[Congressional Record Volume 152, Number 82 (Thursday, June 22, 2006)]
[House]
[Pages H4467-H4493]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                 LEGISLATIVE LINE ITEM VETO ACT OF 2006

  Mr. NUSSLE. Mr. Speaker, pursuant to House Resolution 886, I call up 
the bill (H.R. 4890) to amend the Congressional and Impoundment Control 
Act of 1974 to provide for the expedited consideration of certain 
proposed rescissions of budget authority, and ask for its immediate 
consideration.
  The Clerk read the title of the bill.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 886, the bill 
is considered read.
  The text of the bill is as follows:

                               H.R. 4890

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

       This Act may be cited as the ``Legislative Line Item Veto 
     Act of 2006''.

     SEC. 2. LEGISLATIVE LINE ITEM VETO.

       (a) In General.--Title X of the Congressional Budget and 
     Impoundment Control Act of 1974 (2 U.S.C. 621 et seq.) is 
     amended by striking part C and inserting the following:

                  ``Part C--Legislative Line Item Veto

       ``Sec. 1021. (a) Proposed Rescissions.--The President may 
     propose, at the time and in the manner provided in subsection 
     (b), the rescission of any dollar amount of discretionary 
     budget authority or the rescission, in whole or in part, of 
     any item of direct spending.
       ``(b) Transmittal of Special Message.--
       ``(1) Special message.--
       ``(A) In general.--The President may transmit to Congress a 
     special message proposing to rescind any dollar amount of 
     discretionary budget authority or any item of direct 
     spending.
       ``(B) Contents of special message.--Each special message 
     shall specify, with respect to the budget authority or item 
     of direct spending proposed to be rescinded--
       ``(i) the amount of budget authority or the specific item 
     of direct spending that the President proposes be rescinded;
       ``(ii) any account, department, or establishment of the 
     Government to which such budget authority or item of direct 
     spending is available for obligation, and the specific 
     project or governmental functions involved;
       ``(iii) the reasons why such budget authority or item of 
     direct spending should be rescinded;
       ``(iv) to the maximum extent practicable, the estimated 
     fiscal, economic, and budgetary effect (including the effect 
     on outlays and receipts in each fiscal year) of the proposed 
     rescission;
       ``(v) to the maximum extent practicable, all facts, 
     circumstances, and considerations relating to or bearing upon 
     the proposed rescission and the decision to effect the 
     proposed rescission, and the estimated effect of the proposed 
     rescission upon the objects, purposes, and programs for which 
     the budget authority or item of direct spending is provided; 
     and
       ``(vi) a draft bill that, if enacted, would rescind the 
     budget authority or item of direct spending proposed to be 
     rescinded in that special message.
       ``(2) Enactment of rescission bill.--
       ``(A) Deficit reduction.--Amounts of budget authority or 
     items of direct spending which are rescinded pursuant to 
     enactment of a bill as provided under this section shall be 
     dedicated only to deficit reduction and shall not be used as 
     an offset for other spending increases.
       ``(B) Adjustment of committee allocations.--Not later than 
     5 days after the date of enactment of a rescission bill as 
     provided under this section, the chairs of the Committees on 
     the Budget of the Senate and the House of Representatives 
     shall revise levels under section 311(a) and adjust the 
     committee allocations under section 302(a) to reflect the 
     rescission, and the appropriate committees shall report 
     revised allocations pursuant to section 302(b), as 
     appropriate.
       ``(C) Adjustments to caps.--After enactment of a rescission 
     bill as provided under this section, the Office of Management 
     and Budget shall revise applicable limits under the Balanced 
     Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act, as appropriate.
       ``(c) Procedures for Expedited Consideration.--
       ``(1) In general.--
       ``(A) Introduction.--Before the close of the second day of 
     session of the Senate and the House of Representatives, 
     respectively, after the date of receipt of a special message 
     transmitted to Congress under subsection (b), the majority 
     leader or minority leader of each House shall introduce (by 
     request) a bill to rescind the amounts of budget authority or 
     items of direct spending, as specified in the special message 
     and the President's draft bill. If the bill is not introduced 
     as provided in the preceding sentence in either House, then, 
     on the third day of session of that House after the date of 
     receipt of that special message, any Member of that House may 
     introduce the bill.
       ``(B) Referral and reporting.--The bill shall be referred 
     to the appropriate committee. The committee shall report the 
     bill without substantive revision and with or without 
     recommendation. The committee shall report the bill not later 
     than the fifth day of session of that House after the date of 
     introduction of the bill in that House. If the committee 
     fails to report the bill within that period, the committee 
     shall be automatically discharged from consideration of the 
     bill, and the bill shall be placed on the appropriate 
     calendar.
       ``(C) Final passage.--A vote on final passage of the bill 
     shall be taken in the Senate and the House of Representatives 
     on or before the close of the 10th day of session of that 
     House after the date of the introduction of the bill in that 
     House. If the bill is passed, the Secretary of the Senate or 
     the Clerk of the House of Representatives, as the case may 
     be, shall cause the bill to be transmitted to the other House 
     before the close of the next day of session of that House.
       ``(2) Consideration in the house of representatives.--
       ``(A) Motion to proceed to consideration.--A motion in the 
     House of Representatives to proceed to the consideration of a 
     bill under this subsection shall be highly privileged and not 
     debatable. An amendment to the motion shall not be in order, 
     nor shall it be in order to move to reconsider the vote by 
     which the motion is agreed to or disagreed to.
       ``(B) Limits on debate.--Debate in the House of 
     Representatives on a bill under this subsection shall not 
     exceed 4 hours, which shall be divided equally between those 
     favoring and those opposing the bill. A motion further to 
     limit debate shall not be debatable. It shall not be in order 
     to move to recommit a bill under this subsection or to move 
     to reconsider the vote by which the bill is agreed to or 
     disagreed to.
       ``(C) Appeals.--Appeals from decisions of the Chair 
     relating to the application of the Rules of the House of 
     Representatives to the procedure relating to a bill under 
     this section shall be decided without debate.
       ``(D) Application of house rules.--Except to the extent 
     specifically provided in this section, consideration of a 
     bill under this section shall be governed by the Rules of the

[[Page H4468]]

     House of Representatives. It shall not be in order in the 
     House of Representatives to consider any bill introduced 
     pursuant to the provisions of this section under a suspension 
     of the rules or under a special rule.
       ``(3) Consideration in the senate.--
       ``(A) Motion to proceed to consideration.--A motion to 
     proceed to the consideration of a bill under this subsection 
     in the Senate shall not be debatable. It shall not be in 
     order to move to reconsider the vote by which the motion to 
     proceed is agreed to or disagreed to.
       ``(B) Limits on debate.--Debate in the Senate on a bill 
     under this subsection, and all debatable motions and appeals 
     in connection therewith (including debate pursuant to 
     subparagraph (D)), shall not exceed 10 hours, equally divided 
     and controlled in the usual form.
       ``(C) Appeals.--Debate in the Senate on any debatable 
     motion or appeal in connection with a bill under this 
     subsection shall be limited to not more than 1 hour, to be 
     equally divided and controlled in the usual form.
       ``(D) Motion to limit debate.--A motion in the Senate to 
     further limit debate on a bill under this subsection is not 
     debatable.
       ``(E) Motion to recommit.--A motion to recommit a bill 
     under this subsection is not in order.
       ``(F) Consideration of the house bill.--
       ``(i) In general.--If the Senate has received the House 
     companion bill to the bill introduced in the Senate prior to 
     the vote required under paragraph (1)(C), then the Senate may 
     consider, and the vote under paragraph (1)(C) may occur on, 
     the House companion bill.
       ``(ii) Procedure after vote on senate bill.--If the Senate 
     votes, pursuant to paragraph (1)(C), on the bill introduced 
     in the Senate, then immediately following that vote, or upon 
     receipt of the House companion bill, the House bill shall be 
     deemed to be considered, read the third time, and the vote on 
     passage of the Senate bill shall be considered to be the vote 
     on the bill received from the House.
       ``(d) Amendments and Divisions Prohibited.--No amendment to 
     a bill considered under this section shall be in order in 
     either the Senate or the House of Representatives. It shall 
     not be in order to demand a division of the question in the 
     House of Representatives (or in a Committee of the Whole). No 
     motion to suspend the application of this subsection shall be 
     in order in the House of Representatives, nor shall it be in 
     order in the House of Representatives to suspend the 
     application of this subsection by unanimous consent.
       ``(e) Temporary Presidential Authority To Withhold.--
       ``(1) In general.--At the same time as the President 
     transmits to Congress a special message pursuant to 
     subsection (b), the President may direct that any dollar 
     amount of discretionary budget authority proposed to be 
     rescinded in that special message shall not be made available 
     for obligation for a period not to exceed 180 calendar days 
     from the date the President transmits the special message to 
     Congress.
       ``(2) Early availability.--The President may make any 
     dollar amount of discretionary budget authority deferred 
     pursuant to paragraph (1) available at a time earlier than 
     the time specified by the President if the President 
     determines that continuation of the deferral would not 
     further the purposes of this Act.
       ``(f) Temporary Presidential Authority To Suspend.--
       ``(1) In general.--At the same time as the President 
     transmits to Congress a special message pursuant to 
     subsection (b), the President may suspend the execution of 
     any item of direct spending proposed to be rescinded in that 
     special message for a period not to exceed 180 calendar days 
     from the date the President transmits the special message to 
     Congress.
       ``(2) Early availability.--The President may terminate the 
     suspension of any item of direct spending at a time earlier 
     than the time specified by the President if the President 
     determines that continuation of the suspension would not 
     further the purposes of this Act.
       ``(g) Definitions.--For purposes of this section--
       ``(1) the term `appropriation law' means any general or 
     special appropriation Act, and any Act or joint resolution 
     making supplemental, deficiency, or continuing 
     appropriations;
       ``(2) the term `deferral' has, with respect to any dollar 
     amount of discretionary budget authority, the same meaning as 
     the phrase `deferral of budget authority' defined in section 
     1011(1) in part B (2 U.S.C. 682(1));
       ``(3) the term `dollar amount of discretionary budget 
     authority' means the entire dollar amount of budget authority 
     and obligation limitations--
       ``(A) specified in an appropriation law, or the entire 
     dollar amount of budget authority required to be allocated by 
     a specific proviso in an appropriation law for which a 
     specific dollar figure was not included;
       ``(B) represented separately in any table, chart, or 
     explanatory text included in the statement of managers or the 
     governing committee report accompanying such law;
       ``(C) required to be allocated for a specific program, 
     project, or activity in a law (other than an appropriation 
     law) that mandates the expenditure of budget authority from 
     accounts, programs, projects, or activities for which budget 
     authority is provided in an appropriation law;
       ``(D) represented by the product of the estimated 
     procurement cost and the total quantity of items specified in 
     an appropriation law or included in the statement of managers 
     or the governing committee report accompanying such law; or
       ``(E) represented by the product of the estimated 
     procurement cost and the total quantity of items required to 
     be provided in a law (other than an appropriation law) that 
     mandates the expenditure of budget authority from accounts, 
     programs, projects, or activities for which dollar amount of 
     discretionary budget authority is provided in an 
     appropriation law;
       ``(4) the terms `rescind' or `rescission' mean to modify or 
     repeal a provision of law to prevent--
       ``(A) budget authority from having legal force or effect;
       ``(B) in the case of entitlement authority, to prevent the 
     specific legal obligation of the United States from having 
     legal force or effect; and
       ``(C) in the case of the food stamp program, to prevent the 
     specific provision of law that provides such benefit from 
     having legal force or effect;
       ``(5) the term `direct spending' means budget authority 
     provided by law (other than an appropriation law); 
     entitlement authority; and the food stamp program;
       ``(6) the term `item of direct spending' means any specific 
     provision of law enacted after the effective date of the 
     Legislative Line Item Veto Act of 2006 that is estimated to 
     result in a change in budget authority or outlays for direct 
     spending relative to the most recent levels calculated 
     pursuant to section 257 of the Balanced Budget and Emergency 
     Deficit Control Act of 1985 and included with a budget 
     submission under section 1105(a) of title 31, United States 
     Code, and with respect to estimates made after that budget 
     submission that are not included with it, estimates 
     consistent with the economic and technical assumptions 
     underlying the most recently submitted President's budget;
       ``(7) the term `suspend the execution' means, with respect 
     to an item of direct spending or a targeted tax benefit, to 
     stop for a specified period, in whole or in part, the 
     carrying into effect of the specific provision of law that 
     provides such benefit; and
       ``(8)(A) the term `targeted tax benefit' means--
       ``(i) any revenue-losing provision that provides a Federal 
     tax deduction, credit, exclusion, or preference to 100 or 
     fewer beneficiaries under the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 
     in any fiscal year for which the provision is in effect; and
       ``(ii) any Federal tax provision that provides temporary or 
     permanent transitional relief for 10 or fewer beneficiaries 
     in any fiscal year from a change to the Internal Revenue Code 
     of 1986;
       ``(B) a provision shall not be treated as described in 
     subparagraph (A)(i) if the effect of that provision is that--
       ``(i) all persons in the same industry or engaged in the 
     same type of activity receive the same treatment;
       ``(ii) all persons owning the same type of property, or 
     issuing the same type of investment, receive the same 
     treatment; or
       ``(iii) any difference in the treatment of persons is based 
     solely on--
       ``(I) in the case of businesses and associations, the size 
     or form of the business or association involved;
       ``(II) in the case of individuals, general demographic 
     conditions, such as income, marital status, number of 
     dependents, or tax-return-filing status;
       ``(III) the amount involved; or
       ``(IV) a generally-available election under the Internal 
     Revenue Code of 1986;
       ``(C) a provision shall not be treated as described in 
     subparagraph (A)(ii) if--
       ``(i) it provides for the retention of prior law with 
     respect to all binding contracts or other legally enforceable 
     obligations in existence on a date contemporaneous with 
     congressional action specifying such date; or
       ``(ii) it is a technical correction to previously enacted 
     legislation that is estimated to have no revenue effect;
       ``(D) for purposes of subparagraph (A)--
       ``(i) all businesses and associations that are members of 
     the same controlled group of corporations (as defined in 
     section 1563(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986) shall 
     be treated as a single beneficiary;
       ``(ii) all qualified plans of an employer shall be treated 
     as a single beneficiary;
       ``(iii) all holders of the same bond issue shall be treated 
     as a single beneficiary; and
       ``(iv) if a corporation, partnership, association, trust or 
     estate is the beneficiary of a provision, the shareholders of 
     the corporation, the partners of the partnership, the members 
     of the association, or the beneficiaries of the trust or 
     estate shall not also be treated as beneficiaries of such 
     provision;
       ``(E) for the purpose of this paragraph, the term `revenue-
     losing provision' means any provision that results in a 
     reduction in Federal tax revenues for any one of the two 
     following periods--
       ``(i) the first fiscal year for which the provision is 
     effective; or
       ``(ii) the period of the 5 fiscal years beginning with the 
     first fiscal year for which the provision is effective; and
       ``(F) the terms used in this paragraph shall have the same 
     meaning as those terms have generally in the Internal Revenue 
     Code of 1986, unless otherwise expressly provided.

[[Page H4469]]

       ``(h) Application to Targeted Tax Benefits.--The President 
     may propose the repeal of any targeted tax benefit in any 
     bill that includes such a benefit, under the same conditions, 
     and subject to the same Congressional consideration, as a 
     proposal under this section to rescind an item of direct 
     spending.''.
       (b) Exercise of Rulemaking Powers.--Section 904 of the 
     Congressional Budget Act of 1974 (2 U.S.C. 621 note) is 
     amended--
       (1) in subsection (a), by striking ``and 1017'' and 
     inserting ``1017, and 1021''; and
       (2) in subsection (d), by striking ``section 1017'' and 
     inserting ``sections 1017 and 1021''.
       (c) Clerical Amendments.--(1) Section 1(a) of the 
     Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 is 
     amended by--
       (A) striking ``Parts A and B'' before ``title X'' and 
     inserting ``Parts A, B, and C''; and
       (B) striking the last sentence and inserting at the end the 
     following new sentence: ``Part C of title X also may be cited 
     as the `Legislative Line Item Veto Act of 2006'.''.
       (2) Table of Contents.--The table of contents set forth in 
     section 1(b) of the Congressional Budget and Impoundment 
     Control Act of 1974 is amended by deleting the contents for 
     part C of title X and inserting the following:

                  ``Part C--Legislative Line Item Veto

       ``Sec. 1021. Expedited consideration of certain proposed 
           rescissions.''.
       (d) Severability.--If any provision of this Act or the 
     amendments made by it is held to be unconstitutional, the 
     remainder of this Act and the amendments made by it shall not 
     be affected by the holding.
       (e) Effective Date.--The amendments made by this Act 
     shall--
       (1) take effect on the date of enactment of this Act; and
       (2) apply only to any dollar amount of discretionary budget 
     authority, item of direct spending, or targeted tax benefit 
     provided in an Act enacted on or after the date of enactment 
     of this Act.

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The amendment in the nature of a substitute 
printed in the bill, modified by the amendment printed in House Report 
109-518, is adopted.
  The text of the amendment in the nature of a substitute, as amended, 
is as follows:

                               H.R. 4890

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

       This Act may be cited as the ``Legislative Line Item Veto 
     Act of 2006''.

     SEC. 2. LEGISLATIVE LINE ITEM VETO.

       (a) In General.--Title X of the Congressional Budget and 
     Impoundment Control Act of 1974 (2 U.S.C. 621 et seq.) is 
     amended by striking all of part B (except for sections 1016 
     and 1013, which are redesignated as sections 1019 and 1020, 
     respectively) and part C and inserting the following:

                  ``Part B--Legislative Line Item Veto


                       ``line item veto authority

       ``Sec. 1011. (a) Proposed Cancellations.--Within 45 
     calendar days after the enactment of any bill or joint 
     resolution providing any discretionary budget authority, item 
     of direct spending, or targeted tax benefit, the President 
     may propose, in the manner provided in subsection (b), the 
     cancellation of any dollar amount of such discretionary 
     budget authority, item of direct spending, or targeted tax 
     benefit. If the 45 calendar-day period expires during a 
     period where either House of Congress stands adjourned sine 
     die at the end of a Congress or for a period greater than 45 
     calendar days, the President may propose a cancellation under 
     this section and transmit a special message under subsection 
     (b) on the first calendar day of session following such a 
     period of adjournment.
       ``(b) Transmittal of Special Message.--
       ``(1) Special message.--
       ``(A) In general.--The President may transmit to the 
     Congress a special message proposing to cancel any dollar 
     amounts of discretionary budget authority, items of direct 
     spending, or targeted tax benefits.
       ``(B) Contents of special message.--Each special message 
     shall specify, with respect to the discretionary budget 
     authority, items of direct spending proposed, or targeted tax 
     benefits to be canceled--
       ``(i) the dollar amount of discretionary budget authority, 
     the specific item of direct spending (that OMB, after 
     consultation with CBO, estimates to increase budget authority 
     or outlays as required by section 1017(9)), or the targeted 
     tax benefit that the President proposes be canceled;
       ``(ii) any account, department, or establishment of the 
     Government to which such discretionary budget authority is 
     available for obligation, and the specific project or 
     governmental functions involved;
       ``(iii) the reasons why such discretionary budget 
     authority, item of direct spending, or targeted tax benefit 
     should be canceled;
       ``(iv) to the maximum extent practicable, the estimated 
     fiscal, economic, and budgetary effect (including the effect 
     on outlays and receipts in each fiscal year) of the proposed 
     cancellation;
       ``(v) to the maximum extent practicable, all facts, 
     circumstances, and considerations relating to or bearing upon 
     the proposed cancellation and the decision to effect the 
     proposed cancellation, and the estimated effect of the 
     proposed cancellation upon the objects, purposes, or programs 
     for which the discretionary budget authority, item of direct 
     spending, or the targeted tax benefit is provided;
       ``(vi) a numbered list of cancellations to be included in 
     an approval bill that, if enacted, would cancel discretionary 
     budget authority, items of direct spending, or targeted tax 
     benefits proposed in that special message; and
       ``(vii) if the special message is transmitted subsequent to 
     or at the same time as another special message, a detailed 
     explanation why the proposed cancellations are not 
     substantially similar to any other proposed cancellation in 
     such other message.
       ``(C) Duplicative proposals prohibited.--The President may 
     not propose to cancel the same or substantially similar 
     discretionary budget authority, item of direct spending, or 
     targeted tax benefit more than one time under this Act.
       ``(D) Maximum number of special messages.--The President 
     may not transmit to the Congress more than 5 special messages 
     under this subsection related to any bill or joint resolution 
     described in subsection (a), but may transmit not more than 
     10 special messages for any omnibus budget reconciliation or 
     appropriation measure.
       ``(2) Enactment of approval bill.--
       ``(A) Deficit reduction.--Amounts of budget authority, 
     items of direct spending, or targeted tax benefits which are 
     canceled pursuant to enactment of a bill as provided under 
     this section shall be dedicated only to reducing the deficit 
     or increasing the surplus.
       ``(B) Adjustment of levels in the concurrent resolution on 
     the budget.--Not later than 5 days after the date of 
     enactment of an approval bill as provided under this section, 
     the chairs of the Committees on the Budget of the Senate and 
     the House of Representatives shall revise allocations and 
     aggregates and other appropriate levels under the appropriate 
     concurrent resolution on the budget to reflect the 
     cancellation, and the applicable committees shall report 
     revised suballocations pursuant to section 302(b), as 
     appropriate.
       ``(C) Adjustments to statutory limits.--After enactment of 
     an approval bill as provided under this section, the Office 
     of Management and Budget shall revise applicable limits under 
     the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 
     1985, as appropriate.
       ``(D) Trust funds and special funds.--Nothwithstanding 
     subparagraph (A), nothing in this part shall be construed to 
     require or allow the deposit of amounts derived from a trust 
     fund or special fund which are canceled pursuant to enactment 
     of a bill as provided under this section to any other 
     fund.''.


                ``procedures for expedited consideration

       ``Sec. 1012. (a) Expedited Consideration.--
       ``(1) In general.--The majority leader of each House or his 
     designee shall (by request) introduce an approval bill as 
     defined in section 1017 not later than the fifth day of 
     session of that House after the date of receipt of a special 
     message transmitted to the Congress under section 1011(b) .
       ``(2) Consideration in the house of representatives.--
       ``(A) Referral and reporting.--Any committee of the House 
     of Representatives to which an approval bill is referred 
     shall report it to the House without amendment not later than 
     the seventh legislative day after the date of its 
     introduction. If a committee fails to report the bill within 
     that period or the House has adopted a concurrent resolution 
     providing for adjournment sine die at the end of a Congress, 
     it shall be in order to move that the House discharge the 
     committee from further consideration of the bill. Such a 
     motion shall be in order only at a time designated by the 
     Speaker in the legislative schedule within two legislative 
     days after the day on which the proponent announces his 
     intention to offer the motion. Such a motion shall not be in 
     order after a committee has reported an approval bill with 
     respect to that special message or after the House has 
     disposed of a motion to discharge with respect to that 
     special message. The previous question shall be considered as 
     ordered on the motion to its adoption without intervening 
     motion except twenty minutes of debate equally divided and 
     controlled by the proponent and an opponent. If such a motion 
     is adopted, the House shall proceed immediately to consider 
     the approval bill in accordance with subparagraph (C). A 
     motion to reconsider the vote by which the motion is disposed 
     of shall not be in order.
       ``(B) Proceeding to consideration.--After an approval bill 
     is reported or a committee has been discharged from further 
     consideration, or the House has adopted a concurrent 
     resolution providing for adjournment sine die at the end of a 
     Congress, it shall be in order to move to proceed to consider 
     the approval bill in the House. Such a motion shall be in 
     order only at a time designated by the Speaker in the 
     legislative schedule within two legislative days after the 
     day on which the proponent announces his intention to offer 
     the motion. Such a motion shall not be in order after the 
     House has disposed of a motion to proceed with respect to 
     that special message. The previous question shall be 
     considered as ordered on the motion to its adoption without 
     intervening motion. A motion to reconsider the vote by which 
     the motion is disposed of shall not be in order.
       ``(C) Consideration.--The approval bill shall be considered 
     as read. All points of order against an approval bill and 
     against its consideration are waived. The previous question 
     shall be considered as ordered on an approval bill to its 
     passage without intervening motion except five hours of 
     debate equally divided and controlled by the proponent and an 
     opponent and one motion to limit debate on the bill. A motion 
     to reconsider the vote on passage of the bill shall not be in 
     order.
       ``(D) Senate bill.--An approval bill received from the 
     Senate shall not be referred to committee.

[[Page H4470]]

       ``(3) Consideration in the Senate.--
       ``(A) Motion to proceed to consideration.--A motion to 
     proceed to the consideration of a bill under this subsection 
     in the Senate shall not be debatable. It shall not be in 
     order to move to reconsider the vote by which the motion to 
     proceed is agreed to or disagreed to.
       ``(B) Limits on debate.--Debate in the Senate on a bill 
     under this subsection, and all debatable motions and appeals 
     in connection therewith (including debate pursuant to 
     subparagraph (D)), shall not exceed 10 hours, equally divided 
     and controlled in the usual form.
       ``(C) Appeals.--Debate in the Senate on any debatable 
     motion or appeal in connection with a bill under this 
     subsection shall be limited to not more than 1 hour, to be 
     equally divided and controlled in the usual form.
       ``(D) Motion to limit debate.--A motion in the Senate to 
     further limit debate on a bill under this subsection is not 
     debatable.
       ``(E) Motion to recommit.--A motion to recommit a bill 
     under this subsection is not in order.
       ``(F) Consideration of the house bill.--
       ``(i) In general.--If the Senate has received the House 
     companion bill to the bill introduced in the Senate prior to 
     the vote required under paragraph (1)(C), then the Senate may 
     consider, and the vote under paragraph (1)(C) may occur on, 
     the House companion bill.
       ``(ii) Procedure after vote on senate bill.--If the Senate 
     votes, pursuant to paragraph (1)(C), on the bill introduced 
     in the Senate, then immediately following that vote, or upon 
     receipt of the House companion bill, the House bill shall be 
     deemed to be considered, read the third time, and the vote on 
     passage of the Senate bill shall be considered to be the vote 
     on the bill received from the House.
       ``(b) Amendments Prohibited.--No amendment to, or motion to 
     strike a provision from, a bill considered under this section 
     shall be in order in either the Senate or the House of 
     Representatives.


                   ``presidential deferral authority

       ``Sec. 1013. (a) Temporary Presidential Authority to 
     Withhold Discretionary Budget Authority.--
       ``(1) In general.--At the same time as the President 
     transmits to the Congress a special message pursuant to 
     section 1011(b), the President may direct that any dollar 
     amount of discretionary budget authority to be canceled in 
     that special message shall not be made available for 
     obligation for a period not to exceed 45 calendar days from 
     the date the President transmits the special message to the 
     Congress.
       ``(2) Early availability.--The President shall make any 
     dollar amount of discretionary budget authority deferred 
     pursuant to paragraph (1) available at a time earlier than 
     the time specified by the President if the President 
     determines that continuation of the deferral would not 
     further the purposes of this Act.
       ``(b) Temporary Presidential Authority To Suspend Direct 
     Spending.--
       ``(1) In general.--At the same time as the President 
     transmits to the Congress a special message pursuant to 
     section 1011(b), the President may suspend the implementation 
     of any item of direct spending proposed to be canceled in 
     that special message for a period not to exceed 45 calendar 
     days from the date the President transmits the special 
     message to the Congress.
       ``(2) Early availability.--The President shall terminate 
     the suspension of any item of direct spending at a time 
     earlier than the time specified by the President if the 
     President determines that continuation of the suspension 
     would not further the purposes of this Act.
       ``(c) Temporary Presidential Authority To Suspend a 
     Targeted Tax Benefit.--
       ``(1) In general.--At the same time as the President 
     transmits to the Congress a special message pursuant to 
     section 1011(b), the President may suspend the implementation 
     of any targeted tax benefit proposed to be repealed in that 
     special message for a period not to exceed 45 calendar days 
     from the date the President transmits the special message to 
     the Congress.
       ``(2) Early availability.--The President shall terminate 
     the suspension of any targeted tax benefit at a time earlier 
     than the time specified by the President if the President 
     determines that continuation of the suspension would not 
     further the purposes of this Act.
       ``(d) Extension of 45-day Period.--The President may 
     transmit to the Congress not more than one supplemental 
     special message to extend the period to suspend the 
     implementation of any discretionary budget authority, item of 
     direct spending, or targeted tax benefit, as applicable, by 
     an additional 45 calendar days. Any such supplemental message 
     may not be transmitted to the Congress before the 40th day of 
     the 45-day period set forth in the preceding message or later 
     than the last day of such period.


               ``identification of targeted tax benefits

       ``Sec. 1014. (a) Statement.--The chairman of the Committee 
     on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives and the 
     chairman of the Committee on Finance of the Senate acting 
     jointly (hereafter in this subsection referred to as the 
     `chairmen') shall review any revenue or reconciliation bill 
     or joint resolution which includes any amendment to the 
     Internal Revenue Code of 1986 that is being prepared for 
     filing by a committee of conference of the two Houses, and 
     shall identify whether such bill or joint resolution contains 
     any targeted tax benefits. The chairmen shall provide to the 
     committee of conference a statement identifying any such 
     targeted tax benefits or declaring that the bill or joint 
     resolution does not contain any targeted tax benefits. Any 
     such statement shall be made available to any Member of 
     Congress by the chairmen immediately upon request.
       ``(b) Statement Included in Legislation.--
       ``(1) In general.--Notwithstanding any other rule of the 
     House of Representatives or any rule or precedent of the 
     Senate, any revenue or reconciliation bill or joint 
     resolution which includes any amendment to the Internal 
     Revenue Code of 1986 reported by a committee of conference of 
     the two Houses may include, as a separate section of such 
     bill or joint resolution, the information contained in the 
     statement of the chairmen, but only in the manner set forth 
     in paragraph (2).
       ``(2) Applicability.--The separate section permitted under 
     subparagraph (A) shall read as follows: `Section 1021 of the 
     Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 
     shall ________ apply to ____________.', with the blank spaces 
     being filled in with--
       ``(A) in any case in which the chairmen identify targeted 
     tax benefits in the statement required under subsection (a), 
     the word `only' in the first blank space and a list of all of 
     the specific provisions of the bill or joint resolution 
     identified by the chairmen in such statement in the second 
     blank space; or
       ``(B) in any case in which the chairmen declare that there 
     are no targeted tax benefits in the statement required under 
     subsection (a), the word `not' in the first blank space and 
     the phrase `any provision of this Act' in the second blank 
     space.
       ``(c) Identification in Revenue Estimate.--With respect to 
     any revenue or reconciliation bill or joint resolution with 
     respect to which the chairmen provide a staement under 
     subsection (a), the Joint Committee on Taxation shall--
       ``(1) in the case of a statement described in subsection 
     (b)(2)(A), list the targeted tax benefits identified by the 
     chairmen in such statement in any revenue estimate prepared 
     by the Joint Committee on Taxation for any conference report 
     which accompanies such bill or joint resolution, or
       ``(2) in the case of a statement described in subsection 
     (b)(2)(B), indicate in such revenue estimate that no 
     provision in such bill or joint resolution has been 
     identified as a targeted tax benefit.''.
       ``(d) President's Authority.--If any revenue or 
     reconciliation bill or joint resolution is signed into law--
       ``(1) with a separate section described in subsection 
     (b)(2), then the President may use the authority granted in 
     this section only with respect to any targeted tax benefit in 
     that law, if any, identified in such separate section; or
       ``(2) without a separate section described in subsection 
     (b)(2), then the President may use the authority granted in 
     this section with respect to any targeted tax benefit in that 
     law.


                      ``treatment of cancellations

       ``Sec. 1015. The cancellation of any dollar amount of 
     discretionary budget authority, item of direct spending, or 
     targeted tax benefit shall take effect only upon enactment of 
     the applicable approval bill. If an approval bill is not 
     enacted into law before the end of the applicable period 
     under section 1013, then all proposed cancellations contained 
     in that bill shall be null and void and any such dollar 
     amount of discretionary budget authority, item of direct 
     spending, or targeted tax benefit shall be effective as of 
     the original date provided in the law to which the proposed 
     cancellations applied.


                    ``reports by comptroller general

       ``Sec. 1016. With respect to each special message under 
     this part, the Comptroller General shall issue to the 
     Congress a report determining whether any discretionary 
     budget authority is not made available for obligation or item 
     of direct spending or targeted tax benefit continues to be 
     suspended after the deferral authority set forth in section 
     1013 of the President has expired.


                             ``definitions

       ``Sec. 1017. As used in this part:
       ``(1) Appropriation law.--The term `appropriation law' 
     means an Act referred to in section 105 of title 1, United 
     States Code, including any general or special appropriation 
     Act, or any Act making supplemental, deficiency, or 
     continuing appropriations, that has been signed into law 
     pursuant to Article I, section 7, of the Constitution of the 
     United States.
       ``(2) Approval bill.--The term `approval bill' means a bill 
     or joint resolution which only approves proposed 
     cancellations of dollar amounts of discretionary budget 
     authority, items of new direct spending, or targeted tax 
     benefits in a special message transmitted by the President 
     under this part and--
       ``(A) the title of which is as follows: `A bill approving 
     the proposed cancellations transmitted by the President on 
     ____', the blank space being filled in with the date of 
     transmission of the relevant special message and the public 
     law number to which the message relates;
       ``(B) which does not have a preamble; and
       ``(C) which provides only the following after the enacting 
     clause: `That the Congress approves of proposed cancellations 
     ____', the blank space being filled in with a list of the 
     cancellations contained in the President's special message, 
     `as transmitted by the President in a special message on 
     ____', the blank space being filled in with the appropriate 
     date, `regarding ____.', the blank space being filled in with 
     the public law number to which the special message relates;
       ``(D) which only includes proposed cancellations that are 
     estimated by CBO to meet the definition of discretionary 
     budgetary authority or items of direct spending, or that are 
     identified as targeted tax benefits pursuant to section 1014;
       ``(E) if any proposed cancellation other than discretionary 
     budget authority or targeted tax benefits is estimated by CBO 
     to not meet the definition of item of direct spending, then 
     the approval bill shall include at the end: `The President 
     shall cease the suspension of the implementation of the 
     following under section 1013 of the

[[Page H4471]]

     Legislative Line Item Veto Act of 2006: ____', the blank 
     space being filled in with the list of such proposed 
     cancellations; and
       ``(F) if no CBO estimate is available, then the entire list 
     of legislative provisions proposed by the President is 
     inserted in the second blank space in subparagraph (C).
       ``(3) Calendar day.--The term `calendar day' means a 
     standard 24-hour period beginning at midnight.
       ``(4) Cancel or cancellation.--The terms `cancel' or 
     `cancellation' means to prevent--
       ``(A) budget authority from having legal force or effect;
       ``(B) in the case of entitlement authority, to prevent the 
     specific legal obligation of the United States from having 
     legal force or effect;
       ``(C) in the case of the food stamp program, to prevent the 
     specific provision of law that provides such benefit from 
     having legal force or effect; or
       ``(D) a targeted tax benefit from having legal force or 
     effect; and
     to make any necessary, conforming statutory change to ensure 
     that such targeted tax benefit is not implemented and that 
     any budgetary resources are appropriately canceled.
       ``(5) CBO.--The term `CBO' means the Director of the 
     Congressional Budget Office.
       ``(6) Direct spending.--The term `direct spending' means--
       ``(A) budget authority provided by law (other than an 
     appropriation law);
       ``(B) entitlement authority; and
       ``(C) the food stamp program.
       ``(7) Dollar amount of discretionary budget authority.--(A) 
     Except as provided in subparagraph (B), the term ``dollar 
     amount of discretionary budget authority'' means the entire 
     dollar amount of budget authority--
       ``(i) specified in an appropriation law, or the entire 
     dollar amount of budget authority or obligation limitation 
     required to be allocated by a specific proviso in an 
     appropriation law for which a specific dollar figure was not 
     included;
       ``(ii) represented separately in any table, chart, or 
     explanatory text included in the statement of managers or the 
     governing committee report accompanying such law;
       ``(iii) required to be allocated for a specific program, 
     project, or activity in a law (other than an appropriation 
     law) that mandates the expenditure of budget authority from 
     accounts, programs, projects, or activities for which budget 
     authority is provided in an appropriation law;
       ``(iv) represented by the product of the estimated 
     procurement cost and the total quantity of items specified in 
     an appropriation law or included in the statement of managers 
     or the governing committee report accompanying such law; or
       ``(v) represented by the product of the estimated 
     procurement cost and the total quantity of items required to 
     be provided in a law (other than an appropriation law) that 
     mandates the expenditure of budget authority from accounts, 
     programs, projects, or activities for which budget authority 
     is provided in an appropriation law.
       ``(B) The term `dollar amount of discretionary budget 
     authority' does not include--
       ``(i) direct spending;
       ``(ii) budget authority in an appropriation law which funds 
     direct spending provided for in other law;
       ``(iii) any existing budget authority canceled in an 
     appropriation law; or
       ``(iv) any restriction, condition, or limitation in an 
     appropriation law or the accompanying statement of managers 
     or committee reports on the expenditure of budget authority 
     for an account, program, project, or activity, or on 
     activities involving such expenditure.
       ``(8) Item of direct spending.--The term `item of direct 
     spending' means any provision of law that results in an 
     increase in budget authority or outlays for direct spending 
     relative to the most recent levels calculated consistent with 
     the methodology used to calculate a baseline under section 
     257 of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act 
     of 1985 and included with a budget submission under section 
     1105(a) of title 31, United States Code, in the first year or 
     the 5-year period for which the item is effective. However, 
     such item does not include an extension or reauthorization of 
     existing direct spending, but instead only refers to 
     provisions of law that increase such direct spending.
       ``(9) OMB.--The term `OMB' means the Director of the Office 
     of Management and Budget.
       ``(10) Omnibus reconciliation or appropriation measure.--
     The term `omnibus reconciliation or appropriation measure' 
     means--
       ``(A) in the case of a reconciliation bill, any such bill 
     that is reported to its House by the Committee on the Budget; 
     or
       ``(B) in the case of an appropriation measure, any such 
     measure that provides appropriations for programs, projects, 
     or activities falling within 2 or more section 302(b) 
     suballocations.
       ``(11) Targeted tax benefit.--(A) The term `targeted tax 
     benefit' means any revenue-losing provision that provides a 
     Federal tax deduction, credit, exclusion, or preference to 
     only one beneficiary (determined with respect to either 
     present law or any provision of which the provision is a 
     part) under the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 in any year for 
     which the provision is in effect;
       ``(B) for purposes of subparagraph (A)--
       ``(i) all businesses and associations that are members of 
     the same controlled group of corporations (as defined in 
     section 1563(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986) shall 
     be treated as a single beneficiary;
       ``(ii) all shareholders, partners, members, or 
     beneficiaries of a corporation, partnership, association, or 
     trust or estate, respectively, shall be treated as a single 
     beneficiary;
       ``(iii) all employees of an employer shall be treated as a 
     single beneficiary;
       ``(iv) all qualified plans of an employer shall be treated 
     as a single beneficiary;
       ``(v) all beneficiaries of a qualified plan shall be 
     treated as a single beneficiary;
       ``(vi) all contributors to a charitable organization shall 
     be treated as a single beneficiary;
       ``(vii) all holders of the same bond issue shall be treated 
     as a single beneficiary; and
       ``(viii) if a corporation, partnership, association, trust 
     or estate is the beneficiary of a provision, the shareholders 
     of the corporation, the partners of the partnership, the 
     members of the association, or the beneficiaries of the trust 
     or estate shall not also be treated as beneficiaries of such 
     provision;
       ``(C) for the purpose of this paragraph, the term `revenue-
     losing provision' means any provision that is estimated to 
     result in a reduction in Federal tax revenues (determined 
     with respect to either present law or any provision of which 
     the provision is a part) for any one of the two following 
     periods--
       ``(i) the first fiscal year for which the provision is 
     effective; or
       ``(ii) the period of the 5 fiscal years beginning with the 
     first fiscal year for which the provision is effective; and
       ``(D) the terms used in this paragraph shall have the same 
     meaning as those terms have generally in the Internal Revenue 
     Code of 1986, unless otherwise expressly provided.


                              ``expiration

       ``Sec. 1018. This title shall have no force or effect on or 
     after October 1, 2012.''.

     SEC. 3. TECHNICAL AND CONFORMING AMENDMENTS.

       (a) Exercise of Rulemaking Powers.--Section 904 of the 
     Congressional Budget Act of 1974 (2 U.S.C. 621 note) is 
     amended--
       (1) in subsection (a), by striking ``1017'' and inserting 
     `1012''; and
       (2) in subsection (d), by striking ``section 1017'' and 
     inserting ``section 1012''.
       (b) Analysis by Congressional Budget Office.--Section 402 
     of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 is amended by 
     inserting ``(a)'' after ``402.'' and by adding at the end the 
     following new subsection:
        ``(b) Upon the receipt of a special message under section 
     1011 proposing to cancel any item of direct spending, the 
     Director of the Congressional Budget Office shall prepare an 
     estimate of the savings in budget authority or outlays 
     resulting from such proposed cancellation relative to the 
     most recent levels calculated consistent with the methodology 
     used to calculate a baseline under section 257 of the 
     Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 and 
     included with a budget submission under section 1105(a) of 
     title 31, United States Code, and transmit such estimate to 
     the chairmen of the Committees on the Budget of the House of 
     Representatives and Senate.''.
       (c) Clerical Amendments.--(1) Section 1(a) of the 
     Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 is 
     amended by striking the last sentence.
       (2) Section 1022(c) of such Act (as redesignated) is 
     amended is amended by striking ``rescinded or that is to be 
     reserved'' and insert ``canceled'' and by striking ``1012'' 
     and inserting ``1011''.
       (3) Table of Contents.--The table of contents set forth in 
     section 1(b) of the Congressional Budget and Impoundment 
     Control Act of 1974 is amended by deleting the contents for 
     parts B and C of title X and inserting the following:

                  ``Part B--Legislative Line Item Veto

``Sec. 1011. Line item veto authority.
``Sec. 1012. Procedures for expedited consideration.
``Sec. 1013. Presidential deferral authority.
``Sec. 1014. Identification of targeted tax benefits.
``Sec. 1015. Treatment of cancellations.
``Sec. 1016. Reports by Comptroller General.
``Sec. 1017. Definitions.
``Sec. 1018. Expiration.
``Sec. 1019. Suits by Comptroller General.
``Sec. 1020. Proposed Deferrals of budget authority.''.
       (d) Effective Date.--The amendments made by this Act shall 
     take effect on the date of its enactment and apply only to 
     any dollar amount of discretionary budget authority, item of 
     direct spending, or targeted tax benefit provided in an Act 
     enacted on or after the date of enactment of this Act.

     SEC. 4. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON ABUSE OF PROPOSED CANCELLATIONS.

       It is the sense of Congress no President or any executive 
     branch official should condition the inclusion or exclusion 
     or threaten to condition the inclusion or exclusion of any 
     proposed cancellation in any special message under this 
     section upon any vote cast or to be cast by any Member of 
     either House of Congress.

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Iowa (Mr. Nussle) and the 
gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. Spratt) each will control 30 
minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Iowa.


                             General Leave

  Mr. NUSSLE. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may 
have 5 legislative days in which to revise and extend their remarks and 
include extraneous material on the subject of the bill under 
consideration.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentleman from Iowa?
  There was no objection.
  Mr. NUSSLE. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that the gentleman

[[Page H4472]]

from Wisconsin (Mr. Ryan), the chief sponsor of the bill and a member 
of the Budget Committee, be allowed to control the balance of my time 
after I speak and also be authorized to yield blocks of time to other 
speakers.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentleman from Iowa?
  There was no objection.
  Mr. NUSSLE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  One of the most important obligations Congress has to be good 
stewards of the tax dollars is to spend it wisely, to spend it 
prudently, and with the Nation's best interests in mind. I think it is 
fair to say honoring this obligation is as important today, if not more 
so, than probably any time in our history.
  We have made progress over the past few years in regaining control of 
our nonsecurity and nonemergency spending, both on the appropriations 
side of the budget as well as on the enormous entitlement programs. We 
are going to continue to build on those efforts.
  With economic growth in our country and the economy, with growth of 
jobs, now 5 million and counting, the economy is growing. Revenues are 
coming into the Treasury. We are holding down spending and reforming 
government, and the good news is the deficit is coming down.
  Each and every day on the floor we bring appropriations bills from 
the great committee under the leadership of Jerry Lewis to continue 
that trend that we have started, and that is controlling spending, 
rooting out all waste, fraud and abuse. That committee is doing an 
excellent job, and I commend them.
  But I hear criticism, and I think many Members do, when we go back 
home to talk to our constituents, whether it is in Iowa where I live or 
across the country, that they really are tired of what they hear about 
when it comes to this earmark or special-interest spending that goes on 
that sometimes only benefits a very few people.
  They also tend to surprise a lot of Members in the final conference 
reports that come through on a number of bills, not just the 
appropriation bills, but across the gamut of the work Congress does.
  We all know the game; and frankly, most of us play the game. Members 
take the opportunity to slip in a special-interest goodie for their 
district into these enormous spending bills; and rarely, if ever, do we 
take the opportunity to look at each one of those projects that affects 
other people's districts. As a result, we don't get to look at all of 
the so-called pork-barrel spending that oftentimes goes into these 
projects. We all know full well that many of these so-called extras or 
extra spending would really never survive if it was subjected to all 
435 of us providing our scrutiny.
  But we also know that no one person can vote against these items 
because doing so would mean you would have to vote against the entire 
bill, most of which is for legitimate purposes. So we are never going 
to completely eliminate the appetite on both sides of the aisle for 
tacking onto these large bills these special-interest projects. But 
what we can do and what we continue to try and do today is reform the 
process and minimize the impact of these wasteful items on the 
taxpayer.
  That brings us to the bill at hand. The Legislative Line Item Veto 
Act of 2006 introduced by the gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. Ryan) 
provides an additional effective tool for reducing wasteful spending. 
It is endorsed, it is supported, it is cosponsored by a bipartisan 
majority of this House, men and women on both sides of the aisle, that 
for years on both sides of the aisle in a bipartisan way have been 
working not only to reform the budget process, but to figure out ways 
to adopt a so-called line item veto.
  Presidents, for time immemorial, have chided Congress for not working 
on this. Our President today has done the same. We need to get this 
done. We need to put it into law. We need to try it with a sunset 
attached in order to make sure that we can move this down the field and 
reform wasteful spending.
  Don't use the excuse that this is not a perfect bill. Don't use the 
excuse that this is somehow the wrong time. That's an excuse in an 
election year when you don't want to go home and explain to your voters 
why every press release you said you were for it, why every time you 
cosponsored it, why every time you voted for it, except this time. This 
time somehow it is not perfect; this time somehow it is political; this 
time the timing just doesn't quite seem right. Those are not excuses 
that will hold water with the constituents back home.
  We need to take this opportunity to do what is right and move the 
Legislative Line Item Veto Act of 2006.
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 5\1/2\ minutes.
  Mr. Speaker, I can't help but notice the juxtaposition on the estate 
tax bill that will decrease revenues by $823 billion over its first 10 
years of implementation and this bill which comes to us wearing the 
mantle of fiscal responsibility, but will barely dent the addition to 
the deficit we just made if that bill becomes law.
  Mr. Speaker, I have written and brought to the floor of this House 
and seen to passage at least two, maybe three, expedited rescission 
bills back in the 1990s. But I can't bring those bills to this floor 
today because the Rules Committee won't let me. They shut me out 100 
percent. Every amendment I requested was rejected, even though they 
were serious and substantive amendments.
  So I would say to others who were here on previous occasions: Look at 
this bill carefully because it is not the same bill we have voted upon 
before.
  This bill allows the President a window of 45 days in which to pick 
items to be rescinded. It allows the President to send five rescission 
bills for every appropriation bill. Five times 11, there are 11 
appropriation bills, equals 55. If we have a President who makes full 
use of this, we are inviting chaos.
  The original bill and the substitute I would have offered provide the 
President 10 days, which is enough. Furthermore, the more time you give 
the President, the more apt that the cuts he makes will be for 
political purposes rather than budgetary purposes. Ten days is enough 
for a budgetary review.
  Secondly, this bill allows the House, us, Congress, to vote up or 
down. That's it, no amendments, no way that we can cull through the 
list that the President sends back up here and pick out what is a 
worthy project and make the case for them.
  The original bill which we voted upon before and my substitute 
allowed a Member to go get 99 others and remove a worthy spending item 
from the rescission list.
  Next, this bill allows the President to strike something called 
direct spending items. That's budget talk for Social Security, 
Medicare, Medicaid, veterans benefits, agriculture benefits, on and on. 
What we have in this bill is a fast track, an expedited track to 
passage, summary treatment of things that the President sends up here 
that are supposed to be turned around in less than 30 days, and that is 
no way to decide substantive changes in Medicare and Social Security, 
but that is what this bill provides.
  The original bill and my substitute have no mention of Medicare or 
Social Security direct spending in it. It applied to discretionary 
spending, as it should.
  This bill allows the President to strike targeted tax benefits. So 
did the original bill. I offered that amendment. But this bill defines 
targeted tax benefits to mean those with fewer than 100 beneficiaries. 
That was a targeted tax benefit.
  This bill defines the number down to one beneficiary and lets the 
Ways and Means Committee chairman be the arbiter of that. This is a 
sham. It is a serious deficiency in this bill, and it distinguishes 
this bill from the others that have come before it.
  This bill allows the President to impose a 90-day impoundment on 
spending items for which he seeks rescission, but by the track set up 
in this bill, it will only take 30 days for a rescission to run its 
course. Why not simply confine the amount of impoundment time to 
something close to the amount of time it will take to consider a 
rescission request?
  This may seem like a small point, but we are giving a substantial 
grant of authority to the President. If it is abused or not used in a 
way that we approve, then we better keep it on tight rein. This bill 
sunsets in 6 years. We would sunset it in 2 years. Keep it on a

[[Page H4473]]

tight rein in case it is abused. It may be a small point, but it could 
be a major point as well.
  There are other things that we would have proposed in amendments that 
we would offer that would make this bill better. The gentleman just 
talked about earmarks. We put earmark reforms in our substitute. You 
will not find the word ``earmark'' anywhere in this bill.
  If you are going to do this, and your objective is to take down the 
deficit, then let's put something in here known to work toward that 
end, and that is the PAYGO rule. It worked so well for us in the 1990s 
and can work again for us. Why not use this moving vehicle in the name 
of fiscal responsibility to pass PAYGO as well as rescission? If we did 
something like that, you truly would have a bipartisan bill.
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. RYAN of Wisconsin. Mr. Speaker, I yield 10 seconds to the 
chairman of the Appropriations Committee, the gentleman from California 
(Mr. Lewis).
  (Mr. LEWIS of California asked and was given permission to revise and 
extend his remarks.)
  Mr. LEWIS of California. Mr. Speaker, I congratulate the gentleman 
from Wisconsin (Mr. Ryan) for the work he has done on this very 
important bill. We have had our differences, but in the meantime he has 
been more than cooperative.
  Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to the Legislative Line Item Veto 
Act. My opposition is based on Congress's experience with previous 
efforts to give the President line item veto authority, as well as my 
serious concerns over what this bill would do to the balance of 
budgetary power between the Legislative and Executive Branches.
  During 1997, President Clinton exercised his authority under the Line 
Item Veto Act of 1996 to cancel spending authority or tax benefits 82 
times. Total cancellations of discretionary budget authority amounted 
to $479 million, or less than three one-hundredths of one percent of 
the total fiscal year 1998 Federal budget.
  The cancellations made during this period were mired in controversy. 
On October 6, 1997, President Clinton cancelled $287 million for 38 
military construction projects in 24 States. Soon after the 
cancellations were announced, the administration admitted, in response 
to bipartisan criticism, that they had used flawed information in 
deciding to cancel nearly half of the projects.
  The administration used three criteria in making these decisions. The 
cancelled projects: (1) were not requested by the military; (2) could 
not make contributions to the national defense in fiscal year 1998; and 
(3) would not benefit the quality of life and well-being of military 
personnel. These criteria were applied by the bureaucrats within the 
White House and OMB without consulting either the Department of Defense 
or the Members of Congress who sponsored the projects.
  Congress's motivation for funding many of these projects was safety. 
A Live Fire Command and Control Facility at Fort Irwin, CA, would 
enable the Army to safely train personnel in the live firing of 
ordnance. Renovations at White Sands Missile Range, NM, would address 
the absence of fire suppression systems.
  Other projects provided much-needed housing. One would provide 
housing at Dyess Air Force Base in Texas, where there were no existing 
facilities to house the 13th Bomb Squadron.
  Appropriations Chairman Bob Livingston singled out a particularly 
egregious cancellation relating to the money for Army reserve units in 
Utah. He said, in a letter to President Clinton, ``I can only conclude 
that your decision was based on something other than an altruistic 
yearning to cut spending. Mr. President, this was an embarrassing 
mistake . . .''

  The Clinton Administration responded to some of the criticism by 
stating that many of the cancelled projects would be requested in 
future budgets anyway. This only fueled congressional objections, 
however, as Members could not understand why the projects were not 
necessary now when they could be considered necessary in the next 
budget cycle.
  Congress responded by passing a bill to disapprove the President's 
military construction cancellations. The bill was vetoed by the 
President. The House voted 347-69 and the Senate voted 78-20 to 
override the veto, enacting the bill and nullifying the cancellations.
  On June 25, 1998, the Supreme Court ruled that the Line Item Veto Act 
violated the presentment clause of the Constitution, thus ending a 
divisive and contentious fight between the Executive and Legislative 
branches.
  The experience of the original Line Item Veto Act should cause 
Congress to be extremely cautious about giving the President new line 
item veto authority. Even though implementation under H.R. 4890 differs 
from the 1996 Act, the proposed bill would transfer a great deal of 
budgetary power to the Executive Branch.
  The expedited rescission authority mandated by H.R. 4890 would give 
new weight to the President's rescission proposals. While under current 
law any rescission proposal can be disregarded by Congress if it has no 
merit, H.R. 4890 requires votes in the House and Senate. The President, 
or even bureaucrats within the agencies or the Office of Management and 
Budget, would set the legislative agenda by deciding what rescissions 
to include in a bill.
  A President could also structure his rescission messages with more of 
an eye toward politics instead of good policy. For example, a 
President, encouraged by his political advisors, could propose 
rescissions that target the projects of one political party. In this 
event, the debate over the bill would be blatantly political and would 
certainly lead to legislative stonewalling by the offended party. A 
President could also make deals with specific Members of Congress to 
further his legislative agenda. He could easily threaten to cancel an 
item directly benefiting a particular Member's district, and then back 
off his threat if that Member votes in favor of the President's 
program. If a President is interested in trading Members' projects for 
their support for expanded entitlement spending, for example, overall 
spending would actually increase.

  H.R. 4890 could also present Congress with a procedural nightmare. 
Each rescission bill would use up to five hours of debate time in the 
House and ten hours in the Senate. The President could submit up to 
five rescission messages for each enacted spending or tax bill, or up 
to ten messages for an omnibus bill. A multiple-rescission-bill 
scenario could easily eat up precious legislative time when the 
legislative calendar is already severely limited.
  A Republican Congress might tend to support a Republican President's 
rescission proposals. However, there may not always be a Republican 
President in the White House. Expedited rescission authority would 
provide new opportunities for conflict between a White House and 
Congress of differing parties. The result could be a legislative 
deadlock manufactured by the Executive Branch.
  The experience of the Line Item Veto Act under President Clinton 
showed how contentious the debate could become over saving a relatively 
small amount of money. Congress should have serious reservations over 
giving the Executive Branch so much sway over the funding of 
congressional priorities and the framework of the legislative agenda.
  Mr. RYAN of Wisconsin. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 5\1/2\ minutes.
  Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to be bringing this bill to the floor 
today, and I would like to explain why we are doing this, why this is 
needed.
  Just last year, according to the CRS or Citizens Against Government 
Waste, whichever group you want to talk about, we had over 10,000 
earmarks here, totaling almost $28 billion.
  Mr. Speaker, not every one of those earmarks came in just conference 
reports, but many of them did.

                              {time}  1615

  Mr. Speaker, we need more transparency and more accountability in how 
we spend the taxpayer dollars. In particular, Mr. Speaker, we ought to 
have the ability to be able to have votes on the individual merits of 
spending items, particularly those that we never have a chance to vote 
on, things that go into conference reports.
  The earmark reform legislation that was passed earlier by this body 
did a lot to address bringing more transparency and accountability to 
the spending system as bills come to the floor. This is a perfect 
complement to that, the legislative line item veto, because after bills 
are considered, after conference reports are dealt with, we often find 
out that in conference a lot of things get put into those bills that we 
didn't get a chance to scrutinize. We ought to be able to vote on those 
things.
  Now, how does this work?
  And I want to get to the constitutional point in just a moment. Here 
is exactly how the process is laid out under this constitutional 
legislative line item veto: number one, after a bill becomes law, the 
President identifies an item of discretionary spending, direct spending 
or special interest tax break in legislation that is being signed into 
law. The President then submits a special message to Congress, no more 
than five, asking for the rescission of a spending item or items. After 
receiving this bill or messages, the House and the Senate have a total 
of 14 legislative days to bring it to the

[[Page H4474]]

floor for an up-or-down vote. If the House and Senate pass the 
President's rescission request, it is sent to the President and becomes 
law. If either House votes against it, the rescission is not enacted.
  This is far different than the earlier legislative line item veto. 
This is not your father's line item veto. In fact, I agree with the 
Supreme Court ruling that said that the earlier line item veto was 
unconstitutional, because that line item veto, among other things, 
violated the separation of powers. This protects the prerogatives of 
the legislative branch, specifically, because this: the action is 
executed by Congress, not the administration. Under the old version the 
administration made the decision. Line item veto. That is the end of 
it. If Congress didn't like it, they would have to come up with a two-
thirds vote to override that. That is not how this situation works.
  Under this system, the President, who already has similar existing 
rescission authority, sends a rescission request to the Congress, just 
like he can do today. Only under this situation, we simply add a fast 
track authority, like we do with a lot of other legislation, like trade 
legislation, whereby we can't duck the vote by within 14 legislative 
days the House and the Senate vote on this, up or down. We decide in 
Congress. We vote to affirm the rescission. If we choose not to pass 
the rescission, the rescission does not take place. The money is spent. 
This is constitutional to the point where the gentleman who argued 
against the line item veto successfully in the Supreme Court in 1998 
came to testify in three different committee hearings, Charles Cooper, 
as to the constitutionality of this, that this does, in fact, protect 
the prerogatives of the legislative branch; that this is consistent 
with the bicameralism and presentment clause in the Constitution, and 
maintains the separation of powers.
  Now, we have worked with a lot of parties. We have worked with 
Democrats, constitutional experts, Republicans, OMB. In fact, this bill 
has been so bipartisan in the past, similar legislation has been 
proposed. In 1993, H.R. 1578 received 250 votes, including 174 
Democrats. In 1994, H.R. 4600 received 342 votes, an expedited 
rescission bill, 173 Democrats. Two years ago, Congressman Charles 
Stenholm and I, a Blue Dog Democrat, brought it to the floor. We got 
174 votes for virtually the same legislation, where we got 45 
Democrats.
  Now, the gentleman from South Carolina, the ranking member, has 
brought a lot of good points to the table. He is a gentleman who has 
watched this process for many years and understands this process very, 
very well. In particular, he brought six items of concern to the 
committee 3 weeks ago, which I took very, very copious notes of, which 
I took to heart. And because of that, we have made six big changes to 
this bill to try and improve this legislation, because I think the 
gentleman from South Carolina made excellent suggestions.
  We limited time on the President's submission of a rescission 
request. We limited the number of requests. We wrote a ban on 
duplicative requests so the President couldn't send a request over and 
over and over and tie us into knots. We shortened the deferral period 
to the minimum amount necessary. We clarified that existing 
entitlements are exempt. Not Medicare, not Social Security, not other 
entitlements. We put a sunset in here so that we can revisit this law 
in 6 years to make sure that the balance of power is maintained.
  Why is this needed, Mr. Speaker?
  I think the success of this tool will be judged more in how much 
wasteful spending doesn't get put into bills and less on how much 
wasteful spending we take out of bills. Having this deterrence, having 
this extra layer of accountability will bring the level of sunshine, 
transparency and accountability to the spending and taxing process in 
Congress exactly where it is needed the most.
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from 
North Carolina (Mr. Price).
  (Mr. PRICE of North Carolina asked and was given permission to revise 
and extend his remarks.)
  Mr. PRICE of North Carolina. Mr. Speaker, all this posturing about 
fiscal responsibility is nothing more than a side show. This 
legislation is not about fiscal responsibility. Look no further than 
the Republican estate tax bill this House just passed. Putting us 
nearly $1 trillion further in debt over the next 15 years for the sake 
of a few of our country's wealthiest families is evidence enough of 
where the priorities of the Bush administration and the Republican 
congressional leadership lie.
  In fact, the line item veto has very little to do with budgeting at 
all. It has everything to do with power, Presidential power. The shift 
of constitutional power from Congress to the executive branch has 
greatly accelerated since the 1990s. As congressional scholars Tom Mann 
and Norm Ornstein observe, the Republican Congress, under the 
administration of George W. Bush, has featured ``a general obeisance to 
Presidential initiative, and passivity in the face of Presidential 
power.''
  This bill would tilt the balance of power even further in the 
direction of the White House. Specific provisions of the bill would 
give the President inordinate control over the appropriations process. 
For example, the President could cherry-pick from among a wide range of 
provisions, authorizations or appropriations, discretionary or 
mandatory, and package them together in whatever way he saw fit, 
requiring Congress to vote up or down on the entire package.
  This bill would give the White House unprecedented leverage over 
Congress by allowing the President to condition his support for our 
priorities on our acquiescence in his priorities. It is for this exact 
reason that many experts believe this bill would actually increase 
government spending, not reduce it.
  Now, Mr. Speaker, I will take a back seat to no one in targeting 
bridges to nowhere and other examples of congressional waste. But I 
also know this: Presidents almost invariably ask for more money than 
Congress is willing to appropriate. And the profligacy of our current 
President is well documented.
  The line item veto is not about spending versus saving. It is about 
letting the President, not Congress, decide what we are spending money 
on.
  Mr. Speaker, if the leadership of this House were serious about 
getting our finances in order, it would never have abandoned the pay-
as-you-go rules, which helped produce balanced budgets and even 
surpluses in the 1990s. And it would reinstate those rules today, as 
proposed by Mr. Spratt's substitute.
  The Spratt substitute would also have addressed several other key 
weaknesses of H.R. 4890. But once again, the House leadership has 
rigged the rules to deny us a vote on it. Instead, we get this fig-leaf 
bill designed to hide the fiscal sins of this Republican Congress from 
the American public.
  Mr. Speaker, the House of Representatives has three fundamental 
powers: declaring war, conducting oversight, and the power of the 
purse. We have already gone a long way to sacrifice the first two to 
the executive branch. Do we really want to give away the only one we 
have got left?
  I urge my colleagues to oppose this misguided legislation.
  Mr. RYAN of Wisconsin. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the 
distinguished majority whip, Mr. Blunt.
  Mr. BLUNT. Mr. Speaker, today I come to the floor in support of this 
bill, the Line Item Veto Act, and I applaud Congressman Paul Ryan for 
his hard work on this legislation.
  The Line Item Veto Act will work to eliminate wasteful spending, 
safeguard against questionable appropriation decisions, and further 
protect taxpayers' dollars from waste, fraud and abuse. It becomes 
another important tool that helps us restrain spending and meets the 
constitutional test that the line item veto given to the President 
during the Clinton administration but reversed by the Supreme Court 
could not meet. It may not be everything that line item veto was, but I 
think Mr. Ryan has worked hard to make it everything it could be and 
meet that constitutional standard.
  At the same time, it increases transparency in the process, it 
protects legitimate spending requests that direct funds to carry out 
important projects that benefit Americans, and it also gives Congress 
the final word in that important constitutional responsibility that the 
previous speaker mentioned

[[Page H4475]]

was uniquely given to us. We bring someone else into this process in a 
way that helps. It will make a difference. I think it is more than 
barely a dent, but even a dent becomes another tool, makes a 
difference. I think it makes a significant difference.
  Mr. Ryan has worked hard. He was given six challenges to the original 
proposal that he brought to this Congress. He made six significant 
changes.
  I urge my colleagues to join him in passing this bill and giving the 
President and this Congress the assistance that this and future 
Congresses need to help us restrain spending in Washington.
  Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
Kansas (Mr. Moore).
  Mr. MOORE of Kansas. Mr. Speaker, I would support the proposal before 
this House today if there were just one additional provision, and that 
is something I moved during the Budget Committee last week, to 
reinstate and add as an amendment to this PAYGO provisions that Mr. 
Spratt mentioned early.
  PAYGO sounds complex. All it really is if you have a new spending 
proposal or a new tax cut proposal, the first section is, here is my 
proposal. The second provision is, here is how it will be paid for.
  If we want to truly restore fiscal responsibility to this body, and 
to our Nation, we need to reinstate PAYGO that expired in 2002.
  Over the last 5 years Congress has raised the debt limit four times 
by $3 trillion; raised the debt limit by $3 trillion in the last 5 
years. The most recent was almost $800 billion in March of this year.
  Unfortunately, our current fiscal carelessness is going to land 
squarely on the shoulders of our kids and grandkids. We are putting our 
children and grandchildren in a hole so deep they may never be able to 
climb out. Each person in this country now has their share of the 
national debt at $28,000.
  This debt tax, Mr. Speaker, that we are imposing on our children and 
grandchildren cannot be repealed and can only be reduced if we take 
responsible steps now. We should and must reinstate PAYGO rules. In 
fact, former chairman of the Federal Reserve Board Greenspan testified 
in front of our Budget Committee, as did David Walker, the Comptroller 
General of our country, in favor of reinstating this rule.
  Again, I would support line item veto if we had the addition of PAYGO 
rules. I think we need to take this measure now, and I urge people to 
look at this seriously and to reinstate PAYGO.
  Mr. RYAN of Wisconsin. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the 
distinguished gentleman from Georgia (Mr. Kingston).
  Mr. KINGSTON. Mr. Speaker, I want to say this: as a member of the 
Appropriations Committee, I am proud that this year the House 
Appropriations Committee has eliminated 95 different programs and 
greatly reduced the number of Member projects and earmarks. In each 
year we receive about 25,000 requests for earmarks. And yet, if there 
is another tool out there that we can use to scrutinize spending, I 
don't think any of us should be afraid to do it.
  I support the line item veto. I think that the compromise that Mr. 
Ryan has crafted to get around the questions that we, as a Republican 
Congress, gave to the Democrat President Clinton administration, I 
think we should support this for any administration and leave party out 
of it.
  It would give the President of the United States a tool, and it would 
give a self-imposed threat to this Chamber to make sure that anything 
that we put in the bill would stand the test of public scrutiny and 
transparency. If I have put an earmark in the appropriations bill, I 
ought to be able to defend it, and I ought to be able to defend it not 
to just any Democrat or Republican on the floor of the House, but to 
the President of the United States and to the folks back home.
  I am not afraid of this. I think this is good fiscal policy. It 
builds on what the Appropriations Committee has already been doing in 
terms of eliminating 95 existing programs and bringing down Member 
earmarks tremendously. So I support this bill, and I hope that 
everybody else will.
  Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
Washington (Mr. Baird).
  Mr. BAIRD. Mr. Speaker, I share my good friend from Wisconsin's 
commitment to trying to lower the budget deficit.
  Mr. SPRATT. Will the gentleman suspend?
  I will yield you more time.
  I simply want to say to my friend from Georgia, if you want 
transparency as to earmarks, we offered an amendment. The Rules 
Committee would not make it in order. Our substitute addresses the 
issue of earmarks. It reinstates the earmark reforms in the Obey bill 
which is now languishing in conference.
  I yield the gentleman 2 minutes.
  Mr. BAIRD. I thank my ranking member.
  The gentleman from Wisconsin is well intentioned. We all, I think, 
recognize the need to reduce the size of this deficit.

                              {time}  1630

  But there is an irony here, and the irony is this: The gentleman 
spoke about the need for transparency and accountability. I absolutely 
agree. But I would ask my friends on the majority side, if we are 
talking about transparency, why is it that time after time after time 
you bring bills before this body, giving us less than 24 hours to read 
them? Ironically, this bill gives the President 45 days to look at 
legislation before filing a rescission, and then we have 14 legislative 
days to act on that. You do not give us 14 hours to read the original 
bills.
  We offered in the Budget Committee a proposal that would give us 72 
hours, a mere 3 days, to read thousands of pages, spending hundreds of 
billions of dollars. It is was ruled out of order. Why is it that in 
our effort to establish fiscal responsibility we do not take 
responsibility ourselves, we hand it to the President and say keep us 
from sinning once again?
  We have the authority within this body to review legislation if we 
would just insist that the Rules Committee pass a 72-hour rule and 
enforce it, not override it with the appropriately named ``martial 
law'' rules that they do. Let us require a full two-thirds vote of this 
institution before any bill is brought to this floor with less than 72 
hours to read.
  There is a Web site people can refer to, readthebill.org, and you can 
check this out. It is common sense. The public supports it. If we want 
to start bringing this House in order, let us bring our House in order, 
not give the keys to the executive branch, because I fear that the 
Framers would not have approved that.
  I thank the ranking member for his leadership.
  Mr. RYAN of Wisconsin. Mr. Speaker, at this time I yield 1\1/2\ 
minutes to the gentleman from Utah (Mr. Matheson).
  Mr. MATHESON. Mr. Speaker, I thank Mr. Ryan for his leadership on 
this issue.
  What we are dealing with today is a significant piece to a puzzle. 
Because it is a puzzle. There is no question that in terms of having 
greater accountability and having fiscal responsibility, there are a 
number of steps we need to take as a Congress. And the piece today is 
talking about opening to the light of day certain earmarks that ought 
to be open to the light of day. And I would echo the comments of Mr. 
Kingston. If I have an earmark, I ought to be willing to put it up for 
an up-or-down vote. Everybody in this Congress has requested earmarks, 
and everyone should be comfortable defending those earmarks. And this 
is all about shedding the light of day on that process. And it will 
result, even without having a rescission, it is going to result in 
Members of Congress being a little more careful and being a little more 
substantive in the proposals they make, and it is going to make this 
body more accountable.
  So with that in mind, I encourage my colleagues in a bipartisan way 
to embrace this work and to continue the work after this bill because, 
as I said, there are a number of steps we can take to encourage 
accountability and encourage greater fiscal responsibility. But this is 
an important piece and important step in pursuing that goal.
  Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
Minnesota (Mr. Peterson).

[[Page H4476]]

  Mr. PETERSON of Minnesota. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for 
yielding.
  I rise today in opposition to this bill, which threatens the ability 
of the Agriculture Committee to develop farm policy that addresses the 
new challenges that face American agriculture.
  For 16 years I have represented a rural district in Congress, and 
during that time I have served on the Agriculture Committee, helping to 
write the last three farm bills. Those of us who serve on the 
Agriculture Committee have spent a lot of time learning about and 
talking to those involved in American agriculture. We have a 
responsibility to develop farm policy that is fiscally responsible and 
that keeps our farmers competitive and strong.
  As the Agriculture Committee begins the process of writing the next 
farm bill, we will try to address the many emerging challenges that 
face American producers. As we consider priorities for agriculture, any 
new investments in bioenergy, conservation, specialty crops, and other 
programs, the farm bill will face yet a new hurdle. The farm bill has 
always had an uphill battle. As our country moves away from its 
agriculture roots, we must constantly reach out to our urban and 
suburban colleagues. Now we would face the real possibility that the 
President would veto the spending priorities that we set with input 
from all of agriculture, and, in my opinion, this could threaten the 
very delicate balance that we must maintain in the committee.
  If we pass this bill and allow the President to cancel any new direct 
spending item, we will gut the Agriculture Committee's ability to 
create farm policy that addresses the new and changing world that our 
producers face.
  In closing, I want to remind my colleagues that in 1993, when 
Democrats controlled the Congress and the Presidency, we reduced 
spending $192 billion over 5 years. Why is it that the Republicans can 
only hand us more deficit spending and a spiraling debt? This Line Item 
Veto Act is an admission, in my opinion, of the inability on the other 
side to control spending.
  This bill fails to recognize what we should be doing: working 
together in Congress and with the White House to set priorities and to 
spend the taxpayers' money responsibly.
  Mr. RYAN of Wisconsin. Mr. Speaker, I think the gentleman from 
Minnesota will be happy to know that under the way this bill works, you 
cannot go after mandatory programs in the farm bill that already exist. 
So you cannot go back and take a commodity program out.
  Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished Member from 
Florida (Mr. Crenshaw), a member of the Budget Committee.
  Mr. CRENSHAW. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding, and I 
thank him for his hard work, working on this legislation.
  I am proud to be a cosponsor of this and rise to ask my colleagues to 
vote in favor of this.
  I cannot help but be a little bit amused when I hear some of the 
opponents stand up and say that they kind of think this gives too much 
power to the President. It is like some brand new secret idea that the 
Republicans dreamed up to give a Republican President more power than 
he ought to have.
  I just want to remind everyone this is not a brand new idea. It has 
been around a good while. People have pointed out that 43 governors in 
the States around the country have the same or similar kind of power, 
that we passed legislation like this through the Congress before. In 
fact, people have said they like it, both Democrats and Republicans.
  Let me read you what one of the strongest supporters of this 
legislation, this line item veto, said. He said: ``The fresh air of 
public accountability will glow through the Federal budget. This law 
gives the President tools to cut wasteful spending, and even more 
important, it empowers our citizens, for the exercise of this veto or 
even the possibility of its exercise will throw a spotlight of public 
scrutiny onto the darkest corners of the Federal budget.''
  Do you know who said that? President Clinton said that when he signed 
similar legislation in 1996.
  I could not say it any better. I just urge my colleagues to add this 
tool to our arsenal. If you are serious about getting a handle on 
controlling spending, you will vote in favor of this.
  Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
Wisconsin (Mr. Kind).
  Mr. KIND. Mr. Speaker, I thank my good friend for yielding me this 
time, but also for the substitute that he was hoping to offer here 
today so we could have a legitimate and honest debate about the 
direction we need to go for fiscal responsibility in the House. 
Unfortunately, because of the way the rules are structured, we are 
prohibited from offering any amendments or this gentleman's substitute, 
which I think has a lot of merit.
  I can understand that people with good intent, and there are many in 
this Chamber, can support a piece of legislation. Philosophically I 
agree that we need to get at the heart of earmark reform. We need to 
move forward on earmark reform as this session progresses because this 
legislation alone will not deal with the issue. And I could support a 
piece of legislation like that if I thought there was the institutional 
will here in Congress and also down on Pennsylvania Avenue to finally 
get serious about fiscal responsibility.
  But the facts are what they are, that under the Republican leadership 
over the last 6 years, we have had the largest and quickest increase in 
national debt in our Nation's history, that this President is the first 
President since Thomas Jefferson who has refused to veto one spending 
bill during his entire administration. He is not even using the 
rescission powers that are already granted to him that this legislation 
now is meant to expedite, and that is unfortunate.
  But the real issue, if we are going to get serious about getting back 
on fiscal track as a Nation, is we have got to go to what has proven to 
work. And what worked in the 1990s was something very simple called 
pay-as-you-go. It required tough budgeting decisions on both the 
spending and the revenue sides that led to 4 years of budget surpluses 
where we were paying down the national debt rather than increasing the 
debt burden for our children and grandchildren and, even more 
importantly, becoming more dependent on foreign countries such as China 
to be financing our deficits today.
  I am one of the institutionalists around here who feel that we have 
ceded too much power, too much control, too much authority to this 
administration or future administrations. And if anyone in this Chamber 
wants to stand up and claim that we are a coequal branch of government 
today, they are fooling themselves. This legislation will make it even 
worse.
  Mr. RYAN of Wisconsin. Mr. Speaker, given that my friend from 
Wisconsin voted for virtually the same bill 2 years ago when Charlie 
Stenholm and I had it on the floor, I hope we can count on his support 
again.
  Mr. Speaker, at this time I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman 
from Texas (Mr. Cuellar).
  Mr. CUELLAR. Mr. Speaker, I thank Congressman Ryan and Ranking Member 
Spratt.
  I am a cosponsor of this legislation because my belief and my 
experience show me that this is an effective tool to restoring 
accountability in our government. Mr. Speaker, this legislation is a 
good starting point to begin the process of eliminating wasteful 
spending in government.
  This bill gives the President the latitude to recommend that 
appropriations, direct spending, or tax breaks be cut. These items are 
commonsense in nature and cross party lines. A spending item is as 
eligible for cancellation as a tax break. The items that are eligible 
for cancellation or rescission send a clear message to our constituents 
that we are serious about government accountability.
  Common misperception holds that the President has the final say on 
items that he wishes to eliminate, but this is not correct. Under this 
legislation Congress has the final say. The President can recommend, 
but it is up to Congress to vote up or down on his particular cuts. 
Congress retains the power to say ``no.'' There is no threat to our 
constitutional powers of the purse.
  To address the concerns that the line item veto is a political tool, 
I urge my colleagues to keep in mind that neither party has a monopoly 
on the executive

[[Page H4477]]

branch. While the President is of one party today, this can certainly 
change tomorrow.
  I urge my colleagues to vote for this bill that helps restore 
accountability in Washington and restores the faith of our 
constituents.
  Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
Virginia (Mr. Scott).
  Mr. SCOTT of Virginia. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for 
yielding.
  Mr. Speaker, this bill has nothing to do with fiscal responsibility. 
If we were interested in fiscal responsibility, we would not have 
passed the tax bill just a few minutes ago that adds, over the course 
of just a few years, trillions of dollars in new deficits without any 
way to pay for it.
  Mr. Speaker, 5 years ago we had a $5.5 trillion 10-year surplus. Now 
those 10 years look like they are going to come in at about a $3.5 
trillion deficit, a $9 trillion reversal. If this bill had been in 
effect during those years and the President had used his new powers the 
way we might hope, we might have saved a few hundred thousand dollars, 
a few million, maybe even a few billion, but that is negligible 
compared to the $9 trillion reversal. And that is if the President used 
the new power in a fiscally responsible manner. Nothing in the bill 
prevents the President from using his new powers to coerce even more 
irresponsibility, such as using it as a hammer to coerce Members to 
support new tax cuts without paying for them.
  Finally, Mr. Speaker, on the tax provisions, the bill only allows the 
President to veto teeny weeny, little targeted tax cuts, but does not 
allow him to veto huge, gargantuan, irresponsible, unpaid-for tax cuts.
  Mr. Speaker, this path to fiscal responsibility is paved with hard 
choices. This ineffective gimmick is not one of them. We should reject 
the bill.
  Mr. RYAN of Wisconsin. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 20 seconds to 
answer what the gentleman mentioned on tax cuts.
  The reason we go after tax rifle shots is we do not want to give the 
President the power of setting policy that Congress has. We are going 
after pork, tax pork, spending pork, not tax policy. That would be to 
abrogate our responsibility of setting policy to the executive branch, 
and we do not want to do that. That is why the bill was written as it 
is today.
  Mr. Speaker, I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the distinguished gentleman 
from Delaware (Mr. Castle).
  Mr. CASTLE. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from Wisconsin for 
what he has done and for yielding.
  Mr. Speaker, I would just like to add this as my own personal 
perspective. I was a State legislator and lieutenant governor and I was 
a governor. So I had this both used in a situation in which I was 
worried about it, in a situation in which I used it, and then I came to 
Congress and I actually introduced legislation on this early on and 
later was a cosponsor of that legislation which became law and was 
later overruled by the Supreme Court.
  I have heard a lot of arguments today, and I have listened to this 
both in the rule debate and here pretty intently. And there were 
discussions like, oh, we are taking away revenue at the same time we 
are trying to do this, how can this be fiscally responsible?
  This is not all that big a deal. The bottom line is it is another 
measure which will help us move in the direction of transparency, which 
will help us move in the direction of perhaps balancing the budget. 
This itself will never balance the budget. It is too small an item as 
far as that is concerned. It is similar to a rainy day fund. It is 
similar to earmark reform or a sunset provision or a variety of other 
budgetary process matters that I think that we should take up in an 
effort as Republicans and Democrats to do this.

                              {time}  1645

  This particular President, if people are concerned about that, will 
only be President 2\1/2\ more years. At some point we will have a 
different makeup of the Congress, a different makeup of the Presidency, 
and hopefully this will be around for 100 years.
  But it is a very significant budgetary tool. The reason it is 
significant, Mr. Speaker, is because it makes people get together and 
talk about this, and people are very reluctant to proceed with 
something that may put in the light of day that which they may not want 
to see in the light of day. So you see a lot of restrictions.
  It brings the executive branch and the legislative branch together in 
terms of planning where we are going to go as far as budgets are 
concerned. Unfortunately, that is not happening enough today. I think 
we are all concerned about budget deficits, we are all concerned about 
a lot of the problems which exist out there, and I think we need to 
work together to get this done.
  So in my mind, adopting this is relatively simple. It is something we 
should be doing; it is something I would hope 100 percent of this 
Congress would support. I urge everyone to support it.
  Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume to 
address an issue that Mr. Ryan spoke to just a moment ago.
  This bill does apply to new direct spending items. Now, there could 
be some disagreement over what that means, but direct spending is 
mandatory spending, it is entitlement spending, and under that broad 
rubric falls Medicare, Medicaid, Social Security and veterans benefits.
  The reason we are very concerned about broadening the reach to 
include mandatory programs like that is that these are programs people 
depend upon; and what this bill essentially does is create a fast 
track, a 30-day turnaround. The President sends a bill here, we can't 
amend it in committee, we can't amend it on the floor, we only have an 
up-or-down vote, we have a limited amount of time for debate. It is a 
fast track with no substantive input from Congress, and I would hate to 
see us make an ill-advised change in Social Security or Medicare simply 
because it got wrapped up with other spending issues and was pushed 
through here on such a small fast track that we didn't realize the 
consequences until we woke up a month or two later.
  Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. 
Obey).
  Mr. OBEY. Mr. Speaker, in the end, there are only three essential 
powers that make the Congress the greatest legislative body in the 
history of the world. The first is the power to investigate; the second 
is the power to declare war; and the third is the power of the purse.
  This Congress has already supinely given away most of its ability to 
declare war. It ceded that largely to the President.
  This Congress has also engaged in a pitiful amount of oversight and 
investigation over the past 5 years.
  The only remaining power that Congress has is the power of the purse. 
If Members of this body want to diminish that power and further weaken 
the ability of the legislative body to do its job, then, by all means, 
vote for this underlying bill. If you think it wouldn't be a good idea 
to do that, then you ought to vote against it.
  Can you imagine what a President like LBJ would have done with these 
powers to someone like Gaylord Nelson, from my own State, one of the 
three people who cast a vote against the original appropriation for 
Vietnam? LBJ would have put his arm around Gaylord's shoulder and he 
would have said, Gaylord, if you can't see your way through to be with 
me on the war, you are going to lose an awful lot of things you care 
about in that budget. I will make your life miserable. I will send down 
rescissions again and again and again, on the wilderness, on you name 
it.
  I believe that the most pernicious aspect of this proposal is that it 
will further gut the ability of Congress to review a President's 
foreign policy initiatives in an independent fashion. God knows we have 
already failed in our responsibilities with respect to keeping us out 
of the dumbest war since the War of 1812, in Iraq, and this ill-advised 
proposition will simply make those matters worse.
  I would urge an ``aye'' vote for the Spratt substitute and a ``no'' 
vote on the underlying bill.
  Mr. RYAN of Wisconsin. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may 
consume.
  Mr. Speaker, at this time I would like to respond to something that 
the gentleman from South Carolina said. He said under this bill we 
could go after mandatory programs like Social Security, Medicare, 
veterans benefits.

[[Page H4478]]

  Let me be very clear: you cannot with this program go after Social 
Security, Medicare and veterans benefits as we know it today. We are 
saying new programs. Why do we say it that way? Why new direct spending 
programs?
  There are 5,000-plus earmarks in the transportation bill just this 
last year. Why should that be taken off the table? If you did that, 
then the Bridge to Nowhere would be exempt from the line item veto. I 
think most people who know this stuff think the Bridge to Nowhere ought 
to be one of the things that the President would want to go after under 
the line item veto.
  We are talking about new programs, not the existing entitlement 
programs that we have come to know and enjoy for many of our 
constituents.
  Mr. Speaker, I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the distinguished gentleman 
from Colorado (Mr. Udall).
  (Mr. UDALL of Colorado asked and was given permission to revise and 
extend his remarks.)
  Mr. UDALL of Colorado. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for 
yielding, and I rise with great respect for my friends on my side of 
the aisle when it comes to this proposal today.
  I took an interest in this starting 2 years ago when it seemed to me 
we needed some additional tools to bring these budget deficits under 
control. We have gone from surpluses to enormous deficits, and from 
reducing our national debt to increasing the debt tax on our children; 
and it is my opinion that this bill will help us begin to bring our 
budget back into balance.
  As has been mentioned here, it follows the approach of our former 
colleague Charlie Stenholm, and it also mirrors what 43 Governors have, 
as our friend Congressman Castle mentioned earlier today. It also 
mirrors a bill that I introduced in the last Congress as well.
  So, in sum, this will promote accountability. It will promote 
transparency. It is a small start. I believe that it balances the 
constitutional responsibilities between the President and the Congress; 
and perhaps if we pass this today, then we create some momentum so that 
we move toward putting PAYGO back in place and reining in the earmark 
situation that we now face in this Congress that in part has led us to 
these enormous deficits.
  So let's pass this. Let's work together. Let's find a way to balance 
the budget and not pass on the debt tax to our children.
  I thank the gentleman for yielding, and, again, I rise in support of 
this important piece of legislation.
  Mr. Speaker, over the last 5 years we've seen a dramatic change in 
the Federal budget--a change for the worse.
  We've gone from budget surpluses to big deficits, and from reducing 
the national debt to increasing the ``debt tax'' on our children.
  There's no mystery about how this happened.
  Partly, it was caused by a recession.
  Partly, it was caused by the increased spending needed for national 
defense, homeland security, and fighting terrorism.
  And in part it was caused by excessive and unbalanced tax cuts the 
president pushed for and Congress passed.
  This bill does not directly address those major causes of our 
budgetary problems.
  Fixing them will take long-term work on several fronts, including 
taxes.
  And it will take stronger medicine than this--such as restoring the 
``PAYGO'' rules that helped bring the budget into balance in the past.
  That's why I thought the House should have been able to at least 
debate a stronger version of this bill, in the form of the substitute 
proposed by the gentleman from South Carolina, Mr. Spratt.
  And that's why I voted against the Republican leadership's 
restrictive rule that prevents even debating that substitute.
  But, even so, I support this bill because it can help, at least a 
little, to promote transparency and accountability about spending items 
and tax breaks.
  We have heard a lot of talk about spending ``earmarks''--meaning 
spending based on proposals by Members of Congress instead of the 
Administration.
  Some people are opposed to all earmarks--but I am not one of them.
  I think Members of Congress know the needs of their communities, and 
I think Congress as a whole has the responsibility to decide how tax 
dollars are spent.
  And earmarks can help fund nonprofits and other private-sector groups 
to do jobs that Federal agencies are not able to do as well.
  In short, not all earmarks are bad.
  In fact, I have sought earmarks for various items that have benefited 
Coloradans--and I intend to keep on doing that.
  And a similar case can be made for targeted tax breaks, as well.
  Still, we all know some bills have included spending earmarks or 
special tax breaks that might not have been approved if they were 
considered separately.
  That's why the President--like his predecessors--has asked for the 
kind of ``line-item veto'' that can be used by Governors in Colorado 
and several other States.
  And that's why about 10 years ago Congress actually passed a law 
intended to give President Clinton that kind of authority.
  But the Supreme Court ruled in 1998 that the legislation was 
unconstitutional.
  And I think the Court got it right.
  I think trying to allow the President to in effect repeal a part of a 
law he has already signed--and saying it takes a two-thirds vote in 
both Houses of Congress to restore that part--went too far.
  I think that kind of line-item veto would undermine the checks and 
balances between the Executive and Legislative branches of the 
government.
  So, I could not support that kind of line-item veto.
  But this bill is different.
  It is a practical, effective--and, best of all, Constitutional--
version of a line-item veto.
  It is not unprecedented. It follows the approach of legislation 
passed by the House of Representatives several times during the Clinton 
administration under the leadership of our former colleague Charlie 
Stenholm and others, including Tom Carper, Tim Penny and John Kasich.
  It also is similar to bills I introduced under the heading of 
measures to ``Stimulate Leadership in Cutting Expenditures,'' or 
``SLICE.''
  Under this bill--as under SLICE--the President could identify 
specific spending items he thinks should be cut--and Congress would 
have to vote, up or down, on whether to cut each of them.
  Current law says the President can ask Congress to rescind--that is, 
cancel--spending items. But Congress can ignore those requests, and 
often has done so.
  This bill would change that.
  It says if the President proposes a specific cut, Congress can't 
duck--it would have to vote on it, and if a majority approved the cut, 
that would be that.
  So, it would give the President a bright spotlight of publicity he 
could focus on earmarks or special tax breaks, and it would force 
Congress to debate those items on their merits.
  That would give the President a powerful tool--but it also would 
retain the balance between the Executive and Legislative branches.
  I think that is very important, and I appreciate having had the 
opportunity to work with Mr. Ryan and others to fine-tune the bill 
while it was being considered in committee. I think the result has been 
to improve the bill considerably.
  Mr. Speaker, under the Constitution Congress is primarily accountable 
to the American people for how their tax dollars are spent.
  By making the taxing and spending processes more transparent and 
specific, this bill can promote that accountability.
  Of course, without knowing what the President might propose to 
rescind, I don't know if I would support some, all, or any of his 
proposals.
  But I do know that people in Colorado and across the country think 
there should be greater transparency about our decisions on taxing and 
spending.
  And I know that they are also demanding that we be ready to take 
responsibility for those decisions.
  This bill will promote both transparency and accountability, and so I 
urge its approval.
  Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, I yield 4\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman from 
Maryland (Mr. Hoyer), the distinguished Democratic whip.
  Mr. HOYER. Mr. Speaker, I thank the ranking member for yielding.
  Mr. Speaker, for 5\1/2\ years now the Republican Congress and the 
administration have pursued what I have said repeatedly is the most 
reckless fiscal policy in the history of our Nation. I believe that.
  When George Bush took office, he inherited a projected 10-year budget 
surplus of $5.6 trillion. There is no dispute on that. George Bush said 
that on the floor of this House. In March of 2001, he promised the 
American people, ``We can proceed with tax relief without fear of 
budget deficits, even if the economy softens.''
  Let's compare Republican rhetoric with reality. That projected 
deficit surplus has been turned into a projected budget deficit of some 
$4 trillion, a historical fiscal turnaround of more than $9 trillion.
  Republicans have created the four largest budget deficits in American 
history. We Democrats have no power in this House or in the Senate or 
in the Presidency. It has been Republicans alone that have created 
these deficits.

[[Page H4479]]

  They have raised the debt limit four times, and House Republicans 
have voted to increase it by an additional $653 billion, to a total of 
$9.6 trillion. Let me repeat: we had a $5.6 trillion surplus in January 
of 2001, according to President Bush; we now have an authorized debt of 
$9.6 trillion.
  They have spent every single nickel of Social Security money. It is 
no wonder that former Republican House majority leader Dick Armey of 
Texas told the Wall Street Journal in 2004, ``I'm sitting here, and I'm 
upset about the deficit, and I'm upset about spending. There's no way I 
can pin that on the Democrats. Republicans own the town now.''
  Given their record, I think it takes some audacity, chutzpah perhaps 
would be a better word, for our Republican friends to come to this 
floor today with this so-called Legislative Line Item Veto Act and 
bemoan the growth in Federal spending and the dire fiscal condition, 
created by whom? Created by them. Republicans, after all, own the town, 
as I said Dick Armey noted.
  Yet the President has failed to veto one bill. We are talking about a 
line item veto? This President has not vetoed a bill. This President 
has gone a longer period of time than any President in over 195 years 
in this Nation and he hasn't vetoed anything. All of the spending has 
been marked ``approved'' by George W. Bush, the President of the United 
States. He doesn't exercise vetoes.
  This Republican majority refuses to embrace the one real method of 
restraining spending and restoring fiscal discipline, the pay-as-you-go 
budget rules that applied to both spending and taxes and were adopted, 
I tell my Republican friends, in bipartisan votes in 1990 and again in 
1997.
  But you jettisoned them. Why did you jettison them? You jettisoned 
those rules because you knew you couldn't fit your tax cuts into them. 
You didn't have the courage to cut spending to meet your tax cuts. That 
is a fair policy. If you don't want to spend, fine. If you want to cut 
taxes, fine. Cut spending. That is a fair policy. You haven't done 
that.
  You cut revenues, and you increased very substantially revenues, 
period. And don't talk to me about the war. You included spending very 
radically on entitlement programs, the biggest increase in entitlement 
spending since 1965 on your watch, with very little help from 
Democrats, who overwhelmingly voted against those increases.
  As the New York Times stated on Monday: ``The line item veto bill is 
an attempt to look tough while avoiding the tried-and-true, and truly 
tough, deficit fix: reinstating the original pay-as-you-go rules.''
  Mr. Speaker, this bill is very different from versions introduced in 
the 1990s. It not only fails to include PAYGO rules, but also applies 
to mandatory programs, including Medicare and Social Security. It gives 
the President 45 days to send a rescission message and fails to give 
Congress the power to amend the rescission package.
  We are the policymakers. Article I. This Congress is the most 
complacent, complicit Congress perhaps in history in terms of being a 
lap dog for the President of the United States. We are a coequal 
branch. We are not a branch to ask leave of the President to take 
action.
  The majority, unfortunately, refused to allow us to consider the 
substitute John Spratt wanted to offer. Don't you have the courage to 
argue the merits of your case and let us argue the merits of our case 
and have a vote? Are you so afraid of the alternatives that you won't 
even allow the vote?
  We ought to vote this down. It is a ruse, it is a fraud, it is a 
sham.
  Mr. RYAN of Wisconsin. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may 
consume.
  Mr. Speaker, before I yield to the gentleman from Texas, I would 
simply like to point out I think the gentleman from Maryland said we 
need to cut more spending. I agree. That is why we should pass this. In 
fact, the gentleman from Maryland voted for similar legislation that I 
offered with Charlie Stenholm 2 years ago and two expedited rescission 
bills that the gentleman from South Carolina authored in the past. So I 
hope we can enjoy your support this time around.
  Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from 
Texas (Mr. Hensarling).
  Mr. HENSARLING. Mr. Speaker, first I want to congratulate the 
gentleman from Wisconsin for his principled leadership in the area of 
the budget and to bring the line item veto back to the House. But 
watching this debate, Mr. Speaker, I find it both sad and amusing to 
see how many Democrats who have supported line item veto in the past 
now oppose it. In trying to justify their new-found opposition, we are 
now witnessing acrobatics and contortions that we haven't seen since 
the circus came to town.

                              {time}  1700

  The line item veto has been supported by such Democrats as President 
Bill Clinton, Vice President Al Gore, Senator John Kerry. The last time 
it was enacted in this body and became law over two-thirds of the 
Democrats voted for it.
  But, Mr. Speaker, it is now an election year. The Democrat leadership 
again says no. But no is not an agenda; no is not a vision. And by 
saying no to the legislative line item veto, Democrats are saying yes 
to more wasteful spending.
  Mr. Speaker, we know that almost every Governor in America already 
has some form of the line item veto to help combat wasteful spending. 
It brings transparency and accountability into a process that sorely 
needs it.
  Now, this bill before us is frankly a very simple one. It allows the 
President to highlight examples of wasteful spending, submit them to 
Congress on an expedited basis, and have Congress vote on it. That is 
all it does. Nothing more, nothing less. But what is really important, 
Mr. Speaker, is that the savings, the resulting savings can only go for 
deficit reduction. Mr. Speaker, Democrats can't have it both ways. They 
can't oppose the legislative line item veto and then claim to be for 
deficit reduction. It cannot be done.
  Now, we have just been lectured about the issue of fiscal 
responsibility from the gentleman from Maryland, but let us examine the 
record of the Democrats. For the last 10 years, every time the 
Republicans offer a budget, our friends from the other side of the 
aisle offer a budget that spends even more money. They criticize our 
prescription drug program, yet theirs cost even more. And thanks to 
their stonewalling, we were not able to reform and save Social Security 
for future generations. Instead, there is an extra $2.5 trillion of 
unfunded obligations thanks to their stonewalling. That is what their 
record is.
  Mr. Speaker, if you want to help end the railroads to nowhere, the 
hydroponic tomatoes, the indoor rainforest, say ``yes'' to the line 
item veto, say ``yes'' to our children's fiscal future, and let us vote 
for this legislation.
  Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentlewoman from 
Florida (Ms. Corrine Brown).
  (Ms. CORRINE BROWN of Florida asked and was given permission to 
revise and extend her remarks.)
  Ms. CORRINE BROWN of Florida. This Republican Congress has now gone 
beyond being a rubber stamp for President Bush and is now handing him 
the responsibilities of Congress itself. They are putty, look at this 
putty in my hand, and the President squeezed them into doing anything 
that he wants even if their constituents don't agree. That is why 77 
percent of the public thinks this Congress is out of touch with their 
priorities and why 70 percent of the American public thinks President 
Bush is doing a terrible job.
  Let me be clear. I did not vote to give President Clinton a line item 
veto. I certainly would not vote to give it to this President who, like 
no other President in the history of this country, tramples over the 
rights of Congress and the rights of American people, and still to this 
day shows nothing but contempt for the House of Representatives.
  This President has spent over $450 billion on a war of choice that 
was based on lies.
  The President turned a $5.6 trillion dollar surplus into a $3.2 
trillion dollar deficit. And this is who is supposed to stop the 
rampant spending of this Republican-led Congress. This is a joke, and 
everyone here knows it.
  Vote no on this bill, and let the people's House get back to doing 
the work that the people actually want us to do.
  Mr. RYAN of Wisconsin. At this time, Mr. Speaker, I would like to

[[Page H4480]]

yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from the Appropriations Committee from 
Illinois (Mr. Kirk).
  Mr. KIRK. I thank the gentleman from Wisconsin, my next-door neighbor 
to the north, for this important legislation. It is a commonsense way 
that budget-conscious Republicans and Democrats can come together to 
cut spending.
  Now, this legislation is needed, because the line item veto has been 
used by American States since 1861 to balance their budgets, and over 
40 Governors, Republicans and Democrats, have this spending control.
  Now, we in Congress joined with President Clinton to enact a line 
item veto in the 1990s, and he used that veto 82 times to defend the 
taxpayer. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court struck that needed reform 
down. And when they did, President Clinton called that a defeat for 
America.
  The bill before the House now is modeled after the bipartisan base 
closings legislation that has been used to cut hundreds of millions of 
wasteful spending in the military by closing down bases that the 
Secretary of Defense and our commanders say that they do not need.
  For us at this time, I think the government spends too much, that 
this is a needed reform tried and true for over 120 years by our 
Governors to keep balanced budgets and one that we need in this 
Congress.
  We should all be worried, in the history of democracies, that while 
it is the best form of government on the planet, there is a troubled 
record of democracies spending their way into dictatorship. This needed 
reform helps us control spending to make sure that the American people 
keep their freedom, that the democracy that they live under is 
responsible with the taxpayer dollars, and that we do not waste those 
precious resources on unneeded projects. That is why we should support 
this. That is why this should be bipartisan. President Clinton was 
right to have this power. Forty Governors are right, and it should be 
adopted by this House.
  Mr. RYAN of Wisconsin. Mr. Speaker, at this time I would like to 
yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Conaway).
  Mr. CONAWAY. I thank the gentleman for the recognition. I appreciate 
the opportunity to speak on behalf of this legislation. I also 
appreciate his hard work in bringing this to the floor.
  I would like to make a couple of points. One, it seems the bit 
twisted logic for the folks on the other side to argue that the 
President shouldn't have these authorities that are presented in this 
bill, but yet at the same time gripe that he hasn't used the veto it 
already has, it doesn't seem to me you can have it both ways.
  I am in favor of this legislation because it does apply to all 
spending, both discretionary and direct, and it gives the President an 
opportunity to help us help ourselves in this regard.
  A third point is that these savings actually will reduce the deficit. 
Unlike many of the opportunities that we take to try to reduce 
appropriations bills where that money simply stays within that pot of 
money and ultimately gets spent, this money would actually not get 
spent and therefore have a direct impact on the deficit.
  The last point is that, with these powers, I can assure you that 
would act as a self-limiting deterrent to frivolous earmarks that might 
be proposed. None of us are going to want to be on the President's top 
10 list when with this power he lists out the five projects in a single 
bill or the 10 projects in an omnibus bill. That is a distinction and a 
recognition that no one is going to want to have. So I think my 
colleagues would be much more diligent in their requests for special 
spending that this would address. So I rise today in favor of H.R. 4890 
and urge my colleagues to vote for it.
  Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of the time.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman is recognized for 3 minutes.
  (Mr. SPRATT asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, this could be a bipartisan bill. The 
gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. Ryan) has taken the bill that the 
President sent us, which is a classic case of overreaching, and 
improved it very much and I commend him for that. But it is not good 
enough; it is not worthy of passage, in my opinion. If it really was to 
be a bipartisan bill, if that is what you wanted, why did I get shut 
out in the Rules Committee?
  I came forward with two substitutes, one germane, one nongermane, 
with various individual amendments, all of them serious substantive 
things. Sure, we could disagree about them, but I didn't get to the 
opportunity under the Rules Committee's provision to come here and 
offer those on the floor of the House.
  I think in wrapping up, it is worth showing these charts to everybody 
again to show the path we are on, which is this path right here: a 
deficit this year of $300 billion to $350 billion, more than $400 
billion last year; intractable, structural deficits. And, as you will 
see from the costs plotted by CBO, the numbers only get worse here that 
show the deficit sinking to almost $500 billion in 10 years.
  The consequence of that? First of all, the debt ceiling, the legal 
limit to which we can borrow, we have seen an increase in the debt 
ceiling in the United States since President Bush came to office under 
your watch of $3.668 trillion. That is the increase in 5 fiscal years 
of the debt ceiling of the United States. And the total indebtedness of 
the United States is shown right here. The statutory debt was $5.9 
trillion when President Bush took office. If we continue on the track 
that we are on now with his budgets, we can expect to have a debt of 
nearly $11.3 trillion by the year 2011. That is where we are going.
  It is hard to avoid the suspicion that this bill today is sort of a 
diversionary tactic because, by everybody's admission, even its more 
ardent proponents, this won't even put a dent in the deficit. As I 
said, we just adopted a bill which could have an impact on revenues 
over 10 years, when fully implemented, of $823 billion. This will 
barely, barely amount to a dent in the budget, a deficit addition of 
that kind.
  Now, the gentleman said that I have engaged in acrobatics, as if I 
weren't serious and sincere about the amendments I am proposing. But I 
have a problem with giving the President 45 days to pick through 
appropriation bills, because the wider the window, the more apt he will 
be to use it for political purposes. I have a problem with having the 
President send up five bills for every appropriation bill. There are 11 
appropriation bills. We could have as many as 55 rescission bills here 
on the House floor, and then I am sure, as we take up these bills on 
Christmas Eve, you will be having Members ask: Who came up with these 
ideas?
  I have a problem with direct spending that is reaching too far. If 
this is an experiment to start with, why not stick to discretionary 
spending? None of the previous bills have included that.
  So for all of these reasons, this could be a much better bill. And I 
would offer on a motion to recommit my only opportunity a substantial 
improvement to the bill, and I hope every Member will seriously 
consider it and will also vote for it.
  Mr. RYAN of Wisconsin. Mr. Speaker, may I inquire as to how much time 
I have remaining?
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman has 4\1/2\ minutes.
  Mr. RYAN of Wisconsin. Mr. Speaker, I want to address a few of the 
concerns that have been mentioned by the other side of the aisle.
  First of all, this is a bipartisan bill. If you paid attention, a 
number of the speakers came to the floor from the other side of the 
well to speak in favor of this. Actually, three Democrats came to the 
floor in favor of this bill that we are considering right now, three 
Democrats I am proud to call friends and supporters and coauthors of 
this proposal. In fact, we took an amendment of Mr. Cuellar of Texas to 
improve this bill.
  Other speakers have said this gives too much power to the President. 
Well, let us just remember one thing: the President already has 
rescission authority today. Today, the President can rescind something, 
defer spending, and send it to Congress. Here is the problem: Congress 
just ignores these things. In fact, President Reagan sent $25 billion 
of rescissions to Congress, and they ignored every one of them.

[[Page H4481]]

  So we want to make that process work. We are taking the existing 
authority he has, making it actually shorter in time frame, and we are 
simply guaranteeing that we are going to vote on it.
  I think, if somebody sticks a wasteful pork barrel project like a $50 
million rainforest museum from Iowa, a bridge to nowhere, or something 
like that in a bill in a conference report where we as Members of 
Congress have one choice, vote ``yes'' or ``no'' on the entire bill, 
then the President has a similar choice: sign or veto the entire bill.
  That is wrong. We ought to be able to vote on that $50 million 
rainforest museum. This gives us the chance to do that, and this means 
that we can't duck those votes.
  This is a bipartisan bill. It has been so bipartisan in the past that 
Mr. Spratt has offered very similar legislation. We got 173 Democrats 
on one of them, 174 on another. Mr. Stenholm and I offered a bill very 
similar to this 2 years ago; we got 45 Democrats on it. I hope that we 
will continue to get this bipartisan support that we had been getting.
  But more importantly, Mr. Speaker, the American people know we need 
every tool we can get our hands on to go after wasteful spending. That 
is why taxpayer watchdog groups are key on voting this bill. The 
American Conservative Union, the Americans for Prosperity, Americans 
for Tax Reform, Citizens Against Government Waste, the Club For Growth, 
Freedom Works, National Federation of Independent Businesses, National 
Taxpayer Union, Taxpayers for Common Sense, the U.S. Chamber of 
Commerce all are key voting this vote as a key vote for the taxpayer. 
Other groups supporting this: ALEC, the American Taxpayer Alliance, 
Bond Market Association, Business Roundtable, Center for Individual 
Freedom, Concord Coalition, Association of Wholesale Distributors, 
National Restaurant Association, 60 Plus, Traditional Values. The list 
goes on and on.
  Mr. Speaker, the American people know we need this tool to go after 
wasteful spending, taxpayers need this tool so we can do this, and, 
more importantly, we need more transparency in our process here in 
Congress.
  We passed earmark reform so that Members of Congress have to defend 
their earmarks when they come to the floor of the House when we write 
these bills in the beginning. But a lot of this stuff gets inserted at 
the end of the process in the conference reports; that is why we need 
to have this deterrent.
  I think the success of this bill will be less in how much pork we get 
out of legislation that we line item veto out, and more in how much 
pork never gets put into legislation in the first place, because there 
will be an extra deterrent. A Member of Congress who wants to slip in 
some big piece of pork barrel spending that he probably couldn't 
otherwise justify will think twice, because he or she may have to come 
to the well of the House and the well of the other body to defend that 
pork barrel spending.

                              {time}  1715

  This is good government. This is transparency. This is an added layer 
of accountability that is right for the taxpayer, and it is 
constitutional. It protects the prerogatives of the legislative branch. 
That is why I think this is a good bill. That is why I am pleased to 
call this a bipartisan bill. That is why I think we should strike this 
vote for the taxpayer.
  With that, Mr. Speaker, I urge a ``aye'' vote for this.
  Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I oppose this bill because the 
legislative line-item veto it seeks to create is merely a gimmick to 
divert attention from the majority's pitiful record when it comes to 
fiscal management. In addition, and even more important, this so-called 
line item veto represents a dangerous, and in my view unconstitutional, 
transfer of power from the legislative branch to the Chief Executive.
  Mr. Speaker, while H.R. 4890 seeks to address an important problem--
the massive deficits run up by the majority and the majority's 
squandering of the $5 trillion projected surplus bequeathed it and the 
administration by the Clinton administration--their ``solution'' to the 
problem resorts to legislative gimmicks instead of tackling the problem 
directly.
  Since one-party control of the government began in 2001, Federal 
spending has ballooned 42 percent; an increase of over $830 billion a 
year, reflecting the budgets that President Bush has submitted to 
Congress. During that time, the President has not vetoed a single piece 
of legislation. In fact, President Bush has used the veto less than any 
President in the past 175 years.
  Yet while the proposed line-item authority would give a big new stick 
to the executive branch, it would do little to bring fiscal sanity back 
to the appropriations process. Indeed, it might actually have the 
opposite effect of encouraging these special-interest handouts. 
Conservative columnist George Will observes that the President may 
simply use the authority as a form of legislative horse-trading, 
suggesting that the administration could ``buy legislators'' support on 
other large matters in exchange for not vetoing the legislators' 
favorite small items.''
  Both the Congressional Budget Office and the Congressional Research 
Service have reached similar conclusions. Indeed, it seems the 
President's version of the line-item veto is more about transferring 
power to the executive branch than actually reigning in Federal 
spending.
  That power transfer has already once been found unconstitutional by 
the Supreme Court. The majority decided that ``the President's role in 
the legislative process can be altered only through the cumbersome 
process of amending the Constitution,'' and there is no reason to 
believe that this attempt will be met any more favorably. In fact, the 
House bill actually gives the executive branch more power than the 
previous act, allowing the President up to 45 days to exercise the 
authority (instead of the previous act's five) and 90 days to withhold 
funds even after Congress has overridden his veto.
  If Congress really wants to get a handle on spending, it should 
reform the earmarking process, instead of resorting to legislative 
gimmicks. The President could also do the unthinkable--bring out the 
old-fashioned veto stamp for the first time in 5 years.
  Mr. WELDON of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of the 
H.R. 4890 legislation giving the President Line Item Veto authority.
  As a cosponsor of H.R. 4890, the Legislative Line Item Veto Act of 
2006, I believe it will provide more transparency and scrutiny in the 
funding process while reining in Federal spending. Currently, when 
Congress considers appropriations legislation we have the authority to 
closely scrutinize funding earmarks recommended by the President before 
deciding whether or not to fund them. The Line Item Veto legislation 
gives the President an opportunity to closely examine Congressional 
spending priorities and submit a proposal to Congress that would defund 
those items the President finds objectionable. The proposals by the 
President would be unamendable and would be subject to a simple up or 
down vote in the House and Senate.
  While we have been working to restrain Federal spending, including 
voting to terminate over 95 Federal programs this year alone, this will 
be one more tool in the arsenal of fiscal discipline. It has the added 
benefit of keeping objectionable spending out of these bills in the 
first place as all Members of Congress would know that last minute 
items added to these bills will be subject to individual scrutiny 
through the Line Item Veto.
  In 1996, Congress passed the Line Item Veto Act of 1996. This law 
allowed the President to veto specific spending provisions. However, on 
April 10, 1997, a Federal court ruled that this legislation was 
unconstitutional, arguing that the power of the purse must be under the 
control of Congress, not the President. I voted for this law because it 
granted the President the authority to strike funding while ensuring 
that Congress could override the President's line item veto with a \2/
3\ vote. The Supreme Court, however, ruled that this did not leave 
spending decisions ultimately in the hands of Congress and struck down 
the law. Today's bill addresses this concern while ensuring Congress 
has the final say on the President's line item veto recommendations by 
means of a simple majority vote in the House and Senate.
  It is my understanding that many Democrats are going to play politics 
this year, and not vote for passage of the Line Item Veto. What is 
particularly noteworthy is that in the 103rd Congress over 170 House 
Democrats voted for the line item veto.
  I urge a ``yes'' vote on this legislation.
  Ms. CORRINE BROWN of Florida. Mr. Speaker, this Republican Congress 
has now gone beyond being a rubber stamp for President Bush and is now 
handing him the responsibilities of Congress itself.
  They are putty in the President's hands, and he squeezes them into 
doing anything he wants, even if their constituents don't agree.
  This is why 77 percent of the American Public thinks this Congress is 
out of touch with their priorities, and why 70 percent of the American 
public thinks President Bush is doing a terrible job.
  Now I didn't vote to give President Clinton a line-item veto, so I'm 
certainly not going to give it to the President who, more than any

[[Page H4482]]

other president in history, has trampled over the rights of Congress 
and the rights of the American people, and still today shows nothing 
but contempt for the will of the House and Senate.
  This President has spent $450 Billion dollars on a war in Iraq based 
on lies, and turned a $5.6 Trillion dollar surplus into a $3.2 Trillion 
dollar deficit, and this is who is supposed to stop the rampant 
spending of this Republican led Congress. This is a joke, and everyone 
here knows it.
  Vote ``no'' on this bill, and let the people's House get back to 
doing the work that the people actually want us to do.
  Mr. CANTOR. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the Legislative Line 
Item Veto Act. This bill will give Congress and the President a 
powerful tool to restore fiscal sanity to Washington. This bill is an 
important step toward reforming the Budget Act of 1974, which stripped 
the President of impoundment authority--effectively hobbling a vital 
check on the system to limit wasteful spending. Presidents Jefferson 
through Nixon used impoundment authority to withhold funding for 
wasteful spending.
  In 1821 Thomas Jefferson said: ``The multiplication of public 
offices, increase of expense beyond income, growth and entailment of a 
public debt, are indications soliciting the employment of the pruning 
knife.'' The legislative line item veto is the pruning knife that 
Jefferson envisioned.
  The legislative Line Item Veto will further hold Congress accountable 
to the taxpayers and ensures that we continue to be good stewards of 
taxpayer dollars.
  Mr. BLUMENAUER. Mr. Speaker, I voted against the Line-Item Veto Act 
of 1996 even though it was sought by a Democratic administration 
because I felt that it was unconstitutional and that no president 
either Republican or Democrat should have the unilateral power to 
change the law by themself. My reservations were justified when in 1998 
the Supreme Court ruled this provision unconstitutional. It would be 
the height of irony for a Congress that already failed in its 
constitutional responsibility to check the inappropriate use of Federal 
power by this administration with a record of the largest deficits in 
American history to surrender even more authority.
  The proposal that is being offered although called a ``line item 
veto'' is nothing of the sort. While it attempts procedurally to make 
it easier for the President to eliminate spending, it still may be 
found unconstitutional. What is especially troubling is the provision 
that would permit the President to withhold funding for an item in an 
enacted appropriation bill for up to 90 days regardless of 
Congressional action. This could have a devastating impact on 
transportation programs such as Amtrak which the administration has led 
a crusade to shut it down. Given the precarious financial situation 
that Amtrak faces, the ability to delay funding for 90 days could have 
the effect of pushing Amtrak over the edge in leading to its collapse.
  Personally, I have been happy to vote against programs I thought were 
unaffordable as well as go after them on the House floor. During the 
109th I have already led efforts with some of my conservative 
colleagues against wasteful non-priority programs such as the upper 
Mississippi lock and dam project and costly sugar subsidies. If 
Congress wants to get serious about fiscal discipline, then a few 
simple but important steps taken would make a significant difference.
  For example, it is long past time to restore the pay-as-you-go budget 
procedures. This pay-as-you-go concept required Congress and the 
administration to adopt a sustainable budget policy where money to pay 
for either new spending programs or costly tax cuts would have to be 
provided without increasing the deficit. In addition, just letting 
Congress know what it's voting on would be helpful. The Republican 
leadership routinely overrides the requirements in our rule that 
provides for three days to review conference committee reports.
  One of the greatest failures of Congress for the 10 years that I have 
been in office has been its inability to exercise fiscal discipline. 
During the Bush administration we have seen year after year of record-
breaking deficits with the highest increases in over 50 years. If we 
simply commit to follow our already established rules, we would do more 
good and pose less harm than the budget fig leaf that is being 
considered today. This bill is an attempt to disguise the fact that we 
have a budget problem because of the administration and Republican 
leadership refusal to do their job and to provide the tools to help the 
rest of us do ours.
  Mr. GARY G. MILLER of California. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in 
support of fiscal responsibility.
  As stewards of the taxpayers' hard-earned money, we have the 
obligation to ensure it is spent wisely, sensibly, and where it is 
needed the most.
  I want to commend Speaker Hastert and Leader Boehner for working hard 
to improve the fiscal responsibility of Congress.


                          True Spending Reform

  However, if we are to truly rein in spending and restore fiscal 
sanity, we must do more than address the aftermath of a flawed process.
  Rather than waiting to restore fiscal responsibility after we pass 
legislation, we must work to ensure we remain committed to it as we 
draft legislation.
  Instead of cutting spending at the end of the budgetary process, we 
must start the process with an eye on fiscal discipline.
  True reform means leaving future generations a Federal budget that 
makes sense--a budget that expends only as much as it takes in.
  We must make a commitment to our children and grandchildren by 
improving the complete budgetary process.


                We Must Pass a Balanced Budget Amendment

  To reform this flawed process, we must consider and pass the Balanced 
Budget Amendment.
  H.J. Res. 58, which I cosponsored, is the most important tool in 
bringing fiscal responsibility back to America.
  This amendment would force Congress to spend only as much as it 
receives.
  It would also require the President to join us in this commitment by 
making him submit a balanced budget to Congress.
  As we work today to cut wasteful spending at the end of the process, 
I believe we must also commit ourselves to complete fiscal 
responsibility in the entire budgetary process.
  As we vote today on the Legislative Line Item Veto Act, I ask my 
colleagues to remember that true fiscal responsibility requires a 
commitment to discipline the whole way through the process--it requires 
the Balanced Budget Amendment.
  Mr. MARIO DIAZ-BALART of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in strong 
support of the bipartisan Legislative Line-Item Veto Act of 2006. The 
line-item veto is a commonsense approach to restraining the growth in 
Federal spending.
  The Legislative Line-Item Veto establishes an additional check 
against excessive, redundant, and narrowly focused spending provisions 
and special-interest tax breaks. This legislation would simply allow 
the President to identify questionable and unnecessary spending items 
in bills passed by Congress. It preserves Congress' power of the purse 
by requiring a simple up or down vote on the President's proposed 
rescissions. The final decision on spending or tax items remains in the 
hands of Congress.
  With the passage of this important legislation, this Republican-led 
Congress continues to highlight its commitment to fiscal discipline and 
supporting policies that reform and reduce the growth of mandatory 
government programs. Necessary reform, such as a line-item veto, can 
help rein in unnecessary and wasteful government spending while 
protecting the hard-earned money of American taxpayers.
  Congress must act to bring greater transparency and accountability to 
the budget process. A constitutionally sound line-item veto is a useful 
tool to eliminate government spending that contributes to the waste, 
fraud, and abuse of taxpayer dollars.
  Many governors currently have this ability, including in my own State 
of Florida. This important tool serves the people well and will help 
save their hard-earned money.
  The line-item veto legislation gives Congress and the President yet 
another opportunity to bring spending under control. I urge my 
colleagues on both sides of the aisle to match their rhetoric with 
action and support meaningful budget reform.
  Mr. SIMPSON. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in opposition to the line-item 
veto measure before the House today.
  I know the authors of this measure are sincere in their efforts and 
believe this measure will lead to a better Federal Government.
  But being sincere doesn't make their efforts right, nor does it make 
them wise. Rather, they are fundamentally wrong.
  For 200 years, the unfortunate truth is that power, slowly but 
surely, has been shifting from the legislative branch of Government to 
the executive branch. We all know this to be true.
  It should come as no surprise that this President, or the prior one, 
want this expanded power. The real surprise would be if this Congress 
finally stood up and said no.
  We all know that the President today has the ability to veto any bill 
Congress passes. And we all know he has not done so.
  Some of my colleagues will argue that we make it too hard for him to 
veto a bill. That is nonsense.
  Every day we have to vote on bills with many imperfections. They 
contain provisions we might support and others we strongly oppose. But 
we have to balance the good and the bad in each bill and then cast our 
vote and defend it to our constituents.
  Why should the President be any different? Why should he get to undo 
a hard-earned compromise? I need not remind any Member

[[Page H4483]]

of this body that many times the President has a role in that 
compromise--yet this measure would allow him to selectively undo that 
deal after the fact.
  Let's talk for a minute about spending.
  Even the sponsors of this measure don't really believe it will save 
any taxpayer money.
  They talk about earmarks and equate them with wasteful spending.
  In reality, there are only two types of spending--that which is 
congressionally directed and that which is recommended by the 
President. This measure places the recommendations of the President 
higher in importance than spending directed by the U.S. Congress.
  If the authors of this measure have such faith in the administrative 
branch of Government, why do we have 11,000 unused FEMA trailers 
sitting in a field in Hope, AR?
  Why were millions and millions of dollars wasted on $2,000 credit 
cards that didn't go to victims of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, but 
were instead spent on things I ought not mention on this floor?
  I could go on and on about $600 toilet seats and $400 hammers, but 
everyone here gets the point.
  Let's be clear Mr. Speaker, the taxpayers aren't going to save a dime 
with the passage of this measure. Instead, we are going to weaken the 
Constitutional role of Congress, further strengthen the power of the 
executive branch, and provide a few Members of this body with the 
ability to go home and say they did something--however harmful it might 
be to the future of our Nation or inconsistent it might be with the 
intentions of our Nation's founders.
  My mother used to tell me, ``Be careful what you wish for, you just 
might get it.'' My mother's advice would be well heeded by those who 
believe this measure is in the best interests of our Nation.
  Mr. PAUL. Mr. Speaker, H.R. 4890, the Legislative Line Item Veto Act, 
is not an effective means of reining in excessive government spending. 
In fact, H.R. 4890 would most likely increase the size of government 
because future presidents will use their line item veto powers to 
pressure members of Congress to vote for presidential priorities in 
order to avoid having their spending projects ``line item'' vetoed. In 
my years in Congress, I cannot recall a single instance where a 
president lobbied Congress to reduce spending. In fact, in 1996 Vice 
President Al Gore suggested that President Clinton could use his new 
line item veto power to force Congress to restore federal spending and 
programs eliminated in the 1996 welfare reform bill. Giving the 
president authority to pressure members of Congress to vote for new 
government programs in exchange for protecting members' pet spending 
projects is hardly a victory for fiscal responsibility or limited 
government.
  H.R. 4890 supporters claim that this bill does not violate the 
Constitution. I am skeptical of this claim since giving the president 
the power to pick and choose which parts of legislation to sign into 
law transforms the president into a legislator, thus upending the 
Constitution's careful balance of powers between the Congress and the 
president. I doubt the drafters of the Constitution, who rightly saw 
that giving legislative power to the executive branch would undermine 
republican government and threaten individual liberty, would support 
H.R. 4890.
  Mr. Speaker, it is simply not true that Congress needs to give the 
president the line item veto power to end excessive spending. Congress 
can end excessive spending simply by returning to the limitations on 
government power contained in the United States Constitution. The 
problem is a lack of will among members of Congress to rein in 
spending, not a lack of presidential power. Congress's failure to do 
its duty and cut spending is no excuse for granting new authority to 
the executive branch.
  In conclusion, Mr. Speaker, the Legislative Line Item Veto Act upsets 
the constitutional balance of powers between the executive and 
legislative branches of government. Increasing the power of the 
executive branch will likely increase the size and power of the federal 
government. Therefore, I urge my colleagues to reject this bill and 
instead simply vote against all unconstitutional spending.
  Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Speaker, over my years in the House, I have supported 
budget reforms to make the process more transparent and to eliminate 
excessive congressional spending. I joined many of my colleagues--on 
both sides of the aisle--in making the hard-fought and difficult 
deficit-cutting votes of the 1990s.
  Now, sadly, in this new decade and century, Congress must again take 
steps to impose fiscal discipline and balance the federal budget. In 
theory, the line-item veto seems to be a sensible idea, although 
fraught with constitutional questions, and I have voted in favor of 
similar legislation in the past.
  At times, I have also voted in favor of cutting or eliminating the 
Estate Tax. In eras of government surpluses, we could afford such tax 
cuts.
  However, times have changed.
  The Line-Item Veto bill is little more than a hand-over of 
Congressional authority to a White House that has already elevated 
overreaching to an art form.
  At the same time, this new decade has seen a distinct lack of 
congressional oversight. In the current climate, a line-item veto is a 
step in the wrong direction, and cedes even more Legislative Branch 
power to a President accustomed to invoking extraordinary 
constitutional authority as needed.
  To be truly effective, a line-item veto should be considered along 
with other measures to help restore some fiscal sanity, such as ``pay-
go'' budget rules and earmark reform. But this transparent transfer of 
power to the Executive Branch is no the answer.
  Ironically, on the same day that the House is considering a Line-Item 
Veto--purportedly in the name of budget-balancing--we are also 
considering a massive cut in the estate tax.
  Although my family would personally benefit from a cut in the estate 
tax, this is the wrong tax cut, for the wrong people, at the wrong 
time.
  We face the looming retirement of the baby boomers, a war in Iraq, 
and increasing obligations to our Nation's veterans. We are still 
inadequately prepared to respond to a terrorist attack, natural 
disaster or flu pandemic. Our budget deficit is spiraling out of 
control. And middle class Americans are being squeezed by the rising 
costs of healthcare, energy and education.
  We cannot be so reckless with our fiscal policy.
  I will oppose both initiatives.
  Mr. BUYER. Mr. Speaker, I rise to speak in opposition to H.R. 4890, 
the Legislative Line Item Veto Act of 2006.
  I will readily admit that the underlying goal of this bill is 
commendable. Reducing government waste and unnecessary spending is an 
admirable goal, one that this Congress should pursue diligently. In 
fact, I voted in favor of the Line Item Veto Act of 1996.
  I have seen the line item veto in action . . . by President Clinton 
on a military construction appropriations law. Experience is a cruel, 
but effective teacher. That experience has shown me that the line item 
veto in its practical application would abrogate Congressional 
authority and give the executive additional power over the legislative 
branch, threatening the fine balance of power that our Founding Fathers 
wisely ensured.
  Since 1996, the Supreme Court has ruled the Line Item Veto Act of 
1996 unconstitutional for its violation of Article 1, Section 7, known 
as the Presentation Clause of the United States Constitution. Justice 
Kennedy stated in his opinion in Clinton v. New York, ``Failure of 
political will does not justify unconstitutional remedies''. I stand by 
the decision of the Court and believe that its judgment is applicable 
to the bill before us.
  In the Supreme Court ruling on Clinton v. New York the opinion of the 
Court stated that the ``cancellations'' of the 1996 Act were not merely 
exercises of the President's discretionary budget authority but a 
violation of Article I, Sec. 7, giving the President ``unilateral'' 
power to change the language of a duly enacted statute. In plain 
English, the bill did not allow Congress to exercise its 
constitutionally invested powers.
  The bill before us today, H.R. 4890, attempts to avoid this hazard by 
requiring an up or down vote on each rescission. While these 
rescissions come to Congress for forced consideration, it does not get 
around the objections of the Court that the President, in his 
rescissions, is unilaterally changing a duly enacted statute. By 
forcing Congress to take up rescissions I fear this measure would tip 
the scales of power in favor of the executive. The Clinton ruling 
states that ``Statutory repeals must conform with Article I, (INS v. 
Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 954,) but there is no constitutional 
authorization for the President to amend or repeal. The constitutional 
return is of the entire bill and takes place before it becomes law, 
whereas the statutory cancellations occurs after the bill becomes law 
and affects it only in part'' (Clinton v. New York pp. 17-24).
  This gets to the heart of my argument that Congress has still not 
addressed the objections of the Court. The ideals of the 1996 Act for 
fiscal restraint did not match the practical application leading me to 
question the ability of the executive to faithfully carry out this 
legislation, no matter how well intentioned. I cannot in good faith and 
a clear conscience hand over legislative authority to the executive 
branch and vote for legislation that seeks to dilute this process.
  With regard to the practical aspects of the line item veto, when I 
voted in favor of the 1996 Act, it was my hope and likely the hope of 
everyone who supported the measure that the power would be used 
responsibly, wisely, and prudently. I saw this power abused and 
misused.
  After signing the Military Construction Appropriations measure for 
Fiscal Year 1998, President Clinton used the line item veto authority 
for 38 construction projects. The Clinton administration cited three 
criteria for canceling

[[Page H4484]]

the projects. The projects (1) were not requested by the military; (2) 
could not make contributions to the national defense in FY 1998; and 
(3) would not benefit the quality of life and well-being of military 
personnel. The Clinton administration did not even follow its own 
criteria! The Clinton administration even acknowledged that it had used 
erroneous data as the basis for striking 18 of the 38 projects. The 
overwhelming majority of the projects were on the administration's own 
5-year construction plan. It cut critical funding for our Nation's 
Guard and Reserves.
  This was a blatant use of raw executive arrogance and power. It was 
simply an exercise of the White House wanting its way and ignoring the 
spending priorities set by Congress. Furthermore, the Clinton White 
House made very clear that it would use the line-item veto as a matter 
of politics, rather than objective fiscal policy. The line item veto 
was being used as leverage against Congress to obtain consent to the 
White House's demand for both more spending and for policy positions.
  The Clinton administration made illegitimate the fundamental 
rationale for the line-item veto . . . to reduce spending. They used 
the power to threaten the cutting of Members' projects to extract more 
spending for the administration's priorities; thereby, the line item 
veto was used to increase spending, not decrease spending.
  Despite the need to trim federal spending, I am convinced that this 
legislation, if enacted, could again be misused by the executive 
branch, as has already been proven by the example of the Clinton 
administration. As Justice Kennedy wrote, ``That a congressional 
cession of power is voluntary does not make it innocuous'' (Clinton v. 
New York p. 4).
  I am a voice for the Fourth District of Indiana. My constituents want 
controls on the budget and restraint in federal spending. But, neither 
will I have their voices muffled by an executive power grab. I took an 
oath to ``defend the Constitution.'' I must protect the voice of my 
constituents and the power the Constitution invests in me as their 
representative.
  Mr. MACK. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in strong support of the 
Legislative Line Item Veto Act of 2006, offered by my friend, Mr. Ryan 
of Wisconsin.
  I have said time and again that America's long-term freedom, security 
and prosperity goes hand-in-hand with restoring fiscal discipline in 
Washington. The people of Southwest Florida and the rest of the nation 
deserve a government that taxes less, spends less and regulates less. 
With this legislation, we will move closer to that goal. Congress and 
the President will be able to work together to rein in the federal 
budget deficit--an anchor tethered to our otherwise strong economy that 
needs addressing.
  Moreover, if used properly, the Line Item Veto can be a positive and 
important tool to help ensure taxpayer dollars are being spent wisely 
and on the key services people need.
  Mr. Speaker, we should not be fooled by those who believe we are 
ceding budgetary authority over to the Executive Branch, for it is 
Congress that has the ultimate say on any White House proposal. 
Instead, we are simply increasing our avenues for ways to cut down 
spending. Additionally, clear limits will be placed on what the 
President is, and is not, allowed to do. Rest assured, the power of the 
purse--and its maintenance--will continue to rest solely with the 
United States Congress.
  It is upon those principles I respectfully request my colleagues in 
the House stand together and take an important step in passing this 
bill authorizing the Line Item Veto. I look forward to the prospect of 
it being used in the fight to reign in the cost, size and scope of 
Washington.
  Mr. PETRI. Mr. Speaker, I want to thank the Speaker and my good 
friend and colleague from Wisconsin, Paul Ryan, for their willingness 
to work with the Transportation Committee to ensure that transportation 
trust fund budget protections will be preserved and that trust fund 
dollars are not used for deficit reduction or diverted to the general 
fund.
  It is my understanding that we have a commitment that this bill, when 
and if it comes out of conference, will be in a form that also honors 
funding guarantees and that spending will not be below guaranteed 
levels.
  I further appreciate the clarification by Congressman Ryan that it 
was not his intention to negatively impact the guarantees and that he 
supports continuing to spend the revenues coming into the trust funds.
  This is so important because in 1998 and in subsequent votes, this 
Congress has reaffirmed the principle that user fees collected from 
aviation and highway users should be used only for their intended 
purpose--transportation improvements.
  For too long, aviation and highway trust fund spending had been 
suppressed in order to increase spending in other areas or to mask the 
size of the federal deficit, to the point that we had ballooning 
balances in the trust funds.
  The goal of the line item veto bill here today is to achieve 
savings--and it had originally provided that any vetoed item be used 
for deficit reduction. For direct spending, this would have applied not 
only to ``earmarks,'' but to programs that are increased and supported 
by the trust funds!
  This would be in direct conflict with the spending guarantees we have 
had in our two previous aviation and highway bills and undermined the 
principle that trust fund spending should be linked to trust fund 
revenues--it is spending that is paid for.
  Using gas taxes for deficit reduction (as far as the Highway Trust 
Fund is concerned) was vigorously opposed by Republicans when President 
Clinton proposed it in 1993. It was the right position then and it is 
the right position today.
  Again, this is not spending that contributes to the deficit--it is 
spending that is paid for and we should not break our promise that 
revenues collected will be spent on transportation.
  Much as some may dispute it, programs that are supported by user fees 
are different--and they merit the different budget treatment that they 
currently have. It would be a terrible mistake to turn back the clock 
now, and I am glad that we are taking steps to ensure that it is not 
the case.
  I look forward to continuing to work to fine-tune the provisions 
regarding the transportation trust funds in this bill.
  Mr. RYAN of Wisconsin. Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my 
time.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Terry). Pursuant to House Resolution 
886, the previous question is ordered on the bill, as amended.
  The question is on the engrossment and third reading of the bill.
  The bill was ordered to be engrossed and read a third time, and was 
read the third time.


                Motion to Recommit Offered by Mr. Spratt

  Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, I offer a motion to recommit.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is the gentleman opposed to the bill?
  Mr. SPRATT. I am in its present form.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Clerk will report the motion to 
recommit.
  The Clerk read as follows:

       Mr. Spratt moves to recommit the bill H.R. 4890 to the 
     Committee on the Budget with instructions to report the same 
     back to the House forthwith with the following amendment:
       Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the 
     following:

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

       This Act may be cited as the ``Legislative Line Item Veto 
     Act of 2006''.

                  TITLE I--LEGISLATIVE LINE ITEM VETO

     SEC. 101. LEGISLATIVE LINE ITEM VETO.

       (a) In General.--Title X of the Congressional Budget and 
     Impoundment Control Act of 1974 (2 U.S.C. 621 et seq.) is 
     amended by striking all of part B (except for sections 1016 
     and 1013, which are redesignated as sections 1018 and 1019, 
     respectively) and part C and inserting the following:

                  ``Part B--Legislative Line Item Veto


                       ``line item veto authority

       ``Sec. 1011. (a) Proposed Cancellations.--Within 10 
     calendar days after the enactment of any bill or joint 
     resolution providing any discretionary budget authority or 
     targeted tax benefit, the President may propose, in the 
     manner provided in subsection (b), the cancellation of any 
     dollar amount of such discretionary budget authority or 
     targeted tax benefit. Except for emergency spending, if the 
     10 calendar-day period expires during a period where either 
     House of Congress stands adjourned sine die at the end of a 
     Congress or for a period greater than 10 calendar days, the 
     President may propose a cancellation under this section and 
     transmit a special message under subsection (b) on the first 
     calendar day of session following such a period of 
     adjournment.
       ``(b) Transmittal of Special Message.--
       ``(1) Special message.--
       ``(A) In general.--The President may transmit to the 
     Congress a special message proposing to cancel any dollar 
     amounts of discretionary budget authority or targeted tax 
     benefits.
       ``(B) Contents of special message.--Each special message 
     shall specify with respect to the discretionary budget 
     authority proposed or targeted tax benefits to be canceled--
       ``(i) the dollar amount of discretionary budget authority 
     (that OMB, after consultation with CBO, estimates to increase 
     budget authority or outlays as required by section 1016(9)) 
     or the targeted tax benefit that the President proposes be 
     canceled;
       ``(ii) any account, department, or establishment of the 
     Government to which such discretionary budget authority is 
     available for obligation, and the specific project or 
     governmental functions involved;
       ``(iii) the reasons why such discretionary budget authority 
     or targeted tax benefit should be canceled;
       ``(iv) to the maximum extent practicable, the estimated 
     fiscal, economic, and budgetary effect (including the effect 
     on outlays and receipts in each fiscal year) of the proposed 
     cancellation;
       ``(v) to the maximum extent practicable, all facts, 
     circumstances, and considerations

[[Page H4485]]

     relating to or bearing upon the proposed cancellation and the 
     decision to effect the proposed cancellation, and the 
     estimated effect of the proposed cancellation upon the 
     objects, purposes, or programs for which the discretionary 
     budget authority or the targeted tax benefit is provided;
       ``(vi) a numbered list of cancellations to be included in 
     an approval bill that, if enacted, would cancel discretionary 
     budget authority or targeted tax benefits proposed in that 
     special message; and
       ``(vii) if the special message is transmitted subsequent to 
     or at the same time as another special message, a detailed 
     explanation why the proposed cancellations are not 
     substantially similar to any other proposed cancellation in 
     such other message.
       ``(C) Duplicative proposals prohibited.--The President may 
     not propose to cancel the same or substantially similar 
     discretionary budget authority or targeted tax benefit more 
     than one time under this Act.
       ``(D) Maximum number of special messages.--The President 
     may not transmit to the Congress more than one special 
     message under this subsection related to any bill or joint 
     resolution described in subsection (a).
       ``(E) Prohibition on Presidential Abuse of Proposed 
     Cancellations.--Neither the President nor any other executive 
     branch official shall condition the inclusion or exclusion or 
     threaten to condition the inclusion or exclusion of any 
     proposed cancellation in any special message under this 
     section on any vote cast or to be cast by any Member of 
     either House of Congress.
       ``(2) Enactment of approval bill.--
       ``(A) Deficit reduction.--Amounts of discretionary budget 
     authority or targeted tax benefits which are canceled 
     pursuant to enactment of a bill as provided under this 
     section shall be dedicated only to reducing the deficit or 
     increasing the surplus.
       ``(B) Adjustment of levels in the concurrent resolution on 
     the budget.--Not later than 5 days after the date of 
     enactment of an approval bill as provided under this section, 
     the chairs of the Committees on the Budget of the Senate and 
     the House of Representatives shall revise allocations and 
     aggregates and other appropriate levels under the appropriate 
     concurrent resolution on the budget to reflect the 
     cancellation, and the applicable committees shall report 
     revised suballocations pursuant to section 302(b), as 
     appropriate.
       ``(C) Adjustments to statutory limits.--After enactment of 
     an approval bill as provided under this section, the Office 
     of Management and Budget shall revise applicable limits under 
     the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 
     1985, as appropriate.
       ``(D) Trust funds and special funds..--Notwithstanding 
     subparagraph (A), nothing in this part shall be construed to 
     require or allow the deposit of amounts derived from a trust 
     fund or special fund which are canceled pursuant to enactment 
     of a bill as provided under this section to any other fund.
       ``(E) Highway funding guarantees.--None of the 
     cancellations pursuant to the enactment of a bill as provided 
     under this part shall reduce the level of obligations for the 
     highway category, as defined in section 251(b) of the 
     Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, 
     below, or further below, the levels established by section 
     8003 of the Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient 
     Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users (Public Law 
     109-59; 119 Stat. 1917) for any fiscal year. An approval bill 
     shall not reduce the amount of funding for a particular State 
     where the authorization for the appropriation of funding was 
     authorized in such Act or authorized in title 23, United 
     States Code.
       ``(F) Transit funding guarantees.--None of the 
     cancellations pursuant to the enactment of a bill as provided 
     under this part shall reduce the level of obligations for the 
     transit category, as defined in section 251(b) of the 
     Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, 
     below, or further below, the levels established by section 
     section 8003 of the Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient 
     Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users (Public Law 
     109-59; 119 Stat. 1917) for any fiscal year. An approval bill 
     shall not reduce the amount of funding for a particular State 
     or a designated recipient (as defined in section 5307(a)(2) 
     of title 49, United States Code), where the authorization for 
     the appropriation of funding was authorized in such Act or 
     chapter.
       ``(G) Aviation funding guarantees.--None of the 
     cancellations pursuant to the enactment of a bill as provided 
     under this part shall reduce the level of funding for the 
     Federal Aviation Administration's airport improvement program 
     and facilities and equipment program, in total, below, or 
     further below, the levels authorized by section 48101 or 
     48103 of title 49, United States Code, in total, for any 
     fiscal year.


                ``procedures for expedited consideration

       ``Sec. 1012. (a) Expedited Consideration.--
       ``(1) In general.--The majority leader of each House or his 
     designee shall (by request) introduce an approval bill as 
     defined in section 1016 not later than the fifth day of 
     session of that House after the date of receipt of a special 
     message transmitted to the Congress under section 1011(b) .
       ``(2) Consideration in the house of representatives.--
       ``(A) Referral and reporting.--Any committee of the House 
     of Representatives to which an approval bill is referred 
     shall report it to the House without amendment not later than 
     the seventh legislative day after the date of its 
     introduction. If a committee fails to report the bill within 
     that period or the House has adopted a concurrent resolution 
     providing for adjournment sine die at the end of a Congress, 
     it shall be in order to move that the House discharge the 
     committee from further consideration of the bill. Such a 
     motion shall be in order only at a time designated by the 
     Speaker in the legislative schedule within two legislative 
     days after the day on which the proponent announces his 
     intention to offer the motion. Such a motion shall not be in 
     order after a committee has reported an approval bill with 
     respect to that special message or after the House has 
     disposed of a motion to discharge with respect to that 
     special message. The previous question shall be considered as 
     ordered on the motion to its adoption without intervening 
     motion except twenty minutes of debate equally divided and 
     controlled by the proponent and an opponent. If such a motion 
     is adopted, the House shall proceed immediately to consider 
     the approval bill in accordance with subparagraph (B). A 
     motion to reconsider the vote by which the motion is disposed 
     of shall not be in order.
       ``(B) Proceeding to consideration.--After an approval bill 
     is reported or a committee has been discharged from further 
     consideration, or the House has adopted a concurrent 
     resolution providing for adjournment sine die at the end of a 
     Congress, it shall be in order to move to proceed to consider 
     the approval bill in the House. Such a motion shall be in 
     order only at a time designated by the Speaker in the 
     legislative schedule within two legislative days after the 
     day on which the proponent announces his intention to offer 
     the motion. Such a motion shall not be in order after the 
     House has disposed of a motion to proceed with respect to 
     that special message. There shall be not more than 5 hours of 
     general debate equally divided and controlled by the 
     proponent and an opponent of the bill. After general debate, 
     the bill shall be considered as read for amendment under the 
     five-minute rule. Only one motion to rise shall be in order, 
     except if offered by the manager. No amendment to the bill is 
     in order, except any Member if supported by 99 other Members 
     (a quorum being present) may offer an amendment striking the 
     reference number or numbers of a cancellation or 
     cancellations from the bill. Consideration of the bill for 
     amendment shall not exceed one hour excluding time for 
     recorded votes and quorum calls. No amendment shall be 
     subject to further amendment, except pro forma amendments for 
     the purposes of debate only. At the conclusion of the 
     consideration of the bill for amendment, the Committee shall 
     rise and report the bill to the House with such amendments as 
     may have been adopted. The previous question shall be 
     considered as ordered on the bill and amendments thereto to 
     final passage without intervening motion. A motion to 
     reconsider the vote on passage of the bill shall not be in 
     order.
       ``(C) Senate bill.--An approval bill received from the 
     Senate shall not be referred to committee.
       ``(3) Consideration in the Senate.--
       ``(A) Motion to proceed to consideration.--A motion to 
     proceed to the consideration of a bill under this subsection 
     in the Senate shall not be debatable. It shall not be in 
     order to move to reconsider the vote by which the motion to 
     proceed is agreed to or disagreed to.
       ``(B) Limits on debate.--Debate in the Senate on a bill 
     under this subsection, and all amendments and debatable 
     motions and appeals in connection therewith (including debate 
     pursuant to subparagraph (D)), shall not exceed 10 hours, 
     equally divided and controlled in the usual form.
       ``(C) Appeals.--Debate in the Senate on any debatable 
     motion or appeal in connection with a bill under this 
     subsection shall be limited to not more than 1 hour, to be 
     equally divided and controlled in the usual form.
       ``(D) Amendments.--During consideration under this 
     subsection, any Member of the Senate may move to strike any 
     proposed cancellation or cancellations of budget authority or 
     targeted tax benefit, as applicable, if supported by 15 other 
     Members.
       ``(E) Motion to limit debate.--A motion in the Senate to 
     further limit debate on a bill under this subsection is not 
     debatable.
       ``(F) Motion to recommit.--A motion to recommit a bill 
     under this subsection is not in order.
       ``(G) Consideration of the house bill.--
       ``(i) In general.--If the Senate has received the House 
     companion bill to the bill introduced in the Senate prior to 
     the vote on the Senate bill, then the Senate may consider, 
     and the vote may occur on, the House companion bill.
       ``(ii) Procedure after vote on senate bill.--If the Senate 
     votes on the bill introduced in the Senate, then immediately 
     following that vote, or upon receipt of the House companion 
     bill, the House bill if identical to the Senate bill shall be 
     deemed to be considered, read the third time, and the vote on 
     passage of the Senate bill shall be considered to be the vote 
     on the bill received from the House.
       ``(b) Amendments and Divisions Prohibited.--Except as 
     otherwise provided by this section, no amendment to a bill 
     considered under this section shall be in order in either the 
     House of Representatives or the Senate. It shall not be in 
     order to demand a division of the question in the House of 
     Representatives (or in a Committee of the Whole) or in

[[Page H4486]]

     the Senate. No motion to suspend the application of this 
     subsection shall be in order in either House, nor shall it be 
     in order in either House to suspend the application of this 
     subsection by unanimous consent.
       (c) Consideration of Conference Reports.--(1) Debate in the 
     House of Representatives or the Senate on the conference 
     report and any amendments in disagreement on any approval 
     bill shall be limited to not more than 2 hours, which shall 
     be divided equally between the majority leader and the 
     minority leader. A motion further to limit debate is not 
     debateable. A motion to recommit the conference report is not 
     in order, and it is not in order to move to reconsider the 
     vote by which the conference report is agreed to or disagreed 
     to.
       (2) If an approval bill is amended by either House of 
     Congress and a committee of conference has not completed 
     action (or such committee of conference was never appointed) 
     on such bill by the 15th calendar day after both Houses have 
     passed such bill, then any Member of either House may 
     introduce a bill comprised only of the text of the approval 
     bill as initially introduced and that bill shall be 
     considered under the procedures set forth in this section 
     except that no amendments shall be in order in either House.


                   ``presidential deferral authority

       ``Sec. 1013. (a) Temporary Presidential Authority to 
     Withhold Discretionary Budget Authority.--
       ``(1) In general.--At the same time as the President 
     transmits to the Congress a special message pursuant to 
     section 1011(b), the President may direct that any dollar 
     amount of discretionary budget authority to be canceled in 
     that special message shall not be made available for 
     obligation for a period not to exceed 30 calendar days from 
     the date the President transmits the special message to the 
     Congress or for emergency spending for a period not to exceed 
     7 calendar days.
       ``(2) Early availability.--The President shall make any 
     dollar amount of discretionary budget authority deferred 
     pursuant to paragraph (1) available at a time earlier than 
     the time specified by the President if the President 
     determines that continuation of the deferral would not 
     further the purposes of this Act.
       ``(b) Temporary Presidential Authority to Suspend a 
     Targeted Tax Benefit.--
       ``(1) In general.--At the same time as the President 
     transmits to the Congress a special message pursuant to 
     section 1011(b), the President may suspend the implementation 
     of any targeted tax benefit proposed to be repealed in that 
     special message for a period not to exceed 30 calendar days 
     from the date the President transmits the special message to 
     the Congress.
       ``(2) Early availability.--The President shall terminate 
     the suspension of any targeted tax benefit at a time earlier 
     than the time specified by the President if the President 
     determines that continuation of the suspension would not 
     further the purposes of this Act.


                      ``treatment of cancellations

       ``Sec. 1014. The cancellation of any dollar amount of 
     discretionary budget authority or targeted tax benefit shall 
     take effect only upon enactment of the applicable approval 
     bill. If an approval bill is not enacted into law before the 
     end of the applicable period under section 1013, then all 
     proposed cancellations contained in that bill shall be null 
     and void and any such dollar amount of discretionary budget 
     authority or targeted tax benefit shall be effective as of 
     the original date provided in the law to which the proposed 
     cancellations applied.


                    ``reports by comptroller general

       ``Sec. 1015. With respect to each special message under 
     this part, the Comptroller General shall issue to the 
     Congress a report determining whether any discretionary 
     budget authority is not made available for obligation or 
     targeted tax benefit continues to be suspended after the 
     deferral authority set forth in section 1013 of the President 
     has expired.


                             ``definitions

       ``Sec. 1016. As used in this part:
       ``(1) Appropriation law.--The term `appropriation law' 
     means an Act referred to in section 105 of title 1, United 
     States Code, including any general or special appropriation 
     Act, or any Act making supplemental, deficiency, or 
     continuing appropriations, that has been signed into law 
     pursuant to Article I, section 7, of the Constitution of the 
     United States.
       ``(2) Approval bill.--The term `approval bill' means a bill 
     or joint resolution which only approves proposed 
     cancellations of dollar amounts of discretionary budget 
     authority or targeted tax benefits in a special message 
     transmitted by the President under this part and--
       ``(A) the title of which is as follows: `A bill approving 
     the proposed cancellations transmitted by the President on 
     ____', the blank space being filled in with the date of 
     transmission of the relevant special message and the public 
     law number to which the message relates;
       ``(B) which does not have a preamble; and
       ``(C) which provides only the following after the enacting 
     clause: `That the Congress approves of proposed cancellations 
     ____', the blank space being filled in with a list of the 
     cancellations contained in the President's special message, 
     `as transmitted by the President in a special message on 
     ____', the blank space being filled in with the appropriate 
     date, `regarding ____.', the blank space being filled in with 
     the public law number to which the special message relates;
       ``(D) which only includes proposed cancellations that are 
     estimated by CBO to meet the definition of discretionary 
     budgetary authority or that are identified as targeted tax 
     benefits pursuant to paragraph (9) of section 1016; and
       ``(E) if no CBO estimate is available, then the entire list 
     of legislative provisions affecting discretionary budget 
     authority proposed by the President is inserted in the second 
     blank space in subparagraph (C).
       ``(3) Calendar day.--The term `calendar day' means a 
     standard 24-hour period beginning at midnight.
       ``(4) Cancel or cancellation.--The terms `cancel' or 
     `cancellation' means to prevent--
       ``(A) budget authority from having legal force or effect; 
     or
       ``(B) a targeted tax benefit from having legal force or 
     effect; and
     to make any necessary, conforming statutory change to ensure 
     that such targeted tax benefit is not implemented and that 
     any budgetary resources are appropriately canceled.
       ``(5) CBO.--The term `CBO' means the Director of the 
     Congressional Budget Office.
       ``(6) Direct spending.--The term `direct spending' means--
       ``(A) budget authority provided by law (other than an 
     appropriation law);
       ``(B) entitlement authority; and
       ``(C) the food stamp program.
       ``(7) Dollar amount of discretionary budget authority.--(A) 
     Except as provided in subparagraph (B), the term ``dollar 
     amount of discretionary budget authority'' means the entire 
     dollar amount of budget authority--
       ``(i) specified in an appropriation law, or the entire 
     dollar amount of budget authority or obligation limitation 
     required to be allocated by a specific proviso in an 
     appropriation law for which a specific dollar figure was not 
     included;
       ``(ii) represented separately in any table, chart, or 
     explanatory text included in the statement of managers or the 
     governing committee report accompanying such law;
       ``(iii) required to be allocated for a specific program, 
     project, or activity in a law (other than an appropriation 
     law) that mandates the expenditure of budget authority from 
     accounts, programs, projects, or activities for which budget 
     authority is provided in an appropriation law;
       ``(iv) represented by the product of the estimated 
     procurement cost and the total quantity of items specified in 
     an appropriation law or included in the statement of managers 
     or the governing committee report accompanying such law; or
       ``(v) represented by the product of the estimated 
     procurement cost and the total quantity of items required to 
     be provided in a law (other than an appropriation law) that 
     mandates the expenditure of budget authority from accounts, 
     programs, projects, or activities for which budget authority 
     is provided in an appropriation law.
       ``(B) The term `dollar amount of discretionary budget 
     authority' does not include--
       ``(i) direct spending;
       ``(ii) budget authority in an appropriation law which funds 
     direct spending provided for in other law;
       ``(iii) any existing budget authority canceled in an 
     appropriation law; or
       ``(iv) any restriction, condition, or limitation in an 
     appropriation law or the accompanying statement of managers 
     or committee reports on the expenditure of budget authority 
     for an account, program, project, or activity, or on 
     activities involving such expenditure.
       ``(8) OMB.--The term `OMB' means the Director of the Office 
     of Management and Budget.
       ``(9) Targeted tax benefit.--(A) The term `targeted tax 
     benefit' means any revenue-losing provision that provides a 
     Federal tax deduction, credit, exclusion, or preference to 
     100 or fewer beneficiaries (determined with respect to either 
     present law or any provision of which the provision is a 
     part) under the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 in any year for 
     which the provision is in effect;
       ``(B) for purposes of subparagraph (A)--
       ``(i) all businesses and associations that are members of 
     the same controlled group of corporations (as defined in 
     section 1563(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986) shall 
     be treated as a single beneficiary;
       ``(ii) all shareholders, partners, members, or 
     beneficiaries of a corporation, partnership, association, or 
     trust or estate, respectively, shall be treated as a single 
     beneficiary;
       ``(iii) all employees of an employer shall be treated as a 
     single beneficiary;
       ``(iv) all qualified plans of an employer shall be treated 
     as a single beneficiary;
       ``(v) all beneficiaries of a qualified plan shall be 
     treated as a single beneficiary;
       ``(vi) all contributors to a charitable organization shall 
     be treated as a single beneficiary;
       ``(vii) all holders of the same bond issue shall be treated 
     as a single beneficiary; and
       ``(viii) if a corporation, partnership, association, trust 
     or estate is the beneficiary of a provision, the shareholders 
     of the corporation, the partners of the partnership, the 
     members of the association, or the beneficiaries of the trust 
     or estate shall not also be treated as beneficiaries of such 
     provision;

[[Page H4487]]

       ``(C) for the purpose of this paragraph, the term `revenue-
     losing provision' means any provision that is estimated to 
     result in a reduction in Federal tax revenues (determined 
     with respect to either present law or any provision of which 
     the provision is a part) for any one of the following 
     periods--
       ``(i) the first fiscal year for which the provision is 
     effective;
       ``(ii) the period of the 5 fiscal years beginning with the 
     first fiscal year for which the provision is effective;
       ``(iii) the period of 10 fiscal years beginning with the 
     first fiscal year for which the provision is effective; or
       ``(iv) the period of 20 fiscal years beginning with the 
     first fiscal year for which the provision is effective; and
       ``(D) the terms used in this paragraph shall have the same 
     meaning as those terms have generally in the Internal Revenue 
     Code of 1986, unless otherwise expressly provided.


                              ``expiration

       ``Sec. 1017. This title shall have no force or effect on or 
     after 2 years after the date of enactment of this section.''.

     SEC. 102. TECHNICAL AND CONFORMING AMENDMENTS.

       (a) Exercise of Rulemaking Powers.--Section 904 of the 
     Congressional Budget Act of 1974 (2 U.S.C. 621 note) is 
     amended--
       (1) in subsection (a), by striking ``1017'' and inserting 
     `1012''; and
       (2) in subsection (d), by striking ``section 1017'' and 
     inserting ``section 1012''.
       (b) Clerical Amendments.--(1) Section 1(a) of the 
     Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 is 
     amended by striking the last sentence.
       (2) Section 1022(c) of such Act (as redesignated) is 
     amended by striking ``rescinded or that is to be reserved'' 
     and inserting ``canceled'' and by striking ``1012'' and 
     inserting ``1011''.
       (3) Table of Contents.--The table of contents set forth in 
     section 1(b) of the Congressional Budget and Impoundment 
     Control Act of 1974 is amended by deleting the contents for 
     parts B and C of title X and inserting the following:

                  ``Part B--Legislative Line Item Veto

``Sec. 1011. Line item veto authority.
``Sec. 1012. Procedures for expedited consideration.
``Sec. 1013. Presidential deferral authority.
``Sec. 1014. Treatment of cancellations.
``Sec. 1015. Reports by Comptroller General.
``Sec. 1016. Definitions.
``Sec. 1017. Expiration.
``Sec. 1018. Suits by Comptroller General.
``Sec. 1019. Proposed Deferrals of budget authority.''.

       (c) Effective Date.--The amendments made by this Act shall 
     take effect on the date of its enactment and apply only to 
     any dollar amount of discretionary budget authority or 
     targeted tax benefit provided in an Act enacted on or after 
     the date of enactment of this Act.

                   TITLE II--PAY-AS-YOU-GO EXTENSION

     SEC. 201. PAY-AS-YOU-GO EXTENSION.

       (a) Section 252 Amendments.--Section 252 of the Balanced 
     Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 is amended 
     by striking ``2002'' both places it appears and inserting 
     ``2011''.
       (b) Section 275 Amendment.--Section 275(b) of the Balanced 
     Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 is amended 
     by striking ``2006'' and inserting ``2016''.

  TITLE III--RECONCILIATION INSTRUCTIONS MAY NOT INCREASE THE DEFICIT

     SEC. 301. DEFINITION OF RECONCILIATION.

       Section 310 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 is 
     amended by adding at the end the following new subsection:
       ``(h) Definition of Reconciliation Legislation.--As used in 
     this Act, a reconciliation bill or reconciliation resolution 
     is a measure that, if enacted, would reduce the deficit or 
     increase the surplus for each fiscal year covered by such 
     measure compared to the most recent Congressional Budget 
     Office estimate for any such fiscal year.''.

                        TITLE IV--EARMARK REFORM

     SEC. 401. CURBING ABUSES OF POWER.

       Rule XXIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives 
     (the Code of Official Conduct) is amended--
       (1) by redesignating clause 14 as clause 16; and
       (2) by inserting after clause 13 the following new clauses:
       ``14. A Member, Delegate, or Resident Commissioner shall 
     not condition the inclusion of language to provide funding 
     for a district-oriented earmark, a particular project which 
     will be carried out in a Member's congressional district, or 
     a limited tax benefit in any bill or joint resolution (or an 
     accompanying report thereof) or in any conference report on a 
     bill or joint resolution (including an accompanying joint 
     statement of managers thereto) on any vote cast by the 
     Member, Delegate, or Resident Commissioner in whose 
     Congressional district the project will be carried out.
       ``15. (a) A Member, Delegate, or Resident Commissioner who 
     advocates to include a district-oriented earmark in any bill 
     or joint resolution (or an accompanying report) or in any 
     conference report on a bill or joint resolution (including an 
     accompanying joint statement of managers thereto) shall 
     disclose in writing to the chairman and ranking member of the 
     relevant committee (and in the case of the Committee on 
     Appropriations to the chairman and ranking member of the full 
     committee and of the relevant subcommittee)--
       ``(1) the name of the Member, Delegate, or Resident 
     Commissioner;
       ``(2) the name and address of the intended recipient of 
     such earmark;
       ``(3) the purpose of such earmark; and
       ``(4) whether the Member, Delegate, or Resident 
     Commissioner has a financial interest in such earmark.
       ``(b) Each committee shall make available to the general 
     public the information transmitted to the committee under 
     paragraph (a) for any earmark included in any measure 
     reported by the committee or conference report filed by the 
     chairman of the committee or any subcommittee thereof.
       ``(c) The Joint Committee on Taxation shall review any 
     revenue measure or any reconciliation bill or joint 
     resolution which includes revenue provisions before it is 
     reported by a committee and before it is filed by a committee 
     of conference of the two Houses, and shall identify whether 
     such bill or joint resolution contains any limited tax 
     benefits. The Joint Committee on Taxation shall prepare a 
     statement identifying any such limited tax benefits, stating 
     who the beneficiaries are of such benefits, and any 
     substantially similar introduced measures and the sponsors of 
     such measures. Any such statement shall be made available to 
     the general public by the Joint Committee on Taxation.''.

     SEC. 402. KNOWING WHAT THE HOUSE IS VOTING ON.

       (a) Bills and joint resolutions.--
       (1) In general.--Rule XIII of the Rules of the House of 
     Representatives is amended by adding at the end the following 
     new clause:
       ``8. Except for motions to suspend the rules and consider 
     legislation, it shall not be in order to consider in the 
     House a bill or joint resolution until 24 hours after or, in 
     the case of a bill or joint resolution containing a district-
     oriented earmark or limited tax benefit, until 3 days after 
     copies of such bill or joint resolution (and, if the bill or 
     joint resolution is reported, copies of the accompanying 
     report) are available (excluding Saturdays, Sundays, or legal 
     holidays except when the House is in session on such a 
     day).''.
       (2) Prohibiting waiver.--Clause 6(c) of rule XIII of the 
     Rules of the House of Representatives is amended--
       (A) by striking `or' at the end of subparagraph (1);
       (B) by striking the period at the end of subparagraph (2) 
     and inserting `; or'; and
       (C) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph:
       ``(3) a rule or order that waives clause 8 of rule XIII or 
     clause 8(a)(1)(B) of rule XXII, unless a question of 
     consideration of the rule is adopted by a vote of two-thirds 
     of the Members voting, a quorum being present.''.
       (b) Conference Reports.--Clause 8(a)(1)(B) of rule XXII of 
     the Rules of the House of Representatives is amended by 
     striking ``2 hours'' and inserting ``24 hours or, in the case 
     of a conference report containing a district-oriented earmark 
     or limited tax benefit, until 3 days after''.

     SEC. 403. FULL AND OPEN DEBATE IN CONFERENCE.

       (a) Numbered amendments.--Clause 1 of rule XXII of the 
     Rules of the House of Representatives is amended by adding at 
     the end the following new sentence: ``A motion to request or 
     agree to a conference on a general appropriation bill is in 
     order only if the Senate expresses its disagreements with the 
     House in the form of numbered amendments.''.
       (b) Promoting Openness in Deliberations of Managers.--
     Clause 12(a) of rule XXII of the Rules of the House of 
     Representatives is amended by adding at the end the following 
     new subparagraph:
       ``(3) All provisions on which the two Houses disagree shall 
     be open to discussion at any meeting of a conference 
     committee. The text which reflects the conferees' action on 
     all of the differences between the two Houses, including all 
     matter to be included in the conference report and any 
     amendments in disagreement, shall be available to any of the 
     managers at least one such meeting, and shall be approved by 
     a recorded vote of a majority of the House managers. Such 
     text and, with respect to such vote, the total number of 
     votes cast for and against, and the names of members voting 
     for and against, shall be included in the joint explanatory 
     statement of managers accompanying the conference report of 
     such conference committee.''.
       (c) Point of Order Against Consideration of Conference 
     Report Not Reflecting Resolution of Differences as 
     Approved.--
       (1) In general.--Rule XXII of the Rules of the House of 
     Representatives is amended by adding at the end the following 
     new clause:
       ``13. It shall not be in order to consider a conference 
     report the text of which differs in any material way from the 
     text which reflects the conferees' action on all of the 
     differences between the two Houses, as approved by a recorded 
     vote of a majority of the House managers as required under 
     clause 12(a).''.
       (2) Prohibiting waiver.--Clause 6(c) of rule XIII of the 
     Rules of the House of Representatives, as amended above, is 
     amended
       (A) by striking `or' at the end of subparagraph (2);
       (B) by striking the period at the end of subparagraph (3) 
     and inserting `; or'; and
       (C) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph:
       ``(4) a rule or order that waives clause 12(a) or clause 13 
     of rule XXII.''.


[[Page H4488]]


  Mr. SPRATT (during the reading). Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent 
that the motion be considered as read and printed in the Record.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentleman from South Carolina?
  There was no objection.


                             Point of Order

  Mr. RYAN of Wisconsin. Mr. Speaker, I reluctantly raise a point of 
order to the motion to recommit on the grounds that the motion includes 
provisions that are not germane to the bill. On those grounds, that is 
why I raise the point of order.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Does any other Member wish to speak?
  Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Chairman, the motion to recommit concerns entirely 
the budget process. It is germane and completely germane to the budget 
process. We add to the bill or would add to the bill the so-called pay-
as-you-go provisions which were the law of the land from 1990 to 2002. 
We reinstate that as a complement to, and it is complementary to, the 
other powers granted by this bill. It relates to entitlement spending. 
The bill relates to entitlement spending. So this is well within the 
ambit of the subject matter of this bill.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Does anybody else wish to speak on the point 
of order?
  Mr. RYAN of Wisconsin. Mr. Speaker, I will just rise to say that that 
is evidence of my point of order which PAYGO is outside of the 
germaneness of this bill. Earmark reform is outside the germaneness of 
the bill. It is on those grounds that I raise this point of order.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Are there any other speakers on the point of 
order? Seeing none, the Chair is prepared to rule.
  The gentleman from Wisconsin makes a point of order that the 
instructions contained in the motion to recommit are not germane.
  Clause 7 of rule XVI, the germaneness rule, provides that no 
proposition on a subject different from that under consideration shall 
be admitted under color of amendment. Among the central tenets of the 
germaneness rule are that an amendment may not introduce a subject 
matter not represented in the pending bill.
  The test of germaneness of a motion to recommit with instructions is 
the relationship of those instructions to the bill as a whole, as 
amended by House Resolution 886.
  H.R. 4890 addresses a procedure for the President to propose 
cancellations of certain provisions of law, and a procedure for 
Congress to approve such cancellations. It further provides that the 
President may defer the effectiveness of the provisions of law 
associated with such proposed cancellations pending approval or 
disapproval by the Congress.
  The amendment contained in the motion to recommit addresses, in part, 
a reinstatement of sequestration procedures within the executive 
branch, a change in permissible reconciliation instructions contained 
in a concurrent resolution on the budget, and various points of order 
regarding House procedures.
  Such provisions address subject matters not contained in H.R. 4890, 
as amended.
  Accordingly, the Chair finds that the instructions in the motion to 
recommit are not germane. The point of order is sustained. The motion 
is not in order.


                Motion to Recommit Offered by Mr. Spratt

  Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, I offer an alternate motion to recommit, 
which does not contain the objectionable features.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is the gentleman opposed to the bill?
  Mr. SPRATT. I am in its present form.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Clerk will report the motion to 
recommit.
  The Clerk read as follows:
       Mr. Spratt moves to recommit the bill H.R. 4890 to the 
     Committee on the Budget with instructions to report the same 
     back to the House forthwith with the following amendment:
       Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the 
     following:

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

       This Act may be cited as the ``Legislative Line Item Veto 
     Act of 2006''.

     SEC. 2. LEGISLATIVE LINE ITEM VETO.

       (a) In General.--Title X of the Congressional Budget and 
     Impoundment Control Act of 1974 (2 U.S.C. 621 et seq.) is 
     amended by striking all of part B (except for sections 1016 
     and 1013, which are redesignated as sections 1018 and 1019, 
     respectively) and part C and inserting the following:

                  ``Part B--Legislative Line Item Veto


                       ``line item veto authority

       ``Sec. 1011. (a) Proposed Cancellations.--Within 10 
     calendar days after the enactment of any bill or joint 
     resolution providing any discretionary budget authority or 
     targeted tax benefit, the President may propose, in the 
     manner provided in subsection (b), the cancellation of any 
     dollar amount of such discretionary budget authority or 
     targeted tax benefit. Except for emergency spending, if the 
     10 calendar-day period expires during a period where either 
     House of Congress stands adjourned sine die at the end of a 
     Congress or for a period greater than 10 calendar days, the 
     President may propose a cancellation under this section and 
     transmit a special message under subsection (b) on the first 
     calendar day of session following such a period of 
     adjournment.
       ``(b) Transmittal of Special Message.--
       ``(1) Special message.--
       ``(A) In general.--The President may transmit to the 
     Congress a special message proposing to cancel any dollar 
     amounts of discretionary budget authority or targeted tax 
     benefits.
       ``(B) Contents of special message.--Each special message 
     shall specify with respect to the discretionary budget 
     authority proposed or targeted tax benefits to be canceled--
       ``(i) the dollar amount of discretionary budget authority 
     (that OMB, after consultation with CBO, estimates to increase 
     budget authority or outlays as required by section 1016(9)) 
     or the targeted tax benefit that the President proposes be 
     canceled;
       ``(ii) any account, department, or establishment of the 
     Government to which such discretionary budget authority is 
     available for obligation, and the specific project or 
     governmental functions involved;
       ``(iii) the reasons why such discretionary budget authority 
     or targeted tax benefit should be canceled;
       ``(iv) to the maximum extent practicable, the estimated 
     fiscal, economic, and budgetary effect (including the effect 
     on outlays and receipts in each fiscal year) of the proposed 
     cancellation;
       ``(v) to the maximum extent practicable, all facts, 
     circumstances, and considerations relating to or bearing upon 
     the proposed cancellation and the decision to effect the 
     proposed cancellation, and the estimated effect of the 
     proposed cancellation upon the objects, purposes, or programs 
     for which the discretionary budget authority or the targeted 
     tax benefit is provided;
       ``(vi) a numbered list of cancellations to be included in 
     an approval bill that, if enacted, would cancel discretionary 
     budget authority or targeted tax benefits proposed in that 
     special message; and
       ``(vii) if the special message is transmitted subsequent to 
     or at the same time as another special message, a detailed 
     explanation why the proposed cancellations are not 
     substantially similar to any other proposed cancellation in 
     such other message.
       ``(C) Duplicative proposals prohibited.--The President may 
     not propose to cancel the same or substantially similar 
     discretionary budget authority or targeted tax benefit more 
     than one time under this Act.
       ``(D) Maximum number of special messages.--The President 
     may not transmit to the Congress more than one special 
     message under this subsection related to any bill or joint 
     resolution described in subsection (a).
       ``(E) Prohibition on Presidential Abuse of Proposed 
     Cancellations.--Neither the President nor any other executive 
     branch official shall condition the inclusion or exclusion or 
     threaten to condition the inclusion or exclusion of any 
     proposed cancellation in any special message under this 
     section on any vote cast or to be cast by any Member of 
     either House of Congress.
       ``(2) Enactment of approval bill.--
       ``(A) Deficit reduction.--Amounts of discretionary budget 
     authority or targeted tax benefits which are canceled 
     pursuant to enactment of a bill as provided under this 
     section shall be dedicated only to reducing the deficit or 
     increasing the surplus.
       ``(B) Adjustment of levels in the concurrent resolution on 
     the budget.--Not later than 5 days after the date of 
     enactment of an approval bill as provided under this section, 
     the chairs of the Committees on the Budget of the Senate and 
     the House of Representatives shall revise allocations and 
     aggregates and other appropriate levels under the appropriate 
     concurrent resolution on the budget to reflect the 
     cancellation, and the applicable committees shall report 
     revised suballocations pursuant to section 302(b), as 
     appropriate.
       ``(C) Adjustments to statutory limits.--After enactment of 
     an approval bill as provided under this section, the Office 
     of Management and Budget shall revise applicable limits under 
     the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 
     1985, as appropriate.
       ``(D) Trust funds and special funds..--Notwithstanding 
     subparagraph (A), nothing in this part shall be construed to 
     require or allow the deposit of amounts derived from a trust 
     fund or special fund which are canceled pursuant to enactment 
     of a bill as provided under this section to any other fund.
       ``(E) Highway funding guarantees.--None of the 
     cancellations pursuant to the enactment of a bill as provided 
     under this part shall reduce the level of obligations for the

[[Page H4489]]

     highway category, as defined in section 251(b) of the 
     Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, 
     below, or further below, the levels established by section 
     8003 of the Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient 
     Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users (Public Law 
     109-59; 119 Stat. 1917) for any fiscal year. An approval bill 
     shall not reduce the amount of funding for a particular State 
     where the authorization for the appropriation of funding was 
     authorized in such Act or authorized in title 23, United 
     States Code.
       ``(F) Transit funding guarantees.--None of the 
     cancellations pursuant to the enactment of a bill as provided 
     under this part shall reduce the level of obligations for the 
     transit category, as defined in section 251(b) of the 
     Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, 
     below, or further below, the levels established by section 
     section 8003 of the Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient 
     Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users (Public Law 
     109-59; 119 Stat. 1917) for any fiscal year. An approval bill 
     shall not reduce the amount of funding for a particular State 
     or a designated recipient (as defined in section 5307(a)(2) 
     of title 49, United States Code), where the authorization for 
     the appropriation of funding was authorized in such Act or 
     chapter.
       ``(G) Aviation funding guarantees.--None of the 
     cancellations pursuant to the enactment of a bill as provided 
     under this part shall reduce the level of funding for the 
     Federal Aviation Administration's airport improvement program 
     and facilities and equipment program, in total, below, or 
     further below, the levels authorized by section 48101 or 
     48103 of title 49, United States Code, in total, for any 
     fiscal year.


                ``procedures for expedited consideration

       ``Sec. 1012. (a) Expedited Consideration.--
       ``(1) In general.--The majority leader of each House or his 
     designee shall (by request) introduce an approval bill as 
     defined in section 1016 not later than the fifth day of 
     session of that House after the date of receipt of a special 
     message transmitted to the Congress under section 1011(b) .
       ``(2) Consideration in the house of representatives.--
       ``(A) Referral and reporting.--Any committee of the House 
     of Representatives to which an approval bill is referred 
     shall report it to the House without amendment not later than 
     the seventh legislative day after the date of its 
     introduction. If a committee fails to report the bill within 
     that period or the House has adopted a concurrent resolution 
     providing for adjournment sine die at the end of a Congress, 
     it shall be in order to move that the House discharge the 
     committee from further consideration of the bill. Such a 
     motion shall be in order only at a time designated by the 
     Speaker in the legislative schedule within two legislative 
     days after the day on which the proponent announces his 
     intention to offer the motion. Such a motion shall not be in 
     order after a committee has reported an approval bill with 
     respect to that special message or after the House has 
     disposed of a motion to discharge with respect to that 
     special message. The previous question shall be considered as 
     ordered on the motion to its adoption without intervening 
     motion except twenty minutes of debate equally divided and 
     controlled by the proponent and an opponent. If such a motion 
     is adopted, the House shall proceed immediately to consider 
     the approval bill in accordance with subparagraph (B). A 
     motion to reconsider the vote by which the motion is disposed 
     of shall not be in order.
       ``(B) Proceeding to consideration.--After an approval bill 
     is reported or a committee has been discharged from further 
     consideration, or the House has adopted a concurrent 
     resolution providing for adjournment sine die at the end of a 
     Congress, it shall be in order to move to proceed to consider 
     the approval bill in the House. Such a motion shall be in 
     order only at a time designated by the Speaker in the 
     legislative schedule within two legislative days after the 
     day on which the proponent announces his intention to offer 
     the motion. Such a motion shall not be in order after the 
     House has disposed of a motion to proceed with respect to 
     that special message. There shall be not more than 5 hours of 
     general debate equally divided and controlled by the 
     proponent and an opponent of the bill. After general debate, 
     the bill shall be considered as read for amendment under the 
     five-minute rule. Only one motion to rise shall be in order, 
     except if offered by the manager. No amendment to the bill is 
     in order, except any Member if supported by 99 other Members 
     (a quorum being present) may offer an amendment striking the 
     reference number or numbers of a cancellation or 
     cancellations from the bill. Consideration of the bill for 
     amendment shall not exceed one hour excluding time for 
     recorded votes and quorum calls. No amendment shall be 
     subject to further amendment, except pro forma amendments for 
     the purposes of debate only. At the conclusion of the 
     consideration of the bill for amendment, the Committee shall 
     rise and report the bill to the House with such amendments as 
     may have been adopted. The previous question shall be 
     considered as ordered on the bill and amendments thereto to 
     final passage without intervening motion. A motion to 
     reconsider the vote on passage of the bill shall not be in 
     order.
       ``(C) Senate bill.--An approval bill received from the 
     Senate shall not be referred to committee.
       ``(3) Consideration in the Senate.--
       ``(A) Motion to proceed to consideration.--A motion to 
     proceed to the consideration of a bill under this subsection 
     in the Senate shall not be debatable. It shall not be in 
     order to move to reconsider the vote by which the motion to 
     proceed is agreed to or disagreed to.
       ``(B) Limits on debate.--Debate in the Senate on a bill 
     under this subsection, and all amendments and debatable 
     motions and appeals in connection therewith (including debate 
     pursuant to subparagraph (D)), shall not exceed 10 hours, 
     equally divided and controlled in the usual form.
       ``(C) Appeals.--Debate in the Senate on any debatable 
     motion or appeal in connection with a bill under this 
     subsection shall be limited to not more than 1 hour, to be 
     equally divided and controlled in the usual form.
       ``(D) Amendments.--During consideration under this 
     subsection, any Member of the Senate may move to strike any 
     proposed cancellation or cancellations of budget authority or 
     targeted tax benefit, as applicable, if supported by 15 other 
     Members.
       ``(E) Motion to limit debate.--A motion in the Senate to 
     further limit debate on a bill under this subsection is not 
     debatable.
       ``(F) Motion to recommit.--A motion to recommit a bill 
     under this subsection is not in order.
       ``(G) Consideration of the house bill.--
       ``(i) In general.--If the Senate has received the House 
     companion bill to the bill introduced in the Senate prior to 
     the vote on the Senate bill, then the Senate may consider, 
     and the vote may occur on, the House companion bill.
       ``(ii) Procedure after vote on senate bill.--If the Senate 
     votes on the bill introduced in the Senate, then immediately 
     following that vote, or upon receipt of the House companion 
     bill, the House bill if identical to the Senate bill shall be 
     deemed to be considered, read the third time, and the vote on 
     passage of the Senate bill shall be considered to be the vote 
     on the bill received from the House.
       ``(b) Amendments and Divisions Prohibited.--Except as 
     otherwise provided by this section, no amendment to a bill 
     considered under this section shall be in order in either the 
     House of Representatives or the Senate. It shall not be in 
     order to demand a division of the question in the House of 
     Representatives (or in a Committee of the Whole) or in the 
     Senate. No motion to suspend the application of this 
     subsection shall be in order in either House, nor shall it be 
     in order in either House to suspend the application of this 
     subsection by unanimous consent.
       (c) Consideration of Conference Reports.--(1) Debate in the 
     House of Representatives or the Senate on the conference 
     report and any amendments in disagreement on any approval 
     bill shall be limited to not more than 2 hours, which shall 
     be divided equally between the majority leader and the 
     minority leader. A motion further to limit debate is not 
     debateable. A motion to recommit the conference report is not 
     in order, and it is not in order to move to reconsider the 
     vote by which the conference report is agreed to or disagreed 
     to.
       (2) If an approval bill is amended by either House of 
     Congress and a committee of conference has not completed 
     action (or such committee of conference was never appointed) 
     on such bill by the 15th calendar day after both Houses have 
     passed such bill, then any Member of either House may 
     introduce a bill comprised only of the text of the approval 
     bill as initially introduced and that bill shall be 
     considered under the procedures set forth in this section 
     except that no amendments shall be in order in either House.


                   ``presidential deferral authority

       ``Sec. 1013. (a) Temporary Presidential Authority to 
     Withhold Discretionary Budget Authority.--
       ``(1) In general.--At the same time as the President 
     transmits to the Congress a special message pursuant to 
     section 1011(b), the President may direct that any dollar 
     amount of discretionary budget authority to be canceled in 
     that special message shall not be made available for 
     obligation for a period not to exceed 30 calendar days from 
     the date the President transmits the special message to the 
     Congress or for emergency spending for a period not to exceed 
     7 calendar days.
       ``(2) Early availability.--The President shall make any 
     dollar amount of discretionary budget authority deferred 
     pursuant to paragraph (1) available at a time earlier than 
     the time specified by the President if the President 
     determines that continuation of the deferral would not 
     further the purposes of this Act.
       ``(b) Temporary Presidential Authority to Suspend a 
     Targeted Tax Benefit.--
       ``(1) In general.--At the same time as the President 
     transmits to the Congress a special message pursuant to 
     section 1011(b), the President may suspend the implementation 
     of any targeted tax benefit proposed to be repealed in that 
     special message for a period not to exceed 30 calendar days 
     from the date the President transmits the special message to 
     the Congress.
       ``(2) Early availability.--The President shall terminate 
     the suspension of any targeted tax benefit at a time earlier 
     than the time specified by the President if the President 
     determines that continuation of the suspension would not 
     further the purposes of this Act.


                      ``treatment of cancellations

       ``Sec. 1014. The cancellation of any dollar amount of 
     discretionary budget authority or

[[Page H4490]]

     targeted tax benefit shall take effect only upon enactment of 
     the applicable approval bill. If an approval bill is not 
     enacted into law before the end of the applicable period 
     under section 1013, then all proposed cancellations contained 
     in that bill shall be null and void and any such dollar 
     amount of discretionary budget authority or targeted tax 
     benefit shall be effective as of the original date provided 
     in the law to which the proposed cancellations applied.


                    ``reports by comptroller general

       ``Sec. 1015. With respect to each special message under 
     this part, the Comptroller General shall issue to the 
     Congress a report determining whether any discretionary 
     budget authority is not made available for obligation or 
     targeted tax benefit continues to be suspended after the 
     deferral authority set forth in section 1013 of the President 
     has expired.


                             ``definitions

       ``Sec. 1016. As used in this part:
       ``(1) Appropriation law.--The term `appropriation law' 
     means an Act referred to in section 105 of title 1, United 
     States Code, including any general or special appropriation 
     Act, or any Act making supplemental, deficiency, or 
     continuing appropriations, that has been signed into law 
     pursuant to Article I, section 7, of the Constitution of the 
     United States.
       ``(2) Approval bill.--The term `approval bill' means a bill 
     or joint resolution which only approves proposed 
     cancellations of dollar amounts of discretionary budget 
     authority or targeted tax benefits in a special message 
     transmitted by the President under this part and--
       ``(A) the title of which is as follows: `A bill approving 
     the proposed cancellations transmitted by the President on 
     ____', the blank space being filled in with the date of 
     transmission of the relevant special message and the public 
     law number to which the message relates;
       ``(B) which does not have a preamble; and
       ``(C) which provides only the following after the enacting 
     clause: `That the Congress approves of proposed cancellations 
     ____', the blank space being filled in with a list of the 
     cancellations contained in the President's special message, 
     `as transmitted by the President in a special message on 
     ____', the blank space being filled in with the appropriate 
     date, `regarding ____.', the blank space being filled in with 
     the public law number to which the special message relates;
       ``(D) which only includes proposed cancellations that are 
     estimated by CBO to meet the definition of discretionary 
     budgetary authority or that are identified as targeted tax 
     benefits pursuant to paragraph (9) of section 1016; and
       ``(E) if no CBO estimate is available, then the entire list 
     of legislative provisions affecting discretionary budget 
     authority proposed by the President is inserted in the second 
     blank space in subparagraph (C).
       ``(3) Calendar day.--The term `calendar day' means a 
     standard 24-hour period beginning at midnight.
       ``(4) Cancel or cancellation.--The terms `cancel' or 
     `cancellation' means to prevent--
       ``(A) budget authority from having legal force or effect; 
     or
       ``(B) a targeted tax benefit from having legal force or 
     effect; and
     to make any necessary, conforming statutory change to ensure 
     that such targeted tax benefit is not implemented and that 
     any budgetary resources are appropriately canceled.
       ``(5) CBO.--The term `CBO' means the Director of the 
     Congressional Budget Office.
       ``(6) Direct spending.--The term `direct spending' means--
       ``(A) budget authority provided by law (other than an 
     appropriation law);
       ``(B) entitlement authority; and
       ``(C) the food stamp program.
       ``(7) Dollar amount of discretionary budget authority.--(A) 
     Except as provided in subparagraph (B), the term ``dollar 
     amount of discretionary budget authority'' means the entire 
     dollar amount of budget authority--
       ``(i) specified in an appropriation law, or the entire 
     dollar amount of budget authority or obligation limitation 
     required to be allocated by a specific proviso in an 
     appropriation law for which a specific dollar figure was not 
     included;
       ``(ii) represented separately in any table, chart, or 
     explanatory text included in the statement of managers or the 
     governing committee report accompanying such law;
       ``(iii) required to be allocated for a specific program, 
     project, or activity in a law (other than an appropriation 
     law) that mandates the expenditure of budget authority from 
     accounts, programs, projects, or activities for which budget 
     authority is provided in an appropriation law;
       ``(iv) represented by the product of the estimated 
     procurement cost and the total quantity of items specified in 
     an appropriation law or included in the statement of managers 
     or the governing committee report accompanying such law; or
       ``(v) represented by the product of the estimated 
     procurement cost and the total quantity of items required to 
     be provided in a law (other than an appropriation law) that 
     mandates the expenditure of budget authority from accounts, 
     programs, projects, or activities for which budget authority 
     is provided in an appropriation law.
       ``(B) The term `dollar amount of discretionary budget 
     authority' does not include--
       ``(i) direct spending;
       ``(ii) budget authority in an appropriation law which funds 
     direct spending provided for in other law;
       ``(iii) any existing budget authority canceled in an 
     appropriation law; or
       ``(iv) any restriction, condition, or limitation in an 
     appropriation law or the accompanying statement of managers 
     or committee reports on the expenditure of budget authority 
     for an account, program, project, or activity, or on 
     activities involving such expenditure.
       ``(8) OMB.--The term `OMB' means the Director of the Office 
     of Management and Budget.
       ``(9) Targeted tax benefit.--(A) The term `targeted tax 
     benefit' means any revenue-losing provision that provides a 
     Federal tax deduction, credit, exclusion, or preference to 
     100 or fewer beneficiaries (determined with respect to either 
     present law or any provision of which the provision is a 
     part) under the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 in any year for 
     which the provision is in effect;
       ``(B) for purposes of subparagraph (A)--
       ``(i) all businesses and associations that are members of 
     the same controlled group of corporations (as defined in 
     section 1563(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986) shall 
     be treated as a single beneficiary;
       ``(ii) all shareholders, partners, members, or 
     beneficiaries of a corporation, partnership, association, or 
     trust or estate, respectively, shall be treated as a single 
     beneficiary;
       ``(iii) all employees of an employer shall be treated as a 
     single beneficiary;
       ``(iv) all qualified plans of an employer shall be treated 
     as a single beneficiary;
       ``(v) all beneficiaries of a qualified plan shall be 
     treated as a single beneficiary;
       ``(vi) all contributors to a charitable organization shall 
     be treated as a single beneficiary;
       ``(vii) all holders of the same bond issue shall be treated 
     as a single beneficiary; and
       ``(viii) if a corporation, partnership, association, trust 
     or estate is the beneficiary of a provision, the shareholders 
     of the corporation, the partners of the partnership, the 
     members of the association, or the beneficiaries of the trust 
     or estate shall not also be treated as beneficiaries of such 
     provision;
       ``(C) for the purpose of this paragraph, the term `revenue-
     losing provision' means any provision that is estimated to 
     result in a reduction in Federal tax revenues (determined 
     with respect to either present law or any provision of which 
     the provision is a part) for any one of the following 
     periods--
       ``(i) the first fiscal year for which the provision is 
     effective;
       ``(ii) the period of the 5 fiscal years beginning with the 
     first fiscal year for which the provision is effective;
       ``(iii) the period of 10 fiscal years beginning with the 
     first fiscal year for which the provision is effective; or
       ``(iv) the period of 20 fiscal years beginning with the 
     first fiscal year for which the provision is effective; and
       ``(D) the terms used in this paragraph shall have the same 
     meaning as those terms have generally in the Internal Revenue 
     Code of 1986, unless otherwise expressly provided.


                              ``expiration

       ``Sec. 1017. This title shall have no force or effect on or 
     after 2 years after the date of enactment of this section.''.

     SEC. 3. TECHNICAL AND CONFORMING AMENDMENTS.

       (a) Exercise of Rulemaking Powers.--Section 904 of the 
     Congressional Budget Act of 1974 (2 U.S.C. 621 note) is 
     amended--
       (1) in subsection (a), by striking ``1017'' and inserting 
     `1012''; and
       (2) in subsection (d), by striking ``section 1017'' and 
     inserting ``section 1012''.
       (b) Clerical Amendments.--(1) Section 1(a) of the 
     Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 is 
     amended by striking the last sentence.
       (2) Section 1022(c) of such Act (as redesignated) is 
     amended by striking ``rescinded or that is to be reserved'' 
     and inserting ``canceled'' and by striking ``1012'' and 
     inserting ``1011''.
       (3) Table of Contents.--The table of contents set forth in 
     section 1(b) of the Congressional Budget and Impoundment 
     Control Act of 1974 is amended by deleting the contents for 
     parts B and C of title X and inserting the following:

                  ``Part B--Legislative Line Item Veto

``Sec. 1011. Line item veto authority.
``Sec. 1012. Procedures for expedited consideration.
``Sec. 1013. Presidential deferral authority.
``Sec. 1014. Treatment of cancellations.
``Sec. 1015. Reports by Comptroller General.
``Sec. 1016. Definitions.
``Sec. 1017. Expiration.
``Sec. 1018. Suits by Comptroller General.
``Sec. 1019. Proposed Deferrals of budget authority.''.

       (c) Effective Date.--The amendments made by this Act shall 
     take effect on the date of its enactment and apply only to 
     any dollar amount of discretionary budget authority or 
     targeted tax benefit provided in an Act enacted on or after 
     the date of enactment of this Act.

  Mr. SPRATT (during the reading). Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent 
that the motion be considered as read and printed in the Record.

[[Page H4491]]

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentleman from South Carolina?
  There was no objection.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman is recognized for 5 minutes.
  Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, let me just tell you quickly, by laundry-
list fashion, the changes that this amendment would add to the bill.
  First of all, we have followed the model of similar bills, the bills 
that were passed by this House in 1993 and 1994. We have gone back to 
those to create expedited rescission authority.
  Secondly, we have prohibited the President or any other officer of 
the executive branch from using the rescission authority, that power, 
as a bargaining tool to extract votes on other unrelated legislation.
  Number three, we have provided that during the consideration of a 
rescission request by the President, there is to be a motion to strike; 
in other words, a provision by which 100 Members of the House could ask 
for a separate vote on a separate item which they deem worthy, and they 
could have an opportunity in the well of the House to make the case for 
this worthy spending item.
  Number four, we have limited the number of cancellation proposals 
that the President can send up to one appropriation bill, which is an 
entirely sensible change to the bill. Otherwise, under the terms of the 
bill, the President will be able to send 5 different rescission 
requests on 11 different appropriations bills, in total 55 bills, which 
could wreak havoc with the process and in this place. It invites chaos. 
It is not necessary. It was not in previous bills. It does not need to 
be in this bill.
  Number five, we have reduced the amount of time the President has to 
propose a cancellation or rescission after signing a bill from 45 days 
to 10 days. Why is that? We think that 10 days is more than enough. The 
original bills passed by the House provided only 3 days. We have 
extended it to 10 days, but 10 days give the President all the time he 
needs for a budgetary scrub-down of the budget. Forty-five days is apt 
to cause him to look for political applications as opposed to budgetary 
applications.
  Number six, we have reduced the amount of time that the President can 
withhold funds, impound funds when he proposes a rescission or 
cancellation from 90 days, as in the bill, to 30 days and 7 days for 
emergency spending. We think that is reasonable. That is roughly the 
time it would take for a rescission to run its course.
  Then we think this is extremely important, not just reasonable, but 
critically important. This is a major experiment. Let us not extend it 
to entitlement spending. Americans depend upon Social Security and 
Medicare and veterans benefits. Are we going to take something that 
important from which people depend and put it on the fast track, the 
up-or-down vote process that this vote calls for? I would hope not. 
This particular amendment would put Social Security and Medicare and 
veterans benefits beyond the reach of the President's rescission power, 
fast-track rescission powers.
  This then defines tax benefits the way we originally defined it. One 
of the evolutions in the history of this bill was for us to go back and 
say a lot of money is spent through tax expenditures in the Tax Code. 
There are a lot of earmarks in the Tax Code, as well as in the 
appropriation bills. So let us call attention to something called the 
targeted tax benefits that have fewer than 100 intended beneficiaries, 
and let us provide as to these earmarks in the tax bill the President 
will have the same authority. This bill has been changed significantly 
from 100 beneficiaries to 1 beneficiary, which guts the meaning of that 
original provision.
  Finally, this is an experiment. We are ceding a lot of authority to 
the President of the United States that the Congress has under Article 
I of the Constitution. In order to make sure that this authority is not 
misused or abused or manipulated, we are providing simply that we have 
a sunset of 2 years. Two full years would mean President Bush would 
have this authority for 2 fiscal years, but that we would review it and 
decide whether or not we should go forward with it or make major 
changes.
  These are all serious, substantive amendments. They are not tilted in 
any direction at all except in the direction of getting a better bill 
which we can vote upon.
  Mr. RYAN of Wisconsin. Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to the 
motion to recommit.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman is recognized for 5 minutes.
  Mr. RYAN of Wisconsin. Mr. Speaker, I want to commend the gentleman 
for a very substantive motion to recommit. I would like to go through a 
number of the provisions he raises and some of the concerns I have with 
them and why I have to rise in opposition.
  Number one, Mr. Speaker, he excludes direct spending from the line 
item veto. A case in point. When we do the transportation 
reauthorization bill, that thing contains something like 5,000 
earmarks. The bridge to nowhere is one of the most prolific examples of 
such things. I do not think those things should be exempt from this 
line item veto tool.
  Number two, he reduces the number of messages from five to one. My 
fear with this change is that it will reduce the effectiveness of this 
tool. If the President only has one bite at the apple, only one bill he 
can send, he will only go after one or two earmarks. What if a bill has 
5,000 earmarks? What if a bill has 500 earmarks? The President ought to 
be able to send us more votes so we can go after more earmarks and cut 
out more wasteful spending. If he only gets to send 1 bill, and he puts 
50 pieces in that bill, then the President will be growing his vote 
coalition against it. Fifty State delegations also vote against it. So 
I think if you just do one bill, you are going to make this tool very, 
very small. It will not be nearly as effective because the President 
will be disincentivized from putting many earmarks in it because they 
will fall under their own weight. That is why we put five bills so we 
can go after a great number of earmarks so that we can get maximum 
output for this.
  Now, the other thing, it permits amendments to strike. I understand 
the intent of this. I think it is valuable, but the problem I have with 
permitting amendments to strike is that then you are going to ping-pong 
back and forth with the House and Senate. You will see no end to this.
  The reason why we do not allow amendments to conference reports is 
because conference reports represent a conclusion of a legislative 
process, the end of a legislative process before a bill becomes law. 
But that is where a lot of mischief happens, and mischief occurs 
because people insert earmarks in conference reports. I think by doing 
this you are going to encourage that. Even if you try to come up with 
language to streamline the conference report process, I still think 
this produces those problems.
  Lastly, Mr. Speaker, the tax provision. This is one that is worthy of 
very good debate. Mr. Spratt wants to limit the number of tax 
beneficiaries from 100 to 10. Let me give you an example. We chose to 
do it the way we did it so we would go after tax pork, rifleshot tax 
policy, you know, this tax cut for this person, this tax entity, 
instead of tax policy. Let me just give you one example. The orphan 
drug tax credit.
  We have the orphan drug tax credit in tax law today because there are 
a lot of small diseases that do not have a lot of constituencies, that 
do not have a lot of people--lupus, Duchenne's disease, and you are not 
going to see pharmaceutical companies engaging in committing millions 
of dollars in research to cure such small diseases, but we want cures 
for these smaller diseases, these rare diseases. So we created the 
orphan drug tax credit. How many people utilize this orphan drug tax 
credit? Very few, surely not 100, maybe 3, 4 companies. Researchers 
will research a cure for a rare disease, but if they do the research, 
they qualify for the tax credit. That is tax policy. Fewer than 100 
beneficiaries get it, but we wanted to have a tax incentive so that 
researchers will commit their dollars to researching and finding cures 
for rare diseases. That is just one example of how broadening the scope 
of this goes into tax policy.
  The goal of this is not to give the President the power to rewrite 
policy, to rewrite entitlement policy, to rewrite tax policy. The goal 
of the legislative line item vote is to give us the tool to go after 
pork, tax pork.

[[Page H4492]]

                              {time}  1730

  Now, what we want to accomplish with this, Mr. Speaker, is to give us 
the tools to go after wasteful spending, wasteful direct spending, 
wasteful discretionary spending, and wasteful tax pork. The key thing 
is that we reserve the power. The Executive can give us the bill; the 
Executive, the President, can pull the pork out; but who makes the 
decision is Congress. Congress and Congress alone, the legislative 
branch, are the ones who execute the action.
  I think the compromise we have come up with, the base bill, is the 
right way to go.
  And the last point I will make is the gentleman reduces the deferral 
period to 30 days. Here is the problem with that. That means Congress 
can pass a huge omnibus appropriations bill in October, as we often do, 
and then leave for recess until January 20, when the President has the 
State of the Union address. He is out of session for 3 months and 
Congress cannot waive the deferral period.
  I urge a ``no'' vote on the motion to recommit.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Without objection, the previous question is 
ordered on the motion to recommit.
  There was no objection.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion to recommit.
  The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that 
the noes appeared to have it.


                             Recorded Vote

  Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, I demand a recorded vote.
  A recorded vote was ordered.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 8 and clause 9 of rule 
XX, this 15-minute vote on the motion to recommit will be followed by 
5-minute votes on the question of passage, if ordered, and the motion 
to suspend the rules on House Resolution 323.
  The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 170, 
noes 249, not voting 14, as follows:

                             [Roll No. 316]

                               AYES--170

     Abercrombie
     Ackerman
     Allen
     Andrews
     Baca
     Baird
     Baldwin
     Barrow
     Bean
     Becerra
     Berry
     Bishop (GA)
     Bishop (NY)
     Blumenauer
     Boren
     Boswell
     Boucher
     Boyd
     Brady (PA)
     Brown, Corrine
     Butterfield
     Capps
     Capuano
     Cardin
     Cardoza
     Carnahan
     Carson
     Case
     Chandler
     Clay
     Cleaver
     Clyburn
     Cooper
     Costa
     Costello
     Cramer
     Crowley
     Cuellar
     Cummings
     Davis (AL)
     Davis (CA)
     Davis (IL)
     Davis (TN)
     DeFazio
     DeGette
     Delahunt
     Dingell
     Doyle
     Edwards
     Emanuel
     Engel
     Eshoo
     Etheridge
     Farr
     Fattah
     Filner
     Ford
     Frank (MA)
     Gonzalez
     Gordon
     Green, Al
     Green, Gene
     Grijalva
     Gutierrez
     Harman
     Hastings (FL)
     Herseth
     Higgins
     Hinchey
     Hinojosa
     Holden
     Holt
     Hooley
     Hoyer
     Inslee
     Israel
     Jackson (IL)
     Johnson, E. B.
     Jones (OH)
     Kaptur
     Kennedy (RI)
     Kildee
     Kilpatrick (MI)
     Kind
     Langevin
     Lantos
     Larsen (WA)
     Levin
     Lewis (GA)
     Lipinski
     Lowey
     Lynch
     Markey
     Marshall
     Matsui
     McCarthy
     McCollum (MN)
     McDermott
     McGovern
     McIntyre
     McKinney
     McNulty
     Meehan
     Meek (FL)
     Meeks (NY)
     Melancon
     Michaud
     Millender-McDonald
     Miller (NC)
     Moore (KS)
     Moore (WI)
     Moran (VA)
     Nadler
     Napolitano
     Oberstar
     Obey
     Olver
     Ortiz
     Otter
     Pallone
     Pascrell
     Pastor
     Payne
     Pelosi
     Peterson (MN)
     Pomeroy
     Price (NC)
     Rahall
     Reyes
     Ross
     Rothman
     Roybal-Allard
     Ruppersberger
     Rush
     Sabo
     Salazar
     Sanchez, Linda T.
     Sanchez, Loretta
     Sanders
     Schakowsky
     Schiff
     Scott (GA)
     Scott (VA)
     Sherman
     Simpson
     Skelton
     Slaughter
     Smith (WA)
     Snyder
     Spratt
     Stark
     Strickland
     Stupak
     Tanner
     Tauscher
     Taylor (MS)
     Thompson (MS)
     Towns
     Udall (CO)
     Udall (NM)
     Van Hollen
     Velazquez
     Visclosky
     Wasserman Schultz
     Watson
     Watt
     Waxman
     Weiner
     Wexler
     Wynn

                               NOES--249

     Aderholt
     Akin
     Alexander
     Bachus
     Baker
     Barrett (SC)
     Bartlett (MD)
     Barton (TX)
     Bass
     Beauprez
     Biggert
     Bilbray
     Bilirakis
     Bishop (UT)
     Blackburn
     Blunt
     Boehlert
     Boehner
     Bonilla
     Bonner
     Bono
     Boozman
     Boustany
     Bradley (NH)
     Brady (TX)
     Brown (OH)
     Brown (SC)
     Brown-Waite, Ginny
     Burgess
     Burton (IN)
     Buyer
     Calvert
     Camp (MI)
     Campbell (CA)
     Cannon
     Cantor
     Capito
     Carter
     Castle
     Chabot
     Chocola
     Coble
     Cole (OK)
     Conaway
     Conyers
     Crenshaw
     Cubin
     Culberson
     Davis (KY)
     Davis, Jo Ann
     Davis, Tom
     Deal (GA)
     DeLauro
     Dent
     Diaz-Balart, L.
     Diaz-Balart, M.
     Dicks
     Doolittle
     Drake
     Dreier
     Duncan
     Ehlers
     Emerson
     English (PA)
     Everett
     Feeney
     Ferguson
     Fitzpatrick (PA)
     Flake
     Foley
     Forbes
     Fortenberry
     Fossella
     Foxx
     Franks (AZ)
     Frelinghuysen
     Gallegly
     Garrett (NJ)
     Gerlach
     Gibbons
     Gilchrest
     Gillmor
     Gingrey
     Gohmert
     Goode
     Goodlatte
     Granger
     Graves
     Green (WI)
     Gutknecht
     Hall
     Harris
     Hart
     Hastert
     Hastings (WA)
     Hayes
     Hayworth
     Hefley
     Hensarling
     Herger
     Hobson
     Hoekstra
     Honda
     Hostettler
     Hulshof
     Hunter
     Hyde
     Inglis (SC)
     Issa
     Istook
     Jackson-Lee (TX)
     Jenkins
     Jindal
     Johnson (CT)
     Johnson (IL)
     Jones (NC)
     Kanjorski
     Keller
     Kelly
     Kennedy (MN)
     King (IA)
     King (NY)
     Kingston
     Kirk
     Kline
     Knollenberg
     Kolbe
     Kucinich
     Kuhl (NY)
     LaHood
     Larson (CT)
     Latham
     LaTourette
     Leach
     Lee
     Lewis (CA)
     Lewis (KY)
     Linder
     LoBiondo
     Lofgren, Zoe
     Lucas
     Lungren, Daniel E.
     Mack
     Maloney
     Manzullo
     Marchant
     Matheson
     McCaul (TX)
     McCotter
     McCrery
     McHenry
     McHugh
     McKeon
     McMorris
     Mica
     Miller (FL)
     Miller (MI)
     Miller, Gary
     Mollohan
     Moran (KS)
     Murphy
     Murtha
     Musgrave
     Myrick
     Neal (MA)
     Neugebauer
     Ney
     Northup
     Norwood
     Nunes
     Nussle
     Osborne
     Paul
     Pearce
     Pence
     Peterson (PA)
     Petri
     Pickering
     Platts
     Poe
     Pombo
     Porter
     Price (GA)
     Pryce (OH)
     Putnam
     Radanovich
     Ramstad
     Rangel
     Regula
     Rehberg
     Reichert
     Renzi
     Reynolds
     Rogers (AL)
     Rogers (KY)
     Rogers (MI)
     Rohrabacher
     Ros-Lehtinen
     Royce
     Ryan (OH)
     Ryan (WI)
     Ryun (KS)
     Saxton
     Schmidt
     Schwartz (PA)
     Schwarz (MI)
     Sensenbrenner
     Sessions
     Shadegg
     Shaw
     Sherwood
     Shimkus
     Shuster
     Simmons
     Smith (NJ)
     Smith (TX)
     Sodrel
     Solis
     Souder
     Stearns
     Sullivan
     Sweeney
     Tancredo
     Taylor (NC)
     Terry
     Thomas
     Thompson (CA)
     Thornberry
     Tiahrt
     Tiberi
     Tierney
     Turner
     Upton
     Walden (OR)
     Walsh
     Wamp
     Weldon (FL)
     Weldon (PA)
     Weller
     Westmoreland
     Whitfield
     Wicker
     Wilson (NM)
     Wilson (SC)
     Wolf
     Woolsey
     Wu
     Young (AK)
     Young (FL)

                             NOT VOTING--14

     Berkley
     Berman
     Davis (FL)
     Doggett
     Evans
     Jefferson
     Johnson, Sam
     Miller, George
     Owens
     Oxley
     Pitts
     Serrano
     Shays
     Waters


                Announcement by the Speaker Pro Tempore

  The SPEAKER pro tempore (during the vote). Members are advised 2 
minutes remain in the vote.

                              {time}  1753

  Messrs. NORWOOD, GOODLATTE, RANGEL, KUCINICH, RYAN of Ohio, DICKS, 
LARSON of Connecticut, Ms. SCHWARTZ of Pennsylvania, Ms. SOLIS, and Ms. 
WOOLSEY changed their vote from ``aye'' to ``no.''
  Messrs. BISHOP of Georgia, OTTER, and SHERMAN changed their vote from 
``no'' to ``aye.''
  So the motion to recommit was rejected.
  The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the passage of the bill.
  The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that 
the ayes appeared to have it.


                             Recorded Vote

  Mr. RYAN of Wisconsin. Mr. Speaker, I demand a recorded vote.
  A recorded vote was ordered.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. This will be a 5-minute vote.
  The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 247, 
noes 172, not voting 14, as follows:

                             [Roll No. 317]

                               AYES--247

     Akin
     Alexander
     Andrews
     Bachus
     Baker
     Barrett (SC)
     Barrow
     Bartlett (MD)
     Barton (TX)
     Bass
     Bean
     Beauprez
     Biggert
     Bilbray
     Bilirakis
     Bishop (UT)
     Blackburn
     Blunt
     Boehlert
     Boehner
     Bonilla
     Bonner
     Bono
     Boozman
     Boren
     Boustany
     Boyd
     Bradley (NH)
     Brady (TX)
     Brown (OH)
     Brown (SC)
     Brown-Waite, Ginny
     Burgess
     Burton (IN)
     Calvert
     Camp (MI)
     Campbell (CA)
     Cannon
     Cantor
     Capito
     Cardoza
     Carter
     Case
     Castle
     Chabot
     Chandler
     Chocola
     Coble
     Cole (OK)
     Conaway
     Cooper
     Costa
     Crenshaw
     Cubin
     Cuellar
     Culberson
     Davis (KY)
     Davis (TN)
     Davis, Jo Ann
     Davis, Tom
     Deal (GA)
     DeFazio
     Delahunt
     Dent
     Diaz-Balart, L.
     Diaz-Balart, M.
     Doolittle
     Drake
     Dreier
     Duncan
     Edwards
     Ehlers
     English (PA)
     Everett
     Feeney
     Ferguson
     Fitzpatrick (PA)
     Flake
     Foley
     Forbes
     Ford
     Fortenberry
     Fossella
     Foxx
     Franks (AZ)
     Frelinghuysen

[[Page H4493]]


     Gallegly
     Garrett (NJ)
     Gerlach
     Gibbons
     Gilchrest
     Gillmor
     Gingrey
     Gohmert
     Goode
     Goodlatte
     Gordon
     Granger
     Graves
     Green (WI)
     Gutknecht
     Hall
     Harris
     Hart
     Hastert
     Hastings (WA)
     Hayes
     Hayworth
     Hefley
     Hensarling
     Herger
     Herseth
     Hoekstra
     Hooley
     Hostettler
     Hulshof
     Hunter
     Hyde
     Inglis (SC)
     Inslee
     Issa
     Istook
     Jenkins
     Jindal
     Johnson (CT)
     Johnson (IL)
     Keller
     Kelly
     Kennedy (MN)
     King (IA)
     King (NY)
     Kingston
     Kirk
     Kline
     Knollenberg
     Kolbe
     Kuhl (NY)
     LaHood
     Langevin
     Latham
     LaTourette
     Leach
     Lewis (KY)
     Linder
     LoBiondo
     Lucas
     Lungren, Daniel E.
     Mack
     Maloney
     Manzullo
     Marchant
     Marshall
     Matheson
     McCaul (TX)
     McCotter
     McCrery
     McHenry
     McHugh
     McIntyre
     McKeon
     McMorris
     Melancon
     Mica
     Miller (FL)
     Miller (MI)
     Miller, Gary
     Moran (KS)
     Murphy
     Musgrave
     Myrick
     Neugebauer
     Ney
     Norwood
     Nunes
     Nussle
     Osborne
     Pearce
     Pence
     Peterson (PA)
     Petri
     Pickering
     Platts
     Poe
     Pombo
     Porter
     Price (GA)
     Pryce (OH)
     Putnam
     Radanovich
     Ramstad
     Regula
     Rehberg
     Reichert
     Renzi
     Reynolds
     Rogers (MI)
     Rohrabacher
     Ros-Lehtinen
     Ross
     Royce
     Ryan (WI)
     Ryun (KS)
     Saxton
     Schiff
     Schmidt
     Schwarz (MI)
     Sensenbrenner
     Sessions
     Shadegg
     Shaw
     Sherwood
     Shimkus
     Shuster
     Smith (NJ)
     Smith (TX)
     Smith (WA)
     Sodrel
     Souder
     Stearns
     Strickland
     Sullivan
     Tancredo
     Tanner
     Taylor (MS)
     Taylor (NC)
     Terry
     Thomas
     Thornberry
     Tiahrt
     Tiberi
     Turner
     Udall (CO)
     Upton
     Walden (OR)
     Wamp
     Weldon (FL)
     Weldon (PA)
     Weller
     Westmoreland
     Whitfield
     Wicker
     Wilson (NM)
     Wilson (SC)
     Wolf
     Wynn
     Young (AK)
     Young (FL)

                               NOES--172

     Abercrombie
     Ackerman
     Aderholt
     Allen
     Baca
     Baird
     Baldwin
     Becerra
     Berry
     Bishop (GA)
     Bishop (NY)
     Blumenauer
     Boswell
     Boucher
     Brady (PA)
     Brown, Corrine
     Butterfield
     Buyer
     Capps
     Capuano
     Cardin
     Carnahan
     Carson
     Clay
     Cleaver
     Clyburn
     Conyers
     Costello
     Cramer
     Crowley
     Cummings
     Davis (AL)
     Davis (CA)
     Davis (IL)
     DeGette
     DeLauro
     Dicks
     Dingell
     Doyle
     Emanuel
     Emerson
     Engel
     Eshoo
     Etheridge
     Farr
     Fattah
     Filner
     Frank (MA)
     Gonzalez
     Green, Al
     Green, Gene
     Grijalva
     Gutierrez
     Harman
     Hastings (FL)
     Higgins
     Hinchey
     Hinojosa
     Hobson
     Holden
     Holt
     Honda
     Hoyer
     Israel
     Jackson (IL)
     Jackson-Lee (TX)
     Johnson, E. B.
     Jones (NC)
     Jones (OH)
     Kanjorski
     Kaptur
     Kennedy (RI)
     Kildee
     Kilpatrick (MI)
     Kind
     Kucinich
     Lantos
     Larsen (WA)
     Larson (CT)
     Lee
     Levin
     Lewis (CA)
     Lewis (GA)
     Lipinski
     Lofgren, Zoe
     Lowey
     Lynch
     Markey
     Matsui
     McCarthy
     McCollum (MN)
     McDermott
     McGovern
     McKinney
     McNulty
     Meehan
     Meek (FL)
     Meeks (NY)
     Michaud
     Millender-McDonald
     Miller (NC)
     Mollohan
     Moore (KS)
     Moore (WI)
     Moran (VA)
     Murtha
     Nadler
     Napolitano
     Neal (MA)
     Northup
     Oberstar
     Obey
     Olver
     Ortiz
     Otter
     Pallone
     Pascrell
     Pastor
     Paul
     Payne
     Pelosi
     Peterson (MN)
     Pomeroy
     Price (NC)
     Rahall
     Rangel
     Reyes
     Rogers (AL)
     Rogers (KY)
     Rothman
     Roybal-Allard
     Ruppersberger
     Rush
     Ryan (OH)
     Sabo
     Salazar
     Sanchez, Linda T.
     Sanchez, Loretta
     Sanders
     Schakowsky
     Schwartz (PA)
     Scott (GA)
     Scott (VA)
     Sherman
     Simmons
     Simpson
     Skelton
     Slaughter
     Snyder
     Solis
     Spratt
     Stark
     Stupak
     Sweeney
     Tauscher
     Thompson (CA)
     Thompson (MS)
     Tierney
     Towns
     Udall (NM)
     Van Hollen
     Velazquez
     Visclosky
     Walsh
     Wasserman Schultz
     Watson
     Watt
     Waxman
     Weiner
     Wexler
     Woolsey
     Wu

                             NOT VOTING--14

     Berkley
     Berman
     Davis (FL)
     Doggett
     Evans
     Jefferson
     Johnson, Sam
     Miller, George
     Owens
     Oxley
     Pitts
     Serrano
     Shays
     Waters


                Announcement by the Speaker Pro Tempore

  The SPEAKER pro tempore (during the vote). Members are advised 2 
minutes remain in this vote.

                              {time}  1801

  So the bill was passed.
  The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
  The title of the bill was amended so as to read: ``A bill to amend 
the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 to provide 
for the expedited consideration of certain proposed rescissions of 
budget authority''.
  A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

                          ____________________