[Congressional Record Volume 152, Number 82 (Thursday, June 22, 2006)]
[Senate]
[Pages S6324-S6401]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2007
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Under the previous order, the
Senate will resume consideration of S. 2766, which the clerk will
report.
The legislative clerk read as follows:
A bill (S. 2766) to authorize appropriations for fiscal
year 2007 for military activities of the Department of
Defense, for military construction, and for defense
activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe
personnel strengths for such fiscal year for the Armed
Forces, and for other purposes.
Pending:
McCain amendment No. 4241, to name the Act after John
Warner, a Senator from Virginia.
Levin amendment No. 4320, to state the sense of Congress on
the United States policy on Iraq.
Kerry amendment No. 4442, to require the redeployment of
United States Armed Forces from Iraq in order to further a
political solution in Iraq, encourage the people of Iraq to
provide for their own security, and achieve victory in the
war on terror.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Under the previous order, there
will be 60 minutes for debate, divided as follows: Senator Warner, 30
minutes; Senator Levin, 15 minutes; and Senator Kerry, 15 minutes.
Who yields time? The Senator from Arizona.
Mr. KYL. Mr. President, on behalf of Senator Warner, would the Chair
please advise me when I have consumed 10 minutes?
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so
ordered.
Mr. KYL. Mr. President, since last Tuesday, scores of my constituents
have called my office and otherwise communicated with us, asking a very
poignant question. Since last Tuesday, this country has mourned the
deaths of two brave soldiers who were kidnapped and mutilated and
killed, both Army PFC Kristian Menchaca, from Texas, and Thomas Tucker,
of Oregon. The question my constituents are asking me is, How on Earth
could the Senate be debating resolutions of withdrawal from Iraq in the
same week that we discovered the mutilated bodies of these two American
soldiers? Shouldn't our debate, rather, recall the famous words of
Abraham Lincoln in his Gettysburg address, ``That they shall not have
died in vain,'' and motivate us to redouble our efforts to support our
troops in carrying out the unfinished business that remains in Iraq?
There is unfinished business there, to bring to justice the people
who committed these heinous acts and to rid that country and the region
once and for all of the evildoers who support that kind of violence
against both Americans and Iraqis and who promise in the future to
commit that same kind of violence against us until they have become
victorious. These are the terrorists.
I found it interesting that one of our colleagues was arguing,
wrongly, that there were no terrorists in Iraq before we invaded the
country and eliminated Saddam Hussein. The evidence is overwhelming
that is not true. But in any event, of what importance is it, given the
fact that they are there now, mutilating and killing American soldiers
and Iraqi citizens? What do the terrorists have in mind if we pull out?
The President recently and succinctly described the plans of the
terrorists, directly quoting from a letter that Ayman al-Zawahiri, who
is the second in command of al-Qaida behind Osama bin Laden, wrote to
Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi, who recently, of course, was brought to justice
by American troops and was bin Laden's designated leader of al-Qaida in
Iraq:
Their objective is to drive the United States and coalition
forces out of Iraq, and use the vacuum that would be created
by an American retreat to gain control of that country. They
would then use Iraq as a base from which to launch attacks
against America, and overthrow moderate governments in the
Middle East, and try to establish a totalitarian Islamic
empire.
In that same letter, Zawahiri stated that the battle in Iraq ``is now
the place for the greatest battle of Islam in this era.''
It doesn't matter if we are fighting them. They are going to fight
us. The point is, they are going to fight us wherever the point of the
battle is, based upon their choosing. Today they chose that battle to
be in Iraq. In some respects, given the quality of American forces,
that is a better place for us to be confronting this enemy, these
evildoers, than waiting for them to come back and attack us in the
United States. That is why we owe so much to the soldiers and to the
sailors and to the airmen and to the Marines whom we have sent into
harm's way to confront the enemy there. We owe them not just the best
training and the best equipment and the best planning in the world to
enable them to carry out their missions but support here at home.
The question my constituents are asking me is, What message does it
send to our troops, to our allies, and to our enemies, when we begin
talk of withdrawal? You can sugarcoat it all you want. You can call it
phased withdrawal, you can call it timelines, but whatever you call it,
it pretty much amounts to the same thing.
The distinguished minority leader, as a matter of fact, said just a
couple of days ago, and I am quoting:
I think that even though we have at least two positions, I
think if you look at them closely, they're both basically the
same, that there should be redeployment of troops. It's a
question of when.
Indeed. One resolution says: Right away; it has to be done this year.
That is a time certain, this year. And another one talks about
submission of a plan with estimated dates. Dates, of course, are times
certain. Whenever they are established, you have a specific time within
which the withdrawal is to occur, whether it is in a phased way or all
at once, right next door or 1,000 miles away. The bottom line, whatever
you want to call it, is withdrawal of American troops within certain
timeframes to no longer be able to perform their mission there.
Why would you take that kind of position when there is work yet to be
done? It has to be based upon the guess that by the time that time
comes the work will be finished, that we will have done sufficient work
in Iraq and training up the Iraqi soldiers and performing, ourselves,
that we will no longer be needed. But nobody supporting these
resolutions knows that. The military commanders on the ground will tell
you that they do not know it. No one can know what the circumstances on
the ground will be by the end of 2006 or by the middle of 2007.
All wars are based upon the circumstances at a given time on the
ground. It would have been folly, for example, simply because we were
losing significant numbers of American soldiers in World War II, for
the U.S. Congress to pass a resolution, sending it to President
Roosevelt, saying you have to be out of Germany by a date certain and
you have to begin a phased withdrawal of our Pacific troops by a date
certain.
At that time, America was committed to performing the mission, to
getting the job done, to winning the war. What should the condition for
withdrawal be? Victory; the ability to say we have accomplished our
mission, we have pacified the country to a sufficient extent that we
can leave without creating a power vacuum into which the Iranians and
the Syrians and perhaps the Turks or others might come into Iraq
because of their interests in the area, not sending a message to our
allies in the region that, instead of being on the winning side, it
turned out that they chose the wrong side, the side that wanted to
leave the battlefield before the battle was won.
Think about the Iraqis who are supplying intelligence to us right
now. They have calculated that we are the winning side and that they
can give us information to help get these evildoers without fear of
retribution--that when we leave they are going to be vulnerable to
attacks by the insurgents and the terrorists who remain. They calculate
that we will stay long enough to do the job. The same thing for the 12
million Iraqi people who elected their Government and the same thing
for the
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Government that has now stood up in that country that does not want us
to leave precipitously. Yes, of course they get the message that they
have to eventually be responsible for their own security. Yes, of
course they are participating in the training of their army so that
they can eventually do this job themselves. They don't need to receive
a message from the United States that this is ultimately going to be
their responsibility.
They understand that. What we cannot do is send to the Iraqi people,
who are now very increasingly cooperating with us, send a message to
our allies in the region that they chose the wrong side, and send a
message to our American troops that we are not willing to back them all
the way to victory.
That would be the way to lose this war. It has been said many times
that the insurgents and terrorists cannot defeat our troops. The only
way they can win the conflict is if they defeat us here at home by
undermining our confidence, by undermining our credibility, and by
undermining our support for our troops.
Mr. President, this is the most serious business that the Senate
could be debating. It has to do not just with the freedom of Iraqis in
the future, or the lives of American soldiers, important as they are;
it has to do with the security of the people of the United States of
America from terrorists who are seeking places in the world from which
to operate. We need to deny them that territory and that support and,
in the process, persuade the neighbors of Iraq in the region that they
need to stay with us, to continue to get the terrorists out of their
country, continue to stop funding the terrorists, and to continue to
support our efforts, so that the words of Osama bin Laden will be
demonstrated as absolutely false. Remember what he said--that we are
the weak horse, he's the strong horse. Where did he get that idea?
Because of previous times in which we have withdrawn.
We cannot make that same mistake again. I urge my colleagues to
defeat both of these amendments when they are presented this morning.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Virginia is
recognized.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I yield to myself such time as I may
require. I thank the Senator from Arizona. He has been a very strong
voice, not only in this debate but all debates.
Once again, to me, the debate today hinges around getting this new
Government, in which we have invested an awful lot over these 18 months
in life and limb, dollars, and in every other way, up and running. It
is now running, Mr. President. I have just left a meeting with the
Secretary of Defense, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs, and General
Casey, the field commander in Iraq, who were briefing a few of us this
morning. Clearly, that Government is setting down its roots, getting
stabilized, operating as a sovereign entity. We must give them that
support and not send a signal that we are going to pull, possibly, the
rug out from under them because it is our security environment,
together with the coalition partners, that is enabling that Government
to function.
I reserve the remainder of my time.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Who yields time?
Mr. REED. Mr. President, I yield myself 5 minutes from the time
allotted.
Mr. President, we should take heed of what the Government of Iraq is
doing and saying. We should take heed of the fact that it has made
progress in establishing itself and making significant steps forward.
In this context, let me again remind my colleagues of what the National
Security Adviser for Iraq has said. He suggested we should begin
withdrawing troops by the end of this year. That is what the Reed-Levin
amendment would require. He also suggests and predicts that by the end
of 2007 most American combat forces would be out of the country. He
says, in his words:
The eventual removal of coalition troops from Iraqi streets
will help the Iraqis, who now see foreign troops as occupiers
rather than the liberators they were meant to be. Moreover,
the removal of foreign troops will legitimize Iraq's
government in the eyes of the people.
I concur with Senator Warner that we should support the Iraqi
Government, pay attention to what they are saying. I think we should
pay particular attention to what Iraq's security advisor has said. This
was not a casual off-the-cuff remark. He said it first on CNN, where he
knew he was speaking to a world audience, particularly an American one.
Then he crafted a very careful op ed opinion for the Washington Post.
If that is what one of the key leaders of the Iraqi Government is
saying, then I think that supports our efforts for the Reed-Levin
amendment.
Also, this amendment has been mischaracterized grotesquely. This is
not some arbitrary fixed timetable. This is not something where dates
mean dates specific. We say precisely that the President shall submit
to the Congress a plan by the end of 2006, with estimated dates for the
continued, phased redeployment of U.S. forces, with the understanding
that unexpected contingencies may arise. I think my colleagues
demonstrate a lack of confidence in the ability of the President,
listening to his commanders in the field to prepare an estimate of our
posture in Iraq over the next several years. There is no end point in
our amendment because we recognize, as so many others, that this
process could take an indefinite time but a time that at least could be
estimated by the President.
Let me also suggest that the Levin-Reed amendment recognizes there
will be a residual force in Iraq of American trainers, American
logisticians, and of special operations troops to seek out these
terrorists, rather than having young Americans at checkpoints who are
subject, because of a lack, apparently, of coordinated support, to
being attacked successfully by Iraqis. That mission should be done by
the Iraqis. But we cannot give up the right and capability of striking
at terrorists in Iraq. This amendment clearly states that. It is
something else, too, because we have a lot of people coming to the
floor talking about we are going to stay the course and we are going to
support them.
We have done nothing virtually with respect to nonmilitary support,
effectively, for Iraq. Where are the State Department teams? Months
ago, with great fanfare, the President announced we are going to
develop eventual reconstruction teams and put them in the provinces of
Iraq. There are only four. They lack resources, they lack personnel,
and they lack real support and emphasis. Unless we can fix some
nonmilitary aspects of the reconstruction, redevelopment, political
mentoring, our military efforts will buy us time that we will squander,
as we have squandered to date.
Now, the real test of the other side is not the rhetoric on the floor
and the slogans that you cannot ``cut and run'' and appropriately
recognizing the great sacrifices of our forces. It is coming down here
with a plan--over many years, according to them--and the resources to
support that plan--the billions and billions of dollars that we will
need over the next several years, the personnel we need in the country,
not just from our military forces but from our State Department, our
Agency for International Development, and our Justice Department. If we
are truly committed to this concept of complete victory, we need a
plan. The President has to deliver such a plan. This amendment will
require him, we hope, to sketch out that plan.
At the heart of this, it is not about satisfying the Congress, it is
about confiding in, with candor, the American people, telling them what
the risks are, what the costs are and how we are going to pay for it.
It is easy to come down here and say we are going to support our troops
and do all these things. But then 2 weeks from today, or a week from
today, we will have a bill to cut the estate tax. How do we pay for
these troops and give them equipment and reset our equipment? How do we
give resources for troops in the field and support this new Iraqi
Government? With what?
The real test of the other side will be when they come up with a plan
and with money and with resources. I believe this approach is the most
sound tactically, strategically, and politically, not to surrender but
to succeed.
I yield the floor.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator's time has expired.
Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, I am disappointed that we are considering
legislation that would force the United
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States to withdraw our troops before we have finished the job in Iraq.
It is ironic. Some of my friends on the other side of the aisle fight
over judicial nominations, they fight the President while he is trying
to protect our country, and they fight each other. Just about the only
thing they are unwilling to fight is an actual war.
Let me be clear: We got into the war committed to success, and I am
never going to allow us to cut and run.
Let me remind everyone that bin Laden inspired his followers with his
view that America was easy to defeat. Let's not do anything to confirm
his skewed vision. When we leave Iraq, let's make sure it is stable and
secure enough to defend itself.
Last Thursday, we had our first vote on pulling out the troops. We
voted on a proposal by the distinguished Senator from Massachusetts who
seeks to require the President to set a date for withdrawal by December
31, 2006. Wisely, my colleagues voted down the proposal by a 93 to 6
vote. Now that is a pretty telling vote in today's partisan atmosphere.
The minority is now seeking a scheduled phaseout withdrawal, which
would set an artificial deadline that would only encourage and embolden
our Nation's enemies. I am sure this will get more votes than the
previous proposal, but it clearly doesn't have the votes to pass, and
it shouldn't. The enemy will use this estimate and tell the Iraqi
population that the United States is leaving. This could have
tremendously harmful repercussions.
The United States clearly has a strategy for meeting this difficult
challenge in Iraq. Some of those on the other side insist on focusing
on the difficulties, while asserting that we have no strategy.
Our goal is to stay in Iraq as long as necessary, but not one day
longer.
Our strategy is to ensure that the Iraqi people have developed a
secure constitutional government that embodies a national compact
between all Iraqi groups.
And it is training their forces to provide for their own security.
We have made significant progress. The Iraqis have formed a national
government, and they are taking more and more responsibility for their
security.
In fact, Iraq has nearly 265,000 trained security forces now--
including 115,000 for defense--and that is building daily. Our troops
are serving with Iraqi units and running joint combat operations.
We also have--in conjunction with Iraqis--put Al-Qaida, the
Saddamites and the Sunni insurgents on the defensive. They spend more
time running from us than they do attacking us, although we all agree
they are still lethal.
I think it is shameful that we are even considering proposals to
withdraw our troops before the job is done in Iraq.
We have seen the cost of U.S. withdrawal before, and we should learn
from our past history.
If our Nation sets an artificial deadline for the removal of our
forces, all our adversaries need to do is husband their resources until
we leave and then emerge, possibly destroying all of the
accomplishments to date.
That is not a plan for success--that is a plan for failure.
Mr. NELSON of Florida. Mr. President, the Senate's debate on U.S.
policy with respect to the war in Iraq has been healthy. There is no
question but that every Member of this Chamber is deeply proud of
America's men and women in uniform and the magnificent job they have
done and continue to do to bring peace and stability to that troubled
land. Like all my colleagues, I want them all to come home to their
loved ones and this grateful Nation as soon as possible. But our
departure from Iraq must not leave a greater risk of terror taking hold
there. We cannot afford to leave Iraq in a condition that terrorists
could take over the country, as they did in Afghanistan before
September 11.
I have given the views of my colleagues on all sides of today's votes
careful consideration. I have concluded that I cannot support any
policy that would set an arbitrary timeline for the start, rate, or
conclusion of the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq.
The decision to drawdown American forces must be based on the
application of our military commanders' professional judgment assessing
actual security conditions on the ground. Withdrawal of U.S. forces
must be based on the objective criteria of local stability and the
capability of Iraqi forces.
Setting a timeline for withdrawal limits our Commander in Chief's
strategic options and denies our local commanders the operational
flexibility necessary to sustain progress to stability and reduce the
risks of the insurgency taking any tactical advantage.
We all pray for the safe return of every one of our men and women in
uniform, as soon as the mission of leaving Iraq in the hands of a
stable government can be accomplished.
Mr. JEFFORDS. Mr. President, all of Vermont is breathing a sigh of
relief with the return from Iraq of 350 members of the Vermont National
Guard, many of whom have spent most of the past year in Al Ramadi, one
of the hot spots of the war. We are terribly proud of the outstanding
job they have done, working in a dangerous area, attempting to root out
insurgents, bring stability to the region, and provide a climate that
will permit reconstruction and development. These brave men and women
have set their private lives on hold for a year and a half, risking
injury or death, in order to give Iraqi citizens a chance at a better
life. I thank them and all Vermonters who have served and continue to
serve in Iraq, Afghanistan and Kuwait.
Vermont has lost 23 sons in the Iraq war, one of the highest per
capita casualty rates of any State. As Task Force Saber returns, we
hold particularly close the families of those members who are not
returning: MSG Chris Chapin of Proctor, 1LT Mark Dooley of Wilmington,
SPC Scott McLaughlin of Hardwick; 2LT Mark Procopio of Burlington; SGT
Joshua Allen Johnson of Richford and SPC Christopher Merchant of
Hardwick. My thoughts and prayers are with them.
Vermont soldiers have performed admirably the job that was asked of
them. Now it is incumbent upon us to determine what our role in Iraq
should be and how that role should be carried out in the coming year.
I opposed this war from the very beginning. I did not believe the
administration's claims that Saddam Hussein was an immediate threat to
the United States, and I believed that working through the United
Nations would more effectively curtail Saddam Hussein's regime. At the
start, in 2003, our presence was welcome, and we had an important
obligation to the Iraqi people. But now we find that our presence is in
part feeding the cycle of violence that is tearing Iraq apart. Foreign
terrorists continue to be recruited to Iraq because that is where they
can attack Americans. Iraqi groups are polarized over the American
presence and how and when American forces should leave. American
military actions continue to be controversial and continue to
radicalize certain elements of the population. The newly established
permanent Government of Iraq struggles to assert its sovereignty in the
face of the heavy American military presence.
It is time that we step back and hand more of the security functions
over to the Iraqi security forces. We have been training Iraqi military
and police for 3 years. Finally, significant numbers of Iraqi units are
able to take over for American units and are doing so in many places
across the country. We owe it to them to train, equip, and support
Iraqi security forces. But the Iraqi security forces deserve the chance
to independently establish the security required for reconstruction and
development.
Sectarian violence across Iraq seems to be exacerbated by the U.S.
military presence. The presence of American forces makes it more
difficult for moderates on all sides to keep out foreign jihadists who
are anxious to alter the traditional secular orientation of Iraqi
society. The presence of American forces makes it more difficult to
shift the Iraqi national debate from conflict to the formation of a
unified and effective government. The ongoing presence of American
forces makes it harder for the new Iraqi government to take on primary
responsibility for countering insurgents in the future.
Ultimately, it must be the Iraqi people, working through their new
institutions of government, who find solutions to the religious,
ethnic, and cultural divisions that threaten to tear Iraq apart. The
Shiite majority must realize that unless it incorporates strong Sunni
representation into the
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new Government, Sunni minorities will not feel that they can count on
the protection of the Government. Kurdish groups want guarantees that
their autonomy will be respected. Smaller ethnic and religious groups
are worried that democracy means tyranny by the majority over minority
populations. The Iraqi people must devise the solutions to these
complex problems. They are not likely to look like American solutions.
Some of these solutions may not even feel right to us. But our troops
have fought for the right of the Iraqi people to decide these things
for themselves. We must step back and let them do that.
Getting American troops off the streets of Iraq will remove the sense
of occupation that currently pervades parts of Iraq and makes Iraqis
feel that their fate is not in their own hands. We may also increase
our own security by reducing our visibility in Iraq. Images of American
troops patrolling Iraqi streets continue to inflame conservative Arab
elements all over the world. The struggle against American occupation
is one of the biggest recruiting slogans for radical Muslim groups. If
we are serious about fighting terrorism, then we must be mindful of
where our own actions foster radicalism and strengthen the enemy.
I will vote for the amendment by the Senator from Massachusetts, Mr.
Kerry. The Kerry amendment calls for the withdrawal of the majority of
American troops by this time next year, leaving in place those troops
necessary to train Iraqi security forces, to conduct specialized
counterterrorism operations, or to protect American facilities and
personnel. This language would allow U.S. troops to stay in Iraq where
absolutely necessary but would bring the bulk of our troops home.
I will also support the Levin amendment, which requires that
withdrawal of U.S. forces begin before the end of this year. It calls
upon the administration to set up a timetable for the phased
redeployment of U.S. troops. It makes clear to the Iraqi Government,
the Bush administration, and the American people that we must start
getting out of Iraq. While this amendment is not as firm as the Kerry
amendment, I believe it is an improvement over the current policy of
just staying the course with no clear guidance on withdrawal.
Mr. President, we owe it to the men and women who are serving so
nobly in Iraq to not leave them in harm's way 1 day longer than is
necessary. We can and we must start drawing down the number of troops
in Iraq and bringing our people home. This is the right move for our
troops, and it is the right move for the Iraqi people. It takes
political courage to change course. It is time the Congress showed a
little courage in the face of the daily acts of valor displayed by our
troops under fire. I call upon my colleagues to rise to the occasion
and do what needs to be done. It is time to end a bad policy and focus
our efforts on the reconstruction and development of Iraq.
Mr. SARBANES. Mr. President, the Department of Defense authorization
bill for fiscal year 2007 has now been under consideration on the
Senate floor for more than a week. Much of that time has been devoted
to discussion of Iraq, which casts a long shadow over every decision we
are called to make. I regret that there has been such great
unwillingness, until now, to have this issue freely debated on the
floor of the Senate, and I commend the floor managers for allowing us
to fulfill our constitutional responsibility. If ever there was a time
for a resolute and reasoned assessment of our policy in Iraq, this is
it.
In undertaking unilateral military action to remove Saddam, the
administration chose to pursue a costly policy that has seriously
undermined our ability to focus on and deal effectively with the urgent
national-security challenges we face. Turning its back on 50 years of
bipartisan consensus on the need to work collectively and cooperatively
through multilateral institutions--a consensus that carried us through
the darkest years of the Cold War--this administration insisted on a
go-it-alone strategy that made only minimal gestures toward diplomacy.
Pushing aside the many diplomatic, economic and political resources at
his disposal, the President squandered the vast outpouring of support
that resulted from the tragic events of 9/11. His policies have divided
us not only from the vast population of the Muslim and developing
world, whose support is more important now than ever in the fight
against terrorism, but also from many of our traditional friends and
allies in Europe and Asia.
More than 3 years ago I took the Senate floor and posed this
question: ``Are we going to seek to exercise our power in cooperation,
in coordination with others, which in the current context means working
through the United Nations; or are we going to move down the path of
asserting a unilateral preemptive prerogative, in effect, asserting our
right to do what we want anywhere, anytime, to anyone?'' I say now that
the administration made a grievous mistake in pursuing the second path,
and thus today we find ourselves forced to deal with the consequences.
Mr. President, I call to the attention of my colleagues my remarks of
October 9, 2002.
Had the United States taken that more prudent course, we would find
ourselves in a different, and, I would argue, immeasurably stronger
position than we are in today. Before the invasion began, we had
investigators from the International Atomic Energy Agency on the ground
in Iraq, where they were tracking down and following up all reports of
weapons of mass destruction. U.S. and British aircraft were enforcing
two U.N.-backed no-fly zones, one to protect the Kurds in the north,
and another to protect Shiites in the south. In effect, we had Saddam
Hussein in a corner, and we were keeping him there with the blessing of
the international community.
The President chose instead to take a reckless and irresponsible
gamble. We can count up the number of deaths, we can count up the
number of dollars, we can count up the number of injuries from which
people will never recover, but none of this begins to account for the
true costs to our Nation. We have lost more than 2,500 courageous and
dedicated men and women--a tragedy for them and their families, and
also for the nation, because they represented the promise and hope of
our future. This is not to mention the tens of thousands of innocent
Iraqi civilians, women and children alike, who were caught in the
crossfire. We have diminished our standing in the eyes of the world,
and having declined to use the tools of diplomacy at our disposal, we
now find their effectiveness diminished. This military action has
clouded our vision and distorted our priorities to the point that the
entire question of national security must now be debated through the
prism of Iraq.
With our diplomatic resources focused overwhelmingly on Iraq, we have
undermined our ability to achieve national security objectives we know
to be critical. Today the challenge in Afghanistan is growing, not
receding. More than in the past, al Qaida is an international
phenomenon that adapts to local conditions, making its detection and
destruction ever more difficult. The nuclear challenge posed by Iran is
gaining momentum at the same time that our presence in Iraq
immeasurably complicates the problems of dealing effectively with Iran,
and North Korea has raised its own nuclear challenge to a new level.
Our country's standing in the world community has been diminished on
numerous fronts by the profoundly misguided invasion of Iraq and our
continuing failure to meet the goals we set for ourselves. We have
seriously undermined working relations with our traditional partners
and allies, which the President's trip to Vienna has yet again put on
vivid display. Sixteen of the original 37 members of the coalition
which the administration touted have withdrawn their troops, Japan
being only the most recent to announce its departure. Of those who
remain, only the United Kingdom has more than 5,000 soldiers on the
ground.
This is to say nothing of the toll Iraq has taken at home. There are
thousands who have been disabled by serious war-related injuries and
trauma. Hundreds of thousands of families have been torn apart by
lengthy and unplanned Guard and reserve duty, often creating
substantial financial hardship. Our National Guard, thus stretched, is
less able to render assistance in the situations it was designed to
address. We have had to divert hard-pressed resources from urgent
domestic priorities, the recovery from Hurricane Katrina among them.
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Yet the administration refuses to face these realities. When at a
hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee last fall I asked
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, referring to Iraq, ``Do you think
five years from now, some American forces will have come out?'' She
said, ``Senator, I don't want to speculate.'' Even when asked, ``What
about 10 years from now?'' she refused to rule out the prospect that
our troops would still be on the ground in Iraq. Her response revealed
the administration's adamant refusal to think through to the
consequences of the action, which has characterized our policy in Iraq
from the beginning.
It is long past time to face the situation squarely and undertake a
fundamental redirection of the policy before more damage is done. The
war not only has taken a terrible toll in terms of lives and hopes for
the future; it has diverted our attention from the real and urgent
threats to our national security and compromised our ability to deal
with them. We should not be pursuing an open-ended commitment in Iraq.
It was a war that need never have begun. By failing to offer to a
viable strategy to bring it to an end, the administration does a grave
disservice to our Nation.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, in fairness, we should give the sponsors
of the Kerry-Feingold amendment the opportunity to speak to the Senate.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Who yields time?
Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I ask to be informed when I have
consumed up to 7 minutes.
Mr. President, I thank my colleague from Massachusetts, Senator
Kerry, for working together with me so well on this very important
amendment. We understand that we are not going to get a majority. We
know we are not going to get anywhere near a majority. The Senator and
I know we represent the view of a majority of the American people,
which has clearly been demonstrated in every indication, whether it be
conversation, polling, or town meetings that I hold in Wisconsin. The
people of this country know that we have to finish this Iraq mission,
that it cannot be open-ended.
To me, the most touching moment of the debate came when the senior
Senator from Massachusetts quoted his own brother, Robert Kennedy, who
for many of us was a central figure who inspired us to go into
politics. I hope he doesn't mind my repeating Robert Kennedy's words in
1968:
Past error is no excuse for its own perpetuation.
That is what the Iraq situation represents. Let's be clear. Every one
of us, as the Senator from Massachusetts pointed out last night, voted
for the Afghanistan invasion. We did not think that was a mistake. I
ask my colleagues on the other side, if they believe we believe in cut-
and-run, why aren't we trying to cut-and-run from Afghanistan? Why is
no Senator saying: Let's get the troops out of Afghanistan, as
difficult as it is? Because that was not a mistake, because that was
essential, because we had to go after the Taliban and al-Qaida. It was
not a mistake.
What is a mistake, though, is to continue indefinitely the Iraq
invasion and Iraq situation with some 138,000 troops, without any
realization or recognition that it is sapping our strength, it is
sapping our credibility around the world, and it is sapping the
resources of our military. It is sapping the recruitment ability of our
military. In other words, it is weakening America.
At the same time, as I mentioned on the floor yesterday, the
situation appears to be slipping in places where we know al-Qaida was
operating--such as Somalia or Mogadishu, now taken over by a radical
Islamic government. We are trying to work with Indonesia's Government,
but the fact is, in the area between the Philippines and Malaysia and
Indonesia, there is an ungoverned area where groups sympathetic to al-
Qaida are operating. This is a threat of the exact kind that 9/11
represents, and we know they have successfully pulled off attacks in
Indonesia.
Perhaps most compelling to me is the fact that we are losing ground
in Afghanistan because we have stopped paying attention to the No. 1
priority in the fight against terrorism.
Let me quote from the Washington Post article from June 20, entitled
``In Tribal Pakistan a Tide of Militancy.'' It says:
In north Waziristan, barbers are ordered not to shave off
beards, and thieves have been swiftly beheaded. In Swat,
television sets and VCRs have been burned in public. In Dir,
religious groups openly recruit teenagers to fight U.S.
forces in Afghanistan. In the Khyber area, armed squads have
burst into rooming houses, forcing people to pledge to obey
Islamic law.
. . . A tide of Islamic militancy is spreading across and
beyond the semiautonomous tribal areas of northwest Pakistan,
that hug the Afghan border.
. . . Observers say the army's aggressive efforts since
2004 have backfired, alienating the populace with heavy-
handed tactics and undermining the traditional authority of
tribal elders and officials.
How did we lose focus on those who attacked us on 9/11? Does it make
sense to continue to pour virtually all our resources into an Iraq war
that is not working? It is time to tell the Iraqis that we have done
what we can do militarily, that we will continue to help them in many
ways, and we will continue to have special operations forces capacity
in that region to take on situations, such as the al-Zarqawi situation.
But the notion of continuing to put all of these resources just into
Iraq on the absurd notion that that is the key to the fight against al-
Qaida is one of the worst mistakes in American foreign policy history.
This is an enormous disservice to the American people, and it is
especially a disservice to the families of those who have died, those
who have been injured, and those who continue to serve. We owe it to
those families to not be standing here when No. 3,000 soldier has died.
It doesn't have to happen. It doesn't have to be. What is happening now
is a horrible situation, not the imagined problems that the other side
continually suggests will occur if we have a reasonable program to
bring this to a conclusion within the coming year.
Mr. President, how much time have I consumed?
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator has consumed 5 minutes.
Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I have been a legislator for almost 25
years now. I must say, this is one of the toughest moments of my
career, to see the Senate not recognize that we were falsely led into a
war, that we falsely led the American people into believing this had
something to do with 9/11, and that many of the things that have
happened simply didn't have to happen. That is water over the dam.
What has happened after the mistake was made is that mistake after
mistake has been compounded. Every day this myth that somehow Iraq is
the central focus of the war on terrorism is being used as an excuse to
send more and more Americans into harm's way, which is not necessary.
Iraq is not the be all and end all of our national security. Iraq is
not the situation that led to 9/11. The American people know it. It is
time for this body to catch up and have a reasonable plan to finish the
Iraq mission so we can focus on those who attacked us on 9/11.
I reserve the remainder of our time.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Ms. Murkowski). Who yields time?
Mr. LEVIN. Madam President, how much time remains?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. There is 8 minutes 15 seconds remaining.
Mr. LEVIN. How about Senator Warner's time?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Senator Warner has 18\1/2\ minutes remaining.
Mr. LEVIN. Senator Kerry will go next.
Mr. WARNER. My understanding, Madam President, is that Senator Kerry
has approximately 7\1/2\ minutes; is that correct?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Massachusetts has 7 minutes
15 seconds.
The Senator from Massachusetts.
Mr. KERRY. Madam President, this is obviously the most important
issue facing the country today. I listened to my colleagues on the
other side try to make this a debate about something that it is not
about.
All of us support the troops. The only question here is how do we
most effectively support them. The best way to support the troops is to
get this policy right. That is how we support the troops.
There is nothing more disappointing than being a troop in the field
and see you are doing missions that don't
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make sense or that the overall strategy doesn't make sense. And the
record here--as the Senator from Wisconsin has said in quoting Robert
Kennedy about past error justifying a perpetuation of the same--the
record here is not good.
Prediction after prediction after prediction has been wrong. Policy
choice after policy choice after policy choice has been wrong. Young
men and women in the U.S. Armed Forces have been wounded and killed
because of bad policy decisions, and it is not enough to come to the
floor of the Senate and insist: Oh, we have to stay the course because
otherwise what our troops are doing would be lost or be in vain.
What would be lost and be in vain is not to look at and think about
what is happening over there and to adjust appropriately. Our troops
want us and deserve for us to get this policy right.
What Senator Feingold and I are offering, along with Senator Leahy
and Senator Boxer, is a plan that gets it right, that helps us get on a
path where we demand accountability and where we still support Iraq.
Sure, we can muddle along on this course. None of us have come to the
floor and said the cause is lost. None of us have suggested that we
just have to walk away and leave chaos. That is not what this plan
does. This plan honors the investment of our troops, and, in fact, what
it does is provide a better way of not only empowering the Iraqis but
of empowering the United States of America to fight a more effective
war on terror.
Let me say it plainly. Redeploying U.S. troops is necessary for
success in Iraq, and it is necessary to be able to fight a more
effective war on terror. That is why we put this program forward.
Our amendment requires redeployment of American combat forces with
important exceptions. At the end of the year, if, in fact, it is
necessary to continue to train in order to stand up the Iraqis, we
allow for that. If we need to continue to fight al-Qaida because we
haven't destroyed it completely in the next year, we allow for that.
And we allow, obviously, for the protection of American facilities and
forces. There is no other reason to be in Iraq a year from now, other
than standing up the Iraqi forces or chasing al-Qaida or protecting our
facilities.
So, in fact, what we are providing for is exactly what our policy
ought to be, but it begins the redeployment because the fact is--and
our generals have said it and every expert has said it--the large
presence of American forces in Iraq is contributing to the insurgency.
Why on Earth would Senators want to come to the floor and argue,
Let's just stay the course and do the same old thing, when our own
generals have told us the same old thing is part of the problem, the
same old thing is attracting terrorists, the same old thing is losing
us allies, the same old thing is costing us unbelievable sums of money
and costing us lives unnecessarily?
Our plan believes there is a better way to fight the war on terror
and a better way to be successful in Iraq. It is different from what
Senator Levin and others are offering, but it is not different in that
it has every component of the plan they offer.
I have heard some Senators say we don't have a plan. We have exactly
the same plan that is in the Levin amendment except we go further. We
maintain an over-the-horizon force to protect our security interests in
the region.
In addition to that, we have a date, and it is binding. I don't
believe at this point in time that our troops are well served by only
having a sense-of-the-Senate resolution. We ought to make policy. We
helped make policy that put them there, and we ought to help make the
policy to help get them out of there.
Let me also be clear about this, Madam President: This plan continues
support for Iraq. There is no drop dead, no depart, no ultimatum. It
gives them a deadline to stand up, but it provides the President the
ability to continue to train if that hasn't completely happened. The
fact is, this amendment permits us to accomplish the job.
General Casey has said--how many times does the commanding general
have to say it?--this war cannot be won militarily. The only way to do
this is to bring parties together and resolve the political differences
that are feeding the insurgency.
How much time do I have remaining?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. There is 2\1/2\ minutes remaining.
Mr. KERRY. Madam President, the National Security Adviser of Iraq
said it this week. How many of our colleagues came over to the Senate
the other day and argued about the sovereignty of Iraq? I am for the
sovereignty of Iraq. The sovereignty of Iraq is respected by respecting
what they are saying about themselves.
Prime Minister Maliki says they will be able to take the security of
16 out of 18 provinces by the end of this year. Let's honor that. Prime
Minister Maliki said getting our troops out will, in fact, legitimize
the Government, it will help them. Other Iraqis and Sunnis have said
that. Madam President, 94 percent of the Sunnis say the United States
should set a timetable; 90 percent of the Shia say the United States
should set a timetable. Are the Iraqis cutting and running on
themselves by saying that? Of course not.
All these comparisons with World War II are absolutely ridiculous. Of
course we wouldn't set a date when we are fighting a uniformed force
that has invaded other countries and we can understand how to do it.
But this is not a uniformed force. These are terrorists and these are
insurgents and these are criminals. These are people whom we need to
fight differently. And when our own presence is adding to their ability
to recruit, if we are going to be smart, we ought to think about how we
are going to turn around and fight differently.
I remember what it was like when we fought in a war where we were
bound by a policy without thinking about how we could change it and be
more effective. An awful lot of lives were lost as a result of that
when policy leaders failed to change the policy and do what was
necessary to win.
If the Iraqis themselves keep talking about a timetable and only
deadlines have worked up until this point--the deadline for the
transfer of authority for the provisional government, a deadline for
the Constitution. The Iraqis wanted to let it slip. We said no. We held
their feet to the fire. They did the Constitution. It was the same
thing with the elections. We set a deadline. We said the date will be
now. They wanted to let it slide. We said no. They held the elections.
I believe it is a more effective way to put America in a position of
strength, in a position to fight the war on terror in Somalia, in
Afghanistan, and in the other places of the world where al-Qaida is
growing. Iraq has been a diversion from the real war on terror, and
Iraq has weakened the United States in the world. We deserve to take a
position that supports our troops by getting this policy right.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's time has expired.
Who yields time? The Senator from Virginia.
Mr. WARNER. Madam President, before we start on the next speaker, as
I understand it, the standing order recites that the Levin amendment
would be the first vote. If I understand the request of the
distinguished colleague from Michigan, there is a preference to have it
switched so that the Kerry vote will be first. Is that a request being
propounded?
Mr. LEVIN. The Senator is correct. I asked both Senators Kerry and
Feingold as to what their preference is. They do prefer to go first.
That is fine with me, if it is OK with the manager of the bill.
Mr. WARNER. Madam President, there will be no objection on this side
to that request. So for the advice of all Senators, the first vote that
will occur will be on the Kerry-Feingold amendment to be followed by
the Levin-Reed amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Who yields time?
Mr. WARNER. I yield such time as the distinguished Senator requires.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona.
Mr. McCAIN. Madam President, I rise once again to oppose the
amendment offered by the Senators from Michigan and Rhode Island and
the amendment offered by the Senators from Massachusetts and Wisconsin.
Before I speak about the problems I believe to be inherent in these
amendments, I would like for a moment to discuss the nature of the
debate upon which this body is engaged.
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The discussion over this war is perhaps the most consequential debate
the Senate will engage in this year or perhaps in several years. The
outcome of the war will impact the stability of the Middle East and the
nature of U.S. foreign policy for a generation. It is that important.
So our debate in this Chamber should be a serious weighing of the
arguments. Sometimes, unfortunately, the debate seems to have
deteriorated into sloganeering, but overall, I think this debate has
been very helpful.
I reiterate the fact that we should respect the views of those who
disagree with us. I respect and have known my colleagues who are
sponsors of these amendments, and I believe that a good, healthy,
strong debate is what this Nation needs. In that spirit, I would like
to discuss again my strong opposition to the two amendments.
By calling for a withdrawal of American troops tied to arbitrary
timetables rather than conditions in country, these amendments
literally risk disaster for our intervention in Iraq.
Madam President, the Iraqi security forces, I say to my friends, are
clearly unable to maintain security on their own. All one has to do is
look at every news story every morning or every evening. Even with the
presence of coalition forces in Iraq today, the violence and
instability remain at unacceptably high levels. To abandon the
fledgling Iraqi Army and police to the insurgents, the militias and the
terrorists would risk chaos in Iraq, and chaos in Iraq would mean
disaster.
Madam President, there is an old line about those of us who ignore
the lessons and mistakes of history are doomed to repeat them.
Afghanistan is the classic example of what could happen in Iraq. After
years and years of incredible assistance to those who were seeking
freedom from the then-Soviet Union occupation of Afghanistan, the
Russians were driven out. Then, incredibly, the United States of
America totally disengaged--totally disengaged--from Afghanistan. I
commend to my colleagues a book called ``Ghost Wars'' by Steve Coll
which won a Pulitzer prize. And in that vacuum, of course, came the
Taliban, and the Taliban then obviously was not only a terribly
oppressive, brutal, and cruel regime but became a hotbed of training
for terrorists, al-Qaida and others.
It is clear to me that if we abandon Iraq to that same chaos, there
is no doubt who would come to power, at least in some parts of Iraq,
and the consequences we would pay for that.
We watched Afghanistan descend into chaos. There continues to be much
debate about Saddam Hussein's connections to terrorists before our
invasion, but there can be no doubt about the centrality of this
conflict on the war on terror today. A failed state in Iraq would pose
a clear, present, and enduring danger to the security of our country.
Now, the sponsors of these amendments seem to base them on a premise
that if we begin withdrawing, the Iraqi Government will somehow get
serious and fight the insurgency on its own without our help. That
makes the assumption, incredibly, that the present Government in Iraq
and the military who are out there fighting all the time and their
police are somehow not serious. Of course they are serious. They are
just not capable. It is going to take more time and more effort and, I
am sorry to say, more American sacrifice before they are capable of
assuming those responsibilities. Rather than inducing the Government to
crack down on the insurgency, beginning a U.S. withdrawal is more
likely to induce average Iraqis to join a militia for protection rather
than cast their lots with the Government.
I would also ask the sponsors of the amendments what they advocate if
we withdraw and the violence actually worsens and full-scale civil war
ensues or terrorists then enjoy a safe haven to plan attacks against
Americans and our friends. Do we then face the options only of
tolerating this situation in perpetuity or reinvading the country?
We have just one choice in Iraq, and that is to see our mission there
through to victory. What does victory mean? It is the classic reduction
and eventual elimination of any insurgency, an economy that works, a
government that functions, and a military and police that are able to
come back and eventually eliminate and destroy an insurgency. That is
the way every insurgency in history was put down. There is no peace
signing on board the USS Missouri. There are no Paris peace talks. It
is an insurgency that has to be surrounded, contained, and eliminated.
That is not to say this victory will be quick and easy. It is long
and it is hard and it is tough, and many mistakes have been made and
all of us have been frustrated by those mistakes. Many of us have been
terribly frustrated by the inflated estimates and over-optimistic
statements that so frustrated us and the American people when the
conditions don't warrant it. It is still tough today. We can't fall
prey to wishful thinking, that we can put the costs and the
difficulties and the frustrations aside by ignoring our challenges and
responsibilities. That is something we cannot do.
Madam President, I congratulate my colleagues for their participation
in this debate. The American people expect nothing less of us. I hope
we are a better informed nation and a better informed body when we
vote. It will probably not be the last time we address this issue, but
I think it has been done in a comprehensive fashion.
I would close by reminding my colleagues that it was the United
States that led the invasion of Iraq, the United States led the
occupation, and the United States, with our Iraqi partners, has the
responsibility to see this through. It will take more time, more
commitment, more support, and more brave Americans who will lose their
lives in the service of this great cause. Despite our cajoling,
nagging, and pleading, few other countries around the world will share
much of our burden. Iraq is for us to do, for us to win or lose, for us
to suffer the consequences or share in the benefits. But in the end,
there is only one United States of America, and it is to us that
history will look for courage and commitment.
I urge my colleagues to vote against this amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
Mr. WARNER. Madam President, I commend my longtime friend from
Arizona. He in a very succinct way looked at this debate in the context
of what is going on today and tomorrow and the weeks and months to come
in Iraq, but he is also looking at it in the context of the future, how
generations that follow us will look back on this chapter and moment in
history and how the Congress of the United States, hopefully, has given
support to the Commander in Chief under the Constitution--our
President--to direct the operations of the current conflicts.
The Senator also touched on how we have conducted this debate. I wish
to just repeat a few remarks of my opening remarks yesterday with
respect to my colleague from Michigan in addressing his amendment. I
said that I have studied it carefully. I did not denounce the
amendment; I said it was a serious amendment, and it is a serious
amendment. It deserves serious thought, and I, and I think others, have
given that serious thought to our colleague on his amendment. But I
strongly oppose it.
Unlike last year where I sat down and was able to work out with him a
conciliatory, bipartisan amendment which got three-quarters of the
votes of the Senate, it just, in the form he presented it, was not an
option this time. Therefore, regrettably, we approach these critically
important votes with far greater partisanship than I had hoped. I had
hoped we would have greater bipartisanship.
But my basic message to America and to my colleagues is that we have
put an enormous investment into these conflicts, both in Iraq and in
Afghanistan. We are focusing today on Iraq, but we have to look at the
others.
Madam President, 2,500-plus Americans have lost their lives and left
families and loved ones grieving, and 18,000 have survived their wounds
and are working to reestablish themselves, many going back into uniform
or having never left uniform, but remaining in, which is to their
everlasting credit, but others receiving the love and the care of their
families and their communities in which they live. There has been
enormous sacrifice. We have dollars incalculable in amounts.
Also, what we have on the line is the credibility of the United
States of
[[Page S6331]]
America. The voice of this Senate will be recorded momentarily. I am
optimistic it will be recorded in a way to support the President and
his statements that we are there to work with the Iraqi people, to
establish their democracy, which they have worked on these 18 months,
now with a permanent, unified government, and to try to let this
Government of only weeks establish itself, send its roots into the
ground, derive its strength, and begin to govern and govern fully a
sovereign nation and take on all of the responsibilities.
Both of these amendments, the amendment of the Senator from Michigan
and the amendment of the Senator from Massachusetts, would send a
message which would indicate there is some wavering, some equivocation
here at home in supporting our President, the Commander in Chief, and
that goes to the basic credibility of the United States of America,
which is on the line in these votes.
There is not one of us here who doesn't desire to have our forces
brought home at the earliest possible date, but the formulation by
which they can come home rests on the ability of this Government to
seize those reins, to establish that security, to rebuild that
infrastructure, and gain the confidence and the respect of the Iraqi
people. That is a tough job, given the strong dissent between the
various religious factions, but this Government appears to be up to it.
It must be given a chance. It cannot be crippled at this earliest stage
by messages coming from this Chamber and elsewhere that we have less
than full confidence in their ability to achieve the goals of a full
democracy in Iraq, and they are taking the reins to direct their
people. Our credibility is on the line, Madam President.
So I say to my colleagues as you approach this vote, it will be one
of the most important that you have ever cast. Future generations of
Americans will look back upon this very moment to determine if two
branches of our Government, the executive and the legislative, stood
side by side in honoring those who have given their lives, their
wounds, and the 1 million other men and women of the Armed Forces, plus
untold American citizens who, in the years of the Iraqi conflict, have
gone over and accepted the risks of serving there, be that in the
military or civilian capacities. This is a very heavy investment which
has been made by many thousands of courageous Americans to see that we
have gotten to where we are today; namely, a new government, a unity
government, and to give that government a chance to function without in
any way jeopardizing that by sending a signal that we have less than
full confidence in their ability to achieve their goals.
Madam President, how much time do I have remaining?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. There is 3\1/2\ minutes remaining.
Mr. WARNER. I reserve the remainder of the time.
Mr. LEVIN. Madam President, I yield 3\1/2\ minutes to the Senator
from North Dakota.
Mr. CONRAD. Madam President, I do not believe it is a wise policy to
set a specific date for withdrawal from Iraq. I do believe it makes
sense to begin to redeploy our forces sometime this year. Therefore, I
will support the Levin amendment. I believe that is the right policy
for the following reasons:
No. 1, our military commanders have made clear that is their
intention. In fact, the news this morning says in a headline: ``U.S.
Military to Send Equipment Home.'' The story goes on to say that the
U.S. military has begun sending thousands of Humvees and other war
equipment home as more Iraqi units join the fight. The move also
anticipates that the number of American troops in Iraq will decline.
Is anybody suggesting our military is engaged in a cut-and-run
strategy? I don't think so. It is not a cut-and-run strategy. It has
been the long-term plan to begin to redeploy this year.
No. 2, the President has repeatedly said: We will stand down as the
Iraqis stand up. Well, according to the administration, tens of
thousands, even hundreds of thousands of Iraqis have now stood up. It
is time for us to begin to redeploy. That does not constitute a cut-
and-run approach but simply common sense.
No. 3, Iraq is ultimately the responsibility of the Iraqis. We cannot
forever do the job for them. They must defend their own freedom.
No. 4, there are other priority threats that require our attention,
including the worldwide al-Qaida conspiracy, North Korea nuclear
weapons and missile development, and Iranian nuclear development.
For those reasons, I support a policy of beginning to redeploy our
forces in Iraq this year but without a specific timetable or an
arbitrary pace for reducing those troop commitments. That is the right
policy. That is the policy outlined in the Levin amendment.
Madam President, I yield the remainder of my time.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
Mr. WARNER. Madam President, I had intended to reserve a brief period
of time for the President pro tempore, Mr. Stevens, but in his absence,
I will just once again conclude.
The message today is whether we are here to uphold the credibility of
the United States of America, as stated most eloquently by our
President, as we have come to establish a new government in Iraq. That
has been achieved. It has now been 18 months since the beginning of
their elections, brave elections, followed by the establishment of a
unity government. That Government is functioning, and we must give it
an opportunity to govern.
Our President said it most succinctly upon his return from Iraq:
My message to the Iraqi people is this: Seize the moment.
Seize this opportunity to develop a government of and by and
for the people. And I also have a message to the Iraqi
people, that when America gives a commitment, America keeps
its commitment.
I yield the floor and yield back any time remaining.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan.
Mr. LEVIN. Madam President, the credibility of the United States has
been proven with the loss of lives and the number of wounded we have
suffered in Iraq. We have proven our credibility over 2,500 times
because we have lost more than 2,500 of our troops. We have proven our
credibility over 17,000 times in terms of the number of people who have
been wounded in Iraq. We have proven our credibility with hundreds of
billions of dollars to give the Iraqis an opportunity to have a nation.
It is up to them to seize that opportunity. It is up to them to decide
to make a choice. Do they want a civil war? Do they want to engage in
more sectarian battles? Or do they want to reach the kind of political
compromises which are essential if they are going to have a nation and
end the insurgency and avoid an all-out civil war?
Our credibility has been proven thousands of times and with billions
of dollars. We have given a people an opportunity that is
extraordinary. We cannot make the decision for them, whether they will
seize that opportunity. Only they can make that decision.
Last year we adopted, by an overwhelming vote, an amendment which
said that 2006 would be a year of significant transition, with Iraqi
security forces taking the lead for the security of a free and
sovereign Iraq, thereby creating the conditions for a phased
redeployment of U.S. forces in Iraq. Similar to last year's sense of
the Congress, this year's sense of the Congress that we are offering is
an attempt to change our policy from one of an open-ended commitment--a
policy that, as the Secretary of State put it, we are there as long as
they need us; as the President of Iraq, Mr. Talabani, put it, the
Americans will stay with all the forces that we want for as long as we
want them. That is a recipe, a formula for dependency. It is not the
way in which Iraq can learn that it must, on its own, in a reasonable
period of time, with reasonable notice and consultation, begin to ween
itself, as General Casey put it, from overdependence on the American
military.
That is the issue. That is what our amendment would urge the
President to do. Our amendment does not order the President, as some on
that side have actually put it. This is a sense of the Senate. This is
something where we, the authors of this amendment, believe that we have
a responsibility to use our best efforts to give our best advice as to
what our policy should be. It is not a policy of immediately
redeploying forces. There is not a precipitous nature to this
amendment. It says
[[Page S6332]]
by the end of this year, in the next 6 months, to begin the phased
redeployment of American forces from Iraq.
That is what the Iraqis say their policy is. That is what their
security adviser says their policy is. Their own security adviser, Mr.
Rubaie, in the Washington Post 2 days ago said: We envisage the U.S.
troop presence by year's end to be under 100,000. That is a
redeployment of 30,000 troops. Our amendment tells the Iraqis: Stay
with that. Stick to that policy. It is the right policy. You must take
over your own nation and make it work and make it happen.
Then Mr. Rubaie, the National Security Adviser of Iraq, in a written
document presented to the American people through our newspaper, says
that ``the removal of coalition troops from Iraqi streets will help the
Iraqis who now see foreign troops as occupiers rather than
liberators.'' He says, ``The removal of foreign troops will legitimize
Iraq's government in the eyes of its people.''
Our amendment urging the President to end an open-ended commitment of
our troops to Iraq and to begin the redeployment by year's end is a way
of implementing what the Iraqis themselves have said they plan on
doing.
All Senators want Iraq to end as a success story, every one of us.
There is not one Senator who wants anything other than to maximize the
chances of success in Iraq. No matter how we voted on the original
resolution authorizing force, every one of the 25 or so Senators who
voted against that resolution--and I am one of them--wants to maximize
the chances of success in Iraq. But to do that, we must prod the Iraqis
to take the responsibility for their own nation.
I thank the Presiding Officer and my dear friend from Virginia for
the way in which this debate has proceeded. I hope we have made a
contribution to the Senate and to the Nation.
Mr. WARNER. Madam President, the order requires that the votes be
taken. I ask for the yeas and nays on both amendments.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is in order to seek the
yeas and nays on both amendments.
Is there a sufficient second?
There is a sufficient second with respect to both amendments.
The yeas and nays were ordered.
Mr. WARNER. At this time, the parliamentary situation is leader time,
and I yield the floor to the distinguished Democratic leader.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Democratic leader is recognized.
Mr. REID. Madam President, I would be certainly amiss if I didn't
extend my appreciation for the civil nature of this debate to two of
the Senate's finest, the distinguished Senator from Virginia and the
distinguished Senator from Michigan, two of the finest the Senate has
ever had. I thank them both very much for the civil nature of this very
contentious debate.
Mr. WARNER. I thank our colleague.
Mr. REID. ``That we are to stand by the President, right or wrong, is
not only unpatriotic and servile, but is morally treasonable to the
American people.'' Let me repeat that. ``That we are to stand by the
President, right or wrong, is not only unpatriotic and servile, but is
morally treasonable to the American people.''
That was Republican President Theodore Roosevelt who said that. It is
an appropriate quote for the Senate to hear before we vote.
Today we will decide on a way to move forward in Iraq. I speak in
support of the Levin-Reed amendment. I believe it is long past time to
change course in Iraq and start to end the President's open-ended
commitment. It is time for sound policy, not more tired slogans
designed to distort the facts and divide the American people. It is
time for a strategy that honors the brave service of our troops. A
majority of Americans recognize that we need a new strategy in Iraq. I
am hopeful a bipartisan majority of this body will agree.
Almost 4 years ago, we stood in this Chamber debating whether to give
the President the authority to go to war in Iraq. Much has happened in
Iraq since that fateful day, at a great price to our troops, our
taxpayers, our country, and our security. The Iraq war will soon become
the longest conflict in this Nation's history, longer than World War
II, a war in which we fought across Europe, North Africa, and the
Pacific. My own State of Nevada, a small, sparsely populated State, has
paid an enormous price in this war. We have lost 39 soldiers in Iraq
and Afghanistan, most of them in Iraq. That is 39 fathers, brothers,
uncles, sons, daughters, and aunts who will never come home. Thousands
of other Nevadans have sacrificed as well. Last year 70 percent of the
National Guard of Nevada was deployed. These Nevadans deserve to know
their sacrifices will be honored. They deserve to know their Government
has a plan for success in Iraq that honors our troops and completes the
mission. Just as important, they deserve an honest debate, not
political slogans and not a President and a Republican Congress content
with no plan and no end in sight.
Today the real choice facing this body is a choice between doing
nothing, the so-called ``stay the course'' option the President and his
supporters advocate, or changing the course and providing our troops
and the Iraqi people a way forward. After 4 long years, more than 2,500
Americans have died, thousands have been grievously wounded. Hundreds
of billions of dollars have been spent and threats ignored around the
globe. Congress needs to offer a new direction. I believe we need to
signal to the Iraqi Government that our patience and our presence in
Iraq are not unlimited. We need to say to President Bush: You need a
plan for the Iraqis to take responsibility for their own country, their
own security, so that the phased redeployment of U.S. troops from Iraq
can begin by year's end.
Robert Taft, a great Republican Senator, said:
Criticism in time of war is essential to the maintenance of
any kind of democratic government.
Senator Taft was talking about World War II. But his words still ring
true. There is nothing careless about pointing to the President's
mistakes and missteps in Iraq. In fact, we must. His misjudgments have
made America less safe. From the outset, administration blunders
increased the costs and risks of confronting Saddam Hussein and
securing Iraq: The administration built its case for war on faulty and
cherry-picked intelligence. Smoking guns would become mushroom clouds.
Al-Qaida and Saddam had a dangerous alliance. Nuclear weapons materials
were flowing into Iraq from Africa. We could invade Iraq without
diverting resources from the ongoing war on terror. The Iraq war would
be over quickly, and the costs would be covered by the proceeds from
Iraqi oil sales.
All these assertions, every one of them, turned out to be false. By
the start of 2003, U.S. troops and intelligence assets had already been
diverted from the hunt for Osama bin Laden in order to prepare for an
attack on Iraq. The President's war plan turned out to be as deficient
as the prewar intelligence. He rejected the Powell Doctrine's key
tenets: No. 1, that military force should be used as a last resort; No.
2, that force, when used, should be overwhelming; and No. 3, that there
must be a clear exit strategy from the conflict. And he rejected the
advice of his senior military commanders who called for 4 to 500,000
troops, a recommendation that was based on years of hard-learned and
costly lessons.
As a result, after the Iraqi Government fell, there were not enough
forces to pacify the country, to control looting, to guard the ammo
dumps, to secure the borders, and to restore civility. The seeds for
the insurgency and the sectarian warfare that would soon plague Iraq
had been sown. But this didn't stop the President from donning a flight
suit and landing on an aircraft carrier to declare ``mission
accomplished'' in May of 2003, more than 2 years ago.
Since that date, 95 percent of our casualties have occurred in Iraq--
since the ``mission accomplished'' performance on that aircraft
carrier.
Meanwhile, his viceroy in Baghdad continued to execute a series of
disastrous decisions, including disbanding the Iraqi Army, purging the
Government of all Baath Party officials, and delaying the training of
Iraqi security forces. These early missteps had far-reaching
consequences that our troops must live with.
Three and a half years after the start of the war, there is still not
a single Iraq Army battalion that can operate
[[Page S6333]]
independently--not one. On the reconstruction front, things aren't any
better. The President who campaigned on the pledge not to do nation
building unfortunately stuck to that pledge. From the start, the
rebuilding effort was plagued in Iraq by massive corruption and
contracting abuses. The American taxpayer and the Iraqi people have
paid the price.
Power, water, and oil production all soon slipped below prewar
levels. Today, oil production is still 400,000 barrels per day below
prewar levels. And the availability of electricity in Baghdad dropped
from 16 hours a day prior to the war to its current average of 4 hours
a day.
These Bush administration missteps have reduced Iraqi support for our
presence and fueled anti-American sentiments and insurgent activity. As
a result, the mission of our troops has become more difficult and
certainly more dangerous.
At the same time the President was sending too few troops for the
mission in Iraq, he even failed to provide those he did send--those
valiant troops--with armor and equipment which they need to do the job.
Military families already stretched and burdened from multiple
deployments were forced to buy armor and ship it to their loved ones
serving in Iraq.
They went out and bought equipment and sent it to their loved ones
because the military wasn't providing it. Combat units had to jury-rig
vehicles with scrap metal in order to get some extra degree of
protection from the improvised explosive devices--and understandably
so.
A study by the Marine Corps last year found that 80 percent of upper-
body fatalities could have been prevented with proper armor. The
greatest military in the world should not have to depend on scrap metal
from Iraqi junk yards to protect its troops.
Meanwhile, security problems in Iraq grow more dangerous every day.
In April and May of this year alone, more than 160 U.S. troops have
been killed in Iraq. Weekly insurgent attacks are higher than they have
ever been. At least five troops were killed in Iraq yesterday. We don't
know the exact number, but at least five were killed yesterday.
The country has become what is was not before the war--a training
ground and a launching pad for acts of international terror.
The killing of terrorist Zarqawi was a step forward. But as we have
seen, the killings have not ended. Sectarian violence has not ceased
because the Iraqi Government has failed to make the political
compromises necessary to create a stable government that can provide
for the security of its people--people taken from buses, kidnapped, and
likely will be killed.
That is only part of what happened last night in Iraq. I recall
vividly when the Senate paused for a moment of silence when we reached
the grim milestone of 2,000 U.S. military killed in Iraq. But just last
week on a date that arrived far too quickly, we paused again to honor
the now 2,500 who have given their lives. And, of course, that figure
has since passed and there is more.
The Senate has an obligation to our troops and their families to do
everything we can to delay indefinitely the next milestone. Are we
going to have a moment of silence for 3,000 of our best?
Twenty-five hundred dead Americans is not ``just a number,'' as Tony
Snowe, the President's spokesman, said. These 2,500 are sons,
daughters, mothers, fathers, husbands, and wives. They are PFC Thomas
Tucker and PFC Kristian Menchaca, whose mutilated bodies were found in
Iraq yesterday. These aren't just numbers.
We owe it to these troops and all of our forces serving in Iraq to
develop a sound policy. We hear a lot of rhetoric about ``supporting
the troops.'' But the best way we can support them is with a smart
strategy--not with more rhetoric or slogans. That is why the Levin-Reed
amendment is so important.
The Levin-Reed amendment recognizes that it is time to transform the
U.S. mission in Iraq and to begin the responsible redeployment of U.S.
forces this year. It builds upon the bipartisan Senate amendment which
we passed overwhelmingly last year calling for ``2006 to be a year of
significant transition in Iraq.'' With the midpoint of 2006 upon us,
that transition must begin.
The open-ended commitment advocated by the President and the
majority--that is the Republicans in this body--is not the way to get
the Iraqis to assume responsibility for governing and securing their
country. They have trained 287,000 troops.
The Levin-Reed amendment recognizes that there are only political
solutions remaining in Iraq, not military solutions. This amendment
rightfully focuses on the need to reconcile the sectarian differences,
to regionalize the U.S. strategy, and to revitalize reconstruction
efforts.
Passage of this amendment would chart a new course, one that is well
balanced between the military, the political, the regional, and the
international solutions. An open-ended commitment is not sustainable,
and the American people know that.
The war is now costing the American people every month upwards of $2
billion--$500 million each week. The military has been stretched so
thin, with every available combat unit of the Army and Marine Corps
serving multiple tours in Iraq.
This war is not a matter for ``future Presidents'' as President Bush
said. It is his war. It is the war of President George Bush. And the
time to act is now, for as we are bogged down in Iraq, the threats to
our freedom around the world only grow.
An open-ended commitment in Iraq hurts our ability to address other
national security challenges around the world. While beginning the
phased redeployment this year will allow many of our troops to come
home, it will also permit the President to redeploy forces so they can
deal with other crises such as we now have in Afghanistan--where four
or five were killed yesterday--where the resurgent Taliban threat must
be eliminated and Osama bin Laden must be finally captured or killed.
I watched the floor debate yesterday. The majority, instead of
offering their vision for the future in Iraq, or even speaking to the
merits of the Levin-Reed amendment, chose to resort to a familiar
playbook straight from Karl Rove's book of partisan political tricks.
They have engaged in these cheap political attacks saying Democrats
want to ``surrender'' and ``cut and run.'' Not only are these attacks
baseless, but they won't help Iraqis--and they certainly won't help our
troops who are right now lugging 70-pound packs in 100-degree heat
while trying to avoid roadside bombs and snipers.
The Republicans in the Senate stand alone, insisting on ``no plan and
no end.'' It isn't a position shared by the American people, and it
isn't even a position shared by our military leaders.
On today's morning news, it is reported that General Casey, commander
of U.S. forces in Iraq, has stated that thousands of troops will likely
be redeployed by year's end. That is General Casey.
To my Republican colleagues, is General Casey surrendering? To my
Republican colleagues, is General Casey cutting and running? To my
Republican colleagues, is General Casey admitting defeat? I think not.
Over at the White House, we see similar partisan games. The
administration continues to mislead the American people. The Vice
President continues to insist the insurgency is in its ``last throes,''
despite the headlines we read every day. The President continues to
insist that we will ``stand down when Iraqis stand up.'' That has yet
to occur.
It is time to change from the slogans, the attacks, and the continual
misleading nature of this administration as it relates to the war in
Iraq. Demanding a change of course is not irresponsible, it is not
unpatriotic, it is the right thing to do.
Edward R. Murrow said:
We must not confuse dissent with disloyalty. When the loyal
opposition dies, I think the soul of America dies with it.
For all of those troops who are serving on their third and fourth
tours of duty, for those who have served on their first and second
tours of duty, for all those Iraqis who want to see an end to the civil
war plaguing their nation, for all those people who want Iraq to
succeed in delivering a free and democratic way of life, for those who
believe we need to refocus on the larger global war on terror, we must
vote for a change in policy and a change in direction. We must reject
the ``stay the
[[Page S6334]]
course'' doctrine of the Bush administration. We must vote for the
Levin-Reed amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The majority leader is recognized.
Mr. FRIST. Madam President, I thank both managers for a superb debate
and discussion over the course of the last several days--and really the
last several weeks--as we have focused on an issue that is no more
important to the American people than the safety and security of the
American people.
We can take great pride in what our Nation and our military men and
women have accomplished in Iraq. We thank them. We thank their families
for their commitment and for their dedication. But we did not go into
Iraq in pursuit of oil or riches or some other national advantage. We
went as a volunteer--as a nation willing to enforce the mandates of the
you U.N. Security Council when others were content to allow Saddam
Hussein to defy those mandates.
Some critics accused us at the time of ``unilateralism,'' but in fact
we acted to vindicate multilateralism--most importantly, the authority
of the Security Council and the credibility of many resolutions it
adopted with respect to Iraq between 1991 and 2003.
We went into Iraq to end a cruel dictatorship and free a people that
was no less deserving of freedom than any other. As a result of our
efforts, the dictatorship has ended, and the people of Iraq are now
embarked on a grand democratic project, seeking to build a pluralistic,
multiethnic, multireligious democracy in the heart of the Arab world.
This is a project without precedent in the Arab world. And because it
is so novel, it has come under assault from religious fundamentalists,
Sunni and Shiite extremists, and others whose narrow agendas are
threatened by the prospect of democracy in that part of the world.
We have made an enormous investment in the success of this project.
It would be foolish to squander that investment just as we are seeing
success.
Last year, millions of Iraqis--half of them women--defied the threats
of the terrorists and streamed to the polls in three national
elections. Iraq's Sunni population participated in greater numbers each
time.
On June 8--just a couple of weeks ago--the new democratically elected
Prime Minister Jawad al-Maliki named the last three Cabinet members,
the Ministers of Defense, Interior, and Security, thereby completing
formation of his unity government.
That same day, the death of the foremost terrorist in Iraq, Abu Musab
al-Zarqawi, was announced in Baghdad. That was huge progress.
We made a commitment to the new government of Prime Minister Maliki,
and it would be impossible to imagine a worse time than now, just 2
weeks after that government was fully formed and its most ferocious
enemy eliminated, to turn our backs on it.
None of us know for sure exactly how the democratic reform in Iraq
will turn out, as we stay committed, but we do know it will fail if it
is abandoned prematurely by the United States.
Withdrawal is not an option. Surrender is not a solution. Every
Senator must make his own decision and live with his own conscience,
but this Senator will not be responsible for condemning the 26 million
people of Iraq to decades more of violence and repression--not when
there is a democratic alternative before us that is so manifestly
committed to creating the kind of pluralistic society that until now
has been absent from the Arab world.
Another reason we went into Iraq was because we were convinced that
Saddam Hussein was continuing his pursuit of weapons of mass
destruction--chemical weapons that he had developed and used before.
And the events of 9/11 had taught us that there is no greater threat
to us today than that posed by state sponsors of terrorism--such as
Iraq under Saddam Hussein--working to acquire such weapons.
After the war, of course, there emerged a big debate over whether
Saddam Hussein really was working on weapons of mass destruction in
2003.
But there is no debate that there was a strong international
consensus prior to 2003 that Saddam Hussein must be pursuing weapons of
mass destruction.
This was the view not only of the Bush administration, but also of
the Clinton administration, as well as the opinion of most other
governments around the world.
It made sense for two reasons.
First, Saddam Hussein had a long track record of not only seeking,
but also of using, chemical weapons. He had used chemical weapons
against his own people in the 1980s. And at the end of the first
Persian Gulf war in 1991 he was found to have an advanced nuclear
weapons program--a program that may have only been 1 to 2 years away
from producing a nuclear weapon.
Second, Saddam Hussein was acting like a man who had something to
hide; he was obstructing the U.N.'s weapons inspectors and repeatedly
defying U.S. disarmament mandates. No one can explain why Saddam acted
this way if he in fact had no weapons of mass destruction programs to
hide.
And it is certainly true that if Saddam Hussein were still in power
today, Iraq would remain on the list with Iran and North Korea of
countries that we fear will develop weapons of mass destruction and
pass them to terrorists.
Because Saddam Hussein has been removed from power, Iraq is no longer
on that list.
But we must remember that many of Saddam's weapons scientist--those
who produced the chemical weapons he used against the Kurds in the
1980s and who came close to producing nuclear weapons in the early
1990s--are still in Iraq.
However, in a democratic Iraq these scientists pose no threat because
a democratic Iraq would never seek to revive Saddam Hussein's weapons
programs.
If we were to cut and run from Iraq, and risk letting the terrorists
take power, we would again have to fear that these scientists, and what
remains of Saddam's weapons infrastructure, would once again be put to
work producing weapons that in the hands of international terrorists
could destroy our cities and decimate our population.
Again, every Senator must live with his own conscience, but this
Senator does not want to be complicit in a decision that could reverse
the success we've achieved since 9/11 in keeping terrorism from our
shores and weapons of mass destruction out of the hands of terrorists.
The amendments before us are intentionally misleading. They are
written in soft language and wrapped in reassuring concepts.
They don't sue such terms as ``retreat'' or ``withdrawal,'' but
instead call for ``redeployment'' of our Armed Forces from Iraq.
They don't say that the withdrawal should take place on an artificial
timetable and be concluded by an arbitrary date. Instead, they say that
the ``redeployment'' should take place under a ``schedule,'' that the
``schedule'' should be ``planned,'' that the ``plan'' should be
``coordinated'' with the Government of Iraq, and that the Congress
should be ``consulted'' at every stage.
None of this artful language, however, can conceal what is really
proposed and what really at stake.
The proponents of these amendments want us to tell the new Government
of Iraq that we're leaving--no matter what the implications for the
future of their country; no matter how much they plead with us to stay;
no matter how great the risk that the investment that we and they have
made to date in building a new Iraq will be squandered and turned to
naught.
The amendments may differ in some of the details--how long we'll wait
until we actually leave, how emphatically we tell the Iraqi people we
really care about them as we walk out the door, but the bottom line is
the same.
The amendments tell us to set a deadline and leave by the deadline.
This would be a dangerous policy, a reckless policy, and a shameful
policy.
The time to leave Iraq is when we have achieved our objectives. If we
knew our objectives were unachievable then these amendments might make
sense. But our objectives are achievable and we are achieving them.
The brave men and women of our Armed Forces are fighting daily to win
victory in Iraq, and it would dishonor them, to say nothing of their
fallen comrades, to cut and run at a time as promising as now.
The spirit of these amendments is the spirit of defeatism and
surrender.
This is not the spirit that made America the great Nation it is
today, and I trust that when we vote we will
[[Page S6335]]
send the message that there is no room for defeatism in the United
States.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Ensign). The question is on agreeing to
the amendment No. 4442 offered by the Senator from Massachusetts.
The yeas and nays have been ordered.
The clerk will call the roll.
The bill clerk called the roll.
Mr. DURBIN. I announce that the Senator from West Virginia (Mr.
Rockefeller) is necessarily absent.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Are there any other Senators in the Chamber
desiring to vote?
The result was announced--yeas 13, nays 86, as follows:
[Rollcall Vote No. 181 Leg.]
YEAS--13
Akaka
Boxer
Durbin
Feingold
Harkin
Inouye
Jeffords
Kennedy
Kerry
Lautenberg
Leahy
Menendez
Wyden
NAYS--86
Alexander
Allard
Allen
Baucus
Bayh
Bennett
Biden
Bingaman
Bond
Brownback
Bunning
Burns
Burr
Byrd
Cantwell
Carper
Chafee
Chambliss
Clinton
Coburn
Cochran
Coleman
Collins
Conrad
Cornyn
Craig
Crapo
Dayton
DeMint
DeWine
Dodd
Dole
Domenici
Dorgan
Ensign
Enzi
Feinstein
Frist
Graham
Grassley
Gregg
Hagel
Hatch
Hutchison
Inhofe
Isakson
Johnson
Kohl
Kyl
Landrieu
Levin
Lieberman
Lincoln
Lott
Lugar
Martinez
McCain
McConnell
Mikulski
Murkowski
Murray
Nelson (FL)
Nelson (NE)
Obama
Pryor
Reed
Reid
Roberts
Salazar
Santorum
Sarbanes
Schumer
Sessions
Shelby
Smith
Snowe
Specter
Stabenow
Stevens
Sununu
Talent
Thomas
Thune
Vitter
Voinovich
Warner
NOT VOTING--1
Rockefeller
The amendment (No. 4442) was rejected.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote, and I move
to lay that motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, the following two votes will each be 10
minutes in duration.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the Levin
amendment No. 4320.
The yeas and nays have been ordered, and the clerk will call the
roll.
Mr. DURBIN. I announce that the Senator from West Virginia (Mr.
Rockefeller) is necessarily absent.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Graham). Are there any other Senators in
the Chamber desiring to vote?
The result was announced--yeas 39, nays 60, as follows:
[Rollcall Vote No. 182 Leg.]
YEAS--39
Akaka
Baucus
Bayh
Biden
Bingaman
Boxer
Byrd
Cantwell
Carper
Chafee
Clinton
Conrad
Dodd
Dorgan
Durbin
Feingold
Feinstein
Harkin
Inouye
Jeffords
Johnson
Kennedy
Kerry
Kohl
Lautenberg
Leahy
Levin
Lincoln
Menendez
Mikulski
Murray
Obama
Reed
Reid
Salazar
Sarbanes
Schumer
Stabenow
Wyden
NAYS--60
Alexander
Allard
Allen
Bennett
Bond
Brownback
Bunning
Burns
Burr
Chambliss
Coburn
Cochran
Coleman
Collins
Cornyn
Craig
Crapo
Dayton
DeMint
DeWine
Dole
Domenici
Ensign
Enzi
Frist
Graham
Grassley
Gregg
Hagel
Hatch
Hutchison
Inhofe
Isakson
Kyl
Landrieu
Lieberman
Lott
Lugar
Martinez
McCain
McConnell
Murkowski
Nelson (FL)
Nelson (NE)
Pryor
Roberts
Santorum
Sessions
Shelby
Smith
Snowe
Specter
Stevens
Sununu
Talent
Thomas
Thune
Vitter
Voinovich
Warner
NOT VOTING--1
Rockefeller
The amendment (No. 4320) was rejected.
Mr. WARNER. I move to reconsider the vote.
Mr. CRAIG. I move to lay that motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I oppose cutting off debate on this
important bill prematurely. I have two amendments that have not been
considered by the Senate--one to help service members called to active
duty, the other to cancel this year's automatic pay raise for Members
of Congress--that will be shut out if we invoke cloture. We should be
doing all that we can to help members of our armed services who are
serving so courageously. And, with the Nation's deficits and the tab
for the Iraq war at alarming levels, we should not be accepting another
backdoor payraise. At a minimum, the Senate should consider and vote on
those worthy amendments before completing work on the Defense
authorization bill.
Cloture Motion
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, pursuant to rule
XXII, the Chair lays before the Senate the pending cloture motion,
which the clerk will report.
The legislative clerk read as follows:
Cloture Motion
We the undersigned Senators, in accordance with the
provisions of rule XXII of the Standing Rules of the Senate,
do hereby move to bring to a close debate on S. 2766, the
National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2007.
Bill Frist, John W. Warner, John E. Sununu, Jim Bunning,
George Allen, Lamar Alexander, Craig Thomas, Kay Bailey
Hutchison, Chuck Hagel, Ted Stevens, Judd Gregg, Robert
F. Bennett, Thad Cochran, Pat Roberts, Pete Domenici,
Jim Inhofe, Jeff Sessions.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. By unanimous consent, the mandatory quorum
call has been waived.
The question is, Is it the sense of the Senate that debate on S.
2766, the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2007,
shall be brought to a close? The yeas and nays are mandatory under the
rule. The clerk will call the roll.
The legislative clerk called the roll.
Mr. DURBIN. I announce that the Senator from West Virginia (Mr.
Rockefeller) is necessarily absent.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Are there any other Senators in the Chamber
desiring to vote?
The yeas and nays resulted--yeas 98, nays 1, as follows:
[Rollcall Vote No. 183 Leg.]
YEAS--98
Akaka
Alexander
Allard
Allen
Baucus
Bayh
Bennett
Biden
Bingaman
Bond
Boxer
Brownback
Bunning
Burns
Burr
Byrd
Cantwell
Carper
Chafee
Chambliss
Clinton
Coburn
Cochran
Coleman
Collins
Conrad
Cornyn
Craig
Crapo
Dayton
DeMint
DeWine
Dodd
Dole
Domenici
Dorgan
Durbin
Ensign
Enzi
Feinstein
Frist
Graham
Grassley
Gregg
Hagel
Harkin
Hatch
Hutchison
Inhofe
Inouye
Isakson
Jeffords
Johnson
Kennedy
Kerry
Kohl
Kyl
Landrieu
Lautenberg
Leahy
Levin
Lieberman
Lincoln
Lott
Lugar
Martinez
McCain
McConnell
Menendez
Mikulski
Murkowski
Murray
Nelson (FL)
Nelson (NE)
Obama
Pryor
Reed
Reid
Roberts
Salazar
Santorum
Sarbanes
Schumer
Sessions
Shelby
Smith
Snowe
Specter
Stabenow
Stevens
Sununu
Talent
Thomas
Thune
Vitter
Voinovich
Warner
Wyden
NAYS--1
Feingold
NOT VOTING--1
Rockefeller
The PRESIDING OFFICER. On this vote, the yeas are 98, the nays are 1.
Three-fifths of the Senators duly chosen and sworn having voted in the
affirmative, the motion is agreed to.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote, and I move
to lay that motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, first, on behalf of Senator Levin and
myself, I thank all the Members for the strong cooperation to
procedurally move this series of amendments and to proceed with the
bill. Speaking just for myself--my ranking member is absent for a
moment--I believe very strongly that this bill can be completed today
before sunset. Of course, this is one of the longest days of the year,
so that might be a little longer than some might wish, but I do think
it is achievable. I say that most respectfully.
What we recommend to be done now--and I will ask unanimous consent--
is the Senate now turn to an
[[Page S6336]]
amendment by the distinguished Senator from Texas, and I am told by the
Senator that she will seek a voice vote. That has been cleared on both
sides. The next amendment will be offered by our distinguished
colleague from Georgia, a member of the committee, Mr. Chambliss. That
will take perhaps an hour or more and will require a record vote.
Thereafter, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate then recognize the
Senator from Minnesota, Mr. Dayton, to address the Senate with regard
to amendments and the bill as a whole.
I would also say to colleagues, subject to confirmation by the
leadership, that I am recommending there be no votes from now until
3:30. There are two very serious functions taking place, both of a
religious nature, in our city, and Members are attending either the
last rites of Philip Merrill, a personal friend of mine, a wonderful
man who recently lost his life on the Chesapeake Bay, and then I
understand a distinguished archbishop of the Catholic Church is being
installed with a ceremony today.
Therefore, the bill will continue its momentum in this period of
time, and following those votes, I am certain the leadership will give
the managers such guidance as to when we can conclude this bill, which
again I hope will be today.
So at this time, I yield the floor.
Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, if the chairman will yield just for a
second, we don't need an hour on this amendment, I say to my friend
from Virginia. I think 40 minutes equally divided would be sufficient
for my purposes. I don't know about the author of the amendment; he
might want more time.
Mr. CHAMBLISS. Mr. President, the only thing I would say is I have
several folks who want to speak on it. If we could get an hour equally
divided, my guess is we won't use it.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that there be an
hour equally divided between the distinguished Senators from Georgia
and Arizona on the Chambliss amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. WARNER. We have covered as much ground as we can procedurally at
this point, and I yield the floor.
Amendment No. 4377
Mrs. HUTCHISON. I call up amendment No. 4377 and ask for its
immediate consideration.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the pending amendment is
set aside.
The clerk will report.
The legislative clerk read as follows:
The Senator from Texas [Mrs. Hutchison] proposes an
amendment numbered 4377.
Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the
reading of the amendment be dispensed with.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The amendment is as follows:
(Purpose: To include a delineation of the homeland defense and civil
support missions of the National Guard and Reserves in the Quadrennial
Defense Review)
At the end of subtitle C of title IX, add the following:
SEC. 924. INCLUSION OF HOMELAND DEFENSE AND CIVIL SUPPORT
MISSIONS OF THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES IN
THE QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW.
Section 118(d) of title 10, United States Code, is
amended--
(1) by redesignating paragraph (15) as paragraph (16); and
(2) by inserting after paragraph (14) the following new
paragraph (15):
``(15) The homeland defense mission and civil support
missions of the active and reserve components of the armed
forces, including the organization and capabilities required
for the active and reserve components to discharge each such
mission.''.
Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, this amendment would require the
Department of Defense to clarify in the Quadrennial Defense Review the
homeland defense and civil support missions of the National Guard and
Reserves.
The QDR is a comprehensive examination of national defense strategy,
force structure, force mobilization, and modernization plans,
infrastructure, budget plans--all elements of the defense program. It
is the planning that goes on every 4 years. The QDR is in process now
for the next 4 years. The goal of the QDR is to determine the defense
strategy of the United States and its established defense programs for
the next 20 years, and it is updated every 4 years.
For decades, homeland defense has been a mission of the Department of
Defense. However, only after the 9/11 attacks in 2001 did this very
important mission really come to the forefront in defense planning.
Unfortunately, the present QDR lacks sufficient guidance for the Guard
and Reserve components in this very important mission they have.
The amendment I am proposing would require the Department of Defense
to include in the QDR a definition of the homeland defense and civil
support missions of the National Guard and Reserves. The Department has
not really formalized the requirements for the role of the National
Guard and Reserve in homeland security. We know the President has
ordered the deployment of Guard and Reserve to our borders to try to
secure our borders, so we need a really comprehensive look and guidance
for the Reserve component, particularly the Guard, concerning their
roles and how they will be able to train and equip for homeland
security missions.
Today, the National Guard and Reserve must debate the merits of their
initiatives and their equipment procurement. That is not the way it
should be. Our Guard and Reserve do a fabulous job. They are on active
duty in Iraq and Afghanistan today. They have gone through several
cycles of deployment to Iraq and Afghanistan. There is a Texas Guard
unit in Bosnia in command and control today, continuing the
peacekeeping mission there. They are doing their jobs, they are being
called up at a level that is very high, but ambiguities remain in their
homeland security mission.
Competition for resources continues, and there is a lack of clarity
about what role the Department actually expects them to have. This
omission was painfully obvious after 9/11. After Hurricanes Rita and
Katrina and now with the deployment to the border, which I totally
support, their mission is once again expanding. This amendment will
provide the DOD with the information it needs to determine the role the
National Guard and Reserves should have, must have, and will continue
to have, but with more clarification, in the defense of our country.
This is a very important amendment. I believe it will add to their
responsibilities, and they will be able to get the equipment and the
training they need to do the jobs we are asking them to do in homeland
defense and for the other civil emergencies we have.
Mr. President, I ask for the support of my colleagues for this
amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there further debate on the amendment?
Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, I urge the adoption of the amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. There being no further debate, the question is
on agreeing to the amendment.
The amendment (No. 4377) was agreed to.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
Mrs. HUTCHISON. I move to lay that motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, we will turn to the distinguished Senator
from Georgia for his amendment, with 1 hour equally divided.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Georgia.
Amendment No. 4261
Mr. CHAMBLISS. I rise today to call up amendment No. 4261 and ask for
its immediate consideration.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the pending amendment is
set aside and the clerk will report.
The legislative clerk read as follows:
The Senator from Georgia [Mr. Chambliss], for himself, Mr.
Hatch, Mr. Isakson, Mr. Inhofe, Mr. Lieberman, Mr. Cornyn,
Mr. Thune, Mr. Bennett and Mr. Stevens, proposes an amendment
numbered 4261.
Mr. CHAMBLISS. I ask unanimous consent that the reading of the
amendment be dispensed with.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The amendment is as follows:
(Purpose: To authorize multiyear procurement of F-22A fighter aircraft
and F-119 engines)
On page 29, strike lines 6 through 15 and insert the
following:
SEC. 146. FUNDING FOR PROCUREMENT OF F-22A FIGHTER AIRCRAFT.
(a) Prohibition on Use of Incremental Funding.--The
Secretary of the Air Force shall not use incremental funding
for the procurement of F-22A fighter aircraft.
[[Page S6337]]
(b) Multiyear Procurement.--The Secretary of the Air Force
may, in accordance with section 2306b of title 10, United
States Code, enter into a multiyear contract beginning with
the fiscal year 2007 program year for procurement of not more
than 60 F-22A fighter aircraft.
SEC. 147. MULTIYEAR PROCUREMENT OF F-119 ENGINES FOR F-22A
FIGHTER AIRCRAFT.
The Secretary of the Air Force may, in accordance with
section 2306b of title 10, United States Code, enter into a
multiyear contract beginning with the fiscal year 2007
program year for procurement of the following:
(1) Not more than 120 F-119 engines for F-22A fighter
aircraft.
(2) Not more than 13 spare F-119 engines for F-22A fighter
aircraft.
Mr. CHAMBLISS. Let me say, it is very difficult, any time you have to
oppose your subcommittee chairman--and in this case the full committee
chairman--on an issue, particularly two Senators whom I hold in such
high esteem. But we do have a disagreement in a very professional way
on this issue. At the end of the day, all of us intend to do what is in
the best interests of the men and women who fight for America.
The F-22A Raptor is the U.S. Air Force's top priority for providing a
joint force with air dominance, operational access, homeland and cruise
missile defense for the next 20-plus years. The F-22A is a first-of-a-
kind multimission fighter aircraft that combines Stealth, supercruise,
advanced maneuverability, and integrated avionics to make it the
world's most capable combat aircraft.
This amendment authorizes a 3-year multiyear procurement contract for
the F-22. This is not about spending money, it is about saving money,
and it is about good acquisition practices and policy.
This amendment will save approximately $235 million as a minimum
amount, allowing DOD to use this money for other priorities or allow
us, the Congress, to return these dollars to the taxpayers.
An independent study, commissioned by the Office of the Secretary of
Defense, is the only independent study yet to be done for the F-22
multiyear contract. In that study, the Institute for Defense Analysis,
or IDA, concluded that the proposed F-22A multiyear contract, first of
all, meets all the criteria provided in the law and does, in fact, save
the taxpayer a minimum of $235 million over the next 3 years.
The study was not completed in time for the Senate Armed Services
Committee markup back in early May, which is why it was not included in
the Senate bill at that time, or at least we didn't have an amendment
at that time. However, the study was submitted to the Armed Services
Committee on the 16th of May.
Since I have been on this committee, we have been talking about the
need to conduct acquisitions better, cheaper, and more efficiently.
This amendment does exactly that. We know we are going to buy 60 F-22s
over the next 3 years. That is the current plan. The DOD budget
provides for the funding, and I have heard no one in Congress question
the need for the airplane. As a matter of fact, this airplane today is
flying in rotation around the country and soon will be flying around
the world as it is scheduled to go into rotation to Iraq shortly. As we
are sitting here today, I suspect there is an F-22 flying over
Washington, DC, protecting the skies over our Nation's Capital.
The only question is how are we going to buy these airplanes? Are we
going to buy them with 3 1-year contracts and pay more money, or are we
going to buy them with a 3-year multiyear contract and save a quarter
of a billion dollars?
We need to have a high standard for what qualifies for a multiyear
contract. As a matter of comparison, the F-414 engine for the F-18
saved 2.8 percent and $51 million. The multiyear contract for two
previous F-16 multiyears saved $246 million and $262 million
respectively.
By comparison, the proposed F-22A multiyear contract saves 2.6
percent and a minimum of $235 million.
The point is that the F-22 multiyear is in the same category in terms
of percent savings and total savings of multiyear contracts that this
body has previously approved.
Also, the per-plane savings on the F-22 multiyear will be identical
to the per-plane savings on the F/A-18 multiyear, that being $3.8
million per plane. That is why the authors of the independent business
case analysis at IDA judge this multiyear to have significant savings,
and I agree with them.
Much has been made over the old criteria for multiyear savings, which
was a minimum of 10 percent. But, frankly, that was changed early on in
law and now, instead of 10 percent the statute does say, ``substantial
savings.''
The 2005 QDR, which was provided to Congress in concert with the
fiscal year 2007 budget request, restructures the F-22A program to
extend production through the fiscal year 2010 with a multiyear
acquisition contract to ensure the Department does not have a gap in
fifth-generation Stealth capabilities. To obtain a more favorable cost,
DOD's strategy requested authority for a 3-year multiyear procurement
contract to buy 60 F-22s, 20 in each of the years 2007 through 2009.
This strategy was outlined in a letter from Undersecretary of Defense
Ken Krieg in a letter to the Senate Armed Services Committee on
February 13, 2006.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to print that letter in the
Record.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology and Logistics,
Washington, DC, February 13, 2006.
Hon. John W. Warner,
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: Consistent with the Conference Report on
the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2006, Public
Law, 109-148, the Department has studied alternatives for the
continued acquisition of the F-22A aircraft beyond Fiscal
Year (FY) 2008. This has culminated in the procurement
strategy identified in the President's Budget for FY 2007
(PB07).
The Quadrennial Defense Review Joint Air Dominance study
and budget deliberations addressed alternative procurement
quantities, rates, and force structure mixes. The
Department's PB07 plan provides for procurement of F-22A
aircraft through FY 2010. To obtain a favorable cost, the
strategy employs multiyear procurement of 20 aircraft each,
in Lots 7, 8, and 9, beginning in FY 2008, providing a total
force structure of 183 aircraft. FY 2007 funds will be used
to contract for delivery of economic-order-quantity items,
sub-assemblies and material required for Lot 7, advance
procurement for Lot 8 aircraft, and for other allowable costs
including, sustainment support, production engineering,
laboratories and combined test force infrastructure. This
strategy also procures titanium one-year earlier than normal
advanced procurement to accommodate the long-lead now
required to buy titanium. This plan substantially reduces the
F-22A procurement funds required by the Department in FY
2007, allowing the Department to meet other high-priority
requirements.
Continuing the F-22A procurement through FY 2010 retains
fifth-generation tactical aircraft procurement options in the
event of delays in the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program.
These actions also benefit the JSF program by helping to
reduce overhead rates and by retaining technical expertise
across the tactical aircraft industrial base, including the
prime contractor, subcontractors, and suppliers.
The Department is preparing the business case cost
comparison of multiyear and successive annual procurements
required by subsection 2306b(a)(1) of title 10, United States
Code. We intend to make the business case available to the
congressional defense committees by May 15, 2006, to support
FY 2007 Congressional budget deliberations.
I appreciate the foresight of the Congress in directing the
Department to study alternatives for the continued
acquisition of the F-22A. I believe that we have developed a
fiscally responsible strategy that will allow us to sustain
this viable tactical aircraft production line.
Similar letters have been sent to the chairmen and ranking
members of the other Congressional defense committees.
Sincerely,
Kenneth J. Krieg.
Mr. CHAMBLISS. The business case for the F-22 is clear and was
validated during the QDR by the Joint Army Dominance Study. This study
included any number of options of tactical air mixes, including various
combinations of F-22s, FA-18s, and joint strike fighter and other
airborne weapons systems, so we are not proceeding with a random plan
but one that has been validated by careful analysis.
The business plan was also validated by the IDA study, again the only
independent organization that has looked at this multiyear plan.
[[Page S6338]]
There are six criteria for meeting a multiyear contract. The
independent IDA business case analysis judges the F-22 program
according to each of these six criteria. I mention this because there
is a GAO study that came out, coincidentally, this week relative to the
multiyear procurement of the F-22. It is critical of the multiyear
contract.
The GAO study, though, contains, frankly, false factual information.
For example, in the GAO study they talk about the cost of the airplane
actually increasing under the multiyear contract. But what they fail to
take into consideration is that originally, before the reprogramming to
do 20 airplanes this year and 20 in the next budget and 20 in the next
budget, the Air Force was going to ask for 29 planes in the next budget
and 27 in the following budget.
If you build 29 versus 20, it is going to be cheaper. But that is the
factual information that the GAO plugged into their numbers--29 instead
of 20. That is why there is a higher price cost that the GAO came up
with.
Second, the GAO report talks about the fact that under the Air Force
proposal, there is not enough funding in the budget to pay for these
airplanes. We are going to have to use what is called incremental
funding.
That was talked about early on in the process but abandoned. Here we
are in the end of June of this year. The reprogramming took place the
end of last year and the early part of this year. The facts were known
at that time. GAO ignored those facts.
Second, the incremental funding issue that was talked about early on
was abandoned early in the year. GAO ignored that and included those
false facts in its report. So the GAO study, frankly, is not correct
because it is not based on the actual, as we say in the law--the facts
in evidence.
There is one other issue relative to the GAO that I am going to
conclude with and that is this. It gives a list of the factors that it
took into consideration in doing its report. There is one glaring
factual statement, one factual provision that is left out of
consideration by the GAO. That is talking to pilots that fly this
airplane.
I have talked to several of those guys. We had a red flag operation
that was done several weeks ago by the Air Force. In talking to a
couple of those pilots afterward, it was unbelievable what they had to
say about flying the F-22.
One of them said this:
In the United States Air Force, we don't look to win 51-49.
We look to win 100-nothing, and that is what the Raptor gives
us.
The Raptor is the follow-on for the F-15 and F-16. It is the fifth-
generation fighter. It is going to allow us to continue air superiority
and air dominance against any potential threat that might be
forthcoming. I urge my colleagues to support the multiyear proposal
that is included in the President's budget, that is included in the
authorization bill that comes to the Senate from the House, that will
go into conference. We will save the taxpayer a minimum of $225 million
over the next 3 years. I reserve the remainder of my time.
Mr. DOMENICI. Will the Senator yield 5 minutes to the Senator from
New Mexico?
Mr. CHAMBLISS. I will be happy to yield 5 minutes to the Senator from
New Mexico.
Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, I say to Senator McCain, I understand he
wants to speak in opposition to the amendment. I will not be long.
Mr. McCAIN. No problem.
Mr. DOMENICI. Understand, we will each speak our piece here. It is
not a pleasure to come and oppose my colleague. Nonetheless, I must say
that it seems to me we are always talking in the Senate about trying to
do things that are more efficient; trying to do good business, do
things in a way they ought to be done. Here we have an opportunity to
do that.
We have a situation where the new fighter, the world-class F-22--but
I am not going to take the Senate's time praising its qualities. We
have heard some of that from the distinguished Senator from Georgia. We
could spend all afternoon talking about what a fantastic airplane it
is. That is not the issue before us.
The issue before us is that the Defense Department needs a multiyear
procurement authority to acquire these airplanes. The administration
requested a multiyear procurement authority for the F-22s. The House
Defense Authorization bill granted the request. It makes plain, good
business sense that the Senate do the same--that we give the Department
what it needs.
I also support this because, as indicated by the principal sponsor of
the amendment, the distinguished senior Senator from Georgia, this
authority will save money.
We are going to hear something to the contrary, but the contrary
evidence is from reports that do not apply to the 20-per-year
acquisition of the F-22. That is what we are trying to do. That is what
the Defense Department's final studies were based upon--acquisition of
20 per year, for multiple years. A multiyear procurement of this nature
would net a savings of between $225 million and $325 million.
It seems to this Senator that this is precisely what we ought to be
doing. We ought to be doing more of this, not less. Is anybody doubting
we are going to buy this many of these Raptors? I don't hear that talk.
I thought I was going to hear it 6 or 8 months ago when we were talking
about a number of systems, some of which are on hold, but this one is
not.
Therefore, we ought to proceed and save millions of dollars that can
be used for other needs. $300 million, for example, would pay for 4,200
National Guard troops in active duty for 1 year. That is a lot of
money. This is a monster bill, and one might say what is the difference
here? $225 million to $325 million in savings doesn't amount to much. I
submit it is a pretty big amount.
There has been some talk this week about a new GAO report that is
critical of this multiyear procurement. But this report rehashes old
arguments and uses old data that is not relevant to the Department's
data regarding the multiyear acquisition, which has been stated in
detail by the senior Senator from Georgia.
Therefore, I submit that the airplane we are going to rely on--which
without question the Quadrennial Defense Review says we must have--we
ought to go ahead and procure on a multiyear basis today when we vote
on this amendment.
I thank the Senator for yielding time. I believe he has a compelling
argument, and I hope the Senate will follow his lead.
I yield the floor.
Mr. CHAMBLISS. Mr. President, I yield 2 minutes to the Senator from
Utah.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Utah is recognized.
Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, I thank my colleague from Georgia and my
colleague from Arizona.
What is the bottom line here? Simply put, Senator Chambliss has
offered an amendment that is supported by the ministration that will
enable the Air Force to buy 20 F-22s Raptors a year for the next 3
years. By entering into this multiple year contract, the independent
Institute for Defense Analysis believes that the American taxpayer will
save at least $225 million.
Why are we buying the F-22? Because it is a war-winner. This fighter,
which is also a very capable bomber, is now operational with the 1st
Fighter Wing. The Raptor is stealthier than the famous F-117 Nighthawk,
which dropped the first bombs during the first gulf war. But unlike the
Nighthawk, that must fly at night in order to survive in a combat
environment, the F-22 brings stealth capability out of the night,
enabling operations in high threat areas 24 hours a day 7 days a week.
I have been to the Air Force base where I have talked with the pilots
and have seen this plane and have seen it fly. It is a marvel.
The Raptor is the world's most lethal and maneuverable fighter
aircraft. This is accomplished in no small part by its supercruise
engines. Supercruise engines do not need to go to after-burner in order
to achieve supersonic flight. This provides the F-22 with a strategic
advantage by enabling supersonic speeds to be maintained for a far
greater length of time. By comparison, all other fighters require their
engines to go to after-burner to achieve supersonic speeds. This
consumes a tremendous amount of fuel and greatly limits an aircraft's
range.
[[Page S6339]]
Another legitimate question is why not just rely on the aircraft we
have today? Over the past 30 years, the United States has been able to
maintain air superiority in every conflict largely due to the F-15C.
However, with the great advancements in technology over the past
several years, the F-15 has struggled to keep pace. For example, the F-
15 is not a stealth aircraft and its computer systems are based on
obsolete technology. My colleagues should remember that the F-15 first
flew in the early 1970s. During the ensuing years, nations have been
consistently developing new aircraft and missile systems to defeat this
fighter.
Obviously, we need the F-22 and we have identified a means to save
money while we are buying it.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona.
Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I don't oppose the F-22 program. In fact,
the Armed Services subcommittee provided and the Senate Armed Services
Committee marked down an additional $1.4 billion for 20 F-22s.
The issue is not, frankly, whether we support the F-22. Rightly or
wrongly, we all do--and every member of the committee does. The
question is, Are we going to act responsibly? The question is, Are we
going to authorize a multiyear procurement of an aircraft that has--and
it is not unusual--experienced time after time dramatic delays and cost
overruns? Are we ready to do that? Not according to the GAO, not
according to the OMB, not according to the Congressional Research
Service, and not according to every outside observer of this program.
Let me give a small example. The F-22 experienced an initial
operational capability delay of 9 years 9 months; initial operational
test and evaluation delayed 5 years 3 months; full rate production
delay of 5 years 3 months; low rate initial production, 4 years 9
months; first delivery of operational aircraft delayed 4 years 7
months; first flight delayed 2 years; and completion of critical design
review delayed 1 year 4 months. The record is not good. In fact, the
record is terrible. In 1991, the estimated cost, according to the U.S.
Air Force, for the aircraft was going to be $114 million--in then-year
dollars; now, $354 million per copy.
This program--not atypically--has experienced significant delays and
cost overruns, which, by the way, maybe we will get into at some point.
Then they received incentive bonuses, even for violations of Nunn-
McCurdy. We are not talking about the purchase of F-22s. What we are
talking about is, are we going to violate the basic principles and the
law which requires certain criteria to be met before multiyear
acquisition of these aircraft? The report prepared by the Comptroller
General of the United States clearly states that four of the six
criteria set forth in the law have not been met by the Air Force. They
have not been met. Yet here we are debating a measure that would
effectively permit the Air Force to be held unaccountable, to end run a
good Government provision in Federal law that is specifically designed
to ensure accountability in our Government.
There have been two Nunn-McCurdy violations, according to the
Comptroller General. Since its inception, this program has been subject
to 2 Nunn-McCurdy violations and has been rebaselined 14 times just to
avoid additional breaches. Fourteen times they have rebaselined the
cost of this weapons system. We all know the game. They come and they
say: This weapons system is going to cost X. They get it authorized,
then we get it, and guess what happens. It ends up costing dramatically
more money--in the case of this aircraft, from $114 million each to
$354 million each, and it is still in a relatively embryonic stage.
The Air Force, I am sorry to say, has misrepresented several things,
including the termination cost of the C-130J.
The Air Force--a September 28, 2005, Defense Contract Audit Agency
report points out that Lockheed-Martin earned a profit of almost 27
percent--$643 million--on a $2.4 billion, 60-aircraft, multiprocurement
for C-130 aircraft. The estimate on the actual multiyear procurement
cost savings for the F-22--the Air Force acquisition officers
misrepresented the F-22 program as a stably funded program. Last year,
Congress authorized and appropriated enough money for 24 F-22 aircraft.
The Air Force bought 22. We have been asking them: What happened to the
other two airplanes? We still haven't gotten a response. How we buy the
F-22 is not subject to unfettered discretion. If we choose to buy them
under a multiyear contract, we must do so in compliance with the law.
This amendment does not.
The Congressional Research Service points out the many ongoing
technical problems with the F-22--avionics problems, airframe problems,
engine problems. The F-119 engine fuel consumption has been
unsatisfactory, and problems were experienced with the engine's core
combustor, which did not demonstrate desired temperature levels. The F-
22's cockpit canopy experienced ongoing challenges, including cracking
and reliability. It goes on and on. Many of these things are associated
with the development of a new weapons system.
By the way, I have never met a pilot who didn't like to fly a new
weapons system, but the fact is that it is not ready for multiyear
procurement. That was the subject of extensive hearings in the
subcommittee and consideration in the full committee. I don't expect
this body to rubberstamp everything the committee does, but I can tell
you that extensive analysis and study was done on it.
I also point out that literally every outside group, including the
IDA, had concerns about it, even though they alleged that there would
be significant cost savings. But the fact is that even the IDA, which
my friend from Georgia points out--this form of contracting bears
significant risks. Multiyear procurement reduces Congressional
budgetary flexibility, both for the instant program and across other
programs within the Defense portfolio.
I urge my colleagues who consider supporting this amendment--and we
know very well that there will be reductions in defense spending. It
happens historically as wars wind down. Already on the House side,
there has been a proposal for significant reductions in defense
spending, which I do not support but apparently may be the final
product for next year from the House Appropriations Committee.
We are going to lock in multiyear procurement for a weapons system
that has experienced dramatic cost overruns. And I am not saying we
shouldn't procure this aircraft. I am saying we should. I am not
totally convinced that it would actually meet the challenges of the war
on terrorism, but I strongly support it. But before we give them a
blank check, I think we should regard what we are doing here--locking
in, in a multiyear fashion, the procurement of a weapons system that
has gone from $100-and-some million per copy to over $300 million per
copy which still has very significant technical problems associated
with it. I would caution and urge my colleagues to understand this in
the larger context.
Finally, we have a responsibility of oversight in the committee and
as a body. If we allow multiyear procurement, we basically give up
those oversight responsibilities. And when we talk about a couple
hundred million dollars, which is big money, and cost savings, look at
the overruns, the billions in cost overruns they have already
experienced, and we still haven't got a fully tested, completed, and
operational product.
I understand the desire of my friend from Georgia to make sure this
program is basically locked in, which is what this amendment will do. I
don't think we are ready for it. Every outfit outside of the U.S. Air
Force--and even the IDA, with a qualified endorsement--the
Congressional Research Service, OMB, GAO, and all the others concur in
that conclusion.
I hope we will reject this amendment, but I certainly understand and
respect the position of my friend from Georgia.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I find myself, as chairman, having to live
up to my responsibilities. Not only do I have the highest regard for
our colleague from Georgia, I have a high regard for this airplane.
These airplanes are stationed in Virginia. I am supporting the position
taken by Senator McCain against the constituent interests in my own
State because I feel ever so importantly the statements made by Senator
McCain--namely, that the oversight which our committee tries to provide
should be respected in this Chamber. It is our collective judgment. The
majority of the
[[Page S6340]]
Senators, having voted on this in various ways in our committee,
believe that we should not go to this multiyear procurement at this
time for reasons eloquently stated by the Senator from Arizona.
I regret deeply to be in opposition to one of our most valued
Members, the Senator from Georgia, but let me point this out: You have
to sometimes stand apart from constituent interests, State interests,
and do what you believe is in the best interests of this country.
I say this with a sense of humility. I walked into the Pentagon in
February of 1969 as then-Under Secretary of the Navy. The halls of the
building were filled with the wreckage of a plane called TFX in which
this country had invested billions of dollars to build and it was
finally concluded that, for a number of reasons, the contract shouldn't
go forward. Thereafter, in the positions as Under Secretary and
Secretary of the Navy, I worked with the S-3, a new AFW airplane,
bringing that along. I worked with the F-14. As a matter of fact, this
distinguished aide of the Armed Services Committee was an F-14 pilot
and has reminisced with me many times--thank you for putting two
engines on that plane--because many a time he landed on a carrier with
one engine.
The planes are complicated situations, and they are becoming more and
more complicated each year, and it is the collective judgment of the
members of the Senate Armed Services Committee that we should not
abdicate our oversight and jump into this multiyear procurement.
I support the airplane. I am hopefully getting additional aircraft at
my base in Virginia. I am proud of that. But I am going to support what
I think is a proper management decision. To support the Chambliss
amendment would be, frankly, a violation of statute on the books, the
law of the land. Subsection A(1) through subsection 6 of section
2306(b) of title 10, United States Code, establishes the conditions for
entering into a multiyear procurement contract. The statute requires
the use of such a contract resulting in a substantial savings. This
multiyear procurement proposal under this amendment would not provide
substantial savings--some savings but not substantial. The statute also
requires that the estimates of both the cost of the contract and the
anticipated cost avoidance through the use of a multiyear contract are
realistic.
Just listen to what Senator McCain said. The estimates are not
realistic. The Air Force had budgeted for 24
F-22A aircraft in fiscal year 2006 but will only be able to buy 22 or
23 aircraft with the available funds.
Mr. President, the statute also requires that there is a reasonable
expectation that throughout the contemplated contract period the head
of the agency will request funding for the contract at the level
required to avoid contract cancellation. There is no reasonable
expectation that the level of funding required to avoid contract
cancellation will be met. The multiyear justification package sent to
Congress on May 16, 2006 presented a program that was underfunded by
$674 million.
By statute, I say to colleagues, this amendment cannot be supported.
By statute, by the majority of the members of the Committee of the
Armed Services having examined it carefully, through subcommittee and
full committee review, it cannot be supported. I say most respectfully
to the Senator from Georgia, we are facing here a rather interesting
chapter of a very significant and important defense contractor trying
to get through this body a decision which is in violation of statute
and overrides the judgment of the majority of the members of the Armed
Services Committee. I urge Senators not to support this amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Vitter). The Senator from Georgia is
recognized.
Mr. CHAMBLISS. Mr. President, I yield 3 minutes to my colleague from
Georgia, Senator Isakson.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Georgia is recognized.
Mr. ISAKSON. Mr. President, I thank my distinguished colleague, the
senior Senator from Georgia, Saxby Chambliss, for offering this
amendment. I have the greatest regard for the committee and
subcommittee chairmen. Senators Warner and McCain are outstanding
Members of this body. I beg to differ with them, and I want to focus my
debate on two critical areas.
One is Senator Chambliss presents as a selling point of this
amendment that $235 million in savings that a multiyear contract brings
would not happen if you were doing annual contracts. The distinguished
Senator from Arizona acknowledged, did not argue that that number was
not correct. The distinguished Senator from Virginia also did not argue
that number wasn't correct but made the following statement, that that
is not a substantial savings. That is at best a subjective judgment,
but I would call $235 million substantial any time.
Secondly, I would like to quote from a letter--and I ask unanimous
consent to have this letter printed in the Record--dated June 8 from
James Finley, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense, to the GAO.
Over the past several procurement lots, the Air Force has
been very successfully working with the prime contractor to
drive down cost. Unit flyaway costs have come down 35 percent
between Lot 1 and Lot 5. If stopped, production re-start
would be very costly and difficult to resume, breaking this
positive trend.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense,
Washington, DC, June 8, 2006.
Mr. David M. Walker,
Comptroller General of the United States, U.S. Government
Accountability Office, Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Walker: This is the Department of Defense (DoD)
response to the GAO draft report, ``Tactical Aircraft: DOD
Should Present a New F-22 Business Case Before Making Further
Investments,'' dated May 8, 2006 (GAO Code 120474/GAO-06-
455R).
The Department does not agree with draft GAO report's
recommendation to delay further investment in the F-22. While
the Department agrees with the GAO's emphasis on the
importance of supporting our procurement decisions with
appropriate ``Business Case'' analysis, we have performed
such analysis to support F-22 and tactical aircraft force
structure decisions, and will continue to do so. Additional
information and rationale for the Department's position is
summarized below.
Implementing the GAO's recommendation to delay investment
in the F-22 would disrupt production and create program
instability. This instability would be detrimental to our
nation's defense capabilities and our tactical aircraft
industrial base. Over the past several procurement lots, the
Air Force has been very successfully working with the prime
contractor to drive down costs. Unit flyaway costs have come
down 35% between Lot 1 and Lot 5. If stopped, production re-
start would be very costly and difficult to resume, breaking
this positive trend. Likewise, there is considerable
modernization work ongoing. To stop this work would result in
large termination costs and would be very costly to resume.
Multiple GAO reports have noted the negative impact that
program instability has on program cost, schedule, and
performance.
The assumptions on which the GAO's recommendations are
based were not understood. The quantity and mix of tactical
aircraft to be procured by the Department has been and
remains an area of significant ``Business Case'' analysis. As
the geopolitical and fiscal environment changes, we
continually reassess national security requirements and
adjust our force structure as needed. Keeping the F-22
production line active, preserves the Department's options
and sustains the industrial base for efficient transition to
Joint Strike fighter production.
To support the Quadrennial Defense Review and preparation
of the President's Fiscal Year 2007 Budget (PB07), the
Department performed a Joint Air Dominance (JAD) Study. The
JAD Study examined options for varying levels within the
strike fighter mix. The Department looked at the war
scenarios and cost implications of buying fewer variants of
Joint Strike Fighters, increasing and decreasing the number
of F-22s, and buying more legacy aircraft at the expense of
fewer fifth generation platforms. The results of these
analyses are reflected in PB07, which sets forth a balanced
portfolio of tactical aircraft assets, including Joint Strike
Fighter, F-22 and F/A-18E/F. The draft GAO report makes note
of, ``the large disparity between what the Air Force wants
for the F-22A program and what OSD has committed to fund,
there is a significant break in the business case to justify
buying more F-22As.'' The 381 aircraft the Air Force analysis
indicates are required is a fiscally unconstrained projection
of Service needs. The QDR analysis reflects fiscal realities
and the need to address competing defense priorities. The JAD
analysis showed that a balanced force structure mix of fifth
generation fighters, with legacy F/A-18E/Fs, F-15Es and
conventionally armed bombers, best met our requirements.
Buying fifth generation tactical
[[Page S6341]]
aircraft assets (F-22 and JSF), for both the Air Force and
the Department of the Navy, optimized capability,
affordability, and mitigated risk better than other options.
A detailed response is attached.
Thank you for the opportunity to respond to this draft
report.
James I. Finley.
Mr. ISAKSON. Mr. President, I was in business--didn't build airplanes
but built houses--and I know a little bit about R&D development costs,
but I know what the Raptor does.
Many of the things that were referred to as difficulties were
predictable experiences in the development of a weapons system. The
Raptor is the finest airplane ever built by any government anywhere any
time, and the pilots who fly it attest this meets and exceeds every
specification.
For me as a Senator, the other specification I want to meet is saving
the taxpayers of the United States of America money; $235 million is a
substantial savings. The Senator from Georgia, Mr. Chambliss, is right.
This amendment establishes a 3-year multiyear contract for the F-22 is
right, and I urge my colleagues to support it in the Chamber.
I yield back the time.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Georgia is recognized.
Mr. CHAMBLISS. I yield 3 minutes to the Senator from South Dakota,
Mr. Thune.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from South Dakota is recognized.
Mr. THUNE. Mr. President, the Chambliss amendment will remove the
prohibition on multiyear contract authority for the purchase of the F-
22A aircraft and in so doing give the DOD the flexibility it needs to
purchase 60 F-22A aircraft over a 3-year period in installments of 20.
The multiyear contract will save the Government, as has been noted by
Senator Isakson, over $200 million over the 3-year period and allow for
a rational and steady flow of F-22s.
Mr. President, I also want to note one thing about the GAO study that
has been referenced here today and the funding for the F-22A. The
statement is made in the GAO study that the funding for the F-22 could
be better spent on fighting the war on terror. The problem with that is
it assumes that America faces threats from only irregular forces or
subnational groups.
North Korea's threat to launch a multistage missile that can hit
Hawaii, Iranian nuclear ambitions, and the expansion and modernization
of the Chinese military are patent examples of substantial threats from
independent nation states.
The air superiority gap America once enjoyed has dramatically closed.
The F-15, F-16, or F-18 are no longer without competition on the world
stage. Since the late 1970s, for example, the Russian Air Force has
been continually improving its air fleet. Planes like the MiG-29, Su-
27, Su-35, and the addition of the Su-37 super-flanker have evened the
playing field. The Chinese are now making their own version of the Su-
27 under the designation J-11. Both Russia and China are eyeing foreign
buyers for these formidable aircraft.
Further technology and modern air defenses have grown significantly,
and Legacy aircraft are vulnerable to increased anti-aircraft threats
and technology.
Congressional inaction on this matter is creating a situation where
American pilots will be flying aging Legacy aircraft against comparable
enemy aircraft.
DOD states that the F-22As as fifth-generation fighters is needed to
neutralize advanced air defenses, thus opening the door for follow-on
joint forces to include nonstealthy Legacy aircraft and long-range
strike capabilities.
We need the F-22. The QDR supports this notion. The QDR focuses on
the ability to quickly and effectively penetrate enemy airspace and
exploit stealth and electronic warfare capabilities. The F-22A excels
at all these missions and helps America take a step ahead against
emerging technologies and threats we face.
Mr. President, I urge my colleagues to support the Chambliss
amendment and allow the Air Force to move forward in a way that will
enable us to save the taxpayers money and to meet the needs that we
face for this country as we go forward.
I yield back the remainder of my time.
Mr. CHAMBLISS. Mr. President, how much time is remaining?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has 9 minutes remaining.
Mr. CHAMBLISS. I yield such time as he may consume to the Senator
from Oklahoma.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Oklahoma is recognized.
Mr. INHOFE. I thank the Senator from Georgia. I think this is a very
serious thing we are getting into. I have five very important points I
plan to make to respond to statements that have been made in the
Chamber here. One is I think the Chairman is right when he talks about
the information wasn't there, wasn't adequately discussed during the
markup. One of the reasons for that is the IDA study didn't even come
out until May 15, and because of that, that was not a part of the
conversation.
Let me say one thing about the GAO study. I agree with the Senator
from South Dakota. I am always leery of a new study that comes out the
same day that an amendment is discussed and brought up in the Chamber,
and that happened to be 3 days ago. I think it is quite a coincidence
it came out at the same time. Having looked at the IDA study, we are on
solid ground for pursuing this multiyear effort.
Let me respond to our good friend, the Senator from Arizona, on the
cost overruns and the delays. I cannot remember--I have been on this
Armed Services Committee for 12 years and in the House for 8 years--one
system that did not go through this same thing. In the Navy alone, they
had many cost overruns. The joint strike fighter, now recognized as
something we desperately need and are using, probably had more cost
overruns. We had the Black Hawk upgrades, the same thing there.
But the thing I remember the most is the C-17s because I was in the
House at that time. It was delay after delay after delay, and stop and
think, if we had at that point junked that, where would we be? Where
would we have gone in Bosnia, Kosovo? Things were anticipated where we
would desperately need it.
Right now we need to increase the number of planes. That I think we
all know. And then we know what is happening to the C-130-R program.
This is something that has been happening for a long period of time.
The third thing I want to mention is the savings. I know one of the
six criteria is called substantial savings. I don't know if there is
anyone who is going to be looking at this budget and accepting the fact
that a quarter of a billion dollars is not substantial. But there seems
to be some doubt by Senators as to whether or not these savings would
actually be achieved. And if you really ask questions about it, if we
really had to do this, I say to my friend from Georgia, we could write
that in and say at any point when it looks like we cannot anticipate
these savings, we would go back to the other type of procurement. That
could be done.
Quite frankly, I think the Air Force would be willing to do that. And
the figure of $225 million they and others believe and I believe is a
conservative figure. So I think that would be one way to offset it.
When you look at title 10 criteria, substantial savings, we have
talked about that; stability, we have talked about that, stability of
funding, stability of design, we all know these things and where we are
with the program.
And so I have come to the conclusion after looking at this that it
does qualify for all of these criteria, but there is one thing that has
not been said, quite frankly, in the right wing over here, and that is,
during the 1990s I can remember standing on this floor and saying we
are going to have to do something about what is happening to the
modernization program because it is not just the aircraft and artillery
pieces, the most modern thing we have for the artillery is the
Palladin, which is World War II technology, where you have to get out
and swab the breach after each shot. There are five countries,
including South Africa, making a better artillery piece than we are
sending out with our kids.
Then we look at the F-15 and F-16, great vehicles. We understand
that. But one of the proudest moments I have had was in 1998 when we
were cutting a lot of the Defense budget at that
[[Page S6342]]
time. We had two-star general John Jumper, who stood up and said
publicly: Now we are sending our kids out with equipment that is not as
good as the Russians are making. At that time, they had the Su-27; the
Su-30 was not actually deployed yet, now the Su-35. And we know in one
purchase--I say to my friend from South Dakota because he mentioned
other countries that are buying these things--in one purchase, the
Chinese purchased 230 of these vehicles. We think they are Su-30s, but
we don't know.
Consequently, if you assess the judgment as someone I think we will
have to accept, and that is General John Jumpers, their Su series in
many ways is better than our best strike vehicles, the F-15 and F-
16. That has to concern Americans.
So I think if that were the only reason to keep this on schedule, and
go to a multiyear program where we enjoy the savings, that would be
reason enough. As long as I am here, I am going to try to put America
in a position where we have the very best of equipment with which we
send our kids to battle. That is not the case today. So I strongly
support the amendment and believe we should get on with it.
Mr. President, I yield back.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona.
Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I yield myself such time as I may use.
I think we ought to try to go back to what this amendment is about.
This amendment is not to cure any delay. The fact is, we have in this
authorization 20 F-22s, with $1.4 billion over what was in the budget--
20 of them. And then, next year, I would imagine we will authorize
another 20; and the year after that, another 20. This is not about any
delay. This is about congressional oversight. This is whether we should
go to multiyear funding and lock us into a weapons system which has not
been proven yet.
I say to my friend from Georgia, no matter how this amendment comes
out because of the differences of opinion we have within the committee,
in July I would like to schedule a hearing, and we will get all the
players over again. Whether this amendment goes up or down, in July we
will schedule a hearing in the subcommittee and have another look at
the pluses and minuses. The Senator from Oklahoma mentioned that
several studies have come in. The IDAs came in on the 20th. The GAO one
came in yesterday or the day before.
So I will be glad--no matter how the vote ends up--to have another
hearing on this issue because we are talking about, obviously, really
large sums of money. So this Senator does not want to delay the
procurement of the F-22. But I certainly want to maintain our ability
to oversight the program rather than locking us in. So it is not about
whether we delay or not.
Finally, on the issue of saving $225 million: from what? Because the
Air Force, on May 16, 2006, stated that an additional $674 million is
needed to fully fund the multiyear program being proposed. So is that
savings of $225 million out of the $674 million of additional costs or
does it mean there really isn't an additional $674 million, that they
sent over, that they need? So that has to be sorted out as well.
So again, I restate to my colleagues that literally every outside
organization--CRS, CBO, GAO--all of them believe not that this weapons
system needs to be canceled, not that it needs to be delayed, but we do
not need to embark on a multiyear lock-in acquisition of this weapons
system, which no doubt has very great value.
I hope my colleagues will agree with the distinguished chairman and
me that this amendment should be rejected at this time.
Mr. President, does the Senator from Michigan wish to speak on this?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan is recognized.
Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I will be opposing the Chambliss amendment,
although I am both a supporter of the F-22 and a supporter, generally,
of multiyear contracts. Where they meet the criteria for multiyear
contracts, I am very supportive of them because of, mainly, the money
that can be saved.
I oppose this amendment with some reluctance. Again, I very much
support, and have supported, the airplane. And I, in general, like the
multiyear approach, where it meets the criteria. But some of the
criteria have not been adequately met; for instance, whether the
multiyear contract would result in substantial savings compared to
using annual contracts. The studies are that the savings would be, I
would say, very modest and not substantial. There are some savings, but
I could not say they are substantial savings.
Another criteria is whether the contract is for a number which is
expected to remain substantially unchanged during the contemplated
contract period in terms of both numbers, production rate, procurement
rate, and, again, total quantities. The F-22 total program quantities
are likely to increase before the end of production.
There is also a requirement that there be a stable design for the
property to be acquired and that the technical risks associated with
the purchase are not excessive. There are some unresolved operational
test deficiencies, and there are what I think can fairly be called
major modifications that are planned for providing more robust air-to-
ground capability.
There is also a question as to whether the estimates of both the cost
of the contract and the anticipated cost avoidance through the use of a
multiyear contract are realistic. Cost estimates are still problematic.
The 2006 contract itself, we understand, has still not been signed. So
it does not meet that criteria either.
I would hope that, perhaps next year, a multiyear would indeed meet
the criteria so we could utilize a multiyear approach next year. But I
do not believe this year it does meet the criteria for a multiyear
contract. I, therefore, will be opposing the Chambliss amendment.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Georgia.
Mr. CHAMBLISS. Mr. President, I respond to the distinguished Senator
from Michigan that all of this which he raised has been addressed in
the IDA report and has been answered. The criteria set forth in the
statute has been validated and verified. I don't know of any technical
problems with the airplane today because, as I said earlier, we have 32
at Langley currently. We have other airplanes stationed at a couple of
other bases around. They are flying over us as we speak, protecting our
Nation's Capitol. They are in rotation to go to Iraq. If there were any
deficiencies, obviously, we would not have those airplanes put in that
rotation, engaging in what may be combat.
I will close by finally saying there has been a lot of conversation
about the way the cost of this airplane has increased. I think the
mission of the airplane actually has changed over the 19 years since
this airplane was first authorized. It was initially an air-to-air
airplane. Air-to-ground was added to it, which caused delays. What the
Senator from Arizona alluded to, relative to issues of the airplane is
exactly correct. But all of those have been addressed. And the cost,
the flyaway costs of this airplane for the last three lots have
decreased by 16 percent, 11 percent, and 14 percent respectively.
So it is an expensive airplane. There is no question about that. But
the capability of the airplane is also not questioned. It is a good
deal for the taxpayers. It is a good deal for the folks who are going
to be called on to fly this airplane in defense of this country. I
encourage my colleagues to support the amendment.
Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, today I rise as an ardent supporter of the
F-22A Raptor. I am very pleased that the Armed Services Committee has
modified the Department of Defense's budget request and authorized the
procurement of 20 F-22s during the next fiscal year.
That being said, I must express my disappointment that the committee
did not include in this legislation language authorizing the Secretary
of the Air Force to enter into a multiyear procurement contract to
purchase 20 Raptors a year for the next 3 years. Under such a contract,
the Institute for Defense Analyses estimates that we will save the
taxpayer at least $225 million. Therefore, I am proud to join Senator
Chambliss and cosponsor this important amendment along with Senators
Inhofe, Lieberman, Bingaman, Cornyn, Thune, Bennett, Isakson, Domenici,
Baucus, Dodd, Hutchison, Collins, Ben Nelson, Feinstein and
[[Page S6343]]
Stevens. Our amendment only strengthens the procurement plan for this
vital aircraft.
I am also troubled that this bill does not increase above the 183
currently planned the number of F-22s that the Air Force is authorized
to procure. My trepidation that our Nation will not build a sufficient
number of aircraft is based on careful study of our Nation's needs and
on the advice and counsel of senior Air Force officers who have been
unanimous in their expert opinion that if the Air Force is to meet its
responsibilities under the National Military Strategy, the Nation
requires 381 Raptors.
I have seen first-hand the capabilities of this extraordinary
aircraft, first at Tyndall Air Force Base, FL, where our pilots are
learning to fly the Raptor, and second at Langley Air Force, VA, where
the first operational F-22s are based. As a result of these meetings
with pilots and ground personnel and several other briefings on our
future preparations, I have come to the conclusion that purchasing
sufficient numbers of Raptors is absolutely vital to our national
security.
Over the past 30 years, the United States has been able to maintain
air superiority in every conflict largely due to the F-15C. However,
with the great advancements in technology over the past several years,
the F-15 has struggled to keep pace. For example, the F-15 is not a
stealth aircraft and its computer systems are based on obsolete
technology. My colleagues should remember that the F-15 first flew in
the early 1970s. During the ensuing years, nations have been
consistently developing new aircraft and missile systems to defeat this
fighter.
Realizing that the F-15 would need a replacement, the Air Force
developed the F-22. The F-22's combination of stealth, supersonic
cruise, advanced maneuverability, and sensor-fused avionics makes this
aircraft a powerful deterrent to countries contemplating a challenge to
U.S. interests, and defines the essence of a true fifth generation
fighter.
So far during the current exercise Northern Edge in Alaska, the F-22A
has achieved a kill ratio of 144:0. Not one F-22 has been simulated
``shot down'' while 14 legacy F-15s and F-18s in the exercise have been
simulated ``shot down.'' One-hundred-and-forty-four to zero, that is
the way American forces should go to war.
The F-22 has the greatest stealth capabilities of any aircraft
currently flying or under design. This is a powerful attribute when one
remembers that it was the F-117 Nighthawk's stealth characteristics
that enabled that aircraft to penetrate the integrated air defenses of
Baghdad during the first night of the 1991 gulf war. The F-22 brings
stealth capability out of the night, enabling operations in high threat
areas at the place and time chosen by combatant commanders, 24 hours a
day seven days a week.
The Raptor is also equipped with supercruise engines. These engines
do not need to go to after-burner in order to achieve supersonic
flight. This provides the F-22 with a strategic advantage by enabling
supersonic speeds to be maintained for a far greater length of time. By
comparison, all other fighters require their engines to go to after-
burner to achieve supersonic speeds. This consumes a tremendous amount
of fuel and greatly limits an aircraft's range.
The F-22 is also the most maneuverable fighter flying today. This is
of particular importance when encountering newer Russian-made aircraft
and surface-to-air missile systems, both of which boast advanced,
highly impressive capabilities against our legacy F-15, F-18, and F-16
aircraft.
Yet, a further advantage resides in the F-22's radar and avionics.
When entering hostile airspace, the sensor-fused avionics of the F-22
can detect and engage enemy aircraft and surface threats far before an
enemy can hope to engage the F-22. At the same time its advanced
sensors enable the F-22 to be a forward surveillance platform gathering
crucial intelligence on the enemy.
However, one of the most important capabilities of the Raptor is
often the most misunderstood. Many critics of the program state that,
since much of the design work for this aircraft was performed during
the Cold War, it does not meet the requirements of the future.
I believe this criticism is misplaced. The F-22 is more than just a
fighter--it is also a bomber. In its existing configuration it is able
to carry two 1,000 pound GPS-guided JDAM bombs and will undergo an
upgrade to carry eight small diameter bombs in the near future. In
2008, the F-22's radar system will be enhanced with advanced air-to-
ground modes, enabling the Raptor to hunt independently and destroy
targets on the ground.
All of these capabilities are necessary to fight what is quickly
emerging as the threat of the future--the anti-access integrated air
defense system. Integrated air defenses include both surface-to-air
missiles and fighters deployed in such a fashion as to leverage the
strengths of both systems. Such a system could pose a very real
possibility of denying U.S. aircraft access to strategically important
regions during future conflicts.
It should also be noted that--for a comparably cheap price--an
adversary can purchase the Russian SA-20, surface-to-air missile. This
system has an effective range of approximately 120 nautical miles and
can engage targets at greater then 100,000 feet, much higher than the
service ceiling of any existing American fighter or bomber. Surface-to-
air missiles, with similar capabilities, have been sold to Iran. The
Russians have also developed a family of highly maneuverable fighters,
the SU-30 and 35s, which have been sold to such nations as China. Of
further import, 59 other nations have fourth generation fighters.
It has also been widely reported in the aviation media that the F-
15C, our current air superiority fighter, is not as maneuverable as
newer Russian aircraft, especially the SU-35. However, the F-22 is
designed to defeat an integrated air defense system. By utilizing its
stealth capability, the F-22 can penetrate an enemy's airspace
undetected and, when modified, independently hunt for mobile surface to
air missile systems. Once detected, the F-22 would then be able to drop
bombs on those targets. Some correctly state that the B-2 bomber and
the F-117 could handle these assignments during night only operations.
However, the F-22 offers the additional capability of being able to
engage an enemy's air superiority fighters, such as the widely
proficient SU-35. Therefore, the Raptor will be able to defeat, almost
simultaneously, two very different threats, 24 hours a day, that until
now have been handled by two different types of aircraft.
I should like to point out that these potential threats are not just
future concerns, but they are here today. For example, over the last 2
years, the Air Force has conducted exercises with the Indian Air Force
as part of our effort to strengthen relations with that nation. The
Indian Air Force has a number of SU-30 MKKs, an aircraft which is very
similar to a version of aircraft sold in large quantities to the
People's Republic of China. During these exercises, it has been widely
reported in the aviation and defense media that the Indian Air Force's
SU-30s won a number of engagements when training against our Air
Force's F-15s.
So let me be clear on this point: a developing nation's air force was
able to defeat the F-15. This was a stunning event and one that
requires our immediate attention.
Now that this fact has been established, the question that we must
ask ourselves is: How do we remedy this national security concern? The
F-22 provides the answer.
Though the F-22 may be the solution to these problems, if the Nation
does not purchase a sufficient number of these aircraft our service
members could face unnecessary dangers and risks. Many others and I
have come to this conclusion after closely listening to our service
members when they have outlined their equipment requirements based upon
the national security goals our Government has outlined. What is their
professional opinion? That if the Air Force is to succeed in the tasks
outlined in our National Defense Strategy, our airmen and women require
381 F-22s, far more then the 184 aircraft currently planned.
However, another important consideration is cost. In a period of
runaway procurement costs, we are not only concerned about the effort
to procure the correct number of F-22s but to procure them at a
reasonable price. That
[[Page S6344]]
is exactly what this amendment achieves. It authorizes a multiyear
procurement plan for the Raptor, in which 20 aircraft a year over 3
years will be purchased. This will result in the taxpayer saving
approximately $225 million under the existing plan to purchase 184
aircraft.
Introducing innovative plans to save funds is nothing new to the F-22
program. In fact, since production first began on this aircraft, the
``fly-away'' cost has been reduced by 35 percent. However, we must take
advantage of any opportunity that will result in additional savings
while increasing our military capabilities. A multiyear F-22
procurement plan achieves that goal.
If this amendment is adopted, the Air Force will be permitted to
enter into a multiyear procurement contract. However, some of our
colleagues argue that the F-22 does not meet the six-point requirements
for multiyear procurement under existing law. I, on the other hand,
believe these criteria have been met and the amendment before us should
be seen as reinforcing that fact.
Specifically, the first requirement to authorize a multiyear contract
under the existing statute is the determination that substantial
savings will result from the contract. The Institute for Defense
Analysis estimates that a multiyear contract will result in at least
$225 million in savings.
The second criterion states there must be a ``minimum need'' for the
aircraft. I believe that my address today has shown the urgent need to
deploy the Raptor in order to counter the deployment of fourth
generation fighters and new antiaccess systems.
As far as a minimum need is concerned, as a result of the Joint Air
Dominance Study the Secretary of Defense stated that a minimum
requirement for 183 Raptors existed. Under the administration's
proposal, which this amendment is based upon, the production rate,
procurement rate and the total quantities of the Raptor purchased will
be substantially unchanged during the contract period. Remember, the
contract calls for the purchase of 20 Raptors a year over the next 3
years.
The third requirement insists that the Raptor be a program with
stable funding. The Armed Services Committee has added additional funds
for this year and the Department of Defense's future budgets will also
contain funding requests since the purchase of F-22s under a multiyear
procurement contract was called for in the Quadrennial Defense Review.
Fourth, the aircraft's design must be stable. This is probably the
most controversial requirement. Yes, the F-22 has had its problems
during the development and production process, but I challenge anyone
to identify another strike aircraft that hasn't. Remember, the F-22 is
now operational. That means the Raptor will deploy in support of our
service members and it has satisfactorily completed the engineering and
manufacturing development phase as well as its follow-on operational
test and evaluation.
It is important to note that any upgrades to the Raptor will not
result in significant structural changes. Some might argue, correctly,
that a potential problem with the forward boom frame heat-treating has
been identified on up to 91 aircraft. It is important to note that this
was not an aircraft design problem, but an issue of a manufacturer not
following the prescribed manufacturing process. In reality, testing has
so far shown that 92 percent of the suspect frames tested did in fact
undergo an adequate manufacturing process. I have been advised that
neither a redesign nor a refit are planned or expected. Regardless, the
manufacturer has been replaced and all aircraft procured under a
multiyear agreement will not have this problem.
Fifth, a program must show that its cost estimates are realistic. The
Air Force has gone above and beyond the call of duty in providing the
Congress with independent cost analysis. The Institute for Defense
Analysis provided an Independent Cost Estimate in 2005 and with a
multiyear procurement business case analysis in May of this year.
Finally, the last requirement of a multiyear procurement plan is the
determination that the program is important to the national security of
the United States. I believe that we have already established
conclusively that the Raptor is the answer to the present and future
threats posed by antiaccess systems.
Therefore, I believe that the Raptor qualifies for a multiyear
procurement contract under the existing statute. However, to ensure
there is no doubt on this subject, I strongly recommend this amendment
to my colleagues.
Our Nation stands at a crossroads.
In a wide variety of policy arenas, the Senate is being asked to make
investments that will reap rewards for our children and our
grandchildren.
The F-22 is one of these investments. It will guarantee America's
dominance of the skies for the next half century. All that is required
is that we make a commitment now to ensure that future. By purchasing
adequate numbers of F-22 Raptors we are meeting the threats of today
and tomorrow and we are doing so in such a way as to maximize the
savings of the American taxpayer.
I thank Senator Chambliss for offering this important amendment, and
I urge my colleagues to join my fellow cosponsors, Senators Inhofe,
Lieberman, Bingaman, Cornyn, Thune, Bennett, Isakson, Domenici, Baucus,
Dodd, Hutchison, Collins, Ben Nelson, Feinstein and Stevens in
supporting this amendment.
Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I rise today to speak in support of the
amendment to authorize a multiyear procurement for the F-22 fighter--
amendment No. 4261 I am proud to cosponsor. I thank my friend and
colleague, the Senator from Georgia, Mr. Chambliss, for his leadership
in offering this amendment. I believe he has very ably and
comprehensively argued the case for this multiyear and has persuasively
rebutted the personal arguments against taking this action. But I want
to add some thoughts about why I think this is a prudent act by this
body.
The F-22 has had developmental problems and it has had cost
increases. But all this is old news. There are few, if any, programs
that have had more oversight by the Senate Armed Services Committee
than this program. We have examined it in great detail in hearings each
year from concept to procurement. We have examined the technology, the
acquisition plan, the development process, and the production issue.
And we have examined the costs in substantial detail. In some years we
have put on cost caps to force spending discipline, and in other years
we have slowed down production to align the request with the reality of
the backlog. But despite the challenges of building the world's most
capable fighter, we have decided, and the full Senate has decided, that
this is a critical program that should and must continue. And the U.S.
Air Force has argued it needs the F-22 to continue.
There is a very compelling reason for this decision. Air dominance is
absolutely essential to American military dominance and American
security in the 21st century. Our military has had that dominance since
World War II. If we were ever to lose it, or even allow it to be
seriously challenged, the global strategic environment would
fundamentally change for the United States. The F-22 is the way we
prevent that from happening for the next generation maybe more. Much
has been said about the cutting-edge technologies that are included in
this airplane that will ensure we maintain that air dominance. I need
not repeat that now. But it is the reason that we have voted to
continue procuring the F-22 and it is reason that we will continue to
do so.
I believe the problems with the F-22 that some of my colleagues have
reminded us about have been substantially solved. The F-22 business
case was validated by DOD during the QDR and the Air Dominance Study.
The long debate over the number we will procure is about over. I am
convinced that it will not be lower than the 183 validated by the QDR.
In fact if there are now to be changes in that number, it will be
increased, not decreased. So I believe that we will build the
additional 60 contemplated in this amendment. The decision to procure
these 60 over 3 years instead of 2 years is sound. We should not have a
break in the production line before we begin building the F-35 the JSF.
Those 60 aircraft can be built for about $250 million less with the
multiyear buy provided for by this amendment.
The Senate Armed Services Committee, and the Airland Subcommittee,
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has spent much time focusing on our acquisition system because we are
concerned that the weapons we are buying are taking too long to field
and are costing too much. We believe the American people should not pay
more than they have to. But we also believe our Armed Forces should get
the weapons they need to defend our security. SACS have concluded we
need this fighter. We recommended full funding this year for 20. I
believe we will do that next year and the year after that until we have
procured 183 F-22 fighters. Authorizing a multiyear will cost the
American people $250 million less than if we authorize these fighters
year by year. That is good acquisition policy. Our Armed Force needs
this fighter, and we should not pay $250 million more to get it than we
have to. That is why I urge my colleagues to support this amendment.
Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I yield back the remainder of my time.
Mr. CHAMBLISS. Mr. President, I yield back the remainder of my time.
Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, if the Senator from Arizona will yield 1
minute?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan is recognized for 1
minute.
Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I want to put in the Record a chart from
the Institute for Defense Analysis. It compares savings on various
programs, showing savings with the F/A-18, multiyear, from 7 to 11
percent; the C-17 airplane, of 10 percent; the C-130J, multiyear, of 10
percent; and the comparison to the F-22, which they estimate at 2.6
percent. I ask unanimous consent that this chart be printed in the
Record.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
TABLE 4.--CHARACTERISTICS OF OTHER RELEVANT MYP PROGRAMS
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Amount of Amount of
Savings Savings Prior Period of Procurement Quantity CRI EOQ TINA
Program (%) (TY$M) lots/ performance timeframe procured funding funding FAR waiver
units (years) ($M) ($M)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
F/A-18E/F Air Vehicle (MYP-1)........ 7.4 $850 3/62 5 FY00-04 222 $200 $85 15 No
F414 Engine (MYP-1).................. 2.8 51 5/682 5 FY02-06 454 0 0 15 No
F/A-18E/F/G Air Vehicle (MYP-2)...... 10.95 1,052 8/284 5 FY05-09 210 100 0 15 Yes
C-17A Airframe (MYP-1)............... 5.0 760 8/40 7 FY97-03 80 350 300 15 No
C-17A Engine (F117-PW-100)........... 6.0 122 4/160 7 FY97-03 320 0 0 12 No
C-17A Airframe (MYP-1)............... 10.8 1,211 14/112 5 FY03-07 60 0 645 12 Yes
C-17A Engine (F117-PW-100)........... 5.7 92 14/448 5 FY03-07 267 0 0 12 No
C-130J/KC-130J....................... 10.9 513 9/37 6 FY03-08 62 0 140 12 No
C-130J (Air Force)................... 10.9 340 ......... 6 FY03-08 42 0 unknown 12 No
KC-130J (Marine Corps)............... 13.1 173 ......... 6 FY03-08 20 0 unknown 12 No
F-16A/B/C/D Air Vehicle (MYP-1)...... 7.7 246 4/605 4 FY82-85 450 unknown unknown 15 No
F-16C/D Air Vehicle (MYP-2).......... 10.1 467 8/1139 4 FY86-89 720 unknown unknown 15 No
F-16C/D Air Vehicle (MYP-3).......... 5.7 262 12/1859 4 FY90-93 630 unknown unknown 15 No
Average.............................. 8.00 469 ......... 5.25 N/A 292 N/A N/A
F-122A Air Vehicle................... 2.6 203 8a122 3 FY07-09 60 0 255 15 No
F-122A Engine (F119-PW-100).......... 2.7 32 8b244 3 FY07-09 120 0 45 15 No
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
a Include Production Representative Test Vehicle (PRTV) lot and units.
b Include PRTV lot and units and Replacement Test Aircraft (RTA); installed engines only.
Mr. LEVIN. I yield back my time.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. All time has been yielded back.
Mr. CHAMBLISS. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays on my
amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second? There is a
sufficient second.
The yeas and nays were ordered.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senator from
Minnesota is recognized.
Mr. DAYTON. Thank you, Mr. President.
Amendment No. 4241
Mr. President, I am a proud cosponsor of Senator McCain's proposal to
name this legislation after the great chairman of the Senate Armed
Services Committee, Senator Warner.
I have had the privilege during my term in the Senate to serve on the
Armed Services Committee under two tremendous chairmen, outstanding
Senators, and terrific human beings--John Warner and Carl Levin.
Our Senate, our military, and our country have been fortunate to have
their extraordinary leadership during these critical years.
Chairman Warner, for whom this legislation would be named, is more
than deserving of that honor. He is greatly respected by our committee
members on both sides of the aisle and, indeed, by the entire Senate.
He has been unfailingly fair to all points of view, while leading us
with a firm hand and resolute gaze, that he learned during his own
military service and as Secretary of the Navy.
When he picks up his committee gavel, all of us--members, staff,
military officers, and other interested parties--all know we have a
leader well prepared in all respects for that enormous responsibility.
Our Senate and our Nation are indebted to Senator Warner and to
Senator Levin for their superb public service.
Mr. President, I have listened to many of my colleagues express their
views on Iraq during the past week and have waited for this opportunity
to express my own.
My colleagues reflect sincere differences and I believe sincere
desires to uphold the best interests of our great country in a very
difficult and complicated situation. We are all patriotic Americans
first and foremost and partisan politicians later.
I voted against the Iraq war resolution in October 2002, despite
being presented with incorrect and misleading information by very high
officials in the Bush administration, which purported to prove that
Saddam Hussein was developing nuclear weapons. I questioned the
veracity of that information. And I had grave concerns that an
unwarranted invasion of Iraq, if no weapons of mass destruction were
found, would ultimately weaken, not strengthen, the national security
of the United States by seriously damaging our standing and our
alliances throughout the world.
I also voted against the Iraq war resolution because I believed that
such a decision by the Congress at that time was premature. President
Bush was not asking Congress for a declaration of war, as the U.S.
Constitution requires. He was asking for a congressional resolution
authorizing him to declare war, if he determined it necessary at some
later date. I do not fault the President for asking for that blank
check. I fault the Congress for giving it to him. In fact, it was over
6 months later that the President made his final decision to commence
military action against Iraq.
In a similar vein, I believe that both the Levin-Reed amendment and
the Kerry-Feingold amendment were premature. One called for the
redeployment of U.S. troops from Iraq to begin within 6 months. The
other required the almost complete withdrawal of those troops within a
year.
I believe it is impossible to foresee at this time whether either of
those actions would be in the best national security and foreign policy
interests of the United States 6 months or 1 year from now. The
situation in Iraq is too uncertain and too unpredictable to do so. That
uncertainty and unpredictability evidence the failures of the Bush
administration's conduct of this war effort.
It is now over 3 years since the U.S. military swept from the Iraqi
border to Baghdad in only 3 weeks, overthrew Saddam Hussein and his
evil regime, and liberated the Iraqi people. Yet after that swift and
decisive military victory was won, the Bush administration has failed
to secure it.
Administration officials ignored the advice of their own top military
commanders--and this is an important lesson for us--and failed to
commit
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enough U.S. troops to secure the country. Other mistakes followed,
leaving security and political vacuums that were filled by foreign
terrorists and domestic insurgents.
During the past 3 years, violence in Iraq has steadily increased and
still threatens to rip the country apart. Like it or not, our
courageous troops remain the only effective protections of the Iraqi
people from civil war or anarchy and a lawless bloodbath.
Unfortunately, the bad conditions in Iraq today can become even
worse--much worse--if our troops begin or complete their withdrawals
before Iraqi forces are able to take their place. That training and
equipping of Iraqi replacements should have been completed already, but
it is not. I do not know what that timetable is. I am skeptical that
anyone else in this body does. The Bush administration should tell us,
but they will not, which means they still do not know either.
So it seems to me necessary not to decide and certainly not to act
until we have that information. It is imperative not to make future
mistakes that will compound the previous mistakes. And we certainly
should not decide or act until we have listened to the current views of
the top U.S. military commanders, who are responsible for successfully
completing our mission in Iraq and for protecting the lives and safety
of the 133,000 heroic Americans who are stationed there now.
I serve on the Senate Armed Services Committee, and yet I have not
heard those top military views recently expressed.
I respectfully ask the distinguished chairman of our committee to
arrange for us to hear them as soon as possible. I read a news report 2
days ago that General Casey, the senior American commander in Iraq,
will brief the Secretary of Defense later this week on his newest
thinking about U.S. force levels through the end of the year. I want to
hear General Casey's recommendation myself and his reasons for it
before I am prepared to vote on any proposal affecting U.S. troop
levels. I want to give our military commanders in Iraq and our American
troops in Iraq what they need to succeed now, 6 months from now, a year
from now.
Like most Americans, I wish this war were over. I wish it hadn't
begun. But we are in it; we must win it. We cannot leave Iraq until the
Iraqi Government has established political control over its country and
until the Iraqi security forces can protect their citizens. We cannot
leave what we started to end in a lawless bloodbath.
We must rely on our senior military commanders to tell us what force
strength they need to successfully complete their mission. The
timetable we follow should be theirs, not ours. It should be based upon
American security and Iraqi survival. Again, I respectfully urge
Chairman Warner to summon our top military commanders to tell us what
they need and for how long. I don't want any more incidents where
American soldiers are captured, brutally tortured, and murdered because
there were not enough of their fellow American soldiers there to defend
them.
I agree with my colleagues about the urgent need for the new Iraqi
Government to accelerate their assumption of complete responsibility
for their country's services, security, and success. They need to tell
us their expected schedule for doing so. We need to assist them in that
process, and we need to enlist other nations to help them as well. We
must complete our mission in Iraq as soon as possible, but we must
complete it with a lasting victory, and we cannot leave until that
victory is secure.
We should be discussing what we can do to hasten that day. The Bush
administration should be telling us what we need to do to hasten that
day, how to accelerate the transfer of responsibilities to Iraqis, how
to accelerate the social and economic reconstruction of Iraq, how to
enrich the lives of Iraqi citizens rather than the livelihoods of
American contractors. Instead, all we get are cheap spin-and-thin
slogans rather than substantive proposals and sophisticated solutions.
The administration needs to set forth a plan of action in Iraq, a
roadmap to final victory. That is what we should be demanding. That is
what we should be debating.
I yield the floor and suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I thank my colleague from Minnesota. He
will be departing our committee this fall, as he departs the Senate. I
appreciate the work he has contributed to our committee throughout the
year.
It is time for my distinguished colleague from Michigan, ranking
member, and I to offer a package of amendments.
Mr. LEVIN. Will the Senator yield?
Mr. WARNER. Yes.
Mr. LEVIN. While he was making reference to the Senator from
Minnesota, I think the chairman was off the floor when the Senator from
Minnesota, Mr. Dayton, made some very glowingly positive and
affirmative remarks about our chairman and about how he was really
delighted to be able to cosponsor the amendment which had been
introduced to name this bill after our beloved chairman. I wanted to
make sure that he was aware of that and could look up those remarks
later.
Mr. WARNER. I was absent from the floor. I express my humble
appreciation to my colleague from Minnesota. I recall that he
accompanied Senator Levin and me to Iraq one time. That was when I
first became aware of the knowledge that he had on world affairs and
other subjects. He has contributed to the greater good of the Committee
on Armed Services. I thank him for his service. But there is more time;
he has a little bit left to go.
Amendments Nos. 4492; 4493; 4494; 4266, as Modified; 4495; 4307, as
Modified; 4326, as Modified; 4224; 4496; 4309, as Modified; 4345; 4368;
4497; 4222; 4498; 4499; 4202, as Modified; 4500; 4441; 4231, as
Modified; 4409; 4501; 4502; 4503; 4504; 4505; 4506; 4331; 4507; 4508;
4509; 4510; 4219; 4386; 4511; 4197; 4512; 4513; 4514; 4515; 4342; 4365;
4241; 4220, as Modified; 4371; 4244; 4516; 4466; 4517; 4363, as
Modified; 4450, as Modified; 4362, as Modified; 4275, as Modified;
4475, as Modified; 4276, as Modified; 4469, as Modified; 4477, as
Modified; 4518; 4214; and 4519, En Bloc
At this time I send a series of amendments to the desk. They have
been cleared by myself and the ranking member. I ask unanimous consent
that the Senate consider the amendments en bloc, the amendments be
agreed to, and the motions to reconsider be laid upon the table.
Finally, I ask that any statements relating to any of the individual
amendments be printed in the Record.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The amendments were agreed to, as follows:
amendment no. 4492
(Purpose: To clarify the contracting authority for the chemical
demilitarization program)
At the end of subtitle F of title III, add the following:
SEC. 375. CHEMICAL DEMILITARIZATION PROGRAM CONTRACTING
AUTHORITY.
(a) Multiyear Contracting Authority.--The Secretary of
Defense may carry out responsibilities under section 1412(a)
of the Department of Defense Authorization Act, 1986 (Public
Law 99-145; 50 U.S.C. 1521(a)) through multiyear contracts
entered into before the date of the enactment of this Act.
(b) Availability of Funds.--Contracts entered into under
subsection (a) shall be funded through annual appropriations
for the destruction of chemical agents and munitions.
Amendment No. 4493
(Purpose: To extend the authority for the personnel program for
scientific and technical personnel)
At the end of title XI, add the following:
SEC. 1104. THREE-YEAR EXTENSION OF AUTHORITY FOR EXPERIMENTAL
PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT PROGRAM FOR SCIENTIFIC AND
TECHNICAL PERSONNEL.
Section 1101(e)(1) of the Strom Thurmond National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999 (5 U.S.C. 3104 note)
is amended by striking ``September 30, 2008'' and inserting
``September 30, 2011''.
Amendment No. 4494
(Purpose: To encourage the use of electronic voting technology and to
provide for the continuation of the Interim Voting Assistance System)
On page 187, between lines 20 and 21, insert the following:
(c) Use of Electronic Voting Technology.--
(1) Continuation of interim voting assistance system.--The
Secretary of Defense shall continue the Interim Voting
Assistance System (IVAS) ballot request program with
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respect to all absent uniformed services voters (as defined
under section 107(1) of the Uniformed Overseas Citizens
Absentee Voting Act (42 U.S.C. 1973ff-6(1))), overseas
employees of the Department of Defense, and the dependents of
such voters and employees, for the general election and all
elections through December 31, 2006.
(2) Reports.--
(A) In general.--Not later than 30 days after the date of
the regularly scheduled general election for Federal office
for November 2006, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to
the congressional defense committees a report setting forth--
(i) an assessment of the success of the implementation of
the Interim Voting Assistance System ballot request program
carried out under paragraph (1);
(ii) recommendations for continuation of the Interim Voting
Assistance System and for improvements to that system; and
(iii) an assessment of available technologies and other
means of achieving enhanced use of electronic and Internet-
based capabilities under the Interim Voting Assistance
System.
(B) Future elections.--Not later than May 15, 2007, the
Secretary of Defense shall submit to the congressional
defense committees a report detailing plans for expanding the
use of electronic voting technology for individuals covered
under the Uniformed Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (42
U.S.C. 1973ff et seq.) for elections through November 30,
2010.
Amendment No. 4266, As Modified
On page 421, between lines 6 and 7, insert the following:
SEC. 1066. REPORTS ON DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE EFFORTS TO
INVESTIGATE AND PROSECUTE CASES OF CONTRACTING
ABUSE IN IRAQ, AFGHANISTAN, AND THROUGHOUT THE
WAR ON TERROR.
(a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
(1) Waste, fraud, and abuse in contracting are harmful to
United States efforts to successfully win the conflicts in
Iraq and Afghanistan and succeed in the war on terror. The
act of stealing from our soldiers who are daily in harm's way
is clearly criminal and must be actively prosecuted.
(2) It is a vital interest of United States taxpayers to be
protected from theft of their tax dollars by corrupt
contractors.
(3) Whistleblower lawsuits are an important tool for
exposing waste, fraud, and abuse and can identify serious
graft and corruption.
(4) This issue is of paramount importance to the United
States taxpayer, and the Congress must be provided with
information about alleged contractor waste, fraud, and abuse
taking place in Iraq, Afghanistan, and throughout the war on
terror and about the efforts of the Department of Justice to
combat these crimes.
(b) Reports.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 90 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, and every 180 days thereafter, the
Attorney General shall submit to the Committee on the
Judiciary and the Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs of the Senate, the Committee on the
Judiciary and the Committee on Government Reform of the House
of Representatives, and the congressional defense committees
a report on efforts to investigate and prosecute cases of
waste, fraud, and abuse under sections 3729 and 3730(b) of
title 31, United States Code, or any other related law that
are related to Federal contracting in Iraq, Afghanistan, and
throughout the war on terror.
(2) Content.--Each report submitted under paragraph (1)
shall include the following:
(A) Information on organized efforts of the Department of
Justice that have been created to ensure that the Department
of Justice is investigating, in a timely and appropriate
manner, claims of contractor waste, fraud, and abuse related
to the activities of the United States Government in Iraq,
Afghanistan, and throughout the war on terror.
(B) Information on the specific number of personnel,
financial resources, and workdays devoted to addressing this
waste, fraud, and abuse, including a complete listing of all
of the offices across the United States and throughout the
world that are working on these cases and an explanation of
the types of additional resources, both in terms of personnel
and finances, that the Department of Justice needs to ensure
that all of these cases proceed on a timely basis.
(C) A detailed description of any internal Department of
Justice task force that exists to work specifically on cases
of contractor fraud and abuse in Iraq, Afghanistan, and
throughout the war on terror, including a description of its
action plan, the frequency of its meetings, the level and
quantity of staff dedicated to it, its measures for success,
the nature and substance of the allegations, and the amount
of funds in controversy for each case. If there is a showing
of extraordinary circumstances that disclosure of particular
information would pose an imminent threat of harm to a
relator and be detrimental to the public interest, then this
information should be redacted in accordance with standard
practices.
(D) A detailed description of any interagency task force
that exists to work specifically on cases of contractor
waste, fraud, and abuse in Iraq, Afghanistan, and throughout
the war on terror, including its action plan, the frequency
of its meetings, the level and quantity of staff dedicated to
it, its measures for success, the type, nature, and substance
of the allegations, and the amount of funds in controversy
for each case. If there is a showing of extraordinary
circumstances that disclosure of particular information would
pose an imminent threat of harm to a relator and be
detrimental to the public interest, then this information
should be redacted in accordance with standard practices.
(E) The names of the senior officials directly responsible
for oversight of the efforts to address these cases of
contractor waste, fraud, and abuse in Iraq, Afghanistan, and
throughout the war on terror.
(F) Specific information on the number of investigators and
other personnel that have been provided to the Department of
Justice by other Federal departments and agencies in support
of the efforts of the Department of Justice to combat
contractor waste, fraud, and abuse in Iraq, Afghanistan, and
throughout the war on terror, including data on the quantity
of time that these investigators have spent working within
the Department of Justice structures dedicated to this
effort.
(G) Specific information on the full number of
investigations, including grand jury investigations currently
underway, that are addressing these cases of contractor
waste, fraud, and abuse in Iraq, Afghanistan, and throughout
the war on terror.
(H) Specific information on the number and status of the
criminal cases that have been launched to address contractor
waste, fraud, and abuse in Iraq, Afghanistan, and throughout
the war on terror.
(I) Specific information on the number of civil cases that
have been filed to address contractor waste, fraud, and abuse
in Iraq, Afghanistan, and throughout the war on terror,
including specific information on the quantity of cases
initiated by private parties, as well as the quantity of
cases that have been referred to the Department of Justice by
the Department of Defense, the Department of State, and other
relevant Federal departments and agencies.
(J) Specific information on the resolved civil and criminal
cases that have been filed to address contractor waste,
fraud, and abuse in Iraq, Afghanistan, and throughout the war
on terror, including the specific results of these cases, the
types of waste, fraud, and abuse that took place, the amount
of funds that were returned to the United States Government
as a result of resolution of these cases, and a full
description of the type and substance of the waste, fraud,
and abuse that took place. If there is a showing of
extraordinary circumstances that disclosure of particular
information would pose an imminent threat of harm to a
relator and be detrimental to the public interest, then this
information should be redacted in accordance with standard
practices.
(K) The best estimate by the Department of Justice of the
scale of the problem of contractor waste, fraud, and abuse in
Iraq, Afghanistan, and throughout the war on terror.
amendment no. 4495
(Purpose: To require annual reports on United States contributions to
the United Nations)
At the end of subtitle A of title XII add the following:
SEC. 1209. ANNUAL REPORTS ON UNITED STATES CONTRIBUTIONS TO
THE UNITED NATIONS.
(a) Annual Report Required.--Not later than 90 days after
the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually
thereafter, the President shall submit to Congress a report
listing all assessed and voluntary contributions of the
United States Government for the preceding fiscal year to the
United Nations and United Nations affiliated agencies and
related bodies.
(b) Elements.--Each report under subsection (a) shall set
forth, for the fiscal year covered by such report, the
following:
(1) The total amount of all assessed and voluntary
contributions of the United States Government to the United
Nations and United Nations affiliated agencies and related
bodies.
(2) The approximate percentage of United States Government
contributions to each United Nations affiliated agency or
body in such fiscal year when compared with all contributions
to such agency or body from any source in such fiscal year.
(3) For each such contribution--
(A) the amount of such contribution;
(B) a description of such contribution (including whether
assessed or voluntary);
(C) the department or agency of the United States
Government responsible for such contribution;
(D) the purpose of such contribution; and
(E) the United Nations or United Nations affiliated agency
or related body receiving such contribution.
AMENDMENT NO. 4307, as modified
At the end of subtitle A of title XII, add the following:
SEC. 1209. NORTH KOREA.
(a) Coordinator of Policy on North Korea.--
(1) Appointment required.--Not later than 60 days after the
date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall
appoint a senior presidential envoy to act as coordinator of
United States policy on North Korea.
(2) Designation.--The individual appointed under paragraph
(1) may be known as the ``North Korea Policy Coordinator''
(in this subsection referred to as the ``Coordinator)''.
(3) Duties.--The Coordinator shall--
[[Page S6348]]
(A) conduct a full and complete interagency review of
United States policy toward North Korea including matters
related to security and human rights;
(B) provide policy direction for negotiations with North
Korea relating to nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles, and
other security matters; and
(C) provide leadership for United States participation in
Six Party Talks on the denuclearization of the Korean
peninsula.
(4) Report.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the
appointment of an individual as Coordinator under paragraph
(1), the Coordinator shall submit to the President and
Congress an unclassified report, with a classified annex if
necessary, on the actions undertaken under paragraph (3). The
report shall set forth--
(A) the results of the review under paragraph (3)(A); and
(B) any other matters on North Korea that the individual
considers appropriate.
(b) Report on Nuclear and Missile Programs of North
Korea.--
(1) Report required.--Not later than 90 days after the date
of the enactment of this Act, and every 180 days thereafter,
the President shall submit to Congress an unclassified
report, with a classified annex as appropriate, on the
nuclear program and the missile program of North Korea.
(2) Elements.--Each report submitted under paragraph (1)
shall include the following:
(A) The most current national intelligence estimate on the
nuclear program and the missile program of North Korea, and,
consistent with the protection of intelligence sources and
methods, an unclassified summary of the key judgments in the
estimate.
(B) The most current unclassified United States Government
assessment, stated as a range if necessary, of (i) the number
of nuclear weapons possessed by North Korea and (ii) the
amount of nuclear material suitable for weapons use produced
by North Korea by plutonium reprocessing and uranium
enrichment for each period as follows:
(I) Before October 1994.
(II) Between October 1994 and October 2002.
(III) Between October 2002 and the date of the submittal of
the initial report under paragraph (1).
(IV) Each 12-month period after the submittal of the
initial report under paragraph (1).
(C) Any other matter relating to the nuclear program or
missile program of North Korea that the President considers
appropriate.
AMENDMENT NO. 4326
At the end of subtitle B of title II, add the following:
SEC. 215. ARROW BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEM.
Of the amount authorized to be appropriated by section
201(4) for research, development, test, and evaluation for
Defense-wide activities and available for ballistic missile
defense--
(1) $65,000,000 may be available for coproduction of the
Arrow ballistic missile defense system; and
(2) $63,702,000 may be available for the Arrow System
Improvement Program.
AMENDMENT NO. 4224
(Purpose: To include assessments of Traumatic Brain Injury in the post-
deployment health assessments of members of the Armed Forces returning
from deployment in support of a contingency operation)
On page 267, beginning on line 24, insert after ``mental
health'' the following: ``(including Traumatic Brain Injury
(TBI))''.
On page 268, line 13, insert ``(including Traumatic Brain
Injury)'' after ``mental health''.
AMENDMENT NO. 4496
(Purpose: To require a report on biodefense staffing and training
requirements in support of the national biosafety laboratories)
At the end of subtitle G of title X add the following:
SEC. 1066. REPORT ON BIODEFENSE STAFFING AND TRAINING
REQUIREMENTS IN SUPPORT OF NATIONAL BIOSAFETY
LABORATORIES.
(a) Study Required.--The Secretary of Defense shall, in
consultation with the Secretary of Homeland Security and the
Secretary of Health and Human Services, conduct a study to
determine the staffing and training requirements for pending
capital programs to construct biodefense laboratories
(including agriculture and animal laboratories) at Biosafety
Level (BSL) 3 and Biosafety Level 4 or to expand current
biodefense laboratories to such biosafety levels.
(b) Elements.--In conducting the study, the Secretary of
Defense shall address the following:
(1) The number of trained personnel, by discipline and
qualification level, required for existing biodefense
laboratories at Biosafety Level 3 and Biosafety Level 4.
(2) The number of research and support staff, including
researchers, laboratory technicians, animal handlers,
facility managers, facility or equipment maintainers,
biosecurity personnel (including biosafety, physical, and
electronic security personnel), and other safety personnel
required to manage biodefense research efforts to combat
bioterrorism at the biodefense laboratories described in
subsection (a).
(3) The training required to provide the personnel
described by paragraphs (1) and (2), including the type of
training (whether classroom, laboratory, or field training)
required, the length of training required by discipline, and
the curriculum required to be developed for such training.
(4) Training schedules necessary to meet the scheduled
openings of the biodefense laboratories described in
subsection (a), including schedules for refresher training
and continuing education that may be necessary for that
purpose.
(c) Report.--Not later than December 31, 2006, the
Secretary of Defense shall submit to Congress a report
setting forth the results of the study conducted under this
section.
amendment no. 4309, as modified
At the end of title XIV, add the following:
SEC. . AMOUNT FOR PROCUREMENT OF HEMOSTATIC AGENTS FOR USE
IN THE FIELD.
(a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that
every member of the Armed Forces deployed in a combat zone
should carry life saving resources on them, including
hemostatic agents.
(b) Availability of Funds.--(1) Of the amount authorized
under section 1405(1) for operation and maintenance for the
Army, $15,000,000 may be made available for the procurement
of a sufficient quantity of hemostatic agents, including
blood-clotting bandages, for use by members of the Armed
Forces in the field so that each soldier serving in Iraq and
Afghanistan is issued at least one hemostatic agent and
accompanying medical personnel have a sufficient inventory of
hemostatic agents.
(2) of the amount authorized under section 1405(3) for
operation and maintenance for the Marine Corps, $5,000,000
may be made available for the procurement of a sufficient
quantity of hemostatic agents, including blood-clotting
bandages, for use by members of the Armed Forces in the field
so that each Marine serving in Iraq and Afghanistan is issued
at least one hemostatic agent and accompanying medical
personnel have a sufficient inventory of hemostatic agents.
(c) Report.--Not later than 60 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall submit
to the congressional defense committees a report on the
distribution of hemostatic agents to members of the Armed
Forces serving in Iraq and Afghanistan, including a
description of any distribution problems and attempts to
resolve such problems.
amendment no. 4345
(Purpose: To specify the qualifications required for instructors in the
Junior Reserve Officers' Training Corps Program)
At the end of subtitle D of title V, add the following new
section:
SEC. 569. JUNIOR RESERVE OFFICERS' TRAINING CORPS INSTRUCTOR
QUALIFICATIONS.
(a) In General.--Chapter 102 of title 10, United States
Code, is amended by adding at the end the following new
section:
``Sec. 2033. Instructor qualifications
``(a) In General.--In order for a retired officer or
noncommissioned officer to be employed as an instructor in
the program, the officer must be certified by the Secretary
of the military department concerned as a qualified
instructor in leadership, wellness and fitness, civics, and
other courses related to the content of the program,
according to the qualifications set forth in subsection
(b)(2) or (c)(2), as appropriate.
``(b) Senior Military Instructors.--
``(1) Role.--Senior military instructors shall be retired
officers of the armed forces and shall serve as instructional
leaders who oversee the program.
``(2) Qualifications.--A senior military instructor shall
have the following qualifications:
``(A) Professional military qualification, as determined by
the Secretary of the military department concerned.
``(B) Award of a baccalaureate degree from an institution
of higher learning.
``(C) Completion of secondary education teaching
certification requirements for the program as established by
the Secretary of the military department concerned.
``(D) Award of an advanced certification by the Secretary
of the military department concerned in core content areas
based on--
``(i) accumulated points for professional activities,
services to the profession, awards, and recognitions;
``(ii) professional development to meet content knowledge
and instructional skills; and
``(iii) performance evaluation of competencies and
standards within the program through site visits and
inspections.
``(c) Non-Senior Military Instructors.--
``(1) Role.--Non-senior military instructors shall be
retired noncommissioned officers of the armed forces and
shall serve as instructional leaders and teach independently
of, but share program responsibilities with, senior military
instructors.
``(2) Qualifications.--A non-senior military instructor
shall demonstrate a depth of experience, proficiency, and
expertise in coaching, mentoring, and practical arts in
executing the program, and shall have the following
qualifications:
``(A) Professional military qualification, as determined by
the Secretary of the military department concerned.
``(B) Award of an associates degree from an institution of
higher learning within 5 years of employment.
``(C) Completion of secondary education teaching
certification requirements for the program as established by
the Secretary of the military department concerned.
[[Page S6349]]
``(D) Award of an advanced certification by the Secretary
of the military department concerned in core content areas
based on--
``(i) accumulated points for professional activities,
services to the profession, awards, and recognitions;
``(ii) professional development to meet content knowledge
and instructional skills; and
``(iii) performance evaluation of competencies and
standards within the program through site visits and
inspections.''.
(b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of sections at the
beginning of such chapter is amended by adding at the end the
following new item:
``2033. Instructor qualifications.''.
amendment no. 4368
(Purpose: Relating to Operation Bahamas, Turks & Caicos)
At the end of subtitle C of title X, add the following:
SEC. 1024. OPERATION BAHAMAS, TURKS & CAICOS.
(a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
(1) In 1982 the United States Government created Operation
Bahamas, Turks & Caicos (OPBAT) to counter the smuggling of
cocaine into the United States.
(2) According to the Drug Enforcement Agency, an estimated
80 percent of the cocaine entering the United States in the
1980s came through the Bahamas, whereas, according to the
Office of National Drug Control Policy, only an estimated 10
percent comes through the Bahamas today.
(3) According to the Drug Enforcement Agency, more than
80,000 kilograms of cocaine and nearly 700,000 pounds of
marijuana have been seized in Operation Bahamas, Turks &
Caicos since 1986, with a combined street value of
approximately two trillion dollars.
(4) The Army has provided military airlift to law
enforcement officials under Operation Bahamas, Turks & Caicos
to create an effective, reliable, and immediate response
capability for drug interdiction. This support is largely
responsible for the decline in cocaine shipments to the
United States through the Bahamas.
(5) The Bahamas is an island nation composed of
approximately 700 islands and keys, which makes aviation
assets the best and most efficient method of transporting law
enforcement agents and interdicting smugglers.
(6) It is in the interests of the United States to maintain
the results of the successful Operation Bahamas, Turks &
Caicos program and prevent drug smugglers from rebuilding
their operations through the Bahamas.
(b) Report on United States Government Support for OPBAT.--
(1) Report on decision to withdraw.--Not later than 30 days
before implementing a decision to withdraw Department of
Defense helicopters from Operation Bahamas, Turks & Caicos,
the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the Congress a
report outlining the plan for the coordination of the
Operation Bahamas, Turks & Caicos mission, at the same level
of effectiveness, using other United States Government
assets.
(2) Consultation.--The Secretary of Defense shall consult
with the Secretary of State, the Attorney General, and the
Secretary of Homeland Security, and with other appropriate
officials of the United States Government, in preparing the
report under paragraph (1).
(3) Elements.--The report under paragraph (1) on the
withdrawal of equipment referred to in that paragraph shall
include the following:
(A) An explanation of the military justification for the
withdrawal of the equipment.
(B) An assessment of the availability of other options
(including other Government helicopters) to provide the
capability being provided by the equipment to be withdrawn.
(C) An explanation of how each option specified under
subparagraph (B) will provide the capability currently
provided by the equipment to be withdrawn.
(D) An assessment of the potential use of unmanned aerial
vehicles in Operation Bahamas, Turks & Caicos, including the
capabilities of such vehicles and any advantages or
disadvantages associated with the use of such vehicles in
that operation, and a recommendation on whether or not to
deploy such vehicles in that operation.
amendment no. 4497
(Purpose: To provide for an independent review and assessment of the
organization and management of the Department of Defense for national
security in space)
At the end of subtitle B of title IX, add the following:
SEC. 913. INDEPENDENT REVIEW AND ASSESSMENT OF DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT FOR
NATIONAL SECURITY IN SPACE.
(a) Independent Review and Assessment Required.--
(1) In general.--The Secretary of Defense shall provide for
an independent review and assessment of the organization and
management of the Department of Defense for national security
in space.
(2) Conduct of review.--The review and assessment shall be
conducted by an appropriate entity outside the Department of
Defense selected by the Secretary for purposes of this
section.
(3) Elements.--The review and assessment shall address the
following:
(A) The requirements of the Department of Defense for
national security space capabilities, as identified by the
Department, and the efforts of the Department to fulfill such
requirements.
(B) The future space missions of the Department, and the
plans of the Department to meet the future space missions.
(C) The actions that could be taken by the Department to
modify the organization and management of the Department over
the near-term, medium-term, and long-term in order to
strengthen United States national security in space, and the
ability of the Department to implement its requirements and
carry out the future space missions, including the following:
(i) Actions to exploit existing and planned military space
assets to provide support for United States military
operations.
(ii) Actions to improve or enhance current interagency
coordination processes regarding the operation of national
security space assets, including improvements or enhancements
in interoperability and communications.
(iii) Actions to improve or enhance the relationship
between the intelligence aspects of national security space
(so-called ``black space'') and the non-intelligence aspects
of national security space (so-called ``white space'').
(iv) Actions to improve or enhance the manner in which
military space issues are addressed by professional military
education institutions.
(4) Liaison.--The Secretary shall designate at least one
senior civilian employee of the Department of Defense, and at
least one general or flag officer of an Armed Force, to serve
as liaison between the Department, the Armed Forces, and the
entity conducting the review and assessment.
(b) Report.--
(1) In general.--Not later than one year after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the entity conducting the review
and assessment shall submit to the Secretary and the
congressional defense committees a report on the review and
assessment.
(2) Elements.--The report shall include--
(A) the results of the review and assessment; and
(B) recommendations on the best means by which the
Department may improve its organization and management for
national securit in space.
amendment no. 4222
(Purpose: To require consideration of the utilization of fuel cells as
back-up power systems in Department of Defense operations)
At the end of subtitle F of title III, add the following:
SEC. 375. UTILIZATION OF FUEL CELLS AS BACK-UP POWER SYSTEMS
IN DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE OPERATIONS.
The Secretary of Defense shall consider the utilization of
fuel cells as replacements for current back-up power systems
in a variety of Department of Defense operations and
activities, including in telecommunications networks,
perimeter security, and remote facilities, in order to
increase the operational longevity of back-up power systems
and stand-by power systems in such operations and activities.
amendment no. 4498
(Purpose: To authorize an accession bonus for members of the Armed
Forces who are appointed as a commissioned officer after completing
officer candidate school)
At the end of subtitle B of title VI, add the following:
SEC. 620. ACCESSION BONUS FOR MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES
APPOINTED AS COMMISSIONED OFFICERS AFTER
COMPLETING OFFICER CANDIDATE SCHOOL.
(a) Accession Bonus Authorized.--
(1) In general.--Chapter 5 of title 37, United States Code,
is amended by adding at the end the following new section:
``Sec. 329. Special pay: accession bonus for officer
candidates
``(a) Accession Bonus Authorized.--Under regulations
prescribed by the Secretary concerned, a person who, during
the period beginning on October 1, 2006, and ending on
December 31, 2007, executes a written agreement described in
subsection (b) may, upon acceptance of the agreement by the
Secretary concerned, be paid an accession bonus in an amount
not to exceed $8,000 determined by the Secretary concerned.
``(b) Agreement.--A written agreement described in this
subsection is a written agreement by a person--
``(1) to complete officer candidate school;
``(2) to accept a commission or appointment as an officer
of the armed forces; and
``(3) to serve on active duty as a commissioned officer for
a period specified in such agreement.
``(c) Payment Method.--Upon acceptance of a written
agreement under subsection (a) by the Secretary concerned,
the total amount of the accession bonus payable under the
agreement becomes fixed. The agreement shall specify whether
the accession bonus will be paid in a lump sum or
installments.
``(d) Repayment.--A person who, having received all or part
of the bonus under a written agreement under subsection (a),
does not complete the total period of active duty as a
commissioned officer as specified in such agreement shall be
subject to the repayment provisions of section 303a(e) of
this title.''.
(2) Clerical amendment.--The table of sections at the
beginning of chapter 5 of such
[[Page S6350]]
title is amended by adding at the end the following new item:
``329. Special pay: accession bonus for officer candidates.''.
(3) Effective date.--The amendments made by this subsection
shall take effect on October 1, 2006.
(b) Authority for Payment of Bonus Under Earlier
Agreements.--
(1) In general.--The Secretary of the Army may pay a bonus
to a person who, during the period beginning on April 1,
2005, and ending on April 6, 2006, executed an agreement to
enlist for the purpose of attending officer candidate school
and receive a bonus under section 309 of title 37, United
States Code, and who has completed the terms of the agreement
required for payment of the bonus.
(2) Limitation on amount.--The amount of the bonus payable
to a person under this subsection may not exceed $8,000.
(3) Construction with enlistment bonus.--The bonus payable
under this subsection is in addition to a bonus payable under
section 309 of title 37, United States Code, or any other
provision of law.
amendment no. 4499
(Purpose: To authorize the National Security Agency to collect service
charges for the certification or validation of information assurance
products)
At the end of subtitle D of title X, add the following:
SEC. 1035. COLLECTION BY NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY OF SERVICE
CHARGES FOR CERTIFICATION OR VALIDATION OF
INFORMATION ASSURANCE PRODUCTS.
The National Security Agency Act of 1959 (50 U.S.C. 402
note) is amended by adding at the end the following new
section:
``Sec. 20. (a) The Director may collect charges for
evaluating, certifying, or validating information assurance
products under the National Information Assurance Program or
successor program.
``(b) The charges collected under subsection (a) shall be
established through a public rulemaking process in accordance
with Office of Management and Budget Circular No. A-25.
``(c) Charges collected under subsection (a) shall not
exceed the direct costs of the program referred to in that
subsection.
``(d) The appropriation or fund bearing the cost of the
service for which charges are collected under the program
referred to in subsection (a) may be reimbursed, or the
Director may require advance payment subject to such
adjustment on completion of the work as may be agreed upon.
``(e) Amounts collected under this section shall be
credited to the account or accounts from which costs
associated with such amounts have been or will be incurred,
to reimburse or offset the direct costs of the program
referred to in subsection (a).''.
Amendment No. 4202, As Modified
At the end of subtitle D of title III, add the following:
SEC. 352. REPORTS ON WITHDRAWAL OR DIVERSION OF EQUIPMENT
FROM RESERVE UNITS FOR SUPPORT OF RESERVE UNITS
BEING MOBILIZED AND OTHER UNITS.
(a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
(1) The National Guard continues to provide invaluable
resources to meet national security, homeland defense, and
civil emergency mission requirements.
(2) Current military operations, transnational threats, and
domestic emergencies will increase the use of the National
Guard for both military support to civilian authorities and
to execute the military strategy of the United States.
(3) To meet the demand for certain types of equipment for
continuing United States military operations, the Army has
required Army National Guard Units to leave behind many items
for use by follow-on forces.
(4) The Governors of every State and 2 Territories
expressed concern in February 2006 that units returning from
deployment overseas without adequate equipment would have
trouble carrying out their homeland security and domestic
disaster duties.
(5) The Department of Defense estimates that it has
directed the Army National Guard to leave overseas more than
75,000 items valued at approximately $1,760,000,000 to
support Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi
Freedom.
(6) Department of Defense Directive 1225.6 requires a
replacement and tracking plan be developed within 90 days for
equipment of the reserve components of the Armed Forces that
is transferred to the active components of the Armed Forces.
(7) In October 2005, the Government Accountability Office
found that the Department of Defense can only account for
about 45 percent of such equipment and has not developed a
plan to replace such equipment.
(8) The Government Accountability Office also found that
without a completed and implemented plan to replace all
National Guard equipment left overseas, Army National Guard
units will likely face growing equipment shortages and
challenges in regaining readiness for future missions.
(b) Reports on Withdrawal or Diversion of Equipment From
Reserve Units for Support of Reserve Units Being Mobilized
and Other Units.--
(1) In general.--Chapter 1007 of title 10, United States
Code, is amended by inserting after section 10208 the
following new section:
``Sec. 10208a. Mobilization: reports on withdrawal or
diversion of equipment from Reserve units for support of
Reserve units being mobilized and other units
``(a) Report Required on Withdrawal or Diversion of
Equipment.--Not later than 90 days after withdrawing or
diverting equipment from a unit of the Reserve to a unit of
the Reserve being ordered to active duty under section 12301,
12302, or 12304 of this title, or to a unit or units of a
regular component of the armed forces, for purposes of the
discharge of the mission of such unit or units, the Secretary
concerned shall submit to the Secretary of Defense a status
report on the withdrawal or diversion of equipment.
``(b) Elements.--Each status report under subsection (a) on
equipment withdrawn or diverted shall include the following:
``(1) A plan to recapitalize or replace such equipment
within the unit from which withdrawn or diverted.
``(2) If such equipment is to remain in a theater of
operations while the unit from which withdrawn or diverted
returns to the United States, a plan to provide such unit
with recapitalized or replacement equipment appropriate to
ensure the continuation of the readiness training of such
unit.
``(3) A signed memorandum of understanding between the
active or reserve component to which withdrawn or diverted
and the reserve component from which withdrawn or diverted
that specifies--
``(A) how such equipment will be tracked; and
``(B) when such equipment will be returned to the component
from which withdrawn or diverted.''.
(2) Clerical amendment.--The table of sections at the
beginning of chapter 1007 of such title is amended by
inserting after the item relating to section 10208 the
following new item:
``10208a. Mobilization: reports on withdrawal or diversion of equipment
from Reserve units for support of Reserve units being
mobilized and other units.''.
amendment no. 4500
(Purpose: To provide for the procurement of replacement equipment)
At the end of subtitle B of title I, add the following:
SEC. 114. REPLACEMENT EQUIPMENT.
(a) Priority.--Priority for the distribution of new and
combat serviceable equipment, with associated support and
test equipment for active and reserve component forces, shall
be given to units scheduled for mission deployment,
employment first, or both regardless of component.
(b) Allocation.--In the amounts authorized to be
appropriated by section 101(5) for the procurement of
replacement equipment, subject to subsection (a), priority
for the distribution of Army National Guard equipment
described in subsection (a) may be given to States that have
experienced a major disaster, as determined under the Robert
T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (42
U.S.C. 5121-5206), and may require replacement equipment to
respond to future emergencies/disasters only after
distribution of new and combat serviceable equipment has been
made in accordance with subsection (a).
amendment no. 4441
(Purpose: To require a plan to replace equipment withdrawn or diverted
from the reserve components of the Armed Forces for Operation Iraqi
Freedom or Operation Enduring Freedom)
At the end of subtitle D of title III, add the following:
SEC. 352. PLAN TO REPLACE EQUIPMENT WITHDRAWN OR DIVERTED
FROM THE RESERVE COMPONENTS OF THE ARMED FORCES
FOR OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM OR OPERATION
ENDURING FREEDOM.
(a) Plan Required.--Not later than 90 days after the date
of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall submit to
the congressional defense committees a plan to replace
equipment withdrawn or diverted from units of the reserve
components of the Armed Forces for use in Operation Iraqi
Freedom or Operation Enduring Freedom.
(b) Elements.--The plan required by subsection (a) shall--
(1) identify the equipment to be recapitalized or acquired
to replace the equipment described in subsection (a);
(2) specify a schedule for recapitalizing or acquiring the
equipment identified under paragraph (1), which schedule
shall take into account applicable depot workload and
acquisition considerations, including production capacity and
current production schedules; and
(3) specify the funding to be required to recapitalize or
acquire the equipment identified under paragraph (1)
Amendment No. 4231, as modified
At the end of subtitle B of title VII, add the following:
SEC. 730. MENTAL HEALTH SELF-ASSESSMENT PROGRAM.
(a) Finding.--Congress finds that the Mental Health Self-
Assessment Program (MHSAP) of the Department of Defense is
vital to the overall health and well-being of deploying
members of the Armed Forces and their families because that
program provides--
(1) a non-threatening, voluntary, anonymous self-assessment
of mental health that is effective in helping to detect
mental health and substance abuse conditions;
[[Page S6351]]
(2) awareness regarding warning signs of such conditions;
and
(3) information and outreach to members of the Armed Forces
(including members of the National Guard and Reserves) and
their families on specific services available for such
conditions.
(b) Expansion of Program.--The Secretary of Defense shall,
acting through the Office of Health Affairs of the Department
of Defense, take appropriate actions to expand the Mental
Health Self-Assessment Program in order to achieve the
following:
(1) The continuous availability of the assessment under the
program to members and former members of the Armed Forces in
order to ensure the long-term availability of the diagnostic
mechanisms of the assessment to detect mental health
conditions that may emerge over time.
(2) The availability of programs and services under the
program to address the mental health of dependent children of
members of the Armed Forces who have been deployed or
mobilized.
(c) Outreach.--The Secretary shall develop and implement a
plan to conduct outreach and other appropriate activities to
expand and enhance awareness of the Mental Health Self-
Assessment Program, and the programs and services available
under that program, among members of the Armed Forces
(including members of the National Guard and Reserves) and
their families.
(d) Reports.--Not later than one year after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall submit to Congress
a report on the actions undertaken under this section during
the one-year period ending on the date of such report.
amendment no. 4409
(Purpose: To require a report on the provision of an electronic copy of
military records to members of the Armed Forces upon their discharge or
release from the Armed Forces)
At the end of subtitle F of title V, add the following:
SEC. 587. REPORT ON PROVISION OF ELECTRONIC COPY OF MILITARY
RECORDS ON DISCHARGE OR RELEASE OF MEMBERS FROM
THE ARMED FORCES.
(a) Report Required.--Not later than 120 days after the
date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense
shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report
on the feasibility and advisability of providing an
electronic copy of military records (including all military
service, medical, and other military records) to members of
the Armed Forces on their discharge or release from the Armed
Forces.
(b) Elements.--The report required by subsection (a) shall
include the following:
(1) An estimate of the costs of the provision of military
records as described in subsection (a).
(2) An assessment of providing military records as
described in that subsection through the distribution of a
portable, readily accessible medium (such as a computer disk
or other similar medium) containing such records.
(3) A description and assessment of the mechanisms required
to ensure the privacy of members of the Armed Forces in
providing military records as described in that subsection.
(4) An assessment of the benefits to the members of the
Armed Forces of receiving their military records as described
in that subsection.
(5) If the Secretary determines that providing military
records to members of the Armed Forces as described in that
subsection is feasible and advisable, a plan (including a
schedule) for providing such records to members of the Armed
Forces as so described in order to ensure that each member of
the Armed Forces is provided such records upon discharge or
release from the Armed Forces.
(6) Any other matter to relating to the provision of
military records as described in that subsection that the
Secretary considers appropriate.
amendment no. 4501
(Purpose: To require a report on vehicle-based active protection
systems for certain battlefield threats)
At the end of subtitle D of title III, add the following:
SEC. 352. REPORT ON VEHICLE-BASED ACTIVE PROTECTION SYSTEMS
FOR CERTAIN BATTLEFIELD THREATS.
(a) Independent Assessment.--The Secretary of Defense shall
enter into a contract with an appropriate entity independent
of the United States Government to conduct an assessment of
various foreign and domestic technological approaches to
vehicle-based active protection systems for defense against
both chemical energy and kinetic energy, top attack, and
direct fire threats, including anti-tank missiles and rocket
propelled grenades, mortars, and other similar battlefield
threats.
(b) Report.--
(1) Report required.--The contract required by subsection
(a) shall require the entity entering in to such contract to
submit to the Secretary of Defense, and to the congressional
defense committees, not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, a report on the assessment
required by that subsection.
(2) Elements.--The report required under paragraph (1)
shall include--
(A) a detailed comparative analysis and assessment of the
technical approaches covered by the assessment under
subsection (a), including the feasibility, military utility,
cost, and potential short-term and long-term development and
deployment schedule of such approaches; and
(B) any other elements specified by the Secretary in the
contract under subsection (a).
amendment no. 4502
(Purpose: To require an annual report on the amount of the acquisitions
made by the Department of Defense of articles, materials, or supplies
purchased from entities that manufacture the articles, materials, or
supplies outside of the United States)
At the end of subtitle G of title X, add the following:
SEC. 1066. ANNUAL REPORT ON ACQUISITIONS OF ARTICLES,
MATERIALS, AND SUPPLIES MANUFACTURED OUTSIDE
THE UNITED STATES.
(a) In General.--Not later than March 31 of each year, the
Department of Defense shall submit a report to Congress on
the amount of the acquisitions made by the agency in the
preceding fiscal year of articles, materials, or supplies
purchased from entities that manufacture the articles,
materials, or supplies outside of the United States.
(b) Content.--Each report required by subsection (a) shall
separately indicate--
(1) the dollar value of any articles, materials, or
supplies purchased that were manufactured outside of the
United States;
(2) an itemized list of all waivers granted with respect to
such articles, materials, or supplies under the Buy American
Act (41 U.S.C. 10a et seq.); and
(3) a summary of--
(A) the total procurement funds expended on articles,
materials, and supplies manufactured inside the United
States; and
(B) the total procurement funds expended on articles,
materials, and supplies manufactured outside the United
States.
(c) Public Availability.--The Department of Defense
submitting a report under subsection (a) shall make the
report publicly available to the maximum extent practicable.
(d) Applicability.--This section shall not apply to
acquisitions made by an agency, or component thereof, that is
an element of the intelligence community as set forth in or
designated under section 3(4) of the National Security Act of
1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)).
amendment no. 4503
(Purpose: To require an annual report on foreign military sales and
direct sales to foreign customers of significant military equipment
manufactured inside the United States)
At the end of subtitle G of title X, add the following:
SEC. . ANNUAL REPORT ON FOREIGN SALES OF SIGNIFICANT
MILITARY EQUIPMENT MANUFACTURED INSIDE THE
UNITED STATES.
(a) In General.--Not later than March 31 of each year, the
Department of Defense shall submit a report to Congress on
foreign military sales and direct sales to foreign customers
of significant military equipment manufactured inside the
United states.
(b) Content.--Each report required by subsection (a) shall
indicate, for each sale in excess of $2,000,000--
(1) the nature of the military equipment sold and the
dollar value of the sale;
(2) the country to which the military equipment was sold;
and
(3) the manufacturer of the equipment and the State in
which the equipment was manufactured.
(c) Public Availability.--The Department of Defense shall
make reports submitted under this section publicly available
to the maximum extent practicable.
amendment no. 4504
(Purpose: To expand and enhance the authority of the Secretaries of the
military departments to remit or cancel indebtedness of members of the
Armed Forces)
At the end of subtitle E of title VI, add the following:
SEC. 662. EXPANSION AND ENHANCEMENT OF AUTHORITY TO REMIT OR
CANCEL INDEBTEDNESS OF MEMBERS OF THE ARMED
FORCES.
(a) Members of the Army.--
(1) Coverage of all members and former members.--Subsection
(a) of section 4837 of title 10, United States Code, is
amended by striking ``a member of the Army'' and all that
follows through ``in an active status'' and inserting ``a
member of the Army (including a member on active duty or a
member of a reserve component in an active status), a retired
member of the Army, or a former member of the Army''.
(2) Time for exercise of authority.--Subsection (b) of such
section is amended--
(A) in paragraph (1), by adding ``or'' at the end; and
(B) by striking paragraphs (2) and (3) and inserting the
following new paragraph (2):
``(2) in the case of any other member of the Army covered
by subsection (a), during such period or periods as the
Secretary of Defense may provide in regulations prescribed by
the Secretary of Defense.''.
(3) Repeal of termination of modified authority.--Paragraph
(3) of section 683(a) of the National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2006 (Public Law 109-163; 119 Stat. 3322;
10 U.S.C. 4837 note) is repealed.
(b) Members of the Navy.--
(1) Coverage of all members and former members.--Section
6161 of title 10, United
[[Page S6352]]
States Code, is amended by striking ``a member of the Navy''
and all that follows through ``in an active status'' and
inserting ``a member of the Navy (including a member on
active duty or a member of a reserve component in an active
status), a retired member of the Navy , or a former member of
the Navy''.
(2) Time for exercise of authority.--Subsection (b) of such
section is amended--
(A) in paragraph (1), by adding ``or'' at the end; and
(B) by striking paragraphs (2) and (3) and inserting the
following new paragraph (2):
``(2) in the case of any other member of the Navy covered
by subsection (a), during such period or periods as the
Secretary of Defense may provide in regulations prescribed by
the Secretary of Defense.''.
(3) Repeal of termination of modified authority.--Paragraph
(3) of section 683(b) of the National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2006 (119 Stat. 3323; 10 U.S.C. 6161
note) is repealed.
(c) Members of the Air Force.--
(1) Coverage of all members and former members.--Subsection
(a) of section 4837 of title 10, United States Code, is
amended by striking ``a member of the Air Force'' and all
that follows through ``in an active status'' and inserting
``a member of the Air Force (including a member on active
duty or a member of a reserve component in an active status),
a retired member of the Air Force, or a former member of the
Air Force''.
(2) Time for exercise of authority.--Subsection (b) of such
section is amended--
(A) in paragraph (1), by adding ``or'' at the end; and
(B) by striking paragraphs (2) and (3) and inserting the
following new paragraph (2):
``(2) in the case of any other member of the Air Force
covered by subsection (a), during such period or periods as
the Secretary of Defense may provide in regulations
prescribed by the Secretary of Defense.''.
(3) Repeal of termination of modified authority.--Paragraph
(3) of section 683(c) of the National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2006 (119 Stat. 3324; 10 U.S.C. 9837
note) is repealed.
(d) Deadline for Regulations.--The Secretary of Defense
shall prescribe the regulations required for purposes of
sections 4837, 6161, and 9837 of title 10, United States
Code, as amended by this section, not later than March 1,
2007.
amendment no. 4505
(Purpose: To provide an exception for notice to consumer reporting
agencies regarding debts or erroneous payments for which a decision to
waive or cancel is pending)
At the end of subtitle E of title VI, add the following:
SEC. 662. EXCEPTION FOR NOTICE TO CONSUMER REPORTING AGENCIES
REGARDING DEBTS OR ERRONEOUS PAYMENTS PENDING A
DECISION TO WAIVE, REMIT, OR CANCEL.
(a) Exception.--Section 2780(b) of title 10, United States
Code, is amended--
(1) by striking ``The Secretary'' and inserting ``(1)
Except as provided in paragraph (2), the Secretary''; and
(2) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
``(2) No disclosure shall be made under paragraph (1) with
respect to an indebtedness while a decision regarding waiver
of collection is pending under section 2774 of this title, or
a decision regarding remission or cancellation is pending
under section 4837, 6161, or 9837 of this title, unless the
Secretary concerned (as defined in section 101(5) of title
37), or the designee of such Secretary, determines that
disclosure under that paragraph pending such decision is in
the best interests of the United States.''.
(b) Effective Date.--
(1) In general.--The amendments made by this section shall
take effect on March 1, 2007.
(2) Application to prior actions.--Paragraph (2) of section
2780(b) of title 10, United States Code (as added by
subsection (a)), shall not be construed to apply to or
invalidate any action taken under such section before March
1, 2007.
(c) Report.--Not later than March 1, 2007, the Secretary of
Defense shall submit to the congressional defense committees
a report on the exercise of the authority in section 2780(b)
of title 10, United States Code, including--
(1) the total number of members of the Armed Forces who
have been reported to consumer reporting agencies under such
section;
(2) the circumstances under which such authority has been
exercised, or waived (as provided in paragraph (2) of such
section (as amended by subsection (a))), and by whom;
(3) the cost of contracts for collection services to
recover indebtedness owed to the United States that is
delinquent;
(4) an evaluation of whether or not such contracts, and the
practice of reporting military debtors to collection
agencies, has been effective in reducing indebtedness to the
United States; and
(5) such recommendations as the Secretary considers
appropriate regarding the continuing use of such authority
with respect to members of the Armed Forces.
amendment no. 4506
(Purpose: To enhance authority relating to the waiver of claims for
overpayment of pay and allowances of members of the Armed Forces)
At the end of subtitle E of title VI, add the following:
SEC. 662. ENHANCEMENT OF AUTHORITY TO WAIVE CLAIMS FOR
OVERPAYMENT OF PAY AND ALLOWANCES.
(a) Clarification of Pay and Allowances.--Subsection (a) of
section 2774 of title 10, United States Code, is amended in
the matter preceding paragraph (1) by inserting ``(including
any bonus or special or incentive pay)'' after ``pay or
allowances''.
(b) Waiver by Secretaries Concerned.--Paragraph (2) of such
subsection is amended--
(1) in the matter preceding subparagraph (A), by inserting
``or the designee of such Secretary'' after ``title 37,'';
and
(2) in subparagraph (A), by striking ``$1,500'' and
inserting ``$10,000''.
(c) Time for Waiver.--Subsection (b)(2) of such section is
amended by striking ``three years'' and inserting ``five
years''.
(d) Effective Date.--The amendments made by this section
shall take effect on March 1, 2007.
(e) Deadline for Revised Standards.--The Director of the
Office of Management and Budget and the Secretary of Defense
shall prescribe any modifications to the standards under
section 2774 of title 10, United States Code, that are
required or authorized by reason of the amendments made by
this section not later than March 1, 2007.
amendment no. 4331
(Purpose: To establish requirements with respect to the terms of
consumer credit extended by a creditor to a servicemember or the
dependent of a servicemember, and for other purposes)
At the appropriate place, insert the following:
SEC. ___. TERMS OF CONSUMER CREDIT EXTENDED TO SERVICEMEMBER
OR SERVICEMEMBER'S DEPENDENT.
(a) Terms of Consumer Credit.--Title II of the
Servicemembers Civil Relief Act (50 U.S.C. App. 521 et seq.)
is amended by adding at the end the following new section:
``SEC. 208. TERMS OF CONSUMER CREDIT.
``(a) Interest.--A creditor who extends consumer credit to
a servicemember or a servicemember's dependent shall not
require the servicemember or the servicemember's dependent to
pay interest with respect to the extension of such credit,
except as--
``(1) agreed to under the terms of the credit agreement or
promissory note;
``(2) authorized by applicable State or Federal law; and
``(3) not specifically prohibited by this section.
``(b) Annual Percentage Rate.--A creditor described in
subsection (a) shall not impose an annual percentage rate
greater than 36 percent with respect to the consumer credit
extended to a servicemember or a servicemember's dependent.
``(c) Mandatory Loan Disclosures.--
``(1) Information required.--With respect to any extension
of consumer credit to a servicemember or a servicemember's
dependent, a creditor shall provide to the servicemember or
the servicemember's dependent the following information in
writing, at or before the issuance of the credit:
``(A) A statement of the annual percentage rate applicable
to the extension of credit.
``(B) Any disclosures required under the Truth in Lending
Act (15 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.).
``(C) A clear description of the payment obligations of the
servicemember or the servicemember's dependent, as
applicable.
``(2) Terms.--Such disclosures shall be presented in
accordance with terms prescribed by the regulations issued by
the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System to
implement the Truth in Lending Act (15 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.).
``(d) Limitation.--A creditor described in subsection (a)
shall not automatically renew, repay, refinance, or
consolidate with the proceeds of other credit extended by the
same creditor any consumer credit extended to a servicemember
or a servicemember's dependent without--
``(1) executing new loan documentation signed by the
servicemember or the servicemember's dependent, as
applicable; and
``(2) providing the loan disclosures described in
subsection (c) to the servicemember or the servicemember's
dependent.
``(e) Preemption.--Except as provided in subsection (f)(2),
this section preempts any State or Federal law, rule, or
regulation, including any State usury law, to the extent that
such laws, rules, or regulations are inconsistent with this
section, except that this section shall not preempt any such
law, rule, or regulation that provides additional protection
to a servicemember or a servicemember's dependent.
``(f) Penalties.--
``(1) Misdemeanor.--Any creditor who knowingly violates
this section shall be fined as provided in title 18, United
States Code, or imprisoned for not more than one year, or
both.
``(2) Preservation of other remedies.--The remedies and
rights provided under this section are in addition to and do
not preclude any remedy otherwise available under law to the
person claiming relief under this section, including any
award for consequential and punitive damages.
``(g) Definition.--For purposes of this section, the term
`interest' includes service charges, renewal charges, fees,
or any other charges (except bona fide insurance) with
respect to the extension of consumer credit.''.
(b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents of the
Servicemembers Civil Relief
[[Page S6353]]
Act (50 U.S.C. App. 501) is amended by inserting after the
item relating to section 207 the following new item:
``Sec. 208. Terms of consumer credit''.
Amendment no. 4507
(Purpose: To Require the President to Conduct a Review of Circumstances
Establishing Eligibility for the Purple Heart for former prisoners of
war dying in or due to captivity and to Report to the Congress on the
Advisability of Modifying the Criteria for Award of the Purple Heart)
At the appropriate place, add the following:
(a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
(1) The Purple Heart is the oldest military decoration in
the world in present use;
(2) The Purple Heart was established on August 7, 1782,
during the Revolutionary War, when General George Washington
issued an order establishing the Honorary Badge of
Distinction, otherwise known as the Badge of Military Merit;
(3) The award of the Purple Heart ceased with the end of
the Revolutionary War, but was revived in 1932, the 200th
anniversary of George Washington's birth, out of respect for
his memory and military achievements by War Department
General Orders No. 3, dated February 22, 1932.
(4) The criteria for the award was originally announced in
War Department Circular dated February 22, 1932, and revised
by Presidential Executive Order 9277, dated December 3, 1942;
Executive Order 10409, dated February 12, 1952, Executive
Order 11016, dated April 25, 1962, and Executive Order 12464,
dated February 23, 1984.
(5) The Purple Heart is awarded in the name of the
President of the United States as Commander in Chief to
members of the Armed Forces who qualify under criteria set
forth by Presidential Executive Order.
(b) Determination.--As part of the review and report
required in subsection (d), the President shall make a
determination on expanding eligibility to all deceased
servicemembers held as a prisoner of war after December 7,
1941 and who meet the criteria establishing eligibility for
the prisoner-of-war medal under section 1128 of Title 10 but
who do not meet the criteria establishing eligibility for the
Purple Heart.
(c) Requirements.--In making the determination described in
subsection (b), the President shall take into consideration--
(1) the brutal treatment endured by thousands of POWs
incarcerated by enemy forces;
(2) that many service members died due to starvation,
abuse, the deliberate withholding of medical treatment for
injury or disease, or other causes which do not currently
meet the criteria for award of the Purple Heart;
(3) the views of veteran organizations, including the
Military Order of the Purple Heart;
(4) the importance and gravity that has been assigned to
determining all available facts prior to a decision to award
the Purple Heart, and
(5) the views of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint
Chiefs of Staff:
(d) Report.--Not later than March 1, 2007, the President
shall provide the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate
and House of Representatives a report on the advisability of
modifying the criteria for the award of the Purple Heart to
authorize the award of the Purple Heart to military members
who die in captivity under unknown circumstances or as a
result of conditions and treatment which currently do not
qualify the decedent for award of the Purple Heart; and for
military members who survive captivity as prisoners of war,
but die thereafter as a result of disease or disability
incurred during captivity.
amendment no. 4508
(Purpose: To modify the qualifications for leadership of the Naval
Postgraduate School)
At the end of part I of subtitle A of title V, add the
following:
SEC. 509. MODIFICATION OF QUALIFICATIONS FOR LEADERSHIP OF
THE NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL.
Section 7042(a) of title 10, United States Code, is
amended--
(1) in paragraph (1)(A)--
(A) by inserting ``active-duty or retired'' after ``An'';
(B) by inserting ``or Marine Corps'' after ``Navy'';
(C) by inserting ``or colonel, respectively'' after
``captain''; and
(D) by inserting ``or assigned'' after ``detailed'';
(2) in paragraph (2), by inserting ``and the Commandant of
the Marine Corps'' after ``Operations''; and
(3) in paragraph (4)(A)--
(A) by inserting ``(unless such individual is a retired
officer of the Navy or Marine Corps in a grade not below the
grade of captain or colonel, respectively)'' after ``in the
case of a civilian'';
(B) by inserting ``active-duty or retired'' after ``in the
case of an''; and
(C) by inserting ``or Marine Corps'' after ``Navy''.
amendment no. 4509
(Purpose: To provide that the Secretary of the Army shall not be
considered an owner or operator for purposes of environmental liability
in connection with the construction of any portion of the Fairfax
County Parkway off the Engineer Proving Ground, Fort Belvoir, Virginia,
that is not owned by the Federal Government)
On page 555, strike lines 1 through line 12 and insert the
following:
``(B) With respect to activities related to the
construction of any portion of the Fairfax County Parkway off
the Engineer Proving Ground that is not owned by the Federal
Government, the Secretary of the Army shall not be considered
an owner or operator for purposes of the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of
1980 (42 U.S.C. 9601 et seq.).
amendment no. 4510
(Purpose: To increase the number of options periods authorized for
extension of current contracts under the TRICARE program)
At the end of subtitle B of title VII, add the following:
SEC. 730. ADDITIONAL AUTHORIZED OPTION PERIODS FOR EXTENSION
OF CURRENT CONTRACTS UNDER TRICARE.
(a) Additional Number of Authorized Periods.--
(1) In general.--The Secretary of Defense, after consulting
with the other administering Secretaries, may extend any
contract for the delivery of health care entered into under
section 1097 of title 10, United States Code, that is in
force on the date of the enactment of this Act by one year,
and upon expiration of such extension by one additional year,
if the Secretary determines that such extension--
(A) is in the best interests of the United States; and
(B) will--
(i) facilitate the effective administration of the TRICARE
program; or
(ii) ensure continuity in the delivery of health care under
the TRICARE program.
(2) Limitation on number of extensions.--The total number
of one-year extensions of a contract that may be granted
under paragraph (1) may not exceed 2 extensions.
(3) Notice and wait.--The Secretary may not commence the
exercise of the authority in paragraph (1) until 30 days
after the date on which the Secretary submits to the
congressional defense committees a report setting forth the
minimum level of performance by an incumbent contractor under
a contract covered by such paragraph that will be required by
the Secretary in order to be eligible for an extension
authorized by such paragraph.
(4) Definitions.--In this subsection, the terms
``administering Secretaries'' and ``TRICARE program'' have
the meaning given such terms in section 1072 of title 10,
United States Code.
(b) Report on Contracting Mechanisms for Health Care
Service Support Contracts.--Not later than 180 days after the
date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall submit
to the congressional defense committees a report on
contracting mechanisms under consideration for future
contracts for health care service support under section 1097
of title 10, United States Code. The report shall include an
assessment of the advantages and disadvantages for the
Department of Defense (including the potential for
stimulating competition and the effect on health care
beneficiaries of the Department) of providing in such
contracts for a single term of 5 years, with a single
optional period of extension of an additional 5 years if
performance under such contract is rated as ``excellent''.
amendment no. 4219
(Purpose: To rename the death gratuity payable for deaths of members of
the Armed Forces as fallen hero compensation)
At the end of subtitle D of title VI, add the following:
SEC. 648. RENAMING OF DEATH GRATUITY PAYABLE FOR DEATHS OF
MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES AS FALLEN HERO
COMPENSATION.
(a) In General.--Subchapter II of chapter 75 of title 10,
United States Code, is amended as follows:
(1) In section 1475(a), by striking ``have a death gratuity
paid'' and inserting ``have fallen hero compensation paid''.
(2) In section 1476(a)--
(A) in paragraph (1), by striking ``a death gratuity'' and
inserting ``fallen hero compensation''; and
(B) in paragraph (2), by striking ``A death gratuity'' and
inserting ``Fallen hero compensation''.
(3) In section 1477(a), by striking ``A death gratuity''
and inserting ``Fallen hero compensation''.
(4) In section 1478(a), by striking ``The death gratuity''
and inserting ``The amount of fallen hero compensation''.
(5) In section 1479(1), by striking ``the death gratuity''
and inserting ``fallen hero compensation''.
(6) In section 1489--
(A) in subsection (a), by striking ``a gratuity'' in the
matter preceding paragraph (1) and inserting ``fallen hero
compensation''; and
(B) in subsection (b)(2), by inserting ``or other
assistance'' after ``lesser death gratuity''.
(b) Clerical Amendments.--
(1) Heading amendments.--Such subchapter is further amended
by striking ``DEATH GRATUITY:'' each place it appears in the
heading of sections 1475 through 1480 and 1489 and inserting
``FALLEN HERO COMPENSATION:''.
(2) Table of sections.--The table of sections at the
beginning of such subchapter is amended by striking ``Death
gratuity:'' in the items relating to sections 1474 through
1480 and 1489 and inserting ``Fallen hero compensation:''.
[[Page S6354]]
(c) General References.--Any reference to a death gratuity
payable under subchapter II of chapter 75 of title 10, United
States Code, in any law, regulation, document, paper, or
other record of the United States shall be deemed to be a
reference to fallen hero compensation payable under such
subchapter, as amended by this section.
amendment no. 4386
(Purpose: To require a joint family support assistance program for
families of members of the Armed Forces)
At the end of subtitle E of title VI, add the following:
SEC. 662. JOINT FAMILY SUPPORT ASSISTANCE PROGRAM.
(a) Program Required.--The Secretary of Defense shall carry
out a joint family support assistance program for the purpose
of providing assistance to families of members of the Armed
Forces.
(b) Locations.--
(1) In general.--The Secretary shall carry out the program
for at least six regions of the country through sites
established by the Secretary for purposes of the program in
such regions.
(2) Location of certain sites.--At least three of the sites
established under paragraph (1) shall be located in an area
that it geographically isolated from military installations.
(c) Functions.--The Secretary shall provide assistance to
families of the members of the Armed Forces under the program
by providing at each site established for purposes of the
program under subsection (b) the following:
(1) Financial, material, and other assistance to families
of members of the Armed Forces.
(2) Mobile support services to families of members of the
Armed Forces.
(3) Sponsorship of volunteers and family support
professionals for the delivery of support services to
families of members of the Armed Forces.
(4) Coordination of family assistance programs and
activities provided by Military OneSource, Military Family
Life Consultants, counselors, the Department of Defense,
other departments and agencies of the Federal Government,
State and local agencies, and non-profit entities.
(5) Facilitation of discussion on military family
assistance programs, activities, and initiatives between and
among the organizations, agencies, and entities referred to
in paragraph (4).
(d) Resources.--
(1) In general.--The Secretary shall provide personnel and
other resources necessary for the implementation and
operation of the program at each site established under
subsection (b).
(2) Acceptance of certain services.--In providing resources
under paragraph (1), the Secretary may accept and utilize the
services of non-Federal Government volunteers and non-profit
entities.
(e) Procedures.--The Secretary shall establish procedures
for the operation of each site established under subsection
(b) and for the provision of assistance to families of
members of the Armed Forces at such site.
(f) Implementation Plan.--
(1) Plan required.--Not later than 30 days after the first
obligation of amounts for the program, the Secretary shall
submit to the congressional defense committees a report
setting forth a plan for the implementation of the program.
(2) Elements.--The plan required under paragraph (1) shall
include the following:
(A) A description of the actions taken to select and
establish sites for the program under subsection (b).
(B) A description of the procedures established under
subsection (d).
(C) A review of proposed actions to be taken under the
program to improve coordination on family assistance program
and activities between and among the Department of Defense,
other departments and agencies of the Federal Government,
State and local agencies, and non-profit entities.
(g) Report.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 270 days after the first
obligation of amounts for the program, the Secretary shall
submit to the congressional defense committees a report on
the program.
(2) Elements.--The report shall include the following:
(A) A description of the program, including each site
established for purposes of the program, the procedures
established under subsection (d) for operations at each such
site, and the assistance provided through each such site for
families of members of the Armed Forces.
(B) An assessment of the effectiveness of the program in
providing assistance to families of members of the Armed
Forces.
(C) An assessment of the advisability of extending the
program or making it permanent.
(h) Assistance to Non-Profit Entities Providing Assistance
to Military Families.--The Secretary may provide financial,
material, and other assistance to non-profit entities in
order to facilitate the provision by such entities of
assistance to geographically isolated families of members of
the Armed Forces.
(i) Sunset.--The program required by this section, and the
authority to provide assistance under subsection (h), shall
cease upon the date that is three years after the first
obligation of amounts for the program.
(j) Funding.--Of the amount authorized to be appropriated
by section 301(5) for operation and maintenance for Defense-
wide activities, $5,000,000 may be available for the program
required by this section and the provision of assistance
under subsection (h).
amendment no. 4511
(Purpose: To clarify the repeal of the requirement of reduction of
Survivor Benefit Plan annuities by dependency and indemnity
compensation)
On page 223, strike line 14 and all that follows through
line 23, and insert the following:
(a) Repeal.--
(1) In general.--Subchapter II of chapter 73 of title 10,
United States Code, is amended as follows:
(A) In section 1450, by striking subsection (c).
(B) In section 1451(c)--
(i) by striking paragraph (2); and
(ii) by redesignating paragraphs (3) and (4) as paragraphs
(2) and (3), respectively.
(2) Conforming amendments.--Such subchapter is further
amended as follows:
(A) In section 1450--
(i) by striking subsection (e); and
(ii) by striking subsection (k).
(B) In section 1451(g)(1), by striking subparagraph (C).
(C) In section 1452--
(i) in subsection (f)(2), by striking ``does not apply--''
and all that follows and inserting ``does not apply in the
case of a deduction made through administrative error.''; and
(ii) by striking subsection (g).
(D) In section 1455(c), by striking ``, 1450(k)(2),''.
On page 224, line 15, strike ``Code,'' and insert ``Code
(as in effect on the day before the effective date provided
under subsection (e)),''.
On page 225, line 13, strike ``1448(d)(2)B)'' and insert
``1448(d)(2)(B)''.
amendment no. 4197
(Purpose: To modify the effect date of the termination of the phase-in
of concurrent receipt of retired pay and veterans disability
compensation for veterans with service-connected disabilities rated as
total by virtue of unemployability)
At the end of subtitle D of title VI, add the following:
SEC. 648. EFFECTIVE DATE OF TERMINATION OF PHASE-IN OF
CONCURRENT RECEIPT FOR VETERANS WITH SERVICE-
CONNECTED DISABILITIES RATED AS TOTAL BY VIRTUE
OF UNEMPLOYABILITY.
(a) In General.--Section 1414(a)(1) of title 10, United
States Code, is amended by striking ``100 percent'' the first
place it appears and all that follows and inserting ``100
percent and in the case of a qualified retiree receiving
veterans' disability compensation at the rate payable for a
100 percent disability by reason of a determination of
individual unemployability, payment of retired pay to such
veteran is subject to subsection (c) only during the period
beginning on January 1, 2004, and ending on December 31,
2004.''.
(b) Effective Date.--The amendment made by subsection (a)
shall take effect on December 31, 2004.
amendment no. 4512
(Purpose: To modify certain additional authorities for purposes of the
targeted shaping of the Armed Forces)
On page 214, strike line 3 and insert the following:
(b) Relaxation of Limitation on Selective Early
Retirement.--Section 638(a)(2) of title 10, United States
Code, is amended by adding at the end the following new
sentence: ``However, during the period beginning on October
1, 2006, and ending on December 31, 2012, such number may be
more than 30 percent of the number of officers considered in
each competitive category, but may not be more than 30
percent of the number of officers considered in each
grade.''.
(c) Enhanced Authority for Selective Early Retirement and
Early Discharges.--
(1) Renewal of authority.--Subsection (a) of section 638a
of title 10, United States Code, is amended by inserting
``and during the period beginning on October 1, 2006, and
ending on December 31, 2012,'' after ``December 31, 2001,''.
(2) Relaxation of limitation on selective early
retirement.--Subsection (c)(1) of such section is amended by
adding at the end the following new sentence: ``However,
during the period beginning on October 1, 2006, and ending on
December 31, 2012, such number may be more than 30 percent of
the number of officers considered in each competitive
category, but may not be more than 30 percent of the number
of officers considered in each grade.''.
(3) Relaxation of limitation on selective early
discharge.--Subsection (d)(2) of such section is amended--
(A) in subparagraph (A), by inserting before the semicolon
the following: ``, except that during the period beginning on
October 1, 2006, and ending on December 31, 2012, such number
may be more than 30 percent of the officers considered in
each competitive category, but may not be more than 30
percent of the number of officers considered in each grade'';
and
(B) in subparagraph (B), by inserting before the period the
following: ``, except that during the period beginning on
October 1, 2006, and ending on December 31, 2012, such number
may be more than 30 percent of the officers considered in
each competitive category, but may not be more than 30
percent
[[Page S6355]]
of the number of officers considered in each grade''.
(d) Increase in Amount of Incentive Bonus
amendment no. 4513
(Purpose: To provide for the determination of the retired pay base or
retain pay base of a general or flag officer based on actual rates of
basic pay rather than on amounts payable under the ceiling on the basic
pay of such officers)
At the end of subtitle D of title VI, add the following:
SEC. 648. DETERMINATION OF RETIRED PAY BASE OF GENERAL AND
FLAG OFFICERS BASED ON RATES OF BASIC PAY
PROVIDED BY LAW.
(a) Determination of Retired Pay Base.--
(1) In general.--Chapter 71 of title 10, United States
Code, is amended by inserting after section 1407 the
following new section:
``Sec. 1407a. Retired pay base: members who were general or
flag officers
``Notwithstanding any other provision of law, if the
determination of the retired pay base or retainer pay base
under section 1406 or 1407 of this title with respect to a
person who was a commissioned officer in pay grades O-7
through O-10 involves a rate or rates of basic pay that were
subject to a reduction under section 203(a)(2) of title 37,
such determination shall be made utilizing such rate or rates
of basic pay in effect as provided by law rather than such
rate or rates as so reduced under section 203(a)(2) of title
37.''.
(2) Clerical amendment.--The table of sections for chapter
71 of such title is amended by inserting after the item
relating to section 1407 the following new item:
``1407a. Retired pay base: members who were general or flag
officers.''.
(b) Effective Date.--The amendments made by subsection (a)
shall take effect on October 1, 2006, and shall apply with
respect to the computation of retired pay for members of the
Armed Forces who retire on or after that date.
amendment no. 4514
(Purpose: To provide in the calculation of retired pay for members of
the Armed Forces that service in excess of 30 years shall not be
subject to the maximum limit on the percentage of the retired pay
multiplier)
At the end of subtitle D of title VI, add the following:
SEC. 648. INAPPLICABILITY OF RETIRED PAY MULTIPLIER MAXIMUM
PERCENTAGE TO SERVICE OF MEMBERS OF THE ARMED
FORCES IN EXCESS OF 30 YEARS.
(a) In General.--Paragraph (3) of section 1409(b) of title
10, United States Code, is amended to read as follows:
``(3) 30 Years of service.--
``(A) Retirement before january 1, 2007.--In the case of a
member who retires before January 1, 2007, with more than 30
years of creditable service, the percentage to be used under
subsection (a) is 75 percent.
``(B) Retirement after december 31, 2006.--In the case of a
member who retires after December 31, 2006, with more than 30
years of creditable service, the percentage to be used under
subsection (a) is the sum of--
``(i) 75 percent; and
``(ii) the product (stated as a percentage) of--
``(I) 2\1/2\; and
``(II) the member's years of creditable service (as defined
in subsection (c)) in excess of 30 years of creditable
service in any service, regardless of when served, under
conditions authorized for purposes of this subparagraph
during a period designated by the Secretary of Defense for
purposes of this subparagraph.''.
(b) Retired Pay for Non-Regular Service.--Section 12739(c)
of such title is amended--
(1) by striking ``The total amount'' and inserting ``(1)
Except as provided in paragraph (2), the total amount''; and
(2) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
``(2) In the case of a person who retires after December
31, 2006, with more than 30 years of service credited to that
person under section 12733 of this title, the total amount of
the monthly retired pay computed under subsections (a) and
(b) may not exceed the sum of--
``(A) 75 percent of the retired pay base upon which the
computation is based; and
``(B) the product of--
``(i) the retired pay base upon which the computation is
based; and
``(ii) 2\1/2\ percent of the years of service credited to
that person under section 12733 of this title for service,
regardless of when served, under conditions authorized for
purposes of this paragraph during a period designated by the
Secretary of Defense for purposes of this paragraph.''.
AMENDMENT NO. 4515
(Purpose: To modify the commencement date of eligibility for an
optional annuity for dependents under the Survivor Benefit Plan)
At the end of subtitle D of title VI, add the following:
SEC. 648. MODIFICATION OF ELIGIBILITY FOR COMMENCEMENT OF
AUTHORITY FOR OPTIONAL ANNUITIES FOR DEPENDENTS
UNDER THE SURVIVOR BENEFIT PLAN.
(a) In General.--Section 1448(d)(2)(B) of title 10, United
States Code, is amended by striking ``who dies after November
23, 2003'' and inserting ``who dies after October 7, 2001''.
(b) Applicability.--Any annuity payable to a dependent
child under subchapter II of chapter 73 of title 10, United
States Code, by reason of the amendment made by subsection
(a) shall be payable only for months beginning on or after
the date of the enactment of this Act.
AMENDMENT NO. 4342
(Purpose: To modify the time limitation for use of entitlement to
educational assistance for reserve component members supporting
contingency operations and other operations)
At the end of subtitle D of title V, add the following:
SEC. 569. MODIFICATION OF TIME LIMIT FOR USE OF ENTITLEMENT
TO EDUCATIONAL ASSISTANCE FOR RESERVE COMPONENT
MEMBERS SUPPORTING CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS AND
OTHER OPERATIONS.
(a) Modification.--Section 16164(a) of title 10, United
States Code, is amended by striking ``this chapter while
serving--'' and all that follows and inserting ``this
chapter--
``(1) while the member is serving--
``(A) in the Selected Reserve of the Ready Reserve, in the
case of a member called or ordered to active service while
serving in the Selected Reserve; or
``(B) in the Ready Reserve, in the case of a member ordered
to active duty while serving in the Ready Reserve (other than
the Selected Reserve); and
``(2) in the case of a person who separates from the
Selected Reserve of the Ready Reserve after completion of a
period of active service described in section 16163 of this
title and completion of a service contract under other than
dishonorable conditions, during the 10-year period beginning
on the date on which the person separates from the Selected
Reserve.''.
(b) Conforming Amendment.--Paragraph (2) of section
16165(a) of such title is amended to read as follows:
``(2) when the member separates from the Ready Reserve as
provided in section 16164(a)(1) of this title, or upon
completion of the period provided for in section 16164(a)(2)
of this title, as applicable.''.
(c) Effective Date.--The amendments made by this section
shall take effect on October 28, 2004, as if included in the
enactment of the Ronald W. Reagan National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 (Public Law 108-375),
to which such amendments relate.
AMENDMENT NO. 4365
(Purpose: To reduce the eligibility age for receipt of non-regular
military service retired pay for members of the Ready Reserve in active
federal status or on active duty for significant periods and to expand
eligibility of members of the Selected Reserve for coverage under the
TRICARE program)
At the end of subtitle D of title VI, add the following:
SEC. 648. COMMENCEMENT OF RECEIPT OF NON-REGULAR SERVICE
RETIRED PAY BY MEMBERS OF THE READY RESERVE ON
ACTIVE FEDERAL STATUS OR ACTIVE DUTY FOR
SIGNIFICANT PERIODS.
(a) Reduced Eligibility Age.--Section 12731 of title 10,
United States Code, is amended--
(1) in subsection (a), by striking paragraph (1) and
inserting the following:
``(1) has attained the eligibility age applicable under
subsection (f) to that person;''; and
(2) by adding at the end the following new subsection:
``(f)(1) Subject to paragraph (2), the eligibility age for
purposes of subsection (a)(1) is 60 years of age.
``(2)(A) In the case of a person who as a member of the
Ready Reserve serves on active duty or performs active
service described in subparagraph (B) after September 11,
2001, the eligibility age for purposes of subsection (a)(1)
shall be reduced below 60 years of age by three months for
each aggregate of 90 days on which such person so performs in
any fiscal year after such date, subject to subparagraph (C).
A day of duty may be included in only one aggregate of 90
days for purposes of this subparagraph.
``(B)(i) Service on active duty described in this
subparagraph is service on active duty pursuant to a call or
order to active duty under a provision of law referred to in
section 101(a)(13)(B) of this title or under section 12301(d)
of this title. Such service does not include service on
active duty pursuant to a call or order to active duty under
section 12310 of this title.
``(ii) Active service described in this subparagraph is
service under a call to active service authorized by the
President or the Secretary of Defense under section 502(f) of
title 32 for purposes of responding to a national emergency
declared by the President or supported by Federal funds.
``(C) The eligibility age for purposes of subsection (a)(1)
may not be reduced below 50 years of age for any person under
subparagraph (A).''.
(b) Continuation of Age 60 as Minimum Age for Eligibility
of Non-Regular Service Retirees For Health Care.--Section
1074(b) of such title is amended--
(1) by inserting ``(1)'' after ``(b)''; and
(2) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
``(2) Paragraph (1) does not apply to a member or former
member entitled to retired pay for non-regular service under
chapter 1223 of this title who is under 60 years of age.''.
[[Page S6356]]
(c) Administration of Related Provisions of Law or
Policy.--With respect to any provision of law, or of any
policy, regulation, or directive of the executive branch that
refers to a member or former member of the uniformed services
as being eligible for, or entitled to, retired pay under
chapter 1223 of title 10, United States Code, but for the
fact that the member or former member is under 60 years of
age, such provision shall be carried out with respect to that
member or former member by substituting for the reference to
being 60 years of age a reference to having attained the
eligibility age applicable under subsection (f) of section
12731 of title 10, United States Code (as added by subsection
(a)), to such member or former member for qualification for
such retired pay under subsection (a) of such section.
(d) Effective Date and Applicability.--The amendment made
by subsection (a) shall take effect as of September 11, 2001,
and shall apply with respect to applications for retired pay
that are submitted under section 12731(a) of title 10, United
States Code, on or after the date of the enactment of this
Act.
At the end of subtitle A of title VII, add the following:
SEC. 707. EXPANSION OF ELIGIBILITY OF MEMBERS OF THE SELECTED
RESERVE FOR COVERAGE UNDER TRICARE.
(a) In General.--Subsection (a) of section 1076b of title
10, United States Code, is amended--
(1) in paragraph (2), by striking ``or'' at the end;
(2) in paragraph (3), by striking the period at the end and
inserting ``; or''; and
(3) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
``(4) is an employee of a business with 20 or fewer
employees.''.
(b) Premiums.--Subsection (e)(2) of such section is amended
by adding at the end the following new subparagraph:
``(C) For members eligible under paragraph (4) of
subsection (a), the amount equal to 75 percent of the total
amount determined by the Secretary on an appropriate
actuarial basis as being reasonable for the coverage.''.
(c) Effective Date.--The amendments made by this section
shall take effect on October 1, 2006.
AMENDMENT NO. 4241
(Purpose: To name the Act after John Warner, a Senator from Virginia)
On page 2, strike lines 1 through 3, and insert the
following:
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; FINDINGS.
(a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``John
Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2007''.
(b) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
(1) Senator John Warner of Virginia was elected a member of
the United States Senate on November 7, 1978, for a full term
beginning on January 3, 1979. He was subsequently appointed
by the Governor of Virginia to fill a vacancy on January 2,
1979, and has served continuously since that date. He was
appointed a member of the Committee on Armed Services in
January 1979, and has served continuously on the Committee
since that date, a period of nearly 28 years. Senator
Warner's service on the Committee represents nearly half of
its existence since it was established after World War II.
(2) Senator Warner came to the Senate and the Committee on
Armed Services after a distinguished record of service to the
Nation, including combat service in the Armed Forces and high
civilian office.
(3) Senator Warner enlisted in the United States Navy upon
graduation from high school in 1945, and served until the
summer of 1946, when he was discharged as a Petty Officer 3rd
Class. He then attended Washington and Lee University on the
G.I. Bill. He graduated in 1949 and entered the University of
Virginia Law School.
(4) Upon the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, Senator
Warner volunteered for active duty, interrupting his
education to accept a commission in the United States Marine
Corps. He served in combat in Korea as a ground officer in
the First Marine Air Wing. Following his active service, he
remained in the Marine Corps Reserve for several years,
attaining the rank of captain.
(5) Senator Warner resumed his legal education upon
returning from the Korean War and graduated from the
University of Virginia Law School in 1953. He was selected by
the late Chief Judge E. Barrett Prettyman of the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
as his law clerk. After his service to Judge Prettyman,
Senator Warner became an Assistant United States Attorney in
the District of Columbia, and later entered private law
practice.
(6) In 1969, the Senate gave its advice and consent to the
appointment of Senator Warner as Under Secretary of the Navy.
He served in this position until 1972, when he was confirmed
and appointed as the 61st Secretary of the Navy since the
office was established in 1798. As Secretary, Senator Warner
was the principal United States negotiator and signatory of
the Incidents at Sea Executive Agreement with the Soviet
Union, which was signed in 1972 and remains in effect today.
It has served as the model for similar agreements between
states covering the operation of naval ships and aircraft in
international sea lanes throughout the world.
(7) Senator Warner left the Department of the Navy in 1974.
His next public service was as Director of the American
Revolution Bicentennial Commission. In this capacity, he
coordinated the celebration of the Nation's founding,
directing the Federal role in all 50 States and in over 20
foreign nations.
(8) Senator Warner has served as chairman of the Committee
on Armed Services of the United States Senate from 1999 to
2001, and again since January 2003. He served as ranking
minority member of the committee from 1987 to 1993, and again
from 2001 to 2003. Senator Warner concludes his service as
chairman at the end of the 109th Congress, but will remain a
member of the committee.
(9) This Act is the twenty-eighth annual authorization act
for the Department of Defense for which Senator Warner has
taken a major responsibility as a member of the Committee on
Armed Services of the United States Senate, and the
fourteenth for which he has exercised a leadership role as
chairman or ranking minority member of the committee.
(10) Senator Warner, as seaman, Marine officer, Under
Secretary and Secretary of the Navy, and member, ranking
minority member, and chairman of the Committee on Armed
Services, has made unique and lasting contributions to the
national security of the United States.
(11) It is altogether fitting and proper that his Act, the
last annual authorization Act for the national defense that
Senator Warner manages in and for the United States Senate as
chairman of the Committee on Armed Services, be named in his
honor, as provided in subsection (a).
AMENDMENT NO. 4220, as modified
At the end of subtitle D of title III, add the following:
SEC. 352. REPORT ON HIGH ALTITUDE AVIATION TRAINING SITE,
EAGLE COUNTY, COLORADO.
(a) Report Required.--Not later than December 15, 2006, the
Secretary of the Army shall submit to the congressional
defense committees a report on the High Altitude Aviation
Training Site (HAATS) in Eagle County, Colorado.
(b) Elements.--The report required by subsection (a) shall
include the following:
(1) A description of the type of high altitude aviation
training being conducted at the High Altitude Aviation
Training Site, including the number of pilots who receive
such training on an annual basis and the types of aircraft
used in such training.
(2) A description of the number and type of helicopters
required at the High Altitude Aviation Training Site to
provide the high altitude aviation training needed to sustain
the war strategies contained in the 2006 Quadrennial Defense
Review, assuming that priority is afforded in the provision
of such training to commanders, instructor pilots, aviation
safety officers, and deploying units.
(3) A thorough evaluation of accident rates for deployed
helicopter pilots of the Army who receive high altitude
aviation training at the High Altitude Aviation Training
Site, and accident rates for deployed Army helicopter pilots
who did not receive such training, including the following:
(A) An estimate (set forth as a range) of the number of
accidents attributable to power management.
(B) The number of accidents occurring in a combat
environment.
(C) The number of accidents occurring in a non-combat
environment.
(4) An evaluation of the inventory and availability of Army
aircraft for purposes of establishing an appropriate schedule
for the assignment of a CH-47 aircraft to the High Altitude
Aviation Training Site; if the Chief of Staff of the Army
determines there is value in conducting such training at the
HAATS.
(5) A description of the status of any efforts to ensure
that all helicopter aircrews deployed to the area of
responsibility of the Central Command (CENTCOM AOR) are
qualified in mountain flight and power management prior to
deployment, including the locations where such training
occurred, with particular focus on the status of such efforts
with respect to aircrews to be deployed in support of
Operation Enduring Freedom.
(c) Tracking System.--The Secretary shall implement a
system for tracking those pilots that have attended a school
with an established Program of Instruction for high altitude
aviation operations training. The system should, if
practical, utilize an existing system that permits the query
of pilot flight experience and training.
AMENDMENT NO. 4371
(Purpose: To improve the provisions relating to the linking of award
and incentive fees to acquisition outcomes)
On page 345, line 2, strike ``poor'' and insert ``below-
satisfactory performance or performance that does not meet
the basic requirements of the contract''.
Amendment No. 4244
(Purpose: Relating to military vaccinations)
At the end of subtitle B of title VII, add the following:
SEC. 730. MILITARY VACCINATION MATTERS.
(a) Additional Element for Comptroller General Study and
Report on Vaccine Healthcare Centers.--Section 736(b) of the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006
(Public Law 109-163; 119 Stat. 3356) is amended by adding at
the end the following new paragraph:
``(10) The feasibility and advisability of transferring
direct responsibility for the Centers from the Army Medical
Command to the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and
Readiness and the Assistant Secretary of
[[Page S6357]]
Defense for Force Protection and Readiness.''.
(b) Response to Medical Needs Arising From Mandatory
Military Vaccinations.--
(1) In general.--The Secretary of Defense shall maintain a
joint military medical center of excellence focusing on the
medical needs arising from mandatory military vaccinations.
(2) Elements.--The joint military medical center of
excellence under paragraph (1) shall consist of the
following:
(A) The Vaccine Healthcare Centers of the Department of
Defense, which shall be the principal elements of the center.
(B) Any other elements that the Secretary considers
appropriate.
(3) Authorized activities.--In acting as the principal
elements of the joint military medical center under paragraph
(1), the Vaccine Healthcare Centers referred to in paragraph
(2)(A) may carry out the following:
(A) Medical assistance and care to individuals receiving
mandatory military vaccines and their dependents, including
long-term case management for adverse events where necessary.
(B) Evaluations to identify and treat potential and actual
health effects from vaccines before and after their use in
the field.
(C) The development and sustainment of a long-term vaccine
safety and efficacy registry.
(D) Support for an expert clinical advisory board for case
reviews related to disability assessment questions.
(E) Long-term and short-term studies to identify
unanticipated benefits and adverse events from vaccines.
(F) Educational outreach for immunization providers and
those required to receive immunizations.
(G) The development, dissemination, and validation of
educational materials for Department of Defense healthcare
workers relating to vaccine safety, efficacy, and
acceptability.
(c) Limitation on Restructuring of Vaccine Healthcare
Centers.--
(1) Limitation.--The Secretary of Defense may not downsize
or otherwise restructure the Vaccine Healthcare Centers of
the Department of Defense until the Secretary submits to
Congress a report setting forth a plan for meeting the
immunization needs of the Armed Forces during the 10-year
period beginning on the date of the submittal of the report.
(2) Report elements.--The report submitted under paragraph
(1) shall include the following:
(A) An assessment of the potential biological threats to
members of the Armed Forces that are addressable by vaccine.
(B) An assessment of the distance and time required to
travel to a Vaccine Healthcare Center by members of the Armed
Forces who have severe reactions to a mandatory military
vaccine.
(C) An identification of the most effective mechanisms for
ensuring the provision services by the Vaccine Healthcare
Centers to both military medical professionals and members of
the Armed Forces.
(D) An assessment of current military and civilian
expertise with respect to mass adult immunization programs,
including case management under such programs for rare
adverse reactions to immunizations.
(E) An organizational structure for each military
department to ensure support of the Vaccine Healthcare
Centers in the provision of services to members of the Armed
Forces.
Amendment No. 4516
(Purpose: To ensure the timely completion of the equity finalization
process for Naval Petroleum Reserve Numbered 1)
At the end of division C, add the following:
TITLE XXXIII--NAVAL PETROLEUM RESERVES
SEC. 3301. COMPLETION OF EQUITY FINALIZATION PROCESS FOR
NAVAL PETROLEUM RESERVE NUMBERED 1.
Section 3412(g) of the National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 1996 (Public Law 104-106; 10 U.S.C. 7420
note) is amended--
(1) by inserting ``(1)'' after ``(g)''; and
(2) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
``(2)(A) In light of the unique role that the independent
petroleum engineer who is retained pursuant to paragraph
(b)(2) performs in the process of finalizing equity
interests, and the importance to the United States taxpayer
of timely completion of the equity finalization process, the
independent petroleum engineer's `Shallow Oil Zone
Provisional Recommendation of Equity Participation,' which
was presented to the equity finalization teams for the
Department of Energy and Chevron U.S.A. Inc. on October 1 and
2, 2002, shall become the final equity recommendation of the
independent petroleum engineer, as that term is used in the
Protocol on NPR-1 Equity Finalization Implementation Process,
July 8, 1996, for the Shallow Oil Zone unless the Department
of Energy and Chevron U.S.A. Inc. agree in writing not later
than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this
paragraph that the independent petroleum engineer shall not
be liable to either party for any cost or expense incurred or
for any loss or damage sustained--
``(i) as a result of the manner in which services are
performed by the independent petroleum engineer in accordance
with its contract with the Department of Energy to support
the equity determination process;
``(ii) as a result of the failure of the independent
petroleum engineer in good faith to perform any service or
make any determination or computation, unless caused by its
gross negligence; or
``(iii) as a result of the reliance by either party on any
computation, determination, estimate or evaluation made by
the independent petroleum engineer unless caused by the its
gross negligence or willful misconduct.
``(B) If Chevron U.S.A. Inc. agrees in writing not later
than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this
paragraph that the independent petroleum engineer shall not
be liable to Chevron U.S.A. Inc. or the Department of Energy
for any cost or expense incurred or for any loss or damage
described in clauses (i) through (iii) of subparagraph (A),
the Department of Energy shall agree to the same not later
than such date.''.
Amendment No. 4466
(Purpose: To improve mental health screening and services for members
of the Armed Forces)
At the end of subtitle B of title VII, add the following:
SEC. 730. ENHANCED MENTAL HEALTH SCREENING AND SERVICES FOR
MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES.
(a) Required Elements of Assessments.--Each pre-deployment
mental health assessment of a member of the Armed Forces,
shall include the following:
(1) A mental health history of the member, with emphasis on
mental health status during the 12-month period ending on the
date of the assessment and a review of military service
during that period.
(2) An assessment of the current treatment of the member,
and any use of psychotropic medications by the member, for a
mental health condition or disorder.
(3) An assessment of any behavior of the member identified
by the member's commanding officer that could indicate the
presence of a mental health condition.
(4) Information provided by the member (through a checklist
or other means) on the presence of any serious mental illness
or any symptoms indicating a mental health condition or
disorder.
(b) Referral for Further Evaluation.--Each member of the
Armed Forces who is determined during a pre-deployment or
post-deployment mental health assessment to have, or have
symptoms or indicators for, a mental health condition or
disorder shall be referred to a qualified health care
professional with experience in the evaluation and diagnosis
of mental health conditions.
(c) Referral of Members Deployed in Contingency or Combat
Operations.--any member of the Armed Forces called or ordered
to active duty in support of contingency or combat operations
who requests access to mental health care services any time
before, during, or after deployment shall be provided access
to such services--
(1) not later than 72 hours after the making of such
request; or
(2) at the earliest practicable time thereafter.
(d) Minimum Mental Health Standards for Deployment.--
(1) Standards required.--The Secretary of Defense shall
prescribe in regulations minimum standards for mental health
for the eligibility of a member of the Armed Forces for
deployment to a combat operation or contingency operation.
(2) Elements.--The standards required by paragraph (1)
shall include the following:
(A) A specification of the mental health conditions,
treatment for such conditions, and receipt of psychotropic
medications for such conditions that preclude deployment of a
member of the Armed Forces to a combat operation or
contingency operation, or to a specified type of such
operation.
(B) Guidelines for the deployability and treatment of
members of the Armed Forces diagnosed with a severe mental
illness or Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD).
(3) Utilization.--The Secretary shall take appropriate
actions to ensure the utilization of the standards prescribed
under paragraph (1) in the making of determinations regarding
the deployability of members of the Armed Forces to a combat
operation or contingency operation.
(e) Monitoring of Certain Individuals.--The Secretary of
Defense shall develop a plan, to be implemented throughout
the Department of Defense, for monitoring the mental health
of each member of the Armed Forces who, after deployment to a
combat operation or contingency operation, is known--
(1) to have a mental health condition or disorder; or
(2) to be receiving treatment, including psychotropic
medications, for a mental health condition or disorder.
(f) Implementation.--Not later than six months after the
date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense
shall submit to the Committees on Armed Services of the
Senate and the House or Representatives a report on the
actions taken to implement the requirements of this section.
Amendment No. 4517
(Purpose: To make funds available for the Our Military Kids youth
support program)
At the end of title XIV, add the following:
SEC. 1414. OUR MILITARY KIDS YOUTH SUPPORT PROGRAM.
(a) Army Funding for Expansion of Program.--Of the amount
authorized to be appropriated by section 1405(1) for
operation and maintenance for the Army, $1,500,000 may be
available for the expansion nationwide of the Our Military
Kids youth support program for dependents of elementary and
[[Page S6358]]
secondary school age of members of the National Guard and
Reserve who are severely wounded or injured during
deployment.
(b) Army National Guard Funding for Expansion of Program.--
Of the amount authorized to be appropriated by section
1405(6) for operation and maintenance for the Army National
Guard, $500,000 may be available for the expansion nationwide
of the Our Military Kids youth support program.
Amendment No. 4363, As Modified
At the end of subtitle B of title III, add the following:
SEC. 315. INFANTRY COMBAT EQUIPMENT.
Of the amount authorized to be appropriated by section
301(8) for operation and maintenance for the Marine Corps
Reserve, $2,500,000 may be available for Infantry Combat
Equipment (ICE).
AMENDMENT NO. 4450, as modified
At the end of subtitle B of title II, add the following:
SEC. 215. HIGH ENERGY LASER-LOW ASPECT TARGET TRACKING.
(a) Additional Amount for Research, Development, Test, and
Evaluation, army.--The amount authorized to be appropriated
by section 201(1) for research, development, test, and
evaluation for the Army is hereby increased by $5,000,000.
(b) Availability of Amount.--
(1) In general.--Of the amount authorized to be
appropriated by section 201(1) for research, development,
test, and evaluation for the Army, as increased by subsection
(a), $5,000,000 may be available for the Department of
Defense High Energy Laser Test Facility for High Energy Laser
Low Aspect Target Tracking (HEL-LATT) test series done
jointly with the Navy.
(2) Construction with other amounts.--The amount available
under paragraph (1) for the purpose set forth in that
paragraph is in addition to any amounts available under this
Act for that purpose.
(c) Offset.--The amount authorized to be appropriated by
section 421 for military personnel is hereby reduced by
$5,000,000, due to unexpended obligations, if available.
AMENDMENT NO. 4362, as modified
At the end of subtitle B of title III, add the following:
SEC. 315. INDIVIDUAL FIRST AID KIT.
Of the amount authorized to be appropriated by section
301(8) for operation and maintenance for the Marine Corps
Reserve, $1,500,000 may be available for the Individual First
Aid Kit (IFAK).
AMENDMENT NO. 4275, as modified
At the end of subtitle B of title II, add the following:
SEC. 215. ADVANCED ALUMINUM AEROSTRUCTURES INITIATIVE.
(a) Additional Amount for Research, Development, Test, and
Evaluation, Air Force.--The amount authorized to be
appropriated by section 201(3) for research, development,
test, and evaluation for the Air Force is hereby increased by
$2,000,000.
(b) Availability of Amount.--Of the amount authorized to be
appropriated by section 201(3) for research, development,
test, and evaluation for the Air Force, as increased by
subsection (a), $2,000,000 may be available for Aerospace
Technology Development and Demonstration (PE #603211F) for
the Advanced Aluminum Aerostructures Initiative (A3I).
(c) Offset.--The amount authorized to be appropriated by
section 421 for military personnel is hereby decreased by
$2,000,000, due to unexpended obligations, if available.
AMENDMENT NO. 4475, as modified
At the end of subtitle A of title II, add the following:
SEC. 203. AMOUNT FOR DEVELOPMENT AND VALIDATION OF WARFIGHTER
RAPID AWARENESS PROCESSING TECHNOLOGY.
(a) Increase in Amount for Research, Development, Test, and
Evaluation for the Navy.--The amount authorized to be
appropriated by section 201(2) for research, development,
test, and evaluation for the Navy is hereby increased by
$4,000,000.
(b) Availability of Amount.--Of the amount authorized to be
appropriated by section 201(2) for research, development,
test, and evaluation for the Navy, as increased by subsection
(a), $4,000,000 may be available for the development,
validation, and demonstration of warfighter rapid awareness
processing technology for distributed operations within the
Marine Corps Landing Force Technology program.
(c) Offset.--The amount authorized to be appropriated by
section 421 for military personnel is hereby decreased by
$4,000,000, due to unexpended obligations, if available.
AMENDMENT NO. 4276, as modified
At the end of subtitle B of title II, add the following:
SEC. 215. LEGGED MOBILITY ROBOTIC RESEARCH.
(a) Additional Amount for Research, Development, Test, and
Evaluation, army.--The amount authorized to be appropriated
by section 201(1) for research, development, test, and
evaluation for the Army is hereby increased by $1,000,000.
(b) Availability of Amount.--Of the amount authorized to be
appropriated by section 201(1) for research, development,
test, and evaluation for the Army, as increased by subsection
(a), $1,000,000 may be available for Combat Vehicle and
Automotive Technology (PE #602601A) for legged mobility
robotic research for military applications.
(c) Offset.--The amount authorized to be appropriated by
section 421 for military personnel is hereby decreased by
$1,000,000, due to unexpended obligations, if available.
AMENDMENT NO. 4469, as modified
At the end of subtitle B of title II, add the following:
SEC. 215. WIDEBAND DIGITAL AIRBORNE ELECTRONIC SENSING ARRAY.
(a) Additional Amount for Research, Development, Test, and
Evaluation, Air Force.--The amount authorized to be
appropriated by section 201(3) for research, development,
test, and evaluation for the Air Force is hereby increased by
$3,000,000.
(b) Availability of Amount.--Of the amount authorized to be
appropriated by section 201(3) for research, development,
test, and evaluation for the Air Force, as increased by
subsection (a), $3,000,000 may be available for Wideband
Digital Airborne Electronic Sensing Array (PE #0602204F).
(c) Offset.--The amount authorized to be appropriated by
section 421 for military personnel is hereby reduced by
$3,000,000, due to unexpended obligations, if available.
AMENDMENT NO. 4477, as modified
At the end of subtitle B of title II, add the following:
SEC. 215. SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY.
(a) Army Support for University Research Initiatives.--
(1) Additional amount for research, development, test, and
evaluation, army.--The amount authorized to be appropriated
by section 201(1) for research, development, test, and
evaluation for the Army is hereby increased by $10,000,000.
(2) Availability of amount.--Of the amount authorized to be
appropriated by section 201(1) for research, development,
test, and evaluation for the Army, as increased by paragraph
(1), $10,000,000 may be available for program element PE
0601103A for University Research Initiatives.
(b) Navy Support for University Research Initiatives.--
(1) Additional amount for research, development, test, and
evaluation, navy.--The amount authorized to be appropriated
by section 201(2) for research, development, test, and
evaluation for the Navy is hereby increased by $10,000,000.
(2) Availability of amount.--Of the amount authorized to be
appropriated by section 201(2) for research, development,
test, and evaluation for the Navy, as increased by paragraph
(1), $10,000,000 may be available for program element PE
0601103N for University Research Initiatives.
(c) Air Force Support for University Research
Initiatives.--
(1) Additional amount for research, development, test, and
evaluation, air force.--The amount authorized to be
appropriated by section 201(3) for research, development,
test, and evaluation for the Air Force is hereby increased by
$10,000,000.
(2) Availability of amount.--Of the amount authorized to be
appropriated by section 201(3) for research, development,
test, and evaluation for the Air Force, as increased by
paragraph (1), $10,000,000 may be available for program
element PE 0601103F for University Research Initiatives.
(d) Computer Science and Cybersecurity.--
(1) Additional amount for research, development, test, and
evaluation, defense-wide.--The amount authorized to be
appropriated by section 201(4) for research, development,
test, and evaluation for Defense-wide activities is hereby
increased by $10,000,000.
(2) Availability of amount.--Of the amount authorized to be
appropriated by section 201(4) for research, development,
test, and evaluation for Defense-wide activities, as
increased by paragraph (1), $10,000,000 may be available for
program element PE 0601101E for the Defense Advanced Research
Projects Agency University Research Program in Computer
Science and Cybersecurity.
(e) SMART National Defense Education Program.--
(1) Additional amount for research, development, test, and
evaluation, defense-wide.--The amount authorized to be
appropriated by section 201(4) for research, development,
test, and evaluation for Defense-wide activities is hereby
increased by $5,000,000.
(2) Availability of amount.--Of the amount authorized to be
appropriated by section 201(4) for research, development,
test, and evaluation for Defense-wide activities, as
increased by paragraph (1), $5,000,000 may be available for
program element PE 0601120D8Z for the SMART National Defense
Education Program.
(f) Offset.--The amount authorized to be appropriated by
section 421 for military personnel is hereby reduced by
$45,000,000, due to unexpended obligations, if available.
AMENDMENT NO. 4518
(Purpose: To make available funds for the Reading for the Blind and
Dyslexic program of the Department of Defense)
At the end of subtitle B of title III, add the following:
SEC. 315. READING FOR THE BLIND AND DYSLEXIC PROGRAM OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE.
(a) Defense Dependents.--Of the amount authorized to be
appropriated by section 301(5) for operation and maintenance
for Defense-wide activities, $500,000 may be available for
the Reading for the Blind and Dyslexic program of the
Department of Defense for defense dependents of elementary
[[Page S6359]]
and secondary school age in the continental United States and
overseas.
(b) Severely Wounded or Injured Members of the Armed
Forces.--Of the amount authorized to be appropriated by
section 1405(5) for operation and maintenance for Defense-
wide activities, $500,000 may be available for the Reading
for the Blind and Dyslexic program of the Department of
Defense for severely wounded or injured members of the Armed
Forces.
AMENDMENT NO. 4214
(Purpose: To make a technical correction to a project for Rickenbacker
Airport, Columbus, Ohio)
At the appropriate place, insert the following:
RICKENBACKER AIRPORT, COLUMBUS, OHIO
Sec. ____. The project numbered 4651 in section 1702 of the
Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity
Act: A Legacy for Users (119 Stat. 1434) is amended by
striking ``Grading, paving'' and all that follows through
``Airport'' and inserting ``Grading, paving, roads, and the
transfer of rail-to-truck for the intermodal facility at
Rickenbacker Airport, Columbus, OH''.
AMENDMENT NO. 4519
(Purpose: To make technical corrections to a high priority project and
transportation improvement project in the State of Michigan)
At the appropriate place, insert the following:
SEC. __. HIGHWAY PROJECTS, DETROIT, MICHIGAN.
(a) High Priority Project.--The table contained in section
1702 of the Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient
Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users (119 Stat.
1256) is amended in the item numbered 4333 (119 Stat. 1422)
by striking ``Plan and construct, land acquisition, Detroit
West Riverfront Greenway'' and inserting ``Detroit Riverfront
Conservancy, Riverfront walkway, greenway, and adjacent land
planning, construction, and land acquisition from Gabriel
Richard Park at the Douglas Mac Arthur Bridge to Riverside
Park at the Ambassador Bridge, Detroit''.
(b) Transportation Improvement Project.--The table
contained in section 1934(c) of the Safe, Accountable,
Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for
Users (119 Stat. 1485) is amended in the item numbered 196
(119 Stat. 1495) by striking ``Detroit Riverfront
Conservancy, West Riverfront Walkway, Greenway and Adjacent
Land Acquisition, from Riverfront Towers to Ambassador
Bridge, Detroit'' and inserting ``Detroit Riverfront
Conservancy, Riverfront walkway, greenway, and adjacent land
planning, construction, and land acquisition from Gabriel
Richard Park at the Douglas Mac Arthur Bridge to Riverside
Park at the Ambassador Bridge, Detroit''.
amendment no. 4197
Mr. REID. Mr. President, I rise today along with my colleague Mrs.
Lincoln to discuss an amendment accepted today by the distinguished
chairman Mr. Warner, and ranking member, Mr. Levin.
I appreciate their willingness to advance this very important
legislation. Our policy must reflect our Nation's care and appreciation
for our veterans, and I will continue to work towards obtaining full
concurrent receipt. I have said it before, but I will say it again.
It is unacceptable that the men and women who dedicated their entire
careers to service in the military must surrender a portion of their
retired pay if they want to receive the disability compensation.
It is acceptable, but today, because of the policy of concurrent
receipt, it is the law for veterans classified as unemployable.
Throughout my time in the Senate, I have championed legislation that
would end the unfair policy of denying America's disabled veteran's
retirement benefits they have earned through years of service and
sacrifice.
In 2004, I introduced legislation that was passed into helping those
veterans who were 100 percent disabled to receive full concurrent
receipt immediately. By eliminating the 10-year phasein period, the
passage of this legislation was a significant victory for those who
have fought for our freedom.
But, I never imagined that the administration would intentionally
change the intent, interpret the law, and shamelessly deny unemployable
veterans, no matter what their disability rating, retirement pay and
disability compensation.
What kind of message does this send to our men and women in the
military today?
We have thousands of new American veterans from the Iraq and
Afghanistan wars. These men and women serve in the most inhospitable
reaches of the world, defending our freedoms and fighting for the cause
of liberty.
Most of these young American Veterans don't realize that if they are
injured or wounded to the point were that can no longer work, will have
to choose between their retired pay and their disability compensation.
As of today, they will not receive both until 2009.
This is unfair.
Military retired pay is earned compensation for the extraordinary
demands and sacrifices inherent in a military career. It is a reward
promised for serving two decades or more under conditions that most
Americans find intolerable.
For several years I have introduced and championed legislation that
would end the unfair policy of denying America's disabled veterans'
retirement benefits they have earned through years of service and
sacrifice.
In November 2005, an amendment was passed to expand concurrent
receipt to cover America's disabled veterans rated as ``unemployable,''
and to implement the new policy immediately instead of phasing it in
over a decade. However, I was disappointed that the conference
committee chose not to enact this valuable legislation until 2009.
Therefore, I introduced this amendment to restore their full benefits
as originally intended in the legislation I introduced in 2004.
Veterans' disability compensation is recompense for pain, suffering,
and lost future earning power caused by a service-connected illness or
injury. Few retirees can afford to live on their retired pay alone, and
a severe disability only makes the problem worse by limiting or denying
any post-service working life.
Mr. President, an ``unemployable'' retiree should not have to forfeit
part or all of his or her earned retired pay as a result of having
suffered a service-connected disability.
At a time when our Nation is calling upon our Armed Forces to defend
democracy and freedom, we must be careful not to send the wrong signal
to those in uniform.
All who have selected to make their career in the U.S. military now
face an additional unknown risk in our fight against terrorism. If they
are injured, they would be forced to forego their earned retired pay in
order to receive their VA disability compensation. In effect, they
would be paying for their own disability benefits from their retirement
checks unless my legislation is enacted.
This will send a signal to these brave men and women that the
American people and government take care of those who make sacrifices
for our nation. It is time for us to show our appreciation to the men
and women who have demonstrated their allegiance to their country and
the principles it stands for.
I, again, thank Senator Warner and Senator Levin for their assistance
in including this provision in the fiscal year 2007 Defense
authorization bill.
amendment no. 4494
Mr. DODD. Mr. President, I rise today to discuss my concerns about
the amendment offered by my good colleague Senator Burns, regarding
electronic voting technology to S. 2766, the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007.
I understand that this amendment directs the Department of Defense,
DOD, to continue the interim voting assistance system, IVAS, for
uniformed service voters, overseas Defense Department employees, and
dependents of such voters and employees, for all Federal elections
through December 31, 2006. The amendment would not, as I understand it,
extend the current program to nonmilitary overseas voters. Further, I
understand that the amendment directs the DOD to submit two reports to
Congress, one assessing the IVAS program during the 2006 Federal
elections and the second detailing plans for an expansion of the IVAS
program to all voters covered under the Uniform Overseas Citizens
Absentee Voting Act, UOCAVA, through November 2010.
I commend my colleague from Montana for his efforts to protect the
fundamental right to vote and for extending a critical program that
facilitates electronic ballot access for our valiant overseas service
men and women, their colleagues and families. I strongly support the
goals of this legislation.
However, I am deeply concerned that the amendment as drafted
continues to
[[Page S6360]]
withhold the benefits of new technology from millions of other
nonmilitary overseas voters in a manner that is inconsistent with the
purposes of UOCAVA. According to the language of this amendment, only
those with an existing affiliation to DOD will continue to benefit from
the IVAS program in contrast to the broader group of citizens covered
by UOCAVA, including overseas voters who are not members of the
military, employees of the Defense Department or a dependent of either
group.
As my colleague know, UOCAVA treats all overseas voters--military,
civilian or otherwise--equally with respect to voting rights. Classes
of voters under UOCAVA are not bifurcated. This approach ensures that
the all voters are treated in a nondiscriminatory manner under UOCAVA.
The number of overseas voters continues to make a difference in our
Federal elections. The Federal Voting Assistance Program, FVAP, under
the Secretary of Defense estimates that over 3 percent of the total
vote in the 1996, 2000, and 2004 elections came from abroad. In
addition, an umbrella coalition focused on military and overseas voters
estimates that the number of Americans residing overseas have ranged
from 3 million to 6 million, but generally put the global population
somewhere around 4 million. The coalition's member organizations
include the Federation of American Women's Clubs Overseas Inc, FAWCO,
the American Citizens Abroad, ACA, the Alliance of American
Organizations-Spain and Portugal, ALLAMO and the Association of
Americans Resident Overseas, AARO. Overseas voters are important
Americans who, under the goals of UOCAVA, must have the same
opportunity to cast a vote and have that vote counted as their military
counterparts.
There is nothing more fundamental to the vitality and endurance of a
democracy of the people, by the people and for the people, than the
people's right to vote. Thomas Paine wrote in 1795 that, ``the right of
voting for representatives is the primary right by which other rights
are protected.'' This statement takes on an even more significant
meaning to Americans when America is at war.
As a former Peace Corps volunteer, I can offer testimony to the
meaningful contributions made by overseas citizens who are not included
in the covered classes under the amendment of my colleague from
Montana. At a time when the image of the United States is receiving
international scrutiny, the work of individuals such as Peace Corps
volunteers is critical. The work of all our overseas citizens, whether
they serve in the military to protect us back at home or whether they
conduct businesses and raise their families overseas, must be honored
with an absolute equal opportunity to vote in Federal elections.
We should not take any actions to discourage our civilian overseas
voters. We should not treat civilian overseas voters any differently
than overseas military or DOD contract voters, and certainly not by
erecting an artificial bifurcation barrier between military and
civilian votes under UOCAVA.
I appreciate the fact that this amendment recognizes the need to
eliminate that bifurcation by requiring DOD to report specifically on
expanding the use of electronic voting technology for all voters under
UOCAVA. I look forward to that report and will continue to work to
ensure that all American citizens living overseas have an equal
opportunity to participate in our democracy through the ballot box.
amendment no. 4241
Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk and ask
for its immediate consideration.
This amendment would name the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2007 after the chairman of the Committee on Armed Services,
our distinguished friend and colleague from Virginia, John Warner. I am
pleased to be joined in this effort by Senators Frist, Levin, Inhofe,
Kennedy, Roberts, Byrd, Sessions, Lieberman, Collins, Jack Reed,
Ensign, Akaka, Talent, Bill Nelson, Chambliss, Ben Nelson, Graham,
Dayton, Dole, Bayh, Cornyn, Clinton, Thune, Allard, and Allen.
I am certain that there is not a Senator in this Chamber who would
not agree that Senator Warner, with his grace, courtliness, bipartisan
attitude: and kindness to all, represents the finest traditions of the
Senate. All Senators know that the Defense Authorization bill occupies
a major place in the annual legislative calendar and takes substantial
time to complete. Those Senators who do not have the privilege of
serving on the Committee on Armed Services may not realize the
tremendous amount of work that goes into hearings, formulation of
legislative proposals, preparation for markup, and actual markup of
this bill--the largest annually recurring piece of legislation in
Congress. When one adds to this the oversight of the largest department
in the government, and the processing of thousands of military and
civilian nominations each year, the demands on the chairman of the
committee and the need for leadership are obvious. For 6 years, John
Warner has provided that leadership, and done it in a manner that has
gained him universal respect.
John Warner is, first and foremost, a Virginian--a native of that Old
Dominion that has stood at the center of American history for over two
centuries and has given the Nation so many of its eminent men, from
Washington forward. John Warner has continued that tradition of service
to country from his youth. The son of a decorated Army physician in
World War I, John Warner left high school to enlist in the Navy late in
World War II. He served until 1946, when he was discharged as a petty
officer 3rd class. Like millions of other young Americans, he then
attended college on the GI bill, graduating from Washington and Lee
University in 1949. He then entered the University of Virginia Law
School. He interrupted his education to serve in the Korean war,
volunteering for active duty and accepting a commission in the Marine
Corps. He served in combat as a ground officer in the First Marine Air
Wing, and remained in the Marine Corps Reserve for several years. Upon
returning from the Korean war, he resumed his legal education,
graduating from the University of Virginia Law School in 1953.
Upon graduation, John Warner's outstanding qualities were recognized
when he was selected to serve as the law clerk to the late Judge E.
Barrett Prettyman of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit, one of the most outstanding jurists of the period.
Many years later, Senator Warner would be instrumental in naming the
U.S. Court House in Washington, DC, for his old mentor. After his
clerkship, John Warner became an assistant U.S. attorney in the
District of Columbia, and later was engaged in the private practice of
law.
In 1969, President Nixon nominated John Warner to serve as Under
Secretary of the Navy. The Senate confirmed the nomination, and he
served as Under Secretary until he was confirmed and appointed as the
61st Secretary of the Navy in 1972. During his tenure as Secretary, the
United States and the Soviet Union signed the Incidents at Sea
Executive Agreement, for which he was the principal United States
negotiator and signatory. This agreement remains in effect today and
has served as a model for similar agreements governing naval vessels
and aircraft around the world.
After leaving the Department of the Navy in 1974, John Warner's next
public service was as chairman of the American Revolution Bicentennial
Commission. He oversaw the celebration of the Nation's founding,
directing the Federal Government's role in a commemoration that
embraced all 50 States and over 20 foreign nations.
In 1978, the voters of Virginia elected John Warner to a full term in
the U.S. Senate. Upon beginning his service in 1979, he was elected a
member of the Committee on Armed Services. Upon leaving the
chairmanship next year, he will have served on the committee for 28
years, almost half of the committee's existence. Senator Warner served
as chairman of the committee from 1999 to 2001, and again since 2003.
He also served as ranking member from 1987 to 1993, and again from 2001
to 2003. For 14 years of American history, years that saw the end of
the Cold War, the first gulf war, the attacks on September 11, 2001,
and the global war on terror, John Warner has served in a leadership
role on the committee.
No Member of this body has done more for our national security than
John Warner. As sailor, Marine officer, Under Secretary, and Secretary
of
[[Page S6361]]
the Navy, and U.S. Senator, he has always answered his country's call.
The dignified and evenhanded way in which he has presided over the
business of the committee has enabled it to continue its noble
tradition of being an island of bipartisanship in an increasingly
unpleasant political era. I submit, Mr. President, that it is
exceedingly appropriate that this year's Defense Authorization Act, the
last which John Warner will manage as chairman of the Committee on
Armed Services, be named in his honor.
AMENDMENT NO. 4244
Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I rise to thank my colleagues for accepting
an amendment that I introduced on behalf of myself, Senator Bingaman,
and Senator Carper to fully protect the health of our military
personnel. The majority of this amendment is the same language the
Senate included in last year's Defense Authorization bill clearly
establishing the Vaccine Healthcare Centers, or VHCs, role in force
protection and treatment. That language was not retained in conference.
Instead, a GAO report was mandated. While the GAO report will be
helpful in refining the organization and missions of the VHCs, it is
important to clearly establish their role today.
The GAO report will not be completed until next year. In addition to
the language the Senate passed last year, this amendment includes one
additional area for GAO to investigate and a requirement that the
Department of Defense examine and plan for its future vaccination
needs. Both necessary steps to determining the optimal structure for
the centers.
I should also point out to my colleagues that this amendment does not
add any funding to the bill. The centers are currently being funded at
$6 million a year with global war on terror funds. This amendment does
not change that.
Let me explain more thoroughly what the vaccine health care centers
do. As our military operates around the globe, they are protected from
common illnesses like the flu and from common travel concerns, like
yellow fever for sub-Saharan Africa, by vaccinations. In addition, they
are vaccinated to protect them from biological warfare agents like
anthrax or smallpox.
These force protection measures are critically important, but they
only work if military personnel are confident that the vaccines
themselves are not dangerous or that the side-effects can be treated.
Vaccines, even those generally considered safe, are still drugs put
into the body. For that reason, there are always a small number of
personnel whose bodies will have an adverse reaction to a ``safe''
vaccine. In order to deal with this, the Vaccine Healthcare Centers
Network was established in 2001.
The centers act as a specialized medical unit and center of
excellence that can provide the best possible clinical care to any
military member, Active-Duty, Guard, or Reserve, or their family that
has a severe reaction. They also advise the Department of Defense
regarding vaccine administration policies and educate military health
care professionals regarding the safest and best practices for vaccine
administration. Their overall mission is to promote vaccine safety and
provide expert knowledge to patients and physicians.
Why is this so important? As many of you know, the number of adults
who get regular vaccines is fairly small. While we have civilian
specialists who deal with childhood vaccinations and problems that
might develop, the population of adults regularly vaccinated with
anything more than the flu vaccine is small. No civilian expertise
exists in this area because the cases are rare and infrequent.
In the military, the reverse is true. Military personnel are
regularly vaccinated for travel, for threats relating to their theater
of operation, and for things like the flu. Even in the military,
though, the cases are rare and spread throughout the force. It is
difficult for the average base physician to develop the expertise
needed to recognize the problem and to provide the best treatment. In
order to effectively develop proper treatments, there must be a
centralized center to capture the information on those who experience
severe problems.
Here are some specifics:
Last year, 2005, the VHCs managed over 700 cases of adverse reactions
to mandatory vaccines.
Each military service made use of the help and care offered by the
VHCs--48 percent of their cases were in the Army, 29.6 percent of their
cases were in the Air Force, 13 percent of their cases were in the Navy
and Marine Corps, and 2.4 percent of their cases were in the Coast
Guard.
Since being founded, as part of their ongoing educational effort, the
VHCs have developed and distributed over 50,000 immunization took kits
to improve vaccinations throughout DOD.
The VHCs are leading the effort to properly characterize and develop
treatments for serious reactions to the smallpox vaccine and the
anthrax vaccine. In many cases, they collaborate with outside
researchers and analysts by providing the large sample population
needed to develop case definitions and clinical guidelines.
Since beginning their work in 2001, the VHCs have handled a total of
2,049 cases. Their yearly case load has gone up 83 percent since 2001.
The over 2,000 cases treated demonstrates clearly the need for
postvaccination treatment expertise. In all of these cases, base or
post doctors did not have the expertise to adequately treat sick
personnel. Given that these are mandatory vaccinations, we have an
absolute moral obligation to make sure that those made sick by them get
the best possible treatment. Much as the military developed a unique
expertise in treating those exposed to nuclear radiation, in this new
era of proliferating biological threats we must now develop an
expertise in postvaccination treatments.
This has all been done by an extremely small staff--only one full-
time doctor, three nurse practitioners, and five educators and support
staff at each of the four regional facilities. The value and medical
services they have provided to the entire military family--Army, Navy,
Air Force, Marines, and Coast Guard--has been extraordinary.
Make no mistake, military personnel and their dependents are more
confident in the vaccination programs because of the VHCs. When
personnel do suffer adverse reactions, reports are extremely positive
regarding the care they now get from the centers and we do not see
individual cases becoming national news and fear spreading throughout
the force.
Why do we need the language I am proposing? The reason is simple.
Despite the May 9, 2006, testimony from the Deputy Assistant Secretary
of Defense for Force Health Protection and Readiness to the House
Committee on Government Reform touting the centers as DOD's answer to
adverse anthrax vaccine reactions, the centers are still not clearly
established in law and face regular funding battles.
The VHCs were created in minimally worded report language from the
fiscal year 2001 Labor-HHS Appropriations conference report. It is time
to recognize their role and varied responsibilities with a proper
authorization.
In addition, it is time to make sure they have clear and regular
funding. For the past 5 years, the VHCs have been funded by the Army
alone, primarily with global war on terror funds. I applaud the Army
for recognizing the need for the centers and providing those funds from
their wartime allocation. But, I am concerned that this is not
sustainable and it is not what Congress intended. The Army is only the
executive agent for what is supposed to be a defense-wide service. Even
though almost half, 45 percent, of those treated by the VHC came from
the Air Force, Navy and Marines, and Coast Guard, none of those
services is willing to provide their fair share of the yearly $6
million bill. The Army cannot sustain this and the people that would
lose are injured military personnel from the other services who will
not be able to access expert care.
In recent years, the decision by the other services not to provide a
portion of the funding for the centers has led to proposals to
eliminate some of their operations. If all or part of the VHC network
is dismantled, the technical expertise built up over the past 5 years
will be dispersed. It will be almost impossible to reconstitute that
highly specialized knowledge when we need it in the future. We cannot
just hope that the 708 personnel who sought treatment last year will
just get better on their own.
[[Page S6362]]
This amendment seeks to clarify that the vaccine health care centers
must exist, while also mandating a thorough review of their
organization and functions. Next year, when we have the GAO study and
the Pentagon's study, Congress can act on any worthwhile
recommendations. In the meantime, we cannot leave this vital force
protection and treatment center in limbo, nor can we leave the entire
burden on the Army.
As biological threats grow from both naturally occurring diseases
like bird flu to weaponized agents like anthrax, force protection
clearly demands a good vaccination program. Equally clearly, that
program must include quality care for those who suffer adverse events
in every service, not just the Army.
As we look to the future, the need for vaccinations is only likely to
grow. For that very reason, we established Project BioShield. At this
point, there is no civilian equivalent to the vaccine health care
centers network, but there is an initial collaborative effort between
the VHCs and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. This
collaboration must be encouraged so that we can take advantage of the
VHCs knowledge should a mass civilian inoculation become necessary. If
the VHCs are dismantled, that knowledge will be lost and may not be
easily recovered or recreated.
At the end of the day, this is very simple. We simply cannot mandate
that military personnel take these vaccines and then abandon them when
a problem arises. There should be no ambiguity about the authority for
the vaccine health care centers to continue their excellent work.
If military personnel are injured because of their service to this
Nation, whether it be needing a prosthetic limb or long-term treatment
for an adverse vaccine reaction, we have an absolute obligation to give
them the best possible care.
Anything less is unconscionable.
For that reason, I am thankful that my colleagues have agreed and
that this vital amendment has passed the Senate.
amendment no. 4466
Mrs. BOXER. Mr. President, I would like to take a few minutes to
discuss an amendment that I understand Mr. Warner and Mr. Levin have
included in the managers' package.
I would like to begin by thanking Senators Warner and Levin and their
staffs for working so hard with us to get this done. I would also like
to thank my colleague Senator Lieberman for working diligently with me
to draft this legislation.
He really is a true champion for our men and women in uniform.
This amendment addresses an issue that is vitally important to many
of my colleagues here in the Senate--improving mental health screening
and services for our brave men and women serving in our armed services.
As we all know, our soldiers, marines, airmen, and sailors have been
bogged down in an extremely dangerous and increasingly destructive war
in Iraq for more than 3 years, and the pressure is taking its toll.
Multiple deployments, the insurgency, and the unprecedented urban
combat that many of our service members face is resulting in high
levels of mental illness, including PTSD--a disorder that, if left
untreated, can cripple a person for life.
Tragically, many of our service members are not being adequately
screened and treated for these conditions.
Let me give you an example from last month's Hartford Courant, which
ran an extended series of articles detailing the failures of our
military health care system.
Nine months ago, 27-year-old SSG Bryce Syverson was on suicide watch
and taking antidepressants in the psychiatric unit at Walter Reed Army
Medical Center. Doctors had diagnosed him with PTSD and depression,
which they attributed to his 15-month tour in Iraq as a gunner on a
Bradley tank.
Today, Staff Sergeant Syverson is back in the combat zone as part of
a quick reaction force in Kuwait that could be summoned to Iraq at any
time.
He got his deployment orders after being told he wasn't fit for duty.
He got his gun back after being told he was too unstable to carry a
weapon.
In a recent e-mai1 to his parents and brothers, Sergeant Syverson
wrote: ``Nearly died on a PT test out here on a nice and really mild
night because of the medication that I am taking. Head about to explode
from the blood swelling inside, the [lightening] storm that happened in
my head, the blurred vision, confusion, dizziness and a whole lot more.
Not the best feeling in the entire world to have after being here for
two days. . . . And I ask myself what . . . am I doing here?''
I ask my colleagues, do this make any sense?
In the Hartford Courant's May 17 piece entitled ``Still Suffering,
But Redeployed,'' COL Elspeth Ritchie, a psychiatry consultant to the
Army surgeon general, acknowledged that the decision to deploy soldiers
with PTSD is a matter that the Army is currently wresting with.
I would like to quote Colonel Ritchie, because I think that something
she said is particularly telling: ``historically, we have not wanted to
send soldiers or anybody with post-traumatic stress disorder back into
what traumatized them. . . . The challenge for us . . . is that the
Army has a mission to fight.''
I appreciate that the military--particularly the Army--is facing
severe manpower needs, but the fact that we are knowingly sending U.S.
service members back into the very situation that caused their trauma
is utterly tragic.
Tragic and unacceptable.
The Boxer-Lieberman amendment would do some very important things to
address this situation.
First, it would improve mental health screening procedures for those
about to be deployed. Currently, the military's pre-deployment mental
health assessment is a single question on a form.
The Boxer-Lieberman amendment requires an enhanced mental health
screening process prior to deployment that would include: a mental
health history of the servicemember; current mental health treatment or
use of medications for a mental health disorder; an assessment of any
behavior identified by the unit commander that might provided by the
member, (through a checklist or other means,) of symptoms that might
indicate a mental health condition.
Second, the amendment mandates that soldiers determined to have
symptoms of a mental health condition--either before deployment or
after deployment--will be referred to a qualified health care
professional with experience in the evaluation and diagnosis of mental
health conditions.
This is an area where we are really falling short-the Hartford
Courant reports that military screeners have arranged mental health
evaluations for fewer than one in 300 deploying troops.
Third, the Boxer-Lieberman amendment mandates that any member of the
Armed Forces who requests access to mental health care services,
before, during, or after deployment to a combat zone, will be given
access within 72 hours after making the request or as soon as possible.
Fourth, the amendment directs the Department of Defense to develop
clear and consistent guidelines and regulations on what mental health
conditions and psychotropic drugs ought to prevent a servicemember from
being deployed to a combat zone.
It also requires the Department to develop guidelines for the
deployability and treatment of service members diagnosed with severe
mental illness or PTSD.
And lastly, it will require the Department to develop a plan to
monitor individuals deployed to a combat zone who are known to have a
mental health condition or disorder or are known to be taking
psychotropic medications.
I think that these are small steps that we can take to ensure that
our service members receive a higher standard of mental health services
and care.
I hope it will also prevent stories like the one I am about to tell
you, again in the Hartford Courant, from happening again.
Patricia Powers of Skiatook, OK wonders why her 20-year-old son
Joshua was sent to Iraq barely six months after he enlisted in the
Army.
According to Ms. Powers, she ''just couldn't believe'' that the Army
took her son in, as her son had Asperger's syndrome--a form of autism.
[[Page S6363]]
People with Asperger syndrome tend to be highly intelligent, but they
have trouble in social settings and are quite often loners who have
difficulty building relationships.
However, Asperger's was not the only neurological issue facing
Joshua.
In reading through the medical records of her son's frequent visits
to the base doctor, Ms. Powers found that in every instance, the doctor
had taken note of Joshua's severe depression.
Three weeks after arriving in Iraq, Pvt. Powers left his barracks
around midnight and walked to the latrine, where he ended his life with
a gunshot to the head.
In a recent GAG report, the GAG noted that the military has been
reluctantto create uniform guidelines for deployment.
In its recommendation, the GAG argued that guidelines are necessary
``so that in future deployments [the Defense Department] would not
experience situations such as those that occurred with members being
deployed into Iraq who clearly had pre-existing conditions that should
have prevented their deployment.''
Situations like Joshua Power's Situations like Bryce Syverson's,
where he was forced to ask his family: ``What am I doing here?''
Mr. President, the heroic men and women serving in Iraq and
Afghanistan are doing a fantastic job.
In Iraq, they have succeeded in every mission that has been asked of
them, even the ones that have changed over time. In Afghanistan, they
are relentlessly hunting for the man responsible for the deaths of over
3,000 Americans. But as the death toll continues to rise, so does
strain.
Ided today just two examples of soldiers who clearly indicated that
deploying them to a combat zone would be a mistake. But we know that
there are many more.
What we are asking for in this amendment is simple: that the Pentagon
does a better job of dealing with mental health matters for the men and
women that it sends into harm's way. I don't think this is too much to
ask.
Again, I like to thank Senator Warner, Senator Levin, and Senator
Lieberman for their support.
Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I rise today to speak about an
amendment offered during the debate on the 2007 Defense authorization
bill by Senators Boxer, Kennedy, Clinton, and myself.
In May of this year, the Hartford Courant published a series of
articles describing inadequacies in the military's mental health
screening procedures for servicemembers deploying to Iraq and
Afghanistan. The Courant's investigation revealed that servicemembers
displaying clear signs of distress and mental health problems are being
deployed into combat situations and in some cases have taken their
life. These cases compromise not only the lives of our servicemembers
but the strength and cohesion of our military units.
The Hartford Courant wrote about Jeffrey Henthorn, a young
servicemember who took his life. Jeffrey was from Oklahoma and shipped
out of Fort Riley, KS, the day after Christmas in 2004. While home,
Jeffrey was depressed, was having nightmares, and was plagued by
memories of a young boy who had died in Iraq. Less than 2 months after
his redeployment to Iraq, Jeffrey took his own life at the age of 25
years. Since then, it has become known that Jeffrey had made suicidal
statements that were known to his Army superiors. Despite the clear
psychological problems Jeffrey was having before his deployment, he was
still sent back to a combat zone where he took his own life. To prevent
acts such as this that ruin individual lives and have deleterious
effects on a unit, Congress passed the National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 1998. At that time, the statute required the
military to conduct an ``assessment of mental health'' for all
deploying troops to prevent young men like Jeffrey Henthorn from being
placed in further harm. However, the military's current screening
process for deployment consists of a single mental health question on a
predeployment questionnaire. The law is not being followed as it was
intended.
Alarmingly, the Hartford Courant's investigation found that only 6.5
percent of those indicating mental health problems were referred for
mental health evaluations from March 2003 to October 2005. This is
unacceptable.
Senator Boxer and I are also concerned about the increase in the
numbers of servicemembers being prescribed medication for depression,
anxiety, and post-traumatic stress disorderly, PTSD. These individuals
are being sent into combat with psychotropic medications but are not
systematically receiving any followup or monitoring. We cannot send our
servicemembers into combat zones without the medical and mental health
support they deserve and need. There is nothing controversial about
that.
Another case reported by the Hartford Courant illustrates the dangers
of providing medications without followup or monitoring in the field.
Michael Deem, father of two, saw a psychiatrist before deploying to
help him cope with serious symptoms of depression. He was given a
year's supply of Prozac, among other medications. Less than a month
after deploying to Iraq, Michael Deem was found dead in his bunk. The
Army determined that he died of an enlarged heart ``complicated by
elevated levels'' of Prozac. We cannot have servicemembers on
medications for serious conditions out in the field with inadequate
monitoring, and nonexistent followup. We must do better for those
willing to make the ultimate sacrifice for us.
We have also learned that troops with preexisting mental health
conditions and serious mental health disorders are being sent into
combat zones. This amendment would make sure young men and women who
are unable to serve are not sent into combat zones that make their
conditions worse or place them and their units in danger.
The Courant series also told the story of a young man from
Pennsylvania. Eddie Brabazon had a history of bipolar disorder and
spent time in group homes and psychiatric hospitals during his
adolescent years. In March of 2004, less than 3 months into his second
deployment to the Middle East, Eddie shot himself and took his own life
at the age of 20. There were signs before this act that something was
terribly wrong. In the days leading up to his suicide, Eddie had locked
himself in a portable toilet with his rifle for 45 minutes, causing his
sergeant concern. But no one sent Eddie to receive intensive treatment
to prevent his suicide or send him away from the combat zone where his
condition was worsening. Young men with Eddie's history of mental
health problems and exhibiting such clearly communicated signs of
distress should not continue to serve in a combat zone.
To protect servicemembers similar to the ones the Courant has written
about and their units, Senators Boxer, Kennedy, Clinton, and I are
introducing this amendment. The military mental health amendment has
two purposes. First, it is meant to keep these courageous young men and
women out of the way of any further harm. Second, we must make sure
that our units have the strongest and healthiest soldiers, and this
amendment moves us in the right direction. By deploying servicemembers
with serious mental health problems, we are compromising the strength
of our military units.
Our amendment will ensure that the military would conduct a thorough
screening for determining whether a servicemember has a significant
mental health problem before deploying; servicemembers with a
significant mental health problem are seen by someone with experience
in mental health assessment; access to mental health professionals in a
more timely manner; the military identifies preexisting mental health
conditions to determine appropriateness for deployment; and the
military develops a plan for how to continue to provide mental health
services during deployment for any servicemembers receiving mental
health services before their deployment.
Senator Boxer and I, along with Senators Clinton and Kennedy,
introduced this amendment to ensure that servicemembers like Jeffrey
Henthorn, Michael Deem, and Eddie Brabazon receive the care they
deserve before it is too late. I thank both Senators Levin and Warner
for adopting this amendment into the Defense authorization bill for
2007, and I encourage the conferees in both Houses to maintain the
[[Page S6364]]
provisions of this amendment to ensure we keep our troops strong and
healthy.
amendment no.4507
Mrs. BOXER. Mr. President, I would like to take a few minutes of the
Senate's time to discuss an amendment that I understand Senator Warner
and Senator Levin have included in the managers' package.
This amendment--that I worked on with my colleague Senator Snowe--
would move toward expanding eligibility for the Purple Heart to all
prisoners of war who die in captivity regardless of the cause of death.
The need for this important amendment was brought to my attention by
a group of Korean War veterans--the Tiger Survivors--who identified
what many of my colleagues agree is a glaring loophole in current law.
You may be surprised to learn that currently, only prisoners of war
who die during their imprisonment of wounds inflicted by the enemy--
such as a gunshot wound or intentional poisoning--clearly meet the
criteria for posthumous Purple Heart recognition.
Those who die of starvation, disease, or other causes during
captivity do not. I would like to give you an example of what I mean by
recounting the story of the crew members who survived the sinking of
the USS Houston, a Navy cruiser that was sunk by the Japanese off the
coast of Java in February 1942.
After swimming to shore, the Japanese transported American POWs to
Burma to work as slave labor building the Burma-Thai Railway, which
would stretch 250 miles between mountains, across rivers, and through
jungles.
These American POWs cut down trees, built road beds and bridges, and
laid ties and rails for what is known as the Death Railway.
Conditions for these Americans were appalling. Each man received half
a cup of bug-infested rice a day, and some POWs dropped below 80
pounds. Malnutrition brought on diseases like beri beri, pellagra, and
scurvy--severe vitamin deficiencies that result in horrible suffering
and even death.
The tropical environment also bred cases of dysentery, malaria,
cholera, and tropical ulcers that ate through flesh to expose bone.
Although Japanese doctors were present in the camps, they were not
allowed any drugs or tools for practicing medicine. Those workers who
were too slow were beaten; those who were too sick to work received no
food, and were eventually sent off to die.
Under current law, many of these individuals would not be eligible
for the Purple Heart.
Doesn't it make sense that our young service members who died in this
manner would be recognized as having died at the hands of the enemy?
Doesn't it make sense that the Houston crew members who were denied
treatment and died of starvation and disease in captivity would be
eligible for the Purple Heart?
Language that would correct this injustice was accepted as part of
the House version of the Defense authorization bill, where it had the
overwhelming bipartisan support of 216 cosponsors.
Equally important, correcting this important loophole in the law has
been endorsed by the American Legion, Veterans of Foreign Wars,
Military Order of the Purple Heart, the National Association for
Uniformed Services, the Military Officers of America Association, the
Korean War Veterans Association, National League of POW-MIA Families,
Tiger Survivors, and a number of other prominent veterans
organizations.
I can think of no stronger endorsement than from these fine groups
who know first-hand the suffering of war.
I would like to tell you one more story by a World War II soldier by
the name of John Coleman. This is his story as recounted in his book,
Bataan and Beyond:
The treatment of the death march and imprisonment . . . is
beyond the imagination's ability to comprehend. If there ever
was a hell on earth, this was administered to the 7,000 souls
of some of the bravest and most devoted of our military
personnel. Day after day they were in agony, seemingly
blotted out in memory by their nation. They suffered under
the burning tropical sun, on starvation rations, with little
water to drink. They could not even wash the filth from their
bodies or clothes, matted hair, and beards. They were
mentally depressed, had swollen limbs from beri beri,
unhealed festered wounds that were never treated. They also
had distended stomachs, bloody dysentery, and raw, sore
mouths from pellagra. Even a drink of water would cause their
mouths to burn. Everyone had stomach worms that would
sometimes find their way out of the body through the nose. No
attempt was made by the Imperial Japanese Army to furnish any
kind of medication to alleviate the suffering.
Unimaginable. Simply unimaginable.
Mr. President, these brave members of the Armed Forces suffered these
cruelties so that we might enjoy the freedoms we have today. I can
think of no more fitting tribute for their sacrifice than to
posthumously make them eligible for the Purple Heart.
While the amendment that I originally offered would have provided
congressional authorization expanding eligibility for the Purple Heart,
I worked with Senators Warner and Levin on compromise language that
would require the President to determine whether eligibility for the
Purple Heart should be expanded to all POW's who died in captivity.
I sincerely hope the President will take a serious look at this
proposal, and ensure that our POWs are afforded the recognition they
deserve.
Amendment No. 4371
Mr. OBAMA. Mr. President, I rise to speak in favor of amendment No.
4371, which is being offered today by my friend, Senator Coburn.
Senator Coburn and I have been working tirelessly to improve
accountability and transparency in Federal contracting so that the
American people can rely on their Government for the excellence and
efficiency that they deserve.
Award and incentive fees are often used in defense contracts to
encourage outstanding performance. But too often these awards are given
without regard to performance. That doesn't make sense. This amendment
prohibits unsatisfactory performance from being rewarded by the Federal
Government. It sets a higher standard for defense contractors and
requires them at least to satisfy the basic requirements of a contract
in order to be eligible for any award or incentive fee.
It is a simple concept. No bonus awards when the work is
unsatisfactory. Period. You don't tip a waiter who doesn't bring you
your food. You don't give a bonus to an employee who doesn't do his or
her job at work. The Government should not permit awards for work that
is less than satisfactory. Awards should be used as an incentive for
excellence, not as a backdoor for undeserved payments.
The authorization bill makes some progress by requiring the Secretary
of Defense to provide needed guidance on the use of awards and
incentive fees. It requires guidance that award fees be tied to
performance outcomes. It requires guidance on designating contractor
performance as ``excellent,'' or ``superior.'' It requires standards
for when performance awards are appropriate.
This amendment just makes it clear that unsatisfactory work should
never be eligible for an award. Contractors can and must be held to a
higher standard. Our troops deserve no less. American taxpayers deserve
no less. Americans should reward excellence, not mediocrity; success,
not failure; contract fulfillment, and nothing less.
I urge my colleagues to support this amendment.
amendment no. 4496
Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, the National Biocontainment Lab, NBL,
at the University of Texas Medical Branch, UTMB, in Galveston is an
important tool in our continued fight against bioterrorism and emerging
infectious diseases. As a Regional Center of Excellence for Biodefense
and Emerging Infectious Diseases Research, RCE, for Federal Region VI,
UTMB's lab is able to research and develop new therapies, vaccines, and
tests for microbes that might be used as weapons by terrorists, as well
as naturally occurring diseases such as SARS and West Nile virus.
I was happy to support UTMB in 2003 in their efforts to establish the
NBL in Galveston. In letters and conversations with Dr. Anthony Fauci,
director of the National Institutes of Allergy and Infectious Diseases,
and Dr. Elias Zerhouni, director of National Institutes of Health, I
conveyed the importance of this facility and the benefits to housing
the NBL at UTMB.
Once again, I am pleased to support the NBL and UTMB with this
amendment. By understanding the staffing
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and training requirements needed at this new facility, our doctors and
scientists will be better prepared and more able to recognize a
bioterrorist attack.
Amendment No. 4222
Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President, today marks the anniversary of the
passage of a sense-of-the-Senate resolution on climate change. One year
ago the Senate convened to debate the appropriate policy direction for
the United States on this issue.
The Senate debate on climate change included discussions on various
proposals from Senators Hagel and Pryor, as well as Senators McCain and
Lieberman and others. Although I had worked very closely with Senator
Domenici on a specific policy proposal of our own, we were not able in
the time allotted to find agreement on various aspects of that
proposal. We ultimately decided that we should put the question to the
Senate of whether or not our efforts should continue over the remainder
of the 109th Congress.
I am pleased to say that passage of the sense-of-the-Senate
resolution gave us the foundation to continue our collaboration. Over
the course of the last year, I have worked with Chairman Domenici and
others to explore the basic workings of a mandatory market-based system
to limit greenhouse gases. We have held hearings in the Energy
Committee, participated in workshops and conferences, and engaged
interested stakeholders through a White Paper process that culminated
in an important day-long conference in April.
Other Members of this body have been actively engaged in the
continuing conversation, such as Senators Carper, Feinstein, Lugar, and
Biden just to name a few, but it is important for us to recognize how
much faster this issue is progressing outside of Washington, DC.
The European Union Emissions Trading Scheme is in its second year of
existence. There has been some debate about how the program is
progressing, but there is no debate about the fact that they are moving
forward and addressing global warming in a ground-breaking manner. Here
in the United States, my colleagues from California and the
Northeastern States are intimately aware of State initiatives to
address global warming. My own State of New Mexico has been a leader in
reducing emissions as well.
Most importantly, I think we need to recognize how much we have
learned in the past year about the science of climate change. Last
year, the National Academies of Science from 11 countries, including
the United States, declared that ``scientific understanding of climate
change is now sufficiently clear to justify nations taking prompt
action.'' According to NASA scientists, 2005 was the warmest year since
the late 1800s. 1998, 2002, 2003, and 2004 followed as the next four
warmest years.
With regard to the impacts of global warming, a recent study shows
that we are on track to initiate the melting of the Greenland ice
sheet, which will contribute to continued sea-level rise and will also
have major impacts on oceanic circulation from freshwater influx. Even
small amounts of sea-level rise will have substantial impacts on
coastal erosion, increased susceptibility to storm surges and
groundwater contamination by salt intrusion. The effect on many of the
world's coastal areas and population centers could be devastating.
We are also in the early stages of hurricane season. I have not yet
seen any studies that would indicate global warming will create more
hurricanes, but I have seen two recent studies that conclude that the
warming we are seeing in the world's oceans is caused by human-induced
climate change. In addition, there are more studies that have recently
concluded that the intensity of individual hurricanes has increased,
which in part is attributed to the warming of the oceans.
In conclusion, I believe that this is evidence that we need to act
now. Since the sense-of-the-Senate resolution passed last year, the
U.S. has emitted roughly 6 billion metric tons of carbon dioxide. EIA
forecasts continued steady emissions growth at a rate that, if not
slowed and ultimately stopped and reversed, will make it increasingly
difficult to avoid dangerous climate impacts.
I want to thank Senators Domenici and Specter, along with all of the
cosponsors of the sense-of-the-Senate Resolution and everyone who
supported it. We have learned a great deal over the course of the last
year, and I would like to continue the progress. I would like to urge
all of my colleagues who are interested in this issue to work with us
to find a solution we can implement sooner, rather than later.
I would like the references to some of the studies I have mentioned
printed in the Record so that others can review them as well.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
Alley, R.B., P.U. Clark, P. Huybrechts, and I. Joughin.
2005. Ice sheet and sea-level changes. Science 310: 456-460.
Barnett, T.P., D.W. Pierce, K.M. AchutaRao, P.J. Gleckler,
B.D. Santer, J.M. Gregory, and W.M. Washington. 2005.
Penetration of human-induced warming into the world's oceans.
Science 309:284-287.
Emanuel, K. 2005. Increasing destructiveness of tropical
cyclones over the past 30 years. Nature 436:686-688.
Gregory, JM, P Huybrechts & SCB Raper. 2004. Threatened
loss of the Greenland ice-sheet. Nature 428: 616.
Heij, 2005. and Gregory, J.M., and P. Huybrechts, 2006.
Ice-sheet contributions to future sea-level change. Phil.
Trans. Roy. Soc. Lond. Ser. A, in press.
Hansen, J., L. Nazarenko, R. Ruedy, M. Sato, J. Willis, A.
Del Genio, D. Koch, A. Lacis, K. Lo, S. Menon, T. Novakov, J.
Perlwitz, G. Russell, G.A. Schmidt, and N. Tausnev. 2005.
Earth's energy imbalance: Confirmation and implications.
Science 308:1431-143.
Knutson T.R. and R.E. Tuleya. 2004. Impact of CO2-induced
warming on simulated hurricane intensity and precipitation:
Sensitivity to the choice of climate model and convective
parameterization. Journal of Climate 17: 3477-3495.
Levitus, S., J. Antonov, and T. Boyer. 2005. Warming of the
world ocean, 1955-2003. Geophysical Research Letters. 32.
Sriver, R. and M. Huber. 2006. Low frequency variability in
globally integrated tropical cyclone power dissipation.
Geophysical Research Letters 33: doi:10.1029/2006GL026167.
Trenberth, K. 2005. Uncertainty in Hurricanes and Global
Warming. Science 308: 1753-1754.
U.S. National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA).
2005. Global Temperature Trends: 2005 Summation. NASA Goddard
Institute for Space Studies (GISS). New York, NY. Available
at http://data.giss.nasa.gov/gistemp/2005/.
Webster, P.J., Holland, G.J., Curry, J.A. and H.-R. Chang.
2005. Changes in tropical cyclone number, duration, and
intensity in a warming environment. Science 309: 1844-1846.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan.
Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, the amendments have been cleared on this
side. It is a packet of 60 amendments, as I understand. I thank our
staffs for working so hard on these amendments. There is a lot of
interest in them by a lot of Members. We owe thanks to the staff for
their great work. I have not only no objection but enthusiastically
join in moving their adoption. I gather they have been agreed to by
unanimous consent.
Mr. WARNER. I thank my distinguished colleague for his remarks.
If I might draw to the attention of my distinguished colleague, we
have been consulting with our respective leadership and their staffs.
We have a joint goal of trying to complete this bill today and have
third reading and final passage. The bill is now open for amendment. We
have some knowledge of some amendments that may be offered. We would
urge those who wish to offer amendments, recognizing cloture has been
agreed to by the Chamber, nevertheless within the confines of that
cloture, we are ready to have the opportunity to consider further
amendments.
I believe I am about to put in the first quorum call for the purpose
solely that we have no amendments at the moment pending. That is the
first time in the consideration of this bill, I believe.
Mr. LEVIN. I commend the chairman for the way in which he has been
able to manage this bill, as always. It is a testament to his ability
and the respect that everybody has for him in the Chamber. I have never
seen fewer quorum calls on a bill of this size than we have had this
week. I am sure there have been a few. I have not counted them. There
may have been a quorum call yesterday during the 8 or 9 hours of
debate. If there was, I missed it.
I commend the chairman for putting us in a position where we can
hopefully get this bill agreed to as soon as possible today. Again, I
join him in not urging people to bring amendments to
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the floor--we never do that--but in notifying people that if they have
amendments, they should bring them to the floor.
Mr. WARNER. I thank my colleague who has worked side by side with me
these 28 years on these matters. When I look back on my modest career
in the Senate, I can't think of any other Senator with whom I have had
a better relationship and a more trusting one, although we do disagree
on occasion.
Mr. LEVIN. There is recent evidence of that. But we agree on process.
We agree on civility. We agree on most matters. We are able to work
things out. It is his nature to do that, and we are all very much in
his debt. Our wives are on the same path that we have been on.
Mr. WARNER. That is right. Who quoted Edward R. Murrow, something
about the strength of our Nation depends on the diversity of thinking
and expression?
Mr. LEVIN. Well, it was quoted this morning. It didn't carry the day,
but it was very appropriate.
Mr. WARNER. I thank my colleague. I do believe those two amendments
on which we spent so much time were carefully and fully debated. I
accept with a sense of humility the outcome, that we were able to
prevail on this side of the aisle. However I underline that I do that
with a sense of deep humility.
I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order
for the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Alexander). Without objection, it is so
ordered.
Amendment No. 4471, as Modified
Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to call up my
amendment No. 4471 and ask that it be modified with the changes that
are at the desk.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the pending amendment is
laid aside.
Mr. SESSIONS. I further ask unanimous consent that Senators Allard,
Kyl, Thune, and Vitter be added as cosponsors.
Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, reserving the right to object, there is a
little uncertainty as to the modifications.
Mr. SESSIONS. I don't think the Senator will find that objectionable.
It dealt with funding allocations, the offsets.
Mr. LEVIN. Is the one at the desk the modified version?
Mr. SESSIONS. Yes.
Mr. LEVIN. If the Senator will please withhold for a moment.
Mr. SESSIONS. I will be pleased to.
Mr. LEVIN. I have no objection.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The clerk will report the amendment.
The Senator from Alabama [Mr. Sessions], for himself, Mr.
Allard, Mr. Kyl, Mr. Thune, and Mr. Vitter, proposes an
amendment numbered 4471, as modified.
Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the reading
of the amendment be dispensed with.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The amendment is as follows:
At the end of subtitle C of title II, add the following:
SEC. 236. TESTING AND OPERATIONS FOR MISSILE DEFENSE.
(a) Additional Amount for Missile Defense Agency.--Of the
amount authorized to be appropriated by section 201(4) for
research, development, test, and evaluation for Defense-wide
activities, the amount that is available for the Missile
Defense Agency is hereby increased by $45,000,000.
(b) Availability of Amount.--Of the amount authorized to be
appropriated by section 201(4) for research, development,
test, and evaluation for Defense-wide activities and
available for the Missile Defense Agency, as increased by
subsection (a), $45,000,000 may be available for Ballistic
Missile Defense Midcourse Defense Segment (PE #63882C)--
(1) to accelerate the ability to conduct concurrent test
and missile defense operations; and
(2) to increase the pace of realistic flight testing of the
ground-based midcourse defense system.
(c) Supplement.--Amounts available under subsection (b) for
the program element referred to in that subsection are in
addition to any other amounts available in this Act for that
program element.
(d) Offset.--The amount authorized to be appropriated by
section 421 for military personnel is hereby reduced by
$45,000,000 due to unexpended obligations.
Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. President, recent concerns over a long-range
ballistic missile launch or possible launch toward the United States by
North Korea is an event that many experts have predicted and an event
of serious import for the world.
President Bush, in December of 2002, directed the Department of
Defense to begin fielding a missile defense system to protect the
United States. There were many concerns expressed at that time, but
Congress followed his orders and has moved forward. Today, we have nine
GBIs--ground-based interceptors--in Alaska in silos in the ground, and
two in California that are able to be launched to attack and destroy
incoming missiles. The system and those missiles that we have are not
complete nor fully perfected, but the Commander of Strategic Command,
General Cartwright, says it does have capability to defend our Nation.
So I would first like to give my thanks to President Bush and to the
Department of Defense for moving on this issue some time ago.
I would also like to express my appreciation for a bipartisan effort
that was begun not long after I came to the Senate by Senator Thad
Cochran and Senator Joe Lieberman and the legislation they passed that
called on this Government to deploy a ground-based missile defense
system as soon as feasible. That was a major step forward. Following
that, President Bush's actions in 2002 have moved us farther forward.
These missiles that we have in the ground are able to be launched,
they are able to attack and destroy incoming systems. So it is a
remarkable thing that has been accomplished. Many doubted it. We have a
lot more testing to do to deal with decoys and other matters to make
sure the entire system works in an harmonious and effective way, from
the ground-based radar, sea-based radar, to launch sites and our
intercept capabilities and all of the computer systems that are
necessary to make these missiles move at incredible speeds to collide
in the air with such great force that they basically vaporize without
any explosives being involved. So I think, Mr. President, it is an
important event in our lifetime as a nation to note that this defense
shield is now being employed.
I also was pleased that our Democratic leader a few days ago noted
that: ``We live in a dangerous time and the threats to our Nation are
many.'' He said, ``They range from terrorist attacks like those on 9/11
to rogue nations with nuclear ambitions like North Korea and Iran.'' He
went on to note the: ``Headlines about North Korea's new missile
test.'' He discussed that and noted: ``It is important that we as a
country address each of these threats.''
Mr. President, I suggest, based upon the events of the past few
weeks, that the debate over the need for missile defense is no longer
an academic one, but it is a debate that must now take place in the
reality of current events.
As we convene today, North Korea may perhaps still be preparing to
test launch its Taepo-Dong II long-range ballistic missile. According
to U.S. intelligence agencies, this missile has the potential to reach
the shores of the United States, given its purported maximum range of
9,000 miles, far enough to hit the west coast of the U.S. mainland and
all of the Pacific bases, according to an article in the Washington
Post earlier this week.
The leaders of South Korea, Australia, New Zealand, China, Japan, and
the United States are warning, as Secretary of State Rice did Monday,
that, as she said, ``The launch of a ballistic missile would be a
provocative act that would deepen North Korea's isolation.'' She urged
the North Koreans not to end their moratorium on long-range missile
testing. Japan's warning was even stronger. Japanese Prime Minister
Koizumi said that Japan ``would have to respond harshly'' if there were
a missile attack.
North Korea also fields some 200 medium-range No-Dong ballistic
missiles that can reach Japan, and it deploys some 600 short-range
ballistic missiles tha could reach throughout the Korean Peninsula,
where we have some 30,000-plus troops.
Likewise, on the other side of the world, Iran continues to enhance
and
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test its SHAHAB-3 medium-range ballistic missile to extend its range
and effectiveness. U.S. intelligence agencies estimate that Iran could
have an ICBM capable of reaching the United States before 2015 with
continued foreign assistance.
According to press reports, Israeli intelligence noted in April of
2006 that Iran received a shipment of North Korean-made BM-25 ballistic
missiles which have a range of 2,500 kilometers.
This activity was noted by the Prime Minister of Israel, who stated
in a press conference with President Bush on May 23 that:
There is a major threat posed by the Iranians in their
attempts to have nonconventional capabilities and the
ballistic missiles that can hit major centers all across
Europe, not just the Middle East.
These are real, not hypothetical, threats to the United States and
its allies posed by these ballistic missiles.
These missiles are threats that require a multifaceted response, not
the least of which is by means of an effective ballistic missile
defense system.
I would imagine that over the past 5 weeks, the Department of Defense
has been carefully watching the arrival and fueling of Taepo-Dong
missiles at its launch pad on the eastern coast of North Korea. And I
would suspect that our missile defense capabilities have been carefully
integrated into our diplomatic and deterrent options for dealing with
the situation--a situation that Secretary Rice said is an ``abrogation
of obligations'' of North Korea, a path not of compromise or peace
``but rather instead to once again saber-rattle.''
So our Secretary of State has called the situation correctly. The
Nation and Congress should heed her words.
While I have no direct knowledge of any administration plans beyond
what is being said in the press, I would hope that our U.S. Navy ships,
which are capable of tracking and potentially intercepting ballistic
missiles, have been deployed in the area. I saw this part of our fleet
last year when I was in Pearl Harbor right after they conducted a
series of successful intercept tests in the Pacific.
I would also hope that the ground-based midcourse defense system,
with missiles deployed in both Alaska and California to provide
protections against long-range missile attack, has been activated in
case it is needed. To be sure, these systems are still undergoing
testing. They have been designed to be available in an emergency, and I
would think an imminent Taepo-Dong launch falls into that category.
At the very least, such a capability would add to the options
available to our President. In a radio interview last week, Ambassador
Vershbow, the top U.S. envoy in South Korea, commented on a potential
North Korean launch saying, ``Since it would be clearly a provocative
step vis-a-vis the region and international community, we should not
simply let it pass without some response.''
I don't know what response the Ambassador had in mind, but certainly
the ability to intercept that missile before it struck a populated area
would be high on my list.
My main point to my colleagues on both sides of the aisle and in both
Houses of Congress, Mr. President, is that missile defenses must now be
considered an integral and important tool of U.S. diplomacy and
national security policy.
This is all the more reason to support the administration's efforts
to develop test and field effective missile defenses against missiles
of all ranges. So I am pleased to report that the Defense authorization
bill reported out of the Armed Services Committee fully funds the
President's request for missile defense to include $56 million for site
survey and design work associated with the European defense missile
defense site.
The European missile defense site, scheduled to begin construction in
2008 with full fielding expected in 2011, will allow 10 ground-based
interceptors capable of protecting both the United States and much of
Europe against a long-range missile fired by Iran.
If you look at the globe carefully, you could indicate a long-range
missile launched towards the United States from Iran would fly over
northeastern Europe. That would be an excellent site to protect both
the United States as well as protecting Europe.
Congressional support for this activity is timely for our defense and
to support Western diplomatic efforts aimed at halting Iran's
acquisition of a nuclear weapon capability.
Should diplomacy fail, a European missile defense site will be
critical to defer Iranian ballistic missile threats aimed at attacking
or intimidating the West.
Our NATO allies recognize the threat posed by the proliferation of
ballistic missiles. In 2010, the alliance expects to have the
capability to protect deployed troops against short- and medium-range
missiles. The alliance is now reviewing the results of a 4-year
feasibility study that examines options for protecting alliance
territory--that is the North Atlantic Treaty Organization alliance--and
population against a full range of missile threats.
Congressional commitment to a U.S. missile defense site in Europe at
this time would be a significant factor in shaping NATO's decision to
provide missile defense protection in Europe. Our commanders tell us
that. They tell us it is very important.
I realize some of our colleagues are concerned that funding a
European site would be premature at this time. They suggest a slow
fielding program until more extensive tests and evaluations have been
completed. While I appreciate that concern, I do believe that current
Missile Defense Agency approach of simultaneously fielding and testing
a GMD system has proven to be wise, as we see the threats to our Nation
increase in just recent days.
The Commander of the U.S. Strategic Command has testified that the
current missile system provides a thin line of defense that could be
used. The independent Pentagon Director of Operational Tests and
Evaluation stated on April 4 of this year:
With the current program and the tests that have been
scheduled, it's very likely that the GMD system will
demonstrate that it is effective.
The things that are needed to turn this thin line of defense into a
robust defense system are more interceptors coupled with more flight
testing, both of which are programmed by the missile defense agency and
funded by our bill.
While we have crafted a good funding stream in our committee--and I
thank my colleague, Senator Bill Nelson of Florida, and others, for the
bipartisan way he worked on this--we have worked hard at containing
costs and keeping the costs under control.
The possible launch of a long-range North Korean missile that could
even reach the United States of America calls for us to evaluate this
year's authorization to ensure that all necessary funding exists to
move forward with deployment as well as testing, and to be sure that
throughout that time we are ready. General Trey Obering, who directs
the program, understands these challenges.
My review of this authorization has convinced me that an additional
appropriation of $45 million is critically important in allowing us to,
in the words of our amendment:
accelerate the ability to conduct concurrent tests and
missile defense operations [and] to increase the pace of
realistic flight tests.
The funds that I am talking about and the projects that I am talking
about are already in the 2008 budget. This would allow them to move
forward to the 2007 budget.
The amendment for which I am seeking support today will help ensure
that we can continue testing and always remain ready; not have to have
the readiness of our system degraded by testing that we need to be
doing. This is necessary so that we can respond to any possible missile
launch that may threaten our Nation.
The key matter is that we test and we test regularly. But we cannot
shut down the readiness of our system that could have the capability to
knock down incoming missiles that could be aimed at us.
Congressional support for this amendment, I think, will send a strong
message to any nation, North Korea or Iran, that we will be constantly,
24/7, ready to respond and knock down and destroy any missile that
would be directed at our Nation. It will also reassure our allies that
we will be ready to protect them and help us create the kind of
umbrella of defense that we have dreamed of for many years and
accelerate our ability to make that a reality.
I thank my colleagues. I thank those who indicated they would accept
this
[[Page S6368]]
amendment. I think it is a good step forward.
It is great to see my colleague, Senator Allard, here. He used to
chair the subcommittee that I have now, the Strategic Subcommittee. He
has been a long-time champion of national missile defense.
I say to Senator Levin, he is due to be recognized next, but I know
Senator Allard is here also.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan.
Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, we do accept the amendment on this side.
There are no differences in terms of the North Korean threat. The
question is whether or not we will be deploying a system which will be
adequate to meet that threat. Right now we do not know. There has been
no operational testing, realistic testing of our system. It needs
testing.
Although we have differences and have expressed those and argued over
those differences as to whether we ought to be producing 10 more
missiles which have not been tested operationally or realistically--
whether we ought to be buying these final 10 missiles given the fact we
want to make sure if we are going to have a system that it works, and
we don't know that yet--as far as this Senator is concerned, I very
much disagreed with this approach of buying before we fly. Usually we
fly and test before we buy, but this system, we have decided, at least
the majority of Senators have decided, that we are going to buy before
we test. I think that is a mistake, but that is not the issue on this
amendment.
This amendment would authorize $45 million, mainly for testing,
mainly to improve the likelihood that a missile which has been deployed
will in fact do the job. Since I have been one who has been arguing
regularly for more testing, more realistic testing, more operational
testing, it seems to me that I can very readily support funding which
is going to go to more testing, which is really what this amendment is
all about.
We have not had a single successful intercept test with an
operational system. There have been two failures with this operational
system. We don't know if our system would work. We obviously want it to
work if we are going to have it.
Since this amendment basically is going to increase not only the pace
of realistic flight testing of this ground-based, mid-course defense
system but also is going to accelerate the ability to conduct
concurrent testing while the missile defense operations are going on,
since in both instances the focus is on testing and making sure that
this system will work if ever called upon, I accept the amendment. I
have no objection to it and, indeed, support its purpose.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Colorado.
Mr. ALLARD. Mr. President, I rise to speak in support of the
amendment offered by my good friend, Senator Jeff Sessions of Alabama,
who has worked hard on this issue. I know he is a strong, dedicated
Senator as far as making sure that we have a good, strong national
defense, which is important in today's times.
There is no doubt that this has been an unusual approach where we
develop and purchase at the same time. But these are unusual times. We
have had an emerging threat that, according to many of our defense
experts, is real. We had to move forward at an unprecedented rapid
pace.
Over the last 2 weeks, the North Koreans have moved toward the brink
and have been preparing to test fire a long-range ballistic missile
capable of reaching the United States. We were in the same position in
1998. Then all we could do is threaten to retaliate if North Korea
launched a ballistic missile attack against us. We did not have a
system that was capable of defending our country from attack.
Today the situation is different. Acting upon the direction of
Congress, which mandated in 1999 that our country deploy a missile
defense system as quickly as technologically possible, the Department
of Defense has developed and deployed a missile defense system that is
capable of defending our Nation against limited ballistic missiles.
Given the real-world ballistic threats, such as North Korea, the
Department of Defense has pursued a strategy of concurrent tests and
operations. The Department recognizes that our current missile defense
system does not have sufficient capability and needs more testing. That
is why the Department continues to test the system and add new
capabilities.
At the same time, it is clear that situations such as the ongoing
North Korean threat require that our missile defenses be ready in case
of a ballistic missile attack. Leaving our Nation defenseless to
ballistic missile attack while such situations persist is folly in the
extreme. We currently have 11 ground-based interceptors deployed and
operational. We have also upgraded our early warning radars, improved
our Aegis tracking radars, built new forward-based and sea-based
radars, and created an integrated command-and-control battle management
system.
These are significant achievements that together provide our country
with a limited ballistic missile defense. Yet, as we all know, our
missile defense still needs more work. It has a limited capability,
which is certainly better than having none at all, but we need to do
more--particularly with regard to testing.
The amendment offered by Senator Sessions puts us on the right track.
The Missile Defense Agency needs to test its ballistic missile defense
system more often and under more complicated conditions. This
amendment, offered by Senator Sessions, will help in that effort.
The amendment will also help pay for the unexpected costs of
operating the missile defense system 24 hours a day over the last
couple of weeks. Soldiers who man the system in Colorado and Alaska
have performed exceptionally well, and there is cost for keeping the
system on full-time alert status. This amendment helps address this
cost.
This body mandated that the Department of Defense deploy a missile
defense system as quickly as technologically possible. I supported this
mandate and believe that our current missile defense system can provide
a limited defense against a ballistic missile attack. It still needs
work, which is why this amendment is so important and necessary.
I do support the Sessions amendment and urge my colleagues to do so
as well. I am pleased to hear that the ranking member on the Armed
Services Committee has agreed to support this amendment.
I thank, again, Senator Sessions, for his leadership on this very
important issue. I think this is a valuable system, and we need to be
very sure that we do not get behind in this kind of technology.
Mr. President, I yield the floor and thank the Members for their
support.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I rise to speak on behalf of the amendment
sponsored by the Senator from Alabama, concerning the need to add an
additional $45 million to the Missile Defense Agency for testing and
operations of the ground-based midcourse defense, GMD, system.
In December of 2002, the President directed the Department of Defense
to begin fielding an initial set of missile defense capabilities that
included ground-based interceptors for the defense of the United States
against the long-range ballistic missile threat. Given our total
vulnerability to that threat, the Missile Defense Agency chose to begin
the simultaneous fielding of missile defense interceptors even while
developmental testing continued to validate the effectiveness of the
system. While this is not a conventional acquisition approach, I
believe it was prudent given the emerging ballistic missile threats we
expected to face.
Recent North Korean preparations for the test launch of a long-range
ballistic missile confirm the wisdom of the administration's approach:
we need to have an emergency missile defense capability in place, even
while development and testing of the system continues.
Moreover, I believe Iran's continuing development of longer range
ballistic missiles, coupled with their intention to acquire nuclear
weapons, also argues for fielding missile defense capabilities as soon
as technically feasible and in numbers sufficient to stay ahead of the
threat.
Just last month, from the floor of the Senate, I spoke to my
colleagues about how NATO might respond to the greatest threat to
regional and global stability that we face today: Iran. I noted
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that I support the principle of preserving as many options as possible
in diplomacy, and to bolster those diplomatic options, NATO should
consider erecting a ``ring of deterrence'' that would surround Iran to
deter the use of actual force, as was done so successfully during the
cold war.
I believe that a ground-based interceptor site in Europe, as is being
proposed by the Department of Defense, would contribute to this
deterrence of Iranian--or any other--missile threats, and would be
consistent with NATO activities already underway to provide missile
defense capabilities for the Alliance in the next decade. Most
important, a missile defense site in Europe would send a message to
nations developing longer-range missiles that the United States and its
allies will not be intimidated by the threat of ballistic missiles
armed with weapons of mass destruction.
The amendment before us now recognizes the accomplishments of the
Department of Defense in fielding, in such a short time, a limited
missile defense system that is now available in an emergency to provide
a measure of protection for the American people against a long-range
missile threat--such as the missile that now sits on a North Korean
launch pad.
One of the limitations of the current GMD system, however, is that it
is difficult to maintain the system on alert while it is undergoing the
testing necessary to further improve its capability and reliability. To
address this limitation, the Missile Defense Agency plans to create the
infrastructure and redundant communications links necessary to permit
the system to remain on alert even while test events are underway. This
amendment helps advance these plans so that we are better prepared to
address the threat posed by the development of a North Korean
intercontinental ballistic missile.
In closing, I would note that in my many years here in the Senate, I
have been privileged to participate in many a debate over missile
defense. We have examined this issue from every conceivable angle--
cost, technology, policy, strategy, and diplomacy--and the debate
always appeared to me to be somewhat theoretical, since we lacked
actual missile defense capabilities.
But today this is no longer the case. The United States now has a
limited capability to defend its territory, deployed forces, and its
allies against missiles of all ranges. It is a limited capability, to
be sure, but one that now provides the President and his senior
officials with additional options that can reinforce diplomacy and
deterrence or, as a last resort, protect against the growing ballistic
missile threat.
Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I, too, rise in support of this amendment of
the Senator from Alabama, Mr. Sessions. It is a modest increase in
funding. But as the ranking member of the Armed Services Committee
said, it will enable us to accelerate the pace of testing, which I
think we are all supportive of. And as a result, I think it is a good
amendment. I appreciate the support of both the minority and the
majority. Because of that, I will not take a long time to detail the
reasons why I think it is so important.
Suffice it to say, with the recent news of the preparations of the
North Koreans and our knowledge that they have been very closely
connected to the development of weapon capabilities, in particular the
missile capabilities of the Iranians, and given the fact that both of
those countries have not only become increasingly capable but
increasingly belligerent in recent months and years, it is very obvious
that we have to move forward and accelerate our testing and development
and our deployment of the missile interception system with all the
speed we can muster.
It is a program that we are developing as we go along, and we are
learning a lot in the process. Our most recent tests have been
successful. We can build on those successes.
I am delighted that the missile defense system is receiving the kind
of support that it needs to receive so that in the years to come, when
the American people look back on this and realize that they are
protected from a missile attack, they can say it was during these years
when that threat was evolving and developing that we had the fortitude
to put the money in the program for development and testing that would
enable us to protect the American people.
I remember back, right after 9/11, when the intelligence communities
were criticized for not connecting the dots. Now the dots on the
missile fronts are pretty clear. We are beginning to get big red
circles coming at us with both North Korea and Iran, and others are on
the way as well. It is during this period of time, before they become
completely capable then, we have to develop our interceptor
capabilities with our ground-based missile systems and the follow-on
systems which we are working on as well.
I applaud the efforts of my colleague from Alabama and his foresight
for proposing this modest increase.
I appreciate the support of the ranking minority member on the
committee, and I urge my colleagues to support the amendment.
Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Arizona for his
comments, and in particular I want to express my appreciation to him
for his steadfast leadership to ensure that this Nation has a ballistic
missile defense.
He was active in this long before 9/11. Ever since he has been in the
Senate, this has been a long passion of his. I am delighted that he
could be here today to share some thoughts about it.
The system is not yet where we want it to be. But it has been proved.
We have demonstrated hit-to-kill technology on two occasions. Now we
have this entire system in place where we have ship-based radar,
ground-based radar, our missile satellite system, and the computers are
tied all together.
I ask my colleague, Senator Kyl, a Member of the leadership in this
Senate, if he remembers those debates in the late the 1990s--I guess it
was when the Cochran-Lieberman bill passed to deploy this system. Maybe
he could share some of his thoughts. He must feel some satisfaction to
know that we now have a system in place that can give us at least some
protection from a missile attack.
Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I will respond quickly to make this point. A
lot of folks over the years asked, Why has it taken us so long? It is a
good question. There are several different answers to it.
First of all, this is hard. It is hard to hit a bullet with a bullet.
It has taken a lot of time and effort by very smart people.
I am glad we were there at the beginning, providing them the
resources they needed to conduct these kinds of tests and demonstrate
that we could really intercept an intercontinental ballistic missile,
which is the equivalent of hitting a bullet with a bullet.
There were years in which there was opposition to the missile defense
system, in which funding was cut from the program. That crippled the
program and slowed it down. There were times when we were ready to
deploy something and then opponents said we don't want to deploy yet,
we want to do some more testing. As a result, every time we seemed to
be ready to put up something, we were pulled back--all the way back to
the early 1980s when Ronald Reagan started talking about this. You have
to scratch your head and wonder why it has taken us this long to get to
this point.
I think the most important thing, as the Senator from Alabama pointed
out, is we are now making tremendous progress. We have a system
deployed. It is better with every subsequent test, and as time goes on,
the American people can at least begin to feel a little bit more
secure. We are not there yet, as everybody has pointed out. But we are
making great progress.
Because we worked hard during some of those lean years to keep the
funding going and keep the progress going forward, we are at the stage
we are today.
I thank both Members of the minority and majority for their support
for the program this year.
Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. COBURN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be dispensed with.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. COBURN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the pending
amendment be set aside.
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The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Senator Dodd
be added as a cosponsor to the Levin-Reed Iraq amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, if I might first thank my colleague from
Oklahoma. A few people around here will say they are going to be here
at a certain time and show up at a certain time. The Senator was
committed to come here at a certain time, and I thank him.
Mr. COBURN. Mr. President, I thank the Senator.
I want to spend a few minutes, first of all, praising the chairman
and ranking member of this committee. It is important, I think, that we
see the relationships that develop, as well as the standards that have
been developed on this bill, the fact that Chairman Warner was here
very late last night, the fact that we are moving forward in an
expeditious way.
I have several areas and several amendments I am going to call up. I
will try to be cooperative as to whether we have votes. But I think the
issues are important enough that the American people ought to hear the
debate about them.
I am not under any illusion that will necessarily win some of them.
But I think we need to pay attention to them and the debate needs to be
a part of the Record.
With that, I call up amendment No. 4454 and ask unanimous consent to
modify it with the language of 4491, which I have here in my hand.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the modification?
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, is it possible for the managers to look at
this for a moment before it is sent up? I think it would help
facilitate matters.
Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. COBURN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be dispensed with.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Amendment No. 4491, as Modified
Mr. COBURN. Mr. President, I call up amendment No. 4491, as modified,
and I ask unanimous consent to make it a first-degree amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? Without objection, it is
so ordered.
The amendment (No. 4491), as modified, is as follows:
At the appropriate place insert the following:
SEC. __. REFORMS TO THE DEFENSE TRAVEL SYSTEM TO A FEE-FOR-
USE-OF-SERVICE SYSTEM.
No later than one year after the enactment of this Act, the
Secretary of Defense may not obligate or expend any funds
related to the Defense Travel System except those funds
obtained through a one-time, fixed price service fee per DOD
customer utilizing the system with an additional fixed fee
for each transaction.
Mr. COBURN. Mr. President, this is a great case for the American
people to see what is not operating right in many of the branches of
our Government.
There is a procurement contract that started out 8 years ago. The
total cost was to be $200 million. The idea was to save money on
purchasing travel vouchers for our military. That was the goal. The
original cost was $246 million. We are now 8 years into this, and we
are over $464 million. It is working at a 30-percent level. It was
working at less than 10 percent last year. Even though we have the GAO
saying they may have saved $13 million this year, the fact is that
study didn't consider the fact that the vast majority of time when they
buy an airplane ticket they do not get the best price. So that wasn't
even considered. The purpose of this amendment is to cause us to focus
again on what we are doing.
There are no-bid contracts, contracts that change in terms of
violation of the contracting laws, performance bonuses, pay for back
costs, negotiating through the procurement procedure. There is no
significant oversight in this Congress on procurement in the agencies
of this Government. That has to change. Nobody in the private world
would get away with this. Nobody in their personal life would be able
to get away with this.
Yet we have a system now where almost every ticket that is bought
through this $464 million program still has to be checked by a travel
agent, of which we pay anywhere from $5 to $11 an hour, even though we
might have saved $20 on a payment system through the Pentagon.
What is the problem? I have worked with the comptroller at the
Pentagon. They were aware of this. The Secretary of Defense is aware of
it. The chairman is aware of the problem. The ranking member and I have
had multiple discussions.
The problem is the Pentagon has hundreds of computers that won't talk
to each other. Instead of fixing that problem, we contract to make a
system that should be off the shelf for less than $59 million, and we
pay $500 million for it so it will speak to all these different
programs--and it is not doing it effectively.
The purpose of this amendment is to quit sending good money after bad
and say don't get rid of the program, but let us incentivize the
program. If it is a good program, then let us pay the contractor every
time it is used. If it is not used enough, and if it doesn't get used--
and it is not getting used now because it is too hard to use in the
vast majority of the cases, most people go straight to a travel agent--
let us pay them on a per-transaction basis just like this contractor
has on every other travel program that it has with the Federal
Government.
Why would we do it differently in the Pentagon? We are doing it
differently because our procurement system is broken in terms of how we
hold people accountable.
I have nothing against the contractor.
If you would let me continue to do a program and not perform and
continue to give me money, I will take it. But what it is doing is
breeding incompetency. It is wasting taxpayer dollars, and we ought to
say there is a point in time.
What do we know about travel systems in the Federal Government? What
we know is in five other agencies they don't have any problems at all,
two of which were developed by their same contractor.
Why are we having problems here? One of them is because we have a
cost-plus contract. What is the incentive to fix the problem? There is
not any because it is going to continue to be renewed.
This amendment says very simply change the incentive. If this is a
good program--Oh, I know. This doesn't say throw the money out or throw
the program out.
It says, change the program to incentivize it to be operational. It
is in less than 30 percent of our military bases now. It is still not
used. The one place it has been used is one Air Force base where it was
mandated by the commander: You will use this system.
Do you know what the utilization rate is? Ninety percent. And the
cost in terms of getting it done is about three times the benefit in
terms of savings for paying for the bill.
On that same Air Force base, over 50 percent of the time they never
get the cheapest fare, so what we save in terms of paying--the actual
accounting work within the Pentagon, which I agree is a worthy goal--we
lose because the system does not find the best fare.
As a matter of fact, most Pentagon employees would be better off to
go to Travelocity or Orbitz, buy their own ticket on their own dime,
get reimbursed, and the Pentagon can do it cheaper than with this.
This is a very straightforward amendment. It says don't get rid of
the defense travel system, keep it going, but fund it on a per-
transaction basis that says if this is good for the Pentagon, then use
it and we will pay for it. That incentivizes the contractor to make it
easy, to make it useful, and to get our value for it. Isn't half a
billion enough to pay for a travel system that you could have bought
off the shelf for $50 million? It reflects on what we have as problems
within the Pentagon.
Let me touch on that. I am a supporter of the Pentagon. I am a
supporter of our Defense Secretary. He has told me this is one of the
areas where they have great problems. Last year, the Pentagon paid $6
billion in performance bonuses to contractors who
[[Page S6371]]
did not meet their performance requirements. Think about that for a
minute. That means if you are told where you work: If you meet a
certain expectation you are going to get a bonus, except we will pay
you even if you do not meet that expectation--what are you going to
think next year? You are going to think: I don't have to meet the
expectation because I am going to get paid.
That is exactly what is happening within our contracting within the
Pentagon and several other agencies within the Federal Government.
I ask the chairman and the ranking member to consider this. I believe
it is a way to straighten out a contract and also send a signal. At
best, we are going to have a $350 billion deficit this year. Should we
spend our kids' and grandkids' money in an inefficient way? This is a
good message we ought to send so other contractors see it. You will not
get a cost-plus contract if you do not perform, and you are not going
to continue to have contracts renewed.
There are a lot of other details, and I ask unanimous consent to have
them printed in the Record.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
Background
The Defense Travel System, DTS, is an end-to-end electronic
travel system intended to integrate all travel functions,
from authorization through ticket purchase to accounting for
the Department of Defense. The system was initiated in 1998
and it was supposed to be fully deployed by 2002. DTS is
currently in the final phase of a six-year contract that
expires September 30, 2006. In its entire history, the system
has never met a deadline, never stayed within cost estimates,
and never performed adequately.
To date, DTS has cost the taxpayers $474 million--a
staggering $200 million more than it was originally projected
to cost.
In short, the American taxpayer has funded a project that
is FOUR YEARS behind schedule, is deployed in barely half of
the 11,000 DOD travel sites, cannot be relied upon to provide
DOD travelers with the lowest available airfare, and is
plagued with contracting problems.
And yet . . . Congress continues to fund this broken
system.
This amendment prohibits continued funding of DTS and
instead shifting to the fixed price per transaction e-travel
systems used by government agencies in the civilian sector,
as set up under General Services Administration, GSA,
contracts.
DTS is far behind schedule
According to testimony given by Thomas F. Gimble, Acting
Inspector General Department of Defense, before the Senate
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations on September 29,
2005, ``The Defense Travel System was at `high risk' for not
being an effective solution to streamlining the DOD travel
management process. Furthermore, DTS experienced significant
testing and deployment problems.''
By comparison, according to a March 6, 2006 GSA internal
review of its own in-house Program Management Office for e-
travel systems, two/thirds of civilian agencies fully
deployed their systems on time.
In a January 2006 report, GAO noted that DTS, as originally
envisioned, was to commence within 120 days after the
effective date of contract award in September 1998, with
complete deployment to approximately 11,000 locations by
April 2002. However, that date has been changed to September
2006--a slippage of over 4 years.
DTS is not being utilized
Dr. Scott A. Comes of Program Analysis and Evaluation in
the Defense Department testified last year that the estimated
savings projected for DTS assumed a utilization rate of 60
percent in the first year of operation, rising to 90 percent
thereafter.
In actuality, the utilization rate for DTS was
approximately zero through 2004, reached approximately 15
percent in 2005 and now in the last year of the contract
period remains about 30 percent. It is already too late for
DTS ever to recover the enormous investment that has been
wasted on it.
Furthermore, DTS fails to find the lowest applicable
airfare in a significant number of cases. Industry expert
Robert Langsfeld, who did a comparative study of DTS with the
three civilian e-travel systems approved by GSA, testified
last year that DTS performed less efficiently than any of the
civilian GSA systems.
According to GAO testimony before the PSI Committee, during
fiscal years 2001 and 2002, DOD spent almost $124 million on
airline tickets that included at least one leg of the trip in
premium class--usually business class.
Because of control breakdowns within DTS, DOD paid for
airline tickets that were neither used nor processed for
refund--amounting to about 58,000 tickets totaling more than
$21 million. Based on limited data provided by the airlines
to GAO, it is possible that the unused value of the fully and
partially-used airline tickets that DOD has purchased could
be at least $100 million during the lifespan of DTS.
GAO also found that DOD sometimes paid twice for the same
airline ticket through DTS. Based on GAO's mining of limited
data, the potential magnitude of the improper payments was
27,000 transactions for over $8 million.
In GAO's latest report, January 2006, they examined
agencies that continue to use existing legacy travel systems
at locations where DTS is already deployed! This means that
all of the proclaimed savings that DTS was supposed to reap
are nowhere to be found--because DOD continues to use legacy
systems to do the same thing.
A blatant example of the waste from the use of these two
systems can be seen in the way that travel vouchers are
processed: According to an April 13, 2005, memorandum from
the Assistant Secretary of the Army, Financial Management and
Comptroller, from October 2004 to February 2005, at locations
where DTS had been deployed, the Army paid the Defense
Finance and Accounting Service, DFAS--the system where the
majority of DOD payments are routed through--approximately $6
million to process 177,000 travel vouchers manually, or $34
per travel voucher, versus about $186,000 to process 84,000
travel vouchers electronically, $2.22 per travel voucher.
Overall, for this 5 month period, the Army reported that it
spent about $5.6 million more to process these travel
vouchers manually as opposed to electronically using DTS.
This example here shows that DTS is not even being
utilized! Why in the world are we--the Congress--continuing
to fund two duplicative travel payment systems at DOD which
has proven to lose millions of dollars in a matter of months?
Testing of the System is Not Accurate
In a January 2006 GAO Report, GAO found that testing for
selected requirements for display of flights and airfares was
``ineffective in ensuring that the promised capability was
delivered as intended.''
This means that not only is DTS not performing, the current
system is incapable of testing properly in order to determine
what is required in order to meet DOD's plan.
Further, DOD could not prove that DOD travelers even had
access to the flights that were available for travel. There
is no doubt such a flaw would have produced higher travel
costs.
Confirming the problems with DTS, their own officials
acknowledged that this problem has existed before deployment
of the system--since 2002. In August 2005, DTS officials
stated that the problem was corrected and went ahead with
deploying the system.
DTS is not cost effective
DTS is claiming that they saved over $13 million this year,
but their spokesman was unable to say in comparison to what.
Apparently that ``savings'' is the amount estimated in
reduced paperwork and accounting, estimated at about $20 per
transaction. This does not take into account the numerous
instances in which DTS fails to display the lowest applicable
airfare, the necessity to hand-check all its transactions, or
the fact that the great bulk of DOD travel is still arranged
through old-fashioned conventional travel agents. The alleged
savings are completely illusory.
Under the DTS contract Northrop is being paid millions of
dollars each month for operation and maintenance, training,
help desk, development and deployment--regardless of the
actual extent of use by DOD travelers. In addition, DOD is
also paying travel agents, commercial travel managers, fees
ranging from $5.25 to $12.50 to perform a travel transaction
using DTS, the agent still has to buy the ticket and perform
other administrative functions, and higher fees, up to $23,
if a travel agent has to ``touch'' or assist in completing
or correcting a DTS transaction.
Under the GSA Contract DOD would pay only $5.25 per
transaction to whichever of three contractors won the
contract. GSA e-travel systems are fully automated and do not
require the assistance of a travel agent. Ironically, one of
the three GSA-approved vendors for e-travel for civilian
agencies is Northrop Grumman, the company that holds the DTS
contract.
DTS is beset with contracting problems
The facts show that DTS is another instance of a
guaranteed-profit, cost-plus contract. The government is
responsible for paying all of the costs of the system in
addition to the amount the contractor receives as profit.
The original DTS contract provided for compensation on a
per-transaction basis--pay for performance. By April 2001,
after years of testing failures, it was clear that the
original DTS would not work and the contract was secretly
rewritten.
In 2002, the DOD and TRW, later purchased by Northrup
Grumman, secretly negotiated a total restructure of the
contract, in which the government agreed to pay for all the
of losses sustained to date by the DTS contractor and to
shift from a pay for performance to a cost-plus arrangement.
DOD has paid Northrop Grumman over $264 million to develop
DTS, when this program was supposed to be fully operational
in 2001 and development costs were to be at no cost to the
Federal government in the original contract.
Another contract change was an agreement by the government
to pay the $43.7 million that had been spent in development
costs by the original contractor, subsequently acquired by
Northrop Grumman. We got absolutely nothing for that money;
it
[[Page S6372]]
just covered the losses covered by the contractor when the
original contract stipulated that the contractor would bear
all risks for the development and deployment of DTS.
Last year Judge George Miller of the Federal Court of
Claims decided that he would not even look into allegations
of violations of the Competition in Contracting Act because
the software and source codes are owned by the contractor, so
if the contract were opened for bidding and another bidder
was awarded the contract, the Government would have nothing
left than a $500 million loss. But just a week before the
September 29, 2005 hearing of the Senate Permanent
Subcommittee on Investigations the contractor promised to
transfer ownership of this intellectual property to the
Defense Department at the end of the contract period if
requested, ostensibly to maintain the fiction that the open
bidding on the contract in 2006 is on the level. Ownership of
DTS seems to bounce around to wherever it is most convenient
to avoid serious scrutiny.
The Director, Defense Finance and Accounting Service,
testified before the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on
Investigations in September 2005, and promised that when
Northrop Grumman's contract expired on September 30, 2006,
the DTS contract would be re-bid.
However, this pledge has proved to be false. In February
2006, the Program Director, Defense Travel System Program
Management Office, admitted to the Court of Federal Claims
that when Northrop Grumman's contract expired on September
30, 2006, DOD planned to extend it on a sole source basis to
Northrop Grumman through September 30, 2007 for an additional
$20 million.
Agencies currently using GSA's E-travel system
Northrop Grumman's e-travel system has been in use at the
Department of Transportation for six months. Northrop also
has GSA e-travel contracts with the Environmental Protection
Agency, Department of Energy, and the Department of Health
and Human Services and it is likely that it will reach early
full deployment in each of these.
Mr. COBURN. There were violations in contracting law with this. There
were promises made last year when we had this same discussion in the
Senate that certain things were happening that did not happen in terms
of this contract. There is no question there has been some improvement,
but they have not achieved a level that would say we are anywhere close
to the level of making this an efficient system.
Mr. WARNER. If I can address the Senator with regard to this
amendment, it is an amendment the Senate has visited before.
I would like to have the Senator's observation of whether my
information is correct. The Senator has been at this 2 years. I commend
the Senator for that work. As a consequence of that work, the
Department has done some things, have they not?
Mr. COBURN. They have.
Mr. WARNER. It has been told to me that 95 percent of the Senator's
goals have been achieved and that by October 1 of this year, it will be
100 percent.
Mr. COBURN. The actual numbers on utilization of this system, if the
Senator can bear with me for a minute, the utilization rate right now
is 30 percent in the military. In other words, 3 out of 10 facilities
that purchase travel are utilizing this. If that is what we wanted when
we contracted it, great. But that is not what was in the contract.
This same contractor, by the way, had a system developed through the
Department of Transportation 6 months ago that is working just fine.
I portend that proves the problem with the system is the contracting,
not the contractor. We ought to send a signal. Say it is 90 percent, if
that is the case, they will make more money doing it on a per-
transaction basis than they would under a contract basis.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, my friend is an expert on this, and I
freely admit I am not.
Mr. COBURN. I am not an expert, but I don't like waste. I think we
have wasted money.
Mr. WARNER. It is represented to me the DTS, the defense system is
not merely a travel booking system, but it has much broader
functionality than any of the Federal Government e-travel systems. In
short, DTS is an end-to-end accounting system that automatically
handles the entire range of otherwise very expensive and time-consuming
manual tasks associated with DOD travel.
Any fair comparison has to begin with the fact that DTS offers an
end-to-end travel management capability that incorporates military
entitlements and DOD travel policies, and e-travel services simply do
not.
Mr. COBURN. Early in my statement I made this point: We are fixing
the wrong problem. The problem is the computer system. The reason this
is so expensive, the computer systems in the Pentagon do not talk to
one another. We have designed a monstrous computer system to make it
talk to all these systems that will not talk to one another rather than
to fix the computer system in the Pentagon to make them talk to one
another.
If we do that on every project that we need to enhance and overfill
for the Pentagon, we are going to get into the same problem. They make
all their money by being able to pay the bill. But it is a travel
system.
If they make efficiency in terms of being able to pay the bill--which
is the problem the Pentagon was having--we ought to also expect them to
get the fares right and not have to pay another $6 to a travel agent
for every ticket they write, to doublecheck to see if the system was
right. That is what is happening.
When you say 90 percent, that is 90 percent, plus we are having the
travel agents check it. It is not an automated system.
Have they made improvements? Yes, I do not deny that. But if they are
where they need to be, and if their contract as originally specified
and modified, if they are at 90 percent, they will make a ton more
money on a per-transaction basis, and we will get what we need and they
will get what they need.
But they are not. That is why we have the resistance to a transaction
basis. You cannot have it both ways. If they are at 90 percent, any
prudent businessman would say: Sure, we want it on a transaction basis.
If they are not at 90 percent, if they are at 30 percent, as I propose
they are, and inefficiently at 30 percent, the reason they want a
contract through next year is because they are going to make a lot more
money than they would on the transaction basis.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I continue to be very depressed by the
knowledge that this Senator has on the subject. I freely admit that I
do not have the depth of knowledge.
I understand initially the amendment called for a study. Then, as
provided under the rules of the Senate, the Senator modified the
amendment, and it is now a very specific piece of legislation that I am
advised could well end the program.
Somewhere between a study and trying to end the program, should the
Senator prevail, there must be a basis on which we can have an
accommodation so I can accept some measure to meet the Senator's goals
and incorporate it in the bill, assuming my distinguished ranking
member will accept my recommendation.
Mr. President, why doesn't the Senator go to his next amendment? In
the meantime staff can go to work.
Mr. COBURN. I will gladly do that, and I am happy to work with you.
I make a final point. Supposedly, this contract is going to be out
for bid at the end of this year. It was supposed to have been out for
bid last year. They renewed the contract without putting it out for
bid, so I don't have any hope it will go out, first.
And, No. 2, nobody is going to bid on this. It is a mess. Nobody is
going to bid on it. The only person you will have bid on it is the
original contractor. Whether that is accurate or not, I am willing to
work with the chairman to bring down the costs.
The fact is, the real problem is the computer systems in the
Pentagon. We all know that. The Senator is aware of it, the ranking
member is aware of it. The comptroller is working hard to change that.
That is a 4- to 7-year program that we have embarked on which everyone
knows has to happen.
Here is my worry: I will be back here next year doing the same thing
because it is still not going to work. That is my worry. That is not
fair to our grandkids.
Mr. WARNER. I say that is not fair to the men and women of the Armed
Forces who use this program.
I am not trying to keep in place something that is not adequately
serving this constituency and the Department of Defense. I would rather
put in a fix if I can get in my mind what that fix can be. The
amendment could virtually bring what is in existence at DTS to a
standstill.
Mr. COBURN. If I could ask the chairman a question, if, in fact, it
is at 90 percent, as the contractor says it is,
[[Page S6373]]
then by the contract they should have already converted over to a per-
transaction plan. So why haven't they? They haven't because it is not
at 90 percent because they would be making a whole lot more money if it
was.
I am happy to ask unanimous consent to set this amendment and discuss
other amendments and work with the Senator and his staff prior to the
voting or conclusion of this bill.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. WARNER. I thank the cooperation of the Senator.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from South Carolina.
Amendment No. 4365
Mr. GRAHAM. Mr. President, if it is acceptable to the chairman, I
would like about 10 minutes, maybe less, to talk about a managers'
amendment that has been accepted by the chairman and ranking member, to
put in the record how important I think this is regarding military
retirement, Guard and Reserves.
Mr. WARNER. We certainly want to accommodate the Senator. I suggest
at the conclusion of the presentation of this next amendment.
Mr. GRAHAM. I apologize.
Mr. COBURN. I am happy to let the Senator from South Carolina
intervene for a short period of time.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from South Carolina has the floor.
Mr. GRAHAM. I will be very brief.
One, I thank the chairman and ranking member for their willingness to
help Senator Chambliss and Senator Clinton and myself with a package of
reforms that would be very beneficial to the Guard and Reserves
regarding Reserve retirement.
Right now, the current system will not allow you to retire until you
are 60. You can serve your 20 years, 30 years, but you have to wait
until you are 60 to get your retirement. We are trying to incentivize
those Guard and Reserves to take part in active-duty operations, and if
you are called up to active duty involuntarily, for every 90 days a
member spends on active duty, from September 11 forward, you will get a
day-for-day credit in terms of retirement. If you serve a whole year on
active duty, voluntarily or involuntarily, you could retire at 59.
We have had this scored. It is minimum cost. But I can assure you it
will go a long way in the Guard and Reserve community as a much needed
reform.
It will be well received by our troops. It will be good for them and
their families. Quite honestly, the level of commitment, the level of
Active Duty service is on par with World War II among the Guard and
Reserves, and it is the least we can do. This will certainly benefit
our guardsmen and reservists and their families. I appreciate the
chairman and ranking member putting it in the managers' package.
I have enjoyed working with Senators Chambliss and Clinton on this
issue. The reduced retirement provision was from Senator Chambliss. It
was his amendment. And we used his amendment also to improve health
care for the Guard and Reserves.
What we have done--there is a three-tiered system. For every 90 days
you are called to active duty, you get a year of TRICARE at a 28-
percent premium share rate, which is the same as for Federal employees.
Everyone who works in our offices as Federal employees pays 28 percent
of the cost of their Federal health care. The only group in the Federal
Government not to have Federal health care were the Guard and Reserves.
We fixed that last year. And we are going to have a change in the
allocation.
Tier 2: If you are an unemployed or an uninsured guardsman or
reservist, we are going to have a 50-50 cost share. If you are in the
private sector with health care, and you want to come into TRICARE, to
have continuity of health care, not bouncing back and forth, we are
going to have a 75-25 share. So if you want to get out of your private-
sector health care and come into TRICARE, you will have to pay 75
percent. That will be down from 85 percent. We put a cap on premium
growth rates.
The entire package, from allowing people to retire early if they
serve on active duty, voluntarily or involuntarily, is a great idea.
Balancing out the premiums to be paid will go a long way to make our
Guard and Reserve family members and Active Duty and military members
more appreciated. And it will certainly help them with their budget
problems, because we all know how costly health care is.
I have introduced a separate stand-alone bill that would allow every
guardsman and reservist who is eligible for TRICARE to participate in
premium conversions. It would allow them to have their TRICARE premiums
on a pretax basis, like every other Federal employee. That is a stand-
alone bill. We will do it later.
I thank Senator Chambliss for coming up with a package that would
allow military members and the Guard and Reserves to get credit for
their active service in terms of retiring below age 60. Senator Clinton
and I have worked for several years on TRICARE benefits for guardsmen
and reservists. I think we have improved that benefit in a very
reasonable way. I put that on the record and hope every Member of the
Senate will appreciate what we have done because our guardsmen and
reservists have served above and beyond the call of duty.
Mr. President, I now yield to Senator Clinton, who, as I have
indicated, has been with us every step of the way, leading on this
issue.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New York.
Mrs. CLINTON. Mr. President, I am honored and delighted to join my
voice along with my colleagues, Senator Graham and Senator Chambliss,
and thank them for their efforts.
Today, we have made further progress in improving benefits for
National Guard members and reservists. This bill makes great strides in
improving retirement benefits for reservists and Guard members who
serve for longer periods. For every consecutive 90 days a member spent
in an active Federal status, the age at which they receive their
retirement annuity would be decreased by 3 months. The lowest a member
could collect retirement pay as a result of this provision would be age
50. The age at which they would qualify for health care benefits would
not decrease.
Any Guard or Reserve member who is called or ordered to active duty,
or volunteers for active duty, would qualify. This will greatly help us
with recruitment and especially retention. We have a problem in our
Reserve component which has been under great stress over the last
several years.
Last year, thanks to the leadership of Senator Graham, we made great
progress in expanding access to TRICARE. All members of the Selected
Reserve are eligible to enroll in TRICARE, and we created a separate
category based on whether a Guard member or reservist had been
deployed.
Category one, for members of the Selected Reserves who have been
activated: Members would accumulate 1 year of TRICARE coverage for
every year of service and would only have to pay 28 percent of the
cost. Category two established a 50-50 cost share for those without
health insurance owing to unemployment or lack of employer-provided
coverage. And category three was for the remainder of members of the
Selective Reserve who did not fit in the other categories, allowing
them to buy into coverage at an 85 percent cost share.
Our improvements this year will allow small businesses with fewer
than 20 employees to qualify for the 50-50 cost share. And it reduces
the amount paid, by those who qualify for category three, to 75
percent.
This is not only a win-win for Guard members and reservists. This is
a win-win for our military services and for our country. We are sending
a clear message--not just rhetoric, not just rah-rah--but a very clear,
solemn message to those who volunteer to be our citizen soldiers.
Perhaps in the past they might have thought they would have a weekend a
month, 2 weeks in the summer. Well, now they know they are part of the
war against terrorism. They are on call literally at any moment.
What we found is that when we began to activate those Guard and
Reserve members, 20 to 25 percent of them were found to be medically
unready. They had physical problems. They had dental problems. They
were not ready because they did not have health insurance. They fell
into the category of Americans who go without health care because they
cannot afford it or their employer does not provide it.
[[Page S6374]]
So in addition to the work I have been privileged to do with Senator
Graham on health care benefits, and under the leadership of Senator
Chambliss with respect to retirement, we have really sent a great
message to our men and women in the Guard and Reserve that we care
about you. We care about your families. We value your service. And we
want you to know that when it comes to retirement and health care, your
country is grateful.
Thank you very much, Mr. President.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Oklahoma.
Amendment No. 4370
Mr. COBURN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the pending
amendment be set aside and that amendment No. 4370 be called up.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
Without objection, it is so ordered.
The clerk will report.
The legislative clerk read as follows:
The Senator from Oklahoma [Mr. Coburn] proposes an
amendment numbered 4370.
Mr. COBURN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the reading
of the amendment be dispensed with.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The amendment is as follows:
(Purpose: To require notice to Congress and the public on earmarks of
funds available to the Department of Defense)
At the end of subtitle A of title X, add the following:
SEC. 1008. REPORTS TO CONGRESS AND NOTICE TO PUBLIC ON
EARMARKS IN FUNDS AVAILABLE TO THE DEPARTMENT
OF DEFENSE.
(a) Annual Report and Notice Required.--The Secretary of
Defense shall submit to Congress, and post on the Internet
website of the Department of Defense available to the public,
each year information as follows:
(1) A description of each earmark of funds made available
to the Department of Defense for the previous fiscal year,
including the location (by city, State, country, and
congressional district if relevant) in which the earmarked
funds are to be utilized, the purpose of such earmark (if
known), and the recipient of such earmark.
(2) The total cost of administering each such earmark
including the amount of such earmark, staff time,
administrative expenses, and other costs.
(3) The total cost of administering all such earmarks.
(4) An assessment of the utility of each such earmark in
meeting the goals of the Department, set forth using a rating
system as follows:
(A) A for an earmark that directly advances the primary
goals of the Department or an agency, element, or component
of the Department.
(B) B for an earmark that advances many of the primary
goals of the Department or an agency, element, or component
of the Department.
(C) C for an earmark that may advance some of the primary
goals of the Department or an agency, element, or component
of the Department.
(D) D for an earmark that cannot be demonstrated as being
cost-effective in advancing the primary goals of the
Department or any agency, element, or component of the
Department.
(E) F for an earmark that distracts from or otherwise
impedes that capacity of the Department to meet the primary
goals of the Department.
(b) Earmark Defined.--In this section, the term ``earmark''
means a provision of law, or a directive contained within a
joint explanatory statement or report accompanying a
conference report or bill (as applicable), that specifies the
identity of an entity, program, project, or service,
including a defense system, to receive assistance not
requested by the President and the amount of the assistance
to be so received.
Mr. COBURN. Mr. President, this is an amendment that is going to have
some emotion with it. I want to talk about it first. There is no
question when it comes to the wisdom of many of the Members of our body
that directing the Pentagon to do certain things is valuable. We know
that from anecdotal experience. But what we don't know is how many
times we have told them to do something that has been a complete waste.
What I am talking about are earmarks in the Defense authorization bill
as well as in the Defense appropriations bill.
There is a wonderful body of knowledge, plus an institutional
knowledge, here that helps give wisdom to direct the Armed Services. I
believe we ought to be in that position. What this amendment does is
ask for a report. I want to explain, for a second--and I want the
American public to see--what has happened in terms of earmarks.
In 1994, there were $4.2 billion worth of earmarks in the Defense
appropriations bill. Last year, there were $9.4 billion. The question
we should be asking is not whether or not there should be earmarks, but
what is the result of those earmarks? What is the consequence of the
earmarks? Not only were the numbers up, the dollars up, but the numbers
have skyrocketed.
So the question which I think would be prudent for us to ask is, No.
1: Earmarks are consuming a larger percentage of defense dollars. They
also, according to Pentagon reports and some Members of this body, are
taking money away from other priorities that are deemed to be higher a
lot of the time. They also account for some of the problems we are
having in the emergency supplementals and adding to the rising cost of
our debt. Many times they are not needed, but, in fact, they are
associated with benefiting a region or an industry that is not
necessarily in the highest priority.
So this is not about eliminating earmarks. This is about looking at
earmarks and saying: What are we getting for them? Where are they
working great for us? Where are they not working? Are they beneficial
to the defense of this country? Is it something that gives us a
benefit?
The other thing I would remind us of is, in the most recent history
we have seen an ethical lapse in association with some earmarks, and we
have actually seen some criminal behavior in association with earmarks.
That ought to be a part of the report as well.
So the whole idea is to add transparency and accountability to
earmarks. Let's look at them. What are we getting for them? What are we
losing? What are the opportunity costs that are lost because we have
them there? The total annual cost of earmarks in Defense appropriations
bills would be put in this report.
We can determine the actual numbers of earmarks and the actual price
tags. But we don't know the hidden costs of those earmarks, which
include staff time and administration. And we don't know the
opportunity cost of those earmarks: What did not happen for our
soldiers, what did not happen in terms of procurement because we put in
something else of maybe a lesser priority?
The annual report will provide Congress and the public a more
complete understanding of the total cost of the earmarks to the
Department of Defense, the purpose and location of each earmark, and an
analysis of the usefulness of each earmark in advancing the goals of
the Department of Defense. This will provide Members of Congress a more
complete view of the cost-effectiveness of each project and whether
those projects warrant continued funding.
The last amendment we were on started as an earmark. I remind the
Members of this body, it started at $200 million, and now will have
grown to over $500 million in initiatives and earmarks, but we did not
have the benefit of a report such as this to see if we were getting
value for this money.
This is a simple amendment. It is not going after earmarks. It is not
saying they are bad. It is not saying they are good. What it is saying
is: Shouldn't this body know? Shouldn't we know the impact, positively
and negatively? Shouldn't we know the lost opportunity cost?
I hope both the ranking member and the chairman of this committee
will give this amendment consideration. And I ask for their response.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, the managers are working to try to resolve
a number of issues in the hopes we can complete this bill. I will
eventually reply to the Senator from Georgia. I wonder if at this time,
without losing the floor, he will yield to his colleague to speak on
another matter.
Mr. COBURN. I say to the Senator, I will be happy to.
Mr. WARNER. I thank the Senator.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Georgia.
Mr. CHAMBLISS. Mr. President, I thank the chairman and thank my good
friend from Oklahoma for yielding for just a minute.
Amendment No. 4365
Mr. President, I would like to address amendment No. 4365,
cosponsored by myself, Senator Graham, Senator Clinton, and Senator
Burns.
This amendment, which I am speaking on today, makes what I believe is
a
[[Page S6375]]
relatively minor but very important adjustment to the Reserve
retirement system. My amendment would lower the age at which a
reservist can receive their retirement annuity by 3 months--counting
down from age 60--for every 90 days a reservist spends on active duty
during a fiscal year.
This amendment specifically rewards the members of the Guard and
Reserve who have been called or ordered for active duty, interrupted
their civilian lives for an extended period of time, and in many cases
placed themselves in harm's way in defense of their country.
Currently, the average reservist, if they collect any retirement pay
at all, receives a small fraction of the annuity that an Active Duty
member receives. If this amendment becomes law, that percentage will
rise slightly. But in no way will this amendment result in a major
change with large financial implications.
I do not have a formal CBO estimate for the current version. However,
based on CBO scoring for an earlier version, I suggest the cost of this
amendment will be approximately $300 million over 5 years. There have
been several other bills and amendments related to Reserve retirement
introduced in Congress, and for the sake of comparison, I believe my
amendment provides the right incentives and rewards. It is also the
least costly alternative which has been offered so far.
I believe this amendment is significant and important because it
recognizes the increased contributions our reservists are making,
rewards them for their service in the global war on terrorism, and
provides reservists in the middle of their careers with an incentive to
stay on board. I have received great feedback from the Department of
Defense on this amendment because it provides incentives for
volunteers, provides motivation for retention, and is relatively low
cost.
The Reserve Officers Association of America, the National Guard
Association of the United States, the Naval Reserve Association, the
Reserve Enlisted Association, and several other military associations
also support the amendment and see it as an important, responsible step
forward in support of our reservists.
With the coauthorship of my good friends Senator Graham of South
Carolina and Senator Clinton of New York, this amendment also makes two
important changes to the current laws related to TRICARE by allowing
small businesses under 20 to participate in the 50-50 cost share in the
TRICARE program and changing third tier beneficiaries from paying 85
percent to 75 percent. These are important changes, which benefit our
men and women in the Guard and Reserve and further provide for the
health care benefits of our servicemembers in a way that is affordable
and enhances their service.
I commend its inclusion in the bill. It has been a pleasure to work
with Senators Graham and Clinton, as well as Senator Burns, on this
matter. We have had great cooperation from both the chairman and
ranking member. I can't tell them how much we appreciate this.
This is the No. 1 issue of the Guard and Reserve this year. It is
going to be a great package. I commend Senator Graham for his hard
work, Senator Clinton for her hard work, as well as Senator Burns for
his hard work on this issue. I appreciate very much the cooperation of
the staff, as well as the chairman and ranking member, in making sure
that we continue to look after our men and women in the Guard and
Reserve who are being called up all the more often than we have ever
anticipated and all the more often than what they anticipated.
The chairman and ranking member have accepted the amendment, and I am
appreciative of that.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The majority leader is recognized.
Amendment No. 4471, as Modified
Mr. FRIST. Mr. President, I know in a few moments we will be voting.
I did want to come to the floor and speak strongly in support of the
Sessions missile defense amendment.
More than 23 years have passed since President Reagan announced his
Strategic Defense Initiative--the idea that our Nation should develop
the ability to protect itself against the threat of missile attack by
being able to shoot down incoming missiles.
President Reagan's idea has been very controversial ever since it was
announced.
For some reason there has always been a very substantial school of
thought, especially on the other side of the aisle, that we are better
off being defenseless against missile attack; that instead of being
able to shoot down incoming missiles, we should rely instead
exclusively on the threat that we will strike back after someone else
attacks us first.
This policy of intentional vulnerability--of intentionally exposing
our cities and our people to the threat of missile attack--has never
made sense to me or to the American people.
But that hasn't stopped repeated efforts over the years by opponents
of missile defense to reduce or even eliminate funding for research,
development, and deployment of missile defenses.
Fortunately, Republican administrations and Republican Congresses
over the last 23 years have fought to continue our national investment
in missile defense.
Thanks to our efforts, our Nation today has a number of missile
defense systems and components in place, including a total of 11
ground-based midcourse interceptors fielded in Alaska and California,
and more are on the way.
This system is working today to defend the American people.
As Assistant Secretary of Defense Peter Flory testified 3 months ago
before a House committee:
The United States today has all of the pieces in place
needed to intercept an incoming long-range ballistic missile:
ground based interceptors in Alaska and California; a network
of ground, sea, and space-based sensors; a command and
control network; and most importantly, trained servicemen
and women ready to operate the system. Our ballistic
missile defense system today is primarily oriented toward
continued development and testing. But we are confident
that it could intercept a long-range ballistic missile if
called upon to do so.
The existence of this system, rudimentary though it may be,
is a great source of comfort to the American people,
especially as we confront the threat that North Korea may
test fire an ICBM eastward across the Pacific Ocean any day
now.
No less an expert than Dr. William J. Perry, President
Clinton's Secretary of Defense, has seen the risk of such a
test launch by North Korea as sufficiently threatening to
America to justify a preemptive U.S. attack on the North
Korean ICBM while it is still sitting on its launch pad.
Secretary Perry, in his op-ed in today's Washington Post,
acknowledges that attacking the North Korean ICBM on the
ground in North Korea would be a high-risk action that could
lead to war between the United States and North Korea.
I certainly want to avoid a war with North Korea if at all
possible. At the same time, I cannot disagree with Secretary
Perry that North Korea's missile program poses a great threat
to our Nation that we cannot ignore.
It was precisely to avoid having to choose between
preemptive war and defenselessness that our Nation has been
pursuing missile defense for the last 23 years.
Senator Session's amendment underscores and increases our Nation's
commitment to missile defense by increasing the funding for it in this
bill by $45 million.
It is a worthy amendment that builds on the commitment that many of
us have demonstrated over the years to missile defense.
I understand that the distinguished ranking member, Senator Levin,
has expressed his support for the amendment, which I welcome--not only
because I value his support, but also because, it renews my faith in
the power of redemption.
I know we will be voting shortly, but I urge strong support of the
Sessions amendment.
I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Oklahoma for his
cooperation. We are trying to reduce the number of rollcall votes so
that we can conclude this bill. We are very close to doing so.
I yield the floor for the purposes of the Senator from Oklahoma being
recognized.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Oklahoma.
[[Page S6376]]
Amendment No. 4491, as Modified
Mr. COBURN. Mr. President, I would like to call up amendment No. 4491
again.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the amendment is pending.
Mr. COBURN. I ask for its consideration for the purpose of a vote.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there further debate on the amendment? If
not, the question is on agreeing to amendment No. 4491, as modified.
The amendment (No. 4491), as modified, was agreed to.
Amendment No. 4370
Mr. COBURN. I call up amendment No. 4370.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment is pending.
Mr. COBURN. I ask for its consideration.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there further debate? If not, the question
is on agreeing to amendment No. 4370.
The amendment (No. 4370) was agreed to.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, as a courtesy to the Senator, I move to
reconsider the votes and to lay that motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
Mr. WARNER. I thank the Senator from Oklahoma.
I believe we will shortly have a UC request to present, but I am
looking for the Senator from Alabama, Mr. Sessions. If I could have his
attention, my understanding is that the Senator desires a rollcall vote
on his amendment.
Mr. SESSIONS. I do think that is appropriate.
Mr. WARNER. Fine, the amendment has been debated on both sides.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan.
Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, we support the amendment. Obviously, if
there is a desire for a rollcall, that is their right. We will be
recommending a ``yea'' vote.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, we want to schedule that vote. So it is
agreed that will be the subject of a rollcall vote.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The majority leader.
Mr. FRIST. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that at 3:45 p.m.
today, the Senate proceed to stacked votes in relation to the following
amendments to the Defense authorization bill: Chambliss No. 4261,
Sessions No. 4471, as modified. I further ask that there be no
amendments to the amendments in order prior to the votes and that after
the first vote, all rollcall votes be 10 minutes in length; further
that there be 2 minutes equally divided between each vote after the
first.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Unanimous-Consent Agreement--Executive Calendar
Mr. FRIST. I ask unanimous consent that following the stacked votes
that begin shortly in relation to the Defense authorization bill, the
Senate proceed to executive session and to immediate votes on the
following nominations: No. 704, Andrew Guilford, U.S. District Judge
for the Central District of California; No. 714, Frank D. Whitney, U.S.
District Judge for the Western District of North Carolina.
I ask unanimous consent that prior to each vote it be in order for
the Senators from California and the Senators from North Carolina to
speak for up to 3 minutes each or to submit statements for the Record
prior to the votes; provided further, that following those votes, the
Senate proceed to the consideration of No. 715, the nomination be
confirmed, the President be immediately notified of the Senate's
action, and the Senate then resume legislative session.
Mr. LEVIN. Reserving the right to object, we understand that District
Judge Frank Whitney would probably be a voice vote; is that correct?
Mr. FRIST. That is correct.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. FRIST. Mr. President, I will turn to the chairman and the ranking
member to comment on what they expect over the course of the afternoon,
but the two unanimous-consent requests that we just did means that we
will have a series of two or three rollcall votes and one by voice. And
then after that, I will turn to the chairman and ranking member as to
what we might expect in terms of completion of the bill.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, could those three votes be sequenced, the
first vote will take the normal course and the next two votes be 10
minutes each?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. That is part of the order.
Mr. WARNER. I thank the distinguished Presiding Officer. Secondly,
there seems to be only one remaining amendment which we are trying to
resolve. Then I would approach the leadership jointly for final passage
of the bill.
Mr. FRIST. Mr. President, that is my understanding. Is that the
understanding of the ranking member?
Mr. LEVIN. I understand that unresolved amendment on our side may
have just been resolved. That adds a note of optimism.
Mr. FRIST. Things are sounding better and better.
Mr. WARNER. Would the majority leader authorize the chairman to seek
final passage when we are ready to go?
Mr. FRIST. Yes.
Amendment No. 4261
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous of order, the hour of 3:45
having arrived, the question is on agreeing to the Chambliss amendment
No. 4261.
The yeas and nays have been ordered, and the clerk will call the
roll.
The legislative clerk called the roll.
Mr. McCONNELL. The following Senator was necessarily absent: the
Senator from Wyoming (Mr. Enzi).
Mr. DURBIN. I announce that the Senator from West Virginia (Mr.
Rockefeller) is necessarily absent.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Chafee). Are there any other Senators in
the Chamber desiring to vote?
The result was announced--yeas 70, nays 28, as follows:
[Rollcall Vote No. 184 Leg.]
YEAS--70
Akaka
Alexander
Allard
Baucus
Bennett
Bingaman
Bond
Boxer
Brownback
Bunning
Burns
Burr
Byrd
Cantwell
Chambliss
Coburn
Cochran
Coleman
Collins
Conrad
Cornyn
Craig
Crapo
DeMint
DeWine
Dodd
Domenici
Dorgan
Durbin
Ensign
Feinstein
Frist
Graham
Hatch
Hutchison
Inhofe
Inouye
Isakson
Landrieu
Lautenberg
Lieberman
Lincoln
Lott
Martinez
McConnell
Menendez
Mikulski
Murkowski
Murray
Nelson (NE)
Pryor
Reed
Reid
Roberts
Salazar
Santorum
Sarbanes
Schumer
Sessions
Shelby
Smith
Snowe
Specter
Stevens
Sununu
Talent
Thomas
Thune
Vitter
Voinovich
NAYS--28
Allen
Bayh
Biden
Carper
Chafee
Clinton
Dayton
Dole
Feingold
Grassley
Gregg
Hagel
Harkin
Jeffords
Johnson
Kennedy
Kerry
Kohl
Kyl
Leahy
Levin
Lugar
McCain
Nelson (FL)
Obama
Stabenow
Warner
Wyden
NOT VOTING--2
Enzi
Rockefeller
The amendment (No. 4261) was agreed to.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I move to lay that motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, before we proceed to the next vote, I
would like to propound the following unanimous-consent request:
I ask unanimous consent that following the next vote, which is on the
Sessions amendment, I then be recognized in order to send to the desk a
series of amendments that have been cleared on both sides. I further
ask unanimous consent that following action on those cleared
amendments, the bill be read a third time and the Senate proceed to a
vote on final passage of the bill, with no intervening action or
debate; provided further, that after passage, the Senate proceed to the
votes in executive session as under the previous order.
Mr. LEVIN. No objection.
Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, reserving the right to object, and I will
not object; I wish to clarify with the distinguished chairman, should
we make a clarification with respect to pay raise now or when we are
done?
Mr. WARNER. We have reached an agreement on the pay raise issue. I
would prefer to do that following final
[[Page S6377]]
passage and have the colloquy inserted in the Record prior to.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? Without objection, it is
so ordered.
Mr. WARNER. I thank the Presiding Officer, and I thank my colleagues.
Amendment No. 4471, as Modified
The PRESIDING OFFICER. There are now 2 minutes equally divided for
debate before a vote in relation to the Sessions amendment No. 4471.
Who yields time? Is all time yielded back?
The Senator from Michigan is recognized.
Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I think there is strong support on both
sides of the aisle for this amendment. This is money which goes to
testing of the missile defense system mainly; it surely needs testing.
That has always been the question. So I support this amendment, and I
believe we could have a voice vote, but there has been a request for a
rollcall vote. We support the amendment.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, have the yeas and nays been ordered?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. They have not.
Mr. WARNER. I ask for the yeas and nays.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
There appears to be a sufficient second.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, this is an amendment by the distinguished
Senator from Alabama, Mr. Sessions, and the distinguished Senator from
Tennessee, Mr. Frist, and it has been carefully worked and debated. I
ask that the vote begin.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Alabama still has 1 minute
remaining.
Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. President, I would just say that the projected
launch from North Korea has caused us to focus intensely on the missile
defense system. To celebrate what we have accomplished, we have nine
missiles now in place in Alaska and two in California that are capable
of knocking down such an attacking missile. This amendment would allow
the capability for continued testing and, at the same time, be on 24/7
readiness to knock down an incoming missile.
We think it is a good amendment, and it is offset. I urge my
colleagues to support it. In effect, we would also be sending a message
to North Korea and Iran and other rogue nations that we would be ready
to defend this Nation.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to amendment No.
4471, as modified. The yeas and nays have been ordered. The clerk will
call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk called the roll.
Mr. McCONNELL. The following Senator was necessarily absent: the
Senator from Wyoming (Mr. Enzi).
Mr. DURBIN. I announce that the Senator from West Virginia (Mr.
Rockefeller) is necessary absent.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Are there any other Senators in the Chamber
desiring to vote?
The result was announced--yeas 98, nays 0, as follows:
[Rollcall Vote No. 185 Leg.]
YEAS--98
Akaka
Alexander
Allard
Allen
Baucus
Bayh
Bennett
Biden
Bingaman
Bond
Boxer
Brownback
Bunning
Burns
Burr
Byrd
Cantwell
Carper
Chafee
Chambliss
Clinton
Coburn
Cochran
Coleman
Collins
Conrad
Cornyn
Craig
Crapo
Dayton
DeMint
DeWine
Dodd
Dole
Domenici
Dorgan
Durbin
Ensign
Feingold
Feinstein
Frist
Graham
Grassley
Gregg
Hagel
Harkin
Hatch
Hutchison
Inhofe
Inouye
Isakson
Jeffords
Johnson
Kennedy
Kerry
Kohl
Kyl
Landrieu
Lautenberg
Leahy
Levin
Lieberman
Lincoln
Lott
Lugar
Martinez
McCain
McConnell
Menendez
Mikulski
Murkowski
Murray
Nelson (FL)
Nelson (NE)
Obama
Pryor
Reed
Reid
Roberts
Salazar
Santorum
Sarbanes
Schumer
Sessions
Shelby
Smith
Snowe
Specter
Stabenow
Stevens
Sununu
Talent
Thomas
Thune
Vitter
Voinovich
Warner
Wyden
NOT VOTING--2
Enzi
Rockefeller
The amendment (No. 4471), as modified, was agreed to.
Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
Mr. WARNER. I move to lay that motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, for those Senators who may not have heard
that vote, if I am correct it was 98 yeas, 0 nays. That is a strong
voice from the Senate of the United States in support of the men and
women of the Armed Forces. I thank each and every one of you.
Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, if the Senator will yield, it is also a
very strong voice for testing a missile system as well as supporting
the men and women in the Armed Forces.
I wonder if we could get the attention of the Senate. It is our
understanding now that we are going to proceed to a package which has
been cleared and then move to final passage?
Mr. WARNER. That is correct.
Mr. LEVIN. And then immediately move to consideration of a judge.
Mr. WARNER. That is correct. The prior vote being on the missile
defense.
Mr. LEVIN. I thank my colleague.
Amendments Nos. 4520; 4374; 4521; 4522; 4523; 4458; 4524; 4264, as
Modified; 4464; 4489; 4525; 4526; 4327, as Modified; 4527; 4434; 4393,
as Modified; 4312; 4424; 4416; 4364, as Modified; 4232; 4528; 4529;
4311; 4228; 4439, as Modified; 4530; 4337; 4531; 4411; 4336; 4361;
4532; 4533; 4534; 4535; 4381, as Modified; 4429; 4398, as Modified;
4451, as Modified; 4536; 4537; 4538; 4303; 4539; 4423; 4316; 4407;
4366; 4321; 4540; 4449; 4204, as Modified; and 4541, En Bloc
Mr. WARNER. I send a series of amendments to the desk which have been
cleared by myself and the ranking member. I ask unanimous consent the
Senate consider these amendments en bloc, the amendments be agreed to,
and the motions to reconsider be laid upon the table. Finally, I ask
that any statements pertaining to any of these individual amendments be
printed in the Record.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The amendments were agreed to, as follows:
AMENDMENT NO. 4520
(Purpose: Relating to the Minuteman III Intercontinental Ballistic
Missile)
At end of subtitle D of title I, add the following:
SEC. 147. MINUTEMAN III INTERCONTINENTAL BALLISTIC MISSILES.
(a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
(1) In the Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee of
Conference on H.R. 1815, the National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2006, the conferees state that the policy
of the United States ``is to deploy a force of 500 ICBMs''.
The conferees further note ``that unanticipated strategic
developments may compel the United States to make changes to
this force structure in the future.''.
(2) The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) conducted under
section 118 of title 10, United States Code, in 2005 finds
that maintaining a robust nuclear deterrent ``remains a
keystone of United States national power''. However,
notwithstanding that finding and without providing any
specific justification for the recommendation, the
Quadrennial Defense Review recommends reducing the number of
deployed Minuteman III Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles
(ICBMs) from 500 to 450 beginning in fiscal year 2007. The
Quadrennial Defense Review also fails to identify what
unanticipated strategic developments compelled the United
States to reduce the Intercontinental Ballistic Missile force
structure.
(3) The commander of the Strategic Command, General James
Cartwright, testified before the Committee on Armed Services
of the Senate that the reduction in deployment of Minuteman
III Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles is required so that
the 50 missiles withdrawn from the deployed force could be
used for test assets and spares to extend the life of the
Minuteman III Intercontinental Ballistic Missile well into
the future. If spares are not modernized, the Air Force may
not have sufficient replacement missiles to sustain the force
size.
(b) Modernization of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles
Required.--The Air Force shall modernize Minuteman III
Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles in the United States
inventory as required to maintain a sufficient supply of
launch test assets and spares to sustain the deployed force
of such missiles through 2030.
(c) Limitation on Termination of Modernization Program
Pending Report.--No funds authorized to be appropriated for
the Department of Defense may be obligated or expended for
the termination of any Minuteman III ICBM modernization
program, or for the withdrawal of any Minuteman III
Intercontinental Ballistic Missile from the active force,
until 30 days after the Secretary of Defense submits to the
congressional defense committees a report setting forth the
following:
(1) A detailed strategic justification for the proposal to
reduce the Minuteman III Intercontinental Ballistic Missile
force from 500
[[Page S6378]]
to 450 missiles, including an analysis of the effects of the
reduction on the ability of the United States to assure
allies and dissuade potential competitors.
(2) A detailed analysis of the strategic ramifications of
continuing to equip a portion of the Minuteman III
Intercontinental Ballistic Missile force with multiple
independent warheads rather than single warheads as
recommended by past reviews of the United States nuclear
posture.
(3) An assessment of the test assets and spares required to
maintain a force of 500 deployed Minuteman III
Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles through 2030.
(4) An assessment of the test assets and spares required to
maintain a force of 450 deployed Minuteman III
Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles through 2030.
(5) An inventory of currently available Minuteman III
Intercontinental Ballistic Missile test assets and spares.
(6) A plan to sustain and complete the modernization of all
deployed and spare Minuteman III Intercontinental Ballistic
Missiles, a test plan, and an analysis of the funding
required to carry out modernization of all deployed and spare
Minuteman III Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles.
(7) An assessment of whether halting upgrades to the
Minuteman III Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles withdrawn
from the deployed force would compromise the ability of those
missiles to serve as test assets.
(8) A description of the plan of the Department of Defense
for extending the life of the Minuteman III Intercontinental
Ballistic Missile force beyond fiscal year 2030.
(d) Remote Visual Assessment.--
(1) Additional amount for research, development, test, and
evaluation, air force.--The amount authorized to be
appropriated by section 201(3) for research, development,
test, and evaluation for the Air Force is hereby increased by
$5,000,000.
(2) Availability of amount.--Of the amount authorized to be
appropriated by section 201(3) for research, development,
test, and evaluation for the Air Force, as increased by
paragraph (1), $5,000,000 may be available for ICBM Security
Modernization (PE #0604851) for Remote Visual Assessment for
security for silos for intercontinental ballistic missiles
(ICBMs).
(3) Offset.--The amount authorized to be appropriated by
section 103(2) for procurement of missiles for the Air Force
is hereby reduced by $5,000,000, with the amount of the
reduction to be allocated to amounts available for the
Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle.
(e) ICBM Modernization Program Defined.--In this section,
the term ``ICBM Modernization program'' means each of the
following for the Minuteman III Intercontinental Ballistic
Missile:
(1) The Guidance Replacement Program (GRP).
(2) The Propulsion Replacement Program (PRP).
(3) The Propulsion System Rocket Engine (PSRE) program.
(4) The Safety Enhanced Reentry Vehicle (SERV) program.
AMENDMENT NO. 4374
(Purpose: To provide for a study of the health effects of exposure to
depleted uranium)
At the end of subtitle C of title VII, add the following:
SEC. 746. STUDY OF HEALTH EFFECTS OF EXPOSURE TO DEPLETED
URANIUM.
(a) Study.--The Secretary of Defense, in consultation with
the Secretary for Veterans Affairs and the Secretary of
Health and Human Services, shall conduct a comprehensive
study of the health effects of exposure to depleted uranium
munitions on uranium-exposed soldiers and on children of
uranium-exposed soldiers who were born after the exposure of
the uranium-exposed soldiers to depleted uranium.
(b) Uranium-Exposed Soldiers.--In this section, the term
``uranium-exposed soldiers'' means a member or former member
of the Armed Forces who handled, came in contact with, or had
the likelihood of contact with depleted uranium munitions
while on active duty, including members and former members
who--
(1) were exposed to smoke from fires resulting from the
burning of vehicles containing depleted uranium munitions or
fires at depots at which depleted uranium munitions were
stored;
(2) worked within environments containing depleted uranium
dust or residues from depleted uranium munitions;
(3) were within a structure or vehicle while it was struck
by a depleted uranium munition;
(4) climbed on or entered equipment or structures struck by
a depleted uranium munition; or
(5) were medical personnel who provided initial treatment
to members of the Armed Forces described in paragraph (1),
(2), (3), or (4).
(c) Report.--Not later than 1 year after the date of
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall submit
a report to Congress on the results of the study described in
subsection (a).
AMENDMENT NO. 4521
(Purpose: To provide, with an offset, $10,000,000 for the Joint
Advertising, Market Research and Studies program)
At the end of title XIV, add the following:
SEC. 1414. JOINT ADVERTISING, MARKET RESEARCH AND STUDIES
PROGRAM.
(a) Increase in Amount for Operation and Maintenance,
Defense-Wide.--The amount authorized to be appropriated by
section 301(5) for operation and maintenance for Defense-wide
activities, is hereby increased by $10,000,000.
(b) Availability of Amount.--Of the amount authorized to be
appropriated by section 301(5) for operation and maintenance
for Defense-wide activities, as increased by subsection (a),
$10,000,000 may be available for the Joint Advertising,
Market Research and Studies (JAMRS) program.
(c) Offset.--The amount authorized to be appropriated by
section 421(a) for military personnel is hereby decreased by
$10,000,000, due to unexpended obligations, if available.
AMENDMENT NO. 4522
(Purpose: To require a report on security measures to ensure that data
contained in the Joint Advertising, Market Research and Studies (JAMRS)
program is maintained and protected)
At the appropriate place, add the following:
Report.--Not later than 120 days after the date of
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall submit
to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and House
of Representatives a report on how the data, including social
security numbers, contained in the Joint Advertising, Market
Research and Studies (JAMRS) program is maintained and
protected, including the security measures in place to
prevent unauthorized access or inadvertent disclosure of the
data that could lead to identity theft.
amendment no. 4523
(Purpose: To extend the termination date for the exemption of returning
workers from the numerical limitations for temporary workers)
At the end of subtitle I of title X, add the following:
SEC. 1084. EXTENSION OF RETURNING WORKER EXEMPTION.
Section 402(b)(10 of the Save Our Small and Seasonal
Businesses Act of 2005 (title IV of division B of Public Law
109-13; 8 U.S.C. 1184 note) is amended by striking ``2006''
and inserting ``2008''.
amendment no. 4458
(Purpose: To ensure payment of United States assessments for United
Nations peacekeeping operations in 2005, 2006, and 2007)
At the appropriate place, insert the following:
SEC. __. LIMITATION ON THE UNITED STATES SHARE OF ASSESSMENTS
FOR UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS.
(a) In General.--Section 404(b)(2)(B) of the Foreign
Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1994 and 1995 (22
U.S.C. 287e note) is amended by adding at the end the
following:
``(v) For assessments made during calendar years 2005,
2006, and 2007, 27.10 percent.''.
(b) Conforming Amendment.--Section 411 of the Department of
State and Related Agency Appropriations Act, 2005 (title IV
of division B of Public Law 108-447; 22 U.S.C. 287e note) is
repealed.
amendment no. 4524
(Purpose: To provide for Military Deputies to the Assistant Secretaries
of the military departments for acquisition, logistics, and technology
matters)
At the end of subtitle A of title IX, add following:
SEC. 903. MILITARY DEPUTIES TO THE ASSISTANT SECRETARIES OF
THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS FOR ACQUISITION,
LOGISTICS, AND TECHNOLOGY MATTERS.
(a) Department of the Army.--
(1) Establishment of position.--There is hereby established
within the Department of the Army the position of Military
Deputy to the Assistant Secretary of the Army for
Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology.
(2) Lieutenant general.--The individual serving in the
position of Military Deputy to the Assistant Secretary of the
Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology shall be a
lieutenant general of the Army on active duty.
(3) Exclusion from grade and number limitations.--An
officer serving in the position of Military Deputy to the
Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics,
and Technology shall not be counted against the numbers and
percentages of officers of the Army of the grade of
lieutenant general.
(b) Department of the Navy.--
(1) Establishment of position.--There is hereby established
within the Department of the Navy the position of Military
Deputy to the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research,
Development, and Acquisition.
(2) Vice admiral.--The individual serving in the position
of Military Deputy to the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for
Research, Development, and Acquisition shall be a vice
admiral on active duty.
(3) Exclusion from grade and number limitations.--An
officer serving in the position of Military Deputy to the
Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development,
and Acquisition shall not be counted against the numbers and
percentages of officers of the grade of vice admiral.
(c) Department of the Air Force.--
(1) Establishment of position.--There is hereby established
within the Department of the Air Force the position of
Military Deputy to the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force
for Acquisition.
(2) Lieutenant general.--The individual serving in the
position of Military Deputy to
[[Page S6379]]
the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition
shall be a lieutenant general of the Air Force on active
duty.
(3) Exclusion from grade and number limitations.--An
officer serving in the position of Military Deputy to the
Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition shall
not be counted against the numbers and percentages of
officers of the Air Force of the grade of lieutenant general.
amendment no. 4264, as modified
At the end of title VI, add the following:
Subtitle F--Transition Assistance for Members of the National Guard and
Reserve Returning From Deployment in Operation Iraqi Freedom or
Operation Enduring Freedom
SEC. 681. SHORT TITLE.
This subtitle may be cited as the ``Heroes at Home Act of
2006''.
SEC. 682. SPECIAL WORKING GROUP ON TRANSITION TO CIVILIAN
EMPLOYMENT OF MEMBERS OF THE NATIONAL GUARD AND
RESERVE RETURNING FROM DEPLOYMENT IN OPERATION
IRAQI FREEDOM AND OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM.
(a) Working Group Required.--The Secretary of Defense shall
establish within the Department of Defense a working group to
identify and assess the needs of members of the National
Guard and Reserve returning from deployment in Operation
Iraqi Freedom or Operation Enduring Freedom in transitioning
to civilian employment on their return from such deployment.
(b) Members.--The working group established under
subsection (a) shall include a balance of individuals
appointed by the Secretary of Defense from among the
following:
(1) Personnel of the Department of Defense.
(2) With the concurrence of the Secretary of Veterans
Affairs, personnel of the Department of Veterans Affairs.
(3) With the concurrence of the Secretary of Labor,
personnel of the Department of Labor.
(c) Responsibilities.--The working group established under
subsection (a) shall--
(1) identify and assess the needs of members of the
National Guard and Reserve described in subsection (a) in
transitioning to civilian employment on their return from
deployment as described in that subsection, including the
needs of--
(A) members who were self-employed before deployment and
seek to return to such employment after deployment;
(B) members who were students before deployment and seek to
return to school or commence employment after deployment;
(C) members who have experienced multiple recent
deployments; and
(D) members who have been wounded or injured during
deployment; and
(2) develop recommendations on means of improving
assistance to members of the National Guard and Reserve
described in subsection (a) in meeting the needs identified
in paragraph (1) on their return from deployment as described
in subsection (a).
(d) Consultation.--In carrying out its responsibilities
under subsection (c), the working group established under
subsection (a) shall consult with the following:
(1) Appropriate personnel of the Small Business
Administration.
(2) Representatives of employers who employ members of the
National Guard and Reserve described in subsection (a) on
their return to civilian employment as described in that
subsection.
(3) Representatives of employee assistance organizations.
(4) Representatives of associations of employers.
(5) Representatives of organizations that assist wounded or
injured members of the National Guard and Reserves in finding
or sustaining employment.
(6) Representatives of such other public or private
organizations and entities as the working group considers
appropriate.
(e) Report.--
(1) In general.--Not later than one year after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the working group established
under subsection (a) shall submit to the Secretary of Defense
and Congress a report on its activities under subsection (c).
(2) Elements.--The report required by paragraph (1) shall
include the following:
(A) The results of the identification and assessment
required under subsection (c)(1).
(B) The recommendations developed under subsection (c)(2),
including recommendations on the following:
(i) The provision of outreach and training to employers,
employment assistance organizations, and associations of
employers on the employment and transition needs of members
of the National Guard and Reserve described in subsection (a)
upon their return from deployment as described in that
subsection.
(ii) The provision of outreach and training to employers,
employment assistance organizations, and associations of
employers on the needs of family members of such members.
(iii) The improvement of collaboration between the pubic
and private sectors in order to ensure the successful
transition of such members into civilian employment upon
their return from such deployment.
(3) Availability to public.--The Secretary shall take
appropriate actions to make the report under paragraph (1)
available to the public, including through the Internet
website of the Department of Defense.
(f) Termination.--
(1) In general.--The working group established under
subsection (a) shall terminate on the date that is two years
after the date of the enactment of this Act.
(2) Interim duties.--During the period beginning on the
date of the submittal of the report required by subsection
(e) and the termination of the working group under paragraph
(1), the working group shall serve as an advisory board to
the Office for Employers and Employment Assistance
Organizations under section 683.
(g) Employment Assistance Organization Defined.--In this
section, the term ``employment assistance organization''
means an organization or entity, whether public or private,
that provides assistance to individuals in finding or
retaining employment, including organizations and entities
under military career support programs.
SEC. 683. OFFICE FOR EMPLOYERS AND EMPLOYMENT ASSISTANCE
ORGANIZATIONS.
(a) Designation of Office.--
(1) In general.--The Secretary of Defense shall designate
an office within the Department of Defense to assist
employers, employment assistance organizations, and
associations of employers in facilitating the successful
transition to civilian employment of members of the National
Guard and Reserve returning from deployment in Operation
Iraqi Freedom or Operation Enduring Freedom.
(2) Name.--The office designated under this subsection
shall be known as the ``Office for Employers and Employment
Assistance Organizations'' (in this section referred to as
the ``Office'').
(3) Head.--The Secretary shall designate an individual to
act as the head of the Office.
(4) Integration.--In designating the Office, the Secretary
shall ensure close communication between the Office and the
military departments, including the commands of the reserve
components of the Armed Forces.
(b) Functions.--The Office shall have the following
functions:
(1) To provide education and technical assistance to
employers, employment assistance organizations, and
associations of employers to assist them in facilitating the
successful transition to civilian employment of members of
the National Guard and Reserve described in subsection (a) on
their return from deployment as described in that subsection.
(2) To provide education and technical assistance to
employers, employment assistance organizations, and
associations of employers to assist them in facilitating the
successful adjustment of family members of the National Guard
and Reserve to the deployment and return from deployment of
members of the National Guard and Reserve as described in
that subsection.
(c) Resources to Be Provided.--
(1) In general.--In carrying out the functions specified in
subsection (b), the Office shall provide employers,
employment assistance organizations, and associations of
employers resources, services, and assistance that include
the following:
(A) Guidelines on best practices and effective strategies.
(B) Education on the physical and mental health conditions
that can and may be experienced by members of the National
Guard and Reserve described in subsection (a) on their return
from deployment as described in that subsection in
transitioning to civilian employment, including Post
Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) and traumatic brain injury
(TBI), including education on--
(i) the detection of warning signs of such conditions;
(ii) the medical, mental health, and employment services
available to such members, including materials on services
offered by the Department of Defense, the Department of
Veterans Affairs (including through the vet center program
under section 1712A of title 38, United States Code), the
Department of Labor, military support programs, and community
mental health clinics; and
(iii) the mechanisms for referring such members for
services described in clause (ii) and for other medical and
mental health screening and care when appropriate.
(C) Education on the range and types of potential physical
and mental health effects of deployment and post-deployment
adjustment on family members of members of the National Guard
and Reserve described in subsection (a), including education
on--
(i) the detection of warning signs of such effects on
family members of members of the National Guard and Reserves;
(ii) the medical, mental health, and employment services
available to such family members, including materials on such
services as described in subparagraph (B)(ii); and
(iii) mechanisms for referring such family members for
services described in clause (ii) and for medical and mental
health screening and care when appropriate.
(D) Education on mechanisms, strategies, and resources for
accommodating and employing wounded or injured members of the
National Guard and Reserves in work settings.
(2) Provision of resources.--The Office shall make
resources, services, and assistance available under this
subsection through such mechanisms as the head of the Office
considers appropriate, including the Internet, video
conferencing, telephone services, workshops, trainings,
presentations, group forums, and other mechanisms.
(d) Personnel and Other Resources.--The Secretary of
Defense shall assign to the
[[Page S6380]]
Office such personnel, funding, and other resources as are
required to ensure the effective discharge by the Office of
the functions under subsection (b).
(e) Reports on Activities.--
(1) Annual report by office.--Not later than one year after
the designation of the Office, and annually thereafter, the
head of the Office, in consultation with the working group
established pursuant to section 682 (while in effect), shall
submit to the Secretary of Defense a written report on the
progress and outcomes of the Office during the one-year
period ending on the date of such report.
(2) Transmittal to congress.--Not later than 60 days after
receipt of a report under paragraph (1), the Secretary shall
transmit such report to the Committees on Armed Services of
the Senate and the House of Representatives, together with--
(A) such comments on such report, and such assessment of
the effectiveness of the Office, as the Secretary considers
appropriate; and
(B) such recommendations on means of improving the
effectiveness of the Office as the Secretary considers
appropriate.
(3) Availability to public.--The Secretary shall take
appropriate actions to make each report under paragraph (2)
available to the public, including through the Internet
website of the Office.
(f) Employment Assistance Organization Defined.--In this
section, the term ``employment assistance organization''
means an organization or entity, whether public or private,
that provides assistance to individuals in finding or
retaining employment, including organizations and entities
under military career support programs.
SEC. 684. ADDITIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES OF DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE TASK FORCE ON MENTAL HEALTH RELATING TO
MENTAL HEALTH OF MEMBERS OF THE NATIONAL GUARD
AND RESERVE DEPLOYED IN OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM
AND OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM.
(a) Additional Responsibilities.--Section 723 of the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006
(Public Law 109-163; 119 Stat. 3348) is amended--
(1) by redesignating subsections (d), (e), (f), and (g) as
subsections (e), (f), (g), and (h), respectively; and
(2) by inserting after subsection (c) the following new
subsection (d):
``(d) Assessment of Mental Health Needs of Members of
National Guard and Reserve Deployed in OIF or OEF.--
``(1) In general.--In addition to the activities required
under subsection (c), the task force shall, not later than 12
months after the date of the enactment of the Heroes at Home
Act of 2006, submit to the Secretary a report containing an
assessment and recommendations on the needs with respect to
mental health of members of the National Guard and Reserve
who are deployed in Operation Iraqi Freedom or Operation
Enduring Freedom upon their return from such deployment.
``(2) Elements.--The assessment and recommendations
required by paragraph (1) shall include the following:
``(A) An assessment of the specific needs with respect to
mental health of members of the National Guard and Reserve
who are deployed in Operation Iraqi Freedom or Operation
Enduring Freedom upon their return from such deployment.
``(B) An identification of mental health conditions and
disorders (including Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD),
suicide attempts, and suicide) occurring among members of the
National Guard and Reserve who undergo multiple deployments
in Operation Iraqi Freedom or Operation Enduring Freedom upon
their return from such deployment.
``(C) Recommendations on mechanisms for improving the
mental health services available to members of the National
Guard and Reserve who are deployed in Operation Iraqi Freedom
or Operation Enduring Freedom, including such members who
undergo multiple deployments in such operations, upon their
return from such deployment.''.
(b) Report.--Subsection (f) of such section, as
redesignated by subsection (a)(1) of this section, is further
amended--
(1) in the subsection heading, by striking ``Report'' and
inserting ``Reports'';
(2) by striking paragraph (1) and inserting the following
new paragraph (1):
``(1) In general.--The report submitted to the Secretary
under each of subsections (c) and (d) shall include--
``(A) a description of the activities of the task force
under such subsection;
``(B) the assessment and recommendations required by such
subsection; and
``(C) such other matters relating to the activities of the
task force under such subsection as the task force considers
appropriate.''; and
(3) in paragraph (2)--
(A) by striking ``the report under paragraph (1)'' and
inserting ``a report under paragraph (1)''; and
(B) by striking ``the report as'' and inserting ``such
report as''.
(c) Plan Matters.--Subsection (g) of such section, as
redesignated by subsection (a)(1) of this section, is further
amended--
(1) by striking ``the report from the task force under
subsection (e)(1)'' and inserting ``a report from the task
force under subsection (f)(1)''; and
(2) by inserting ``contained in such report'' after ``the
task force'' the second place it appears.
(d) Termination.--Subsection (h) of such section, as
redesignated by subsection (a)(1) of this section, is further
amended--
(1) by inserting ``with respect to the assessment and
recommendations required by subsection (d)'' after ``the task
force''; and
(2) by striking ``subsection (e)(2)'' and inserting
``subsection (f)(2)''.
SEC. 685. GRANTS ON ASSISTANCE IN COMMUNITY-BASED SETTINGS
FOR MEMBERS OF THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVE
AND THEIR FAMILIES AFTER DEPLOYMENT IN
OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM AND OPERATION ENDURING
FREEDOM.
(a) In General.--The Secretary of Defense may award grants
to eligible entities to carry out demonstration projects to
assess the feasibility and advisability of utilizing
community-based settings for the provision of assistance to
members of the National Guard and Reserve who serve in
Operation Iraqi Freedom or Operation Enduring Freedom, and
their families, after the return of such members from
deployment in Operation Iraqi Freedom or Operation Enduring
Freedom, as the case may be, including--
(1) services to improve the reuniting of such members of
the National Guard and Reserve and their families;
(2) education to increase awareness of the physical and
mental health conditions that members of the National Guard
and Reserve can and may experience on their return from such
deployment, including education on--
(A) Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) and traumatic
brain injury (TBI); and
(B) mechanisms for the referral of such members of the
National Guard and Reserve for medical and mental health
screening and care when necessary; and
(3) education to increase awareness of the physical and
mental health conditions that family members of such members
of the National Guard and Reserve can and may experience on
the return of such members from such deployment, including
education on--
(A) depression, anxiety, and relationship problems; and
(B) mechanisms for medical and mental health screening and
care when appropriate.
(b) Eligible Entities.--An entity eligible for the award of
a grant under this section is any public or private non-
profit organization, such as a community mental health
clinic, family support organization, military support
organization, law enforcement agency, community college, or
public school.
(c) Application.--An eligible entity seeking a grant under
this section shall submit to the Secretary of Defense an
application therefor in such manner, and containing such
information, as the Secretary may require for purposes of
this section, including a description of how such entity will
work with the Department of Defense, the Department of
Veterans Affairs, State health agencies, other appropriate
Federal, State, and local agencies, family support
organizations, and other community organization in
undertaking activities described in subsection (a).
(d) Annual Reports by Grant Recipients.--An entity awarded
a grant under this section shall submit to the Secretary of
Defense on an annual basis a report on the activities
undertaken by such entity during the preceding year utilizing
amounts under the grant. Each report shall include such
information as the Secretary shall specify for purposes of
this subsection.
(e) Annual Reports to Congress.--
(1) In general.--Not later than one year after the date of
the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the
Secretary of Defense shall submit to Congress a report on
activities undertaken under the grants awarded under this
section. The report shall include recommendations for
legislative, programmatic, or administrative action to
improve or enhance activities under the grants awarded under
this section.
(2) Availability to public.--The Secretary shall take
appropriate actions to make each report under this subsection
available to the public.
SEC. 686. LONGITUDINAL STUDY ON TRAUMATIC BRAIN INJURY
INCURRED BY MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES IN
OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM AND OPERATION ENDURING
FREEDOM.
(a) Study Required.--The Secretary of Defense shall, in
consultation with the Secretary of Veterans Affairs, conduct
a longitudinal study on the effects of traumatic brain injury
incurred by members of the Armed Forces in Operation Iraqi
Freedom or Operation Enduring Freedom. The duration of the
longitudinal study shall be 15 years.
(b) Elements.--The study required by subsection (a) shall
address the following:
(1) The long-term physical and mental health effects of
traumatic brain injuries incurred by members of the Armed
Forces during service in Operation Iraqi Freedom or Operation
Enduring Freedom.
(2) The health care, mental health care, and rehabilitation
needs of such members for such injuries after the completion
of inpatient treatment through the Department of Defense, the
Department of Veterans Affairs, or both.
(3) The type and availability of long-term care
rehabilitation programs and services within and outside the
Department of Defense and the Department of Veterans Affairs
for such members for such injuries, including community-based
programs and services and in-home programs and services.
(c) Reports.--
(1) Periodic and final reports.--After the third, seventh,
eleventh, and fifteenth years
[[Page S6381]]
of the study required by subsection (a), the Secretary of
Defense shall, in consultation with the Secretary of Veterans
Affairs, submit to Congress a comprehensive report on the
results of the study during the preceding years. Each report
shall include the following:
(A) Current information on the cumulative outcomes of the
study.
(B) Such recommendations as the Secretary of Defense and
the Secretary of Veterans Affairs jointly consider
appropriate based on the outcomes of the study, including
recommendations for legislative, programmatic, or
administrative action to improve long-term care and
rehabilitation programs and services for members of the Armed
Forces with traumatic brain injuries.
(2) Availability to public.--The Secretary of Defense and
the Secretary of Veterans Affairs shall jointly take
appropriate actions to make each report under this subsection
available to the public.
(d) Funding.--
(1) Authorization of appropriations.--There is authorized
to be appropriated to the Department of Defense to carry out
this section amounts as follows:
(A) For fiscal year 2007, $5,000,000.
(B) For each of fiscal years 2008 through 2021, such sums
as may be necessary.
(2) Offset.--The amount authorized to be appropriated by
section 102(a)(2) for weapons procurement for the Navy is
hereby reduced by $5,000,000, with the amount of the
reduction to be allocated to amounts for the Trident II
conventional modification program.
SEC. 687. TRAINING CURRICULA FOR FAMILY CAREGIVERS ON CARE
AND ASSISTANCE FOR MEMBERS AND FORMER MEMBERS
OF THE ARMED FORCES WITH TRAUMATIC BRAIN INJURY
INCURRED IN OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM AND
OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM.
(a) Traumatic Brain Injury Family Caregiver Panel.--
(1) Establishment.--The Secretary of Defense shall, in
consultation with the Secretary of Veterans Affairs,
establish within the Department of Defense a panel to develop
coordinated, uniform, and consistent training curricula to be
used in training family members in the provision of care and
assistance to members and former members of the Armed Forces
for traumatic brain injuries incurred during service in the
Armed Forces in Operation Iraqi Freedom or Operation Enduring
Freedom.
(2) Designation of panel.--The panel established under
paragraph (1) shall be known as the ``Traumatic Brain Injury
Family Caregiver Panel''.
(3) Members.--The Traumatic Brain Injury Family Caregiver
Panel established under paragraph (1) shall consist of 15
members appointed by the Secretary of Defense, in
consultation with the Secretary of Veterans Affairs, equally
represented from among--
(A) physicians, nurses, rehabilitation therapists, and
other individuals with an expertise in caring for and
assisting individuals with traumatic brain injury, including
those who specialize in caring for and assisting individuals
with traumatic brain injury incurred in war;
(B) representatives of family caregivers or family
caregiver associations;
(C) Department of Defense and Department of Veterans
Affairs health and medical personnel with expertise in
traumatic brain injury, and Department of Defense personnel
and readiness representatives with expertise in traumatic
brain injury;
(D) psychologists or other individuals with expertise in
the mental health treatment and care of individuals with
traumatic brain injury;
(E) experts in the development of training curricula; and
(F) any other individuals the Secretary considers
appropriate.
(b) Development of Curricula.--
(1) In general.--The Traumatic Brain Injury Family
Caregiver Panel shall develop training curricula to be
utilized during the provision of training to family members
of members and former members of the Armed Forces described
in subsection (a) on techniques, strategies, and skills for
care and assistance for such members and former members with
the traumatic brain injuries described in that subsection.
(2) Scope of curricula.--The curricula shall--
(A) be based on empirical research and validated
techniques; and
(B) shall provide for training that permits recipients to
tailor caregiving to the unique circumstances of the member
or former member of the Armed Forces receiving care.
(3) Particular requirements.--In developing the curricula,
the Traumatic Brain Injury Family Caregiver Panel shall--
(A) specify appropriate training commensurate with the
severity of traumatic brain injury; and
(B) identify appropriate care and assistance to be provided
for the degree of severity of traumatic brain injury for
caregivers of various levels of skill and capability.
(4) Use of existing materials.--In developing the
curricula, the Traumatic Brain Injury Family Caregiver Panel
shall utilize and enhance any existing training curricula,
materials, and resources applicable to such curricula as the
Panel considers appropriate.
(5) Deadline for development.--The Traumatic Brain Injury
Family Caregiver Panel shall develop the curricula not later
than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act.
(c) Dissemination of Curricula.--
(1) In general.--The Secretary of Defense shall, in
consultation with the Traumatic Brain Injury Family Caregiver
Panel, develop mechanisms for the dissemination of the
curricula developed under subsection (b) to health care
professionals referred to in paragraph (2) who treat or
otherwise work with members and former members of the Armed
Forces with traumatic brain injury incurred in Operation
Iraqi Freedom or Operation Enduring Freedom. In developing
such mechanisms, the Secretary may utilize and enhance
existing mechanisms, including the Military Severely Injured
Center.
(2) Health care professionals.--The health care
professionals referred to in this paragraph are the
following:
(A) Personnel at military medical treatment facilities.
(B) Personnel at the polytrauma centers of the Department
of Veterans Affairs.
(C) Personnel and care managers at the Military Severely
Injured Center.
(D) Such other health care professionals of the Department
of Defense as the Secretary considers appropriate.
(E) Such other health care professionals of the Department
of Veterans Affairs as the Secretary of Defense, in
consultation with the Secretary of Veterans Affairs,
considers appropriate.
(3) Provision of training to family caregivers.--
(A) In general.--Health care professionals referred to in
paragraph (2) who are trained in the curricula developed
under subsection (b) shall provide training to family members
of members and former members of the Armed Forces who incur
traumatic brain injuries during service in the Operation
Iraqi Freedom or Operation Enduring Freedom in the care and
assistance to be provided for such injuries.
(B) Timing of training.--Training under this paragraph
shall, to the extent practicable, be provided to family
members while the member or former member concerned is
undergoing treatment at a facility of the Department of
Defense or Department of Veterans Affairs, as applicable, in
order to ensure that such family members receive practice on
the provision of such care and assistance under the guidance
of qualified health professionals.
(C) Particularized training.--Training provided under this
paragraph to family members of a particular member or former
member shall be tailored to the particular care needs of such
member or former member and the particular caregiving needs
of such family members.
(4) Quality assurance.--The Secretary shall develop
mechanisms to ensure quality in the provision of training
under this section to health care professionals referred to
in paragraph (2) and in the provision of such training under
paragraph (4) by such health care professionals.
(5) Report.--Not later than one year after the development
of the curricula required by subsection (b), and annually
thereafter, the Traumatic Brain Injury Family Caregiver
Training Panel shall submit to the Secretary of Defense and
the Secretary of Veterans Affairs, and to Congress, a report
on the following:
(A) The actions undertaken under this subsection.
(B) The results of the tracking of outcomes based on
training developed and provided under this section.
(C) Recommendations for the improvement of training
developed and provided under this section.
(d) Funding.--
(1) Authorization of appropriations.--There is authorized
to be appropriated to the Department of Defense to carry out
this section amounts as follows:
(A) For fiscal year 2007, $1,000,000.
(B) For each of fiscal years 2008 through 2011, such sums
as may be necessary.
(2) Offset.--The amount authorized to be appropriated by
section 102(a)(2) for weapons procurement for the Navy is
hereby reduced by $1,000,000, with the amount of the
reduction to be allocated to amounts for the Trident II
conventional modification program.
amendment no. 4464
(Purpose: To provide a sunset date for the Small Business Competitive
Demonstration Program)
At the end of title X of division A, insert the following:
SEC. 1084. TERMINATION OF PROGRAM.
Section 711(c) of the Small Business Competitive
Demonstration Program Act of 1988 (15 U.S.C. 644 note) is
amended by inserting after ``January 1, 1989'' the following:
``, and shall terminate on the date of enactment of the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007''.
amendment no. 4489
(Purpose: To propose an alternative to section 1083 to improve the
Quadrennial Defense Review)
Strike section 1083 and insert the following:
SEC. 1083. QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW.
(a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
(1) The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) under section 118
of title 10, United States Code, is vital in laying out the
strategic military planning and threat objectives of the
Department of Defense.
[[Page S6382]]
(2) The Quadrennial Defense Review is critical to
identifying the correct mix of military planning assumptions,
defense capabilities, and strategic focuses for the Armed
Forces of the United States.
(b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that
the Quadrennial Defense Review is intended to provide more
than an overview of global threats and the general strategic
orientation of the Department of Defense.
(c) Improvements to Quadrennial Defense Review.--
(1) Conduct of review.--Subsection (b) of section 118 of
title 10, United States Code, is amended--
(A) in paragraph (2), by striking ``and'' at the end;
(B) in paragraph (3), by striking the period at the end and
inserting ``; and''; and
(C) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
``(4) to make recommendations that are not constrained to
comply with the budget submitted to Congress by the President
pursuant to section 1105 of title 31.''.
(2) Additional element in report to congress.--Subsection
(d) of such section is amended--
(A) in paragraph (1), by inserting ``, the strategic
planning guidance,'' after ``United States'';
(B) by redesignating paragraphs (9) through (15) as
paragraphs (10) through (16), respectively; and
(C) by inserting after paragraph (8) the following new
paragraph (9):
``(9) The specific capabilities, including the general
number and type of specific military platforms, needed to
achieve the strategic and warfighting objectives identified
in the review.''.
(3) CJCS review.--Subsection (e)(1) of such section is
amended by inserting before the period at the end the
following: `` and a description of the capabilities needed to
address such risk''.
(4) Independent assessment.--Such section is further
amended by adding at the end the following new subsection:
``(f) Independent Assessment.--(1) Not later than one year
before the date a report on a quadrennial defense review is
to be submitted to Congress under subsection (d), the
President shall appoint a panel to conduct an independent
assessment of the review.
``(2) The panel appointed under paragraph (1) shall be
composed of seven individuals (who may not be employees of
the Department of Defense) as follows:
``(A) Three members shall be appointed by the President.
``(B) One member shall be appointed by the President in
consultation with, and based on the recommendations of, the
Speaker of the House of Representatives.
``(C) One member shall be appointed by the President in
consultation with, and based on the recommendations of, the
Minority Leader of the House of Representatives.
``(D) One member shall be appointed by the President in
consultation with, and based on the recommendations of, the
Majority Leader of the Senate.
``(E) One member shall be appointed by the President in
consultation with, and based on the recommendations of, the
Minority Leader of the Senate.
``(3) Not later than three months after the date that the
report on a quadrennial defense review is submitted to
Congress under subsection (d), the panel appointed under
paragraph (2) shall provide to the congressional defense
committees an assessment of the assumptions, planning
guidelines, recommendations, and realism of the review.''.
amendment no. 4525
(Purpose: To require a report on Air Force safety requirements for Air
Force flight training operations at Pueblo Memorial Airport, Colorado)
At the end of subtitle D of title III, add the following:
SEC. 352. REPORT ON AIR FORCE SAFETY REQUIREMENTS FOR AIR
FORCE FLIGHT TRAINING OPERATIONS AT PUEBLO
MEMORIAL AIRPORT, COLORADO.
(a) Report Required.--Not later than February 15, 2007, the
Secretary of the Air Force shall submit to the congressional
defense committees a report on Air Force safety requirements
for Air Force flight training operations at Pueblo Memorial
Airport, Colorado.
(b) Elements.--The report required by subsection (a) shall
include the following:
(1) A description of the Air Force flying operations at
Pueblo Memorial Airport.
(2) An assessment of the impact of Air Force operations at
Pueblo Memorial Airport on non-Air Force activities at the
airport.
(3) A description of the requirements necessary at Pueblo
Memorial Airport to ensure safe Air Force flying operations,
including continuous availability of fire protection, crash
rescue, and other emergency response capabilities.
(4) An assessment of the necessity of providing for a
continuous fire-fighting capability at Pueblo Memorial
Airport.
(5) A description and analysis of alternatives for Air
Force flying operations at Pueblo Memorial Airport, including
the cost and availability of such alternatives.
(6) An assessment of whether Air Force funding is required
to assist the City of Pueblo, Colorado, in meeting Air Force
requirements for safe Air Force flight operations at Pueblo
Memorial Airport, and if required, the Air Force plan to
provide the funds to the City.
amendment no. 4526
(Purpose: To require the President to develop a comprehensive strategy
toward Somalia)
At the end of subtitle A of title XII, add the following:
SEC. 1209. COMPREHENSIVE STRATEGY FOR SOMALIA.
(a) Sense of Senate.--It is the sense of the Senate that
the United States should--
(1) support the development of the Transitional Federal
Institutions in Somalia into a unified national government,
support humanitarian assistance to the people of Somalia,
support efforts to prevent Somalia from becoming a safe haven
for terrorists and terrorist activities, and support regional
stability;
(2) broaden and integrate its strategic approach toward
Somalia within the context of United States activities in
countries of the Horn of Africa, including Djibouti,
Ethiopia, Kenya, Eritrea, and in Yemen on the Arabian
Peninsula; and
(3) carry out all diplomatic, humanitarian, counter-
terrorism, and security-related activities in Somalia within
the context of a comprehensive strategy developed through an
interagency process.
(b) Development of a Comprehensive Strategy for Somalia.--
(1) Requirement for strategy.--Not later then 90 days after
the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall
develop and submit to the appropriate committees of Congress
a comprehensive strategy toward Somalia within the context of
United States activities in the countries of the Horn of
Africa.
(2) Content of strategy.--The strategy should include the
following:
(A) A clearly stated policy towards Somalia that will help
establish a functional, legitimate, unified national
government in Somalia that is capable of maintaining the rule
of law and preventing Somalia from becoming a safe haven for
terrorists.
(B) An integrated political, humanitarian, intelligence,
and military approach to counter transnational security
threats in Somalia within the context of United States
activities in the countries of the Horn of Africa.
(C) An interagency framework to plan, coordinate, and
execute United States activities in Somalia within the
context of other activities in the countries of the Horn of
Africa among the agencies and departments of the United
States to oversee policy and program implementation.
(D) A description of the type and form of diplomatic
engagement to coordinate the implementation of the United
States policy in Somalia.
(E) A description of bilateral, regional, and multilateral
efforts to strengthen and promote diplomatic engagement in
Somalia.
(F) A description of appropriate metrics to measure the
progress and effectiveness of the United States policy
towards Somalia and throughout the countries of the Horn of
Africa.
(G) Guidance on the manner in which the strategy will be
implemented.
(c) Annual Reports.--Not later than April 1, 2007, and
annually thereafter, the President shall prepare and submit
to the appropriate committees of Congress a report on the
status of the implementation of the strategy.
(d) Form.--Each report under this section shall be
submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified
annex.
(e) Appropriate Committees of Congress Defined.--In this
section, the term ``appropriate committees of Congress''
means--
(1) the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on Armed
Services, the Committee on Foreign Relations, and the Select
Committee Intelligence of the Senate; and
(2) the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on Armed
Services, the Committees on International Relations, and the
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of
Representatives.
amendment no. 4327, As Modified
At the end of subtitle E of title VI, add the following:
SEC. 662. IMPROVEMENT OF MANAGEMENT OF ARMED FORCES
RETIREMENT HOME.
(a) Redesignation of Chief Operating Officer as Chief
Executive Officer.--
(1) In general.--Section 1515 of the Armed Forces
Retirement Home Act of 1991 (24 U.S.C. 415) is amended--
(A) by striking ``Chief Operating Officer'' each place it
appears and inserting ``Chief Executive Officer''; and
(B) in subsection (e)(1), by striking ``Chief Operating
Officer's'' and inserting ``Chief Executive Officer's''.
(2) Conforming amendments.--Such Act is further amended by
striking ``Chief Operating Officer'' each place it appears in
a provision as follows and inserting ``Chief Executive
Officer'':
(A) Section 1511 (24 U.S.C. 411).
(B) Section 1512 (24 U.S.C. 412).
(C) Section 1513(a) (24 U.S.C. 413(a)).
(D) Section 1514(c)(1) (24 U.S.C. 414(c)(1)).
(E) Section 1516(b) (24 U.S.C. 416(b)).
(F) Section 1517 (24 U.S.C. 417).
(G) Section 1518(c) (24 U.S.C. 418(c)).
(H) Section 1519(c) (24 U.S.C. 419(c)).
(I) Section 1521(a) (24 U.S.C. 421(a)).
(J) Section 1522 (24 U.S.C. 422).
(K) Section 1523(b) (24 U.S.C. 423(b)).
[[Page S6383]]
(L) Section 1531 (24 U.S.C. 431).
(3) Clerical amendments.--(A) The heading of section 1515
of such Act is amended to read as follows:
``SEC. 1515. CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER.''.
(B) The table of contents for such Act is amended by
striking the item relating to section 1515 and inserting the
following new item:
``Sec. 1515. Chief Executive Officer.''.
(4) References.--Any reference in any law, regulation,
document, record, or other paper of the United States to the
Chief Operating Officer of the Armed Forces Retirement Home
shall be considered to be a reference to the Chief Executive
Officer of the Armed Forces Retirement Home.
(b) Director and Deputy Director of Facilities.--
(1) Military director.--Subsection (b)(1) of section 1517
of such Act (24 U.S.C. 417) is amended by striking ``a
civilian with experience as a continuing care retirement
community professional or''.
(2) Civilian deputy director.--Subsection (d)(1)(A) of such
section is amended by striking ``or a member'' and all that
follows and inserting ``; and''.
(3) Effective date.--The amendments made by this subsection
shall take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act,
and shall apply with respect to any vacancy that occur in the
position of Director or Deputy Director of a facility of the
Armed Forces Retirement Home that occurs on or after that
date.
(c) Clarification of Membership on Local Board of
Trustees.--Section 1516(c)(1)(H) of such Act (24 U.S.C.
416(c)(1)(K)) is amended by inserting before the period at
the end the following: ``, who shall be a member of the Armed
Forces serving on active duty in the grade of brigadier
general, or in the case of the Navy, rear admiral (lower
half)''.
AMENDMENT NO. 4527
(Purpose: To require a report on the feasibility of establishing a
United States military regional combatant command for Africa)
At the end of subtitle G of title X, insert the following:
SEC. 1066. REPORT ON FEASIBILITY OF ESTABLISHING REGIONAL
COMBATANT COMMAND FOR AFRICA.
(a) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall
submit to the congressional defense committees and the
Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the
Committee on International Relations of the House of
Representatives a report on the establishment of a United
States Armed Forces regional combatant command for Africa.
(b) Content.--The report required under subsection (a)
shall include--
(1) a study on the feasibility and desirability of
establishing of a United States Armed Forces regional
combatant command for Africa;
(2) an assessment of the benefits and problems associated
with establishing such a command; and
(3) an estimate of the costs, time, and resources needed to
establish such a command.
AMENDMENT NO. 4434
(Purpose: To ensure proper education, training, and supervision of
personnel providing special education services for dependents of
members of the Armed Forces under extended benefits under TRICARE)
At the end of subtitle B of title VII, add the following:
SEC. 730. EDUCATION, TRAINING, AND SUPERVISION OF PERSONNEL
PROVIDING SPECIAL EDUCATION SERVICES UNDER
EXTENDED BENEFITS UNDER TRICARE.
Section 1079(d)(2) of title 10, United States Code is
amended by adding at the end the following: ``The regulations
shall include the following:
``(A) Requirements for education, training, and supervision
of individuals providing special education services known as
Applied Behavioral Analysis under this subsection that are in
addition to any other education, training, and supervision
requirements applicable to Board Certified Behavior Analysts
or Board Certified Associate Behavior Analysts or are
otherwise applicable to personnel providing such services
under applicable State law.
``(B) Metrics to identify and measure the availability and
distribution of individuals of various expertise in Applied
Behavioral Analysis in order to evaluate and assure the
availability of qualified personnel to meet needs for Applied
Behavioral Analysis under this subsection.''.
AMENDMENT NO. 4393, As Modified
At the end of subtitle D of title VII, add the following:
SEC. 762. TRANSFER OF CUSTODY OF THE AIR FORCE HEALTH STUDY
ASSETS TO MEDICAL FOLLOW-UP AGENCY.
(a) Transfer.--
(1) Notification of participants.--The Secretary of the Air
Force shall notify the participants of the Air Force Health
Study that the study as currently constituted is ending as of
September 30, 2006. In consultation with the Medical Follow-
up Agency (in this section referred to as the ``Agency'') of
the Institute of Medicine of the National Academy of
Sciences, the Secretary of the Air Force shall request the
written consent of the participants to transfer their data
and biological specimens to the Agency during fiscal year
2007 and written consent for the Agency to maintain the data
and specimens and make them available for additional studies.
(2) Completion of transfer.--Custodianship of the Air Force
Health Study shall be completely transferred to the Agency on
or before September 30, 2007. Assets to be transferred shall
include electronic data files and biological specimens of all
the study participants.
(3) Copies to archives.--The Air Force shall send paper
copies of all study documents to the National Archives.
(b) Report on Transfer.--
(1) Requirement.--Not later than 30 days after completion
of the transfer of the assets of the Air Force Health Study
under subsection (a), the Secretary of the Air Force shall
submit to the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate and
the Committee on Armed Services of the House of
Representatives a report on the transfer.
(2) Matters covered.--At a minimum, the report shall
include information on the number of study participants whose
data and biological specimens were not transferred, the
efforts that were taken to contact such participants, and the
reasons why the transfer of their data and specimens did not
occur.
(c) Disposition of Assets Not Transferred.--The Secretary
of the Air Force may not destroy any data or biological
specimens not transferred under subsection (a) until the
expiration of the one-year period following submission of the
report under subsection (b).
(d) Funding.--
(1) Costs of transfer of the funds available to the defense
health program.--The Secretary of Defense may make available
to the Air Force $850,000 for preparation, transfer of the
assets of the Air Force Health Study and shipment of data and
specimens to the Medical Follow-up Agency and the National
Archives during fiscal year 2007 from amounts available from
the Department of Defense for that year. The Secretary of
Defense is authorized to transfer the freezers and other
physical assets assigned to the Air Force Health Study to the
Agency without charge.
(2) Costs of collaboration of the funds available to the
defense health program.--The Secretary of Defense may
reimburse the National Academy of Sciences up to $200,000 for
costs of the Medical Follow-up Agency to collaborate with the
Air Force in the transfer and receipt of the assets of the
Air Force Health Study to the Agency during fiscal year 2007
from amounts available from the Department of Defense for
that year.
AMENDMENT NO. 4312
(Purpose: To expand and enhance the bonus to encourage members of the
Army to refer other persons for enlistment in the Army)
At the end of subtitle B of title VI, add the following:
SEC. 620. ENHANCEMENT OF BONUS TO ENCOURAGE MEMBERS OF THE
ARMY TO REFER OTHER PERSONS FOR ENLISTMENT IN
THE ARMY.
(a) Individuals Eligible for Bonus.--Subsection (a) of
section 645 of the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2006 (Public Law 109-163; 119 Stat. 3310) is
amended--
(1) by striking ``The Secretary'' and inserting the
following:
``(1) In general.--The Secretary'';
(2) by striking ``a member of the Army, whether in the
regular component of the Army or in the Army National Guard
or Army Reserve,'' and inserting ``an individual referred to
in paragraph (2)''; and
(3) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
``(2) Individuals eligible for bonus.--Subject to
subsection (c), the following individuals are eligible for a
referral bonus under this section:
``(A) A member in the regular component of the Army.
``(B) A member of the Army National Guard.
``(C) A member of the Army Reserve.
``(D) A member of the Army in a retired status, including a
member under 60 years of age who, but for age, would be
eligible for retired pay.
``(E) A civilian employee of the Department of the Army.''.
(b) Amount of Bonus.--Subsection (d) of such section is
amended to read as follows:
``(d) Amount of Bonus.--The amount of the bonus payable for
a referral under subsection (a) may not exceed $2,000. The
amount shall be payable in two lump sums as provided in
subsection (e).''.
(c) Payment of Bonus.--Subsection (e) of such section is
amended to read as follows:
``(e) Payment.--A bonus payable for a referral of a person
under subsection (a) shall be paid as follows:
``(1) Not more than $1,000 shall be paid upon the
commencement of basic training by the person referred.
``(2) Not more than $1,000 shall be paid upon the
completion of basic training and individual advanced training
by the person referred.''.
(d) Coordination With Receipt of Retired Pay.--Such section
is further amended--
(1) by redesignating subsection (g) as subsection (h); and
(2) by inserting after subsection (f) the following new
subsection (g):
``(g) Coordination With Receipt of Retired Pay.--A bonus
paid under this section
[[Page S6384]]
to a member of the Army in a retired status is in addition to
any compensation to such member is entitled under title 10,
37, or 38, United States Code, or under any other provision
of law.''.
(e) Effective Date.--The amendments made by this section
shall take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act,
and shall apply with respect to bonuses payable under section
645 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2006, as amended by this section, on or after that date.
amendment no. 4424
(Purpose: To modify certain requirements related to counterdrug
activities)
On page 387, line 7, strike ``and aircraft'' and insert
``and, subject to section 484(a) of the Foreign Assistance
Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2291c(a)), aircraft''.
On page 387, line 25, after ``congressional defense
committees'' the following: ``and the Committee on Foreign
Relations of the Senate and the Committee on International
Relations of the House of Representatives''.
On page 388, line 3, strike ``paragraphs (10)'' and insert
``paragraphs (1)''.
amendment no. 4416
(Purpose: To direct the Secretary of the Army to assume responsibility
for the annual operation and maintenance of the Fox Point Hurricane
Barrier, Providence, Rhode Island)
At the appropriate place, insert the following:
SEC. ___. FOX POINT HURRICANE BARRIER, PROVIDENCE, RHODE
ISLAND.
(a) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) The term ``Barrier'' means the Fox Point Hurricane
Barrier, Providence, Rhode Island.
(2) The term ``City'' means the city of Providence, Rhode
Island.
(3) The term ``Secretary'' means the Secretary of the Army,
acting through the Chief of Engineers.
(b) Responsibility for Barrier.--Not later than 2 years
after the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall
assume responsibility for the annual operation and
maintenance of the Barrier.
(c) Required Structures.--
(1) In general.--The City, in coordination with the
Secretary, shall identify any land and structures required
for the continued operation and maintenance, repair,
replacement, rehabilitation, and structural integrity of the
Barrier.
(2) Conveyance.--The City shall convey to the Secretary, by
quitclaim deed and without consideration, all rights, title,
and interests of the City in and to the land and structures
identified under paragraph (1).
(d) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized
to be appropriated to the Secretary such funds as are
necessary for each fiscal year to operate and maintain the
Barrier (including repair, replacement, and rehabilitation).
amendment no. 4364, as modified
At the end of subtitle B of title XXVIII, add the
following:
SEC. 2828. NAMING OF NAVY AND MARINE CORPS RESERVE CENTER AT
ROCK ISLAND, ILLINOIS, IN HONOR OF LANE EVANS,
A MEMBER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES.
Designation.--The Navy and Marine Corps Reserve Center at
Rock Island Arsenal, Illinois, shall be known and designated
as the ``Lane Evans Navy and Marine Corps Reserve Center''.
Any reference in a law, map, regulation, document, paper, or
other record of the United States to the Navy and Marine
Corps Reserve Center at Rock Island Arsenal shall be deemed
to be a reference to the Lane Evans Navy and Marine Corps
Reserve Center.
AMENDMENT NO. 4232
(Purpose: To name the new administration building at the Joint Systems
Manufacturing Center in Lima, Ohio, after Michael G. Oxley, a member of
the House of Representatives)
At the end of subtitle A of title XXVIII, add the
following:
SEC. 2814. NAMING OF ADMINISTRATION BUILDING AT JOINT SYSTEMS
MANUFACTURING CENTER IN LIMA, OHIO, AFTER
MICHAEL G. OXLEY, A MEMBER OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES.
The administration building under construction at the Joint
Systems Manufacturing Center in Lima, Ohio, shall, upon be
completion, be known and designated as the ``Michael G. Oxley
Administration and Technology Center''. Any reference in a
law, map, regulation, document, paper, or other record of the
United States to such administration building shall be deemed
to be a reference to the Michael G. Oxley Administration and
Technology Center.
AMENDMENT NO. 4528
(Purpose: To name a military family housing facility at Fort Carson,
Colorado, after Representative Joel Hefley)
On page 535, between lines 12 and 13, insert the following:
SEC. 2814. NAMING OF MILITARY FAMILY HOUSING FACILITY AT FORT
CARSON, COLORADO, IN HONOR OF JOEL HEFLEY, A
MEMBER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES.
The Secretary of the Army shall designate one of the
military family housing areas or facilities constructed for
Fort Carson, Colorado, using the authority provided by
subchapter IV of chapter 169 of title 10, United States Code,
as the ``Joel Hefley Village''. Any reference in any law,
regulation, map, document, record, or other paper of the
United States to the military housing area or facility
designated under this section shall be considered to be a
reference to Joel Hefley Village.
amendment no. 4529
(Purpose: To require the submittal to Congress of the Department of
Defense Supplemental and Cost of War Execution reports)
At the end of title XIV, insert the following:
SEC. 1414. SUBMITTAL TO CONGRESS OF DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
SUPPLEMENTAL AND COST OF WAR EXECUTION REPORTS.
Section 1221(c) of the National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2006 (Public Law 109-163; 119 Stat. 3462; 10
U.S.C. 113 note) is amended--
(1) in the subsection caption by inserting ``Congress and''
after ``Submission to''; and
(2) by inserting ``the congressional defense committees
and'' before ``the Comptroller General''.
amendment no. 4311
(Purpose: To provide that acceptance by a military officer of
appointment to the position of Director of National Intelligence or
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency shall be conditional upon
retirement of the officer after the assignment)
At the end of subtitle A of title V, add the following:
SEC. 509. CONDITION ON APPOINTMENT OF COMMISSIONED OFFICERS
TO POSITION OF DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL
INTELLIGENCE OR DIRECTOR OF THE CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.
(a) Condition.--
(1) In general.--Chapter 32 of title 10, United States
Code, is amended by adding at the end the following new
section:
``Sec. 529. Condition on appointment to certain positions:
Director of National Intelligence; Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency
``As a condition of appointment to the position of Director
of National Intelligence or Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency, an officer shall acknowledge that upon
termination of service in such position the officer shall be
retired in accordance with section 1253 of this title.''.
(2) Clerical amendment.--The table of sections at the
beginning of chapter 32 of such title is amended by adding at
the end the following new item:
``529. Condition on appointment to certain positions: Director of
National Intelligence; Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency.''.
(b) Retirement.--
(1) In general.--Chapter 63 of title 10, United States
Code, is amended by adding at the end the following new
section:
``Sec. 1253. Mandatory retirement: Director of National
Intelligence; Director of the Central Intelligence Agency
``Upon termination of the appointment of an officer to the
position of Director of National Intelligence or Director of
the Central Intelligence Agency, the Secretary of the
military department concerned shall retire the officer under
any provision of this title under which the officer is
eligible to retire.''.
(2) Clerical amendment.--The table of sections at the
beginning of chapter 63 of such title is amended by adding at
the end the following new item:
``1253. Mandatory retirement: Director of National Intelligence;
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.''.
(c) Effective Date.--The amendments made by this section
shall take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act,
and shall apply with respect to appointments of commissioned
officers of the Armed Forces to the position of Director of
National Intelligence or Director of the Central Intelligence
Agency on or after that date.
amendment no. 4228
(Purpose: Relating to the comprehensive review of the procedures of the
Department of Defense on mortuary affairs)
At the end of subtitle F of title V, add the following:
SEC. 587. COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW ON PROCEDURES OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ON MORTUARY AFFAIRS.
(a) Report.--As soon as practicable after the completion of
the comprehensive review of the procedures of the Department
of Defense on mortuary affairs, the Secretary of Defense
shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report
on the review.
(b) Additional Elements.--In conducting the comprehensive
review described in subsection (a), the Secretary shall also
address, in addition to any other matters covered by the
review, the following:
(1) The utilization of additional or increased
refrigeration (including icing) in combat theaters in order
to enhance preservation of remains.
(2) The relocation of refrigeration assets further forward
in the field.
(3) Specific time standards for the movement of remains
from combat units.
(4) The forward location of autopsy and embalming
operations.
(5) Any other matters that the Secretary considers
appropriate in order to speed the return of remains to the
United States in a non-decomposed state.
(c) Additional Element of Policy on Casualty Assistance to
Survivors of Military Decedents.--Section 562(b) of the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
[[Page S6385]]
Year 2006 (Public Law 109-163; 119 Stat. 3267; 10 U.S.C. 1475
note) is amended by adding at the end the following new
paragraph:
``(12) The process by which the Department of Defense, upon
request, briefs survivors of military decedents on the cause
of, and any investigation into, the death of such military
decedents and on the disposition and transportation of the
remains of such decedents, which process shall--
``(A) provide for the provision of such briefings by fully
qualified Department personnel;
``(B) ensure briefings take place as soon as possible after
death and updates are provided in a timely manner when new
information becomes available;
``(C) ensure that--
``(i) such briefings and updates relate the most complete
and accurate information available at the time of such
briefings or updates, as the case may be; and
``(ii) incomplete or unverified information is identified
as such during the course of such briefings or updates; and
``(D) include procedures by which such survivors shall,
upon request, receive updates or supplemental information on
such briefings or updates from qualified Department
personnel.''.
amendment no. 4439, as modified
At the end of subtitle B of title XII, add the following:
SEC. 1223. REPORTS ON THE DARFUR PEACE AGREEMENT.
Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of
this Act, and annually thereafter, the Secretary of Defense
shall submit to the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate
and the Committee on Armed Services of the House of
Representatives a detailed report on the Department of
Defense's role in assisting the parties to the Darfur Peace
Agreement of May 5, 2006 with implementing that Agreement.
Each such report shall include a description of--
(1) the assets that the United States military, in concert
with the United States North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
(NATO) allies, are able to offer the African Union Mission in
Sudan (AMIS) and any United Nations peacekeeping mission
authorized for Darfur;
(2) any plans of the Secretary of Defense to support the
AMIS by providing information regarding the location of
belligerents and potential violations of the Darfur Peace
Agreement and assistance to improve the AMIS use of
intelligence and tactical mobility;
(3) the resources that will be used during the current
fiscal year to provide the support described in paragraph (2)
and the resources that will be needed during the next fiscal
year to provide such support;
(4) the efforts of the Secretary of Defense and Secretary
of State to leverage troop contributions from other countries
to serve in the proposed United Nation peacekeeping mission
for Darfur;
(5) any plans of the Secretary of Defense to participate in
the deployment of any NATO mentoring or technical assistance
teams to Darfur to assist the AMIS; and
(6) any actions carried out by the Secretary of Defense to
address deficiencies in the AMIS communications systems,
particularly the interoperability of communications
equipment.
amendment no. 4530
(Purpose: To extend the patent term for the badges of the American
Legion, the American Legion Women's Auxiliary, and the Sons of the
American Legion, and for other purposes)
At the appropriate place, insert the following:
SEC. __. PATENT TERM EXTENSIONS FOR THE BADGES OF THE
AMERICAN LEGION, THE AMERICAN LEGION WOMEN'S
AUXILIARY, AND THE SONS OF THE AMERICAN LEGION.
(a) Patent Term Extension for the Badge of the American
Legion.--The term of a certain design patent numbered 54,296
(for the badge of the American Legion) is renewed and
extended for a period of 14 years beginning on the date of
enactment of this Act, with all the rights and privileges
pertaining to such patent.
(b) Patent Term Extension for the Badge of the American
Legion Women's Auxiliary.--The term of a certain design
patent numbered 55,398 (for the badge of the American Legion
Women's Auxiliary) is renewed and extended for a period of 14
years beginning on the date of enactment of this Act, with
all the rights and privileges pertaining to such patent.
(c) Patent Term Extension for the Badge of the Sons of the
American Legion.--The term of a certain design patent
numbered 92,187 (for the badge of the Sons of the American
Legion) is renewed and extended for a period of 14 years
beginning on the date of enactment of this Act, with all the
rights and privileges pertaining to such patent.
amendment no. 4337
(Purpose: Relating to intelligence on Iran)
At the end of subtitle A of title XII, add the following:
SEC. 1209. INTELLIGENCE ON IRAN.
(a) Submittal to Congress of Updated National Intelligence
Estimate on Iran.--
(1) Submittal required.--As soon as is practicable, but not
later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this
Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to
Congress an updated National Intelligence Estimate on Iran.
(2) Notice regarding submittal.--If the Director determines
that the National Intelligence Estimate required by paragraph
(1) cannot be submitted by the date specified in that
paragraph, the Director shall submit to Congress a report
setting forth--
(A) the reasons why the National Intelligence Estimate
cannot be submitted by such date; and
(B) an estimated date for the submittal of the National
Intelligence Estimate.
(3) Form.--The National Intelligence Estimate under
paragraph (1) shall be submitted in classified form.
Consistent with the protection of intelligence sources and
methods, an unclassified summary of the key judgments of the
National Intelligence Estimate should be submitted.
(4) Elements.--The National Intelligence Estimate submitted
under paragraph (1) shall address the following:
(A) The foreign policy and regime objectives of Iran.
(B) The current status of the nuclear programs of Iran,
including--
(i) an assessment of the current and projected capabilities
of Iran to design a nuclear weapon, to produce plutonium,
enriched uranium, and other weapons materials, to build a
nuclear weapon, and to deploy a nuclear weapon; and
(ii) an assessment of the intentions of Iran regarding
possible development of nuclear weapons, the motivations
underlying such intentions, and the factors that might
influence changes in such intentions.
(C) The military and defense capabilities of Iran,
including any non-nuclear weapons of mass destruction
programs and related delivery systems.
(D) The relationship of Iran with terrorist organizations,
the use by Iran of terrorist organizations in furtherance of
its foreign policy objectives, and the factors that might
cause Iran to reduce or end such relationships.
(E) The prospects for support from the international
community for various potential courses of action with
respect to Iran, including diplomacy, sanctions, and military
action.
(F) The anticipated reaction of Iran to the courses of
action set forth under subparagraph (E), including an
identification of the course or courses of action most likely
to successfully influence Iran in terminating or moderating
its policies of concern.
(G) The level of popular and elite support within Iran for
the Iran regime, and for its civil nuclear program, nuclear
weapons ambitions, and other policies, and the prospects for
reform and political change within Iran.
(H) The views among the populace and elites of Iran with
respect to the United States, including views on direct
discussions with or normalization of relations with the
United States.
(I) The views among the populace and elites of Iran with
respect to other key countries involved in nuclear diplomacy
with Iran.
(J) The likely effects and consequences of any military
action against the nuclear programs or other regime interests
of Iran.
(K) The confidence level of key judgments in the National
Intelligence Estimate, the quality of the sources of
intelligence on Iran, the nature and scope of any gaps in
intelligence on Iran, and any significant alternative views
on the matters contained in the National Intelligence
Estimate.
(b) Presidential Report on Policy Objectives and United
States Strategy Regarding Iran.--
(1) Report required.--As soon as is practicable, but not
later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this
Act, the President shall submit to Congress a report on the
following:
(A) The objectives of United States policy on Iran.
(B) The strategy for achieving such objectives.
(2) Form.--The report under paragraph (1) shall be
submitted in unclassified form with a classified annex, as
appropriate.
(3) Elements.--The report submitted under paragraph (1)
shall--
(A) address the role of diplomacy, incentives, sanctions,
other punitive measures and incentives, and other programs
and activities relating to Iran for which funds are provided
by Congress; and
(B) summarize United States contingency planning regarding
the range of possible United States military actions in
support of United States policy objectives with respect to
Iran.
(c) Director of National Intelligence Report on Process for
Vetting and Clearing Administration Officials' Statements
Drawn From Intelligence.--
(1) Report required.--As soon as is practicable, but not
later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this
Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to
Congress a report on the process for vetting and clearing
statements of Administration officials that are drawn from or
rely upon intelligence.
(2) Elements.--The report shall--
(A) describe current policies and practices of the Office
of the Director of National Intelligence and the intelligence
community for--
(i) vetting and clearing statements of senior
Administration officials that are drawn from or rely upon
intelligence; and
(ii) how significant misstatements of intelligence that may
occur in public statements of senior public officials are
identified,
[[Page S6386]]
brought to the attention of any such officials, and
corrected;
(B) assess the sufficiency and adequacy of such policies
and practices; and
(C) include any recommendations that the Director considers
appropriate to improve such policies and practices.
amendment no. 4531
(Purpose: To make available $2,900,000 from Operation and Maintenance,
Army, for the Virginia Military Institute for military training
infrastructure improvements)
At the end of subtitle B of title III, add the following:
SEC. 315. MILITARY TRAINING INFRASTRUCTURE IMPROVEMENTS AT
VIRGINIA MILITARY INSTITUTE.
Of the amount authorized to be appropriated by section
301(1) for operation and maintenance for the Army, $2,900,000
may be available to the Virginia Military Institute for
military training infrastructure improvements to provide
adequate field training of all Armed Forces Reserve Officer
Training Corps.
amendment no. 4411
(Purpose: To authorize $3,600,000 for military construction for the Air
National Guard of the United States to construct an engine inspection
and maintenance facility at Little Rock Air Force Base, Arkansas)
On page 519, line 21, strike ``$242,143,000'' and insert
``$245,743,000''.
amendment no. 4336
(Purpose: To require a report on the feasability of omitting Social
Security Numbers from military identification cards)
At the end of subtitle F of title V, add the following:
SEC. 587. REPORT ON OMISSION OF SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBERS ON
MILITARY IDENTIFICATION CARDS.
(a) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall submit
to Congress a report setting forth the assessment of the
Secretary of the feasibility of utilizing military
identification cards that do not contain, display or exhibit
the Social Security Number of the individual identified by
such military identification card.
(b) Military Identification Card Defined.--In this section,
the term ``military identification card'' has the meaning
given the term ``military ID card'' in section 1060b(b)(1) of
title 10, United States Code.
amendment no. 4361
(Purpose: To require that Congress be apprised periodically on the
implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement)
At the end of subtitle A of title XII, add the following:
SEC. 1209. REPORTS ON IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DARFUR PEACE
AGREEMENT.
(a) Requirement for Reports.--Not later than 30 days after
the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 60 days
thereafter until the date that the President submits the
certification described in subsection (b), the President
shall submit to Congress a report on the implementation of
the Darfur Peace Agreement of May 5, 2006, and the situation
in Darfur, Sudan. Each such report shall include--
(1) a description of the steps being taken by the
Government of Sudan, the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/
A), and other parties to the Agreement to uphold their
commitments to--
(A) demobilize and disarm the Janjaweed, as stated in
paragraphs 214(F), 338, 339, 340, 366, 387, and 368 of the
Agreement;
(B) provide secure, unfettered access for humanitarian
personnel and supplies, as stated in paragraph 214(E) of the
Agreement;
(C) ensure that foreign combatants respect the provisions
of the Agreement, as stated in paragraphs 341 through 344 of
the Agreement; and
(D) expedite the safe and voluntary return of internally-
displaced persons and refugees to their places of origin, as
stated in paragraphs 182 through 187 of the Agreement;
(2) a description of any violation of the Agreement and any
delay in implementing the Agreement, including any such
violation or delay that compromises the safety of civilians,
and the names of the individuals or entities responsible for
such violation or delay;
(3) a description of any attacks against civilians and any
activities that disrupt implementation of the Agreement by
armed persons who are not a party to the Agreement; and
(4) a description of the ability of the Ceasefire
Commission, the African Union Mission in Sudan, and the other
organizations identified in the Agreement to monitor the
implementation of the Agreement, and a description of any
obstruction to such monitoring.
(b) Certification.--The certification described in this
subsection is a certification made by the President and
submitted to Congress that the Government of Sudan has
fulfilled its obligations under the Darfur Peace Agreement of
May 5, 2006, to demobilize and disarm the Janjaweed and to
protect civilians.
(c) Form and Availability of Reports.--
(1) Form.--A report submitted under this section shall be
in an unclassified form and may include a classified annex.
(2) Availability.--The President shall make the
unclassified portion of a reported submitted under this
section available to the public.
AMENDMENT NO. 4532
(Purpose: To require a report on the use of alternative fuels by the
Department of Defense)
At the end of subtitle D of title III, add the following:
SEC. 352. REPORT ON USE OF ALTERNATIVE FUELS BY THE
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE.
(a) Study.--The Secretary of Defense shall conduct a study
on the use of alternative fuels by the Armed Forces and the
Defense Agencies, including any measures that can be taken to
increase the use of such fuels by the Department of Defense
and the Defense Agencies.
(b) Elements.--The study shall address each matter set
forth in paragraphs (1) through (7) of section 357(b) of the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006
(Public Law 109-163; 119 Stat. 3207) with respect to
alternative fuels (rather than to the fuels specified in such
paragraphs).
(c) Report.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall submit to the
Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of
Representatives a report on the study conducted under this
section.
(2) Manner of submittal.--The report required by this
subsection may be incorporated into, or provided as an annex
to, the study required by section 357(c) of the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006.
(d) Alternative Fuels Defined.--In this section, the term
``alternative fuels'' means biofuels, biodiesel, renewable
diesel, ethanol that contain less than 85 percent ethyl
alcohol, and cellulosic ethanol.
AMENDMENT NO. 4533
(Purpose: To make available an additional $450,000,000 for Research,
Development, Test, and Evaluation, Defense-wide and provide an
offsetting reduction for a certain military intelligence program)
At the end of subtitle D of title X, add the following:
SEC. 1035. FUNDING FOR A CERTAIN MILITARY INTELLIGENCE
PROGRAM.
(a) Increase in Amount for Research, Development, Test, and
Evaluation, Defense-Wide.--The amount authorized to be
appropriated by section 201(4) for research, development,
test, and evaluation for Defense-wide activities is hereby
increased by $450,000,000.
(b) Offset.--The amount authorized to be appropriated by
section 201(3) for research, development, test, and
evaluation for the Air Force is hereby decreased by
$450,000,000, with the amount of the reduction to be
allocated to amounts available for a classified program as
described on page 34 of Volume VII (Compartmented Annex) of
the Fiscal Year 2007 Military Intelligence Program
justification book.
AMENDMENT NO. 4534
(Purpose: To authorize the prepositioning of Department of Defense
assets to improve support to civilian authorities)
At the end of subtitle F of title III, add the following:
SEC. 375. PREPOSITIONING OF DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ASSETS TO
IMPROVE SUPPORT TO CIVILIAN AUTHORITIES.
(a) Prepositioning Authorized.--The Secretary of Defense
may provide for the prepositioning of prepackaged or
preidentified basic response assets, such as medical
supplies, food and water, and communications equipment, in
order to improve Department of Defense support to civilian
authorities.
(b) Reimbursement.--To the extent required by section 1535
of title 31, United States Code (popularly known as the
``Economy Act''), or other applicable law, the Secretary
shall require reimbursement of the Department of Defense for
costs incurred in the prepositioning of basic response assets
under subsection (a).
(c) Limitation.--Basic response assets may not be
prepositioned under subsection (a) if the prepositioning of
such assets will adversely affect the military preparedness
of the United States.
(d) Procedures and Guidelines.--The Secretary may develop
procedures and guidelines applicable to the prepositioning of
basic response assets under this section.
AMENDMENT NO. 4535
(Purpose: To provide for energy efficiency in new construction)
On page 531, strike lines 7 through 13 and insert the
following:
(3) in subsection (b)(2)(A), by striking ``installations of
the Department of Defense as may be designated'' and
inserting ``installations of the Department of Defense and
related to such vehicles and military support equipment of
the Department of Defense as may be designated'';
(4) by redesignating subsections (e) and (f) as subsections
(f) and (g), respectively; and
(5) by inserting after subsection (d) the following new
subsection:
``(e) Energy Efficiency in New Construction.--
``(1) The Secretary of Defense shall ensure, to the maximum
extent practicable, that energy efficient products meeting
the Department's requirements, if cost effective over the
life cycle of the product and readily available, be used in
new facility construction by or for the Department carried
out under this chapter.
[[Page S6387]]
``(2) In determining the energy efficiency of products, the
Secretary shall consider products that--
``(A) meet or exceed Energy Star specifications; or
``(B) are listed on the Department of Energy's Federal
Energy Management Program Product Energy Efficiency
Recommendations product list.''.
AMENDMENT NO. 4381, As Modified
On page 178, between lines 10 and 11, insert the following:
(c) Transition of Military Dependents From Military to
Civilian Schools.--
(1) In general.--The Secretary of Defense shall work
collaboratively with the Secretary of Education in any
efforts to ease the transition of dependents of members of
the Armed Forces from attendance in Department of Defense
dependent schools to civilian schools in systems operated by
local educational agencies.
(2) Utilization of existing resources.--In working with the
Secretary of Education under paragraph (1), the Secretary of
Defense may utilize funds authorized to be appropriated for
operation and maintenance for Defense-wide activities to
share expertise and experience of the Department of Defense
Education Activity with local educational agencies as
dependents of members of the Armed Forces make the transition
from attendance at Department of Defense dependent schools to
attendance at civilian schools in systems operated by such
local educational agencies, including such transitions
resulting from defense base closure and realignment, global
rebasing, and force restructuring.
(3) Definitions.--In this subsection:
(A) The term ``expertise and experience'', with respect to
the Department of Defense Education Activity, means resources
of such activity relating to--
(i) academic strategies which result in increased academic
achievement;
(ii) curriculum development consultation and materials;
(iii) teacher training resources and materials;
(iv) access to virtual and distance learning technology
capabilities and related applications for teachers; and
(v) such other services as the Secretary of Defense
considers appropriate to improve the academic achievement of
such students.
(B) The term ``local educational agency'' has the meaning
given that term in section 8013(9) of the Elementary and
Secondary Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 7713(9)).
(4) Expiration.--The authority of the Secretary of the
Defense under this subsection shall expire on September 30,
2011.
AMENDMENT NO. 4429
(Purpose: To authorize the donation of the SS Arthur M. Huddell to the
Government of Greece)
At the end of subtitle B of title X, add the following:
SEC. 1013. AUTHORITY TO DONATE SS ARTHUR M. HUDDELL TO THE
GOVERNMENT OF GREECE.
(a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
(1) It is in the economic and environmental interests of
the United States to promote the disposal of vessels in the
National Defense Reserve Fleet that are of insufficient value
to warrant further preservation.
(2) The Maritime Administration of the Department of
Transportation has been authorized to make such disposals,
including the sale and recycling of such vessels and the
donation of such vessels to any State, commonwealth, or
possession of the United States, and to nonprofit
organizations.
(3) The government of Greece has expressed an interest in
obtaining and using the ex-Liberty ship, SS ARTHUR M.
HUDDELL, for purposes of a museum exhibit.
(4) It is in the interest of the United States to authorize
the Maritime Administration to donate SS ARTHUR M. HUDDELL to
Greece.
(b) Donation of SS ARTHUR M. HUDDELL to Government of
Greece.--Notwithstanding Section 510(j) of the Merchant
Marine Act, 1936 (46 App. U.S.C. 1158), the Secretary of
Transportation is authorized to transfer SS ARTHUR M.
HUDDELL, by gift, to the Government of Greece, in accordance
with terms and conditions determined by the Secretary.
(c) Additional Equipment.--The Secretary may convey
additional equipment from other obsolete vessels of the
National Defense Reserve Fleet to assist the Government of
Greece under this section for purposes of the museum exhibit
referred to in subsection (a)(3).
AMENDMENT NO. 4398
At the end of subtitle D of title II, add the following:
SEC. 257. REPORT ON BIOMETRICS PROGRAMS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE.
(a) Report.--The Secretary of Defense shall submit to
Congress, at the same time as the submittal of the budget of
the President for fiscal year 2008 (as submitted under
section 1105(a) of title 31, United States Code) a report on
the biometrics programs of the Department of Defense.
(b) Elements.--The report shall address the following:
(1) Whether the Department should modify the current
executive agent management structure for the biometrics
programs.
(2) The requirements for the biometrics programs to meet
needs throughout the Department of Defense.
(3) A description of programs currently fielded to meet
requirements in Iraq and Afghanistan.
(4) An assessment of the adequacy of fielded programs to
meet operational requirements.
(5) An assessment of programmatic or capability gaps in
meeting future requirements.
(6) The actions being taken within the Executive Branch to
coordinate and integrate requirements, programs, and
resources among the departments and agencies of the Executive
Branch with a role in using or developing biometrics
capabilities.
(c) Biometrics Defined.--In this section, the term
``biometrics'' means an identity management program or system
that utilizes distinct personal attributes, including DNA,
facial features, irises, retinas, signatures, or voices, to
identify individuals.
amendment no. 4451, as modified
At the end of subtitle G of title X, add the following:
SEC. 1066. ANNUAL REPORTS ON EXPANDED USE OF UNMANNED AERIAL
VEHICLES IN THE NATIONAL AIRSPACE SYSTEM.
(a) Findings.--The Senate makes the following findings:
(1) Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) serve Department of
Defense intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and
combat missions.
(2) Operational reliability of unmanned systems continues
to improve and sense-and-avoid technology development and
fielding must continue in an effort to provide unmanned
aerial systems with an equivalent level of safety to manned
aircraft..
(3) Unmanned aerial vehicles have the potential to support
the Nation's homeland defense mission, border security
mission, and natural disaster recovery efforts.
(4) Accelerated development and testing of standards for
the integration of unmanned aerial vehicles in the National
Airspace System would further the increased safe use of such
vehicles for border security, homeland defense, and natural
disaster recovery efforts.
(b) Annual Reports.--Not later than one year after the date
of the enactment of this Act and annually thereafter until
the Federal Aviation Administration promulgates such policy,
the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the Committees on
Armed Services, Commerce, Science and Transportation, and
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate and
the Committees on Armed Services, Energy and Commerce, and
Government Reform of the House of Representatives a report on
the actions of the Department of Defense to support the
development by the Federal Aviation Administration of a
policy on the testing and operation of unmanned aerial
vehicles in the National Airspace System.
AMENDMENT NO. 4536
(Purpose: To require a report on the incorporation of elements of the
reserve components into the Special Forces in the expansion of the
Special Forces)
At the end of subtitle C of title IX, add the following:
SEC. 924. REPORT ON INCORPORATION OF ELEMENTS OF THE RESERVE
COMPONENTS INTO THE SPECIAL FORCES.
(a) Findings.--The Senate makes the following findings:
(1) The Quadrennial Defense Review recommends an increase
in the size of the Special Operations Command and the Special
Forces as a fundamental part of our efforts to fight the war
on terror.
(2) The Special Forces play a crucial role in the war on
terror, and the expansion of their force structure as
outlined in the Quadrennial Defense Review should be fully
funded.
(3) Expansion of the Special Forces should be consistent
with the Total Force Policy.
(4) The Secretary of Defense should assess whether the
establishment of additional reserve component Special Forces
units and associated units is consistent with the Total Force
Policy.
(5) Training areas in high-altitude and mountainous areas
represent a national asset for preparing Special Forces units
and personnel for duty in similar regions of Central Asia.
(b) Report on Incorporation of Elements Into Special
Forces.--Not later than six months after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall submit
to the congressional defense committees a report to address
whether units and capabilities should be incorporated into
the reserve components of the Armed Forces as part of the
expansion of the Special Forces as outlined in the
Quadrennial Defense Review, and consistent with the Total
Force Policy.
(c) Report on Special Forces Training.--Not later than six
months after the date of the enactment of this Act, the
Secretary of Defense shall submit to the congressional
defense committees a report on the effort taken by the U.S.
Special Operations Command to provide Special Forces training
in high-altitude and mountainous areas within the United
States.
AMENDMENT NO. 4537
(Purpose: To express the sense of the Senate on the Transformational
Medical Technology Initiative of the Department of Defense)
At the end of subtitle D of title VII, add the following:
[[Page S6388]]
SEC. 762. SENSE OF SENATE ON THE TRANSFORMATIONAL MEDICAL
TECHNOLOGY INITIATIVE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE.
(a) Findings.--The Senate finds the following:
(1) The most recent Quadrennial Defense Review and other
studies have identified the need to develop broad-spectrum
medical countermeasures against the threat of genetically
engineered bioterror agents.
(2) The Transformational Medical Technology Initiative of
the Department of Defense implements cutting edge
transformational medical technologies and applies them to
address the challenges of known, emerging, and bioengineered
threats.
(3) The Transformational Medical Technology Initiative is
designed to provide such technologies in a much shorter
timeframe, and at lower cost, than is required with
traditional approaches.
(b) Sense of Senate.--It is the sense of the Senate that--
(1) the Transformational Medical Technology Initiative is
an important effort to provide needed capability within the
Department of Defense to field effective broad-spectrum
countermeasures against a significant array of current and
future biological threats; and
(2) innovative technological approaches to achieve broad-
spectrum medical countermeasures are a necessary component of
the capacity of the Department to provide chemical-biological
defense and force protection capabilities for the Armed
Forces.
AMENDMENT NO. 4538
(Purpose: To provide for the enhancement of funeral ceremonies for
veterans)
At the end of subtitle F of title V, add the following:
SEC. 587. FUNERAL CEREMONIES FOR VETERANS.
(a) Support for Ceremonies by Details Consisting Solely of
Members of Veterans and Other Organizations.--
(1) Support of ceremonies.--Section 1491 of title 10,
United States Code, is amended--
(A) by redesignating subsections (e), (f), (g), and (h) as
subsections (f), (g), (h), and (i), respectively; and
(B) by inserting after subsection (d) the following new
subsection (e):
``(e) Support for Funeral Honors Details Composed of
Members of Veterans Organizations.--(1) Subject to such
regulations and procedures as the Secretary of Defense may
prescribe, the Secretary of the military department of which
a veteran was a member may support the conduct of funeral
honors for such veteran that are provided solely by members
of veterans organizations or other organizations referred to
in subsection (b)(2).
``(2) The provision of support under this subsection is
subject to the availability of appropriations for that
purpose.
``(3) The support provided under this subsection may
include the following:
``(A) Reimbursement for costs incurred by organizations
referred to in paragraph (1) in providing funeral honors,
including costs of transportation, meals, and similar costs.
``(B) Payment to members of such organizations providing
such funeral honors of the daily stipend prescribed under
subsection (d)(2).''.
(2) Conforming amendments.--Such section is further
amended--
(A) in subsection (d)(2), by inserting ``and subsection
(e)'' after ``paragraph (1)(A)''; and
(B) in paragraph (1) of section (f), as redesignated by
subsection (a)(1) of this section, by inserting ``(other than
a requirement in subsection (e)'' after ``pursuant to this
section''.
(b) Use of Excess M-1 Rifles for Ceremonial and Other
Purposes.--Section 4683 of such title is amended--
(1) in subsection (a), by adding at the end the following
new paragraph:
``(3) Rifles loaned or donated under paragraph (1) may be
used by an eligible designee for funeral ceremonies of a
member or former member of the armed forces and for other
ceremonial purposes.'';
(2) in subsection (c), by inserting after
``accountability'' the following: ``, provided that such
conditions do not unduly hamper eligible designees from
participating in funeral ceremonies of a member or former
member of the armed forces or other ceremonies'';
(3) in subsection (d)--
(A) in paragraph (2), by striking ``; or'' and inserting
``or fire department;'';
(B) in paragraph (3), by striking the period at the end and
inserting ``; or''; and
(C) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
``(4) any other member in good standing of an organization
described in paragraphs (1), (2), or (3).''; and
(4) by adding at the end the following new subsection:
``(e) Eligible Designee Defined.--In this section, the term
`eligible designee' means a designee of an eligible
organization who--
``(1) is a spouse, son, daughter, nephew, niece, or other
family relation of a member or former member of the armed
forces;
``(2) is at least 18 years of age; and
``(3) has successfully completed a formal firearm training
program or a hunting safety program.''.
AMENDMENT NO. 4303
(Purpose: To provide for the recovery and availability to the
Corporation for the Promotion of Rifle Practice and Firearms Safety of
certain firearms, ammunition, and parts)
At the end of subtitle F of title III, add the following:
SEC. 375. RECOVERY AND AVAILABILITY TO CORPORATION FOR THE
PROMOTION OF RIFLE PRACTICE AND FIREARMS SAFETY
OF CERTAIN FIREARMS, AMMUNITION, AND PARTS.
(a) In General.--Subchapter II of chapter 407 of title 36,
United States Code, is amended by inserting after the item
relating to section 40728 the following new section:
``Sec. 40728A. Recovery and availability of excess firearms,
ammunition, and parts granted to foreign countries
``(a) Recovery.--The Secretary of the Army may recover from
any country to which a grant of rifles, ammunition, repair
parts, or other supplies described in section 40731(a) of
this title is made under section 505 of the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2314) any such rifles,
ammunition, repair parts, or supplies that are excess to the
needs of such country.
``(b) Cost of Recovery.--(1) Except as provided in
paragraph (2), the cost of recovery of any rifles,
ammunition, repair parts, or supplies under subsection (a)
shall be treated as incremental direct costs incurred in
providing logistical support to the corporation for which
reimbursement shall be required as provided in section
40727(a) of this title.
``(2) The Secretary may require the corporation to pay
costs of recovery described in paragraph (1) in advance of
incurring such costs. Amounts so paid shall not be subject to
the provisions of section 3302 of title 31, but shall be
administered in accordance with the last sentence of section
40727(a) of this title.
``(c) Availability.--Any rifles, ammunition, repair parts,
or supplies recovered under subsection (a) shall be available
for transfer to the corporation in accordance with the
provisions of section 40728 of this title under such
additional terms and conditions as the Secretary shall
prescribe for purposes of this section.''.
(b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of sections at the
beginning of chapter 407 of such title is amended by
inserting after the item relating to section 40728 the
following new item:
``40728A. Recovery and availability of excess firearms, ammunition, and
parts granted to foreign countries.''.
AMENDMENT NO. 4539
(Purpose: To provide that the Secretary of the Army may authorize
family members of a member of the armed forces on active duty who is
occupying military family housing units leased under the exception
provided for United States Southern Command personnel to remain in such
units while the soldier is assigned to a family-member-restricted area)
At the end of subtitle A of title XXVIII, add the
following:
SEC. 2814. AUTHORITY TO OCCUPY UNITED STATES SOUTHERN COMMAND
FAMILY HOUSING.
(a) The Secretary of the Army may authorize family members
of a member of the armed forces on active duty who is
occupying a housing unit leased under section 2828(b)(4) of
title 10, United States Code and who is assigned to a family-
member-restricted area to remain in the leased housing unit
until the member completes the family-member-restricted tour.
Costs incurred for such housing during such tour shall be
included in the costs subject to the limitation under
subparagraph (B) of that paragraph.
(b) The authority granted by subsection (a) shall expire on
September 30, 2008.
amendment no. 4423
(Purpose: To limit the availability of funds for certain purposes
relating to Iraq)
At the end of title XIV, add the following:
SEC. 1414. LIMITATION ON AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS FOR CERTAIN
PURPOSES RELATING TO IRAQ.
No funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act may be
obligated or expended for a purpose as follows:
(1) To establish a permanent United States military
installation or base in Iraq.
(2) To exercise United States control over the oil
resources of Iraq.
amendment no. 4316
(Purpose: To provide for the conveyance of land located in Hopkinton,
New Hampshire)
At the end of subtitle D of title XXVIII, add the
following:
SEC. 2844. LAND CONVEYANCE, HOPKINTON, NEW HAMPSHIRE.
(a) Conveyance Authorized.--The Secretary of the Army may
convey to the Town of Hopkinton, New Hampshire (in this
section referred to as the ``Town''), all right, title, and
interest of the United States in and to a parcel of real
property, including any improvements thereon, consisting of
approximately 90 acres located at a site in Hopkinton, New
Hampshire, known as the ``Kast Hill'' property for the
purpose of permitting the Town to use the existing sand and
gravel resources on the property and to ensure perpetual
conservation of the property.
(b) Consideration.--
(1) In general.--As consideration for the conveyance under
subsection (a), the Town shall, subject to paragraph (2),
provide to the United States, whether by cash payment, in-
kind consideration, or a combination thereof, an amount that
is not less than the fair market value of the conveyed
property, as
[[Page S6389]]
determined pursuant to an appraisal acceptable to the
Secretary.
(2) Waiver of payment of consideration.--The Secretary may
waive the requirement for consideration under paragraph (1)
if the Secretary determines that the Town will not use the
existing sand and gravel resources to generate revenue.
(c) Reversionary Interest.--If the Secretary determines at
any time that the real property conveyed under subsection (a)
is not being used in accordance with the purpose of the
conveyance specified in such subsection, all right, title,
and interest in and to all or any portion of the property
shall revert, at the option of the Secretary, to the United
States, and the United States shall have the right of
immediate entry onto the property. Any determination of the
Secretary under this subsection shall be made on the record
after an opportunity for a hearing.
(d) Prohibition on Reconveyance of Land.--The Town may not
reconvey any of the land acquired from the United States
under subsection (a) without the prior approval of the
Secretary.
(e) Payment of Costs of Conveyance.--
(1) Payment required.--The Secretary shall require the Town
to cover costs to be incurred by the Secretary, or to
reimburse the Secretary for costs incurred by the Secretary,
to carry out the conveyance under subsection (a), including
survey costs, costs related to environmental documentation,
and other administrative costs related to the conveyance. If
amounts are collected from the Town in advance of the
Secretary incurring the actual costs, and the amount
collected exceeds the costs actually incurred by the
Secretary to carry out the conveyance, the Secretary shall
refund the excess amount to the Town.
(2) Treatment of amounts received.--Amounts received as
reimbursement under paragraph (1) shall be credited to the
fund or account that was used to cover the costs incurred by
the Secretary in carrying out the conveyance. Amounts so
credited shall be merged with amounts in such fund or account
and shall be available for the same purposes, and subject to
the same conditions and limitations, as amounts in such fund
or account.
(f) Description of Property.--The exact acreage and legal
description of the real property to be conveyed under
subsection (a) shall be determined by a survey satisfactory
to the Secretary.
(g) Additional Terms and Conditions.--The Secretary may
require such additional terms and conditions in connection
with the conveyance of real property under subsection (a) as
the Secretary consider appropriate to protect the interests
of the United States.
amendment no. 4407
(Purpose: To authorize $1,000,000 for the phase 1 construction of an
air traffic control complex at Minot Air Force Base, North Dakota, and
to provide an offset)
On page 502, in the table preceding line 1, strike
``$8,000,000'' in the amount column of the item relating to
Minot Air Force Base, North Dakota, and insert
``$9,000,000''.
On page 503, in the table following line 10, strike
``$171,188,000'' in the amount column of the item relating to
Minot Air Force Base, North Dakota, and insert
``$170,188,000''.
On page 504, line 23, strike ``$862,661,000'' and insert
``$863,661,000''.
On page 505, line 16, strike ``$1,183,138,000'' and insert
``$1,182,138,000''.
amendment no. 4366
(Purpose: To provide for an independent review and assessment of the
organization and management of the Department of Defense for national
security in space)
At the end of subtitle B of title IX, add the following:
SEC. 913. INDEPENDENT REVIEW AND ASSESSMENT OF DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT FOR
NATIONAL SECURITY IN SPACE.
(a) Independent Review and Assessment Required.--
(1) In general.--The Secretary of Defense shall provide for
an independent review and assessment of the organization and
management of the Department of Defense for national security
in space.
(2) Conduct of review.--The review and assessment shall be
conducted by an appropriate entity outside the Department of
Defense selected by the Secretary for purposes of this
section.
(3) Elements.--The review and assessment shall address the
following:
(A) The requirements of the Department of Defense for
national security space capabilities, as identified by the
Department, and the efforts of the Department to fulfill such
requirements.
(B) The future space missions of the Department, and the
plans of the Department to meet the future space missions.
(C) The actions that could be taken by the Department to
modify the organization and management of the Department over
the near-term, medium-term, and long-term in order to
strengthen United States national security in space, and the
ability of the Department to implement its requirements and
carry out the future space missions, including the following:
(i) Actions to exploit existing and planned military space
assets to provide support for United States military
operations.
(ii) Actions to improve or enhance current interagency
coordination processes regarding the operation of national
security space assets, including improvements or enhancements
in interoperability and communications.
(iii) Actions to improve or enhance the relationship
between the intelligence aspects of national security space
(so-called ``black space'') and the non-intelligence aspects
of national security space (so-called ``white space'').
(iv) Actions to improve or enhance the manner in which
military space issues are addressed by professional military
education institutions.
(4) Liaison.--The Secretary shall designate at least one
senior civilian employee of the Department of Defense, and at
least one general or flag officer of an Armed Force, to serve
as liaison between the Department, the Armed Forces, and the
entity conducting the review and assessment.
(b) Report.--
(1) In general.--Not later than one year after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the entity conducting the review
and assessment shall submit to the Secretary and the
congressional defense committees a report on the review and
assessment.
(2) Elements.--The report shall include--
(A) the results of the review and assessment; and
(B) recommendations on the best means by which the
Department may improve its organization and management for
national security in space.
amendment no. 4321
(Purpose: To exclude Minnesota's Northstar Corridor Commuter Rail
Project from the Federal Transit Administration's medium cost-
effectiveness rating requirement for Federal funding)
At the appropriate place, insert the following:
SEC. __. FEDERAL FUNDING FOR FIXED GUIDEWAY PROJECTS.
The Federal Transit Administration's Dear Colleague letter
dated April 29, 2005 (C-05-05), which requires fixed guideway
projects to achieve a ``medium'' cost-effectiveness rating
for the Federal Transit Administration to recommend such
projects for funding, shall not apply to the Northstar
Corridor Commuter Rail Project in Minnesota.
AMENDMENT NO. 4540
(Purpose: To provide for the availability of funds authorized to the
South County Commuter Rail project, Providence, Rhode Island)
At the end of subtitle I of title X, add the following:
SEC. 1084. AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS FOR SOUTH COUNTY COMMUTER
RAIL PROJECT, PROVIDENCE, RHODE ISLAND.
Funds available for the South County Commuter Rail project,
Providence, Rhode Island, authorized by paragraphs (34) and
(35) of section 3034(d) of the Safe, Accountable, Flexible,
Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users
(Public Law 109-59; 119 Stat. 1650) shall be available for
the purchase of commuter rail equipment for the South County
Commuter Rail project upon the receipt by the Rhode Island
Department of Transportation of an approved environmental
assessment for the South County Commuter Rail project.
AMENDMENT NO. 4449
(Purpose: To require the Secretary of the Air Force to prepare an
environmental impact statement or similar analysis for the beddown of
F-22A fighter aircraft at Holloman Air Force Base, New Mexico, as
replacements for retiring F-117A fighter aircraft)
At the end of subtitle B of title III, add the following:
SEC. 313. ENVIRONMENTAL DOCUMENTATION FOR BEDDOWN OF F-22A
AIRCRAFT AT HOLLOMAN AIR FORCE BASE, NEW
MEXICO.
The Secretary of the Air Force shall prepare environmental
documentation per the requirements of the National
Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq.) for
the beddown of F-22A aircraft at Holloman Air Force Base, New
Mexico, as replacements for the retiring F-117A aircraft.
AMENDMENT NO. 4204, as modified
On page 437, between lines 2 and 3, insert the following:
SEC. 1084. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON IRAQ SUMMIT.
Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that the
President should convene a summit as soon as possible that
includes the leaders of the Government of Iraq, leaders of
the governments of each country bordering Iraq,
representatives of the Arab League, the Secretary General of
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, representatives of
the European Union, and leaders of the governments of each
permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, for
the purpose of reaching a comprehensive political agreement
for Iraq that addresses fundamental issues including
federalism, oil revenues, the militias, security guarantees,
reconstruction, economic assistance, and border security.
[[Page S6390]]
AMENDMENT NO. 4541
(Purpose: To require a report on planning by the Department of the Air
Force for the realignment of aircraft, weapons systems, and functions
at active and Air National Guard bases as a result of the 2005 round of
defense base closure and realignment)
At the end of subtitle C of title XXVIII, add the
following:
SEC. 2834. REPORT ON AIR FORCE AND AIR NATIONAL GUARD BASES
AFFECTED BY 2005 ROUND OF DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE
AND REALIGNMENT.
(a) Report.--Not later than January 1, 2007, the Secretary
of the Air Force shall submit to Congress a report on
planning by the Department of the Air Force for future roles
and missions for active and Air National Guard personnel and
installations affected by decisions of the 2005 round of
defense base closure and realignment.
(b) Content.--The report required under subsection (a)
shall include--
(1) an assessment of the capabilities, characteristics, and
capacity of the facilities, infrastructure, and authorized
personnel at each affected base;
(2) a description of the planning process used by the Air
Force to determine future roles and missions at active and
Air National Guard bases affected by the decisions of the
2005 round of defense base closure and realignment, including
an analysis of alternatives for installations to support each
future role or mission;
(3) a description of the future roles and missions under
consideration for each active and Air National Guard base and
an explanation of the criteria and decision-making process to
make final decisions about future roles and missions for each
base; and
(4) a timeline for decisions on the final determination of
future roles and missions for each active and Air National
Guard base affected by the decisions of the 2005 round of
defense base closure and realignment.
(c) Bases Covered.--The report required under subsection
(a) shall include information on each active and Air National
Guard base at which the number of aircraft, weapon systems,
or functions is proposed to be reduced or eliminated and to
any installation that was considered as a potential receiving
location for the realignment of aircraft, weapons systems, or
functions.
amendment no. 4337
Mr. REID. Mr. President, I appreciate very much that there has been
consent to agree to my amendment No. 4337 on Congressional oversight of
Iran policy. I would like to explain why I believe it is important that
the Senate pass this amendment and sustain it in conference with the
House.
Mr. President, we live in a dangerous time. The threats to our
freedom are many.
As the administration embarks on serious diplomacy with Iran, the
Senate must be engaged and consulted. We Senators must take seriously
our responsibility to insist on a thorough review of the facts, a full
debate of the threat, and full consultation as events move forward.
The amendment I propose today would help put in place the rigorous
oversight necessary to hold the administration accountable for its
rhetoric and its policy decisions.
Yesterday, Senate leadership met with State Department officials to
get briefed on the details of the ``offer'' the administration laid on
the table for Iran a few weeks ago. The meeting was welcome. I respect
the hard work of Secretary Rice and Ambassador Burns in moving
diplomacy forward. However, I am surprised the meeting happened several
weeks after the deal was already offered. To the best of my knowledge,
until yesterday, Congress had not been briefed on the key details of
the deal offered to Iran a few weeks ago. The Iranians had been
briefed. The Europeans had been briefed. The Russians and Chinese had
been briefed. But not the United States Senate.
This reminds me of how the administration handled the proposed Indian
nuclear deal, which Members first found out about from the Indian prime
minister and the press, not from the Administration.
I am also reminded of the sales campaign that the administration
engaged in, in the runup to war in Iraq. A sales campaign--rather than
a serious effort to consult and treat Congress as a partner in figuring
out how to protect America.
It makes the executive branch's job a lot tougher when Congress is
consulted last, rather than first. Congress should be in the take off,
not asked to join for the crash landing.
This amendment requires the administration to give Congress and the
American people three things: an updated intelligence assessment of the
threat of Iran, a clear statement of the President's policy objectives
and strategy, and a confirmation that administration officials' public
statements about the threat of Iran are being reviewed for accuracy.
These are reasonable requests to ensure a rigorous debate about the
way forward. The amendment's adoption would increase the
administration's information flow to Congress on Iran issues and
improve the Senate's oversight in this important area of national
security policy.
I would note that the House Armed Services Committee included
parallel reporting requirements on the threat of Iran and the U.S.
strategy for responding to it in its report on the House version of
this bill. I trust that the conference of the two bodies will, in
striving to reconcile these parallel reporting requirements, put the
United States Congress on record in law about the importance of
rigorous Congressional oversight of U.S. policy regarding Iran and the
importance of the administration working in close consultation with
Congress in this area.
AMENDMENT NO. 4528
Mr. ALLARD. Mr. President, I rise today to discuss amendment No.
4528. This amendment honors Representative Joel Hefley, Congressman of
Colorado's 5th district, for his outstanding service to the people of
Colorado and to our Nation.
As you may know, Mr. President, Representative Hefley made the
decision earlier this year to retire after 2 decades of service in
Congress. This was a very difficult decision for him. He was the 3rd
ranking Republican on the House Armed Services Committee and had
garnered considerable influence because of his integrity and his
respect of the legislative branch as an institution. He worked
diligently over his 20 years in Congress and served the people of
Colorado's 5th District well.
Representative Hefley was first elected to represent Colorado's 5th
Congressional district in 1986 and has served in the House of
Representatives since that time with distinction, class, integrity, and
honor. As his current and former colleagues will attest, Representative
Hefley is a fair and effective lawmaker who works for the national
interest while never forgetting his Western roots.
For most of his two decades in the House, Representative Hefley
poured his time and energy into the Committee on Armed Services of the
House of Representatives. He served as chairman of the Subcommittee on
Military Installations and Facilities from 1995 through 2000 and, since
2001, as chairman of the Subcommittee on Readiness.
Representative Hefley's efforts on the Committee on Armed Services
have instrumental to the military value of, and quality of life at,
installations in the State of Colorado, Cheyenne Mountain, Peterson Air
Force Base, Schriever Air Force Base, Buckley Air Force Base, and the
United States Air Force Academy.
Representative Hefley was a leader in efforts to retain and expand
Fort Carson as an essential part of the national defense system during
the Defense Base Closure and Realignment process.
Representative Hefley has also consistently advocated for providing
members of the Armed Forces and their families with quality, safe, and
affordable housing and supportive communities.
Representative Hefley's leadership on the Military House
Privatization Initiative has allowed for the privatization of more than
121,000 units of military family housing, which brought meaningful
improvements to living conditions for thousands of members of the Armed
Forces and their spouses and children at installations throughout the
United States.
In honor of Representative Hefley's achievements and his work on
military housing privatization, this amendment designates the military
family housing areas at Fort Carson, Colorado in his name.
I served with Representative Hefley in the House of Representatives
for 6 years before I was elected to the Senate. I consider him to be
one of my closest colleagues in Congress and a dear friend. I have
tremendous respect for his character and for his ability to get things
done. He has been a champion for over two decades for the Colorado
Springs community and for conservative values. I know that he will be
sorely missed in the House of Representatives.
[[Page S6391]]
I believe Representative Hefley deserves the honor and recognition
that this amendment provides. I am pleased my colleagues agreed to join
me in adopting this amendment.
Amendment No. 4424
Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I appreciate the support of Chairman Warner
and Senator Levin in agreeing to accept amendment No. 4424 to S. 2766,
which I have sponsored.
Section 1023 relates to a counternarcotics authority granted to the
Department of Defense in the fiscal year 1998 Defense Authorization
Act. P.L. 105-85, specifically section 1033 of that Act. The original
provision, enacted in 1997, gave the Department authority to provide
counterdrug support to the Governments of Peru and Colombia, including
authority to transfer riverine patrol boats to those Governments, and
to maintain and repair equipment used for counter-drug activities by
those Governments. In recent years, the so-called 1033 authority has
been expanded to cover the other countries in the Andes, and to
Afghanistan and many of its neighboring states.
The bill now before the Senate would expand the list of eligible
governments still further, to include a long list of countries in Asia,
the Americas, and Africa. It also provides the Department the authority
to transfer aircraft to eligible governments.
The amendment I have proposed to section 1023 would ensure that the
transfer of aircraft is subject to section 484(a) of the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961, which requires that the United States retain
title to aircraft made available to a foreign country primarily for
narcotics-related purposes, unless the President makes a national
interest determination and so notifies Congress. The requirement that
such aircraft be made available only on a loan or lease basis has been
the law for 20 years, since the enactment of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of
1986, P.L. 99-570, and no good argument has been offered as to why it
should not apply to Department of Defense programs. Simply put, the
requirement strengthens the ability of the United States to make sure
that the aircraft provided is used for the intended purpose.
In my view, section 484(a) already does apply to Defense Department
counternarcotics programs. By its terms, it applies to any aircraft
``made available to a foreign country primarily for narcotics-related
purposes'' under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 or ``under any
other provision of law.'' This expansive statutory language makes clear
that any U.S. Government agency providing aircraft to a foreign
government for counterdrug purposes must retain title to that aircraft.
Yet inquiries to the Department of Defense officials about whether the
authority provided in section 1023 of S. 2766 would be governed by
section 484(a) have proven inconclusive. So that there is no doubt
about this question, I have proposed this amendment, which I understand
the managers of the bill have agreed to accept.
amendment no. 4364
Mr. DURBIN. Mr. President, I rise today to offer an amendment that
would rename the Navy and Marine Corps Reserve Center at Rock Island,
IL, in honor of Representative Lane Evans.
Representative Evans has been a tireless advocate of our men and
women in uniform during his 24 years in Congress. Unfortunately,
Congress will lose a great man when he retires at the end of this year,
and we can honor him and his accomplishments by renaming the Navy and
Marine Corps Reserve Center at Rock Island after him.
Lane Evans came to Congress as a Marine Corps veteran, and military
personnel and veterans were always on the forefront of his mind during
his service on the House Committee on Armed Services and Committee on
Veterans' Affairs. Throughout his career, Representative Evans has
fought to ensure that veterans receive the medical care they need and
has provided outspoken support for individuals suffering from post-
traumatic stress disorder and gulf war syndrome. Additionally,
Representative Evans is credited with bringing new services to veterans
living in his congressional district. In particular, he was responsible
for the development of outpatient clinics in the Quad Cities and
Quincy, IL, as well as the establishment of the Quad-Cities Vet Center.
Representative Evans also has worked to ensure that military
personnel experience a smooth transition from active military service
into the care of the Department of Veterans Affairs. Generations of
veterans will continue to benefit from his hard work long after he has
retired.
Representative Evans has worked in conjunction with local leaders to
promote the Rock Island Arsenal, and through his support, the facility
has received new jobs and new missions. It is fitting and proper that
the Navy and Marine Corps Reserve Center at Rock Island Arsenal be
named in honor of Representative Evans in order to commemorate his
service to America's military personnel, its veterans, and his 17th
Congressional district.
I urge my colleagues to join me in supporting this amendment.
amendment no. 4336
Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, Social Security numbers are included
on all military identification cards including the service member,
military spouse, and all dependents over the age of ten. In light of
the recent theft of millions of veterans' personal information from the
Department of Veterans Affairs, all federal agencies must take measures
to protect crucial information. To this end, I have introduced an
amendment that would require the Department of Defense to conduct a
feasibility study on prohibiting the use of Social Security numbers on
all military identification cards.
When the Department of Defense began using Social Security numbers on
identification cards in 1967, identity theft was not a problem most
Americans worried about. Electronic transactions were, for the most
part, non-existent, and we did not have the kind of access to personal
records that we have today. By simply gaining access to someone's
Social Security number, a malicious person could attempt to open a line
of credit, obtain a false driver's license or passport, or completely
steal another person's identity. Our military men and women should not
have to worry about these problems while defending our country.
We cannot wait until an incident occurs within the Department of
Defense that compromises the security of our military members. The
federal government must be proactive. The feasibility study I have
proposed has a reasonable finish date of six months from enactment and
would give the Department ample time to study this issue and find a
self-imposed solution.
Social Security numbers are not included on driver's licenses or
passports. Colleges and universities are using generic numbers for
student identification rather than Social Security numbers. It is time
the Department of Defense provides this important safeguard for our
troops.
amendment no. 4398
Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I urge my colleagues to join me in
supporting this amendment to ensure that the Defense Department invests
in critical basic research and maintains the workforce it needs to stay
globally competitive.
Our military is first in the world because of the quality and
training of our personnel and the technological sophistication of our
equipment and weaponry. But many of our Nation's best civilian
scientific minds in the Defense Department are nearing retirement age,
and our uncertain commitment to basic research funding makes it harder
to attract a new corps of scientists to do this research.
Our amendment that the Senator from Maine and I are offering includes
an additional $5 million for the Department's SMART Scholars Program
which is essentially an ROTC program for its civilian scientists. The
amendment will more than double the funding level provided last year
and provide more than 100 full college scholarships and graduate
fellowships in science, technology, engineering, and math.
Our amendment also adds $40 million to the Department's funding of
basic research in science and technology to ensure that its investment
in the field is maintained and our military technology remains the best
in the world. The amendment is supported by more than 60 of the most
prestigious institutions of higher education in the Nation.
Advances in military technology often have their source in the work
of civilian scientists in Department of
[[Page S6392]]
Defense laboratories. Unfortunately, a large percentage of these
scientists are nearing retirement. Today, nearly one in three DOD
civilian engineers in science, technology, engineering, and mathematics
is eligible to retire. In 7 years, 70 percent will be of retirement
age.
It is distressing that the number of new doctoral level scientists
being produced by our major universities each year has declined by 6
percent since 1997. Many of those who do graduate are ineligible to
work on sensitive defense matters, since about a third of all science
and engineering doctorate degrees awarded at American universities go
to foreign students.
It is unlikely that retiring DOD scientists can be replaced by
current private industry employees. About 5,000 science and engineering
positions are unfilled in private industry in defense-related fields.
The Department of Labor estimates that by 2012, more than 40 percent of
jobs in science and engineering occupations will be unfilled.
We face a major math and science challenge in both higher education
and in elementary and secondary education. We are tied with Latvia for
28th in the industrial world in math education, and that is far from
good enough. We have fallen from 3rd in the world to 15th in producing
scientists and engineers. Clearly, we need a new National Defense
Education Act of the size and scope passed nearly 50 years ago.
At the very least, however, the legislation before us needs to do
more to maintain our military's technological advantage. In 2004, over
100 ``highly rated'' SMART Scholar applications were turned down
because of insufficient funding. Our amendment provides enough funds to
support every one of those talented young people who want to learn and
serve.
Our amendment also deals with the critical need to provide the basic
research dollars that enable science and technology graduates and
students to pursue their research. Basic research investments by the
Defense Department in science and technology a generation ago helped
the United States win the Cold War. But funding for basic research has
fallen by more than 10 percent in the past decade.
Investing in basic research and attracting the best minds to science
and engineering are as important today as they have ever been. Almost
every day, you can pick up the paper and see yet another high-
performing company setting up an R&D shop in India or China. Those
countries get it. They know how important basic research is to their
prospects for growth. But this Congress and this President ignore how
important it is to invest in our talent and our research capacity.
China now graduates over 2\1/2\ times the number of engineers and
computer science majors as the United States. We still have an edge in
dollars invested, but our average annual investment growth in R&D is
far less than China and other countries.
These countries are increasing their government investment in science
and technology, but our Federal research investment is stagnating as a
share of the U.S. economy. It has plateaued at 1.1 percent of GDP. We
are still ahead of most other nations, but they are catching up. In
combined Federal and private R&D, the fastest growing countries such as
Ireland and Singapore are clearly challenging us.
Yet the President's proposed budget reduces Defense Department basic
research, and this authorization bill does little to increase it over
last year's appropriation, even though we know we have to increase it.
The Defense Science Board recommends that funding for science and
technology reach 3 percent of total defense spending, and the
administration and Congress have adopted this goal in the past. But the
President's budget cuts science and technology funding by 18.6 percent
and falls well short of this goal. The board also recommends that 20
percent of that amount be dedicated to basic research. Again, the
administration's budget falls short: basic research accounts for only
12.6 percent of total science and technology funding.
Our leading economic and scientific thinkers are telling us we need
to invest in these areas to stay globally competitive. The National
Academy of Sciences, the Council on Competitiveness, and others say it
is wrong to ignore the need to increase investment in basic research.
Nobel prize-winners such as American physicist Steven Chu say that we
need to increase Federal investment in long-term basic research because
``there are growing signs that all is not well.''
The Internet, the laser, MRIs, global positioning systems-all came
from basic research at the Department of Defense. We can't forget that
this type of research leads to the kinds of innovations that can
generate millions of jobs and major new economic activity.
Our global competitiveness deserves high priority, and our amendment
provides it. The goal is to see that American innovation grows and that
we continue to attract and retain the best and the brightest men and
women to these critical fields in math and science.
I urge my colleagues to join us in supporting this needed amendment
to provide more scholarships to math and science students and to
increase our Federal commitment to basic research at the Department of
Defense.
LEGISLATIVE INTENT WITH REGARD TO EXPANDED NATIONAL GUARD AUTHORITIES
Mr. CONRAD. Mr. President, I thank Mr. Levin for agreeing to join me
in this discussion of the legislative intent of the Senate in approving
several provisions related to the integration between the Active-Duty
military and the Reserve component. This bill will enhance the
authority of the Department of Defense to achieve future total force
integration between the Active-Duty and Reserve components. I would be
grateful in the ranking member could explain in more detail the intent
of section 531 of S. 2766, the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2007.
Mr. LEVIN. Specifically, the changes contained in this bill will
increase the efficiency of the Department of Defense's operations by
allowing the Guard and Reserve to train and instruct other component
members as an additional duty. It is desirable for Active Guard and
Reserve, AGR, and technician members of the National Guard and Reserve
to be able to train members of all components to the extent that these
duties do not interfere with the performance of the member's primary
duties. Currently, titles 10 and 32, United States Code, limit the
efficiencies that can be realized by restricting the employment of AGRs
and technicians to ``organizing, administering, recruiting,
instructing, or training'' the Reserve components. This bill will
expand the role of AGRs and technicians so that they may instruct and
train members of any other component, and also DOD civilian employees,
DOD contractor personnel, and foreign military personnel.
The changes included in this bill will also increase the Department's
flexibility in using the Guard and Reserve to support certain
operations or missions. It is the committee's belief that members of
the Reserve and National Guard need increased flexibility to support
certain operations or missions assigned in whole or in part to the
Reserve, or undertaken by the National Guard at the request of the
President or Secretary of Defense. This bill will facilitate the
transformation of the National Guard and Reserve from a Cold War
``strategic reserve'' to a present day ``operational reserve.'' An
``operational reserve'' actively supports ongoing operational missions
where appropriate, while also providing the additional reserve capacity
needed to meet surge requirements or support wartime or contingency
operations. These amendments would make some distinctions between the
duties that may be performed, in addition to their primary duties, by
Reserve AGRs and technicians and those that may be performed by Guard
AGRs and technicians in title 32 status. Generally, full-time Reserve
personnel would be permitted to support title 10 operational
activities, while full-time Guard, including AGRs and technicians,
would be permitted to perform operational activities if authorized by
the President or the Secretary of Defense.
Mr. CONRAD. I thank the ranking member. These are very important
expansions to the National Guard's role and will play an important part
in allowing the Air Force to achieve its objectives for total force
integration. It is my belief that the provisions included in this bill
will permit, for example, the North Dakota Air National
[[Page S6393]]
Guard to provide a security forces squadron to augment the Active-Duty
security forces in the ICBM field at Minot Air Force Base, assuming
that the Secretary requests that they perform such a mission. Air Force
Space Command is eager to begin this initiative and has secured funding
for it in the Air Force Program Objective Memorandum. This unit would
include both traditional guardsmen and AGRs and would augment, not
replace, the Active-Duty security forces group currently assigned to
the mission. I would encourage Secretary Rumsfeld to give serious
consideration to requesting that the North Dakota Air National Guard
augment the Active-Duty Air Force in carrying out this important
operational mission, and I thank my colleagues for their time and their
support.
Killing of U.s. Soldiers by Iraqi Security Forces
Mrs. BOXER. This week, the military informed two California families
that their sons were shot and killed by the very same Iraqi troops they
were training.
SGT Patrick McCaffrey and 1LT Andre Tyson were killed near Balad in
2004. At first, the Army told the families that these two National
Guardsmen were killed by Iraqi insurgents.
An investigation by the U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command
determined in September 2005 that both soldiers were shot and killed by
members of the Iraqi security forces.
In addition to the fact that Iraqi security forces are killing U.S.
soldiers, this situation raises several troubling questions.
First, according to his parents, there were two prior incidents in
which Sergeant McCaffrey was fired upon by Iraqi security forces and
the chain of command took no action. Why was nothing done? Are there
other incidents where American troops are being shot at by the Iraqi
forces they are training?
Second, why did the Army close its investigation in September 2005
but fail to inform the family until June 2006? Was there a coverup of
this incident? What other explanation could there be?
Third, why were the families denied official government reports on
the events that led to the deaths of these two soldiers? One of the
families needed the help of my office to make any progress in learning
the truth. How could the Army treat the families of dead soldiers in
such a callous and dismissive way? Where are the military case officers
who are supposed to help the families of slain U.S. soldiers?
And, fourth, a Defense Department spokesmen has called this incident
``extremely rare.'' How can the Department of Defense conclude that the
incident is rare when such incidents are evidently not being reported
up the chain of command? Members of Sergeant McCaffrey's unit told his
father that insurgents were offering Iraqi soldiers about $100 apiece
for each American they could kill.
I ask the Senator from Michigan, is he willing to work with me to get
answers to these troubling questions?
Mr. LEVIN. I share the Senator's concern and will work with her to
address these important questions.
Mr. COBURN. Mr. President, the Senate today accepted three amendments
that I offered to S. 2766, the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2007, intended to improve transparency and accountability
of taxpayer funds provided to the Department of Defense.
Amendment No. 4370 addresses the practice of the earmarking of
Federal funds by members of Congress. ``Earmarks,'' more commonly known
as ``pork projects,'' are provisions inserted into bills or directives
contained within a joint explanatory statement or reports accompanying
bills specifying the identity of an entity, program, project or service
to receive assistance.
Many Congressional earmarks inserted within Defense appropriations
bills are not needed, or even wanted, by the Pentagon. Just this week,
the Washington Post published an article titled, ``The Project That
Wouldn't Die; Using earmarks, members of Congress kept money flowing to
a local company that got $37 million for technology the military
couldn't use.''
Earmarks contained within Defense appropriations bills have been
linked to a number of recent Congressional corruption and ethics
probes. Convicted super-lobbyist Jack Abramoff openly boasted that
earmarks were his political currency and he called the Appropriations
Committee that doles them out a ``favor factory'' for lobbyists.
The $80 billion emergency supplemental passed last year was riddled
with add-ons. It included $10 million to expand wastewater facilities
in Swiftwater, PA. The University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center
got $3 million. A wastewater treatment plant in Desoto County, MS, got
$35 million, and $4 million went to the Fire Sciences Academy in Elk,
NV. While these many have been local priorities for these communities,
it is difficult to argue that they are needed for our national defense.
In its report on its fiscal 2001 Defense appropriations bill, the
Senate Appropriations Committee wrote: ``The committee understands that
medical studies indicate the potential benefits of cranberry juice and
other cranberry products in maintaining health. The committee urges the
Secretary of Defense to take steps to increase the department's use of
cranberry products in the diet of on-base personnel and troops in the
field. Such purchases should prioritize cranberry products with high
cranberry content such as fresh cranberries, cranberry sauces and
jellies and concentrate and juice with over 25 percent cranberry
content.''
Most Americans do not support earmarking Federal funds, especially
for such dubious purposes that serve parochial interests at the expense
of our national defense. A recent Wall Street Journal/NBC News poll, in
fact, found that of all the issues facing our nation, curtailing
earmarks was identified as ``the single most important thing for
Congress to accomplish this year.''
The number of earmarks in Defense appropriations laws has grown from
about 587 in fiscal year 1994 to about 2,847 in fiscal year 2006,
according to a recent report by the Congressional Research Service,
CRS. The amount of money earmarked has increased over the same period,
from about $4.2 billion to $9.4 billion. The amount earmarked as a
percentage of the total in the Defense appropriations bill has
correspondingly increased from about 1.8 percent in 1994 to
approximately 2.4 percent in 2006.
While we can determine the total number of earmarks and the actual
pricetag of each, we have no way of calculating the hidden cost of
earmarking, which includes staff time and administration expenses.
Specifically the amendment accepted today requires the Department of
Defense to report annually: The total annual cost of earmarking in
Defense appropriations bills; the purpose and location of each earmark;
an analysis of the usefulness of each earmark in advancing the goals of
the Department of Defense. This will provide Members of Congress a more
complete view of the cost effectiveness of each project and if such
projects warranted continued funding.
This annual report will provide Congress and the public a more
complete understanding of the total cost of ``pork'' to the Department
of Defense.
The earmark grading system will, likewise, provide needed information
to lawmakers and the public about projects inserted into bills that
have not had proper oversight, debate or discussion. This added
transparency will ensure that every Member of Congress can cast a truly
informed vote and ensure greater accountability for how Federal funds
are allocated and hopefully return some integrity to the appropriations
process that has been undermined by recent investigations into
earmarking.
My second amendment, No. 4371, accepted by the Senate today seeks to
end the practice of Defense contractors being rewarded for poor
performance. The Department of Defense has been improperly paying
awards and incentives to contractors that do not fulfill the terms and
conditions of their contracts. These are intended to be paid only for
outstanding performances on contracts but are routinely paid out
without regard to performance.
In a recent study conducted by the Government Accountability Office,
GAO, DOD paid out at least $8 billion in fees over 4 years, the vast
majority of which were not earned and were improperly awarded. This of
course, was just a small fraction of the overall
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total of award fees given out to contractors every year.
My amendment seeks to end this process and require performance as a
prerequisite for award fee bonuses. My amendment specifically requires
that a contractor cannot receive an award fee unless the contractor has
met the basic requirements of the contract.
This amendment has the potential to save the Federal Government
billions of wasted tax dollars every year and improve contractor
performance.
The third amendment, No. 4491, as modified, will require DOD's
Defense Travel System, DTS, to transform its ``cost plus'' contract to
a fee-for-use-of-service system similar to the private sector travel
reservation systems currently available in the marketplace.
DTS was initiated in 1998 DTS and intended to make travel
arrangements for the military service branches and defense agencies. It
was supposed to be fully deployed by 2002. However, that date has been
pushed back to September 2006--a delay of over 4 years--and has cost
the American taxpayer $474 million--a staggering $200 million more than
it was originally projected to cost.
DTS has a long record of failure. In July 2002, the DOD inspector
general released a report on DTS which highlighted numerous concerns
with the program and stated that DTS was being ``substantially
developed without the requisite requirements, cost, performance, and
schedule documents and analyses needed as the foundation for assessing
the effectiveness of the system and its return on investment.''
Following on that IG report, DOD's office for Program Assessment and
Evaluation prepared a report recommending termination of the program.
In January 2006, GAO reported that ``DTS's development and
implementation have been problematic . . . thus it is not surprising
that critical flaws have been identified, resulting in significant
slippages between the planned and actual deployment dates of the
system'' and that selected requirements for display of flights and
airfares found that system testing was ``ineffective in ensuring that
the promised capability was delivered as intended.''
This means that not only is DTS not performing, the current system is
incapable of testing properly in order to determine what is required in
order to meet DOD's plan.
Further, DOD could not prove that DOD travelers even had access to
the flights that were available for travel. There is no doubt such a
flaw would have produced higher travel costs.
Compounding this problem is the fact that some DOD agencies continue
to use the existing legacy travel systems at locations where DTS is
already deployed. This means that all of the proclaimed savings that
DTS was supposed to reap are nowhere to be found--because DOD continues
to use legacy systems to do the same thing.
As originally envisioned, DTS was supposed to be a pay-for-use-of-
service system in which the DTS was paid by the government based only
on the extent to which the system was used--thereby creating an
incentive for DTS to be a cost effective travel reservation system for
the Department of Defense.
This amendment requires the Department of Defense to honor the
original intentions of the DTS contract. Within a year of enactment of
this bill, DTS will be required to utilize a fee-for-use-of-service
system. The funds raised through fees charged will be used by DTS to
pay for its operational and maintenance costs as the system is slated
to be fully developed and deployed by September 2006. DTS will be
required to: (1) levy a one-time, fixed price service fee per DOD
consumer using the system, and (2) charge an additional fixed fee for
each transaction.
Together these three amendments ensure greater transparency and
accountability of Federal funds and ensure taxpayers and our men and
women in service are guaranteed that the funds we are spending on the
defense of our Nation are better spent.
I would like to thank Chairman Warner and his staff and look forward
to continuing to work with them on these issues as this bill goes to
conference.
Mrs. LINCOLN. Mr. President, today I offered an amendment on behalf
of the brave men and women of our National Guard and Reserve who have
sacrificed so greatly for our freedom. This amendment would allow
members of the Selected Reserve who have been activated for extended
durations to utilize some of the educational benefits they have earned
once they separate from service.
Since World War II, providing educational benefits to returning
servicemembers has served an invaluable role in stimulating recruitment
and retention for our armed services. In assisting veterans readjusting
to civilian life, these educational benefits have also enhanced our
Nation's competitiveness through the development of a more highly
educated and productive workforce.
When the Montgomery GI bill was signed into law in 1984, members of
the Selected Reserve--members of the National Guard and Reserve on
active status or performing initial Active Duty training--were seldom
mobilized. Consequently, standard Montgomery GI Bill benefits reflected
that reality. That is not the same reality today.
More than 500,000 members of the National Guard and Reserve have been
called up since the terrible events of September 11, 2001, and more
than 70,000 have pulled two or more tours of duty. In my State of
Arkansas, nearly 3,400 of our National Guard's 39th Infantry Brigade
were called to serve in Operation Iraqi Freedom. These citizen soldiers
served with distinction and did so in some of the worst conditions
imaginable. While their families and their communities have welcomed
them home with open arms, our Nation should do the same by ensuring
they receive the benefits and services they need as they transition
back to their civilian lives.
The rising price of higher education, increases in the interest rates
on student loans, and the limited earnings ability of those who return
from the service with only high school credentials make educational
benefits a primary means of helping members of the Selected Reserve
make that transition. In addressing this issue, Congress took a step in
the right direction in October 2004 with creation of the Reserve
Education Assistance Program. This program provided enhanced Montgomery
GI bill benefits for members of the Selected Reserve who were activated
since September 11, 2001, and mobilized for more than 90 days in
response to a contingency operation--a war or national emergency as
declared by the President or Congress.
Although increasing benefits was a step in the right direction, it
did not address the lack of a readjustment or transition component to
these educational benefits. As a result, Active-Duty servicemembers
have up to 10 years after their separation of service to utilize their
MGIB benefits, while members of the Selected Reserve must forfeit all
of the educational benefits they have earned once they separate from
the Selected Reserve. Montgomery GI bill benefits continue to be the
only benefit that those who have served Selected Reserve activated duty
in the war on terrorism may not access when they eventually separate or
retire.
For example, a young man enlists in the Arkansas National Guard for a
6-year commitment after graduating from high school in 2001. He is
mobilized in June 2005 and will return home from Iraq in September
2006, a 15-month mobilization. He plans to complete his service in June
2007 and use the Montgomery GI bill benefits he earned during his
mobilization to attend the University of Arkansas. Under current law,
he would forfeit all of these benefits once he leaves the Guard. I
believe our young men and women who have fulfilled their service
obligations deserve better than that.
Specifically, my amendment would allow members of the Selected
Reserve to have portability of their chapter 1607 Montgomery GI bill
benefits for up to 10 years from their last date of service. To
clarify, this amendment applies only to their chapter 1607 benefits--
those they have earned through activated service--and not their
standard Selected Reserve educational benefits, chapter 1606 benefits.
Some have raised concerns that this amendment would have an effect on
retention because it would provide a post-service portability of
benefits. I disagree. There are many valid personal and family reasons
that influence a volunteer's decision to serve. Military analysts have
consistently noted that reenlistment bonuses in lump-sum cash payments
have been effective in
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meeting or exceeding reenlistment goals in the Active and Reserve
Forces, not the educational benefits that are deferred over time.
Further, there is a built-in incentive to continue serving in the
Selected Reserve because reenlistment or extension in the Guard and
Reserve enables the servicemember to retain their standard Selected
Reserve Montgomery GI bill benefits under chapter 1606 with the
potential to acquire more chapter 1607 benefits through successive
activations. If they reenlist, they would also remain eligible for any
other educational ``kickers'' such as Federal tuition assistance and
state Guard or Reserve educational benefits.
Young high school graduates thinking about furthering their
educations and whether to join the Guard or Reserve should know that
they will earn Montgomery GI bill benefits by joining the Reserves and
even more if they are called up. When it is time to reenlist, they can
keep all earned educational benefits by staying in or can take with
them into civilian life the benefits they earned when they were called
up to defend our Nation.
As the daughter of a Korean war veteran, I was taught from an early
age about the sacrifices our troops have to make to keep our Nation
free and have been grateful for the service of so many of our brave men
and women from the State of Arkansas and across the Nation. On behalf
of them and their families, I will continue to fight to ensure they are
provided with the benefits, pay, and health care that they have earned.
I urge my colleagues to support this amendment. It is the least we can
do for those whom we owe so much and to reassure future generations
that a grateful nation will not forget them when their military service
is complete.
Mr. NELSON of Florida. Mr. President, the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 includes a provision that would
repeal section 5062(2), title 10, United States Code that requires the
Navy to keep a minimum of 12 operational aircraft carriers in the
fleet. As many of my colleagues know, I oppose this repeal. I am
convinced that as a nation at war, we should not increase our strategic
risk by reducing our ability to place U.S. naval aviation anywhere and
at any time as may be required to respond to crises around the world.
Although this bill would repeal the 12-carrier minimum requirement,
the Armed Services Committee was clear that we should not allow our
carrier fleet to fall dangerously lower than 11 ships. I believe
strongly that the size and capability of our carrier fleet is a matter
of highest national concern. Once mothballed, scrapped, or a combat
loss, a carrier is extremely difficult and expensive to replace. The
Nation needs 12 carriers for worldwide presence and crisis response.
Congress should support a funding program to ensure that we achieve and
sustain that level as soon as practical.
As concerned as I am about reducing the size of our carrier fleet, I
am equally concerned about the risk of failing to adequately disperse
them. Stationing all our Atlantic coast carriers in a single port only
compounds the challenges we will face with a smaller fleet. I am not
alone in that assessment. The former Chief of Naval Operations, ADM
Vernon Clark, told the Armed Services Committee in February 2005 that
in his view, ``overcentralization of the [carrier] port structure is
not a good strategic move . . . the Navy should have two carrier-
capable home ports on each coast.'' Admiral Clark went on to say, ``. .
. it is my belief that it would be a serious strategic mistake to have
all of those key assets of our Navy tied up in one port.''
As recently as March this year, Deputy Secretary of Defense and
former Secretary of the Navy, Gordon England, testified to this
committee that the Navy needed to disperse its Atlantic coast carriers
saying, ``My judgment is that [dispersion] is still the situation . . .
a nuclear carrier should be in Florida to replace the [USS John F.]
Kennedy to get some dispersion. `` Secretary England explained that,
``the concern there was always weapons of mass destruction. Even though
carriers were at sea, the maintenance facilities, et cetera, are all
still there and the crews . . . so having some dispersion would be of
value to the Department of the Navy.''
At the same hearing, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, ADM
Edmund Giambastiani, shared his own judgment that we should disperse
our carriers. He illustrated his sense of risk to the Nation's east
coast carriers when he recalled his own visit to Norfolk one Christmas,
``where we had five aircraft carriers all sitting next to one another,
and that is not something we'd like to routinely do.''
I am opposed to cutting our Nation's aircraft carrier fleet as a
matter of strategic necessity during time of war. The risk, in my view,
is unacceptable. As a matter of protecting our smaller carrier force, I
am convinced that the Nation must establish a second Atlantic coast
nuclear carrier base as quickly as possible. An environmental impact
study in 1997 found Naval Station Mayport, FL, current home of the USS
John F. Kennedy, suitable to permanently station a nuclear aircraft
carrier. The Navy should complete its update of that study as quickly
as possible. Additionally, in order not to lose any time once the study
is complete, the Navy should include funding in its fiscal year 2008
Future Years Defense Program to begin building the maintenance and
support facilities necessary to stationing a nuclear aircraft carrier
at Naval Station Mayport. Availability of these funds should naturally
be contingent upon but timed in the budget's outyears to coincide with
the completion of an updated environmental impact study. I look forward
to working with my colleagues on both these vital issues.
Mr. AKAKA. Mr. President, at the outset, I have and I will continue
to support our military personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan. They deserve
no less than our complete backing.
I recently returned from visiting Iraq, where I had the honor of
meeting with our troops and visiting with Iraqi officials. I left with
a deep admiration for the spirit of our fighting men and women who
continue to give their all under very difficult circumstances. I was
also impressed by the willingness of many Iraqis to put themselves in
harm's way as they dedicate their lives to the future of their Nation.
However, I continue to harbor grave concerns over the current situation
in Iraq and the President's strategy for fighting the Iraq conflict.
So far, more than 2,500 Americans have died and 18,000 have been
wounded. We owe it to both our honored dead and wounded to ensure that
their sacrifices were not in vain and that we successfully accomplish
our mission in Iraq and Afghanistan. However, as I have said from the
beginning of this conflict, we need a clear understanding of what the
mission is, what is needed to accomplish the mission, and the true
accounting of the cost of the mission.
It is time for the President to tell Congress, the American public,
and most importantly, the families of our fallen heroes and the men and
women in the Armed Forces what is his exit plan. Instead, we only get
vague assertions such as in the President's address to the Nation a
year ago at Fort Bragg in which he said: ``. . . our strategy can be
summed up this way: As the Iraqi's stand up, we will stand down.'' What
this country needs now is a detailed exit strategy that puts the Iraqi
Government and its people on the path to controlling their own destiny.
It is not clear why we went to war, what we are trying to achieve,
and how we will measure success. There are many of us who believe that
we went into Iraq for the wrong reason: because the President and his
advisers miscalculated or misrepresented the threat. And now that we
are there, the President continues to come up with new reasons for
staying. Before the war, President Bush said we needed to remove Saddam
Hussein's weapons of mass destruction. It turned out there were none.
Faced with the absence of weapons of mass destruction, the
administration has argued that our presence in Iraq is necessary to
protect the United States from acts of global terrorism and to ensure
that Iraq successfully transforms into a stable democracy.
As Brian Jenkins of the RAND Corporation, one of the country's most
noted terrorism experts, has written, ``Taking the fight to terrorists
abroad--as America did by invading Afghanistan and by continuing
efforts against terrorists worldwide--makes sense. But Iraq is a
separate and special case, because many of the combatants killed or
captured by American
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and allied forces in Iraq are insurgents created by opposition to the
U.S. invasion itself.'' It is my understanding that terrorist cells
have become even more decentralized since the war in Iraq, spreading to
many corners of the globe. Islamic extremists in Iraq are reportedly
training Taliban and al-Qaida fighters. Furthermore, Brigadier General
Robert Caslen says that 30 new terrorist groups have been created since
9/11, and ``we are not killing them faster than they are being
created.'' Even Defense Secretary Rumsfeld admits that the United
States is not winning the battle of ideas over the terrorists.
A week ago, President Bush justified our presence in Iraq by stating
that our mission now ``is to develop a country that can govern itself,
sustain itself, and defend itself, and a country that is an ally in the
war on terror. While I support building a strong democracy in Iraq, I
am still very concerned that the number of troops stationed there
stands in the way of the Iraqi people developing their own nation.
If we remain in Iraq without a clear exit strategy, I believe that
the situation there will worsen. Iraq is a country that is becoming
more polarized along ethnic and sectarian lines. The December elections
for a new National Assembly were dominated by the religious-based
political parties.
Furthermore, the Iraqi public's perception of the economy is becoming
increasingly pessimistic. The social situation in Iraq is just as
disheartening. As a recent Pentagon report notes, we have spent almost
$1 billion in electricity projects and are planning an additional $1.1
billion, but the gap between demand and supply is growing.
The price for not having a clear exit strategy is being borne by the
American taxpayer and future generations of Americans who will truly
pay the cost of this war. So far, the United States has spent about $40
billion for Iraqi reconstruction and much of that has been wasted. For
example, instead of building 142 health centers in Iraq, only 20
clinics have been completed at a cost of $200 million. In addition,
former Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz confidently promised
the Congress a week after the war had started that ``. . . we're
dealing with a country that can really finance its own reconstruction,
and relatively soon.'' His economic projections were exceptionally
faulty. Americans are paying inflated prices for Iraqi reconstruction
projects that are only partially complete, instead of Iraqi oil
revenues paying for Iraqi reconstruction.
The President's policy gives the Iraqis veto power over when American
troops withdraw. Whether our troops remain there, should not be subject
to an Iraqi veto. Making the departure of U.S. troops dependent on the
Iraqis places the health and welfare of our brave men and women at the
mercy of Iraqi decisions.
When I spoke with Iraq's National Security Adviser, Dr. Mowaffak
Rubaie, he shared his view that the removal of foreign troops will
legitimize Iraq's Government in the eyes of its people. In my view, a
phased withdrawal of American troops will encourage the Iraqi
Government and military to take responsibility for their future. In
addition I support maintaining sufficient security forces to continue
training the Iraqi military, sufficient security forces to protect the
continued American civilian presence, and sufficient security forces to
attack al-Qaida terrorist networks. The result will be a strengthened,
not weakened, Iraqi Government and military.
I agree with the President when he said that ``success in Iraq
depends upon the Iraqis. If the Iraqis don't have the will to succeed,
they're not going to succeed. We can have all the will we want, I can
have all the confidence in the ability for us to bring people to
justice, but if they choose not to . . . make the hard decisions and to
implement a plan, they're not going to make it.''
We must empower the Iraqis to defend and govern themselves. For that
reason, phased withdrawal is the only road to success.
Mr. President, some say that asking this administration to provide a
plan detailing the eventual withdrawal of our troops from Iraq
demonstrates a lack of courage. To me, it takes courage to do what is
right for our Nation and for Iraq. What is right for our Nation is to
establish an exit strategy to bring our troops home to their families.
What is right for Iraq is to empower them to control their own destiny.
Mr. PRYOR. Mr. President, I wish to speak about an amendment I
offered to the 2007 Defense authorization bill that would be very
beneficial to the members of our Reserve Component. The amendment would
award them 15 days of paid leave at the end of their deployment,
provided they have been deployed more than 6 months and have been
deployed in a combat zone. The members of the Reserves and National
Guard face a different situation and different challenges when they
return from combat than do those on active duty because they return to
civilian life and civilian jobs almost immediately. In many cases I
believe it happens too soon, primarily for financial reasons.
The need to return to their jobs as soon as possible means Reservists
and Guardsmen have little or no time to make what can be a difficult
adjustment. Combat experiences may never be forgotten, especially by
those who are not professional soldiers, but a chance to begin to do
so, to talk to people if that seems appropriate, would be very helpful.
Post Traumatic Stress Disorder is a very real disability. We must do
whatever we can to help our citizen soldiers avoid it. And to help
those who get it despite our efforts.
The experiences of our combat soldiers are stressful at best,
debilitating at worst. I believe 2 weeks to readjust, to spend time
with their families, and to make whatever preparations are necessary
would be tremendously helpful and very well deserved. These men and
women have left their families and their jobs to serve our country
overseas for extended periods at great personal sacrifice. Two weeks of
paid leave would relieve the financial pressure to return to work
immediately. I believe not only the soldiers would benefit, but so
would the employers and coworkers. They would at long last regain an
employee who has had time to adjust and is ready to become a productive
worker again. So the benefits would not go solely to the soldiers and
their families.
This is an important amendment, one that would help soldiers, their
families, and their communities around the nation. I believe it
deserves to be included in the Defense authorization bill, and I ask my
colleagues for their support.
Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, last Thursday, we passed by a 99-to-1 vote
an emergency spending bill to support our troops in Iraq and
Afghanistan and provide relief to the victims of Hurricane Katrina.
Unfortunately, behind closed conference doors, a key provision of both
the House and Senate versions was stripped out--an amendment,
introduced by Representative Barbara Lee and myself, that would bar any
funds from being used to establish permanent U.S. military bases in
Iraq or to control Iraq's oil.
I voted to support our troops, though I was surprised that my
amendment was removed in conference after not a single Senator spoke
against it during the floor debate. By removing the ``no permanent
bases'' amendment, we make life more difficult for our men and women in
uniform and undercut our Nation's broader effort against terrorism. So
I am happy that my amendment has now been accepted as part of the
Defense authorization bill.
It is straightforward, clear, and simple: It affirms that the United
States will not seek to establish permanent military bases in Iraq and
has no intention of controlling Iraqi oil. I will repeat what I said 6
weeks ago: While it may be obvious to Americans that we don't intend to
stay in Iraq indefinitely, such conspiracy theories are accepted as
fact by most Iraqis. In an opinion poll conducted by the University of
Maryland in January, 80 percent of Iraqis--and 92 percent of the Sunni
Arabs--believe we have plans to establish permanent military bases. The
same poll found that an astounding 88 percent of Sunni Arabs approve of
attacks on American forces.
Why do Iraqis believe we want permanent bases? Why do they think we
would subject ourselves to the enormous ongoing costs of Iraq in blood
and treasure? Do they think we want their sand? No, they think we want
their oil. To my mind, the connection between these two public opinion
findings is incontrovertible.
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Before you dismiss these as simple conspiracy theories, remember what
Iraqis have been through in the past three decades: three wars and a
tyrannical regime that turned brother against brother and made paranoia
a way of life. And there is a longer history, too: 400 years of British
and Ottoman occupation have led to a deeply ingrained suspicion of a
foreign military presence.
These views extend well beyond Iraq. In a 2004 Pew Charitable Trust
survey, majorities in all four Muslim states surveyed--Turkey,
Pakistan, Jordan, and Morocco--believed that control of Mideast oil was
an important factor in our invasion of Iraq. Our enemies understand the
boon these misconceptions provide to their recruiting efforts and use
them as a rallying cry in their calls-to-arms. Last year, in a letter
intercepted by the U.S. military, Ayman al-Zawahiri, the deputy leader
of al-Qaida, wrote to the recently killed Jordanian terrorist Abu Musab
al-Zarqawi: ``The Muslim masses . . . do not rally except against an
outside occupying enemy.''
Our military and diplomatic leaders understand that countering this
vicious propaganda requires clear signals about our intentions in Iraq.
And they have done just this: GEN George Casey, the ground force
commander in Iraq, told the Committee on Armed Services last September:
``Increased coalition presence feeds the notion of occupation.'' At the
same hearing, GEN John Abizaid, the commander of all U.S. troops in the
Middle East, told Congress: ``We must make clear to the people of the
region we have no designs on their territory or resources.'' In March,
the American Ambassador to Iraq, Zalmay Khalilzad, told an Iraqi
television station that the United States has ``no goal in establishing
permanent bases in Iraq.''
Unfortunately, this clarity has been clouded by mixed messages from
the senior-most decision-makers in the Bush administration: To my
knowledge, President Bush has never explicitly stated that we will not
establish permanent bases in Iraq. And both the Secretary of Defense
and the Secretary of State have left the door open to do just that. On
February 17, 2005, Secretary Rumsfeld told the Committee on Armed
Services: ``We have no intention, at the present time, of putting
permanent bases in Iraq.'' ``At the present time'' is not exactly an
unequivocal statement.
On February 15, 2006, at the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
hearing, Senator Kerry asked Secretary Rice: ``Is it, in fact, the
policy of the administration not to have permanent bases in Iraq?''
Rather than answering the simple one word, ``Yes,'' Secretary Rice said
during a 400-word exchange on the question: ``I don't want to in this
forum try to prejudice everything that might happen way into the
future.'' Just last Thursday, columnist Helen Thomas asked the White
House Press Secretary to unambiguously declare that the United States
will not seek permanent bases in Iraq. Again, the Press Secretary could
not unequivocally declare this to be the case.
These mixed messages are confusing to the American people and the
Iraqi people alike. They feed conspiracy theories and cede rhetorical
space to our enemies. They make it that much more difficult to win the
battle for the hearts and minds of 1.2 billion Muslims in the world.
Our success in that battle will determine our success in the struggle
between freedom and radical fundamentalism. Against this backdrop, I
believe that it is incumbent upon us to speak where the administration
has not.
My amendment will have no detrimental effect on the military
operations of our Armed Forces in Iraq or their ability to provide
security for Iraqi oil infrastructure. United Nations Council
Resolution 1546 recognizes that the American and coalition forces are
present in Iraq at the invitation of the Iraqi Government and that
their operations are essential to Iraq's political, economic, and
social well-being. In his first speech to the Iraqi Parliament last
month, Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki endorsed that resolution. We are
anxious for the day when Iraqis can take control of their own destiny,
but the Iraqis are suspicious of our intentions and are growing
increasingly impatient.
This amendment may not in itself change a lot of minds on the ground
or in the region, but it can mark the beginning of a sustained effort
to demonstrate through words and deeds that we have no intention of
controlling Iraq's oil or staying there forever. I believe it is our
duty to do so.
Mr. REID. Mr. President, I thank the chairman and the ranking member
of the Armed Services Committee for working with my office and Senator
Ensign's office on scaling back the new exceptions to the Berry
amendment--the Buy American rules--that were ultimately included in
this legislation. The changes to narrow the language as originally
proposed go a long way toward addressing the concerns of the U.S.
specialty metals industry, including titanium production in Nevada. So
again I thank the chairman and ranking member for working with us on
these changes.
Still, I have concerns about provisions in this bill that were
adopted as part of amendment 4286 on June 15 that weaken the Buy
American provisions of the Berry amendment. I know this is not the
intention of the Senate or the committee, but I am concerned that we
may be opening a door to the use of foreign specialty metals in
production of U.S. military equipment that is very dangerous, and we
may have started down the proverbial slippery slope.
Right now, due in no small part to the policy of the Berry amendment,
the United States has the most sophisticated titanium and specialty
metals sector in the world. The Berry amendment policy is good national
policy because these are materials that a modern military must have,
and so we need to maintain a robust domestic manufacturing capability
to meet our national security needs.
My starting point, then, and I know the Senators agree, is that we
need strong Buy American provisions for purchases of specialty metals
from the Defense Department. There have been some complaints about
administrability--some of which are legitimate but some of which
unfortunately I think may be driven by opponents of Buy American rules
in and outside the administration.
I think the legitimate concerns can and should be addressed with some
minor tweaking and appropriately limited waivers. If material of the
right quality or grade is not available in the United States, the
Pentagon could exercise its existing waiver authority. We could pass
legislation that could improve that authority. If lax enforcement has
led to a buildup in foreign inventories, we could create a temporary
``get well period.'' If a few off-the-shelf items should not be
included under the Berry amendment, let's figure out what they are and
exempt them.
But I worry we have gone much further than that. The Senate's bill
introduces a number of new concepts that I am not sure we fully
understand individually, and I am very concerned we do not understand
how all of these different concepts will interact together.
Let me be clear about one thing. Outside of the U.S. companies, there
is only one other worldwide producer of aerospace-quality titanium. In
other words, one titanium company in the whole world will get the new
U.S. defense business from weakening the Buy American provisions of the
Berry amendment. That company is a Russian company called VSMPO. It was
built by the Government of the Soviet Union, later privatized, and
recently the Government of Russia has indicated that it intends to take
a controlling share of the company.
That is right, the Kremlin intends to take a large ownership position
in this company. This is the same Kremlin that used access to energy
supplies to try to bully the Ukraine as an intimidation tactic. I have
a series of newspaper articles on VSMPO and its relation to the Russian
Government and I will ask unanimous consent that they be printed in the
Record.
The administration has talked about needing to change the Berry
amendment and has said that it wants greater ``commercial and military
integration.'' But, I am concerned that if it is not appropriately
narrow, changes to the Berry amendment will create greater ``Kremlin-
Defense integration.'' So if this new language would have the result of
increasing U.S. dependence on Russian titanium producers, I think it
would be terrible military and defense policy.
[[Page S6398]]
I hope that as the bill moves forward, we will have an opportunity to
take a closer look at these provisions and narrow them even further.
Perhaps some concepts we will determine deserve to be dropped
altogether.
I ask unanimous consent that the articles to which I referred be
printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
Kremlin Capitalism
russian car maker comes under sway of old pal of putin
a tight circle in government is drawing key industries into the state's
orbit
Frictions with partner gm
(By Guy Chazan)
Moscow.--Last December, the head of Russia's state arms-
trading agency emerged from the shadows as one of the
country's most powerful businessmen. Aided by 300 heavy armed
police, he took control of Russia's largest auto maker.
His agency had no experience running a car company, nor did
it own any shares of this one, OAO Avtovaz, producer of the
ubiquitous Lada. But the chief arms trader, Sergei Chemezov,
had one invaluable asset: He is an old friend of Russia's
president, Vladimir Putin.
Mr. Chemezov says he has known Mr. Putin since the two were
KGB agents in the 1980s. He acknowledges that his ties give
him a leg up in business. ``It means we can get a lot of
issues resolved fast,'' he says.
Since being tapped in 2004 to run the arms-export business,
Mr. Chemezov has been using his unique access to turn the
state agency, called Rosoboronexport, into a conglomerate
with interests ranging from to oil-drilling gear to cars. Its
newest target is one of the world's largest titanium
producers, a critical supplier for Airbus and Boeing Co.
Rosoboronexport is one of several fast-growing companies
headed by friends of Mr. Putin that embody his particular
brand of state capitalism. Across Russian industry, private
capital is in retreat as state-controlled entities ride a
wave or consolidation and confiscation to dominate oil, gas,
aviation, engineering and other sectors Mr. Putin deems
strategic.
It's a process with strange echoes of the past. In the
1990s, a generation of aggressive young businessmen used
connections to snap up assets at rigged privatization
auctions. Now, some of Mr. Putin's closest associates are
taking advantage of their proximity to the Kremlin to build
up similarly huge, although nominally state-owned business
empires.
Their growth worries the few outspoken advocates of market-
oriented policies left in the top ranks of the Putin
government. We do not have enough ways and means to keep
track of state-controlled firms, many of them monopolies, as
they grab market assets,'' said Economics Minister German
Gref at a conference in April.
Long noted for graft and inefficiency, Russian state-owned
behemoths increasingly have become tools of government
policy. In January, gas monopoly OAO Gazprom briefly shut off
the fuel to neighboring Ukraine in a price dispute that was
widely denounced as a move to punish the pro-West government
in Kiev. The Kremlin rejects those accusations and says big
state-owned companies will be subject to the discipline of
the market, often with some shares available to foreign
investors. (The government is planning an initial public
offering of state oil company OAA Rosneft this summer.)
But at Avtovaz, Rosoboronexport's takeover wasn't good news
for General Motors Corp.'s $340 million joint venture with
the Russian auto giant. The change in management brought to a
head simmering tensions at the operation. Now there are signs
the entire deal, the largest foreign investment in Russia's
auto sector, could unravel.
Until recently, Rosoboronexport was barely known, an
operation with a few hundred employees headquartered on a
quiet Moscow boulevard. It was, and remains, one of Russia's
most opaque companies: Its business activities are largely a
state secret. With Mr. Chemezov at the helm, however its
profile began to grow.
According to Mr. Chemezov, he and Mr. Putin met when both
were KGB intelligence officers in Dresden, East Germany--a
claim the Kremlin won't comment on but one published in a
government-controlled magazine. Mr. Chemezov says the two
lived in the same apartment block and their families
socialized. They kept in touch after their return to Russia.
In 1996, when Mr. Putin got a job as a mid-level Kremlin
bureaucrat, he made Mr. Chemezov his deputy.
In 1999 Mr. Chemezov moved to the arms industry. It was a
time of corruption and chaos. The advent of capitalism had
left defense factories starved for cash. Desperate to
survive, the mostly state-owned firms competed with one
another for foreign contracts, often with the help of dubious
middlemen.
After Mr. Putin became Russian president the following
year, he took control of the trade. He formed Rosoboronexport
as a state monopoly to squeeze out freelance arms salesmen
and root out graft, staffing it with old comrades. Mr.
Chemezov became its deputy head and then, in 2004, its chief.
Russian weapons exports boomed. They totaled $6 billion
last year, up 70% since 1999. Rosoboronexport, which takes a
3.8% commission on all sales, prospered.
The agency expanded its horizons. Last year, it merged all
of Russia's helicopter makers, some of them privately owned,
into one of its subsidiaries. Now it is involved in a similar
effort to consolidate Russia's struggling airplane
manufacturers under state control.
Chemezov's influence grew as the Kremlin picked him to
represent the state on the boards of a string of large
defense firms. But his most ambitious gambit yet involved
Avtovaz. The auto story developed fast last fall, ignited by
a meeting in the Kremlin between President Putin and the
long-serving CEO of the publicly held car company.
Down on Its Luck
Avtovaz was built in the late 1960s in Togliatti, a drab
Volga River city named after an Italian Communist. In the
1990s the city was torn apart by mafia wars, as rival gangs
vying for control of the auto works staged shootouts at the
factory gates. The company was broke. Big profits, however,
were being racked up by trading firms--some linked to Avtovaz
management--that supplied auto parts and sold the company's
finished cars.
More recently, Avtovaz has struggled to hold market share
as some in Russia's growing middle class switch from clunky
Ladas to foreign-brand cars, By mid-2005, corporate raiders,
some alleged to have criminal connections, were tightening
their grip on the big auto maker. They bought up parts
suppliers and dealerships, installing loyal managers and
acquiring shares.
Mr. Chemezov says that when President Putin met last fall
with Avtovaz's chief, 64-year-old Vladimir Kadannikov, the
veteran auto executive said he wanted to retire. Mr.
Kadannikov declined to be interviewed. People close to him
say he didn't have much choice in his decision to leave. A
Kremlin spokesman said Mr. Putin doesn't fire the managers of
private companies.
After consulting with aides, Mr. Putin gave Rosoboronexport
the task of cleaning up Avtovaz, Mr. Chemezov says.
Moving in was a simple operation. Avtovaz's managers
control the auto maker through an arcane system of cross-
shareholdings. By replacing the bosses, Rosoboronexport could
take charge of the company without having to buy any shares.
First, though, the old management team had to be persuaded
to leave peacefully. After Mr. Kadannikov resigned in
October, a team of police investigators and prosecutors was
airlifted in to begin the process. ``To impose order . . .
the state had to bring in 300 policemen from outside,'' says
Mr. Chemezov. ``Over the next few months, we had to replace
virtually the entire police force, both in Togliatti and in
the factory itself!'' Soon, three of Avtovaz's senior
accountants found themselves facing charges of theft and tax
evasion. The charges were dropped a few weeks later.
On Dec. 22, a tight police cordon encircled Avtovaz's high-
rise headquarters in Togliatti as shareholders gathered to
elect a new board. Within half an hour, they had voted for
the new, state-approved slate. Most had never even seen the
candidates before. No alternatives were on the ballot.
Auto Giant
President Putin defended the takeover. ``Let's face it, the
enterprise is in a bad way,'' he told reporters in January.
``And if a state structure goes in as crisis manager to try
to improve the situation, then that's no bad thing.''
The new bosses are pushing for $4.5 billion in state money
to roll out new models and build a new factory to make
450,000 cars a year. Some in the government want Avtovaz to
go further, absorbing other, smaller Russian car makers to
form a national auto giant. Mr. Chemezov has a personal
notion of how to restore the car company's onetime glory. He
has just announced it will build a Jeep-type vehicle for the
army, to be called the Kalashnikov.
On the whole, workers appear to have welcomed the change at
the top. ``With the new lot, at least there's hope they'll
get rid of the mafia. They're the only ones who can,'' says
Pyotr Zolotaryov, head of Edintsvo, Avtovaz's independent
trade union.
Rosoboronexport moved quickly to get control over Avtovaz's
lucrative sales operations. One of the first steps was to put
the company's Moscow office in the hands of the brother of
Avtovaz's new chairman.
Then the new regime shifted a big chunk of Avtovaz's
financial flows, including some of its hard-currency
accounts, to a preferred bank. Called Novikombank, it is tiny
but has close links to Russia's defense industry. For years,
one of its main shareholders was Russia's Association of
Foreign Intelligence Veterans, and in the late 1990s it was
run by Mr. Chemezov's Rosoboronexport predecessor, another
old KGB hand.
A Spat with GM
Rosoboronexport soon was in a spat with Avtovaz's American
joint-venture partner, General Motors. GM had seen relations
cool with the previous management team. But it was stunned in
February when the new bosses at Avtovaz suddenly stopped
supplying parts to the companies' five-year-old joint
venture, closing down its production line for 10 days.
``There was no discussion at all about a shutdown,'' says
Warren Browne, head of GM in Russia. ``They took that
decision unilaterally.''
Avtovaz had long grumbled that the joint venture wasn't
paying enough for the parts
[[Page S6399]]
Avtovaz supplied. After tough negotiations, the sides worked
out a compromise that raised the price, though not by the 60%
that Avtovaz had demanded. But that deal expires at the end
of this year, and beyond that, the venture's prospects look
murky. ``There's still a lot of distrust on both sides,''
says a banker familiar with the project. ``I think one will
buy the other out.''
That would be a big blow for a pioneering project that in
its time put GM way ahead of competitors in one of the
world's fastest-growing car markets. GM took the risky step
of putting its Chevrolet logo on a Russian-designed car, a
strategy that initially paid off as Chevrolet became Russia's
top-selling foreign brand in 2004. After this year's tiff, GM
says it remains committed to the joint venture. ``It's debt-
free, it's got cash flow and it achieved a profit a year
before we expected it to,'' says Mr. Browne.
Avtovaz's new bosses are less effusive. ``When it started,
the venture was a breakthrough, but times change,'' says
Vladimir Artyakov, Avtovaz's new chairman. ``It got stuck in
its original format . . . and began to limp. It no longer
really fits into Avtovaz's strategy.'' Asked if Avtovaz might
seek to buy out GM, he said, ``Why not?''
GM appears to be looking at other alternatives. It has
taken out an option on land in St. Petersburg for a possible
assembly plant there, which it would own with no local
partners.
Metals Race
Mr. Chemezov is also on the lookout for other business.
He's in talks to have his Rosoboronexport buy a stake in
publicly held OAO VSMPO-Avisma one of the world's main
producers of titanium. It would become part of a big new
state company producing metals and alloys for the Russian
defense industry.
VSMPO has just signed a $1.4 billion contract to sell the
lightweight metal to Airbus through 2015. It's also a key
supplier to Boeing. Rosoboronexport says it wants to make
sure not all of the country's store of the metal ends up
abroad. VSMPO ``is a strategic enterprise,' 'Mr. Chemezov
says. ``It supplies all our defense plants with titanium. And
naturally we want it to be . . . under state control.''
He denies that plan would amount to nationalization,
although he acknowledges that the price Rosoboronexport is
offering is only about half the titanium maker's current
share price.
As Mr. Chemezov's influence expands, the line separating
his different roles--civil servant and entrepreneur--is
increasingly blurred. ``You know, we're not really the state,
we're businessmen,'' he says of Rosoboronexport. ``Call it
state commerce.''
____
Russian State To Buy Stake in VSMPO
(By Arkady Ostrovskyin, Moscow)
The owners of VSMPO-Avisma, the world's largest titanium
producer, have succumbed to advances from the Russian
authorities to sell a stake to Rosoboronexport, the state
arms trading monopoly, which is fast emerging as one of the
most powerful players in the Russian economy.
While talks between Rosoboronexport and VSMPO-Avisma
shareholders are still going on, a decision in principle to
sell some of their shares to the state has been made, the
shareholders said.
The company is controlled by Vladislav Tetyukhin and
Vyacheslav Bresht, who have transformed the former Soviet
military plant into a highly profitable and globally
competitive business. VSMPO supplies Airbus and Boeing with
most of their titanium, increasingly used in aircraft
construction because of its toughness and lightness.
Both Mr. Tetyukhin and Mr. Bresht have previously resisted
attempts by Rosoboronexport to take control over the plant.
Mr. Bresht said yesterday: ``I am ready to sell my shares
to the state.'' He declined to comment on the reasons for his
decision. Mr. Tetyukhin, said: ``The state will definitely
become a shareholder in VSMPO-Avisma.'' He said it was a
question of time, the size of the stake, and the price.
Observers said the shareholders' decision to give up
control over the company was the latest illustration of the
Kremlin squeezing out private owners from what it deemed to
be strategic industries.
It was also a sign of the growing power of Rosoboronexport,
which was set up to trade arms but has a licence for a wide
range of commercial activities.
Last year it seized control of Avtovaz, the country's
largest carmaker, which it is now trying to revive.
It has also consolidated control over Russia's helicopter
makers and is believed to be interested in buying large
shipbuilding companies.
It emerged this week that Rosoboronexport, which has the
status of a state department, wants to transform itself into
a state-owned corporation, which would give its managers more
freedom.
VSMPO-Avisma last month struck a $1.4bn deal to supply
between 60 and 70 per cent of all titanium consumed by
Airbus.
Russia recently consolidated civil and military aircraft
manufacturers into a single holding company, which could
become a customer of VSMPO.
Rosoboronexport wants at least 25 per cent of VSMPO, but a
source close to the talks said the agency was interested in
gaining control.
____
Kremlin Moves to Take Control of Key Mineral Titanium
Yekaterinburg, Russia.--The huge new Airbus A380 cannot
take off without it, nor can Boeing's 787 Dreamliner--
titanium has become an essential component in modern
aircraft.
The Urals contain much of the world's reserves of this
metal, and the Russian company VSMPO-Avisma, as the world's
largest producer, has closed lucrative contracts with
aerospace sector in the West. The fact has not gone unnoticed
in Moscow. After recovering control of oil and gas, the
Kremlin is now looking at retaking control of the metal
industry.
Aircraft manufacturers in Europe and North America are
concerned. They fear the Russian state could exert influence
in the way it has recently in energy politics.
But at VSMPO-Avisma the concern is that circles around
President Vladimir Putin are less concerned about national
strategy than about personal gain.
With every billion dollars that flows into the Russian
state coffers as a result of the continuing high energy
prices, the Kremlin's confidence in its economic policy
grows.
A few months ago Putin announced the formation of a state
holding company for the decaying Russian aircraft
construction sector. It is to fall under the arms exporter
Rosoboronexport.
Rosoboronexport head Sergey Jemesov, a close Putin
associate, made clear to the titanium producer while on a
visit to the Urals that the state would not tolerate an
independent concern in a key strategic area of this kind.
VSMPO-Avisma, which produced around 30,000 tons in 2005,
also supplies titanium for submarines, rockets and nuclear
power stations. VSMPO-Avisma general director and major
shareholder Vladislav V. Tetiyukhin believes it only a matter
of months before the company is sold to the state.
``We are currently in talks about deadlines, price and the
extent of the future state holding,'' the 73-year-old
businessman says. He does not appear happy at the prospect.
Speaking at the company's headquarters in Verknyaya Salda
near Yekaterinburg, Tetiyukhin says that neither the clients,
such as Boeing and Airbus, nor the company's employees need
be concerned about the future.
But there are other voices being raised. A manager says she
fears a state takeover. ``We have never seen the state
managing a business effectively,'' she says, pointing to
reports of poor management at the huge gas production company
Gazprom, which has effectively been renationalized over
recent years.
A colleague who works in public relations agrees. ``Putin's
immediate circle are merely aiming at personal gain. Once the
president stands down in 2008, our concern will soon be
converted to cash,'' he believes. Western aircraft
manufacturers could also find that renationalization could
have unfortunate consequences for them.
There are fears that Rosoboronexport could make deliveries
of the strong and light metal dependent on Western countries
buying Russian aircraft in return.
The current owners of VSMPO-Avisma have made the
responsibilities clear to Rosoboronexport. ``If the new
managers make just one mistake, they will pay heavily for
it,'' says one of the main shareholders, who puts the value
of the concern at 2 billion euros.
VSMPO-Avisma is unusual among Russian commodity producers,
as it does not export the raw materials but actually
processes them. With an annual turnover of 400 million
dollars, the company supplies around a third of world
titanium demand. Almost 75 percent of its production goes to
exports.
In an attempt to allay the concerns of the company's staff,
Tetiyukhin says it is not yet clear whether the Kremlin will
take a majority shareholding. He has backed on principle a
minority holding by the state in the company which was built
up under the Soviet Union and then privatized during the
tumultuous 1990s.
But Putin may not be satisfied with this.
The alarm bells started ringing when the tax authorities
began taking a keen interest in VSMPO-Avisma and the
prosecution services began making ominous visits.
Tetiyukhin sees the threat to his company as not yet
serious, but the example of Yukos has shown how quickly that
situation can change. Precisely these agencies--tax officials
and the prosecutors' office--acted as the long arm of the
Kremlin in destroying what was the largest Russian oil
concern and then selling it to the state-owned competition.
____
Back in Business--How Putin's Allies are Turning Russia Into a
Corporate State
(By Neil Buckley and Arkady Ostrovsky)
Leaders of Russian industry, lined up under company banners
to greet President Vladimir Putin in St. Petersburg last
week, looked like soldiers standing to attention for their
commanding officer. Some had flown hundreds of miles for a
place in the parade.
A month before world leaders fly into the city for the
summit of the Group of Eight industrialised nations, the
investment forum in Mr. Putin's home city was designed to
showcase Russia's economic resurgence. As top executives
oozed a confidence born of $70-a-barrel oil and the economic
recovery it has generated, the message was clear: Russia is
back--and is aggressively eager to use its
[[Page S6400]]
natural resources as tools to regain its influence in the
world.
Its renewed assertiveness could scarcely have been imagined
eight years ago when, still in the throes of its post-Soviet
transformation, the country defaulted on $40bn ($22bn, =32bn)
of debt and plunged into financial crisis.
But the forum also displayed the new economic order in
Russia. Pride of place was given to the state-controlled
giants: Gazprom, the natural gas producer that has a market
worth of $225bn--bigger than Wal-Mart or Royal Dutch Shell;
Rosneft, the oil company about to launch a $10bn initial
public offering; and Russian Railways, also planning IPOs of
some of its units.
Directors of these companies are intimately linked to the
president. Alexei Miller, the Gazprom chief executive, worked
with Mr. Putin in the St Petersburg mayor's office in the
1990s. So, too, did Dmitry Medvedev, who combines his job as
first deputy prime minister with chairing Gazprom, and Igor
Sechin, who is the president's deputy chief of staff as well
as Rosneft chairman. Dmitry Yakunin, chief executive of
Russian Railways, also forged a bond with Mr. Putin in the
same period.
All are part of a network of Putin associates, either from
his spell in Russia's second city or former fellow officers
in the KGB secret police, who have quietly come to dominate
state-controlled businesses--and who often double up as
government ministers or senior Kremlin officials. Together,
they form the quasiboard of what might be called Russia Inc.,
comprising the country's most lucrative assets not just in
oil and gas but also nuclear power, diamonds, metals, arms,
aviation and transport.
The dominant force in Russia is no longer the oligarchs of
Boris Yeltsin's presidency, who hustled their way to wealth
in murky post-Soviet privatisations, then parlayed their
riches into political power. Mr. Putin's associates have
formed a new marriage of economic and political power. Add in
the state's resumption of control of most mass media and,
says Boris Nemtsov, the liberal former deputy prime minister,
this group has all the resources that defined the old
oligarchy.
``The 1990s oligarchs have ceased to be oligarchs and just
become businessmen again,'' says Mr. Nemtsov. ``Now we have a
chekist oligarchy,'' he says, using Russian slang for a
secret policeman.
When Mr. Putin succeeded Mr. Yeltsin in March 2000, his
goal was to reassert Kremlin control over a chaotic, cash-
strapped state dominated by big businessmen powerful enough
to shape legislation to their own advantage. Through a 1995
``loans for shares'' scheme, in which some oligarchs lent
money for the budget in return for stakes in the most coveted
unprivatised businesses, and by funding Mr. Yeltsin's 1996
presidential election victory, they established a hold over
the then president.
By helping Mr. Putin to power, they expected to hold
similar sway over him. But, by making high-profile examples
of some Yeltsin-era oligarchs, Mr. Putin radically clipped
the wings of the rest. Two, Boris Berezovsky and Vladimir
Gusinsky, fled abroad in 2000 facing fraud charges after
clashing with the president.
When Mikhail Khodorkovsky, owner of Yukos, was arrested
three years later on fraud charges and his oil company was
hit with a $28bn back tax bill, it seemed to be part of the
same process. Mr. Khodorkovsky had shown political ambitions
and was financing opposition parties. It did not just open a
new chapter in the wielding of Kremlin power but began a
process of redistribution of assets that has been dogging
Russia's economy ever Since.
The president has not ``liquidated the oligarchs as a
class'', as he once pledged--three of the big seven from the
1990s are still in business. Alongside the state companies in
St. Petersburg last week were leaders of private companies
including Lukoil, the energy group, and Rusal, the aluminium
giant.
But Mr. Putin has made private businessmen loyal and
pliant. The Yukos case taught them that they held their
assets at the Kremlin's pleasure and became involved in
politics at their peril. Asked if he has had any recent
contacts with Mikhail Kasyanov, the former prime minister
turned anti-Kremlin presidential candidate, one 1990s
oligarch grimaces.
``Are you crazy? Seeing Kasyanov today would be like
meeting the head of the CIA in the 1970s,'' he says.
As the Yeltsin-era oligarchs have declined, the ``state''
oligarchs have emerged. One reason is Mr. Putin's propensity
for using trusted acquaintances or former KGB colleagues in
every aspect of his attempt to re-establish state power. He
packed the presidential administration and government with
them--and increasingly in his second term has given the same
people supervisory roles in state business.
The second is the still largely unacknowledged policy of
using state businesses to reestablish Kremlin control of
strategic assets. Sometimes, as with Rosneft's purchase of
the main production arm of Yukos in 2004, or Gazprom's
acquisition of Sibneft from the UK-based Roman Abramovich,
this has amounted to a re-nationalisation of assets
privatised in the loans-for-shares scheme. In other cases,
state-controlled assets are being regrouped into national
champions in airlines, aviation or nuclear power (see
diagram).
Andrei Illarionov, Mr. Putin's former economic adviser
turned Kremlin critic, says Russia's ruling apparatus has
turned into a kind of corporation. ``The main incentive for a
corporation member is the prospect of being placed in charge
of a state-controlled company; the size of that company's
financial flows is the most accurate indicator of that
person's place in the corporate hierarchy,'' he says.
On the other hand, Mr. Med-vedev--a leading contender to
succeed Mr. Putin--tells the Financial Times: ``I don't
believe we're seeing any significant increase in the state's
participation in business.
``True, in a number of cases . . . state-controlled
companies increased their presence. Above all we're talking
about the energy sector. But . . . we're not talking about
nationalisation but about buying appropriate assets on the
market.''
Dmitry Peskov, a spokesman for Mr. Putin, says he
``categorically does not agree'' that a new oligarchy has
formed in Russia--although he makes no bones about the fact
that many senior officials and associates of the president
hold positions in state companies. The officials, he says,
rightly represent the state's interests. ``These people are
not businessmen; they don't have operational control of the
company.''
As for managers such as Gazprom's Mr. Miller or Russian
Railways' Mr. Yakunin, he--like other senior officials--says
it is not unusual in Europe or North America for big
companies to be run by people who happen to know the
country's leader. ``Gas and railways are life-and-death
industries for a country the size of Russia,'' says Mr.
Peskov. ``Whether Mr. Yakunin is a friend of the president is
of minor importance. What is important is whether he is a
good manager.''
But FT research has found Russian officialdom and business
to be extraordinarily intertwined. Of its presidential
administration, 11 members chaired six state companies and
had 12 further state directorships; 15 senior government
officials held six chairmanships and 24 other board seats. In
no other G8 country do ministers or senior aides to the head
of state or government sit on government companies' boards.
The state has also become a big player in mergers and
acquisitions. Two transactions--its move to increase its
stake in Gazprom from 38 to 51 per cent and Gazprom's
purchase of Sibneft--totalled $20.21bn, or half the $40.5bn
value of all Russian M&A deals last year, according to KPMG.
Figures from the European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development show the public sector's share of the economy
rose from 30 per cent to 35 per cent last year.
Just like the rise of the 1990s-era oligarchs, the
increasing role of state business and its directors has
important implications. It does not represent a return to
Soviet-era central planning. The Kremlin has embraced the
market--as demonstrated by the planned Rosneft IPO and its
move to lift restrictions on foreign investors buying the 49
per cent of Gazprom shares not owned by the state. But the
new model is a much more directed capitalism.
Take aviation. As Chris Weafer, chief strategist at Alfa
Bank (owned by Mikhail Fridman, another 1990s oligarch),
points out, in order to recreate a national carrier, Aeroflot
is being reunited with several regional airlines carved out
of it in the 1990s. Instead of replacing its aging fleet with
Boeings or Airbuses, it may buy aircraft from United Aircraft
Corporation, the national aviation giant now being formed.
UAC may, in turn, buy parts from VSMPO-Avisma, a privately
owned world leader in titanium that also seems set to fall
under state control. Throw in the possibility that windfall
oil revenues sitting in Russia's $60bn ``stabilisation fund''
could rebuild crumbling airports and the vision of state
capitalism takes shape.
There are risks in such an approach. Around the world,
public ownership has generally been less effective than
private. Instead of focusing on areas where Russia has real
global advantages, the state might focus on propping up
ailing dinosaurs.
State companies can also seek to use a compliant judiciary
and tax police to put pressure on targets. One leading
businessman says some bureaucrats see themselves as ``Robin
Hoods'' taking assets from private ``fat cats.'' ``This is
worse than in the mid-1990s, when businessmen paid courts to
make particular decisions,'' he says. ``At that time,
everyone knew that what they were doing was bad. Now, judges
think that by giving preference to state interests in a
dispute, they are doing the right thing.'' There is also the
danger of well-connected state managers winning favours for
their businesses in a way that distorts competition. The
leading Russian businessman warns that the state's growing
role ``kills initiative.''
``A businessman who can't rely on state orders comes up
with something the market needs,'' this businessman says.
``But if the state starts handing out orders and money,
people start thinking in terms of lobbying their interest in
this or that government project. This requires not
entrepreneurial skills but lobbying skills.''
State companies may simply attempt to cherry-pick
attractive private assets. One example is the pursuit of
VSMPO-Avisma, the privately held titanium company, by
Rosoboronexport, a state arms export agency headed by Sergei
Chemezov, another longtime Putin friend. The same group last
year took control of Avtovaz, the Lada car maker, and is
emerging as a prime mover in the new state capitalism.
The Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs, a
lobby group, has raised the
[[Page S6401]]
alarm about the government's failure to protect property
rights. In April it published research that concluded
Russia's economic model had been most favourable for
investment in 2002 and 2003, before state capitalism started
to emerge. Had the climate been maintained, it added, a real
investment boom would have boosted industrial output and the
economy could have grown at nearly twice last year's 6.4 per
cent. Even ministers have weighed in. German Gref, the
liberal economy minister, recently warned that the sheer
number of deals meant the government could not ``keep track
of state-controlled firms . . . as they grab market assets.''
But is this asset grab the result of ideology--that state
control is best--or attempts by officials to line their
pockets? Mr. Putin himself has denied that senior officials
running state businesses are enriching themselves. Supporters
say he put trusted allies into state companies partly to
clamp down on corruption--notably Mr. Miller, who has
reclaimed $1 bn of Gazprom assets spirited out of the
company's control by Yeltsin-era management.
Yegor Gaidar, the former prime minister who masterminded
Russia's post-communist economic reforms, says state control
tends to breed corruption. ``When you are the owner, you
don't cheat the company,'' he says. ``But when it isn't your
money but the state's money, being a manager you suddenly
find you have a lot of good friends and relatives who could
benefit from this money.''
Some observers say the process could go further: state
managers could become owners through flotations or partial
privatisations that would give them the chance to buy shares.
Most analysts agree Mr. Putin was right to break the
influence of the 1990s-era oligarchs, which was distorting
competition and deforming the development of Russian
capitalism. Yet rather than separating political and business
interests in a stable system governed by the rule of law, he
has created a new class of politically connected business
people.
Russia risks becoming locked in a vicious circle of
property redistribution and mutating oligarchies. To ensure
they do not lose their own assets, those who have gained
under Mr. Putin will be prepared to use every resource at
their disposal to ensure the election of his chosen successor
in 2008.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I understand under the order we now
proceed to the final passage of the authorization bill.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on the engrossment and third
reading of the bill.
The bill was ordered to be engrossed for a third reading and was read
the third time.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question occurs on passage of the bill as
amended.
Mr. LEVIN. Have the yeas and nays been ordered?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. They have not.
Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second? There is a
sufficient second.
The bill having been read the third time, the question is, Shall the
bill pass? The clerk will call the roll.
The legislative clerk called the roll.
Mr. McCONNELL. The following Senators were necessarily absent: the
Senator from Wyoming (Mr. Enzi) and the Senator from New Hampshire (Mr.
Sununu).
Mr. DURBIN. I announce that the Senator from Connecticut (Mr.
Lieberman) and the Senator from West Virginia (Mr. Rockefeller) are
necessarily absent.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Cornyn). Are there any other Senators in
the Chamber desiging to vote?
The result was announced--yeas 96, nays 0, as follows:
[Rollcall Vote No. 186 Leg.]
YEAS--96
Akaka
Alexander
Allard
Allen
Baucus
Bayh
Bennett
Biden
Bingaman
Bond
Boxer
Brownback
Bunning
Burns
Burr
Byrd
Cantwell
Carper
Chafee
Chambliss
Clinton
Coburn
Cochran
Coleman
Collins
Conrad
Cornyn
Craig
Crapo
Dayton
DeMint
DeWine
Dodd
Dole
Domenici
Dorgan
Durbin
Ensign
Feingold
Feinstein
Frist
Graham
Grassley
Gregg
Hagel
Harkin
Hatch
Hutchison
Inhofe
Inouye
Isakson
Jeffords
Johnson
Kennedy
Kerry
Kohl
Kyl
Landrieu
Lautenberg
Leahy
Levin
Lincoln
Lott
Lugar
Martinez
McCain
McConnell
Menendez
Mikulski
Murkowski
Murray
Nelson (FL)
Nelson (NE)
Obama
Pryor
Reed
Reid
Roberts
Salazar
Santorum
Sarbanes
Schumer
Sessions
Shelby
Smith
Snowe
Specter
Stabenow
Stevens
Talent
Thomas
Thune
Vitter
Voinovich
Warner
Wyden
NOT VOTING--4
Enzi
Lieberman
Rockefeller
Sununu
The bill (S. 2766), as amended, was passed.
(The bill will be printed in a future edition of the Record.)
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote, and I move
to lay that motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, once again I thank colleagues for the
unanimous vote, 96 to 0, sending a strong message to the men and women
of the Armed Forces.
Mr. LEVIN. We will have more to say on this after the next vote.
While everyone is here, I thank our chairman. This is the sixth bill he
has brought to the Senate of the United States as chairman. It gets
better every time. It gets smoother every time. That is owed to this
great Senator from Virginia. We will have more to say about that when
we bring the conference report back. A lot of Members need to leave. I
want everyone to know before they leave, this Senator is entitled to
their thanks.
Mr. WARNER. I thank my distinguished colleague.
Mr. KERRY. First of all, I join in congratulating the managers of
this bill.
Very quickly, Senator Hagel and I had an amendment with respect to
the pay raise of the troops. The House has raised the pay level by 2.7
percent. In this bill, there is a 2.2-percent raise. Senator Hagel and
I sought to equal what the House did and raise it across the board, but
it is our understanding that the committee has made the determination,
in consultation with people in the services, the needs of the services,
that there is a particular problem with respect to retention of
noncommissioned officers. Instead of taking that .5 percent
differential and spreading it throughout the services, it is the
intention of the committee on the Senate side to try to address the
retention issue and put that money into noncommissioned officers.
If that is the understanding, I think Senator Hagel and I, for that
reason, will pull back our amendment, and we agree to support the
position of the Senate.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, the Senator from Massachusetts is correct.
The group that has consulted with the committee staff was the senior
enlisted ranks. The problem rests in the senior enlisted ranks, the
warrant officer ranks. That is where the targeted money was applied. We
will look at it further in conference.
I thank the Senator.
Mr. KERRY. I thank the Senator.
____________________