[Congressional Record Volume 152, Number 68 (Friday, May 26, 2006)]
[Senate]
[Pages S5388-S5390]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

      By Mr. LUGAR (for himself, Mr. Biden, Mr. Hagel, Mr. Alexander, 
        and Mr. Warner):
  S. 3322. A bill to build operational readiness in civilian agencies, 
and for other purposes; considered and passed.
  Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, this legislation is the result of a 
conversation begun in 2003 between members of the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee and the leadership of the State Department. Since 
that time, the legislation has gone through a number of evolutions and 
has passed the committee unanimously both as a freestanding bill and as 
part of the State Department authorization bill. I am asking the Senate 
to pass it now as a free-standing bill.
  International crises are inevitable, and in most cases, U.S. national 
security interests will be threatened by sustained instability. The war 
on terrorism necessitates that we not leave nations crumbling and 
ungoverned. We have already seen how terrorists can exploit nations 
afflicted by lawlessness and desperate circumstances. They seek out 
such places to establish training camps, recruit new members, and tap 
into a global black market in weapons.
  In this international atmosphere, the United States must have the 
right structures, personnel, and resources in place when an emergency 
occurs. A delay in our response of a few weeks, or even days, can mean 
the difference between success and failure. Clearly we need a full 
range of tools to prevail. Our committee's focus has been on boosting 
the civilian side of our stabilization and reconstruction capabilities, 
while encouraging improved mechanisms for civilian and military 
agencies to work together on these missions.
  Over the years, our Government has cobbled together plans, people, 
and projects to respond to post-conflict situations in the Balkans, in 
Afghanistan, in Iraq, and elsewhere. The efforts of those engaged have 
been valiant, but these emergencies have been complex and time 
sensitive. In my judgment, our ad hoc approach has been inadequate to 
deal quickly and efficiently with complex emergencies. In turn, our 
lack of preparation for immediate stabilization contingencies has made 
our subsequent reconstruction efforts more difficult and expensive.
  This legislation builds on legislation, S. 2127, that Senators Biden 
and Hagel and I introduced in early 2004 to encourage and support a 
well-organized, sufficiently resourced and strongly led civilian 
counterpart to the military in post-conflict zones. It is our view that 
the civilian side needs both operational capability and a significant 
surge capacity. This legislation gives statutory status to the State 
Department's Office of the Coordinator of Reconstruction and 
Stabilization and makes the position of Coordinator subject to the 
advice and consent of the Senate. The legislation authorizes the 
establishment of a civilian response corps with both Active-Duty and 
Reserve components and provides the office flexibility in personnel 
management, pay, and benefits to build that corps and create surge 
capacity in an emergency. Finally, it authorizes expenditures for a 
crisis response fund, for the civilian response corps, and for a 
substantial training, planning and operational capacity for the office.
  The State Department has come a long way in recognizing the role it 
could and should be playing. It established the Office of the 
Coordinator of Reconstruction and Stabilization in July of 2004. Under 
the leadership of Carlos Pascual, the office conducted a government-
wide inventory of the civilian assets that might be available for 
stabilization and reconstruction tasks in post-conflict zones. It has 
undertaken the planning necessary to recruit, train, and organize a 
Reserve corps of civilians for rapid deployment. It also is formulating 
interagency contingency plans--informed by our past experiences--for 
countries and regions of the world where the next crisis could suddenly 
arise.
  In December 2005, the President signed a directive putting the 
Secretary of State in charge of interagency stabilization and 
reconstruction efforts. Last month, Secretary Rice promised to dedicate 
15 of the 100 new positions she is requesting for fiscal year 2007 to 
the Reconstruction and Stabilization Office. This will increase staff 
to about 95 individuals, with seconded personnel and contractors 
included in that count.
  Despite this good progress, significant gaps in our capabilities 
remain. Our legislation calls for a 250-person Active-Duty corps, in 
addition to the Reserves, made up of both State Department and OSAID 
employees. Such a corps could be rapidly deployed with the military for 
both initial assessments and operational purposes. They would be the 
first civilian team on the ground in post-conflict situations, well in 
advance of the establishment of an embassy. This Active-Duty corps 
would be able to do a wide range of civilian jobs that are needed in a 
post-conflict or otherwise hostile environment.

  Such a 250-person corps would be no larger than the typical Army 
company, but it would be a force multiplier. It would be equipped with 
the authority and training to take broad operational responsibility for 
stabilization missions. Establishment of such a corps is a modest 
investment when seen as part of the overall national security budget. 
Even in peace time, we maintain Active-Duty military forces of almost 
1.4 million men and women who train and plan for the possibility of 
war. Given how critical post-conflict situations have been to American 
national security in the last decade, I believe it is reasonable to 
have a mere 250 civilians who are training for these situations and are 
capable of being deployed anywhere in the world, at any time they may 
be needed.
  This legislation also calls on the heads of other executive branch 
agencies to establish personnel exchange programs designed to enhance 
stabilization and reconstruction capacity. The Departments of 
Agriculture, Treasury, Commerce, Health and Human Services--indeed 
virtually all the civilian agencies--can make unique contributions to 
the overall effort.
  Once the Department embraced the concept of organizing and leading 
the civilian effort, the main roadblock became resources. So far, only 
about $21 million has been provided for the operations of the office, 
despite administration requests for substantially more funding. For 
2007, the administration has requested a $75 million crisis response 
fund to be made available as a contingency for stabilization and 
reconstruction crises. Of this amount, the administration would like to 
spend $25 million for the organization, training, and emergency 
deployment of the Reserve component of the response corps. This 
legislation authorizes the crisis response fund and $80 million for the 
operations of the new State Department office and the Active-Duty 
corps, including training, equipment, and travel.
  So far, the office has heroically stretched dollars by recruiting 
personnel on detail from other agencies, taking advantage of DOD-funded 
training, and getting the State Department to pay for the overhead of 
new office space from other sources. But such a hand-to-mouth existence 
has obvious disadvantages. Detailed personnel rarely stay long, and 
institutional memory

[[Page S5390]]

becomes short. Relying on DOD funds puts the office in the passenger 
seat when it should have the resources to pursue uniquely civilian-
oriented goals.
  In addition, the crisis response fund outlined in our legislation has 
not been appropriated. On the Senate side, we were able to secure $20 
million for the fund in the fiscal year 2006 Foreign Operations 
Appropriations bill. The entire amount, however, was eliminated in the 
conference committee with the House.
  One stopgap measure that the Congress did pass in fiscal year 2006 
was the authority to transfer up to $100 million from the Pentagon to 
the State Department for boosting the civilian response to particular 
trouble spots. However, this money will not provide the resources 
necessary over the long term to improve the State Department's capacity 
to be a capable partner in responding to complex emergencies.
  The foreign affairs budget is always a tougher sell to Congress than 
the military budget. President Bush has attempted to reverse the 
downward spiral in overall foreign affairs spending that took place in 
the 1990s. In that decade, both the executive and legislative branches 
rushed to cash in on the peace dividend. But President Bush has 
consistently requested increases for the 150 Account in his budgets. 
For the fiscal year 2007 budget, he requested a 10.3-percent increase 
over the CBO-determined baseline of fiscal year 2006.
  But, if previous years are any example, the amount appropriated will 
fall far short of the amount requested. Last year, the President's 
annual request for foreign affairs was cut by $2.1 billion. The 
Congress cut the fiscal 2005 annual request by a similar amount. 
According to a Congressional Research Service report that I requested, 
Congress has provided $5.8 billion less than the President has 
requested for foreign affairs in regular and supplemental spending 
bills since September 11, 2001.
  Today, when we are in the midst of a global struggle of information 
and ideas: when anti-Western riots can be set off by the publication of 
a cartoon; when we are in the midst of a crisis with Iran that will 
decide whether the nonproliferation regime of the last half century 
will be abandoned; when we have entered our fourth year of attempting 
to stabilize Iraq; and when years of effort to move the Arab-Israeli 
peace process are at risk--even then, we are unable to muster the 
necessary support for the President's budget in foreign affairs.
  As all this suggests, we have a long way to go in creating the kind 
of robust civilian capacity that we need. Both the State Department and 
the Defense Department are keenly aware of the importance of this 
legislation. If we cannot think this through and plan better as a 
government, the United States may come to depend even more on our 
military for tasks and functions far beyond its current role. But I 
remain optimistic that we can build on the progress already made to 
create a strong and reliable civilian component that boosts our 
stabilization and reconstruction capabilities. Passing this legislation 
will demonstrate that there is a keen understanding in the Senate that 
we need to move forward. It will support executive branch actions 
already taken and encourage further progress. I urge its passage.
                                 ______