[Congressional Record Volume 152, Number 47 (Wednesday, April 26, 2006)]
[Senate]
[Pages S3593-S3597]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

      By Mr. BOND (for himself and Mr. Leahy):
  S. 2658. A bill to amend title 10, United States Code, to enhance the 
national defense through empowerment of the Chief of the National Guard 
Bureau and the enhancement of the functions of the National Guard 
Bureau, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Armed Services.

  Mr. BOND. Mr. President, today I join my friend and fellow cochair of 
the Senate National Guard caucus, Senator Pat Leahy, in introducing 
bipartisan legislation to strengthen one of our Nation's most important 
military and civilian resources--the National Guard.
  The Guard has a long and proud history of contributing to America's 
military away game, while providing vital support and security to civil 
authorities in the home game. Since September 11, 2001, our citizen-
soldiers have taken on greater responsibilities and risks from fighting 
the war on terror to disaster assistance.
  Today, the Guard supports the Nation's military strategy overseas, 
functions as a primary line of defense here at home, and helps local 
responders deal with overwhelming natural disasters.
  We have seen the tremendous value of Guard forces as they confront 
terrorists in Afghanistan, Iraq, and other hotspots, and as they 
provide water, food, and health supplies to victims of Hurricane 
Katrina and other natural disasters.
  More than 1,300 guardsmen from my home State of Missouri were 
deployed in less than 72 hours following Hurricane Katrina, providing 
medical, transportation, airlift, military police, engineering, and 
communications capabilities. For example, the 139th Airlift Wing 
evacuated 23 critically ill young patients from Children's Hospital in 
New Orleans and brought them to Children's Mercy Hospital in Kansas 
City for the high-level care they needed.
  Stories such as this were repeated all over the country in most if 
not all our States.
  Why was the Guard successful when other elements of the Katrina 
response were not? Quite simply, the Guard is the entity best organized 
and trained to initiate and coordinate a civil response to any disaster 
on the scale of Katrina.
  In addition, more than 200,000 Guard troops have left their homes, 
their

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jobs, and their families to participate in another critical mission: 
the global war on terror. The National Guard has provided as much as 
half the combat force and 40 percent of the total force in Iraq.
  I point out that the Guard is a tremendous value for the capabilities 
it provides. It gives 40 percent of the total military force for around 
4.5 percent of the budget. Whether at home or abroad, the men and women 
of the Guard are performing their duties with honor and valor, often at 
great sacrifice to their families and their own lives. As they 
willingly make these sacrifices to preserve American lives and 
freedoms, we have a responsibility to support them as they carry out 
their unique dual mission.
  While serving abroad, National Guard troops serve under Air Force and 
Army commands under title 10 status. But when the Guard operates at 
home, they serve under the command and control of the Nation's 
Governors in title 32 status.
  There is a lot more we can do to make this work more smoothly.
  Despite their importance on the street, as it were, the Guard is 
often given short shrift back at Pentagon headquarters, which has 
proposed repeatedly to cut Guard personnel and equipment budgets.
  The Guard will play a critical role in response to another terrorist 
attack or natural disaster, but the Pentagon has allowed its equipment 
levels to sink to dangerously low levels. Currently, the National Guard 
has only about 35 percent of the equipment it needs. In Missouri, only 
one of two engineering battalions that were requested to assist with 
Katrina could respond because the other one did not have the equipment 
they needed.
  With the support of 75 of my colleagues, Senator Leahy and I led an 
effort to increase equipment funding for the Guard by almost $1 
billion. We are going to continue that fight this year to ensure the 
Guard has equipment it needs to carry out both missions.
  Just a few months ago, the Army proposed significant cuts to Guard 
troop strength. Three-quarters of the Senate again joined us in a 
letter opposing this, and I thank all of our colleagues who joined us.
  We need to do more to empower the Guard. We need to give the Guard 
more bureaucratic muscle. Time and again, the Guard has had to rely on 
Congress, not its total force partners in the active duty, to provide 
and equip fully the resources it needs to fulfill its missions.
  That the Guard is left out of the Pentagon decisionmaking process is 
beyond dispute. In the most recent Quadrennial Defense Review, during 
the BRAC review process of 2004 and 2005, when the Army and Air Force 
reduced National Guard force structure in 2005, and when equipment 
levels of the Army and National Guard reached the dangerously low 
levels of 35 percent, Congress has had to step in.
  To remedy this, the legislation we introduce today to strengthen the 
Guard consists of three central planks.
  One, we will allow the National Guard Bureau to establish more formal 
relationships with the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs.
  We will give the Guard more muscle in existing relationships, 
elevating the Chief of the National Guard Bureau to a four-star 
position and providing a seat for him on the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
  It goes without saying that to be a part of a big decision, you have 
to be at the table. Having a four-star Guard general providing advice 
to the SECDEF instead of a two-star major general will give our 
governors and 450,000 citizen-soldiers and airmen access to the highest 
level of the DOD and ensure key policy decisions are heard and taken 
into account.
  To put things in perspective, the Active-Duty Army has 12 four-star 
generals and 46 lieutenant generals. The Air Force has 13 four-star 
generals and 35 lieutenant generals. The National Guard, which 
represents over 40 percent of the entire force structure, is 
represented by three lieutenant generals and zero four-star generals.
  Can anyone tell me with a straight face how the Guard one four-star 
general and an additional three-star will endanger our national 
security? The only element endangered would be the Pentagon status quo 
which is outdated.
  Facts are stubborn things. Clearly, the facts demonstrate a glaring, 
disproportionate number of three- and four-star generals in the Army 
and the Air Force when compared with the Guard.
  Second, we will ensure that the Deputy Commander of the Northern 
Command is a member of the Guard, a new command with the mission of 
coordinating responses to emergencies within the United States.
  The Guard is the entity best suited to respond to major incidents, 
and they need that capability. With both the Guard and NorthCom's 
missions being defense of the homeland, it only makes sense to have 
substantive input through a lieutenant general as deputy commander.
  Finally, we must ensure the Guard plays a role in identifying and 
filling any gaps between civilian emergency response capabilities and 
those of the military. Current DOD policy prohibits procurement of 
supplies or equipment for providing military support to civilian 
authorities during emergencies except with the permission of SECDEF. 
That policy is outdated. It will give the National Guard Bureau, in 
consultation with the State adjutant generals, the budgetary power to 
research, validate, and make those equipment purchases.
  Neither the homeland support nor the military support missions of the 
Guard are likely to diminish. They are needed more now than ever. But 
we must strengthen the decisionmaking capability of Guard leaders 
within the Department of Defense.
  As we heard today from General Blum, Chief of the National Guard 
Bureau, before the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee when he was 
asked questions by Senator Inouye, he responded with a football 
analogy. When we asked him if he was in the huddle, he said he was 
``not in the huddle'' during the QDR.
  This legislation would empower the Guard to respond in the 
affirmative the next time it is asked, ``are you in the huddle'' on 
this major decision.
  I thank my colleagues for their past support. I ask for their support 
of this legislation.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that congressional findings 
regarding National Guard Forces be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                         National Guard Forces

       (a) Congressional Findings.--The Congress finds that--
       1. The Constitution of the United States recognizes a well-
     regulated militia is a necessity to the security of a free 
     state.
       2. The United States continues to face a wide spectrum of 
     threats at home and abroad, including terrorism, natural 
     disasters, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and 
     other emerging perils. In meeting these threats, the United 
     States relies heavily on the men and women of the National 
     Guard.
       3. At no time in America's history has the National Guard 
     played so critical a role in the security of our homeland and 
     in our Nation's military objectives abroad.
       4. The National Guard is a vital part of this Nation's 
     security, and this country relies on the exemplary service 
     provided this Nation by the members of the Guard, their 
     families, their employers and their communities.
       5. The National Guard is a critical component of the 
     Department of Defense's contribution to the security of our 
     Nation and has been key to the Department's accomplishments 
     at home and abroad. Much of the success DOD has had would not 
     have been possible without the participation of National 
     Guard forces.
       6. The National Guard's response to our Nation's 
     emergencies in the post 9/11 world has been unparalleled.
       7. Within hours of the attacks on the World Trade Center, 
     1,500 New York National Guard troops reported for duty. 
     Within 24 hours of the attacks, over 8,000 New York National 
     Guard Soldiers and Air men and women were on active duty 
     supporting New York State's security needs. These troops 
     provided not just a calming presence on the streets of New 
     York during unsettling times; they provided New York's first 
     responders with critical perimeter security support, 
     refueling for civilian emergency vehicles, emergency 
     lighting, power generation, communications, emergency 
     transportation, engineering assets and other logistical 
     support.
       8. At the request of the President, State Governors 
     supplemented the security of the Nation's airports with 
     National Guard personnel. Their missions encompassed over 400 
     airports in 52 States and territories. National Guard troops 
     along the northern and southern borders were used to support 
     the U.S. Custom Service, the Immigration and Naturalization 
     Service, and the Border Patrol in the heightened post 9/11 
     security posture.

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       9. In contrast to Hurricane Andrew (1992) in which National 
     Guard forces constituted 24 percent of the military response, 
     National Guard forces represented more than 70 percent of the 
     military force for Hurricane Katrina.
       10. The response to Hurricane Katrina proved that the 
     National Guard is the Nation's first military responder and 
     that the overwhelming majority of forces that respond to 
     disasters in the United States will be National Guard who 
     will be on the scene before the Department of Defense is 
     requested to respond.
       11. More than 9,700 National Guard soldiers and airmen were 
     in New Orleans by August 30. National Guard deployed over 
     30,000 additional troops within 96 hours of the storms 
     passing. In wake of the Hurricane Katrina devastation, the 
     National Guard mobilized over 50,000 personnel in support of 
     hurricane relief in the largest and fastest domestic 
     deployment since World War II, saving over 17,000 lives. The 
     Air National Guard flew nearly 3,500 flights and over 12,000 
     tons of cargo in support of all Hurricane relief in the last 
     year.
       12. The National Guard Bureau will be a part of any large-
     scale emergency response. As demonstrated during the 
     Hurricane Katrina response, the National Guard Bureau is a 
     significant joint force provider for homeland security 
     missions.
       13. The National Guard is continuously on active duty 
     supporting State security missions, Federal security missions 
     under Operation Noble Eagle and overseas military operations 
     as part of Operation Enduring Freedom, Iraqi Freedom and more 
     are engaged in regularly scheduled training and operational 
     requirements around the Nation and the world. Under Title 32, 
     counter-drug activities are a daily operational mission of 
     the National Guard, fortifying a longstanding successful 
     relationship with civil authorities.
       14. The Department of the Army and the Department of the 
     Air Force could not fulfill current Title 10 responsibilities 
     without the Army and Air National Guard. In 2005, National 
     Guard units at one time made up 50 percent of the combat 
     forces in Iraq.
       15. The National Guard has mobilized over 300,000 soldiers 
     and 36,000 airmen supporting the Global War on Terror since 
     September 11, 2001. (Need NGB confirmation)
       16. Since September 11, 2001, 85 percent of the Army 
     National Guard has been mobilized. Since September 11, 2001, 
     the Air National Guard has flown over 206,000 sorties 
     accumulating over 620,000 flying hours. These deployments 
     abroad have created a battle hardened and seasoned force of 
     experienced veterans ready for the challenges of the 21st 
     century.
       17. National Guard forces have provided: 55 percent of the 
     Army's combat capability; 55 percent of the Air Force's 
     airlift capability; 50 percent of the Army strategic and 
     tactical manpower; 45 percent of all in-flight refueling 
     missions; 33 percent of all aircraft in Operation Iraqi 
     Freedom; 100 percent of Operation Enduring Freedom A-10 
     missions; 66 percent of Operation Iraqi Freedom A-10 
     missions; 45 percent of all F-16 fighter missions; 86 
     percent of Operation Iraqi Freedom tanker sorties; 94 
     percent of Strategic Air Defense Alert; and 75 percent of 
     all domestic combat air patrols in the Global War on 
     Terror.
       18. The National Guard offers unique efficiencies between 
     State and Federal, and domestic and overseas missions, 
     operating under three different command relationships: 
     Federal funding and Federal control; Federal funding and 
     State control; and State funding and State control.
       19. National Guardsmen and women are their State's primary 
     emergency response force, providing support in their 
     communities and to civil authorities and first responders 
     throughout their States.
       20. The National Guard is invaluable to civil support 
     mission, homeland defense and emergency preparedness. The 
     National Guard has an undeniable record of military 
     assistance to civilian authorities since the birth of this 
     Nation, responding heroically and meeting every mission asked 
     of them, particularly in times of crisis--terrorism, natural 
     disasters, plane crashes, blizzards, wildfires, floods.
       21. There must be strong agreement between State and 
     Federal leadership as to the operational objectives during 
     emergencies. State concerns about maintaining sovereignty 
     must be respected. Governors, who are most intimately 
     familiar with and better understand the National Guard's 
     unique capabilities, must retain the ability and authority to 
     deploy their National Guard troops in times of crisis.
       22. Governors using State-to-State emergency mutual 
     assistance compacts are an integral part of the use of 
     National Guard resources in responding to emergencies at 
     home.
       23. The National Guard and State Adjutants General are 
     invaluable nexus of coordination between Federal and State 
     planning, exercising and response to emergencies and 
     disasters. Over 50 percent of State Adjutants General are 
     also State Emergency Managers offering unparalleled 
     integration of planning, preparation and response 
     capabilities in emergencies.
       24. National Guard forces are also uniquely positioned to 
     engage within the U.S. and its territories by virtue of their 
     geographic dispersal and relationships to State and local 
     governments.
       25. The National Guard is familiar with the local area and 
     local culture. The National Guard has close ties with first 
     responders such as local and State law enforcement, fire 
     departments, and other emergency service providers. The local 
     community relies upon the National Guard because they are 
     part of the community. National Guard personnel are more 
     likely to have more experience working with local 
     responders than the active component.
       26. WMD Civil Support Teams are a specialized homeland 
     security capability based entirely in the National Guard.
       27. As America prepares for an influenza pandemic, the 
     National Guard has more domestic response training and 
     decentralized capabilities than any other military 
     organization and ready to respond in a moment's notice.
       28. The National Guard Bureau has proved its ability to 
     plan for and respond to natural and man-made events with the 
     establishment of Joint Force Headquarters-State, Joint Task 
     Force State, CBRNE Enhanced Response Force Packages, CERFP, 
     National Guard Reaction Force, NGRF, and the current 
     development of Joint CONUS Communications Support 
     Environment, JCCSE.
       Congress finds that despite the contributions of the 
     National Guard to the United States--
       1. The Department of Defense has not adapted to the 
     significant role of the National Guard in this nation's 
     security.
       2. The Department of Defense, the Department of the Army 
     and the Department of the Air Force have not sufficiently 
     integrated the National Guard into planning, procuring or 
     decision-making processes.
       3. The Department of Defense, the Department of the Army 
     and the Department of the Air Force do not have a long-term 
     strategy to equip the National Guard at a high level of 
     readiness for overseas or domestic missions.
       4. The Department of Defense does not adequately resource 
     or equip the National Guard for its current operational 
     missions. Currently the National Guard receives only 4.5 
     percent of the Department of Defense's budget.
       5. The Army National Guard has been equipped at less than 
     war-time readiness levels and is forced to transfer equipment 
     to deploying units. Army National Guard units that have 
     returned from overseas deployments have also left behind many 
     equipment items for use by follow on units. Army officials do 
     not track and develop plans to replace Guard equipment.
       6. Army and Air National Guard forces are generally 
     expected to perform homeland defense and civil support 
     missions only with equipment supplied for their war-fighting 
     mission or equipment supplied by the States.
       7. In the current budget, the Department of the Air Force 
     does not fund the Air Sovereignty Alert mission of the Air 
     National Guard at full capacity.
       8. During the BRAC process, the Air Force failed to 
     adequately solicit input of Air Guard leadership and State 
     Adjutants General.
       9. When developing Future Total Force Strategy, the Air 
     Force failed to adequately consult Air Guard leaders and 
     State Adjutants General.
       10. The Department of Defense does not have adequate 
     knowledge of the role of the National Guard at home or 
     incorporated the National Guard's significant capabilities 
     into plans for homeland defense or security.
       11. Left unchecked, the Department of Defense will continue 
     to ignore the Federal requirements of the National Guard to 
     perform homeland defense and civil support missions.
       12. The Department of Defense has not recognized the value 
     of including State Adjutants General in all homeland defense 
     and military support to civilian authority planning.
       13. The Department of Defense has not recognized that 
     governors will rely on National Guard manpower and equipment 
     before relying on Federal forces.
       14. Although DOD has a Strategy for Homeland Defense and 
     Civil Support, which recognizes the National Guard's critical 
     role in Federal and State missions, the strategy does not 
     detail what the Army or Air National Guard's role or 
     requirements will be in implementing the strategy.
       15. The Department of Defense and Northern Command have not 
     articulated specific requirements or capabilities that 
     National Guard forces need during major homeland disasters. 
     Without formal requirements, equipment deemed necessary for 
     the National Guard to assist civilian authorities in Katrina 
     had not been purchased by the Department of the Army and the 
     Department of the Air Force.
       16. The readiness of the National Guard to perform homeland 
     missions that may be needed in the future is unknown because 
     the National Guard's roles in these missions has not been 
     defined and requirements for manpower, equipment and training 
     have not been established; and preparedness standards and 
     measures have not been developed by the Department of 
     Defense. The Department of Defense does not require the 
     purchase of equipment specifically for military assistance to 
     civilian authorities for the National Guard.
       17. WMD Civil Support Teams' face challenges in personnel, 
     equipment acquisition and facilities under current Department 
     of Defense and service budgets.
       18. The lack of coordination of National Guard and active 
     duty forces hampered the military response to Katrina. 
     Advance planning between active-duty personnel and the Guard 
     is vital during emergencies. The Department of Defense and 
     the National Guard

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     must plan and exercise together to prepare for events in the 
     homeland.
       19. The National Guard leadership and State Adjutants 
     General are not adequately involved in Department of Defense 
     planning guidance developed at Northern Command, including 
     concept of operations plans and functional plans for military 
     support to civilian authorities.
       20. There was a lack of coordination of Joint Task Force 
     Katrina and the National Guard headquarters in supporting 
     States.
       21. The Department of Defense has not adequately 
     incorporated or funded the National Guard to participate in 
     joint exercises in military assistance to civil authorities, 
     which would have allowed for a more effective response to 
     Hurricane Katrina and other homeland emergencies.
       22. Northern Command does not have adequate insight into 
     State response capabilities or adequate interface with 
     governors, which contributed to a lack of mutual 
     understanding and trust during the Katrina response.
       23. There is an unresolved tension between the Department 
     of Defense and the States regarding the role of the military 
     in emergency response that could be resolved if the 
     Department of Defense and the Department of Homeland Security 
     adopted and made NIMS a priority for emergency management.
       24. The National Guard lacked communications equipment 
     during Hurricane Katrina, suggesting that the Pentagon does 
     not assign homeland defense and military assistance to 
     civilian authorities a sufficiently high priority.
       25. The Department of the Army decided to reduce end-
     strength without substantive consultation with Guard leaders 
     and the Air Force has decided to reduce end-strength without 
     substantive consultation with National Guard leaders.
       26. The Department of the Army currently plans to scale 
     back the Army National Guard to 324,000 soldiers from 
     350,000. The Department of the Air Force plans to scale back 
     the Air National Guard by 14,000 airmen and women. To cut 
     Guard manpower in this time of increased homeland need, and 
     the fluxation of current Department of Defense transformation 
     policies affecting the Army and Air National Guard, sets up 
     an undeniable risk to this country.
       27. National Guard force structure cuts could result in the 
     closure of over 200 National Guard community-based facilities 
     throughout the U.S.
       (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
       1. The National Guard is a force essential to the Nation's 
     security and safety.
       2. The National Guard brings to bear significant 
     capabilities for contingencies at home or abroad.
       3. The National Guard is no longer a strategic reserve, but 
     an operational reserve.
       4. States and governors are not adequately represented at 
     the Department of Defense.
       5. The role of the National Guard Bureau as chief 
     communicator between the Department of Defense and the 
     Department of Homeland Security and the States needs to be 
     enhanced.
       6. The men and women of the National Guard have earned the 
     right to be represented at the highest levels of the 
     Department of Defense.
       7. The National Guard leadership needs to be integrated 
     into the highest offices in the Department of Defense, the 
     Department of the Army and the Department of the Air Force.
       8. The National Guard Bureau plays a critical role in 
     planning for and responding to future terrorist attacks in 
     the U.S.
       9. The National Guard Bureau is in a unique position to 
     understand and create requirements for the National Guard for 
     missions in support of states and other civilian authorities.
       10. The National Guard Bureau plays a critical role in the 
     development of requirements for military assistance to 
     civilian authorities.
       11. NORTHCOM lacks knowledge of its theater of operations, 
     specifically State emergency plans and resources, and 
     knowledge of National Guard resources. NORTHCOM needs to be 
     reformed to include increased National Guard leadership and 
     participation in all levels of its operations.
  Mr. LEAHY. Mr President, I am pleased today to join my friend and co-
chair of the Senate National Guard Caucus, the Senator from Missouri, 
Senator Bond, in introducing far-reaching legislation that will 
strengthen our Nation's defense and the National Guard, which is an 
inextricable part of the bedrock of our security. The National Defense 
Enhancement and National Guard Empowerment Act of 2006 would empower 
the National Guard.
  It offers the Guard new authorities and a greater and more fitting 
voice in policy and budgetary discussions that is more line with the 
reliance that we place on this force of proud men and women.
  The Nation asks the Guard to provide a large part of the ground 
forces in Iraq, but then we give the force no say in strategic planning 
and budget discussions. In fact, there have been recent efforts within 
the armed services to cut the force precipitously.
  Anyone who has watched recent events knows that the role of the Guard 
is dramatically changed as we come into this century.
  We ask the Guard to carry out missions at home in response to 
disasters and possible domestic attacks, but then give the force no 
real ability to develop new equipment for this unique mission. And, in 
a crunch, our senior defense leaders--including the President--turn to 
the Chief of the National Guard for guidance in addressing and 
responding to emergencies within the domestic United States, yet those 
same senior Guard leaders receive only mediated and filtered advice at 
other points. This gap between the Guard's real world missions and its 
institutional position is simply unacceptable. It is not efficient, and 
it is not smart. It violates basic notions of logic, and it hinders our 
ability to get the full potential out of the National Guard.
  Our legislation will take them from the 19th and 20th century 
structure into the 21st century's reality.
  Our legislation directly addresses this troubling missions-to-
authorities gap in three very specific ways. First, the National 
Defense Enhancement and National Guard Empowerment Act of 2006 would 
elevate the Chief of the National Guard to the rank of General with 
four-stars, also installing this senior officer on the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff. The Joint Chiefs is the highest military advisory body to the 
President and the Secretary of Defense. Without a Guard representative 
at the four-star level, the Secretary and the President receive only 
filtered advice from the Chiefs of Staff of the Army and the Air Force 
about National Guard matters.
  The Army and the Air Force chiefs can provide keen insights about the 
Guard's role as a prime military reserve to the active components. 
However, they are not responsible for, and therefore are not experts 
on, disaster relief and homeland security functions that the Guard 
carries out at the State level, often under the command-and-control of 
the Nation's governors. Placing a National Guard General on the Joint 
Chiefs offers the fullest and most sensible guidance to our leaders on 
all aspects of the Guard, and this arrangement would give the Nation's 
governors a straight line to the Joint Chiefs and the President on 
military matters.
  Creating a Guard senior advisor to the Secretary of Defense and the 
President streamlines and formalizes an arrangement that already arises 
in real emergencies. During the darkest early days of Katrina, for 
example, the current National Guard Bureau Chief General Steven Blum 
was by the side of the Secretary of Defense and the President. A 
permanent Guard presence on the Joint Chiefs ensures that this advisory 
relationship is in no way last-minute and ad-hoc.
  The second way that this legislation puts the National Guard's 
authorities more in line with its real-world missions is by giving the 
force more budgetary authority. The Act gives the National Guard the 
ability to research, develop and procure equipment that is peculiar to 
its unique mission in the realm of homeland security.
  This authority would be similar to the authority of the Special 
Operations Command, given under the Nunn-Cohen legislation of the mid-
1980s, to develop unique equipment for the special forces.
  Last year, Congress appropriated almost $1 billion for the National 
Guard to procure equipment that has application for homeland security. 
This legislation establishes more formal structure for the Guard to 
refine such equipment requirements and work in close coordination with 
the states to ensure an adequate force structure--fully adequate in 
domestic emergencies--is in place.
  The final way that this legislation brings realistic authorities to 
the Guard is by ensuring that the Deputy Commander of Northern Command 
is a three-star general from the National Guard. This Command is 
charged with planning for the active military's response to federal 
emergencies, as well as coordinating the response with other federal 
agencies and civilian authorities. Any military response in the 
domestic United States will surely include the National Guard, in many 
cases with the State governor overseeing the effort.
  Currently, there are few if any senior Guard officers at the highest 
reaches of

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the Command, and the legislation would ensure expertise on the force 
exists there.
  There has been a lot of discussion already about this legislation 
after Senator Bond and I last month expressed our intention to pursue 
it. To clear up any confusion, let me say what this legislation does 
not do. This legislation does not affect the National Guard's role as 
one of the primary military reserves to the Air Force and the Army, 
which we believe is beneficial for the country.
  It also does not inflate the size of National Guard headquarters here 
in Washington. We put a firm cap on the size of the Guard Bureau in 
this legislation. The legislation further does not create any new 
general office positions beyond the four-star Joint Chiefs position. It 
only ensures that the adequate seats of representation is in place in 
key positions; in fact, the legislation actually removes a less 
influential Major General officer slot on the Joint Staff.
  What this bill does do--and with great intensity--is to give the 
National Guard the institutional muscle commensurate with the Guard's 
missions. With this bill, we can ask the Guard to do all that it does, 
but then say that, yes, it can have a seat at the table during key 
discussions involving the Guard's missions and readiness. With this 
bill, we can tap into the Guard for situations like the war in Iraq and 
the response to Hurricane Katrina and tell these proud men and women 
that we take are committed to taking real steps to keep the size of 
this force steady and improve its stock of available equipment.
  With this bill, we can ensure that our senior leaders--the Secretary 
of Defense and the President--are making decisions about the National 
Guard based on the best available information.
  With this bill, we strengthen the National Guard, the military chain-
of-command, and the Guard's ability to effectively serve each of the 
States and the entire Nation.
                                 ______