[Congressional Record Volume 152, Number 46 (Tuesday, April 25, 2006)]
[House]
[Pages H1710-H1711]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                         THE SITUATION IN IRAQ

  Mr. LEACH. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to address the House 
for 5 minutes and to revise and extend my remarks.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentleman from Iowa?
  There was no objection.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the 
gentleman from Iowa (Mr. Leach) is recognized for 5 minutes.
  Mr. LEACH. Mr. Speaker, with mounting sectarian tensions and unabated 
insurgent violence, I rise today to discuss the deeply troubling 
situation in Iraq and its implications for the national interests of 
the United States.
  Sometimes it is harder to know how to end a war than to start one. 
Just as it is important to think through the ``why'' of committing 
troops to a conflict, we must also think through the ``why'' of ending 
an engagement. Timing is a key element of both considerations.
  Perspective is always difficult to bring to bear on events of the 
day. Developments of this week, however, could provide Washington with 
a seminal opportunity to stimulate a rethinking about the philosophical 
basis for a war that we initiated, with the goal of assessing how a 
great power can and should disengage.
  Many people have noted analogies between America's involvement in 
Vietnam and the U.S. intervention in Iraq. My sense is that a number of 
these analogies are quite frail. But the one I am most concerned about 
relates to America's extraordinary difficulty in disengaging from 
Vietnam.
  A key problem for Washington in trying to wind down its commitment in 
Vietnam was how to develop a mutual accommodation with the other side 
that would lessen the prideful pitfalls that often occur when political 
figures are forced to reassess policies. In the end it was the Paris 
Peace Accord which facilitated the withdrawal of American troops.
  A negotiating avenue in a third-country capital does not appear to 
lend itself to a resolution of the Iraqi situation at this time. 
Nonetheless, I find it remarkable that in an autobiographical tome 
Henry Kissinger wrote that in December 1968, shortly after Richard 
Nixon had asked him to be his National Security Council Director, he 
met with the President-elect to discuss the direction of the new 
administration's foreign policy. They determined together, he noted, 
that their policy would be to get out of Vietnam.
  After reading this passage I asked him years later at a Library of 
Congress symposium why they did not just proceed to do that. Kissinger 
looked at me for a moment and then uttered words I will never forget. 
``Young man,'' he said, ``we meant with honor.''
  I then asked him if honor required escalation. ``Absolutely,'' he 
responded.
  In the Iraq circumstance, the executive branch has provided three 
broad rationales for American intervention. First, it hinted that there 
was an Iraqi connection to the attacks on 9/11. Then

[[Page H1711]]

it suggested that America and the world faced an imminent threat from 
Iraqi weapons of mass destruction. When these two justifications for 
the U.S.-led invasion turned out to be without foundation, the 
administration fell back on the goal of spreading democracy in Iraq and 
the broader Middle East as the basis for ongoing U.S. engagement.
  From an American perspective, the case for extending the reach of 
democracy abroad always has a ring of validity, although many have 
concluded that imposing democracy from the outside is not a proven or 
necessarily compelling art form. Intriguingly, however, it would appear 
that today in Iraq democracy building provides a credible rationale for 
American disengagement even though it was a secondary and possibly 
flawed basis for original intervention.
  In the aftermath of elections held 3 months ago, the Iraqis have 
finally formed a government which will have under its jurisdiction, 
although perhaps not complete control, a newly formed Army and a 
fledgling police apparatus. Based on three elements, credible national 
elections, a new government and a new infrastructure of security, the 
U.S. is positioned to begin and, almost as consequently, to announce a 
steady process of disengagement.
  In the middle of the Vietnam War, Senator Aiken proposed that we 
simply declare victory and get out. This may have been good politics 
then, but there is no basis for suggesting victory was at hand. 
Ironically, the formation of a new government today may provide the 
most promising claim of some success in Iraq. Not to take advantage of 
the circumstance could be a lost opportunity. This may indeed be the 
last timely movement for decisive decisionmaking.
  Lyndon Johnson knew his Vietnam policy was failing, but he chose to 
pass it on to a successor who proceeded to escalate an already 
escalated conflict. To the degree there is relevance to Presidential 
precedent, it would seem far wiser for this administration to set the 
conditions and proceed with withdrawal rather than leave such a 
decision to a future President.
  The reason a democracy-based framework for disengagement needs to be 
articulated is that it allows the United States to set forth a basis 
for ending the occupation that is on our terms and on our timetable. If 
we don't develop and announce a plan and a rationale for disengagement, 
we could at some point find ourselves withdrawing with the other side 
claiming it forced us out through destructive anarchy, i.e., insurgent 
attacks and suicide bombings, or through the insistence of the elected 
government in Baghdad.
  Democracy implies consent of the governed and when a large percentage 
of the Iraqi people want us to leave, as opinion polls indicate is the 
case today, the U.S. should be hard-pressed to follow the original neo-
con strategy of establishing and maintaining a semi-permanent military 
base in the country.
  Here a note about the Crusades is relevant. While Americans use the 
word loosely and conjure up quaint cartoon images King Arthur and his 
knights, citizens of the Muslim world consider the Crusades living 
history, and it is no accident that Osama bin Laden refers to us as 
crusaders. For al Qaeda, the pushing out of U.S. forces would be an 
extension of the Crusades, an act of multi-century consequences. That 
is why it is so important to apply reason and public reasoning to the 
disengagement process.
  This war has precipitated a great loss of confidence in and respect 
for the United States around the world. Quite possibly Iraq will be a 
better country because of America's intervention. But if we hang around 
too long, the Iraqi government and our government may suffer 
consequences even more negative than has so far been evidenced. Indeed, 
with each passing day of occupation, it appears our presence is 
increasingly inspiring more instability than stability.

  It is true that precipitous withdrawal might be counterproductive and 
that precise timetables have disadvantages. But it is difficult for me 
to believe anything other than the declaration of a credible plan and 
reason for disengagement, coupled with a steady drawdown policy, is the 
wisest course of action today.
  In a novel development, Congress has required the establishment of an 
``Iraq Study Group,'' under the aegis of the U.S. Institute for Peace, 
to be chaired by former Secretary of State James Baker and former 
Representative Lee Hamilton. At the risk of presumption, I would hope 
the perspective outlined above will be one of the approaches it and the 
Administration review. There are risks in too abrupt a departure; but a 
prolonged occupation leads too easily to the kind of retributive 
civilization clash that misserves America as well as peoples of the 
region.

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