[Congressional Record Volume 152, Number 71 (Wednesday, June 7, 2006)]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Pages E1041-E1042]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                   WARMING TO THE INDIA NUCLEAR DEAL

                                 ______
                                 

                         HON. CHARLES B. RANGEL

                              of new york

                    in the house of representatives

                        Wednesday, June 7, 2006

  Mr. RANGEL. Mr. Speaker, with the President's proposed agreement with 
India on civil nuclear cooperation, there has been much discussion as 
to what Congress' position should be concerning this matter. I find it 
appropriate to bring to the attention of Congress a May 23 article 
written by Will Marshall, President of the Progressive Policy 
Institute, and Wesley Clark, a candidate for the Democratic 
Presidential nomination in 2004, a retired Army general, and former 
supreme allied commander of NATO. The article entitled ``Warming to the 
India Nuclear Deal'' comprehensively discusses the proposed agreement, 
determining that it is a great opportunity to create a strategic 
partnership with India.
  The Marshall and Clark article encourages the Senate to support 
Bush's proposed agreement, but also to articulate several commitments 
by the Administration on which the support is conditioned, most 
importantly a fresh

[[Page E1042]]

burst of energy in promoting the international nonproliferation system.
  This deal is a great opportunity for the United States to form a 
truly beneficial partnership with India, an up-and-coming 21st century 
power. India has proved its stability as a multi ethnic democracy with 
an ever-growing economy, a middle-class that is well-versed in English, 
a lively technology sector, and a tremendous domestic market.
  Advocates of arms control argue that the removal of a ban on the 
supply of fuel to India's civilian nuclear-power sector should not 
compromise nonproliferation efforts. However, it is clear that 
admonishing India for its failure to join the Non-Proliferation Treaty, 
NPT, is not enjoying the success that it should and therefore must be 
modernized.
  The need for efforts to improve the NPT is confirmed by the inception 
of several new nuclear states and the potential for the establishment 
of even more in the near future.
  Considering India's exceptional nonproliferation efforts, a United 
States-India partnership in designing a superior global 
nonproliferation system should prove to be beneficial worldwide.
  Mr. Marshall and Mr. Clark encourage a push for NPT reforms, 
including more effective inspection and control of nuclear activity 
across the globe. They cite the critical reform as disallowing states 
who agree not to build nuclear weapons to then develop civilian nuclear 
energy programs. A loophole such as this permits countries, such as 
Iran, to insist upon a ``right'' to produce their own nuclear fuel 
supplies, as opposed to acquiring their supply from already established 
nuclear powers.
  The article cites a simple solution to the problem: internationalize 
the nuclear fuels cycle. U.S. officials can organize an adequate source 
of fuel to countries that agree not to produce nuclear weapons and 
submit to rigid inspections through an international consortium. India 
should be at the forefront of this effort.
  Mr. Marshall and Mr. Clark also encourage the Senate to demand that 
the U.S., along with other nuclear powers, move in the direction of 
disarmament. The current administration has failed to do this, and has 
in fact done the opposite.
  I thank Mr. Marshall and Mr. Clark for their thorough analysis of the 
President's proposed agreement with India. Their views on the matter 
are greatly respected.
  I therefore submit for the Record a piece from the May 23 issue of 
the Hill for our consideration.

                     [From the Hill, May 23, 2006]

                   Warming to the India Nuclear Deal

                  (By Will Marshall and Wesley Clark)

       At first glance, President Bush's proposed agreement with 
     India on civil nuclear cooperation is a no-win proposition 
     for the U.S. Senate. Rejecting the deal could chill relations 
     between the world's biggest democracies; approving it might 
     shred America's credibility as a leader of global efforts to 
     restrain nuclear proliferation.
       Senators can escape this dilemma, however, by offering the 
     White House a deal of their own: support for the India 
     agreement conditioned on concrete commitments by the Bush 
     administration to breathe new life into the international 
     nonproliferation system.
       Under the deal struck last summer, the United States would 
     lift its ban on supplying expertise and fuel to India's 
     civilian nuclear-power sector. India agreed to place 14 of 
     its 22 nuclear reactors under safeguards with the 
     International Atomic Energy Agency. The deal is intended to 
     remove the chief irritant in U.S.-India relations: America's 
     longtime policy of banning sales of civilian nuclear 
     technology and fuel to any country--most prominently India--
     that has refused to sign the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
     Treaty (NPT).
       U.S. leaders should not miss the best opportunity since the 
     Cold War ended to forge a true strategic partnership with 
     India. As a stable, multiethnic democracy with a brisk 
     economic growth rate, a vibrant technology sector, an 
     English-speaking middle class and a potential domestic market 
     four times larger than America's, India is fast emerging as a 
     21st century power of the first rank.
       Arms-control advocates, however, warn that closer U.S.-
     India ties should not come at the price of undermining the 
     nonproliferation framework. Yet U.S. efforts to punish India 
     for spurning the NPT have manifestly failed. More important, 
     it's clear that the NPT cannot survive in its present terms 
     and needs fundamental revision.
       Since the treaty's inception, four new states have elbowed 
     their way into the exclusive nuclear club, and such scofflaw 
     regimes as North Korea and Iran are pounding on the door. 
     Without bold action now to strengthen and modernize the NPT 
     framework, we could be looking at as many as 20 nuclear-armed 
     states within the next decade or two.
       So instead of persisting in vain attempts to punish India--
     which, unlike rival Pakistan, has an exemplary 
     nonproliferation record--the United States should enlist New 
     Delhi's help in designing a fairer and more effective global 
     nonproliferation system.
       The Senate, for example, should insist on boosting spending 
     on the Cooperative Threat Reduction programs aimed at 
     securing Russia's loose nuclear materials. It should also 
     press the Bush administration to push for overdue NPT 
     reforms, including stronger inspections, tighter control of 
     nuclear know-how and a closer watch on the activities of 
     nuclear-trained scientists and engineers worldwide.
       The key reform is to close the NPT loophole that allows 
     states to develop civilian nuclear energy programs if they 
     agree not to build nuclear weapons. The problem comes when 
     countries demand, as Iran has done, a ``right'' under NPT to 
     develop their own nuclear fuel supplies rather than acquiring 
     what they need from the nuclear powers. As Ashton Carter and 
     Stephen LaMontagne point out, ``Enrichment and reprocessing 
     facilities low states to cross into a proliferation `red 
     zone,' putting them dangerously close to a nuclear weapons 
     capability.''
       Carter and LaMontagne offer a simple solution: 
     Internationalize the nuclear fuels cycle. Building on 
     Russia's offer to provide nuclear fuel for Iran, the United 
     States should organize an international suppliers consortium 
     to provide a reliable source of fuel for nuclear energy 
     plants (and a repository for spent fuel) to countries that 
     forswear nuclear weapons and submit to robust inspections. 
     India, as a former leader of the nonaligned nations, could 
     show its commitment to nonproliferation by helping to build 
     support for such an approach among the developing nations.
       The Senate also should insist that the United States hold 
     up its end of the nuclear bargain. Under the NPT, the nuclear 
     ``haves'' are obliged to move toward disarmament. Yet the 
     Bush administration has gone in the opposite direction. It 
     has rejected the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, failed to 
     engage the other nuclear powers in talks aimed at mutual cuts 
     in nuclear arsenals and even launched new programs for 
     developing nuclear ``small'' bombs and ``bunker-buster'' 
     weapons.
       Finally, the United States should offer similar terms to 
     Pakistan, providing it is willing to return to the NPT, put 
     its nuclear programs under international safeguards and offer 
     a full accounting for the worldwide nuclear bazaar operated 
     by A.Q. Khan.
       If accompanied by imaginative U.S. efforts to update and 
     strengthen the global nonproliferation system, the proposed 
     deal with India could become a cornerstone of a comprehensive 
     post-Cold War strategy--but only if elected leaders at both 
     ends of Pennsylvania Avenue have the insight and courage to 
     seize this opportunity.

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