[Congressional Record Volume 152, Number 82 (Thursday, June 22, 2006)]
[House]
[Pages H4500-H4502]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                          WITHDRAWAL FROM IRAQ

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the 
gentleman from Iowa (Mr. Leach) is recognized for 5 minutes.
  Mr. LEACH. Mr. Speaker, last week the House entertained 10 hours of 
debate on the Iraq war. The unamendable resolution which formed the 
basis of the debate was a partisan measure crafted to be a simple 
endorsement of our troops, a subject upon which all Americans are 
united. But the resolution also scoffed at the notion of establishing 
time lines for withdrawal and thus implicitly sanctioned a prolonged 
engagement, implying that it might be considered a 21st century version 
of Lyndon Johnson's Gulf of Tonkin resolution.
  During the debate, several of us suggested that the longer we stay in 
Iraq, the greater the prospect that forces of anarchy will multiply and 
spread, perhaps across oceans. I would like to amplify on this concern.
  From an American perspective, the two central issues in our Iraq 
policy are how best to advance our long-term national interests and how 
best to protect our troops. At issue is whether a prolonged engagement 
makes better sense than a time-lined withdrawal policy.
  The case for a prolonged engagement involves a neocon objective of 
establishing semipermanent bases in Iraq and neighboring emirates from 
which American military power, or the threat thereof, can be readily 
projected against Syria or Iran, or potentially Saudi Arabia if it were 
to become radicalized. It also allows greater flexibility in support of 
the new Iraqi Government. On the other hand, there is a thin line 
between being a liberating and an occupying power that many in the 
Muslim world either do not accept or think has been crossed.
  Sometimes it is as hard to determine when to end a war as when to 
start one. It may have been a mistake to intervene in Iraq in the first 
place, but clearly a precipitous departure after our initial engagement 
would have been an error. By the same token, prolonging our involvement 
runs the risk of causing American forces supporting the Shi'a majority 
government to be seen by Sunnis as favoring one side in an 
intrareligious conflict. Worse yet, the longer we stay, the more we 
will be seen as an occupying force, embarrassing to the Muslim world, 
causing the prospect of a long-lasting conflict between the Judeo-
Christian and Muslim civilizations to increase in likelihood.
  It is important to give momentum to and solidify Iraqi democracy, but 
there are tipping points in all struggles. We are at a point where 
action/reaction engagements could all too easily and rapidly intensify 
in asymmetric and multigeographic ways if the struggle to build a new 
Iraq comes to be perceived as an imperial American imposition on Iraqi 
sovereignty instead of an effort by Iraqis working to shape their own 
future.
  This is why it is so important that we reframe the discourse away 
from WMD and 9/11 concerns and define instead the establishment of 
democracy as our principal reason for intervention, and thus the 
logical basis for disengagement. Now that a Constitution has been 
written, elections held, and a government formed, we should 
forthrightly announce that we are prepared to draw down our troops in a 
measured, orderly way. A hasty departure would be imprudent, but the 
sooner the disengagement process begins, the better. Our goal may be to 
fight anarchistic forces over there rather than here, but we must 
understand that prolonging our involvement over there could precipitate 
a gathering storm of resentment which could make violence here more 
rather than less likely.
  With regard to protecting our troops, it is impressive that in 
polling data reported by the Brookings Institute, 47 percent of Iraqis 
favor attacking American forces, and 87 percent favor time lines for 
withdrawal. Occupation is neither the American way, nor is it tolerable 
for Muslims. While precipitous withdrawal after our intervention might 
have led to civil war and a breakup of the Iraqi state, the logic of 
these polling statistics would seem to indicate that Iraqis have become 
weary of and humiliated by a foreign occupying presence.
  The rationale for attacks against American forces would be undercut 
if Muslims had confidence that we were committed to an orderly and 
timely withdrawal policy. If we do not begin to leave Iraq now that 
democratic institutions have been put in place, anarchistic acts will 
continue, and the other side may be in a position to say when we 
eventually draw down our forces that they have somehow forced us out. 
Little would be worse for the American national interest or more 
demoralizing for all those who have

[[Page H4501]]

served so valiantly in combat there than such a preposterous claim.
  This is why the implications of slogans like the need to stay the 
course can be so misleading. There is nothing more disadvantageous for 
our national security or more dangerous for our troops in the field 
than overstaying our presence.
  The longer this war goes on, the greater the likelihood that anger 
will intensify in the Muslim world as well as among Muslims in the 
West, including the United States. The recent arrest of 17 young 
Muslims in Canada is a case in point. From news accounts it would 
appear that an accumulation of U.S. actions with which Canada was 
considered complicit triggered perfectly normal youngsters to consider 
violent and profoundly anti-democratic actions, including a plot to 
kidnap Canadian legislators and slit the throat of the Prime Minister.
  As long as the conflict in Iraq continues and the Israeli-Palestinian 
issue remains unresolved it is only a question of time before other 9/
11 type events or series of violent acts will occur in various parts of 
the world. Bringing the occupation to an end and resolving other Middle 
Eastern issues will not ensure against future violence but it could 
dampen the anger of millions of Muslims and reduce the prospect of a 
clash of civilizations.
  The challenge for the administration is to determine when the new 
Iraqi Government is strong enough to stand on its own. Our presence is 
dual edged. We have helped train a new army, perhaps erring along the 
way in disbanding the Iraqi armed forces after the capture of Baghdad. 
But we also are the subject of anger and humiliation for many Muslims 
in and out of Iraq. The opposition continues for an assortment of 
reasons. Some relate to the centuries-old antagonism between Sunnis and 
Shi'a, complicated by the nationalist ambitions of the Kurds. Some 
relate to the millennia-old implication of the Crusades, memories of 
which hang over the Middle East the way the Civil War did for a century 
in the American South. And some relate to current events--the 
Palestinian-Israeli confrontation, the occupation of Iraq and, to a far 
lesser extent, the more understandable U.S. intervention in 
Afghanistan, as well as problems attendant to the unforeseen--
Guantanamo, Abu Ghraib, Haditha.
  We are in unprecedented times. But there are parallels from recent 
history that might provide glimmers of guidance for policy makers 
today. One from the Reagan era that I have always assumed stemmed as 
much from the President's wife, Nancy, the closet moderate within that 
administration, as any geo-strategic planner relates to an attitudinal 
shift away from confrontation to diplomacy. In Reagan's first term he 
postured firmly in the anti-multilateralist, anti-arms control camp, 
objecting to negotiations with the evil empire. At the U.N., he ordered 
a U.S. withdrawal from UNESCO, one of the more financially bloated but 
least dangerous international organizations ever created. In reaction 
to a perceived anti-progressivism in his first term, two movements of 
educated citizens mushroomed in size. One, the environmental movement, 
was concerned with the confrontational policies of the Secretary of the 
Interior, Jim Watt; the other, which paralleled it in foreign policy, 
was the arms control movement. Thousands of fledgling advocates came to 
support the concept of a nuclear freeze in the context of SALT--
strategic arms limitation talks. This movement gained so much currency 
that a poll of delegates to the 1984 Republican National Convention 
which renominated Reagan found that the majority favored a nuclear 
freeze rather than the intransigent negotiating policy then in vogue.
  But the President, in a remarkable policy shift early in his second 
term upstaged his opposition by out-radicalizing it. Instead of pushing 
for a ``status quo'' SALT approach which would halt the arms race, he 
threw his support behind a more imaginative START initiative--a 
strategic arms reduction treaty--which would reverse it. The 
implication was a strategic oxymoron: America had to build up military 
might in order to reduce it.

  An inconsistent geo-strategic policy was adroitly presented as 
consistency. In part because of the wisdom of the policy reversal, in 
part because of Reagan's unique personal capacity to persuade, in part 
because the persuader spoke from the bully pulpit of the Presidency, 
America began to lead the world as a force both of resolve and 
restraint.
  A progressive might presumptuously hope today that on issues as 
diverse as North Korea, Iraq and potentially the Israeli-Palestinian 
challenge the Reagan policy-shift model beckons this President.
  Since John Kennedy, all American Presidents have been obsessed with 
what their place in history may be. In most circumstances I cannot 
envision a more worthwhile or uplifting motivation. I am concerned, 
however, that an unnecessarily sticky situation may be developing with 
this presidency. My sense is that advisors are telling the President 
that his administration will be judged on the steadfastness of his 
commitment to a policy of continued military engagement in Iraq and, 
quite possibly, following through with a military confrontation with 
Iran. But might not the Reagan ``consistent inconsistency'' model be 
fortuitously adapted? Instead of following one military action with 
another, what if the President were to commence drawing down forces as 
democratic institutions take hold in Iraq? And having proven that he is 
willing to use force--as Reagan proved his willingness to escalate 
defense spending--the President could then plausibly point out that he 
is now prepared to negotiate from a position of strength with Iran and 
North Korea. But for such a change in emphasis--use of diplomacy 
instead of force--to take place, the administration cannot continue to 
fritter away time and opportunity. If it continues to refuse to offer 
the respectful attention that direct negotiations imply with countries 
like Iran and North Korea, our adversaries could wait us out, or tempt 
the administration into a highly dangerous confrontation.
  The other historical model that gets little attention, except to 
serve as an apparent warning not to get too involved in African civil 
wars, is Somalia. Under this President's father, U.S. Armed Forces were 
deployed in a unique humanitarian intervention. The logistical 
capacities of the U.S. military were used to bring food and medical 
help to a war-torn society. This might have been a model of success 
rather than failure had events in the field not gotten out of hand. But 
over time, as one administration folded into the next, American forces 
in their efforts to provide assistance to starving people found it 
necessary to try to stabilize internal relations and thus do battle 
with anarchistic elements of Somali society. For many in Somalia this 
came to be perceived as siding with one side in an internal conflict. 
The disastrous consequence of becoming militarily engaged instead of 
simply humanitarianly involved may have relevance in a very different 
setting today--Iraq. Good intentions and heroic deeds can backfire.
  In this context, one of the most constitutionally awkward 
pronouncements of the civilian side of this administration deserves 
review. The President and Secretary of Defense have repeatedly 
suggested that troop-level determinations in Iraq will be made by the 
commander in the field. This articulation, which at first blush seems 
indisputedly prudent, is perhaps related to the hammering the 
administration has taken, especially from supporters in the press and 
on Capitol Hill of the intervention, who hold that there would be far 
fewer problems in Iraq today if more troops had been committed at the 
outset. According to this reasoning, the mistake for any failure of 
policy rests not with the judgment call on going to war, but with the 
implementation of the decision.

  It may be, as Colin Powell has implied, that once the decision to 
intervene had been made, it would have been wiser to follow the 
overwhelming force doctrine that is derived from military history but 
in recent times has come to bear the former Secretary's name. In any 
regard, whether or not the commitment of more troops would have made a 
significant difference in sealing Iraqi borders or bringing greater 
stability to Baghdad, both the military and civilian side of government 
have to think through the issue of who responds to whom on troop-level 
questions.
  There are distinctions between tactical decision-making and strategic 
judgments. The former should be disproportionately military; the latter 
require greater and, at some point, total civilian involvement. In a 
historical sense it is worth remembering, for instance, that Harry 
Truman stood down the most popular military officer of the 20th century 
when GEN Douglas MacArthur attempted to widen the war in Korea. 
Decisions to end as well as begin wars are constitutionally proscribed.
  The constitutional dimension of modern war making is not as clear-cut 
as the Founders might have surmised. This is the case because modem 
warfare, for a variety of reasons, is conducted without a formal 
declaration of war from Congress and because the law of the land, 
despite being unlikely to pass constitutional muster if tested in the 
courts, is the War Powers Act. Whether one approves or disapproves of 
the decision to intervene in Iraq, there is no question that because of 
a congressional vote to authorize the use of force, this war is legal. 
A strike without a precise Congressional authorization on Iran is more 
conjectural, but the War Powers Act which gives the President 60 days 
discretion on use of force as well as other war against terror 
resolutions, the NPT and possible future Security Council resolutions 
would presumably be used by the administration to justify executive 
discretion. Others might suggest that lacking an imminent threat 
rationale, the Constitution would seem to envision the need for 
congressional concurrence.
  As one who is doubtful of the wisdom of intervention against Iran, I 
was disappointed

[[Page H4502]]

that an effort to amend the DOD appropriations bill this week to 
require prior congressional consent for a strike against Iran was 
defeated. In any regard, the executive branch, possibly with 
congressional advice, has two profound judgment calls to make in the 
near future: whether and how to end the Iraq war and whether and how to 
engage Iran. And here--based on public commentary within the civilian 
side of our government and the private observations of former 
generals--my sense is that it is quite conceivable that a rift could 
develop between the military and civilian elements of our government 
which would be the reverse image of the MacArthur/Truman confrontation. 
The professional military seems far more skeptical than the White House 
of the judgment of the neo-cons who drove the decision to intervene in 
Iraq and far more dubious than many on Capitol Hill about the wisdom of 
a preemptive strike against Iran.
  With regard to Iran, I am impressed how congressional leadership of 
both parties, at least on the House side, remains confrontational. This 
is one reason I feel that it is important to emphasize the 
appropriateness of bipartisan criticism as well as bipartisan support 
for executive branch foreign policies. Partisanship should stop at the 
water's edge; but judgmental capitulation must never occur. Closed-
mindedness is the enemy. Members are obligated to review decisions made 
and oversee actions taken by the Executive. It is the question of 
motivation that must be above partisan reproach. The only motivation 
consistent with our pledge to uphold and defend the Constitution is to 
concern ourselves exclusively with the national interest. Neither 
concerns for political party advantage nor individual ambition should 
play a role in foreign policy judgments.

  Over the years I have become impressed by how within Republican 
administrations there is a tendency of political appointees, 
particularly in the White House, to advocate confrontation over 
diplomacy. My sense is that there is a lot of frustration within high 
levels of the military with what might be described as an immature, 
ideological machismo among key political appointees. It would not be 
surprising to me if in the next couple of years it falls to the 
professional military and career CIA and foreign service officers to 
raise cautionary flags about various policy options.
  In conclusion, as a representative of a State which has 
disproportionately provided Reserve and National Guard forces for the 
Iraqi conflict, I am struck by an extraordinarily impressive aspect of 
America's involvement in Iraq. In one of the most psychologically and 
militarily difficult settings ever to confront U.S. Armed Forces, the 
morale of our troops and their families at home has never ebbed and the 
patriotism of volunteer soldiers has never been challenged. This 
reflects well on their character as well as on their dedication to 
duty. There may be question whether intervention should have occurred, 
but once our troops were committed there is no question that it is in 
the national interest that they succeed.
  What remains at issue is whether longevity of commitment contributes 
to or undermines the success of the mission; whether IED attacks and 
skirmishes at the field level escalate or diminish; and whether 
diplomacy or lack thereof leads to a more peaceful or violent world.

                          ____________________