[Congressional Record Volume 152, Number 46 (Tuesday, April 25, 2006)]
[Senate]
[Pages S3513-S3514]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

      By Mr. LEVIN (for himself, Ms. Collins, and Mr. Reed):
  S.J. Res. 34. A joint resolution expressing United States policy on 
Iraq; to the Committee on Foreign Relations.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of 
the

[[Page S3514]]

joint resolution be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the text of the joint resolution was 
ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

                              S.J. Res. 34

       Whereas there has been a strong consensus among the senior 
     United States military commanders that a broad-based 
     political settlement involving the three main Iraqi groups is 
     essential for defeating the insurgency;
       Whereas the two parts of that political settlement are (1) 
     agreement on a national unity government that serves the 
     interests of all Iraqis, and (2) compromises to amend the 
     Iraq Constitution to make it an inclusive document;
       Whereas such a two-part political settlement is also 
     essential to prevent all-out civil war and is a critical 
     element of our exit strategy for United States military 
     forces in Iraq;
       Whereas the Iraqi Council of Representatives' approval on 
     April 22, 2006, of the Presidency Council consisting of Jalal 
     Talabani as President and two Vice Presidents, and the 
     election of a Speaker and two Deputy Speakers is a 
     significant step, as is the decision by the Iraqi political 
     leadership to select Jawad al-Maliki as the Prime Minister 
     designate;
       Whereas the Council of Representatives still needs to 
     consider the nomination of Jawad al-Maliki and his still-to-
     be-chosen Cabinet, including an Interior Minister and a 
     Defense Minister, and still needs to form a committee to 
     recommend changes to the Iraq Constitution;
       Whereas under the Iraq Constitution, Prime Minister 
     designate Jawad al-Maliki has 30 days from April 22, 2006, to 
     choose and present a Cabinet to the Council of 
     Representatives for its approval;
       Whereas under the Iraq Constitution, the Council of 
     Representatives, at the start of its functioning, is required 
     to appoint a committee from its members which will have four 
     months to present recommendations to the Council for 
     necessary amendments to the Iraq Constitution;
       Whereas while the three main Iraqi groups have differing 
     views about the duration of the presence in Iraq of the 
     United States-led Coalition forces, none of them favor the 
     immediate withdrawal of United States military forces from 
     Iraq;
       Whereas section 1227 of the National Defense Authorization 
     Act for Fiscal Year 2006 (Public Law 109--163; 119 Stat. 
     3465; 50 U.S.C. 1541 note) provides in part that ``[t]he 
     Administration should tell the leaders of all groups and 
     political parties in Iraq that they need to make the 
     compromises necessary to achieve the broad-based and 
     sustainable political settlement that is essential for 
     defeating the insurgency in Iraq, within the timetable they 
     set for themselves'';
       Whereas the United States Ambassador to Iraq, Zalmay 
     Khalilzad, has done an exceptional job in working with Iraqi 
     political, religious, and tribal leaders in an effort to 
     achieve consensus on the prompt formation of a national unity 
     government; and
       Whereas the American public has become increasingly and 
     understandably impatient with the failure of the Iraqis to 
     form a national unity government: Now, therefore, be it
       Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
     United States of America in Congress assembled, That it is 
     the sense of Congress that the Iraqi political, religious, 
     and tribal leaders should be told by the Administration 
     that--
       (1) the continued presence of United States military forces 
     in Iraq is not unconditional;
       (2) whether the Iraqis avoid all-out civil war and have a 
     future as a nation is in their hands;
       (3) the Iraqis need to seize that opportunity and only they 
     can be responsible for their own future; and
       (4) completing the formation of a government of national 
     unity and subsequent agreement to modifications to the Iraq 
     Constitution to make it more inclusive, within the deadlines 
     the Iraqis have set for themselves in the Iraq Constitution, 
     is--
       (A) essential to defeating the insurgency and avoiding all-
     out civil war; and
       (B) a condition of the continued presence of United States 
     military forces in Iraq.

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