Congressional Record, Volume 152 Issue 47 (Wednesday, April 26, 2006)

[Congressional Record Volume 152, Number 47 (Wednesday, April 26, 2006)]
[House]
[Pages H1754-H1774]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

IRAN FREEDOM SUPPORT ACT

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Madam Speaker, I move to suspend the rules
and pass the bill (H.R. 282) to hold the current regime in Iran
accountable for its threatening behavior and to support a transition to
democracy in Iran, as amended.
The Clerk read as follows:

H.R. 282

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the ``Iran Freedom Support Act''.

SEC. 2. TABLE OF CONTENTS.

The table of contents for this Act is as follows:

Sec. 1. Short title
Sec. 2. Table of contents

TITLE I--CODIFICATION OF SANCTIONS AGAINST IRAN

Sec. 101. Codification of sanctions
Sec. 102. Liability of parent companies for violations of sanctions by
foreign entities

TITLE II--AMENDMENTS TO THE IRAN AND LIBYA SANCTIONS ACT OF 1996 AND
OTHER PROVISIONS RELATED TO INVESTMENT IN IRAN

Sec. 201. Multilateral regime
Sec. 202. Imposition of sanctions
Sec. 203. Termination of sanctions
Sec. 204. Sunset
Sec. 205. Clarification and expansion of definitions
Sec. 206. United States pension plans
Sec. 207. Technical and conforming amendments

[[Page H1755]]

TITLE III--DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS TO CURTAIL IRANIAN NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION
AND SPONSORSHIP OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

Sec. 301. Diplomatic efforts
Sec. 302. Strengthening the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty

TITLE IV--DEMOCRACY IN IRAN

Sec. 401. Declaration of Congress regarding United States policy toward
Iran
Sec. 402. Assistance to support democracy in Iran
Sec. 403. Waiver of certain export license requirements

TITLE I--CODIFICATION OF SANCTIONS AGAINST IRAN

SEC. 101. CODIFICATION OF SANCTIONS.

(a) Codification of Sanctions.--United States sanctions,
controls, and regulations with respect to Iran imposed
pursuant to Executive Order 12957, sections 1(b) through
(1)(g) and sections (2) through (6) of Executive Order 12959,
and sections 2 and 3 of Executive Order 13059 (relating to
exports and certain other transactions with Iran) as in
effect on January 1, 2006, shall remain in effect until the
President certifies to the Committee on International
Relations of the House of Representatives and the Committee
on Foreign Relations of the Senate that the Government of
Iran has verifiably dismantled its weapons of mass
destruction programs.
(b) No Effect on Other Sanctions Relating to Support for
Acts of International Terrorism.--Subsection (a) shall have
no effect on United States sanctions, controls, and
regulations relating to a determination under section
6(j)(1)(A) of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (50
U.S.C. App. 2405(j)(1)(A)), section 620A(a) of the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2371(a)), or section 40(d)
of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2780(d)) relating
to support for acts of international terrorism by the
Government of Iran, as in effect on January 1, 2006.

SEC. 102. LIABILITY OF PARENT COMPANIES FOR VIOLATIONS OF
SANCTIONS BY FOREIGN ENTITIES.

(a) In General.--In any case in which an entity engages in
an act outside the United States which, if committed in the
United States or by a United States person, would violate
Executive Order 12959 of May 6, 1995, Executive Order 13059
of August 19, 1997, or any other prohibition on transactions
with respect to Iran that is imposed under the International
Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) and if
that entity was created or availed of for the purpose of
engaging in such an act, the parent company of that entity
shall be subject to the penalties for such violation to the
same extent as if the parent company had engaged in that act.
(b) Definitions.--In this section--
(1) an entity is a ``parent company'' of another entity if
it owns, directly or indirectly, more than 50 percent of the
equity interest in that other entity and is a United States
person; and
(2) the term ``entity'' means a partnership, association,
trust, joint venture, corporation, or other organization.

TITLE II--AMENDMENTS TO THE IRAN AND LIBYA SANCTIONS ACT OF 1996 AND
OTHER PROVISIONS RELATED TO INVESTMENT IN IRAN

SEC. 201. MULTILATERAL REGIME.

(a) Reports to Congress.--Section 4(b) of the Iran and
Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note) is amended
to read as follows:
``(b) Reports to Congress.--Not later than six months after
the date of the enactment of the Iran Freedom Support Act and
every six months thereafter, the President shall submit to
the appropriate congressional committees a report regarding
specific diplomatic efforts undertaken pursuant to subsection
(a), the results of those efforts, and a description of
proposed diplomatic efforts pursuant to such subsection. Each
report shall include--
``(1) a list of the countries that have agreed to undertake
measures to further the objectives of section 3 with respect
to Iran;
``(2) a description of those measures, including--
``(A) government actions with respect to public or private
entities (or their subsidiaries) located in their
territories, that are engaged in Iran;
``(B) any decisions by the governments of these countries
to rescind or continue the provision of credits, guarantees,
or other governmental assistance to these entities; and
``(C) actions taken in international fora to further the
objectives of section 3;
``(3) a list of the countries that have not agreed to
undertake measures to further the objectives of section 3
with respect to Iran, and the reasons therefor; and
``(4) a description of any memorandums of understanding,
political understandings, or international agreements to
which the United States has acceded which affect
implementation of this section or section 5(a).''.
(b) Waiver.--Section 4(c) of such Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 note)
is amended to read as follows:
``(c) Waiver.--
``(1) In general.--The President may, on a case by case
basis, waive for a period of not more than six months the
application of section 5(a) with respect to a national of a
country, if the President certifies to the appropriate
congressional committees at least 30 days before such waiver
is to take effect that--
``(A) such waiver is vital to the national security
interests of the United States; and
``(B) the country of the national has undertaken
substantial measures to prevent the acquisition and
development of weapons of mass destruction by the Government
of Iran.
``(2) Subsequent renewal of waiver.--If the President
determines that, in accordance with paragraph (1), such a
waiver is appropriate, the President may, at the conclusion
of the period of a waiver under paragraph (1), renew such
waiver for subsequent periods of not more than six months
each.''.
(c) Investigations.--Section 4 of such Act (50 U.S.C. 1701
note) is amended by adding at the end the following new
subsection:
``(f) Investigations.--
``(1) In general.--The President shall initiate an
investigation into the possible imposition of sanctions
against a person upon receipt by the United States of
credible information indicating that such person is engaged
in activity related to investment in Iran as described in
section 5(a).
``(2) Determination and notification.--
``(A) In general.--Not later than 180 days after an
investigation is initiated in accordance with paragraph (1),
the President shall determine, pursuant to section 5(a),
whether or not to impose sanctions against a person engaged
in activity related to investment in Iran as described in
such section as a result of such activity and shall notify
the appropriate congressional committees of the basis for
such determination.
``(B) Extension.--If the President is unable to make a
determination under subparagraph (A), the President shall
notify the appropriate congressional committees and shall
extend such investigation for a subsequent period, not to
exceed 180 days, after which the President shall make the
determination required under such subparagraph and shall
notify the appropriate congressional committees of the basis
for such determination in accordance with such subparagraph.
``(3) Determinations regarding pending investigations.--Not
later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this
Act, the President shall, with respect to any investigation
that was pending as of January 1, 2006, concerning a person
engaged in activity related to investment in Iran as
described in section 5(a), determine whether or not to impose
sanctions against such person as a result of such activity
and shall notify the appropriate congressional committees of
the basis for such determination.
``(4) Publication.--Not later than 10 days after the
President notifies the appropriate congressional committees
under paragraphs (2) and (3), the President shall ensure
publication in the Federal Register of the identification of
the persons against which the President has made a
determination that the imposition of sanctions is
appropriate, together with an explanation for such
determination.''.

SEC. 202. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS.

(a) Sanctions With Respect to Development of Petroleum
Resources.--Section 5(a) of the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act
of 1996 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note) is amended--
(1) in the heading, by striking ``to Iran'' and inserting
``to the Development of Petroleum Resources of Iran'';
(2) by striking ``(6)'' and inserting ``(5)''; and
(3) by striking ``with actual knowledge,''.
(b) Sanctions With Respect to Development of Weapons of
Mass Destruction or Other Military Capabilities.--Section
5(b) of such Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 note) is amended to read as
follows:
``(b) Mandatory Sanctions With Respect to Development of
Weapons of Mass Destruction or Other Military Capabilities.--
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the President
shall impose two or more of the sanctions described in
paragraphs (1) through (5) of section 6 if the President
determines that a person has, on or after the date of the
enactment of this Act, exported, transferred, or otherwise
provided to Iran any goods, services, technology, or other
items knowing that the provision of such goods, services,
technology, or other items would contribute to the ability of
Iran to--
``(1) acquire or develop chemical, biological, or nuclear
weapons or related technologies; or
``(2) acquire or develop destabilizing numbers and types of
advanced conventional weapons.''.
(c) Persons Against Which the Sanctions Are to Be
Imposed.--Section 5(c)(2) of such Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 note)
is amended--
(1) in subparagraph (B), by striking ``, with actual
knowledge,'' and by striking ``or'' at the end;
(2) in subparagraph (C), by striking ``, with actual
knowledge,'' and by striking the period at the end and
inserting ``; or''; and
(3) by adding after subparagraph (C) the following new
subparagraph:
``(D) is a private or government lender, insurer,
underwriter, or guarantor of the person referred to in
paragraph (1) if that private or government lender, insurer,
underwriter, or guarantor engaged in the activities referred
to in paragraph (1).''.
(d) Effective Date.--The amendments made by this section
shall apply with respect to actions taken on or after March
15, 2006.

[[Page H1756]]

SEC. 203. TERMINATION OF SANCTIONS.

Section 8(a) of the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996
(50 U.S.C. 1701 note) is amended--
(1) in paragraph (1)(C), by striking ``and'' at the end;
(2) in paragraph (2), by striking the period at the end and
inserting ``; and''; and
(3) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
``(3) poses no significant threat to United States national
security, interests, or allies.''.

SEC. 204. SUNSET.

Section 13 of the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 (50
U.S.C. 1701 note) is amended--
(1) in the section heading, by striking ``; SUNSET'';
(2) in subsection (a), by striking the subsection
designation and heading; and
(3) by striking subsection (b).

SEC. 205. CLARIFICATION AND EXPANSION OF DEFINITIONS.

(a) Person.--Section 14(14)(B) of the Iran and Libya
Sanctions Act of 1996 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note) is amended--
(1) by inserting after ``trust,'' the following:
``financial institution, insurer, underwriter, guarantor, any
other business organization, including any foreign
subsidiaries of the foregoing,''; and
(2) by inserting before the semicolon the following: ``,
such as an export credit agency''.
(b) Petroleum Resources.--Section 14(15) of the Iran and
Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note) is amended
by inserting after ``petroleum'' the second place it appears,
the following: ``, petroleum by-products,''.

SEC. 206. UNITED STATES PENSION PLANS.

(a) Findings.--Congress finds the following:
(1) The United States and the international community face
no greater threat to their security than the prospect of
rogue regimes who support international terrorism obtaining
weapons of mass destruction, and particularly nuclear
weapons.
(2) Iran is the leading state sponsor of international
terrorism and is close to achieving nuclear weapons
capability but has paid no price for nearly twenty years of
deception over its nuclear program. Foreign entities that
have invested in Iran's energy sector, despite Iran's support
of international terrorism and its nuclear program, have
afforded Iran a free pass while many United States entities
have unknowingly invested in those same foreign entities.
(3) United States investors have a great deal at stake in
preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons.
(4) United States investors can have considerable influence
over the commercial decisions of the foreign entities in
which they have invested.
(b) Publication in Federal Register.--Not later than six
months after the date of the enactment of this Act and every
six months thereafter, the Secretary of State shall ensure
publication in the Federal Register of a list of all United
States and foreign entities that have invested more than
$20,000,000 in Iran's energy sector between August 5, 1996,
and the date of such publication. Such list shall include an
itemization of individual investments of each such entity,
including the dollar value, intended purpose, and current
status of each such investment.
(c) Sense of Congress Relating to Divestiture From Iran.--
It is the sense of Congress that, upon publication of a list
in the relevant Federal Register under subsection (b),
managers of United States Government pension plans or thrift
savings plans, managers of pension plans maintained in the
private sector by plan sponsors in the United States, and
managers of mutual funds sold or distributed in the United
States should, to the extent consistent with the legal and
fiduciary duties otherwise imposed on them, immediately
initiate efforts to divest all investments of such plans or
funds in any entity included on the list.
(d) Sense of Congress Relating to Prohibition on Future
Investment.--It is the sense of Congress that, upon
publication of a list in the relevant Federal Register under
subsection (b), there should be, to the extent consistent
with the legal and fiduciary duties otherwise imposed on
them, no future investment in any entity included on the list
by managers of United States Government pension plans or
thrift savings plans, managers of pension plans maintained in
the private sector by plan sponsors in the United States, and
managers of mutual funds sold or distributed in the United
States.

SEC. 207. TECHNICAL AND CONFORMING AMENDMENTS.

(a) Findings.--Section 2 of the Iran and Libya Sanctions
Act of 1996 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note) is amended by striking
paragraph (4).
(b) Declaration of Policy.--Section 3 of the Iran and Libya
Sanctions Act of 1996 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note) is amended--
(1) in subsection (a), by striking ``(a) Policy With
Respect to Iran.--''; and
(2) by striking subsection (b).
(c) Termination of Sanctions.--Section 8 of the Iran and
Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note) is
amended--
(1) in subsection (a), by striking ``(a) Iran.--''; and
(2) by striking subsection (b).
(d) Duration of Sanctions; Presidential Waiver.--Section
9(c)(2)(C) of the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 (50
U.S.C. 1701 note) is amended to read as follows:
``(C) an estimate of the significance of the provision of
the items described in section 5(a) or section 5(b) to Iran's
ability to, respectively, develop its petroleum resources or
its weapons of mass destruction or other military
capabilities; and''.
(e) Reports Required.--Section 10(b)(1) of the Iran and
Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note) is amended
by striking ``and Libya'' each place it appears.
(f) Definitions.--Section 14 of the Iran and Libya
Sanctions Act of 1996 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note) is amended--
(1) in paragraph (9)--
(A) in the matter preceding subparagraph (A), by--
(i) striking ``, or with the Government of Libya or a
nongovernmental entity in Libya,''; and
(ii) by striking ``nongovenmental'' and inserting
``nongovernmental''; and
(B) in subparagraph (A), by striking ``or Libya (as the
case may be)'';
(2) by striking paragraph (12); and
(3) by redesignating paragraphs (13), (14), (15), (16), and
(17) as paragraphs (12), (13), (14), (15), and (16),
respectively.
(g) Short Title.--
(1) In general.--Section 1 of the Iran and Libya Sanctions
Act of 1996 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note) is amended by striking
``and Libya''.
(2) References.--Any reference in any other provision of
law, regulation, document, or other record of the United
States to the ``Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996'' shall
be deemed to be a reference to the ``Iran Sanctions Act of
1996''.

TITLE III--DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS TO CURTAIL IRANIAN NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION
AND SPONSORSHIP OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

SEC. 301. DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS.

(a) Sense of Congress Relating to United Nations Security
Council and the International Atomic Energy Agency.--It is
the sense of Congress that the President should instruct the
United States Permanent Representative to the United Nations
to work to secure support at the United Nations Security
Council for a resolution that would impose sanctions on Iran
as a result of its repeated breaches of its nuclear
nonproliferation obligations, to remain in effect until Iran
has verifiably dismantled its weapons of mass destruction
programs.
(b) Prohibition on Assistance to Countries That Invest in
the Energy Sector of Iran.--
(1) Withholding of assistance.--If, on or after April 13,
2005, a foreign person (as defined in section 14 of the Iran
Sanctions Act of 1996 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note), as renamed
pursuant to section 208(g)(1)) or an agency or
instrumentality of a foreign government has more than
$20,000,000 invested in Iran's energy sector, the President
shall, until the date on which such person or agency or
instrumentality of such government terminates such
investment, withhold assistance under the Foreign Assistance
Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151 et seq.) to the government of the
country to which such person owes allegiance or to which
control is exercised over such agency or instrumentality.
(2) Waiver.--Assistance prohibited by this section may be
furnished to the government of a foreign country described in
subsection (a) if the President determines that furnishing
such assistance is important to the national security
interests of the United States, furthers the goals described
in this Act, and, not later that 15 days before obligating
such assistance, notifies the Committee on International
Relations of the House of Representatives, the Committee on
Foreign Relations of the Senate, the Committee on
Appropriations of the House of Representatives, and the
Committee on Appropriations of the Senate of such
determination and submits to such committees a report that
includes--
(A) a statement of the determination;
(B) a detailed explanation of the assistance to be
provided;
(C) the estimated dollar amount of the assistance; and
(D) an explanation of how the assistance furthers United
States national security interests.

SEC. 302. STRENGTHENING THE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION TREATY.

(a) Findings.--Congress finds the following:
(1) Article IV of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons (commonly referred to as the ``Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty'' or ``NPT'') states that countries
that are parties to the Treaty have the ``inalienable right .
. . to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy
for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in
conformity with articles I and II of this Treaty.''.
(2) Iran has manipulated Article IV of the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty to acquire technologies needed to
manufacture nuclear weapons under the guise of developing
peaceful nuclear technology.
(3) Legal authorities, diplomatic historians, and officials
closely involved in the negotiation and ratification of the
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty state that the Treaty neither
recognizes nor protects such a per se right to all nuclear
technology, such as enrichment and reprocessing, but rather
affirms that the right to the use of peaceful nuclear energy
is qualified.
(b) Declaration of Congress Regarding United States Policy
to Strengthen the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.--Congress
declares that it should be the policy of

[[Page H1757]]

the United States to support diplomatic efforts to end the
manipulation of Article IV of the Nuclear Nonproliferation
Treaty, as undertaken by Iran, without undermining the Treaty
itself.

TITLE IV--DEMOCRACY IN IRAN

SEC. 401. DECLARATION OF CONGRESS REGARDING UNITED STATES
POLICY TOWARD IRAN.

(a) In General.--Congress declares that it should be the
policy of the United States to support independent human
rights and peaceful pro-democracy forces in Iran.
(b) Rule of Construction.--Nothing in this Act shall be
construed as authorizing the use of force against Iran.

SEC. 402. ASSISTANCE TO SUPPORT DEMOCRACY IN IRAN.

(a) Authorization.--
(1) In general.--The President is authorized to provide
financial and political assistance (including the award of
grants) to foreign and domestic individuals, organizations,
and entities that support democracy and the promotion of
democracy in Iran. Such assistance may include the award of
grants to eligible independent pro-democracy radio and
television broadcasting organizations that broadcast into
Iran.
(2) Limitation on assistance.--In accordance with the rule
of construction described in subsection (b) of section 401,
none of the funds authorized under this section shall be used
to support the use of force against Iran.
(b) Eligibility for Assistance.--Financial and political
assistance under this section may be provided only to an
individual, organization, or entity that--
(1) officially opposes the use of violence and terrorism
and has not been designated as a foreign terrorist
organization under section 219 of the Immigration and
Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1189) at any time during the
preceding four years;
(2) advocates the adherence by Iran to nonproliferation
regimes for nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and
materiel;
(3) is dedicated to democratic values and supports the
adoption of a democratic form of government in Iran;
(4) is dedicated to respect for human rights, including the
fundamental equality of women;
(5) works to establish equality of opportunity for people;
and
(6) supports freedom of the press, freedom of speech,
freedom of association, and freedom of religion.
(c) Funding.--The President may provide assistance under
this section using--
(1) funds available to the Middle East Partnership
Initiative (MEPI), the Broader Middle East and North Africa
Initiative, and the Human Rights and Democracy Fund; and
(2) amounts made available pursuant to the authorization of
appropriations under subsection (g).
(d) Notification.--Not later than 15 days before each
obligation of assistance under this section, and in
accordance with the procedures under section 634A of the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2394-l), the
President shall notify the Committee on International
Relations and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of
Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations and
the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate. Such
notification shall include, as practicable, the types of
programs supported by such assistance and the recipients of
such assistance.
(e) Sense of Congress Regarding Diplomatic Assistance.--It
is the sense of Congress that--
(1) contacts should be expanded with opposition groups in
Iran that meet the criteria under subsection (b);
(2) support for a transition to democracy in Iran should be
expressed by United States representatives and officials in
all appropriate international fora;
(3) efforts to bring a halt to the nuclear weapons program
of Iran, including steps to end the supply of nuclear
components or fuel to Iran, should be intensified, with
particular attention focused on the cooperation regarding
such program--
(A) between the Government of Iran and the Government of
the Russian Federation; and
(B) between the Government of Iran and individuals from
China and Pakistan, including the network of Dr. Abdul Qadeer
(A. Q.) Khan; and
(4) officials and representatives of the United States
should--
(A) strongly and unequivocally support indigenous efforts
in Iran calling for free, transparent, and democratic
elections; and
(B) draw international attention to violations by the
Government of Iran of human rights, freedom of religion,
freedom of assembly, and freedom of the press.
(f) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized
to be appropriated to the Department of State such sums as
may be necessary to carry out this section.

SEC. 403. WAIVER OF CERTAIN EXPORT LICENSE REQUIREMENTS.

The Secretary of State may, in consultation with the
Secretary of Commerce, waive the requirement to obtain a
license for the export to, or by, any person to whom the
Department of State has provided a grant under a program to
promote democracy or human rights abroad, any item which is
commercially available in the United States without
government license or permit, to the extent that such export
would be used exclusively for carrying out the purposes of
the grant.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from New
Jersey (Mr. Smith) and the gentleman from California (Mr. Lantos) each
will control 20 minutes.
Mr. PAUL. Madam Speaker, I request the time in opposition if neither
gentleman is opposed to the bill.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Does the gentleman from California support
the motion?
Mr. LANTOS. Yes, I support the motion, Madam Speaker.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Then the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Paul) is
entitled to control 20 minutes in opposition.
Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Madam Speaker, I yield 10 minutes of my time
to the gentleman from California (Mr. Lantos) and ask unanimous consent
that he be permitted to control that time.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the
gentleman from New Jersey?
There was no objection.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New
Jersey.

General Leave

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Madam Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that
all Members have 5 legislative days to revise and extend their remarks
and include extraneous material on the bill under consideration.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the
gentleman from New Jersey?
There was no objection.
Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Madam Speaker, I yield myself such time as I
may consume.
I rise in very strong support of H.R. 282, the Iran Freedom Support
Act. And I want to thank our colleague from Florida, Chairman Ros-
Lehtinen, for sponsoring this important legislation. I am proud to be
an original cosponsor.
The United States and the world community, Madam Speaker, are at a
crucial point in our efforts to prevent Iran from producing nuclear
weapons. Let us be clear: Iran's acquisition of nuclear weapons will be
a devastating blow to peace and security not only in the Middle East
but in the entire world.
Iran has been designated, as we know, as a ``State Sponsor of
Terrorism'' for over two decades. The Department of State has declared
in its most recent Country Reports on Terrorism that Iran ``remained
the most active state sponsor of terrorism in the world.'' Iran
maintains ``a high profile role,'' they go on to say, ``in encouraging
antiIsraeli terrorist activity, both rhetorically and operationally,''
according to the State Department. Supreme religious leader Khamenei
does not just praise Palestinian terrorist operations; Iran also
provides Lebanese and Palestinian terrorist groups, most notably Hamas,
with funding, safe haven, training, and weapons. Iran has now pledged
to contribute $50 million to Hamas so that the Hamas regime in
Palestine can continue to resist international pressure to recognize
Israel's right to exist.
In October Iran's President Ahmadinejad called for Israel to be
``wiped off the map.'' In December he declared the Holocaust ``a
myth.'' Last Monday he attacked Israel as a ``fake regime'' that
``cannot logically continue to live.'' Can we doubt that such people
are capable of carrying out their threats if they ever acquire the
means to do so? Have we learned nothing in 60 years?
This prudent measure will strengthen our sanctions regime against
Iran's nuclear weapons proliferation. To keep up economic pressure, the
bill tightens the existing sanctions against Iran by requiring a yes-
or-no decision on whether to impose sanctions on firms reported to be
making investments in the Iranian petroleum sector. The bill also
amends the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act, or ILSA, Public Law 104-172, to
eliminate the 5-year sunset clause included in the original ILSA. We
should certainly not give the Iranians the impression that they can
wait us out on the sanctions issue.
The bill requires that all bilateral U.S. sanctions, controls, and
regulations on Iran related to weapons of mass destruction remain in
effect until Iran has verifiably dismantled its WMD programs. The bill
also provides the means and moral pressure to encourage American
investors and American pension plans to divest from companies

[[Page H1758]]

that invest in Iran's energy sector. Such investment can be a powerful
tool in our efforts to stop Iran's march towards nuclear weapons.
In February, Madam Speaker, H. Con. Res. 341 passed overwhelmingly by
this House, 404-4. We called on all members of the U.N. Security
Council, in particular the Russian Federation and the People's Republic
of China, to take expeditious action in response to Iran's
noncompliance with the mandate of the Security Council, and it calls on
``all responsible members of the international community'' to impose
economic sanctions designed to deny Iran the ability to develop nuclear
weapons.
We were severely criticized by many members of the world community,
Madam Speaker, for not relying on the Security Council and on sanctions
in our confrontation with Saddam Hussein. Now is the time for the world
community, for China and Russia especially, to show that they are
indeed responsible members of the international community and take
effective action to stop this terrorist regime in Iran.
Time is running out. The world needs to act now. The Bush
administration deserves high praise for working with our friends to get
Iran to the Security Council where once again next week it will be on
the agenda.
This bill renews our call for diplomatic and multilateral action and
will strengthen the President's hand with our international partners.
Finally, we must work to change Iran itself by working to promote
democracy and human rights within Iran. This bill authorizes the
President to provide democracy assistance to individuals who are
working through exclusively peaceful means to support democracy and
promote democracy in Iran. It does not in any way authorize the use of
force.
The bill was introduced, as I noted, by our friend and colleague Ms.
Ros-Lehtinen of Florida, who has devoted tremendous efforts to secure
its passage. She now has 360 cosponsors. Chairman Hyde had asked her to
manage the bill, but she has a family emergency in Florida that
required her to leave for Florida and to be with her family. Our
thoughts and prayers are with her during this time.
Madam Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. PAUL. Madam Speaker, I yield myself 5 minutes.
Madam Speaker, I sought the time in opposition mainly because it is a
very opportune time to talk about our foreign policy and the
disadvantages that intervention poses for us.
There are two types of foreign policy we can have: interventionism,
where we tell other people what to do; and the more traditional
American foreign policy of nonintervention and not using force to tell
other people what to do. The policy of foreign intervention has been
around a long time, and it is not only one party that endorses it. In
1998 we had a similar bill come up to the floor. It was called the
Iraqi Freedom Act. And that was the preliminary stages of leading to a
war, which is a very unpopular, very expensive, and deadly war going on
right now in Iraq. So this is a similar bill moving in that direction.

{time} 1115

The 1998 resolution, which required regime change and laid the plans
out for regime change, did not come up under this administration. That
occurred with the previous administration.
But I have no qualms about the goals of the authors of this
legislation. They would like to see freedom in Iran. I would, too. It
is just that I believe the use of force backfires on us, and when we
use force such as sanctions and subsidizing and giving money to
dissidents, what we really do is the opposite of what we want. Those
individuals who are trying to promote more freedom in Iran actually are
forced to ally themselves with the radicals, so instead of undermining
the system, it has made it worse. It is always argued that they will
welcome us when we march in as liberators, and Iraq proved that that
was not the case. Iran won't be much better.
But let me just say a few things about interventionism.
Interventionism, which is essentially something that was gradually
developed over the 20th century, led to a century of war and killing
and was very expensive to the American people in costs. It means that
we assume the moral right and the constitutional authority to be
involved in the internal affairs of other nations, and yet there is no
moral right for us to get involved in the internal affairs of other
countries, and there is no constitutional authority for us to do so.
We are not designated as ``the nation builder.'' No matter how well-
intended it is, it doesn't work, and we don't have this authority to do
this. We have not been designated the ``policeman of the world,''
although we have assumed that role more so every year, and that has
been going on for several decades.
There are always more costs than anybody imagines. Iraq was supposed
to cost $50 billion. It is now hundreds of billions of dollars. There
is economic harm done. There is inflation that it causes. Yet it
continues, and instead of coming to an end, it tends to spread. That is
why I fear this so much.
I see the way we are dealing with Iran as just spreading a problem
that we contributed to in the Middle East. Too many innocent lives are
lost, innocent American lives, GIs that go over and are killed so
needlessly, especially since we don't achieve the goal of bringing
freedom and liberty and democracy to these countries.
Interventionism endorses the principle that we have this authority to
change regimes. We have been doing it for more than 50 years through
activities of the CIA in a secret manner, and now we are doing it in a
much more open manner where we literally invade countries. We initiate
the force. We start the war because we believe that we have a monopoly
on goodness that we can spread and teach other people to understand and
live with.
There are too many unintended consequences, too much blow-back. It
comes back to harm us in the long run. At one time we were an ally of
Saddam Hussein. At one time we were an ally of Osama bin Laden. These
things don't work out the way we think they are going to.
The one thing that interventionism endorses, which I strongly
disagree with, it really deemphasizes diplomacy. It deemphasizes it to
the point where if we don't feel like it, we are not willing to talk to
people. When we feel like it, we might demagogue it and pretend we are
talking. But it really doesn't encourage diplomacy.
Another reason why interventionism is so bad for us, it encourages
special interests to get behind our foreign policy and endorse what we
are doing and influence what we are doing, possibly another country and
possibly some industry that might influence us.
Mr. LANTOS. Madam Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Madam Speaker, I rise in strong support of this resolution. The
single-most important action that we will take today is to ensure that
the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act is not extended. Libya no longer needs to
be subject to such punitive measures. It is our partner in the global
goal of controlling the spread of unconventional weapons.
In December 2003, Libya took a bold and courageous step. It pledged
to rid itself of all weapons of mass destruction. I was in Tripoli
immediately thereafter in January 2004 to encourage the leadership of
Libya to follow through with its stated goal. After that, Libya loaded
its nuclear weapons onto American ships. These weapons, together with
all detailed plans and programs, are today under lock and key in
Tennessee. As a result, the legislation now before us removes all
references to Libya from the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act. ILSA, Madam
Speaker, is dead, and the Iran Sanctions Act will rise in its place.
The weight of American sanctions will now be focused exclusively on
Iran because the mullahs in Tehran continue to pursue blatantly their
nuclear ambitions. The message to Tehran is simple: follow the Libya
model, and we in Congress are more than prepared to open a new,
constructive and happy chapter in U.S.-Iranian relations.
Madam Speaker, the Iran Freedom Support Act will dramatically ratchet
up the economic pressure on Tehran to abandon its head-long pursuit of
nuclear weapons. If we fail to use both our economic and our diplomatic
tools, the world will face a nightmare that

[[Page H1759]]

knows no end; a despotic, fundamentalist regime that avidly supports
terrorism, exploiting and threatening to use the ultimate weapon of
terror.
Just yesterday the leader of Iran indicated that they stand ready to
share their nuclear technology with the Government of Sudan, which as
we speak here this morning is engaged in genocide in Darfur. This is
the regime that we are dealing with.
It is very naive, Madam Speaker, to expect that we can convince Iran
to end its nuclear program voluntarily based on reason. We can only
hope to inflict economic pain at the highest levels in Tehran and
starve the Iranian leadership of the resources it needs to fund a
costly nuclear program. And that is the purpose of our legislation.
Some argue that this legislation might undermine our relations with
European allies which invest in Iran, but who have also helped lead an
important diplomatic effort to bring the Iranian nuclear issue to the
U.N. Security Council. But that argument, Madam Speaker, is a pure and
simple misreading of the contents of our bill.
Our legislation is intended to reinforce diplomacy with economics. We
ask our allies to do what the United States did over a decade ago,
divest from Iran's energy sector, the cash cow of the ayatollahs'
nuclear plans.
At the same time, our legislation does not put the President in a
straitjacket. If a verifiable deal to eliminate Iran's nuclear program
can be negotiated, or if certain sanctions will undermine the national
security of our own Nation, the President may waive implementation of
our law.
But, Madam Speaker, let me be clear on one point: Congress will no
longer tolerate lax enforcement of American sanctions against Iran. For
over a decade both Democratic and Republican administrations failed to
implement the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act measures that we do have in
place. Meanwhile, Iran's nuclear program has marched forward at a
frighteningly rapid pace.
Our legislation will extend the Iran Sanctions Act indefinitely. It
will dramatically boost congressional oversight over its
implementation. The administration will have to enforce the law fully.
Ignoring the law will no longer be an option.
I commend the administration for convincing the International Atomic
Energy Agency in Vienna to send its Iran file to the U.N. Security
Council. Unfortunately, the Russians have already made clear that the
Security Council action will be impeded by them. Just last week, the
Russian Foreign Minister announced that Moscow would only consider U.N.
sanctions on Iran if it were shown what it called concrete proof of
Iran's nonpeaceful intentions.
Madam Speaker, what gall. As we all know, there is no shortage of
proof to be found in the numerous International Atomic Energy Agency
reports over recent years. These reports demonstrate conclusively that
for two decades, for two decades, Iran has run a clandestine nuclear
program in violation of its commitments under the treaty of the
nonproliferation of nuclear weapons.
I can't help but wonder what the Russians require as proof. Perhaps
Iran parading a nuclear device through the streets of Tehran, or Israel
being wiped off the map, as the Iranian President has declared.
The leadership in Moscow ought to know that support for terrorists is
not a policy that the United States or other civilized nations will
accept, especially from a country that expects to be treated as a
member of the G-8 nations, seven of which are a true democracy. Russia
clearly is not.
Madam Speaker, I would be delighted if our legislation were rendered
redundant by serious Security Council action, but the attitudes shown
by Russia and China thus far show that that is a most unlikely
development. In the meantime, we cannot shirk our responsibility to
employ every peaceful means possible to undermine Iran's ugly nuclear
ambitions. That, in essence, is the reason for the urgency of passing
H.R. 282 today.
Madam Speaker, I strongly support this bill for the sake of staving
off a looming, long-term nuclear threat, and I urge all of my
colleagues to do as well.
Madam Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that the balance of my time be
controlled by my good friend, our colleague from New York (Mr. Crowley)
since I have responsibilities in the International Relations Committee.
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mrs. Miller of Michigan). Is there objection
to the request of the gentleman from California?
There was no objection.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Without objection, the gentleman from
Indiana (Mr. Pence) will now control the time that the gentleman from
New Jersey (Mr. Smith) previously had controlled.
There was no objection.
Mr. PAUL. Madam Speaker, I yield myself 20 seconds for a quick quote,
and then I am going to yield to the gentleman from Oregon.
The quote: ``The people of England have been led in Mesopotamia into
a trap from which it will be hard to escape with dignity and honor.
They have been tricked into it by a steady withholding of information.
The Baghdad communiques are belated, insincere, incomplete. Things have
been far worse than we have been told, our administration more bloody
and inefficient than the public knows. We are today not far from a
disaster.''
This comes from Lawrence of Arabia, 1920. We should learn from our
mistakes and other countries' mistakes.
Madam Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Oregon (Mr.
Blumenauer).
Mr. BLUMENAUER. Madam Speaker, I appreciate the gentleman's courtesy
in permitting me to speak on this resolution.
One of the reasons, Madam Speaker, that I argued against our invasion
of Iraq long before the war began was because I felt we needed to face
far more serious threats like the danger posed by Iran. In the 3 years
since that attack, the threat from Iran has grown, and our capacity to
meet that threat has diminished. Now Iran has a President who exploits
Iranian national grievances to consolidate power and has threatened to
wipe Israel off the map. Our troops are bogged down in Iraq, placing
them at risk should Iran launch a new wave of terrorism.

{time} 1130

We have done nothing to break our dependency on oil, the control of
which gives Iran its greatest ability now to blackmail us and other
countries.
I appreciate the leadership of my good friend Mr. Lantos and others
bringing the resolution forward to spotlight the problems with Iran. I
appreciate their working with us to improve the bill.
For instance, now the bill will not allow us to deal with terrorist
groups on our own watch list. I think that is very, very important.
Unfortunately, this legislation does not provide solutions. Instead it
limits the administration's flexibility to pursue diplomacy without
providing any new tools not already at their disposal.
We need allies and partners to address the Iranian threat. We need
the cooperation of the European Union, of China and, yes, Russia, since
we have no more unilateral sanctions to place on Iran.
Our global standing is at a low point. Yet this bill sanctions not
Iran, but the very countries we need for a strong diplomatic effort.
This bill tragically gives equal weight to overthrowing the Iranian
Government as it does to the immediate threat of nuclear proliferation.
Now, I am strongly opposed to this regime, but preventing them from
developing nuclear weapons capacity must be our first priority, not
prioritizing behavior change over regime change. We pull the rug out
from underneath anybody in the current Iranian leadership who values
survival over the nuclear program, and it clearly works to eliminate
incentives for diplomatic solutions.
I have a sense of deja vu when I think back to the Iraq Liberation
Act of 1998 which did not explicitly authorize the use of force, but
certainly got the ball rolling that led to the tragedy of this Iraq
war. Knowing what they know today, how many Members of this House would
have voted differently 8 years ago?
I am very worried about where all this ends. We have heard reports
from the Pentagon of plans to attack Iran, indeed plans for a nuclear
strike on Iran, the repercussions of which should make us all recoil
with horror. Now, the administration dismisses these news reports, but
the American people

[[Page H1760]]

and this Congress got better information about what happened in Iraq
from reporters like Seymour Hirsch than it got from, sadly, the
President, Secretary Rumsfeld and Secretary Rice.
I do not pretend to imagine the horrific things that Iran would do
with nuclear weapons. We are all opposed to that. That is why we need a
strong, smart, constructive diplomatic strategy. This bill does not
provide it.
For over half a century, Madam Speaker, we have made a series of
mistakes regarding Iran, starting in 1953 when the United States led
the charge to overthrow the democratically elected Government of Iran
and replace them with a dictatorship in the person of the Shah. Our
support for that dictatorship and its repressive policies fueled the
reaction that led to the Iranian revolution. It was part of what
happened with the hostage crisis in Iran.
More recently there are very credible reports that diplomatic feelers
extended by the Iranian Government were dismissed by this
administration 2 and 3 years ago. I sincerely hope that we do not
overwhelmingly and unthinkingly pass a resolution today that makes us
feel good because we all hate this regime, but instead sets in motion a
process that actually is destabilizing and makes the peaceful future
that we all seek harder.
Mr. PENCE. Madam Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that debate on this
bill be extended by 40 minutes equally divided, and I yield 10 minutes
of my time to the gentleman from New York (Mr. Crowley) which I ask he
be permitted to control.
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mrs. Miller of Michigan). Is there objection
to the request of the gentleman from Indiana?
There was no objection.
Mr. PENCE. Madam Speaker, I yield myself 5 minutes.
(Mr. PENCE asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. PENCE. Madam Speaker, debates of this nature, I think, are wholly
constructive in the life of the Nation. I rise today not just to
support the Iran Freedom Support Act, but to engage in a thoughtful
debate.
I commend my colleagues, 360 of whom have cosponsored this
legislation brought forward by the admirable Representative Ros-
Lehtinen of Florida and supported strongly by the International
Relations Committee. But I also speak with admiration on behalf of my
colleagues who are here debating and opposing this measure. In fact,
the gentleman from Oregon just made some eloquent comments in which he
called, and I paraphrase, with respect for strong, smart, diplomatic
efforts.
And while we may disagree on the meaning of those words, I would
borrow them, Madam Speaker, to say that I believe that is precisely
what the Iran Freedom Support Act is. It is strong, it is smart, and it
is a diplomatic measure expressed by the Congress, the will of the
American people, into a circumstance that is real, that is meaningful,
and for which the clarity of the position of the United States of
America is essential at this moment.
Let me speak for just a second about the Iran Freedom Support Act,
which does just a couple of things that are worth restating, and then I
want to talk about the nature of this confrontation.
This legislation attempts to deny the Iranian regime critical
technical and financial resources to pursue unconventional weapons,
incite terror and oppress the Iranian people. It is important to note
that H.R. 282 does not authorize the use of force against Iran, despite
the tone and tenor of some of the debate today.
Specifically this bill requires that WMD-related U.S. sanction
controls and regulations on Iraq remain in effect until Iran has
verifiably dismantled its WMD program. It also authorizes the President
to provide democracy assistance to foreign and domestic individuals and
organizations promoting freedom within that country, and engages in a
host of additional economic measures and sanctions, including amending
the Iran-Libyan Sanctions Act to recognize the historic gains that
Ranking Member Lantos referred to in relation to our relationship with
Libya.
Now, that being said, I just want to talk as a Hoosier from the
Midwest about the real stakes here, and about the nature of the present
leadership in Iran, and the importance of us to speak as the one people
and as one Nation forcefully into this diplomatic engagement.
Listen to some of the quotes of the leadership of Iran today.
President Ahmadinejad said in September of last year, ``Iran is ready
to transfer nuclear know-how to the Islamic countries due to their
need.''
We are not just dealing with nuclear proliferation within a country
that has a long and profound history of association with terrorism, but
one that desires to export nuclear technologies.
President Ahmadinejad said in October of last year, ``God willing,
with the force of God behind it, we shall soon experience a world
without the United States and without Zionism.'' And it was not long
ago that he said that Iran would inflict both ``harm and pain on the
United States.''
And his threats against Israel in particular should be deeply
offensive to every freedom-loving person in the world, and every
American who cherishes our relationship with our ally, Israel.
President Ahmadinejad said in October of last year, ``As the Imam said,
Israel must be wiped off the map.'' And the President of Iran also
said, ``Anyone who recognizes Israel will burn in the fire of the
Islamic Nations' fury.''
This is real, Madam Speaker. This is a confrontation that I pray we
will be able to resolve with strong, smart, diplomatic efforts. But if
the United States fails to act with clarity, including adopting the
Iran Freedom Support Act, the potential consequences of inaction could
be catastrophic.
I urge my colleagues to join the 360 Members, Republicans and
Democrats alike, who have supported this legislation when it comes to
the floor later today.
Madam Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. PAUL. Madam Speaker, this bill authorizes strong sanctions as
well as funding to dissident groups inside Iraq to overthrow that
government. In my interpretation that is the use of force, and I yield
6\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman from Ohio.
Mr. KUCINICH. Madam Speaker, I thank the gentleman from Texas for the
point that he made that is well taken.
With all due respect to my colleagues who may have a difference of
opinion about this bill, I think that most American people know that
this administration has already made a mess of international relations
with respect to the illegal and unwarranted invasion of Iraq.
We now know that Iraq did not have weapons of mass destruction, that
Iraq was not cooperating with al Qaeda with respect to 9/11, that Iraq
had neither the intention nor the capability of attacking the United
States, and yet we took steps, starting with the policy of regime
change, that took us into a war against Iraq that we clearly did not
have to initiate, and we clearly should not be there.
Now, if you love the steps which took this country into a war in
Iraq, then you are going to like this bill because it does the same
thing, which is why I rise in opposition to it. This bill sounds a lot
like the Iraq Liberation Act of 1998, which many Members voted for in
good faith, not knowing later on it would be evoked as a cause for the
prosecution of war against Iraq.
Overall this bill seriously inhibits the ability of the United States
Government to use diplomacy, and diplomacy is the strongest and most
rational tool we have to resolve the situation regarding Iran's nuclear
program.
Instead I submit that this bill sets our country on a path to war
with Iran. You can be sure the Government of Iran will view this bill
in this way. First, the bill makes it official U.S. policy to impose
international sanctions through the U.N. Security Council for Iran's
``repeated breaches'' of its nuclear nonproliferation obligations.
Now, this sounds eerily familiar to actions pursued in the lead-up to
the invasion of Iraq, and which, as we know, were for appearances only.
Similarly, advocating international sanctions against Iran through the
Security Council is for appearances only. This administration has
apparently made up its mind it wants to attack Iran. There is evidence
that the U.S.

[[Page H1761]]

military is already inside Iran, and I ask to include at this point in
the debate an article from the New Yorker by Seymour Hirsch which
asserts just that.
Including this section in the bill that I just referred to is simply
an attempt to cover the President's slap in the face of the
international community with respect to Iran.
Second, H.R. 282 also promotes regime change in Iran as opposed to
behavior change, regime change as a solution to the stand-off regarding
Iran's nuclear program. By advocating regime change, we indicate our
priority is not, in fact, to encourage Iran to adhere to its
nonproliferation treaty obligation, but to remove the leadership in
Iran even if it were to make some concessions.

{time} 1145

This communicates to the world community that, to the U.S., Iran has
passed the point of no return, which completely undermines any efforts
towards diplomacy and negotiations. Furthermore, while this bill makes
the point of so-called not authorizing the use of force against Iran,
be assured this is a stepping stone to the use of force, the same way
that the Iraq Liberation Act was used as a stepping stone.
Third, H.R. 282 supports antigovernment advocates in Iran promoting
regime change. Now this is highly problematic. While an important
amendment offered by my friend Congressman Blumenauer was adopted in
this bill during markup to prohibit U.S. assistance to groups that are
on the State Department's list of terrorist organizations or have been
on the list for the last 4 years, there are ways around this.
For example, according to a Newsweek article from February 14, 2005
that the U.S. has been recruiting individuals from the MEK, a group
currently labeled as terrorists by the State Department, who have
agreed to form a new group with the same mission as the MEK, regime
change in Iraq.
I will insert this article from Newsweek in the Record at this point.

[From Newsweek, Feb. 14, 2006]

Looking for a Few Good Spies

(By Christopher Dickey, Mark Hosenball and Michael Hirsh)

This is a terrorist cultleader? Maryam Rajavi is dressed in
a Chanel-style suit with her skirt at midcalf, lilac colored
pumps and a matching headscarf. Over a dinner of kebab, rice
and French pastries, Rajavi smiles often and laughs easily.
She's at once colorful and demure, like many an educated
woman in the Middle East. Indeed if George W. Bush--who
relies on powerful females for counsel--were pressed to
identify a Muslim model of womanhood, this 51-year-old
Iranian would look very much the part.
But of course that's exactly the impression Rajavi seeks to
give. Behind her smile is a saleswoman's savvy--and a
revolutionary's zeal to prove that she and her mysterious
husband, Massoud Rajavi, are neither cultists nor terrorists.
Maryam Rajavi is demanding that the exile groups they lead
together, centered on the Mujahedin-e Khalq (People's Holy
Warriors) or MEK for short, should be taken off the State
Department's list of terrorist organizations, their assets
unfrozen and their energies unleashed. The MEK, Rajavi says,
is the answer to American prayers as Tehran continues to
dabble defiantly in both terrorism and nuclear arms. ``I
believe increasingly the Americans have come to realize that
the solution is an Iranian force that is able to get rid of
the Islamic fundamentalists in power in Iran,'' she told
Newsweek in a rare interview at her organization's compound
in the quiet French village of Auvers sur Oise. The group's
own former role in terrorist attacks dating back to its
support for the U.S. Embassy takeover in 1979, Rajavi
insists, is ancient history. And the MEK is not a Jim Jones-
like cult as critics allege, with forced separation between
men and women and indoctrination for children, all overseen
by the Rajavis' autocratic style. Instead, she insists, it is
``a democratic force.''
Whatever Rajavi's true colors, Newsweek has learned that
her role may be growing in the calculations of Bush
administration hard-liners. At a camp south of Baghdad--it's
called Ashraf, after Massoud Rajavi's assassinated first
wife--3,850 MEK members have been confined but gently treated
by U.S. forces since the invasion of Iraq (once they were
allies of Saddam against their own country in the 1980s Iran-
Iraq war). Now the administration is seeking to cull useful
MEK members as operatives for use against Tehran, all while
insisting that it does not deal with the MEK as a group,
American government sources say.
Some Pentagon civilians and intelligence planners are
hoping a corps of informants can be picked from among the MEK
prisoners, then split away from the movement and given
training as spies, U.S. officials say. After that, the
thinking goes, they will be sent back to their native Iran to
gather intelligence on the Iranian clerical regime,
particularly its efforts to develop nuclear weapons. Some
hawks also hope they could help to reawaken the democratic
reform movement in Iran, which the mullahs have silenced.
``They [want] to make us mercenaries,'' one MEK official told
Newsweek.

These individuals have been conducting military activity in Iran with
United States support. I just wanted to remind everyone that the MEK
was the group responsible for the U.S. Embassy takeover in Tehran in
1979. This group also had a camp in Iraq where Osama bin Laden's first
fighters were reportedly trained. The MEK also trained and supported
Taliban fighters. Now we are recruiting help from members of the MEK
which makes a total mockery of the so-called war on terror.
Fourth, H.R. 282 states that it is U.S. policy to focus attention to
stopping cooperation, stopping cooperation, between Iran, Russia, China
and Pakistan. Considering Russia and China have the strongest leverage
with Iran, yet are also opposed to Iran's violations of the
Nonproliferation Treaty obligations, the U.S. should try to work with
Russia and China to try to find a path to diplomacy, not to isolate
Russia and China.
In the end we are only isolating ourselves and setting our country on
another unilateral path of war. Our troops are already extended in
Iraq, and they are in a vulnerable position. Starting a war in Iran is
the last thing we should be doing.
I urge a vote against this dangerous bill. Stop this unilateralism.
Work with diplomacy and work towards peace.
Mr. CROWLEY. Madam Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may
consume.
I rise in support of the Iran Freedom Support Act. This legislation
received strong bipartisan support when it was passed in the
International Relations Committee last month.
I commend my colleague from Florida, Ms. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, for
introducing this bill and working both sides of the aisle to produce
this strong bipartisan piece of legislation.
I would also like to thank my ranking member, Tom Lantos, for his
continued leadership on ensuring that Iran does not gain access to
nuclear weapons. This legislation is not the first step towards war,
like I have heard some contend, but I believe a tightening of the
current restrictions on Iran. We must use every tool we have, whether
it be diplomatically or economically, to limit the development of
Iran's nuclear weapons. Iran has shown time and time again that they do
not respect the international community, or the International Atomic
Energy Agency, the United Nation's nuclear watchdog.
Iran made a deal with the international community when they designed
the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, and that was to not seek nuclear
weapons in exchange for civilian nuclear technology. Iran broke this
deal 18 years ago when they began to pursue a secret nuclear program
with the aim of producing enough material to create nuclear weapons to
threaten the stability of the region and of the world. We cannot allow
a terrorist state like Iran to attain such deadly weapons.
On Monday of this week, Iranian President Ahmadinejad vowed to press
ahead with uranium enrichment and boasted how he did not expect the
United Nations Security Council to impose sanctions on this terrorist
state. This legislation is needed to let our allies know that the House
of Representatives and the United States are serious about using
economic means to isolate Iran and ensure they end their nuclear
weapons ambitions. The permanent five members of the Security Council
have all declared they are opposed to Iran gaining the knowledge to
develop nuclear weapons, but words are sometimes not enough.
When the IAEA presents its report to the Security Council on Friday,
the members of the Security Council must be prepared to move forward
with sanctions if Iran chooses to remain in noncompliance of the IAEA.
I hope this House speaks with a unified voice today to let our allies
know we are serious about stopping Iran's pursuit of nuclear weapons. I
urge my colleagues to support this legislation.

[[Page H1762]]

Madam Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. PENCE. Madam Speaker, it is my privilege to yield 3 minutes to
the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. Blunt), our distinguished majority
whip.
Mr. BLUNT. Madam Speaker, I rise today in support of H.R. 282, the
Iran Freedom Support Act, and I particularly want to join in thanking
Representative Ileana Ros-Lehtinen for her efforts on this bill. The
United States and the international community should hold the current
regime in Iran accountable for its threatening behavior. We do need to
encourage the Government of Iran to change.
We need to focus on the danger of allowing the President of Iran, a
man who has repeatedly called for the destruction of Israel and is
willing to support terrorist organizations such as Hamas and others, to
be in control of the most dangerous weapons in the world. This is a
serious test for the international community. Passing this bill alone
will not prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons. However, it will
send a message that the United States considers any person or entity
that helps Iran develop weapons of mass destruction to be an obstacle
to peace and security.
This bill also encourages the forces of democracy in Iran. Among all
nations of the world, Iran has one of the longest and strongest
national heritages, and many Iranian Americans join in these efforts to
strengthen the potential for an Iran that proudly embraces freedom and
proudly embraces the idea of the rule of law.
I urge my colleagues to support this bill. It is essential to the
well-being and safety of our country, and the entire international
community that the Iranian regime does not possess nuclear weapons to
hold the world hostage, and that the Iranian people are allowed to move
proudly toward freedom.
Mr. PENCE. Madam Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from
Virginia (Mr. Cantor), our chief deputy majority whip.
Mr. CANTOR. Madam Speaker, I thank the gentleman from Indiana.
I too rise today in strong support of the Iran Freedom Support Act,
and I would like to also commend the leadership of Chairman Ros-
Lehtinen for her leadership on this bill and all those that she
continues to fight for in the defense of freedom around the world.
The world is clearly at a critical juncture. We are in the midst of
waging a global war on terrorism to defend the free world from
terrorists who seek not only to kill us, but to destroy our way of
life. Make no mistake about it; the very essence of the rights and
freedoms for which our forefathers fought are at stake.
This bill that stands before us today is a key component of our war
on terror. Iran is one of the largest state sponsors of terror in the
world. They have funneled money and arms to terrorist cells throughout
the Middle East, and have American blood on their hands. Iran, without
a doubt, is one of the most dangerous threats to our national security
and to world stability.
Now Iran stands on the verge of obtaining a nuclear weapon, yet
another tool in its arsenal of terror and violence. Iran's President
Ahmadinejad is a maniacal dictator who thrives on his hatred for the
United States and its desire to destroy our freedom. The world cannot
and will not tolerate a nuclear Iran.
It is not only the United States which is at risk, but our allies as
well. President Ahmadinejad has made clear his intentions to wipe off
the map Israel, our longest-standing democratic ally in the Middle
East.
This week, Madam Speaker, we commemorate Yom Hashoah, Holocaust
Memorial Day. We remember with great reverence and respect the victims
of another maniacal dictator who threatened to wipe an entire people
off the map and who wanted to impose his theory of a perfect society on
the rest of the world.
We must learn from our mistakes of the past to take these threats
seriously and act hastily.
The Iran Freedom Support Act is an important step in neutralizing the
threat Iran poses to the world. I must stress, however, that passage of
this bill should be the first step, not the last. God forbid we stand
on this floor 60 years from now memorializing the victims of yet
another Holocaust.
Let us fulfill our pledge to never forget. Let us learn from the
lessons of our history and continue to strengthen our tools to fight
this global war on terror and preserve our freedoms.
Mr. PAUL. Madam Speaker, I yield myself 1 minute before I yield to
the gentleman from Iowa.
I want to quote from Article IV of the NonProliferation Treaty of
which Iran is a signator: ``Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted
as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to
develop research, production, and use of nuclear energy for peaceful
purposes without discrimination.''
Our position is that they do not have the right to enrich. Those who
deny the right to enrich are more in violation of the NPT Treaty than
Iran itself.
What do we do for those who are totally in defiance to international
law in the NPT Treaty, like India and Pakistan? We reward them and
subsidize them. At the same time, there is no proof that there has been
any violation of this treaty by Iran, and yet the rewards go to those
who are in total defiance.
Madam Speaker, I would yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Iowa
(Mr. Leach).
(Mr. LEACH asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. LEACH. Madam Speaker, I know of no circumstance in the world in
which more options are all bad than this particular one. We all have to
be clear-headed about the challenge of Iran. It is a more difficult
society to deal with, a more difficult government than Iraq.
It is absolutely clear that Iran does seek nuclear capacity. It is
absolutely clear that Iran has been the greatest State promulgator of
terrorist activity in the Middle East. Those are bases that we all have
to understand.
Then we have to think through what is our response and what are the
kinds of strategies that the United States should develop and are there
lessons that exist today that might lend to this circumstance.
One of the lessons is that some things we do as a society can be
counterproductive. All of us are concerned with the security and the
fate of the State of Israel as well as the American national security,
but if we think it through, does our policy in Iraq advance the
security of Israel? Does a preemption of Iran advance the security of
Israel? Does it advance the security of the United States?
If the United States acts militarily, for instance, in Iran, do we
spark and ensure the great prediction, that none of us want to come to
pass, that we will enter into one of these clashes of civilization made
inevitable by another war of the West against another Muslim State?
Muslims would view this as a circumstance that the Judeo-Christian
world is attacking the world of Muslim culture. We have to think deeply
and seriously about this.
Then when it comes to nuclear weapons, it is bad for Iran to have a
nuclear weapon, but there are things that are worse. One of the things
that is worse is to give them reason to use that nuclear weapon,
whether it be against ourselves or an ally of the United States.
The administration has informed the committee of jurisdiction that it
profoundly opposes this piece of legislation and that it prefers a tack
of stressing international diplomacy, and it is suggested to the
committee in the strongest possible terms that this type of legislation
undercuts their effort to be multilateral.

{time} 1200

And so, while many Members of this body, many members of the public
have objected to this administration for being too unilateral, this
Congress is saying, with this kind of legislation, that we will be more
unilateral than the administration wishes to be. In other words, with
an administration that no one of any stripe would argue is not
muscular--it is a very muscular administration--this Congress is trying
to out-macho the muscular. That is something we should all think very
seriously about.
Then we ought to think through what it means if we go forth in a
given kind of direction, which words like ``regime change'' imply. What
does preemption mean? It is clear that if we

[[Page H1763]]

move in a muscular direction and, for example, preemptively strike
Iraq, that that will slow down the capacity of Iraq to develop a
nuclear weapon. But will it stop it? Not necessarily, partly because of
the capacities Iran has to develop WMD capacity in a more decentralized
way than Iraq once did, but there are other ways of getting nuclear
weapons. One can get nuclear weapons through the ``loose nuke'' dilemma
of purchase or theft. And if one gives Iran reason to attack, it will,
and it will in many ways that are now available in the world through
decentralized terrorist activities, but also potentially through
nuclear. And the potential of nuclear use increases if they are
attacked.
Now we have the other option which is stressed in this bill--but the
first, force being implied, but what is stressed is economic sanctions.
So our two options are to shoot Iran or to shoot ourselves in the foot
economically. And I will tell you that I can't think of anything that
is more outrageous in logic. So I think we have to think through new
types of approaches involving new ways of dialogue, new ways of
international pressure of a very different nature than are proposed by
this committee at this time.
While I have enormous respect for the proponents of this legislation,
particularly the distinguished chair of the Subcommittee on the Middle
East and Central Asia (Ms. Ros-Lehtinen) and our distinguished ranking
member on the full committee (Mr. Lantos), I am convinced that in its
present form the approach brought before this body complicates ongoing
diplomatic efforts to peacefully resolve the building crisis with Iran.
Indeed, it is for this reason that the Department of State indicated
that the Administration would be unable to support the legislation. As
noted in a letter to Chairman Hyde, the bill would ``narrow in
important ways the President's flexibility in the implementation of
Iran sanctions, create tensions with countries whose help we need in
dealing with Iran, and shift the focus away from Iran's actions and
spotlight differences between us and our allies. This could play into
Iran's hands, as it attempts to divide the U.S. from the international
community as well as to sow division between the EU-3, China, and
Russia. It would also create dissension among UNSC members, as the
Council considers the Iran nuclear dossier.''
There are few areas of the world with a more troubling mix of
geopolitical problems than the Middle East. The irony is that the war
in Iraq which has consumed so much of our country's political and
economic capital may hold less far-reaching consequences than
challenges posed in neighboring Middle Eastern countries.
To the West, the Israeli-Palestinian stand-off remains the sorest
point in world relations, complicated by the incapacitation of Ariel
Sharon and the rise of a Hamas-led government in the occupied
territories. To the East, the sobering prospect of Iran joining the
nuclear club stands out.
In life, individuals and countries sometimes face circumstances in
which all judgments and options are bad. The Iranian dilemma is a case-
in-point. But it is more than just an abstract bad-option model because
at issue are nuclear weapons in the hands of a mullah-controlled
society which has actively aided and abetted regional terrorists for
years.
Indeed, the issue has become even more acute with the election in
Iran of its hard-line, populist President, Mahmood Ahmadinejad, who
suggested late last year that the murder of six million European Jews
by the Nazis did not occur and called for Israel to be wiped off the
map.
In reference to recent disclosures of enhanced Iranian efforts to
develop nuclear weapons as well as missile delivery systems to carry
such weapons, concerned outside parties are actively reviewing options.
The Europeans have led with diplomatic entreaties; neo-con
strategists in the U.S. with open-option planning--including, if
investigative journalist Seymour Hersh is to be believed--the possible
use of nuclear weapons.
In the background are references to the 1981 preemptive strike by the
Israeli Air Force against Iraq's Osirak reactor.
At issue is the question of whether preemption is justified; if so,
how it should be carried out; and, if carried out, whether intervention
would lead to a more conciliatory, non-nuclear Iran or whether the
effects of military action would be short-term, perhaps pushing back
nuclear development a year or two, but precipitating a new level of
hostility against the U.S. and Israel in Iran and the rest of the
Muslim world which could continue for decades, if not centuries.
Since the American hostage crisis which so bedeviled the Carter
Administration in the late 1970s, we have had a policy of economic
sanctions coupled with comprehensive efforts to politically isolate
Iran.
Six years ago, Senator Arlen Specter and I invited Iran's U.N.
Ambassador to Capitol Hill, the first visit to Washington by a high-
level Iranian representative since the hostage crisis.
On the subject of possible movement toward normalization of relations
with Iran, I told the ambassador that while many would like to see a
warming of relations, it would be inconceivable for the U.S. to
consider normalizing our relationship so long as Iran continued its
support of Hamas and Hezbollah. The ambassador forthrightly
acknowledged that Iran provided help to both these terrorist
organizations, but also noted, in what for some might be considered the
most optimistic thing he said that day, that his government was
prepared to cease support to anti-Israeli terrorist groups the moment a
Palestinian state was established with borders acceptable to
Palestinians.
For decades in the Muslim world, debate has been on-going whether to
embrace a credible two-state (Israel and Palestine) approach or advance
an irrevocable push-Israel-to-the-sea agenda. The implicit Iranian
position, as articulated by the ambassador, was support for a two-state
approach, but if the U.S. on its own, or Israel as a perceived
surrogate, were to attack Iran, the possibility that such a compromise
can ever become possible deteriorates.
While angst-ridden, the Muslim world understands the rationale for
our intervention in Afghanistan where the plotting for the 9/11 attack
on the U.S. occurred. It has no sympathy for our engagement in Iraq,
which had nothing to do with 9/11, but if these two interventions were
followed by a third in Iran, the likelihood is that such would be
perceived in the vocabulary of the Harvard historian, Samuel
Huntington, as an all-out ``clash of civilizations,'' pitting the
Judeo-Christian against the Muslim world. In the Middle East it would
be considered a war of choice precipitated by the United States. We
might want it to be seen as a short-term action to halt the spread of
nuclear weapons, but the Muslim world would more likely view it as a
continuance of the Crusades: a religious conflict of centuries'
dimensions, with a revived future.
If military action is deemed necessary, the U.S. broadly has only
three tactical options: (a) full-scale invasion a la Iraq; (b) surgical
strikes of Iranian nuclear and missile installations; or (c) a
surrogate strike by Israel, modeled along the lines of Osirak.
The first can be described as manifestly more difficult than our
engagement in Iraq, particularly a post-conflict occupation. The second
presents a number of difficulties, including the comprehensiveness of
such a strike and the question of whether all aspects of a program that
is clandestine can be eliminated. The third makes the U.S. accountable
for Israeli actions, which themselves are likely to be more physically
destructive but less effective than the 1981 strike against Osirak.
In thinking through the consequences of military action, even if
projected to be successfully carried out, policymakers must put
themselves in the place of a potential adversary. A strike that merely
buys time may also be a strike that changes the manner and rationale of
Iranian support for terrorist organizations. It may also change the
geo-strategic reason and methodology for a country like Iran to garner
control of nuclear weapons. ``Loose nukes'' abound. Countries with
money and will can garner almost anything in the world despite efforts
by the U.S. and others to make theft or sale difficult.
It is presumed that the major reasons that Iran currently seeks
nuclear weapons relates to: (1) Pride: a belief that a 5,000 year-old
society has as much right to control the most modern of weapons systems
as a younger civilization like America or its neighbors to the west,
Israel, and to the east, Pakistan; (2) Power: the implications of
control of nuclear weapons with regard to its perceived hegemony as the
largest and most powerful country in the Persian Gulf, particularly
with regard to its nemesis, Iraq, which not only once attacked Kuwait,
but Iran itself using chemical weapons; (3) Politics: the concern that
Israeli military dominance is based in part on the control of weapons
that cannot be balanced in the Muslim world, except by a very distant
Pakistan.
The issue of the day from an American perspective is weapons of mass
destruction, their development and potential proliferation to nation-
states and non-national terrorist groups. The question that cannot be
ducked is whether military action against Iran might add to the list of
reasons Iran may wish to control such weapons: their potential use
against the United States. Perhaps as significantly, American
policymakers must think through the new world of terrorism and what
might be described as lesser weapons of mass destruction.
Any strike on Iran would be expected to immediately precipitate a
violent reaction in the

[[Page H1764]]

Shi'a part of Iraq, where the U.S. has some support today. With ease,
Iranian influence on the majority Shi'a of Iraq could make our ability
to constructively influence the direction of change in Iraq near
hopeless.
And there should be little doubt that in a world in which ``tit for
tat'' is the norm, a strike on Iran would increase the prospect of
counter-strikes on American assets around the world and American
territory itself. The asymmetrical nature of modem warfare is such that
traditional armies will not be challenged in traditional ways. Nation-
states which are attacked may feel they have little option except to
ally themselves with terrorist groups to advance national interests.
We view terrorism as an illegitimate tool of uncivilized agents of
change. In other parts of the world, increasing numbers of people view
terrorist acts as legitimate responses of societies and, in some cases,
groups within societies who are oppressed, against those who have
stronger military forces.
If Afghanistan, an impoverished country as distant from our shores as
any in the world, could become a plotting place for international
terrorism, such danger would increase manifoldly with an increase in
Iranian hostility, especially if based on an American attack.
If there exists today something like a one-in-three chance of another
9/11-type incident or set of incidents in the U.S. in the next few
years, a preemptive strike against Iran must be assumed to double or
triple such a prospect.
And Iran, far more than Osama bin-Laden, has within its power the
ability not only to destabilize world politics, but world economies as
well. Oil is, after all, the grease of economic activity, and an
Iranian-led cutback in supply precipitated by us or them cannot be
ruled out.
Given the risk, if not the untenability, of military action,
policymakers are obligated to review other than military options. One,
which has characterized our post-hostage taking Iranian policy for a
full generation, is isolation of Iran. This policy can be continued,
but as tempting as it is, there is little prospect of ratcheting it up
much more, except in ways, such as a naval embargo on Iranian oil, that
would be difficult to garner international support for and would, in
any regard, damage us more than Iran.
The only logical alternative is to consider increasing dialogue
without abandoning the possibility of future sanctions with this very
difficult government.
Iran--its government and people--has to be fully engaged, and I am
pleased that U.S. Ambassador Khalilzad in Baghdad has been authorized
to talk to the Iranians about the situation in Iraq. The Iranians
played a stabilizing role regarding Afghanistan just several years ago,
and logically they have a stake in a stable Iraq. I would urge the
leadership in Tehran to re-think its apparent decision to close the
door on this potentially productive avenue for dialogue.
With respect to the Iranian nuclear program, however, it is difficult
to see how confrontation can be avoided if we will not talk directly
with Tehran in appropriate foras about this and other matters. The
stakes could not be higher. If diplomacy fails, there is a credible
prospect that Iran will follow the North Korean model of rapid crisis
escalation, including the cessation of international inspections, with
a wholly unsupervised nuclear program leading in time to the production
of nuclear weapons and the dangerously unpredictable regional
consequences that might flow from that; or a perilous move to an Iraq-
like preventive military strike, with even more far-reaching and
alarming consequences both regionally and world-wide.
A proposal that might be suggested is negotiation of a Persian Gulf
nuclear-free zone, which would reduce, although given the high
possibility of cheating, not eliminate entirely one of the reasons Iran
presumably seeks nuclear weapons--fear that it may be at a disadvantage
in a conflict with an oil-rich neighbor. In this context, Iran, the EU
and Russia, with U.S. support, might agree on a proposal under which
Iran would indefinitely and verifiably suspend domestic enrichment
activity in exchange for an internationally guaranteed fuel supply,
U.S.-backed security assurances, and a gradual lifting of sanctions by
and resumption of normal diplomatic relations with the U.S., including
expanded country-to-country cultural ties.
Here, it should be stressed, hundreds of thousands of Iranians have
been educated in the United States. The people, although not the
government of Iran, have democratic proclivities. While real power in
Iran is controlled by the mullahs. Few societies in the world have if
given a chance more potential to move quickly in a democratic direction
than Iran. And just as it is hard to believe that outside military
intervention would lead to anything except greater ensconcement of
authoritarian mullah rule, a bettering of U.S. relations with Iran
provide a greater prospect of progressive change in Iranian society.
There is nothing the new government of Iran, or for that matter Osama
bin Laden and his al Qaeda movement, benefit more from than an
aggressive, interventionist U.S. policy toward Iran.
Finally, a note about arms control. If the U.S. wishes to lead in
multilateral restraint, we might want to consider joining rather than
rebuking the international community in development of a comprehensive
test ban (CTB). All American administrations from Eisenhower on favored
negotiation of a CTB. This one has taken the position the Senate took
when it irrationally rejected such a ban seven years ago. The Senate
took its angst against the strategic leadership of the Clinton
Administration out on the wrong issue. This partisan, ideological
posturing demands reconsideration. We simply cannot expect others to
restrain themselves when we refuse to put constraints on ourselves.
We are in a world where use of force can not be ruled out. But we are
also in a world where alternatives are vastly preferable. They must be
put forthrightly on the table.
Mr. PENCE. Madam Speaker, it is my privilege to yield 1 minute to the
gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Boehner), the distinguished majority leader of
the House of Representatives and an original cosponsor of this
legislation.
Mr. BOEHNER. Madam Speaker, I appreciate my colleague for yielding,
and I want to congratulate Chairman Hyde and Ranking Member Lantos of
the International Relations Committee, as well as Ms. Ros-Lehtinen for
her work on this issue, and I rise strongly today to support H.R. 282,
the Iran Freedom Support Act. The Iran Freedom Support Act sends, I
think, a strong message: the United States expects Iran to be a
responsible member of the international community.
Iran has repeatedly asserted its rights to nuclear power, but its
government has remained silent on their international obligations. Iran
must be transparent in meeting its international nuclear obligations.
In particular, Iran's refusal to answer the International Atomic Energy
Agency's questions about critical elements of its nuclear power program
is of deep concern to me.
In addition, Iran's sponsorship of terrorism raises troubling
questions about its true intentions and its long-term goals. It is
impossible to have faith in a regime which spreads fear, violence, and
disruption through its support of terrorist organizations and networks.
I support President Bush's efforts to work with the United Nations
Security Council and the International Atomic Energy Agency to compel
the Iranian regime to be a responsible member of the international
community.
Mr. CROWLEY. Madam Speaker, at this time I yield 3 minutes to the
gentlewoman from Nevada (Ms. Berkley).
Ms. BERKLEY. I thank Mr. Crowley for yielding time, Madam Speaker,
and I rise in strong support of the Iran Freedom Support Act. I am
proud to be an original cosponsor of this important legislation and ask
for its immediate passage.
It would be difficult to overstate the danger Iran represents.
Unchecked Iranian nuclear proliferation, combined with increasing
support for international terrorism, will help to further destabilize
the entire region.
Iran currently possesses ballistic missiles capable of striking 1,200
miles away. This places U.S. forces in this region, moderate Islamic
Arab countries located in the region, as well as the State of Israel in
grave danger. Imagine, if you will, if these missiles had nuclear
delivery capability.
For over two decades, the Iranian regime has been pursuing a covert
and now overt nuclear program. It has manufactured centrifuges, sought
completion of heavy-water reactors, and experimented with uranium
enrichment. According to one weapons inspector, it has already
converted 45 tons of uranium into gas, enough to build more than one
nuclear bomb.
In a perfect world, we should be able to rely on the United Nations
to curb Iranian nuclear proliferation. In a perfect world, the eight
reports by the International Atomic Energy Agency regarding Iran's
violation of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty would be enough to
motivate action. In a perfect world, all of the members of the Security
Council would appreciate the seriousness and catastrophe of a nuclear
Iran. But since we cannot count on the international community, China
and Russia are far too interested in Iranian oil and Iranian trade
money, the

[[Page H1765]]

United States must step up the pressure and do what is right.
This bill, in my opinion, accomplishes that goal. U.S. sanctions
would dramatically increase the pressure on the Iranian regime to give
up their nuclear ambitions and allow international inspections of their
facilities. Since the President of Iran was elected last summer, Iran's
stock market has lost 40 percent of its value, there has been a capital
flight of more than $200 billion, and Iran's manufacturing sector is
increasingly dependent on imports. Iran is struggling financially. This
legislation will further squeeze Iran and deny it the financial
resources to continue its path towards nuclear armament.
There is no debate, not anywhere, not in this body, that Iran is a
radical and fundamentalist country headed by a President who is willing
to share nuclear technology with the most unstable countries in the
world, and by mullahs who raise religious fanaticism to a new art form.
Every pronouncement this President makes further dramatizes how
mentally unstable and unbalanced and dangerous he is. The United States
must act quickly and decisively if we are to counter the continuing
threat posed by the Iranian regime. We must deny Iran the technology
and assistance and financial resources it needs to pursue this
unacceptable behavior.
I have no illusions. I can't guarantee that the sanctions contained
in this bill will have the desired effect, but I do know that it is a
far better alternative to invading Iran or bombing Iran. And unlike the
Iraq Freedom Act, which many people have cited today as a reason not to
pass this particular piece of legislation, there is nothing in this act
that we are debating today, there is nothing in this legislation that
can be construed as authorizing use of force against Iran, and none of
the assistance should be used to support covert action that is
contained in the legislation.
Mr. CROWLEY. Madam Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from
New York (Mr. Engel).
Mr. ENGEL. I thank the gentleman from New York and the gentleman from
Indiana, and I am happy to be an original cosponsor of this bill. I
want to compliment Congresswoman Ros-Lehtinen and Congressman Lantos
for this bill. I rise in strong support of this resolution, and I
condemn the actions and statements of the Iranian Government.
I believe this is one of the greatest crises since the end of the
Cold War, and we have to be up to the challenge. Under the guise of
saying it needs to meet its own energy needs, Iran has, for years, been
engaged in secret efforts to develop nuclear technology that has
weapons capability.
Let us be very clear. Iran is lying when she says she wants to use
this for peaceful purposes. Iran is a major oil exporter and doesn't
need nuclear power for peaceful purposes. She is doing this for one
reason and one reason only: to be hostile; defying and misleading the
international community.
Iran's President Ahmadinejad has gone to extremes to stir up anti-
American and anti-Israel sentiment in Iran and throughout the Arab
world. Not only, as was stated before, has he publicly declared his
hope for ``a world without America,'' he has also stated his desire
``to wipe Israel off the map.''
These remarks demonstrate a gross disregard for the rule of law,
human life, and the core principles of the United Nations. I
wholeheartedly support the United Nations Security Council's looking
into taking swift and strong action to counter Iran's growing threat,
and I urge prompt adoption of H.R. 282.
This is a commonsense resolution. This has nothing to do with Iraq,
to my colleagues who were talking about Iraq. There is no analogy here.
This is another threat, and we have to stand up to the threat. If the
world had stood up to Hitler in the 1930s, maybe the Holocaust wouldn't
have happened. Maybe World War II wouldn't have happened. Every time
there is a chance, society and the world has to stand up to prevent
worse things from happening in the future. I don't want to be around if
Iran detonates a nuclear weapon and say I stood here in Washington and
was afraid to act.
As Ms. Berkley pointed out, this resolution doesn't say anything
about any kind of military action. We hope this can be resolved
diplomatically, but, frankly, I believe that all options should be on
the table. The military should be an absolute, absolute, ultimate last
resort, but we have to tell these thugs in Iran that we are not going
to stand idly by and allow them to be destructive, allow them to make
threats, allow them to kill people, or allow them to have another
Holocaust.
Mr. PAUL. Madam Speaker, there has been talk in the media and
elsewhere about the necessity of bombing Iran, and we are talking today
about regime change, which is an act of force, yet some of us believe
we are acting too hastily. Others deny that; that something imminently
is going to happen. But I want to read a little quote here from John
Negroponte, Director of National Intelligence. He says, ``Our
assessment at the moment is that even though we believe that Iran is
determined to acquire a nuclear weapon, we believe that it is still a
number of years before they are likely to have enough fissile material
to assemble into or put into a nuclear weapon; perhaps into the next
decade. So I think it is important that this issue be kept in
perspective.'' This is John Negroponte. And I think those who are so
eager to pass this legislation and move toward regime change are moving
in the wrong direction too hastily, and there are a lot of analogies to
this and to Iraq, so we caution you about that.
Madam Speaker, I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from Oregon (Mr.
Blumenauer).
Mr. BLUMENAUER. Madam Speaker, I do think this is an important
conversation for us to have on this floor. I am pleased that the debate
time was extended, and I hope our colleagues will take the time to
scroll through the information that is available and think of the
consequences.
For instance, I would enter into the record, a letter from Under
Secretary of State Nick Burns to Chairman Hyde. I will just quote a
little and then insert the rest in the Record.

We have enormous concerns about this proposed legislation,
particularly title II. These provisions would impair our
ability to continue working closely and successfully with our
allies to deal with the threat that Iran poses.

Nobody here, nobody here, apologizes for this regime. And my good
friend from Indiana is correct, there is a lot of shared interest and
deep concern. The notion that this despotic regime would have control
of nuclear weapons is terrifying, absolutely terrifying.
We long for the day that the Iranian people are free, in no small
measure because the United States' history with the Iranian people over
more than half a century is one where we have not always been on the
side of democracy for the Iranian people, overthrowing their
democratically elected regime in 1953. That was not a proud moment in
our history when we helped install a dictator, but we called him the
Shah.
We are united in our commitment to deal meaningfully with this
problem. This legislation, as the administration has made clear, falls
short of the mark. It is not tightening our sanctions against Iran.

{time} 1215

We have done that.
There have been administrations, both Republican and Democrat, who
have maybe not been as zealous in implementing those sanctions; but
that is on the books. We have done it.
What this talks about doing is extending sanctions against the very
people whose cooperation we need to solve this problem. We are
confusing our goals. Is it more important to threaten a regime change
and thereby consolidate it? This Government of Iran by all indications
is not monolithic. There are people who disagree with the sad and
repulsive face of the current leader. There are a vast number of young
people in Iran who are not at this point violently anti-American. They
are pro-Western. There is interest in the United States. If we misplay
this, we can end up turning another generation against us in Iran.
We have had empty threats against North Korea that did not stop them
from going full speed ahead developing nuclear weapons, in fact, we are
probably less safe today because we have not been focused and
effective.
I do strongly identify with the words of my friend, the gentleman
from Iowa

[[Page H1766]]

(Mr. Leach). I have been one who has been somewhat critical of this
administration in its actions in the past. I would find it absolutely
inappropriate to not reinforce when I think they are trying to
reposition themselves vis-a-vis Iran. There are many people on our side
of the aisle who were against the rush to war in Iraq and many more who
have found that it was a mistake to do so. We have supported more
diplomatic initiatives, and this is the opportunity we have now.
This legislation is not each-handed. It is not focused. The
administration does not want it. It sanctions our allies. I strongly
urge that we do things that are coming down the pike now that we in
Congress can do that will make a difference in Iran. Think about how we
deal with India and nuclear weapons. This is a decision that is looming
ahead of us that will make a difference for China and other countries
that have nuclear technology about how we treat them in that situation.
And for heaven's sake, when people have suddenly discovered $3-a-
gallon gasoline and that we are addicted to foreign oil, which is part
of Iran's strength right now, maybe we in Congress can forget the goofy
energy bill we passed and get serious about conservation, alternative
energy, increasing fuel standards and giving full value to the American
public for our oil and gas resources. These are things that we can do
now that will make a difference. Let the administration do its job
diplomatically; provide oversight, but do not go over the edge with
this legislation.

Department of State,

Washington, DC.
Hon. Henry J. Hyde,
Chairman, Committee on International Relations, House of
Representatives.
Dear Mr. Chairman: I am writing to comment on HR 282, the
``Iran Freedom Support Act of 2005,'' that currently is
pending before your Committee.
We have serious concerns about this proposed legislation,
particularly Title II, which would amend the Iran and Libya
Sanctions Act (ILSA). These provisions would impair our
ability to continue working closely and successfully with our
allies to deal with the threat that Iran poses.
The Iran issue is sensitive and critically important. The
September 24 IAEA resolution, tabled by the EU-3 (Germany,
the UK, and France), was an important step forward. We are
going to have to continue working with our international
partners to isolate Iran and to build and maintain an
international coalition to ensure that Iran does not acquire
a nuclear weapons capability. In doing so, the President
needs the flexibility that HR 282 would impede.
I note that one portion of the bill, Title IV, regarding
support for democracy in Iran, could, with relatively minor
modifications, make a positive contribution to our Iran
objectives, and we would welcome the opportunity to work with
Congress in developing this approach.
Sincerely,
R. Nicholas Burns,
Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs.

Mr. PENCE. Madam Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
There have been repeated assertions by several of my colleagues today
about the administration's position on the bill we are considering
today. In fact, it has been characterized repeatedly by several
colleagues that the administration ``strongly opposes'' this
legislation.
With great respect to my colleagues, they are referring specifically
to an administration letter that expressed an opinion to the chairman
of the Committee on International Relations before the bill provided
further flexibility to the President, and it is not a response to the
text of the bill we are considering today. The administration has not
taken a position on the legislation, as amended, that we are
considering today.
In specific reference to the concerns that were addressed, I would
like to address title II of the legislation before I recognize the
gentleman from Pennsylvania.
Title II of the bill was the focus of the administration's letter,
and it had to do in particular with that section concerning the ability
of the President of the United States to waive certain provisions of
this act in the national interest. The legislation that we consider
today states that the President may on a case-by-case basis waive for a
period of not more than 6 months with respect to national security the
certifications required in this bill if such a waiver is ``vital to the
national security interests of the country'' and the country of the
national has undertaken substantial measures to prevent the acquisition
and development of weapons of mass destruction.
What we in effect did here is we lowered the threshold significantly
for the President's waiver in this case. It is significant that the
administration has not expressed opposition to the legislation, as
amended. For the sake of clarity of the record, I wanted to add that to
our debate today.
Madam Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Pennsylvania
(Mr. Weldon), the distinguished vice chairman of the Armed Services
Committee.
Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Madam Speaker, I thank the gentleman for
yielding me this time and the leaders for bringing this bill forward.
I just want to refresh the memories of my colleagues who say we
should not take any action. It was in 1997 when we had evidence that
Iran was getting cooperation on developing a missile system that we
brought a bill before this body called the Iran Missile Sanctions Act.
For my colleagues who were not here, 398 Members voted ``yes,'' 98
Senators voted ``yes,'' the White House opposed the bill, and President
Clinton vetoed the bill that year because he said we did not need it.
Last summer, Iran paraded the Shabab III missile system down the
streets of Tehran. It is completed. It is the most capable offensive
system in the Middle East. We could have stopped it and we didn't.
Madam Speaker, for the past 3 years I have been feeding the CIA
information about Iran's efforts to undermine Iraq, the Middle East,
and to foment terrorism around the world. It got so uncomfortable that
I had to write a book. Everything that I said that I gave to the CIA
for the past 3 years is now true: the support for Bani Sadr, the
efforts for taking two teams up into North Korea to acquire nuclear
technology, the attempts to assassinate Mullah al-Sastani. All of those
things are now verified, and all of them I told the CIA and they
ignored.
We do need to be aggressive with Iran and we need an approach that
does not call for war. I am not for war with Iran. The people of Iran
are not our enemy. It is a young nation. The people there want to be
back as friends with America and the West. We need to work with those
Iranians in exile, and that is what this legislation calls for.
Madam Speaker, 2 months ago I was out in California where I spoke to
the 13 largest Iranian radio and television stations that beamed by
satellite into Iran. For 2 hours I spoke directly to the Iranian people
by satellite, 12 million households. I came back 8 hours later and took
calls from people inside of Iran.
Madam Speaker, 400 Iranians called through the satellite and through
cell phones to issue their recommendations and their questions to me
live.
Madam Speaker, only 1 of 400 supported the regime of Ahmadinejad and
Ayatollah Khomeini, who really runs the government there. Every other
caller said we need your help, we need to do what you did with Ukraine,
you need to help us take back our government. You need to do what they
did in Georgia, to have an internal revolution, to bring about change
so we truly can be friends with the West. That is what this legislation
calls for.
But there is one other point this legislation does not focus on that
I feel strongly about, and this was mentioned by my friend and
colleague, the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Kucinich). The closest nation
to Iran is Russia, and what we have to do is renew our efforts
diplomatically to have Russia play a significant role to peacefully
convince the people of Iran to get their government to back off of this
nasty rhetoric and of this effort to build up this offensive capability
using WMD, including nuclear weapons. This is of vital urgency for us.
This is the number-one threat we face in the world.
While this legislation may not be perfect, it certainly sends a
signal that we are not going to do what we did back in 1997. We are not
going to allow any administration to back us off from stopping the
development of technology like the missile system that Iran currently
possesses.
Mr. CROWLEY. Madam Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from
Maryland (Mr. Cardin).
Mr. CARDIN. Madam Speaker, let me thank my friend for yielding me
this time.

[[Page H1767]]

Madam Speaker, I agree with many of the comments that have been made
on this floor about the dilemma we have now in Iran as a result of our
policies in Iraq. I opposed the U.S. involvement in Iraq. I thought it
was wrong. And as one of the consequences, it has caused us to lose
focus on our war against terror and to make it more difficult for us to
deal with Iran.
Having said that, I think this is an important bill that we need to
move forward. It is an important effort to make it clear that Iran
cannot be permitted to become a nuclear weapons power.
Madam Speaker, let me point out some of the proudest moments in U.S.
history have been the use of sanctions. I think back about U.S.
leadership and imposing sanctions basically against the Soviet Union
which allowed people to be able to leave that country.
I think back about the U.S. leadership in South Africa when it was an
apartheid country and how we imposed sanctions against South Africa and
were accused of causing problems in doing that. But what we did was
bring down the apartheid Government of South Africa without the
necessary use of force.
So I think it is critically important that we stand united in our
efforts to impose sanctions against Iran to make it clear that we
cannot allow Iran to become a nuclear weapons power. Make no mistake
about it, Iran is trying to do that. We know Iran is trying to do that.
We know about the vote of the IAEA of 27-3 that referred Iran to the
Security Council, that they are enriching uranium clearly to develop a
nuclear weapon, that they have supported terrorist organizations, the
Hezbollah and the Islamic Jihad. The Iranian President has made it
clear that he wants a world without the United States and he wants to
wipe Israel off the face of the map. These are serious threats that we
need to take seriously.
Therefore, we need effective sanctions against Iran so they change
their way. This legislation is an effort to strengthen the sanctions
against Iran by removing the sunset, by taking away some of the
discretion and removing the sanctions unless Iran changes its way.
Madam Speaker, I look at this as a way to engage the international
community to work with us. We did not do that in Iraq, and that was one
of the fatal flaws of our policy in Iraq is that we did not engage the
international community.
This legislation says, look, we have a chance with Iran to get them
to change their ways through the imposition of sanctions and isolating
the country, but we do need the help of our friends around the world.
We do need them to work with us. It is in the interest of the civilized
world to prevent Iran from becoming a nuclear weapons power. We need
their help. Working with them, we can add another proud history to
America in its international leadership of saying yes, we are going to
use our international power, our diplomatic skills, to change the
direction of a country that otherwise would become even a more
dangerous risk to the United States and the civilized world. I urge my
colleagues to support the legislation.
Mr. PAUL. Madam Speaker, I yield myself 5 minutes.
Madam Speaker, there has been a lot of talk here about what this bill
is doing and that it does not authorize the use of force. As a matter
of fact, the language in the bill says this does not authorize the use
of force. But my contention is it is a contradiction to the bill itself
because the bill itself does authorize the use of force. No, not tanks
and airplanes and bombs yet, but we know that all these options are
still on the table.

{time} 1230

But what it does authorize is something that is equivalent to force,
and that is sanctions. Sanctions are used as an act of war.
Also, this bill has money in it, and it is open-ended, an
authorization of appropriation. There is authorized to be appropriated
to the Department of State such sums as may be necessary to carry out
this section. And what is this section talking about? Subsidies and
funding of dissident groups to go in there and undermine the Iranian
government.
Yes, we quote Ahmadinejad about his vitriolic statements, and they
are horrible, but how do you think they interpret other statements when
we say we are going to wipe their regime off the face of the Earth? We
are going to have regime change. So from their viewpoint we are saying
the same thing, and we should not be blinded to that and pretend,
because our language is not quite as violent. We are saying the same
thing, because look at the result of the violence in Iraq as a result
of our efforts of regime change.
Now, one of the major authors of the Iraqi war, a leader of the
neoconservative movement, came before the committee when this
resolution was debated and when we had hearings on it. I want to read a
quote from him because it clarifies this issue. The quote comes from
Michael Ledeen, and he wants regime change. This is what he had to say.
``There is much that is praiseworthy in the Iran Freedom Support Act. I
think it can be improved by more openly embracing a policy of regime
change in Iran and allocating an adequate budget to demonstrate our
seriousness in this endeavor. I know some Members would prefer to dance
around the explicit declaration of regime change as the policy of this
country, but anyone looking closely at the language, and that is what I
have done, and content of the Iran Freedom Support Act and its close
relative in the Senate can clearly see that it is, in fact, the essence
of the matter. You can't have freedom in Iran, that is, we can't have
our way, without bringing down the mullahs.''
That is an outright threat. That is the testimony of a
neoconservative who led us and promoted and pushed the war in Iraq, and
nothing would please him and others who are behind this type of
resolution to see regime change. There is no denial of that.
The question is how do we do it? Are we going to do it pussyfooting
around? Or are we going to use force and violence? We did, we used
bombs for a long time against Iraq. But we had a bill in 1998 that said
explicitly we are going to get rid of the Iraqi government, and it took
a few years to get the war going.
Both parties are involved in this. It is not just this administration
that has promoted this type of foreign policy, which, quite frankly, I
see is not in the best interest of our country. This is why I am a
strong advocate of minding our own business. Don't get involved in
nation building. Don't police the world. Don't get involved in the
internal affairs of the other nations. Otherwise, we have a big job
ahead of us.
What about the fact that Kim Jong Il is still in power? We are
talking to him. We talked to Qadaffi. Mao was in power, and he had
nuclear weapons. What did we do; did we attack him? No. What did we do
with Stalin? Stalin and Khrushchev had 30,000 nuclear weapons. Were we
ready to use force and intimidation and yelling and screaming? And
Khrushchev was ready to wipe us off the face of the Earth also.
But I am asking you to reconsider the fact that moving in this
direction is the same thing as we did against Iraq, and it won't do us
any good. It is going to cost us a lot of money, and it is going to
cost a lot of lives, and it is un-American. It is not constitutional.
It is not moral. We should not pursue this type of foreign policy. We
should take care of ourselves, and we should be more friendly with
nations. We should be willing to trade. And if you are concerned about
the world, why not set a good example? When our house is clean, when we
have a good democracy and a worthy Republic, and we do well, believe
me, they will want to emulate us.
But attacking and intimidating other nations, the way we go at it
now, literally backfires on us. What is it doing to the dissidents,
those who would love to overthrow the Islamic radicals in Iran right
now? It unifies them. Did we become unified in this country when we
were attacked on 9/11? Do you think Republicans and Democrats were
divided on 9/11 and 9/12? No, it brings them together. So this policy
does exactly the opposite of what you pretend that you want to do, and
that is encourage those people who don't like their government. But by
doing it this way, you literally are doing the very opposite.
So I just plead with you to be more cautious. Negroponte says there
is no rush. Take some time. They are not about to have a nuclear
weapon. And

[[Page H1768]]

whether or not that is their plan or not probably at this moment is
irrelevant. I mean, if we stood down all these nations and all these
nuclear weapons in the past, why can't we practice more diplomacy to
resolve our differences. I was talking to somebody the other day and
they said, well, maybe in 10 years they might have a nuclear weapon, so
we must act now. Get the bombs ready. They are talking about a nuclear
attack on Iran in order to stop them from producing a nuclear bomb. It
is time to step back and look at the policy. The policy of
nonintervention and peaceful relations with the world and peaceful
trade is the American way to go, and it will lead to peace and
prosperity.
I yield the balance of my time to the gentleman from Ohio.
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mrs. Emerson). The gentleman from Ohio is
recognized for 5\3/4\ minutes.
Mr. KUCINICH. I want to thank the gentleman from Texas for his very
calm and patient approach to this. I don't think the American people
want our Nation set on a path of war with Iran, and I believe the
American people are very concerned about the steps which set us on a
path to war against Iraq. There are questions that have to be answered
by this administration before Congress should rightfully even vote on
this.
You know, it has been reported recently that U.S. troops are
conducting military operations in Iran. In Iran. Now, if that is true,
then apparently the administration has made a decision to commit U.S.
military forces to a unilateral conflict with Iran, even before direct
or indirect negotiations with the Government of Iran have been
attempted, without U.N. support and without authorization from this
Congress.
First things first here. Where are we right now? Are we already
inside Iran? According to Seymour Hersh, in the New Yorker, there is
evidence that suggests that we are. The presence of U.S. troops in Iran
would constitute a hostile act against that country.
Now, put that in the context of this particular bill. At a time when
diplomacy is urgently needed, this bill would escalate an international
crisis that is already percolating by the probability or at least the
possibility that this administration has already committed troops to
Iran. What we are seeing here is an undermining of any attempt to
negotiate with the Government of Iran, and we are seeing the
undermining of any diplomatic efforts at the U.N.
I said this before and I will say it again. Any kind of saber
rattling against Iran puts our troops in Iraq at jeopardy. The
achievement of stability in transition to Iraqi security control will
be compromised, reversing any progress that has been cited by the
administration.
I am sure that many Americans are saying, you know, it is hard to
believe that the United States could have already taken such an
imprudent decision as committing troops to Iran, but we have had a
number and variety of sources confirming this. Over a week ago Air
Force Colonel Sam Gardner related on CNN that the Iranian Ambassador to
the IAEA, Aliasghar Soltaniyeh, reported to him that Iranians have
captured dissident forces who have confessed to working with U.S.
troops in Iran. Earlier that week, Seymour Hersh reported that a U.S.
source told him that U.S. Marines were operating in the Baluchi, Azeri
and Kurdish regions of Iran.
Now, any kind of military deployment in Iran would and should
constitute an urgent matter of national significance. And I think that
the administration has an obligation to this Congress, before Congress
would vote on this kind of a bill, to tell us exactly what is going on
with the activities of American forces with regard to Iran.
Also, there are reports that the U.S. is fomenting opposition and
supporting military operations in Iran among insurgent groups and
Iranian ethnic minority groups, some of whom are operating from Iraq.
The Party for a Free Life in Kurdistan, PEJAK, is one such group, and
the other group is called the MEK, the Mujahedin e-Khalq. It is an
Iranian antigovernment group which was listed as a terrorist group by
the State Department since 1997. An article by Jim Lobe, published in
antiwar.com, on February 11, 2005, claims that the Pentagon civilians
in Vice President Cheney's office are among those in the U.S.
Government who support MEK. We also know from the Hersh article in the
New Yorker which confirms that U.S. troops are establishing contact
with antigovernment ethnic minority groups in Iran.
Now, U.S. support for insurgent activity in Iran would not be
tolerable. The administration has claimed numerous times that the
object of the so-called war on terrorism is to target lawless insurgent
groups. It would be a breach of trust if the administration is involved
in this. Iran does not present an imminent threat. Any setting the
stage for an attack on Iran is setting the stage for a unilateral act
of war.
I think that this country needs to move very slowly anytime we are
setting the stage for conflict with another nation. Don't we have
enough problems in Iraq to clean up without setting the stage for
another conflict in Iran? We must use diplomacy. We must use our
relationships with Russia and China and other nations in order to avert
a conflict with Iran.
Mr. CROWLEY. Madam Speaker, I yield myself 1 minute.
Madam Speaker, I heard our colleague thank Mr. Paul of Texas for
being calm and patient. I don't know how much more patient we can be
with a country that supports international terrorism as Iran does.
Let me point out, this bill does not authorize the use of force. It
does not authorize the use of force. We can say it over and over again.
That is clearly not getting through. But this country, we are talking
about Iran, is bent on the destruction of our ally Israel, bent on the
destruction of our ally Israel and the interests of the United States
in that region.
This is a peaceful way to help resolve this issue. It will restrict
access to reserves by the mullahs in Iran to pursue development of
weapons of mass destruction and nuclear weapons. So, Madam Speaker,
once again, I rise in strong support of this legislation. I hope my
colleagues on both sides of the aisle see the wisdom of this
legislation that is seen as well in the Senate, and the President
understands the wisdom of this legislation and signs it into law.
I yield the balance of my time to my friend, Mr. Pence.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Indiana is recognized for
1 minute.
Mr. PENCE. I thank the gentleman from New York for yielding and for
his strong leadership on the international stage today and at other
times in his career.
To the gentlewoman from Florida who is in our thoughts and prayers
today, Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, who authored the Iran Freedom Support Act,
I express gratitude.
Mr. Crowley of New York just said it best. The bill we will consider
today codifies U.S. sanctions on Iran and requires that they remain in
place until Iran has verifiably dismantled its chemical, biological and
nuclear weapons program. It does not, this legislation today does not
authorize the use of force against Iran. It does a host of other things
that represent economic sanctions. It supports independent human rights
and peaceful prodemocracy forces within Iran.
But the Iran Freedom Support Act is the right bill at the right time.
It is a strong diplomatic measure. The potential consequences of
inaction could be catastrophic. Congress and this administration must
act before it is too late, before our options are severely limited, and
this diplomatic measure today, the Iran Freedom Support Act, is such a
measure.
I ask my colleagues to render their overwhelming support of this
legislation.
Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Madam Speaker, Iran is the full ticket--a defiant
rogue state, defined by the State Department as the world's most
active--state sponsor of terrorism. Its ambition to develop weapons of
mass destruction capabilities has been deliberate, deceptive, and long
in the making.
U.S. policy has to date pursued a patient course of diplomacy
including working with our allies, heeding the findings of the
International Atomic Energy Agency, and accepting ineffectual
incentives.
However, diplomacy does not mean surrender and of the ``constructive
engagement'', incentives, and inducements of the Iranian regime have
been no more effective than Neville Chamberlain's famous failed
policies of appeasement during World War II.

[[Page H1769]]

It is time for the U.S. and our allies to undertake the sacrifices
required to deny Iran the political legitimacy, technology, materials,
and financial resources to pursue its destructive policies--policies
that threaten U.S and global security.
It is our hope that H.R. 282 will serve as leverage for cooperation
from those allies who claim to be concerned about the growing Iranian
threat but who continue to invest billions in Iran's energy sector and
continue to assist Iran's nuclear and missile programs.
Ten years ago, the U.S. called on our European allies to take steps
to deny Iran the financial resources to nuclear capabilities.
The U.S. also called on Russia and China to cease their support for
Iran's nuclear and missile program.
These calls were ignored.
Then, four years ago, the Iran saga within the context of the IAEA
begins.
According to multiple IAEA reports Iran's deceptions and breaches of
its international obligations have dealt with the most sensitive
aspects of the nuclear cycle.
By September of 2004, as Iran resumed large-scale uranium conversion,
then Secretary of State Colin Powell called for the Iran case to be
referred to the United Nations Security Council for sanctions to be
imposed.
That was not to be. The response from the international community was
to offer Iran yet more incentives and to increase its investments in
Iran's energy sector.
Every step along the way, Iran has demonstrated contempt for the IAEA
and has mocked the international community.
In fact, Iran's former nuclear negotiator recently boasted: ``When we
were negotiating with the Europeans in Tehran we were still installing
some of the equipment at the Isfahan site . . . In reality, by creating
a same situation, we could finish Isfahan.''
That is but a microcosm of how concessions and inaction--inaction
including the failure to implement U.S. laws such as the Iran-Libya
Sanctions Act--have only served to embolden the Iranian regime and
increase the threat Iran poses to U.S. national security interests and
global stability.
Just in the last few months, Iran: Resumed its nuclear efforts,
removing the IAEA seals on uranium conversion plants; announced it
could successfully use biotechnology for its nuclear program, thereby
improving its capacity to build nuclear weapons; called for Israel to
be wiped off the map; Iran's Defense Minister said that it is ``Iran's
absolute right to have access to nuclear arms . . .''; Iran is
identified by U.S. military commanders as the source of some of the
IEDs being used in terrorist attacks in Iraq; Iran's leader announces
that Iran would inflict ``harm and pain'' on the U.S.
Just over a week ago, Iran's so-called president announces that Iran
has an indigenous capability to enrich uranium and that it continues to
pursue a more sophisticated technology, P-2 centrifuges, that could
speed Iran's path to nuclear weapons.
Just yesterday, Iran's Grand Ayatollah underscored that Iran would
share nuclear technology with other Islamic nations.
This announcement was made during a meeting with Sudan's brutal
leader where the Ayatollah praised the Sudanese regime's policies.
This clearly indicates that the Iranian threat is more than just
about its nuclear pursuits. This is a repressive regime that denies the
Iranian people the most fundamental freedoms.
It is a regime that, since the infamous day in November 1979 when the
U.S. embassy was overrun by Iranian radicals and Americans were taken
hostage and held for 444 days, has increasingly viewed terrorism as a
legitimate means to further its ideological and strategic aims.
Iran provides Hezbollah with funding, safe haven, training, and
weapons that have been estimated by some at more than $80 million per
year.
Hezbollah has been linked to the 1983 attacks on the U.S. Marine
barracks in Lebanon.
Hezbollah has also been linked to the bombing of the U.S. Embassy and
the Embassy annex, in Beirut in 1984.
Iran is directly linked to the June 1996 truck bombing of the Khobar
Towers U.S. military housing complex in Saudi Arabia.
Iran has used Hezbollah to assert a global reach that has extended
into the Western Hemisphere. We witnessed the 1992 bombing of the
Israeli embassy in Argentina and the July 1994 bombing of the AMIA
Jewish Community Center, also in Buenos Aires.
In December 2001, Matthew Levitt, a former FBI counter-terrorism
official, detailed the beginning of al-Qaeda's links with Iran.
Levitt noted: ``According to U.S. intelligence reports, Osama bin
Laden's operatives approached Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and
Security, MOIS, agents in 1995 and again in 1996, offering to join
forces against America.''
He added: ``In fact, phone records obtained by U.S. officials
investigating the 1998 U.S. embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania
revealed that 10 percent of the calls from the Compact-M satellite
phone used by bin Laden and his key lieutenants were to Iran. ``
Testimony from defendants in the Kenya and Tanzania U.S. embassy
bombings, indicate that Al-Qaeda and Hezbollah, with Iranian
assistance, have had strategic meetings throughout the years in Sudan
and elsewhere.
This is just the tip of the iceberg.
There is still time to contain the threat posed by Iran and adopt
short and long-term policies that will compel Iran to change its
unacceptable behavior.
H.R. 282 provides such a response.
Briefly, this bill: Codifies U.S. sanctions on Iran and requires that
they remain in place until Iran has verifiably dismantled its chemical,
biological, and nuclear weapons programs; amends the Iran-Libya
Sanctions Act, ILSA, including by enlarging the number of entities that
would be subject to sanctions, limiting its application to Iran, and
eliminating the expiration date of the law; requires that the names of
all individuals, governments and companies that have invested a total
of at least $20 million in Iran's energy sector be published in the
Federal Register; denies U.S. assistance to countries that are invested
in Iran's energy sector; authorizes the President to provide U.S.
assistance to peaceful prodemocracy and human rights groups in Iran and
for independent broadcasts into Iran.
We must use all available political and economic means to truly make
Iran pay for its behavior, and to leverage for cooperation from our
allies and convince them to deny Iran the resources to continue along
this track.
We must act before it is too late and our options are severely
limited.
I ask my colleagues to render their overwhelming support to this
legislation.
Mr. McDERMOTT. Madam Speaker, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, National
Foreign Trade Council, Coalition for Employment Through Exports and
USA*Engage yesterday distributed to members a very cogent description
of some of the reasons to oppose H.R. 282. I recommend that members
review it.
Hon. Jim McDermott,
House of Representatives,
Washington, DC.
Re H.R. 282, Iran Sanctions Act.

Dear Congressman McDermott: Our organizations write in
opposition to the Iran Sanctions Act, H.R. 282, which has
been placed on the House suspension calendar for this week.
While we recognize the serious concerns raised by the current
regime in Iran, we are concerned that the changes which have
been proposed to the U.S. sanctions program would hinder, not
help, our efforts to address the situation. Specifically,
these changes would remove the vital flexibility of U.S.
sanctions policy, drive a wedge between U.S. and our allies
in the on-going joint efforts to influence the Iranian
regime, increase the involvement of courts in U.S. foreign
policy, and discourage foreign investment in the United
States. We urge you to oppose passage of H.R. 282 when it
comes up under suspension of the rules this week to allow for
fuller and more informed consideration over the negative
consequences of these changes to U.S. law.
In particular, we note the following concerns with the
current bill as it was ordered reported by the House
International Relations Committee on March 15:
The bill would remove the extremely useful periodic review
of the Iran sanctions regime by removing the sunset provision
included in the earlier Iran Libya Sanctions Act. Sunset
provisions are vital to creating an effective sanctions
regime as they permit Congress to review sanctions to ensure
that they are effective and useful over time. Congress
engaged in a useful debate over reforms in Iran when
sanctions up for renewal in 2001 and it is important that
Members allow for such a debate in the future.
H.R. 282 would make the United States more vulnerable to
international commercial complaints and damage U.S. global
financial leadership by greatly expanding the entities
subject to sanctions to include insurers, creditors and
foreign subsidiaries. The United States would undoubtedly
face complaints and lawsuits from our trading partners
questioning their legality. It would also stoke ``economic
nationalism,'' which may seriously disrupt vital U.S.
business overseas.
The capital market sanctions contained in H.R. 282 would
discourage foreign investment in the United States and could
potentially damage U.S. business interests abroad. By
requiring publication of the names of entities that have
investments in violation of the sanctions, ordering a report
by an office of the Security and Exchange Commission, and
encouraging divestment of stocks, H.R. 282 sends a negative
signal to foreign companies interested in investing in the
United States. This bill encourages global companies to avoid
investments in the United States by leaving them exposed to
potential capital market sanctions. Foreign governments may
also seek to retaliate against U.S. firms abroad based on
their own political motivations.
H.R. 282 would hinder the flexibility of the President to
conduct foreign policy. The bill would require the President
to direct the Treasury Department to initiate investigations
into the potential for sanctioning firms investing in Iran
and would require the President to determine to impose
sanctions

[[Page H1770]]

on such entities within 360 days. This provision would also
apply retroactively, requiring sanctions determinations on
pending investigations of prior investments within ninety
days of enactment. If the President chose to waive the
sanctions, which is possible under an inadequately narrow
provision in this bill, he would be required to renew that
waiver every six months. This policy of requiring
investigations and sanctions determinations on each and every
past and future investment in Iran by a person described in
the Act would severely restrict the Administration's
flexibility to conduct foreign policy in ways that can adapt
to complex, changing circumstances.
Finally, we encourage Congress and the House International
Relations Committee to rethink the sanctions regime in light
of their serious unintended impact on the people of Iran
and our own ability to forge vital international
alliances. When we hear of reports like those raised in
the March 15 hearing of the Committee on International
Relations--about the difficulties that humanitarian
organizations have had operating to relieve suffering by
earthquake victims--it seems appropriate to take a closer
look at whether there might be a better way for the United
States to address the serious concerns raised by the
policies of the Iranian government.
At the very least, we hope that there will be an
opportunity to hold a fuller debate over the proposed radical
changes to the Iran Libya Sanctions Act, and therefore
respectfully request that you vote against H.R. 282.
Respectfully submitted,
USA*Engage.
Coalition for Employment Through Exports.
National Foreign Trade Council.
U.S. Chamber of Commerce.

Mr. BERMAN. Madam Speaker, several years ago we discovered that Iran
was operating a secret program to enrich uranium and carry out other
sensitive nuclear fuel cycle activities.
Iran's failure to report these activities to the International Atomic
Energy Agency was a blatant violation of its obligations under the
Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty.
The more we have learned about Iran's nuclear program in the
intervening months, the more obvious it's become that Tehran's true
intention is not peaceful power generation, but the development of a
nuclear arsenal that could threaten the United States, our allies in
the Middle East, and any other part of the world within the range of
Iran's increasingly sophisticated ballistic missiles.
Any seeds of doubt on the purpose of Iran's nuclear activities were
dispelled once and for all by their outright rejection of a sensible
proposal offered by our European allies and, more recently, Iran's
resumption of uranium enrichment in defiance of the international
community.
The election of Iranian President Ahmadinejad has made the urgency of
preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons that much greater.
His messianic world view, vocal support for ``wiping Israel off the
map,'' and close ties to Hezbollah, Hamas and other terrorist
organizations make the prospect of a nuclear-armed Iran truly
unimaginable.
Everyone hopes we can find a diplomatic solution to this crisis, and
the IAEA's recent decision to refer Iran to the U.N. Security Council
was a long-overdue step in the right direction.
But tough words must be backed by tough action, and we have got to
keep the pressure on Russia and China to support meaningful measures
that will cause the Iranian regime to reevaluate the wisdom of its
current course.
And, through this legislation before us today, we must push our own
Executive Branch to enforce the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act, legislation
passed by Congress back in 1996 to deter investment in Iran's oil and
gas sector.
By requiring the President to impose sanctions on foreign firms that
continue to invest in Iran, we hoped to starve the Iranian regime of
hard currency necessary to pursue nuclear weapons and support
terrorism.
In the months after ILSA was signed into law, there were strong
indications that it was having the intended deterrent effect.
But then, in an effort to avoid offending our allies, the Clinton
Administration made a decision not to enforce the law--a shortsighted
policy continued by President Bush.
H.R. 282 would close a legal loophole that has allowed the State
Department to sit on investigations for years without making a
determination, one way or the other, if a foreign firm has in fact made
an investment in Iran.
Madam Speaker, this legislation won't make Iran's nuclear program go
away, but it is an important step in the right direction, and--with 360
cosponsors--sends a clear signal that Congress is extremely concerned
about this critical matter.
Mr. GENE GREEN of Texas. Madam Speaker, I urge my colleagues to join
me today in supporting H.R. 282, the Iran Freedom Support Act.
I want to thank Ms. Ros-Lehtinen and Mr. Lantos for drafting this
bill that has gathered great support from our colleagues to address the
urgent and problematic situation in Iran.
This bill will extend and strengthen existing sanctions designed to
cut off funds Iran could use for its illicit atomic programs.
Inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) over the
past three years have turned up evidence that Iran has been pursuing
nuclear technology for nearly two decades. Despite recent rulings by
the IAEA Board of Governors that found Iran to be in noncompliance with
its Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty safeguards agreement, and a
presidential statement last month by the United Nations Security
Council that called upon Iran to reinstitute its voluntary suspension
of enrichment and reprocessing, Iran has stated that it will continue
development of its nuclear program.
The U.S. and our allies cannot stand by and watch Iran develop
nuclear capabilities, and this legislation is just a first step in what
must be done to address this problem.
A state that has vowed to continue supporting terrorist activity
against the West and the U.S., has openly stated that Israel must be
wiped off the map, and has threatened to retaliate to international
pressure and sanctions by giving nuclear technology to other states,
must be dealt with before it has a robust nuclear program.
Iran's pursuit for weapons of mass destruction--and nuclear
technology in particular--along with its outright support for
international terrorism require a strong response from our government.
Passing H.R. 282 is a first step in addressing this urgent situation,
and I ask my colleagues to join me in supporting this bill.
Ms. HARRIS. Madam Speaker, I rise in support of H.R. 282, the Iran
Freedom Support Act. For more than two decades the Iranian regime has
displayed its contempt for the rule of law by willingly and
aggressively breaching its international obligations, in pursuit of
nuclear weapons.
The incendiary remark made by Iranian President Ahmadinejad, that
Israel is a ``fake regime [that] can not logically continue to live,''
underscores the importance of this measure.
H.R. 282 denies technical assistance and financial resources to the
regime of President Ahmadinejad, and strengthens sanctions against
those who would facilitate the development of a covert nuclear program
in Iran. This bill sends a clear and unambiguous message to Iran that
their behavior is unacceptable.
The overwhelming 37-3 vote by which this measure passed the
International Relations Committee exemplifies the bipartisan nature of
the issue.
Madam Speaker, with the proliferation of nuclear weaponry at issue,
there is neither room for error, nor for mixed signals. The price to be
paid for inaction or indecision is beyond consideration. This
legislation is a measured, responsible demonstration of our commitment
to ensuring the freedom of Iranians and Americans alike.
Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Madam Speaker, I am attaching an exchange of
letters between Chairman Hyde and Chairmen Davis, Thomas, McKeon and
Oxley concerning the bill H.R. 282 ``The Iran Freedom Support Act'' for
printing in the Record.

House of Representatives,

Committee on Government Reform,

Washington, DC, April 13, 2006.
Hon. Henry J. Hyde,
Chairman, Committee on International Relations, House of
Representatives, Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: I am writing to confirm our mutual
understanding with respect to consideration of H.R. 282, the
Iran Freedom Support Act, which the Committee on
International Relations ordered reported on April 13, 2006.
In the bill as ordered reported by your Committee, section
206, specifically the provisions providing Senses of Congress
urging U.S. government pension plan and thrift savings plan
managers to take certain actions (section 206(c) and (d)) and
the provision requiring certain disclosures by managers of
U.S. government pension plans and thrift savings plans
(section 206(e)) are within the jurisdiction of the
Government Reform Committee.
I thank you for your agreement to support the removal of
section 206(e) from the bill and to modify sections 206(c)
and (d) with the addition of language recognizing the
fiduciary duties of U. S. government pension plan managers,
as you work to move this important legislation forward. Given
the importance and timeliness of the Iran Freedom Support
Act, and your willingness to work with us regarding pension
issues, I will not request a sequential referral of this
legislation to the Committee on Government Reform. However, I
only do so with the understanding that this procedural route
should not be construed to prejudice the Committee on
Government Reform's jurisdictional interest and prerogatives
on these provisions or any other similar legislation and will
not be considered as precedent for consideration of matters
of jurisdictional interest to my Committee in the future.
Furthermore, should these or similar provisions be considered
in a conference with the Senate, I would expect Members of
the Committee on Government Reform be appointed to the
conference committee on these provisions.

[[Page H1771]]

Finally, I would ask that you include a copy of our
exchange of letters in the Committee Report on H.R. 282 and
in the Congressional Record during the consideration of this
bill. If you have any questions regarding this matter, please
do not hesitate to call me. I thank you for your
consideration.
Sincerely,
Tom Davis,
Chairman.
____

House of Representatives, Committee on International
Relations,
Washington, DC, April 13, 2006.
Hon. Tom Davis,
Chairman, Committee on Government Reform, House of
Representatives, Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: Thank you for your letter concerning
H.R. 282, the Iran Freedom Support Act. I concur with your
assessment that Section 206 of the bill, as ordered reported
by the Committee on International Relations, which deals with
United States Pension Plans, falls within the Rule X
jurisdiction of the Committee on Government Reform--
specifically Section 206(e), which requires certain
disclosures by managers of U.S. government pension plans. In
addition, the Senses of Congress contained in Sections 206
(c) and (d), urging U.S. government pension plan managers to
take certain actions, are also within the jurisdiction of
your Committee.
I thank you for your agreement to support moving this
important legislation forward. Based on our discussions, this
Committee will remove Section 206(e) from the bill, modify
Sections 206 (c) and (d), and add language recognizing the
fiduciary duties of pension plan managers. I appreciate your
willingness to forego seeking a sequential referral of this
legislation. I understand your willingness to do so does not
in any way prejudice the Committee on Government Reform's
jurisdictional interest and prerogatives on these provisions
or any other similar legislation and will not be considered
as precedent for consideration of matters of jurisdictional
interest to your Committee in the future. Should these or
similar provisions be considered in a conference with the
Senate, I will urge the Speaker to appoint members of the
Committee on Government Reform to the conference committee.
As you requested, I will include a copy of our exchange of
letters in the Committee Report on H.R. 282 and in the
Congressional Record during the consideration of this bill.
Sincerely,
Henry J. Hyde,
Chairman.
____

House of Representatives,

Committee on Ways and Means,

Washington, DC, April 6, 2006.
Hon. Henry J. Hyde,
Chairman, Committee on International Relations, Washington,
DC.
Dear Chairman Hyde: I am writing regarding H.R. 282, the
``Iran Freedom Support Act,'' which the Committee on
International Relations marked up on March 15, 2006.
As per the agreement between our Committees, to be included
in a manager's amendment to H.R. 282, the amended bill would
modify the language in Section 101(a) so that the import
sanctions contained in Executive Order 12959 may remain in
effect under the terms of the Executive Order but would not
be codified by this bill, In addition, Sections 202(a) and
202(b) of the reported bill will remain in the amended
version. These sections would change current law by striking
the statutory option the President currently has to ban
imports against both Iran and Libya.
Because all of these provisions have the effect of
modifying and altering the application of an import ban, they
fall within the jurisdiction of the Committee on Ways and
Means. However, in order to expedite this legislation for
floor consideration, the Committee will forgo action on this
bill. This is being done with the understanding that it does
not in any way prejudice the Committee with respect to the
appointment of conferees or its jurisdictional prerogatives
on this or similar legislation.
I would appreciate your response to this letter, confinning
this understanding with respect to H.R. 282, and would ask
that a copy of our exchange of letters on this matter be
included in your Committee report.
Best regards,
Bill Thomas,
Chairman.
____

House of Representatives, Committee on International
Relations,
Washington, DC, April 7, 2006.
Hon. William M. Thomas,
Chairman, Committee on Ways and Means, House of
Representatives, Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: I am writing regarding H.R. 282, the
``Iran Freedom Support Act,'' which the Committee on
International Relations marked up on March 15, 2006.
As per the agreement between our Committees, I will include
in the manager's amendment to H.R. 282 language which would
modify the text in Section 101(a) so that the import
sanctions contained in Executive Order 12959 may remain in
effect under the terms of the Executive Order but would not
be codified by this bill. In addition, Sections 202(a) and
202(b) of the reported bill will remain in the amended
version. These sections would change current law by striking
the statutory option the President currently has to ban
imports against both Iran and Libya.
I concur that these provisions have the effect of modifying
and altering the application of an import ban and, therefore,
they fall within the jurisdiction of the Committee on Ways
and Means. I appreciate your willingness to assist in
expediting this legislation by foregoing action on this bill.
This is being done with the understanding that it does not in
any way prejudice the Committee on Ways and Means with
respect to the appointment of conferees or its jurisdictional
prerogatives on this or similar legislation.
As you requested, I will be pleased to include a copy of
this exchange of letters in the Committee Report on H.R. 282
and in the Congressional Record during the consideration of
this bill. If you have any questions regarding this matter,
please do not hesitate to call me. I thank you for your
consideration.
Sincerely,
Henry J. Hyde,
Chairman.
____

House of Representatives,

Committee on Financial Services,

Washington, DC, April 7, 2006.
Hon. Henry J. Hyde,
Chairman, Committee on International Relations, House of
Representatives, Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: I am writing to confirm our mutual
understanding with respect to the consideration of H.R. 282,
the Iran Freedom Support Act. This bill was ordered reported
by the Committee on International Relations on March 15,
2006. Section 206, ``United States pension plans'', and
section 207, ``Report by Office of Global Security Risks'',
of the bill as ordered reported by your committee are within
the jurisdiction of the Committee on Financial Services under
clause l(g) of rule X of the Rules of the House of
Representatives.
Ordinarily, the Committee on Financial Services would be
entitled to receive a sequential referral of the bill.
However, I thank you for your agreement to support in moving
this important legislation forward the removal of section
206(e) and section 207 from the bill and to modify section
206(b) by inserting the Secretary of State in lieu of the
President. Given the importance and timeliness of the Iran
Freedom Support Act, and your willingness to work with us
regarding these issues, I will not seek a sequential referral
of this legislation. However, I do so only with the
understanding that this procedural route should not be
construed to prejudice the jurisdictional interest of the
Committee on Financial Services on these provisions or any
other similar legislation and will not be considered as
precedent for consideration of matters of jurisdictional
interest to my committee in the future. Furthermore, should
these or similar provisions be considered in a conference
with the Senate, I would expect members of the Committee on
Financial Services be appointed to the conference committee
on these provisions.
Finally, I would ask that you include a copy of our
exchange of letters in the Committee Report on H.R. 282 and
in the Congressional Record during the consideration of this
bill. If you have any questions regarding this matter, please
do not hesitate to call me. I thank you for your
consideration.
Sincerely,
Michael G. Oxley,
Chairman.
____

House of Representatives, Committee on International
Relations,
Washington, DC, April 7, 2006.
Hon. Michael G. Oxley,
Chairman, Committee on Financial Services, House of
Representatives, Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: Thank you for your letter concerning
H.R. 282, the Iran Freedom Support Act. I concur that the
bill, as ordered reported by the Committee on International
Relations on March 15, 2006, contains language which falls
within the Rule X jurisdiction of the Committee on Financial
Services. Specifically, Section 206, ``United States Pension
Plans,'' and Section 207, ``Report by Office of Global
Security Risks,'' of the bill are within your Committee's
jurisdiction.
Our two committees have reached agreement that, in the
interest of moving this important legislation forward, the
text of the bill which we will place in the manager's
amendment will remove Section 206(e) and Section 207 from the
bill and will modify Section 206(b) by inserting the
``Secretary of State'' in lieu of ``the President.'' Given
the importance and timeliness of the Iran Freedom Support
Act, I appreciate your willingness to work with us regarding
these issues and to forego sequential referral of this
legislation. I understand that by doing so, it should not be
construed to prejudice the jurisdictional interest of the
Committee on Financial Services on these provisions or any
other similar legislation and will not be considered as
precedent for consideration of matters of jurisdictional
interest to your Committee in the future. Furthermore, should
these or similar provisions be considered in a conference
with the Senate, I will request the Speaker to name members
of the Committee on Financial Services to the conference
committee.
As you requested, I will be pleased to include a copy of
this exchange of letters in the Committee Report on H.R. 282
and in the Congressional Record during the consideration of
this bill. If you have any questions regarding this matter,
please do not hesitate

[[Page H1772]]

to call me. I thank you for your consideration.
Sincerely,
Henry J. Hyde,
Chairman.
____

House of Representatives, Committee on Education and the
Workforce,
Washington, DC, April 6, 2006.
Hon. Henry J. Hyde,
Committee on International Relations, House of
Representatives, Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman, I am writing to confirm our mutual
understanding with respect to the consideration of H.R. 282,
the Iran Freedom Support Act. Section 206, United States
Pension Plans, of the bill as ordered reported by your
committee is within the jurisdiction of the Committee on
Education and Workforce--specifically, section 206 (e), which
requires certain disclosures by managers of private pension
plans. In addition, the Senses of Congress contained in
sections 206 (c) and (d) urge private pension plan managers
to take certain actions and are also within the jurisdiction
of the Committee on Education and the Workforce.
I thank you for your agreement to support the removal of
section 206 (e) from the bill and to modify sections 206 ( c)
and (d) with the addition of language recognizing the
fiduciary duties of pension plan managers, as you work to
move this important legislation forward. Given the importance
and timeliness of the Iran Freedom Support Act, and your
willingness to work with us regarding pension issues, I will
not seek a sequential referral of this legislation. However,
I do so only with the understanding that this procedural
route should not be construed to prejudice the Committee on
Education and the Workforce's jurisdictional interest and
prerogatives on these provisions or any other similar
legislation and will not be considered as precedent for
consideration of matters of jurisdictional interest to my
committee in the future. Furthermore, should these or similar
provisions be considered in a conference with the Senate, I
would expect members of the Committee on Education and the
Workforce be appointed to the conference committee on these
provisions.
Finally, I would ask that you include a copy of our
exchange of letters in the Committee Report on H.R. 282 and
in the Congressional Record during the consideration of this
bill. If you have any questions regarding this matter, please
do not hesitate to call me. I thank you for your
consideration.
Sincerely,
Howard P. ``Buck'' McKeon,
Chairman.
____

House of Representatives, Committee on International
Relations,
Washington, DC, April 6, 2006.
Hon. Howard P. ``Buck'' McKeon,
Chairman, Committee on Education and the Workforce, House of
Representatives, Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: Thank you for your letter concerning
H.R. 282, the Iran Freedom Support Act. I concur with your
assessment that Section 206 of the bill, as ordered reported
by the Committee on International Relations, which deals with
United States Pension Plans, falls within the Rule X
jurisdiction of the Committee on Education and Workforce--
specifically Section 206(e), which requires certain
disclosures by managers of private pension plans. In
addition, the Senses of Congress contained in Sections 206
(c) and (d), urging private pension plan managers to take
certain actions, are also within the jurisdiction of your
Committee.
I thank you for your agreement to support moving this
important legislation forward. Based on our discussions, this
Committee will remove Section 206(e) from the bill, modify
Sections 206 (c) and (d), and add language recognizing the
fiduciary duties of pension plan managers. I appreciate your
willingness to forgo seeking a sequential referral of this
legislation. I understand your willingness to do so does not
in any way prejudice the Committee on Education and the
Workforce's jurisdictional interest and prerogatives on these
provisions or any other similar legislation and will not be
considered as precedent for consideration of matters of
jurisdictional interest to your Committee in the future.
Should these or similar provisions be considered in a
conference with the Senate, I will urge the Speaker to
appoint members of the Committee on Education and the
Workforce to the conference committee.
As you requested, I will include a copy of our exchange of
letters in the Committee Report on H.R. 282 and in the
Congressional Record during the consideration of this bill.
Sincerely,
Henry J. Hyde,
Chairman.

Mr. CARDIN. Madam Speaker, I rise in strong support of H.R. 282, the
Iran Freedom Support Act. This bill strengthens U.S. sanctions on Iran,
and requires that they remain in place until Iran has dismantled its
chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons programs.
Iran is actively seeking weapons of mass destruction, which poses a
threat to the national security of the United States and to the world.
Iran has repeatedly violated its obligations to the international
community, specifically the 1973 Safeguards Agreement with the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). In 2002 the world learned
that Iran was illegally continuing to develop a secret nuclear program,
which has led to years of negotiations with the international
community. Last August, however, the Iranian government resumed its
conversion of uranium. In February the IAEA voted 27 to 3 to report
Iran to the United Nations Security Council for further action. In
March the U.N. Security Council directed Iran to its nuclear
activities. Iran defied the United Nations, and made an announcement
that it had enriched uranium to reactor-grade levels, which is a
precursor to the development of a nuclear bomb. This week the U.N.
Security Council is meeting to evaluate Iran's behavior, and I urge the
Security Council to use all the tools at its disposal to pressure Iran
to meet its commitments to the IAEA.
I am pleased that the legislation today establishes mandatory
sanctions for contributions to development of weapons, limits the
President's flexibility to waive sanctions, authorizes funding to
promote democracy activities in Iran, and supports efforts to
strengthen the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. Finally, this bill
eliminates the sunset of sanctions against Iran, and requires them to
remain in place until the President certifies that Iran has dismantled
its WMD programs.
I am pleased that the United States has continued to work closely
with the international community--including the European Union, Russia,
and China--on this urgent matter. I urge the President to keep Congress
fully and current informed on this matter, as called for in this
resolution. I urge the international community to impose economic
sanctions designed to deny Iran the ability to develop nuclear weapons.
We cannot allow a rogue nation such as Iran to obtain nuclear
weapons. Iran has actively supported terrorist groups, such as
Hezbollah in Lebanon and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. Iran has funded
suicide bombers in Israel and militant organizations elsewhere. Many of
these terrorist groups are seeking weapons of mass destruction (WMD) so
that they can kill or injure thousands or even millions of people. The
Iranian President has publicly expressed his hope for a world without
America, his desire to wipe Israel off the map, and has denied the
existence of the Holocaust.
Ms. LEE. Madam Speaker, although not a perfect bill, I plan to
support H.R. 282 based on several important decisions I authored and
that were included in the committee-passed bill. First, and most
importantly, this bill includes my language explicitly stating that
this bill in no way constitutes an authorization to use military force
against Iran. Additionally, it includes my provision clarifying that
none of the funds authorized for democracy promotion should be used to
fund destabilizing activities against Iran. Moreover, in the report
accompanying this legislation, I was able to include language aimed at
ensuring that none of the funds authorized in this legislation are
channeled to democracy promotion organizations that may in turn
bankroll covert action against Iran.
My vote today in no way detracts from my vigilance regarding this
administration and its reported interest in another preemptive strike--
this time against Iran. I have and will continue to strongly oppose the
so-called doctrine of preemption and believe we must engage Iran in
smart and tough diplomacy regarding its nuclear programs.
Mr. FARR. Madam Speaker, I am very concerned about Iran's nuclear
power program. I am extremely opposed to any attempts by the
Administration to preemptively strike Iran. We must work multilaterally
to bring Iran back to the negotiation table and into compliance with
the Nonproliferation Treaty.
While the government of Iran continues to defy international pressure
to conform to the NPT, unilateral military action against Iran is not
the solution. The repercussions and unintended consequences of a U.S.
military attack on Iran are terrifying to contemplate. I personally do
not believe that a military strike on Iran would advance U.S. or
regional security. I am afraid it could create a backlash against the
U.S. that would be a more serious threat than a nuclear Iran. Congress
has the constitutional responsibility to debate the commitment of
troops or military action, and the obligation to the American people to
have an up or down vote before the Administration takes any steps
towards military engagement.
The solution to the Iranian problem lies in diplomacy. The
Administration needs to work with other members of the U.N. Security
Council and gain a strong coalition of support for a diplomatic
solution. I urge my colleagues to join me in calling on the
Administration to find peaceful means of ensuring Iran's compliance
with the NPT.
Mr. HOLT. Madam Speaker, I rise today in strong support of Iran
Freedom Support Act, H.R. 282. I am a cosponsor of this important
legislation because I remain deeply troubled by the current regime and
situation in Iran.
It is long past time for the House to address the security challenge
posed to the world community and our allies in the Middle East by the
current regime in Iran. The hateful and threatening comments made by
the President of Iran against Israel cannot be tolerated. Further, the
provocative actions taken by Iran to

[[Page H1773]]

further their nuclear weapons program must be stopped. A nuclear Iran
would destabilize the region and threaten the United States and our
allies. We must use every tool at our disposal today to end Iran's
nuclear ambitions. Iran must change its way.
This important legislation would codify bilateral U.S. sanctions
against Iran and strengthens third-party sanctions through amendments
to the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act. H.R. 282 would make the removal of
these sanctions contingent upon a Presidential certification that Iran
no longer poses a threat to the national security of the United States,
its interests, or allies. It would also require the Administration to
report to Congress on countries cooperating (or not) with U.S. efforts
to forge a multilateral Iran sanctions regime. The bill would also
provide U.S. assistance to pro-democracy groups in Iran and to
independent broadcasts into Iran from abroad.
I was troubled when I read the recent reports about the
Administration seriously considering a nuclear attack on Iran. While I
strongly oppose Iran's efforts to create a nuclear weapons program, it
would be unconscionable to use nuclear weapons in an attempt to
eliminate their program. The President must reassure the world that
America remains a responsible world power. He must state unambiguously
that the United States will never use nuclear weapons in a first strike
against Iran or any other sovereign nation.
H.R. 282 is in keeping with United States priorities to address the
multiple threats posed by the Iranian regime, as well as with our goal
to bring peace and stability the people of the Middle East. I support
this important legislation.
Mr. BLUMENAUER. Madam Speaker, I would like to include the following
article, which I referenced on the floor, in the Record of the debate
on H.R. 282, the ``Iran Freedom Support Act.''

[From the Asia Times, March 30, 2006]

Neo-Con Cabal Blocked 2003 Nuclear Talks

(By Gareth Porter)

Washington.--The George W. Bush administration failed to
enter into negotiations with Iran on its nuclear program in
May 2003 because neo-conservatives who advocated
destabilization and regime change were able to block any
serious diplomatic engagement with Tehran, according to
former administration officials.
The same neo-conservative veto power also prevented the
administration from adopting any official policy statement on
Iran, those same officials said.
Lawrence Wilkerson, then chief of staff to secretary of
state Colin Powell, said the failure to adopt a formal Iran
policy in 2002-03 was the result of obstruction by a ``secret
cabal'' of neo-conservatives in the administration, led by
Vice President Dick Cheney.
``The secret cabal got what it wanted: no negotiations with
Tehran,'' Wilkerson wrote in an e-mail to Inter Press Service
(IPS). The Iranian negotiating offer, transmitted to the
State Department in early May 2003 by the Swiss ambassador in
Tehran, acknowledged that Iran would have to address U.S.
concerns about its nuclear program, although it made no
specific concession in advance of the talks, according to
Flynt Leverett, then the National Security Council's senior
director for Middle East Affairs.
Iran's offer also raised the possibility of cutting off
Iran's support for Hamas and Islamic Jihad and converting
Hezbollah into a purely socio-political organization,
according to Leverett. That was an explicit response to
Powell's demand in late March that Iran ``end its support for
terrorism''.
In return, Leverett recalls, the Iranians wanted the U.S.
to address security questions, the lifting of economic
sanctions and normalization of relations, including support
for Iran's integration into the global economic order.
Leverett also recalls that the Iranian offer was drafted
with the blessing of all the major political players in the
Iranian regime, including Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali
Khomeini.
Realists, led by Powell and his deputy, Richard Armitage,
were inclined to respond positively to the Iranian offer.
Nevertheless, within a few days of its receipt, the State
Department had rebuked the Swiss ambassador for having passed
on the offer.
Exactly how the decision was made is not known. ``As with
many of these issues of national security decision-making,
there are no fingerprints,'' Wilkerson told IPS. ``But I
would guess Dick Cheney with the blessing of George W.
Bush.''
As Wilkerson observes, however, the mysterious death of
what became known among Iran specialists as Iran's ``grand
bargain'' initiative was a result of the administration's
inability to agree on a policy toward Tehran.
A draft National Security Policy Directive (NSPD) on Iran
calling for diplomatic engagement had been in the process of
interagency coordination for more than a year, according to a
source who asked to remain unidentified.
But it was impossible to get formal agreement on the NSPD,
the source recalled, because officials in Cheney's office and
in under secretary of defense for policy Douglas Feith's
Office of Special Plans wanted a policy of regime change and
kept trying to amend it.
Opponents of the neo-conservative policy line blame
Condoleezza Rice, then the national security adviser, for the
failure of the administration to override the extremists in
the administration. The statutory policymaker process on
Iran, Wilkerson told IPS in an e-mail, was ``managed by a
national security adviser incapable of standing up to the
cabal . . .''
In the absence of an Iran policy, the two contending camps
struggled in 2003 over a proposal by realists in the
administration to reopen the Geneva channel with Iran that
had been used successfully on Afghanistan in 2001-02. They
believed Iran could be helpful in stabilizing postconflict
Iraq, because the Iraqi Shi'ite militants whom they expected
to return from Iran after Saddam Hussein's overthrow owed
some degree of allegiance to Iran.
The neo-conservatives tried to block those meetings on
tactical policy grounds, according to Leverett. ``They were
saying we didn't want to engage with Iran because we didn't
want to owe them,'' he recalled.
Nevertheless, U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan Zalmay
Khalilzad (now envoy in Iraq) was authorized to begin meeting
secretly in Geneva with Iranian officials to discuss Iraq.
The neo-conservatives then tried to sandbag the talks by
introducing a demand for full information on any high-ranking
al-Oaeda cadres who might be detained by the Iranians.
Iran regarded that information as a bargaining chip to be
given up only for a quid pro quo from Washington. The Bush
administration, however, had adopted a policy in early 2002
of refusing to share any information with Iran on al-Oaeda or
other terrorist organizations.
On May 3,2003, as the Iranian ``grand bargain'' proposal
was on its way to Washington, Tehran's representative in
Geneva, Javad Zarif, offered a compromise on the issue,
according to Leverett: if the U.S. gave Iran the names of the
cadres of the Mujahideen-e Khalq (MEK) who were being held by
U.S. forces in Iraq, Iran would give the U.S. the names of
the al-Oaeda operatives they had detained.
The MEK had carried out armed attacks against Iran from
Iraqi territory during the Hussein regime and had been named
a terrorist organization by the U.S. But it had capitulated
to U.S. forces after the invasion, and the neo-conservatives
now saw the MEK as a potential asset in an effort to
destabilize the Iranian regime.
The MEK had already become a key element in the alternative
draft NSPD drawn up by neo-conservatives in the
administration.
The indictment of Iran analyst Larry Franklin on Feith's
staff last year revealed that, by February 2003, Franklin had
begun sharing a draft NSPD that he knew would be to the
liking of the Israeli Embassy.
(Franklin eventually pleaded guilty to passing classified
information to two employees of an influential pro-Israel
lobbying group and was sentenced to 12 and a half years in
prison.)
Reflecting the substance of that draft policy, ABC News
reported on May 30, 2003, that the Pentagon was calling for
the destabilization of the Iranian government by ``using all
available points of pressure on the Iranian regime, including
backing armed Iranian dissidents and employing the services
of the Mujahideen-e Khalq . . .''
Nevertheless, Bush apparently initially saw nothing wrong
with trading information on MEK, despite arguments that MEK
should not be repatriated to Iran. ``I have it on good
authority,'' Leverett told IPS, ``that Bush's initial
reaction was, `But we say there is no such thing as a good
terrorist.' '' Nevertheless, Bush finally rejected the
Iranian proposal.
By the end of May, the neo-conservatives had succeeded in
closing down the Geneva channel for good. They had hoped to
push through their own NSPD on Iran, but according to the
Franklin indictment, Franklin told an Israeli Embassy officer
in October that work on the NSPD had been stopped.
But the damage had been done. With no direct diplomatic
contact between Iran and the U.S., the neo-conservatives had
a clear path to raising tensions and building political
support for regarding Iran as the primary enemy of the United
States.
Ms. SCHWARTZ of Pennsylvania. Madam Speaker, I rise in strong support
of the Iran Freedom Support Act.
Iran's continued pursuit of nuclear weapons, support for
international terrorist organizations, and abhorrent human rights
practices pose one of the greatest threats to global security.
Further, the Iranian government has made clear its intentions toward
the United States. Six months ago, Iranian President Mahmoud
Ahmadinejad stated that a world without the United States is a
``possible goal and slogan''. This is not a veiled threat and we must
take him seriously.
Our greatest responsibility is the safety and security of the
American people. As such, we must employ every option at our disposal
to ensure that Mr. Ahmadinejad's stated goals remain unattainable.
The Iran Freedom Support Act takes a responsible and sensible
approach--tightening and codifying economic sanctions against the
Iranian regime. It will hinder Iran's ability to acquire nuclear
weapons and fund terrorist groups and it will send a clear signal to
the

[[Page H1774]]

Iranian regime that it will be held accountable for its threatening
behavior.
The United States must also continue to push the United Nations
Security Council for strong action to thwart Iran's nuclear ambitions.
In the meantime, it is our job to take meaningful steps to eliminate
the threats posed by Iran. And that is why I urge my colleagues to
support this bill.
Miss. McMORRIS. Madam Speaker, I rise today in support of H.R. 282,
the Iran Freedom Support Act. I applaud this bi-partisan effort by
Congress to address the increasing threat posed to our country and
world by Iran.
Many defense experts have predicted that we face no greater threat
from a single country than from Iran. Iran's leaders, including Iranian
President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, have continuously called for the
destruction of Israel, rejected overtures from the world community,
including the United Nations, supported international terrorism, and
continued to advance their nuclear program with the announcement on
April 11 that Iran had successfully enriched fuel-grade uranium.
All of these actions are unacceptable. We would be remiss to ignore a
country that perilously threatens our allies and the security of the
world while simultaneously seeking to advance its unsupervised nuclear
capabilities. We must not allow Iran to bully the world or our allies
or fail to show Iran that we will take their irresponsible and careless
behavior seriously.
H.R. 282 will help support democracy while taking a firm stance
against the radical and reckless leaders of Iran and those that would
support them. At this time, supporting democracy in Iran is an
important ingredient to resolving this situation peacefully. One of my
top priorities in Congress is to ensure our national security, and I
support H.R. 282 as an important step in combating the rising risk of
Iran.
Mr. DeFAZIO. Madam Speaker, I rise today in reluctant opposition to
H.R. 282, the Iran sanction bill. If this bill was only about imposing
targeted sanctions against the Iranian regime, or companies and
countries who invest in Iran, I could support it. In fact, I voted in
favor of the original Iran sanctions bill when it was approved in 1996,
and I voted to extend the bill when it came up for renewal in 2001.
Unfortunately, the bill on the floor today does not just extend or
expand sanctions against Iran and those doing business with that
country; it also establishes a U.S. policy in favor of regime change in
Iran. Therefore, I am extremely concerned that H.R. 282 is the first
step in taking our country down the same misguided path that was taken
with Iraq. The Iranian exile groups that would likely benefit from the
provisions in this bill to support groups seeking regime change in Iran
eerily echo Ahmad Chalabi's Iraqi National Congress. You may recall
that Chalabi's INC worked with the Bush administration to mislead
Congress and the American people about Iraq's supposed weapons of mass
destruction in order to gain support for toppling Saddam Hussein using
U.S. forces.
It is my hope that as this bill continues through the legislative
process, it will be amended to focus on sanctions and diplomacy rather
than U.S. sponsored regime change. I believe that sanctions should be
targeted at foreign investment in Iran, which would force Iranian
leaders to choose between a growing economy and their desire for
nuclear weapons. Sanctions could also be targeted at Iran's leaders by
freezing their assets and imposing travel bans. Targeted sanctions can
ratchet up the pressure on Iran's leaders without harming or alienating
the Iranian people.
Mr. SHAYS. Madam Speaker, when Iran will have a nuclear weapon is not
the right question. Rather, we need to focus on when Iran will have the
indigenous capability to produce nuclear fissile materials. This is the
point of no return and should be our benchmark regarding the urgency of
addressing Iran's behavior.
It is an undisputed fact Iran is pursuing nuclear capabilities. It is
a fact Iran is the world's must egregious exporter of terrorism. And we
all heard for ourselves when Iran's president threatened to ``wipe
Israel off the map'' and when Ayatollah Khamenei, just yesterday, told
another one of the world's worst human rights abusers, Sudan, that Iran
would gladly transfer nuclear technology. When one considers these
points together, it becomes clear how important it is we act today.
Some residents of Connecticut's Fourth Congressional district have
already expressed concern to me about the United States' consideration
of the use of force against Iran to eliminate its nuclear weapons
program and end its state support of terrorism. Such action, while not
off the table, must be an absolute last resort. That is why it is so
critical our government utilize the tools at our disposal including
economic and diplomatic sanctions and the appropriate distribution of
foreign aid as suggested in this bill, to deter the threat Iran poses
to global security. It is also appropriate for us impose pressure on
the other nations of the world who prop up the Iranian government and
the extremists at its helm by investing heavily in that nation.
While I understand the concern the Administration has expressed that
by passing this bill we are tying its hands to conduct foreign policy,
I would be more sympathetic if it were doing more to enforce the laws
Congress has already passed.
The International Relations Committee states in the report
accompanying this legislation that, ``the laws which have been enacted,
as enforced, and other steps taken by current and past Administrations,
have proven inadequate . . . Specifically with respect to ILSA, the
Committee is deeply dismayed that the current Administration, like the
prior Administration, has not acted to sanction a single enterprise for
investing in Iran, but has delayed its decisions on `alleged'
investments well past the point of failing the `laugh test.' ''
Given the extreme rhetoric of Iranian President Ahmadinejad, I do not
expect this legislation will bring an immediate change to Iran's
aggressive and ill-advised march to acquire nuclear capabilities. It
does send an important message, however, that the United States will
not stand by as Iran pursues its nuclear ambitions and threatens
international security.
The bottom line is, in defiance of its assurances to the contrary,
Iran remains committed to a nuclear weapons program. The United States
must be unequivocal in its rejection of these ambitions.
I urge support of this legislation and appreciate the leadership of
Chairman Hyde and Ranking Member Lantos to bring it to the floor today.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion offered by the
gentleman from Indiana (Mr. Pence) that the House suspend the rules and
pass the bill, H.R. 282, as amended.
The question was taken.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. In the opinion of the Chair, two-thirds of
those present have voted in the affirmative.
Mr. PENCE. Madam Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.
The yeas and nays were ordered.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 8 of rule XX and the
Chair's prior announcement, further proceedings on this question will
be postponed.

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