic principles and the 
law which requires certain criteria to be met before multiyear 
acquisition of these aircraft? The report prepared by the Comptroller 
General of the United States clearly states that four of the six 
criteria set forth in the law have not been met by the Air Force. They 
have not been met. Yet here we are debating a measure that would 
effectively permit the Air Force to be held unaccountable, to end run a 
good Government provision in Federal law that is specifically designed 
to ensure accountability in our Government.
  There have been two Nunn-McCurdy violations, according to the 
Comptroller General. Since its inception, this program has been subject 
to 2 Nunn-McCurdy violations and has been rebaselined 14 times just to 
avoid additional breaches. Fourteen times they have rebaselined the 
cost of this weapons system. We all know the game. They come and they 
say: This weapons system is going to cost X. They get it authorized, 
then we get it, and guess what happens. It ends up costing dramatically 
more money--in the case of this aircraft, from $114 million each to 
$354 million each, and it is still in a relatively embryonic stage.
  The Air Force, I am sorry to say, has misrepresented several things, 
including the termination cost of the C-130J.
  The Air Force--a September 28, 2005, Defense Contract Audit Agency 
report points out that Lockheed-Martin earned a profit of almost 27 
percent--$643 million--on a $2.4 billion, 60-aircraft, multiprocurement 
for C-130 aircraft. The estimate on the actual multiyear procurement 
cost savings for the F-22--the Air Force acquisition officers 
misrepresented the F-22 program as a stably funded program. Last year, 
Congress authorized and appropriated enough money for 24 F-22 aircraft. 
The Air Force bought 22. We have been asking them: What happened to the 
other two airplanes? We still haven't gotten a response. How we buy the 
F-22 is not subject to unfettered discretion. If we choose to buy them 
under a multiyear contract, we must do so in compliance with the law. 
This amendment does not.
  The Congressional Research Service points out the many ongoing 
technical problems with the F-22--avionics problems, airframe problems, 
engine problems. The F-119 engine fuel consumption has been 
unsatisfactory, and problems were experienced with the engine's core 
combustor, which did not demonstrate desired temperature levels. The F-
22's cockpit canopy experienced ongoing challenges, including cracking 
and reliability. It goes on and on. Many of these things are associated 
with the development of a new weapons system.
  By the way, I have never met a pilot who didn't like to fly a new 
weapons system, but the fact is that it is not ready for multiyear 
procurement. That was the subject of extensive hearings in the 
subcommittee and consideration in the full committee. I don't expect 
this body to rubberstamp everything the committee does, but I can tell 
you that extensive analysis and study was done on it.
  I also point out that literally every outside group, including the 
IDA, had concerns about it, even though they alleged that there would 
be significant cost savings. But the fact is that even the IDA, which 
my friend from Georgia points out--this form of contracting bears 
significant risks. Multiyear procurement reduces Congressional 
budgetary flexibility, both for the instant program and across other 
programs within the Defense portfolio.

  I urge my colleagues who consider supporting this amendment--and we 
know very well that there will be reductions in defense spending. It 
happens historically as wars wind down. Already on the House side, 
there has been a proposal for significant reductions in defense 
spending, which I do not support but apparently may be the final 
product for next year from the House Appropriations Committee.
  We are going to lock in multiyear procurement for a weapons system 
that has experienced dramatic cost overruns. And I am not saying we 
shouldn't procure this aircraft. I am saying we should. I am not 
totally convinced that it would actually meet the challenges of the war 
on terrorism, but I strongly support it. But before we give them a 
blank check, I think we should regard what we are doing here--locking 
in, in a multiyear fashion, the procurement of a weapons system that 
has gone from $100-and-some million per copy to over $300 million per 
copy which still has very significant technical problems associated 
with it. I would caution and urge my colleagues to understand this in 
the larger context.
  Finally, we have a responsibility of oversight in the committee and 
as a body. If we allow multiyear procurement, we basically give up 
those oversight responsibilities. And when we talk about a couple 
hundred million dollars, which is big money, and cost savings, look at 
the overruns, the billions in cost overruns they have already 
experienced, and we still haven't got a fully tested, completed, and 
operational product.
  I understand the desire of my friend from Georgia to make sure this 
program is basically locked in, which is what this amendment will do. I 
don't think we are ready for it. Every outfit outside of the U.S. Air 
Force--and even the IDA, with a qualified endorsement--the 
Congressional Research Service, OMB, GAO, and all the others concur in 
that conclusion.
  I hope we will reject this amendment, but I certainly understand and 
respect the position of my friend from Georgia.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I find myself, as chairman, having to live 
up to my responsibilities. Not only do I have the highest regard for 
our colleague from Georgia, I have a high regard for this airplane. 
These airplanes are stationed in Virginia. I am supporting the position 
taken by Senator McCain against the constituent interests in my own 
State because I feel ever so importantly the statements made by Senator 
McCain--namely, that the oversight which our committee tries to provide 
should be respected in this Chamber. It is our collective judgment. The 
majority of the

[[Page S6340]]

Senators, having voted on this in various ways in our committee, 
believe that we should not go to this multiyear procurement at this 
time for reasons eloquently stated by the Senator from Arizona.
  I regret deeply to be in opposition to one of our most valued 
Members, the Senator from Georgia, but let me point this out: You have 
to sometimes stand apart from constituent interests, State interests, 
and do what you believe is in the best interests of this country.
  I say this with a sense of humility. I walked into the Pentagon in 
February of 1969 as then-Under Secretary of the Navy. The halls of the 
building were filled with the wreckage of a plane called TFX in which 
this country had invested billions of dollars to build and it was 
finally concluded that, for a number of reasons, the contract shouldn't 
go forward. Thereafter, in the positions as Under Secretary and 
Secretary of the Navy, I worked with the S-3, a new AFW airplane, 
bringing that along. I worked with the F-14. As a matter of fact, this 
distinguished aide of the Armed Services Committee was an F-14 pilot 
and has reminisced with me many times--thank you for putting two 
engines on that plane--because many a time he landed on a carrier with 
one engine.
  The planes are complicated situations, and they are becoming more and 
more complicated each year, and it is the collective judgment of the 
members of the Senate Armed Services Committee that we should not 
abdicate our oversight and jump into this multiyear procurement.
  I support the airplane. I am hopefully getting additional aircraft at 
my base in Virginia. I am proud of that. But I am going to support what 
I think is a proper management decision. To support the Chambliss 
amendment would be, frankly, a violation of statute on the books, the 
law of the land. Subsection A(1) through subsection 6 of section 
2306(b) of title 10, United States Code, establishes the conditions for 
entering into a multiyear procurement contract. The statute requires 
the use of such a contract resulting in a substantial savings. This 
multiyear procurement proposal under this amendment would not provide 
substantial savings--some savings but not substantial. The statute also 
requires that the estimates of both the cost of the contract and the 
anticipated cost avoidance through the use of a multiyear contract are 
realistic.

  Just listen to what Senator McCain said. The estimates are not 
realistic. The Air Force had budgeted for 24 
F-22A aircraft in fiscal year 2006 but will only be able to buy 22 or 
23 aircraft with the available funds.
  Mr. President, the statute also requires that there is a reasonable 
expectation that throughout the contemplated contract period the head 
of the agency will request funding for the contract at the level 
required to avoid contract cancellation. There is no reasonable 
expectation that the level of funding required to avoid contract 
cancellation will be met. The multiyear justification package sent to 
Congress on May 16, 2006 presented a program that was underfunded by 
$674 million.
  By statute, I say to colleagues, this amendment cannot be supported. 
By statute, by the majority of the members of the Committee of the 
Armed Services having examined it carefully, through subcommittee and 
full committee review, it cannot be supported. I say most respectfully 
to the Senator from Georgia, we are facing here a rather interesting 
chapter of a very significant and important defense contractor trying 
to get through this body a decision which is in violation of statute 
and overrides the judgment of the majority of the members of the Armed 
Services Committee. I urge Senators not to support this amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Vitter). The Senator from Georgia is 
recognized.
  Mr. CHAMBLISS. Mr. President, I yield 3 minutes to my colleague from 
Georgia, Senator Isakson.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Georgia is recognized.
  Mr. ISAKSON. Mr. President, I thank my distinguished colleague, the 
senior Senator from Georgia, Saxby Chambliss, for offering this 
amendment. I have the greatest regard for the committee and 
subcommittee chairmen. Senators Warner and McCain are outstanding 
Members of this body. I beg to differ with them, and I want to focus my 
debate on two critical areas.
  One is Senator Chambliss presents as a selling point of this 
amendment that $235 million in savings that a multiyear contract brings 
would not happen if you were doing annual contracts. The distinguished 
Senator from Arizona acknowledged, did not argue that that number was 
not correct. The distinguished Senator from Virginia also did not argue 
that number wasn't correct but made the following statement, that that 
is not a substantial savings. That is at best a subjective judgment, 
but I would call $235 million substantial any time.
  Secondly, I would like to quote from a letter--and I ask unanimous 
consent to have this letter printed in the Record--dated June 8 from 
James Finley, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense, to the GAO.

       Over the past several procurement lots, the Air Force has 
     been very successfully working with the prime contractor to 
     drive down cost. Unit flyaway costs have come down 35 percent 
     between Lot 1 and Lot 5. If stopped, production re-start 
     would be very costly and difficult to resume, breaking this 
     positive trend.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                            Deputy Under Secretary of Defense,

                                     Washington, DC, June 8, 2006.
     Mr. David M. Walker,
     Comptroller General of the United States, U.S. Government 
         Accountability Office, Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. Walker: This is the Department of Defense (DoD) 
     response to the GAO draft report, ``Tactical Aircraft: DOD 
     Should Present a New F-22 Business Case Before Making Further 
     Investments,'' dated May 8, 2006 (GAO Code 120474/GAO-06-
     455R).
       The Department does not agree with draft GAO report's 
     recommendation to delay further investment in the F-22. While 
     the Department agrees with the GAO's emphasis on the 
     importance of supporting our procurement decisions with 
     appropriate ``Business Case'' analysis, we have performed 
     such analysis to support F-22 and tactical aircraft force 
     structure decisions, and will continue to do so. Additional 
     information and rationale for the Department's position is 
     summarized below.
       Implementing the GAO's recommendation to delay investment 
     in the F-22 would disrupt production and create program 
     instability. This instability would be detrimental to our 
     nation's defense capabilities and our tactical aircraft 
     industrial base. Over the past several procurement lots, the 
     Air Force has been very successfully working with the prime 
     contractor to drive down costs. Unit flyaway costs have come 
     down 35% between Lot 1 and Lot 5. If stopped, production re-
     start would be very costly and difficult to resume, breaking 
     this positive trend. Likewise, there is considerable 
     modernization work ongoing. To stop this work would result in 
     large termination costs and would be very costly to resume. 
     Multiple GAO reports have noted the negative impact that 
     program instability has on program cost, schedule, and 
     performance.
       The assumptions on which the GAO's recommendations are 
     based were not understood. The quantity and mix of tactical 
     aircraft to be procured by the Department has been and 
     remains an area of significant ``Business Case'' analysis. As 
     the geopolitical and fiscal environment changes, we 
     continually reassess national security requirements and 
     adjust our force structure as needed. Keeping the F-22 
     production line active, preserves the Department's options 
     and sustains the industrial base for efficient transition to 
     Joint Strike fighter production.
       To support the Quadrennial Defense Review and preparation 
     of the President's Fiscal Year 2007 Budget (PB07), the 
     Department performed a Joint Air Dominance (JAD) Study. The 
     JAD Study examined options for varying levels within the 
     strike fighter mix. The Department looked at the war 
     scenarios and cost implications of buying fewer variants of 
     Joint Strike Fighters, increasing and decreasing the number 
     of F-22s, and buying more legacy aircraft at the expense of 
     fewer fifth generation platforms. The results of these 
     analyses are reflected in PB07, which sets forth a balanced 
     portfolio of tactical aircraft assets, including Joint Strike 
     Fighter, F-22 and F/A-18E/F. The draft GAO report makes note 
     of, ``the large disparity between what the Air Force wants 
     for the F-22A program and what OSD has committed to fund, 
     there is a significant break in the business case to justify 
     buying more F-22As.'' The 381 aircraft the Air Force analysis 
     indicates are required is a fiscally unconstrained projection 
     of Service needs. The QDR analysis reflects fiscal realities 
     and the need to address competing defense priorities. The JAD 
     analysis showed that a balanced force structure mix of fifth 
     generation fighters, with legacy F/A-18E/Fs, F-15Es and 
     conventionally armed bombers, best met our requirements. 
     Buying fifth generation tactical

[[Page S6341]]

     aircraft assets (F-22 and JSF), for both the Air Force and 
     the Department of the Navy, optimized capability, 
     affordability, and mitigated risk better than other options.
       A detailed response is attached.
       Thank you for the opportunity to respond to this draft 
     report.
                                                  James I. Finley.

  Mr. ISAKSON. Mr. President, I was in business--didn't build airplanes 
but built houses--and I know a little bit about R&D development costs, 
but I know what the Raptor does.
  Many of the things that were referred to as difficulties were 
predictable experiences in the development of a weapons system. The 
Raptor is the finest airplane ever built by any government anywhere any 
time, and the pilots who fly it attest this meets and exceeds every 
specification.
  For me as a Senator, the other specification I want to meet is saving 
the taxpayers of the United States of America money; $235 million is a 
substantial savings. The Senator from Georgia, Mr. Chambliss, is right. 
This amendment establishes a 3-year multiyear contract for the F-22 is 
right, and I urge my colleagues to support it in the Chamber.
  I yield back the time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Georgia is recognized.
  Mr. CHAMBLISS. I yield 3 minutes to the Senator from South Dakota, 
Mr. Thune.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from South Dakota is recognized.
  Mr. THUNE. Mr. President, the Chambliss amendment will remove the 
prohibition on multiyear contract authority for the purchase of the F-
22A aircraft and in so doing give the DOD the flexibility it needs to 
purchase 60 F-22A aircraft over a 3-year period in installments of 20.
  The multiyear contract will save the Government, as has been noted by 
Senator Isakson, over $200 million over the 3-year period and allow for 
a rational and steady flow of F-22s.
  Mr. President, I also want to note one thing about the GAO study that 
has been referenced here today and the funding for the F-22A. The 
statement is made in the GAO study that the funding for the F-22 could 
be better spent on fighting the war on terror. The problem with that is 
it assumes that America faces threats from only irregular forces or 
subnational groups.
  North Korea's threat to launch a multistage missile that can hit 
Hawaii, Iranian nuclear ambitions, and the expansion and modernization 
of the Chinese military are patent examples of substantial threats from 
independent nation states.
  The air superiority gap America once enjoyed has dramatically closed. 
The F-15, F-16, or F-18 are no longer without competition on the world 
stage. Since the late 1970s, for example, the Russian Air Force has 
been continually improving its air fleet. Planes like the MiG-29, Su-
27, Su-35, and the addition of the Su-37 super-flanker have evened the 
playing field. The Chinese are now making their own version of the Su-
27 under the designation J-11. Both Russia and China are eyeing foreign 
buyers for these formidable aircraft.
  Further technology and modern air defenses have grown significantly, 
and Legacy aircraft are vulnerable to increased anti-aircraft threats 
and technology.
  Congressional inaction on this matter is creating a situation where 
American pilots will be flying aging Legacy aircraft against comparable 
enemy aircraft.
  DOD states that the F-22As as fifth-generation fighters is needed to 
neutralize advanced air defenses, thus opening the door for follow-on 
joint forces to include nonstealthy Legacy aircraft and long-range 
strike capabilities.
  We need the F-22. The QDR supports this notion. The QDR focuses on 
the ability to quickly and effectively penetrate enemy airspace and 
exploit stealth and electronic warfare capabilities. The F-22A excels 
at all these missions and helps America take a step ahead against 
emerging technologies and threats we face.
  Mr. President, I urge my colleagues to support the Chambliss 
amendment and allow the Air Force to move forward in a way that will 
enable us to save the taxpayers money and to meet the needs that we 
face for this country as we go forward.
  I yield back the remainder of my time.
  Mr. CHAMBLISS. Mr. President, how much time is remaining?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has 9 minutes remaining.
  Mr. CHAMBLISS. I yield such time as he may consume to the Senator 
from Oklahoma.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Oklahoma is recognized.
  Mr. INHOFE. I thank the Senator from Georgia. I think this is a very 
serious thing we are getting into. I have five very important points I 
plan to make to respond to statements that have been made in the 
Chamber here. One is I think the Chairman is right when he talks about 
the information wasn't there, wasn't adequately discussed during the 
markup. One of the reasons for that is the IDA study didn't even come 
out until May 15, and because of that, that was not a part of the 
conversation.
  Let me say one thing about the GAO study. I agree with the Senator 
from South Dakota. I am always leery of a new study that comes out the 
same day that an amendment is discussed and brought up in the Chamber, 
and that happened to be 3 days ago. I think it is quite a coincidence 
it came out at the same time. Having looked at the IDA study, we are on 
solid ground for pursuing this multiyear effort.
  Let me respond to our good friend, the Senator from Arizona, on the 
cost overruns and the delays. I cannot remember--I have been on this 
Armed Services Committee for 12 years and in the House for 8 years--one 
system that did not go through this same thing. In the Navy alone, they 
had many cost overruns. The joint strike fighter, now recognized as 
something we desperately need and are using, probably had more cost 
overruns. We had the Black Hawk upgrades, the same thing there.
  But the thing I remember the most is the C-17s because I was in the 
House at that time. It was delay after delay after delay, and stop and 
think, if we had at that point junked that, where would we be? Where 
would we have gone in Bosnia, Kosovo? Things were anticipated where we 
would desperately need it.
  Right now we need to increase the number of planes. That I think we 
all know. And then we know what is happening to the C-130-R program. 
This is something that has been happening for a long period of time.
  The third thing I want to mention is the savings. I know one of the 
six criteria is called substantial savings. I don't know if there is 
anyone who is going to be looking at this budget and accepting the fact 
that a quarter of a billion dollars is not substantial. But there seems 
to be some doubt by Senators as to whether or not these savings would 
actually be achieved. And if you really ask questions about it, if we 
really had to do this, I say to my friend from Georgia, we could write 
that in and say at any point when it looks like we cannot anticipate 
these savings, we would go back to the other type of procurement. That 
could be done.
  Quite frankly, I think the Air Force would be willing to do that. And 
the figure of $225 million they and others believe and I believe is a 
conservative figure. So I think that would be one way to offset it.
  When you look at title 10 criteria, substantial savings, we have 
talked about that; stability, we have talked about that, stability of 
funding, stability of design, we all know these things and where we are 
with the program.
  And so I have come to the conclusion after looking at this that it 
does qualify for all of these criteria, but there is one thing that has 
not been said, quite frankly, in the right wing over here, and that is, 
during the 1990s I can remember standing on this floor and saying we 
are going to have to do something about what is happening to the 
modernization program because it is not just the aircraft and artillery 
pieces, the most modern thing we have for the artillery is the 
Palladin, which is World War II technology, where you have to get out 
and swab the breach after each shot. There are five countries, 
including South Africa, making a better artillery piece than we are 
sending out with our kids.
  Then we look at the F-15 and F-16, great vehicles. We understand 
that. But one of the proudest moments I have had was in 1998 when we 
were cutting a lot of the Defense budget at that

[[Page S6342]]

time. We had two-star general John Jumper, who stood up and said 
publicly: Now we are sending our kids out with equipment that is not as 
good as the Russians are making. At that time, they had the Su-27; the 
Su-30 was not actually deployed yet, now the Su-35. And we know in one 
purchase--I say to my friend from South Dakota because he mentioned 
other countries that are buying these things--in one purchase, the 
Chinese purchased 230 of these vehicles. We think they are Su-30s, but 
we don't know.
  Consequently, if you assess the judgment as someone I think we will 
have to accept, and that is General John Jumpers, their Su series in 
many ways is better than our best strike vehicles, the F-15 and F-
16. That has to concern Americans.

  So I think if that were the only reason to keep this on schedule, and 
go to a multiyear program where we enjoy the savings, that would be 
reason enough. As long as I am here, I am going to try to put America 
in a position where we have the very best of equipment with which we 
send our kids to battle. That is not the case today. So I strongly 
support the amendment and believe we should get on with it.
  Mr. President, I yield back.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona.
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I yield myself such time as I may use.
  I think we ought to try to go back to what this amendment is about. 
This amendment is not to cure any delay. The fact is, we have in this 
authorization 20 F-22s, with $1.4 billion over what was in the budget--
20 of them. And then, next year, I would imagine we will authorize 
another 20; and the year after that, another 20. This is not about any 
delay. This is about congressional oversight. This is whether we should 
go to multiyear funding and lock us into a weapons system which has not 
been proven yet.
  I say to my friend from Georgia, no matter how this amendment comes 
out because of the differences of opinion we have within the committee, 
in July I would like to schedule a hearing, and we will get all the 
players over again. Whether this amendment goes up or down, in July we 
will schedule a hearing in the subcommittee and have another look at 
the pluses and minuses. The Senator from Oklahoma mentioned that 
several studies have come in. The IDAs came in on the 20th. The GAO one 
came in yesterday or the day before.
  So I will be glad--no matter how the vote ends up--to have another 
hearing on this issue because we are talking about, obviously, really 
large sums of money. So this Senator does not want to delay the 
procurement of the F-22. But I certainly want to maintain our ability 
to oversight the program rather than locking us in. So it is not about 
whether we delay or not.
  Finally, on the issue of saving $225 million: from what? Because the 
Air Force, on May 16, 2006, stated that an additional $674 million is 
needed to fully fund the multiyear program being proposed. So is that 
savings of $225 million out of the $674 million of additional costs or 
does it mean there really isn't an additional $674 million, that they 
sent over, that they need? So that has to be sorted out as well.
  So again, I restate to my colleagues that literally every outside 
organization--CRS, CBO, GAO--all of them believe not that this weapons 
system needs to be canceled, not that it needs to be delayed, but we do 
not need to embark on a multiyear lock-in acquisition of this weapons 
system, which no doubt has very great value.
  I hope my colleagues will agree with the distinguished chairman and 
me that this amendment should be rejected at this time.
  Mr. President, does the Senator from Michigan wish to speak on this?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan is recognized.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I will be opposing the Chambliss amendment, 
although I am both a supporter of the F-22 and a supporter, generally, 
of multiyear contracts. Where they meet the criteria for multiyear 
contracts, I am very supportive of them because of, mainly, the money 
that can be saved.
  I oppose this amendment with some reluctance. Again, I very much 
support, and have supported, the airplane. And I, in general, like the 
multiyear approach, where it meets the criteria. But some of the 
criteria have not been adequately met; for instance, whether the 
multiyear contract would result in substantial savings compared to 
using annual contracts. The studies are that the savings would be, I 
would say, very modest and not substantial. There are some savings, but 
I could not say they are substantial savings.
  Another criteria is whether the contract is for a number which is 
expected to remain substantially unchanged during the contemplated 
contract period in terms of both numbers, production rate, procurement 
rate, and, again, total quantities. The F-22 total program quantities 
are likely to increase before the end of production.
  There is also a requirement that there be a stable design for the 
property to be acquired and that the technical risks associated with 
the purchase are not excessive. There are some unresolved operational 
test deficiencies, and there are what I think can fairly be called 
major modifications that are planned for providing more robust air-to-
ground capability.
  There is also a question as to whether the estimates of both the cost 
of the contract and the anticipated cost avoidance through the use of a 
multiyear contract are realistic. Cost estimates are still problematic. 
The 2006 contract itself, we understand, has still not been signed. So 
it does not meet that criteria either.
  I would hope that, perhaps next year, a multiyear would indeed meet 
the criteria so we could utilize a multiyear approach next year. But I 
do not believe this year it does meet the criteria for a multiyear 
contract. I, therefore, will be opposing the Chambliss amendment.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Georgia.
  Mr. CHAMBLISS. Mr. President, I respond to the distinguished Senator 
from Michigan that all of this which he raised has been addressed in 
the IDA report and has been answered. The criteria set forth in the 
statute has been validated and verified. I don't know of any technical 
problems with the airplane today because, as I said earlier, we have 32 
at Langley currently. We have other airplanes stationed at a couple of 
other bases around. They are flying over us as we speak, protecting our 
Nation's Capitol. They are in rotation to go to Iraq. If there were any 
deficiencies, obviously, we would not have those airplanes put in that 
rotation, engaging in what may be combat.
  I will close by finally saying there has been a lot of conversation 
about the way the cost of this airplane has increased. I think the 
mission of the airplane actually has changed over the 19 years since 
this airplane was first authorized. It was initially an air-to-air 
airplane. Air-to-ground was added to it, which caused delays. What the 
Senator from Arizona alluded to, relative to issues of the airplane is 
exactly correct. But all of those have been addressed. And the cost, 
the flyaway costs of this airplane for the last three lots have 
decreased by 16 percent, 11 percent, and 14 percent respectively.
  So it is an expensive airplane. There is no question about that. But 
the capability of the airplane is also not questioned. It is a good 
deal for the taxpayers. It is a good deal for the folks who are going 
to be called on to fly this airplane in defense of this country. I 
encourage my colleagues to support the amendment.
  Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, today I rise as an ardent supporter of the 
F-22A Raptor. I am very pleased that the Armed Services Committee has 
modified the Department of Defense's budget request and authorized the 
procurement of 20 F-22s during the next fiscal year.
  That being said, I must express my disappointment that the committee 
did not include in this legislation language authorizing the Secretary 
of the Air Force to enter into a multiyear procurement contract to 
purchase 20 Raptors a year for the next 3 years. Under such a contract, 
the Institute for Defense Analyses estimates that we will save the 
taxpayer at least $225 million. Therefore, I am proud to join Senator 
Chambliss and cosponsor this important amendment along with Senators 
Inhofe, Lieberman, Bingaman, Cornyn, Thune, Bennett, Isakson, Domenici, 
Baucus, Dodd, Hutchison, Collins, Ben Nelson, Feinstein and

[[Page S6343]]

Stevens. Our amendment only strengthens the procurement plan for this 
vital aircraft.
  I am also troubled that this bill does not increase above the 183 
currently planned the number of F-22s that the Air Force is authorized 
to procure. My trepidation that our Nation will not build a sufficient 
number of aircraft is based on careful study of our Nation's needs and 
on the advice and counsel of senior Air Force officers who have been 
unanimous in their expert opinion that if the Air Force is to meet its 
responsibilities under the National Military Strategy, the Nation 
requires 381 Raptors.
  I have seen first-hand the capabilities of this extraordinary 
aircraft, first at Tyndall Air Force Base, FL, where our pilots are 
learning to fly the Raptor, and second at Langley Air Force, VA, where 
the first operational F-22s are based. As a result of these meetings 
with pilots and ground personnel and several other briefings on our 
future preparations, I have come to the conclusion that purchasing 
sufficient numbers of Raptors is absolutely vital to our national 
security.
  Over the past 30 years, the United States has been able to maintain 
air superiority in every conflict largely due to the F-15C. However, 
with the great advancements in technology over the past several years, 
the F-15 has struggled to keep pace. For example, the F-15 is not a 
stealth aircraft and its computer systems are based on obsolete 
technology. My colleagues should remember that the F-15 first flew in 
the early 1970s. During the ensuing years, nations have been 
consistently developing new aircraft and missile systems to defeat this 
fighter.
  Realizing that the F-15 would need a replacement, the Air Force 
developed the F-22. The F-22's combination of stealth, supersonic 
cruise, advanced maneuverability, and sensor-fused avionics makes this 
aircraft a powerful deterrent to countries contemplating a challenge to 
U.S. interests, and defines the essence of a true fifth generation 
fighter.
  So far during the current exercise Northern Edge in Alaska, the F-22A 
has achieved a kill ratio of 144:0. Not one F-22 has been simulated 
``shot down'' while 14 legacy F-15s and F-18s in the exercise have been 
simulated ``shot down.'' One-hundred-and-forty-four to zero, that is 
the way American forces should go to war.
  The F-22 has the greatest stealth capabilities of any aircraft 
currently flying or under design. This is a powerful attribute when one 
remembers that it was the F-117 Nighthawk's stealth characteristics 
that enabled that aircraft to penetrate the integrated air defenses of 
Baghdad during the first night of the 1991 gulf war. The F-22 brings 
stealth capability out of the night, enabling operations in high threat 
areas at the place and time chosen by combatant commanders, 24 hours a 
day seven days a week.
  The Raptor is also equipped with supercruise engines. These engines 
do not need to go to after-burner in order to achieve supersonic 
flight. This provides the F-22 with a strategic advantage by enabling 
supersonic speeds to be maintained for a far greater length of time. By 
comparison, all other fighters require their engines to go to after-
burner to achieve supersonic speeds. This consumes a tremendous amount 
of fuel and greatly limits an aircraft's range.
  The F-22 is also the most maneuverable fighter flying today. This is 
of particular importance when encountering newer Russian-made aircraft 
and surface-to-air missile systems, both of which boast advanced, 
highly impressive capabilities against our legacy F-15, F-18, and F-16 
aircraft.
  Yet, a further advantage resides in the F-22's radar and avionics. 
When entering hostile airspace, the sensor-fused avionics of the F-22 
can detect and engage enemy aircraft and surface threats far before an 
enemy can hope to engage the F-22. At the same time its advanced 
sensors enable the F-22 to be a forward surveillance platform gathering 
crucial intelligence on the enemy.
  However, one of the most important capabilities of the Raptor is 
often the most misunderstood. Many critics of the program state that, 
since much of the design work for this aircraft was performed during 
the Cold War, it does not meet the requirements of the future.
  I believe this criticism is misplaced. The F-22 is more than just a 
fighter--it is also a bomber. In its existing configuration it is able 
to carry two 1,000 pound GPS-guided JDAM bombs and will undergo an 
upgrade to carry eight small diameter bombs in the near future. In 
2008, the F-22's radar system will be enhanced with advanced air-to-
ground modes, enabling the Raptor to hunt independently and destroy 
targets on the ground.
  All of these capabilities are necessary to fight what is quickly 
emerging as the threat of the future--the anti-access integrated air 
defense system. Integrated air defenses include both surface-to-air 
missiles and fighters deployed in such a fashion as to leverage the 
strengths of both systems. Such a system could pose a very real 
possibility of denying U.S. aircraft access to strategically important 
regions during future conflicts.
  It should also be noted that--for a comparably cheap price--an 
adversary can purchase the Russian SA-20, surface-to-air missile. This 
system has an effective range of approximately 120 nautical miles and 
can engage targets at greater then 100,000 feet, much higher than the 
service ceiling of any existing American fighter or bomber. Surface-to-
air missiles, with similar capabilities, have been sold to Iran. The 
Russians have also developed a family of highly maneuverable fighters, 
the SU-30 and 35s, which have been sold to such nations as China. Of 
further import, 59 other nations have fourth generation fighters.
  It has also been widely reported in the aviation media that the F-
15C, our current air superiority fighter, is not as maneuverable as 
newer Russian aircraft, especially the SU-35. However, the F-22 is 
designed to defeat an integrated air defense system. By utilizing its 
stealth capability, the F-22 can penetrate an enemy's airspace 
undetected and, when modified, independently hunt for mobile surface to 
air missile systems. Once detected, the F-22 would then be able to drop 
bombs on those targets. Some correctly state that the B-2 bomber and 
the F-117 could handle these assignments during night only operations. 
However, the F-22 offers the additional capability of being able to 
engage an enemy's air superiority fighters, such as the widely 
proficient SU-35. Therefore, the Raptor will be able to defeat, almost 
simultaneously, two very different threats, 24 hours a day, that until 
now have been handled by two different types of aircraft.
  I should like to point out that these potential threats are not just 
future concerns, but they are here today. For example, over the last 2 
years, the Air Force has conducted exercises with the Indian Air Force 
as part of our effort to strengthen relations with that nation. The 
Indian Air Force has a number of SU-30 MKKs, an aircraft which is very 
similar to a version of aircraft sold in large quantities to the 
People's Republic of China. During these exercises, it has been widely 
reported in the aviation and defense media that the Indian Air Force's 
SU-30s won a number of engagements when training against our Air 
Force's F-15s.
  So let me be clear on this point: a developing nation's air force was 
able to defeat the F-15. This was a stunning event and one that 
requires our immediate attention.
  Now that this fact has been established, the question that we must 
ask ourselves is: How do we remedy this national security concern? The 
F-22 provides the answer.
  Though the F-22 may be the solution to these problems, if the Nation 
does not purchase a sufficient number of these aircraft our service 
members could face unnecessary dangers and risks. Many others and I 
have come to this conclusion after closely listening to our service 
members when they have outlined their equipment requirements based upon 
the national security goals our Government has outlined. What is their 
professional opinion? That if the Air Force is to succeed in the tasks 
outlined in our National Defense Strategy, our airmen and women require 
381 F-22s, far more then the 184 aircraft currently planned.
  However, another important consideration is cost. In a period of 
runaway procurement costs, we are not only concerned about the effort 
to procure the correct number of F-22s but to procure them at a 
reasonable price. That

[[Page S6344]]

is exactly what this amendment achieves. It authorizes a multiyear 
procurement plan for the Raptor, in which 20 aircraft a year over 3 
years will be purchased. This will result in the taxpayer saving 
approximately $225 million under the existing plan to purchase 184 
aircraft.
  Introducing innovative plans to save funds is nothing new to the F-22 
program. In fact, since production first began on this aircraft, the 
``fly-away'' cost has been reduced by 35 percent. However, we must take 
advantage of any opportunity that will result in additional savings 
while increasing our military capabilities. A multiyear F-22 
procurement plan achieves that goal.
  If this amendment is adopted, the Air Force will be permitted to 
enter into a multiyear procurement contract. However, some of our 
colleagues argue that the F-22 does not meet the six-point requirements 
for multiyear procurement under existing law. I, on the other hand, 
believe these criteria have been met and the amendment before us should 
be seen as reinforcing that fact.
  Specifically, the first requirement to authorize a multiyear contract 
under the existing statute is the determination that substantial 
savings will result from the contract. The Institute for Defense 
Analysis estimates that a multiyear contract will result in at least 
$225 million in savings.
  The second criterion states there must be a ``minimum need'' for the 
aircraft. I believe that my address today has shown the urgent need to 
deploy the Raptor in order to counter the deployment of fourth 
generation fighters and new antiaccess systems.
  As far as a minimum need is concerned, as a result of the Joint Air 
Dominance Study the Secretary of Defense stated that a minimum 
requirement for 183 Raptors existed. Under the administration's 
proposal, which this amendment is based upon, the production rate, 
procurement rate and the total quantities of the Raptor purchased will 
be substantially unchanged during the contract period. Remember, the 
contract calls for the purchase of 20 Raptors a year over the next 3 
years.
  The third requirement insists that the Raptor be a program with 
stable funding. The Armed Services Committee has added additional funds 
for this year and the Department of Defense's future budgets will also 
contain funding requests since the purchase of F-22s under a multiyear 
procurement contract was called for in the Quadrennial Defense Review.
  Fourth, the aircraft's design must be stable. This is probably the 
most controversial requirement. Yes, the F-22 has had its problems 
during the development and production process, but I challenge anyone 
to identify another strike aircraft that hasn't. Remember, the F-22 is 
now operational. That means the Raptor will deploy in support of our 
service members and it has satisfactorily completed the engineering and 
manufacturing development phase as well as its follow-on operational 
test and evaluation.
  It is important to note that any upgrades to the Raptor will not 
result in significant structural changes. Some might argue, correctly, 
that a potential problem with the forward boom frame heat-treating has 
been identified on up to 91 aircraft. It is important to note that this 
was not an aircraft design problem, but an issue of a manufacturer not 
following the prescribed manufacturing process. In reality, testing has 
so far shown that 92 percent of the suspect frames tested did in fact 
undergo an adequate manufacturing process. I have been advised that 
neither a redesign nor a refit are planned or expected. Regardless, the 
manufacturer has been replaced and all aircraft procured under a 
multiyear agreement will not have this problem.
  Fifth, a program must show that its cost estimates are realistic. The 
Air Force has gone above and beyond the call of duty in providing the 
Congress with independent cost analysis. The Institute for Defense 
Analysis provided an Independent Cost Estimate in 2005 and with a 
multiyear procurement business case analysis in May of this year.
  Finally, the last requirement of a multiyear procurement plan is the 
determination that the program is important to the national security of 
the United States. I believe that we have already established 
conclusively that the Raptor is the answer to the present and future 
threats posed by antiaccess systems.
  Therefore, I believe that the Raptor qualifies for a multiyear 
procurement contract under the existing statute. However, to ensure 
there is no doubt on this subject, I strongly recommend this amendment 
to my colleagues.
  Our Nation stands at a crossroads.
  In a wide variety of policy arenas, the Senate is being asked to make 
investments that will reap rewards for our children and our 
grandchildren.
  The F-22 is one of these investments. It will guarantee America's 
dominance of the skies for the next half century. All that is required 
is that we make a commitment now to ensure that future. By purchasing 
adequate numbers of F-22 Raptors we are meeting the threats of today 
and tomorrow and we are doing so in such a way as to maximize the 
savings of the American taxpayer.
  I thank Senator Chambliss for offering this important amendment, and 
I urge my colleagues to join my fellow cosponsors, Senators Inhofe, 
Lieberman, Bingaman, Cornyn, Thune, Bennett, Isakson, Domenici, Baucus, 
Dodd, Hutchison, Collins, Ben Nelson, Feinstein and Stevens in 
supporting this amendment.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I rise today to speak in support of the 
amendment to authorize a multiyear procurement for the F-22 fighter--
amendment No. 4261 I am proud to cosponsor. I thank my friend and 
colleague, the Senator from Georgia, Mr. Chambliss, for his leadership 
in offering this amendment. I believe he has very ably and 
comprehensively argued the case for this multiyear and has persuasively 
rebutted the personal arguments against taking this action. But I want 
to add some thoughts about why I think this is a prudent act by this 
body.
  The F-22 has had developmental problems and it has had cost 
increases. But all this is old news. There are few, if any, programs 
that have had more oversight by the Senate Armed Services Committee 
than this program. We have examined it in great detail in hearings each 
year from concept to procurement. We have examined the technology, the 
acquisition plan, the development process, and the production issue. 
And we have examined the costs in substantial detail. In some years we 
have put on cost caps to force spending discipline, and in other years 
we have slowed down production to align the request with the reality of 
the backlog. But despite the challenges of building the world's most 
capable fighter, we have decided, and the full Senate has decided, that 
this is a critical program that should and must continue. And the U.S. 
Air Force has argued it needs the F-22 to continue.
  There is a very compelling reason for this decision. Air dominance is 
absolutely essential to American military dominance and American 
security in the 21st century. Our military has had that dominance since 
World War II. If we were ever to lose it, or even allow it to be 
seriously challenged, the global strategic environment would 
fundamentally change for the United States. The F-22 is the way we 
prevent that from happening for the next generation maybe more. Much 
has been said about the cutting-edge technologies that are included in 
this airplane that will ensure we maintain that air dominance. I need 
not repeat that now. But it is the reason that we have voted to 
continue procuring the F-22 and it is reason that we will continue to 
do so.
  I believe the problems with the F-22 that some of my colleagues have 
reminded us about have been substantially solved. The F-22 business 
case was validated by DOD during the QDR and the Air Dominance Study. 
The long debate over the number we will procure is about over. I am 
convinced that it will not be lower than the 183 validated by the QDR. 
In fact if there are now to be changes in that number, it will be 
increased, not decreased. So I believe that we will build the 
additional 60 contemplated in this amendment. The decision to procure 
these 60 over 3 years instead of 2 years is sound. We should not have a 
break in the production line before we begin building the F-35 the JSF. 
Those 60 aircraft can be built for about $250 million less with the 
multiyear buy provided for by this amendment.
  The Senate Armed Services Committee, and the Airland Subcommittee,

[[Page S6345]]

has spent much time focusing on our acquisition system because we are 
concerned that the weapons we are buying are taking too long to field 
and are costing too much. We believe the American people should not pay 
more than they have to. But we also believe our Armed Forces should get 
the weapons they need to defend our security. SACS have concluded we 
need this fighter. We recommended full funding this year for 20. I 
believe we will do that next year and the year after that until we have 
procured 183 F-22 fighters. Authorizing a multiyear will cost the 
American people $250 million less than if we authorize these fighters 
year by year. That is good acquisition policy. Our Armed Force needs 
this fighter, and we should not pay $250 million more to get it than we 
have to. That is why I urge my colleagues to support this amendment.
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I yield back the remainder of my time.
  Mr. CHAMBLISS. Mr. President, I yield back the remainder of my time.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, if the Senator from Arizona will yield 1 
minute?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan is recognized for 1 
minute.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I want to put in the Record a chart from 
the Institute for Defense Analysis. It compares savings on various 
programs, showing savings with the F/A-18, multiyear, from 7 to 11 
percent; the C-17 airplane, of 10 percent; the C-130J, multiyear, of 10 
percent; and the comparison to the F-22, which they estimate at 2.6 
percent. I ask unanimous consent that this chart be printed in the 
Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                                                TABLE 4.--CHARACTERISTICS OF OTHER RELEVANT MYP PROGRAMS
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                                              Amount of  Amount of
                                        Savings    Savings     Prior     Period of   Procurement   Quantity      CRI        EOQ                   TINA
               Program                    (%)       (TY$M)     lots/    performance   timeframe    procured    funding    funding      FAR       waiver
                                                               units       (years)                               ($M)       ($M)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
F/A-18E/F Air Vehicle (MYP-1)........        7.4       $850       3/62           5      FY00-04       222          $200        $85         15         No
F414 Engine (MYP-1)..................        2.8         51      5/682           5      FY02-06       454             0          0         15         No
F/A-18E/F/G Air Vehicle (MYP-2)......      10.95      1,052      8/284           5      FY05-09       210           100          0         15        Yes
C-17A Airframe (MYP-1)...............        5.0        760       8/40           7      FY97-03        80           350        300         15         No
C-17A Engine (F117-PW-100)...........        6.0        122      4/160           7      FY97-03       320             0          0         12         No
C-17A Airframe (MYP-1)...............       10.8      1,211     14/112           5      FY03-07        60             0        645         12        Yes
C-17A Engine (F117-PW-100)...........        5.7         92     14/448           5      FY03-07       267             0          0         12         No
C-130J/KC-130J.......................       10.9        513       9/37           6      FY03-08        62             0        140         12         No
C-130J (Air Force)...................       10.9        340  .........           6      FY03-08        42             0    unknown         12         No
KC-130J (Marine Corps)...............       13.1        173  .........           6      FY03-08        20             0    unknown         12         No
F-16A/B/C/D Air Vehicle (MYP-1)......        7.7        246      4/605           4      FY82-85       450       unknown    unknown         15         No
F-16C/D Air Vehicle (MYP-2)..........       10.1        467     8/1139           4      FY86-89       720       unknown    unknown         15         No
F-16C/D Air Vehicle (MYP-3)..........        5.7        262    12/1859           4      FY90-93       630       unknown    unknown         15         No
Average..............................       8.00        469  .........        5.25          N/A       292           N/A        N/A
F-122A Air Vehicle...................        2.6        203      8a122           3      FY07-09        60             0        255         15         No
F-122A Engine (F119-PW-100)..........        2.7         32      8b244           3      FY07-09       120             0         45         15         No
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
a Include Production Representative Test Vehicle (PRTV) lot and units.
b Include PRTV lot and units and Replacement Test Aircraft (RTA); installed engines only.

  Mr. LEVIN. I yield back my time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. All time has been yielded back.
  Mr. CHAMBLISS. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays on my 
amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second? There is a 
sufficient second.
  The yeas and nays were ordered.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senator from 
Minnesota is recognized.
  Mr. DAYTON. Thank you, Mr. President.


                           Amendment No. 4241

  Mr. President, I am a proud cosponsor of Senator McCain's proposal to 
name this legislation after the great chairman of the Senate Armed 
Services Committee, Senator Warner.
  I have had the privilege during my term in the Senate to serve on the 
Armed Services Committee under two tremendous chairmen, outstanding 
Senators, and terrific human beings--John Warner and Carl Levin.
  Our Senate, our military, and our country have been fortunate to have 
their extraordinary leadership during these critical years.
  Chairman Warner, for whom this legislation would be named, is more 
than deserving of that honor. He is greatly respected by our committee 
members on both sides of the aisle and, indeed, by the entire Senate. 
He has been unfailingly fair to all points of view, while leading us 
with a firm hand and resolute gaze, that he learned during his own 
military service and as Secretary of the Navy.
  When he picks up his committee gavel, all of us--members, staff, 
military officers, and other interested parties--all know we have a 
leader well prepared in all respects for that enormous responsibility.
  Our Senate and our Nation are indebted to Senator Warner and to 
Senator Levin for their superb public service.
  Mr. President, I have listened to many of my colleagues express their 
views on Iraq during the past week and have waited for this opportunity 
to express my own.
  My colleagues reflect sincere differences and I believe sincere 
desires to uphold the best interests of our great country in a very 
difficult and complicated situation. We are all patriotic Americans 
first and foremost and partisan politicians later.
  I voted against the Iraq war resolution in October 2002, despite 
being presented with incorrect and misleading information by very high 
officials in the Bush administration, which purported to prove that 
Saddam Hussein was developing nuclear weapons. I questioned the 
veracity of that information. And I had grave concerns that an 
unwarranted invasion of Iraq, if no weapons of mass destruction were 
found, would ultimately weaken, not strengthen, the national security 
of the United States by seriously damaging our standing and our 
alliances throughout the world.
  I also voted against the Iraq war resolution because I believed that 
such a decision by the Congress at that time was premature. President 
Bush was not asking Congress for a declaration of war, as the U.S. 
Constitution requires. He was asking for a congressional resolution 
authorizing him to declare war, if he determined it necessary at some 
later date. I do not fault the President for asking for that blank 
check. I fault the Congress for giving it to him. In fact, it was over 
6 months later that the President made his final decision to commence 
military action against Iraq.
  In a similar vein, I believe that both the Levin-Reed amendment and 
the Kerry-Feingold amendment were premature. One called for the 
redeployment of U.S. troops from Iraq to begin within 6 months. The 
other required the almost complete withdrawal of those troops within a 
year.
  I believe it is impossible to foresee at this time whether either of 
those actions would be in the best national security and foreign policy 
interests of the United States 6 months or 1 year from now. The 
situation in Iraq is too uncertain and too unpredictable to do so. That 
uncertainty and unpredictability evidence the failures of the Bush 
administration's conduct of this war effort.
  It is now over 3 years since the U.S. military swept from the Iraqi 
border to Baghdad in only 3 weeks, overthrew Saddam Hussein and his 
evil regime, and liberated the Iraqi people. Yet after that swift and 
decisive military victory was won, the Bush administration has failed 
to secure it.
  Administration officials ignored the advice of their own top military 
commanders--and this is an important lesson for us--and failed to 
commit

[[Page S6346]]

enough U.S. troops to secure the country. Other mistakes followed, 
leaving security and political vacuums that were filled by foreign 
terrorists and domestic insurgents.
  During the past 3 years, violence in Iraq has steadily increased and 
still threatens to rip the country apart. Like it or not, our 
courageous troops remain the only effective protections of the Iraqi 
people from civil war or anarchy and a lawless bloodbath.
  Unfortunately, the bad conditions in Iraq today can become even 
worse--much worse--if our troops begin or complete their withdrawals 
before Iraqi forces are able to take their place. That training and 
equipping of Iraqi replacements should have been completed already, but 
it is not. I do not know what that timetable is. I am skeptical that 
anyone else in this body does. The Bush administration should tell us, 
but they will not, which means they still do not know either.
  So it seems to me necessary not to decide and certainly not to act 
until we have that information. It is imperative not to make future 
mistakes that will compound the previous mistakes. And we certainly 
should not decide or act until we have listened to the current views of 
the top U.S. military commanders, who are responsible for successfully 
completing our mission in Iraq and for protecting the lives and safety 
of the 133,000 heroic Americans who are stationed there now.
  I serve on the Senate Armed Services Committee, and yet I have not 
heard those top military views recently expressed.
  I respectfully ask the distinguished chairman of our committee to 
arrange for us to hear them as soon as possible. I read a news report 2 
days ago that General Casey, the senior American commander in Iraq, 
will brief the Secretary of Defense later this week on his newest 
thinking about U.S. force levels through the end of the year. I want to 
hear General Casey's recommendation myself and his reasons for it 
before I am prepared to vote on any proposal affecting U.S. troop 
levels. I want to give our military commanders in Iraq and our American 
troops in Iraq what they need to succeed now, 6 months from now, a year 
from now.
  Like most Americans, I wish this war were over. I wish it hadn't 
begun. But we are in it; we must win it. We cannot leave Iraq until the 
Iraqi Government has established political control over its country and 
until the Iraqi security forces can protect their citizens. We cannot 
leave what we started to end in a lawless bloodbath.
  We must rely on our senior military commanders to tell us what force 
strength they need to successfully complete their mission. The 
timetable we follow should be theirs, not ours. It should be based upon 
American security and Iraqi survival. Again, I respectfully urge 
Chairman Warner to summon our top military commanders to tell us what 
they need and for how long. I don't want any more incidents where 
American soldiers are captured, brutally tortured, and murdered because 
there were not enough of their fellow American soldiers there to defend 
them.
  I agree with my colleagues about the urgent need for the new Iraqi 
Government to accelerate their assumption of complete responsibility 
for their country's services, security, and success. They need to tell 
us their expected schedule for doing so. We need to assist them in that 
process, and we need to enlist other nations to help them as well. We 
must complete our mission in Iraq as soon as possible, but we must 
complete it with a lasting victory, and we cannot leave until that 
victory is secure.
  We should be discussing what we can do to hasten that day. The Bush 
administration should be telling us what we need to do to hasten that 
day, how to accelerate the transfer of responsibilities to Iraqis, how 
to accelerate the social and economic reconstruction of Iraq, how to 
enrich the lives of Iraqi citizens rather than the livelihoods of 
American contractors. Instead, all we get are cheap spin-and-thin 
slogans rather than substantive proposals and sophisticated solutions. 
The administration needs to set forth a plan of action in Iraq, a 
roadmap to final victory. That is what we should be demanding. That is 
what we should be debating.
  I yield the floor and suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I thank my colleague from Minnesota. He 
will be departing our committee this fall, as he departs the Senate. I 
appreciate the work he has contributed to our committee throughout the 
year.
  It is time for my distinguished colleague from Michigan, ranking 
member, and I to offer a package of amendments.
  Mr. LEVIN. Will the Senator yield?
  Mr. WARNER. Yes.
  Mr. LEVIN. While he was making reference to the Senator from 
Minnesota, I think the chairman was off the floor when the Senator from 
Minnesota, Mr. Dayton, made some very glowingly positive and 
affirmative remarks about our chairman and about how he was really 
delighted to be able to cosponsor the amendment which had been 
introduced to name this bill after our beloved chairman. I wanted to 
make sure that he was aware of that and could look up those remarks 
later.
  Mr. WARNER. I was absent from the floor. I express my humble 
appreciation to my colleague from Minnesota. I recall that he 
accompanied Senator Levin and me to Iraq one time. That was when I 
first became aware of the knowledge that he had on world affairs and 
other subjects. He has contributed to the greater good of the Committee 
on Armed Services. I thank him for his service. But there is more time; 
he has a little bit left to go.


  Amendments Nos. 4492; 4493; 4494; 4266, as Modified; 4495; 4307, as 
Modified; 4326, as Modified; 4224; 4496; 4309, as Modified; 4345; 4368; 
    4497; 4222; 4498; 4499; 4202, as Modified; 4500; 4441; 4231, as 
 Modified; 4409; 4501; 4502; 4503; 4504; 4505; 4506; 4331; 4507; 4508; 
4509; 4510; 4219; 4386; 4511; 4197; 4512; 4513; 4514; 4515; 4342; 4365; 
    4241; 4220, as Modified; 4371; 4244; 4516; 4466; 4517; 4363, as 
  Modified; 4450, as Modified; 4362, as Modified; 4275, as Modified; 
   4475, as Modified; 4276, as Modified; 4469, as Modified; 4477, as 
                Modified; 4518; 4214; and 4519, En Bloc

  At this time I send a series of amendments to the desk. They have 
been cleared by myself and the ranking member. I ask unanimous consent 
that the Senate consider the amendments en bloc, the amendments be 
agreed to, and the motions to reconsider be laid upon the table.
  Finally, I ask that any statements relating to any of the individual 
amendments be printed in the Record.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendments were agreed to, as follows:


                           amendment no. 4492

    (Purpose: To clarify the contracting authority for the chemical 
                       demilitarization program)

       At the end of subtitle F of title III, add the following:

     SEC. 375. CHEMICAL DEMILITARIZATION PROGRAM CONTRACTING 
                   AUTHORITY.

       (a) Multiyear Contracting Authority.--The Secretary of 
     Defense may carry out responsibilities under section 1412(a) 
     of the Department of Defense Authorization Act, 1986 (Public 
     Law 99-145; 50 U.S.C. 1521(a)) through multiyear contracts 
     entered into before the date of the enactment of this Act.
       (b) Availability of Funds.--Contracts entered into under 
     subsection (a) shall be funded through annual appropriations 
     for the destruction of chemical agents and munitions.


                           Amendment No. 4493

    (Purpose: To extend the authority for the personnel program for 
                  scientific and technical personnel)

       At the end of title XI, add the following:

     SEC. 1104. THREE-YEAR EXTENSION OF AUTHORITY FOR EXPERIMENTAL 
                   PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT PROGRAM FOR SCIENTIFIC AND 
                   TECHNICAL PERSONNEL.

       Section 1101(e)(1) of the Strom Thurmond National Defense 
     Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999 (5 U.S.C. 3104 note) 
     is amended by striking ``September 30, 2008'' and inserting 
     ``September 30, 2011''.


                           Amendment No. 4494

 (Purpose: To encourage the use of electronic voting technology and to 
 provide for the continuation of the Interim Voting Assistance System)

       On page 187, between lines 20 and 21, insert the following:
       (c) Use of Electronic Voting Technology.--
       (1) Continuation of interim voting assistance system.--The 
     Secretary of Defense shall continue the Interim Voting 
     Assistance System (IVAS) ballot request program with

[[Page S6347]]

     respect to all absent uniformed services voters (as defined 
     under section 107(1) of the Uniformed Overseas Citizens 
     Absentee Voting Act (42 U.S.C. 1973ff-6(1))), overseas 
     employees of the Department of Defense, and the dependents of 
     such voters and employees, for the general election and all 
     elections through December 31, 2006.
       (2) Reports.--
       (A) In general.--Not later than 30 days after the date of 
     the regularly scheduled general election for Federal office 
     for November 2006, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to 
     the congressional defense committees a report setting forth--
       (i) an assessment of the success of the implementation of 
     the Interim Voting Assistance System ballot request program 
     carried out under paragraph (1);
       (ii) recommendations for continuation of the Interim Voting 
     Assistance System and for improvements to that system; and
       (iii) an assessment of available technologies and other 
     means of achieving enhanced use of electronic and Internet-
     based capabilities under the Interim Voting Assistance 
     System.
       (B) Future elections.--Not later than May 15, 2007, the 
     Secretary of Defense shall submit to the congressional 
     defense committees a report detailing plans for expanding the 
     use of electronic voting technology for individuals covered 
     under the Uniformed Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (42 
     U.S.C. 1973ff et seq.) for elections through November 30, 
     2010.


                    Amendment No. 4266, As Modified

       On page 421, between lines 6 and 7, insert the following:

     SEC. 1066. REPORTS ON DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE EFFORTS TO 
                   INVESTIGATE AND PROSECUTE CASES OF CONTRACTING 
                   ABUSE IN IRAQ, AFGHANISTAN, AND THROUGHOUT THE 
                   WAR ON TERROR.

       (a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
       (1) Waste, fraud, and abuse in contracting are harmful to 
     United States efforts to successfully win the conflicts in 
     Iraq and Afghanistan and succeed in the war on terror. The 
     act of stealing from our soldiers who are daily in harm's way 
     is clearly criminal and must be actively prosecuted.
       (2) It is a vital interest of United States taxpayers to be 
     protected from theft of their tax dollars by corrupt 
     contractors.
       (3) Whistleblower lawsuits are an important tool for 
     exposing waste, fraud, and abuse and can identify serious 
     graft and corruption.
       (4) This issue is of paramount importance to the United 
     States taxpayer, and the Congress must be provided with 
     information about alleged contractor waste, fraud, and abuse 
     taking place in Iraq, Afghanistan, and throughout the war on 
     terror and about the efforts of the Department of Justice to 
     combat these crimes.
       (b) Reports.--
       (1) In general.--Not later than 90 days after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, and every 180 days thereafter, the 
     Attorney General shall submit to the Committee on the 
     Judiciary and the Committee on Homeland Security and 
     Governmental Affairs of the Senate, the Committee on the 
     Judiciary and the Committee on Government Reform of the House 
     of Representatives, and the congressional defense committees 
     a report on efforts to investigate and prosecute cases of 
     waste, fraud, and abuse under sections 3729 and 3730(b) of 
     title 31, United States Code, or any other related law that 
     are related to Federal contracting in Iraq, Afghanistan, and 
     throughout the war on terror.
       (2) Content.--Each report submitted under paragraph (1) 
     shall include the following:
       (A) Information on organized efforts of the Department of 
     Justice that have been created to ensure that the Department 
     of Justice is investigating, in a timely and appropriate 
     manner, claims of contractor waste, fraud, and abuse related 
     to the activities of the United States Government in Iraq, 
     Afghanistan, and throughout the war on terror.
       (B) Information on the specific number of personnel, 
     financial resources, and workdays devoted to addressing this 
     waste, fraud, and abuse, including a complete listing of all 
     of the offices across the United States and throughout the 
     world that are working on these cases and an explanation of 
     the types of additional resources, both in terms of personnel 
     and finances, that the Department of Justice needs to ensure 
     that all of these cases proceed on a timely basis.
       (C) A detailed description of any internal Department of 
     Justice task force that exists to work specifically on cases 
     of contractor fraud and abuse in Iraq, Afghanistan, and 
     throughout the war on terror, including a description of its 
     action plan, the frequency of its meetings, the level and 
     quantity of staff dedicated to it, its measures for success, 
     the nature and substance of the allegations, and the amount 
     of funds in controversy for each case. If there is a showing 
     of extraordinary circumstances that disclosure of particular 
     information would pose an imminent threat of harm to a 
     relator and be detrimental to the public interest, then this 
     information should be redacted in accordance with standard 
     practices.
       (D) A detailed description of any interagency task force 
     that exists to work specifically on cases of contractor 
     waste, fraud, and abuse in Iraq, Afghanistan, and throughout 
     the war on terror, including its action plan, the frequency 
     of its meetings, the level and quantity of staff dedicated to 
     it, its measures for success, the type, nature, and substance 
     of the allegations, and the amount of funds in controversy 
     for each case. If there is a showing of extraordinary 
     circumstances that disclosure of particular information would 
     pose an imminent threat of harm to a relator and be 
     detrimental to the public interest, then this information 
     should be redacted in accordance with standard practices.
       (E) The names of the senior officials directly responsible 
     for oversight of the efforts to address these cases of 
     contractor waste, fraud, and abuse in Iraq, Afghanistan, and 
     throughout the war on terror.
       (F) Specific information on the number of investigators and 
     other personnel that have been provided to the Department of 
     Justice by other Federal departments and agencies in support 
     of the efforts of the Department of Justice to combat 
     contractor waste, fraud, and abuse in Iraq, Afghanistan, and 
     throughout the war on terror, including data on the quantity 
     of time that these investigators have spent working within 
     the Department of Justice structures dedicated to this 
     effort.
       (G) Specific information on the full number of 
     investigations, including grand jury investigations currently 
     underway, that are addressing these cases of contractor 
     waste, fraud, and abuse in Iraq, Afghanistan, and throughout 
     the war on terror.
       (H) Specific information on the number and status of the 
     criminal cases that have been launched to address contractor 
     waste, fraud, and abuse in Iraq, Afghanistan, and throughout 
     the war on terror.
       (I) Specific information on the number of civil cases that 
     have been filed to address contractor waste, fraud, and abuse 
     in Iraq, Afghanistan, and throughout the war on terror, 
     including specific information on the quantity of cases 
     initiated by private parties, as well as the quantity of 
     cases that have been referred to the Department of Justice by 
     the Department of Defense, the Department of State, and other 
     relevant Federal departments and agencies.
       (J) Specific information on the resolved civil and criminal 
     cases that have been filed to address contractor waste, 
     fraud, and abuse in Iraq, Afghanistan, and throughout the war 
     on terror, including the specific results of these cases, the 
     types of waste, fraud, and abuse that took place, the amount 
     of funds that were returned to the United States Government 
     as a result of resolution of these cases, and a full 
     description of the type and substance of the waste, fraud, 
     and abuse that took place. If there is a showing of 
     extraordinary circumstances that disclosure of particular 
     information would pose an imminent threat of harm to a 
     relator and be detrimental to the public interest, then this 
     information should be redacted in accordance with standard 
     practices.
       (K) The best estimate by the Department of Justice of the 
     scale of the problem of contractor waste, fraud, and abuse in 
     Iraq, Afghanistan, and throughout the war on terror.


                           amendment no. 4495

 (Purpose: To require annual reports on United States contributions to 
                          the United Nations)

       At the end of subtitle A of title XII add the following:

     SEC. 1209. ANNUAL REPORTS ON UNITED STATES CONTRIBUTIONS TO 
                   THE UNITED NATIONS.

       (a) Annual Report Required.--Not later than 90 days after 
     the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually 
     thereafter, the President shall submit to Congress a report 
     listing all assessed and voluntary contributions of the 
     United States Government for the preceding fiscal year to the 
     United Nations and United Nations affiliated agencies and 
     related bodies.
       (b) Elements.--Each report under subsection (a) shall set 
     forth, for the fiscal year covered by such report, the 
     following:
       (1) The total amount of all assessed and voluntary 
     contributions of the United States Government to the United 
     Nations and United Nations affiliated agencies and related 
     bodies.
       (2) The approximate percentage of United States Government 
     contributions to each United Nations affiliated agency or 
     body in such fiscal year when compared with all contributions 
     to such agency or body from any source in such fiscal year.
       (3) For each such contribution--
       (A) the amount of such contribution;
       (B) a description of such contribution (including whether 
     assessed or voluntary);
       (C) the department or agency of the United States 
     Government responsible for such contribution;
       (D) the purpose of such contribution; and
       (E) the United Nations or United Nations affiliated agency 
     or related body receiving such contribution.


                    AMENDMENT NO. 4307, as modified

       At the end of subtitle A of title XII, add the following:

     SEC. 1209. NORTH KOREA.

       (a) Coordinator of Policy on North Korea.--
       (1) Appointment required.--Not later than 60 days after the 
     date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall 
     appoint a senior presidential envoy to act as coordinator of 
     United States policy on North Korea.
       (2) Designation.--The individual appointed under paragraph 
     (1) may be known as the ``North Korea Policy Coordinator'' 
     (in this subsection referred to as the ``Coordinator)''.
       (3) Duties.--The Coordinator shall--

[[Page S6348]]

       (A) conduct a full and complete interagency review of 
     United States policy toward North Korea including matters 
     related to security and human rights;
       (B) provide policy direction for negotiations with North 
     Korea relating to nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles, and 
     other security matters; and
       (C) provide leadership for United States participation in 
     Six Party Talks on the denuclearization of the Korean 
     peninsula.
       (4) Report.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the 
     appointment of an individual as Coordinator under paragraph 
     (1), the Coordinator shall submit to the President and 
     Congress an unclassified report, with a classified annex if 
     necessary, on the actions undertaken under paragraph (3). The 
     report shall set forth--
       (A) the results of the review under paragraph (3)(A); and
       (B) any other matters on North Korea that the individual 
     considers appropriate.
       (b) Report on Nuclear and Missile Programs of North 
     Korea.--
       (1) Report required.--Not later than 90 days after the date 
     of the enactment of this Act, and every 180 days thereafter, 
     the President shall submit to Congress an unclassified 
     report, with a classified annex as appropriate, on the 
     nuclear program and the missile program of North Korea.
       (2) Elements.--Each report submitted under paragraph (1) 
     shall include the following:
       (A) The most current national intelligence estimate on the 
     nuclear program and the missile program of North Korea, and, 
     consistent with the protection of intelligence sources and 
     methods, an unclassified summary of the key judgments in the 
     estimate.
       (B) The most current unclassified United States Government 
     assessment, stated as a range if necessary, of (i) the number 
     of nuclear weapons possessed by North Korea and (ii) the 
     amount of nuclear material suitable for weapons use produced 
     by North Korea by plutonium reprocessing and uranium 
     enrichment for each period as follows:
       (I) Before October 1994.
       (II) Between October 1994 and October 2002.
       (III) Between October 2002 and the date of the submittal of 
     the initial report under paragraph (1).
       (IV) Each 12-month period after the submittal of the 
     initial report under paragraph (1).
       (C) Any other matter relating to the nuclear program or 
     missile program of North Korea that the President considers 
     appropriate.


                           AMENDMENT NO. 4326

       At the end of subtitle B of title II, add the following:

     SEC. 215. ARROW BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEM.

       Of the amount authorized to be appropriated by section 
     201(4) for research, development, test, and evaluation for 
     Defense-wide activities and available for ballistic missile 
     defense--
       (1) $65,000,000 may be available for coproduction of the 
     Arrow ballistic missile defense system; and
       (2) $63,702,000 may be available for the Arrow System 
     Improvement Program.


                           AMENDMENT NO. 4224

(Purpose: To include assessments of Traumatic Brain Injury in the post-
deployment health assessments of members of the Armed Forces returning 
         from deployment in support of a contingency operation)

       On page 267, beginning on line 24, insert after ``mental 
     health'' the following: ``(including Traumatic Brain Injury 
     (TBI))''.
       On page 268, line 13, insert ``(including Traumatic Brain 
     Injury)'' after ``mental health''.


                           AMENDMENT NO. 4496

   (Purpose: To require a report on biodefense staffing and training 
    requirements in support of the national biosafety laboratories)

       At the end of subtitle G of title X add the following:

     SEC. 1066. REPORT ON BIODEFENSE STAFFING AND TRAINING 
                   REQUIREMENTS IN SUPPORT OF NATIONAL BIOSAFETY 
                   LABORATORIES.

       (a) Study Required.--The Secretary of Defense shall, in 
     consultation with the Secretary of Homeland Security and the 
     Secretary of Health and Human Services, conduct a study to 
     determine the staffing and training requirements for pending 
     capital programs to construct biodefense laboratories 
     (including agriculture and animal laboratories) at Biosafety 
     Level (BSL) 3 and Biosafety Level 4 or to expand current 
     biodefense laboratories to such biosafety levels.
       (b) Elements.--In conducting the study, the Secretary of 
     Defense shall address the following:
       (1) The number of trained personnel, by discipline and 
     qualification level, required for existing biodefense 
     laboratories at Biosafety Level 3 and Biosafety Level 4.
       (2) The number of research and support staff, including 
     researchers, laboratory technicians, animal handlers, 
     facility managers, facility or equipment maintainers, 
     biosecurity personnel (including biosafety, physical, and 
     electronic security personnel), and other safety personnel 
     required to manage biodefense research efforts to combat 
     bioterrorism at the biodefense laboratories described in 
     subsection (a).
       (3) The training required to provide the personnel 
     described by paragraphs (1) and (2), including the type of 
     training (whether classroom, laboratory, or field training) 
     required, the length of training required by discipline, and 
     the curriculum required to be developed for such training.
       (4) Training schedules necessary to meet the scheduled 
     openings of the biodefense laboratories described in 
     subsection (a), including schedules for refresher training 
     and continuing education that may be necessary for that 
     purpose.
       (c) Report.--Not later than December 31, 2006, the 
     Secretary of Defense shall submit to Congress a report 
     setting forth the results of the study conducted under this 
     section.


                    amendment no. 4309, as modified

       At the end of title XIV, add the following:

     SEC.   . AMOUNT FOR PROCUREMENT OF HEMOSTATIC AGENTS FOR USE 
                   IN THE FIELD.

       (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that 
     every member of the Armed Forces deployed in a combat zone 
     should carry life saving resources on them, including 
     hemostatic agents.
       (b) Availability of Funds.--(1) Of the amount authorized 
     under section 1405(1) for operation and maintenance for the 
     Army, $15,000,000 may be made available for the procurement 
     of a sufficient quantity of hemostatic agents, including 
     blood-clotting bandages, for use by members of the Armed 
     Forces in the field so that each soldier serving in Iraq and 
     Afghanistan is issued at least one hemostatic agent and 
     accompanying medical personnel have a sufficient inventory of 
     hemostatic agents.
       (2) of the amount authorized under section 1405(3) for 
     operation and maintenance for the Marine Corps, $5,000,000 
     may be made available for the procurement of a sufficient 
     quantity of hemostatic agents, including blood-clotting 
     bandages, for use by members of the Armed Forces in the field 
     so that each Marine serving in Iraq and Afghanistan is issued 
     at least one hemostatic agent and accompanying medical 
     personnel have a sufficient inventory of hemostatic agents.
       (c) Report.--Not later than 60 days after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall submit 
     to the congressional defense committees a report on the 
     distribution of hemostatic agents to members of the Armed 
     Forces serving in Iraq and Afghanistan, including a 
     description of any distribution problems and attempts to 
     resolve such problems.


                           amendment no. 4345

(Purpose: To specify the qualifications required for instructors in the 
            Junior Reserve Officers' Training Corps Program)

       At the end of subtitle D of title V, add the following new 
     section:

     SEC. 569. JUNIOR RESERVE OFFICERS' TRAINING CORPS INSTRUCTOR 
                   QUALIFICATIONS.

       (a) In General.--Chapter 102 of title 10, United States 
     Code, is amended by adding at the end the following new 
     section:

     ``Sec. 2033. Instructor qualifications

       ``(a) In General.--In order for a retired officer or 
     noncommissioned officer to be employed as an instructor in 
     the program, the officer must be certified by the Secretary 
     of the military department concerned as a qualified 
     instructor in leadership, wellness and fitness, civics, and 
     other courses related to the content of the program, 
     according to the qualifications set forth in subsection 
     (b)(2) or (c)(2), as appropriate.
       ``(b) Senior Military Instructors.--
       ``(1) Role.--Senior military instructors shall be retired 
     officers of the armed forces and shall serve as instructional 
     leaders who oversee the program.
       ``(2) Qualifications.--A senior military instructor shall 
     have the following qualifications:
       ``(A) Professional military qualification, as determined by 
     the Secretary of the military department concerned.
       ``(B) Award of a baccalaureate degree from an institution 
     of higher learning.
       ``(C) Completion of secondary education teaching 
     certification requirements for the program as established by 
     the Secretary of the military department concerned.
       ``(D) Award of an advanced certification by the Secretary 
     of the military department concerned in core content areas 
     based on--
       ``(i) accumulated points for professional activities, 
     services to the profession, awards, and recognitions;
       ``(ii) professional development to meet content knowledge 
     and instructional skills; and
       ``(iii) performance evaluation of competencies and 
     standards within the program through site visits and 
     inspections.
       ``(c) Non-Senior Military Instructors.--
       ``(1) Role.--Non-senior military instructors shall be 
     retired noncommissioned officers of the armed forces and 
     shall serve as instructional leaders and teach independently 
     of, but share program responsibilities with, senior military 
     instructors.
       ``(2) Qualifications.--A non-senior military instructor 
     shall demonstrate a depth of experience, proficiency, and 
     expertise in coaching, mentoring, and practical arts in 
     executing the program, and shall have the following 
     qualifications:
       ``(A) Professional military qualification, as determined by 
     the Secretary of the military department concerned.
       ``(B) Award of an associates degree from an institution of 
     higher learning within 5 years of employment.
       ``(C) Completion of secondary education teaching 
     certification requirements for the program as established by 
     the Secretary of the military department concerned.

[[Page S6349]]

       ``(D) Award of an advanced certification by the Secretary 
     of the military department concerned in core content areas 
     based on--
       ``(i) accumulated points for professional activities, 
     services to the profession, awards, and recognitions;
       ``(ii) professional development to meet content knowledge 
     and instructional skills; and
       ``(iii) performance evaluation of competencies and 
     standards within the program through site visits and 
     inspections.''.
       (b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of sections at the 
     beginning of such chapter is amended by adding at the end the 
     following new item:

       ``2033. Instructor qualifications.''.


                           amendment no. 4368

        (Purpose: Relating to Operation Bahamas, Turks & Caicos)

       At the end of subtitle C of title X, add the following:

     SEC. 1024. OPERATION BAHAMAS, TURKS & CAICOS.

       (a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
       (1) In 1982 the United States Government created Operation 
     Bahamas, Turks & Caicos (OPBAT) to counter the smuggling of 
     cocaine into the United States.
       (2) According to the Drug Enforcement Agency, an estimated 
     80 percent of the cocaine entering the United States in the 
     1980s came through the Bahamas, whereas, according to the 
     Office of National Drug Control Policy, only an estimated 10 
     percent comes through the Bahamas today.
       (3) According to the Drug Enforcement Agency, more than 
     80,000 kilograms of cocaine and nearly 700,000 pounds of 
     marijuana have been seized in Operation Bahamas, Turks & 
     Caicos since 1986, with a combined street value of 
     approximately two trillion dollars.
       (4) The Army has provided military airlift to law 
     enforcement officials under Operation Bahamas, Turks & Caicos 
     to create an effective, reliable, and immediate response 
     capability for drug interdiction. This support is largely 
     responsible for the decline in cocaine shipments to the 
     United States through the Bahamas.
       (5) The Bahamas is an island nation composed of 
     approximately 700 islands and keys, which makes aviation 
     assets the best and most efficient method of transporting law 
     enforcement agents and interdicting smugglers.
       (6) It is in the interests of the United States to maintain 
     the results of the successful Operation Bahamas, Turks & 
     Caicos program and prevent drug smugglers from rebuilding 
     their operations through the Bahamas.
       (b) Report on United States Government Support for OPBAT.--
       (1) Report on decision to withdraw.--Not later than 30 days 
     before implementing a decision to withdraw Department of 
     Defense helicopters from Operation Bahamas, Turks & Caicos, 
     the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the Congress a 
     report outlining the plan for the coordination of the 
     Operation Bahamas, Turks & Caicos mission, at the same level 
     of effectiveness, using other United States Government 
     assets.
       (2) Consultation.--The Secretary of Defense shall consult 
     with the Secretary of State, the Attorney General, and the 
     Secretary of Homeland Security, and with other appropriate 
     officials of the United States Government, in preparing the 
     report under paragraph (1).
       (3) Elements.--The report under paragraph (1) on the 
     withdrawal of equipment referred to in that paragraph shall 
     include the following:
       (A) An explanation of the military justification for the 
     withdrawal of the equipment.
       (B) An assessment of the availability of other options 
     (including other Government helicopters) to provide the 
     capability being provided by the equipment to be withdrawn.
       (C) An explanation of how each option specified under 
     subparagraph (B) will provide the capability currently 
     provided by the equipment to be withdrawn.
       (D) An assessment of the potential use of unmanned aerial 
     vehicles in Operation Bahamas, Turks & Caicos, including the 
     capabilities of such vehicles and any advantages or 
     disadvantages associated with the use of such vehicles in 
     that operation, and a recommendation on whether or not to 
     deploy such vehicles in that operation.


                           amendment no. 4497

 (Purpose: To provide for an independent review and assessment of the 
 organization and management of the Department of Defense for national 
                           security in space)

       At the end of subtitle B of title IX, add the following:

     SEC. 913. INDEPENDENT REVIEW AND ASSESSMENT OF DEPARTMENT OF 
                   DEFENSE ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT FOR 
                   NATIONAL SECURITY IN SPACE.

       (a) Independent Review and Assessment Required.--
       (1) In general.--The Secretary of Defense shall provide for 
     an independent review and assessment of the organization and 
     management of the Department of Defense for national security 
     in space.
       (2) Conduct of review.--The review and assessment shall be 
     conducted by an appropriate entity outside the Department of 
     Defense selected by the Secretary for purposes of this 
     section.
       (3) Elements.--The review and assessment shall address the 
     following:
       (A) The requirements of the Department of Defense for 
     national security space capabilities, as identified by the 
     Department, and the efforts of the Department to fulfill such 
     requirements.
       (B) The future space missions of the Department, and the 
     plans of the Department to meet the future space missions.
       (C) The actions that could be taken by the Department to 
     modify the organization and management of the Department over 
     the near-term, medium-term, and long-term in order to 
     strengthen United States national security in space, and the 
     ability of the Department to implement its requirements and 
     carry out the future space missions, including the following:
       (i) Actions to exploit existing and planned military space 
     assets to provide support for United States military 
     operations.
       (ii) Actions to improve or enhance current interagency 
     coordination processes regarding the operation of national 
     security space assets, including improvements or enhancements 
     in interoperability and communications.
       (iii) Actions to improve or enhance the relationship 
     between the intelligence aspects of national security space 
     (so-called ``black space'') and the non-intelligence aspects 
     of national security space (so-called ``white space'').
       (iv) Actions to improve or enhance the manner in which 
     military space issues are addressed by professional military 
     education institutions.
       (4) Liaison.--The Secretary shall designate at least one 
     senior civilian employee of the Department of Defense, and at 
     least one general or flag officer of an Armed Force, to serve 
     as liaison between the Department, the Armed Forces, and the 
     entity conducting the review and assessment.
       (b) Report.--
       (1) In general.--Not later than one year after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, the entity conducting the review 
     and assessment shall submit to the Secretary and the 
     congressional defense committees a report on the review and 
     assessment.
       (2) Elements.--The report shall include--
       (A) the results of the review and assessment; and
       (B) recommendations on the best means by which the 
     Department may improve its organization and management for 
     national securit in space.


                           amendment no. 4222

(Purpose: To require consideration of the utilization of fuel cells as 
       back-up power systems in Department of Defense operations)

       At the end of subtitle F of title III, add the following:

     SEC. 375. UTILIZATION OF FUEL CELLS AS BACK-UP POWER SYSTEMS 
                   IN DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE OPERATIONS.

       The Secretary of Defense shall consider the utilization of 
     fuel cells as replacements for current back-up power systems 
     in a variety of Department of Defense operations and 
     activities, including in telecommunications networks, 
     perimeter security, and remote facilities, in order to 
     increase the operational longevity of back-up power systems 
     and stand-by power systems in such operations and activities.


                           amendment no. 4498

  (Purpose: To authorize an accession bonus for members of the Armed 
  Forces who are appointed as a commissioned officer after completing 
                       officer candidate school)

       At the end of subtitle B of title VI, add the following:

     SEC. 620. ACCESSION BONUS FOR MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES 
                   APPOINTED AS COMMISSIONED OFFICERS AFTER 
                   COMPLETING OFFICER CANDIDATE SCHOOL.

       (a) Accession Bonus Authorized.--
       (1) In general.--Chapter 5 of title 37, United States Code, 
     is amended by adding at the end the following new section:

     ``Sec. 329. Special pay: accession bonus for officer 
       candidates

       ``(a) Accession Bonus Authorized.--Under regulations 
     prescribed by the Secretary concerned, a person who, during 
     the period beginning on October 1, 2006, and ending on 
     December 31, 2007, executes a written agreement described in 
     subsection (b) may, upon acceptance of the agreement by the 
     Secretary concerned, be paid an accession bonus in an amount 
     not to exceed $8,000 determined by the Secretary concerned.
       ``(b) Agreement.--A written agreement described in this 
     subsection is a written agreement by a person--
       ``(1) to complete officer candidate school;
       ``(2) to accept a commission or appointment as an officer 
     of the armed forces; and
       ``(3) to serve on active duty as a commissioned officer for 
     a period specified in such agreement.
       ``(c) Payment Method.--Upon acceptance of a written 
     agreement under subsection (a) by the Secretary concerned, 
     the total amount of the accession bonus payable under the 
     agreement becomes fixed. The agreement shall specify whether 
     the accession bonus will be paid in a lump sum or 
     installments.
       ``(d) Repayment.--A person who, having received all or part 
     of the bonus under a written agreement under subsection (a), 
     does not complete the total period of active duty as a 
     commissioned officer as specified in such agreement shall be 
     subject to the repayment provisions of section 303a(e) of 
     this title.''.
       (2) Clerical amendment.--The table of sections at the 
     beginning of chapter 5 of such

[[Page S6350]]

     title is amended by adding at the end the following new item:

``329. Special pay: accession bonus for officer candidates.''.

       (3) Effective date.--The amendments made by this subsection 
     shall take effect on October 1, 2006.
       (b) Authority for Payment of Bonus Under Earlier 
     Agreements.--
       (1) In general.--The Secretary of the Army may pay a bonus 
     to a person who, during the period beginning on April 1, 
     2005, and ending on April 6, 2006, executed an agreement to 
     enlist for the purpose of attending officer candidate school 
     and receive a bonus under section 309 of title 37, United 
     States Code, and who has completed the terms of the agreement 
     required for payment of the bonus.
       (2) Limitation on amount.--The amount of the bonus payable 
     to a person under this subsection may not exceed $8,000.
       (3) Construction with enlistment bonus.--The bonus payable 
     under this subsection is in addition to a bonus payable under 
     section 309 of title 37, United States Code, or any other 
     provision of law.


                           amendment no. 4499

(Purpose: To authorize the National Security Agency to collect service 
 charges for the certification or validation of information assurance 
                               products)

       At the end of subtitle D of title X, add the following:

     SEC. 1035. COLLECTION BY NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY OF SERVICE 
                   CHARGES FOR CERTIFICATION OR VALIDATION OF 
                   INFORMATION ASSURANCE PRODUCTS.

       The National Security Agency Act of 1959 (50 U.S.C. 402 
     note) is amended by adding at the end the following new 
     section:
       ``Sec. 20. (a) The Director may collect charges for 
     evaluating, certifying, or validating information assurance 
     products under the National Information Assurance Program or 
     successor program.
       ``(b) The charges collected under subsection (a) shall be 
     established through a public rulemaking process in accordance 
     with Office of Management and Budget Circular No. A-25.
       ``(c) Charges collected under subsection (a) shall not 
     exceed the direct costs of the program referred to in that 
     subsection.
       ``(d) The appropriation or fund bearing the cost of the 
     service for which charges are collected under the program 
     referred to in subsection (a) may be reimbursed, or the 
     Director may require advance payment subject to such 
     adjustment on completion of the work as may be agreed upon.
       ``(e) Amounts collected under this section shall be 
     credited to the account or accounts from which costs 
     associated with such amounts have been or will be incurred, 
     to reimburse or offset the direct costs of the program 
     referred to in subsection (a).''.


                    Amendment No. 4202, As Modified

       At the end of subtitle D of title III, add the following:

     SEC. 352. REPORTS ON WITHDRAWAL OR DIVERSION OF EQUIPMENT 
                   FROM RESERVE UNITS FOR SUPPORT OF RESERVE UNITS 
                   BEING MOBILIZED AND OTHER UNITS.

       (a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
       (1) The National Guard continues to provide invaluable 
     resources to meet national security, homeland defense, and 
     civil emergency mission requirements.
       (2) Current military operations, transnational threats, and 
     domestic emergencies will increase the use of the National 
     Guard for both military support to civilian authorities and 
     to execute the military strategy of the United States.
       (3) To meet the demand for certain types of equipment for 
     continuing United States military operations, the Army has 
     required Army National Guard Units to leave behind many items 
     for use by follow-on forces.
       (4) The Governors of every State and 2 Territories 
     expressed concern in February 2006 that units returning from 
     deployment overseas without adequate equipment would have 
     trouble carrying out their homeland security and domestic 
     disaster duties.
       (5) The Department of Defense estimates that it has 
     directed the Army National Guard to leave overseas more than 
     75,000 items valued at approximately $1,760,000,000 to 
     support Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi 
     Freedom.
       (6) Department of Defense Directive 1225.6 requires a 
     replacement and tracking plan be developed within 90 days for 
     equipment of the reserve components of the Armed Forces that 
     is transferred to the active components of the Armed Forces.
       (7) In October 2005, the Government Accountability Office 
     found that the Department of Defense can only account for 
     about 45 percent of such equipment and has not developed a 
     plan to replace such equipment.
       (8) The Government Accountability Office also found that 
     without a completed and implemented plan to replace all 
     National Guard equipment left overseas, Army National Guard 
     units will likely face growing equipment shortages and 
     challenges in regaining readiness for future missions.
       (b) Reports on Withdrawal or Diversion of Equipment From 
     Reserve Units for Support of Reserve Units Being Mobilized 
     and Other Units.--
       (1) In general.--Chapter 1007 of title 10, United States 
     Code, is amended by inserting after section 10208 the 
     following new section:

     ``Sec. 10208a. Mobilization: reports on withdrawal or 
       diversion of equipment from Reserve units for support of 
       Reserve units being mobilized and other units

       ``(a) Report Required on Withdrawal or Diversion of 
     Equipment.--Not later than 90 days after withdrawing or 
     diverting equipment from a unit of the Reserve to a unit of 
     the Reserve being ordered to active duty under section 12301, 
     12302, or 12304 of this title, or to a unit or units of a 
     regular component of the armed forces, for purposes of the 
     discharge of the mission of such unit or units, the Secretary 
     concerned shall submit to the Secretary of Defense a status 
     report on the withdrawal or diversion of equipment.
       ``(b) Elements.--Each status report under subsection (a) on 
     equipment withdrawn or diverted shall include the following:
       ``(1) A plan to recapitalize or replace such equipment 
     within the unit from which withdrawn or diverted.
       ``(2) If such equipment is to remain in a theater of 
     operations while the unit from which withdrawn or diverted 
     returns to the United States, a plan to provide such unit 
     with recapitalized or replacement equipment appropriate to 
     ensure the continuation of the readiness training of such 
     unit.
       ``(3) A signed memorandum of understanding between the 
     active or reserve component to which withdrawn or diverted 
     and the reserve component from which withdrawn or diverted 
     that specifies--
       ``(A) how such equipment will be tracked; and
       ``(B) when such equipment will be returned to the component 
     from which withdrawn or diverted.''.
       (2) Clerical amendment.--The table of sections at the 
     beginning of chapter 1007 of such title is amended by 
     inserting after the item relating to section 10208 the 
     following new item:

``10208a. Mobilization: reports on withdrawal or diversion of equipment 
              from Reserve units for support of Reserve units being 
              mobilized and other units.''.


                           amendment no. 4500

   (Purpose: To provide for the procurement of replacement equipment)

       At the end of subtitle B of title I, add the following:

     SEC. 114. REPLACEMENT EQUIPMENT.

       (a) Priority.--Priority for the distribution of new and 
     combat serviceable equipment, with associated support and 
     test equipment for active and reserve component forces, shall 
     be given to units scheduled for mission deployment, 
     employment first, or both regardless of component.
       (b) Allocation.--In the amounts authorized to be 
     appropriated by section 101(5) for the procurement of 
     replacement equipment, subject to subsection (a), priority 
     for the distribution of Army National Guard equipment 
     described in subsection (a) may be given to States that have 
     experienced a major disaster, as determined under the Robert 
     T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (42 
     U.S.C. 5121-5206), and may require replacement equipment to 
     respond to future emergencies/disasters only after 
     distribution of new and combat serviceable equipment has been 
     made in accordance with subsection (a).


                           amendment no. 4441

(Purpose: To require a plan to replace equipment withdrawn or diverted 
  from the reserve components of the Armed Forces for Operation Iraqi 
                 Freedom or Operation Enduring Freedom)

       At the end of subtitle D of title III, add the following:

     SEC. 352. PLAN TO REPLACE EQUIPMENT WITHDRAWN OR DIVERTED 
                   FROM THE RESERVE COMPONENTS OF THE ARMED FORCES 
                   FOR OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM OR OPERATION 
                   ENDURING FREEDOM.

       (a) Plan Required.--Not later than 90 days after the date 
     of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall submit to 
     the congressional defense committees a plan to replace 
     equipment withdrawn or diverted from units of the reserve 
     components of the Armed Forces for use in Operation Iraqi 
     Freedom or Operation Enduring Freedom.
       (b) Elements.--The plan required by subsection (a) shall--
       (1) identify the equipment to be recapitalized or acquired 
     to replace the equipment described in subsection (a);
       (2) specify a schedule for recapitalizing or acquiring the 
     equipment identified under paragraph (1), which schedule 
     shall take into account applicable depot workload and 
     acquisition considerations, including production capacity and 
     current production schedules; and
       (3) specify the funding to be required to recapitalize or 
     acquire the equipment identified under paragraph (1)


                    Amendment No. 4231, as modified

       At the end of subtitle B of title VII, add the following:

     SEC. 730. MENTAL HEALTH SELF-ASSESSMENT PROGRAM.

       (a) Finding.--Congress finds that the Mental Health Self-
     Assessment Program (MHSAP) of the Department of Defense is 
     vital to the overall health and well-being of deploying 
     members of the Armed Forces and their families because that 
     program provides--
       (1) a non-threatening, voluntary, anonymous self-assessment 
     of mental health that is effective in helping to detect 
     mental health and substance abuse conditions;

[[Page S6351]]

       (2) awareness regarding warning signs of such conditions; 
     and
       (3) information and outreach to members of the Armed Forces 
     (including members of the National Guard and Reserves) and 
     their families on specific services available for such 
     conditions.
       (b) Expansion of Program.--The Secretary of Defense shall, 
     acting through the Office of Health Affairs of the Department 
     of Defense, take appropriate actions to expand the Mental 
     Health Self-Assessment Program in order to achieve the 
     following:
       (1) The continuous availability of the assessment under the 
     program to members and former members of the Armed Forces in 
     order to ensure the long-term availability of the diagnostic 
     mechanisms of the assessment to detect mental health 
     conditions that may emerge over time.
       (2) The availability of programs and services under the 
     program to address the mental health of dependent children of 
     members of the Armed Forces who have been deployed or 
     mobilized.
       (c) Outreach.--The Secretary shall develop and implement a 
     plan to conduct outreach and other appropriate activities to 
     expand and enhance awareness of the Mental Health Self-
     Assessment Program, and the programs and services available 
     under that program, among members of the Armed Forces 
     (including members of the National Guard and Reserves) and 
     their families.
       (d) Reports.--Not later than one year after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall submit to Congress 
     a report on the actions undertaken under this section during 
     the one-year period ending on the date of such report.


                           amendment no. 4409

(Purpose: To require a report on the provision of an electronic copy of 
military records to members of the Armed Forces upon their discharge or 
                     release from the Armed Forces)

       At the end of subtitle F of title V, add the following:

     SEC. 587. REPORT ON PROVISION OF ELECTRONIC COPY OF MILITARY 
                   RECORDS ON DISCHARGE OR RELEASE OF MEMBERS FROM 
                   THE ARMED FORCES.

       (a) Report Required.--Not later than 120 days after the 
     date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense 
     shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report 
     on the feasibility and advisability of providing an 
     electronic copy of military records (including all military 
     service, medical, and other military records) to members of 
     the Armed Forces on their discharge or release from the Armed 
     Forces.
       (b) Elements.--The report required by subsection (a) shall 
     include the following:
       (1) An estimate of the costs of the provision of military 
     records as described in subsection (a).
       (2) An assessment of providing military records as 
     described in that subsection through the distribution of a 
     portable, readily accessible medium (such as a computer disk 
     or other similar medium) containing such records.
       (3) A description and assessment of the mechanisms required 
     to ensure the privacy of members of the Armed Forces in 
     providing military records as described in that subsection.
       (4) An assessment of the benefits to the members of the 
     Armed Forces of receiving their military records as described 
     in that subsection.
       (5) If the Secretary determines that providing military 
     records to members of the Armed Forces as described in that 
     subsection is feasible and advisable, a plan (including a 
     schedule) for providing such records to members of the Armed 
     Forces as so described in order to ensure that each member of 
     the Armed Forces is provided such records upon discharge or 
     release from the Armed Forces.
       (6) Any other matter to relating to the provision of 
     military records as described in that subsection that the 
     Secretary considers appropriate.


                           amendment no. 4501

   (Purpose: To require a report on vehicle-based active protection 
                systems for certain battlefield threats)

       At the end of subtitle D of title III, add the following:

     SEC. 352. REPORT ON VEHICLE-BASED ACTIVE PROTECTION SYSTEMS 
                   FOR CERTAIN BATTLEFIELD THREATS.

       (a) Independent Assessment.--The Secretary of Defense shall 
     enter into a contract with an appropriate entity independent 
     of the United States Government to conduct an assessment of 
     various foreign and domestic technological approaches to 
     vehicle-based active protection systems for defense against 
     both chemical energy and kinetic energy, top attack, and 
     direct fire threats, including anti-tank missiles and rocket 
     propelled grenades, mortars, and other similar battlefield 
     threats.
       (b) Report.--
       (1) Report required.--The contract required by subsection 
     (a) shall require the entity entering in to such contract to 
     submit to the Secretary of Defense, and to the congressional 
     defense committees, not later than 180 days after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, a report on the assessment 
     required by that subsection.
       (2) Elements.--The report required under paragraph (1) 
     shall include--
       (A) a detailed comparative analysis and assessment of the 
     technical approaches covered by the assessment under 
     subsection (a), including the feasibility, military utility, 
     cost, and potential short-term and long-term development and 
     deployment schedule of such approaches; and
       (B) any other elements specified by the Secretary in the 
     contract under subsection (a).


                           amendment no. 4502

(Purpose: To require an annual report on the amount of the acquisitions 
 made by the Department of Defense of articles, materials, or supplies 
 purchased from entities that manufacture the articles, materials, or 
                 supplies outside of the United States)

       At the end of subtitle G of title X, add the following:

     SEC. 1066. ANNUAL REPORT ON ACQUISITIONS OF ARTICLES, 
                   MATERIALS, AND SUPPLIES MANUFACTURED OUTSIDE 
                   THE UNITED STATES.

       (a) In General.--Not later than March 31 of each year, the 
     Department of Defense shall submit a report to Congress on 
     the amount of the acquisitions made by the agency in the 
     preceding fiscal year of articles, materials, or supplies 
     purchased from entities that manufacture the articles, 
     materials, or supplies outside of the United States.
       (b) Content.--Each report required by subsection (a) shall 
     separately indicate--
       (1) the dollar value of any articles, materials, or 
     supplies purchased that were manufactured outside of the 
     United States;
       (2) an itemized list of all waivers granted with respect to 
     such articles, materials, or supplies under the Buy American 
     Act (41 U.S.C. 10a et seq.); and
       (3) a summary of--
       (A) the total procurement funds expended on articles, 
     materials, and supplies manufactured inside the United 
     States; and
       (B) the total procurement funds expended on articles, 
     materials, and supplies manufactured outside the United 
     States.
       (c) Public Availability.--The Department of Defense 
     submitting a report under subsection (a) shall make the 
     report publicly available to the maximum extent practicable.
       (d) Applicability.--This section shall not apply to 
     acquisitions made by an agency, or component thereof, that is 
     an element of the intelligence community as set forth in or 
     designated under section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 
     1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)).


                           amendment no. 4503

  (Purpose: To require an annual report on foreign military sales and 
  direct sales to foreign customers of significant military equipment 
                 manufactured inside the United States)

       At the end of subtitle G of title X, add the following:

     SEC.  . ANNUAL REPORT ON FOREIGN SALES OF SIGNIFICANT 
                   MILITARY EQUIPMENT MANUFACTURED INSIDE THE 
                   UNITED STATES.

       (a) In General.--Not later than March 31 of each year, the 
     Department of Defense shall submit a report to Congress on 
     foreign military sales and direct sales to foreign customers 
     of significant military equipment manufactured inside the 
     United states.
       (b) Content.--Each report required by subsection (a) shall 
     indicate, for each sale in excess of $2,000,000--
       (1) the nature of the military equipment sold and the 
     dollar value of the sale;
       (2) the country to which the military equipment was sold; 
     and
       (3) the manufacturer of the equipment and the State in 
     which the equipment was manufactured.
       (c) Public Availability.--The Department of Defense shall 
     make reports submitted under this section publicly available 
     to the maximum extent practicable.


                           amendment no. 4504

(Purpose: To expand and enhance the authority of the Secretaries of the 
military departments to remit or cancel indebtedness of members of the 
                             Armed Forces)

       At the end of subtitle E of title VI, add the following:

     SEC. 662. EXPANSION AND ENHANCEMENT OF AUTHORITY TO REMIT OR 
                   CANCEL INDEBTEDNESS OF MEMBERS OF THE ARMED 
                   FORCES.

       (a) Members of the Army.--
       (1) Coverage of all members and former members.--Subsection 
     (a) of section 4837 of title 10, United States Code, is 
     amended by striking ``a member of the Army'' and all that 
     follows through ``in an active status'' and inserting ``a 
     member of the Army (including a member on active duty or a 
     member of a reserve component in an active status), a retired 
     member of the Army, or a former member of the Army''.
       (2) Time for exercise of authority.--Subsection (b) of such 
     section is amended--
       (A) in paragraph (1), by adding ``or'' at the end; and
       (B) by striking paragraphs (2) and (3) and inserting the 
     following new paragraph (2):
       ``(2) in the case of any other member of the Army covered 
     by subsection (a), during such period or periods as the 
     Secretary of Defense may provide in regulations prescribed by 
     the Secretary of Defense.''.
       (3) Repeal of termination of modified authority.--Paragraph 
     (3) of section 683(a) of the National Defense Authorization 
     Act for Fiscal Year 2006 (Public Law 109-163; 119 Stat. 3322; 
     10 U.S.C. 4837 note) is repealed.
       (b) Members of the Navy.--
       (1) Coverage of all members and former members.--Section 
     6161 of title 10, United

[[Page S6352]]

     States Code, is amended by striking ``a member of the Navy'' 
     and all that follows through ``in an active status'' and 
     inserting ``a member of the Navy (including a member on 
     active duty or a member of a reserve component in an active 
     status), a retired member of the Navy , or a former member of 
     the Navy''.
       (2) Time for exercise of authority.--Subsection (b) of such 
     section is amended--
       (A) in paragraph (1), by adding ``or'' at the end; and
       (B) by striking paragraphs (2) and (3) and inserting the 
     following new paragraph (2):
       ``(2) in the case of any other member of the Navy covered 
     by subsection (a), during such period or periods as the 
     Secretary of Defense may provide in regulations prescribed by 
     the Secretary of Defense.''.
       (3) Repeal of termination of modified authority.--Paragraph 
     (3) of section 683(b) of the National Defense Authorization 
     Act for Fiscal Year 2006 (119 Stat. 3323; 10 U.S.C. 6161 
     note) is repealed.
       (c) Members of the Air Force.--
       (1) Coverage of all members and former members.--Subsection 
     (a) of section 4837 of title 10, United States Code, is 
     amended by striking ``a member of the Air Force'' and all 
     that follows through ``in an active status'' and inserting 
     ``a member of the Air Force (including a member on active 
     duty or a member of a reserve component in an active status), 
     a retired member of the Air Force, or a former member of the 
     Air Force''.
       (2) Time for exercise of authority.--Subsection (b) of such 
     section is amended--
       (A) in paragraph (1), by adding ``or'' at the end; and
       (B) by striking paragraphs (2) and (3) and inserting the 
     following new paragraph (2):
       ``(2) in the case of any other member of the Air Force 
     covered by subsection (a), during such period or periods as 
     the Secretary of Defense may provide in regulations 
     prescribed by the Secretary of Defense.''.
       (3) Repeal of termination of modified authority.--Paragraph 
     (3) of section 683(c) of the National Defense Authorization 
     Act for Fiscal Year 2006 (119 Stat. 3324; 10 U.S.C. 9837 
     note) is repealed.
       (d) Deadline for Regulations.--The Secretary of Defense 
     shall prescribe the regulations required for purposes of 
     sections 4837, 6161, and 9837 of title 10, United States 
     Code, as amended by this section, not later than March 1, 
     2007.


                           amendment no. 4505

  (Purpose: To provide an exception for notice to consumer reporting 
agencies regarding debts or erroneous payments for which a decision to 
                      waive or cancel is pending)

       At the end of subtitle E of title VI, add the following:

     SEC. 662. EXCEPTION FOR NOTICE TO CONSUMER REPORTING AGENCIES 
                   REGARDING DEBTS OR ERRONEOUS PAYMENTS PENDING A 
                   DECISION TO WAIVE, REMIT, OR CANCEL.

       (a) Exception.--Section 2780(b) of title 10, United States 
     Code, is amended--
       (1) by striking ``The Secretary'' and inserting ``(1) 
     Except as provided in paragraph (2), the Secretary''; and
       (2) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
       ``(2) No disclosure shall be made under paragraph (1) with 
     respect to an indebtedness while a decision regarding waiver 
     of collection is pending under section 2774 of this title, or 
     a decision regarding remission or cancellation is pending 
     under section 4837, 6161, or 9837 of this title, unless the 
     Secretary concerned (as defined in section 101(5) of title 
     37), or the designee of such Secretary, determines that 
     disclosure under that paragraph pending such decision is in 
     the best interests of the United States.''.
       (b) Effective Date.--
       (1) In general.--The amendments made by this section shall 
     take effect on March 1, 2007.
       (2) Application to prior actions.--Paragraph (2) of section 
     2780(b) of title 10, United States Code (as added by 
     subsection (a)), shall not be construed to apply to or 
     invalidate any action taken under such section before March 
     1, 2007.
       (c) Report.--Not later than March 1, 2007, the Secretary of 
     Defense shall submit to the congressional defense committees 
     a report on the exercise of the authority in section 2780(b) 
     of title 10, United States Code, including--
       (1) the total number of members of the Armed Forces who 
     have been reported to consumer reporting agencies under such 
     section;
       (2) the circumstances under which such authority has been 
     exercised, or waived (as provided in paragraph (2) of such 
     section (as amended by subsection (a))), and by whom;
       (3) the cost of contracts for collection services to 
     recover indebtedness owed to the United States that is 
     delinquent;
       (4) an evaluation of whether or not such contracts, and the 
     practice of reporting military debtors to collection 
     agencies, has been effective in reducing indebtedness to the 
     United States; and
       (5) such recommendations as the Secretary considers 
     appropriate regarding the continuing use of such authority 
     with respect to members of the Armed Forces.


                           amendment no. 4506

  (Purpose: To enhance authority relating to the waiver of claims for 
   overpayment of pay and allowances of members of the Armed Forces)

       At the end of subtitle E of title VI, add the following:

     SEC. 662. ENHANCEMENT OF AUTHORITY TO WAIVE CLAIMS FOR 
                   OVERPAYMENT OF PAY AND ALLOWANCES.

       (a) Clarification of Pay and Allowances.--Subsection (a) of 
     section 2774 of title 10, United States Code, is amended in 
     the matter preceding paragraph (1) by inserting ``(including 
     any bonus or special or incentive pay)'' after ``pay or 
     allowances''.
       (b) Waiver by Secretaries Concerned.--Paragraph (2) of such 
     subsection is amended--
       (1) in the matter preceding subparagraph (A), by inserting 
     ``or the designee of such Secretary'' after ``title 37,''; 
     and
       (2) in subparagraph (A), by striking ``$1,500'' and 
     inserting ``$10,000''.
       (c) Time for Waiver.--Subsection (b)(2) of such section is 
     amended by striking ``three years'' and inserting ``five 
     years''.
       (d) Effective Date.--The amendments made by this section 
     shall take effect on March 1, 2007.
       (e) Deadline for Revised Standards.--The Director of the 
     Office of Management and Budget and the Secretary of Defense 
     shall prescribe any modifications to the standards under 
     section 2774 of title 10, United States Code, that are 
     required or authorized by reason of the amendments made by 
     this section not later than March 1, 2007.


                           amendment no. 4331

   (Purpose: To establish requirements with respect to the terms of 
   consumer credit extended by a creditor to a servicemember or the 
         dependent of a servicemember, and for other purposes)

       At the appropriate place, insert the following:

     SEC. ___. TERMS OF CONSUMER CREDIT EXTENDED TO SERVICEMEMBER 
                   OR SERVICEMEMBER'S DEPENDENT.

       (a) Terms of Consumer Credit.--Title II of the 
     Servicemembers Civil Relief Act (50 U.S.C. App. 521 et seq.) 
     is amended by adding at the end the following new section:

     ``SEC. 208. TERMS OF CONSUMER CREDIT.

       ``(a) Interest.--A creditor who extends consumer credit to 
     a servicemember or a servicemember's dependent shall not 
     require the servicemember or the servicemember's dependent to 
     pay interest with respect to the extension of such credit, 
     except as--
       ``(1) agreed to under the terms of the credit agreement or 
     promissory note;
       ``(2) authorized by applicable State or Federal law; and
       ``(3) not specifically prohibited by this section.
       ``(b) Annual Percentage Rate.--A creditor described in 
     subsection (a) shall not impose an annual percentage rate 
     greater than 36 percent with respect to the consumer credit 
     extended to a servicemember or a servicemember's dependent.
       ``(c) Mandatory Loan Disclosures.--
       ``(1) Information required.--With respect to any extension 
     of consumer credit to a servicemember or a servicemember's 
     dependent, a creditor shall provide to the servicemember or 
     the servicemember's dependent the following information in 
     writing, at or before the issuance of the credit:
       ``(A) A statement of the annual percentage rate applicable 
     to the extension of credit.
       ``(B) Any disclosures required under the Truth in Lending 
     Act (15 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.).
       ``(C) A clear description of the payment obligations of the 
     servicemember or the servicemember's dependent, as 
     applicable.
       ``(2) Terms.--Such disclosures shall be presented in 
     accordance with terms prescribed by the regulations issued by 
     the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System to 
     implement the Truth in Lending Act (15 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.).
       ``(d) Limitation.--A creditor described in subsection (a) 
     shall not automatically renew, repay, refinance, or 
     consolidate with the proceeds of other credit extended by the 
     same creditor any consumer credit extended to a servicemember 
     or a servicemember's dependent without--
       ``(1) executing new loan documentation signed by the 
     servicemember or the servicemember's dependent, as 
     applicable; and
       ``(2) providing the loan disclosures described in 
     subsection (c) to the servicemember or the servicemember's 
     dependent.
       ``(e) Preemption.--Except as provided in subsection (f)(2), 
     this section preempts any State or Federal law, rule, or 
     regulation, including any State usury law, to the extent that 
     such laws, rules, or regulations are inconsistent with this 
     section, except that this section shall not preempt any such 
     law, rule, or regulation that provides additional protection 
     to a servicemember or a servicemember's dependent.
       ``(f) Penalties.--
       ``(1) Misdemeanor.--Any creditor who knowingly violates 
     this section shall be fined as provided in title 18, United 
     States Code, or imprisoned for not more than one year, or 
     both.
       ``(2) Preservation of other remedies.--The remedies and 
     rights provided under this section are in addition to and do 
     not preclude any remedy otherwise available under law to the 
     person claiming relief under this section, including any 
     award for consequential and punitive damages.
       ``(g) Definition.--For purposes of this section, the term 
     `interest' includes service charges, renewal charges, fees, 
     or any other charges (except bona fide insurance) with 
     respect to the extension of consumer credit.''.
       (b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents of the 
     Servicemembers Civil Relief

[[Page S6353]]

     Act (50 U.S.C. App. 501) is amended by inserting after the 
     item relating to section 207 the following new item:

``Sec. 208. Terms of consumer credit''.


                           Amendment no. 4507

(Purpose: To Require the President to Conduct a Review of Circumstances 
 Establishing Eligibility for the Purple Heart for former prisoners of 
 war dying in or due to captivity and to Report to the Congress on the 
 Advisability of Modifying the Criteria for Award of the Purple Heart)

       At the appropriate place, add the following:
       (a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
       (1) The Purple Heart is the oldest military decoration in 
     the world in present use;
       (2) The Purple Heart was established on August 7, 1782, 
     during the Revolutionary War, when General George Washington 
     issued an order establishing the Honorary Badge of 
     Distinction, otherwise known as the Badge of Military Merit;
       (3) The award of the Purple Heart ceased with the end of 
     the Revolutionary War, but was revived in 1932, the 200th 
     anniversary of George Washington's birth, out of respect for 
     his memory and military achievements by War Department 
     General Orders No. 3, dated February 22, 1932.
       (4) The criteria for the award was originally announced in 
     War Department Circular dated February 22, 1932, and revised 
     by Presidential Executive Order 9277, dated December 3, 1942; 
     Executive Order 10409, dated February 12, 1952, Executive 
     Order 11016, dated April 25, 1962, and Executive Order 12464, 
     dated February 23, 1984.
       (5) The Purple Heart is awarded in the name of the 
     President of the United States as Commander in Chief to 
     members of the Armed Forces who qualify under criteria set 
     forth by Presidential Executive Order.
       (b) Determination.--As part of the review and report 
     required in subsection (d), the President shall make a 
     determination on expanding eligibility to all deceased 
     servicemembers held as a prisoner of war after December 7, 
     1941 and who meet the criteria establishing eligibility for 
     the prisoner-of-war medal under section 1128 of Title 10 but 
     who do not meet the criteria establishing eligibility for the 
     Purple Heart.
       (c) Requirements.--In making the determination described in 
     subsection (b), the President shall take into consideration--
       (1) the brutal treatment endured by thousands of POWs 
     incarcerated by enemy forces;
       (2) that many service members died due to starvation, 
     abuse, the deliberate withholding of medical treatment for 
     injury or disease, or other causes which do not currently 
     meet the criteria for award of the Purple Heart;
       (3) the views of veteran organizations, including the 
     Military Order of the Purple Heart;
       (4) the importance and gravity that has been assigned to 
     determining all available facts prior to a decision to award 
     the Purple Heart, and
       (5) the views of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint 
     Chiefs of Staff:
       (d) Report.--Not later than March 1, 2007, the President 
     shall provide the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate 
     and House of Representatives a report on the advisability of 
     modifying the criteria for the award of the Purple Heart to 
     authorize the award of the Purple Heart to military members 
     who die in captivity under unknown circumstances or as a 
     result of conditions and treatment which currently do not 
     qualify the decedent for award of the Purple Heart; and for 
     military members who survive captivity as prisoners of war, 
     but die thereafter as a result of disease or disability 
     incurred during captivity.


                           amendment no. 4508

  (Purpose: To modify the qualifications for leadership of the Naval 
                          Postgraduate School)

       At the end of part I of subtitle A of title V, add the 
     following:

     SEC. 509. MODIFICATION OF QUALIFICATIONS FOR LEADERSHIP OF 
                   THE NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL.

       Section 7042(a) of title 10, United States Code, is 
     amended--
       (1) in paragraph (1)(A)--
       (A) by inserting ``active-duty or retired'' after ``An'';
       (B) by inserting ``or Marine Corps'' after ``Navy'';
       (C) by inserting ``or colonel, respectively'' after 
     ``captain''; and
       (D) by inserting ``or assigned'' after ``detailed'';
       (2) in paragraph (2), by inserting ``and the Commandant of 
     the Marine Corps'' after ``Operations''; and
       (3) in paragraph (4)(A)--
       (A) by inserting ``(unless such individual is a retired 
     officer of the Navy or Marine Corps in a grade not below the 
     grade of captain or colonel, respectively)'' after ``in the 
     case of a civilian'';
       (B) by inserting ``active-duty or retired'' after ``in the 
     case of an''; and
       (C) by inserting ``or Marine Corps'' after ``Navy''.


                           amendment no. 4509

   (Purpose: To provide that the Secretary of the Army shall not be 
considered an owner or operator for purposes of environmental liability 
   in connection with the construction of any portion of the Fairfax 
County Parkway off the Engineer Proving Ground, Fort Belvoir, Virginia, 
              that is not owned by the Federal Government)

       On page 555, strike lines 1 through line 12 and insert the 
     following:
       ``(B) With respect to activities related to the 
     construction of any portion of the Fairfax County Parkway off 
     the Engineer Proving Ground that is not owned by the Federal 
     Government, the Secretary of the Army shall not be considered 
     an owner or operator for purposes of the Comprehensive 
     Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 
     1980 (42 U.S.C. 9601 et seq.).


                           amendment no. 4510

  (Purpose: To increase the number of options periods authorized for 
       extension of current contracts under the TRICARE program)

       At the end of subtitle B of title VII, add the following:

     SEC. 730. ADDITIONAL AUTHORIZED OPTION PERIODS FOR EXTENSION 
                   OF CURRENT CONTRACTS UNDER TRICARE.

       (a) Additional Number of Authorized Periods.--
       (1) In general.--The Secretary of Defense, after consulting 
     with the other administering Secretaries, may extend any 
     contract for the delivery of health care entered into under 
     section 1097 of title 10, United States Code, that is in 
     force on the date of the enactment of this Act by one year, 
     and upon expiration of such extension by one additional year, 
     if the Secretary determines that such extension--
       (A) is in the best interests of the United States; and
       (B) will--
       (i) facilitate the effective administration of the TRICARE 
     program; or
       (ii) ensure continuity in the delivery of health care under 
     the TRICARE program.
       (2) Limitation on number of extensions.--The total number 
     of one-year extensions of a contract that may be granted 
     under paragraph (1) may not exceed 2 extensions.
       (3) Notice and wait.--The Secretary may not commence the 
     exercise of the authority in paragraph (1) until 30 days 
     after the date on which the Secretary submits to the 
     congressional defense committees a report setting forth the 
     minimum level of performance by an incumbent contractor under 
     a contract covered by such paragraph that will be required by 
     the Secretary in order to be eligible for an extension 
     authorized by such paragraph.
       (4) Definitions.--In this subsection, the terms 
     ``administering Secretaries'' and ``TRICARE program'' have 
     the meaning given such terms in section 1072 of title 10, 
     United States Code.
       (b) Report on Contracting Mechanisms for Health Care 
     Service Support Contracts.--Not later than 180 days after the 
     date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall submit 
     to the congressional defense committees a report on 
     contracting mechanisms under consideration for future 
     contracts for health care service support under section 1097 
     of title 10, United States Code. The report shall include an 
     assessment of the advantages and disadvantages for the 
     Department of Defense (including the potential for 
     stimulating competition and the effect on health care 
     beneficiaries of the Department) of providing in such 
     contracts for a single term of 5 years, with a single 
     optional period of extension of an additional 5 years if 
     performance under such contract is rated as ``excellent''.


                           amendment no. 4219

(Purpose: To rename the death gratuity payable for deaths of members of 
             the Armed Forces as fallen hero compensation)

       At the end of subtitle D of title VI, add the following:

     SEC. 648. RENAMING OF DEATH GRATUITY PAYABLE FOR DEATHS OF 
                   MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES AS FALLEN HERO 
                   COMPENSATION.

       (a) In General.--Subchapter II of chapter 75 of title 10, 
     United States Code, is amended as follows:
       (1) In section 1475(a), by striking ``have a death gratuity 
     paid'' and inserting ``have fallen hero compensation paid''.
       (2) In section 1476(a)--
       (A) in paragraph (1), by striking ``a death gratuity'' and 
     inserting ``fallen hero compensation''; and
       (B) in paragraph (2), by striking ``A death gratuity'' and 
     inserting ``Fallen hero compensation''.
       (3) In section 1477(a), by striking ``A death gratuity'' 
     and inserting ``Fallen hero compensation''.
       (4) In section 1478(a), by striking ``The death gratuity'' 
     and inserting ``The amount of fallen hero compensation''.
       (5) In section 1479(1), by striking ``the death gratuity'' 
     and inserting ``fallen hero compensation''.
       (6) In section 1489--
       (A) in subsection (a), by striking ``a gratuity'' in the 
     matter preceding paragraph (1) and inserting ``fallen hero 
     compensation''; and
       (B) in subsection (b)(2), by inserting ``or other 
     assistance'' after ``lesser death gratuity''.
       (b) Clerical Amendments.--
       (1) Heading amendments.--Such subchapter is further amended 
     by striking ``DEATH GRATUITY:'' each place it appears in the 
     heading of sections 1475 through 1480 and 1489 and inserting 
     ``FALLEN HERO COMPENSATION:''.
       (2) Table of sections.--The table of sections at the 
     beginning of such subchapter is amended by striking ``Death 
     gratuity:'' in the items relating to sections 1474 through 
     1480 and 1489 and inserting ``Fallen hero compensation:''.

[[Page S6354]]

       (c) General References.--Any reference to a death gratuity 
     payable under subchapter II of chapter 75 of title 10, United 
     States Code, in any law, regulation, document, paper, or 
     other record of the United States shall be deemed to be a 
     reference to fallen hero compensation payable under such 
     subchapter, as amended by this section.


                           amendment no. 4386

  (Purpose: To require a joint family support assistance program for 
                families of members of the Armed Forces)

       At the end of subtitle E of title VI, add the following:

     SEC. 662. JOINT FAMILY SUPPORT ASSISTANCE PROGRAM.

       (a) Program Required.--The Secretary of Defense shall carry 
     out a joint family support assistance program for the purpose 
     of providing assistance to families of members of the Armed 
     Forces.
       (b) Locations.--
       (1) In general.--The Secretary shall carry out the program 
     for at least six regions of the country through sites 
     established by the Secretary for purposes of the program in 
     such regions.
       (2) Location of certain sites.--At least three of the sites 
     established under paragraph (1) shall be located in an area 
     that it geographically isolated from military installations.
       (c) Functions.--The Secretary shall provide assistance to 
     families of the members of the Armed Forces under the program 
     by providing at each site established for purposes of the 
     program under subsection (b) the following:
       (1) Financial, material, and other assistance to families 
     of members of the Armed Forces.
       (2) Mobile support services to families of members of the 
     Armed Forces.
       (3) Sponsorship of volunteers and family support 
     professionals for the delivery of support services to 
     families of members of the Armed Forces.
       (4) Coordination of family assistance programs and 
     activities provided by Military OneSource, Military Family 
     Life Consultants, counselors, the Department of Defense, 
     other departments and agencies of the Federal Government, 
     State and local agencies, and non-profit entities.
       (5) Facilitation of discussion on military family 
     assistance programs, activities, and initiatives between and 
     among the organizations, agencies, and entities referred to 
     in paragraph (4).
       (d) Resources.--
       (1) In general.--The Secretary shall provide personnel and 
     other resources necessary for the implementation and 
     operation of the program at each site established under 
     subsection (b).
       (2) Acceptance of certain services.--In providing resources 
     under paragraph (1), the Secretary may accept and utilize the 
     services of non-Federal Government volunteers and non-profit 
     entities.
       (e) Procedures.--The Secretary shall establish procedures 
     for the operation of each site established under subsection 
     (b) and for the provision of assistance to families of 
     members of the Armed Forces at such site.
       (f) Implementation Plan.--
       (1) Plan required.--Not later than 30 days after the first 
     obligation of amounts for the program, the Secretary shall 
     submit to the congressional defense committees a report 
     setting forth a plan for the implementation of the program.
       (2) Elements.--The plan required under paragraph (1) shall 
     include the following:
       (A) A description of the actions taken to select and 
     establish sites for the program under subsection (b).
       (B) A description of the procedures established under 
     subsection (d).
       (C) A review of proposed actions to be taken under the 
     program to improve coordination on family assistance program 
     and activities between and among the Department of Defense, 
     other departments and agencies of the Federal Government, 
     State and local agencies, and non-profit entities.
       (g) Report.--
       (1) In general.--Not later than 270 days after the first 
     obligation of amounts for the program, the Secretary shall 
     submit to the congressional defense committees a report on 
     the program.
       (2) Elements.--The report shall include the following:
       (A) A description of the program, including each site 
     established for purposes of the program, the procedures 
     established under subsection (d) for operations at each such 
     site, and the assistance provided through each such site for 
     families of members of the Armed Forces.
       (B) An assessment of the effectiveness of the program in 
     providing assistance to families of members of the Armed 
     Forces.
       (C) An assessment of the advisability of extending the 
     program or making it permanent.
       (h) Assistance to Non-Profit Entities Providing Assistance 
     to Military Families.--The Secretary may provide financial, 
     material, and other assistance to non-profit entities in 
     order to facilitate the provision by such entities of 
     assistance to geographically isolated families of members of 
     the Armed Forces.
       (i) Sunset.--The program required by this section, and the 
     authority to provide assistance under subsection (h), shall 
     cease upon the date that is three years after the first 
     obligation of amounts for the program.
       (j) Funding.--Of the amount authorized to be appropriated 
     by section 301(5) for operation and maintenance for Defense-
     wide activities, $5,000,000 may be available for the program 
     required by this section and the provision of assistance 
     under subsection (h).


                           amendment no. 4511

  (Purpose: To clarify the repeal of the requirement of reduction of 
      Survivor Benefit Plan annuities by dependency and indemnity 
                             compensation)

       On page 223, strike line 14 and all that follows through 
     line 23, and insert the following:
       (a) Repeal.--
       (1) In general.--Subchapter II of chapter 73 of title 10, 
     United States Code, is amended as follows:
       (A) In section 1450, by striking subsection (c).
       (B) In section 1451(c)--
       (i) by striking paragraph (2); and
       (ii) by redesignating paragraphs (3) and (4) as paragraphs 
     (2) and (3), respectively.
       (2) Conforming amendments.--Such subchapter is further 
     amended as follows:
       (A) In section 1450--
       (i) by striking subsection (e); and
       (ii) by striking subsection (k).
       (B) In section 1451(g)(1), by striking subparagraph (C).
       (C) In section 1452--
       (i) in subsection (f)(2), by striking ``does not apply--'' 
     and all that follows and inserting ``does not apply in the 
     case of a deduction made through administrative error.''; and
       (ii) by striking subsection (g).
       (D) In section 1455(c), by striking ``, 1450(k)(2),''.
       On page 224, line 15, strike ``Code,'' and insert ``Code 
     (as in effect on the day before the effective date provided 
     under subsection (e)),''.
       On page 225, line 13, strike ``1448(d)(2)B)'' and insert 
     ``1448(d)(2)(B)''.


                           amendment no. 4197

(Purpose: To modify the effect date of the termination of the phase-in 
     of concurrent receipt of retired pay and veterans disability 
compensation for veterans with service-connected disabilities rated as 
                  total by virtue of unemployability)

       At the end of subtitle D of title VI, add the following:

     SEC. 648. EFFECTIVE DATE OF TERMINATION OF PHASE-IN OF 
                   CONCURRENT RECEIPT FOR VETERANS WITH SERVICE-
                   CONNECTED DISABILITIES RATED AS TOTAL BY VIRTUE 
                   OF UNEMPLOYABILITY.

       (a) In General.--Section 1414(a)(1) of title 10, United 
     States Code, is amended by striking ``100 percent'' the first 
     place it appears and all that follows and inserting ``100 
     percent and in the case of a qualified retiree receiving 
     veterans' disability compensation at the rate payable for a 
     100 percent disability by reason of a determination of 
     individual unemployability, payment of retired pay to such 
     veteran is subject to subsection (c) only during the period 
     beginning on January 1, 2004, and ending on December 31, 
     2004.''.
       (b) Effective Date.--The amendment made by subsection (a) 
     shall take effect on December 31, 2004.


                           amendment no. 4512

(Purpose: To modify certain additional authorities for purposes of the 
                 targeted shaping of the Armed Forces)

       On page 214, strike line 3 and insert the following:
       (b) Relaxation of Limitation on Selective Early 
     Retirement.--Section 638(a)(2) of title 10, United States 
     Code, is amended by adding at the end the following new 
     sentence: ``However, during the period beginning on October 
     1, 2006, and ending on December 31, 2012, such number may be 
     more than 30 percent of the number of officers considered in 
     each competitive category, but may not be more than 30 
     percent of the number of officers considered in each 
     grade.''.
       (c) Enhanced Authority for Selective Early Retirement and 
     Early Discharges.--
       (1) Renewal of authority.--Subsection (a) of section 638a 
     of title 10, United States Code, is amended by inserting 
     ``and during the period beginning on October 1, 2006, and 
     ending on December 31, 2012,'' after ``December 31, 2001,''.
       (2) Relaxation of limitation on selective early 
     retirement.--Subsection (c)(1) of such section is amended by 
     adding at the end the following new sentence: ``However, 
     during the period beginning on October 1, 2006, and ending on 
     December 31, 2012, such number may be more than 30 percent of 
     the number of officers considered in each competitive 
     category, but may not be more than 30 percent of the number 
     of officers considered in each grade.''.
       (3) Relaxation of limitation on selective early 
     discharge.--Subsection (d)(2) of such section is amended--
       (A) in subparagraph (A), by inserting before the semicolon 
     the following: ``, except that during the period beginning on 
     October 1, 2006, and ending on December 31, 2012, such number 
     may be more than 30 percent of the officers considered in 
     each competitive category, but may not be more than 30 
     percent of the number of officers considered in each grade''; 
     and
       (B) in subparagraph (B), by inserting before the period the 
     following: ``, except that during the period beginning on 
     October 1, 2006, and ending on December 31, 2012, such number 
     may be more than 30 percent of the officers considered in 
     each competitive category, but may not be more than 30 
     percent

[[Page S6355]]

     of the number of officers considered in each grade''.
       (d) Increase in Amount of Incentive Bonus


                           amendment no. 4513

 (Purpose: To provide for the determination of the retired pay base or 
 retain pay base of a general or flag officer based on actual rates of 
basic pay rather than on amounts payable under the ceiling on the basic 
                         pay of such officers)

       At the end of subtitle D of title VI, add the following:

     SEC. 648. DETERMINATION OF RETIRED PAY BASE OF GENERAL AND 
                   FLAG OFFICERS BASED ON RATES OF BASIC PAY 
                   PROVIDED BY LAW.

       (a) Determination of Retired Pay Base.--
       (1) In general.--Chapter 71 of title 10, United States 
     Code, is amended by inserting after section 1407 the 
     following new section:

     ``Sec. 1407a. Retired pay base: members who were general or 
       flag officers

       ``Notwithstanding any other provision of law, if the 
     determination of the retired pay base or retainer pay base 
     under section 1406 or 1407 of this title with respect to a 
     person who was a commissioned officer in pay grades O-7 
     through O-10 involves a rate or rates of basic pay that were 
     subject to a reduction under section 203(a)(2) of title 37, 
     such determination shall be made utilizing such rate or rates 
     of basic pay in effect as provided by law rather than such 
     rate or rates as so reduced under section 203(a)(2) of title 
     37.''.
       (2) Clerical amendment.--The table of sections for chapter 
     71 of such title is amended by inserting after the item 
     relating to section 1407 the following new item:

       ``1407a. Retired pay base: members who were general or flag 
           officers.''.

       (b) Effective Date.--The amendments made by subsection (a) 
     shall take effect on October 1, 2006, and shall apply with 
     respect to the computation of retired pay for members of the 
     Armed Forces who retire on or after that date.


                           amendment no. 4514

 (Purpose: To provide in the calculation of retired pay for members of 
   the Armed Forces that service in excess of 30 years shall not be 
   subject to the maximum limit on the percentage of the retired pay 
                              multiplier)

       At the end of subtitle D of title VI, add the following:

     SEC. 648. INAPPLICABILITY OF RETIRED PAY MULTIPLIER MAXIMUM 
                   PERCENTAGE TO SERVICE OF MEMBERS OF THE ARMED 
                   FORCES IN EXCESS OF 30 YEARS.

       (a) In General.--Paragraph (3) of section 1409(b) of title 
     10, United States Code, is amended to read as follows:
       ``(3) 30 Years of service.--
       ``(A) Retirement before january 1, 2007.--In the case of a 
     member who retires before January 1, 2007, with more than 30 
     years of creditable service, the percentage to be used under 
     subsection (a) is 75 percent.
       ``(B) Retirement after december 31, 2006.--In the case of a 
     member who retires after December 31, 2006, with more than 30 
     years of creditable service, the percentage to be used under 
     subsection (a) is the sum of--
       ``(i) 75 percent; and
       ``(ii) the product (stated as a percentage) of--

       ``(I) 2\1/2\; and
       ``(II) the member's years of creditable service (as defined 
     in subsection (c)) in excess of 30 years of creditable 
     service in any service, regardless of when served, under 
     conditions authorized for purposes of this subparagraph 
     during a period designated by the Secretary of Defense for 
     purposes of this subparagraph.''.

       (b) Retired Pay for Non-Regular Service.--Section 12739(c) 
     of such title is amended--
       (1) by striking ``The total amount'' and inserting ``(1) 
     Except as provided in paragraph (2), the total amount''; and
       (2) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
       ``(2) In the case of a person who retires after December 
     31, 2006, with more than 30 years of service credited to that 
     person under section 12733 of this title, the total amount of 
     the monthly retired pay computed under subsections (a) and 
     (b) may not exceed the sum of--
       ``(A) 75 percent of the retired pay base upon which the 
     computation is based; and
       ``(B) the product of--
       ``(i) the retired pay base upon which the computation is 
     based; and
       ``(ii) 2\1/2\ percent of the years of service credited to 
     that person under section 12733 of this title for service, 
     regardless of when served, under conditions authorized for 
     purposes of this paragraph during a period designated by the 
     Secretary of Defense for purposes of this paragraph.''.


                           AMENDMENT NO. 4515

    (Purpose: To modify the commencement date of eligibility for an 
    optional annuity for dependents under the Survivor Benefit Plan)

       At the end of subtitle D of title VI, add the following:

     SEC. 648. MODIFICATION OF ELIGIBILITY FOR COMMENCEMENT OF 
                   AUTHORITY FOR OPTIONAL ANNUITIES FOR DEPENDENTS 
                   UNDER THE SURVIVOR BENEFIT PLAN.

       (a) In General.--Section 1448(d)(2)(B) of title 10, United 
     States Code, is amended by striking ``who dies after November 
     23, 2003'' and inserting ``who dies after October 7, 2001''.
       (b) Applicability.--Any annuity payable to a dependent 
     child under subchapter II of chapter 73 of title 10, United 
     States Code, by reason of the amendment made by subsection 
     (a) shall be payable only for months beginning on or after 
     the date of the enactment of this Act.


                           AMENDMENT NO. 4342

   (Purpose: To modify the time limitation for use of entitlement to 
    educational assistance for reserve component members supporting 
              contingency operations and other operations)

       At the end of subtitle D of title V, add the following:

     SEC. 569. MODIFICATION OF TIME LIMIT FOR USE OF ENTITLEMENT 
                   TO EDUCATIONAL ASSISTANCE FOR RESERVE COMPONENT 
                   MEMBERS SUPPORTING CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS AND 
                   OTHER OPERATIONS.

       (a) Modification.--Section 16164(a) of title 10, United 
     States Code, is amended by striking ``this chapter while 
     serving--'' and all that follows and inserting ``this 
     chapter--
       ``(1) while the member is serving--
       ``(A) in the Selected Reserve of the Ready Reserve, in the 
     case of a member called or ordered to active service while 
     serving in the Selected Reserve; or
       ``(B) in the Ready Reserve, in the case of a member ordered 
     to active duty while serving in the Ready Reserve (other than 
     the Selected Reserve); and
       ``(2) in the case of a person who separates from the 
     Selected Reserve of the Ready Reserve after completion of a 
     period of active service described in section 16163 of this 
     title and completion of a service contract under other than 
     dishonorable conditions, during the 10-year period beginning 
     on the date on which the person separates from the Selected 
     Reserve.''.
       (b) Conforming Amendment.--Paragraph (2) of section 
     16165(a) of such title is amended to read as follows:
       ``(2) when the member separates from the Ready Reserve as 
     provided in section 16164(a)(1) of this title, or upon 
     completion of the period provided for in section 16164(a)(2) 
     of this title, as applicable.''.
       (c) Effective Date.--The amendments made by this section 
     shall take effect on October 28, 2004, as if included in the 
     enactment of the Ronald W. Reagan National Defense 
     Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 (Public Law 108-375), 
     to which such amendments relate.


                           AMENDMENT NO. 4365

  (Purpose: To reduce the eligibility age for receipt of non-regular 
military service retired pay for members of the Ready Reserve in active 
federal status or on active duty for significant periods and to expand 
 eligibility of members of the Selected Reserve for coverage under the 
                            TRICARE program)

       At the end of subtitle D of title VI, add the following:

     SEC. 648. COMMENCEMENT OF RECEIPT OF NON-REGULAR SERVICE 
                   RETIRED PAY BY MEMBERS OF THE READY RESERVE ON 
                   ACTIVE FEDERAL STATUS OR ACTIVE DUTY FOR 
                   SIGNIFICANT PERIODS.

       (a) Reduced Eligibility Age.--Section 12731 of title 10, 
     United States Code, is amended--
       (1) in subsection (a), by striking paragraph (1) and 
     inserting the following:
       ``(1) has attained the eligibility age applicable under 
     subsection (f) to that person;''; and
       (2) by adding at the end the following new subsection:
       ``(f)(1) Subject to paragraph (2), the eligibility age for 
     purposes of subsection (a)(1) is 60 years of age.
       ``(2)(A) In the case of a person who as a member of the 
     Ready Reserve serves on active duty or performs active 
     service described in subparagraph (B) after September 11, 
     2001, the eligibility age for purposes of subsection (a)(1) 
     shall be reduced below 60 years of age by three months for 
     each aggregate of 90 days on which such person so performs in 
     any fiscal year after such date, subject to subparagraph (C). 
     A day of duty may be included in only one aggregate of 90 
     days for purposes of this subparagraph.
       ``(B)(i) Service on active duty described in this 
     subparagraph is service on active duty pursuant to a call or 
     order to active duty under a provision of law referred to in 
     section 101(a)(13)(B) of this title or under section 12301(d) 
     of this title. Such service does not include service on 
     active duty pursuant to a call or order to active duty under 
     section 12310 of this title.
       ``(ii) Active service described in this subparagraph is 
     service under a call to active service authorized by the 
     President or the Secretary of Defense under section 502(f) of 
     title 32 for purposes of responding to a national emergency 
     declared by the President or supported by Federal funds.
       ``(C) The eligibility age for purposes of subsection (a)(1) 
     may not be reduced below 50 years of age for any person under 
     subparagraph (A).''.
       (b) Continuation of Age 60 as Minimum Age for Eligibility 
     of Non-Regular Service Retirees For Health Care.--Section 
     1074(b) of such title is amended--
       (1) by inserting ``(1)'' after ``(b)''; and
       (2) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
       ``(2) Paragraph (1) does not apply to a member or former 
     member entitled to retired pay for non-regular service under 
     chapter 1223 of this title who is under 60 years of age.''.

[[Page S6356]]

       (c) Administration of Related Provisions of Law or 
     Policy.--With respect to any provision of law, or of any 
     policy, regulation, or directive of the executive branch that 
     refers to a member or former member of the uniformed services 
     as being eligible for, or entitled to, retired pay under 
     chapter 1223 of title 10, United States Code, but for the 
     fact that the member or former member is under 60 years of 
     age, such provision shall be carried out with respect to that 
     member or former member by substituting for the reference to 
     being 60 years of age a reference to having attained the 
     eligibility age applicable under subsection (f) of section 
     12731 of title 10, United States Code (as added by subsection 
     (a)), to such member or former member for qualification for 
     such retired pay under subsection (a) of such section.
       (d) Effective Date and Applicability.--The amendment made 
     by subsection (a) shall take effect as of September 11, 2001, 
     and shall apply with respect to applications for retired pay 
     that are submitted under section 12731(a) of title 10, United 
     States Code, on or after the date of the enactment of this 
     Act.
       At the end of subtitle A of title VII, add the following:

     SEC. 707. EXPANSION OF ELIGIBILITY OF MEMBERS OF THE SELECTED 
                   RESERVE FOR COVERAGE UNDER TRICARE.

       (a) In General.--Subsection (a) of section 1076b of title 
     10, United States Code, is amended--
       (1) in paragraph (2), by striking ``or'' at the end;
       (2) in paragraph (3), by striking the period at the end and 
     inserting ``; or''; and
       (3) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
       ``(4) is an employee of a business with 20 or fewer 
     employees.''.
       (b) Premiums.--Subsection (e)(2) of such section is amended 
     by adding at the end the following new subparagraph:
       ``(C) For members eligible under paragraph (4) of 
     subsection (a), the amount equal to 75 percent of the total 
     amount determined by the Secretary on an appropriate 
     actuarial basis as being reasonable for the coverage.''.
       (c) Effective Date.--The amendments made by this section 
     shall take effect on October 1, 2006.


                           AMENDMENT NO. 4241

 (Purpose: To name the Act after John Warner, a Senator from Virginia)

       On page 2, strike lines 1 through 3, and insert the 
     following:

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; FINDINGS.

       (a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``John 
     Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
     2007''.
       (b) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
       (1) Senator John Warner of Virginia was elected a member of 
     the United States Senate on November 7, 1978, for a full term 
     beginning on January 3, 1979. He was subsequently appointed 
     by the Governor of Virginia to fill a vacancy on January 2, 
     1979, and has served continuously since that date. He was 
     appointed a member of the Committee on Armed Services in 
     January 1979, and has served continuously on the Committee 
     since that date, a period of nearly 28 years. Senator 
     Warner's service on the Committee represents nearly half of 
     its existence since it was established after World War II.
       (2) Senator Warner came to the Senate and the Committee on 
     Armed Services after a distinguished record of service to the 
     Nation, including combat service in the Armed Forces and high 
     civilian office.
       (3) Senator Warner enlisted in the United States Navy upon 
     graduation from high school in 1945, and served until the 
     summer of 1946, when he was discharged as a Petty Officer 3rd 
     Class. He then attended Washington and Lee University on the 
     G.I. Bill. He graduated in 1949 and entered the University of 
     Virginia Law School.
       (4) Upon the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, Senator 
     Warner volunteered for active duty, interrupting his 
     education to accept a commission in the United States Marine 
     Corps. He served in combat in Korea as a ground officer in 
     the First Marine Air Wing. Following his active service, he 
     remained in the Marine Corps Reserve for several years, 
     attaining the rank of captain.
       (5) Senator Warner resumed his legal education upon 
     returning from the Korean War and graduated from the 
     University of Virginia Law School in 1953. He was selected by 
     the late Chief Judge E. Barrett Prettyman of the United 
     States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit 
     as his law clerk. After his service to Judge Prettyman, 
     Senator Warner became an Assistant United States Attorney in 
     the District of Columbia, and later entered private law 
     practice.
       (6) In 1969, the Senate gave its advice and consent to the 
     appointment of Senator Warner as Under Secretary of the Navy. 
     He served in this position until 1972, when he was confirmed 
     and appointed as the 61st Secretary of the Navy since the 
     office was established in 1798. As Secretary, Senator Warner 
     was the principal United States negotiator and signatory of 
     the Incidents at Sea Executive Agreement with the Soviet 
     Union, which was signed in 1972 and remains in effect today. 
     It has served as the model for similar agreements between 
     states covering the operation of naval ships and aircraft in 
     international sea lanes throughout the world.
       (7) Senator Warner left the Department of the Navy in 1974. 
     His next public service was as Director of the American 
     Revolution Bicentennial Commission. In this capacity, he 
     coordinated the celebration of the Nation's founding, 
     directing the Federal role in all 50 States and in over 20 
     foreign nations.
       (8) Senator Warner has served as chairman of the Committee 
     on Armed Services of the United States Senate from 1999 to 
     2001, and again since January 2003. He served as ranking 
     minority member of the committee from 1987 to 1993, and again 
     from 2001 to 2003. Senator Warner concludes his service as 
     chairman at the end of the 109th Congress, but will remain a 
     member of the committee.
       (9) This Act is the twenty-eighth annual authorization act 
     for the Department of Defense for which Senator Warner has 
     taken a major responsibility as a member of the Committee on 
     Armed Services of the United States Senate, and the 
     fourteenth for which he has exercised a leadership role as 
     chairman or ranking minority member of the committee.
       (10) Senator Warner, as seaman, Marine officer, Under 
     Secretary and Secretary of the Navy, and member, ranking 
     minority member, and chairman of the Committee on Armed 
     Services, has made unique and lasting contributions to the 
     national security of the United States.
       (11) It is altogether fitting and proper that his Act, the 
     last annual authorization Act for the national defense that 
     Senator Warner manages in and for the United States Senate as 
     chairman of the Committee on Armed Services, be named in his 
     honor, as provided in subsection (a).


                    AMENDMENT NO. 4220, as modified

       At the end of subtitle D of title III, add the following:

     SEC. 352. REPORT ON HIGH ALTITUDE AVIATION TRAINING SITE, 
                   EAGLE COUNTY, COLORADO.

       (a) Report Required.--Not later than December 15, 2006, the 
     Secretary of the Army shall submit to the congressional 
     defense committees a report on the High Altitude Aviation 
     Training Site (HAATS) in Eagle County, Colorado.
       (b) Elements.--The report required by subsection (a) shall 
     include the following:
       (1) A description of the type of high altitude aviation 
     training being conducted at the High Altitude Aviation 
     Training Site, including the number of pilots who receive 
     such training on an annual basis and the types of aircraft 
     used in such training.
       (2) A description of the number and type of helicopters 
     required at the High Altitude Aviation Training Site to 
     provide the high altitude aviation training needed to sustain 
     the war strategies contained in the 2006 Quadrennial Defense 
     Review, assuming that priority is afforded in the provision 
     of such training to commanders, instructor pilots, aviation 
     safety officers, and deploying units.
       (3) A thorough evaluation of accident rates for deployed 
     helicopter pilots of the Army who receive high altitude 
     aviation training at the High Altitude Aviation Training 
     Site, and accident rates for deployed Army helicopter pilots 
     who did not receive such training, including the following:
       (A) An estimate (set forth as a range) of the number of 
     accidents attributable to power management.
       (B) The number of accidents occurring in a combat 
     environment.
       (C) The number of accidents occurring in a non-combat 
     environment.
       (4) An evaluation of the inventory and availability of Army 
     aircraft for purposes of establishing an appropriate schedule 
     for the assignment of a CH-47 aircraft to the High Altitude 
     Aviation Training Site; if the Chief of Staff of the Army 
     determines there is value in conducting such training at the 
     HAATS.
       (5) A description of the status of any efforts to ensure 
     that all helicopter aircrews deployed to the area of 
     responsibility of the Central Command (CENTCOM AOR) are 
     qualified in mountain flight and power management prior to 
     deployment, including the locations where such training 
     occurred, with particular focus on the status of such efforts 
     with respect to aircrews to be deployed in support of 
     Operation Enduring Freedom.
       (c) Tracking System.--The Secretary shall implement a 
     system for tracking those pilots that have attended a school 
     with an established Program of Instruction for high altitude 
     aviation operations training. The system should, if 
     practical, utilize an existing system that permits the query 
     of pilot flight experience and training.


                           AMENDMENT NO. 4371

 (Purpose: To improve the provisions relating to the linking of award 
              and incentive fees to acquisition outcomes)

       On page 345, line 2, strike ``poor'' and insert ``below-
     satisfactory performance or performance that does not meet 
     the basic requirements of the contract''.


                           Amendment No. 4244

              (Purpose: Relating to military vaccinations)

       At the end of subtitle B of title VII, add the following:

     SEC. 730. MILITARY VACCINATION MATTERS.

       (a) Additional Element for Comptroller General Study and 
     Report on Vaccine Healthcare Centers.--Section 736(b) of the 
     National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006 
     (Public Law 109-163; 119 Stat. 3356) is amended by adding at 
     the end the following new paragraph:
       ``(10) The feasibility and advisability of transferring 
     direct responsibility for the Centers from the Army Medical 
     Command to the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and 
     Readiness and the Assistant Secretary of

[[Page S6357]]

     Defense for Force Protection and Readiness.''.
       (b) Response to Medical Needs Arising From Mandatory 
     Military Vaccinations.--
       (1) In general.--The Secretary of Defense shall maintain a 
     joint military medical center of excellence focusing on the 
     medical needs arising from mandatory military vaccinations.
       (2) Elements.--The joint military medical center of 
     excellence under paragraph (1) shall consist of the 
     following:
       (A) The Vaccine Healthcare Centers of the Department of 
     Defense, which shall be the principal elements of the center.
       (B) Any other elements that the Secretary considers 
     appropriate.
       (3) Authorized activities.--In acting as the principal 
     elements of the joint military medical center under paragraph 
     (1), the Vaccine Healthcare Centers referred to in paragraph 
     (2)(A) may carry out the following:
       (A) Medical assistance and care to individuals receiving 
     mandatory military vaccines and their dependents, including 
     long-term case management for adverse events where necessary.
       (B) Evaluations to identify and treat potential and actual 
     health effects from vaccines before and after their use in 
     the field.
       (C) The development and sustainment of a long-term vaccine 
     safety and efficacy registry.
       (D) Support for an expert clinical advisory board for case 
     reviews related to disability assessment questions.
       (E) Long-term and short-term studies to identify 
     unanticipated benefits and adverse events from vaccines.
       (F) Educational outreach for immunization providers and 
     those required to receive immunizations.
       (G) The development, dissemination, and validation of 
     educational materials for Department of Defense healthcare 
     workers relating to vaccine safety, efficacy, and 
     acceptability.
       (c) Limitation on Restructuring of Vaccine Healthcare 
     Centers.--
       (1) Limitation.--The Secretary of Defense may not downsize 
     or otherwise restructure the Vaccine Healthcare Centers of 
     the Department of Defense until the Secretary submits to 
     Congress a report setting forth a plan for meeting the 
     immunization needs of the Armed Forces during the 10-year 
     period beginning on the date of the submittal of the report.
       (2) Report elements.--The report submitted under paragraph 
     (1) shall include the following:
       (A) An assessment of the potential biological threats to 
     members of the Armed Forces that are addressable by vaccine.
       (B) An assessment of the distance and time required to 
     travel to a Vaccine Healthcare Center by members of the Armed 
     Forces who have severe reactions to a mandatory military 
     vaccine.
       (C) An identification of the most effective mechanisms for 
     ensuring the provision services by the Vaccine Healthcare 
     Centers to both military medical professionals and members of 
     the Armed Forces.
       (D) An assessment of current military and civilian 
     expertise with respect to mass adult immunization programs, 
     including case management under such programs for rare 
     adverse reactions to immunizations.
       (E) An organizational structure for each military 
     department to ensure support of the Vaccine Healthcare 
     Centers in the provision of services to members of the Armed 
     Forces.


                           Amendment No. 4516

 (Purpose: To ensure the timely completion of the equity finalization 
            process for Naval Petroleum Reserve Numbered 1)

       At the end of division C, add the following:

                 TITLE XXXIII--NAVAL PETROLEUM RESERVES

     SEC. 3301. COMPLETION OF EQUITY FINALIZATION PROCESS FOR 
                   NAVAL PETROLEUM RESERVE NUMBERED 1.

       Section 3412(g) of the National Defense Authorization Act 
     for Fiscal Year 1996 (Public Law 104-106; 10 U.S.C. 7420 
     note) is amended--
       (1) by inserting ``(1)'' after ``(g)''; and
       (2) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
       ``(2)(A) In light of the unique role that the independent 
     petroleum engineer who is retained pursuant to paragraph 
     (b)(2) performs in the process of finalizing equity 
     interests, and the importance to the United States taxpayer 
     of timely completion of the equity finalization process, the 
     independent petroleum engineer's `Shallow Oil Zone 
     Provisional Recommendation of Equity Participation,' which 
     was presented to the equity finalization teams for the 
     Department of Energy and Chevron U.S.A. Inc. on October 1 and 
     2, 2002, shall become the final equity recommendation of the 
     independent petroleum engineer, as that term is used in the 
     Protocol on NPR-1 Equity Finalization Implementation Process, 
     July 8, 1996, for the Shallow Oil Zone unless the Department 
     of Energy and Chevron U.S.A. Inc. agree in writing not later 
     than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this 
     paragraph that the independent petroleum engineer shall not 
     be liable to either party for any cost or expense incurred or 
     for any loss or damage sustained--
       ``(i) as a result of the manner in which services are 
     performed by the independent petroleum engineer in accordance 
     with its contract with the Department of Energy to support 
     the equity determination process;
       ``(ii) as a result of the failure of the independent 
     petroleum engineer in good faith to perform any service or 
     make any determination or computation, unless caused by its 
     gross negligence; or
       ``(iii) as a result of the reliance by either party on any 
     computation, determination, estimate or evaluation made by 
     the independent petroleum engineer unless caused by the its 
     gross negligence or willful misconduct.
       ``(B) If Chevron U.S.A. Inc. agrees in writing not later 
     than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this 
     paragraph that the independent petroleum engineer shall not 
     be liable to Chevron U.S.A. Inc. or the Department of Energy 
     for any cost or expense incurred or for any loss or damage 
     described in clauses (i) through (iii) of subparagraph (A), 
     the Department of Energy shall agree to the same not later 
     than such date.''.


                           Amendment No. 4466

 (Purpose: To improve mental health screening and services for members 
                          of the Armed Forces)

       At the end of subtitle B of title VII, add the following:

     SEC. 730. ENHANCED MENTAL HEALTH SCREENING AND SERVICES FOR 
                   MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES.

       (a) Required Elements of Assessments.--Each pre-deployment 
     mental health assessment of a member of the Armed Forces, 
     shall include the following:
       (1) A mental health history of the member, with emphasis on 
     mental health status during the 12-month period ending on the 
     date of the assessment and a review of military service 
     during that period.
       (2) An assessment of the current treatment of the member, 
     and any use of psychotropic medications by the member, for a 
     mental health condition or disorder.
       (3) An assessment of any behavior of the member identified 
     by the member's commanding officer that could indicate the 
     presence of a mental health condition.
       (4) Information provided by the member (through a checklist 
     or other means) on the presence of any serious mental illness 
     or any symptoms indicating a mental health condition or 
     disorder.
       (b) Referral for Further Evaluation.--Each member of the 
     Armed Forces who is determined during a pre-deployment or 
     post-deployment mental health assessment to have, or have 
     symptoms or indicators for, a mental health condition or 
     disorder shall be referred to a qualified health care 
     professional with experience in the evaluation and diagnosis 
     of mental health conditions.
       (c) Referral of Members Deployed in Contingency or Combat 
     Operations.--any member of the Armed Forces called or ordered 
     to active duty in support of contingency or combat operations 
     who requests access to mental health care services any time 
     before, during, or after deployment shall be provided access 
     to such services--
       (1) not later than 72 hours after the making of such 
     request; or
       (2) at the earliest practicable time thereafter.
       (d) Minimum Mental Health Standards for Deployment.--
       (1) Standards required.--The Secretary of Defense shall 
     prescribe in regulations minimum standards for mental health 
     for the eligibility of a member of the Armed Forces for 
     deployment to a combat operation or contingency operation.
       (2) Elements.--The standards required by paragraph (1) 
     shall include the following:
       (A) A specification of the mental health conditions, 
     treatment for such conditions, and receipt of psychotropic 
     medications for such conditions that preclude deployment of a 
     member of the Armed Forces to a combat operation or 
     contingency operation, or to a specified type of such 
     operation.
       (B) Guidelines for the deployability and treatment of 
     members of the Armed Forces diagnosed with a severe mental 
     illness or Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD).
       (3) Utilization.--The Secretary shall take appropriate 
     actions to ensure the utilization of the standards prescribed 
     under paragraph (1) in the making of determinations regarding 
     the deployability of members of the Armed Forces to a combat 
     operation or contingency operation.
       (e) Monitoring of Certain Individuals.--The Secretary of 
     Defense shall develop a plan, to be implemented throughout 
     the Department of Defense, for monitoring the mental health 
     of each member of the Armed Forces who, after deployment to a 
     combat operation or contingency operation, is known--
       (1) to have a mental health condition or disorder; or
       (2) to be receiving treatment, including psychotropic 
     medications, for a mental health condition or disorder.
       (f) Implementation.--Not later than six months after the 
     date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense 
     shall submit to the Committees on Armed Services of the 
     Senate and the House or Representatives a report on the 
     actions taken to implement the requirements of this section.


                           Amendment No. 4517

   (Purpose: To make funds available for the Our Military Kids youth 
                            support program)

       At the end of title XIV, add the following:

     SEC. 1414. OUR MILITARY KIDS YOUTH SUPPORT PROGRAM.

       (a) Army Funding for Expansion of Program.--Of the amount 
     authorized to be appropriated by section 1405(1) for 
     operation and maintenance for the Army, $1,500,000 may be 
     available for the expansion nationwide of the Our Military 
     Kids youth support program for dependents of elementary and

[[Page S6358]]

     secondary school age of members of the National Guard and 
     Reserve who are severely wounded or injured during 
     deployment.
       (b) Army National Guard Funding for Expansion of Program.--
     Of the amount authorized to be appropriated by section 
     1405(6) for operation and maintenance for the Army National 
     Guard, $500,000 may be available for the expansion nationwide 
     of the Our Military Kids youth support program.


                    Amendment No. 4363, As Modified

       At the end of subtitle B of title III, add the following:

     SEC. 315. INFANTRY COMBAT EQUIPMENT.

       Of the amount authorized to be appropriated by section 
     301(8) for operation and maintenance for the Marine Corps 
     Reserve, $2,500,000 may be available for Infantry Combat 
     Equipment (ICE).


                    AMENDMENT NO. 4450, as modified

       At the end of subtitle B of title II, add the following:

     SEC. 215. HIGH ENERGY LASER-LOW ASPECT TARGET TRACKING.

       (a) Additional Amount for Research, Development, Test, and 
     Evaluation, army.--The amount authorized to be appropriated 
     by section 201(1) for research, development, test, and 
     evaluation for the Army is hereby increased by $5,000,000.
       (b) Availability of Amount.--
       (1) In general.--Of the amount authorized to be 
     appropriated by section 201(1) for research, development, 
     test, and evaluation for the Army, as increased by subsection 
     (a), $5,000,000 may be available for the Department of 
     Defense High Energy Laser Test Facility for High Energy Laser 
     Low Aspect Target Tracking (HEL-LATT) test series done 
     jointly with the Navy.
       (2) Construction with other amounts.--The amount available 
     under paragraph (1) for the purpose set forth in that 
     paragraph is in addition to any amounts available under this 
     Act for that purpose.
       (c) Offset.--The amount authorized to be appropriated by 
     section 421 for military personnel is hereby reduced by 
     $5,000,000, due to unexpended obligations, if available.


                    AMENDMENT NO. 4362, as modified

       At the end of subtitle B of title III, add the following:

     SEC. 315. INDIVIDUAL FIRST AID KIT.

       Of the amount authorized to be appropriated by section 
     301(8) for operation and maintenance for the Marine Corps 
     Reserve, $1,500,000 may be available for the Individual First 
     Aid Kit (IFAK).


                    AMENDMENT NO. 4275, as modified

       At the end of subtitle B of title II, add the following:

     SEC. 215. ADVANCED ALUMINUM AEROSTRUCTURES INITIATIVE.

       (a) Additional Amount for Research, Development, Test, and 
     Evaluation, Air Force.--The amount authorized to be 
     appropriated by section 201(3) for research, development, 
     test, and evaluation for the Air Force is hereby increased by 
     $2,000,000.
       (b) Availability of Amount.--Of the amount authorized to be 
     appropriated by section 201(3) for research, development, 
     test, and evaluation for the Air Force, as increased by 
     subsection (a), $2,000,000 may be available for Aerospace 
     Technology Development and Demonstration (PE #603211F) for 
     the Advanced Aluminum Aerostructures Initiative (A3I).
       (c) Offset.--The amount authorized to be appropriated by 
     section 421 for military personnel is hereby decreased by 
     $2,000,000, due to unexpended obligations, if available.


                    AMENDMENT NO. 4475, as modified

       At the end of subtitle A of title II, add the following:

     SEC. 203. AMOUNT FOR DEVELOPMENT AND VALIDATION OF WARFIGHTER 
                   RAPID AWARENESS PROCESSING TECHNOLOGY.

       (a) Increase in Amount for Research, Development, Test, and 
     Evaluation for the Navy.--The amount authorized to be 
     appropriated by section 201(2) for research, development, 
     test, and evaluation for the Navy is hereby increased by 
     $4,000,000.
       (b) Availability of Amount.--Of the amount authorized to be 
     appropriated by section 201(2) for research, development, 
     test, and evaluation for the Navy, as increased by subsection 
     (a), $4,000,000 may be available for the development, 
     validation, and demonstration of warfighter rapid awareness 
     processing technology for distributed operations within the 
     Marine Corps Landing Force Technology program.
       (c) Offset.--The amount authorized to be appropriated by 
     section 421 for military personnel is hereby decreased by 
     $4,000,000, due to unexpended obligations, if available.


                    AMENDMENT NO. 4276, as modified

       At the end of subtitle B of title II, add the following:

     SEC. 215. LEGGED MOBILITY ROBOTIC RESEARCH.

       (a) Additional Amount for Research, Development, Test, and 
     Evaluation, army.--The amount authorized to be appropriated 
     by section 201(1) for research, development, test, and 
     evaluation for the Army is hereby increased by $1,000,000.
       (b) Availability of Amount.--Of the amount authorized to be 
     appropriated by section 201(1) for research, development, 
     test, and evaluation for the Army, as increased by subsection 
     (a), $1,000,000 may be available for Combat Vehicle and 
     Automotive Technology (PE #602601A) for legged mobility 
     robotic research for military applications.
       (c) Offset.--The amount authorized to be appropriated by 
     section 421 for military personnel is hereby decreased by 
     $1,000,000, due to unexpended obligations, if available.


                    AMENDMENT NO. 4469, as modified

       At the end of subtitle B of title II, add the following:

     SEC. 215. WIDEBAND DIGITAL AIRBORNE ELECTRONIC SENSING ARRAY.

       (a) Additional Amount for Research, Development, Test, and 
     Evaluation, Air Force.--The amount authorized to be 
     appropriated by section 201(3) for research, development, 
     test, and evaluation for the Air Force is hereby increased by 
     $3,000,000.
       (b) Availability of Amount.--Of the amount authorized to be 
     appropriated by section 201(3) for research, development, 
     test, and evaluation for the Air Force, as increased by 
     subsection (a), $3,000,000 may be available for Wideband 
     Digital Airborne Electronic Sensing Array (PE #0602204F).
       (c) Offset.--The amount authorized to be appropriated by 
     section 421 for military personnel is hereby reduced by 
     $3,000,000, due to unexpended obligations, if available.


                    AMENDMENT NO. 4477, as modified

       At the end of subtitle B of title II, add the following:

     SEC. 215. SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY.

       (a) Army Support for University Research Initiatives.--
       (1) Additional amount for research, development, test, and 
     evaluation, army.--The amount authorized to be appropriated 
     by section 201(1) for research, development, test, and 
     evaluation for the Army is hereby increased by $10,000,000.
       (2) Availability of amount.--Of the amount authorized to be 
     appropriated by section 201(1) for research, development, 
     test, and evaluation for the Army, as increased by paragraph 
     (1), $10,000,000 may be available for program element PE 
     0601103A for University Research Initiatives.
       (b) Navy Support for University Research Initiatives.--
       (1) Additional amount for research, development, test, and 
     evaluation, navy.--The amount authorized to be appropriated 
     by section 201(2) for research, development, test, and 
     evaluation for the Navy is hereby increased by $10,000,000.
       (2) Availability of amount.--Of the amount authorized to be 
     appropriated by section 201(2) for research, development, 
     test, and evaluation for the Navy, as increased by paragraph 
     (1), $10,000,000 may be available for program element PE 
     0601103N for University Research Initiatives.
       (c) Air Force Support for University Research 
     Initiatives.--
       (1) Additional amount for research, development, test, and 
     evaluation, air force.--The amount authorized to be 
     appropriated by section 201(3) for research, development, 
     test, and evaluation for the Air Force is hereby increased by 
     $10,000,000.
       (2) Availability of amount.--Of the amount authorized to be 
     appropriated by section 201(3) for research, development, 
     test, and evaluation for the Air Force, as increased by 
     paragraph (1), $10,000,000 may be available for program 
     element PE 0601103F for University Research Initiatives.
       (d) Computer Science and Cybersecurity.--
       (1) Additional amount for research, development, test, and 
     evaluation, defense-wide.--The amount authorized to be 
     appropriated by section 201(4) for research, development, 
     test, and evaluation for Defense-wide activities is hereby 
     increased by $10,000,000.
       (2) Availability of amount.--Of the amount authorized to be 
     appropriated by section 201(4) for research, development, 
     test, and evaluation for Defense-wide activities, as 
     increased by paragraph (1), $10,000,000 may be available for 
     program element PE 0601101E for the Defense Advanced Research 
     Projects Agency University Research Program in Computer 
     Science and Cybersecurity.
       (e) SMART National Defense Education Program.--
       (1) Additional amount for research, development, test, and 
     evaluation, defense-wide.--The amount authorized to be 
     appropriated by section 201(4) for research, development, 
     test, and evaluation for Defense-wide activities is hereby 
     increased by $5,000,000.
       (2) Availability of amount.--Of the amount authorized to be 
     appropriated by section 201(4) for research, development, 
     test, and evaluation for Defense-wide activities, as 
     increased by paragraph (1), $5,000,000 may be available for 
     program element PE 0601120D8Z for the SMART National Defense 
     Education Program.
       (f) Offset.--The amount authorized to be appropriated by 
     section 421 for military personnel is hereby reduced by 
     $45,000,000, due to unexpended obligations, if available.


                           AMENDMENT NO. 4518

  (Purpose: To make available funds for the Reading for the Blind and 
             Dyslexic program of the Department of Defense)

       At the end of subtitle B of title III, add the following:

     SEC. 315. READING FOR THE BLIND AND DYSLEXIC PROGRAM OF THE 
                   DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE.

       (a) Defense Dependents.--Of the amount authorized to be 
     appropriated by section 301(5) for operation and maintenance 
     for Defense-wide activities, $500,000 may be available for 
     the Reading for the Blind and Dyslexic program of the 
     Department of Defense for defense dependents of elementary

[[Page S6359]]

     and secondary school age in the continental United States and 
     overseas.
       (b) Severely Wounded or Injured Members of the Armed 
     Forces.--Of the amount authorized to be appropriated by 
     section 1405(5) for operation and maintenance for Defense-
     wide activities, $500,000 may be available for the Reading 
     for the Blind and Dyslexic program of the Department of 
     Defense for severely wounded or injured members of the Armed 
     Forces.


                           AMENDMENT NO. 4214

(Purpose: To make a technical correction to a project for Rickenbacker 
                        Airport, Columbus, Ohio)

       At the appropriate place, insert the following:


                  RICKENBACKER AIRPORT, COLUMBUS, OHIO

       Sec. ____. The project numbered 4651 in section 1702 of the 
     Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity 
     Act: A Legacy for Users (119 Stat. 1434) is amended by 
     striking ``Grading, paving'' and all that follows through 
     ``Airport'' and inserting ``Grading, paving, roads, and the 
     transfer of rail-to-truck for the intermodal facility at 
     Rickenbacker Airport, Columbus, OH''.


                           AMENDMENT NO. 4519

(Purpose: To make technical corrections to a high priority project and 
      transportation improvement project in the State of Michigan)

       At the appropriate place, insert the following:

     SEC. __. HIGHWAY PROJECTS, DETROIT, MICHIGAN.

       (a) High Priority Project.--The table contained in section 
     1702 of the Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient 
     Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users (119 Stat. 
     1256) is amended in the item numbered 4333 (119 Stat. 1422) 
     by striking ``Plan and construct, land acquisition, Detroit 
     West Riverfront Greenway'' and inserting ``Detroit Riverfront 
     Conservancy, Riverfront walkway, greenway, and adjacent land 
     planning, construction, and land acquisition from Gabriel 
     Richard Park at the Douglas Mac Arthur Bridge to Riverside 
     Park at the Ambassador Bridge, Detroit''.
       (b) Transportation Improvement Project.--The table 
     contained in section 1934(c) of the Safe, Accountable, 
     Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for 
     Users (119 Stat. 1485) is amended in the item numbered 196 
     (119 Stat. 1495) by striking ``Detroit Riverfront 
     Conservancy, West Riverfront Walkway, Greenway and Adjacent 
     Land Acquisition, from Riverfront Towers to Ambassador 
     Bridge, Detroit'' and inserting ``Detroit Riverfront 
     Conservancy, Riverfront walkway, greenway, and adjacent land 
     planning, construction, and land acquisition from Gabriel 
     Richard Park at the Douglas Mac Arthur Bridge to Riverside 
     Park at the Ambassador Bridge, Detroit''.


                           amendment no. 4197

  Mr. REID. Mr. President, I rise today along with my colleague Mrs. 
Lincoln to discuss an amendment accepted today by the distinguished 
chairman Mr. Warner, and ranking member, Mr. Levin.
  I appreciate their willingness to advance this very important 
legislation. Our policy must reflect our Nation's care and appreciation 
for our veterans, and I will continue to work towards obtaining full 
concurrent receipt. I have said it before, but I will say it again.
  It is unacceptable that the men and women who dedicated their entire 
careers to service in the military must surrender a portion of their 
retired pay if they want to receive the disability compensation.
  It is acceptable, but today, because of the policy of concurrent 
receipt, it is the law for veterans classified as unemployable.
  Throughout my time in the Senate, I have championed legislation that 
would end the unfair policy of denying America's disabled veteran's 
retirement benefits they have earned through years of service and 
sacrifice.
  In 2004, I introduced legislation that was passed into helping those 
veterans who were 100 percent disabled to receive full concurrent 
receipt immediately. By eliminating the 10-year phasein period, the 
passage of this legislation was a significant victory for those who 
have fought for our freedom.
  But, I never imagined that the administration would intentionally 
change the intent, interpret the law, and shamelessly deny unemployable 
veterans, no matter what their disability rating, retirement pay and 
disability compensation.
  What kind of message does this send to our men and women in the 
military today?
  We have thousands of new American veterans from the Iraq and 
Afghanistan wars. These men and women serve in the most inhospitable 
reaches of the world, defending our freedoms and fighting for the cause 
of liberty.
  Most of these young American Veterans don't realize that if they are 
injured or wounded to the point were that can no longer work, will have 
to choose between their retired pay and their disability compensation. 
As of today, they will not receive both until 2009.
  This is unfair.
  Military retired pay is earned compensation for the extraordinary 
demands and sacrifices inherent in a military career. It is a reward 
promised for serving two decades or more under conditions that most 
Americans find intolerable.
  For several years I have introduced and championed legislation that 
would end the unfair policy of denying America's disabled veterans' 
retirement benefits they have earned through years of service and 
sacrifice.
  In November 2005, an amendment was passed to expand concurrent 
receipt to cover America's disabled veterans rated as ``unemployable,'' 
and to implement the new policy immediately instead of phasing it in 
over a decade. However, I was disappointed that the conference 
committee chose not to enact this valuable legislation until 2009.
  Therefore, I introduced this amendment to restore their full benefits 
as originally intended in the legislation I introduced in 2004.
  Veterans' disability compensation is recompense for pain, suffering, 
and lost future earning power caused by a service-connected illness or 
injury. Few retirees can afford to live on their retired pay alone, and 
a severe disability only makes the problem worse by limiting or denying 
any post-service working life.
  Mr. President, an ``unemployable'' retiree should not have to forfeit 
part or all of his or her earned retired pay as a result of having 
suffered a service-connected disability.
  At a time when our Nation is calling upon our Armed Forces to defend 
democracy and freedom, we must be careful not to send the wrong signal 
to those in uniform.
  All who have selected to make their career in the U.S. military now 
face an additional unknown risk in our fight against terrorism. If they 
are injured, they would be forced to forego their earned retired pay in 
order to receive their VA disability compensation. In effect, they 
would be paying for their own disability benefits from their retirement 
checks unless my legislation is enacted.
  This will send a signal to these brave men and women that the 
American people and government take care of those who make sacrifices 
for our nation. It is time for us to show our appreciation to the men 
and women who have demonstrated their allegiance to their country and 
the principles it stands for.
  I, again, thank Senator Warner and Senator Levin for their assistance 
in including this provision in the fiscal year 2007 Defense 
authorization bill.


                           amendment no. 4494

  Mr. DODD. Mr. President, I rise today to discuss my concerns about 
the amendment offered by my good colleague Senator Burns, regarding 
electronic voting technology to S. 2766, the National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007.
  I understand that this amendment directs the Department of Defense, 
DOD, to continue the interim voting assistance system, IVAS, for 
uniformed service voters, overseas Defense Department employees, and 
dependents of such voters and employees, for all Federal elections 
through December 31, 2006. The amendment would not, as I understand it, 
extend the current program to nonmilitary overseas voters. Further, I 
understand that the amendment directs the DOD to submit two reports to 
Congress, one assessing the IVAS program during the 2006 Federal 
elections and the second detailing plans for an expansion of the IVAS 
program to all voters covered under the Uniform Overseas Citizens 
Absentee Voting Act, UOCAVA, through November 2010.
  I commend my colleague from Montana for his efforts to protect the 
fundamental right to vote and for extending a critical program that 
facilitates electronic ballot access for our valiant overseas service 
men and women, their colleagues and families. I strongly support the 
goals of this legislation.
  However, I am deeply concerned that the amendment as drafted 
continues to

[[Page S6360]]

withhold the benefits of new technology from millions of other 
nonmilitary overseas voters in a manner that is inconsistent with the 
purposes of UOCAVA. According to the language of this amendment, only 
those with an existing affiliation to DOD will continue to benefit from 
the IVAS program in contrast to the broader group of citizens covered 
by UOCAVA, including overseas voters who are not members of the 
military, employees of the Defense Department or a dependent of either 
group.
  As my colleague know, UOCAVA treats all overseas voters--military, 
civilian or otherwise--equally with respect to voting rights. Classes 
of voters under UOCAVA are not bifurcated. This approach ensures that 
the all voters are treated in a nondiscriminatory manner under UOCAVA.
  The number of overseas voters continues to make a difference in our 
Federal elections. The Federal Voting Assistance Program, FVAP, under 
the Secretary of Defense estimates that over 3 percent of the total 
vote in the 1996, 2000, and 2004 elections came from abroad. In 
addition, an umbrella coalition focused on military and overseas voters 
estimates that the number of Americans residing overseas have ranged 
from 3 million to 6 million, but generally put the global population 
somewhere around 4 million. The coalition's member organizations 
include the Federation of American Women's Clubs Overseas Inc, FAWCO, 
the American Citizens Abroad, ACA, the Alliance of American 
Organizations-Spain and Portugal, ALLAMO and the Association of 
Americans Resident Overseas, AARO. Overseas voters are important 
Americans who, under the goals of UOCAVA, must have the same 
opportunity to cast a vote and have that vote counted as their military 
counterparts.
  There is nothing more fundamental to the vitality and endurance of a 
democracy of the people, by the people and for the people, than the 
people's right to vote. Thomas Paine wrote in 1795 that, ``the right of 
voting for representatives is the primary right by which other rights 
are protected.'' This statement takes on an even more significant 
meaning to Americans when America is at war.
  As a former Peace Corps volunteer, I can offer testimony to the 
meaningful contributions made by overseas citizens who are not included 
in the covered classes under the amendment of my colleague from 
Montana. At a time when the image of the United States is receiving 
international scrutiny, the work of individuals such as Peace Corps 
volunteers is critical. The work of all our overseas citizens, whether 
they serve in the military to protect us back at home or whether they 
conduct businesses and raise their families overseas, must be honored 
with an absolute equal opportunity to vote in Federal elections.
  We should not take any actions to discourage our civilian overseas 
voters. We should not treat civilian overseas voters any differently 
than overseas military or DOD contract voters, and certainly not by 
erecting an artificial bifurcation barrier between military and 
civilian votes under UOCAVA.
  I appreciate the fact that this amendment recognizes the need to 
eliminate that bifurcation by requiring DOD to report specifically on 
expanding the use of electronic voting technology for all voters under 
UOCAVA. I look forward to that report and will continue to work to 
ensure that all American citizens living overseas have an equal 
opportunity to participate in our democracy through the ballot box.


                           amendment no. 4241

  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk and ask 
for its immediate consideration.
  This amendment would name the National Defense Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 2007 after the chairman of the Committee on Armed Services, 
our distinguished friend and colleague from Virginia, John Warner. I am 
pleased to be joined in this effort by Senators Frist, Levin, Inhofe, 
Kennedy, Roberts, Byrd, Sessions, Lieberman, Collins, Jack Reed, 
Ensign, Akaka, Talent, Bill Nelson, Chambliss, Ben Nelson, Graham, 
Dayton, Dole, Bayh, Cornyn, Clinton, Thune, Allard, and Allen.
  I am certain that there is not a Senator in this Chamber who would 
not agree that Senator Warner, with his grace, courtliness, bipartisan 
attitude: and kindness to all, represents the finest traditions of the 
Senate. All Senators know that the Defense Authorization bill occupies 
a major place in the annual legislative calendar and takes substantial 
time to complete. Those Senators who do not have the privilege of 
serving on the Committee on Armed Services may not realize the 
tremendous amount of work that goes into hearings, formulation of 
legislative proposals, preparation for markup, and actual markup of 
this bill--the largest annually recurring piece of legislation in 
Congress. When one adds to this the oversight of the largest department 
in the government, and the processing of thousands of military and 
civilian nominations each year, the demands on the chairman of the 
committee and the need for leadership are obvious. For 6 years, John 
Warner has provided that leadership, and done it in a manner that has 
gained him universal respect.
  John Warner is, first and foremost, a Virginian--a native of that Old 
Dominion that has stood at the center of American history for over two 
centuries and has given the Nation so many of its eminent men, from 
Washington forward. John Warner has continued that tradition of service 
to country from his youth. The son of a decorated Army physician in 
World War I, John Warner left high school to enlist in the Navy late in 
World War II. He served until 1946, when he was discharged as a petty 
officer 3rd class. Like millions of other young Americans, he then 
attended college on the GI bill, graduating from Washington and Lee 
University in 1949. He then entered the University of Virginia Law 
School. He interrupted his education to serve in the Korean war, 
volunteering for active duty and accepting a commission in the Marine 
Corps. He served in combat as a ground officer in the First Marine Air 
Wing, and remained in the Marine Corps Reserve for several years. Upon 
returning from the Korean war, he resumed his legal education, 
graduating from the University of Virginia Law School in 1953.
  Upon graduation, John Warner's outstanding qualities were recognized 
when he was selected to serve as the law clerk to the late Judge E. 
Barrett Prettyman of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit, one of the most outstanding jurists of the period. 
Many years later, Senator Warner would be instrumental in naming the 
U.S. Court House in Washington, DC, for his old mentor. After his 
clerkship, John Warner became an assistant U.S. attorney in the 
District of Columbia, and later was engaged in the private practice of 
law.

  In 1969, President Nixon nominated John Warner to serve as Under 
Secretary of the Navy. The Senate confirmed the nomination, and he 
served as Under Secretary until he was confirmed and appointed as the 
61st Secretary of the Navy in 1972. During his tenure as Secretary, the 
United States and the Soviet Union signed the Incidents at Sea 
Executive Agreement, for which he was the principal United States 
negotiator and signatory. This agreement remains in effect today and 
has served as a model for similar agreements governing naval vessels 
and aircraft around the world.
  After leaving the Department of the Navy in 1974, John Warner's next 
public service was as chairman of the American Revolution Bicentennial 
Commission. He oversaw the celebration of the Nation's founding, 
directing the Federal Government's role in a commemoration that 
embraced all 50 States and over 20 foreign nations.
  In 1978, the voters of Virginia elected John Warner to a full term in 
the U.S. Senate. Upon beginning his service in 1979, he was elected a 
member of the Committee on Armed Services. Upon leaving the 
chairmanship next year, he will have served on the committee for 28 
years, almost half of the committee's existence. Senator Warner served 
as chairman of the committee from 1999 to 2001, and again since 2003. 
He also served as ranking member from 1987 to 1993, and again from 2001 
to 2003. For 14 years of American history, years that saw the end of 
the Cold War, the first gulf war, the attacks on September 11, 2001, 
and the global war on terror, John Warner has served in a leadership 
role on the committee.
  No Member of this body has done more for our national security than 
John Warner. As sailor, Marine officer, Under Secretary, and Secretary 
of

[[Page S6361]]

the Navy, and U.S. Senator, he has always answered his country's call. 
The dignified and evenhanded way in which he has presided over the 
business of the committee has enabled it to continue its noble 
tradition of being an island of bipartisanship in an increasingly 
unpleasant political era. I submit, Mr. President, that it is 
exceedingly appropriate that this year's Defense Authorization Act, the 
last which John Warner will manage as chairman of the Committee on 
Armed Services, be named in his honor.


                           AMENDMENT NO. 4244

  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I rise to thank my colleagues for accepting 
an amendment that I introduced on behalf of myself, Senator Bingaman, 
and Senator Carper to fully protect the health of our military 
personnel. The majority of this amendment is the same language the 
Senate included in last year's Defense Authorization bill clearly 
establishing the Vaccine Healthcare Centers, or VHCs, role in force 
protection and treatment. That language was not retained in conference. 
Instead, a GAO report was mandated. While the GAO report will be 
helpful in refining the organization and missions of the VHCs, it is 
important to clearly establish their role today.
  The GAO report will not be completed until next year. In addition to 
the language the Senate passed last year, this amendment includes one 
additional area for GAO to investigate and a requirement that the 
Department of Defense examine and plan for its future vaccination 
needs. Both necessary steps to determining the optimal structure for 
the centers.
  I should also point out to my colleagues that this amendment does not 
add any funding to the bill. The centers are currently being funded at 
$6 million a year with global war on terror funds. This amendment does 
not change that.
  Let me explain more thoroughly what the vaccine health care centers 
do. As our military operates around the globe, they are protected from 
common illnesses like the flu and from common travel concerns, like 
yellow fever for sub-Saharan Africa, by vaccinations. In addition, they 
are vaccinated to protect them from biological warfare agents like 
anthrax or smallpox.
  These force protection measures are critically important, but they 
only work if military personnel are confident that the vaccines 
themselves are not dangerous or that the side-effects can be treated.
  Vaccines, even those generally considered safe, are still drugs put 
into the body. For that reason, there are always a small number of 
personnel whose bodies will have an adverse reaction to a ``safe'' 
vaccine. In order to deal with this, the Vaccine Healthcare Centers 
Network was established in 2001.
  The centers act as a specialized medical unit and center of 
excellence that can provide the best possible clinical care to any 
military member, Active-Duty, Guard, or Reserve, or their family that 
has a severe reaction. They also advise the Department of Defense 
regarding vaccine administration policies and educate military health 
care professionals regarding the safest and best practices for vaccine 
administration. Their overall mission is to promote vaccine safety and 
provide expert knowledge to patients and physicians.
  Why is this so important? As many of you know, the number of adults 
who get regular vaccines is fairly small. While we have civilian 
specialists who deal with childhood vaccinations and problems that 
might develop, the population of adults regularly vaccinated with 
anything more than the flu vaccine is small. No civilian expertise 
exists in this area because the cases are rare and infrequent.
  In the military, the reverse is true. Military personnel are 
regularly vaccinated for travel, for threats relating to their theater 
of operation, and for things like the flu. Even in the military, 
though, the cases are rare and spread throughout the force. It is 
difficult for the average base physician to develop the expertise 
needed to recognize the problem and to provide the best treatment. In 
order to effectively develop proper treatments, there must be a 
centralized center to capture the information on those who experience 
severe problems.
  Here are some specifics:
  Last year, 2005, the VHCs managed over 700 cases of adverse reactions 
to mandatory vaccines.
  Each military service made use of the help and care offered by the 
VHCs--48 percent of their cases were in the Army, 29.6 percent of their 
cases were in the Air Force, 13 percent of their cases were in the Navy 
and Marine Corps, and 2.4 percent of their cases were in the Coast 
Guard.
  Since being founded, as part of their ongoing educational effort, the 
VHCs have developed and distributed over 50,000 immunization took kits 
to improve vaccinations throughout DOD.
  The VHCs are leading the effort to properly characterize and develop 
treatments for serious reactions to the smallpox vaccine and the 
anthrax vaccine. In many cases, they collaborate with outside 
researchers and analysts by providing the large sample population 
needed to develop case definitions and clinical guidelines.
  Since beginning their work in 2001, the VHCs have handled a total of 
2,049 cases. Their yearly case load has gone up 83 percent since 2001.
  The over 2,000 cases treated demonstrates clearly the need for 
postvaccination treatment expertise. In all of these cases, base or 
post doctors did not have the expertise to adequately treat sick 
personnel. Given that these are mandatory vaccinations, we have an 
absolute moral obligation to make sure that those made sick by them get 
the best possible treatment. Much as the military developed a unique 
expertise in treating those exposed to nuclear radiation, in this new 
era of proliferating biological threats we must now develop an 
expertise in postvaccination treatments.
  This has all been done by an extremely small staff--only one full-
time doctor, three nurse practitioners, and five educators and support 
staff at each of the four regional facilities. The value and medical 
services they have provided to the entire military family--Army, Navy, 
Air Force, Marines, and Coast Guard--has been extraordinary.
  Make no mistake, military personnel and their dependents are more 
confident in the vaccination programs because of the VHCs. When 
personnel do suffer adverse reactions, reports are extremely positive 
regarding the care they now get from the centers and we do not see 
individual cases becoming national news and fear spreading throughout 
the force.
  Why do we need the language I am proposing? The reason is simple. 
Despite the May 9, 2006, testimony from the Deputy Assistant Secretary 
of Defense for Force Health Protection and Readiness to the House 
Committee on Government Reform touting the centers as DOD's answer to 
adverse anthrax vaccine reactions, the centers are still not clearly 
established in law and face regular funding battles.
  The VHCs were created in minimally worded report language from the 
fiscal year 2001 Labor-HHS Appropriations conference report. It is time 
to recognize their role and varied responsibilities with a proper 
authorization.
  In addition, it is time to make sure they have clear and regular 
funding. For the past 5 years, the VHCs have been funded by the Army 
alone, primarily with global war on terror funds. I applaud the Army 
for recognizing the need for the centers and providing those funds from 
their wartime allocation. But, I am concerned that this is not 
sustainable and it is not what Congress intended. The Army is only the 
executive agent for what is supposed to be a defense-wide service. Even 
though almost half, 45 percent, of those treated by the VHC came from 
the Air Force, Navy and Marines, and Coast Guard, none of those 
services is willing to provide their fair share of the yearly $6 
million bill. The Army cannot sustain this and the people that would 
lose are injured military personnel from the other services who will 
not be able to access expert care.

  In recent years, the decision by the other services not to provide a 
portion of the funding for the centers has led to proposals to 
eliminate some of their operations. If all or part of the VHC network 
is dismantled, the technical expertise built up over the past 5 years 
will be dispersed. It will be almost impossible to reconstitute that 
highly specialized knowledge when we need it in the future. We cannot 
just hope that the 708 personnel who sought treatment last year will 
just get better on their own.

[[Page S6362]]

  This amendment seeks to clarify that the vaccine health care centers 
must exist, while also mandating a thorough review of their 
organization and functions. Next year, when we have the GAO study and 
the Pentagon's study, Congress can act on any worthwhile 
recommendations. In the meantime, we cannot leave this vital force 
protection and treatment center in limbo, nor can we leave the entire 
burden on the Army.
  As biological threats grow from both naturally occurring diseases 
like bird flu to weaponized agents like anthrax, force protection 
clearly demands a good vaccination program. Equally clearly, that 
program must include quality care for those who suffer adverse events 
in every service, not just the Army.
  As we look to the future, the need for vaccinations is only likely to 
grow. For that very reason, we established Project BioShield. At this 
point, there is no civilian equivalent to the vaccine health care 
centers network, but there is an initial collaborative effort between 
the VHCs and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. This 
collaboration must be encouraged so that we can take advantage of the 
VHCs knowledge should a mass civilian inoculation become necessary. If 
the VHCs are dismantled, that knowledge will be lost and may not be 
easily recovered or recreated.
  At the end of the day, this is very simple. We simply cannot mandate 
that military personnel take these vaccines and then abandon them when 
a problem arises. There should be no ambiguity about the authority for 
the vaccine health care centers to continue their excellent work.
  If military personnel are injured because of their service to this 
Nation, whether it be needing a prosthetic limb or long-term treatment 
for an adverse vaccine reaction, we have an absolute obligation to give 
them the best possible care.
  Anything less is unconscionable.
  For that reason, I am thankful that my colleagues have agreed and 
that this vital amendment has passed the Senate.


                           amendment no. 4466

  Mrs. BOXER. Mr. President, I would like to take a few minutes to 
discuss an amendment that I understand Mr. Warner and Mr. Levin have 
included in the managers' package.
  I would like to begin by thanking Senators Warner and Levin and their 
staffs for working so hard with us to get this done. I would also like 
to thank my colleague Senator Lieberman for working diligently with me 
to draft this legislation.
  He really is a true champion for our men and women in uniform.
  This amendment addresses an issue that is vitally important to many 
of my colleagues here in the Senate--improving mental health screening 
and services for our brave men and women serving in our armed services.
  As we all know, our soldiers, marines, airmen, and sailors have been 
bogged down in an extremely dangerous and increasingly destructive war 
in Iraq for more than 3 years, and the pressure is taking its toll.
  Multiple deployments, the insurgency, and the unprecedented urban 
combat that many of our service members face is resulting in high 
levels of mental illness, including PTSD--a disorder that, if left 
untreated, can cripple a person for life.
  Tragically, many of our service members are not being adequately 
screened and treated for these conditions.
  Let me give you an example from last month's Hartford Courant, which 
ran an extended series of articles detailing the failures of our 
military health care system.
  Nine months ago, 27-year-old SSG Bryce Syverson was on suicide watch 
and taking antidepressants in the psychiatric unit at Walter Reed Army 
Medical Center. Doctors had diagnosed him with PTSD and depression, 
which they attributed to his 15-month tour in Iraq as a gunner on a 
Bradley tank.
  Today, Staff Sergeant Syverson is back in the combat zone as part of 
a quick reaction force in Kuwait that could be summoned to Iraq at any 
time.
  He got his deployment orders after being told he wasn't fit for duty.
  He got his gun back after being told he was too unstable to carry a 
weapon.
  In a recent e-mai1 to his parents and brothers, Sergeant Syverson 
wrote: ``Nearly died on a PT test out here on a nice and really mild 
night because of the medication that I am taking. Head about to explode 
from the blood swelling inside, the [lightening] storm that happened in 
my head, the blurred vision, confusion, dizziness and a whole lot more. 
Not the best feeling in the entire world to have after being here for 
two days. . . . And I ask myself what . . . am I doing here?''
  I ask my colleagues, do this make any sense?
  In the Hartford Courant's May 17 piece entitled ``Still Suffering, 
But Redeployed,'' COL Elspeth Ritchie, a psychiatry consultant to the 
Army surgeon general, acknowledged that the decision to deploy soldiers 
with PTSD is a matter that the Army is currently wresting with.
  I would like to quote Colonel Ritchie, because I think that something 
she said is particularly telling: ``historically, we have not wanted to 
send soldiers or anybody with post-traumatic stress disorder back into 
what traumatized them. . . . The challenge for us . . . is that the 
Army has a mission to fight.''
  I appreciate that the military--particularly the Army--is facing 
severe manpower needs, but the fact that we are knowingly sending U.S. 
service members back into the very situation that caused their trauma 
is utterly tragic.
  Tragic and unacceptable.
  The Boxer-Lieberman amendment would do some very important things to 
address this situation.
  First, it would improve mental health screening procedures for those 
about to be deployed. Currently, the military's pre-deployment mental 
health assessment is a single question on a form.
  The Boxer-Lieberman amendment requires an enhanced mental health 
screening process prior to deployment that would include: a mental 
health history of the servicemember; current mental health treatment or 
use of medications for a mental health disorder; an assessment of any 
behavior identified by the unit commander that might provided by the 
member, (through a checklist or other means,) of symptoms that might 
indicate a mental health condition.
  Second, the amendment mandates that soldiers determined to have 
symptoms of a mental health condition--either before deployment or 
after deployment--will be referred to a qualified health care 
professional with experience in the evaluation and diagnosis of mental 
health conditions.
  This is an area where we are really falling short-the Hartford 
Courant reports that military screeners have arranged mental health 
evaluations for fewer than one in 300 deploying troops.
  Third, the Boxer-Lieberman amendment mandates that any member of the 
Armed Forces who requests access to mental health care services, 
before, during, or after deployment to a combat zone, will be given 
access within 72 hours after making the request or as soon as possible.
  Fourth, the amendment directs the Department of Defense to develop 
clear and consistent guidelines and regulations on what mental health 
conditions and psychotropic drugs ought to prevent a servicemember from 
being deployed to a combat zone.
  It also requires the Department to develop guidelines for the 
deployability and treatment of service members diagnosed with severe 
mental illness or PTSD.
  And lastly, it will require the Department to develop a plan to 
monitor individuals deployed to a combat zone who are known to have a 
mental health condition or disorder or are known to be taking 
psychotropic medications.
  I think that these are small steps that we can take to ensure that 
our service members receive a higher standard of mental health services 
and care.
  I hope it will also prevent stories like the one I am about to tell 
you, again in the Hartford Courant, from happening again.
  Patricia Powers of Skiatook, OK wonders why her 20-year-old son 
Joshua was sent to Iraq barely six months after he enlisted in the 
Army.
  According to Ms. Powers, she ''just couldn't believe'' that the Army 
took her son in, as her son had Asperger's syndrome--a form of autism.

[[Page S6363]]

  People with Asperger syndrome tend to be highly intelligent, but they 
have trouble in social settings and are quite often loners who have 
difficulty building relationships.
  However, Asperger's was not the only neurological issue facing 
Joshua.
  In reading through the medical records of her son's frequent visits 
to the base doctor, Ms. Powers found that in every instance, the doctor 
had taken note of Joshua's severe depression.
  Three weeks after arriving in Iraq, Pvt. Powers left his barracks 
around midnight and walked to the latrine, where he ended his life with 
a gunshot to the head.
  In a recent GAG report, the GAG noted that the military has been 
reluctantto create uniform guidelines for deployment.
  In its recommendation, the GAG argued that guidelines are necessary 
``so that in future deployments [the Defense Department] would not 
experience situations such as those that occurred with members being 
deployed into Iraq who clearly had pre-existing conditions that should 
have prevented their deployment.''
  Situations like Joshua Power's Situations like Bryce Syverson's, 
where he was forced to ask his family: ``What am I doing here?''
  Mr. President, the heroic men and women serving in Iraq and 
Afghanistan are doing a fantastic job.
  In Iraq, they have succeeded in every mission that has been asked of 
them, even the ones that have changed over time. In Afghanistan, they 
are relentlessly hunting for the man responsible for the deaths of over 
3,000 Americans. But as the death toll continues to rise, so does 
strain.
  Ided today just two examples of soldiers who clearly indicated that 
deploying them to a combat zone would be a mistake. But we know that 
there are many more.
  What we are asking for in this amendment is simple: that the Pentagon 
does a better job of dealing with mental health matters for the men and 
women that it sends into harm's way. I don't think this is too much to 
ask.
  Again, I like to thank Senator Warner, Senator Levin, and Senator 
Lieberman for their support.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I rise today to speak about an 
amendment offered during the debate on the 2007 Defense authorization 
bill by Senators Boxer, Kennedy, Clinton, and myself.
  In May of this year, the Hartford Courant published a series of 
articles describing inadequacies in the military's mental health 
screening procedures for servicemembers deploying to Iraq and 
Afghanistan. The Courant's investigation revealed that servicemembers 
displaying clear signs of distress and mental health problems are being 
deployed into combat situations and in some cases have taken their 
life. These cases compromise not only the lives of our servicemembers 
but the strength and cohesion of our military units.
  The Hartford Courant wrote about Jeffrey Henthorn, a young 
servicemember who took his life. Jeffrey was from Oklahoma and shipped 
out of Fort Riley, KS, the day after Christmas in 2004. While home, 
Jeffrey was depressed, was having nightmares, and was plagued by 
memories of a young boy who had died in Iraq. Less than 2 months after 
his redeployment to Iraq, Jeffrey took his own life at the age of 25 
years. Since then, it has become known that Jeffrey had made suicidal 
statements that were known to his Army superiors. Despite the clear 
psychological problems Jeffrey was having before his deployment, he was 
still sent back to a combat zone where he took his own life. To prevent 
acts such as this that ruin individual lives and have deleterious 
effects on a unit, Congress passed the National Defense Authorization 
Act for Fiscal Year 1998. At that time, the statute required the 
military to conduct an ``assessment of mental health'' for all 
deploying troops to prevent young men like Jeffrey Henthorn from being 
placed in further harm. However, the military's current screening 
process for deployment consists of a single mental health question on a 
predeployment questionnaire. The law is not being followed as it was 
intended.
  Alarmingly, the Hartford Courant's investigation found that only 6.5 
percent of those indicating mental health problems were referred for 
mental health evaluations from March 2003 to October 2005. This is 
unacceptable.
  Senator Boxer and I are also concerned about the increase in the 
numbers of servicemembers being prescribed medication for depression, 
anxiety, and post-traumatic stress disorderly, PTSD. These individuals 
are being sent into combat with psychotropic medications but are not 
systematically receiving any followup or monitoring. We cannot send our 
servicemembers into combat zones without the medical and mental health 
support they deserve and need. There is nothing controversial about 
that.
  Another case reported by the Hartford Courant illustrates the dangers 
of providing medications without followup or monitoring in the field. 
Michael Deem, father of two, saw a psychiatrist before deploying to 
help him cope with serious symptoms of depression. He was given a 
year's supply of Prozac, among other medications. Less than a month 
after deploying to Iraq, Michael Deem was found dead in his bunk. The 
Army determined that he died of an enlarged heart ``complicated by 
elevated levels'' of Prozac. We cannot have servicemembers on 
medications for serious conditions out in the field with inadequate 
monitoring, and nonexistent followup. We must do better for those 
willing to make the ultimate sacrifice for us.
  We have also learned that troops with preexisting mental health 
conditions and serious mental health disorders are being sent into 
combat zones. This amendment would make sure young men and women who 
are unable to serve are not sent into combat zones that make their 
conditions worse or place them and their units in danger.
  The Courant series also told the story of a young man from 
Pennsylvania. Eddie Brabazon had a history of bipolar disorder and 
spent time in group homes and psychiatric hospitals during his 
adolescent years. In March of 2004, less than 3 months into his second 
deployment to the Middle East, Eddie shot himself and took his own life 
at the age of 20. There were signs before this act that something was 
terribly wrong. In the days leading up to his suicide, Eddie had locked 
himself in a portable toilet with his rifle for 45 minutes, causing his 
sergeant concern. But no one sent Eddie to receive intensive treatment 
to prevent his suicide or send him away from the combat zone where his 
condition was worsening. Young men with Eddie's history of mental 
health problems and exhibiting such clearly communicated signs of 
distress should not continue to serve in a combat zone.
  To protect servicemembers similar to the ones the Courant has written 
about and their units, Senators Boxer, Kennedy, Clinton, and I are 
introducing this amendment. The military mental health amendment has 
two purposes. First, it is meant to keep these courageous young men and 
women out of the way of any further harm. Second, we must make sure 
that our units have the strongest and healthiest soldiers, and this 
amendment moves us in the right direction. By deploying servicemembers 
with serious mental health problems, we are compromising the strength 
of our military units.
  Our amendment will ensure that the military would conduct a thorough 
screening for determining whether a servicemember has a significant 
mental health problem before deploying; servicemembers with a 
significant mental health problem are seen by someone with experience 
in mental health assessment; access to mental health professionals in a 
more timely manner; the military identifies preexisting mental health 
conditions to determine appropriateness for deployment; and the 
military develops a plan for how to continue to provide mental health 
services during deployment for any servicemembers receiving mental 
health services before their deployment.
  Senator Boxer and I, along with Senators Clinton and Kennedy, 
introduced this amendment to ensure that servicemembers like Jeffrey 
Henthorn, Michael Deem, and Eddie Brabazon receive the care they 
deserve before it is too late. I thank both Senators Levin and Warner 
for adopting this amendment into the Defense authorization bill for 
2007, and I encourage the conferees in both Houses to maintain the

[[Page S6364]]

provisions of this amendment to ensure we keep our troops strong and 
healthy.


                           amendment no.4507

  Mrs. BOXER. Mr. President, I would like to take a few minutes of the 
Senate's time to discuss an amendment that I understand Senator Warner 
and Senator Levin have included in the managers' package.
  This amendment--that I worked on with my colleague Senator Snowe--
would move toward expanding eligibility for the Purple Heart to all 
prisoners of war who die in captivity regardless of the cause of death.
  The need for this important amendment was brought to my attention by 
a group of Korean War veterans--the Tiger Survivors--who identified 
what many of my colleagues agree is a glaring loophole in current law.
  You may be surprised to learn that currently, only prisoners of war 
who die during their imprisonment of wounds inflicted by the enemy--
such as a gunshot wound or intentional poisoning--clearly meet the 
criteria for posthumous Purple Heart recognition.
  Those who die of starvation, disease, or other causes during 
captivity do not. I would like to give you an example of what I mean by 
recounting the story of the crew members who survived the sinking of 
the USS Houston, a Navy cruiser that was sunk by the Japanese off the 
coast of Java in February 1942.
  After swimming to shore, the Japanese transported American POWs to 
Burma to work as slave labor building the Burma-Thai Railway, which 
would stretch 250 miles between mountains, across rivers, and through 
jungles.
  These American POWs cut down trees, built road beds and bridges, and 
laid ties and rails for what is known as the Death Railway.
  Conditions for these Americans were appalling. Each man received half 
a cup of bug-infested rice a day, and some POWs dropped below 80 
pounds. Malnutrition brought on diseases like beri beri, pellagra, and 
scurvy--severe vitamin deficiencies that result in horrible suffering 
and even death.
  The tropical environment also bred cases of dysentery, malaria, 
cholera, and tropical ulcers that ate through flesh to expose bone.
  Although Japanese doctors were present in the camps, they were not 
allowed any drugs or tools for practicing medicine. Those workers who 
were too slow were beaten; those who were too sick to work received no 
food, and were eventually sent off to die.
  Under current law, many of these individuals would not be eligible 
for the Purple Heart.
  Doesn't it make sense that our young service members who died in this 
manner would be recognized as having died at the hands of the enemy?
  Doesn't it make sense that the Houston crew members who were denied 
treatment and died of starvation and disease in captivity would be 
eligible for the Purple Heart?
  Language that would correct this injustice was accepted as part of 
the House version of the Defense authorization bill, where it had the 
overwhelming bipartisan support of 216 cosponsors.
  Equally important, correcting this important loophole in the law has 
been endorsed by the American Legion, Veterans of Foreign Wars, 
Military Order of the Purple Heart, the National Association for 
Uniformed Services, the Military Officers of America Association, the 
Korean War Veterans Association, National League of POW-MIA Families, 
Tiger Survivors, and a number of other prominent veterans 
organizations.
  I can think of no stronger endorsement than from these fine groups 
who know first-hand the suffering of war.
  I would like to tell you one more story by a World War II soldier by 
the name of John Coleman. This is his story as recounted in his book, 
Bataan and Beyond:

       The treatment of the death march and imprisonment . . . is 
     beyond the imagination's ability to comprehend. If there ever 
     was a hell on earth, this was administered to the 7,000 souls 
     of some of the bravest and most devoted of our military 
     personnel. Day after day they were in agony, seemingly 
     blotted out in memory by their nation. They suffered under 
     the burning tropical sun, on starvation rations, with little 
     water to drink. They could not even wash the filth from their 
     bodies or clothes, matted hair, and beards. They were 
     mentally depressed, had swollen limbs from beri beri, 
     unhealed festered wounds that were never treated. They also 
     had distended stomachs, bloody dysentery, and raw, sore 
     mouths from pellagra. Even a drink of water would cause their 
     mouths to burn. Everyone had stomach worms that would 
     sometimes find their way out of the body through the nose. No 
     attempt was made by the Imperial Japanese Army to furnish any 
     kind of medication to alleviate the suffering.
  Unimaginable. Simply unimaginable.
  Mr. President, these brave members of the Armed Forces suffered these 
cruelties so that we might enjoy the freedoms we have today. I can 
think of no more fitting tribute for their sacrifice than to 
posthumously make them eligible for the Purple Heart.
  While the amendment that I originally offered would have provided 
congressional authorization expanding eligibility for the Purple Heart, 
I worked with Senators Warner and Levin on compromise language that 
would require the President to determine whether eligibility for the 
Purple Heart should be expanded to all POW's who died in captivity.
  I sincerely hope the President will take a serious look at this 
proposal, and ensure that our POWs are afforded the recognition they 
deserve.


                           Amendment No. 4371

  Mr. OBAMA. Mr. President, I rise to speak in favor of amendment No. 
4371, which is being offered today by my friend, Senator Coburn. 
Senator Coburn and I have been working tirelessly to improve 
accountability and transparency in Federal contracting so that the 
American people can rely on their Government for the excellence and 
efficiency that they deserve.
  Award and incentive fees are often used in defense contracts to 
encourage outstanding performance. But too often these awards are given 
without regard to performance. That doesn't make sense. This amendment 
prohibits unsatisfactory performance from being rewarded by the Federal 
Government. It sets a higher standard for defense contractors and 
requires them at least to satisfy the basic requirements of a contract 
in order to be eligible for any award or incentive fee.
  It is a simple concept. No bonus awards when the work is 
unsatisfactory. Period. You don't tip a waiter who doesn't bring you 
your food. You don't give a bonus to an employee who doesn't do his or 
her job at work. The Government should not permit awards for work that 
is less than satisfactory. Awards should be used as an incentive for 
excellence, not as a backdoor for undeserved payments.
  The authorization bill makes some progress by requiring the Secretary 
of Defense to provide needed guidance on the use of awards and 
incentive fees. It requires guidance that award fees be tied to 
performance outcomes. It requires guidance on designating contractor 
performance as ``excellent,'' or ``superior.'' It requires standards 
for when performance awards are appropriate.
  This amendment just makes it clear that unsatisfactory work should 
never be eligible for an award. Contractors can and must be held to a 
higher standard. Our troops deserve no less. American taxpayers deserve 
no less. Americans should reward excellence, not mediocrity; success, 
not failure; contract fulfillment, and nothing less.
  I urge my colleagues to support this amendment.


                           amendment no. 4496

  Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, the National Biocontainment Lab, NBL, 
at the University of Texas Medical Branch, UTMB, in Galveston is an 
important tool in our continued fight against bioterrorism and emerging 
infectious diseases. As a Regional Center of Excellence for Biodefense 
and Emerging Infectious Diseases Research, RCE, for Federal Region VI, 
UTMB's lab is able to research and develop new therapies, vaccines, and 
tests for microbes that might be used as weapons by terrorists, as well 
as naturally occurring diseases such as SARS and West Nile virus.
  I was happy to support UTMB in 2003 in their efforts to establish the 
NBL in Galveston. In letters and conversations with Dr. Anthony Fauci, 
director of the National Institutes of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, 
and Dr. Elias Zerhouni, director of National Institutes of Health, I 
conveyed the importance of this facility and the benefits to housing 
the NBL at UTMB.
  Once again, I am pleased to support the NBL and UTMB with this 
amendment. By understanding the staffing

[[Page S6365]]

and training requirements needed at this new facility, our doctors and 
scientists will be better prepared and more able to recognize a 
bioterrorist attack.


                           Amendment No. 4222

  Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President, today marks the anniversary of the 
passage of a sense-of-the-Senate resolution on climate change. One year 
ago the Senate convened to debate the appropriate policy direction for 
the United States on this issue.
  The Senate debate on climate change included discussions on various 
proposals from Senators Hagel and Pryor, as well as Senators McCain and 
Lieberman and others. Although I had worked very closely with Senator 
Domenici on a specific policy proposal of our own, we were not able in 
the time allotted to find agreement on various aspects of that 
proposal. We ultimately decided that we should put the question to the 
Senate of whether or not our efforts should continue over the remainder 
of the 109th Congress.
  I am pleased to say that passage of the sense-of-the-Senate 
resolution gave us the foundation to continue our collaboration. Over 
the course of the last year, I have worked with Chairman Domenici and 
others to explore the basic workings of a mandatory market-based system 
to limit greenhouse gases. We have held hearings in the Energy 
Committee, participated in workshops and conferences, and engaged 
interested stakeholders through a White Paper process that culminated 
in an important day-long conference in April.
  Other Members of this body have been actively engaged in the 
continuing conversation, such as Senators Carper, Feinstein, Lugar, and 
Biden just to name a few, but it is important for us to recognize how 
much faster this issue is progressing outside of Washington, DC.
  The European Union Emissions Trading Scheme is in its second year of 
existence. There has been some debate about how the program is 
progressing, but there is no debate about the fact that they are moving 
forward and addressing global warming in a ground-breaking manner. Here 
in the United States, my colleagues from California and the 
Northeastern States are intimately aware of State initiatives to 
address global warming. My own State of New Mexico has been a leader in 
reducing emissions as well.
  Most importantly, I think we need to recognize how much we have 
learned in the past year about the science of climate change. Last 
year, the National Academies of Science from 11 countries, including 
the United States, declared that ``scientific understanding of climate 
change is now sufficiently clear to justify nations taking prompt 
action.'' According to NASA scientists, 2005 was the warmest year since 
the late 1800s. 1998, 2002, 2003, and 2004 followed as the next four 
warmest years.
  With regard to the impacts of global warming, a recent study shows 
that we are on track to initiate the melting of the Greenland ice 
sheet, which will contribute to continued sea-level rise and will also 
have major impacts on oceanic circulation from freshwater influx. Even 
small amounts of sea-level rise will have substantial impacts on 
coastal erosion, increased susceptibility to storm surges and 
groundwater contamination by salt intrusion. The effect on many of the 
world's coastal areas and population centers could be devastating.
  We are also in the early stages of hurricane season. I have not yet 
seen any studies that would indicate global warming will create more 
hurricanes, but I have seen two recent studies that conclude that the 
warming we are seeing in the world's oceans is caused by human-induced 
climate change. In addition, there are more studies that have recently 
concluded that the intensity of individual hurricanes has increased, 
which in part is attributed to the warming of the oceans.
  In conclusion, I believe that this is evidence that we need to act 
now. Since the sense-of-the-Senate resolution passed last year, the 
U.S. has emitted roughly 6 billion metric tons of carbon dioxide. EIA 
forecasts continued steady emissions growth at a rate that, if not 
slowed and ultimately stopped and reversed, will make it increasingly 
difficult to avoid dangerous climate impacts.
  I want to thank Senators Domenici and Specter, along with all of the 
cosponsors of the sense-of-the-Senate Resolution and everyone who 
supported it. We have learned a great deal over the course of the last 
year, and I would like to continue the progress. I would like to urge 
all of my colleagues who are interested in this issue to work with us 
to find a solution we can implement sooner, rather than later.
  I would like the references to some of the studies I have mentioned 
printed in the Record so that others can review them as well.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

       Alley, R.B., P.U. Clark, P. Huybrechts, and I. Joughin. 
     2005. Ice sheet and sea-level changes. Science 310: 456-460.
       Barnett, T.P., D.W. Pierce, K.M. AchutaRao, P.J. Gleckler, 
     B.D. Santer, J.M. Gregory, and W.M. Washington. 2005. 
     Penetration of human-induced warming into the world's oceans. 
     Science 309:284-287.
       Emanuel, K. 2005. Increasing destructiveness of tropical 
     cyclones over the past 30 years. Nature 436:686-688.
       Gregory, JM, P Huybrechts & SCB Raper. 2004. Threatened 
     loss of the Greenland ice-sheet. Nature 428: 616.
       Heij, 2005. and Gregory, J.M., and P. Huybrechts, 2006. 
     Ice-sheet contributions to future sea-level change. Phil. 
     Trans. Roy. Soc. Lond. Ser. A, in press.
       Hansen, J., L. Nazarenko, R. Ruedy, M. Sato, J. Willis, A. 
     Del Genio, D. Koch, A. Lacis, K. Lo, S. Menon, T. Novakov, J. 
     Perlwitz, G. Russell, G.A. Schmidt, and N. Tausnev. 2005. 
     Earth's energy imbalance: Confirmation and implications. 
     Science 308:1431-143.
       Knutson T.R. and R.E. Tuleya. 2004. Impact of CO2-induced 
     warming on simulated hurricane intensity and precipitation: 
     Sensitivity to the choice of climate model and convective 
     parameterization. Journal of Climate 17: 3477-3495.
       Levitus, S., J. Antonov, and T. Boyer. 2005. Warming of the 
     world ocean, 1955-2003. Geophysical Research Letters. 32.
       Sriver, R. and M. Huber. 2006. Low frequency variability in 
     globally integrated tropical cyclone power dissipation. 
     Geophysical Research Letters 33: doi:10.1029/2006GL026167.
       Trenberth, K. 2005. Uncertainty in Hurricanes and Global 
     Warming. Science 308: 1753-1754.
       U.S. National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). 
     2005. Global Temperature Trends: 2005 Summation. NASA Goddard 
     Institute for Space Studies (GISS). New York, NY. Available 
     at http://data.giss.nasa.gov/gistemp/2005/.
       Webster, P.J., Holland, G.J., Curry, J.A. and H.-R. Chang. 
     2005. Changes in tropical cyclone number, duration, and 
     intensity in a warming environment. Science 309: 1844-1846.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, the amendments have been cleared on this 
side. It is a packet of 60 amendments, as I understand. I thank our 
staffs for working so hard on these amendments. There is a lot of 
interest in them by a lot of Members. We owe thanks to the staff for 
their great work. I have not only no objection but enthusiastically 
join in moving their adoption. I gather they have been agreed to by 
unanimous consent.
  Mr. WARNER. I thank my distinguished colleague for his remarks.
  If I might draw to the attention of my distinguished colleague, we 
have been consulting with our respective leadership and their staffs. 
We have a joint goal of trying to complete this bill today and have 
third reading and final passage. The bill is now open for amendment. We 
have some knowledge of some amendments that may be offered. We would 
urge those who wish to offer amendments, recognizing cloture has been 
agreed to by the Chamber, nevertheless within the confines of that 
cloture, we are ready to have the opportunity to consider further 
amendments.
  I believe I am about to put in the first quorum call for the purpose 
solely that we have no amendments at the moment pending. That is the 
first time in the consideration of this bill, I believe.
  Mr. LEVIN. I commend the chairman for the way in which he has been 
able to manage this bill, as always. It is a testament to his ability 
and the respect that everybody has for him in the Chamber. I have never 
seen fewer quorum calls on a bill of this size than we have had this 
week. I am sure there have been a few. I have not counted them. There 
may have been a quorum call yesterday during the 8 or 9 hours of 
debate. If there was, I missed it.
  I commend the chairman for putting us in a position where we can 
hopefully get this bill agreed to as soon as possible today. Again, I 
join him in not urging people to bring amendments to

[[Page S6366]]

the floor--we never do that--but in notifying people that if they have 
amendments, they should bring them to the floor.
  Mr. WARNER. I thank my colleague who has worked side by side with me 
these 28 years on these matters. When I look back on my modest career 
in the Senate, I can't think of any other Senator with whom I have had 
a better relationship and a more trusting one, although we do disagree 
on occasion.
  Mr. LEVIN. There is recent evidence of that. But we agree on process. 
We agree on civility. We agree on most matters. We are able to work 
things out. It is his nature to do that, and we are all very much in 
his debt. Our wives are on the same path that we have been on.
  Mr. WARNER. That is right. Who quoted Edward R. Murrow, something 
about the strength of our Nation depends on the diversity of thinking 
and expression?
  Mr. LEVIN. Well, it was quoted this morning. It didn't carry the day, 
but it was very appropriate.
  Mr. WARNER. I thank my colleague. I do believe those two amendments 
on which we spent so much time were carefully and fully debated. I 
accept with a sense of humility the outcome, that we were able to 
prevail on this side of the aisle. However I underline that I do that 
with a sense of deep humility.
  I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Alexander). Without objection, it is so 
ordered.


                    Amendment No. 4471, as Modified

  Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to call up my 
amendment No. 4471 and ask that it be modified with the changes that 
are at the desk.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the pending amendment is 
laid aside.
  Mr. SESSIONS. I further ask unanimous consent that Senators Allard, 
Kyl, Thune, and Vitter be added as cosponsors.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, reserving the right to object, there is a 
little uncertainty as to the modifications.
  Mr. SESSIONS. I don't think the Senator will find that objectionable. 
It dealt with funding allocations, the offsets.
  Mr. LEVIN. Is the one at the desk the modified version?
  Mr. SESSIONS. Yes.
  Mr. LEVIN. If the Senator will please withhold for a moment.
  Mr. SESSIONS. I will be pleased to.
  Mr. LEVIN. I have no objection.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The clerk will report the amendment.

       The Senator from Alabama [Mr. Sessions], for himself, Mr. 
     Allard, Mr. Kyl, Mr. Thune, and Mr. Vitter, proposes an 
     amendment numbered 4471, as modified.

  Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the reading 
of the amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

       At the end of subtitle C of title II, add the following:

     SEC. 236. TESTING AND OPERATIONS FOR MISSILE DEFENSE.

       (a) Additional Amount for Missile Defense Agency.--Of the 
     amount authorized to be appropriated by section 201(4) for 
     research, development, test, and evaluation for Defense-wide 
     activities, the amount that is available for the Missile 
     Defense Agency is hereby increased by $45,000,000.
       (b) Availability of Amount.--Of the amount authorized to be 
     appropriated by section 201(4) for research, development, 
     test, and evaluation for Defense-wide activities and 
     available for the Missile Defense Agency, as increased by 
     subsection (a), $45,000,000 may be available for Ballistic 
     Missile Defense Midcourse Defense Segment (PE #63882C)--
       (1) to accelerate the ability to conduct concurrent test 
     and missile defense operations; and
       (2) to increase the pace of realistic flight testing of the 
     ground-based midcourse defense system.
       (c) Supplement.--Amounts available under subsection (b) for 
     the program element referred to in that subsection are in 
     addition to any other amounts available in this Act for that 
     program element.
       (d) Offset.--The amount authorized to be appropriated by 
     section 421 for military personnel is hereby reduced by 
     $45,000,000 due to unexpended obligations.

  Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. President, recent concerns over a long-range 
ballistic missile launch or possible launch toward the United States by 
North Korea is an event that many experts have predicted and an event 
of serious import for the world.
  President Bush, in December of 2002, directed the Department of 
Defense to begin fielding a missile defense system to protect the 
United States. There were many concerns expressed at that time, but 
Congress followed his orders and has moved forward. Today, we have nine 
GBIs--ground-based interceptors--in Alaska in silos in the ground, and 
two in California that are able to be launched to attack and destroy 
incoming missiles. The system and those missiles that we have are not 
complete nor fully perfected, but the Commander of Strategic Command, 
General Cartwright, says it does have capability to defend our Nation.
  So I would first like to give my thanks to President Bush and to the 
Department of Defense for moving on this issue some time ago.
  I would also like to express my appreciation for a bipartisan effort 
that was begun not long after I came to the Senate by Senator Thad 
Cochran and Senator Joe Lieberman and the legislation they passed that 
called on this Government to deploy a ground-based missile defense 
system as soon as feasible. That was a major step forward. Following 
that, President Bush's actions in 2002 have moved us farther forward.
  These missiles that we have in the ground are able to be launched, 
they are able to attack and destroy incoming systems. So it is a 
remarkable thing that has been accomplished. Many doubted it. We have a 
lot more testing to do to deal with decoys and other matters to make 
sure the entire system works in an harmonious and effective way, from 
the ground-based radar, sea-based radar, to launch sites and our 
intercept capabilities and all of the computer systems that are 
necessary to make these missiles move at incredible speeds to collide 
in the air with such great force that they basically vaporize without 
any explosives being involved. So I think, Mr. President, it is an 
important event in our lifetime as a nation to note that this defense 
shield is now being employed.
  I also was pleased that our Democratic leader a few days ago noted 
that: ``We live in a dangerous time and the threats to our Nation are 
many.'' He said, ``They range from terrorist attacks like those on 9/11 
to rogue nations with nuclear ambitions like North Korea and Iran.'' He 
went on to note the: ``Headlines about North Korea's new missile 
test.'' He discussed that and noted: ``It is important that we as a 
country address each of these threats.''
  Mr. President, I suggest, based upon the events of the past few 
weeks, that the debate over the need for missile defense is no longer 
an academic one, but it is a debate that must now take place in the 
reality of current events.
  As we convene today, North Korea may perhaps still be preparing to 
test launch its Taepo-Dong II long-range ballistic missile. According 
to U.S. intelligence agencies, this missile has the potential to reach 
the shores of the United States, given its purported maximum range of 
9,000 miles, far enough to hit the west coast of the U.S. mainland and 
all of the Pacific bases, according to an article in the Washington 
Post earlier this week.
  The leaders of South Korea, Australia, New Zealand, China, Japan, and 
the United States are warning, as Secretary of State Rice did Monday, 
that, as she said, ``The launch of a ballistic missile would be a 
provocative act that would deepen North Korea's isolation.'' She urged 
the North Koreans not to end their moratorium on long-range missile 
testing. Japan's warning was even stronger. Japanese Prime Minister 
Koizumi said that Japan ``would have to respond harshly'' if there were 
a missile attack.
  North Korea also fields some 200 medium-range No-Dong ballistic 
missiles that can reach Japan, and it deploys some 600 short-range 
ballistic missiles tha could reach throughout the Korean Peninsula, 
where we have some 30,000-plus troops.

  Likewise, on the other side of the world, Iran continues to enhance 
and

[[Page S6367]]

test its SHAHAB-3 medium-range ballistic missile to extend its range 
and effectiveness. U.S. intelligence agencies estimate that Iran could 
have an ICBM capable of reaching the United States before 2015 with 
continued foreign assistance.
  According to press reports, Israeli intelligence noted in April of 
2006 that Iran received a shipment of North Korean-made BM-25 ballistic 
missiles which have a range of 2,500 kilometers.
  This activity was noted by the Prime Minister of Israel, who stated 
in a press conference with President Bush on May 23 that:

       There is a major threat posed by the Iranians in their 
     attempts to have nonconventional capabilities and the 
     ballistic missiles that can hit major centers all across 
     Europe, not just the Middle East.

  These are real, not hypothetical, threats to the United States and 
its allies posed by these ballistic missiles.
  These missiles are threats that require a multifaceted response, not 
the least of which is by means of an effective ballistic missile 
defense system.
  I would imagine that over the past 5 weeks, the Department of Defense 
has been carefully watching the arrival and fueling of Taepo-Dong 
missiles at its launch pad on the eastern coast of North Korea. And I 
would suspect that our missile defense capabilities have been carefully 
integrated into our diplomatic and deterrent options for dealing with 
the situation--a situation that Secretary Rice said is an ``abrogation 
of obligations'' of North Korea, a path not of compromise or peace 
``but rather instead to once again saber-rattle.''
  So our Secretary of State has called the situation correctly. The 
Nation and Congress should heed her words.
  While I have no direct knowledge of any administration plans beyond 
what is being said in the press, I would hope that our U.S. Navy ships, 
which are capable of tracking and potentially intercepting ballistic 
missiles, have been deployed in the area. I saw this part of our fleet 
last year when I was in Pearl Harbor right after they conducted a 
series of successful intercept tests in the Pacific.
  I would also hope that the ground-based midcourse defense system, 
with missiles deployed in both Alaska and California to provide 
protections against long-range missile attack, has been activated in 
case it is needed. To be sure, these systems are still undergoing 
testing. They have been designed to be available in an emergency, and I 
would think an imminent Taepo-Dong launch falls into that category.
  At the very least, such a capability would add to the options 
available to our President. In a radio interview last week, Ambassador 
Vershbow, the top U.S. envoy in South Korea, commented on a potential 
North Korean launch saying, ``Since it would be clearly a provocative 
step vis-a-vis the region and international community, we should not 
simply let it pass without some response.''
  I don't know what response the Ambassador had in mind, but certainly 
the ability to intercept that missile before it struck a populated area 
would be high on my list.
  My main point to my colleagues on both sides of the aisle and in both 
Houses of Congress, Mr. President, is that missile defenses must now be 
considered an integral and important tool of U.S. diplomacy and 
national security policy.
  This is all the more reason to support the administration's efforts 
to develop test and field effective missile defenses against missiles 
of all ranges. So I am pleased to report that the Defense authorization 
bill reported out of the Armed Services Committee fully funds the 
President's request for missile defense to include $56 million for site 
survey and design work associated with the European defense missile 
defense site.
  The European missile defense site, scheduled to begin construction in 
2008 with full fielding expected in 2011, will allow 10 ground-based 
interceptors capable of protecting both the United States and much of 
Europe against a long-range missile fired by Iran.
  If you look at the globe carefully, you could indicate a long-range 
missile launched towards the United States from Iran would fly over 
northeastern Europe. That would be an excellent site to protect both 
the United States as well as protecting Europe.
  Congressional support for this activity is timely for our defense and 
to support Western diplomatic efforts aimed at halting Iran's 
acquisition of a nuclear weapon capability.
  Should diplomacy fail, a European missile defense site will be 
critical to defer Iranian ballistic missile threats aimed at attacking 
or intimidating the West.
  Our NATO allies recognize the threat posed by the proliferation of 
ballistic missiles. In 2010, the alliance expects to have the 
capability to protect deployed troops against short- and medium-range 
missiles. The alliance is now reviewing the results of a 4-year 
feasibility study that examines options for protecting alliance 
territory--that is the North Atlantic Treaty Organization alliance--and 
population against a full range of missile threats.
  Congressional commitment to a U.S. missile defense site in Europe at 
this time would be a significant factor in shaping NATO's decision to 
provide missile defense protection in Europe. Our commanders tell us 
that. They tell us it is very important.
  I realize some of our colleagues are concerned that funding a 
European site would be premature at this time. They suggest a slow 
fielding program until more extensive tests and evaluations have been 
completed. While I appreciate that concern, I do believe that current 
Missile Defense Agency approach of simultaneously fielding and testing 
a GMD system has proven to be wise, as we see the threats to our Nation 
increase in just recent days.
  The Commander of the U.S. Strategic Command has testified that the 
current missile system provides a thin line of defense that could be 
used. The independent Pentagon Director of Operational Tests and 
Evaluation stated on April 4 of this year:

       With the current program and the tests that have been 
     scheduled, it's very likely that the GMD system will 
     demonstrate that it is effective.

  The things that are needed to turn this thin line of defense into a 
robust defense system are more interceptors coupled with more flight 
testing, both of which are programmed by the missile defense agency and 
funded by our bill.
  While we have crafted a good funding stream in our committee--and I 
thank my colleague, Senator Bill Nelson of Florida, and others, for the 
bipartisan way he worked on this--we have worked hard at containing 
costs and keeping the costs under control.
  The possible launch of a long-range North Korean missile that could 
even reach the United States of America calls for us to evaluate this 
year's authorization to ensure that all necessary funding exists to 
move forward with deployment as well as testing, and to be sure that 
throughout that time we are ready. General Trey Obering, who directs 
the program, understands these challenges.
  My review of this authorization has convinced me that an additional 
appropriation of $45 million is critically important in allowing us to, 
in the words of our amendment:

     accelerate the ability to conduct concurrent tests and 
     missile defense operations [and] to increase the pace of 
     realistic flight tests.

  The funds that I am talking about and the projects that I am talking 
about are already in the 2008 budget. This would allow them to move 
forward to the 2007 budget.
  The amendment for which I am seeking support today will help ensure 
that we can continue testing and always remain ready; not have to have 
the readiness of our system degraded by testing that we need to be 
doing. This is necessary so that we can respond to any possible missile 
launch that may threaten our Nation.
  The key matter is that we test and we test regularly. But we cannot 
shut down the readiness of our system that could have the capability to 
knock down incoming missiles that could be aimed at us.
  Congressional support for this amendment, I think, will send a strong 
message to any nation, North Korea or Iran, that we will be constantly, 
24/7, ready to respond and knock down and destroy any missile that 
would be directed at our Nation. It will also reassure our allies that 
we will be ready to protect them and help us create the kind of 
umbrella of defense that we have dreamed of for many years and 
accelerate our ability to make that a reality.
  I thank my colleagues. I thank those who indicated they would accept 
this

[[Page S6368]]

amendment. I think it is a good step forward.
  It is great to see my colleague, Senator Allard, here. He used to 
chair the subcommittee that I have now, the Strategic Subcommittee. He 
has been a long-time champion of national missile defense.
  I say to Senator Levin, he is due to be recognized next, but I know 
Senator Allard is here also.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, we do accept the amendment on this side. 
There are no differences in terms of the North Korean threat. The 
question is whether or not we will be deploying a system which will be 
adequate to meet that threat. Right now we do not know. There has been 
no operational testing, realistic testing of our system. It needs 
testing.
  Although we have differences and have expressed those and argued over 
those differences as to whether we ought to be producing 10 more 
missiles which have not been tested operationally or realistically--
whether we ought to be buying these final 10 missiles given the fact we 
want to make sure if we are going to have a system that it works, and 
we don't know that yet--as far as this Senator is concerned, I very 
much disagreed with this approach of buying before we fly. Usually we 
fly and test before we buy, but this system, we have decided, at least 
the majority of Senators have decided, that we are going to buy before 
we test. I think that is a mistake, but that is not the issue on this 
amendment.
  This amendment would authorize $45 million, mainly for testing, 
mainly to improve the likelihood that a missile which has been deployed 
will in fact do the job. Since I have been one who has been arguing 
regularly for more testing, more realistic testing, more operational 
testing, it seems to me that I can very readily support funding which 
is going to go to more testing, which is really what this amendment is 
all about.
  We have not had a single successful intercept test with an 
operational system. There have been two failures with this operational 
system. We don't know if our system would work. We obviously want it to 
work if we are going to have it.
  Since this amendment basically is going to increase not only the pace 
of realistic flight testing of this ground-based, mid-course defense 
system but also is going to accelerate the ability to conduct 
concurrent testing while the missile defense operations are going on, 
since in both instances the focus is on testing and making sure that 
this system will work if ever called upon, I accept the amendment. I 
have no objection to it and, indeed, support its purpose.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Colorado.
  Mr. ALLARD. Mr. President, I rise to speak in support of the 
amendment offered by my good friend, Senator Jeff Sessions of Alabama, 
who has worked hard on this issue. I know he is a strong, dedicated 
Senator as far as making sure that we have a good, strong national 
defense, which is important in today's times.
  There is no doubt that this has been an unusual approach where we 
develop and purchase at the same time. But these are unusual times. We 
have had an emerging threat that, according to many of our defense 
experts, is real. We had to move forward at an unprecedented rapid 
pace.
  Over the last 2 weeks, the North Koreans have moved toward the brink 
and have been preparing to test fire a long-range ballistic missile 
capable of reaching the United States. We were in the same position in 
1998. Then all we could do is threaten to retaliate if North Korea 
launched a ballistic missile attack against us. We did not have a 
system that was capable of defending our country from attack.
  Today the situation is different. Acting upon the direction of 
Congress, which mandated in 1999 that our country deploy a missile 
defense system as quickly as technologically possible, the Department 
of Defense has developed and deployed a missile defense system that is 
capable of defending our Nation against limited ballistic missiles.
  Given the real-world ballistic threats, such as North Korea, the 
Department of Defense has pursued a strategy of concurrent tests and 
operations. The Department recognizes that our current missile defense 
system does not have sufficient capability and needs more testing. That 
is why the Department continues to test the system and add new 
capabilities.
  At the same time, it is clear that situations such as the ongoing 
North Korean threat require that our missile defenses be ready in case 
of a ballistic missile attack. Leaving our Nation defenseless to 
ballistic missile attack while such situations persist is folly in the 
extreme. We currently have 11 ground-based interceptors deployed and 
operational. We have also upgraded our early warning radars, improved 
our Aegis tracking radars, built new forward-based and sea-based 
radars, and created an integrated command-and-control battle management 
system.
  These are significant achievements that together provide our country 
with a limited ballistic missile defense. Yet, as we all know, our 
missile defense still needs more work. It has a limited capability, 
which is certainly better than having none at all, but we need to do 
more--particularly with regard to testing.
  The amendment offered by Senator Sessions puts us on the right track. 
The Missile Defense Agency needs to test its ballistic missile defense 
system more often and under more complicated conditions. This 
amendment, offered by Senator Sessions, will help in that effort.
  The amendment will also help pay for the unexpected costs of 
operating the missile defense system 24 hours a day over the last 
couple of weeks. Soldiers who man the system in Colorado and Alaska 
have performed exceptionally well, and there is cost for keeping the 
system on full-time alert status. This amendment helps address this 
cost.
  This body mandated that the Department of Defense deploy a missile 
defense system as quickly as technologically possible. I supported this 
mandate and believe that our current missile defense system can provide 
a limited defense against a ballistic missile attack. It still needs 
work, which is why this amendment is so important and necessary.
  I do support the Sessions amendment and urge my colleagues to do so 
as well. I am pleased to hear that the ranking member on the Armed 
Services Committee has agreed to support this amendment.
  I thank, again, Senator Sessions, for his leadership on this very 
important issue. I think this is a valuable system, and we need to be 
very sure that we do not get behind in this kind of technology.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor and thank the Members for their 
support.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I rise to speak on behalf of the amendment 
sponsored by the Senator from Alabama, concerning the need to add an 
additional $45 million to the Missile Defense Agency for testing and 
operations of the ground-based midcourse defense, GMD, system.
  In December of 2002, the President directed the Department of Defense 
to begin fielding an initial set of missile defense capabilities that 
included ground-based interceptors for the defense of the United States 
against the long-range ballistic missile threat. Given our total 
vulnerability to that threat, the Missile Defense Agency chose to begin 
the simultaneous fielding of missile defense interceptors even while 
developmental testing continued to validate the effectiveness of the 
system. While this is not a conventional acquisition approach, I 
believe it was prudent given the emerging ballistic missile threats we 
expected to face.
  Recent North Korean preparations for the test launch of a long-range 
ballistic missile confirm the wisdom of the administration's approach: 
we need to have an emergency missile defense capability in place, even 
while development and testing of the system continues.
  Moreover, I believe Iran's continuing development of longer range 
ballistic missiles, coupled with their intention to acquire nuclear 
weapons, also argues for fielding missile defense capabilities as soon 
as technically feasible and in numbers sufficient to stay ahead of the 
threat.
  Just last month, from the floor of the Senate, I spoke to my 
colleagues about how NATO might respond to the greatest threat to 
regional and global stability that we face today: Iran. I noted

[[Page S6369]]

that I support the principle of preserving as many options as possible 
in diplomacy, and to bolster those diplomatic options, NATO should 
consider erecting a ``ring of deterrence'' that would surround Iran to 
deter the use of actual force, as was done so successfully during the 
cold war.
  I believe that a ground-based interceptor site in Europe, as is being 
proposed by the Department of Defense, would contribute to this 
deterrence of Iranian--or any other--missile threats, and would be 
consistent with NATO activities already underway to provide missile 
defense capabilities for the Alliance in the next decade. Most 
important, a missile defense site in Europe would send a message to 
nations developing longer-range missiles that the United States and its 
allies will not be intimidated by the threat of ballistic missiles 
armed with weapons of mass destruction.

  The amendment before us now recognizes the accomplishments of the 
Department of Defense in fielding, in such a short time, a limited 
missile defense system that is now available in an emergency to provide 
a measure of protection for the American people against a long-range 
missile threat--such as the missile that now sits on a North Korean 
launch pad.
  One of the limitations of the current GMD system, however, is that it 
is difficult to maintain the system on alert while it is undergoing the 
testing necessary to further improve its capability and reliability. To 
address this limitation, the Missile Defense Agency plans to create the 
infrastructure and redundant communications links necessary to permit 
the system to remain on alert even while test events are underway. This 
amendment helps advance these plans so that we are better prepared to 
address the threat posed by the development of a North Korean 
intercontinental ballistic missile.
  In closing, I would note that in my many years here in the Senate, I 
have been privileged to participate in many a debate over missile 
defense. We have examined this issue from every conceivable angle--
cost, technology, policy, strategy, and diplomacy--and the debate 
always appeared to me to be somewhat theoretical, since we lacked 
actual missile defense capabilities.
  But today this is no longer the case. The United States now has a 
limited capability to defend its territory, deployed forces, and its 
allies against missiles of all ranges. It is a limited capability, to 
be sure, but one that now provides the President and his senior 
officials with additional options that can reinforce diplomacy and 
deterrence or, as a last resort, protect against the growing ballistic 
missile threat.
  Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I, too, rise in support of this amendment of 
the Senator from Alabama, Mr. Sessions. It is a modest increase in 
funding. But as the ranking member of the Armed Services Committee 
said, it will enable us to accelerate the pace of testing, which I 
think we are all supportive of. And as a result, I think it is a good 
amendment. I appreciate the support of both the minority and the 
majority. Because of that, I will not take a long time to detail the 
reasons why I think it is so important.
  Suffice it to say, with the recent news of the preparations of the 
North Koreans and our knowledge that they have been very closely 
connected to the development of weapon capabilities, in particular the 
missile capabilities of the Iranians, and given the fact that both of 
those countries have not only become increasingly capable but 
increasingly belligerent in recent months and years, it is very obvious 
that we have to move forward and accelerate our testing and development 
and our deployment of the missile interception system with all the 
speed we can muster.
  It is a program that we are developing as we go along, and we are 
learning a lot in the process. Our most recent tests have been 
successful. We can build on those successes.
  I am delighted that the missile defense system is receiving the kind 
of support that it needs to receive so that in the years to come, when 
the American people look back on this and realize that they are 
protected from a missile attack, they can say it was during these years 
when that threat was evolving and developing that we had the fortitude 
to put the money in the program for development and testing that would 
enable us to protect the American people.
  I remember back, right after 9/11, when the intelligence communities 
were criticized for not connecting the dots. Now the dots on the 
missile fronts are pretty clear. We are beginning to get big red 
circles coming at us with both North Korea and Iran, and others are on 
the way as well. It is during this period of time, before they become 
completely capable then, we have to develop our interceptor 
capabilities with our ground-based missile systems and the follow-on 
systems which we are working on as well.
  I applaud the efforts of my colleague from Alabama and his foresight 
for proposing this modest increase.
  I appreciate the support of the ranking minority member on the 
committee, and I urge my colleagues to support the amendment.
  Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Arizona for his 
comments, and in particular I want to express my appreciation to him 
for his steadfast leadership to ensure that this Nation has a ballistic 
missile defense.
  He was active in this long before 9/11. Ever since he has been in the 
Senate, this has been a long passion of his. I am delighted that he 
could be here today to share some thoughts about it.
  The system is not yet where we want it to be. But it has been proved. 
We have demonstrated hit-to-kill technology on two occasions. Now we 
have this entire system in place where we have ship-based radar, 
ground-based radar, our missile satellite system, and the computers are 
tied all together.
  I ask my colleague, Senator Kyl, a Member of the leadership in this 
Senate, if he remembers those debates in the late the 1990s--I guess it 
was when the Cochran-Lieberman bill passed to deploy this system. Maybe 
he could share some of his thoughts. He must feel some satisfaction to 
know that we now have a system in place that can give us at least some 
protection from a missile attack.
  Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I will respond quickly to make this point. A 
lot of folks over the years asked, Why has it taken us so long? It is a 
good question. There are several different answers to it.
  First of all, this is hard. It is hard to hit a bullet with a bullet. 
It has taken a lot of time and effort by very smart people.
  I am glad we were there at the beginning, providing them the 
resources they needed to conduct these kinds of tests and demonstrate 
that we could really intercept an intercontinental ballistic missile, 
which is the equivalent of hitting a bullet with a bullet.

  There were years in which there was opposition to the missile defense 
system, in which funding was cut from the program. That crippled the 
program and slowed it down. There were times when we were ready to 
deploy something and then opponents said we don't want to deploy yet, 
we want to do some more testing. As a result, every time we seemed to 
be ready to put up something, we were pulled back--all the way back to 
the early 1980s when Ronald Reagan started talking about this. You have 
to scratch your head and wonder why it has taken us this long to get to 
this point.
  I think the most important thing, as the Senator from Alabama pointed 
out, is we are now making tremendous progress. We have a system 
deployed. It is better with every subsequent test, and as time goes on, 
the American people can at least begin to feel a little bit more 
secure. We are not there yet, as everybody has pointed out. But we are 
making great progress.
  Because we worked hard during some of those lean years to keep the 
funding going and keep the progress going forward, we are at the stage 
we are today.
  I thank both Members of the minority and majority for their support 
for the program this year.
  Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. COBURN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. COBURN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the pending 
amendment be set aside.

[[Page S6370]]

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Senator Dodd 
be added as a cosponsor to the Levin-Reed Iraq amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, if I might first thank my colleague from 
Oklahoma. A few people around here will say they are going to be here 
at a certain time and show up at a certain time. The Senator was 
committed to come here at a certain time, and I thank him.
  Mr. COBURN. Mr. President, I thank the Senator.
  I want to spend a few minutes, first of all, praising the chairman 
and ranking member of this committee. It is important, I think, that we 
see the relationships that develop, as well as the standards that have 
been developed on this bill, the fact that Chairman Warner was here 
very late last night, the fact that we are moving forward in an 
expeditious way.
  I have several areas and several amendments I am going to call up. I 
will try to be cooperative as to whether we have votes. But I think the 
issues are important enough that the American people ought to hear the 
debate about them.
  I am not under any illusion that will necessarily win some of them. 
But I think we need to pay attention to them and the debate needs to be 
a part of the Record.
  With that, I call up amendment No. 4454 and ask unanimous consent to 
modify it with the language of 4491, which I have here in my hand.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the modification?
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, is it possible for the managers to look at 
this for a moment before it is sent up? I think it would help 
facilitate matters.
  Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. COBURN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.


                    Amendment No. 4491, as Modified

  Mr. COBURN. Mr. President, I call up amendment No. 4491, as modified, 
and I ask unanimous consent to make it a first-degree amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? Without objection, it is 
so ordered.
  The amendment (No. 4491), as modified, is as follows:

       At the appropriate place insert the following:

     SEC. __. REFORMS TO THE DEFENSE TRAVEL SYSTEM TO A FEE-FOR-
                   USE-OF-SERVICE SYSTEM.

       No later than one year after the enactment of this Act, the 
     Secretary of Defense may not obligate or expend any funds 
     related to the Defense Travel System except those funds 
     obtained through a one-time, fixed price service fee per DOD 
     customer utilizing the system with an additional fixed fee 
     for each transaction.
  Mr. COBURN. Mr. President, this is a great case for the American 
people to see what is not operating right in many of the branches of 
our Government.
  There is a procurement contract that started out 8 years ago. The 
total cost was to be $200 million. The idea was to save money on 
purchasing travel vouchers for our military. That was the goal. The 
original cost was $246 million. We are now 8 years into this, and we 
are over $464 million. It is working at a 30-percent level. It was 
working at less than 10 percent last year. Even though we have the GAO 
saying they may have saved $13 million this year, the fact is that 
study didn't consider the fact that the vast majority of time when they 
buy an airplane ticket they do not get the best price. So that wasn't 
even considered. The purpose of this amendment is to cause us to focus 
again on what we are doing.
  There are no-bid contracts, contracts that change in terms of 
violation of the contracting laws, performance bonuses, pay for back 
costs, negotiating through the procurement procedure. There is no 
significant oversight in this Congress on procurement in the agencies 
of this Government. That has to change. Nobody in the private world 
would get away with this. Nobody in their personal life would be able 
to get away with this.
  Yet we have a system now where almost every ticket that is bought 
through this $464 million program still has to be checked by a travel 
agent, of which we pay anywhere from $5 to $11 an hour, even though we 
might have saved $20 on a payment system through the Pentagon.
  What is the problem? I have worked with the comptroller at the 
Pentagon. They were aware of this. The Secretary of Defense is aware of 
it. The chairman is aware of the problem. The ranking member and I have 
had multiple discussions.
  The problem is the Pentagon has hundreds of computers that won't talk 
to each other. Instead of fixing that problem, we contract to make a 
system that should be off the shelf for less than $59 million, and we 
pay $500 million for it so it will speak to all these different 
programs--and it is not doing it effectively.
  The purpose of this amendment is to quit sending good money after bad 
and say don't get rid of the program, but let us incentivize the 
program. If it is a good program, then let us pay the contractor every 
time it is used. If it is not used enough, and if it doesn't get used--
and it is not getting used now because it is too hard to use in the 
vast majority of the cases, most people go straight to a travel agent--
let us pay them on a per-transaction basis just like this contractor 
has on every other travel program that it has with the Federal 
Government.
  Why would we do it differently in the Pentagon? We are doing it 
differently because our procurement system is broken in terms of how we 
hold people accountable.
  I have nothing against the contractor.
  If you would let me continue to do a program and not perform and 
continue to give me money, I will take it. But what it is doing is 
breeding incompetency. It is wasting taxpayer dollars, and we ought to 
say there is a point in time.
  What do we know about travel systems in the Federal Government? What 
we know is in five other agencies they don't have any problems at all, 
two of which were developed by their same contractor.
  Why are we having problems here? One of them is because we have a 
cost-plus contract. What is the incentive to fix the problem? There is 
not any because it is going to continue to be renewed.
  This amendment says very simply change the incentive. If this is a 
good program--Oh, I know. This doesn't say throw the money out or throw 
the program out.
  It says, change the program to incentivize it to be operational. It 
is in less than 30 percent of our military bases now. It is still not 
used. The one place it has been used is one Air Force base where it was 
mandated by the commander: You will use this system.
  Do you know what the utilization rate is? Ninety percent. And the 
cost in terms of getting it done is about three times the benefit in 
terms of savings for paying for the bill.
  On that same Air Force base, over 50 percent of the time they never 
get the cheapest fare, so what we save in terms of paying--the actual 
accounting work within the Pentagon, which I agree is a worthy goal--we 
lose because the system does not find the best fare.
  As a matter of fact, most Pentagon employees would be better off to 
go to Travelocity or Orbitz, buy their own ticket on their own dime, 
get reimbursed, and the Pentagon can do it cheaper than with this.
  This is a very straightforward amendment. It says don't get rid of 
the defense travel system, keep it going, but fund it on a per-
transaction basis that says if this is good for the Pentagon, then use 
it and we will pay for it. That incentivizes the contractor to make it 
easy, to make it useful, and to get our value for it. Isn't half a 
billion enough to pay for a travel system that you could have bought 
off the shelf for $50 million? It reflects on what we have as problems 
within the Pentagon.
  Let me touch on that. I am a supporter of the Pentagon. I am a 
supporter of our Defense Secretary. He has told me this is one of the 
areas where they have great problems. Last year, the Pentagon paid $6 
billion in performance bonuses to contractors who

[[Page S6371]]

did not meet their performance requirements. Think about that for a 
minute. That means if you are told where you work: If you meet a 
certain expectation you are going to get a bonus, except we will pay 
you even if you do not meet that expectation--what are you going to 
think next year? You are going to think: I don't have to meet the 
expectation because I am going to get paid.
  That is exactly what is happening within our contracting within the 
Pentagon and several other agencies within the Federal Government.
  I ask the chairman and the ranking member to consider this. I believe 
it is a way to straighten out a contract and also send a signal. At 
best, we are going to have a $350 billion deficit this year. Should we 
spend our kids' and grandkids' money in an inefficient way? This is a 
good message we ought to send so other contractors see it. You will not 
get a cost-plus contract if you do not perform, and you are not going 
to continue to have contracts renewed.
  There are a lot of other details, and I ask unanimous consent to have 
them printed in the Record.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:


                               Background

       The Defense Travel System, DTS, is an end-to-end electronic 
     travel system intended to integrate all travel functions, 
     from authorization through ticket purchase to accounting for 
     the Department of Defense. The system was initiated in 1998 
     and it was supposed to be fully deployed by 2002. DTS is 
     currently in the final phase of a six-year contract that 
     expires September 30, 2006. In its entire history, the system 
     has never met a deadline, never stayed within cost estimates, 
     and never performed adequately.
       To date, DTS has cost the taxpayers $474 million--a 
     staggering $200 million more than it was originally projected 
     to cost.
       In short, the American taxpayer has funded a project that 
     is FOUR YEARS behind schedule, is deployed in barely half of 
     the 11,000 DOD travel sites, cannot be relied upon to provide 
     DOD travelers with the lowest available airfare, and is 
     plagued with contracting problems.
       And yet . . . Congress continues to fund this broken 
     system.
       This amendment prohibits continued funding of DTS and 
     instead shifting to the fixed price per transaction e-travel 
     systems used by government agencies in the civilian sector, 
     as set up under General Services Administration, GSA, 
     contracts.


                       DTS is far behind schedule

       According to testimony given by Thomas F. Gimble, Acting 
     Inspector General Department of Defense, before the Senate 
     Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations on September 29, 
     2005, ``The Defense Travel System was at `high risk' for not 
     being an effective solution to streamlining the DOD travel 
     management process. Furthermore, DTS experienced significant 
     testing and deployment problems.''
       By comparison, according to a March 6, 2006 GSA internal 
     review of its own in-house Program Management Office for e-
     travel systems, two/thirds of civilian agencies fully 
     deployed their systems on time.
       In a January 2006 report, GAO noted that DTS, as originally 
     envisioned, was to commence within 120 days after the 
     effective date of contract award in September 1998, with 
     complete deployment to approximately 11,000 locations by 
     April 2002. However, that date has been changed to September 
     2006--a slippage of over 4 years.


                       DTS is not being utilized

       Dr. Scott A. Comes of Program Analysis and Evaluation in 
     the Defense Department testified last year that the estimated 
     savings projected for DTS assumed a utilization rate of 60 
     percent in the first year of operation, rising to 90 percent 
     thereafter.
       In actuality, the utilization rate for DTS was 
     approximately zero through 2004, reached approximately 15 
     percent in 2005 and now in the last year of the contract 
     period remains about 30 percent. It is already too late for 
     DTS ever to recover the enormous investment that has been 
     wasted on it.
       Furthermore, DTS fails to find the lowest applicable 
     airfare in a significant number of cases. Industry expert 
     Robert Langsfeld, who did a comparative study of DTS with the 
     three civilian e-travel systems approved by GSA, testified 
     last year that DTS performed less efficiently than any of the 
     civilian GSA systems.
       According to GAO testimony before the PSI Committee, during 
     fiscal years 2001 and 2002, DOD spent almost $124 million on 
     airline tickets that included at least one leg of the trip in 
     premium class--usually business class.
       Because of control breakdowns within DTS, DOD paid for 
     airline tickets that were neither used nor processed for 
     refund--amounting to about 58,000 tickets totaling more than 
     $21 million. Based on limited data provided by the airlines 
     to GAO, it is possible that the unused value of the fully and 
     partially-used airline tickets that DOD has purchased could 
     be at least $100 million during the lifespan of DTS.
       GAO also found that DOD sometimes paid twice for the same 
     airline ticket through DTS. Based on GAO's mining of limited 
     data, the potential magnitude of the improper payments was 
     27,000 transactions for over $8 million.
       In GAO's latest report, January 2006, they examined 
     agencies that continue to use existing legacy travel systems 
     at locations where DTS is already deployed! This means that 
     all of the proclaimed savings that DTS was supposed to reap 
     are nowhere to be found--because DOD continues to use legacy 
     systems to do the same thing.
       A blatant example of the waste from the use of these two 
     systems can be seen in the way that travel vouchers are 
     processed: According to an April 13, 2005, memorandum from 
     the Assistant Secretary of the Army, Financial Management and 
     Comptroller, from October 2004 to February 2005, at locations 
     where DTS had been deployed, the Army paid the Defense 
     Finance and Accounting Service, DFAS--the system where the 
     majority of DOD payments are routed through--approximately $6 
     million to process 177,000 travel vouchers manually, or $34 
     per travel voucher, versus about $186,000 to process 84,000 
     travel vouchers electronically, $2.22 per travel voucher. 
     Overall, for this 5 month period, the Army reported that it 
     spent about $5.6 million more to process these travel 
     vouchers manually as opposed to electronically using DTS.
       This example here shows that DTS is not even being 
     utilized! Why in the world are we--the Congress--continuing 
     to fund two duplicative travel payment systems at DOD which 
     has proven to lose millions of dollars in a matter of months?


                 Testing of the System is Not Accurate

       In a January 2006 GAO Report, GAO found that testing for 
     selected requirements for display of flights and airfares was 
     ``ineffective in ensuring that the promised capability was 
     delivered as intended.''
       This means that not only is DTS not performing, the current 
     system is incapable of testing properly in order to determine 
     what is required in order to meet DOD's plan.
       Further, DOD could not prove that DOD travelers even had 
     access to the flights that were available for travel. There 
     is no doubt such a flaw would have produced higher travel 
     costs.
       Confirming the problems with DTS, their own officials 
     acknowledged that this problem has existed before deployment 
     of the system--since 2002. In August 2005, DTS officials 
     stated that the problem was corrected and went ahead with 
     deploying the system.


                       DTS is not cost effective

       DTS is claiming that they saved over $13 million this year, 
     but their spokesman was unable to say in comparison to what. 
     Apparently that ``savings'' is the amount estimated in 
     reduced paperwork and accounting, estimated at about $20 per 
     transaction. This does not take into account the numerous 
     instances in which DTS fails to display the lowest applicable 
     airfare, the necessity to hand-check all its transactions, or 
     the fact that the great bulk of DOD travel is still arranged 
     through old-fashioned conventional travel agents. The alleged 
     savings are completely illusory.
       Under the DTS contract Northrop is being paid millions of 
     dollars each month for operation and maintenance, training, 
     help desk, development and deployment--regardless of the 
     actual extent of use by DOD travelers. In addition, DOD is 
     also paying travel agents, commercial travel managers, fees 
     ranging from $5.25 to $12.50 to perform a travel transaction 
     using DTS, the agent still has to buy the ticket and perform 
     other administrative functions, and higher fees, up to $23, 
     if a travel agent has to ``touch'' or assist in completing 
     or correcting a DTS transaction.
       Under the GSA Contract DOD would pay only $5.25 per 
     transaction to whichever of three contractors won the 
     contract. GSA e-travel systems are fully automated and do not 
     require the assistance of a travel agent. Ironically, one of 
     the three GSA-approved vendors for e-travel for civilian 
     agencies is Northrop Grumman, the company that holds the DTS 
     contract.


                 DTS is beset with contracting problems

       The facts show that DTS is another instance of a 
     guaranteed-profit, cost-plus contract. The government is 
     responsible for paying all of the costs of the system in 
     addition to the amount the contractor receives as profit.
       The original DTS contract provided for compensation on a 
     per-transaction basis--pay for performance. By April 2001, 
     after years of testing failures, it was clear that the 
     original DTS would not work and the contract was secretly 
     rewritten.
       In 2002, the DOD and TRW, later purchased by Northrup 
     Grumman, secretly negotiated a total restructure of the 
     contract, in which the government agreed to pay for all the 
     of losses sustained to date by the DTS contractor and to 
     shift from a pay for performance to a cost-plus arrangement.
       DOD has paid Northrop Grumman over $264 million to develop 
     DTS, when this program was supposed to be fully operational 
     in 2001 and development costs were to be at no cost to the 
     Federal government in the original contract.
       Another contract change was an agreement by the government 
     to pay the $43.7 million that had been spent in development 
     costs by the original contractor, subsequently acquired by 
     Northrop Grumman. We got absolutely nothing for that money; 
     it

[[Page S6372]]

     just covered the losses covered by the contractor when the 
     original contract stipulated that the contractor would bear 
     all risks for the development and deployment of DTS.
       Last year Judge George Miller of the Federal Court of 
     Claims decided that he would not even look into allegations 
     of violations of the Competition in Contracting Act because 
     the software and source codes are owned by the contractor, so 
     if the contract were opened for bidding and another bidder 
     was awarded the contract, the Government would have nothing 
     left than a $500 million loss. But just a week before the 
     September 29, 2005 hearing of the Senate Permanent 
     Subcommittee on Investigations the contractor promised to 
     transfer ownership of this intellectual property to the 
     Defense Department at the end of the contract period if 
     requested, ostensibly to maintain the fiction that the open 
     bidding on the contract in 2006 is on the level. Ownership of 
     DTS seems to bounce around to wherever it is most convenient 
     to avoid serious scrutiny.
       The Director, Defense Finance and Accounting Service, 
     testified before the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on 
     Investigations in September 2005, and promised that when 
     Northrop Grumman's contract expired on September 30, 2006, 
     the DTS contract would be re-bid.
       However, this pledge has proved to be false. In February 
     2006, the Program Director, Defense Travel System Program 
     Management Office, admitted to the Court of Federal Claims 
     that when Northrop Grumman's contract expired on September 
     30, 2006, DOD planned to extend it on a sole source basis to 
     Northrop Grumman through September 30, 2007 for an additional 
     $20 million.


             Agencies currently using GSA's E-travel system

       Northrop Grumman's e-travel system has been in use at the 
     Department of Transportation for six months. Northrop also 
     has GSA e-travel contracts with the Environmental Protection 
     Agency, Department of Energy, and the Department of Health 
     and Human Services and it is likely that it will reach early 
     full deployment in each of these.

  Mr. COBURN. There were violations in contracting law with this. There 
were promises made last year when we had this same discussion in the 
Senate that certain things were happening that did not happen in terms 
of this contract. There is no question there has been some improvement, 
but they have not achieved a level that would say we are anywhere close 
to the level of making this an efficient system.
  Mr. WARNER. If I can address the Senator with regard to this 
amendment, it is an amendment the Senate has visited before.
  I would like to have the Senator's observation of whether my 
information is correct. The Senator has been at this 2 years. I commend 
the Senator for that work. As a consequence of that work, the 
Department has done some things, have they not?
  Mr. COBURN. They have.
  Mr. WARNER. It has been told to me that 95 percent of the Senator's 
goals have been achieved and that by October 1 of this year, it will be 
100 percent.
  Mr. COBURN. The actual numbers on utilization of this system, if the 
Senator can bear with me for a minute, the utilization rate right now 
is 30 percent in the military. In other words, 3 out of 10 facilities 
that purchase travel are utilizing this. If that is what we wanted when 
we contracted it, great. But that is not what was in the contract.
  This same contractor, by the way, had a system developed through the 
Department of Transportation 6 months ago that is working just fine.
  I portend that proves the problem with the system is the contracting, 
not the contractor. We ought to send a signal. Say it is 90 percent, if 
that is the case, they will make more money doing it on a per-
transaction basis than they would under a contract basis.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, my friend is an expert on this, and I 
freely admit I am not.
  Mr. COBURN. I am not an expert, but I don't like waste. I think we 
have wasted money.
  Mr. WARNER. It is represented to me the DTS, the defense system is 
not merely a travel booking system, but it has much broader 
functionality than any of the Federal Government e-travel systems. In 
short, DTS is an end-to-end accounting system that automatically 
handles the entire range of otherwise very expensive and time-consuming 
manual tasks associated with DOD travel.
  Any fair comparison has to begin with the fact that DTS offers an 
end-to-end travel management capability that incorporates military 
entitlements and DOD travel policies, and e-travel services simply do 
not.
  Mr. COBURN. Early in my statement I made this point: We are fixing 
the wrong problem. The problem is the computer system. The reason this 
is so expensive, the computer systems in the Pentagon do not talk to 
one another. We have designed a monstrous computer system to make it 
talk to all these systems that will not talk to one another rather than 
to fix the computer system in the Pentagon to make them talk to one 
another.
  If we do that on every project that we need to enhance and overfill 
for the Pentagon, we are going to get into the same problem. They make 
all their money by being able to pay the bill. But it is a travel 
system.
  If they make efficiency in terms of being able to pay the bill--which 
is the problem the Pentagon was having--we ought to also expect them to 
get the fares right and not have to pay another $6 to a travel agent 
for every ticket they write, to doublecheck to see if the system was 
right. That is what is happening.
  When you say 90 percent, that is 90 percent, plus we are having the 
travel agents check it. It is not an automated system.
  Have they made improvements? Yes, I do not deny that. But if they are 
where they need to be, and if their contract as originally specified 
and modified, if they are at 90 percent, they will make a ton more 
money on a per-transaction basis, and we will get what we need and they 
will get what they need.
  But they are not. That is why we have the resistance to a transaction 
basis. You cannot have it both ways. If they are at 90 percent, any 
prudent businessman would say: Sure, we want it on a transaction basis. 
If they are not at 90 percent, if they are at 30 percent, as I propose 
they are, and inefficiently at 30 percent, the reason they want a 
contract through next year is because they are going to make a lot more 
money than they would on the transaction basis.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I continue to be very depressed by the 
knowledge that this Senator has on the subject. I freely admit that I 
do not have the depth of knowledge.
  I understand initially the amendment called for a study. Then, as 
provided under the rules of the Senate, the Senator modified the 
amendment, and it is now a very specific piece of legislation that I am 
advised could well end the program.
  Somewhere between a study and trying to end the program, should the 
Senator prevail, there must be a basis on which we can have an 
accommodation so I can accept some measure to meet the Senator's goals 
and incorporate it in the bill, assuming my distinguished ranking 
member will accept my recommendation.
  Mr. President, why doesn't the Senator go to his next amendment? In 
the meantime staff can go to work.
  Mr. COBURN. I will gladly do that, and I am happy to work with you.
  I make a final point. Supposedly, this contract is going to be out 
for bid at the end of this year. It was supposed to have been out for 
bid last year. They renewed the contract without putting it out for 
bid, so I don't have any hope it will go out, first.
  And, No. 2, nobody is going to bid on this. It is a mess. Nobody is 
going to bid on it. The only person you will have bid on it is the 
original contractor. Whether that is accurate or not, I am willing to 
work with the chairman to bring down the costs.
  The fact is, the real problem is the computer systems in the 
Pentagon. We all know that. The Senator is aware of it, the ranking 
member is aware of it. The comptroller is working hard to change that. 
That is a 4- to 7-year program that we have embarked on which everyone 
knows has to happen.
  Here is my worry: I will be back here next year doing the same thing 
because it is still not going to work. That is my worry. That is not 
fair to our grandkids.
  Mr. WARNER. I say that is not fair to the men and women of the Armed 
Forces who use this program.
  I am not trying to keep in place something that is not adequately 
serving this constituency and the Department of Defense. I would rather 
put in a fix if I can get in my mind what that fix can be. The 
amendment could virtually bring what is in existence at DTS to a 
standstill.
  Mr. COBURN. If I could ask the chairman a question, if, in fact, it 
is at 90 percent, as the contractor says it is,

[[Page S6373]]

then by the contract they should have already converted over to a per-
transaction plan. So why haven't they? They haven't because it is not 
at 90 percent because they would be making a whole lot more money if it 
was.
  I am happy to ask unanimous consent to set this amendment and discuss 
other amendments and work with the Senator and his staff prior to the 
voting or conclusion of this bill.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. WARNER. I thank the cooperation of the Senator.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from South Carolina.


                           Amendment No. 4365

  Mr. GRAHAM. Mr. President, if it is acceptable to the chairman, I 
would like about 10 minutes, maybe less, to talk about a managers' 
amendment that has been accepted by the chairman and ranking member, to 
put in the record how important I think this is regarding military 
retirement, Guard and Reserves.
  Mr. WARNER. We certainly want to accommodate the Senator. I suggest 
at the conclusion of the presentation of this next amendment.
  Mr. GRAHAM. I apologize.
  Mr. COBURN. I am happy to let the Senator from South Carolina 
intervene for a short period of time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from South Carolina has the floor.
  Mr. GRAHAM. I will be very brief.
  One, I thank the chairman and ranking member for their willingness to 
help Senator Chambliss and Senator Clinton and myself with a package of 
reforms that would be very beneficial to the Guard and Reserves 
regarding Reserve retirement.
  Right now, the current system will not allow you to retire until you 
are 60. You can serve your 20 years, 30 years, but you have to wait 
until you are 60 to get your retirement. We are trying to incentivize 
those Guard and Reserves to take part in active-duty operations, and if 
you are called up to active duty involuntarily, for every 90 days a 
member spends on active duty, from September 11 forward, you will get a 
day-for-day credit in terms of retirement. If you serve a whole year on 
active duty, voluntarily or involuntarily, you could retire at 59.
  We have had this scored. It is minimum cost. But I can assure you it 
will go a long way in the Guard and Reserve community as a much needed 
reform.
  It will be well received by our troops. It will be good for them and 
their families. Quite honestly, the level of commitment, the level of 
Active Duty service is on par with World War II among the Guard and 
Reserves, and it is the least we can do. This will certainly benefit 
our guardsmen and reservists and their families. I appreciate the 
chairman and ranking member putting it in the managers' package.
  I have enjoyed working with Senators Chambliss and Clinton on this 
issue. The reduced retirement provision was from Senator Chambliss. It 
was his amendment. And we used his amendment also to improve health 
care for the Guard and Reserves.
  What we have done--there is a three-tiered system. For every 90 days 
you are called to active duty, you get a year of TRICARE at a 28-
percent premium share rate, which is the same as for Federal employees. 
Everyone who works in our offices as Federal employees pays 28 percent 
of the cost of their Federal health care. The only group in the Federal 
Government not to have Federal health care were the Guard and Reserves. 
We fixed that last year. And we are going to have a change in the 
allocation.
  Tier 2: If you are an unemployed or an uninsured guardsman or 
reservist, we are going to have a 50-50 cost share. If you are in the 
private sector with health care, and you want to come into TRICARE, to 
have continuity of health care, not bouncing back and forth, we are 
going to have a 75-25 share. So if you want to get out of your private-
sector health care and come into TRICARE, you will have to pay 75 
percent. That will be down from 85 percent. We put a cap on premium 
growth rates.
  The entire package, from allowing people to retire early if they 
serve on active duty, voluntarily or involuntarily, is a great idea. 
Balancing out the premiums to be paid will go a long way to make our 
Guard and Reserve family members and Active Duty and military members 
more appreciated. And it will certainly help them with their budget 
problems, because we all know how costly health care is.
  I have introduced a separate stand-alone bill that would allow every 
guardsman and reservist who is eligible for TRICARE to participate in 
premium conversions. It would allow them to have their TRICARE premiums 
on a pretax basis, like every other Federal employee. That is a stand-
alone bill. We will do it later.
  I thank Senator Chambliss for coming up with a package that would 
allow military members and the Guard and Reserves to get credit for 
their active service in terms of retiring below age 60. Senator Clinton 
and I have worked for several years on TRICARE benefits for guardsmen 
and reservists. I think we have improved that benefit in a very 
reasonable way. I put that on the record and hope every Member of the 
Senate will appreciate what we have done because our guardsmen and 
reservists have served above and beyond the call of duty.
  Mr. President, I now yield to Senator Clinton, who, as I have 
indicated, has been with us every step of the way, leading on this 
issue.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New York.
  Mrs. CLINTON. Mr. President, I am honored and delighted to join my 
voice along with my colleagues, Senator Graham and Senator Chambliss, 
and thank them for their efforts.
  Today, we have made further progress in improving benefits for 
National Guard members and reservists. This bill makes great strides in 
improving retirement benefits for reservists and Guard members who 
serve for longer periods. For every consecutive 90 days a member spent 
in an active Federal status, the age at which they receive their 
retirement annuity would be decreased by 3 months. The lowest a member 
could collect retirement pay as a result of this provision would be age 
50. The age at which they would qualify for health care benefits would 
not decrease.
  Any Guard or Reserve member who is called or ordered to active duty, 
or volunteers for active duty, would qualify. This will greatly help us 
with recruitment and especially retention. We have a problem in our 
Reserve component which has been under great stress over the last 
several years.
  Last year, thanks to the leadership of Senator Graham, we made great 
progress in expanding access to TRICARE. All members of the Selected 
Reserve are eligible to enroll in TRICARE, and we created a separate 
category based on whether a Guard member or reservist had been 
deployed.
  Category one, for members of the Selected Reserves who have been 
activated: Members would accumulate 1 year of TRICARE coverage for 
every year of service and would only have to pay 28 percent of the 
cost. Category two established a 50-50 cost share for those without 
health insurance owing to unemployment or lack of employer-provided 
coverage. And category three was for the remainder of members of the 
Selective Reserve who did not fit in the other categories, allowing 
them to buy into coverage at an 85 percent cost share.
  Our improvements this year will allow small businesses with fewer 
than 20 employees to qualify for the 50-50 cost share. And it reduces 
the amount paid, by those who qualify for category three, to 75 
percent.
  This is not only a win-win for Guard members and reservists. This is 
a win-win for our military services and for our country. We are sending 
a clear message--not just rhetoric, not just rah-rah--but a very clear, 
solemn message to those who volunteer to be our citizen soldiers. 
Perhaps in the past they might have thought they would have a weekend a 
month, 2 weeks in the summer. Well, now they know they are part of the 
war against terrorism. They are on call literally at any moment.
  What we found is that when we began to activate those Guard and 
Reserve members, 20 to 25 percent of them were found to be medically 
unready. They had physical problems. They had dental problems. They 
were not ready because they did not have health insurance. They fell 
into the category of Americans who go without health care because they 
cannot afford it or their employer does not provide it.

[[Page S6374]]

  So in addition to the work I have been privileged to do with Senator 
Graham on health care benefits, and under the leadership of Senator 
Chambliss with respect to retirement, we have really sent a great 
message to our men and women in the Guard and Reserve that we care 
about you. We care about your families. We value your service. And we 
want you to know that when it comes to retirement and health care, your 
country is grateful.
  Thank you very much, Mr. President.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Oklahoma.


                           Amendment No. 4370

  Mr. COBURN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the pending 
amendment be set aside and that amendment No. 4370 be called up.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The clerk will report.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Oklahoma [Mr. Coburn] proposes an 
     amendment numbered 4370.

  Mr. COBURN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the reading 
of the amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

 (Purpose: To require notice to Congress and the public on earmarks of 
             funds available to the Department of Defense)

       At the end of subtitle A of title X, add the following:

     SEC. 1008. REPORTS TO CONGRESS AND NOTICE TO PUBLIC ON 
                   EARMARKS IN FUNDS AVAILABLE TO THE DEPARTMENT 
                   OF DEFENSE.

       (a) Annual Report and Notice Required.--The Secretary of 
     Defense shall submit to Congress, and post on the Internet 
     website of the Department of Defense available to the public, 
     each year information as follows:
       (1) A description of each earmark of funds made available 
     to the Department of Defense for the previous fiscal year, 
     including the location (by city, State, country, and 
     congressional district if relevant) in which the earmarked 
     funds are to be utilized, the purpose of such earmark (if 
     known), and the recipient of such earmark.
       (2) The total cost of administering each such earmark 
     including the amount of such earmark, staff time, 
     administrative expenses, and other costs.
       (3) The total cost of administering all such earmarks.
       (4) An assessment of the utility of each such earmark in 
     meeting the goals of the Department, set forth using a rating 
     system as follows:
       (A) A for an earmark that directly advances the primary 
     goals of the Department or an agency, element, or component 
     of the Department.
       (B) B for an earmark that advances many of the primary 
     goals of the Department or an agency, element, or component 
     of the Department.
       (C) C for an earmark that may advance some of the primary 
     goals of the Department or an agency, element, or component 
     of the Department.
       (D) D for an earmark that cannot be demonstrated as being 
     cost-effective in advancing the primary goals of the 
     Department or any agency, element, or component of the 
     Department.
       (E) F for an earmark that distracts from or otherwise 
     impedes that capacity of the Department to meet the primary 
     goals of the Department.
       (b) Earmark Defined.--In this section, the term ``earmark'' 
     means a provision of law, or a directive contained within a 
     joint explanatory statement or report accompanying a 
     conference report or bill (as applicable), that specifies the 
     identity of an entity, program, project, or service, 
     including a defense system, to receive assistance not 
     requested by the President and the amount of the assistance 
     to be so received.

  Mr. COBURN. Mr. President, this is an amendment that is going to have 
some emotion with it. I want to talk about it first. There is no 
question when it comes to the wisdom of many of the Members of our body 
that directing the Pentagon to do certain things is valuable. We know 
that from anecdotal experience. But what we don't know is how many 
times we have told them to do something that has been a complete waste. 
What I am talking about are earmarks in the Defense authorization bill 
as well as in the Defense appropriations bill.
  There is a wonderful body of knowledge, plus an institutional 
knowledge, here that helps give wisdom to direct the Armed Services. I 
believe we ought to be in that position. What this amendment does is 
ask for a report. I want to explain, for a second--and I want the 
American public to see--what has happened in terms of earmarks.
  In 1994, there were $4.2 billion worth of earmarks in the Defense 
appropriations bill. Last year, there were $9.4 billion. The question 
we should be asking is not whether or not there should be earmarks, but 
what is the result of those earmarks? What is the consequence of the 
earmarks? Not only were the numbers up, the dollars up, but the numbers 
have skyrocketed.
  So the question which I think would be prudent for us to ask is, No. 
1: Earmarks are consuming a larger percentage of defense dollars. They 
also, according to Pentagon reports and some Members of this body, are 
taking money away from other priorities that are deemed to be higher a 
lot of the time. They also account for some of the problems we are 
having in the emergency supplementals and adding to the rising cost of 
our debt. Many times they are not needed, but, in fact, they are 
associated with benefiting a region or an industry that is not 
necessarily in the highest priority.
  So this is not about eliminating earmarks. This is about looking at 
earmarks and saying: What are we getting for them? Where are they 
working great for us? Where are they not working? Are they beneficial 
to the defense of this country? Is it something that gives us a 
benefit?
  The other thing I would remind us of is, in the most recent history 
we have seen an ethical lapse in association with some earmarks, and we 
have actually seen some criminal behavior in association with earmarks. 
That ought to be a part of the report as well.
  So the whole idea is to add transparency and accountability to 
earmarks. Let's look at them. What are we getting for them? What are we 
losing? What are the opportunity costs that are lost because we have 
them there? The total annual cost of earmarks in Defense appropriations 
bills would be put in this report.
  We can determine the actual numbers of earmarks and the actual price 
tags. But we don't know the hidden costs of those earmarks, which 
include staff time and administration. And we don't know the 
opportunity cost of those earmarks: What did not happen for our 
soldiers, what did not happen in terms of procurement because we put in 
something else of maybe a lesser priority?
  The annual report will provide Congress and the public a more 
complete understanding of the total cost of the earmarks to the 
Department of Defense, the purpose and location of each earmark, and an 
analysis of the usefulness of each earmark in advancing the goals of 
the Department of Defense. This will provide Members of Congress a more 
complete view of the cost-effectiveness of each project and whether 
those projects warrant continued funding.
  The last amendment we were on started as an earmark. I remind the 
Members of this body, it started at $200 million, and now will have 
grown to over $500 million in initiatives and earmarks, but we did not 
have the benefit of a report such as this to see if we were getting 
value for this money.
  This is a simple amendment. It is not going after earmarks. It is not 
saying they are bad. It is not saying they are good. What it is saying 
is: Shouldn't this body know? Shouldn't we know the impact, positively 
and negatively? Shouldn't we know the lost opportunity cost?
  I hope both the ranking member and the chairman of this committee 
will give this amendment consideration. And I ask for their response.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, the managers are working to try to resolve 
a number of issues in the hopes we can complete this bill. I will 
eventually reply to the Senator from Georgia. I wonder if at this time, 
without losing the floor, he will yield to his colleague to speak on 
another matter.
  Mr. COBURN. I say to the Senator, I will be happy to.
  Mr. WARNER. I thank the Senator.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Georgia.
  Mr. CHAMBLISS. Mr. President, I thank the chairman and thank my good 
friend from Oklahoma for yielding for just a minute.


                           Amendment No. 4365

  Mr. President, I would like to address amendment No. 4365, 
cosponsored by myself, Senator Graham, Senator Clinton, and Senator 
Burns.
  This amendment, which I am speaking on today, makes what I believe is 
a

[[Page S6375]]

relatively minor but very important adjustment to the Reserve 
retirement system. My amendment would lower the age at which a 
reservist can receive their retirement annuity by 3 months--counting 
down from age 60--for every 90 days a reservist spends on active duty 
during a fiscal year.
  This amendment specifically rewards the members of the Guard and 
Reserve who have been called or ordered for active duty, interrupted 
their civilian lives for an extended period of time, and in many cases 
placed themselves in harm's way in defense of their country.
  Currently, the average reservist, if they collect any retirement pay 
at all, receives a small fraction of the annuity that an Active Duty 
member receives. If this amendment becomes law, that percentage will 
rise slightly. But in no way will this amendment result in a major 
change with large financial implications.
  I do not have a formal CBO estimate for the current version. However, 
based on CBO scoring for an earlier version, I suggest the cost of this 
amendment will be approximately $300 million over 5 years. There have 
been several other bills and amendments related to Reserve retirement 
introduced in Congress, and for the sake of comparison, I believe my 
amendment provides the right incentives and rewards. It is also the 
least costly alternative which has been offered so far.
  I believe this amendment is significant and important because it 
recognizes the increased contributions our reservists are making, 
rewards them for their service in the global war on terrorism, and 
provides reservists in the middle of their careers with an incentive to 
stay on board. I have received great feedback from the Department of 
Defense on this amendment because it provides incentives for 
volunteers, provides motivation for retention, and is relatively low 
cost.
  The Reserve Officers Association of America, the National Guard 
Association of the United States, the Naval Reserve Association, the 
Reserve Enlisted Association, and several other military associations 
also support the amendment and see it as an important, responsible step 
forward in support of our reservists.
  With the coauthorship of my good friends Senator Graham of South 
Carolina and Senator Clinton of New York, this amendment also makes two 
important changes to the current laws related to TRICARE by allowing 
small businesses under 20 to participate in the 50-50 cost share in the 
TRICARE program and changing third tier beneficiaries from paying 85 
percent to 75 percent. These are important changes, which benefit our 
men and women in the Guard and Reserve and further provide for the 
health care benefits of our servicemembers in a way that is affordable 
and enhances their service.
  I commend its inclusion in the bill. It has been a pleasure to work 
with Senators Graham and Clinton, as well as Senator Burns, on this 
matter. We have had great cooperation from both the chairman and 
ranking member. I can't tell them how much we appreciate this.
  This is the No. 1 issue of the Guard and Reserve this year. It is 
going to be a great package. I commend Senator Graham for his hard 
work, Senator Clinton for her hard work, as well as Senator Burns for 
his hard work on this issue. I appreciate very much the cooperation of 
the staff, as well as the chairman and ranking member, in making sure 
that we continue to look after our men and women in the Guard and 
Reserve who are being called up all the more often than we have ever 
anticipated and all the more often than what they anticipated.
  The chairman and ranking member have accepted the amendment, and I am 
appreciative of that.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The majority leader is recognized.


                    Amendment No. 4471, as Modified

  Mr. FRIST. Mr. President, I know in a few moments we will be voting. 
I did want to come to the floor and speak strongly in support of the 
Sessions missile defense amendment.
  More than 23 years have passed since President Reagan announced his 
Strategic Defense Initiative--the idea that our Nation should develop 
the ability to protect itself against the threat of missile attack by 
being able to shoot down incoming missiles.
  President Reagan's idea has been very controversial ever since it was 
announced.
  For some reason there has always been a very substantial school of 
thought, especially on the other side of the aisle, that we are better 
off being defenseless against missile attack; that instead of being 
able to shoot down incoming missiles, we should rely instead 
exclusively on the threat that we will strike back after someone else 
attacks us first.
  This policy of intentional vulnerability--of intentionally exposing 
our cities and our people to the threat of missile attack--has never 
made sense to me or to the American people.
  But that hasn't stopped repeated efforts over the years by opponents 
of missile defense to reduce or even eliminate funding for research, 
development, and deployment of missile defenses.
  Fortunately, Republican administrations and Republican Congresses 
over the last 23 years have fought to continue our national investment 
in missile defense.
  Thanks to our efforts, our Nation today has a number of missile 
defense systems and components in place, including a total of 11 
ground-based midcourse interceptors fielded in Alaska and California, 
and more are on the way.
  This system is working today to defend the American people.
  As Assistant Secretary of Defense Peter Flory testified 3 months ago 
before a House committee:

       The United States today has all of the pieces in place 
     needed to intercept an incoming long-range ballistic missile: 
     ground based interceptors in Alaska and California; a network 
     of ground, sea, and space-based sensors; a command and 
     control network; and most importantly, trained servicemen 
     and women ready to operate the system. Our ballistic 
     missile defense system today is primarily oriented toward 
     continued development and testing. But we are confident 
     that it could intercept a long-range ballistic missile if 
     called upon to do so.
       The existence of this system, rudimentary though it may be, 
     is a great source of comfort to the American people, 
     especially as we confront the threat that North Korea may 
     test fire an ICBM eastward across the Pacific Ocean any day 
     now.
       No less an expert than Dr. William J. Perry, President 
     Clinton's Secretary of Defense, has seen the risk of such a 
     test launch by North Korea as sufficiently threatening to 
     America to justify a preemptive U.S. attack on the North 
     Korean ICBM while it is still sitting on its launch pad.
       Secretary Perry, in his op-ed in today's Washington Post, 
     acknowledges that attacking the North Korean ICBM on the 
     ground in North Korea would be a high-risk action that could 
     lead to war between the United States and North Korea.
       I certainly want to avoid a war with North Korea if at all 
     possible. At the same time, I cannot disagree with Secretary 
     Perry that North Korea's missile program poses a great threat 
     to our Nation that we cannot ignore.
       It was precisely to avoid having to choose between 
     preemptive war and defenselessness that our Nation has been 
     pursuing missile defense for the last 23 years.

  Senator Session's amendment underscores and increases our Nation's 
commitment to missile defense by increasing the funding for it in this 
bill by $45 million.
  It is a worthy amendment that builds on the commitment that many of 
us have demonstrated over the years to missile defense.
  I understand that the distinguished ranking member, Senator Levin, 
has expressed his support for the amendment, which I welcome--not only 
because I value his support, but also because, it renews my faith in 
the power of redemption.
  I know we will be voting shortly, but I urge strong support of the 
Sessions amendment.
  I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Oklahoma for his 
cooperation. We are trying to reduce the number of rollcall votes so 
that we can conclude this bill. We are very close to doing so.
  I yield the floor for the purposes of the Senator from Oklahoma being 
recognized.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Oklahoma.

[[Page S6376]]

                    Amendment No. 4491, as Modified

  Mr. COBURN. Mr. President, I would like to call up amendment No. 4491 
again.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the amendment is pending.
  Mr. COBURN. I ask for its consideration for the purpose of a vote.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there further debate on the amendment? If 
not, the question is on agreeing to amendment No. 4491, as modified.
  The amendment (No. 4491), as modified, was agreed to.


                           Amendment No. 4370

  Mr. COBURN. I call up amendment No. 4370.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment is pending.
  Mr. COBURN. I ask for its consideration.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there further debate? If not, the question 
is on agreeing to amendment No. 4370.
  The amendment (No. 4370) was agreed to.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, as a courtesy to the Senator, I move to 
reconsider the votes and to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
  Mr. WARNER. I thank the Senator from Oklahoma.
  I believe we will shortly have a UC request to present, but I am 
looking for the Senator from Alabama, Mr. Sessions. If I could have his 
attention, my understanding is that the Senator desires a rollcall vote 
on his amendment.
  Mr. SESSIONS. I do think that is appropriate.
  Mr. WARNER. Fine, the amendment has been debated on both sides.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, we support the amendment. Obviously, if 
there is a desire for a rollcall, that is their right. We will be 
recommending a ``yea'' vote.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, we want to schedule that vote. So it is 
agreed that will be the subject of a rollcall vote.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The majority leader.
  Mr. FRIST. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that at 3:45 p.m. 
today, the Senate proceed to stacked votes in relation to the following 
amendments to the Defense authorization bill: Chambliss No. 4261, 
Sessions No. 4471, as modified. I further ask that there be no 
amendments to the amendments in order prior to the votes and that after 
the first vote, all rollcall votes be 10 minutes in length; further 
that there be 2 minutes equally divided between each vote after the 
first.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.


            Unanimous-Consent Agreement--Executive Calendar

  Mr. FRIST. I ask unanimous consent that following the stacked votes 
that begin shortly in relation to the Defense authorization bill, the 
Senate proceed to executive session and to immediate votes on the 
following nominations: No. 704, Andrew Guilford, U.S. District Judge 
for the Central District of California; No. 714, Frank D. Whitney, U.S. 
District Judge for the Western District of North Carolina.
  I ask unanimous consent that prior to each vote it be in order for 
the Senators from California and the Senators from North Carolina to 
speak for up to 3 minutes each or to submit statements for the Record 
prior to the votes; provided further, that following those votes, the 
Senate proceed to the consideration of No. 715, the nomination be 
confirmed, the President be immediately notified of the Senate's 
action, and the Senate then resume legislative session.
  Mr. LEVIN. Reserving the right to object, we understand that District 
Judge Frank Whitney would probably be a voice vote; is that correct?
  Mr. FRIST. That is correct.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. FRIST. Mr. President, I will turn to the chairman and the ranking 
member to comment on what they expect over the course of the afternoon, 
but the two unanimous-consent requests that we just did means that we 
will have a series of two or three rollcall votes and one by voice. And 
then after that, I will turn to the chairman and ranking member as to 
what we might expect in terms of completion of the bill.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, could those three votes be sequenced, the 
first vote will take the normal course and the next two votes be 10 
minutes each?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. That is part of the order.
  Mr. WARNER. I thank the distinguished Presiding Officer. Secondly, 
there seems to be only one remaining amendment which we are trying to 
resolve. Then I would approach the leadership jointly for final passage 
of the bill.
  Mr. FRIST. Mr. President, that is my understanding. Is that the 
understanding of the ranking member?
  Mr. LEVIN. I understand that unresolved amendment on our side may 
have just been resolved. That adds a note of optimism.
  Mr. FRIST. Things are sounding better and better.
  Mr. WARNER. Would the majority leader authorize the chairman to seek 
final passage when we are ready to go?
  Mr. FRIST. Yes.


                           Amendment No. 4261

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous of order, the hour of 3:45 
having arrived, the question is on agreeing to the Chambliss amendment 
No. 4261.
  The yeas and nays have been ordered, and the clerk will call the 
roll.
  The legislative clerk called the roll.
  Mr. McCONNELL. The following Senator was necessarily absent: the 
Senator from Wyoming (Mr. Enzi).
  Mr. DURBIN. I announce that the Senator from West Virginia (Mr. 
Rockefeller) is necessarily absent.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Chafee). Are there any other Senators in 
the Chamber desiring to vote?
  The result was announced--yeas 70, nays 28, as follows:

                      [Rollcall Vote No. 184 Leg.]

                                YEAS--70

     Akaka
     Alexander
     Allard
     Baucus
     Bennett
     Bingaman 
     Bond
     Boxer
     Brownback
     Bunning
     Burns
     Burr
     Byrd 
     Cantwell
     Chambliss
     Coburn
     Cochran
     Coleman
     Collins 
     Conrad
     Cornyn
     Craig
     Crapo
     DeMint
     DeWine
     Dodd 
     Domenici
     Dorgan
     Durbin
     Ensign
     Feinstein
     Frist 
     Graham
     Hatch
     Hutchison
     Inhofe
     Inouye
     Isakson 
     Landrieu
     Lautenberg
     Lieberman
     Lincoln
     Lott
     Martinez 
     McConnell
     Menendez
     Mikulski
     Murkowski
     Murray
     Nelson (NE)
     Pryor
     Reed
     Reid
     Roberts
     Salazar
     Santorum 
     Sarbanes
     Schumer
     Sessions
     Shelby
     Smith
     Snowe 
     Specter
     Stevens
     Sununu
     Talent
     Thomas
     Thune
     Vitter 
     Voinovich

                                NAYS--28

     Allen
     Bayh
     Biden
     Carper
     Chafee
     Clinton
     Dayton 
     Dole
     Feingold
     Grassley
     Gregg
     Hagel
     Harkin
     Jeffords 
     Johnson
     Kennedy
     Kerry
     Kohl
     Kyl
     Leahy
     Levin
     Lugar 
     McCain
     Nelson (FL)
     Obama
     Stabenow
     Warner
     Wyden

                             NOT VOTING--2

     Enzi
     Rockefeller
       
  The amendment (No. 4261) was agreed to.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, before we proceed to the next vote, I 
would like to propound the following unanimous-consent request:
  I ask unanimous consent that following the next vote, which is on the 
Sessions amendment, I then be recognized in order to send to the desk a 
series of amendments that have been cleared on both sides. I further 
ask unanimous consent that following action on those cleared 
amendments, the bill be read a third time and the Senate proceed to a 
vote on final passage of the bill, with no intervening action or 
debate; provided further, that after passage, the Senate proceed to the 
votes in executive session as under the previous order.
  Mr. LEVIN. No objection.
  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, reserving the right to object, and I will 
not object; I wish to clarify with the distinguished chairman, should 
we make a clarification with respect to pay raise now or when we are 
done?
  Mr. WARNER. We have reached an agreement on the pay raise issue. I 
would prefer to do that following final

[[Page S6377]]

passage and have the colloquy inserted in the Record prior to.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? Without objection, it is 
so ordered.
  Mr. WARNER. I thank the Presiding Officer, and I thank my colleagues.


                    Amendment No. 4471, as Modified

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. There are now 2 minutes equally divided for 
debate before a vote in relation to the Sessions amendment No. 4471. 
Who yields time? Is all time yielded back?
  The Senator from Michigan is recognized.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I think there is strong support on both 
sides of the aisle for this amendment. This is money which goes to 
testing of the missile defense system mainly; it surely needs testing. 
That has always been the question. So I support this amendment, and I 
believe we could have a voice vote, but there has been a request for a 
rollcall vote. We support the amendment.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, have the yeas and nays been ordered?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. They have not.
  Mr. WARNER. I ask for the yeas and nays.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
  There appears to be a sufficient second.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, this is an amendment by the distinguished 
Senator from Alabama, Mr. Sessions, and the distinguished Senator from 
Tennessee, Mr. Frist, and it has been carefully worked and debated. I 
ask that the vote begin.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Alabama still has 1 minute 
remaining.
  Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. President, I would just say that the projected 
launch from North Korea has caused us to focus intensely on the missile 
defense system. To celebrate what we have accomplished, we have nine 
missiles now in place in Alaska and two in California that are capable 
of knocking down such an attacking missile. This amendment would allow 
the capability for continued testing and, at the same time, be on 24/7 
readiness to knock down an incoming missile.
  We think it is a good amendment, and it is offset. I urge my 
colleagues to support it. In effect, we would also be sending a message 
to North Korea and Iran and other rogue nations that we would be ready 
to defend this Nation.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to amendment No. 
4471, as modified. The yeas and nays have been ordered. The clerk will 
call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk called the roll.
  Mr. McCONNELL. The following Senator was necessarily absent: the 
Senator from Wyoming (Mr. Enzi).
  Mr. DURBIN. I announce that the Senator from West Virginia (Mr. 
Rockefeller) is necessary absent.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Are there any other Senators in the Chamber 
desiring to vote?
  The result was announced--yeas 98, nays 0, as follows:

                      [Rollcall Vote No. 185 Leg.]

                                YEAS--98

     Akaka
     Alexander
     Allard
     Allen
     Baucus
     Bayh
     Bennett
     Biden
     Bingaman
     Bond
     Boxer
     Brownback
     Bunning
     Burns
     Burr
     Byrd
     Cantwell
     Carper
     Chafee
     Chambliss
     Clinton
     Coburn
     Cochran
     Coleman
     Collins
     Conrad
     Cornyn
     Craig
     Crapo
     Dayton
     DeMint
     DeWine
     Dodd
     Dole
     Domenici
     Dorgan
     Durbin
     Ensign
     Feingold
     Feinstein
     Frist
     Graham
     Grassley
     Gregg
     Hagel
     Harkin
     Hatch
     Hutchison
     Inhofe
     Inouye
     Isakson
     Jeffords
     Johnson
     Kennedy
     Kerry
     Kohl
     Kyl
     Landrieu
     Lautenberg
     Leahy
     Levin
     Lieberman
     Lincoln
     Lott
     Lugar
     Martinez
     McCain
     McConnell
     Menendez
     Mikulski
     Murkowski
     Murray
     Nelson (FL)
     Nelson (NE)
     Obama
     Pryor
     Reed
     Reid
     Roberts
     Salazar
     Santorum
     Sarbanes
     Schumer
     Sessions
     Shelby
     Smith
     Snowe
     Specter
     Stabenow
     Stevens
     Sununu
     Talent
     Thomas
     Thune
     Vitter
     Voinovich
     Warner
     Wyden

                             NOT VOTING--2

     Enzi
     Rockefeller
       
  The amendment (No. 4471), as modified, was agreed to.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
  Mr. WARNER. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, for those Senators who may not have heard 
that vote, if I am correct it was 98 yeas, 0 nays. That is a strong 
voice from the Senate of the United States in support of the men and 
women of the Armed Forces. I thank each and every one of you.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, if the Senator will yield, it is also a 
very strong voice for testing a missile system as well as supporting 
the men and women in the Armed Forces.
  I wonder if we could get the attention of the Senate. It is our 
understanding now that we are going to proceed to a package which has 
been cleared and then move to final passage?
  Mr. WARNER. That is correct.
  Mr. LEVIN. And then immediately move to consideration of a judge.
  Mr. WARNER. That is correct. The prior vote being on the missile 
defense.
  Mr. LEVIN. I thank my colleague.


  Amendments Nos. 4520; 4374; 4521; 4522; 4523; 4458; 4524; 4264, as 
Modified; 4464; 4489; 4525; 4526; 4327, as Modified; 4527; 4434; 4393, 
  as Modified; 4312; 4424; 4416; 4364, as Modified; 4232; 4528; 4529; 
  4311; 4228; 4439, as Modified; 4530; 4337; 4531; 4411; 4336; 4361; 
  4532; 4533; 4534; 4535; 4381, as Modified; 4429; 4398, as Modified; 
  4451, as Modified; 4536; 4537; 4538; 4303; 4539; 4423; 4316; 4407; 
      4366; 4321; 4540; 4449; 4204, as Modified; and 4541, En Bloc

  Mr. WARNER. I send a series of amendments to the desk which have been 
cleared by myself and the ranking member. I ask unanimous consent the 
Senate consider these amendments en bloc, the amendments be agreed to, 
and the motions to reconsider be laid upon the table. Finally, I ask 
that any statements pertaining to any of these individual amendments be 
printed in the Record.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendments were agreed to, as follows:


                           AMENDMENT NO. 4520

  (Purpose: Relating to the Minuteman III Intercontinental Ballistic 
                                Missile)

       At end of subtitle D of title I, add the following:

     SEC. 147. MINUTEMAN III INTERCONTINENTAL BALLISTIC MISSILES.

       (a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
       (1) In the Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee of 
     Conference on H.R. 1815, the National Defense Authorization 
     Act for Fiscal Year 2006, the conferees state that the policy 
     of the United States ``is to deploy a force of 500 ICBMs''. 
     The conferees further note ``that unanticipated strategic 
     developments may compel the United States to make changes to 
     this force structure in the future.''.
       (2) The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) conducted under 
     section 118 of title 10, United States Code, in 2005 finds 
     that maintaining a robust nuclear deterrent ``remains a 
     keystone of United States national power''. However, 
     notwithstanding that finding and without providing any 
     specific justification for the recommendation, the 
     Quadrennial Defense Review recommends reducing the number of 
     deployed Minuteman III Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles 
     (ICBMs) from 500 to 450 beginning in fiscal year 2007. The 
     Quadrennial Defense Review also fails to identify what 
     unanticipated strategic developments compelled the United 
     States to reduce the Intercontinental Ballistic Missile force 
     structure.
       (3) The commander of the Strategic Command, General James 
     Cartwright, testified before the Committee on Armed Services 
     of the Senate that the reduction in deployment of Minuteman 
     III Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles is required so that 
     the 50 missiles withdrawn from the deployed force could be 
     used for test assets and spares to extend the life of the 
     Minuteman III Intercontinental Ballistic Missile well into 
     the future. If spares are not modernized, the Air Force may 
     not have sufficient replacement missiles to sustain the force 
     size.
       (b) Modernization of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles 
     Required.--The Air Force shall modernize Minuteman III 
     Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles in the United States 
     inventory as required to maintain a sufficient supply of 
     launch test assets and spares to sustain the deployed force 
     of such missiles through 2030.
       (c) Limitation on Termination of Modernization Program 
     Pending Report.--No funds authorized to be appropriated for 
     the Department of Defense may be obligated or expended for 
     the termination of any Minuteman III ICBM modernization 
     program, or for the withdrawal of any Minuteman III 
     Intercontinental Ballistic Missile from the active force, 
     until 30 days after the Secretary of Defense submits to the 
     congressional defense committees a report setting forth the 
     following:
       (1) A detailed strategic justification for the proposal to 
     reduce the Minuteman III Intercontinental Ballistic Missile 
     force from 500

[[Page S6378]]

     to 450 missiles, including an analysis of the effects of the 
     reduction on the ability of the United States to assure 
     allies and dissuade potential competitors.
       (2) A detailed analysis of the strategic ramifications of 
     continuing to equip a portion of the Minuteman III 
     Intercontinental Ballistic Missile force with multiple 
     independent warheads rather than single warheads as 
     recommended by past reviews of the United States nuclear 
     posture.
       (3) An assessment of the test assets and spares required to 
     maintain a force of 500 deployed Minuteman III 
     Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles through 2030.
       (4) An assessment of the test assets and spares required to 
     maintain a force of 450 deployed Minuteman III 
     Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles through 2030.
       (5) An inventory of currently available Minuteman III 
     Intercontinental Ballistic Missile test assets and spares.
       (6) A plan to sustain and complete the modernization of all 
     deployed and spare Minuteman III Intercontinental Ballistic 
     Missiles, a test plan, and an analysis of the funding 
     required to carry out modernization of all deployed and spare 
     Minuteman III Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles.
       (7) An assessment of whether halting upgrades to the 
     Minuteman III Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles withdrawn 
     from the deployed force would compromise the ability of those 
     missiles to serve as test assets.
       (8) A description of the plan of the Department of Defense 
     for extending the life of the Minuteman III Intercontinental 
     Ballistic Missile force beyond fiscal year 2030.
       (d) Remote Visual Assessment.--
       (1) Additional amount for research, development, test, and 
     evaluation, air force.--The amount authorized to be 
     appropriated by section 201(3) for research, development, 
     test, and evaluation for the Air Force is hereby increased by 
     $5,000,000.
       (2) Availability of amount.--Of the amount authorized to be 
     appropriated by section 201(3) for research, development, 
     test, and evaluation for the Air Force, as increased by 
     paragraph (1), $5,000,000 may be available for ICBM Security 
     Modernization (PE #0604851) for Remote Visual Assessment for 
     security for silos for intercontinental ballistic missiles 
     (ICBMs).
       (3) Offset.--The amount authorized to be appropriated by 
     section 103(2) for procurement of missiles for the Air Force 
     is hereby reduced by $5,000,000, with the amount of the 
     reduction to be allocated to amounts available for the 
     Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle.
       (e) ICBM Modernization Program Defined.--In this section, 
     the term ``ICBM Modernization program'' means each of the 
     following for the Minuteman III Intercontinental Ballistic 
     Missile:
       (1) The Guidance Replacement Program (GRP).
       (2) The Propulsion Replacement Program (PRP).
       (3) The Propulsion System Rocket Engine (PSRE) program.
       (4) The Safety Enhanced Reentry Vehicle (SERV) program.


                           AMENDMENT NO. 4374

 (Purpose: To provide for a study of the health effects of exposure to 
                           depleted uranium)

       At the end of subtitle C of title VII, add the following:

     SEC. 746. STUDY OF HEALTH EFFECTS OF EXPOSURE TO DEPLETED 
                   URANIUM.

       (a) Study.--The Secretary of Defense, in consultation with 
     the Secretary for Veterans Affairs and the Secretary of 
     Health and Human Services, shall conduct a comprehensive 
     study of the health effects of exposure to depleted uranium 
     munitions on uranium-exposed soldiers and on children of 
     uranium-exposed soldiers who were born after the exposure of 
     the uranium-exposed soldiers to depleted uranium.
       (b) Uranium-Exposed Soldiers.--In this section, the term 
     ``uranium-exposed soldiers'' means a member or former member 
     of the Armed Forces who handled, came in contact with, or had 
     the likelihood of contact with depleted uranium munitions 
     while on active duty, including members and former members 
     who--
       (1) were exposed to smoke from fires resulting from the 
     burning of vehicles containing depleted uranium munitions or 
     fires at depots at which depleted uranium munitions were 
     stored;
       (2) worked within environments containing depleted uranium 
     dust or residues from depleted uranium munitions;
       (3) were within a structure or vehicle while it was struck 
     by a depleted uranium munition;
       (4) climbed on or entered equipment or structures struck by 
     a depleted uranium munition; or
       (5) were medical personnel who provided initial treatment 
     to members of the Armed Forces described in paragraph (1), 
     (2), (3), or (4).
       (c) Report.--Not later than 1 year after the date of 
     enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall submit 
     a report to Congress on the results of the study described in 
     subsection (a).


                           AMENDMENT NO. 4521

    (Purpose: To provide, with an offset, $10,000,000 for the Joint 
           Advertising, Market Research and Studies program)

       At the end of title XIV, add the following:

     SEC. 1414. JOINT ADVERTISING, MARKET RESEARCH AND STUDIES 
                   PROGRAM.

       (a) Increase in Amount for Operation and Maintenance, 
     Defense-Wide.--The amount authorized to be appropriated by 
     section 301(5) for operation and maintenance for Defense-wide 
     activities, is hereby increased by $10,000,000.
       (b) Availability of Amount.--Of the amount authorized to be 
     appropriated by section 301(5) for operation and maintenance 
     for Defense-wide activities, as increased by subsection (a), 
     $10,000,000 may be available for the Joint Advertising, 
     Market Research and Studies (JAMRS) program.
       (c) Offset.--The amount authorized to be appropriated by 
     section 421(a) for military personnel is hereby decreased by 
     $10,000,000, due to unexpended obligations, if available.


                           AMENDMENT NO. 4522

(Purpose: To require a report on security measures to ensure that data 
contained in the Joint Advertising, Market Research and Studies (JAMRS) 
                  program is maintained and protected)

       At the appropriate place, add the following:
       Report.--Not later than 120 days after the date of 
     enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall submit 
     to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and House 
     of Representatives a report on how the data, including social 
     security numbers, contained in the Joint Advertising, Market 
     Research and Studies (JAMRS) program is maintained and 
     protected, including the security measures in place to 
     prevent unauthorized access or inadvertent disclosure of the 
     data that could lead to identity theft.


                           amendment no. 4523

(Purpose: To extend the termination date for the exemption of returning 
     workers from the numerical limitations for temporary workers)

       At the end of subtitle I of title X, add the following:

     SEC. 1084. EXTENSION OF RETURNING WORKER EXEMPTION.

       Section 402(b)(10 of the Save Our Small and Seasonal 
     Businesses Act of 2005 (title IV of division B of Public Law 
     109-13; 8 U.S.C. 1184 note) is amended by striking ``2006'' 
     and inserting ``2008''.


                           amendment no. 4458

  (Purpose: To ensure payment of United States assessments for United 
        Nations peacekeeping operations in 2005, 2006, and 2007)

       At the appropriate place, insert the following:

     SEC. __. LIMITATION ON THE UNITED STATES SHARE OF ASSESSMENTS 
                   FOR UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS.

       (a) In General.--Section 404(b)(2)(B) of the Foreign 
     Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1994 and 1995 (22 
     U.S.C. 287e note) is amended by adding at the end the 
     following:
       ``(v) For assessments made during calendar years 2005, 
     2006, and 2007, 27.10 percent.''.
       (b) Conforming Amendment.--Section 411 of the Department of 
     State and Related Agency Appropriations Act, 2005 (title IV 
     of division B of Public Law 108-447; 22 U.S.C. 287e note) is 
     repealed.


                           amendment no. 4524

(Purpose: To provide for Military Deputies to the Assistant Secretaries 
of the military departments for acquisition, logistics, and technology 
                                matters)

       At the end of subtitle A of title IX, add following:

     SEC. 903. MILITARY DEPUTIES TO THE ASSISTANT SECRETARIES OF 
                   THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS FOR ACQUISITION, 
                   LOGISTICS, AND TECHNOLOGY MATTERS.

       (a) Department of the Army.--
       (1) Establishment of position.--There is hereby established 
     within the Department of the Army the position of Military 
     Deputy to the Assistant Secretary of the Army for 
     Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology.
       (2) Lieutenant general.--The individual serving in the 
     position of Military Deputy to the Assistant Secretary of the 
     Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology shall be a 
     lieutenant general of the Army on active duty.
       (3) Exclusion from grade and number limitations.--An 
     officer serving in the position of Military Deputy to the 
     Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics, 
     and Technology shall not be counted against the numbers and 
     percentages of officers of the Army of the grade of 
     lieutenant general.
       (b) Department of the Navy.--
       (1) Establishment of position.--There is hereby established 
     within the Department of the Navy the position of Military 
     Deputy to the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, 
     Development, and Acquisition.
       (2) Vice admiral.--The individual serving in the position 
     of Military Deputy to the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for 
     Research, Development, and Acquisition shall be a vice 
     admiral on active duty.
       (3) Exclusion from grade and number limitations.--An 
     officer serving in the position of Military Deputy to the 
     Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, 
     and Acquisition shall not be counted against the numbers and 
     percentages of officers of the grade of vice admiral.
       (c) Department of the Air Force.--
       (1) Establishment of position.--There is hereby established 
     within the Department of the Air Force the position of 
     Military Deputy to the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force 
     for Acquisition.
       (2) Lieutenant general.--The individual serving in the 
     position of Military Deputy to

[[Page S6379]]

     the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition 
     shall be a lieutenant general of the Air Force on active 
     duty.
       (3) Exclusion from grade and number limitations.--An 
     officer serving in the position of Military Deputy to the 
     Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition shall 
     not be counted against the numbers and percentages of 
     officers of the Air Force of the grade of lieutenant general.

                    amendment no. 4264, as modified

       At the end of title VI, add the following:

Subtitle F--Transition Assistance for Members of the National Guard and 
    Reserve Returning From Deployment in Operation Iraqi Freedom or 
                       Operation Enduring Freedom

     SEC. 681. SHORT TITLE.

       This subtitle may be cited as the ``Heroes at Home Act of 
     2006''.

     SEC. 682. SPECIAL WORKING GROUP ON TRANSITION TO CIVILIAN 
                   EMPLOYMENT OF MEMBERS OF THE NATIONAL GUARD AND 
                   RESERVE RETURNING FROM DEPLOYMENT IN OPERATION 
                   IRAQI FREEDOM AND OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM.

       (a) Working Group Required.--The Secretary of Defense shall 
     establish within the Department of Defense a working group to 
     identify and assess the needs of members of the National 
     Guard and Reserve returning from deployment in Operation 
     Iraqi Freedom or Operation Enduring Freedom in transitioning 
     to civilian employment on their return from such deployment.
       (b) Members.--The working group established under 
     subsection (a) shall include a balance of individuals 
     appointed by the Secretary of Defense from among the 
     following:
       (1) Personnel of the Department of Defense.
       (2) With the concurrence of the Secretary of Veterans 
     Affairs, personnel of the Department of Veterans Affairs.
       (3) With the concurrence of the Secretary of Labor, 
     personnel of the Department of Labor.
       (c) Responsibilities.--The working group established under 
     subsection (a) shall--
       (1) identify and assess the needs of members of the 
     National Guard and Reserve described in subsection (a) in 
     transitioning to civilian employment on their return from 
     deployment as described in that subsection, including the 
     needs of--
       (A) members who were self-employed before deployment and 
     seek to return to such employment after deployment;
       (B) members who were students before deployment and seek to 
     return to school or commence employment after deployment;
       (C) members who have experienced multiple recent 
     deployments; and
       (D) members who have been wounded or injured during 
     deployment; and
       (2) develop recommendations on means of improving 
     assistance to members of the National Guard and Reserve 
     described in subsection (a) in meeting the needs identified 
     in paragraph (1) on their return from deployment as described 
     in subsection (a).
       (d) Consultation.--In carrying out its responsibilities 
     under subsection (c), the working group established under 
     subsection (a) shall consult with the following:
       (1) Appropriate personnel of the Small Business 
     Administration.
       (2) Representatives of employers who employ members of the 
     National Guard and Reserve described in subsection (a) on 
     their return to civilian employment as described in that 
     subsection.
       (3) Representatives of employee assistance organizations.
       (4) Representatives of associations of employers.
       (5) Representatives of organizations that assist wounded or 
     injured members of the National Guard and Reserves in finding 
     or sustaining employment.
       (6) Representatives of such other public or private 
     organizations and entities as the working group considers 
     appropriate.
       (e) Report.--
       (1) In general.--Not later than one year after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, the working group established 
     under subsection (a) shall submit to the Secretary of Defense 
     and Congress a report on its activities under subsection (c).
       (2) Elements.--The report required by paragraph (1) shall 
     include the following:
       (A) The results of the identification and assessment 
     required under subsection (c)(1).
       (B) The recommendations developed under subsection (c)(2), 
     including recommendations on the following:
       (i) The provision of outreach and training to employers, 
     employment assistance organizations, and associations of 
     employers on the employment and transition needs of members 
     of the National Guard and Reserve described in subsection (a) 
     upon their return from deployment as described in that 
     subsection.
       (ii) The provision of outreach and training to employers, 
     employment assistance organizations, and associations of 
     employers on the needs of family members of such members.
       (iii) The improvement of collaboration between the pubic 
     and private sectors in order to ensure the successful 
     transition of such members into civilian employment upon 
     their return from such deployment.
       (3) Availability to public.--The Secretary shall take 
     appropriate actions to make the report under paragraph (1) 
     available to the public, including through the Internet 
     website of the Department of Defense.
       (f) Termination.--
       (1) In general.--The working group established under 
     subsection (a) shall terminate on the date that is two years 
     after the date of the enactment of this Act.
       (2) Interim duties.--During the period beginning on the 
     date of the submittal of the report required by subsection 
     (e) and the termination of the working group under paragraph 
     (1), the working group shall serve as an advisory board to 
     the Office for Employers and Employment Assistance 
     Organizations under section 683.
       (g) Employment Assistance Organization Defined.--In this 
     section, the term ``employment assistance organization'' 
     means an organization or entity, whether public or private, 
     that provides assistance to individuals in finding or 
     retaining employment, including organizations and entities 
     under military career support programs.

     SEC. 683. OFFICE FOR EMPLOYERS AND EMPLOYMENT ASSISTANCE 
                   ORGANIZATIONS.

       (a) Designation of Office.--
       (1) In general.--The Secretary of Defense shall designate 
     an office within the Department of Defense to assist 
     employers, employment assistance organizations, and 
     associations of employers in facilitating the successful 
     transition to civilian employment of members of the National 
     Guard and Reserve returning from deployment in Operation 
     Iraqi Freedom or Operation Enduring Freedom.
       (2) Name.--The office designated under this subsection 
     shall be known as the ``Office for Employers and Employment 
     Assistance Organizations'' (in this section referred to as 
     the ``Office'').
       (3) Head.--The Secretary shall designate an individual to 
     act as the head of the Office.
       (4) Integration.--In designating the Office, the Secretary 
     shall ensure close communication between the Office and the 
     military departments, including the commands of the reserve 
     components of the Armed Forces.
       (b) Functions.--The Office shall have the following 
     functions:
       (1) To provide education and technical assistance to 
     employers, employment assistance organizations, and 
     associations of employers to assist them in facilitating the 
     successful transition to civilian employment of members of 
     the National Guard and Reserve described in subsection (a) on 
     their return from deployment as described in that subsection.
       (2) To provide education and technical assistance to 
     employers, employment assistance organizations, and 
     associations of employers to assist them in facilitating the 
     successful adjustment of family members of the National Guard 
     and Reserve to the deployment and return from deployment of 
     members of the National Guard and Reserve as described in 
     that subsection.
       (c) Resources to Be Provided.--
       (1) In general.--In carrying out the functions specified in 
     subsection (b), the Office shall provide employers, 
     employment assistance organizations, and associations of 
     employers resources, services, and assistance that include 
     the following:
       (A) Guidelines on best practices and effective strategies.
       (B) Education on the physical and mental health conditions 
     that can and may be experienced by members of the National 
     Guard and Reserve described in subsection (a) on their return 
     from deployment as described in that subsection in 
     transitioning to civilian employment, including Post 
     Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) and traumatic brain injury 
     (TBI), including education on--
       (i) the detection of warning signs of such conditions;
       (ii) the medical, mental health, and employment services 
     available to such members, including materials on services 
     offered by the Department of Defense, the Department of 
     Veterans Affairs (including through the vet center program 
     under section 1712A of title 38, United States Code), the 
     Department of Labor, military support programs, and community 
     mental health clinics; and
       (iii) the mechanisms for referring such members for 
     services described in clause (ii) and for other medical and 
     mental health screening and care when appropriate.
       (C) Education on the range and types of potential physical 
     and mental health effects of deployment and post-deployment 
     adjustment on family members of members of the National Guard 
     and Reserve described in subsection (a), including education 
     on--
       (i) the detection of warning signs of such effects on 
     family members of members of the National Guard and Reserves;
       (ii) the medical, mental health, and employment services 
     available to such family members, including materials on such 
     services as described in subparagraph (B)(ii); and
       (iii) mechanisms for referring such family members for 
     services described in clause (ii) and for medical and mental 
     health screening and care when appropriate.
       (D) Education on mechanisms, strategies, and resources for 
     accommodating and employing wounded or injured members of the 
     National Guard and Reserves in work settings.
       (2) Provision of resources.--The Office shall make 
     resources, services, and assistance available under this 
     subsection through such mechanisms as the head of the Office 
     considers appropriate, including the Internet, video 
     conferencing, telephone services, workshops, trainings, 
     presentations, group forums, and other mechanisms.
       (d) Personnel and Other Resources.--The Secretary of 
     Defense shall assign to the

[[Page S6380]]

     Office such personnel, funding, and other resources as are 
     required to ensure the effective discharge by the Office of 
     the functions under subsection (b).
       (e) Reports on Activities.--
       (1) Annual report by office.--Not later than one year after 
     the designation of the Office, and annually thereafter, the 
     head of the Office, in consultation with the working group 
     established pursuant to section 682 (while in effect), shall 
     submit to the Secretary of Defense a written report on the 
     progress and outcomes of the Office during the one-year 
     period ending on the date of such report.
       (2) Transmittal to congress.--Not later than 60 days after 
     receipt of a report under paragraph (1), the Secretary shall 
     transmit such report to the Committees on Armed Services of 
     the Senate and the House of Representatives, together with--
       (A) such comments on such report, and such assessment of 
     the effectiveness of the Office, as the Secretary considers 
     appropriate; and
       (B) such recommendations on means of improving the 
     effectiveness of the Office as the Secretary considers 
     appropriate.
       (3) Availability to public.--The Secretary shall take 
     appropriate actions to make each report under paragraph (2) 
     available to the public, including through the Internet 
     website of the Office.
       (f) Employment Assistance Organization Defined.--In this 
     section, the term ``employment assistance organization'' 
     means an organization or entity, whether public or private, 
     that provides assistance to individuals in finding or 
     retaining employment, including organizations and entities 
     under military career support programs.

     SEC. 684. ADDITIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES OF DEPARTMENT OF 
                   DEFENSE TASK FORCE ON MENTAL HEALTH RELATING TO 
                   MENTAL HEALTH OF MEMBERS OF THE NATIONAL GUARD 
                   AND RESERVE DEPLOYED IN OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM 
                   AND OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM.

       (a) Additional Responsibilities.--Section 723 of the 
     National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006 
     (Public Law 109-163; 119 Stat. 3348) is amended--
       (1) by redesignating subsections (d), (e), (f), and (g) as 
     subsections (e), (f), (g), and (h), respectively; and
       (2) by inserting after subsection (c) the following new 
     subsection (d):
       ``(d) Assessment of Mental Health Needs of Members of 
     National Guard and Reserve Deployed in OIF or OEF.--
       ``(1) In general.--In addition to the activities required 
     under subsection (c), the task force shall, not later than 12 
     months after the date of the enactment of the Heroes at Home 
     Act of 2006, submit to the Secretary a report containing an 
     assessment and recommendations on the needs with respect to 
     mental health of members of the National Guard and Reserve 
     who are deployed in Operation Iraqi Freedom or Operation 
     Enduring Freedom upon their return from such deployment.
       ``(2) Elements.--The assessment and recommendations 
     required by paragraph (1) shall include the following:
       ``(A) An assessment of the specific needs with respect to 
     mental health of members of the National Guard and Reserve 
     who are deployed in Operation Iraqi Freedom or Operation 
     Enduring Freedom upon their return from such deployment.
       ``(B) An identification of mental health conditions and 
     disorders (including Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), 
     suicide attempts, and suicide) occurring among members of the 
     National Guard and Reserve who undergo multiple deployments 
     in Operation Iraqi Freedom or Operation Enduring Freedom upon 
     their return from such deployment.
       ``(C) Recommendations on mechanisms for improving the 
     mental health services available to members of the National 
     Guard and Reserve who are deployed in Operation Iraqi Freedom 
     or Operation Enduring Freedom, including such members who 
     undergo multiple deployments in such operations, upon their 
     return from such deployment.''.
       (b) Report.--Subsection (f) of such section, as 
     redesignated by subsection (a)(1) of this section, is further 
     amended--
       (1) in the subsection heading, by striking ``Report'' and 
     inserting ``Reports'';
       (2) by striking paragraph (1) and inserting the following 
     new paragraph (1):
       ``(1) In general.--The report submitted to the Secretary 
     under each of subsections (c) and (d) shall include--
       ``(A) a description of the activities of the task force 
     under such subsection;
       ``(B) the assessment and recommendations required by such 
     subsection; and
       ``(C) such other matters relating to the activities of the 
     task force under such subsection as the task force considers 
     appropriate.''; and
       (3) in paragraph (2)--
       (A) by striking ``the report under paragraph (1)'' and 
     inserting ``a report under paragraph (1)''; and
       (B) by striking ``the report as'' and inserting ``such 
     report as''.
       (c) Plan Matters.--Subsection (g) of such section, as 
     redesignated by subsection (a)(1) of this section, is further 
     amended--
       (1) by striking ``the report from the task force under 
     subsection (e)(1)'' and inserting ``a report from the task 
     force under subsection (f)(1)''; and
       (2) by inserting ``contained in such report'' after ``the 
     task force'' the second place it appears.
       (d) Termination.--Subsection (h) of such section, as 
     redesignated by subsection (a)(1) of this section, is further 
     amended--
       (1) by inserting ``with respect to the assessment and 
     recommendations required by subsection (d)'' after ``the task 
     force''; and
       (2) by striking ``subsection (e)(2)'' and inserting 
     ``subsection (f)(2)''.

     SEC. 685. GRANTS ON ASSISTANCE IN COMMUNITY-BASED SETTINGS 
                   FOR MEMBERS OF THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVE 
                   AND THEIR FAMILIES AFTER DEPLOYMENT IN 
                   OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM AND OPERATION ENDURING 
                   FREEDOM.

       (a) In General.--The Secretary of Defense may award grants 
     to eligible entities to carry out demonstration projects to 
     assess the feasibility and advisability of utilizing 
     community-based settings for the provision of assistance to 
     members of the National Guard and Reserve who serve in 
     Operation Iraqi Freedom or Operation Enduring Freedom, and 
     their families, after the return of such members from 
     deployment in Operation Iraqi Freedom or Operation Enduring 
     Freedom, as the case may be, including--
       (1) services to improve the reuniting of such members of 
     the National Guard and Reserve and their families;
       (2) education to increase awareness of the physical and 
     mental health conditions that members of the National Guard 
     and Reserve can and may experience on their return from such 
     deployment, including education on--
       (A) Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) and traumatic 
     brain injury (TBI); and
       (B) mechanisms for the referral of such members of the 
     National Guard and Reserve for medical and mental health 
     screening and care when necessary; and
       (3) education to increase awareness of the physical and 
     mental health conditions that family members of such members 
     of the National Guard and Reserve can and may experience on 
     the return of such members from such deployment, including 
     education on--
       (A) depression, anxiety, and relationship problems; and
       (B) mechanisms for medical and mental health screening and 
     care when appropriate.
       (b) Eligible Entities.--An entity eligible for the award of 
     a grant under this section is any public or private non-
     profit organization, such as a community mental health 
     clinic, family support organization, military support 
     organization, law enforcement agency, community college, or 
     public school.
       (c) Application.--An eligible entity seeking a grant under 
     this section shall submit to the Secretary of Defense an 
     application therefor in such manner, and containing such 
     information, as the Secretary may require for purposes of 
     this section, including a description of how such entity will 
     work with the Department of Defense, the Department of 
     Veterans Affairs, State health agencies, other appropriate 
     Federal, State, and local agencies, family support 
     organizations, and other community organization in 
     undertaking activities described in subsection (a).
       (d) Annual Reports by Grant Recipients.--An entity awarded 
     a grant under this section shall submit to the Secretary of 
     Defense on an annual basis a report on the activities 
     undertaken by such entity during the preceding year utilizing 
     amounts under the grant. Each report shall include such 
     information as the Secretary shall specify for purposes of 
     this subsection.
       (e) Annual Reports to Congress.--
       (1) In general.--Not later than one year after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the 
     Secretary of Defense shall submit to Congress a report on 
     activities undertaken under the grants awarded under this 
     section. The report shall include recommendations for 
     legislative, programmatic, or administrative action to 
     improve or enhance activities under the grants awarded under 
     this section.
       (2) Availability to public.--The Secretary shall take 
     appropriate actions to make each report under this subsection 
     available to the public.

     SEC. 686. LONGITUDINAL STUDY ON TRAUMATIC BRAIN INJURY 
                   INCURRED BY MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES IN 
                   OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM AND OPERATION ENDURING 
                   FREEDOM.

       (a) Study Required.--The Secretary of Defense shall, in 
     consultation with the Secretary of Veterans Affairs, conduct 
     a longitudinal study on the effects of traumatic brain injury 
     incurred by members of the Armed Forces in Operation Iraqi 
     Freedom or Operation Enduring Freedom. The duration of the 
     longitudinal study shall be 15 years.
       (b) Elements.--The study required by subsection (a) shall 
     address the following:
       (1) The long-term physical and mental health effects of 
     traumatic brain injuries incurred by members of the Armed 
     Forces during service in Operation Iraqi Freedom or Operation 
     Enduring Freedom.
       (2) The health care, mental health care, and rehabilitation 
     needs of such members for such injuries after the completion 
     of inpatient treatment through the Department of Defense, the 
     Department of Veterans Affairs, or both.
       (3) The type and availability of long-term care 
     rehabilitation programs and services within and outside the 
     Department of Defense and the Department of Veterans Affairs 
     for such members for such injuries, including community-based 
     programs and services and in-home programs and services.
       (c) Reports.--
       (1) Periodic and final reports.--After the third, seventh, 
     eleventh, and fifteenth years

[[Page S6381]]

     of the study required by subsection (a), the Secretary of 
     Defense shall, in consultation with the Secretary of Veterans 
     Affairs, submit to Congress a comprehensive report on the 
     results of the study during the preceding years. Each report 
     shall include the following:
       (A) Current information on the cumulative outcomes of the 
     study.
       (B) Such recommendations as the Secretary of Defense and 
     the Secretary of Veterans Affairs jointly consider 
     appropriate based on the outcomes of the study, including 
     recommendations for legislative, programmatic, or 
     administrative action to improve long-term care and 
     rehabilitation programs and services for members of the Armed 
     Forces with traumatic brain injuries.
       (2) Availability to public.--The Secretary of Defense and 
     the Secretary of Veterans Affairs shall jointly take 
     appropriate actions to make each report under this subsection 
     available to the public.
       (d) Funding.--
       (1) Authorization of appropriations.--There is authorized 
     to be appropriated to the Department of Defense to carry out 
     this section amounts as follows:
       (A) For fiscal year 2007, $5,000,000.
       (B) For each of fiscal years 2008 through 2021, such sums 
     as may be necessary.
       (2) Offset.--The amount authorized to be appropriated by 
     section 102(a)(2) for weapons procurement for the Navy is 
     hereby reduced by $5,000,000, with the amount of the 
     reduction to be allocated to amounts for the Trident II 
     conventional modification program.

     SEC. 687. TRAINING CURRICULA FOR FAMILY CAREGIVERS ON CARE 
                   AND ASSISTANCE FOR MEMBERS AND FORMER MEMBERS 
                   OF THE ARMED FORCES WITH TRAUMATIC BRAIN INJURY 
                   INCURRED IN OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM AND 
                   OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM.

       (a) Traumatic Brain Injury Family Caregiver Panel.--
       (1) Establishment.--The Secretary of Defense shall, in 
     consultation with the Secretary of Veterans Affairs, 
     establish within the Department of Defense a panel to develop 
     coordinated, uniform, and consistent training curricula to be 
     used in training family members in the provision of care and 
     assistance to members and former members of the Armed Forces 
     for traumatic brain injuries incurred during service in the 
     Armed Forces in Operation Iraqi Freedom or Operation Enduring 
     Freedom.
       (2) Designation of panel.--The panel established under 
     paragraph (1) shall be known as the ``Traumatic Brain Injury 
     Family Caregiver Panel''.
       (3) Members.--The Traumatic Brain Injury Family Caregiver 
     Panel established under paragraph (1) shall consist of 15 
     members appointed by the Secretary of Defense, in 
     consultation with the Secretary of Veterans Affairs, equally 
     represented from among--
       (A) physicians, nurses, rehabilitation therapists, and 
     other individuals with an expertise in caring for and 
     assisting individuals with traumatic brain injury, including 
     those who specialize in caring for and assisting individuals 
     with traumatic brain injury incurred in war;
       (B) representatives of family caregivers or family 
     caregiver associations;
       (C) Department of Defense and Department of Veterans 
     Affairs health and medical personnel with expertise in 
     traumatic brain injury, and Department of Defense personnel 
     and readiness representatives with expertise in traumatic 
     brain injury;
       (D) psychologists or other individuals with expertise in 
     the mental health treatment and care of individuals with 
     traumatic brain injury;
       (E) experts in the development of training curricula; and
       (F) any other individuals the Secretary considers 
     appropriate.
       (b) Development of Curricula.--
       (1) In general.--The Traumatic Brain Injury Family 
     Caregiver Panel shall develop training curricula to be 
     utilized during the provision of training to family members 
     of members and former members of the Armed Forces described 
     in subsection (a) on techniques, strategies, and skills for 
     care and assistance for such members and former members with 
     the traumatic brain injuries described in that subsection.
       (2) Scope of curricula.--The curricula shall--
       (A) be based on empirical research and validated 
     techniques; and
       (B) shall provide for training that permits recipients to 
     tailor caregiving to the unique circumstances of the member 
     or former member of the Armed Forces receiving care.
       (3) Particular requirements.--In developing the curricula, 
     the Traumatic Brain Injury Family Caregiver Panel shall--
       (A) specify appropriate training commensurate with the 
     severity of traumatic brain injury; and
       (B) identify appropriate care and assistance to be provided 
     for the degree of severity of traumatic brain injury for 
     caregivers of various levels of skill and capability.
       (4) Use of existing materials.--In developing the 
     curricula, the Traumatic Brain Injury Family Caregiver Panel 
     shall utilize and enhance any existing training curricula, 
     materials, and resources applicable to such curricula as the 
     Panel considers appropriate.
       (5) Deadline for development.--The Traumatic Brain Injury 
     Family Caregiver Panel shall develop the curricula not later 
     than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act.
       (c) Dissemination of Curricula.--
       (1) In general.--The Secretary of Defense shall, in 
     consultation with the Traumatic Brain Injury Family Caregiver 
     Panel, develop mechanisms for the dissemination of the 
     curricula developed under subsection (b) to health care 
     professionals referred to in paragraph (2) who treat or 
     otherwise work with members and former members of the Armed 
     Forces with traumatic brain injury incurred in Operation 
     Iraqi Freedom or Operation Enduring Freedom. In developing 
     such mechanisms, the Secretary may utilize and enhance 
     existing mechanisms, including the Military Severely Injured 
     Center.
       (2) Health care professionals.--The health care 
     professionals referred to in this paragraph are the 
     following:
       (A) Personnel at military medical treatment facilities.
       (B) Personnel at the polytrauma centers of the Department 
     of Veterans Affairs.
       (C) Personnel and care managers at the Military Severely 
     Injured Center.
       (D) Such other health care professionals of the Department 
     of Defense as the Secretary considers appropriate.
       (E) Such other health care professionals of the Department 
     of Veterans Affairs as the Secretary of Defense, in 
     consultation with the Secretary of Veterans Affairs, 
     considers appropriate.
       (3) Provision of training to family caregivers.--
       (A) In general.--Health care professionals referred to in 
     paragraph (2) who are trained in the curricula developed 
     under subsection (b) shall provide training to family members 
     of members and former members of the Armed Forces who incur 
     traumatic brain injuries during service in the Operation 
     Iraqi Freedom or Operation Enduring Freedom in the care and 
     assistance to be provided for such injuries.
       (B) Timing of training.--Training under this paragraph 
     shall, to the extent practicable, be provided to family 
     members while the member or former member concerned is 
     undergoing treatment at a facility of the Department of 
     Defense or Department of Veterans Affairs, as applicable, in 
     order to ensure that such family members receive practice on 
     the provision of such care and assistance under the guidance 
     of qualified health professionals.
       (C) Particularized training.--Training provided under this 
     paragraph to family members of a particular member or former 
     member shall be tailored to the particular care needs of such 
     member or former member and the particular caregiving needs 
     of such family members.
       (4) Quality assurance.--The Secretary shall develop 
     mechanisms to ensure quality in the provision of training 
     under this section to health care professionals referred to 
     in paragraph (2) and in the provision of such training under 
     paragraph (4) by such health care professionals.
       (5) Report.--Not later than one year after the development 
     of the curricula required by subsection (b), and annually 
     thereafter, the Traumatic Brain Injury Family Caregiver 
     Training Panel shall submit to the Secretary of Defense and 
     the Secretary of Veterans Affairs, and to Congress, a report 
     on the following:
       (A) The actions undertaken under this subsection.
       (B) The results of the tracking of outcomes based on 
     training developed and provided under this section.
       (C) Recommendations for the improvement of training 
     developed and provided under this section.
       (d) Funding.--
       (1) Authorization of appropriations.--There is authorized 
     to be appropriated to the Department of Defense to carry out 
     this section amounts as follows:
       (A) For fiscal year 2007, $1,000,000.
       (B) For each of fiscal years 2008 through 2011, such sums 
     as may be necessary.
       (2) Offset.--The amount authorized to be appropriated by 
     section 102(a)(2) for weapons procurement for the Navy is 
     hereby reduced by $1,000,000, with the amount of the 
     reduction to be allocated to amounts for the Trident II 
     conventional modification program.


                           amendment no. 4464

 (Purpose: To provide a sunset date for the Small Business Competitive 
                         Demonstration Program)

       At the end of title X of division A, insert the following:

     SEC. 1084. TERMINATION OF PROGRAM.

       Section 711(c) of the Small Business Competitive 
     Demonstration Program Act of 1988 (15 U.S.C. 644 note) is 
     amended by inserting after ``January 1, 1989'' the following: 
     ``, and shall terminate on the date of enactment of the 
     National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007''.


                           amendment no. 4489

  (Purpose: To propose an alternative to section 1083 to improve the 
                      Quadrennial Defense Review)

       Strike section 1083 and insert the following:

     SEC. 1083. QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW.

       (a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
       (1) The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) under section 118 
     of title 10, United States Code, is vital in laying out the 
     strategic military planning and threat objectives of the 
     Department of Defense.

[[Page S6382]]

       (2) The Quadrennial Defense Review is critical to 
     identifying the correct mix of military planning assumptions, 
     defense capabilities, and strategic focuses for the Armed 
     Forces of the United States.
       (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that 
     the Quadrennial Defense Review is intended to provide more 
     than an overview of global threats and the general strategic 
     orientation of the Department of Defense.
       (c) Improvements to Quadrennial Defense Review.--
       (1) Conduct of review.--Subsection (b) of section 118 of 
     title 10, United States Code, is amended--
       (A) in paragraph (2), by striking ``and'' at the end;
       (B) in paragraph (3), by striking the period at the end and 
     inserting ``; and''; and
       (C) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
       ``(4) to make recommendations that are not constrained to 
     comply with the budget submitted to Congress by the President 
     pursuant to section 1105 of title 31.''.
       (2) Additional element in report to congress.--Subsection 
     (d) of such section is amended--
       (A) in paragraph (1), by inserting ``, the strategic 
     planning guidance,'' after ``United States'';
       (B) by redesignating paragraphs (9) through (15) as 
     paragraphs (10) through (16), respectively; and
       (C) by inserting after paragraph (8) the following new 
     paragraph (9):
       ``(9) The specific capabilities, including the general 
     number and type of specific military platforms, needed to 
     achieve the strategic and warfighting objectives identified 
     in the review.''.
       (3) CJCS review.--Subsection (e)(1) of such section is 
     amended by inserting before the period at the end the 
     following: `` and a description of the capabilities needed to 
     address such risk''.
       (4) Independent assessment.--Such section is further 
     amended by adding at the end the following new subsection:
       ``(f) Independent Assessment.--(1) Not later than one year 
     before the date a report on a quadrennial defense review is 
     to be submitted to Congress under subsection (d), the 
     President shall appoint a panel to conduct an independent 
     assessment of the review.
       ``(2) The panel appointed under paragraph (1) shall be 
     composed of seven individuals (who may not be employees of 
     the Department of Defense) as follows:
       ``(A) Three members shall be appointed by the President.
       ``(B) One member shall be appointed by the President in 
     consultation with, and based on the recommendations of, the 
     Speaker of the House of Representatives.
       ``(C) One member shall be appointed by the President in 
     consultation with, and based on the recommendations of, the 
     Minority Leader of the House of Representatives.
       ``(D) One member shall be appointed by the President in 
     consultation with, and based on the recommendations of, the 
     Majority Leader of the Senate.
       ``(E) One member shall be appointed by the President in 
     consultation with, and based on the recommendations of, the 
     Minority Leader of the Senate.
       ``(3) Not later than three months after the date that the 
     report on a quadrennial defense review is submitted to 
     Congress under subsection (d), the panel appointed under 
     paragraph (2) shall provide to the congressional defense 
     committees an assessment of the assumptions, planning 
     guidelines, recommendations, and realism of the review.''.


                           amendment no. 4525

(Purpose: To require a report on Air Force safety requirements for Air 
 Force flight training operations at Pueblo Memorial Airport, Colorado)

       At the end of subtitle D of title III, add the following:

     SEC. 352. REPORT ON AIR FORCE SAFETY REQUIREMENTS FOR AIR 
                   FORCE FLIGHT TRAINING OPERATIONS AT PUEBLO 
                   MEMORIAL AIRPORT, COLORADO.

       (a) Report Required.--Not later than February 15, 2007, the 
     Secretary of the Air Force shall submit to the congressional 
     defense committees a report on Air Force safety requirements 
     for Air Force flight training operations at Pueblo Memorial 
     Airport, Colorado.
       (b) Elements.--The report required by subsection (a) shall 
     include the following:
       (1) A description of the Air Force flying operations at 
     Pueblo Memorial Airport.
       (2) An assessment of the impact of Air Force operations at 
     Pueblo Memorial Airport on non-Air Force activities at the 
     airport.
       (3) A description of the requirements necessary at Pueblo 
     Memorial Airport to ensure safe Air Force flying operations, 
     including continuous availability of fire protection, crash 
     rescue, and other emergency response capabilities.
       (4) An assessment of the necessity of providing for a 
     continuous fire-fighting capability at Pueblo Memorial 
     Airport.
       (5) A description and analysis of alternatives for Air 
     Force flying operations at Pueblo Memorial Airport, including 
     the cost and availability of such alternatives.
       (6) An assessment of whether Air Force funding is required 
     to assist the City of Pueblo, Colorado, in meeting Air Force 
     requirements for safe Air Force flight operations at Pueblo 
     Memorial Airport, and if required, the Air Force plan to 
     provide the funds to the City.


                           amendment no. 4526

(Purpose: To require the President to develop a comprehensive strategy 
                            toward Somalia)

       At the end of subtitle A of title XII, add the following:

     SEC. 1209. COMPREHENSIVE STRATEGY FOR SOMALIA.

       (a) Sense of Senate.--It is the sense of the Senate that 
     the United States should--
       (1) support the development of the Transitional Federal 
     Institutions in Somalia into a unified national government, 
     support humanitarian assistance to the people of Somalia, 
     support efforts to prevent Somalia from becoming a safe haven 
     for terrorists and terrorist activities, and support regional 
     stability;
       (2) broaden and integrate its strategic approach toward 
     Somalia within the context of United States activities in 
     countries of the Horn of Africa, including Djibouti, 
     Ethiopia, Kenya, Eritrea, and in Yemen on the Arabian 
     Peninsula; and
       (3) carry out all diplomatic, humanitarian, counter-
     terrorism, and security-related activities in Somalia within 
     the context of a comprehensive strategy developed through an 
     interagency process.
       (b) Development of a Comprehensive Strategy for Somalia.--
       (1) Requirement for strategy.--Not later then 90 days after 
     the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall 
     develop and submit to the appropriate committees of Congress 
     a comprehensive strategy toward Somalia within the context of 
     United States activities in the countries of the Horn of 
     Africa.
       (2) Content of strategy.--The strategy should include the 
     following:
       (A) A clearly stated policy towards Somalia that will help 
     establish a functional, legitimate, unified national 
     government in Somalia that is capable of maintaining the rule 
     of law and preventing Somalia from becoming a safe haven for 
     terrorists.
       (B) An integrated political, humanitarian, intelligence, 
     and military approach to counter transnational security 
     threats in Somalia within the context of United States 
     activities in the countries of the Horn of Africa.
       (C) An interagency framework to plan, coordinate, and 
     execute United States activities in Somalia within the 
     context of other activities in the countries of the Horn of 
     Africa among the agencies and departments of the United 
     States to oversee policy and program implementation.
       (D) A description of the type and form of diplomatic 
     engagement to coordinate the implementation of the United 
     States policy in Somalia.
       (E) A description of bilateral, regional, and multilateral 
     efforts to strengthen and promote diplomatic engagement in 
     Somalia.
       (F) A description of appropriate metrics to measure the 
     progress and effectiveness of the United States policy 
     towards Somalia and throughout the countries of the Horn of 
     Africa.
       (G) Guidance on the manner in which the strategy will be 
     implemented.
       (c) Annual Reports.--Not later than April 1, 2007, and 
     annually thereafter, the President shall prepare and submit 
     to the appropriate committees of Congress a report on the 
     status of the implementation of the strategy.
       (d) Form.--Each report under this section shall be 
     submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified 
     annex.
       (e) Appropriate Committees of Congress Defined.--In this 
     section, the term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' 
     means--
       (1) the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on Armed 
     Services, the Committee on Foreign Relations, and the Select 
     Committee Intelligence of the Senate; and
       (2) the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on Armed 
     Services, the Committees on International Relations, and the 
     Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of 
     Representatives.


                    amendment no. 4327, As Modified

       At the end of subtitle E of title VI, add the following:

     SEC. 662. IMPROVEMENT OF MANAGEMENT OF ARMED FORCES 
                   RETIREMENT HOME.

       (a) Redesignation of Chief Operating Officer as Chief 
     Executive Officer.--
       (1) In general.--Section 1515 of the Armed Forces 
     Retirement Home Act of 1991 (24 U.S.C. 415) is amended--
       (A) by striking ``Chief Operating Officer'' each place it 
     appears and inserting ``Chief Executive Officer''; and
       (B) in subsection (e)(1), by striking ``Chief Operating 
     Officer's'' and inserting ``Chief Executive Officer's''.
       (2) Conforming amendments.--Such Act is further amended by 
     striking ``Chief Operating Officer'' each place it appears in 
     a provision as follows and inserting ``Chief Executive 
     Officer'':
       (A) Section 1511 (24 U.S.C. 411).
       (B) Section 1512 (24 U.S.C. 412).
       (C) Section 1513(a) (24 U.S.C. 413(a)).
       (D) Section 1514(c)(1) (24 U.S.C. 414(c)(1)).
       (E) Section 1516(b) (24 U.S.C. 416(b)).
       (F) Section 1517 (24 U.S.C. 417).
       (G) Section 1518(c) (24 U.S.C. 418(c)).
       (H) Section 1519(c) (24 U.S.C. 419(c)).
       (I) Section 1521(a) (24 U.S.C. 421(a)).
       (J) Section 1522 (24 U.S.C. 422).
       (K) Section 1523(b) (24 U.S.C. 423(b)).

[[Page S6383]]

       (L) Section 1531 (24 U.S.C. 431).
       (3) Clerical amendments.--(A) The heading of section 1515 
     of such Act is amended to read as follows:

     ``SEC. 1515. CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER.''.

       (B) The table of contents for such Act is amended by 
     striking the item relating to section 1515 and inserting the 
     following new item:

``Sec. 1515. Chief Executive Officer.''.

       (4) References.--Any reference in any law, regulation, 
     document, record, or other paper of the United States to the 
     Chief Operating Officer of the Armed Forces Retirement Home 
     shall be considered to be a reference to the Chief Executive 
     Officer of the Armed Forces Retirement Home.
       (b) Director and Deputy Director of Facilities.--
       (1) Military director.--Subsection (b)(1) of section 1517 
     of such Act (24 U.S.C. 417) is amended by striking ``a 
     civilian with experience as a continuing care retirement 
     community professional or''.
       (2) Civilian deputy director.--Subsection (d)(1)(A) of such 
     section is amended by striking ``or a member'' and all that 
     follows and inserting ``; and''.
       (3) Effective date.--The amendments made by this subsection 
     shall take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act, 
     and shall apply with respect to any vacancy that occur in the 
     position of Director or Deputy Director of a facility of the 
     Armed Forces Retirement Home that occurs on or after that 
     date.
       (c) Clarification of Membership on Local Board of 
     Trustees.--Section 1516(c)(1)(H) of such Act (24 U.S.C. 
     416(c)(1)(K)) is amended by inserting before the period at 
     the end the following: ``, who shall be a member of the Armed 
     Forces serving on active duty in the grade of brigadier 
     general, or in the case of the Navy, rear admiral (lower 
     half)''.


                           AMENDMENT NO. 4527

  (Purpose: To require a report on the feasibility of establishing a 
     United States military regional combatant command for Africa)

       At the end of subtitle G of title X, insert the following:

     SEC. 1066. REPORT ON FEASIBILITY OF ESTABLISHING REGIONAL 
                   COMBATANT COMMAND FOR AFRICA.

       (a) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall 
     submit to the congressional defense committees and the 
     Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the 
     Committee on International Relations of the House of 
     Representatives a report on the establishment of a United 
     States Armed Forces regional combatant command for Africa.
       (b) Content.--The report required under subsection (a) 
     shall include--
       (1) a study on the feasibility and desirability of 
     establishing of a United States Armed Forces regional 
     combatant command for Africa;
       (2) an assessment of the benefits and problems associated 
     with establishing such a command; and
       (3) an estimate of the costs, time, and resources needed to 
     establish such a command.


                           AMENDMENT NO. 4434

  (Purpose: To ensure proper education, training, and supervision of 
   personnel providing special education services for dependents of 
   members of the Armed Forces under extended benefits under TRICARE)

       At the end of subtitle B of title VII, add the following:

     SEC. 730. EDUCATION, TRAINING, AND SUPERVISION OF PERSONNEL 
                   PROVIDING SPECIAL EDUCATION SERVICES UNDER 
                   EXTENDED BENEFITS UNDER TRICARE.

       Section 1079(d)(2) of title 10, United States Code is 
     amended by adding at the end the following: ``The regulations 
     shall include the following:
       ``(A) Requirements for education, training, and supervision 
     of individuals providing special education services known as 
     Applied Behavioral Analysis under this subsection that are in 
     addition to any other education, training, and supervision 
     requirements applicable to Board Certified Behavior Analysts 
     or Board Certified Associate Behavior Analysts or are 
     otherwise applicable to personnel providing such services 
     under applicable State law.
       ``(B) Metrics to identify and measure the availability and 
     distribution of individuals of various expertise in Applied 
     Behavioral Analysis in order to evaluate and assure the 
     availability of qualified personnel to meet needs for Applied 
     Behavioral Analysis under this subsection.''.


                    AMENDMENT NO. 4393, As Modified

       At the end of subtitle D of title VII, add the following:

     SEC. 762. TRANSFER OF CUSTODY OF THE AIR FORCE HEALTH STUDY 
                   ASSETS TO MEDICAL FOLLOW-UP AGENCY.

       (a) Transfer.--
       (1) Notification of participants.--The Secretary of the Air 
     Force shall notify the participants of the Air Force Health 
     Study that the study as currently constituted is ending as of 
     September 30, 2006. In consultation with the Medical Follow-
     up Agency (in this section referred to as the ``Agency'') of 
     the Institute of Medicine of the National Academy of 
     Sciences, the Secretary of the Air Force shall request the 
     written consent of the participants to transfer their data 
     and biological specimens to the Agency during fiscal year 
     2007 and written consent for the Agency to maintain the data 
     and specimens and make them available for additional studies.
       (2) Completion of transfer.--Custodianship of the Air Force 
     Health Study shall be completely transferred to the Agency on 
     or before September 30, 2007. Assets to be transferred shall 
     include electronic data files and biological specimens of all 
     the study participants.
       (3) Copies to archives.--The Air Force shall send paper 
     copies of all study documents to the National Archives.
       (b) Report on Transfer.--
       (1) Requirement.--Not later than 30 days after completion 
     of the transfer of the assets of the Air Force Health Study 
     under subsection (a), the Secretary of the Air Force shall 
     submit to the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate and 
     the Committee on Armed Services of the House of 
     Representatives a report on the transfer.
       (2) Matters covered.--At a minimum, the report shall 
     include information on the number of study participants whose 
     data and biological specimens were not transferred, the 
     efforts that were taken to contact such participants, and the 
     reasons why the transfer of their data and specimens did not 
     occur.
       (c) Disposition of Assets Not Transferred.--The Secretary 
     of the Air Force may not destroy any data or biological 
     specimens not transferred under subsection (a) until the 
     expiration of the one-year period following submission of the 
     report under subsection (b).
       (d) Funding.--
       (1) Costs of transfer of the funds available to the defense 
     health program.--The Secretary of Defense may make available 
     to the Air Force $850,000 for preparation, transfer of the 
     assets of the Air Force Health Study and shipment of data and 
     specimens to the Medical Follow-up Agency and the National 
     Archives during fiscal year 2007 from amounts available from 
     the Department of Defense for that year. The Secretary of 
     Defense is authorized to transfer the freezers and other 
     physical assets assigned to the Air Force Health Study to the 
     Agency without charge.
       (2) Costs of collaboration of the funds available to the 
     defense health program.--The Secretary of Defense may 
     reimburse the National Academy of Sciences up to $200,000 for 
     costs of the Medical Follow-up Agency to collaborate with the 
     Air Force in the transfer and receipt of the assets of the 
     Air Force Health Study to the Agency during fiscal year 2007 
     from amounts available from the Department of Defense for 
     that year.


                           AMENDMENT NO. 4312

 (Purpose: To expand and enhance the bonus to encourage members of the 
        Army to refer other persons for enlistment in the Army)

       At the end of subtitle B of title VI, add the following:

     SEC. 620. ENHANCEMENT OF BONUS TO ENCOURAGE MEMBERS OF THE 
                   ARMY TO REFER OTHER PERSONS FOR ENLISTMENT IN 
                   THE ARMY.

       (a) Individuals Eligible for Bonus.--Subsection (a) of 
     section 645 of the National Defense Authorization Act for 
     Fiscal Year 2006 (Public Law 109-163; 119 Stat. 3310) is 
     amended--
       (1) by striking ``The Secretary'' and inserting the 
     following:
       ``(1) In general.--The Secretary'';
       (2) by striking ``a member of the Army, whether in the 
     regular component of the Army or in the Army National Guard 
     or Army Reserve,'' and inserting ``an individual referred to 
     in paragraph (2)''; and
       (3) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
       ``(2) Individuals eligible for bonus.--Subject to 
     subsection (c), the following individuals are eligible for a 
     referral bonus under this section:
       ``(A) A member in the regular component of the Army.
       ``(B) A member of the Army National Guard.
       ``(C) A member of the Army Reserve.
       ``(D) A member of the Army in a retired status, including a 
     member under 60 years of age who, but for age, would be 
     eligible for retired pay.
       ``(E) A civilian employee of the Department of the Army.''.
       (b) Amount of Bonus.--Subsection (d) of such section is 
     amended to read as follows:
       ``(d) Amount of Bonus.--The amount of the bonus payable for 
     a referral under subsection (a) may not exceed $2,000. The 
     amount shall be payable in two lump sums as provided in 
     subsection (e).''.
       (c) Payment of Bonus.--Subsection (e) of such section is 
     amended to read as follows:
       ``(e) Payment.--A bonus payable for a referral of a person 
     under subsection (a) shall be paid as follows:
       ``(1) Not more than $1,000 shall be paid upon the 
     commencement of basic training by the person referred.
       ``(2) Not more than $1,000 shall be paid upon the 
     completion of basic training and individual advanced training 
     by the person referred.''.
       (d) Coordination With Receipt of Retired Pay.--Such section 
     is further amended--
       (1) by redesignating subsection (g) as subsection (h); and
       (2) by inserting after subsection (f) the following new 
     subsection (g):
       ``(g) Coordination With Receipt of Retired Pay.--A bonus 
     paid under this section

[[Page S6384]]

     to a member of the Army in a retired status is in addition to 
     any compensation to such member is entitled under title 10, 
     37, or 38, United States Code, or under any other provision 
     of law.''.
       (e) Effective Date.--The amendments made by this section 
     shall take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act, 
     and shall apply with respect to bonuses payable under section 
     645 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
     2006, as amended by this section, on or after that date.


                           amendment no. 4424

    (Purpose: To modify certain requirements related to counterdrug 
                              activities)

       On page 387, line 7, strike ``and aircraft'' and insert 
     ``and, subject to section 484(a) of the Foreign Assistance 
     Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2291c(a)), aircraft''.
       On page 387, line 25, after ``congressional defense 
     committees'' the following: ``and the Committee on Foreign 
     Relations of the Senate and the Committee on International 
     Relations of the House of Representatives''.
       On page 388, line 3, strike ``paragraphs (10)'' and insert 
     ``paragraphs (1)''.


                           amendment no. 4416

(Purpose: To direct the Secretary of the Army to assume responsibility 
  for the annual operation and maintenance of the Fox Point Hurricane 
                   Barrier, Providence, Rhode Island)

       At the appropriate place, insert the following:

     SEC. ___. FOX POINT HURRICANE BARRIER, PROVIDENCE, RHODE 
                   ISLAND.

       (a) Definitions.--In this section:
       (1) The term ``Barrier'' means the Fox Point Hurricane 
     Barrier, Providence, Rhode Island.
       (2) The term ``City'' means the city of Providence, Rhode 
     Island.
       (3) The term ``Secretary'' means the Secretary of the Army, 
     acting through the Chief of Engineers.
       (b) Responsibility for Barrier.--Not later than 2 years 
     after the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall 
     assume responsibility for the annual operation and 
     maintenance of the Barrier.
       (c) Required Structures.--
       (1) In general.--The City, in coordination with the 
     Secretary, shall identify any land and structures required 
     for the continued operation and maintenance, repair, 
     replacement, rehabilitation, and structural integrity of the 
     Barrier.
       (2) Conveyance.--The City shall convey to the Secretary, by 
     quitclaim deed and without consideration, all rights, title, 
     and interests of the City in and to the land and structures 
     identified under paragraph (1).
       (d) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized 
     to be appropriated to the Secretary such funds as are 
     necessary for each fiscal year to operate and maintain the 
     Barrier (including repair, replacement, and rehabilitation).


                    amendment no. 4364, as modified

       At the end of subtitle B of title XXVIII, add the 
     following:

     SEC. 2828. NAMING OF NAVY AND MARINE CORPS RESERVE CENTER AT 
                   ROCK ISLAND, ILLINOIS, IN HONOR OF LANE EVANS, 
                   A MEMBER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES.

       Designation.--The Navy and Marine Corps Reserve Center at 
     Rock Island Arsenal, Illinois, shall be known and designated 
     as the ``Lane Evans Navy and Marine Corps Reserve Center''. 
     Any reference in a law, map, regulation, document, paper, or 
     other record of the United States to the Navy and Marine 
     Corps Reserve Center at Rock Island Arsenal shall be deemed 
     to be a reference to the Lane Evans Navy and Marine Corps 
     Reserve Center.


                           AMENDMENT NO. 4232

(Purpose: To name the new administration building at the Joint Systems 
Manufacturing Center in Lima, Ohio, after Michael G. Oxley, a member of 
                     the House of Representatives)

       At the end of subtitle A of title XXVIII, add the 
     following:

     SEC. 2814. NAMING OF ADMINISTRATION BUILDING AT JOINT SYSTEMS 
                   MANUFACTURING CENTER IN LIMA, OHIO, AFTER 
                   MICHAEL G. OXLEY, A MEMBER OF THE HOUSE OF 
                   REPRESENTATIVES.

       The administration building under construction at the Joint 
     Systems Manufacturing Center in Lima, Ohio, shall, upon be 
     completion, be known and designated as the ``Michael G. Oxley 
     Administration and Technology Center''. Any reference in a 
     law, map, regulation, document, paper, or other record of the 
     United States to such administration building shall be deemed 
     to be a reference to the Michael G. Oxley Administration and 
     Technology Center.


                           AMENDMENT NO. 4528

 (Purpose: To name a military family housing facility at Fort Carson, 
              Colorado, after Representative Joel Hefley)

       On page 535, between lines 12 and 13, insert the following:

     SEC. 2814. NAMING OF MILITARY FAMILY HOUSING FACILITY AT FORT 
                   CARSON, COLORADO, IN HONOR OF JOEL HEFLEY, A 
                   MEMBER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES.

       The Secretary of the Army shall designate one of the 
     military family housing areas or facilities constructed for 
     Fort Carson, Colorado, using the authority provided by 
     subchapter IV of chapter 169 of title 10, United States Code, 
     as the ``Joel Hefley Village''. Any reference in any law, 
     regulation, map, document, record, or other paper of the 
     United States to the military housing area or facility 
     designated under this section shall be considered to be a 
     reference to Joel Hefley Village.


                           amendment no. 4529

  (Purpose: To require the submittal to Congress of the Department of 
        Defense Supplemental and Cost of War Execution reports)

       At the end of title XIV, insert the following:

     SEC. 1414. SUBMITTAL TO CONGRESS OF DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 
                   SUPPLEMENTAL AND COST OF WAR EXECUTION REPORTS.

       Section 1221(c) of the National Defense Authorization Act 
     for Fiscal Year 2006 (Public Law 109-163; 119 Stat. 3462; 10 
     U.S.C. 113 note) is amended--
       (1) in the subsection caption by inserting ``Congress and'' 
     after ``Submission to''; and
       (2) by inserting ``the congressional defense committees 
     and'' before ``the Comptroller General''.


                           amendment no. 4311

     (Purpose: To provide that acceptance by a military officer of 
  appointment to the position of Director of National Intelligence or 
 Director of the Central Intelligence Agency shall be conditional upon 
            retirement of the officer after the assignment)

       At the end of subtitle A of title V, add the following:

     SEC. 509. CONDITION ON APPOINTMENT OF COMMISSIONED OFFICERS 
                   TO POSITION OF DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL 
                   INTELLIGENCE OR DIRECTOR OF THE CENTRAL 
                   INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.

       (a) Condition.--
       (1) In general.--Chapter 32 of title 10, United States 
     Code, is amended by adding at the end the following new 
     section:

     ``Sec. 529. Condition on appointment to certain positions: 
       Director of National Intelligence; Director of the Central 
       Intelligence Agency

       ``As a condition of appointment to the position of Director 
     of National Intelligence or Director of the Central 
     Intelligence Agency, an officer shall acknowledge that upon 
     termination of service in such position the officer shall be 
     retired in accordance with section 1253 of this title.''.
       (2) Clerical amendment.--The table of sections at the 
     beginning of chapter 32 of such title is amended by adding at 
     the end the following new item:

``529. Condition on appointment to certain positions: Director of 
              National Intelligence; Director of the Central 
              Intelligence Agency.''.

       (b) Retirement.--
       (1) In general.--Chapter 63 of title 10, United States 
     Code, is amended by adding at the end the following new 
     section:

     ``Sec. 1253. Mandatory retirement: Director of National 
       Intelligence; Director of the Central Intelligence Agency

       ``Upon termination of the appointment of an officer to the 
     position of Director of National Intelligence or Director of 
     the Central Intelligence Agency, the Secretary of the 
     military department concerned shall retire the officer under 
     any provision of this title under which the officer is 
     eligible to retire.''.
       (2) Clerical amendment.--The table of sections at the 
     beginning of chapter 63 of such title is amended by adding at 
     the end the following new item:

``1253. Mandatory retirement: Director of National Intelligence; 
              Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.''.

       (c) Effective Date.--The amendments made by this section 
     shall take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act, 
     and shall apply with respect to appointments of commissioned 
     officers of the Armed Forces to the position of Director of 
     National Intelligence or Director of the Central Intelligence 
     Agency on or after that date.


                           amendment no. 4228

(Purpose: Relating to the comprehensive review of the procedures of the 
               Department of Defense on mortuary affairs)

       At the end of subtitle F of title V, add the following:

     SEC. 587. COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW ON PROCEDURES OF THE 
                   DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ON MORTUARY AFFAIRS.

       (a) Report.--As soon as practicable after the completion of 
     the comprehensive review of the procedures of the Department 
     of Defense on mortuary affairs, the Secretary of Defense 
     shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report 
     on the review.
       (b) Additional Elements.--In conducting the comprehensive 
     review described in subsection (a), the Secretary shall also 
     address, in addition to any other matters covered by the 
     review, the following:
       (1) The utilization of additional or increased 
     refrigeration (including icing) in combat theaters in order 
     to enhance preservation of remains.
       (2) The relocation of refrigeration assets further forward 
     in the field.
       (3) Specific time standards for the movement of remains 
     from combat units.
       (4) The forward location of autopsy and embalming 
     operations.
       (5) Any other matters that the Secretary considers 
     appropriate in order to speed the return of remains to the 
     United States in a non-decomposed state.
       (c) Additional Element of Policy on Casualty Assistance to 
     Survivors of Military Decedents.--Section 562(b) of the 
     National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal

[[Page S6385]]

     Year 2006 (Public Law 109-163; 119 Stat. 3267; 10 U.S.C. 1475 
     note) is amended by adding at the end the following new 
     paragraph:
       ``(12) The process by which the Department of Defense, upon 
     request, briefs survivors of military decedents on the cause 
     of, and any investigation into, the death of such military 
     decedents and on the disposition and transportation of the 
     remains of such decedents, which process shall--
       ``(A) provide for the provision of such briefings by fully 
     qualified Department personnel;
       ``(B) ensure briefings take place as soon as possible after 
     death and updates are provided in a timely manner when new 
     information becomes available;
       ``(C) ensure that--
       ``(i) such briefings and updates relate the most complete 
     and accurate information available at the time of such 
     briefings or updates, as the case may be; and
       ``(ii) incomplete or unverified information is identified 
     as such during the course of such briefings or updates; and
       ``(D) include procedures by which such survivors shall, 
     upon request, receive updates or supplemental information on 
     such briefings or updates from qualified Department 
     personnel.''.


                    amendment no. 4439, as modified

       At the end of subtitle B of title XII, add the following:

     SEC. 1223. REPORTS ON THE DARFUR PEACE AGREEMENT.

       Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of 
     this Act, and annually thereafter, the Secretary of Defense 
     shall submit to the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate 
     and the Committee on Armed Services of the House of 
     Representatives a detailed report on the Department of 
     Defense's role in assisting the parties to the Darfur Peace 
     Agreement of May 5, 2006 with implementing that Agreement. 
     Each such report shall include a description of--
       (1) the assets that the United States military, in concert 
     with the United States North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 
     (NATO) allies, are able to offer the African Union Mission in 
     Sudan (AMIS) and any United Nations peacekeeping mission 
     authorized for Darfur;
       (2) any plans of the Secretary of Defense to support the 
     AMIS by providing information regarding the location of 
     belligerents and potential violations of the Darfur Peace 
     Agreement and assistance to improve the AMIS use of 
     intelligence and tactical mobility;
       (3) the resources that will be used during the current 
     fiscal year to provide the support described in paragraph (2) 
     and the resources that will be needed during the next fiscal 
     year to provide such support;
       (4) the efforts of the Secretary of Defense and Secretary 
     of State to leverage troop contributions from other countries 
     to serve in the proposed United Nation peacekeeping mission 
     for Darfur;
       (5) any plans of the Secretary of Defense to participate in 
     the deployment of any NATO mentoring or technical assistance 
     teams to Darfur to assist the AMIS; and
       (6) any actions carried out by the Secretary of Defense to 
     address deficiencies in the AMIS communications systems, 
     particularly the interoperability of communications 
     equipment.


                           amendment no. 4530

  (Purpose: To extend the patent term for the badges of the American 
  Legion, the American Legion Women's Auxiliary, and the Sons of the 
                American Legion, and for other purposes)

       At the appropriate place, insert the following:

     SEC. __. PATENT TERM EXTENSIONS FOR THE BADGES OF THE 
                   AMERICAN LEGION, THE AMERICAN LEGION WOMEN'S 
                   AUXILIARY, AND THE SONS OF THE AMERICAN LEGION.

       (a) Patent Term Extension for the Badge of the American 
     Legion.--The term of a certain design patent numbered 54,296 
     (for the badge of the American Legion) is renewed and 
     extended for a period of 14 years beginning on the date of 
     enactment of this Act, with all the rights and privileges 
     pertaining to such patent.
       (b) Patent Term Extension for the Badge of the American 
     Legion Women's Auxiliary.--The term of a certain design 
     patent numbered 55,398 (for the badge of the American Legion 
     Women's Auxiliary) is renewed and extended for a period of 14 
     years beginning on the date of enactment of this Act, with 
     all the rights and privileges pertaining to such patent.
       (c) Patent Term Extension for the Badge of the Sons of the 
     American Legion.--The term of a certain design patent 
     numbered 92,187 (for the badge of the Sons of the American 
     Legion) is renewed and extended for a period of 14 years 
     beginning on the date of enactment of this Act, with all the 
     rights and privileges pertaining to such patent.

                           amendment no. 4337

              (Purpose: Relating to intelligence on Iran)

       At the end of subtitle A of title XII, add the following:

     SEC. 1209. INTELLIGENCE ON IRAN.

       (a) Submittal to Congress of Updated National Intelligence 
     Estimate on Iran.--
       (1) Submittal required.--As soon as is practicable, but not 
     later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this 
     Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to 
     Congress an updated National Intelligence Estimate on Iran.
       (2) Notice regarding submittal.--If the Director determines 
     that the National Intelligence Estimate required by paragraph 
     (1) cannot be submitted by the date specified in that 
     paragraph, the Director shall submit to Congress a report 
     setting forth--
       (A) the reasons why the National Intelligence Estimate 
     cannot be submitted by such date; and
       (B) an estimated date for the submittal of the National 
     Intelligence Estimate.
       (3) Form.--The National Intelligence Estimate under 
     paragraph (1) shall be submitted in classified form. 
     Consistent with the protection of intelligence sources and 
     methods, an unclassified summary of the key judgments of the 
     National Intelligence Estimate should be submitted.
       (4) Elements.--The National Intelligence Estimate submitted 
     under paragraph (1) shall address the following:
       (A) The foreign policy and regime objectives of Iran.
       (B) The current status of the nuclear programs of Iran, 
     including--
       (i) an assessment of the current and projected capabilities 
     of Iran to design a nuclear weapon, to produce plutonium, 
     enriched uranium, and other weapons materials, to build a 
     nuclear weapon, and to deploy a nuclear weapon; and
       (ii) an assessment of the intentions of Iran regarding 
     possible development of nuclear weapons, the motivations 
     underlying such intentions, and the factors that might 
     influence changes in such intentions.
       (C) The military and defense capabilities of Iran, 
     including any non-nuclear weapons of mass destruction 
     programs and related delivery systems.
       (D) The relationship of Iran with terrorist organizations, 
     the use by Iran of terrorist organizations in furtherance of 
     its foreign policy objectives, and the factors that might 
     cause Iran to reduce or end such relationships.
       (E) The prospects for support from the international 
     community for various potential courses of action with 
     respect to Iran, including diplomacy, sanctions, and military 
     action.
       (F) The anticipated reaction of Iran to the courses of 
     action set forth under subparagraph (E), including an 
     identification of the course or courses of action most likely 
     to successfully influence Iran in terminating or moderating 
     its policies of concern.
       (G) The level of popular and elite support within Iran for 
     the Iran regime, and for its civil nuclear program, nuclear 
     weapons ambitions, and other policies, and the prospects for 
     reform and political change within Iran.
       (H) The views among the populace and elites of Iran with 
     respect to the United States, including views on direct 
     discussions with or normalization of relations with the 
     United States.
       (I) The views among the populace and elites of Iran with 
     respect to other key countries involved in nuclear diplomacy 
     with Iran.
       (J) The likely effects and consequences of any military 
     action against the nuclear programs or other regime interests 
     of Iran.
       (K) The confidence level of key judgments in the National 
     Intelligence Estimate, the quality of the sources of 
     intelligence on Iran, the nature and scope of any gaps in 
     intelligence on Iran, and any significant alternative views 
     on the matters contained in the National Intelligence 
     Estimate.
       (b) Presidential Report on Policy Objectives and United 
     States Strategy Regarding Iran.--
       (1) Report required.--As soon as is practicable, but not 
     later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this 
     Act, the President shall submit to Congress a report on the 
     following:
       (A) The objectives of United States policy on Iran.
       (B) The strategy for achieving such objectives.
       (2) Form.--The report under paragraph (1) shall be 
     submitted in unclassified form with a classified annex, as 
     appropriate.
       (3) Elements.--The report submitted under paragraph (1) 
     shall--
       (A) address the role of diplomacy, incentives, sanctions, 
     other punitive measures and incentives, and other programs 
     and activities relating to Iran for which funds are provided 
     by Congress; and
       (B) summarize United States contingency planning regarding 
     the range of possible United States military actions in 
     support of United States policy objectives with respect to 
     Iran.
       (c) Director of National Intelligence Report on Process for 
     Vetting and Clearing Administration Officials' Statements 
     Drawn From Intelligence.--
       (1) Report required.--As soon as is practicable, but not 
     later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this 
     Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to 
     Congress a report on the process for vetting and clearing 
     statements of Administration officials that are drawn from or 
     rely upon intelligence.
       (2) Elements.--The report shall--
       (A) describe current policies and practices of the Office 
     of the Director of National Intelligence and the intelligence 
     community for--
       (i) vetting and clearing statements of senior 
     Administration officials that are drawn from or rely upon 
     intelligence; and
       (ii) how significant misstatements of intelligence that may 
     occur in public statements of senior public officials are 
     identified,

[[Page S6386]]

     brought to the attention of any such officials, and 
     corrected;
       (B) assess the sufficiency and adequacy of such policies 
     and practices; and
       (C) include any recommendations that the Director considers 
     appropriate to improve such policies and practices.


                           amendment no. 4531

(Purpose: To make available $2,900,000 from Operation and Maintenance, 
    Army, for the Virginia Military Institute for military training 
                      infrastructure improvements)

       At the end of subtitle B of title III, add the following:

     SEC. 315. MILITARY TRAINING INFRASTRUCTURE IMPROVEMENTS AT 
                   VIRGINIA MILITARY INSTITUTE.

       Of the amount authorized to be appropriated by section 
     301(1) for operation and maintenance for the Army, $2,900,000 
     may be available to the Virginia Military Institute for 
     military training infrastructure improvements to provide 
     adequate field training of all Armed Forces Reserve Officer 
     Training Corps.


                           amendment no. 4411

(Purpose: To authorize $3,600,000 for military construction for the Air 
 National Guard of the United States to construct an engine inspection 
   and maintenance facility at Little Rock Air Force Base, Arkansas)

       On page 519, line 21, strike ``$242,143,000'' and insert 
     ``$245,743,000''.


                           amendment no. 4336

  (Purpose: To require a report on the feasability of omitting Social 
          Security Numbers from military identification cards)

       At the end of subtitle F of title V, add the following:

     SEC. 587. REPORT ON OMISSION OF SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBERS ON 
                   MILITARY IDENTIFICATION CARDS.

       (a) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall submit 
     to Congress a report setting forth the assessment of the 
     Secretary of the feasibility of utilizing military 
     identification cards that do not contain, display or exhibit 
     the Social Security Number of the individual identified by 
     such military identification card.
       (b) Military Identification Card Defined.--In this section, 
     the term ``military identification card'' has the meaning 
     given the term ``military ID card'' in section 1060b(b)(1) of 
     title 10, United States Code.

                           amendment no. 4361

  (Purpose: To require that Congress be apprised periodically on the 
             implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement)

       At the end of subtitle A of title XII, add the following:

     SEC. 1209. REPORTS ON IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DARFUR PEACE 
                   AGREEMENT.

       (a) Requirement for Reports.--Not later than 30 days after 
     the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 60 days 
     thereafter until the date that the President submits the 
     certification described in subsection (b), the President 
     shall submit to Congress a report on the implementation of 
     the Darfur Peace Agreement of May 5, 2006, and the situation 
     in Darfur, Sudan. Each such report shall include--
       (1) a description of the steps being taken by the 
     Government of Sudan, the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/
     A), and other parties to the Agreement to uphold their 
     commitments to--
       (A) demobilize and disarm the Janjaweed, as stated in 
     paragraphs 214(F), 338, 339, 340, 366, 387, and 368 of the 
     Agreement;
       (B) provide secure, unfettered access for humanitarian 
     personnel and supplies, as stated in paragraph 214(E) of the 
     Agreement;
       (C) ensure that foreign combatants respect the provisions 
     of the Agreement, as stated in paragraphs 341 through 344 of 
     the Agreement; and
       (D) expedite the safe and voluntary return of internally-
     displaced persons and refugees to their places of origin, as 
     stated in paragraphs 182 through 187 of the Agreement;
       (2) a description of any violation of the Agreement and any 
     delay in implementing the Agreement, including any such 
     violation or delay that compromises the safety of civilians, 
     and the names of the individuals or entities responsible for 
     such violation or delay;
       (3) a description of any attacks against civilians and any 
     activities that disrupt implementation of the Agreement by 
     armed persons who are not a party to the Agreement; and
       (4) a description of the ability of the Ceasefire 
     Commission, the African Union Mission in Sudan, and the other 
     organizations identified in the Agreement to monitor the 
     implementation of the Agreement, and a description of any 
     obstruction to such monitoring.
       (b) Certification.--The certification described in this 
     subsection is a certification made by the President and 
     submitted to Congress that the Government of Sudan has 
     fulfilled its obligations under the Darfur Peace Agreement of 
     May 5, 2006, to demobilize and disarm the Janjaweed and to 
     protect civilians.
       (c) Form and Availability of Reports.--
       (1) Form.--A report submitted under this section shall be 
     in an unclassified form and may include a classified annex.
       (2) Availability.--The President shall make the 
     unclassified portion of a reported submitted under this 
     section available to the public.


                           AMENDMENT NO. 4532

 (Purpose: To require a report on the use of alternative fuels by the 
                         Department of Defense)

       At the end of subtitle D of title III, add the following:

     SEC. 352. REPORT ON USE OF ALTERNATIVE FUELS BY THE 
                   DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE.

       (a) Study.--The Secretary of Defense shall conduct a study 
     on the use of alternative fuels by the Armed Forces and the 
     Defense Agencies, including any measures that can be taken to 
     increase the use of such fuels by the Department of Defense 
     and the Defense Agencies.
       (b) Elements.--The study shall address each matter set 
     forth in paragraphs (1) through (7) of section 357(b) of the 
     National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006 
     (Public Law 109-163; 119 Stat. 3207) with respect to 
     alternative fuels (rather than to the fuels specified in such 
     paragraphs).
       (c) Report.--
       (1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall submit to the 
     Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of 
     Representatives a report on the study conducted under this 
     section.
       (2) Manner of submittal.--The report required by this 
     subsection may be incorporated into, or provided as an annex 
     to, the study required by section 357(c) of the National 
     Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006.
       (d) Alternative Fuels Defined.--In this section, the term 
     ``alternative fuels'' means biofuels, biodiesel, renewable 
     diesel, ethanol that contain less than 85 percent ethyl 
     alcohol, and cellulosic ethanol.


                           AMENDMENT NO. 4533

 (Purpose: To make available an additional $450,000,000 for Research, 
    Development, Test, and Evaluation, Defense-wide and provide an 
   offsetting reduction for a certain military intelligence program)

       At the end of subtitle D of title X, add the following:

     SEC. 1035. FUNDING FOR A CERTAIN MILITARY INTELLIGENCE 
                   PROGRAM.

       (a) Increase in Amount for Research, Development, Test, and 
     Evaluation, Defense-Wide.--The amount authorized to be 
     appropriated by section 201(4) for research, development, 
     test, and evaluation for Defense-wide activities is hereby 
     increased by $450,000,000.
       (b) Offset.--The amount authorized to be appropriated by 
     section 201(3) for research, development, test, and 
     evaluation for the Air Force is hereby decreased by 
     $450,000,000, with the amount of the reduction to be 
     allocated to amounts available for a classified program as 
     described on page 34 of Volume VII (Compartmented Annex) of 
     the Fiscal Year 2007 Military Intelligence Program 
     justification book.


                           AMENDMENT NO. 4534

  (Purpose: To authorize the prepositioning of Department of Defense 
           assets to improve support to civilian authorities)

       At the end of subtitle F of title III, add the following:

     SEC. 375. PREPOSITIONING OF DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ASSETS TO 
                   IMPROVE SUPPORT TO CIVILIAN AUTHORITIES.

       (a) Prepositioning Authorized.--The Secretary of Defense 
     may provide for the prepositioning of prepackaged or 
     preidentified basic response assets, such as medical 
     supplies, food and water, and communications equipment, in 
     order to improve Department of Defense support to civilian 
     authorities.
       (b) Reimbursement.--To the extent required by section 1535 
     of title 31, United States Code (popularly known as the 
     ``Economy Act''), or other applicable law, the Secretary 
     shall require reimbursement of the Department of Defense for 
     costs incurred in the prepositioning of basic response assets 
     under subsection (a).
       (c) Limitation.--Basic response assets may not be 
     prepositioned under subsection (a) if the prepositioning of 
     such assets will adversely affect the military preparedness 
     of the United States.
       (d) Procedures and Guidelines.--The Secretary may develop 
     procedures and guidelines applicable to the prepositioning of 
     basic response assets under this section.


                           AMENDMENT NO. 4535

    (Purpose: To provide for energy efficiency in new construction)

       On page 531, strike lines 7 through 13 and insert the 
     following:
       (3) in subsection (b)(2)(A), by striking ``installations of 
     the Department of Defense as may be designated'' and 
     inserting ``installations of the Department of Defense and 
     related to such vehicles and military support equipment of 
     the Department of Defense as may be designated'';
       (4) by redesignating subsections (e) and (f) as subsections 
     (f) and (g), respectively; and
       (5) by inserting after subsection (d) the following new 
     subsection:
       ``(e) Energy Efficiency in New Construction.--
       ``(1) The Secretary of Defense shall ensure, to the maximum 
     extent practicable, that energy efficient products meeting 
     the Department's requirements, if cost effective over the 
     life cycle of the product and readily available, be used in 
     new facility construction by or for the Department carried 
     out under this chapter.

[[Page S6387]]

       ``(2) In determining the energy efficiency of products, the 
     Secretary shall consider products that--
       ``(A) meet or exceed Energy Star specifications; or
       ``(B) are listed on the Department of Energy's Federal 
     Energy Management Program Product Energy Efficiency 
     Recommendations product list.''.


                    AMENDMENT NO. 4381, As Modified

       On page 178, between lines 10 and 11, insert the following:
       (c) Transition of Military Dependents From Military to 
     Civilian Schools.--
       (1) In general.--The Secretary of Defense shall work 
     collaboratively with the Secretary of Education in any 
     efforts to ease the transition of dependents of members of 
     the Armed Forces from attendance in Department of Defense 
     dependent schools to civilian schools in systems operated by 
     local educational agencies.
       (2) Utilization of existing resources.--In working with the 
     Secretary of Education under paragraph (1), the Secretary of 
     Defense may utilize funds authorized to be appropriated for 
     operation and maintenance for Defense-wide activities to 
     share expertise and experience of the Department of Defense 
     Education Activity with local educational agencies as 
     dependents of members of the Armed Forces make the transition 
     from attendance at Department of Defense dependent schools to 
     attendance at civilian schools in systems operated by such 
     local educational agencies, including such transitions 
     resulting from defense base closure and realignment, global 
     rebasing, and force restructuring.
       (3) Definitions.--In this subsection:
       (A) The term ``expertise and experience'', with respect to 
     the Department of Defense Education Activity, means resources 
     of such activity relating to--
       (i) academic strategies which result in increased academic 
     achievement;
       (ii) curriculum development consultation and materials;
       (iii) teacher training resources and materials;
       (iv) access to virtual and distance learning technology 
     capabilities and related applications for teachers; and
       (v) such other services as the Secretary of Defense 
     considers appropriate to improve the academic achievement of 
     such students.
       (B) The term ``local educational agency'' has the meaning 
     given that term in section 8013(9) of the Elementary and 
     Secondary Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 7713(9)).
       (4) Expiration.--The authority of the Secretary of the 
     Defense under this subsection shall expire on September 30, 
     2011.


                           AMENDMENT NO. 4429

(Purpose: To authorize the donation of the SS Arthur M. Huddell to the 
                         Government of Greece)

       At the end of subtitle B of title X, add the following:

     SEC. 1013. AUTHORITY TO DONATE SS ARTHUR M. HUDDELL TO THE 
                   GOVERNMENT OF GREECE.

       (a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
       (1) It is in the economic and environmental interests of 
     the United States to promote the disposal of vessels in the 
     National Defense Reserve Fleet that are of insufficient value 
     to warrant further preservation.
       (2) The Maritime Administration of the Department of 
     Transportation has been authorized to make such disposals, 
     including the sale and recycling of such vessels and the 
     donation of such vessels to any State, commonwealth, or 
     possession of the United States, and to nonprofit 
     organizations.
       (3) The government of Greece has expressed an interest in 
     obtaining and using the ex-Liberty ship, SS ARTHUR M. 
     HUDDELL, for purposes of a museum exhibit.
       (4) It is in the interest of the United States to authorize 
     the Maritime Administration to donate SS ARTHUR M. HUDDELL to 
     Greece.
       (b) Donation of SS ARTHUR M. HUDDELL to Government of 
     Greece.--Notwithstanding Section 510(j) of the Merchant 
     Marine Act, 1936 (46 App. U.S.C. 1158), the Secretary of 
     Transportation is authorized to transfer SS ARTHUR M. 
     HUDDELL, by gift, to the Government of Greece, in accordance 
     with terms and conditions determined by the Secretary.
       (c) Additional Equipment.--The Secretary may convey 
     additional equipment from other obsolete vessels of the 
     National Defense Reserve Fleet to assist the Government of 
     Greece under this section for purposes of the museum exhibit 
     referred to in subsection (a)(3).


                           AMENDMENT NO. 4398

       At the end of subtitle D of title II, add the following:

     SEC. 257. REPORT ON BIOMETRICS PROGRAMS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF 
                   DEFENSE.

       (a) Report.--The Secretary of Defense shall submit to 
     Congress, at the same time as the submittal of the budget of 
     the President for fiscal year 2008 (as submitted under 
     section 1105(a) of title 31, United States Code) a report on 
     the biometrics programs of the Department of Defense.
       (b) Elements.--The report shall address the following:
       (1) Whether the Department should modify the current 
     executive agent management structure for the biometrics 
     programs.
       (2) The requirements for the biometrics programs to meet 
     needs throughout the Department of Defense.
       (3) A description of programs currently fielded to meet 
     requirements in Iraq and Afghanistan.
       (4) An assessment of the adequacy of fielded programs to 
     meet operational requirements.
       (5) An assessment of programmatic or capability gaps in 
     meeting future requirements.
       (6) The actions being taken within the Executive Branch to 
     coordinate and integrate requirements, programs, and 
     resources among the departments and agencies of the Executive 
     Branch with a role in using or developing biometrics 
     capabilities.
       (c) Biometrics Defined.--In this section, the term 
     ``biometrics'' means an identity management program or system 
     that utilizes distinct personal attributes, including DNA, 
     facial features, irises, retinas, signatures, or voices, to 
     identify individuals.


                    amendment no. 4451, as modified

       At the end of subtitle G of title X, add the following:

     SEC. 1066. ANNUAL REPORTS ON EXPANDED USE OF UNMANNED AERIAL 
                   VEHICLES IN THE NATIONAL AIRSPACE SYSTEM.

       (a) Findings.--The Senate makes the following findings:
       (1) Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) serve Department of 
     Defense intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and 
     combat missions.
       (2) Operational reliability of unmanned systems continues 
     to improve and sense-and-avoid technology development and 
     fielding must continue in an effort to provide unmanned 
     aerial systems with an equivalent level of safety to manned 
     aircraft..
       (3) Unmanned aerial vehicles have the potential to support 
     the Nation's homeland defense mission, border security 
     mission, and natural disaster recovery efforts.
       (4) Accelerated development and testing of standards for 
     the integration of unmanned aerial vehicles in the National 
     Airspace System would further the increased safe use of such 
     vehicles for border security, homeland defense, and natural 
     disaster recovery efforts.
       (b) Annual Reports.--Not later than one year after the date 
     of the enactment of this Act and annually thereafter until 
     the Federal Aviation Administration promulgates such policy, 
     the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the Committees on 
     Armed Services, Commerce, Science and Transportation, and 
     Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate and 
     the Committees on Armed Services, Energy and Commerce, and 
     Government Reform of the House of Representatives a report on 
     the actions of the Department of Defense to support the 
     development by the Federal Aviation Administration of a 
     policy on the testing and operation of unmanned aerial 
     vehicles in the National Airspace System.


                           AMENDMENT NO. 4536

 (Purpose: To require a report on the incorporation of elements of the 
  reserve components into the Special Forces in the expansion of the 
                            Special Forces)

       At the end of subtitle C of title IX, add the following:

     SEC. 924. REPORT ON INCORPORATION OF ELEMENTS OF THE RESERVE 
                   COMPONENTS INTO THE SPECIAL FORCES.

       (a) Findings.--The Senate makes the following findings:
       (1) The Quadrennial Defense Review recommends an increase 
     in the size of the Special Operations Command and the Special 
     Forces as a fundamental part of our efforts to fight the war 
     on terror.
       (2) The Special Forces play a crucial role in the war on 
     terror, and the expansion of their force structure as 
     outlined in the Quadrennial Defense Review should be fully 
     funded.
       (3) Expansion of the Special Forces should be consistent 
     with the Total Force Policy.
       (4) The Secretary of Defense should assess whether the 
     establishment of additional reserve component Special Forces 
     units and associated units is consistent with the Total Force 
     Policy.
       (5) Training areas in high-altitude and mountainous areas 
     represent a national asset for preparing Special Forces units 
     and personnel for duty in similar regions of Central Asia.
       (b) Report on Incorporation of Elements Into Special 
     Forces.--Not later than six months after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall submit 
     to the congressional defense committees a report to address 
     whether units and capabilities should be incorporated into 
     the reserve components of the Armed Forces as part of the 
     expansion of the Special Forces as outlined in the 
     Quadrennial Defense Review, and consistent with the Total 
     Force Policy.
       (c) Report on Special Forces Training.--Not later than six 
     months after the date of the enactment of this Act, the 
     Secretary of Defense shall submit to the congressional 
     defense committees a report on the effort taken by the U.S. 
     Special Operations Command to provide Special Forces training 
     in high-altitude and mountainous areas within the United 
     States.


                           AMENDMENT NO. 4537

 (Purpose: To express the sense of the Senate on the Transformational 
      Medical Technology Initiative of the Department of Defense)

       At the end of subtitle D of title VII, add the following:

[[Page S6388]]

     SEC. 762. SENSE OF SENATE ON THE TRANSFORMATIONAL MEDICAL 
                   TECHNOLOGY INITIATIVE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF 
                   DEFENSE.

       (a) Findings.--The Senate finds the following:
       (1) The most recent Quadrennial Defense Review and other 
     studies have identified the need to develop broad-spectrum 
     medical countermeasures against the threat of genetically 
     engineered bioterror agents.
       (2) The Transformational Medical Technology Initiative of 
     the Department of Defense implements cutting edge 
     transformational medical technologies and applies them to 
     address the challenges of known, emerging, and bioengineered 
     threats.
       (3) The Transformational Medical Technology Initiative is 
     designed to provide such technologies in a much shorter 
     timeframe, and at lower cost, than is required with 
     traditional approaches.
       (b) Sense of Senate.--It is the sense of the Senate that--
       (1) the Transformational Medical Technology Initiative is 
     an important effort to provide needed capability within the 
     Department of Defense to field effective broad-spectrum 
     countermeasures against a significant array of current and 
     future biological threats; and
       (2) innovative technological approaches to achieve broad-
     spectrum medical countermeasures are a necessary component of 
     the capacity of the Department to provide chemical-biological 
     defense and force protection capabilities for the Armed 
     Forces.


                           AMENDMENT NO. 4538

  (Purpose: To provide for the enhancement of funeral ceremonies for 
                               veterans)

       At the end of subtitle F of title V, add the following:

     SEC. 587. FUNERAL CEREMONIES FOR VETERANS.

       (a) Support for Ceremonies by Details Consisting Solely of 
     Members of Veterans and Other Organizations.--
       (1) Support of ceremonies.--Section 1491 of title 10, 
     United States Code, is amended--
       (A) by redesignating subsections (e), (f), (g), and (h) as 
     subsections (f), (g), (h), and (i), respectively; and
       (B) by inserting after subsection (d) the following new 
     subsection (e):
       ``(e) Support for Funeral Honors Details Composed of 
     Members of Veterans Organizations.--(1) Subject to such 
     regulations and procedures as the Secretary of Defense may 
     prescribe, the Secretary of the military department of which 
     a veteran was a member may support the conduct of funeral 
     honors for such veteran that are provided solely by members 
     of veterans organizations or other organizations referred to 
     in subsection (b)(2).
       ``(2) The provision of support under this subsection is 
     subject to the availability of appropriations for that 
     purpose.
       ``(3) The support provided under this subsection may 
     include the following:
       ``(A) Reimbursement for costs incurred by organizations 
     referred to in paragraph (1) in providing funeral honors, 
     including costs of transportation, meals, and similar costs.
       ``(B) Payment to members of such organizations providing 
     such funeral honors of the daily stipend prescribed under 
     subsection (d)(2).''.
       (2) Conforming amendments.--Such section is further 
     amended--
       (A) in subsection (d)(2), by inserting ``and subsection 
     (e)'' after ``paragraph (1)(A)''; and
       (B) in paragraph (1) of section (f), as redesignated by 
     subsection (a)(1) of this section, by inserting ``(other than 
     a requirement in subsection (e)'' after ``pursuant to this 
     section''.
       (b) Use of Excess M-1 Rifles for Ceremonial and Other 
     Purposes.--Section 4683 of such title is amended--
       (1) in subsection (a), by adding at the end the following 
     new paragraph:
       ``(3) Rifles loaned or donated under paragraph (1) may be 
     used by an eligible designee for funeral ceremonies of a 
     member or former member of the armed forces and for other 
     ceremonial purposes.'';
       (2) in subsection (c), by inserting after 
     ``accountability'' the following: ``, provided that such 
     conditions do not unduly hamper eligible designees from 
     participating in funeral ceremonies of a member or former 
     member of the armed forces or other ceremonies'';
       (3) in subsection (d)--
       (A) in paragraph (2), by striking ``; or'' and inserting 
     ``or fire department;'';
       (B) in paragraph (3), by striking the period at the end and 
     inserting ``; or''; and
       (C) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
       ``(4) any other member in good standing of an organization 
     described in paragraphs (1), (2), or (3).''; and
       (4) by adding at the end the following new subsection:
       ``(e) Eligible Designee Defined.--In this section, the term 
     `eligible designee' means a designee of an eligible 
     organization who--
       ``(1) is a spouse, son, daughter, nephew, niece, or other 
     family relation of a member or former member of the armed 
     forces;
       ``(2) is at least 18 years of age; and
       ``(3) has successfully completed a formal firearm training 
     program or a hunting safety program.''.


                           AMENDMENT NO. 4303

     (Purpose: To provide for the recovery and availability to the 
Corporation for the Promotion of Rifle Practice and Firearms Safety of 
                certain firearms, ammunition, and parts)

       At the end of subtitle F of title III, add the following:

     SEC. 375. RECOVERY AND AVAILABILITY TO CORPORATION FOR THE 
                   PROMOTION OF RIFLE PRACTICE AND FIREARMS SAFETY 
                   OF CERTAIN FIREARMS, AMMUNITION, AND PARTS.

       (a) In General.--Subchapter II of chapter 407 of title 36, 
     United States Code, is amended by inserting after the item 
     relating to section 40728 the following new section:

     ``Sec. 40728A. Recovery and availability of excess firearms, 
       ammunition, and parts granted to foreign countries

       ``(a) Recovery.--The Secretary of the Army may recover from 
     any country to which a grant of rifles, ammunition, repair 
     parts, or other supplies described in section 40731(a) of 
     this title is made under section 505 of the Foreign 
     Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2314) any such rifles, 
     ammunition, repair parts, or supplies that are excess to the 
     needs of such country.
       ``(b) Cost of Recovery.--(1) Except as provided in 
     paragraph (2), the cost of recovery of any rifles, 
     ammunition, repair parts, or supplies under subsection (a) 
     shall be treated as incremental direct costs incurred in 
     providing logistical support to the corporation for which 
     reimbursement shall be required as provided in section 
     40727(a) of this title.
       ``(2) The Secretary may require the corporation to pay 
     costs of recovery described in paragraph (1) in advance of 
     incurring such costs. Amounts so paid shall not be subject to 
     the provisions of section 3302 of title 31, but shall be 
     administered in accordance with the last sentence of section 
     40727(a) of this title.
       ``(c) Availability.--Any rifles, ammunition, repair parts, 
     or supplies recovered under subsection (a) shall be available 
     for transfer to the corporation in accordance with the 
     provisions of section 40728 of this title under such 
     additional terms and conditions as the Secretary shall 
     prescribe for purposes of this section.''.
       (b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of sections at the 
     beginning of chapter 407 of such title is amended by 
     inserting after the item relating to section 40728 the 
     following new item:

``40728A. Recovery and availability of excess firearms, ammunition, and 
              parts granted to foreign countries.''.


                           AMENDMENT NO. 4539

   (Purpose: To provide that the Secretary of the Army may authorize 
 family members of a member of the armed forces on active duty who is 
  occupying military family housing units leased under the exception 
provided for United States Southern Command personnel to remain in such 
units while the soldier is assigned to a family-member-restricted area)

       At the end of subtitle A of title XXVIII, add the 
     following:

     SEC. 2814. AUTHORITY TO OCCUPY UNITED STATES SOUTHERN COMMAND 
                   FAMILY HOUSING.

       (a) The Secretary of the Army may authorize family members 
     of a member of the armed forces on active duty who is 
     occupying a housing unit leased under section 2828(b)(4) of 
     title 10, United States Code and who is assigned to a family-
     member-restricted area to remain in the leased housing unit 
     until the member completes the family-member-restricted tour. 
     Costs incurred for such housing during such tour shall be 
     included in the costs subject to the limitation under 
     subparagraph (B) of that paragraph.
       (b) The authority granted by subsection (a) shall expire on 
     September 30, 2008.


                           amendment no. 4423

   (Purpose: To limit the availability of funds for certain purposes 
                           relating to Iraq)

       At the end of title XIV, add the following:

     SEC. 1414. LIMITATION ON AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS FOR CERTAIN 
                   PURPOSES RELATING TO IRAQ.

       No funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act may be 
     obligated or expended for a purpose as follows:
       (1) To establish a permanent United States military 
     installation or base in Iraq.
       (2) To exercise United States control over the oil 
     resources of Iraq.


                           amendment no. 4316

 (Purpose: To provide for the conveyance of land located in Hopkinton, 
                             New Hampshire)

       At the end of subtitle D of title XXVIII, add the 
     following:

     SEC. 2844. LAND CONVEYANCE, HOPKINTON, NEW HAMPSHIRE.

       (a) Conveyance Authorized.--The Secretary of the Army may 
     convey to the Town of Hopkinton, New Hampshire (in this 
     section referred to as the ``Town''), all right, title, and 
     interest of the United States in and to a parcel of real 
     property, including any improvements thereon, consisting of 
     approximately 90 acres located at a site in Hopkinton, New 
     Hampshire, known as the ``Kast Hill'' property for the 
     purpose of permitting the Town to use the existing sand and 
     gravel resources on the property and to ensure perpetual 
     conservation of the property.
       (b) Consideration.--
       (1) In general.--As consideration for the conveyance under 
     subsection (a), the Town shall, subject to paragraph (2), 
     provide to the United States, whether by cash payment, in-
     kind consideration, or a combination thereof, an amount that 
     is not less than the fair market value of the conveyed 
     property, as

[[Page S6389]]

     determined pursuant to an appraisal acceptable to the 
     Secretary.
       (2) Waiver of payment of consideration.--The Secretary may 
     waive the requirement for consideration under paragraph (1) 
     if the Secretary determines that the Town will not use the 
     existing sand and gravel resources to generate revenue.
       (c) Reversionary Interest.--If the Secretary determines at 
     any time that the real property conveyed under subsection (a) 
     is not being used in accordance with the purpose of the 
     conveyance specified in such subsection, all right, title, 
     and interest in and to all or any portion of the property 
     shall revert, at the option of the Secretary, to the United 
     States, and the United States shall have the right of 
     immediate entry onto the property. Any determination of the 
     Secretary under this subsection shall be made on the record 
     after an opportunity for a hearing.
       (d) Prohibition on Reconveyance of Land.--The Town may not 
     reconvey any of the land acquired from the United States 
     under subsection (a) without the prior approval of the 
     Secretary.
       (e) Payment of Costs of Conveyance.--
       (1) Payment required.--The Secretary shall require the Town 
     to cover costs to be incurred by the Secretary, or to 
     reimburse the Secretary for costs incurred by the Secretary, 
     to carry out the conveyance under subsection (a), including 
     survey costs, costs related to environmental documentation, 
     and other administrative costs related to the conveyance. If 
     amounts are collected from the Town in advance of the 
     Secretary incurring the actual costs, and the amount 
     collected exceeds the costs actually incurred by the 
     Secretary to carry out the conveyance, the Secretary shall 
     refund the excess amount to the Town.
       (2)  Treatment of amounts received.--Amounts received as 
     reimbursement under paragraph (1) shall be credited to the 
     fund or account that was used to cover the costs incurred by 
     the Secretary in carrying out the conveyance. Amounts so 
     credited shall be merged with amounts in such fund or account 
     and shall be available for the same purposes, and subject to 
     the same conditions and limitations, as amounts in such fund 
     or account.
       (f) Description of Property.--The exact acreage and legal 
     description of the real property to be conveyed under 
     subsection (a) shall be determined by a survey satisfactory 
     to the Secretary.
       (g) Additional Terms and Conditions.--The Secretary may 
     require such additional terms and conditions in connection 
     with the conveyance of real property under subsection (a) as 
     the Secretary consider appropriate to protect the interests 
     of the United States.


                           amendment no. 4407

 (Purpose: To authorize $1,000,000 for the phase 1 construction of an 
air traffic control complex at Minot Air Force Base, North Dakota, and 
                         to provide an offset)

       On page 502, in the table preceding line 1, strike 
     ``$8,000,000'' in the amount column of the item relating to 
     Minot Air Force Base, North Dakota, and insert 
     ``$9,000,000''.
       On page 503, in the table following line 10, strike 
     ``$171,188,000'' in the amount column of the item relating to 
     Minot Air Force Base, North Dakota, and insert 
     ``$170,188,000''.
       On page 504, line 23, strike ``$862,661,000'' and insert 
     ``$863,661,000''.
       On page 505, line 16, strike ``$1,183,138,000'' and insert 
     ``$1,182,138,000''.


                           amendment no. 4366

 (Purpose: To provide for an independent review and assessment of the 
 organization and management of the Department of Defense for national 
                           security in space)

       At the end of subtitle B of title IX, add the following:

     SEC. 913. INDEPENDENT REVIEW AND ASSESSMENT OF DEPARTMENT OF 
                   DEFENSE ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT FOR 
                   NATIONAL SECURITY IN SPACE.

       (a) Independent Review and Assessment Required.--
       (1) In general.--The Secretary of Defense shall provide for 
     an independent review and assessment of the organization and 
     management of the Department of Defense for national security 
     in space.
       (2) Conduct of review.--The review and assessment shall be 
     conducted by an appropriate entity outside the Department of 
     Defense selected by the Secretary for purposes of this 
     section.
       (3) Elements.--The review and assessment shall address the 
     following:
       (A) The requirements of the Department of Defense for 
     national security space capabilities, as identified by the 
     Department, and the efforts of the Department to fulfill such 
     requirements.
       (B) The future space missions of the Department, and the 
     plans of the Department to meet the future space missions.
       (C) The actions that could be taken by the Department to 
     modify the organization and management of the Department over 
     the near-term, medium-term, and long-term in order to 
     strengthen United States national security in space, and the 
     ability of the Department to implement its requirements and 
     carry out the future space missions, including the following:
       (i) Actions to exploit existing and planned military space 
     assets to provide support for United States military 
     operations.
       (ii) Actions to improve or enhance current interagency 
     coordination processes regarding the operation of national 
     security space assets, including improvements or enhancements 
     in interoperability and communications.
       (iii) Actions to improve or enhance the relationship 
     between the intelligence aspects of national security space 
     (so-called ``black space'') and the non-intelligence aspects 
     of national security space (so-called ``white space'').
       (iv) Actions to improve or enhance the manner in which 
     military space issues are addressed by professional military 
     education institutions.
       (4) Liaison.--The Secretary shall designate at least one 
     senior civilian employee of the Department of Defense, and at 
     least one general or flag officer of an Armed Force, to serve 
     as liaison between the Department, the Armed Forces, and the 
     entity conducting the review and assessment.
       (b) Report.--
       (1) In general.--Not later than one year after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, the entity conducting the review 
     and assessment shall submit to the Secretary and the 
     congressional defense committees a report on the review and 
     assessment.
       (2) Elements.--The report shall include--
       (A) the results of the review and assessment; and
       (B) recommendations on the best means by which the 
     Department may improve its organization and management for 
     national security in space.


                           amendment no. 4321

   (Purpose: To exclude Minnesota's Northstar Corridor Commuter Rail 
     Project from the Federal Transit Administration's medium cost-
         effectiveness rating requirement for Federal funding)

       At the appropriate place, insert the following:

     SEC. __. FEDERAL FUNDING FOR FIXED GUIDEWAY PROJECTS.

       The Federal Transit Administration's Dear Colleague letter 
     dated April 29, 2005 (C-05-05), which requires fixed guideway 
     projects to achieve a ``medium'' cost-effectiveness rating 
     for the Federal Transit Administration to recommend such 
     projects for funding, shall not apply to the Northstar 
     Corridor Commuter Rail Project in Minnesota.


                           AMENDMENT NO. 4540

 (Purpose: To provide for the availability of funds authorized to the 
     South County Commuter Rail project, Providence, Rhode Island)

       At the end of subtitle I of title X, add the following:

     SEC. 1084. AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS FOR SOUTH COUNTY COMMUTER 
                   RAIL PROJECT, PROVIDENCE, RHODE ISLAND.

       Funds available for the South County Commuter Rail project, 
     Providence, Rhode Island, authorized by paragraphs (34) and 
     (35) of section 3034(d) of the Safe, Accountable, Flexible, 
     Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users 
     (Public Law 109-59; 119 Stat. 1650) shall be available for 
     the purchase of commuter rail equipment for the South County 
     Commuter Rail project upon the receipt by the Rhode Island 
     Department of Transportation of an approved environmental 
     assessment for the South County Commuter Rail project.


                           AMENDMENT NO. 4449

   (Purpose: To require the Secretary of the Air Force to prepare an 
 environmental impact statement or similar analysis for the beddown of 
   F-22A fighter aircraft at Holloman Air Force Base, New Mexico, as 
           replacements for retiring F-117A fighter aircraft)

       At the end of subtitle B of title III, add the following:

     SEC. 313. ENVIRONMENTAL DOCUMENTATION FOR BEDDOWN OF F-22A 
                   AIRCRAFT AT HOLLOMAN AIR FORCE BASE, NEW 
                   MEXICO.

       The Secretary of the Air Force shall prepare environmental 
     documentation per the requirements of the National 
     Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq.) for 
     the beddown of F-22A aircraft at Holloman Air Force Base, New 
     Mexico, as replacements for the retiring F-117A aircraft.


                    AMENDMENT NO. 4204, as modified

       On page 437, between lines 2 and 3, insert the following:

     SEC. 1084. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON IRAQ SUMMIT.

       Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that the 
     President should convene a summit as soon as possible that 
     includes the leaders of the Government of Iraq, leaders of 
     the governments of each country bordering Iraq, 
     representatives of the Arab League, the Secretary General of 
     the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, representatives of 
     the European Union, and leaders of the governments of each 
     permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, for 
     the purpose of reaching a comprehensive political agreement 
     for Iraq that addresses fundamental issues including 
     federalism, oil revenues, the militias, security guarantees, 
     reconstruction, economic assistance, and border security.

[[Page S6390]]

                           AMENDMENT NO. 4541

(Purpose: To require a report on planning by the Department of the Air 
 Force for the realignment of aircraft, weapons systems, and functions 
at active and Air National Guard bases as a result of the 2005 round of 
                 defense base closure and realignment)

       At the end of subtitle C of title XXVIII, add the 
     following:

     SEC. 2834. REPORT ON AIR FORCE AND AIR NATIONAL GUARD BASES 
                   AFFECTED BY 2005 ROUND OF DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE 
                   AND REALIGNMENT.

       (a) Report.--Not later than January 1, 2007, the Secretary 
     of the Air Force shall submit to Congress a report on 
     planning by the Department of the Air Force for future roles 
     and missions for active and Air National Guard personnel and 
     installations affected by decisions of the 2005 round of 
     defense base closure and realignment.
       (b) Content.--The report required under subsection (a) 
     shall include--
       (1) an assessment of the capabilities, characteristics, and 
     capacity of the facilities, infrastructure, and authorized 
     personnel at each affected base;
       (2) a description of the planning process used by the Air 
     Force to determine future roles and missions at active and 
     Air National Guard bases affected by the decisions of the 
     2005 round of defense base closure and realignment, including 
     an analysis of alternatives for installations to support each 
     future role or mission;
       (3) a description of the future roles and missions under 
     consideration for each active and Air National Guard base and 
     an explanation of the criteria and decision-making process to 
     make final decisions about future roles and missions for each 
     base; and
       (4) a timeline for decisions on the final determination of 
     future roles and missions for each active and Air National 
     Guard base affected by the decisions of the 2005 round of 
     defense base closure and realignment.
       (c) Bases Covered.--The report required under subsection 
     (a) shall include information on each active and Air National 
     Guard base at which the number of aircraft, weapon systems, 
     or functions is proposed to be reduced or eliminated and to 
     any installation that was considered as a potential receiving 
     location for the realignment of aircraft, weapons systems, or 
     functions.


                           amendment no. 4337

  Mr. REID. Mr. President, I appreciate very much that there has been 
consent to agree to my amendment No. 4337 on Congressional oversight of 
Iran policy. I would like to explain why I believe it is important that 
the Senate pass this amendment and sustain it in conference with the 
House.
  Mr. President, we live in a dangerous time. The threats to our 
freedom are many.
  As the administration embarks on serious diplomacy with Iran, the 
Senate must be engaged and consulted. We Senators must take seriously 
our responsibility to insist on a thorough review of the facts, a full 
debate of the threat, and full consultation as events move forward.
  The amendment I propose today would help put in place the rigorous 
oversight necessary to hold the administration accountable for its 
rhetoric and its policy decisions.
  Yesterday, Senate leadership met with State Department officials to 
get briefed on the details of the ``offer'' the administration laid on 
the table for Iran a few weeks ago. The meeting was welcome. I respect 
the hard work of Secretary Rice and Ambassador Burns in moving 
diplomacy forward. However, I am surprised the meeting happened several 
weeks after the deal was already offered. To the best of my knowledge, 
until yesterday, Congress had not been briefed on the key details of 
the deal offered to Iran a few weeks ago. The Iranians had been 
briefed. The Europeans had been briefed. The Russians and Chinese had 
been briefed. But not the United States Senate.
  This reminds me of how the administration handled the proposed Indian 
nuclear deal, which Members first found out about from the Indian prime 
minister and the press, not from the Administration.
  I am also reminded of the sales campaign that the administration 
engaged in, in the runup to war in Iraq. A sales campaign--rather than 
a serious effort to consult and treat Congress as a partner in figuring 
out how to protect America.
  It makes the executive branch's job a lot tougher when Congress is 
consulted last, rather than first. Congress should be in the take off, 
not asked to join for the crash landing.
  This amendment requires the administration to give Congress and the 
American people three things: an updated intelligence assessment of the 
threat of Iran, a clear statement of the President's policy objectives 
and strategy, and a confirmation that administration officials' public 
statements about the threat of Iran are being reviewed for accuracy.
  These are reasonable requests to ensure a rigorous debate about the 
way forward. The amendment's adoption would increase the 
administration's information flow to Congress on Iran issues and 
improve the Senate's oversight in this important area of national 
security policy.
  I would note that the House Armed Services Committee included 
parallel reporting requirements on the threat of Iran and the U.S. 
strategy for responding to it in its report on the House version of 
this bill. I trust that the conference of the two bodies will, in 
striving to reconcile these parallel reporting requirements, put the 
United States Congress on record in law about the importance of 
rigorous Congressional oversight of U.S. policy regarding Iran and the 
importance of the administration working in close consultation with 
Congress in this area.


                           AMENDMENT NO. 4528

  Mr. ALLARD. Mr. President, I rise today to discuss amendment No. 
4528. This amendment honors Representative Joel Hefley, Congressman of 
Colorado's 5th district, for his outstanding service to the people of 
Colorado and to our Nation.
  As you may know, Mr. President, Representative Hefley made the 
decision earlier this year to retire after 2 decades of service in 
Congress. This was a very difficult decision for him. He was the 3rd 
ranking Republican on the House Armed Services Committee and had 
garnered considerable influence because of his integrity and his 
respect of the legislative branch as an institution. He worked 
diligently over his 20 years in Congress and served the people of 
Colorado's 5th District well.
  Representative Hefley was first elected to represent Colorado's 5th 
Congressional district in 1986 and has served in the House of 
Representatives since that time with distinction, class, integrity, and 
honor. As his current and former colleagues will attest, Representative 
Hefley is a fair and effective lawmaker who works for the national 
interest while never forgetting his Western roots.
  For most of his two decades in the House, Representative Hefley 
poured his time and energy into the Committee on Armed Services of the 
House of Representatives. He served as chairman of the Subcommittee on 
Military Installations and Facilities from 1995 through 2000 and, since 
2001, as chairman of the Subcommittee on Readiness.
  Representative Hefley's efforts on the Committee on Armed Services 
have instrumental to the military value of, and quality of life at, 
installations in the State of Colorado, Cheyenne Mountain, Peterson Air 
Force Base, Schriever Air Force Base, Buckley Air Force Base, and the 
United States Air Force Academy.
  Representative Hefley was a leader in efforts to retain and expand 
Fort Carson as an essential part of the national defense system during 
the Defense Base Closure and Realignment process.
  Representative Hefley has also consistently advocated for providing 
members of the Armed Forces and their families with quality, safe, and 
affordable housing and supportive communities.
  Representative Hefley's leadership on the Military House 
Privatization Initiative has allowed for the privatization of more than 
121,000 units of military family housing, which brought meaningful 
improvements to living conditions for thousands of members of the Armed 
Forces and their spouses and children at installations throughout the 
United States.
  In honor of Representative Hefley's achievements and his work on 
military housing privatization, this amendment designates the military 
family housing areas at Fort Carson, Colorado in his name.
  I served with Representative Hefley in the House of Representatives 
for 6 years before I was elected to the Senate. I consider him to be 
one of my closest colleagues in Congress and a dear friend. I have 
tremendous respect for his character and for his ability to get things 
done. He has been a champion for over two decades for the Colorado 
Springs community and for conservative values. I know that he will be 
sorely missed in the House of Representatives.

[[Page S6391]]

  I believe Representative Hefley deserves the honor and recognition 
that this amendment provides. I am pleased my colleagues agreed to join 
me in adopting this amendment.


                           Amendment No. 4424

  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I appreciate the support of Chairman Warner 
and Senator Levin in agreeing to accept amendment No. 4424 to S. 2766, 
which I have sponsored.
  Section 1023 relates to a counternarcotics authority granted to the 
Department of Defense in the fiscal year 1998 Defense Authorization 
Act. P.L. 105-85, specifically section 1033 of that Act. The original 
provision, enacted in 1997, gave the Department authority to provide 
counterdrug support to the Governments of Peru and Colombia, including 
authority to transfer riverine patrol boats to those Governments, and 
to maintain and repair equipment used for counter-drug activities by 
those Governments. In recent years, the so-called 1033 authority has 
been expanded to cover the other countries in the Andes, and to 
Afghanistan and many of its neighboring states.
  The bill now before the Senate would expand the list of eligible 
governments still further, to include a long list of countries in Asia, 
the Americas, and Africa. It also provides the Department the authority 
to transfer aircraft to eligible governments.
  The amendment I have proposed to section 1023 would ensure that the 
transfer of aircraft is subject to section 484(a) of the Foreign 
Assistance Act of 1961, which requires that the United States retain 
title to aircraft made available to a foreign country primarily for 
narcotics-related purposes, unless the President makes a national 
interest determination and so notifies Congress. The requirement that 
such aircraft be made available only on a loan or lease basis has been 
the law for 20 years, since the enactment of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 
1986, P.L. 99-570, and no good argument has been offered as to why it 
should not apply to Department of Defense programs. Simply put, the 
requirement strengthens the ability of the United States to make sure 
that the aircraft provided is used for the intended purpose.
  In my view, section 484(a) already does apply to Defense Department 
counternarcotics programs. By its terms, it applies to any aircraft 
``made available to a foreign country primarily for narcotics-related 
purposes'' under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 or ``under any 
other provision of law.'' This expansive statutory language makes clear 
that any U.S. Government agency providing aircraft to a foreign 
government for counterdrug purposes must retain title to that aircraft. 
Yet inquiries to the Department of Defense officials about whether the 
authority provided in section 1023 of S. 2766 would be governed by 
section 484(a) have proven inconclusive. So that there is no doubt 
about this question, I have proposed this amendment, which I understand 
the managers of the bill have agreed to accept.


                           amendment no. 4364

  Mr. DURBIN. Mr. President, I rise today to offer an amendment that 
would rename the Navy and Marine Corps Reserve Center at Rock Island, 
IL, in honor of Representative Lane Evans.
  Representative Evans has been a tireless advocate of our men and 
women in uniform during his 24 years in Congress. Unfortunately, 
Congress will lose a great man when he retires at the end of this year, 
and we can honor him and his accomplishments by renaming the Navy and 
Marine Corps Reserve Center at Rock Island after him.
  Lane Evans came to Congress as a Marine Corps veteran, and military 
personnel and veterans were always on the forefront of his mind during 
his service on the House Committee on Armed Services and Committee on 
Veterans' Affairs. Throughout his career, Representative Evans has 
fought to ensure that veterans receive the medical care they need and 
has provided outspoken support for individuals suffering from post-
traumatic stress disorder and gulf war syndrome. Additionally, 
Representative Evans is credited with bringing new services to veterans 
living in his congressional district. In particular, he was responsible 
for the development of outpatient clinics in the Quad Cities and 
Quincy, IL, as well as the establishment of the Quad-Cities Vet Center.
  Representative Evans also has worked to ensure that military 
personnel experience a smooth transition from active military service 
into the care of the Department of Veterans Affairs. Generations of 
veterans will continue to benefit from his hard work long after he has 
retired.
  Representative Evans has worked in conjunction with local leaders to 
promote the Rock Island Arsenal, and through his support, the facility 
has received new jobs and new missions. It is fitting and proper that 
the Navy and Marine Corps Reserve Center at Rock Island Arsenal be 
named in honor of Representative Evans in order to commemorate his 
service to America's military personnel, its veterans, and his 17th 
Congressional district.
  I urge my colleagues to join me in supporting this amendment.


                           amendment no. 4336

  Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, Social Security numbers are included 
on all military identification cards including the service member, 
military spouse, and all dependents over the age of ten. In light of 
the recent theft of millions of veterans' personal information from the 
Department of Veterans Affairs, all federal agencies must take measures 
to protect crucial information. To this end, I have introduced an 
amendment that would require the Department of Defense to conduct a 
feasibility study on prohibiting the use of Social Security numbers on 
all military identification cards.
  When the Department of Defense began using Social Security numbers on 
identification cards in 1967, identity theft was not a problem most 
Americans worried about. Electronic transactions were, for the most 
part, non-existent, and we did not have the kind of access to personal 
records that we have today. By simply gaining access to someone's 
Social Security number, a malicious person could attempt to open a line 
of credit, obtain a false driver's license or passport, or completely 
steal another person's identity. Our military men and women should not 
have to worry about these problems while defending our country.
  We cannot wait until an incident occurs within the Department of 
Defense that compromises the security of our military members. The 
federal government must be proactive. The feasibility study I have 
proposed has a reasonable finish date of six months from enactment and 
would give the Department ample time to study this issue and find a 
self-imposed solution.
  Social Security numbers are not included on driver's licenses or 
passports. Colleges and universities are using generic numbers for 
student identification rather than Social Security numbers. It is time 
the Department of Defense provides this important safeguard for our 
troops.


                           amendment no. 4398

  Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I urge my colleagues to join me in 
supporting this amendment to ensure that the Defense Department invests 
in critical basic research and maintains the workforce it needs to stay 
globally competitive.
  Our military is first in the world because of the quality and 
training of our personnel and the technological sophistication of our 
equipment and weaponry. But many of our Nation's best civilian 
scientific minds in the Defense Department are nearing retirement age, 
and our uncertain commitment to basic research funding makes it harder 
to attract a new corps of scientists to do this research.
  Our amendment that the Senator from Maine and I are offering includes 
an additional $5 million for the Department's SMART Scholars Program 
which is essentially an ROTC program for its civilian scientists. The 
amendment will more than double the funding level provided last year 
and provide more than 100 full college scholarships and graduate 
fellowships in science, technology, engineering, and math.
  Our amendment also adds $40 million to the Department's funding of 
basic research in science and technology to ensure that its investment 
in the field is maintained and our military technology remains the best 
in the world. The amendment is supported by more than 60 of the most 
prestigious institutions of higher education in the Nation.
  Advances in military technology often have their source in the work 
of civilian scientists in Department of

[[Page S6392]]

Defense laboratories. Unfortunately, a large percentage of these 
scientists are nearing retirement. Today, nearly one in three DOD 
civilian engineers in science, technology, engineering, and mathematics 
is eligible to retire. In 7 years, 70 percent will be of retirement 
age.
  It is distressing that the number of new doctoral level scientists 
being produced by our major universities each year has declined by 6 
percent since 1997. Many of those who do graduate are ineligible to 
work on sensitive defense matters, since about a third of all science 
and engineering doctorate degrees awarded at American universities go 
to foreign students.
  It is unlikely that retiring DOD scientists can be replaced by 
current private industry employees. About 5,000 science and engineering 
positions are unfilled in private industry in defense-related fields. 
The Department of Labor estimates that by 2012, more than 40 percent of 
jobs in science and engineering occupations will be unfilled.
  We face a major math and science challenge in both higher education 
and in elementary and secondary education. We are tied with Latvia for 
28th in the industrial world in math education, and that is far from 
good enough. We have fallen from 3rd in the world to 15th in producing 
scientists and engineers. Clearly, we need a new National Defense 
Education Act of the size and scope passed nearly 50 years ago.
  At the very least, however, the legislation before us needs to do 
more to maintain our military's technological advantage. In 2004, over 
100 ``highly rated'' SMART Scholar applications were turned down 
because of insufficient funding. Our amendment provides enough funds to 
support every one of those talented young people who want to learn and 
serve.

  Our amendment also deals with the critical need to provide the basic 
research dollars that enable science and technology graduates and 
students to pursue their research. Basic research investments by the 
Defense Department in science and technology a generation ago helped 
the United States win the Cold War. But funding for basic research has 
fallen by more than 10 percent in the past decade.
  Investing in basic research and attracting the best minds to science 
and engineering are as important today as they have ever been. Almost 
every day, you can pick up the paper and see yet another high-
performing company setting up an R&D shop in India or China. Those 
countries get it. They know how important basic research is to their 
prospects for growth. But this Congress and this President ignore how 
important it is to invest in our talent and our research capacity.
  China now graduates over 2\1/2\ times the number of engineers and 
computer science majors as the United States. We still have an edge in 
dollars invested, but our average annual investment growth in R&D is 
far less than China and other countries.
  These countries are increasing their government investment in science 
and technology, but our Federal research investment is stagnating as a 
share of the U.S. economy. It has plateaued at 1.1 percent of GDP. We 
are still ahead of most other nations, but they are catching up. In 
combined Federal and private R&D, the fastest growing countries such as 
Ireland and Singapore are clearly challenging us.
  Yet the President's proposed budget reduces Defense Department basic 
research, and this authorization bill does little to increase it over 
last year's appropriation, even though we know we have to increase it.
  The Defense Science Board recommends that funding for science and 
technology reach 3 percent of total defense spending, and the 
administration and Congress have adopted this goal in the past. But the 
President's budget cuts science and technology funding by 18.6 percent 
and falls well short of this goal. The board also recommends that 20 
percent of that amount be dedicated to basic research. Again, the 
administration's budget falls short: basic research accounts for only 
12.6 percent of total science and technology funding.
  Our leading economic and scientific thinkers are telling us we need 
to invest in these areas to stay globally competitive. The National 
Academy of Sciences, the Council on Competitiveness, and others say it 
is wrong to ignore the need to increase investment in basic research. 
Nobel prize-winners such as American physicist Steven Chu say that we 
need to increase Federal investment in long-term basic research because 
``there are growing signs that all is not well.''
  The Internet, the laser, MRIs, global positioning systems-all came 
from basic research at the Department of Defense. We can't forget that 
this type of research leads to the kinds of innovations that can 
generate millions of jobs and major new economic activity.
  Our global competitiveness deserves high priority, and our amendment 
provides it. The goal is to see that American innovation grows and that 
we continue to attract and retain the best and the brightest men and 
women to these critical fields in math and science.
  I urge my colleagues to join us in supporting this needed amendment 
to provide more scholarships to math and science students and to 
increase our Federal commitment to basic research at the Department of 
Defense.


 LEGISLATIVE INTENT WITH REGARD TO EXPANDED NATIONAL GUARD AUTHORITIES

  Mr. CONRAD. Mr. President, I thank Mr. Levin for agreeing to join me 
in this discussion of the legislative intent of the Senate in approving 
several provisions related to the integration between the Active-Duty 
military and the Reserve component. This bill will enhance the 
authority of the Department of Defense to achieve future total force 
integration between the Active-Duty and Reserve components. I would be 
grateful in the ranking member could explain in more detail the intent 
of section 531 of S. 2766, the National Defense Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 2007.
  Mr. LEVIN. Specifically, the changes contained in this bill will 
increase the efficiency of the Department of Defense's operations by 
allowing the Guard and Reserve to train and instruct other component 
members as an additional duty. It is desirable for Active Guard and 
Reserve, AGR, and technician members of the National Guard and Reserve 
to be able to train members of all components to the extent that these 
duties do not interfere with the performance of the member's primary 
duties. Currently, titles 10 and 32, United States Code, limit the 
efficiencies that can be realized by restricting the employment of AGRs 
and technicians to ``organizing, administering, recruiting, 
instructing, or training'' the Reserve components. This bill will 
expand the role of AGRs and technicians so that they may instruct and 
train members of any other component, and also DOD civilian employees, 
DOD contractor personnel, and foreign military personnel.
  The changes included in this bill will also increase the Department's 
flexibility in using the Guard and Reserve to support certain 
operations or missions. It is the committee's belief that members of 
the Reserve and National Guard need increased flexibility to support 
certain operations or missions assigned in whole or in part to the 
Reserve, or undertaken by the National Guard at the request of the 
President or Secretary of Defense. This bill will facilitate the 
transformation of the National Guard and Reserve from a Cold War 
``strategic reserve'' to a present day ``operational reserve.'' An 
``operational reserve'' actively supports ongoing operational missions 
where appropriate, while also providing the additional reserve capacity 
needed to meet surge requirements or support wartime or contingency 
operations. These amendments would make some distinctions between the 
duties that may be performed, in addition to their primary duties, by 
Reserve AGRs and technicians and those that may be performed by Guard 
AGRs and technicians in title 32 status. Generally, full-time Reserve 
personnel would be permitted to support title 10 operational 
activities, while full-time Guard, including AGRs and technicians, 
would be permitted to perform operational activities if authorized by 
the President or the Secretary of Defense.
  Mr. CONRAD. I thank the ranking member. These are very important 
expansions to the National Guard's role and will play an important part 
in allowing the Air Force to achieve its objectives for total force 
integration. It is my belief that the provisions included in this bill 
will permit, for example, the North Dakota Air National

[[Page S6393]]

Guard to provide a security forces squadron to augment the Active-Duty 
security forces in the ICBM field at Minot Air Force Base, assuming 
that the Secretary requests that they perform such a mission. Air Force 
Space Command is eager to begin this initiative and has secured funding 
for it in the Air Force Program Objective Memorandum. This unit would 
include both traditional guardsmen and AGRs and would augment, not 
replace, the Active-Duty security forces group currently assigned to 
the mission. I would encourage Secretary Rumsfeld to give serious 
consideration to requesting that the North Dakota Air National Guard 
augment the Active-Duty Air Force in carrying out this important 
operational mission, and I thank my colleagues for their time and their 
support.


           Killing of U.s. Soldiers by Iraqi Security Forces

  Mrs. BOXER. This week, the military informed two California families 
that their sons were shot and killed by the very same Iraqi troops they 
were training.
  SGT Patrick McCaffrey and 1LT Andre Tyson were killed near Balad in 
2004. At first, the Army told the families that these two National 
Guardsmen were killed by Iraqi insurgents.
  An investigation by the U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command 
determined in September 2005 that both soldiers were shot and killed by 
members of the Iraqi security forces.
  In addition to the fact that Iraqi security forces are killing U.S. 
soldiers, this situation raises several troubling questions.
  First, according to his parents, there were two prior incidents in 
which Sergeant McCaffrey was fired upon by Iraqi security forces and 
the chain of command took no action. Why was nothing done? Are there 
other incidents where American troops are being shot at by the Iraqi 
forces they are training?
  Second, why did the Army close its investigation in September 2005 
but fail to inform the family until June 2006? Was there a coverup of 
this incident? What other explanation could there be?
  Third, why were the families denied official government reports on 
the events that led to the deaths of these two soldiers? One of the 
families needed the help of my office to make any progress in learning 
the truth. How could the Army treat the families of dead soldiers in 
such a callous and dismissive way? Where are the military case officers 
who are supposed to help the families of slain U.S. soldiers?
  And, fourth, a Defense Department spokesmen has called this incident 
``extremely rare.'' How can the Department of Defense conclude that the 
incident is rare when such incidents are evidently not being reported 
up the chain of command? Members of Sergeant McCaffrey's unit told his 
father that insurgents were offering Iraqi soldiers about $100 apiece 
for each American they could kill.
  I ask the Senator from Michigan, is he willing to work with me to get 
answers to these troubling questions?
  Mr. LEVIN. I share the Senator's concern and will work with her to 
address these important questions.
  Mr. COBURN. Mr. President, the Senate today accepted three amendments 
that I offered to S. 2766, the National Defense Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 2007, intended to improve transparency and accountability 
of taxpayer funds provided to the Department of Defense.
  Amendment No. 4370 addresses the practice of the earmarking of 
Federal funds by members of Congress. ``Earmarks,'' more commonly known 
as ``pork projects,'' are provisions inserted into bills or directives 
contained within a joint explanatory statement or reports accompanying 
bills specifying the identity of an entity, program, project or service 
to receive assistance.
  Many Congressional earmarks inserted within Defense appropriations 
bills are not needed, or even wanted, by the Pentagon. Just this week, 
the Washington Post published an article titled, ``The Project That 
Wouldn't Die; Using earmarks, members of Congress kept money flowing to 
a local company that got $37 million for technology the military 
couldn't use.''
  Earmarks contained within Defense appropriations bills have been 
linked to a number of recent Congressional corruption and ethics 
probes. Convicted super-lobbyist Jack Abramoff openly boasted that 
earmarks were his political currency and he called the Appropriations 
Committee that doles them out a ``favor factory'' for lobbyists.
  The $80 billion emergency supplemental passed last year was riddled 
with add-ons. It included $10 million to expand wastewater facilities 
in Swiftwater, PA. The University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center 
got $3 million. A wastewater treatment plant in Desoto County, MS, got 
$35 million, and $4 million went to the Fire Sciences Academy in Elk, 
NV. While these many have been local priorities for these communities, 
it is difficult to argue that they are needed for our national defense.
  In its report on its fiscal 2001 Defense appropriations bill, the 
Senate Appropriations Committee wrote: ``The committee understands that 
medical studies indicate the potential benefits of cranberry juice and 
other cranberry products in maintaining health. The committee urges the 
Secretary of Defense to take steps to increase the department's use of 
cranberry products in the diet of on-base personnel and troops in the 
field. Such purchases should prioritize cranberry products with high 
cranberry content such as fresh cranberries, cranberry sauces and 
jellies and concentrate and juice with over 25 percent cranberry 
content.''
  Most Americans do not support earmarking Federal funds, especially 
for such dubious purposes that serve parochial interests at the expense 
of our national defense. A recent Wall Street Journal/NBC News poll, in 
fact, found that of all the issues facing our nation, curtailing 
earmarks was identified as ``the single most important thing for 
Congress to accomplish this year.''
  The number of earmarks in Defense appropriations laws has grown from 
about 587 in fiscal year 1994 to about 2,847 in fiscal year 2006, 
according to a recent report by the Congressional Research Service, 
CRS. The amount of money earmarked has increased over the same period, 
from about $4.2 billion to $9.4 billion. The amount earmarked as a 
percentage of the total in the Defense appropriations bill has 
correspondingly increased from about 1.8 percent in 1994 to 
approximately 2.4 percent in 2006.
  While we can determine the total number of earmarks and the actual 
pricetag of each, we have no way of calculating the hidden cost of 
earmarking, which includes staff time and administration expenses.
  Specifically the amendment accepted today requires the Department of 
Defense to report annually: The total annual cost of earmarking in 
Defense appropriations bills; the purpose and location of each earmark; 
an analysis of the usefulness of each earmark in advancing the goals of 
the Department of Defense. This will provide Members of Congress a more 
complete view of the cost effectiveness of each project and if such 
projects warranted continued funding.
  This annual report will provide Congress and the public a more 
complete understanding of the total cost of ``pork'' to the Department 
of Defense.
  The earmark grading system will, likewise, provide needed information 
to lawmakers and the public about projects inserted into bills that 
have not had proper oversight, debate or discussion. This added 
transparency will ensure that every Member of Congress can cast a truly 
informed vote and ensure greater accountability for how Federal funds 
are allocated and hopefully return some integrity to the appropriations 
process that has been undermined by recent investigations into 
earmarking.
  My second amendment, No. 4371, accepted by the Senate today seeks to 
end the practice of Defense contractors being rewarded for poor 
performance. The Department of Defense has been improperly paying 
awards and incentives to contractors that do not fulfill the terms and 
conditions of their contracts. These are intended to be paid only for 
outstanding performances on contracts but are routinely paid out 
without regard to performance.
  In a recent study conducted by the Government Accountability Office, 
GAO, DOD paid out at least $8 billion in fees over 4 years, the vast 
majority of which were not earned and were improperly awarded. This of 
course, was just a small fraction of the overall

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total of award fees given out to contractors every year.
  My amendment seeks to end this process and require performance as a 
prerequisite for award fee bonuses. My amendment specifically requires 
that a contractor cannot receive an award fee unless the contractor has 
met the basic requirements of the contract.
  This amendment has the potential to save the Federal Government 
billions of wasted tax dollars every year and improve contractor 
performance.
  The third amendment, No. 4491, as modified, will require DOD's 
Defense Travel System, DTS, to transform its ``cost plus'' contract to 
a fee-for-use-of-service system similar to the private sector travel 
reservation systems currently available in the marketplace.
  DTS was initiated in 1998 DTS and intended to make travel 
arrangements for the military service branches and defense agencies. It 
was supposed to be fully deployed by 2002. However, that date has been 
pushed back to September 2006--a delay of over 4 years--and has cost 
the American taxpayer $474 million--a staggering $200 million more than 
it was originally projected to cost.
  DTS has a long record of failure. In July 2002, the DOD inspector 
general released a report on DTS which highlighted numerous concerns 
with the program and stated that DTS was being ``substantially 
developed without the requisite requirements, cost, performance, and 
schedule documents and analyses needed as the foundation for assessing 
the effectiveness of the system and its return on investment.'' 
Following on that IG report, DOD's office for Program Assessment and 
Evaluation prepared a report recommending termination of the program.
  In January 2006, GAO reported that ``DTS's development and 
implementation have been problematic . . . thus it is not surprising 
that critical flaws have been identified, resulting in significant 
slippages between the planned and actual deployment dates of the 
system'' and that selected requirements for display of flights and 
airfares found that system testing was ``ineffective in ensuring that 
the promised capability was delivered as intended.''
  This means that not only is DTS not performing, the current system is 
incapable of testing properly in order to determine what is required in 
order to meet DOD's plan.
  Further, DOD could not prove that DOD travelers even had access to 
the flights that were available for travel. There is no doubt such a 
flaw would have produced higher travel costs.
  Compounding this problem is the fact that some DOD agencies continue 
to use the existing legacy travel systems at locations where DTS is 
already deployed. This means that all of the proclaimed savings that 
DTS was supposed to reap are nowhere to be found--because DOD continues 
to use legacy systems to do the same thing.
  As originally envisioned, DTS was supposed to be a pay-for-use-of-
service system in which the DTS was paid by the government based only 
on the extent to which the system was used--thereby creating an 
incentive for DTS to be a cost effective travel reservation system for 
the Department of Defense.
  This amendment requires the Department of Defense to honor the 
original intentions of the DTS contract. Within a year of enactment of 
this bill, DTS will be required to utilize a fee-for-use-of-service 
system. The funds raised through fees charged will be used by DTS to 
pay for its operational and maintenance costs as the system is slated 
to be fully developed and deployed by September 2006. DTS will be 
required to: (1) levy a one-time, fixed price service fee per DOD 
consumer using the system, and (2) charge an additional fixed fee for 
each transaction.
  Together these three amendments ensure greater transparency and 
accountability of Federal funds and ensure taxpayers and our men and 
women in service are guaranteed that the funds we are spending on the 
defense of our Nation are better spent.
  I would like to thank Chairman Warner and his staff and look forward 
to continuing to work with them on these issues as this bill goes to 
conference.
  Mrs. LINCOLN. Mr. President, today I offered an amendment on behalf 
of the brave men and women of our National Guard and Reserve who have 
sacrificed so greatly for our freedom. This amendment would allow 
members of the Selected Reserve who have been activated for extended 
durations to utilize some of the educational benefits they have earned 
once they separate from service.
  Since World War II, providing educational benefits to returning 
servicemembers has served an invaluable role in stimulating recruitment 
and retention for our armed services. In assisting veterans readjusting 
to civilian life, these educational benefits have also enhanced our 
Nation's competitiveness through the development of a more highly 
educated and productive workforce.
  When the Montgomery GI bill was signed into law in 1984, members of 
the Selected Reserve--members of the National Guard and Reserve on 
active status or performing initial Active Duty training--were seldom 
mobilized. Consequently, standard Montgomery GI Bill benefits reflected 
that reality. That is not the same reality today.
  More than 500,000 members of the National Guard and Reserve have been 
called up since the terrible events of September 11, 2001, and more 
than 70,000 have pulled two or more tours of duty. In my State of 
Arkansas, nearly 3,400 of our National Guard's 39th Infantry Brigade 
were called to serve in Operation Iraqi Freedom. These citizen soldiers 
served with distinction and did so in some of the worst conditions 
imaginable. While their families and their communities have welcomed 
them home with open arms, our Nation should do the same by ensuring 
they receive the benefits and services they need as they transition 
back to their civilian lives.
  The rising price of higher education, increases in the interest rates 
on student loans, and the limited earnings ability of those who return 
from the service with only high school credentials make educational 
benefits a primary means of helping members of the Selected Reserve 
make that transition. In addressing this issue, Congress took a step in 
the right direction in October 2004 with creation of the Reserve 
Education Assistance Program. This program provided enhanced Montgomery 
GI bill benefits for members of the Selected Reserve who were activated 
since September 11, 2001, and mobilized for more than 90 days in 
response to a contingency operation--a war or national emergency as 
declared by the President or Congress.
  Although increasing benefits was a step in the right direction, it 
did not address the lack of a readjustment or transition component to 
these educational benefits. As a result, Active-Duty servicemembers 
have up to 10 years after their separation of service to utilize their 
MGIB benefits, while members of the Selected Reserve must forfeit all 
of the educational benefits they have earned once they separate from 
the Selected Reserve. Montgomery GI bill benefits continue to be the 
only benefit that those who have served Selected Reserve activated duty 
in the war on terrorism may not access when they eventually separate or 
retire.
  For example, a young man enlists in the Arkansas National Guard for a 
6-year commitment after graduating from high school in 2001. He is 
mobilized in June 2005 and will return home from Iraq in September 
2006, a 15-month mobilization. He plans to complete his service in June 
2007 and use the Montgomery GI bill benefits he earned during his 
mobilization to attend the University of Arkansas. Under current law, 
he would forfeit all of these benefits once he leaves the Guard. I 
believe our young men and women who have fulfilled their service 
obligations deserve better than that.
  Specifically, my amendment would allow members of the Selected 
Reserve to have portability of their chapter 1607 Montgomery GI bill 
benefits for up to 10 years from their last date of service. To 
clarify, this amendment applies only to their chapter 1607 benefits--
those they have earned through activated service--and not their 
standard Selected Reserve educational benefits, chapter 1606 benefits.
  Some have raised concerns that this amendment would have an effect on 
retention because it would provide a post-service portability of 
benefits. I disagree. There are many valid personal and family reasons 
that influence a volunteer's decision to serve. Military analysts have 
consistently noted that reenlistment bonuses in lump-sum cash payments 
have been effective in

[[Page S6395]]

meeting or exceeding reenlistment goals in the Active and Reserve 
Forces, not the educational benefits that are deferred over time.
  Further, there is a built-in incentive to continue serving in the 
Selected Reserve because reenlistment or extension in the Guard and 
Reserve enables the servicemember to retain their standard Selected 
Reserve Montgomery GI bill benefits under chapter 1606 with the 
potential to acquire more chapter 1607 benefits through successive 
activations. If they reenlist, they would also remain eligible for any 
other educational ``kickers'' such as Federal tuition assistance and 
state Guard or Reserve educational benefits.
  Young high school graduates thinking about furthering their 
educations and whether to join the Guard or Reserve should know that 
they will earn Montgomery GI bill benefits by joining the Reserves and 
even more if they are called up. When it is time to reenlist, they can 
keep all earned educational benefits by staying in or can take with 
them into civilian life the benefits they earned when they were called 
up to defend our Nation.
  As the daughter of a Korean war veteran, I was taught from an early 
age about the sacrifices our troops have to make to keep our Nation 
free and have been grateful for the service of so many of our brave men 
and women from the State of Arkansas and across the Nation. On behalf 
of them and their families, I will continue to fight to ensure they are 
provided with the benefits, pay, and health care that they have earned. 
I urge my colleagues to support this amendment. It is the least we can 
do for those whom we owe so much and to reassure future generations 
that a grateful nation will not forget them when their military service 
is complete.
  Mr. NELSON of Florida. Mr. President, the National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 includes a provision that would 
repeal section 5062(2), title 10, United States Code that requires the 
Navy to keep a minimum of 12 operational aircraft carriers in the 
fleet. As many of my colleagues know, I oppose this repeal. I am 
convinced that as a nation at war, we should not increase our strategic 
risk by reducing our ability to place U.S. naval aviation anywhere and 
at any time as may be required to respond to crises around the world.
  Although this bill would repeal the 12-carrier minimum requirement, 
the Armed Services Committee was clear that we should not allow our 
carrier fleet to fall dangerously lower than 11 ships. I believe 
strongly that the size and capability of our carrier fleet is a matter 
of highest national concern. Once mothballed, scrapped, or a combat 
loss, a carrier is extremely difficult and expensive to replace. The 
Nation needs 12 carriers for worldwide presence and crisis response. 
Congress should support a funding program to ensure that we achieve and 
sustain that level as soon as practical.
  As concerned as I am about reducing the size of our carrier fleet, I 
am equally concerned about the risk of failing to adequately disperse 
them. Stationing all our Atlantic coast carriers in a single port only 
compounds the challenges we will face with a smaller fleet. I am not 
alone in that assessment. The former Chief of Naval Operations, ADM 
Vernon Clark, told the Armed Services Committee in February 2005 that 
in his view, ``overcentralization of the [carrier] port structure is 
not a good strategic move . . . the Navy should have two carrier-
capable home ports on each coast.'' Admiral Clark went on to say, ``. . 
. it is my belief that it would be a serious strategic mistake to have 
all of those key assets of our Navy tied up in one port.''

  As recently as March this year, Deputy Secretary of Defense and 
former Secretary of the Navy, Gordon England, testified to this 
committee that the Navy needed to disperse its Atlantic coast carriers 
saying, ``My judgment is that [dispersion] is still the situation . . . 
a nuclear carrier should be in Florida to replace the [USS John F.] 
Kennedy to get some dispersion. `` Secretary England explained that, 
``the concern there was always weapons of mass destruction. Even though 
carriers were at sea, the maintenance facilities, et cetera, are all 
still there and the crews . . . so having some dispersion would be of 
value to the Department of the Navy.''
  At the same hearing, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, ADM 
Edmund Giambastiani, shared his own judgment that we should disperse 
our carriers. He illustrated his sense of risk to the Nation's east 
coast carriers when he recalled his own visit to Norfolk one Christmas, 
``where we had five aircraft carriers all sitting next to one another, 
and that is not something we'd like to routinely do.''
  I am opposed to cutting our Nation's aircraft carrier fleet as a 
matter of strategic necessity during time of war. The risk, in my view, 
is unacceptable. As a matter of protecting our smaller carrier force, I 
am convinced that the Nation must establish a second Atlantic coast 
nuclear carrier base as quickly as possible. An environmental impact 
study in 1997 found Naval Station Mayport, FL, current home of the USS 
John F. Kennedy, suitable to permanently station a nuclear aircraft 
carrier. The Navy should complete its update of that study as quickly 
as possible. Additionally, in order not to lose any time once the study 
is complete, the Navy should include funding in its fiscal year 2008 
Future Years Defense Program to begin building the maintenance and 
support facilities necessary to stationing a nuclear aircraft carrier 
at Naval Station Mayport. Availability of these funds should naturally 
be contingent upon but timed in the budget's outyears to coincide with 
the completion of an updated environmental impact study. I look forward 
to working with my colleagues on both these vital issues.
  Mr. AKAKA. Mr. President, at the outset, I have and I will continue 
to support our military personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan. They deserve 
no less than our complete backing.
  I recently returned from visiting Iraq, where I had the honor of 
meeting with our troops and visiting with Iraqi officials. I left with 
a deep admiration for the spirit of our fighting men and women who 
continue to give their all under very difficult circumstances. I was 
also impressed by the willingness of many Iraqis to put themselves in 
harm's way as they dedicate their lives to the future of their Nation. 
However, I continue to harbor grave concerns over the current situation 
in Iraq and the President's strategy for fighting the Iraq conflict.
  So far, more than 2,500 Americans have died and 18,000 have been 
wounded. We owe it to both our honored dead and wounded to ensure that 
their sacrifices were not in vain and that we successfully accomplish 
our mission in Iraq and Afghanistan. However, as I have said from the 
beginning of this conflict, we need a clear understanding of what the 
mission is, what is needed to accomplish the mission, and the true 
accounting of the cost of the mission.
  It is time for the President to tell Congress, the American public, 
and most importantly, the families of our fallen heroes and the men and 
women in the Armed Forces what is his exit plan. Instead, we only get 
vague assertions such as in the President's address to the Nation a 
year ago at Fort Bragg in which he said: ``. . . our strategy can be 
summed up this way: As the Iraqi's stand up, we will stand down.'' What 
this country needs now is a detailed exit strategy that puts the Iraqi 
Government and its people on the path to controlling their own destiny.
  It is not clear why we went to war, what we are trying to achieve, 
and how we will measure success. There are many of us who believe that 
we went into Iraq for the wrong reason: because the President and his 
advisers miscalculated or misrepresented the threat. And now that we 
are there, the President continues to come up with new reasons for 
staying. Before the war, President Bush said we needed to remove Saddam 
Hussein's weapons of mass destruction. It turned out there were none. 
Faced with the absence of weapons of mass destruction, the 
administration has argued that our presence in Iraq is necessary to 
protect the United States from acts of global terrorism and to ensure 
that Iraq successfully transforms into a stable democracy.
  As Brian Jenkins of the RAND Corporation, one of the country's most 
noted terrorism experts, has written, ``Taking the fight to terrorists 
abroad--as America did by invading Afghanistan and by continuing 
efforts against terrorists worldwide--makes sense. But Iraq is a 
separate and special case, because many of the combatants killed or 
captured by American

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and allied forces in Iraq are insurgents created by opposition to the 
U.S. invasion itself.'' It is my understanding that terrorist cells 
have become even more decentralized since the war in Iraq, spreading to 
many corners of the globe. Islamic extremists in Iraq are reportedly 
training Taliban and al-Qaida fighters. Furthermore, Brigadier General 
Robert Caslen says that 30 new terrorist groups have been created since 
9/11, and ``we are not killing them faster than they are being 
created.'' Even Defense Secretary Rumsfeld admits that the United 
States is not winning the battle of ideas over the terrorists.

  A week ago, President Bush justified our presence in Iraq by stating 
that our mission now ``is to develop a country that can govern itself, 
sustain itself, and defend itself, and a country that is an ally in the 
war on terror. While I support building a strong democracy in Iraq, I 
am still very concerned that the number of troops stationed there 
stands in the way of the Iraqi people developing their own nation.
  If we remain in Iraq without a clear exit strategy, I believe that 
the situation there will worsen. Iraq is a country that is becoming 
more polarized along ethnic and sectarian lines. The December elections 
for a new National Assembly were dominated by the religious-based 
political parties.
  Furthermore, the Iraqi public's perception of the economy is becoming 
increasingly pessimistic. The social situation in Iraq is just as 
disheartening. As a recent Pentagon report notes, we have spent almost 
$1 billion in electricity projects and are planning an additional $1.1 
billion, but the gap between demand and supply is growing.
  The price for not having a clear exit strategy is being borne by the 
American taxpayer and future generations of Americans who will truly 
pay the cost of this war. So far, the United States has spent about $40 
billion for Iraqi reconstruction and much of that has been wasted. For 
example, instead of building 142 health centers in Iraq, only 20 
clinics have been completed at a cost of $200 million. In addition, 
former Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz confidently promised 
the Congress a week after the war had started that ``. . . we're 
dealing with a country that can really finance its own reconstruction, 
and relatively soon.'' His economic projections were exceptionally 
faulty. Americans are paying inflated prices for Iraqi reconstruction 
projects that are only partially complete, instead of Iraqi oil 
revenues paying for Iraqi reconstruction.
  The President's policy gives the Iraqis veto power over when American 
troops withdraw. Whether our troops remain there, should not be subject 
to an Iraqi veto. Making the departure of U.S. troops dependent on the 
Iraqis places the health and welfare of our brave men and women at the 
mercy of Iraqi decisions.
  When I spoke with Iraq's National Security Adviser, Dr. Mowaffak 
Rubaie, he shared his view that the removal of foreign troops will 
legitimize Iraq's Government in the eyes of its people. In my view, a 
phased withdrawal of American troops will encourage the Iraqi 
Government and military to take responsibility for their future. In 
addition I support maintaining sufficient security forces to continue 
training the Iraqi military, sufficient security forces to protect the 
continued American civilian presence, and sufficient security forces to 
attack al-Qaida terrorist networks. The result will be a strengthened, 
not weakened, Iraqi Government and military.

  I agree with the President when he said that ``success in Iraq 
depends upon the Iraqis. If the Iraqis don't have the will to succeed, 
they're not going to succeed. We can have all the will we want, I can 
have all the confidence in the ability for us to bring people to 
justice, but if they choose not to . . . make the hard decisions and to 
implement a plan, they're not going to make it.''
  We must empower the Iraqis to defend and govern themselves. For that 
reason, phased withdrawal is the only road to success.
  Mr. President, some say that asking this administration to provide a 
plan detailing the eventual withdrawal of our troops from Iraq 
demonstrates a lack of courage. To me, it takes courage to do what is 
right for our Nation and for Iraq. What is right for our Nation is to 
establish an exit strategy to bring our troops home to their families. 
What is right for Iraq is to empower them to control their own destiny.
  Mr. PRYOR. Mr. President, I wish to speak about an amendment I 
offered to the 2007 Defense authorization bill that would be very 
beneficial to the members of our Reserve Component. The amendment would 
award them 15 days of paid leave at the end of their deployment, 
provided they have been deployed more than 6 months and have been 
deployed in a combat zone. The members of the Reserves and National 
Guard face a different situation and different challenges when they 
return from combat than do those on active duty because they return to 
civilian life and civilian jobs almost immediately. In many cases I 
believe it happens too soon, primarily for financial reasons.
  The need to return to their jobs as soon as possible means Reservists 
and Guardsmen have little or no time to make what can be a difficult 
adjustment. Combat experiences may never be forgotten, especially by 
those who are not professional soldiers, but a chance to begin to do 
so, to talk to people if that seems appropriate, would be very helpful. 
Post Traumatic Stress Disorder is a very real disability. We must do 
whatever we can to help our citizen soldiers avoid it. And to help 
those who get it despite our efforts.
  The experiences of our combat soldiers are stressful at best, 
debilitating at worst. I believe 2 weeks to readjust, to spend time 
with their families, and to make whatever preparations are necessary 
would be tremendously helpful and very well deserved. These men and 
women have left their families and their jobs to serve our country 
overseas for extended periods at great personal sacrifice. Two weeks of 
paid leave would relieve the financial pressure to return to work 
immediately. I believe not only the soldiers would benefit, but so 
would the employers and coworkers. They would at long last regain an 
employee who has had time to adjust and is ready to become a productive 
worker again. So the benefits would not go solely to the soldiers and 
their families.
  This is an important amendment, one that would help soldiers, their 
families, and their communities around the nation. I believe it 
deserves to be included in the Defense authorization bill, and I ask my 
colleagues for their support.
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, last Thursday, we passed by a 99-to-1 vote 
an emergency spending bill to support our troops in Iraq and 
Afghanistan and provide relief to the victims of Hurricane Katrina. 
Unfortunately, behind closed conference doors, a key provision of both 
the House and Senate versions was stripped out--an amendment, 
introduced by Representative Barbara Lee and myself, that would bar any 
funds from being used to establish permanent U.S. military bases in 
Iraq or to control Iraq's oil.
  I voted to support our troops, though I was surprised that my 
amendment was removed in conference after not a single Senator spoke 
against it during the floor debate. By removing the ``no permanent 
bases'' amendment, we make life more difficult for our men and women in 
uniform and undercut our Nation's broader effort against terrorism. So 
I am happy that my amendment has now been accepted as part of the 
Defense authorization bill.
  It is straightforward, clear, and simple: It affirms that the United 
States will not seek to establish permanent military bases in Iraq and 
has no intention of controlling Iraqi oil. I will repeat what I said 6 
weeks ago: While it may be obvious to Americans that we don't intend to 
stay in Iraq indefinitely, such conspiracy theories are accepted as 
fact by most Iraqis. In an opinion poll conducted by the University of 
Maryland in January, 80 percent of Iraqis--and 92 percent of the Sunni 
Arabs--believe we have plans to establish permanent military bases. The 
same poll found that an astounding 88 percent of Sunni Arabs approve of 
attacks on American forces.
  Why do Iraqis believe we want permanent bases? Why do they think we 
would subject ourselves to the enormous ongoing costs of Iraq in blood 
and treasure? Do they think we want their sand? No, they think we want 
their oil. To my mind, the connection between these two public opinion 
findings is incontrovertible.

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  Before you dismiss these as simple conspiracy theories, remember what 
Iraqis have been through in the past three decades: three wars and a 
tyrannical regime that turned brother against brother and made paranoia 
a way of life. And there is a longer history, too: 400 years of British 
and Ottoman occupation have led to a deeply ingrained suspicion of a 
foreign military presence.
  These views extend well beyond Iraq. In a 2004 Pew Charitable Trust 
survey, majorities in all four Muslim states surveyed--Turkey, 
Pakistan, Jordan, and Morocco--believed that control of Mideast oil was 
an important factor in our invasion of Iraq. Our enemies understand the 
boon these misconceptions provide to their recruiting efforts and use 
them as a rallying cry in their calls-to-arms. Last year, in a letter 
intercepted by the U.S. military, Ayman al-Zawahiri, the deputy leader 
of al-Qaida, wrote to the recently killed Jordanian terrorist Abu Musab 
al-Zarqawi: ``The Muslim masses . . . do not rally except against an 
outside occupying enemy.''
  Our military and diplomatic leaders understand that countering this 
vicious propaganda requires clear signals about our intentions in Iraq. 
And they have done just this: GEN George Casey, the ground force 
commander in Iraq, told the Committee on Armed Services last September: 
``Increased coalition presence feeds the notion of occupation.'' At the 
same hearing, GEN John Abizaid, the commander of all U.S. troops in the 
Middle East, told Congress: ``We must make clear to the people of the 
region we have no designs on their territory or resources.'' In March, 
the American Ambassador to Iraq, Zalmay Khalilzad, told an Iraqi 
television station that the United States has ``no goal in establishing 
permanent bases in Iraq.''
  Unfortunately, this clarity has been clouded by mixed messages from 
the senior-most decision-makers in the Bush administration: To my 
knowledge, President Bush has never explicitly stated that we will not 
establish permanent bases in Iraq. And both the Secretary of Defense 
and the Secretary of State have left the door open to do just that. On 
February 17, 2005, Secretary Rumsfeld told the Committee on Armed 
Services: ``We have no intention, at the present time, of putting 
permanent bases in Iraq.'' ``At the present time'' is not exactly an 
unequivocal statement.
  On February 15, 2006, at the Senate Foreign Relations Committee 
hearing, Senator Kerry asked Secretary Rice: ``Is it, in fact, the 
policy of the administration not to have permanent bases in Iraq?'' 
Rather than answering the simple one word, ``Yes,'' Secretary Rice said 
during a 400-word exchange on the question: ``I don't want to in this 
forum try to prejudice everything that might happen way into the 
future.'' Just last Thursday, columnist Helen Thomas asked the White 
House Press Secretary to unambiguously declare that the United States 
will not seek permanent bases in Iraq. Again, the Press Secretary could 
not unequivocally declare this to be the case.
  These mixed messages are confusing to the American people and the 
Iraqi people alike. They feed conspiracy theories and cede rhetorical 
space to our enemies. They make it that much more difficult to win the 
battle for the hearts and minds of 1.2 billion Muslims in the world. 
Our success in that battle will determine our success in the struggle 
between freedom and radical fundamentalism. Against this backdrop, I 
believe that it is incumbent upon us to speak where the administration 
has not.
  My amendment will have no detrimental effect on the military 
operations of our Armed Forces in Iraq or their ability to provide 
security for Iraqi oil infrastructure. United Nations Council 
Resolution 1546 recognizes that the American and coalition forces are 
present in Iraq at the invitation of the Iraqi Government and that 
their operations are essential to Iraq's political, economic, and 
social well-being. In his first speech to the Iraqi Parliament last 
month, Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki endorsed that resolution. We are 
anxious for the day when Iraqis can take control of their own destiny, 
but the Iraqis are suspicious of our intentions and are growing 
increasingly impatient.
  This amendment may not in itself change a lot of minds on the ground 
or in the region, but it can mark the beginning of a sustained effort 
to demonstrate through words and deeds that we have no intention of 
controlling Iraq's oil or staying there forever. I believe it is our 
duty to do so.
  Mr. REID. Mr. President, I thank the chairman and the ranking member 
of the Armed Services Committee for working with my office and Senator 
Ensign's office on scaling back the new exceptions to the Berry 
amendment--the Buy American rules--that were ultimately included in 
this legislation. The changes to narrow the language as originally 
proposed go a long way toward addressing the concerns of the U.S. 
specialty metals industry, including titanium production in Nevada. So 
again I thank the chairman and ranking member for working with us on 
these changes.
  Still, I have concerns about provisions in this bill that were 
adopted as part of amendment 4286 on June 15 that weaken the Buy 
American provisions of the Berry amendment. I know this is not the 
intention of the Senate or the committee, but I am concerned that we 
may be opening a door to the use of foreign specialty metals in 
production of U.S. military equipment that is very dangerous, and we 
may have started down the proverbial slippery slope.
  Right now, due in no small part to the policy of the Berry amendment, 
the United States has the most sophisticated titanium and specialty 
metals sector in the world. The Berry amendment policy is good national 
policy because these are materials that a modern military must have, 
and so we need to maintain a robust domestic manufacturing capability 
to meet our national security needs.
  My starting point, then, and I know the Senators agree, is that we 
need strong Buy American provisions for purchases of specialty metals 
from the Defense Department. There have been some complaints about 
administrability--some of which are legitimate but some of which 
unfortunately I think may be driven by opponents of Buy American rules 
in and outside the administration.
  I think the legitimate concerns can and should be addressed with some 
minor tweaking and appropriately limited waivers. If material of the 
right quality or grade is not available in the United States, the 
Pentagon could exercise its existing waiver authority. We could pass 
legislation that could improve that authority. If lax enforcement has 
led to a buildup in foreign inventories, we could create a temporary 
``get well period.'' If a few off-the-shelf items should not be 
included under the Berry amendment, let's figure out what they are and 
exempt them.
  But I worry we have gone much further than that. The Senate's bill 
introduces a number of new concepts that I am not sure we fully 
understand individually, and I am very concerned we do not understand 
how all of these different concepts will interact together.
  Let me be clear about one thing. Outside of the U.S. companies, there 
is only one other worldwide producer of aerospace-quality titanium. In 
other words, one titanium company in the whole world will get the new 
U.S. defense business from weakening the Buy American provisions of the 
Berry amendment. That company is a Russian company called VSMPO. It was 
built by the Government of the Soviet Union, later privatized, and 
recently the Government of Russia has indicated that it intends to take 
a controlling share of the company.
  That is right, the Kremlin intends to take a large ownership position 
in this company. This is the same Kremlin that used access to energy 
supplies to try to bully the Ukraine as an intimidation tactic. I have 
a series of newspaper articles on VSMPO and its relation to the Russian 
Government and I will ask unanimous consent that they be printed in the 
Record.
  The administration has talked about needing to change the Berry 
amendment and has said that it wants greater ``commercial and military 
integration.'' But, I am concerned that if it is not appropriately 
narrow, changes to the Berry amendment will create greater ``Kremlin-
Defense integration.'' So if this new language would have the result of 
increasing U.S. dependence on Russian titanium producers, I think it 
would be terrible military and defense policy.

[[Page S6398]]

  I hope that as the bill moves forward, we will have an opportunity to 
take a closer look at these provisions and narrow them even further. 
Perhaps some concepts we will determine deserve to be dropped 
altogether.
  I ask unanimous consent that the articles to which I referred be 
printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                           Kremlin Capitalism


         russian car maker comes under sway of old pal of putin

a tight circle in government is drawing key industries into the state's 
                                 orbit

                       Frictions with partner gm

                            (By Guy Chazan)

       Moscow.--Last December, the head of Russia's state arms-
     trading agency emerged from the shadows as one of the 
     country's most powerful businessmen. Aided by 300 heavy armed 
     police, he took control of Russia's largest auto maker.
       His agency had no experience running a car company, nor did 
     it own any shares of this one, OAO Avtovaz, producer of the 
     ubiquitous Lada. But the chief arms trader, Sergei Chemezov, 
     had one invaluable asset: He is an old friend of Russia's 
     president, Vladimir Putin.
       Mr. Chemezov says he has known Mr. Putin since the two were 
     KGB agents in the 1980s. He acknowledges that his ties give 
     him a leg up in business. ``It means we can get a lot of 
     issues resolved fast,'' he says.
       Since being tapped in 2004 to run the arms-export business, 
     Mr. Chemezov has been using his unique access to turn the 
     state agency, called Rosoboronexport, into a conglomerate 
     with interests ranging from to oil-drilling gear to cars. Its 
     newest target is one of the world's largest titanium 
     producers, a critical supplier for Airbus and Boeing Co.
       Rosoboronexport is one of several fast-growing companies 
     headed by friends of Mr. Putin that embody his particular 
     brand of state capitalism. Across Russian industry, private 
     capital is in retreat as state-controlled entities ride a 
     wave or consolidation and confiscation to dominate oil, gas, 
     aviation, engineering and other sectors Mr. Putin deems 
     strategic.
       It's a process with strange echoes of the past. In the 
     1990s, a generation of aggressive young businessmen used 
     connections to snap up assets at rigged privatization 
     auctions. Now, some of Mr. Putin's closest associates are 
     taking advantage of their proximity to the Kremlin to build 
     up similarly huge, although nominally state-owned business 
     empires.
       Their growth worries the few outspoken advocates of market-
     oriented policies left in the top ranks of the Putin 
     government. We do not have enough ways and means to keep 
     track of state-controlled firms, many of them monopolies, as 
     they grab market assets,'' said Economics Minister German 
     Gref at a conference in April.
       Long noted for graft and inefficiency, Russian state-owned 
     behemoths increasingly have become tools of government 
     policy. In January, gas monopoly OAO Gazprom briefly shut off 
     the fuel to neighboring Ukraine in a price dispute that was 
     widely denounced as a move to punish the pro-West government 
     in Kiev. The Kremlin rejects those accusations and says big 
     state-owned companies will be subject to the discipline of 
     the market, often with some shares available to foreign 
     investors. (The government is planning an initial public 
     offering of state oil company OAA Rosneft this summer.)
       But at Avtovaz, Rosoboronexport's takeover wasn't good news 
     for General Motors Corp.'s $340 million joint venture with 
     the Russian auto giant. The change in management brought to a 
     head simmering tensions at the operation. Now there are signs 
     the entire deal, the largest foreign investment in Russia's 
     auto sector, could unravel.
       Until recently, Rosoboronexport was barely known, an 
     operation with a few hundred employees headquartered on a 
     quiet Moscow boulevard. It was, and remains, one of Russia's 
     most opaque companies: Its business activities are largely a 
     state secret. With Mr. Chemezov at the helm, however its 
     profile began to grow.
       According to Mr. Chemezov, he and Mr. Putin met when both 
     were KGB intelligence officers in Dresden, East Germany--a 
     claim the Kremlin won't comment on but one published in a 
     government-controlled magazine. Mr. Chemezov says the two 
     lived in the same apartment block and their families 
     socialized. They kept in touch after their return to Russia. 
     In 1996, when Mr. Putin got a job as a mid-level Kremlin 
     bureaucrat, he made Mr. Chemezov his deputy.
       In 1999 Mr. Chemezov moved to the arms industry. It was a 
     time of corruption and chaos. The advent of capitalism had 
     left defense factories starved for cash. Desperate to 
     survive, the mostly state-owned firms competed with one 
     another for foreign contracts, often with the help of dubious 
     middlemen.
       After Mr. Putin became Russian president the following 
     year, he took control of the trade. He formed Rosoboronexport 
     as a state monopoly to squeeze out freelance arms salesmen 
     and root out graft, staffing it with old comrades. Mr. 
     Chemezov became its deputy head and then, in 2004, its chief.
       Russian weapons exports boomed. They totaled $6 billion 
     last year, up 70% since 1999. Rosoboronexport, which takes a 
     3.8% commission on all sales, prospered.
       The agency expanded its horizons. Last year, it merged all 
     of Russia's helicopter makers, some of them privately owned, 
     into one of its subsidiaries. Now it is involved in a similar 
     effort to consolidate Russia's struggling airplane 
     manufacturers under state control.
       Chemezov's influence grew as the Kremlin picked him to 
     represent the state on the boards of a string of large 
     defense firms. But his most ambitious gambit yet involved 
     Avtovaz. The auto story developed fast last fall, ignited by 
     a meeting in the Kremlin between President Putin and the 
     long-serving CEO of the publicly held car company.


                            Down on Its Luck

       Avtovaz was built in the late 1960s in Togliatti, a drab 
     Volga River city named after an Italian Communist. In the 
     1990s the city was torn apart by mafia wars, as rival gangs 
     vying for control of the auto works staged shootouts at the 
     factory gates. The company was broke. Big profits, however, 
     were being racked up by trading firms--some linked to Avtovaz 
     management--that supplied auto parts and sold the company's 
     finished cars.
       More recently, Avtovaz has struggled to hold market share 
     as some in Russia's growing middle class switch from clunky 
     Ladas to foreign-brand cars, By mid-2005, corporate raiders, 
     some alleged to have criminal connections, were tightening 
     their grip on the big auto maker. They bought up parts 
     suppliers and dealerships, installing loyal managers and 
     acquiring shares.
       Mr. Chemezov says that when President Putin met last fall 
     with Avtovaz's chief, 64-year-old Vladimir Kadannikov, the 
     veteran auto executive said he wanted to retire. Mr. 
     Kadannikov declined to be interviewed. People close to him 
     say he didn't have much choice in his decision to leave. A 
     Kremlin spokesman said Mr. Putin doesn't fire the managers of 
     private companies.
       After consulting with aides, Mr. Putin gave Rosoboronexport 
     the task of cleaning up Avtovaz, Mr. Chemezov says.
       Moving in was a simple operation. Avtovaz's managers 
     control the auto maker through an arcane system of cross-
     shareholdings. By replacing the bosses, Rosoboronexport could 
     take charge of the company without having to buy any shares.
       First, though, the old management team had to be persuaded 
     to leave peacefully. After Mr. Kadannikov resigned in 
     October, a team of police investigators and prosecutors was 
     airlifted in to begin the process. ``To impose order . . . 
     the state had to bring in 300 policemen from outside,'' says 
     Mr. Chemezov. ``Over the next few months, we had to replace 
     virtually the entire police force, both in Togliatti and in 
     the factory itself!'' Soon, three of Avtovaz's senior 
     accountants found themselves facing charges of theft and tax 
     evasion. The charges were dropped a few weeks later.
       On Dec. 22, a tight police cordon encircled Avtovaz's high-
     rise headquarters in Togliatti as shareholders gathered to 
     elect a new board. Within half an hour, they had voted for 
     the new, state-approved slate. Most had never even seen the 
     candidates before. No alternatives were on the ballot.


                               Auto Giant

       President Putin defended the takeover. ``Let's face it, the 
     enterprise is in a bad way,'' he told reporters in January. 
     ``And if a state structure goes in as crisis manager to try 
     to improve the situation, then that's no bad thing.''
       The new bosses are pushing for $4.5 billion in state money 
     to roll out new models and build a new factory to make 
     450,000 cars a year. Some in the government want Avtovaz to 
     go further, absorbing other, smaller Russian car makers to 
     form a national auto giant. Mr. Chemezov has a personal 
     notion of how to restore the car company's onetime glory. He 
     has just announced it will build a Jeep-type vehicle for the 
     army, to be called the Kalashnikov.
       On the whole, workers appear to have welcomed the change at 
     the top. ``With the new lot, at least there's hope they'll 
     get rid of the mafia. They're the only ones who can,'' says 
     Pyotr Zolotaryov, head of Edintsvo, Avtovaz's independent 
     trade union.
       Rosoboronexport moved quickly to get control over Avtovaz's 
     lucrative sales operations. One of the first steps was to put 
     the company's Moscow office in the hands of the brother of 
     Avtovaz's new chairman.
       Then the new regime shifted a big chunk of Avtovaz's 
     financial flows, including some of its hard-currency 
     accounts, to a preferred bank. Called Novikombank, it is tiny 
     but has close links to Russia's defense industry. For years, 
     one of its main shareholders was Russia's Association of 
     Foreign Intelligence Veterans, and in the late 1990s it was 
     run by Mr. Chemezov's Rosoboronexport predecessor, another 
     old KGB hand.


                             A Spat with GM

       Rosoboronexport soon was in a spat with Avtovaz's American 
     joint-venture partner, General Motors. GM had seen relations 
     cool with the previous management team. But it was stunned in 
     February when the new bosses at Avtovaz suddenly stopped 
     supplying parts to the companies' five-year-old joint 
     venture, closing down its production line for 10 days. 
     ``There was no discussion at all about a shutdown,'' says 
     Warren Browne, head of GM in Russia. ``They took that 
     decision unilaterally.''
       Avtovaz had long grumbled that the joint venture wasn't 
     paying enough for the parts

[[Page S6399]]

     Avtovaz supplied. After tough negotiations, the sides worked 
     out a compromise that raised the price, though not by the 60% 
     that Avtovaz had demanded. But that deal expires at the end 
     of this year, and beyond that, the venture's prospects look 
     murky. ``There's still a lot of distrust on both sides,'' 
     says a banker familiar with the project. ``I think one will 
     buy the other out.''
       That would be a big blow for a pioneering project that in 
     its time put GM way ahead of competitors in one of the 
     world's fastest-growing car markets. GM took the risky step 
     of putting its Chevrolet logo on a Russian-designed car, a 
     strategy that initially paid off as Chevrolet became Russia's 
     top-selling foreign brand in 2004. After this year's tiff, GM 
     says it remains committed to the joint venture. ``It's debt-
     free, it's got cash flow and it achieved a profit a year 
     before we expected it to,'' says Mr. Browne.
       Avtovaz's new bosses are less effusive. ``When it started, 
     the venture was a breakthrough, but times change,'' says 
     Vladimir Artyakov, Avtovaz's new chairman. ``It got stuck in 
     its original format . . . and began to limp. It no longer 
     really fits into Avtovaz's strategy.'' Asked if Avtovaz might 
     seek to buy out GM, he said, ``Why not?''
       GM appears to be looking at other alternatives. It has 
     taken out an option on land in St. Petersburg for a possible 
     assembly plant there, which it would own with no local 
     partners.


                              Metals Race

       Mr. Chemezov is also on the lookout for other business. 
     He's in talks to have his Rosoboronexport buy a stake in 
     publicly held OAO VSMPO-Avisma one of the world's main 
     producers of titanium. It would become part of a big new 
     state company producing metals and alloys for the Russian 
     defense industry.
       VSMPO has just signed a $1.4 billion contract to sell the 
     lightweight metal to Airbus through 2015. It's also a key 
     supplier to Boeing. Rosoboronexport says it wants to make 
     sure not all of the country's store of the metal ends up 
     abroad. VSMPO ``is a strategic enterprise,' 'Mr. Chemezov 
     says. ``It supplies all our defense plants with titanium. And 
     naturally we want it to be . . . under state control.''
       He denies that plan would amount to nationalization, 
     although he acknowledges that the price Rosoboronexport is 
     offering is only about half the titanium maker's current 
     share price.
       As Mr. Chemezov's influence expands, the line separating 
     his different roles--civil servant and entrepreneur--is 
     increasingly blurred. ``You know, we're not really the state, 
     we're businessmen,'' he says of Rosoboronexport. ``Call it 
     state commerce.''
                                  ____


                  Russian State To Buy Stake in VSMPO

                    (By Arkady Ostrovskyin, Moscow)

       The owners of VSMPO-Avisma, the world's largest titanium 
     producer, have succumbed to advances from the Russian 
     authorities to sell a stake to Rosoboronexport, the state 
     arms trading monopoly, which is fast emerging as one of the 
     most powerful players in the Russian economy.
       While talks between Rosoboronexport and VSMPO-Avisma 
     shareholders are still going on, a decision in principle to 
     sell some of their shares to the state has been made, the 
     shareholders said.
       The company is controlled by Vladislav Tetyukhin and 
     Vyacheslav Bresht, who have transformed the former Soviet 
     military plant into a highly profitable and globally 
     competitive business. VSMPO supplies Airbus and Boeing with 
     most of their titanium, increasingly used in aircraft 
     construction because of its toughness and lightness.
       Both Mr. Tetyukhin and Mr. Bresht have previously resisted 
     attempts by Rosoboronexport to take control over the plant.
       Mr. Bresht said yesterday: ``I am ready to sell my shares 
     to the state.'' He declined to comment on the reasons for his 
     decision. Mr. Tetyukhin, said: ``The state will definitely 
     become a shareholder in VSMPO-Avisma.'' He said it was a 
     question of time, the size of the stake, and the price.
       Observers said the shareholders' decision to give up 
     control over the company was the latest illustration of the 
     Kremlin squeezing out private owners from what it deemed to 
     be strategic industries.
       It was also a sign of the growing power of Rosoboronexport, 
     which was set up to trade arms but has a licence for a wide 
     range of commercial activities.
       Last year it seized control of Avtovaz, the country's 
     largest carmaker, which it is now trying to revive.
       It has also consolidated control over Russia's helicopter 
     makers and is believed to be interested in buying large 
     shipbuilding companies.
       It emerged this week that Rosoboronexport, which has the 
     status of a state department, wants to transform itself into 
     a state-owned corporation, which would give its managers more 
     freedom.
       VSMPO-Avisma last month struck a $1.4bn deal to supply 
     between 60 and 70 per cent of all titanium consumed by 
     Airbus.
       Russia recently consolidated civil and military aircraft 
     manufacturers into a single holding company, which could 
     become a customer of VSMPO.
       Rosoboronexport wants at least 25 per cent of VSMPO, but a 
     source close to the talks said the agency was interested in 
     gaining control.
                                  ____


         Kremlin Moves to Take Control of Key Mineral Titanium

       Yekaterinburg, Russia.--The huge new Airbus A380 cannot 
     take off without it, nor can Boeing's 787 Dreamliner--
     titanium has become an essential component in modern 
     aircraft.
       The Urals contain much of the world's reserves of this 
     metal, and the Russian company VSMPO-Avisma, as the world's 
     largest producer, has closed lucrative contracts with 
     aerospace sector in the West. The fact has not gone unnoticed 
     in Moscow. After recovering control of oil and gas, the 
     Kremlin is now looking at retaking control of the metal 
     industry.
       Aircraft manufacturers in Europe and North America are 
     concerned. They fear the Russian state could exert influence 
     in the way it has recently in energy politics.
       But at VSMPO-Avisma the concern is that circles around 
     President Vladimir Putin are less concerned about national 
     strategy than about personal gain.
       With every billion dollars that flows into the Russian 
     state coffers as a result of the continuing high energy 
     prices, the Kremlin's confidence in its economic policy 
     grows.
       A few months ago Putin announced the formation of a state 
     holding company for the decaying Russian aircraft 
     construction sector. It is to fall under the arms exporter 
     Rosoboronexport.
       Rosoboronexport head Sergey Jemesov, a close Putin 
     associate, made clear to the titanium producer while on a 
     visit to the Urals that the state would not tolerate an 
     independent concern in a key strategic area of this kind.
       VSMPO-Avisma, which produced around 30,000 tons in 2005, 
     also supplies titanium for submarines, rockets and nuclear 
     power stations. VSMPO-Avisma general director and major 
     shareholder Vladislav V. Tetiyukhin believes it only a matter 
     of months before the company is sold to the state.
       ``We are currently in talks about deadlines, price and the 
     extent of the future state holding,'' the 73-year-old 
     businessman says. He does not appear happy at the prospect.
       Speaking at the company's headquarters in Verknyaya Salda 
     near Yekaterinburg, Tetiyukhin says that neither the clients, 
     such as Boeing and Airbus, nor the company's employees need 
     be concerned about the future.
       But there are other voices being raised. A manager says she 
     fears a state takeover. ``We have never seen the state 
     managing a business effectively,'' she says, pointing to 
     reports of poor management at the huge gas production company 
     Gazprom, which has effectively been renationalized over 
     recent years.
       A colleague who works in public relations agrees. ``Putin's 
     immediate circle are merely aiming at personal gain. Once the 
     president stands down in 2008, our concern will soon be 
     converted to cash,'' he believes. Western aircraft 
     manufacturers could also find that renationalization could 
     have unfortunate consequences for them.
       There are fears that Rosoboronexport could make deliveries 
     of the strong and light metal dependent on Western countries 
     buying Russian aircraft in return.
       The current owners of VSMPO-Avisma have made the 
     responsibilities clear to Rosoboronexport. ``If the new 
     managers make just one mistake, they will pay heavily for 
     it,'' says one of the main shareholders, who puts the value 
     of the concern at 2 billion euros.
       VSMPO-Avisma is unusual among Russian commodity producers, 
     as it does not export the raw materials but actually 
     processes them. With an annual turnover of 400 million 
     dollars, the company supplies around a third of world 
     titanium demand. Almost 75 percent of its production goes to 
     exports.
       In an attempt to allay the concerns of the company's staff, 
     Tetiyukhin says it is not yet clear whether the Kremlin will 
     take a majority shareholding. He has backed on principle a 
     minority holding by the state in the company which was built 
     up under the Soviet Union and then privatized during the 
     tumultuous 1990s.
       But Putin may not be satisfied with this.
       The alarm bells started ringing when the tax authorities 
     began taking a keen interest in VSMPO-Avisma and the 
     prosecution services began making ominous visits.
       Tetiyukhin sees the threat to his company as not yet 
     serious, but the example of Yukos has shown how quickly that 
     situation can change. Precisely these agencies--tax officials 
     and the prosecutors' office--acted as the long arm of the 
     Kremlin in destroying what was the largest Russian oil 
     concern and then selling it to the state-owned competition.
                                  ____


    Back in Business--How Putin's Allies are Turning Russia Into a 
                            Corporate State

                 (By Neil Buckley and Arkady Ostrovsky)

       Leaders of Russian industry, lined up under company banners 
     to greet President Vladimir Putin in St. Petersburg last 
     week, looked like soldiers standing to attention for their 
     commanding officer. Some had flown hundreds of miles for a 
     place in the parade.
       A month before world leaders fly into the city for the 
     summit of the Group of Eight industrialised nations, the 
     investment forum in Mr. Putin's home city was designed to 
     showcase Russia's economic resurgence. As top executives 
     oozed a confidence born of $70-a-barrel oil and the economic 
     recovery it has generated, the message was clear: Russia is 
     back--and is aggressively eager to use its

[[Page S6400]]

     natural resources as tools to regain its influence in the 
     world.
       Its renewed assertiveness could scarcely have been imagined 
     eight years ago when, still in the throes of its post-Soviet 
     transformation, the country defaulted on $40bn ($22bn, =32bn) 
     of debt and plunged into financial crisis.
       But the forum also displayed the new economic order in 
     Russia. Pride of place was given to the state-controlled 
     giants: Gazprom, the natural gas producer that has a market 
     worth of $225bn--bigger than Wal-Mart or Royal Dutch Shell; 
     Rosneft, the oil company about to launch a $10bn initial 
     public offering; and Russian Railways, also planning IPOs of 
     some of its units.
       Directors of these companies are intimately linked to the 
     president. Alexei Miller, the Gazprom chief executive, worked 
     with Mr. Putin in the St Petersburg mayor's office in the 
     1990s. So, too, did Dmitry Medvedev, who combines his job as 
     first deputy prime minister with chairing Gazprom, and Igor 
     Sechin, who is the president's deputy chief of staff as well 
     as Rosneft chairman. Dmitry Yakunin, chief executive of 
     Russian Railways, also forged a bond with Mr. Putin in the 
     same period.
       All are part of a network of Putin associates, either from 
     his spell in Russia's second city or former fellow officers 
     in the KGB secret police, who have quietly come to dominate 
     state-controlled businesses--and who often double up as 
     government ministers or senior Kremlin officials. Together, 
     they form the quasiboard of what might be called Russia Inc., 
     comprising the country's most lucrative assets not just in 
     oil and gas but also nuclear power, diamonds, metals, arms, 
     aviation and transport.
       The dominant force in Russia is no longer the oligarchs of 
     Boris Yeltsin's presidency, who hustled their way to wealth 
     in murky post-Soviet privatisations, then parlayed their 
     riches into political power. Mr. Putin's associates have 
     formed a new marriage of economic and political power. Add in 
     the state's resumption of control of most mass media and, 
     says Boris Nemtsov, the liberal former deputy prime minister, 
     this group has all the resources that defined the old 
     oligarchy.
       ``The 1990s oligarchs have ceased to be oligarchs and just 
     become businessmen again,'' says Mr. Nemtsov. ``Now we have a 
     chekist oligarchy,'' he says, using Russian slang for a 
     secret policeman.
       When Mr. Putin succeeded Mr. Yeltsin in March 2000, his 
     goal was to reassert Kremlin control over a chaotic, cash-
     strapped state dominated by big businessmen powerful enough 
     to shape legislation to their own advantage. Through a 1995 
     ``loans for shares'' scheme, in which some oligarchs lent 
     money for the budget in return for stakes in the most coveted 
     unprivatised businesses, and by funding Mr. Yeltsin's 1996 
     presidential election victory, they established a hold over 
     the then president.
       By helping Mr. Putin to power, they expected to hold 
     similar sway over him. But, by making high-profile examples 
     of some Yeltsin-era oligarchs, Mr. Putin radically clipped 
     the wings of the rest. Two, Boris Berezovsky and Vladimir 
     Gusinsky, fled abroad in 2000 facing fraud charges after 
     clashing with the president.
       When Mikhail Khodorkovsky, owner of Yukos, was arrested 
     three years later on fraud charges and his oil company was 
     hit with a $28bn back tax bill, it seemed to be part of the 
     same process. Mr. Khodorkovsky had shown political ambitions 
     and was financing opposition parties. It did not just open a 
     new chapter in the wielding of Kremlin power but began a 
     process of redistribution of assets that has been dogging 
     Russia's economy ever Since.
       The president has not ``liquidated the oligarchs as a 
     class'', as he once pledged--three of the big seven from the 
     1990s are still in business. Alongside the state companies in 
     St. Petersburg last week were leaders of private companies 
     including Lukoil, the energy group, and Rusal, the aluminium 
     giant.
       But Mr. Putin has made private businessmen loyal and 
     pliant. The Yukos case taught them that they held their 
     assets at the Kremlin's pleasure and became involved in 
     politics at their peril. Asked if he has had any recent 
     contacts with Mikhail Kasyanov, the former prime minister 
     turned anti-Kremlin presidential candidate, one 1990s 
     oligarch grimaces.
       ``Are you crazy? Seeing Kasyanov today would be like 
     meeting the head of the CIA in the 1970s,'' he says.
       As the Yeltsin-era oligarchs have declined, the ``state'' 
     oligarchs have emerged. One reason is Mr. Putin's propensity 
     for using trusted acquaintances or former KGB colleagues in 
     every aspect of his attempt to re-establish state power. He 
     packed the presidential administration and government with 
     them--and increasingly in his second term has given the same 
     people supervisory roles in state business.
       The second is the still largely unacknowledged policy of 
     using state businesses to reestablish Kremlin control of 
     strategic assets. Sometimes, as with Rosneft's purchase of 
     the main production arm of Yukos in 2004, or Gazprom's 
     acquisition of Sibneft from the UK-based Roman Abramovich, 
     this has amounted to a re-nationalisation of assets 
     privatised in the loans-for-shares scheme. In other cases, 
     state-controlled assets are being regrouped into national 
     champions in airlines, aviation or nuclear power (see 
     diagram).
       Andrei Illarionov, Mr. Putin's former economic adviser 
     turned Kremlin critic, says Russia's ruling apparatus has 
     turned into a kind of corporation. ``The main incentive for a 
     corporation member is the prospect of being placed in charge 
     of a state-controlled company; the size of that company's 
     financial flows is the most accurate indicator of that 
     person's place in the corporate hierarchy,'' he says.
       On the other hand, Mr. Med-vedev--a leading contender to 
     succeed Mr. Putin--tells the Financial Times: ``I don't 
     believe we're seeing any significant increase in the state's 
     participation in business.
       ``True, in a number of cases . . . state-controlled 
     companies increased their presence. Above all we're talking 
     about the energy sector. But . . . we're not talking about 
     nationalisation but about buying appropriate assets on the 
     market.''
       Dmitry Peskov, a spokesman for Mr. Putin, says he 
     ``categorically does not agree'' that a new oligarchy has 
     formed in Russia--although he makes no bones about the fact 
     that many senior officials and associates of the president 
     hold positions in state companies. The officials, he says, 
     rightly represent the state's interests. ``These people are 
     not businessmen; they don't have operational control of the 
     company.''
       As for managers such as Gazprom's Mr. Miller or Russian 
     Railways' Mr. Yakunin, he--like other senior officials--says 
     it is not unusual in Europe or North America for big 
     companies to be run by people who happen to know the 
     country's leader. ``Gas and railways are life-and-death 
     industries for a country the size of Russia,'' says Mr. 
     Peskov. ``Whether Mr. Yakunin is a friend of the president is 
     of minor importance. What is important is whether he is a 
     good manager.''
       But FT research has found Russian officialdom and business 
     to be extraordinarily intertwined. Of its presidential 
     administration, 11 members chaired six state companies and 
     had 12 further state directorships; 15 senior government 
     officials held six chairmanships and 24 other board seats. In 
     no other G8 country do ministers or senior aides to the head 
     of state or government sit on government companies' boards.
       The state has also become a big player in mergers and 
     acquisitions. Two transactions--its move to increase its 
     stake in Gazprom from 38 to 51 per cent and Gazprom's 
     purchase of Sibneft--totalled $20.21bn, or half the $40.5bn 
     value of all Russian M&A deals last year, according to KPMG. 
     Figures from the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
     Development show the public sector's share of the economy 
     rose from 30 per cent to 35 per cent last year.
       Just like the rise of the 1990s-era oligarchs, the 
     increasing role of state business and its directors has 
     important implications. It does not represent a return to 
     Soviet-era central planning. The Kremlin has embraced the 
     market--as demonstrated by the planned Rosneft IPO and its 
     move to lift restrictions on foreign investors buying the 49 
     per cent of Gazprom shares not owned by the state. But the 
     new model is a much more directed capitalism.
       Take aviation. As Chris Weafer, chief strategist at Alfa 
     Bank (owned by Mikhail Fridman, another 1990s oligarch), 
     points out, in order to recreate a national carrier, Aeroflot 
     is being reunited with several regional airlines carved out 
     of it in the 1990s. Instead of replacing its aging fleet with 
     Boeings or Airbuses, it may buy aircraft from United Aircraft 
     Corporation, the national aviation giant now being formed. 
     UAC may, in turn, buy parts from VSMPO-Avisma, a privately 
     owned world leader in titanium that also seems set to fall 
     under state control. Throw in the possibility that windfall 
     oil revenues sitting in Russia's $60bn ``stabilisation fund'' 
     could rebuild crumbling airports and the vision of state 
     capitalism takes shape.
       There are risks in such an approach. Around the world, 
     public ownership has generally been less effective than 
     private. Instead of focusing on areas where Russia has real 
     global advantages, the state might focus on propping up 
     ailing dinosaurs.
       State companies can also seek to use a compliant judiciary 
     and tax police to put pressure on targets. One leading 
     businessman says some bureaucrats see themselves as ``Robin 
     Hoods'' taking assets from private ``fat cats.'' ``This is 
     worse than in the mid-1990s, when businessmen paid courts to 
     make particular decisions,'' he says. ``At that time, 
     everyone knew that what they were doing was bad. Now, judges 
     think that by giving preference to state interests in a 
     dispute, they are doing the right thing.'' There is also the 
     danger of well-connected state managers winning favours for 
     their businesses in a way that distorts competition. The 
     leading Russian businessman warns that the state's growing 
     role ``kills initiative.''
       ``A businessman who can't rely on state orders comes up 
     with something the market needs,'' this businessman says. 
     ``But if the state starts handing out orders and money, 
     people start thinking in terms of lobbying their interest in 
     this or that government project. This requires not 
     entrepreneurial skills but lobbying skills.''
       State companies may simply attempt to cherry-pick 
     attractive private assets. One example is the pursuit of 
     VSMPO-Avisma, the privately held titanium company, by 
     Rosoboronexport, a state arms export agency headed by Sergei 
     Chemezov, another longtime Putin friend. The same group last 
     year took control of Avtovaz, the Lada car maker, and is 
     emerging as a prime mover in the new state capitalism.
       The Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs, a 
     lobby group, has raised the

[[Page S6401]]

     alarm about the government's failure to protect property 
     rights. In April it published research that concluded 
     Russia's economic model had been most favourable for 
     investment in 2002 and 2003, before state capitalism started 
     to emerge. Had the climate been maintained, it added, a real 
     investment boom would have boosted industrial output and the 
     economy could have grown at nearly twice last year's 6.4 per 
     cent. Even ministers have weighed in. German Gref, the 
     liberal economy minister, recently warned that the sheer 
     number of deals meant the government could not ``keep track 
     of state-controlled firms . . . as they grab market assets.''
       But is this asset grab the result of ideology--that state 
     control is best--or attempts by officials to line their 
     pockets? Mr. Putin himself has denied that senior officials 
     running state businesses are enriching themselves. Supporters 
     say he put trusted allies into state companies partly to 
     clamp down on corruption--notably Mr. Miller, who has 
     reclaimed $1 bn of Gazprom assets spirited out of the 
     company's control by Yeltsin-era management.
       Yegor Gaidar, the former prime minister who masterminded 
     Russia's post-communist economic reforms, says state control 
     tends to breed corruption. ``When you are the owner, you 
     don't cheat the company,'' he says. ``But when it isn't your 
     money but the state's money, being a manager you suddenly 
     find you have a lot of good friends and relatives who could 
     benefit from this money.''
       Some observers say the process could go further: state 
     managers could become owners through flotations or partial 
     privatisations that would give them the chance to buy shares.
       Most analysts agree Mr. Putin was right to break the 
     influence of the 1990s-era oligarchs, which was distorting 
     competition and deforming the development of Russian 
     capitalism. Yet rather than separating political and business 
     interests in a stable system governed by the rule of law, he 
     has created a new class of politically connected business 
     people.
       Russia risks becoming locked in a vicious circle of 
     property redistribution and mutating oligarchies. To ensure 
     they do not lose their own assets, those who have gained 
     under Mr. Putin will be prepared to use every resource at 
     their disposal to ensure the election of his chosen successor 
     in 2008.

  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I understand under the order we now 
proceed to the final passage of the authorization bill.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on the engrossment and third 
reading of the bill.
  The bill was ordered to be engrossed for a third reading and was read 
the third time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question occurs on passage of the bill as 
amended.
  Mr. LEVIN. Have the yeas and nays been ordered?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. They have not.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second? There is a 
sufficient second.
  The bill having been read the third time, the question is, Shall the 
bill pass? The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk called the roll.
  Mr. McCONNELL. The following Senators were necessarily absent: the 
Senator from Wyoming (Mr. Enzi) and the Senator from New Hampshire (Mr. 
Sununu).
  Mr. DURBIN. I announce that the Senator from Connecticut (Mr. 
Lieberman) and the Senator from West Virginia (Mr. Rockefeller) are 
necessarily absent.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Cornyn). Are there any other Senators in 
the Chamber desiging to vote?
  The result was announced--yeas 96, nays 0, as follows:

                      [Rollcall Vote No. 186 Leg.]

                                YEAS--96

     Akaka
     Alexander
     Allard
     Allen
     Baucus
     Bayh
     Bennett
     Biden
     Bingaman
     Bond
     Boxer
     Brownback
     Bunning
     Burns
     Burr
     Byrd
     Cantwell
     Carper
     Chafee
     Chambliss
     Clinton
     Coburn
     Cochran
     Coleman
     Collins
     Conrad
     Cornyn
     Craig
     Crapo
     Dayton
     DeMint
     DeWine
     Dodd
     Dole
     Domenici
     Dorgan
     Durbin
     Ensign
     Feingold
     Feinstein
     Frist
     Graham
     Grassley
     Gregg
     Hagel
     Harkin
     Hatch
     Hutchison
     Inhofe
     Inouye
     Isakson
     Jeffords
     Johnson
     Kennedy
     Kerry
     Kohl
     Kyl
     Landrieu
     Lautenberg
     Leahy
     Levin
     Lincoln
     Lott
     Lugar
     Martinez
     McCain
     McConnell
     Menendez
     Mikulski
     Murkowski
     Murray
     Nelson (FL)
     Nelson (NE)
     Obama
     Pryor
     Reed
     Reid
     Roberts
     Salazar
     Santorum
     Sarbanes
     Schumer
     Sessions
     Shelby
     Smith
     Snowe
     Specter
     Stabenow
     Stevens
     Talent
     Thomas
     Thune
     Vitter
     Voinovich
     Warner
     Wyden

                             NOT VOTING--4

     Enzi
     Lieberman
     Rockefeller
     Sununu
  The bill (S. 2766), as amended, was passed.
  (The bill will be printed in a future edition of the Record.)
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote, and I move 
to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, once again I thank colleagues for the 
unanimous vote, 96 to 0, sending a strong message to the men and women 
of the Armed Forces.
  Mr. LEVIN. We will have more to say on this after the next vote. 
While everyone is here, I thank our chairman. This is the sixth bill he 
has brought to the Senate of the United States as chairman. It gets 
better every time. It gets smoother every time. That is owed to this 
great Senator from Virginia. We will have more to say about that when 
we bring the conference report back. A lot of Members need to leave. I 
want everyone to know before they leave, this Senator is entitled to 
their thanks.
  Mr. WARNER. I thank my distinguished colleague.
  Mr. KERRY. First of all, I join in congratulating the managers of 
this bill.
  Very quickly, Senator Hagel and I had an amendment with respect to 
the pay raise of the troops. The House has raised the pay level by 2.7 
percent. In this bill, there is a 2.2-percent raise. Senator Hagel and 
I sought to equal what the House did and raise it across the board, but 
it is our understanding that the committee has made the determination, 
in consultation with people in the services, the needs of the services, 
that there is a particular problem with respect to retention of 
noncommissioned officers. Instead of taking that .5 percent 
differential and spreading it throughout the services, it is the 
intention of the committee on the Senate side to try to address the 
retention issue and put that money into noncommissioned officers.
  If that is the understanding, I think Senator Hagel and I, for that 
reason, will pull back our amendment, and we agree to support the 
position of the Senate.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, the Senator from Massachusetts is correct.
  The group that has consulted with the committee staff was the senior 
enlisted ranks. The problem rests in the senior enlisted ranks, the 
warrant officer ranks. That is where the targeted money was applied. We 
will look at it further in conference.
  I thank the Senator.
  Mr. KERRY. I thank the Senator.

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