[Congressional Record Volume 152, Number 56 (Wednesday, May 10, 2006)]
[Senate]
[Pages S4340-S4341]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

      By Mr. INHOFE (for himself, Mr. Chafee, and Ms. Murkowski):
  S. 2781. A bill to amend the Federal Water Pollution Control Act to 
enhance the security of wastewater treatment works; to the Committee on 
Environment and Public Works.
  Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, I rise today to introduce the Wastewater 
Treatment Works Security Act of 2006. I am pleased to be joined in this 
effort by Senator Chafee, the chairman of the Subcommittee on 
Fisheries, Wildife and Water and Senator Murkowski, an important and 
influential member of the Committee on Environment and Public Works, 
EPW. The bill being proposed is similar to legislation, S. 1039, that 
passed the Committee on Environment and Public Works last Congress on a 
strong bipartisan vote and a bill that passed the House of 
Representatives by a vote of 413 to 2. Unfortunately, some of my 
colleagues in the minority objected to bringing that important, 
bipartisan legislation to the floor. At an impasse with the close of 
the 108th Congress, I asked the Government Accountability Office to 
survey the wastewater community in order to determine what steps 
publicly owned treatment works, POTWs, had taken to assess their 
security and if need be, what steps they had taken to enhance security 
at their facilities.
  In March 2006 we received GAO's report and the results confirm that 
the approach advocated by the House of Representatives and by the EPW 
Committee is the right approach. The Federal Government must work 
cooperatively with our counterparts at the state and local level to 
ensure our nation's infrastructure is secure. GAO found that without a 
federal requirement to do so, the overwhelming majority of the largest 
POTWs have conducted or are in the process of conducting vulnerability 
assessments. They did not need a heavy handed federal mandate to do the 
right thing. Of those who have not and do not plan to do a 
vulnerability assessment, a majority believed they had taken sufficient 
other security measures or believed that by updating their Emergency 
Response Plan the utility had a good understanding of its 
vulnerabilities.
  While this is tremendous progress, it is important that all systems 
know what their vulnerabilities are and take steps to mitigate them. 
The legislation my colleagues Senator Chafee and Senator Murkowski and 
I introduce today builds upon the good work already taking place by 
working in collaboration with the publicly owned treatment works. For 
the few systems remaining who have not done an assessment, our bill 
provides them an incentive to do so by authorizing funding. Further, 
once these systems have completed their assessments and certified to 
EPA that they have done so, they can join their colleagues in seeking 
grants to address some of the security problems identified in the 
assessments.
  During Hurricane Katrina, we saw how important emergency response 
plans are and how valuable mutual aid agreements can be. Our bill 
allows funding for the development, expansion or upgrading of an 
emergency response plan as well as for the voluntary creation of a 
mutual aid agreement or participation in such an agreement.
  The GAO also found that the majority facilities had actually made 
significant security improvements prior to the tragedy of September 11. 
Of the 206 who responded, 149 had vehicle gates; 174 had security 
fences; 160 had redundant power sources; 133 had redundant pumping 
devices or collection bypass systems. Following September 11, 138 
facilities now have safeguards for on-site delivery of materials and 
112 have additional site lighting. It is important for all of my 
colleagues to note how much progress these entities have taken to 
secure their facilities and protect their communities.
  The use of chlorine has been a topic of discussion for years. 
Chlorine is by far the most effective disinfectant available and it is 
the least expensive. During these times of aging systems, growing 
Federal regulations and limited resources, cost is an important

[[Page S4341]]

consideration. In its January 2005 report on security at wastewater 
utilities, the GAO estimated it would cost a utility $12.5 million to 
switch from chlorine to sodium hypochlorite. There are other 
considerations that must be considered as well, such as downstream 
effects of a chlorine alternative. For example, the switch from 
chlorine to chloramines in Washington, DC's drinking water system was 
found to cause lead to leach out of service pipes and into the faucets 
of homes and businesses. Thus, decisions about chlorine must be fully 
evaluated and must be site specific. Many POTWs are already undergoing 
these evaluations. After careful review of cost, technical feasibility 
and safety considerations, and without the presence of a Federal 
mandate on technology, 116 of the 206 largest POTWs do not use gaseous 
chlorine. According to the GAO report, another 20 plan to switch to a 
technology other than chlorine. To sum, nearly two-thirds of the 
nation's largest POTWs are not using chlorine. Those who continue to 
use chlorine have taken steps to ensure the chlorine is secure.
  While the GAO report found significant steps were being taken at the 
nation's largest wastewater utilities, the Office also found an area 
very much in need of assistance. Each POTW has a collection system that 
consists of the pipes to carry wastewater from homes and businesses to 
the treatment works. These pipes are often large enough for an 
individual to stand in and they provide an underground roadway beneath 
most major cities. In its January 2005 report, 42 of the 50 experts on 
GAO's panel identified the collection system as the most vulnerable 
asset of a POTW. However, in discussions with engineers and utility 
managers, there remain many questions and obstacles on how to 
effectively secure a collection system. Therefore, our bill authorizes 
a research program to identify how a collection system could be used in 
a terrorist attack, how to identify potential chemicals or explosives 
that could be placed in a collection system and how best to mitigate 
against these risks. Finally, our legislation asks EPA to examine the 
various drinking water technologies to determine how affordable and 
effective each is.
  As GAO found, POTWs are taking the critical steps necessary to secure 
their facilities and develop appropriate response mechanisms in the 
event of an attack or natural disaster. We at the Federal level must 
continue to work with them, not against them by imposing one-size-fits-
all, heavyhanded unfunded Federal regulations. I hope my colleagues 
will join me in supporting this legislation and that we can finally 
enact wastewater security legislation.
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