[Congressional Record Volume 152, Number 47 (Wednesday, April 26, 2006)]
[House]
[Pages H1786-H1812]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




          INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2007

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 774 and rule 
XVIII, the Chair declares the House in the Committee of the Whole House 
on the State of the Union for the consideration of the bill, H.R. 5020.

                              {time}  1453


                     In the Committee of the Whole

  Accordingly, the House resolved itself into the Committee of the 
Whole House on the State of the Union for the consideration of the bill 
(H.R. 5020) to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2007 for 
intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United States 
Government, the Community Management Account, and the Central 
Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for other 
purposes, with Mr. Rehberg in the chair.
  The Clerk read the title of the bill.
  The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to the rule, the bill is considered read the 
first time.
  The gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Hoekstra) and the gentlewoman from 
California (Ms. Harman) each will control 30 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Michigan.
  Mr. HOEKSTRA. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may 
consume.
  Mr. Chairman, I first wish to announce that, subsequent to reporting 
the bill, the committee has modified the classified annex to the bill 
with respect to the authorized level of funding for certain programs 
with bipartisan agreement between myself and the ranking member.
  The classified annex containing the modified schedule of 
authorizations is and was available for review by all Members of the 
House, subject to the rules of the House and the Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence under the procedures described in my 
announcement to the House on April 6, 2006.
  Mr. Chairman, the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence 
has a reputation for conducting its business in a bipartisan manner. 
With the intelligence authorization legislation before us today, I can 
say that we have clearly hit that mark again. I look across the aisle 
to my colleague and friend, the committee's ranking Democrat member, 
Ms. Harman, and say thank you for once again helping to craft a very 
good bipartisan piece of legislation that will allow the talented, 
dedicated and patriotic men and women of our Nation's intelligence 
community, our first line of defense, to protect America, its people 
and our friends around the world.
  Mr. Chairman, this bill is all about national security. It is about 
authorizing the intelligence resources, capabilities and operations 
necessary for us to know about foreign threats and to defend ourselves 
in an increasingly dangerous world. It is about rebuilding, reshaping 
and indeed fixing a community that was decimated by the budget cuts of 
the 1990s.
  Because of these cuts, on September 11, 2001, we were without a 
robust human intelligence capability and without a robust analytic 
capability that may have helped prevent or minimize these attacks on 
the United States. This bill continues a many-year effort to transform, 
build up and recreate an intelligence community that can know and 
respond to threats.
  There will be those here today who will not share our concerns about 
the many threats against which our intelligence community must operate. 
There will be those who do not agree with the necessary activities of 
our intelligence community. There will be even be those who actually 
accuse our dedicated intelligence professionals of violating, if not 
the law, then the spirit of American values. This as they go about a 
business to protect you and me.
  To those who would and will take such positions, I say: you are 
wrong. The threats are real. The professional

[[Page H1787]]

dedication, the discipline, the expertise and the extraordinary respect 
for the civil liberties of all Americans that the honorable men and 
women of our intelligence community exhibit is real. To them we owe a 
great debt. To them we must make our best collaborative efforts to 
provide the resources and authorities that H.R. 5020 authorizes.
  Finally, because of them, we have the responsibility to rise above 
any partisan politics in order to come together and pass this national 
security bill.
  This is the first intelligence budget request that was fully 
determined by the new Director of National Intelligence, or the DNI. 
Although the Office of the DNI is still in its formative stages, I am 
pleased that the promise of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism 
Prevention Act of 2040, the legislation that created the DNI, is 
beginning to bear fruit, and that incremental but real improvements 
have been made since the standup.
  It was our intent to better unify the disparate pieces of the 
intelligence community; to create a more cohesive whole that is greater 
than the sum of the parts. That goal is a work in progress, and we will 
continue to support the DNI's efforts to create a more effective 
intelligence community.
  We will support that effort, but we also provide the necessary 
oversight, and this bill provides some mechanisms to make sure that we 
get the intelligence community that the ranking member and I envisioned 
when we worked so hard at passing that legislation.
  Mr. Chairman, as you also know, much of this legislation is 
classified and can't be discussed here on the floor. We must be very 
careful to ensure that today's debate does not involve classified 
information. That said, I do want to discuss, at an unclassified level, 
some specific items contained in the authorization bill before us.
  The first is our continuing support for an effective Director of 
National Intelligence that can, as I mentioned earlier, bring together 
all of the agencies of the intelligence community. We need an effective 
and efficient DNI that fully coordinates and sets the direction for the 
high-fidelity capabilities of the intelligence community.
  In this legislation we are sending a strong signal that the vision of 
the 2004 intelligence reform legislation was about building a 
qualitatively better intelligence establishment and not building a 
bureaucracy.
  This bill continues to pursue improvements to our core intelligence 
for human intelligence, intelligence analysis, infrastructure and 
counterintelligence capabilities. Improvements in these areas are 
absolutely critical to gaining the upper hand in the war against 
worldwide terrorism. We have, for example, made recommendations for 
improved HUMINT training and associated support. We have recommended 
additional funding for analytical tools. And we have put a great deal 
of emphasis on increasing counterintelligence programs and personnel, 
because, in case you have not been looking, there are many nations and 
nonstate actors actively trying to steal America's secrets.
  This bill also puts a renewed and continued emphasis on overhead 
imagery architecture. As many know, last year there were some decisions 
that were made that included terminating a part of the Future Imagery 
Architecture program. This was a tough decision. It had its positive 
aspects. It also had its negative downside. We are now in a late-to-
need race to ensure we do not have future capabilities gaps. I am 
concerned that the current approach has not adequately addressed this 
problem. So this legislation vigorously pursues one of a very limited 
number of options.
  Finally, I would like to also address a provision that was mentioned 
in one of the amendments that was proposed by the minority for today. I 
want to reinforce to my colleagues on the intelligence committee that 
we remain very, very committed to active oversight and reporting by the 
intelligence community on the progress that they are making in Iran. We 
have provisions in the bill for Iraq. We have got some of that language 
for Iran and other hot spots around the world. But as the ranking 
member and I have discussed, as the rule was being debated, the spirit 
of the amendment is one that we embrace. We may have some technical or 
drafting differences, but the intent of that amendment is one that we 
will stay focused on. We believe it is inherently important for us to 
focus on those kinds of issues and to do this in a bipartisan basis.

                              {time}  1500

  The issues and the threats that we are facing, al Qaeda, radical 
Islam, Iran, North Korea, as well as future threats that are on the 
horizon that we are only beginning to think about, require us to 
continue to work in a bipartisan basis.
  I recognize that we had some disagreements on the bill. We have got 
disagreements between Republicans and Democrats. We have got 
disagreements within each side of the aisle. But the important thing is 
that we continue to focus on working in a bipartisan basis to keep 
America safe. That is the request that our colleagues on both sides of 
the aisle have placed to us, and I hope that we will continue in 
working in that direction.
  Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Chairman, in my 12 years in Congress, in my 8 on the Intelligence 
Committee, I have always supported intelligence authorization bills, 
but never in my 12 years and never in my nearly 4 decades involved in 
public policy have I been as concerned as I now am about our Nation's 
security.
  Just this week bin Laden and Zarqawi issued new threats against the 
United States and our allies, yet we do not know what they are 
plotting. We do not even know where they are. Despite 4\1/2\ years of 
effort and the expenditure of tens of billions of taxpayer dollars, we 
still do not have a handle on al Qaeda, a threat that is metastasizing 
and growing ever more dangerous.
  We are losing soldiers in Iraq, in part because we never had 
intelligence dominance. We still do not have it. The so-called war on 
terror outside Iraq is essentially an intelligence war, but we did not 
know that home-grown terrorists were going to blow themselves up on 
London's subways. We did not know about Madrid, Bali, Casablanca, 
Istanbul or Dahab, Egypt. We do not know if America will be hit 
tomorrow or where.
  Iran is making noisy threats, but we do not know if Ahmadinejad poses 
a real danger or if he is bluffing, because our intelligence on Iran is 
weak. And again we are hearing the drumbeat for war, without a clear 
idea of where the targets are, whether we can hit them effectively, or 
what would happen the day after.
  We have taken our eye off over-the-horizon threats, the networks of 
Muslim extremists growing in Europe, Africa and Latin America, the 
threat of loose nukes from the former Soviet Union and the rising power 
of China.
  Here at home our intelligence reorganization is a slow start-up, and 
the CIA is in free fall. The Director of National Intelligence, a 
position Congress created to integrate the activities of the entire 
Intelligence Community after 9/11, has not taken command yet of that 
community. Meanwhile at CIA, our premier intelligence organization, 300 
years of experience have either been pushed out or left in frustration, 
and morale is dangerously low.
  The DNI is giving away authority to the Pentagon, which is happy to 
receive it, as it expands its own role in intelligence-gathering abroad 
and here at home. The efforts to integrate homeland intelligence 
between the FBI and DHS is still uneven.
  And our borders, airports, seaports remain vulnerable. As we speak, 
the House Homeland Security Committee on which I serve is trying to 
report a strong port security bill. I hope that effort succeeds. We 
surely need it.
  Given all this, what does this bill do, and as important, what does 
it not do? It funds an NSA program that in my view violates a clear 
statute passed by Congress. It fails to require that the program be 
fully briefed to Members of the Intelligence Committee.
  I surely support, and I have said this over and over again, the 
capability to monitor al Quaeda. I want to know what their plans are so 
we can disrupt them before they harm us. But I do not support violating 
the law or the Constitution. Enhanced security without respect for law 
gives away the very values we are fighting to defend, and I believe 
that the program I am talking

[[Page H1788]]

about can and must fully comply with the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act and with our Constitution.
  The bill also fails to give clarity to the issue of leaks. Leaks of 
classified information are wrong, but it is also wrong to have a double 
standard. When career professionals blow the whistle on controversial 
activities, it is illegal, a firing offense, but when the President and 
Vice President authorize the selective leaking of classified 
information to discredit criticism, it is defended as a prerogative of 
the Presidency, part of the President's inherent authority.
  This bill includes a provision that gives arrest powers to the 
protective officers at CIA and NSA in order to help them protect agency 
officials. This provision, in my view, has been somewhat misconstrued 
in the press as granting new warrantless surveillance powers to these 
agencies. It does not. It simply gives these protective details the 
same authority that the Capitol Police, the Secret Service and other 
Federal authorities have. But, like all new powers, they are 
susceptible to abuse without strong oversight, and so it would be my 
hope that we will include more safeguards before this provision becomes 
law.
  I do want to say to the chairman of the committee that I appreciate 
the bipartisanship which the majority has shown in accepting some 
initiatives raised over many years by committee Democrats. For 2 years 
committee Democrats have registered strong opposition to the practice 
of funding counterterrorism through supplemental budgets. We fought 
this reckless practice in committee and on the floor.
  This year, again, the President's budget provided 22 percent less 
than what is needed for counterterrorism operations. On a bipartisan 
basis we are now authorizing 100 percent of the Intelligence 
Committee's counterterrorism funding needs for 2007 in this base bill, 
and that is something the majority agreed to, and I applaud them for 
that.
  Second, for years our Intelligence Community has been denied the 
service of many patriotic Americans from versus ethnic backgrounds, 
Iraqi Americans, Iranian Americans, who want to serve, but who cannot 
get security clearances. Committee Democrats offered an amendment to 
last year's bill to require a multitier system of clearances so that 
these Americans, despite the fact that they may have relatives in these 
countries, can get clearances up to a certain level to help us with 
language and cultural issues. That language is in this bill, and I 
commend the majority for including it.
  On a personal level, Chairman Hoekstra and I have made a major effort 
to work together to put America first. I am grateful for that and for 
him. I appreciate your kind words, Peter, and I thank you. We will 
continue to try to do our best to get the best possible legislation 
enacted.
  Mr. Chairman, this bill, in my view, misses an enormous opportunity 
to send a message to the White House, and that message is that 
surveillance of Americans must comply with our law and our 
Constitution; that intelligence on Iran is not good enough; that 
protection of privacy and civil liberties must be part of our effort to 
improve intelligence gathering, not an afterthought; and that we will 
not tolerate a double standard on leaks of classified information.
  I hope this debate, Mr. Chairman, will assure me that this bill is 
adequate. The dedicated women and men of the Intelligence Community not 
only deserve our full support, but our best effort to enact funding 
legislation that truly upholds America's values and America's 
principles.
  Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. HOEKSTRA. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman 
from Texas (Mr. Thornberry), who is the chairman of the oversight 
subcommittee assigned with the responsibility of making sure that the 
reshaping and the rebuilding of the intelligence community under the 
Office of the Director of National Intelligence is a successful launch 
and does rebuild the community into what we need after what we 
inherited in the 1990s.
  Mr. THORNBERRY. Mr. Chairman, I thank Chairman Hoekstra for all of 
his work in this area.
  Mr. Chairman, there is no perfect bill that comes across this floor. 
And particularly in the area of intelligence, there is no perfect 
amount of information that tells us everything that we want to know. 
But rather than use this bill to send a message to the White House, I 
think that the committee generally has come together to try to fashion 
a bill that makes our country safer.
  It is not perfect, it does not do everything that I would like it to 
do, but the members of this committee on both sides of the aisle take 
their job very seriously, and realize how much is at stake, and have 
generally avoided the kinds of partisan rhetoric that we sometimes see.
  The chairman and ranking member have assigned the oversight 
subcommittee with strategic oversight. That means we are not to follow 
the headlines of the day, but the distinguished gentlemen from Alabama 
(Mr. Cramer) and I have worked very well together, I think, to try to 
find those strategic issues, focusing on them. That really make a 
difference in the long run.
  As the chairman mentioned, one of our areas of focus is to make sure 
that this new DNI office gets started on the right foot; is not just 
another bureaucracy, but truly brings the intelligence community 
together so there is not the duplication, not the stovepipes, not the 
gaps that we have seen in the past.
  And it is important for folks to know that we did not just pass a 
bill, the intelligence reform bill, and walk away from it. We are 
engaged day after day in trying to work with the administration and 
with the agencies to make sure that it is a success.
  This bill includes a requirement for a strategic planning process 
that is a part of that effort to make it a success. In addition to 
that, the oversight subcommittee has focused on reducing unnecessary 
paperwork burdens, reports and studies that often require many 
manhours, many dollars to prepare, but then come to nothing, where no 
one up here reads them.
  Rather, we are trying to focus on information exchanges that matter, 
and particularly in the area of metrics, so that, for example, when we 
talk about Iran, we can quantify the quality differences, the quantity 
differences that come from sustained efforts in human and technical 
intelligence.
  I think this bill does help make the country safer, and I suggest 
that Members support it.
  Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate that sending messages to the 
White House is not all we should do here, but there are very few ways 
to send those messages.
  I yield 2 minutes to a senior member of our committee, also a member 
of the Armed Services Committee, the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Reyes).
  Mr. REYES. Mr. Chairman, I thank the ranking member for yielding me 
time on this important issue.
  I agree with my colleague from Texas that very few pieces of 
legislation are perfect. It is not that we are looking for perfection, 
we are looking for an effort that gives us the cooperation, an effort 
that gives us the ability to hold people accountable for doing their 
jobs.
  Earlier today we heard that one of the amendments, the amendment that 
has been proposed by my colleague, the gentleman from Iowa (Mr. 
Boswell), had been ruled out of order, and that amendment required a 
quarterly report to Congress on the nuclear program of Iran. The report 
would be submitted every 90 days and would include an assessment of 
nuclear weapons programs; an evaluation on the sources upon which the 
intelligence is based; a summary of any new intelligence that had been 
gathered since the previous report; and a discussion of any dissents, 
caveats, gaps in knowledge, or other information that would reduce the 
confidence in the overall assessment.
  People may wonder why would we want to include an amendment like 
that. Well, the reason goes back to why we are in Iraq today. The 
reason goes back to our lack of oversight and the issues of WMD, 
weapons of mass destruction.
  The reason is because we have not done our job as a Congress in 
holding the administration accountable in WMD, in the issue of Abu 
Ghraib, and the issue of the leaking of the Valerie Plame outing, and 
many other different issues.

                              {time}  1515

  Our Founding Fathers had the idea that the best democracy, the best 
form

[[Page H1789]]

of government, would be one that would be a balanced approach. We 
haven't done our job in balancing that by oversight.
  Mr. HOEKSTRA. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to my distinguished 
colleague from New York (Mr. McHugh) who in the past year has sat 
through seven briefings on Iran in the Intelligence Committee.
  Mr. McHUGH. Mr. Chairman, I thank the distinguished chairman of the 
Intelligence Committee for his work, his effort, and all Members', to 
bring this product to the floor here today.
  I certainly associate myself with the comments of previous speakers 
about perfection. I am one of the newer members of the committee, I 
have to be very frank. As a long-term member of the Armed Services 
Committee, I was shocked at the condition, or lack of positive 
condition of our intelligence resources coming out of the 1990s. Let us 
be honest about it. Congress, particularly the administration, did a 
terrible job in maintaining the kind of infrastructure programs and 
resources necessary to do adequate intelligence.
  The good news is I think this bill continues the recent efforts, 
particularly since post-9/11, to try to rebuild those communities. It 
has not been an easy job, and it has been a bipartisan one, and I can 
hope that will continue.
  With respect to this bill, I would say that it does, indeed, help 
meet the President's goal of growing our analytic cadre by 50 percent. 
It continues efforts that were begun with the Intelligence Reform Act 
to rebuild the community.
  As I said, after it was literally devastated by what I would 
categorize as irresponsible budget cuts in the 1980s, the passage of 
this bill would provide the DNI with the necessary resources to best 
identify practices for analysis, and will fund use of experts from 
across the spectrum, academia, the private sector, to supplement the 
intelligence community expertise.
  More than that, it will support fundamental assessment of the 
community's analytic resources, and that can serve as the ``yellow 
pages'' for intelligence community analysts, and it will serve as well 
to illustrate what skills and expertise the community still needs as we 
continue that very, very important challenge. In addition, H.R. 5020 
provides our intelligence community with resources and authorities 
necessary to win the war on terror.
  It shakes off the last vestiges of the Deutsch doctrine, which tied 
our hands for all intelligence officers. It is a long road back. This 
bill takes us a long way down that path and I strongly support its 
passage.
  Mr. CRAMER. Mr. Chairman, I now yield 3\1/2\ minutes to the 
gentlewoman from California (Ms. Eshoo), a member of the committee.
  Ms. ESHOO. Mr. Chairman, I thank our distinguished colleague for 
yielding.
  Mr. Chairman, this bill provides the brave men and women of our 
intelligence community with the tools they need to conduct their 
constant silent struggle to guarantee our national security. They 
deserve it. They place their lives on the line every day, and they 
should have these resources provided to them.
  What I am deeply disappointed about in this bill is that we are not 
using this opportunity to crack down on the administration's reckless 
and unlawful abuses in the field of intelligence gathering.
  For the first time in our Nation's history, we are living under an 
administration that asserts it has the right, without statutory or 
judicial review, to eavesdrop on the electronic communications of 
American citizens. The NSA wiretapping program, revealed last December 
and acknowledged by the President himself, represents for the first 
time ever the completely warrantless surveillance of U.S. citizens, an 
unheard of breach of our rights guaranteed under the Constitution.
  We have learned from news reports that the Counter-Intelligence Field 
Activity, CIFA, part of the Department of Defense, has illegally 
collected and retained information on Americans, including several in 
my district in California. Worse, they did this on the basis of 
protected first amendment activity, notably the exercise of free speech 
about military recruiting at the University of California at Santa 
Cruz.
  When I learned of this, I was able to investigate and learn that the 
reports had been improperly entered into and retained in a Department 
of Defense database. I objected, and the DOD has promised in writing to 
correct the situation and issue guidance to employees to prevent future 
abuses. I am pleased with their attention to the problem, and I hope 
that we have turned the corner with CIFA.
  This has not been the case with the President's NSA wiretapping 
program. Not only does the program fall outside the statutory 
guidelines of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, but the 
President continues, in my view, to violate the law by failing to brief 
the full Intelligence Committee about the program.
  Our Nation was founded on the premise of three coequal branches of 
government, providing checks and balances on the abuse of power by any 
one body. Yet this administration continues to act without regard for 
congressional or judicial guidelines. This is not only un-American, it 
is dangerous, and we have a responsibility to put an end to it.
  I offered an amendment to this bill in committee which sought only to 
determine the cost of the President's program. It was a reasonable and 
measured attempt at meaningful oversight. It didn't seek operational 
details or names of targets, but just the most basic oversight 
questions, what is in the budget. It was defeated. When the vote is 
cast on this, Members are voting in the dark.
  I offered another amendment last night which was rejected by the 
Rules Committee. That was even more benign. It simply expressed the 
sense of Congress that all electronic surveillance must comply with the 
Constitution and FISA.
  This bill has shortcomings, Mr. Chairman, and I regret that it does 
because I think that it is not good for our country.
  Mr. HOEKSTRA. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2\1/2\ minutes to our 
distinguished colleague from New Mexico (Mrs. Wilson) who has 
responsibility as chairwoman of the Tactical and Technical 
Subcommittee.
  Mrs. WILSON of New Mexico. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the 
bill we hope to pass this afternoon, because it continues to rebuild 
America's global intelligence capability and implemented intelligence 
reform.
  I think we have to be honest with ourselves and the American people 
that the intelligence challenge that we face today is much more 
difficult than the challenge that we faced during the Cold War. The 
Soviet Union was powerful but predictable. They were knowable, 
understandable. Al Qaeda is deadly but amorphous, adaptive, parasitic, 
and suicidal.
  The intelligence challenge, the bar, is much higher than it used to 
be. This bill helps us move forward to meet that challenge.
  In the area of technical and tactical intelligence, this bill raises 
the standards for program planning. In the area of broad missions like 
ballistic missile technical collection, we require agencies to work 
together to come up with a comprehensive plan to gather the information 
needed and not duplicate programs.
  We require agencies to plan not only for a technical program, but for 
the life cycle of that program: the tasking, the processing, the 
exploitation and dissemination, the training of personnel, and those 
kinds of efforts that have to be put in place.
  Thirdly, we know we have serious deficiencies in some technical 
programs in our technical architecture. There is one essential program 
that has not been successful, and the way forward is fraught with risk. 
We put the resources and authorize them in this bill to develop long-
term comprehensive solutions to the technical architectures we need to 
keep this country safe.
  I ask my colleagues to support this legislation.
  Mr. CRAMER. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from 
Maryland (Mr. Ruppersberger).
  Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the 2007 
Intelligence Authorization Act. I believe that good intelligence is the 
best defense against terrorism. As we continue to fight this war on 
terror, I believe we must give the intelligence community the resources 
it needs to

[[Page H1790]]

keep our families and communities safe.
  As a member of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, 
I support this legislation because I believe that it provides 
intelligence officials with key resources as they work to protect our 
country.
  The bill improves the U.S. human intelligence activities, boosts U.S. 
counterintelligence programs and personnel, and increases funding for 
counterterrorism programs by 22 percent to achieve full funding, 
something the President's budget did not do.
  But I do have some reservations about this bill as well. This 
legislation, supported by the Bush administration, moves a large number 
of intelligence agents and analysts from the FBI's new national 
security branch, currently under the authority of the Director of 
National Intelligence, to the Department of Justice. I do not believe 
this move is good for our country's security.
  The agents in this new FBI branch specialize in collecting and 
analyzing domestic intelligence. They work to penetrate terrorist cells 
currently operating in the United States to thwart another attack on 
our soil.
  After the horrific attacks of 9/11, Congress created the Director of 
National Intelligence, known as the DNI, to ensure better coordination 
and communication between the 15 intelligence agencies. The DNI was 
created to connect the dots, something that did not happen before 9/11.
  It is the Department of Justice's job to investigate and indict 
criminals for breaking our laws.
  I fear that shifting a large number of agents and analysts from the 
DNI to the Department of Justice will keep the status quo. If we want 
to change the culture, change the system that failed us before 9/11, 
and effectively break up terrorist cells in our country, the FBI's new 
security branch must stay under the DNI, the Director of National 
Intelligence.
  Mr. HOEKSTRA. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2\1/2\ minutes to the gentlewoman 
from Virginia (Mrs. Jo Ann Davis), our distinguished colleague who is 
the chair of our subcommittee responsible for rebuilding human 
intelligence capabilities.
  Mrs. JO ANN DAVIS of Virginia. Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support 
of H.R. 5020, the Intelligence Authorization Act of 2007, and I applaud 
Chairman Hoekstra for presenting a bill that addresses the funding 
needs for the global war on terrorism and ongoing intelligence 
operations in Iraq.
  Mr. Chairman, as chair of the Terrorism, Human Intelligence, Analysis 
and Counterintelligence Subcommittee, I have been directed to ensure 
that the intelligence community has the resources necessary to complete 
the thousands upon thousands of intelligence operations conducted each 
year in direct support of our Nation's diplomatic and military efforts 
worldwide, all during a time of war.
  Although the risks involved in intelligence operations are inherently 
high, they are significantly greater when conducted against blood-
thirsty insurgents and radical extremists, both of which accept that 
the mass murder of innocent men, women and children is justifiable.
  When faced with an enemy that is so brutal and remorseless, we must 
ensure that the intelligence community has the personnel and the 
operational tools needed to collect, analyze, and disseminate the type 
of intelligence that allows us to disrupt the activities of such an 
enemy. H.R. 5020 does this as it provides the resources needed to 
increase human intelligence operations, enhance analytical 
capabilities, and sustain intelligence collection platforms.
  Insightful, accurate and timely intelligence has always been the key 
to understanding the plans and intentions of our adversaries. It is not 
a secret that some of these adversaries have little respect for human 
rights or the internationally accepted rule of law. They are determined 
to destroy growing democracies and strip their citizens of the 
liberties we as Americans often take for granted.
  They are committed to bringing the war back to the homeland, where 
our families and friends might be subjected to similar horrors as were 
experienced on 9/11. We cannot and we will not let this happen. We 
cannot appear irresolute in our goal to ensure our political and 
military leaders have the best intelligence possible while we are 
waging this war.
  It is our duty to ensure that the Nation is protected, and H.R. 5020 
strives to guarantee that the right type of intelligence is provided to 
our leaders so that they may protect our Nation. It is also our duty to 
provide resources to improve the ability of our servicemembers and 
intelligence officers as they confront terrorism worldwide and combat 
insurgents in Iraq and Afghanistan.
  Authorizing any amount less than the full funding requested for the 
global war on terrorism or operations in Iraq would place members of 
our armed services and our intelligence community under greater peril 
than they are today. Not authorizing the full amount would be 
tantamount to compromising our national security.
  I urge my colleagues to support this legislation, and, once again, I 
congratulate my chairman on his outstanding effort.
  Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, how much time remains on each side?
  The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Hoekstra) has 12\1/2\ 
minutes remaining. The gentlewoman from California (Ms. Harman) has 14 
minutes remaining.
  Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from 
Alabama (Mr. Cramer), who is ranking member on our new Oversight 
Subcommittee, on which Mr. Thornberry is doing, I think, a superb job 
attempting to oversee activities of our intelligence.

                              {time}  1530

  Mr. CRAMER. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentlewoman from California, 
and I want to congratulate you on your leadership in this committee, 
along with the chairman as well. I have been on this committee for 
several terms now, and as the chairman stated and the ranking member 
stated, we bend over backwards to work in a bipartisan way. This hasn't 
been easy, and this hasn't been an easy year. And I say to both of you, 
congratulations for trying to help us work through this very difficult 
year.
  This is not a perfect bill, and I am disappointed that several of the 
amendments were not allowed in order. I think the chairman is, too. I 
think there are some of the issues that were ruled out, particularly 
Mr. Boswell's issue, that we can work through together, and so I look 
forward to the chairman and ranking member's leadership.
  I do stand in support of H.R. 5020. This bill does address many of 
the issues surrounding the way in which the intelligence community is 
being restructured. I say to my friend, the gentleman from Texas (Mr. 
Thornberry), thank you for the leadership you have enjoyed with me and 
with this full committee over the Oversight Subcommittee. We haven't 
always had an Oversight Subcommittee, and this makes sense that we now 
have the opportunity, particularly as we have stood up the DNI, to 
engage the new people at the DNI, the new leaders at the DNI that we 
are looking to to lead this country into a new era of intelligence 
management that we haven't had. This is our opportunity to hold their 
feet to the fire.
  The stand-up of the DNI has been slow, and it has been frustrating, 
but we have been working together, Mr. Thornberry and I, to bring 
information back to the full committee from the DNI and the relevant 
agencies. We have taken on the tough issues, interrogation, detention 
operations, information sharing, overall management structure of the 
DNI, and we have done this in ways that the committee hasn't worked 
before. We have done it by having briefings; we have done it by going 
to their turf, their sites, sitting with their personnel, leaving the 
country, talking to our people in sensitive parts of the world that are 
doing brave and noble things for this country, and then we have brought 
that information back into the subcommittee and into the full committee 
as well. This is the way I enjoy working.
  Also in this bill there is an investment in an analytical initiative 
that draws on the expertise resident at three centers, the Missile and 
Space Intelligence Center, which just happens to be in Huntsville, 
Alabama, my home district; the National Air and Space Intelligence 
Center in Dayton, Ohio; and at the National Ground Intelligence Center 
in Charlottesville, Virginia. These centers collaborate and they

[[Page H1791]]

work to analyze weapons that we bring back that could be threats to 
this country and to our aircraft and to our personnel as well. So those 
people in those locations get a reinvestment in their work through this 
bill.
  All in all, I think this is a good bill, and I urge my colleagues to 
support it.
  Mr. HOEKSTRA. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2\1/2\ minutes to my colleague 
from the great State of Michigan (Mr. Rogers), who chairs our policy 
committee on the Intelligence Committee, responsible for identifying 
and understanding the threats that we face as a Nation.
  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to compliment 
you, your staff, and that of both the ranking member and the majority 
on a job well done on this bill.
  The challenges that we face came from the 1990s, and many of the 
problems the ranking member even pointed out were a different direction 
set, a different policy set from where they wanted our intelligence 
services to go. They went so far as to say back then that we don't even 
want you to talk to somebody who is a bad character or may be an 
embarrassment to the United States. So they did the honorable thing; 
they shut down their human operations. They followed the law and the 
policies of the United States. If you would have asked an intelligence 
official back then, they would have told you it was a bad idea. We 
shouldn't have done it.
  Today, through the leadership of this committee and this chairman, 
and the folks who are out in the field today trying to rebuild our 
human intelligence, it is nothing short of miraculous. These people are 
incredibly talented, and I think we miss that sometimes. We miss it in 
the halls here and in the debates in committee. And by the way, we have 
debated ad nauseam many of the issues brought up today on these things, 
as we should in that context. But these are great people who could do a 
myriad of other things: make more money. A lot of them came to the CIA, 
and they took pay cuts because they believe in what they are doing. And 
they are risking their lives today for this country and for our safety.
  I had the great privilege to reenlist a young soldier in a very 
remote part of the world in a small, dinky little room with all the 
windows taped up and with a small American flag hanging behind us 
because that is all we could find, because he believed. He said, yeah, 
this is hardship, but I believe in my country more than I believe in 
anything.
  So when we talk about the problems of intelligence and the policies 
of the past, let us not forget one thing: when you bump into somebody 
whose morale is low, it isn't because of the work that they are doing. 
They are off the charts excited about making a difference for their 
country. It is because policymakers back here use words like ``illegal 
wiretap,'' even though they have never been briefed into the program at 
all and have no concept of what it is; because they say ``Abu Ghraib'' 
like it paints everybody who has ever been involved in an interrogation 
as doing something wrong and breaking the law.
  Shame on us if we allow this to continue to happen and affect the 
morale of people who are risking their lives on work that is so 
precious to our safety, security and liberty. We ought to applaud them 
today, and this bill, I think, does that.
  Mr. Chairman, again I want to applaud you and thank you for your 
work. And I want to caution all the Members of this Chamber: we 
shouldn't be more worried about winning in November than we should be 
about winning the war on terror. We should stand with these people, 
tell them we are proud of them, tell them we are proud of the work they 
are doing, and thank you for signing up to defend the greatest Nation 
on the face of the Earth.
  Let this squabbling go by. We know that the folks who have come down 
on this floor, and it has shocked me today, Mr. Chairman, that some 
would even come out here after getting the full brief and describe a 
program in terms that they didn't describe it in the privacy and the 
security and with the confidence of previous briefings. This is the 
wrong time to do that.
  Let us continue to work together. We have done it so well in those 
committees. I look forward to working with you, Mr. Chairman, and I 
look forward to standing up for the very people who risk their lives 
today defending this great country and going after probably the 
toughest enemy we have ever seen.
  Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I would just say to my friend Mr. Rogers 
that all of us on this committee put America first, though we may 
disagree about precisely what this bill should include.
  It is now my pleasure to yield to the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. 
Holt), the ranking member on our policy committee, 3\1/2\ minutes.
  Mr. HOLT. Mr. Chairman, I thank my colleague, the ranking member, the 
gentlewoman from California, for affording me a few minutes to comment 
on this bill.
  I agree with many of my colleagues that there are some very important 
and positive features of this bill. The dedicated and often brave 
members of the intelligence agencies have earned and deserve our 
support, but this bill weakens our freedoms.
  There are a number of points, and I hardly know where to begin, but 
the basic point is that the bill fails to address what I believe are 
some of the core oversight challenges facing our committee and this 
body. There are under way some of the greatest changes in intelligence 
collection in American history, and it deserves our careful oversight.
  This bill turns a blind eye, really, to misuses of executive power 
that threaten our liberties and the constitutional balance of powers 
which we are sworn to protect. And I say this advisedly. I don't mean 
to overstate the matter.
  The bill does not provide funding for privacy and civil liberties 
oversight. There has been some mention of that. The bill also does not 
address this really important issue of domestic spying. Make no 
mistake, all of us in Congress support intercepting communications of 
terrorists set on doing us harm, doing Americans harm anywhere in the 
world, but there are multiple examples of how innocent people are 
ensnared.
  The Muslim American lawyer Brandon Mayfield, we have spoken about him 
on the floor; Christian peace activists; others who have been falsely 
labeled as terrorist coconspirators and domestic security threats based 
on their political beliefs or simple mistaken erroneous information. 
This is what happens when there are no checks and balances.
  To date, there has been no independent audit of the NSA program, the 
domestic spying surveillance program, to determine whether similar 
abuses have occurred. That is our role, but we have been stonewalled in 
our efforts. Eavesdropping on Americans must comply with FISA, that is 
what I maintain. If the other side disagrees, let us have it out here 
on the floor. At least let us have it out in committee.
  The President says FISA, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 
doesn't apply to him. However, the President doesn't get to pick and 
choose which laws he will follow and which ones he won't.
  The administration still refuses to brief all members of the 
Intelligence Committee on this program. The National Security Act 
requires him to do that. The failure to brief the full committee 
compromises our oversight responsibility, violates the law, I think, 
and makes a mockery of the checks and balances that we are sworn to 
protect.
  In another case, the Iraq NIE, the National Intelligence Estimate, 
the information that was leaked, we now know for purely political 
purposes to try to discredit a public servant. We are talking about the 
protection of intelligence for its proper use. Classified information 
should never be misused as a political weapon through selective 
declassification and leaking to attack opponents a particular point of 
view. No, I am not flogging a dead horse, I am talking about the 
principles that we are supposed to protect.
  Mr. Chairman, the bill also provides no meaningful protections for 
national security whistleblowers. Members of the national intelligence 
community can sometimes be discouraged or even intimidated from raising 
concerns within their agencies.
  Mr. Chairman, I recommend that we vote against this bill.
  Mr. HOEKSTRA. I yield 2\1/2\ minutes to a great member of the 
committee, someone who understands that the Civil Liberties and Privacy 
Board is funded out of the budget of the Executive Office of the 
President and does

[[Page H1792]]

not come out of the Intelligence Committee authorization bill, the 
gentleman from Alabama (Mr. Everett).
  (Mr. EVERETT asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. EVERETT. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from Michigan, and I 
do rise in support of the intelligence authorization bill for fiscal 
year 2007. Chairman Hoekstra is to be congratulated and commended for 
his efforts in drafting this important legislation to meet the 
intelligence needs of the country.
  There are many great things in this bill for the warfighter and for 
the intelligence community; however, I would like to focus on a very 
important reconnaissance and surveillance program, the U-2. Recently, a 
program budget decision was released by the Air Force to retire the U-2 
by 2011. This transition flight plan would replace the U-2 with the 
Global Hawk UAV that is not yet capable of taking on this mission. This 
plan is premature, and after further review it appears that the Air 
Force now shares my concerns. The bill before us prevents the 
retirement of the U-2 unless the Secretary of Defense can certify that 
there will be no loss of intelligence collection capabilities.
  Just to make a point, I am associated with the U-2 all the way back 
to the 1950s when it made its first flight. It has been upgraded 
continuously over the years with a large variety of mature intelligence 
collection sensors. The U-2 is, in fact, the force behind our long-
range stand-off intelligence capabilities today.
  The last U-2 left the production line in 1989. Its airframe is 
engineered for 75,000 hours. The U-2 provides critical multisensor 
intelligence through all phases of conflict, including peacetime, the 
war on terror, low-intensity conflict, and high-scale hostilities. The 
U-2 has even provided photographs to FEMA in support of the Hurricane 
Katrina and other national disasters. The U-2's modular payload design 
allows the aircraft to be reconfigured to perform various missions and 
can perform them until 2050 at the rate we are now using them.
  Mr. Chairman, intelligence is the first line of defense and necessary 
for the security of the Nation. Our warfighters, to be successful on 
the battlefield, have to have this intelligence. I urge all my 
colleagues to support this bill, and again I congratulate the chairman 
and our ranking member for us being able to get this bill to the floor.
  In particular, I'd like to focus on a very important Reconnaissance 
and Surveillance Program: the U-2.
  Recently, a Program Budget Decision was released by the Air Force to 
retire the U-2 by 2011. This ``transition flight plan'' would replace 
the U-2 with the Global Hawk UAV that is not yet capable of taking on 
this mission. This plan is premature, and after further review, it 
appears the Air Force now shares some of my concerns. The bill before 
us prevents the retirement of the U-2 unless the Secretary of Defense 
can certify that there will be no loss of intelligence collection 
capabilities.
  Just to make a point about the capability of the U-2, although the 
origins of the aircraft go back to the 1950s, it has been upgraded 
continuously over the years with a large variety of mature intelligence 
collection sensors. The U-2 is, in fact, the force behind our long-
range, stand-off intelligence capabilities today.
  The last U-2 left the production line only in 1989. Its airframe is 
engineered for 75,000 hours, yet our fleet of operational aircraft 
averages only 10,000 hours. The U-2 provides critical multi-sensor 
intelligence through all phases of conflict, including peacetime, the 
war on terror, low-intensity conflict and large-scale hostilities. The 
U-2 has even provided photographs to FEMA in support of Hurricane 
Katrina and other natural disasters. The U-2's modular payload design 
allows the aircraft to be reconfigured to perform various missions, and 
can perform them until 2050 at the rate we are using them today.
  The Bill rightly directs that the Secretary of Defense must certify 
that there will be no loss of intelligence capabilities in 
transitioning from the U-2 to the Global Hawk, and that the collection 
capabilities reach parity, before a final decision is made. This will 
help ensure that the ``persistent stare'' goal in the Quadrennial 
Defense Review is met.
  Mr. Chairman, intelligence ``is'' the first line of defense and 
necessary for the security of this Nation, and for our war fighters to 
be successful on the battlefield. I urge my colleagues to vote in favor 
of this legislation.

                              {time}  1545

  Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from 
Massachusetts (Mr. Tierney).
  Mr. TIERNEY. Mr. Chairman, the intelligence authorization bill before 
us today is a bit of a mixed bag. It does, on the positive side, direct 
the Director of National Intelligence to better conform to the 
committee's intent that the Director of National Intelligence be a 
coordinator of intelligence, that it not create an additional layer of 
bureaucracy, and that it strengthen the community's capability to 
penetrate hard targets.
  It does, at the Democrats' insistence, provide full funding for 
counterterrorism programs instead of going along with the President's 
22 percent cut. It does contain report language requiring that the 
Department of Defense inspector general audit the controversial 
activities of the Department of Defense Counterintelligence Field 
Activities, or CIFA.
  But there are concerns that remain unanswered, and among these 
concerns are the continued insistence of this administration to limit 
access to information about the President's domestic surveillance 
program. After weeks of debate, the program remains limited to only a 
select group of the already select Intelligence Committee. We should 
not expect members charged with the oversight to write a blank check to 
the President to conduct intelligence activities under a shroud of 
secrecy from the very group that was established on behalf of this 
Congress to do oversight. Members of this full House look to the 
members of the Select Committee on Intelligence for advice, and in this 
case the President has limited that committee in full from being able 
to get the information necessary to be able to advise and lead on these 
issues.
  The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 
established the Director of National Intelligence with strong statutory 
budget authorities to enable that office to reach across the whole 
community and to reallocate resources and personnel to respond to 
emerging threats. The administration appears to be on a path to 
dismantle this critical budgetary authority, piece by piece.
  The 2007 budget request of the President moves significant resources 
and personnel permanently out of the management and control of the 
Director of National Intelligence. Most of those transfers move 
intelligence assets to the control of the Secretary of Defense and the 
Attorney General.
  We should keep in mind over the last 2 years the military 
intelligence program has grown by 25 percent while the national 
intelligence program has actually shrunk by almost 1 percent. Both 
press reports and the Quadrennial Defense Review evidence the 
Pentagon's intention to expand special operations activities worldwide 
to engage in operations traditionally reserved for the Central 
Intelligence Agency and the State Department.
  In the committee I proposed an amendment that would protect the 
authorities of the Director of National Intelligence, at least pending 
a Federal review and some answers from the administration with respect 
to its intentions in this regard. That failed, but I understand that 
the Senate is believed to have this issue in its sights, under 
consideration, and I should hope it is for the purposes of being in 
line with my amendment.
  Allowing the Department of Defense to creep into the intelligence 
areas, especially when the result would be to avoid oversight, is 
problematical in the least. I have strong reservations about this bill, 
and I ask Members to consider these before they vote on this measure.
  Mr. HOEKSTRA. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
Arizona (Mr. Renzi), a distinguished member of the committee.
  Mr. RENZI. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate your work and the ranking 
member's work on this bill.
  I want to also go back to some things that were said earlier 
concerning civil liberties and the Republican Party, in its effort to 
try to balance civil liberties post-September 11. It is unfair and 
unwise to enter into the Congressional Record the misleading 
information that this is the first time in history that terrorist 
surveillance was conducted outside of FISA. Every one of you over there 
knows that President Clinton conducted terrorist surveillance outside 
of FISA, and he was justified in doing so by Jamie Gorelich at

[[Page H1793]]

the Justice Department based on an argument of Article II of the 
Constitution. It is not the first time in history outside of FISA it 
has been conducted.
  This legislation also, as the gentlewoman from New Mexico talked 
about, goes to restore and rebuild our capabilities that were very much 
slashed during the 1990s. It was a time when our intelligence officers 
declined by 30 percent. It was a time when a number of CIA sources 
worldwide were cut by 40 percent. The number of intelligence reports 
that our intelligence community was able to produce was cut in half.
  If you remember back during the Reagan administration when President 
Reagan had to rebuild our military, this is very much like how our 
history stands right now in trying to restore and rebuild our 
intelligence capability. There was a time when our intelligence 
officers were hamstrung by the Deutsch guidelines, when poor management 
and a lack of urgency at the top did not allow our intelligence agents 
to function properly in the field. That has changed.
  This intelligence authorization bill allows us to gather more 
information globally at more locations than we had in the recent past. 
When famine strikes in Africa, when the saber-rattling in Venezuela is 
conducted, when the narcoterrorists along the Mexican border begin 
control, this intelligence bill acts.
  I want to once again thank the chairman. As a Member from Arizona, we 
need the kind of increases that our agents are asking for, particularly 
on our Mexican border.
  Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself the balance of my time.
  Mr. Chairman, I am the longest-serving member currently on this 
committee. I love this committee; I love the issues we consider. My 
district is the place where most of our intelligence satellites are 
made. It is the location of the Air Force Space and Missiles Command, 
which just opened a state-of-the-art complex and develops and fields 
our satellite and missile capabilities.
  I was there in El Segundo 2 days ago, and I am immensely proud of the 
work of SMC and the people who do the work, both in uniform and 
civilians.
  Mr. Chairman, I have traveled the corners of the earth with our 
committee members. They are my friends. I am very fond of them on a 
bipartisan basis and I have been very moved by some of the comments 
made about this bill. A lot of what they say I truly and sincerely 
agree with. I think this bill is a lot better than it would have been 
because there has been bipartisan cooperation. I appreciate that. And I 
appreciate the personal effort that Chairman Hoekstra made to work with 
me and work with the minority.
  What has upset me today, and I do not think anyone has missed it, is 
what I view as callous, partisan behavior by the Committee on Rules at 
a level that I have not felt and experienced, at least with respect to 
the Intelligence Committee. Members on our side offered responsible 
amendments. All of them were shown to the majority; and in one case, 
the Boswell amendment, the majority collaborated with us on adjusting 
the language so it was mutually acceptable. Then at the last minute, 
for no good reason other than pure partisanship, the Boswell amendment 
was made out of order.
  That experience has prompted me to revisit some of the things that 
still bother me. The NSA program bothers me. It is not that I do not 
support the capability; surely I do. I have made that clear. But I do 
not support any part of that program being outside of FISA, because I 
believe, based on information that I have, that it can fully comply 
with FISA. There is no reason to exempt that program.
  Mr. Renzi was just talking about the actions of President Clinton 
that he claimed were outside of FISA. My understanding is that at the 
time, physical searches were not covered by FISA, and later FISA was 
amended to cover it. That is the right way to go, and that is what I 
would hope our committee would end up doing.
  Mr. Chairman, it is a tough call whether to support the bill at this 
stage. I hope and expect that I will support the conference report. I 
think the conference report will be better than the bill we pass in 
this House, because I think that the other body and the conference will 
consider and make decisions about some of these issues we have not 
addressed adequately here.
  In closing, it is always on my mind that dedicated men and women are 
serving overseas taking tough risks for our freedom. I love them and I 
have been there to tell them that. This bill has to honor them, which 
means this has to be the best bill we can field. I do not think it is 
the best bill we can pass. I will make a decision about my vote later 
in this debate. I know that some members on our committee will support 
it and some will oppose it and I respect their views, as I do the views 
of the majority.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. HOEKSTRA. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent at this point to 
include for the Record an exchange of letters with other committees of 
jurisdiction and the executive branch with respect to this legislation. 
I appreciate the willingness of those committees to work with us on 
this legislation.
  The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman's request to insert matter at this point 
is already covered by his request for general leave in the House.

                                         House of Representatives,


                               Committee on Government Reform,

                                   Washington, DC, April 25, 2006.
     Hon. Peter Hoekstra,
      Chairman, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, 
         Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. Chairman: On April 6, 2006, the House Permanent 
     Select Committee on Intelligence reported H.R. 5020, the 
     ``Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007.'' As 
     you know, the bill includes provisions within the 
     jurisdiction of the Committee on Government Reform.
       In the interests of moving this important legislation 
     forward, I agreed to waive sequential consideration of this 
     bill by the Committee on Government Reform. However, I did so 
     only with the understanding that this procedural route would 
     not be construed to prejudice the Committee on Government 
     Reform's jurisdictional interest and prerogatives on this 
     bill or any other similar legislation and will not be 
     considered as precedent for consideration of matters of 
     jurisdictional interest to my Committee in the future.
       I respectfully request your support for the appointment of 
     outside conferees from the Committee on Government Reform 
     should this bill or a similar bill be considered in a 
     conference with the Senate. Finally, I request that you 
     include this letter and your response in the Congressional 
     Record during consideration of the legislation on the House 
     floor.
       Thank you for your attention to these matters.
           Sincerely,
     Tom Davis.
                                  ____

         House of Representatives, Permanent Select Committee on 
           Intelligence,
                                   Washington, DC, April 25, 2006.
     Hon. Tom Davis,
     Chairman, Committee on Government Reform, U.S. House of 
         Representatives, Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. Chairman: Thank you for your letter regarding the 
     Committee on Government Reform's jurisdictional interest in 
     H.R. 5020, the ``Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal 
     Year 2007,'' and your willingness to forego consideration of 
     H.R. 5020 by the Government Reform Committee.
       I agree that the Government Reform Committee has a valid 
     jurisdictional interest in certain provisions of H.R. 5020 
     and that the Committee's jurisdiction will not be adversely 
     affected by your decision to not request a sequential 
     referral of H.R. 5020. As you have requested, I will support 
     your request for an appropriate appointment of outside 
     conferees from your Committee in the event of a House-Senate 
     conference on this or similar legislation should such a 
     conference be convened.
       Finally, I will include a copy of your letter and this 
     response in the Congressional Record during the floor 
     consideration of this bill. Thank you again for your 
     cooperation.
           Sincerely,
                                                   Peter Hoekstra,
     Chairman.
                                  ____

                                         House of Representatives,


                                   Committee on the Judiciary,

                                   Washington, DC, April 26, 2006.
     Hon. Peter Hoekstra,
     Chairman, House Committee on Intelligence, U.S. House of 
         Representatives, Washington, DC.
       Dear Chairman Hoekstra: I write to confirm our mutual 
     understanding regarding H.R. 5020, the ``Intelligence 
     Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007.'' This legislation 
     contains subject matter within the jurisdiction of the 
     Committee on the Judiciary. However, in order to expedite 
     floor consideration of this important legislation, the 
     Committee waives consideration of the bill. The Committee on 
     the Judiciary takes this action with the understanding that 
     the Committee's jurisdictional interests over this and 
     similar legislation are in no way diminished or altered. I 
     also wish to confirm our

[[Page H1794]]

     mutual agreement that the authorization of the Drug 
     Enforcement Agency's (DEA) Office of National Security 
     Intelligence within the National Intelligence Program in no 
     way impairs or affects the Committee on the Judiciary's 
     jurisdiction over law enforcement and information sharing 
     activities of all components of the DEA, including those 
     carried out by this Office.
       The Committee also reserves the right to seek appointment 
     to any House-Senate conference on this legislation and 
     requests your support if such a request is made. Finally, I 
     would appreciate your including this letter in the 
     Congressional Record during consideration of H.R. 5020 on the 
     House floor. Thank you for your attention to these matters.
           Sincerely,
                                       F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr.
     Chairman.
                                  ____

         House of Representatives, Permanent Select Committee on 
           Intelligence,
                                   Washington, DC, April 26, 2006.
     Hon. F. James Sensenbrenner,
     Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. House of 
         Representatives, Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. Chairman: Thank you for your letter of April 26, 
     2006, regarding H.R. 5020, the Intelligence Authorization Act 
     for Fiscal Year 2007. As you noted, elements of the bill as 
     reported fall within the jurisdiction of the Committee on the 
     Judiciary. I will support the request of the Committee on the 
     Judiciary for conferees on these provisions.
       In addition, the bill reflects action on the part of the 
     Administration to include specified elements of the Drug 
     Enforcement Administration within the Intelligence Community. 
     As you know, I intend to offer a manager's amendment to the 
     bill to clarify that the DEA's membership in the Intelligence 
     Community is specifically limited to the DEA's Office of 
     National Security Intelligence, the authorization for which 
     has been requested within the National Intelligence Program, 
     the program for which we have jurisdiction. I will be glad to 
     work with you on a continuing basis to ensure that this 
     designation is not construed in any way to limit the conduct 
     of oversight by the Committee on the Judiciary with respect 
     to law enforcement and information sharing activities of all 
     components of the DEA, which I fully recognize are within the 
     jurisdiction of the Committee on the Judiciary.
       I appreciate your willingness to forego consideration of 
     the bill in the interest of expediting this legislation for 
     floor consideration. I acknowledge that by agreeing to waive 
     consideration of the bill, the Committee on the Judiciary 
     does not waive any jurisdiction it may have over provisions 
     of the bill or any matters under your jurisdiction.
       Finally, I will include a copy of your letter and this 
     response in the Congressional Record during consideration of 
     the legislation on the House floor. Thank you for your 
     assistance in this matter.
           Sincerely,
                                                   Peter Hoekstra,
                                                         Chairman.
                                 ______
                                 
         Department of Justice, Drug Enforcement Administration, 
           Office of Congressional Affairs,
                                   Washington, DC, April 25, 2006.
     Hon. Peter Hoekstra,
     Chairman, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, 
         Washington. DC.
       Dear Chairman Hoekstra: Thank you for supporting a portion 
     of Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) joining the 
     Intelligence Community (IC). This is in response to your 
     staff inquiry regarding the organizational relationship 
     between the Office of National Security Intelligence and the 
     Central Tasking Management System (CTMS).
       As you know, DBA has created the Office of National 
     Security Intelligence at DEA headquarters to oversee and 
     coordinate the three major functions necessary for the Office 
     of National Security Intelligence integration into the IC: 
     all-source analysis, a Central Tasking Management System, and 
     liaison with IC members. All-source analysis of drug 
     trafficking investigative and other information will enhance 
     the intelligence available to policy makers in the law 
     enforcement and intelligence communities. The CTMS will allow 
     DBA to notify IC partners of pertinent drug information 
     related to national security.
       We appreciate your interest in the organizational structure 
     of the Office of National Security Intelligence. Please 
     contact us again if you have additional questions, or need 
     additional information.
           Sincerely,
                                                    Eric J. Akers,
                           Chief, Office of Congressional Affairs.

  Mr. HOEKSTRA. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may 
consume.
  In closing, I appreciate again the work of the ranking member, my 
colleagues on both sides of the aisle, and the staff on both sides of 
the aisle, to pull together a bill which I think addresses the 
priorities that we established at this committee really beginning a 
year and a half ago: that we were going to stay focused on rebuilding 
an intelligence capability to match the threats that America faces 
today.
  This legislation puts in the necessary fences that will ensure that 
this committee has the oversight over the standup of the Office of the 
Director of National Intelligence. We all want this process to work. We 
would all like it to go faster because of the significant threats that 
we face as a Nation. But standing up the Office of the DNI will be the 
responsibility of monitoring, and that will be the responsibility of 
our oversight subcommittee.
  Our policy committee is going to continue to monitor and evaluate the 
threats that we face as a Nation. Whether it is al Qaeda, radical 
Islam, the affiliated groups to al Qaeda, Iran, Iraq, North Korea, 
China, we want to make sure that we as a committee have a good grasp of 
making sure that the intelligence community is structured to go after 
these threats and provide us as policymakers with the information that 
we need to be successful.
  The third thing that we are going to do is to make sure that we 
thoroughly take a look at what we can accomplish to stop leaks, the 
devastating leaks from within the community and outside of the 
community that damage our capabilities and give those who want to 
attack us insight as to what our plans, intentions and capabilities 
are.
  And then for my colleagues who have talked about the TSA program and 
other activities, it is the responsibility of this committee, it is the 
responsibility of the members of this committee to make sure that we do 
effective oversight, to make sure that the executive branch operates 
within the parameters that we have established, the legal parameters 
that we have established for it to operate within.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield the balance of my time to the gentleman from 
Kansas (Mr. Tiahrt) to close the general debate on our side.
  Mr. TIAHRT. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. 
Hoekstra) for yielding me this time, and I apologize for being late.
  Mr. Chairman, this legislation before us provides funding resources 
and authorization to support our intelligence community, and I think it 
is coming at a very important time so we can protect our Nation from 
attack.
  Following September 11, 2001, our economy suffered a $2 trillion 
loss. That does not really address the nearly 3,000 lives lost as a by-
product of the terrorist attacks. Certainly that carries greater 
weight.
  We have held hearings, appointed commissions and watched 
documentaries about this tragedy. It is clear during the 1990s, our 
government reduced the human intelligence capabilities and let our 
infrastructure fall into disrepair. This bill, which is so important, 
continues to rebuild our intelligence community.
  First, it provides full funding for the global war on terror instead 
of piecemealing in increments through supplementals and emergency 
bills.
  Second, the legislation provides much-needed new buildings and 
rehabilitates other capital investments that deteriorated during the 
1990s under the last administration.
  And finally, it begins a long process of training agents, recruiting 
recourses, and hiring the support personnel needed to achieve the human 
intelligence capability that we need to protect ourselves, our 
families, and our economy.
  Mr. Chairman, I strongly urge my fellow colleagues to support this 
bill. I would like to say this is an important step in the right 
direction to allow our new Director of National Intelligence to have 
the voice that he needs to coordinate our activities, to break down the 
stovepipes and to continue the process of doing an excellent job of 
protecting this Nation, as they have done since September 11, 2001.
  Mr. MORAN of Virginia. Mr. Chairman, almost 2 years ago, the 9/11 
Commission reported that our intelligence community failed our Nation 
because of its aversion to share information, lack of oversight and 
limited imagination in how to deal with emerging sources of 
information. Since that final report was issued, Congress has 
authorized an overhaul of intelligence agencies, but progress has not 
met with our expectations. We all experienced what can happen with 
inadequate intelligence on 9/11, so the path that is being taken should 
serve as a brilliant warning sign that much more needs to be done.
  When the House of Representatives votes on this year's Intelligence 
Authorization, I will vote against the bill. In doing so, my opposition 
is not because Congress shouldn't fund intelligence activities, but 
rather I believe that

[[Page H1795]]

it is disingenuous for this body to act as if the intelligence 
community is not the source of great concern. The resistance to change, 
the absence of leadership and partisan politics have tempered positive 
evolution and hurt our Nation. Indeed, in the place of real progress, 
the intelligence community has been a source of a number of 
controversial and classified programs that the public has since learned 
about. Last year, we were made aware that:
  The President initiated an illegal program to secretly intercept 
international phone calls, including intercepting calls of American 
citizens, without fully briefing the House and Senate Intelligence 
Committees. This new spy program subverts the congressionally approved 
standard and no one comprehends the full scope of the program;
  The United States government operated a secretive program known as 
``extraordinary rendition'' that shipped accused terrorist suspect to 
other countries for imprisonment and interrogation, all to avoid U.S. 
laws prescribing due process and prohibiting torture;
  The White House selectively declassified information and offered it 
to preferred reporters to discredit political adversaries;
  Intelligence officials sat on a report contradicting the 
Administration's claim that mobile laboratories in Iraq were developing 
weapons, while the President announced to the Nation that ``we have 
found the weapons of mass destruction''; and
  Last week the CIA fired lifelong federal employee Mary McCarthy for 
disclosure, offering the misimpression she was fired for a leak she 
never knew anything about.
  These instances are only the most grievous, but they highlight this 
administration's contempt for accountability and put the unassailable 
standing of our civil liberties in doubt. And when given the 
opportunity, the White House has dragged its feet to appoint the staff, 
fund and begin the work of the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight 
Board which is intended to safeguard our citizens from unnecessary 
government intrusion. .
  I understand the formidable challenge that is being undertaken and I 
applaud the many brave and good hearted people who work to secure our 
nation every day. Unfortunately, the White House and the leadership of 
these agencies are undercutting reform by failing to deliver greater 
communication, transparency and accountability. We are reminded 
repeatedly with reports that the CIA is losing key personnel because of 
the politicization of the agency, or when the 9/11 Commission gives 
``D'' grades to government-wide information sharing and intelligence 
oversight reform.
  The American public looks to Congress to safeguard our civil 
liberties, and to ensure that intelligence is good and intelligence 
reform is meaningful. I'm afraid that in the last year there has been 
increasing evidence that this institution has failed to do its job. Mr. 
Chairman, instead of passing a reauthorization bill today that does 
little to address the nation's concern we should reexamine what we can 
do to ensure our intelligence agencies can do their job and instill our 
constituent's faith in our intelligence community.
  Mr. YOUNG of Florida. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of H.R. 5020, 
the Intelligence Authorization Act for fiscal year 2007.
  In supporting this bill, I want to emphasize to Chairman Hoekstra 
that the Defense Appropriation Subcommittee will do what it can to work 
with the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence in the weeks 
and months ahead. We intend to follow through with a fiscal year 2007 
Department of Defense Appropriations bill that supports the major areas 
of emphasis addressed in the authorization bill now before us.
  I intend to work closely with Chairman Hoekstra and the HPSCI to 
provide the funds necessary to strengthen U.S. intelligence collection 
and analysis, improve the technical means that support the Intelligence 
Community, and strengthen the organization of the Intelligence 
Community. I also stand ready to work with his Committee as we 
carefully scrutinize the fiscal year 2007 budget request to ensure that 
funding is used as effectively and as efficiently as possible to obtain 
the best return for the American taxpayer.
  While I support this measure, I must also advise that some areas of 
difference between the Authorization and Appropriations bills may 
arise. Of course, we intend to try to minimize any such issues. 
However, the committees have different institutional roles, 
responsibilities, and processes, and while I fully respect the role of 
the Chairman of the authorizing committee, I know he appreciates my 
role as well.
  In an increasingly constrained spending environment, the 
Appropriations Committee may find it necessary to reduce the overall 
funding available for the Department of Defense Appropriations bill. We 
will have to make hard choices on how best to address those 
constraints.
  I offer my congratulations to Chairman Hoekstra for his work on this 
legislation, and my support for final passage.

                              {time}  1600

  The CHAIRMAN. All time for general debate has expired.
  Pursuant to the rule, the amendment in the nature of a substitute 
printed in the bill shall be considered as an original bill for the 
purpose of amendment under the 5-minute rule and shall be considered 
read.
  The text of the amendment in the nature of a substitute is as 
follows:

                               H.R. 5020

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SEC. 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

       (a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the 
     ``Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007''.
       (b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act 
     is as follows:

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.

                    TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Sec. 101. Authorization of appropriations.
Sec. 102. Classified Schedule of Authorizations.
Sec. 103. Personnel ceiling adjustments.
Sec. 104. Intelligence Community Management Account.
Sec. 105. Incorporation of reporting requirements.

 TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

Sec. 201. Authorization of appropriations.

   TITLE III--INTELLIGENCE AND GENERAL INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MATTERS

Sec. 301. Increase in employee compensation and benefits authorized by 
              law.
Sec. 302. Restriction on conduct of intelligence Activities.
Sec. 303. Clarification of definition of Intelligence Community under 
              the National Security Act of 1947.
Sec. 304. Delegation of authority for travel on common carriers for 
              intelligence collection personnel.
Sec. 305. Retention and use of amounts paid as debts to Elements of the 
              Intelligence Community.
Sec. 306. Availability of funds for travel and transportation of 
              personal effects, household goods, and automobiles.
Sec. 307. Purchases by elements of the intelligence community of 
              products of federal prison industries.

  TITLE IV--MATTERS RELATING TO ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

      Subtitle A--Office of the Director of National Intelligence

Sec. 401. Clarification of delegation of transfer or reprogramming 
              authority.
Sec. 402. Clarification of limitation on co-location of the Office of 
              the Director of National Intelligence.
Sec. 403. Additional duties of the Director of Science and Technology 
              of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
Sec. 404. Appointment and title of Chief Information Officer of the 
              Intelligence Community.
Sec. 405. Leadership and location of certain offices and officials.
Sec. 406. Eligibility for incentive awards of personnel assigned to the 
              Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
Sec. 407. Repeal of certain authorities relating to the Office of the 
              national counterintelligence Executive.
Sec. 408. Membership of the Director of National Intelligence on the 
              transportation security oversight Board.
Sec. 409. Temporary inapplicability to the Office of the Director of 
              National Intelligence of certain financial reporting 
              requirements.
Sec. 410. Comprehensive inventory of special access programs.
Sec. 411. Sense of Congress on multi-level security clearances.
Sec. 412. Access to information by staff and members of the 
              congressional intelligence committees.
Sec. 413. Study on revoking pensions of persons who commit unauthorized 
              disclosures of classified information.

                Subtitle B--Central Intelligence Agency

Sec. 421. Enhanced protection of Central Intelligence Agency 
              intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized 
              disclosure.
Sec. 422. Additional exception to foreign language proficiency 
              requirement for certain senior level positions in the 
              Central Intelligence Agency.
Sec. 423. Additional functions and authorities for protective personnel 
              of the central intelligence agency.
Sec. 424. Protective services for former officials of the intelligence 
              community.
Sec. 425. Strategic review process.

              Subtitle C--Defense Intelligence Components

Sec. 431. Enhancements of National Security Agency training Program.
Sec. 432. Codification of authorities of national security agency 
              protective personnel.

                       Subtitle D--Other Elements

Sec. 441. Clarification of inclusion of Coast Guard and Drug 
              Enforcement Administration elements in the Intelligence 
              Community.

[[Page H1796]]

Sec. 442. Clarifying amendments relating to Section 105 of the 
              Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004.

                         TITLE V--OTHER MATTERS

Sec. 501. Aerial reconnaissance platforms.
Sec. 502. Elimination of certain reporting requirements.
Sec. 503. Technical amendments to the National Security Act of 1947.
Sec. 504. Technical clarification of certain references to joint 
              military intelligence Program and tactical intelligence 
              and related Activities.
Sec. 505. Technical amendments to the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism 
              Prevention Act of 2004.
Sec. 506. Technical amendment to the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 
              1949.
Sec. 507. Technical amendments relating to the multiyear National 
              Intelligence Program.
Sec. 508. Technical amendments to the Executive Schedule.
Sec. 509. Technical amendments relating to redesignation of the 
              National Imagery and Mapping Agency as the national 
              Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.

                    TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

     SEC. 101. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

       Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal 
     year 2007 for the conduct of the intelligence and 
     intelligence-related activities of the following elements of 
     the United States Government:
       (1) The Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
       (2) The Central Intelligence Agency.
       (3) The Department of Defense.
       (4) The Defense Intelligence Agency.
       (5) The National Security Agency.
       (6) The Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, 
     and the Department of the Air Force.
       (7) The Department of State.
       (8) The Department of the Treasury.
       (9) The Department of Energy.
       (10) The Department of Justice.
       (11) The Federal Bureau of Investigation.
       (12) The National Reconnaissance Office.
       (13) The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.
       (14) The Coast Guard.
       (15) The Department of Homeland Security.
       (16) The Drug Enforcement Administration.

     SEC. 102. CLASSIFIED SCHEDULE OF AUTHORIZATIONS.

       (a) Specifications of Amounts and Personnel Ceilings.--The 
     amounts authorized to be appropriated under section 101, and 
     the authorized personnel ceilings as of September 30, 2007, 
     for the conduct of the intelligence and intelligence-related 
     activities of the elements listed in such section, are those 
     specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations 
     prepared to accompany the conference report on the bill H.R. 
     5020 of the One Hundred Ninth Congress.
       (b) Availability of Classified Schedule of 
     Authorizations.--The Schedule of Authorizations shall be made 
     available to the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate 
     and House of Representatives and to the President. The 
     President shall provide for suitable distribution of the 
     Schedule, or of appropriate portions of the Schedule, within 
     the executive branch.

     SEC. 103. PERSONNEL CEILING ADJUSTMENTS.

       (a) Authority for Adjustments.--With the approval of the 
     Director of the Office of Management and Budget, the Director 
     of National Intelligence may authorize employment of civilian 
     personnel in excess of the number authorized for fiscal year 
     2007 under section 102 when the Director of National 
     Intelligence determines that such action is necessary to the 
     performance of important intelligence functions, except that 
     the number of personnel employed in excess of the number 
     authorized under such section may not, for any element of the 
     intelligence community, exceed 2 percent of the number of 
     civilian personnel authorized under such section for such 
     element.
       (b) Notice to Intelligence Committees.--The Director of 
     National Intelligence shall promptly notify the Select 
     Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and the Permanent 
     Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of 
     Representatives whenever the Director exercises the authority 
     granted by this section.

     SEC. 104. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT ACCOUNT.

       (a) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized 
     to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management 
     Account of the Director of National Intelligence for fiscal 
     year 2007 the sum of $990,000,000. Within such amount, funds 
     identified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations 
     referred to in section 102(a) for advanced research and 
     development shall remain available until September 30, 2008.
       (b) Authorized Personnel Levels.--The elements within the 
     Intelligence Community Management Account of the Director of 
     National Intelligence are authorized 1,539 full-time 
     personnel as of September 30, 2007. Personnel serving in such 
     elements may be permanent employees of the Intelligence 
     Community Management Account or personnel detailed from other 
     elements of the United States Government.
       (c) Classified Authorizations.--
       (1) Authorization of appropriations.--In addition to 
     amounts authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence 
     Community Management Account by subsection (a), there are 
     also authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence 
     Community Management Account for fiscal year 2007 such 
     additional amounts as are specified in the classified 
     Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a). 
     Such additional amounts for research and development shall 
     remain available until September 30, 2007.
       (2) Authorization of personnel.--In addition to the 
     personnel authorized by subsection (b) for elements of the 
     Intelligence Community Management Account as of September 30, 
     2007, there are also authorized such additional personnel for 
     such elements as of that date as are specified in the 
     classified Schedule of Authorizations.
       (d) Reimbursement.--Except as provided in section 113 of 
     the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404h), during 
     fiscal year 2007 any officer or employee of the United States 
     or a member of the Armed Forces who is detailed to the staff 
     of the Intelligence Community Management Account from another 
     element of the United States Government shall be detailed on 
     a reimbursable basis, except that any such officer, employee, 
     or member may be detailed on a nonreimbursable basis for a 
     period of less than one year as the Director of National 
     Intelligence considers necessary.

     SEC. 105. INCORPORATION OF REPORTING REQUIREMENTS.

       (a) In General.--Each requirement to submit a report to the 
     congressional intelligence committees that is included in the 
     joint explanatory statement to accompany the conference 
     report on the bill H.R. 5020 of the One Hundred Ninth 
     Congress, or in the classified annex to this Act, is hereby 
     incorporated into this Act, and is hereby made a requirement 
     in law.
       (b) Congressional Intelligence Committees Defined.--In this 
     section, the term ``congressional intelligence committees'' 
     means--
       (1) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and
       (2) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the 
     House of Representatives.

 TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

     SEC. 201. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

       There is authorized to be appropriated for the Central 
     Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability Fund for fiscal 
     year 2007 the sum of $256,400,000.

   TITLE III--INTELLIGENCE AND GENERAL INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MATTERS

     SEC. 301. INCREASE IN EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS 
                   AUTHORIZED BY LAW.

       Appropriations authorized by this Act for salary, pay, 
     retirement, and other benefits for Federal employees may be 
     increased by such additional or supplemental amounts as may 
     be necessary for increases in such compensation or benefits 
     authorized by law.

     SEC. 302. RESTRICTION ON CONDUCT OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

       The authorization of appropriations by this Act shall not 
     be deemed to constitute authority for the conduct of any 
     intelligence activity which is not otherwise authorized by 
     the Constitution or the laws of the United States.

     SEC. 303. CLARIFICATION OF DEFINITION OF INTELLIGENCE 
                   COMMUNITY UNDER THE NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 
                   1947.

       Subparagraph (L) of section 3(4) of the National Security 
     Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)) is amended by striking 
     ``other'' the second place it appears.

     SEC. 304. DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY FOR TRAVEL ON COMMON 
                   CARRIERS FOR INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION PERSONNEL.

       (a) Delegation of Authority.--Section 116(b) of the 
     National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404k(b)) is 
     amended--
       (1) by inserting ``(1)'' before ``The Director'';
       (2) in paragraph (1), by striking ``may only delegate'' and 
     all that follows and inserting ``may delegate the authority 
     in subsection (a) to the head of any other element of the 
     intelligence community.''; and
       (3) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
       ``(2) The head of an element of the intelligence community 
     to whom the authority in subsection (a) is delegated pursuant 
     to paragraph (1) may further delegate such authority to such 
     senior officials of such element as are specified in 
     guidelines prescribed by the Director of National 
     Intelligence for purposes of this paragraph.''.
       (b) Submittal of Guidelines to Congress.--Not later than 
     six months after the date of the enactment of this Act, the 
     Director of National Intelligence shall prescribe and submit 
     to the congressional intelligence committees the guidelines 
     referred to in paragraph (2) of section 116(b) of the 
     National Security Act of 1947, as added by subsection (a).
       (c) Congressional Intelligence Committees Defined.--In this 
     section, the term ``congressional intelligence committees'' 
     means--
       (1) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and
       (2) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the 
     House of Representatives.

     SEC. 305. RETENTION AND USE OF AMOUNTS PAID AS DEBTS TO 
                   ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.

       (a) In General.--Title XI of the National Security Act of 
     1947 (50 U.S.C. 442 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end 
     the following new section:


    ``Retention and use of amounts paid as debts to Elements of the 
                         Intelligence Community

       ``Sec. 1103. (a) Authority to Retain Amounts Paid.--
     Notwithstanding section 3302 of title 31, United States Code, 
     or any other provision of law, the head of an element of the 
     intelligence community may retain amounts paid or reimbursed 
     to the United States, including amounts paid by an employee 
     of the Federal

[[Page H1797]]

     Government from personal funds, for repayment of a debt owed 
     to the element of the intelligence community.
       ``(b) Crediting of Amounts Retained.--(1) Amounts retained 
     under subsection (a) shall be credited to the current 
     appropriation or account from which such funds were derived 
     or whose expenditure formed the basis for the underlying 
     activity from which the debt concerned arose.
       ``(2) Amounts credited to an appropriation or account under 
     paragraph (1) shall be merged with amounts in such 
     appropriation or account, and shall be available in 
     accordance with subsection (c).
       ``(c) Availability of Amounts.--Amounts credited to an 
     appropriation or account under subsection (b) with respect to 
     a debt owed to an element of the intelligence community shall 
     be available to the head of such element, for such time as is 
     applicable to amounts in such appropriation or account, or 
     such longer time as may be provided by law, for purposes as 
     follows:
       ``(1) In the case of a debt arising from lost or damaged 
     property of such element, the repair of such property or the 
     replacement of such property with alternative property that 
     will perform the same or similar functions as such property.
       ``(2) The funding of any other activities authorized to be 
     funded by such appropriation or account.
       ``(d) Debt Owed to an Element of the Intelligence Community 
     Defined.--In this section, the term `debt owed to an element 
     of the intelligence community' means any of the following:
       ``(1) A debt owed to an element of the intelligence 
     community by an employee or former employee of such element 
     for the negligent or willful loss of or damage to property of 
     such element that was procured by such element using 
     appropriated funds.
       ``(2) A debt owed to an element of the intelligence 
     community by an employee or former employee of such element 
     as repayment for default on the terms and conditions 
     associated with a scholarship, fellowship, or other 
     educational assistance provided to such individual by such 
     element, whether in exchange for future services or 
     otherwise, using appropriated funds.
       ``(3) Any other debt or repayment owed to an element of the 
     intelligence community by a private person or entity by 
     reason of the negligent or willful action of such person or 
     entity, as determined by a court of competent jurisdiction or 
     in a lawful administrative proceeding.''.
       (b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents in the first 
     section of that Act is amended by adding at the end the 
     following new item:

``Sec. 1103. Retention and use of amounts paid as debts to elements of 
              the intelligence community.''.

     SEC. 306. AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS FOR TRAVEL AND TRANSPORTATION 
                   OF PERSONAL EFFECTS, HOUSEHOLD GOODS, AND 
                   AUTOMOBILES.

       (a) Funds of Office of Director of National Intelligence.--
     Funds appropriated to the Office of the Director of National 
     Intelligence and available for travel and transportation 
     expenses shall be available for such expenses when any part 
     of the travel or transportation concerned begins in a fiscal 
     year pursuant to travel orders issued in such fiscal year, 
     notwithstanding that such travel or transportation is or may 
     not be completed during such fiscal year.
       (b) Funds of Central Intelligence Agency.--Funds 
     appropriated to the Central Intelligence Agency and available 
     for travel and transportation expenses shall be available for 
     such expenses when any part of the travel or transportation 
     concerned begins in a fiscal year pursuant to travel orders 
     issued in such fiscal year, notwithstanding that such travel 
     or transportation is or may not be completed during such 
     fiscal year.
       (c) Travel and Transportation Expenses Defined.--In this 
     section, the term ``travel and transportation expenses'' 
     means the following:
       (1) Expenses in connection with travel of personnel, 
     including travel of dependents.
       (2) Expenses in connection with transportation of personal 
     effects, household goods, or automobiles of personnel.

     SEC. 307. PURCHASES BY ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY 
                   OF PRODUCTS OF FEDERAL PRISON INDUSTRIES.

       Section 404 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for 
     Fiscal Year 2004 (Public Law 108-177; 117 Stat. 2632) is 
     amended--
       (1) by striking ``by the Central Intelligence Agency'' and 
     inserting ``by an element of the intelligence community (as 
     defined in section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 
     (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)))''; and
       (2) by striking ``the Director of the Central Intelligence 
     Agency determines that the product or service'' and inserting 
     ``the head of that element determines that the product or 
     service (including a surveying or mapping service)''.

  TITLE IV--MATTERS RELATING TO ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

      Subtitle A--Office of the Director of National Intelligence

     SEC. 401. CLARIFICATION OF DELEGATION OF TRANSFER OR 
                   REPROGRAMMING AUTHORITY.

       Section 102A(d)(5)(B) of the National Security Act of 1947 
     (50 U.S.C. 403-1(d)(5)(B)), as added by section 1011(a) of 
     the National Security Intelligence Reform Act of 2004 (title 
     I of Public Law 108-458; 118 Stat. 3643), is amended in the 
     second sentence by striking ``or agency involved'' and 
     inserting ``involved or the Director of the Central 
     Intelligence Agency (in the case of the Central Intelligence 
     Agency)''.

     SEC. 402. CLARIFICATION OF LIMITATION ON CO-LOCATION OF THE 
                   OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL 
                   INTELLIGENCE.

       Section 103(e) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 
     U.S.C. 403-3(e)) is amended--
       (1) in the heading, by striking ``With'' and inserting ``of 
     Headquarters With Headquarters Of'' ;
       (2) by inserting ``the headquarters of'' before ``the 
     Office''; and
       (3) by striking ``any other element'' and inserting ``the 
     headquarters of any other element''.

     SEC. 403. ADDITIONAL DUTIES OF THE DIRECTOR OF SCIENCE AND 
                   TECHNOLOGY OF THE OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF 
                   NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE.

       (a) Coordination and Prioritization of Research Conducted 
     by Elements of Intelligence Community.--Subsection (d) of 
     section 103E of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 
     403-3e) is amended--
       (1) in paragraph (3)(A), by inserting ``and prioritize'' 
     after ``coordinate''; and
       (2) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
       ``(4) In carrying out paragraph (3)(A), the Committee shall 
     identify basic, advanced, and applied research programs to be 
     carried out by elements of the intelligence community.''.
       (b) Development of Technology Goals.--Such section is 
     further amended--
       (1) in subsection (c)--
       (A) in paragraph (4), by striking ``and'' at the end;
       (B) by redesignating paragraph (5) as paragraph (6); and
       (C) by inserting after paragraph (4) the following new 
     paragraph:
       ``(5) assist the Director in establishing goals for the 
     elements of the intelligence community to meet the technology 
     needs of the intelligence community; and''; and
       (2) by adding at the end the following new subsection:
       ``(e) Goals for Technology Needs of Intelligence 
     Community.--In carrying out subsection (c)(5), the Director 
     of Science and Technology shall--
       ``(1) systematically identify and assess the most 
     significant intelligence challenges that require technical 
     solutions; and
       ``(2) examine options to enhance the responsiveness of 
     research and design programs of elements of the intelligence 
     community to meet the requirements of the intelligence 
     community for timely support.''.
       (c) Report.--(1) Not later than June 30, 2007, the Director 
     of National Intelligence shall submit to Congress a report 
     containing a strategy for the development and use of 
     technology in the intelligence community through 2021.
       (2) The report shall include--
       (A) an assessment of the highest priority intelligence gaps 
     across the intelligence community that may be resolved by the 
     use of technology;
       (B) goals for advanced research and development and a 
     strategy to achieve such goals;
       (C) an explanation of how each advanced research and 
     development project funded under the National Intelligence 
     Program addresses an identified intelligence gap;
       (D) a list of all current and projected research and 
     development projects by research type (basic, advanced, or 
     applied) with estimated funding levels, estimated initiation 
     dates, and estimated completion dates; and
       (E) a plan to incorporate technology from research and 
     development projects into National Intelligence Program 
     acquisition programs.
       (3) The report may be submitted in classified form.

     SEC. 404. APPOINTMENT AND TITLE OF CHIEF INFORMATION OFFICER 
                   OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.

       (a) Appointment.--
       (1) In general.--Subsection (a) of section 103G of the 
     National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3g) is amended 
     by striking ``the President, by and with the advice and 
     consent of the Senate'' and inserting ``the Director of 
     National Intelligence''.
       (2) Applicability.--The amendment made by paragraph (1) 
     shall take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act, 
     and shall apply with respect to any nomination of an 
     individual as Chief Information Officer of the Intelligence 
     Community that is made on or after that date.
       (b) Title.--Such section is further amended--
       (1) in subsection (a), by inserting ``of the Intelligence 
     Community'' after ``Chief Information Officer'';
       (2) in subsection (b), by inserting ``of the Intelligence 
     Community'' after ``Chief Information Officer'';
       (3) in subsection (c), by inserting ``of the Intelligence 
     Community'' after ``Chief Information Officer''; and
       (4) in subsection (d), by inserting ``of the Intelligence 
     Community'' after ``Chief Information Officer''.

     SEC. 405. LEADERSHIP AND LOCATION OF CERTAIN OFFICES AND 
                   OFFICIALS.

       (a) National Counter Proliferation Center.--Section 119A(a) 
     of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404o-1(a)) is 
     amended--
       (1) by striking ``Establishment.--Not later than 18 months 
     after the date of the enactment of the National Security 
     Intelligence Reform Act of 2004, the'' and inserting ``(1) 
     Establishment.--The''; and
       (2) by adding at the end the following new paragraphs:
       ``(2) Director.--The head of the National Counter 
     Proliferation Center shall be the Director of the National 
     Counter Proliferation Center, who shall be appointed by the 
     Director of National Intelligence.
       ``(3) Location.--The National Counter Proliferation Center 
     shall be located within the Office of the Director of 
     National Intelligence.''.
       (b) Officers.--Section 103(c) of that Act (50 U.S.C. 403-
     3(c)) is amended--
       (1) by redesignating paragraph (9) as paragraph (13); and

[[Page H1798]]

       (2) by inserting after paragraph (8) the following new 
     paragraphs:
       ``(9) The Chief Information Officer of the intelligence 
     community.
       ``(10) The Inspector General of the intelligence community.
       ``(11) The Director of the National Counterterrorism 
     Center.
       ``(12) The Director of the National Counter Proliferation 
     Center.''.

     SEC. 406. ELIGIBILITY FOR INCENTIVE AWARDS OF PERSONNEL 
                   ASSIGNED TO THE OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF 
                   NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE.

       (a) In General.--Subsection (a) of section 402 of the 
     Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1984 (50 
     U.S.C. 403e-1) is amended to read as follows:
       ``(a) Authority for Payment of Awards.--(1) The Director of 
     National Intelligence may exercise the authority granted in 
     section 4503 of title 5, United States Code, with respect to 
     Federal employees and members of the Armed Forces detailed or 
     assigned to the Office of the Director of National 
     Intelligence in the same manner as such authority may be 
     exercised with respect to personnel of the Office.
       ``(2) The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency may 
     exercise the authority granted in section 4503 of title 5, 
     United States Code, with respect to Federal employees and 
     members of the Armed Forces detailed or assigned to the 
     Central Intelligence Agency in the same manner as such 
     authority may be exercised with respect to personnel of the 
     Agency.''.
       (b) Repeal of Obsolete Authority.--Such section is further 
     amended--
       (1) by striking subsection (c); and
       (2) by redesignating subsection (d) as subsection (c).
       (c) Conforming Amendments.--Such section is further 
     amended--
       (1) in subsection (b), by striking ``to the Central 
     Intelligence Agency or to the Intelligence Community Staff'' 
     and inserting ``to the Office of the Director of National 
     Intelligence or to the Central Intelligence Agency''; and
       (2) in subsection (c), as redesignated by subsection (b)(2) 
     of this section, by striking ``Director of Central 
     Intelligence'' and inserting ``Director of National 
     Intelligence or Director of the Central Intelligence 
     Agency''.
       (d) Technical and Stylistic Amendments.--That section is 
     further amended--
       (1) in subsection (b)--
       (A) by inserting ``Personnel Eligible for Awards.--'' after 
     ``(b)'';
       (B) by striking ``subsection (a) of this section'' and 
     inserting ``subsection (a)''; and
       (C) by striking ``a date five years before the date of 
     enactment of this section'' and inserting ``December 9, 
     1978''; and
       (2) in subsection (c), as so redesignated, by inserting 
     ``Payment and Acceptance of Awards.--'' after ``(c)''.

     SEC. 407. REPEAL OF CERTAIN AUTHORITIES RELATING TO THE 
                   OFFICE OF THE NATIONAL COUNTERINTELLIGENCE 
                   EXECUTIVE.

       (a) Repeal of Certain Authorities.--Section 904 of the 
     Counterintelligence Enhancement Act of 2002 (title IX of 
     Public Law 107-306; 50 U.S.C. 402c) is amended--
       (1) by striking subsections (d), (g), (h), (i), and (j); 
     and
       (2) by redesignating subsections (e), (f), (k), (l), and 
     (m) as subsections (d), (e), (f), (g), and (h), respectively.
       (b) Conforming Amendments.--That section is further 
     amended--
       (1) in subsection (d), as redesignated by subsection (a)(2) 
     of this section, by striking ``subsection (f)'' each place it 
     appears in paragraphs (1) and (2) and inserting ``subsection 
     (e)''; and
       (2) in subsection (e)(2), as so redesignated, by striking 
     ``subsection (e)(2)'' and inserting ``subsection (d)(2)''.

     SEC. 408. MEMBERSHIP OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE 
                   ON THE TRANSPORTATION SECURITY OVERSIGHT BOARD.

       Subparagraph (F) of section 115(b)(1) of title 49, United 
     States Code, is amended to read as follows:
       ``(F) The Director of National Intelligence, or the 
     Director's designee.''.

     SEC. 409. TEMPORARY INAPPLICABILITY TO THE OFFICE OF THE 
                   DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OF CERTAIN 
                   FINANCIAL REPORTING REQUIREMENTS.

       The Director of National Intelligence shall not be required 
     to submit an audited financial statement under section 3515 
     of title 31, United States Code, for the Office of the 
     Director of National Intelligence with respect to fiscal year 
     2005 or 2006.

     SEC. 410. COMPREHENSIVE INVENTORY OF SPECIAL ACCESS PROGRAMS.

       Not later than January 15, 2007, the Director of National 
     Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence 
     committees (as defined in section 3(7) of the National 
     Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(7))) a classified report 
     providing a comprehensive inventory of all special access 
     programs under the National Intelligence Program (as defined 
     in section 3(6) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 
     U.S.C. 401a(6))).

     SEC. 411. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON MULTI-LEVEL SECURITY 
                   CLEARANCES.

       It is the sense of Congress that the Director of National 
     Intelligence should promptly establish and oversee the 
     implementation of a multi-level security clearance system 
     across the intelligence community to leverage the cultural 
     and linguistic skills of subject matter experts and 
     individuals proficient in foreign languages critical to 
     national security.

     SEC. 412. ACCESS TO INFORMATION BY STAFF AND MEMBERS OF THE 
                   CONGRESSIONAL INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEES.

       Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of 
     this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall provide 
     to the members and staff of the Permanent Select Committee on 
     Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the Select 
     Committee on Intelligence of the Senate accounts for and 
     access to the Intelink System (or any successor system) 
     through the Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications 
     System (or any successor system). Such access shall include 
     access up to and including the level of sensitive 
     compartmented information and shall be provided in the 
     sensitive compartmented information facilities of each 
     Committee.

     SEC. 413. STUDY ON REVOKING PENSIONS OF PERSONS WHO COMMIT 
                   UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURES OF CLASSIFIED 
                   INFORMATION.

       (a) Study.--The Director of National Intelligence shall 
     conduct a study on the feasibility of revoking the pensions 
     of personnel in the intelligence community (as defined in 
     section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 
     401a(4))) who commit unauthorized disclosures of classified 
     information, including whether revoking such pensions is 
     feasible under existing law or under the administrative 
     authority of the Director of National Intelligence or any 
     other head of an element of the intelligence community.
       (b) Report.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence 
     shall submit to the Permanent Select Committee on 
     Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the Select 
     Committee on Intelligence of the Senate a report containing 
     the results of the study conducted under subsection (a).

                Subtitle B--Central Intelligence Agency

     SEC. 421. ENHANCED PROTECTION OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 
                   INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS FROM 
                   UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE.

       (a) Responsibility of Director of Central Intelligence 
     Agency Under National Security Act of 1947.--Subsection (d) 
     of section 104A of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 
     U.S.C. 403-4a) is amended--
       (1) in paragraph (3), by striking ``and'' at the end;
       (2) by redesignating paragraph (4) as paragraph (5); and
       (3) by inserting after paragraph (3) the following new 
     paragraph:
       ``(4) protect intelligence sources and methods of the 
     Central Intelligence Agency from unauthorized disclosure, 
     consistent with any direction issued by the President or the 
     Director of National Intelligence; and''.
       (b) Protection Under Central Intelligence Agency Act of 
     1949.--Section 6 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 
     1949 (50 U.S.C. 403g) is amended by striking ``section 
     102A(i)'' and all that follows through ``unauthorized 
     disclosure'' and inserting ``sections 102A(i) and 104A(d)(4) 
     of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-1(i), 
     403-4a(d)(4))''.
       (c) Construction With Exemption From Requirement for 
     Disclosure of Information to Public.--Section 104A(d)(4) of 
     the National Security Act of 1947, as amended by subsection 
     (a), and section 6 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 
     1949, as amended by subsection (b), shall be treated as 
     statutes that specifically exempt from disclosure the matters 
     specified in such sections for purposes of section 552(b)(3) 
     of title 5, United States Code.
       (d) Technical Amendments to Central Intelligence Agency 
     Retirement Act.--Section 201(c) of the Central Intelligence 
     Agency Retirement Act (50 U.S.C. 2011(c)) is amended--
       (1) in the subsection heading, by striking ``of DCI'';
       (2) by striking ``section 102A(i)'' and inserting 
     ``sections 102A(i) and 104A(d)(4)'';
       (3) by striking ``of National Intelligence''; and
       (4) by inserting ``of the Central Intelligence Agency'' 
     after ``methods''.

     SEC. 422. ADDITIONAL EXCEPTION TO FOREIGN LANGUAGE 
                   PROFICIENCY REQUIREMENT FOR CERTAIN SENIOR 
                   LEVEL POSITIONS IN THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE 
                   AGENCY.

       (a) Additional Exception.--Subsection (g) of section 104A 
     of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-4a) is 
     amended--
       (1) in paragraph (1), by striking ``paragraph (2)'' and 
     inserting ``paragraphs (2) and (3)'';
       (2) in paragraph (2), by striking ``position or category of 
     positions'' each place it appears and inserting ``individual, 
     individuals, position, or category of positions''; and
       (3) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
       ``(3) Paragraph (1) shall not apply to any individual in 
     the Directorate of Intelligence or the Directorate of 
     Operations of the Central Intelligence Agency who is serving 
     in a Senior Intelligence Service position as of December 23, 
     2005, regardless of whether such individual is a member of 
     the Senior Intelligence Service.''.
       (b) Report on Waivers.--Section 611(c) of the Intelligence 
     Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 (Public Law 108-487; 
     118 Stat. 3955) is amended--
       (1) in the first sentence, by inserting ``individuals or'' 
     before ``positions''; and
       (2) in the second sentence, by striking ``position or 
     category of positions'' and inserting ``individual, 
     individuals, position, or category of positions''.

     SEC. 423. ADDITIONAL FUNCTIONS AND AUTHORITIES FOR PROTECTIVE 
                   PERSONNEL OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.

       (a) Protection of Certain Persons.--Section 5(a)(4) of the 
     Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 
     403f(a)(4)) is amended--
       (1) by striking ``and the protection'' and inserting ``the 
     protection''; and
       (2) by striking the semicolon and inserting ``, and the 
     protection of the Director of National Intelligence and such 
     personnel of the Office of

[[Page H1799]]

     the Director of National Intelligence as the Director of 
     National Intelligence may designate;''.
       (b) Authority to Arrest.--
       (1) Chapter 203 of title 18, United States Code, is amended 
     by adding at the end the following:

     ``Sec. 3065. Powers of authorized personnel in the Central 
       Intelligence Agency

       ``(a) The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency may 
     issue regulations to allow personnel designated to carry out 
     protective functions for the Central Intelligence Agency 
     under section 5(a)(4) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act 
     of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403f) to, while engaged in such protective 
     functions, make arrests without a warrant for any offense 
     against the United States committed in the presence of such 
     personnel, or for any felony cognizable under the laws of the 
     United States, if such personnel have probable cause to 
     believe that the person to be arrested has committed or is 
     committing that felony offense.
       ``(b) The powers granted under subsection (a) may be 
     exercised only in accordance with guidelines approved by the 
     Attorney General.''.
       (2) The table of sections at the beginning of chapter 203 
     of title 18, United States Code, is amended by adding at the 
     end the following:

``3065. Powers of authorized personnel in the Central Intelligence 
              Agency.''.

     SEC. 424. PROTECTIVE SERVICES FOR FORMER OFFICIALS OF THE 
                   INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.

       (a) In General.--Title III of the National Security Act of 
     1947 (50 U.S.C. 409a et seq.) is amended by inserting after 
     section 303 the following new section:


    ``Protective services for former officials of the intelligence 
                               community

       ``Sec. 304. (a) In General.--Subject to subsection (b), the 
     head of an element of the intelligence community may not 
     provide personnel for the protection of a former official of 
     an element of the intelligence community unless--
       ``(1) there is a specific and credible threat to such 
     former official arising from the service of such former 
     official to the United States; and
       ``(2) such head of an element of the intelligence community 
     submits to the Director of National Intelligence notice of 
     the intention to provide such personnel and an assessment 
     of--
       ``(A) the threat to such former official; and
       ``(B) the level of protective services necessary to protect 
     such former official based on such threat.
       ``(b) Exception for Recent Termination of Employment.--The 
     head of an element of the intelligence community may provide 
     personnel for the protection of a former official of an 
     element of the intelligence community without a specific and 
     credible threat to such former official for not more than one 
     year after the termination of the employment of such former 
     official if such former official requests such protection.
       ``(c) Threat Assessment Updates.--Not later than 180 days 
     after the date on which the head of an element of the 
     intelligence community begins providing personnel for the 
     protection of a former official of an element of the 
     intelligence community, and at least every 180 days 
     thereafter until such head of an element of the intelligence 
     community determines that there is no longer a threat to such 
     former official, such head of an element of the intelligence 
     community shall submit to the Director of National 
     Intelligence an updated assessment of the threat to such 
     former official and the level of protective services 
     necessary to protect such former official based on such 
     threat.
       ``(d) Termination of Protective Services.--If the head of 
     an element of the intelligence community that is providing 
     personnel for the protection of a former official of an 
     element of the intelligence community pursuant to subsection 
     (a) determines that there is no longer a threat to such 
     former official, such head of an element of the intelligence 
     community shall cease providing personnel for the protection 
     of such former official not later than 30 days after 
     determining such threat no longer exists.
       ``(e) Report.--Not later than 7 days after the date on 
     which the head of an element of the intelligence community 
     begins providing personnel for the protection of a former 
     official of an element of the intelligence community, the 
     Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the 
     congressional intelligence committees notice of the provision 
     of personnel for the protection of such former official.''.
       (b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents of such Act 
     is amended by--
       (1) striking the second item relating to section 301;
       (2) striking the second item relating to section 302;
       (3) striking the items relating to sections 304, 305, and 
     306; and
       (4) inserting after the item relating to section 303 the 
     following new item:

``Sec. 304. Protective services for former officials of the 
              intelligence community.''.

     SEC. 425. STRATEGIC REVIEW PROCESS.

       Section 102A(f) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 
     U.S.C. 403-1(f)) is amended by adding at the end the 
     following new paragraph:
       ``(9) Not later than September 30, 2007, and every four 
     years thereafter, the Director of National Intelligence 
     shall, in consultation with the heads of the elements of the 
     intelligence community, manage and oversee the conduct of a 
     strategic review of the intelligence community to develop 
     intelligence capabilities required to address threats to 
     national security. Such review shall analyze near-term, mid-
     term, and future threats to national security and shall 
     include estimates of the allocation of resources and 
     structural change that should be reflected in future budget 
     requests.''.

              Subtitle C--Defense Intelligence Components

     SEC. 431. ENHANCEMENTS OF NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY TRAINING 
                   PROGRAM.

       (a) Termination of Employees.--Subsection (d)(1)(C) of 
     section 16 of the National Security Agency Act of 1959 (50 
     U.S.C. 402 note) is amended by striking ``terminated either 
     by'' and all that follows and inserting ``terminated--
       ``(i) by the Agency due to misconduct by the employee;
       ``(ii) by the employee voluntarily; or
       ``(iii) by the Agency for the failure of the employee to 
     maintain such level of academic standing in the educational 
     course of training as the Director of the National Security 
     Agency shall have specified in the agreement of the employee 
     under this subsection; and''.
       (b) Authority to Withhold Disclosure of Affiliation With 
     NSA.--Subsection (e) of such section is amended by striking 
     ``(1) When an employee'' and all that follows through ``(2) 
     Agency efforts'' and inserting ``Agency efforts''.

     SEC. 432. CODIFICATION OF AUTHORITIES OF NATIONAL SECURITY 
                   AGENCY PROTECTIVE PERSONNEL.

       (a) Protection of Certain Persons.--The National Security 
     Agency Act of 1959 (50 U.S.C. 402 note) is amended by adding 
     at the end the following new section:
       ``Sec. 20. (a) The Director is authorized to designate 
     personnel of the Agency to perform protective functions for 
     the Director and for any personnel of the Agency designated 
     by the Director.
       ``(b) Nothing in this section shall be construed to impair 
     or otherwise affect any authority under any other provision 
     of law relating to the performance of protective 
     functions.''.
       (b) Authority to Arrest.--
       (1) Chapter 203 of title 18, United States Code, as amended 
     by section 423 of this Act, is amended by adding at the end 
     the following:

     ``Sec. 3066. Powers of authorized personnel in the National 
       Security Agency

       ``(a) The Director of the National Security Agency may 
     issue regulations to allow personnel designated to carry out 
     protective functions for the Agency to--
       ``(1) carry firearms; and
       ``(2) make arrests without warrant for any offense against 
     the United States committed in the presence of such 
     personnel, or for any felony cognizable under the laws of the 
     United States, if such personnel have probable cause to 
     believe that the person to be arrested has committed or is 
     committing that felony offense.
       ``(b) The powers granted under subsection (a) may be 
     exercised only in accordance with guidelines approved by the 
     Attorney General.''.
       (2) Clerical amendment.--The table of sections at the 
     beginning of chapter 203 of title 18, United States Code, as 
     amended by section 423 of this Act, is amended by adding at 
     the end the following:

``3066. Powers of authorized personnel in the National Security 
              Agency.''.

                       Subtitle D--Other Elements

     SEC. 441. CLARIFICATION OF INCLUSION OF COAST GUARD AND DRUG 
                   ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION ELEMENTS IN THE 
                   INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.

       Section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 
     U.S.C. 401a(4)) is amended--
       (1) in subparagraph (H)--
       (A) by inserting ``the Coast Guard,'' after ``the Marine 
     Corps,''; and
       (B) by inserting ``the Drug Enforcement Administration,'' 
     after ``the Federal Bureau of Investigation,''; and
       (2) in subparagraph (K), by striking ``, including the 
     Office of Intelligence of the Coast Guard''.

     SEC. 442. CLARIFYING AMENDMENTS RELATING TO SECTION 105 OF 
                   THE INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL 
                   YEAR 2004.

       Section 105(b) of the Intelligence Authorization Act for 
     Fiscal Year 2004 (Public Law 108-177; 117 Stat. 2603; 31 
     U.S.C. 311 note) is amended--
       (1) by striking ``Director of Central Intelligence'' and 
     inserting ``Director of National Intelligence''; and
       (2) by inserting ``or in section 313 of such title,'' after 
     ``subsection (a)),''.

                         TITLE V--OTHER MATTERS

     SEC. 501. AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE PLATFORMS.

       (a) Limitation on Termination of U-2 Aircraft Program.--The 
     Secretary of Defense may not begin the process to terminate 
     the U-2 aircraft program until the Secretary certifies in 
     accordance with subsection (b) that there would be no loss of 
     national or Department of Defense intelligence, surveillance, 
     and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities in transitioning from 
     the U-2 aircraft program to the Global Hawk RQ-4 unmanned 
     aerial vehicle platform.
       (b) Report and Certification.--
       (1) Study.--The Secretary of Defense shall conduct a study 
     of aerial reconnaissance platforms to determine whether the 
     Global Hawk RQ-4 unmanned aerial vehicle has reached mission 
     capability and has attained collection capabilities on a par 
     with the collection capabilities of the U-2 Block 20 aircraft 
     program as of April 1, 2006.
       (2) Report.--The Secretary shall submit to the 
     congressional committees specified in subsection (c) a report 
     containing the results of the study. The Secretary shall 
     include in the report the Secretary's determination as to 
     whether the Global Hawk RQ-4 unmanned aerial vehicle--
       (A) has reached mission capability; and
       (B) has attained collection capabilities on a par with the 
     collection capabilities of the U-2 Block 20 aircraft program 
     as of April 1, 2006.
       (3) Certification.--The Secretary shall include with the 
     report the Secretary's certification, based on the results of 
     the study, as to whether or not there would be a loss of 
     national or Department of Defense intelligence, surveillance, 
     and reconnaissance capabilities with a transition from the U-
     2 aircraft program to the

[[Page H1800]]

     Global Hawk RQ-4 unmanned aerial vehicle platform.
       (c) Specified Committees.--The congressional committees 
     specified in this subsection are the following:
       (1) The Committee on Armed Services and the Select 
     Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.
       (2) The Committee on Armed Services and the Permanent 
     Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of 
     Representatives.

     SEC. 502. ELIMINATION OF CERTAIN REPORTING REQUIREMENTS.

       (a) Intelligence Sharing With UN.--Section 112 of the 
     National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404g) is amended by 
     striking subsection (b).
       (b) Improvement of Financial Statements for Auditing 
     Purposes.--The National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401 
     et seq.) is amended--
       (1) by striking section 114A; and
       (2) in the table of contents in the first section, by 
     striking the item relating to section 114A.
       (c) Financial Intelligence on Terrorist Assets.--The 
     National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401 et seq.) is 
     amended--
       (1) by striking section 118; and
       (2) in the table of contents in the first section, by 
     striking the item relating to section 118.
       (d) Counterdrug Intelligence.--The Intelligence 
     Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 (Public Law 107-306) 
     is amended--
       (1) by striking section 826; and
       (2) in the table of contents in section 1(b), by striking 
     the item relating to section 826.

     SEC. 503. TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY ACT 
                   OF 1947.

       The National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401 et seq.) 
     is amended as follows:
       (1) In section 102A (50 U.S.C. 403-1)--
       (A) in subsection (c)(7)(A), by striking ``section'' and 
     inserting ``subsection'';
       (B) in subsection (d)--
       (i) in paragraph (3), by striking ``subparagraph (A)'' in 
     the matter preceding subparagraph (A) and inserting 
     ``paragraph (1)(A)''; and
       (ii) in paragraph (5)(A), by striking ``or personnel'' in 
     the matter preceding clause (i); and
       (C) in subsection (l)(2)(B), by striking ``section'' and 
     inserting ``paragraph''.
       (2) In section 119(c)(2)(B) (50 U.S.C. 404o(c)(2)(B)), by 
     striking ``subsection (h)'' and inserting ``subsection (i)''.

     SEC. 504. TECHNICAL CLARIFICATION OF CERTAIN REFERENCES TO 
                   JOINT MILITARY INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM AND 
                   TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE AND RELATED ACTIVITIES.

       Section 102A of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 
     U.S.C. 403-1) is amended--
       (1) in subsection (c)(3)(A), by striking ``annual budgets 
     for the Joint Military Intelligence Program and for Tactical 
     Intelligence and Related Activities'' and inserting ``annual 
     budget for the Military Intelligence Program or any successor 
     program or programs''; and
       (2) in subsection (d)(1)(B), by striking ``Joint Military 
     Intelligence Program'' and inserting ``Military Intelligence 
     Program or any successor program or programs''.

     SEC. 505. TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS TO THE INTELLIGENCE REFORM AND 
                   TERRORISM PREVENTION ACT OF 2004.

       (a) Amendments to National Security Intelligence Reform Act 
     of 2004.--The National Security Intelligence Reform Act of 
     2004 (title I of Public Law 108-458) is amended as follows:
       (1) In section 1016(e)(10)(B) (6 U.S.C. 458(e)(10)(B)), by 
     striking ``Attorney General'' the second place it appears and 
     inserting ``Department of Justice''.
       (2) In section 1061 (5 U.S.C. 601 note)--
       (A) in subsection (d)(4)(A), by striking ``National 
     Intelligence Director'' and inserting ``Director of National 
     Intelligence''; and
       (B) in subsection (h), by striking ``National Intelligence 
     Director'' and inserting ``Director of National 
     Intelligence''.
       (3) In section 1071(e), by striking ``(1)''.
       (4) In section 1072(b), by inserting ``Agency'' after 
     ``Intelligence''.
       (b) Other Amendments to Intelligence Reform and Terrorism 
     Prevention Act of 2004.--The Intelligence Reform and 
     Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (Public Law 108-458) is 
     amended as follows:
       (1) In section 2001 (28 U.S.C. 532 note)--
       (A) in subsection (c)(1), by inserting ``of'' before ``an 
     institutional culture'';
       (B) in subsection (e)(2), by striking ``the National 
     Intelligence Director in a manner consistent with section 
     112(e)'' and inserting ``the Director of National 
     Intelligence in a manner consistent with applicable law''; 
     and
       (C) in subsection (f), by striking ``shall,'' in the matter 
     preceding paragraph (1) and inserting ``shall''.
       (2) In section 2006 (28 U.S.C. 509 note)--
       (A) in paragraph (2), by striking ``the Federal'' and 
     inserting ``Federal''; and
       (B) in paragraph (3), by striking ``the specific'' and 
     inserting ``specific''.

     SEC. 506. TECHNICAL AMENDMENT TO THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE 
                   AGENCY ACT OF 1949.

       Section 5(a)(1) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 
     1949 (50 U.S.C. 403f(a)(1)) is amended by striking 
     ``authorized under paragraphs (2) and (3) of section 102(a), 
     subsections (c)(7) and (d) of section 103, subsections (a) 
     and (g) of section 104, and section 303 of the National 
     Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403(a)(2), (3), 403-3(c)(7), 
     (d), 403-4(a), (g), and 405)'' and inserting ``authorized 
     under subsections (c), (d), (e), and (f) of section 104A of 
     the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-4a)''.

     SEC. 507. TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS RELATING TO THE MULTIYEAR 
                   NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM.

       (a) In General.--Subsection (a) of section 1403 of the 
     National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991 (50 
     U.S.C. 404b) is amended--
       (1) in the subsection heading, by striking ``Foreign''; and
       (2) by striking ``foreign'' each place it appears.
       (b) Responsibility of DNI.--That section is further 
     amended--
       (1) in subsections (a) and (c), by striking ``Director of 
     Central Intelligence'' and inserting ``Director of National 
     Intelligence''; and
       (2) in subsection (b), by inserting ``of National 
     Intelligence'' after ``Director''.
       (c) Conforming Amendment.--The heading of that section is 
     amended to read as follows:

     ``SEC. 1403. MULTIYEAR NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM.''.

     SEC. 508. TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS TO THE EXECUTIVE SCHEDULE.

       (a) Executive Schedule Level II.--Section 5313 of title 5, 
     United States Code, is amended by striking the item relating 
     to the Director of Central Intelligence and inserting the 
     following new item:
       ``Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.''.
       (b) Executive Schedule Level IV.--Section 5315 of title 5, 
     United States Code, is amended by striking the item relating 
     to the General Counsel of the Office of the National 
     Intelligence Director and inserting the following new item:
       ``General Counsel of the Office of the Director of National 
     Intelligence.''.

     Sec. 509. Technical amendments relating to redesignation of 
       the National Imagery and Mapping Agency as the national 
       Geospatial-Intelligence Agency

       (a) Title 5, United States Code.--(1) Title 5, United 
     States Code, is amended by striking ``National Imagery and 
     Mapping Agency'' each place it appears in a provision as 
     follows and inserting ``National Geospatial-Intelligence 
     Agency'':
       (A) Section 2302(a)(2)(C)(ii).
       (B) Section 3132(a)(1)(B).
       (C) Section 4301(1) (in clause (ii)).
       (D) Section 4701(a)(1)(B).
       (E) Section 5102(a)(1) (in clause (x)).
       (F) Section 5342(a)(1) (in clause (K)).
       (G) Section 6339(a)(1)(E).
       (H) Section 7323(b)(2)(B)(i)(XIII).
       (2) Section 6339(a)(2)(E) of such title is amended by 
     striking ``National Imagery and Mapping Agency, the Director 
     of the National Imagery and Mapping Agency'' and inserting 
     ``National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, the Director of 
     the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency''.
       (b) Title 44, United States Code.--(1)(A) Section 1336 of 
     title 44, United States Code, is amended by striking 
     ``National Imagery and Mapping Agency'' both places it 
     appears and inserting ``National Geospatial-Intelligence 
     Agency''.
       (B) The heading of such section is amended to read as 
     follows:

     ``Sec. 1336. National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency: special 
       publications''.

       (2) The table of sections at the beginning of chapter 13 of 
     such title is amended by striking the item relating to 
     section 1336 and inserting the following new item:

``1336. National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency: special 
              publications.''.
       (c) Homeland Security Act of 2002.--Section 201(f)(2)(E) of 
     the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 121(f)(2)(E)) is 
     amended by striking ``National Imagery and Mapping Agency'' 
     and inserting ``National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency''.
       (d) Inspector General Act of 1978.--Section 8H of the 
     Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.) is amended by 
     striking ``National Imagery and Mapping Agency'' each place 
     it appears and inserting ``National Geospatial-Intelligence 
     Agency''.
       (e) Ethics in Government Act of 1978.--Section 105(a)(1) of 
     the Ethics in Government Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.) is 
     amended by striking ``National Imagery and Mapping Agency'' 
     and inserting ``National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency''.
       (f) Other Acts.--(1) Section 7(b)(2)(A)(i) of the Employee 
     Polygraph Protection Act of 1988 (29 U.S.C. 2006(b)(2)(A)(i)) 
     is amended by striking ``National Imagery and Mapping 
     Agency'' and inserting ``National Geospatial-Intelligence 
     Agency''.
       (2) Section 207(a)(2)(B) of the Legislative Branch 
     Appropriations Act, 1993 (44 U.S.C. 501 note) is amended by 
     striking ``National Imagery and Mapping Agency'' and 
     inserting ``National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency''.

  The CHAIRMAN. No amendment to the committee amendment is in order 
except those printed in House Report 109-438. Each amendment may be 
offered only in the order printed in the report, by a Member designated 
in the report, shall be considered read, shall be debatable for the 
time specified in the report, equally divided and controlled by the 
proponent and an opponent, shall not be subject to amendment, and shall 
not be subject to a demand for division of the question.


                Amendment No. 1 Offered by Mr. Hoekstra

  Mr. HOEKSTRA. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Amendment No. 1 printed in House Report 109-438 offered by 
     Mr. Hoekstra:
       In section 421, strike subsection (c) (page 29, lines 15 
     through 23).
       Page 29, line 24, redesignate subsection (d) as subsection 
     (c).

[[Page H1801]]

       Amend paragraph (1) of section 441 (page 39, line 8) to 
     read as follows:
       (1) in subparagraph (H), by inserting ``the Coast Guard'' 
     after ``the Marine Corps'';
       Page 39, line 15, strike the final period and insert a 
     semicolon.
       Page 39, after line 15, insert the following new 
     paragraphs:
       (3) by redesignating subparagraph (L) as subparagraph (M); 
     and
       (4) by inserting after subparagraph (K) the following new 
     subparagraph:
       ``(L) The Office of National Security Intelligence of the 
     Drug Enforcement Administration.''.
  The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to House Resolution 774, the gentleman from 
Michigan (Mr. Hoekstra) and a Member opposed each will control 5 
minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Michigan.
  Mr. HOEKSTRA. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself as much time as I may 
consume.
  Mr. Chairman, this is the manager's amendment to the bill. It 
contains two provisions. The first strikes the provision of the 
committee's amendment relating to the Freedom of Information Act at the 
request of the Committee on Government Reform. The second specifically 
clarifies that the new membership of the Drug Enforcement 
Administration in the intelligence community is limited to the DEA's 
Office of National Security Intelligence. This clarification was 
requested by the Department of Justice and the DEA. I do not believe 
that either of these changes are controversial. I urge Members to 
support the amendment.
  I reserve the balance of my time.
  Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I will support this amendment, but I rise 
to note that the chairman has agreed to modify a provision, and I 
appreciate the modification that he has made, and that relates to the 
CIA Director's responsibility under the Freedom of Information Act. The 
minority felt that the provisions were restricting FOIA requests, and 
the majority agreed to accommodate us and struck the language, and I 
would like our colleagues to know that that accommodation has been 
made. It makes the manager's amendment a better amendment, and I 
support the manager's amendment.
  Mr. HOEKSTRA. If the gentlewoman has no additional speakers, I will 
yield back the balance of my time.
  The CHAIRMAN. All time for debate has expired.
  The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from 
Michigan (Mr. Hoekstra).
  The amendment was agreed to.


                Amendment No. 2 Offered by Mr. Fossella

  Mr. FOSSELLA. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Amendment No. 2 printed in House Report 109-438 offered by 
     Mr. Fossella:
       At the end of the bill, add the following (and conform the 
     table of contents accordingly):

  TITLE VI--COMMUNICATION OF INFORMATION CONCERNING TERRORIST THREATS

     SEC. 601. IDENTIFICATION OF BEST PRATICES.

       (a) Study.--The Secretary of Homeland Security and the 
     Director of National Intelligence shall conduct jointly, or 
     contract with an entity to conduct, a study of the operations 
     of Federal, State, and local government entities to identify 
     best practices for the communication of information 
     concerning a terrorist threat.
       (b) Contents.--
       (1) Identification of best practices.--The study conducted 
     under this section shall be focused on an analysis and 
     identification of the best practices of the information 
     sharing processes of the following government entities:
       (A) Joint Terrorism Task Forces, which are operated by the 
     Federal Bureau of Investigations with the participation of 
     local law enforcement agencies.
       (B) State Homeland Security Fusion Centers, which are 
     established by a State and share information with Federal 
     departments.
       (C) The Homeland Security Operations Center, which is 
     operated by the Department of Homeland Security for the 
     purposes of coordinating information.
       (D) State and local law enforcement agencies that collect, 
     utilize, and disseminate information on potential terrorist 
     attacks.
       (E) The appropriate elements of the intelligence community, 
     as defined in section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 
     (50 U.S.C. 401a), involved in the sharing of counter-
     terrorism information.
       (2) Coordination of government entities.--The study 
     conducted under this section shall include an examination of 
     methods for coordinating the activities of Federal, State, 
     and local entities in responding to a terrorist threat, and 
     specifically the communication to the general public of 
     information concerning the threat. The study shall not 
     include an examination of the sources and methods used in the 
     collection of the information.
       (c) Obtaining Official Data.--In conducting the study, the 
     Secretary, in conjunction with the Director, with due regard 
     for the protection of classified information, may secure 
     directly from any department or agency of the United States 
     information necessary to enable the Secretary to carry out 
     this section. Classified information shall be handled through 
     established methods for controlling such information.
       (d) Temporary Duty of Federal Personnel.--The Secretary, in 
     conjunction with the Director, may request the head of any 
     department or agency of the United States to detail to 
     temporary duty personnel within the administrative 
     jurisdiction of the head of the department or agency that the 
     Secretary may need to carry out this section, each detail to 
     be without loss of seniority, pay, or other employee status.
       (e) Report.--
       (1) In general.--Not later than 6 months after the date of 
     enactment of this Act, the Secretary, in conjunction with the 
     Director, shall submit to Congress a report that contains--
       (A) a detailed statement of the findings and conclusions of 
     the study, including identification of the best practices for 
     the processing, analysis, and dissemination of information 
     between the government entities referred to in subsection 
     (b)(1); and
       (B) recommendations for a formalized process of 
     consultation, communication, and confidentiality between 
     Federal, State, and local governments, incorporating the best 
     practices of the various entities studied, to facilitate 
     communication and help prevent the unauthorized dissemination 
     of information and criticism of decisions concerning 
     terrorist threats.
       (2) Classified information.--To the extent determined 
     appropriate by the Secretary, in conjunction with the 
     Director, the Secretary may submit a portion of the report in 
     classified form.
       (f) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized 
     to be appropriated to carry out this section $5,000,000 for 
     fiscal year 2007.

     SEC. 602. CENTERS OF BEST PRACTICES.

       (a) In General.--The Secretary of Homeland Security, in 
     consultation with the Director of National Intelligence, 
     shall make grants for the establishment and operation of 3 
     centers to implement the best practices, identified by the 
     study conducted under section 601, for the processing, 
     analysis, and dissemination of information concerning a 
     terrorist threat (in this section, each referred to as a 
     ``Center'').
       (b) Location of Centers.--In carrying out subsection (a), 
     the Secretary, in consultation with the Director, shall make 
     grants to--
       (1) the State of New York for the establishment of a Center 
     to be located in New York City;
       (2) the State of Michigan for the establishment of a Center 
     to be located in Detroit; and
       (3) the State of California for the establishment of a 
     Center to be located in Los Angeles.
       (c) Purpose of Centers.--Each Center shall--
       (1) implement the best practices, identified by the study 
     conducted under section 601, for information sharing 
     concerning a terrorist threat;
       (2) coordinate the communication of these best practices 
     with other metropolitan areas;
       (3) coordinate with the Secretary and the Director to 
     develop a training curriculum to implement these best 
     practices;
       (4) provide funding and technical assistance to other 
     metropolitan areas to assist the metropolitan areas in the 
     implementation of the curriculum developed under paragraph 
     (3); and
       (5) coordinate with the Secretary and the Director to 
     establish a method to advertise and disseminate these best 
     practices.
       (d) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized 
     to be appropriated for making grants under this section--
       (1) $10,000,000 for fiscal year 2007 for the establishment 
     of the Centers; and
       (2) $3,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2008 through 2012 
     for the operation of the Centers.
       (e) Report to Congress.--Not later than March 31, 2010, the 
     Secretary, in consultation with the Director, shall submit to 
     Congress a report evaluating the operations of the Centers 
     and making recommendations for future funding.

  The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to House Resolution 774, the gentleman from 
New York (Mr. Fossella) and a Member opposed each will control 5 
minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New York.
  Mr. FOSSELLA. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may 
consume.
  First, let me thank the chairman and the ranking member for allowing 
me to bring this amendment forward in the Rules Committee.
  One of the essential elements of government responsibility is to 
communicate effectively to the American people, especially in time of a 
potential terrorist attack or a natural disaster.

[[Page H1802]]

  On October 6 of 2005, New York City was made aware of several reports 
that terrorists were planning a large-scale attack on the subway 
systems. That evening, as New Yorkers watched the news, they had to 
struggle with two conflicting messages about the day's events. City 
officials, led by the mayor and the police commissioner, announced that 
a credible threat was aimed at New York City subway system, and stated 
that the threat was specific enough to warrant an immediate and 
overwhelming response.
  However, the news also reported that officials in Washington were 
down
playing the severity of the threat. A spokesman for the Department of 
Homeland Security described it as ``specific, yet noncredible.'' Other 
antiterrorism officials stated that the information gathered about the 
plot was not verifiable.
  New York officials first learned of the threat earlier in the week. 
The information gained from a reliable informant indicated that the 
people in Iraq were plotting with people in the United States to hide 
bombs in baby strollers, briefcases and packages and set them off in 
the city's subways.
  But the Department of Homeland Security had a different take. They 
released to law enforcement agencies an unclassified bulletin on the 
threat to the subway system, indicating that the FBI and Department of 
Homeland Security had doubts about the credibility of that threat. Yet 
the document also stated that a team of operatives, ``some of whom may 
travel to or who may be in the New York City area,'' might attempt an 
attack on or about October 9, 3 days after this warning. It also said 
that the terrorists might use remote-controlled or timed explosives 
hidden inside or underneath baby carriages and briefcases or suitcases.
  Vetting and verifying information is one thing. Having our government 
sending out conflicting messages to the American people when conflict 
can be avoided is another.
  I have always and will continue to be supportive of all efforts by 
antiterrorism forces at the Federal, State and local levels, but it 
pained me, and I am sure many others, to watch the confusion that 
unfolded that October.
  The trend continued weeks later in Maryland. Officials responded to a 
bomb threat in the I-95 tunnel under Baltimore Harbor, which the 
closing of resulted in stopping of thousands of cars for hours along a 
major transportation corridor. However, Baltimore's mayor and police 
commissioner said they learned of the tunnel closure and the bomb 
threat from the news media. This is not the way the system should work.
  Bear in mind, since 9/11, law enforcement at all levels has responded 
to a variety of threats every day such as a misplaced bag, a suspicious 
package or unknown substance. In general, these agencies and the men 
and women who work for these agencies are dedicated, responsible, 
diligent, and respond very well to these potentially dangerous 
situations.
  But what clearly needs to be done and to be improved is how different 
levels of government interact with each other when these threats are 
elevated. We need to get everyone on the same page and, when a credible 
threat occurs, inform the public in a coordinated way. In short, what 
is needed is a 911 call center for first responders. To achieve that, 
my amendment works in the following ways:
  It authorizes a study to be conducted by the Secretary of Homeland 
Security and the Director of National Intelligence to identify the 
problems and the success of terrorist threat information sharing 
between the Federal, State and local levels of government.
  Number 2, in addition to identifying the best practices, it will 
recommend a formalized process between the Federal, State and local 
levels of government for communicating threats to the public in a 
coordinated way.
  Once complete, the study will be made available to all Federal, State 
and local government entities involved in terrorist intelligence 
gathering.
  Finally, based on the results of the study, three centers of best 
practices will be created; staffs of the centers tasked with developing 
techniques to teach State and local governments how to improve their 
information sharing and planning techniques in conjunction with the 
Federal Government.
  The center's staff will ensure the results of the study are 
incorporated in the daily workings of homeland security preparedness 
and responsive activities through all levels of government.
  And finally, let me just say it is a fact that not every city can 
dedicate resources to terrorism. On the one hand, we have New York City 
where more than 1,000, about 1 in every 40, police officers in New York 
City are dedicated to antiterrorism duties. The reality is New York 
City faces a threat every single day. New York can be Exhibit A. But 
for other municipalities developing advanced techniques on fighting the 
war on terrorism, it is not so important. They don't have the 
resources, the manpower to dedicate. This amendment is not limited to 
just New York. The other centers of best practices, a suggestion would 
be in Detroit and Los Angeles, and can disseminate and share their 
techniques with other cities, whether it be Topeka or Peoria.
  The sad fact is that the same terrorist scenarios, if they occurred 
in five different States, there could be five different sets of 
responses to the American people. We need, at a minimum, a level of 
coordination on communicating threats to the public. This amendment, I 
believe, will achieve that goal. The American people deserve it.
  I yield back the balance of my time.
  Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word, and rise in 
support of the Fossella amendment. I think it is an excellent 
amendment, and I think the explanation by Mr. Fossella was excellent.
  We had meltdowns, as he well describes, both in New York and 
Baltimore recently. I think local officials acted responsibly. The 
information they had showed direct threats to their municipalities, so 
they had no choice.
  We can improve this. We not only need to share information better 
horizontally, a point we have been making in this committee and one of 
the reasons we set up the Director of National Intelligence, but we 
need to share it better vertically. Some of the best ideas are in our 
hometowns, and some of the best people trying to keep us safe are in 
our hometowns. I think the Fossella amendment will help us, through the 
establishment of centers of excellence, develop best practices to share 
information horizontally and vertically and get best information to 
those in our hometowns who are trying to protect us.
  This is a great idea. I am kind of embarrassed we didn't have it in 
the base bill. It shows that when this House works together, we bring 
good information to the floor, and we improve legislation. I only wish 
that we had been able to bring some other good amendments to the floor 
to improve this legislation. I say to Mr. Fossella, I strongly support 
you.
  Mr. FOSSELLA. Would the gentlewoman yield?
  Ms. HARMAN. Yes, I would be happy to yield to the gentleman.
  Mr. FOSSELLA. I would just like to thank the gentlewoman for her 
efforts and that of your staff, especially Chairman Hoekstra, that of 
Chairman Peter King and his staff and Rob O'Connor. But I thank the 
gentlewoman for her comments and strong support.
  Mr. HOEKSTRA. Will the gentlewoman yield?
  Ms. HARMAN. I would be happy to yield to the gentleman.
  Mr. HOEKSTRA. I would like to thank the gentlewoman for her comments. 
I don't have time on this amendment. I also would like to indicate our 
side's support of this amendment. And this is something that you and I 
have talked about before. And again, we have gone through this the way 
it should be gone through. Appreciate your help.
  Ms. HARMAN. Well, I agree. And just reclaiming my time, this is how 
this House should be working. This is bipartisan collaboration at work. 
It is going to make our cities safer, and it is going to send a message 
to the American people of one team, one fight, which is the message 
they want to hear.
  I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
  The CHAIRMAN. All time for debate has expired.
  The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from New 
York (Mr. Fossella).
  The amendment was agreed to.

[[Page H1803]]

                   Amendment No. 3 Offered by Ms. Lee

  Ms. LEE. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Amendment No. 3 printed in House Report 109-438 offered by 
     Ms. Lee:
       At the end of the bill, add the following new section:

     SEC. 510. REPORT ON AUTHORIZATION TO OVERTHROW DEMOCRATICALLY 
                   ELECTED GOVERNMENTS.

       Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of 
     this Act, the President shall submit to the Permanent Select 
     Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and 
     the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate a report 
     describing any authorization granted during the 10-year 
     period ending on the date of the enactment of this Act to 
     engage in intelligence activities related to the overthrow of 
     a democratically elected government.

  The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to House Resolution 774, the gentlewoman from 
California (Ms. Lee) and a Member opposed each will control 5 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentlewoman from California.
  Ms. LEE. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Let me first thank our ranking member of the committee, my colleague 
and friend from California, Congresswoman Jane Harman, for her support 
of this amendment and for her leadership.
  Mr. Chairman, this amendment is very simple and noncontroversial. It 
merely requires the President to submit a report to the House and 
Senate Intelligence Committees describing any authorization granted 
over the last 10 years to engage in intelligence activities related to 
the overthrow of a democratically elected government.
  Mr. Chairman, we all know that democracy promotion is at the top of 
this administration's agenda, and I believe that there is no question 
that supporting democracy should be a nonpartisan issue that we all 
agree on because it is at the core of our Nation's values. It is, quite 
simply, fundamental to who we are as a people and what we stand for as 
a Nation. That is why we must support democratic movements as they take 
place across the world. Nothing less than our values are on the line if 
we don't. That is why we must be vigilant and safeguard against any 
actions that would undermine or threaten our ability to support 
democratic efforts.
  It is clear that actions that undermine democracies also undermine 
our credibility in the world and, therefore, our ability to be viewed 
as a serious and legitimate agent of democracy. So if promoting 
democracy is to remain a critical pillar of our foreign policy, we must 
ensure that our ability to be this voice for people's movements 
throughout the world is not damaged by contrary actions. Who will 
believe us if our actions are inconsistent with our words? How 
successful will we be in achieving our goals?
  So today I offer this amendment to support and protect our efforts 
toward promoting democracy and to help ensure that our actions are 
consistent with our values. Toward that end this amendment will help 
Members of this body stay well informed about our Nation's actions 
related to these types of overt or covert intelligence activities which 
is especially critical at this moment. This amendment will help 
increase transparency in the process by requiring a report that is 
organized and comprehensive over the past 10 years. It will also help 
provide this information in an organized fashion so Members do not need 
to sort through voluminous records or seek information on a country-by-
country basis.
  It is also critical to point out that that amendment in no way 
compromises the confidential and sensitive nature of the information as 
it requires the report to be delivered to the House and Senate 
Intelligence Committees and for Members to review it in a confidential 
and secure setting.
  So, Mr. Chairman, I want to conclude by thanking again our ranking 
member for her support, and want to strongly urge all my colleagues 
here to stand up for democracy and to stand up for transparency by 
supporting this amendment.
  I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. HOEKSTRA. Mr. Chairman, I would like to claim the time in 
opposition to the amendment.
  I will not oppose the amendment, but I do want to just have a couple 
of clarifying comments. We should not presume and we are not presuming 
by accepting the amendment that any such authorization to overthrow 
democratically elected governments has ever happened or been 
authorized.

                              {time}  1615

  But we think it would be helpful to have this 10-year history to 
clarify that. The reporting requirements are very much appropriate. So 
with that clarification, we are inclined to accept the amendment.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
  Ms. LEE. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank the chairman for his support 
and want to make sure that it is on the record that we have talked and 
agreed with regard to the intent of this amendment.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from California 
(Ms. Harman), ranking member of the committee.
  Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentlewoman for yielding to me. 
I commend her for her courageous voice in Congress, she knows I do, on 
many important issues.
  I also want to commend our chairman for saying that he will accept 
this amendment. He should know, and the gentlewoman surely does know, 
that we have worked together over the years to describe this issue in a 
manner acceptable to many in the committee. She and I have had 
conversations on the floor in past years about this issue. This year 
she is offering her concerns in the form of legislation, and I think 
this legislation is really very good. I think the goals of 
democratization and transparency are both good goals. Our President 
says he supports democratization. It surely is one of our major foreign 
policy goals.
  I am for, and I mince no words about this, the robust use of 
intelligence to find out the plans and intentions of people who are 
plotting to do us harm. I do not think this amendment in any way 
compromises that, and I think the fact that the report is to be 
prepared and will be delivered to our committee in a classified form 
makes absolutely certain that we are not advertising to our enemies how 
we deploy our resources.
  So, again, I want to commend the gentlewoman for offering this 
amendment and offer my strong support for it.
  Ms. LEE. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself the balance of my time.
  I want to thank the gentlewoman for her leadership and for her 
support. And, yes, we have talked over the years about this and wanted 
to come to some bipartisan agreement and solution. So I think this is a 
very modest yet very important amendment, and I want to thank again our 
chairman and ranking member for their support.
  Let me also thank our staffs on both sides of the aisle. Especially I 
want to thank my chief of staff, Julie Nixon, for her support and 
leadership, and both the minority and majority staff for, again, 
helping us to figure out the appropriate language to accomplish the 
goals that we want to accomplish. I thank them for their support.
  Ms. WATERS. Mr. Chairman, I rise to support the Lee amendment, which 
would require the President to submit to Congress a report describing 
any authorization in the past 10 years to engage in intelligence 
activities related to the overthrow of a democratically-elected 
government.
  In February of 2004, our government was a party to a coup d'etat that 
overthrew President Jean-Bertrand Aristide, the democratically-elected 
President of Haiti. Former soldiers and other heavily-armed thugs took 
over several Haitian cities and then marched into Haiti's capital, 
while opposition groups representing Haiti's wealthy elites staged 
confrontational demonstrations throughout the country. Early in the 
morning on February 29, U.S. Marines and Embassy officials entered 
President Aristide's home and told him to leave immediately or he and 
thousands of other Haitians would be killed. President Aristide was 
flown aboard a U.S. plane to the Central African Republic and left 
there.
  The Bush administration had been working with the wealthy Haitian 
elites who hated President Aristide to force him to step down. The 
International Republican Institute, which is affiliated with the 
Republican Party, funneled U.S. taxpayer dollars to the Aristide-
haters; and Roger Noriega, President Bush's former Assistant Secretary 
of State for Western

[[Page H1804]]

Hemisphere Affairs, conspired with sweatshop-owner Andre Apaid to 
organize, train and finance the opposition.
  Congress has a right to know why the Bush administration allowed a 
small minority of wealthy elites and a group of heavily armed thugs to 
overthrow a democratically-elected government. More importantly, 
Congress has a right to know whether U.S. intelligence agencies and 
operatives were directly involved in this coup d'etat.
  I urge my colleagues to support the Lee amendment and demand that 
Congress uncover the truth about the coup d'etat in Haiti.
  The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the 
gentlewoman from California (Ms. Lee).
  The amendment was agreed to.


         Amendment No. 4 Offered by Mr. Price of North Carolina

  Mr. PRICE of North Carolina. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Amendment No. 4 printed in House Report 109-438 offered by 
     Mr. Price of North Carolina:
       At the end of title III, add the following new section:

     SEC. 308. ACCOUNTABILITY IN INTELLIGENCE CONTRACTING.

       (a) Report on Regulations Governing Intelligence Community 
     Contracting.--
       (1) Report requirement.--Not later than 90 days after the 
     date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National 
     Intelligence shall submit to the Permanent Select Committee 
     on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the 
     Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate a report on 
     regulations governing covered contracts under the National 
     Intelligence Program and, at the discretion of the Director 
     of National Intelligence, the Military Intelligence Program.
       (2) Matters covered.--
       (A) The report required by paragraph (1) shall include a 
     description of any relevant regulations prescribed by the 
     Director of National Intelligence or by the heads of agencies 
     in the intelligence community, including those relating to 
     the following matters:
       (i) Types of functions or activities that may be 
     appropriately carried out by contractors.
       (ii) Minimum standards regarding the hiring, training, 
     security clearance, and assignment of contract personnel.
       (iii) Procedures for conducting oversight of covered 
     contracts to ensure identification and prosecution of 
     criminal violations; financial waste, fraud, or abuse; or 
     other abuses committed by contractors or contract personnel.
       (B) The report also shall include a description of progress 
     made by the Director of National Intelligence in 
     standardizing the regulations described in subparagraph (A) 
     across the different agencies of the National Intelligence 
     Program to the extent practicable.
       (3) Form of report.--The report required by paragraph (1) 
     shall be in unclassified form, but may contain a classified 
     annex if necessary.
       (b) Accountability Requirements for Contracts Awarded by 
     Intelligence Community Agencies.--
       (1) Information on intelligence activities to be 
     performed.--Each covered contract in an amount greater than 
     $1,000,000 shall require the contractor to provide to the 
     contracting officer for the contract, not later than 5 days 
     after award of the contract, the following information 
     regarding intelligence activities performed under the 
     contract:
       (A) Number of persons to be used to perform such functions.
       (B) A description of how such persons are trained to carry 
     out tasks specified under the contract relating to such 
     functions.
       (C) A description of each category of activity relating to 
     such functions required by the contract.
       (2) Updates.--The information provided under paragraph (1) 
     shall be updated during contract performance as necessary.
       (3) Information on costs.--Each covered contract shall 
     include the following requirements:
       (A) Upon award of the contract, the contractor shall 
     provide to the contracting officer cost estimates of salary, 
     benefits, insurance, materials, logistics, administrative 
     costs, and other costs of carrying out intelligence 
     activities under the contract.
       (B) Before contract closeout (other than closeout of a 
     firm, fixed price contract), the contractor shall provide to 
     the contracting officer a report on the actual costs of 
     carrying out intelligence activities under the contract, in 
     the same categories as provided under subparagraph (A).
       (c) Accountability Requirements for Contracting Agencies of 
     the Intelligence Community.--
       (1) Report requirement.--Not later than 90 days after the 
     date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, 
     the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the 
     Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of 
     Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence of 
     the Senate a report containing the information described in 
     paragraph (2) on contracting activities in the intelligence 
     community.
       (2) Matters covered.--The report required by paragraph (1) 
     shall include the following information:
       (A) A list of contracts awarded for intelligence activities 
     by each agency in the intelligence community during the one-
     year period preceding the date of submission of the report.
       (B) A description of the activities to be performed by 
     contractors in fulfillment of each contract on the list under 
     subparagraph (A), including whether such activities are 
     classified or unclassified.
       (C) The number of personnel carrying out work under each 
     such contract.
       (D) The estimated cost of performance of the work required 
     by each such contract.
       (d)  Retention of Intelligence Community Professionals.--
       (1) Report requirement.--Not later than 90 days after the 
     date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National 
     of Intelligence shall submit to the Permanent Select 
     Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and 
     the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate a report 
     on hiring, promotion, and retention of intelligence community 
     professionals.
       (2) Matters covered.-- The report required by paragraph (1) 
     shall include the following:
       (A) Recommendations regarding any bonuses, benefits, or 
     other inducements that would help the intelligence community 
     to hire, promote, and retain its professional workforce in 
     order to compete effectively against the attraction of 
     private sector opportunities.
       (B) Recommendations regarding any policy changes, including 
     changes to policies governing the awarding of security 
     clearances, that may promote hiring, promotion, and retention 
     of the intelligence community professional workforce.
       (C) A description of any additional authority needed from 
     Congress to implement the recommendations under subparagraphs 
     (A) and (B).
       (3) Form of report.--The report required by paragraph (1) 
     shall be in unclassified form, but may contain a classified 
     annex if necessary.
       (e) Definitions.--In this section:
       (1) Intelligence community.--The term ``intelligence 
     community'' has the meaning given the term in section 3(4) of 
     the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)).
       (2) Covered contract.--The term ``covered contract'' 
     means--
       (A) a prime contract with any agency or office that is part 
     of the intelligence community;
       (B) a subcontract at any tier under any prime contract with 
     an office or agency referred to in subparagraph (A); or
       (C) a task order issued under a task or delivery order 
     contract entered into by an office or agency referred to in 
     subparagraph (A, if the work to be performed under the 
     contract, subcontract, or task order includes intelligence 
     activities to be performed either within or outside the 
     United States.

  The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to House Resolution 774, the gentleman from 
North Carolina (Mr. Price) and a Member opposed each will control 5 
minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from North Carolina.
  Mr. PRICE of North Carolina. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time 
as I may consume.
  Mr. Chairman, since the 9/11 attacks, the budgets of U.S. 
intelligence agencies and the scope of their operations have increased, 
and they have increasingly turned to private sector contractors to help 
do their work. Experts both within and outside the intelligence 
community have warned that the expanded use of private contractors is 
posing some major challenges. According to the Washington Post, the 
Director of National Intelligence, Mr. Negroponte, has himself 
expressed concern about this issue.
  It is an important matter. About half of the intelligence community's 
budget is reportedly now spent through contracts awarded to private 
sector firms. So we are talking about several billion dollars in 
contracts each year.
  While the intelligence community has addressed some of the questions 
about how private contractors are being used and how they should be 
used, there needs to be a deeper examination and discussion of these 
issues both in the community and in Congress. My amendment would 
solicit information from the Director of National Intelligence and, I 
hope, would spur such dialogue.
  It would also ask the director to provide suggestions on how to help 
him recruit and retain top-notch personnel, too many of whom we are now 
losing to private sector opportunities. Over and over again, we see the 
government invest thousands of dollars in training and obtaining top-
level security clearances for intelligence personnel, only to lose them 
to lucrative jobs in the private sector. I know Representative

[[Page H1805]]

John Tierney and others have been interested in this issue, and I 
appreciate their support for my amendment.
  I have worked with the Intelligence Committee majority and minority 
to draft this amendment in a way that will give Congress the 
information it needs to conduct proper oversight without posing an 
undue reporting burden on the intelligence community. I believe we have 
achieved a good balance with my amendment, and, as I have indicated to 
the chairman, I am happy to continue working with him and the ranking 
member to further improve the language as the legislation moves 
forward.
  I urge my colleagues to support this amendment and help us shed some 
light on an important and largely unnoticed shift in the way we gather 
intelligence.
  Mr. CRAMER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. PRICE of North Carolina. I yield to the gentleman from Alabama.
  Mr. CRAMER. Mr. Chairman, I would like to make a point for the 
benefit of the members of the committee. Mr. Thornberry and I have been 
aggressively involved in standing up to DNI and we have been concerned, 
the committee has been concerned, that we do not establish a new set of 
regulations and reporting requirements for our intelligence agencies.
  Would your amendment have that kind of impact? Could you explain that 
to us?
  Mr. PRICE of North Carolina. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the question. 
My amendment, in fact, does not establish new regulations for the 
intelligence community nor does it prohibit contractors from carrying 
out any type of work. It simply requires contractors and the 
intelligence community to provide Congress with more information so we 
can do our job effectively. It is not about more regulations. It is 
about information, about what practices and policies are already in 
effect.
  As for the reporting requirements, this amendment would require 
reports on private contracting. We have crafted the amendment to 
minimize the additional burden on the agency. The vast majority of what 
we are requesting is information that the agency either has or should 
have already, but it is a matter of assembling that information and 
making it available to the appropriate committees of the Congress.
  Mr. CRAMER. If you would continue to yield, I think you clearly raise 
issues that we need to continue to address, and this is information 
that we should continue to have. I would support your amendment and 
would urge my colleagues in the committee to do the same thing.
  Mr. PRICE of North Carolina. Mr. Chairman, I thank my colleague for 
his support, and I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. HOEKSTRA. Mr. Chairman, I would like to claim time in opposition 
to the amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman is recognized for 5 minutes.
  Mr. HOEKSTRA. Mr. Chairman, again, I believe that with some of the 
dialogue we have had before, we will not oppose the amendment, but I 
just want to add some clarification.
  I am very appreciative of the efforts of the gentleman from North 
Carolina to work closely with the committee to perfect his original 
amendment. The intent of this amendment, as I understand it, is to 
improve contractor management, civilian retention, and to eliminate 
fraud, waste, and abuse across the intelligence community. These are 
the goals that the Intelligence Committee has embraced and we fully 
support.
  The amendment as written requires numerous duplicative and onerous 
reports that will only increase costs in personnel overhead at the 
intelligence community agencies, and particularly within the Office of 
the Director of National Intelligence, an issue that the ranking member 
and I and other members of the committee have been very, very concerned 
about.
  As Mr. Cramer has also identified, the Oversight Subcommittee has 
been working in a way to try to reduce the number of reports. This 
amendment, we believe, as an example, within 90 days of enactment of 
the legislation, there would be a requirement for the delivery of a 
report on hiring, promotion, and retention of all intelligence 
community professionals. The text does not define intelligence 
professional; so the amendment basically would ask for this report on 
every career field within the intelligence community. This may simply 
not be necessary. It would potentially be overly burdensome. Since it 
also applies to parts of the Defense Department that are part of the 
military intelligence program, our friends at the House Armed Services 
Committee have expressed some concerns about this. But based on the 
discussions that we had before the amendment came up indicating Mr. 
Price's willingness to work with us on refining this amendment once we 
are in conference, we are inclined to accept the amendment and to move 
on.
  Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. PRICE of North Carolina. Mr. Chairman, I thank the chairman and 
once again assure him that we indeed do stand ready to work on refining 
this language so we get the information we need in the Congress but 
that we do not impose undue reporting requirements.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentlewoman from California 
(Ms. Harman), ranking member.
  Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding.
  And I agree that there is more to explore about this subject in 
conference. But outsourcing is a big deal, and it is probably a bigger 
deal than any of us on the committee knows.
  Oversight of the intelligence community in today's world means 
oversight of contractors. We have outsourced more and more of the 
community, and I think that more serious thought needs to go into the 
impact of this.
  The good thing about the Price amendment is that it does not mandate 
any particular solution. It just requires the DNI to examine the 
problem in a meaningful way. It essentially calls for an inventory of 
contracts and of rules regarding what duties may be outsourced. And I 
think giving us full information will allow better policy.
  I applaud the gentleman for introducing this amendment and urge our 
colleagues to support it.
  The CHAIRMAN. All time has expired on the proponent's side.
  Mr. HOEKSTRA. Mr. Chairman, again I am looking forward to working in 
conference in a bipartisan way to work out any concerns or any 
additional issues that may arise with this amendment.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
  The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the 
gentleman from North Carolina (Mr. Price).
  The amendment was agreed to.


                 Amendment No. 5 Offered by Mr. Andrews

  Mr. ANDREWS. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Amendment No. 5 printed in House Report 109-438 offered by 
     Mr. Andrews:
       At the end of the bill, add the following new section:

     SEC. 510. REPORT ON INTELLIGENCE RELATING TO INSURGENT FORCES 
                   IN IRAQ.

       Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of 
     this Act, and every 90 days thereafter, the Director of 
     National Intelligence shall submit to Congress a report, in 
     classified form, on intelligence relating to the disposition 
     of insurgent forces in Iraq fighting against Coalition forces 
     and the forces of the Government of Iraq, including--
       (1) an estimate of the number of insurgent forces;
       (2) an estimate of the number of insurgent forces that 
     are--
       (A) former members of the Ba'ath Party; and
       (B) members of al Qaeda or other terrorist organizations;
       (3) a description of where in Iraq the insurgent forces are 
     located;
       (4) a description of the capability of the insurgent 
     forces; and
       (5) a description of how the insurgent forces are funded.

  The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to House Resolution 774, the gentleman from 
New Jersey (Mr. Andrews) and a Member opposed each will control 5 
minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New Jersey.
  Mr. ANDREWS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Chairman, there are many different views in the House as to how 
we should prosecute the war effort in Iraq. There are many different 
views as to

[[Page H1806]]

what we should do next. But I believe there is only one view about the 
constitutional responsibility of this branch of government, and that is 
that we have the solemn and grave responsibility of oversight.
  It is our job on behalf of our constituents to ask questions about 
the direction, the efficacy, and the future of American policy in Iraq. 
In order to appropriately answer those questions, it is important that 
certain facts be adduced and be available to the Members on a regular 
basis. Because of the sensitive nature of those facts, it is important 
that the facts be available on a classified basis so that those who are 
prosecuting the war and the related intelligence activities are not 
compromised in any way.
  The purpose of my amendment is to serve the twin goals of promoting 
fact-based oversight while maintaining the confidentiality and security 
of sources and methods of intelligence gathering.
  My amendment says this: on a quarterly basis, the relevant 
intelligence authorities would be responsible for producing for the 
House a classified report that would set forth the best intelligence 
estimates as to the number of resistance fighters in Iraq. These 
categories would be broken down according to the various sources of the 
disruption and violence that we are seeing: former regime elements, 
insurgents from outside of the country, groups associated with 
terrorist organizations around the world, and so forth.
  I am not suggesting that the only metric of the success of our policy 
would be the diminution of such forces, but I am suggesting that a 
critical metric of the success or failure would be the metric of that 
reduction. Similarly, if we are having trouble pinpointing the number 
in each category, that alone is a relevant fact that would help us 
understand the nature of the problem that we face and the nature of 
remedies to those problems.
  So this report would produce an important metric for review by the 
Members as to the progress or lack thereof with respect to defeating 
the resistance in Iraq.
  I want to reemphasize that this report is quarterly and it is 
classified. This would be handled much in the same way that the 
intelligence budget is handled, where Members who have properly 
executed the proper oath would have access to the information on a 
quarterly basis, would have the opportunity to review it, would be 
bound by the appropriate rules of confidentiality in discussing what 
they have seen, but would be able to form a more factual basis for an 
evaluation of the success or lack thereof of our policies in Iraq.

                              {time}  1630

  Again, I believe that this amendment serves the many different views 
we have with the prosecution of this policy in Iraq. For those who 
would call for an expeditious withdrawal, for those who would call for 
staying the course, for all those in between, this would be fact-based 
information that I think would enrich our debate and further advance 
our constitutional responsibility of oversight.
  Mr. Chairman, I would respectfully urge adoption of the amendment, 
and I thank you for this opportunity to explain it.
  Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. HOEKSTRA. Mr. Chairman, I rise to claim the time in opposition to 
the amendment.
  Mr. Chairman, I will not oppose the amendment. I think this 
information is very consistent with the type of information that the 
Intelligence Committee receives on a regular basis, but we need to make 
sure that we continue receiving it in the future.
  Again, we will be inclined to accept this amendment.
  Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. ANDREWS. Mr. Chairman, I thank my friend from Michigan and my 
friend from California for their cooperation, and I yield back the 
balance of my time.
  Mr. HOEKSTRA. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
  The CHAIRMAN. All time for debate has expired.
  The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from New 
Jersey (Mr. Andrews).
  The amendment was agreed to.


                  Amendment No. 6 Offered by Mr. Renzi

  Mr. RENZI. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Amendment No. 6 printed in House Report 109-438 offered by 
     Mr. Renzi:
       At the end of the bill, add the following new section:

     SEC. 510. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE 
                   OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION.

       (a) Findings.--Congress finds the following:
       (1) The Supreme Court has unequivocally recognized that the 
     Constitution vests the President with the authority to 
     protect national security information as head of the 
     Executive Branch and as Commander-in-Chief.
       (2) The Supreme Court has recognized a compelling 
     government interest in withholding national security 
     information from unauthorized persons.
       (3) The Supreme Court has recognized that secrecy 
     agreements for government employees are a reasonable means 
     for protecting this vital interest.
       (4) The Supreme Court has noted that ``It should be obvious 
     that no one has a `right' to a security clearance''.
       (5) Unauthorized disclosures of classified information 
     relating to national security are most damaging when they 
     have the potential to compromise intelligence sources and 
     methods and ongoing intelligence operations.
       (6) Potential unauthorized disclosures of classified 
     information have impeded relationships with foreign 
     intelligence services and the effectiveness of the Global War 
     on Terrorism.
       (7) Media corporations and journalists have improperly 
     profited financially from publishing purported unauthorized 
     disclosures of classified information.
       (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that 
     the President should utilize the constitutional authority of 
     the President to the fullest practicable extent, where 
     warranted, to classify and protect national security 
     information relating to intelligence activities and 
     information and to take effective action against persons who 
     commit unauthorized disclosures of classified information 
     relating to intelligence activities and information contrary 
     to law and voluntary secrecy agreements.

  The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to House Resolution 774, the gentleman from 
Arizona (Mr. Renzi) and a Member opposed will each control 10 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Arizona.
  Mr. RENZI. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Chairman, within our Nation's media organizations there exists a 
great number of professionals who provide America with information of 
substance and great importance. The media's role is vital to this 
Nation. They provide checks and balances of power and oversight of our 
political activity, and I want my words today to be respectful, 
particularly of those true professional journalists who have a hard 
time choosing in the battle to get their story and the need to protect 
our Nation.
  Yet amongst the journalistic profession there are a few, a small few, 
who disclose our most sensitive intelligence sources and methods to our 
enemies. They even boldly have justified their actions recently by 
claiming themselves to be whistleblowers.
  Yet it is not the role of a reporter working with a disgraced or 
disgruntled politically motivated former government employee or those 
who are on the verge of retirement to determine when to reveal our 
national secrets.
  Some reporters explain that the information that they are disclosing 
is illegal. If you suspect it to be illegal, then notify the FBI or the 
intelligence committees. If you feel that there will be inactivity or 
political coverup, then inform both Republicans and Democrats. But do 
not publish classified information for personal gain.
  My amendment expresses the sense of Congress that the President ought 
to use his full authority, where warranted, not to overclassify 
information, but to protect national security information and take 
effective action against those persons who have betrayed this Nation 
during wartime by publishing current, ongoing operational disclosures 
of classified information.
  We all want to protect our frontline agents. It is vital to the war 
on terror. It is also vital that those nations who we conduct joint 
operations with are able to trust us, not to ask our agents in the 
field whether or not we can even keep a secret.

[[Page H1807]]

  I understand our publishers and their need to get the story, but I 
also understand that it is their right that by free speech they also 
safeguard this Nation and help contribute to our victory in this war on 
terror.
  Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to this amendment, 
though I may not oppose it. I really rise for the purpose of entering 
into a colloquy with the amendment's sponsor.
  Mr. Chairman, there is much that is good in this amendment. All of 
us, certainly this Member, oppose the leaks, unauthorized leaks, of 
classified information. That is the wrong thing to do. All of us who 
serve on the Intelligence Committee not only took the general oath as 
Members of Congress, but I believe we signed a second oath as members 
of the committee, and I have no reason to believe that any one of us 
ever, not for a nanosecond, has compromised classified information, nor 
would we. I am sure the amendment's author agrees.
  I think it is important to say that the Congress wants those who leak 
in an unauthorized fashion to be prosecuted. I think that is a fair 
thing to say. I am also in full agreement that the President should use 
the fullest extent of his power to properly classify information and to 
protect classified information.
  But two things are on my mind, and one of them relates to the 
language here. One thing on my mind, as I stated earlier, is we should 
not have a double standard. If we are against leaks of classified 
information, we should be against leaks of classified information 
everywhere, and I don't believe, and I am not asking the sponsor, 
unless he would like to comment, that it is proper for the President or 
the Vice President to use inherent power to authorize their own aides 
to discuss what was classified information with selected reporters.
  But the question I want to ask the sponsor is this: there is one 
section of this amendment that I think is overly broad, and it is 
clause (7) of the findings, where it says, ``Media corporations and 
journalists have improperly profited financially from publishing 
purported unauthorized disclosures of classified information.'' That 
may be conjecture. I don't personally think that is true.
  I would like to ask the amendment's sponsor whether he will work with 
us as this bill goes to conference to modify this language so that it 
can be absolutely accurate and convey on a bipartisan basis the view 
that unauthorized leaks are wrong, but that our findings are completely 
factual on the point.
  Mr. RENZI. Mr. Chairman, if the gentlewoman will yield, I appreciate 
the dialogue with the ranking member and have great respect, as she 
knows, for her command of this subject matter.
  In recent weeks we have almost seen a glorification, a self-
glorification, almost a self-indulgence with this issue. In my opinion, 
with the rewards that have gone with the Pulitzer Prize, the money that 
goes with it, the trophies, the whole idea of leaking information and 
making it part of the marketplace was the motive for why I had that 
language put in.
  If you are asking if I am willing to work with you, absolutely. From 
day one I want to work with you on it, and I would ask the chairman to 
look at it as it relates to the conference. But I think we need to send 
a message to the publishers in America that they have got to help us in 
this war on terror, and the motivation cannot be an ambition that is 
out of the realm of asking our media outlets to be reasonable. I would 
just offer that to the ranking member.
  Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, reclaiming my time, I appreciate the 
gentleman's sincerity. You know, I enjoy working with you, but I doubt, 
and that is why I said we need more facts here, I don't think we should 
allege this unless it is factually based. I doubt the motivation in 
many of these cases was financial. I doubt it.
  I understand that books have been written and prizes have been 
garnered based on publishing classified information, but we have a 
strong tradition of freedom of the press and a strong constitutional 
amendment, the first amendment, that protects freedom of speech. So I 
think we should be very careful in making claims like this.
  What I am seeking is just a commitment that we will review this 
language and make sure that we all feel it is factually based.
  Mr. RENZI. Mr. Chairman, if the gentlewoman will yield further, I 
appreciate the gentlewoman from California and her comments. I only 
would point out that books on these are in the millions and millions of 
dollars. I don't mean to limit it to just awards. But taking and 
listening to your initiative, I would also ask that the chairman look 
at his leadership role on this and his ideas and be able to formulate 
the final opinion along with you. I appreciate that.
  Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. RENZI. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to our 
chairman, the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Hoekstra).
  Mr. HOEKSTRA. Mr. Chairman, I thank my colleague from Arizona. My 
commitment is to work with the ranking member and with the gentleman 
from Arizona on making sure that this language, we move it to somewhere 
that we are all agreeable. I think we can find that common ground.
  I just want to say I rise to support the gentleman from Arizona's 
amendment today. We need to set the record straight about our national 
security. Specifically, Congress must speak with a single voice, clear 
and unwavering, about the value of our intelligence information and 
about who makes decisions regarding its use. We need to speak now.
  This amendment says the right things. We are at war. Every day our 
Armed Forces and intelligence services do battle with an enemy whose 
sole purpose is to kill Americans. This point sounds fairly basic. It 
is. But the point bears repeating as long as some individuals here in 
Washington behave as if they have forgotten that we are at war.
  Our government has a vital interest in protecting sensitive national 
security information during a time of war. The United States Supreme 
Court has recognized this vital interest in preserving secrecy. This 
interest is not merely some speculative opinion. It is the law of the 
land. This amendment makes that point.
  The Constitution places the responsibility and authority to protect 
national security with the President of the United States. The 
President does so as the head of the executive branch and Commander in 
Chief. The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized this fact as law. The 
gentleman's amendment again makes that point.
  Under our system of laws, the President must decide what sensitive 
national security information can be shared with the public and what 
must remain closely guarded. The President does not make these 
decisions lightly. He is elected by the American people to exercise his 
judgment in this regard and to make such decisions with the best 
interests of the American people in mind. Ultimately he is accountable 
to the people at the voting booth.
  We have worked with the President and disagreed with his opinions and 
directions, most recently the decision to declassify over 48,000 boxes 
of documents that were obtained in Iraq. The position of the 
intelligence community and the executive branch for an extended period 
of time was to hold that information. After working with the executive 
branch, that information is now in the process of being declassified 
and released to the American people. That is a good decision.
  But we went through a process. Individuals who disclose sensitive 
national security information without authority undermine the rule of 
law. These people substitute their judgment for that of the President, 
and they exercise that authority when legally it does not even belong 
to them. These individuals may act for self-determined reasons, not in 
the best interests of the American people, but in their own interests. 
I think that is what makes it different. Unless they are prosecuted, 
they remain unaccountable to the American people for their actions.
  Mr. RENZI. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to the 
gentleman from Texas (Mr. Thornberry).
  Mr. THORNBERRY. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from Arizona for 
yielding.
  Mr. Chairman, I support his amendment and share his concern about the 
destructive consequences of unauthorized disclosures or leaks. This was 
one

[[Page H1808]]

of the strategic oversight areas which the chairman and ranking member 
assigned to the Oversight Subcommittee at the beginning of this 
Congress.
  We have held several hearings, including an open hearing, to discuss 
this problem. One of the results is that we have found that there are a 
limited number of tools that the agencies have to deal with those 
inside the agencies who choose to violate the law and disclose 
classified materials.
  One of the things that is in this bill is to request information from 
the Director of National Intelligence on other tools, administrative or 
contractual avenues perhaps, with which we can help encourage people to 
follow their oath and to obey the law.

                              {time}  1645

  I think what is in the bill, as well as what is in the gentleman from 
Arizona's amendment, work very well together to convey the seriousness 
with which we take this problem.
  I applaud the gentleman's amendment and support it.
  Mr. RENZI. Mr. Chairman, I continue to reserve the balance of my 
time.
  Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself the balance of the time.
  Mr. Chairman, we have no further speakers and I do appreciate the 
comments of the amendment's sponsor on his amendment. I do intend to 
support the amendment and then to work with him and our chairman on 
some modifications of that amendment in the conference.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. RENZI. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself the balance of our time.
  Mr. Chairman, I very much appreciate the ranking member and her 
kindness on the issue. I just want to wrap up by saying that the leaks 
are absolutely vital to our victory against the Islamofascists who very 
much want to establish a worldwide caliphate. It is that real.
  The leaks have got to stop to protect our frontline agents. They have 
got to stop in order to rebuild the trust between our nations and our 
allies. I would urge my colleagues to support this amendment.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
  The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the 
gentleman from Arizona (Mr. Renzi).
  The question was taken; and the Chairman announced that the ayes 
appeared to have it.


                             Recorded Vote

  Mr. RENZI. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.
  A recorded vote was ordered.
  The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 366, 
noes 56, answered ``present'' 1, not voting 9, as follows:

                             [Roll No. 106]

                               AYES--366

     Aderholt
     Akin
     Alexander
     Allen
     Andrews
     Baca
     Bachus
     Baird
     Baker
     Barrett (SC)
     Barrow
     Bartlett (MD)
     Barton (TX)
     Bass
     Bean
     Beauprez
     Becerra
     Berkley
     Berman
     Berry
     Biggert
     Bilirakis
     Bishop (GA)
     Bishop (NY)
     Bishop (UT)
     Blackburn
     Blunt
     Boehlert
     Boehner
     Bonilla
     Bonner
     Bono
     Boozman
     Boren
     Boswell
     Boucher
     Boustany
     Boyd
     Bradley (NH)
     Brady (PA)
     Brady (TX)
     Brown (OH)
     Brown (SC)
     Brown, Corrine
     Brown-Waite, Ginny
     Burgess
     Burton (IN)
     Butterfield
     Buyer
     Calvert
     Camp (MI)
     Campbell (CA)
     Cannon
     Cantor
     Capito
     Capps
     Cardin
     Cardoza
     Carnahan
     Carson
     Carter
     Castle
     Chabot
     Chandler
     Chocola
     Clay
     Cleaver
     Clyburn
     Coble
     Cole (OK)
     Conaway
     Cooper
     Costa
     Cramer
     Crenshaw
     Crowley
     Cubin
     Cuellar
     Culberson
     Cummings
     Davis (AL)
     Davis (CA)
     Davis (FL)
     Davis (IL)
     Davis (KY)
     Davis (TN)
     Davis, Jo Ann
     Davis, Tom
     Deal (GA)
     DeFazio
     DeGette
     DeLay
     Dent
     Diaz-Balart, L.
     Diaz-Balart, M.
     Dicks
     Doolittle
     Doyle
     Drake
     Dreier
     Duncan
     Edwards
     Ehlers
     Emanuel
     Emerson
     Engel
     English (PA)
     Eshoo
     Etheridge
     Everett
     Fattah
     Feeney
     Ferguson
     Fitzpatrick (PA)
     Flake
     Foley
     Forbes
     Fortenberry
     Fossella
     Foxx
     Franks (AZ)
     Frelinghuysen
     Gallegly
     Garrett (NJ)
     Gerlach
     Gibbons
     Gilchrest
     Gillmor
     Gingrey
     Gohmert
     Gonzalez
     Goode
     Goodlatte
     Gordon
     Granger
     Graves
     Green (WI)
     Green, Al
     Green, Gene
     Gutknecht
     Hall
     Harman
     Harris
     Hart
     Hastings (WA)
     Hayes
     Hayworth
     Hefley
     Hensarling
     Herger
     Herseth
     Higgins
     Hinojosa
     Hobson
     Hoekstra
     Holden
     Holt
     Honda
     Hooley
     Hostettler
     Hoyer
     Hulshof
     Hunter
     Hyde
     Inglis (SC)
     Israel
     Issa
     Istook
     Jackson (IL)
     Jefferson
     Jenkins
     Jindal
     Johnson (CT)
     Johnson (IL)
     Johnson, Sam
     Jones (NC)
     Jones (OH)
     Kanjorski
     Kaptur
     Keller
     Kelly
     Kennedy (MN)
     Kennedy (RI)
     Kildee
     Kilpatrick (MI)
     Kind
     King (IA)
     King (NY)
     Kingston
     Kirk
     Kline
     Knollenberg
     Kolbe
     Kuhl (NY)
     LaHood
     Langevin
     Lantos
     Larsen (WA)
     Latham
     LaTourette
     Leach
     Levin
     Lewis (CA)
     Lewis (KY)
     Linder
     Lipinski
     LoBiondo
     Lofgren, Zoe
     Lowey
     Lucas
     Lungren, Daniel E.
     Mack
     Manzullo
     Marchant
     Marshall
     Matheson
     Matsui
     McCarthy
     McCaul (TX)
     McCotter
     McCrery
     McHenry
     McHugh
     McIntyre
     McKeon
     McMorris
     McNulty
     Meek (FL)
     Melancon
     Mica
     Michaud
     Miller (FL)
     Miller (MI)
     Miller (NC)
     Miller, Gary
     Mollohan
     Moore (KS)
     Moran (KS)
     Murphy
     Murtha
     Musgrave
     Myrick
     Napolitano
     Neugebauer
     Ney
     Northup
     Norwood
     Nunes
     Nussle
     Ortiz
     Osborne
     Otter
     Oxley
     Pallone
     Pascrell
     Paul
     Pearce
     Pelosi
     Pence
     Peterson (MN)
     Peterson (PA)
     Petri
     Pickering
     Pitts
     Platts
     Poe
     Pombo
     Pomeroy
     Porter
     Price (GA)
     Price (NC)
     Pryce (OH)
     Putnam
     Radanovich
     Rahall
     Ramstad
     Regula
     Rehberg
     Reichert
     Renzi
     Reyes
     Reynolds
     Rogers (AL)
     Rogers (KY)
     Rogers (MI)
     Rohrabacher
     Ross
     Rothman
     Roybal-Allard
     Royce
     Ruppersberger
     Rush
     Ryan (OH)
     Ryan (WI)
     Ryun (KS)
     Sabo
     Salazar
     Sanchez, Loretta
     Sanders
     Saxton
     Schiff
     Schmidt
     Schwartz (PA)
     Schwarz (MI)
     Scott (GA)
     Sensenbrenner
     Sessions
     Shadegg
     Shaw
     Shays
     Sherman
     Sherwood
     Shimkus
     Shuster
     Simmons
     Simpson
     Skelton
     Smith (NJ)
     Smith (TX)
     Smith (WA)
     Snyder
     Sodrel
     Souder
     Spratt
     Stearns
     Strickland
     Stupak
     Sullivan
     Sweeney
     Tancredo
     Tanner
     Tauscher
     Taylor (MS)
     Taylor (NC)
     Terry
     Thomas
     Thompson (CA)
     Thompson (MS)
     Thornberry
     Tiahrt
     Tiberi
     Turner
     Udall (CO)
     Upton
     Van Hollen
     Velazquez
     Visclosky
     Walden (OR)
     Walsh
     Wamp
     Wasserman Schultz
     Waxman
     Weiner
     Weldon (FL)
     Weldon (PA)
     Weller
     Westmoreland
     Wexler
     Whitfield
     Wicker
     Wilson (NM)
     Wilson (SC)
     Wolf
     Wynn
     Young (AK)
     Young (FL)

                                NOES--56

     Abercrombie
     Ackerman
     Baldwin
     Blumenauer
     Conyers
     Costello
     Delahunt
     DeLauro
     Dingell
     Doggett
     Farr
     Filner
     Frank (MA)
     Grijalva
     Gutierrez
     Hinchey
     Inslee
     Jackson-Lee (TX)
     Johnson, E. B.
     Kucinich
     Larson (CT)
     Lee
     Lewis (GA)
     Lynch
     Maloney
     Markey
     McCollum (MN)
     McDermott
     McGovern
     McKinney
     Meehan
     Meeks (NY)
     Moran (VA)
     Nadler
     Neal (MA)
     Oberstar
     Obey
     Olver
     Owens
     Pastor
     Payne
     Rangel
     Sanchez, Linda T.
     Scott (VA)
     Serrano
     Slaughter
     Solis
     Stark
     Tierney
     Towns
     Udall (NM)
     Waters
     Watson
     Watt
     Woolsey
     Wu

                        ANSWERED ``PRESENT''--1

       
     Capuano
       

                             NOT VOTING--9

     Case
     Evans
     Ford
     Hastings (FL)
     Millender-McDonald
     Miller, George
     Moore (WI)
     Ros-Lehtinen
     Schakowsky

                              {time}  1713

  Messrs. STARK, MEEHAN, OWENS, Mrs. MALONEY, Ms. McCOLLUM of 
Minnesota, Mr. LYNCH, Ms. DeLAURO, Messrs. LARSON of Connecticut, WATT, 
INSLEE, RANGEL, TIERNEY, Ms. WATSON, Ms. EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON of 
Texas, Mr. SCOTT of Virginia, Mr. TOWNS, Ms. SOLIS, Mr. PASTOR, Ms. 
JACKSON-LEE of Texas, and Mr. COSTELLO changed their vote from ``aye'' 
to ``no.''
  Ms. BEAN, Mr. DAVIS of Illinois and Mr. WAXMAN changed their vote 
from ``no'' to ``aye.''
  So the amendment was agreed to.
  The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
  The CHAIRMAN. There being no other amendments, the question is on the 
amendment in the nature of a substitute, as amended.
  The amendment in the nature of a substitute, as amended, was agreed 
to.
  The CHAIRMAN. Under the rule, the Committee rises.
  Accordingly, the Committee rose; and the Speaker pro tempore (Mr. 
Kuhl of New York) having assumed the chair, Mr. Rehberg, Chairman of 
the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union, reported 
that that

[[Page H1809]]

Committee, having had under consideration the bill (H.R. 5020) to 
authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2007 for intelligence and 
intelligence-related activities of the United States Government, the 
Community Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency 
Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes, pursuant to 
House Resolution 774, he reported the bill back to the House with an 
amendment adopted by the Committee of the Whole.

                              {time}  1715

  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Kuhl of New York). Under the rule, the 
previous question is ordered.
  Is a separate vote demanded on any amendment to the committee 
amendment in the nature of a substitute adopted by the Committee of the 
Whole? If not, the question is on the amendment.
  The amendment was agreed to.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the engrossment and third 
reading of the bill.
  The bill was ordered to be engrossed and read a third time, and was 
read the third time.


                Motion to Recommit Offered by Mr. Schiff

  Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Speaker, I offer a motion to recommit
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is the gentleman opposed to the bill?
  Mr. SCHIFF. Yes, in its current form.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Clerk will report the motion to 
recommit.
  The Clerk read as follows:

       Mr. Schiff moves to recommit the bill, H.R. 5020, to the 
     Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence with instructions 
     to report the same back to the House forthwith with the 
     following amendment:
       At the end of title III (Page 16, after line 10), add the 
     following new section:

     SEC. 308. NSA OVERSIGHT ACT.

       (a) Short Title.--This section may be cited as the ``NSA 
     Oversight Act''.
       (b) Findings.--Congress finds the following:
       (1) On September 11, 2001, acts of treacherous violence 
     were committed against the United States and its citizens.
       (2) Such acts render it both necessary and appropriate that 
     the United States exercise its right to self-defense by 
     protecting United States citizens both at home and abroad.
       (3) The Federal Government has a duty to pursue al Qaeda 
     and other enemies of the United States with all available 
     tools, including the use of electronic surveillance, to 
     thwart future attacks on the United States and to destroy the 
     enemy.
       (4) The President of the United States possesses the 
     inherent authority to engage in electronic surveillance of 
     the enemy outside of the United States consistent with his 
     authority as Commander-in-Chief under Article II of the 
     Constitution.
       (5) Congress possesses the authority to regulate electronic 
     surveillance within the United States.
       (6) The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution guarantees to 
     the American people the right ``to be secure in their 
     persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
     searches and seizures'' and provides that courts shall issue 
     ``warrants'' to authorize searches and seizures, based upon 
     probable cause.
       (7) The Supreme Court has consistently held for nearly 40 
     years that the monitoring and recording of private 
     conversations constitutes a ``search and seizure'' within the 
     meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
       (8) The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 
     U.S.C. 1801 et seq.) and chapters 119 and 121 of title 18, 
     United States Code, were enacted to provide the legal 
     authority for the Federal Government to engage in searches of 
     Americans in connection with criminal investigations, 
     intelligence gathering, and counterintelligence.
       (9) The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 and 
     specified provisions of the Federal criminal code, were 
     expressly enacted as the ``exclusive means by which 
     electronic surveillance . . . may be conducted'' domestically 
     pursuant to law (18 U.S.C. 2511(2)(f)).
       (10) Warrantless electronic surveillance of Americans 
     inside the United States conducted without congressional 
     authorization may have a serious impact on the civil 
     liberties of citizens of the United States.
       (11) United States citizens, such as journalists, 
     academics, and researchers studying global terrorism, who 
     have made international phone calls subsequent to the 
     terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and are law-abiding 
     citizens, may have the reasonable fear of being the subject 
     of such surveillance.
       (12) Since the nature and criteria of the National Security 
     Agency (NSA) program is highly classified and unknown to the 
     public, many other Americans who make frequent international 
     calls, such as Americans engaged in international business, 
     Americans with family overseas, and others, have a legitimate 
     concern they may be the inadvertent targets of eavesdropping.
       (13) The President has sought and signed legislation 
     including the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing 
     Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct 
     Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of 2001 (Public Law 107-56), 
     and the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Protection Act of 
     2004 (Public Law 108-458), that have expanded authorities 
     under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978.
       (14) It may be necessary and desirable to amend the Foreign 
     Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 to address new 
     challenges in the Global War on Terrorism. The President 
     should submit a request for legislation to Congress to amend 
     the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 if the 
     President desires that the electronic surveillance authority 
     provided by such Act be further modified.
       (15) The Authorization for Use of Military Force (Public 
     Law 107-40), passed by Congress on September 14, 2001, 
     authorized military action against those responsible for the 
     attacks on September 11, 2001, but did not contain legal 
     authorization nor approve of domestic electronic surveillance 
     not authorized by chapters 119 or 121 of title 18, United 
     States Code, or the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 
     1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.).
       (c) Reiteration of Chapters 119 and 121 of Title 18, United 
     States Code, and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 
     1978 as the Exclusive Means by Which Domestic Electronic 
     Surveillance May Be Conducted.--
       (1) Exclusive means.--Notwithstanding any other provision 
     of law, chapters 119 and 121 of title 18, United States Code, 
     and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 
     U.S.C. 1801 et seq.) shall be the exclusive means by which 
     electronic surveillance may be conducted.
       (2) Future congressional action.--Paragraph (1) shall apply 
     until specific statutory authorization for electronic 
     surveillance, other than as an amendment to chapters 119 or 
     121 of title 18, United States Code, or the Foreign 
     Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et 
     seq.), is enacted. Such specific statutory authorization 
     shall be the only exception to paragraph (1).
       (d) Disclosure Requirements.--Not later than 14 days after 
     the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall 
     submit to the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and 
     the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of 
     Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence and 
     the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate a report in 
     classified form identifying the United States persons who 
     have been the subject of electronic surveillance not 
     authorized to be conducted under the Foreign Intelligence 
     Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.) or chapters 
     119 or 121 of title 18, United States Code, and the basis for 
     the selection of such persons for such electronic 
     surveillance.
       (e) Electronic Surveillance Defined.--In this section, the 
     term ``electronic surveillance'' has the meaning given the 
     term in section 101(f) of the Foreign Intelligence 
     Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801(f)).

  Mr. SCHIFF (during the reading). Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent 
that the motion be considered as read and printed in the Record.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentleman from California?
  There was no objection.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from 
California is recognized for 5 minutes in support of the motion.
  Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Speaker, the motion to recommit is based on 
bipartisan legislation that I introduced, along with Representatives 
Flake, Harman and Inglis, dealing with the NSA surveillance program. 
And the basic premise of this legislation is that the Government must 
have all the tools it needs, it must have all the authority it needs to 
pursue al Qaeda using every tool in the toolbox.
  But the premise is also that we are a Nation of laws, and that 
whereas the Commander in Chief has the authority to eavesdrop and 
surveil off American shores, when it comes to the electronic 
surveillance of Americans on American soil, Congress has the authority 
to regulate that surveillance. And, in fact, Congress has regulated 
that surveillance through title III and through the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act; and, in fact, those two laws form the 
exclusive authority to surveil Americans on American soil.
  Now, we have learned, both through a disclosure in The New York Times 
and through the disclosures of the present administration, that there 
is an NSA surveillance program that, among others things, surveils 
conversations between Americans or people on U.S. soil and people 
overseas who may be affiliated with al Qaeda. Other than a small number 
of us, we don't know much about the contours of this program.
  Recently when the Attorney General testified in the Judiciary 
Committee, I asked about the limiting principle of this program: Was it 
restricted only to these international calls? What if the Attorney 
General decided tomorrow or

[[Page H1810]]

the administration decided tomorrow that it had the inherent authority 
as Commander in Chief to tap purely domestic calls between two 
Americans; did it feel it would need to go to court for that authority? 
And the Attorney General said he would not rule it out. He would not 
rule out having the pure authority, without going to court, to tap the 
calls between two Americans on American soil.
  So what is the limiting principle if this program can change from day 
to day without the input of Congress? The only limiting principle is 
the good faith of the executive, which when the executive shows it is 
infallible might be a sufficient limiting principle. But the executive 
is no more infallible than we are here in Congress, and so we have a 
role to play.
  And this motion to recommit says that that role is the following: 
that, first, when we pass a law, like FISA and Title III, where we say 
the exclusive means of domestic eavesdropping is under these provisions 
with court approval, we mean what we say; that, second, the 
authorization to use military force that we voted on in the immediate 
aftermath of 9/11 did not create an exception to the authority to 
eavesdrop on Americans on American soil; that, third, if the President 
believes that FISA or existing law is insufficient to the task, he 
should come to Congress through his representatives and ask us to amend 
the law.
  And this is what is most disturbing about what has happened so far. 
When the administration did come in the context of the PATRIOT bill and 
asked us to change FISA, we made changes to FISA. When one of the 
Republican Senators asked the administration, do you need us to change 
FISA more; is there a problem with FISA; is it not keeping pace with 
the terrorists or technology? The answer from the administration was, 
no, FISA is working just fine. The more truthful answer would have 
been, no, because we don't feel bound by FISA. We feel we can do what 
we choose to, what we feel we must, without consulting with Congress.
  So this bill says, importantly, that if the administration feels that 
existing law is not enough, it should come to us and ask for amendment. 
And, finally, it asks the administration to report to Congress on the 
extent to which Americans have been surveilled on American soil so we 
can do our job as a coequal branch of government.
  Mr. Speaker, I yield to my colleague, the ranking member from 
California.
  Ms. HARMAN. I thank the gentleman for yielding and commend him and 
Messrs. Flake and Inglis for their bipartisan leadership on this issue.
  Mr. Speaker, every Member of this body supports tracking the 
communications of al Qaeda. That is not the issue. The issue is whether 
the electronic surveillance of Americans must comply with law and the 
fourth amendment. I believe it must. And as one of the few in this body 
who has been briefed on the highly classified program we are talking 
about, I believe it can. This program can and must comply with FISA. 
That is what the amendment says. The President believes his inherent 
authority trumps Article I of the Constitution, and I respectfully 
disagree.
  Recommitting this bill and adding this provision will make a good 
bill stronger and will honor the sacrifice and dedication of those who 
serve us so courageously in the field.
  Mr. HOEKSTRA. Mr. Speaker, I am opposed to the motion to recommit.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman is recognized for 5 minutes.
  Mr. HOEKSTRA. Mr. Speaker, I thank my colleagues on the other side of 
the aisle for this motion to recommit so that we can talk about this 
issue.
  The language that is being used to describe the President and the 
executive branch is absolutely outrageous. Today we have heard the 
charges ``unlawful, reckless, abusive, infallible, without consulting 
with Congress.'' For 4\1/2\ years, Republicans and Democrats have been 
brought into this program.
  Immediately when this program was started, to protect Americans both 
here and abroad, the leadership, on a bipartisan basis, was informed on 
the program. They consistently on a quarterly or a 4-month basis met 
with the executive branch, met with the Vice President and the people 
operating this program, and they came back united and said this program 
is legal, it is limited, the safeguards are in place to protect 
American civil liberties, it is effective, it is making a difference, 
and it is necessary.
  And only when someone leaked it to the press all of a sudden did it 
become all of these other things that you have ascribed to the 
President. The President has reached out. The President has worked with 
Congress to make sure that we address these concerns.
  America is at war. We were at war when this program started. We 
continue to be at war. Bin Laden was on tapes this weekend. Zarqawi is 
on a tape. We have bombings in Egypt, and troops in Iraq and 
Afghanistan. This continues to be the same thing that on a bipartisan 
basis people said needed to be done. It is legal, it is limited, it is 
necessary, and it is making a difference.
  Mr. Speaker, I yield to my colleague from New Mexico (Mrs. Wilson).
  Mrs. WILSON of New Mexico. Thank you, Mr. Speaker.
  I have to say to my colleague from California that I really don't 
understand. For over 3 years, the ranking member of the Intelligence 
Committee and the minority leader of this House, Ms. Pelosi, have gone 
along with this and accepted limited briefings without insisting that 
the Intelligence Committee be informed and that oversight happen.
  In January of this year, Ms. Harman said, ``This program is essential 
to U.S. national security, and its disclosure has damaged critical 
national intelligence capabilities.'' But now that effective oversight 
is taking place, because I demanded it, and this committee, the 
Intelligence Committee, is conducting effective oversight, you want a 
report.
  Mr. Schiff has proposed not a benign piece of amendment, but a 
specific report on by-name targets, not only to the Intelligence 
Committee, but to the Judiciary Committee, an unprecedented release of 
sources and methods of intelligence that you know would compromise 
ongoing operations critical and vital to the security of this country.
  The oversight of this program is proceeding. This committee went to 
the NSA on the 8th of April. We are going again on Friday. The Director 
of National Intelligence and the Deputy Director have briefed this 
committee, and continuing information comes in as we speak.
  We will do our job as the Intelligence Committee, and we will also 
protect the security of the United States in the process. I urge my 
colleagues to oppose this motion to recommit.
  Mr. HOEKSTRA. Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Without objection, the previous question is 
ordered on the motion to recommit.
  There was no objection.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion to recommit.
  The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that 
the noes appeared to have it.


                             Recorded Vote

  Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Speaker, I demand a recorded vote.
  A recorded vote was ordered.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 9 of rule XX, the Chair 
will reduce to 5 minutes the minimum time for any electronic vote on 
the question of passage.
  The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 195, 
noes 230, not voting 7, as follows:

                             [Roll No. 107]

                               AYES--195

     Abercrombie
     Ackerman
     Allen
     Andrews
     Baca
     Baird
     Baldwin
     Bean
     Becerra
     Berkley
     Berman
     Berry
     Bishop (GA)
     Bishop (NY)
     Blumenauer
     Boren
     Boswell
     Boucher
     Boyd
     Brady (PA)
     Brown (OH)
     Brown, Corrine
     Butterfield
     Capps
     Capuano
     Cardin
     Cardoza
     Carnahan
     Carson
     Case
     Chandler
     Clay
     Cleaver
     Clyburn
     Conyers
     Costa
     Costello
     Cramer
     Crowley
     Cuellar
     Cummings
     Davis (AL)
     Davis (CA)
     Davis (FL)
     Davis (IL)
     Davis (TN)
     DeFazio
     DeGette
     Delahunt
     DeLauro
     Dicks
     Dingell
     Doggett
     Doyle
     Edwards
     Emanuel
     Engel
     Eshoo
     Etheridge
     Farr
     Fattah
     Filner
     Flake
     Frank (MA)
     Gonzalez
     Gordon
     Green, Al
     Green, Gene
     Grijalva
     Gutierrez
     Harman
     Herseth
     Higgins
     Hinchey
     Hinojosa
     Holden
     Holt
     Honda

[[Page H1811]]


     Hooley
     Hoyer
     Inglis (SC)
     Inslee
     Israel
     Jackson (IL)
     Jackson-Lee (TX)
     Jefferson
     Johnson, E. B.
     Jones (OH)
     Kanjorski
     Kaptur
     Kennedy (RI)
     Kildee
     Kilpatrick (MI)
     Kind
     Kucinich
     Langevin
     Lantos
     Larsen (WA)
     Larson (CT)
     Leach
     Lee
     Levin
     Lewis (GA)
     Lipinski
     Lofgren, Zoe
     Lowey
     Lynch
     Maloney
     Markey
     Matsui
     McCarthy
     McCollum (MN)
     McDermott
     McGovern
     McIntyre
     McKinney
     McNulty
     Meehan
     Meek (FL)
     Meeks (NY)
     Melancon
     Michaud
     Miller (NC)
     Mollohan
     Moore (KS)
     Moran (VA)
     Murtha
     Nadler
     Napolitano
     Neal (MA)
     Oberstar
     Obey
     Olver
     Ortiz
     Owens
     Pallone
     Pascrell
     Pastor
     Paul
     Payne
     Pelosi
     Peterson (MN)
     Pomeroy
     Price (NC)
     Rahall
     Rangel
     Reyes
     Ross
     Rothman
     Roybal-Allard
     Ruppersberger
     Rush
     Ryan (OH)
     Sabo
     Salazar
     Sanchez, Linda T.
     Sanchez, Loretta
     Sanders
     Schakowsky
     Schiff
     Schwartz (PA)
     Scott (GA)
     Scott (VA)
     Serrano
     Sherman
     Skelton
     Slaughter
     Smith (WA)
     Solis
     Spratt
     Stark
     Strickland
     Stupak
     Tanner
     Tauscher
     Taylor (MS)
     Thompson (CA)
     Thompson (MS)
     Tierney
     Towns
     Udall (CO)
     Udall (NM)
     Van Hollen
     Velazquez
     Visclosky
     Wasserman Schultz
     Waters
     Watson
     Watt
     Waxman
     Weiner
     Wexler
     Woolsey
     Wu
     Wynn

                               NOES--230

     Aderholt
     Akin
     Alexander
     Bachus
     Baker
     Barrett (SC)
     Barrow
     Bartlett (MD)
     Barton (TX)
     Bass
     Beauprez
     Biggert
     Bilirakis
     Bishop (UT)
     Blackburn
     Blunt
     Boehlert
     Boehner
     Bonilla
     Bonner
     Bono
     Boozman
     Boustany
     Bradley (NH)
     Brady (TX)
     Brown (SC)
     Brown-Waite, Ginny
     Burgess
     Burton (IN)
     Buyer
     Calvert
     Camp (MI)
     Campbell (CA)
     Cannon
     Cantor
     Capito
     Carter
     Castle
     Chabot
     Chocola
     Coble
     Cole (OK)
     Conaway
     Cooper
     Crenshaw
     Cubin
     Culberson
     Davis (KY)
     Davis, Jo Ann
     Davis, Tom
     Deal (GA)
     DeLay
     Dent
     Diaz-Balart, L.
     Diaz-Balart, M.
     Doolittle
     Drake
     Dreier
     Duncan
     Ehlers
     Emerson
     English (PA)
     Everett
     Feeney
     Ferguson
     Fitzpatrick (PA)
     Foley
     Forbes
     Fortenberry
     Fossella
     Foxx
     Franks (AZ)
     Frelinghuysen
     Gallegly
     Garrett (NJ)
     Gerlach
     Gibbons
     Gilchrest
     Gillmor
     Gingrey
     Gohmert
     Goode
     Goodlatte
     Granger
     Graves
     Green (WI)
     Gutknecht
     Hall
     Harris
     Hart
     Hastings (WA)
     Hayes
     Hayworth
     Hefley
     Hensarling
     Herger
     Hobson
     Hoekstra
     Hostettler
     Hulshof
     Hunter
     Hyde
     Issa
     Istook
     Jenkins
     Jindal
     Johnson (CT)
     Johnson (IL)
     Johnson, Sam
     Jones (NC)
     Keller
     Kelly
     Kennedy (MN)
     King (IA)
     King (NY)
     Kingston
     Kirk
     Kline
     Knollenberg
     Kolbe
     Kuhl (NY)
     LaHood
     Latham
     LaTourette
     Lewis (CA)
     Lewis (KY)
     Linder
     LoBiondo
     Lucas
     Lungren, Daniel E.
     Mack
     Manzullo
     Marchant
     Marshall
     Matheson
     McCaul (TX)
     McCotter
     McCrery
     McHenry
     McHugh
     McKeon
     McMorris
     Mica
     Miller (FL)
     Miller (MI)
     Miller, Gary
     Moran (KS)
     Murphy
     Musgrave
     Myrick
     Neugebauer
     Ney
     Northup
     Norwood
     Nunes
     Nussle
     Osborne
     Otter
     Oxley
     Pearce
     Pence
     Peterson (PA)
     Petri
     Pickering
     Pitts
     Platts
     Poe
     Pombo
     Porter
     Price (GA)
     Pryce (OH)
     Putnam
     Radanovich
     Ramstad
     Regula
     Rehberg
     Reichert
     Renzi
     Reynolds
     Rogers (AL)
     Rogers (KY)
     Rogers (MI)
     Rohrabacher
     Royce
     Ryan (WI)
     Ryun (KS)
     Saxton
     Schmidt
     Schwarz (MI)
     Sensenbrenner
     Sessions
     Shadegg
     Shaw
     Shays
     Sherwood
     Shimkus
     Shuster
     Simmons
     Simpson
     Smith (NJ)
     Smith (TX)
     Snyder
     Sodrel
     Souder
     Stearns
     Sullivan
     Sweeney
     Tancredo
     Taylor (NC)
     Terry
     Thomas
     Thornberry
     Tiahrt
     Tiberi
     Turner
     Upton
     Walden (OR)
     Walsh
     Wamp
     Weldon (FL)
     Weldon (PA)
     Weller
     Westmoreland
     Whitfield
     Wicker
     Wilson (NM)
     Wilson (SC)
     Wolf
     Young (AK)
     Young (FL)

                             NOT VOTING--7

     Evans
     Ford
     Hastings (FL)
     Millender-McDonald
     Miller, George
     Moore (WI)
     Ros-Lehtinen

                              {time}  1746

  Mr. SKELTON changed his vote from ``no'' to ``aye.''
  So the motion to recommit was rejected.
  The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Kuhl of New York.) The question is on 
the passage of the bill.
  The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that 
the ayes appeared to have it.


                             Recorded Vote

  Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Speaker, I demand a recorded vote.
  A recorded vote was ordered.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. This will be a 5-minute vote.
  The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 327, 
noes 96, not voting 9, as follows:

                             [Roll No. 108]

                               AYES--327

     Aderholt
     Akin
     Alexander
     Allen
     Baca
     Bachus
     Baird
     Baker
     Barrett (SC)
     Barrow
     Bartlett (MD)
     Barton (TX)
     Bass
     Bean
     Beauprez
     Berkley
     Berman
     Berry
     Biggert
     Bilirakis
     Bishop (GA)
     Bishop (NY)
     Bishop (UT)
     Blackburn
     Blunt
     Boehlert
     Boehner
     Bonilla
     Bonner
     Bono
     Boozman
     Boren
     Boswell
     Boucher
     Boustany
     Bradley (NH)
     Brady (TX)
     Brown (OH)
     Brown (SC)
     Brown, Corrine
     Brown-Waite, Ginny
     Burgess
     Burton (IN)
     Butterfield
     Buyer
     Calvert
     Camp (MI)
     Campbell (CA)
     Cannon
     Cantor
     Capito
     Capps
     Cardin
     Cardoza
     Carnahan
     Carson
     Carter
     Case
     Castle
     Chabot
     Chandler
     Chocola
     Clay
     Cleaver
     Clyburn
     Coble
     Cole (OK)
     Conaway
     Cooper
     Costa
     Cramer
     Crenshaw
     Crowley
     Cubin
     Cuellar
     Culberson
     Cummings
     Davis (AL)
     Davis (KY)
     Davis (TN)
     Davis, Jo Ann
     Deal (GA)
     DeLay
     Dent
     Diaz-Balart, L.
     Diaz-Balart, M.
     Dicks
     Dingell
     Doolittle
     Doyle
     Drake
     Dreier
     Edwards
     Ehlers
     Emanuel
     Emerson
     Engel
     English (PA)
     Etheridge
     Everett
     Feeney
     Ferguson
     Fitzpatrick (PA)
     Flake
     Foley
     Forbes
     Fortenberry
     Fossella
     Foxx
     Franks (AZ)
     Frelinghuysen
     Gallegly
     Garrett (NJ)
     Gerlach
     Gibbons
     Gilchrest
     Gillmor
     Gingrey
     Gohmert
     Gonzalez
     Goode
     Goodlatte
     Gordon
     Granger
     Graves
     Green (WI)
     Green, Al
     Green, Gene
     Gutknecht
     Hall
     Harris
     Hart
     Hastings (WA)
     Hayes
     Hayworth
     Hefley
     Hensarling
     Herger
     Herseth
     Higgins
     Hinojosa
     Hobson
     Hoekstra
     Holden
     Hooley
     Hostettler
     Hoyer
     Hulshof
     Hunter
     Hyde
     Inglis (SC)
     Israel
     Issa
     Istook
     Jefferson
     Jenkins
     Jindal
     Johnson (CT)
     Johnson (IL)
     Johnson, Sam
     Kanjorski
     Keller
     Kelly
     Kennedy (MN)
     Kennedy (RI)
     Kildee
     King (IA)
     King (NY)
     Kingston
     Kirk
     Kline
     Knollenberg
     Kolbe
     Kuhl (NY)
     LaHood
     Langevin
     Lantos
     Larsen (WA)
     Latham
     LaTourette
     Leach
     Levin
     Lewis (CA)
     Lewis (KY)
     Linder
     Lipinski
     LoBiondo
     Lowey
     Lucas
     Lungren, Daniel E.
     Mack
     Maloney
     Manzullo
     Marchant
     Marshall
     Matheson
     McCarthy
     McCaul (TX)
     McCotter
     McCrery
     McHenry
     McHugh
     McIntyre
     McKeon
     McMorris
     McNulty
     Meek (FL)
     Melancon
     Mica
     Michaud
     Miller (FL)
     Miller (MI)
     Miller (NC)
     Miller, Gary
     Mollohan
     Moore (KS)
     Moran (KS)
     Murphy
     Murtha
     Musgrave
     Myrick
     Nadler
     Neugebauer
     Ney
     Northup
     Norwood
     Nunes
     Nussle
     Ortiz
     Osborne
     Otter
     Oxley
     Pascrell
     Pearce
     Pence
     Peterson (MN)
     Peterson (PA)
     Petri
     Pickering
     Pitts
     Platts
     Poe
     Pombo
     Pomeroy
     Porter
     Price (GA)
     Pryce (OH)
     Putnam
     Rahall
     Ramstad
     Regula
     Rehberg
     Reichert
     Renzi
     Reynolds
     Rogers (AL)
     Rogers (KY)
     Rogers (MI)
     Rohrabacher
     Ross
     Royce
     Ruppersberger
     Ryan (OH)
     Ryan (WI)
     Ryun (KS)
     Salazar
     Sanders
     Saxton
     Schiff
     Schmidt
     Schwartz (PA)
     Schwarz (MI)
     Scott (GA)
     Sensenbrenner
     Sessions
     Shadegg
     Shaw
     Shays
     Sherwood
     Shimkus
     Shuster
     Simmons
     Simpson
     Skelton
     Smith (NJ)
     Smith (TX)
     Smith (WA)
     Snyder
     Sodrel
     Souder
     Spratt
     Stearns
     Strickland
     Stupak
     Sullivan
     Sweeney
     Tancredo
     Tanner
     Taylor (MS)
     Taylor (NC)
     Terry
     Thomas
     Thompson (MS)
     Thornberry
     Tiahrt
     Tiberi
     Turner
     Udall (CO)
     Udall (NM)
     Upton
     Van Hollen
     Walden (OR)
     Walsh
     Wamp
     Wasserman Schultz
     Weldon (FL)
     Weldon (PA)
     Weller
     Westmoreland
     Whitfield
     Wicker
     Wilson (NM)
     Wilson (SC)
     Wolf
     Wu
     Young (AK)
     Young (FL)

                                NOES--96

     Abercrombie
     Ackerman
     Andrews
     Baldwin
     Becerra
     Blumenauer
     Boyd
     Brady (PA)
     Capuano
     Conyers
     Costello
     Davis (CA)
     Davis (FL)
     Davis (IL)
     DeFazio
     DeGette
     Delahunt
     DeLauro
     Doggett
     Duncan
     Eshoo
     Farr
     Fattah
     Filner
     Frank (MA)
     Grijalva
     Gutierrez
     Harman
     Hinchey
     Holt
     Honda
     Inslee
     Jackson (IL)
     Jackson-Lee (TX)
     Johnson, E. B.
     Jones (NC)
     Jones (OH)
     Kaptur
     Kilpatrick (MI)
     Kind
     Kucinich
     Larson (CT)
     Lee
     Lewis (GA)
     Lofgren, Zoe
     Lynch
     Markey
     Matsui
     McCollum (MN)
     McDermott
     McGovern
     McKinney
     Meehan
     Meeks (NY)
     Moran (VA)
     Napolitano
     Neal (MA)
     Oberstar
     Obey
     Olver
     Owens
     Pallone
     Pastor
     Paul
     Payne
     Pelosi
     Price (NC)
     Rangel
     Reyes
     Rothman
     Roybal-Allard
     Rush
     Sabo
     Sanchez, Linda T.
     Sanchez, Loretta
     Schakowsky
     Scott (VA)
     Serrano
     Sherman

[[Page H1812]]


     Slaughter
     Solis
     Stark
     Tauscher
     Thompson (CA)
     Tierney
     Towns
     Velazquez
     Visclosky
     Waters
     Watson
     Watt
     Waxman
     Weiner
     Wexler
     Woolsey
     Wynn

                             NOT VOTING--9

     Davis, Tom
     Evans
     Ford
     Hastings (FL)
     Millender-McDonald
     Miller, George
     Moore (WI)
     Radanovich
     Ros-Lehtinen

                              {time}  1758

  Messrs. GUTIERREZ, WYNN and DOGGETT changed their vote from ``aye'' 
to ``no.''
  Mr. CUMMINGS changed his vote from ``no'' to ``aye.''
  So the bill was passed.
  The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
  A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.
  Stated for:
  Mr. TOM DAVIS of Virginia. Mr. Speaker, on rollcall vote No. 108, 
final passage of the Intelligence Authorization Act, I am recorded as 
not voting. Although I was present in the Chamber, my vote was not 
recorded.
  I intended to vote ``aye'' and would like to be recorded as such.

                          ____________________