[Congressional Record Volume 152, Number 36 (Tuesday, March 28, 2006)]
[Senate]
[Pages S2441-S2461]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




   LEGISLATIVE TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY ACT OF 2006--Continued


                           Amendment No. 3176

  Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, would the Presiding Officer review the 
time agreement that we are about to embark on for consideration of the 
Collins-Lieberman-McCain amendment?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. There is 2 hours evenly divided between the 
Senator from Maine and the Presiding Officer.
  Ms. COLLINS. Thank you, Mr. President. I was aware that was the case, 
but I thought it would be helpful to our colleagues to better 
understand the state of play.
  Mr. President, I made some preliminary comments this morning. I do 
want to explain further the concept of the Office of Public Integrity, 
but I know the Senator from Illinois had asked that I yield to him some 
time. In the interests of accommodating his schedule, I yield 10 
minutes to the Senator from Illinois to speak in support of the 
amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Illinois.
  Mr. OBAMA. Mr. President, I thank Senator Collins, not only for her 
accommodation but also for her leadership on this issue. I also thank 
Senator Lieberman for his outstanding work on this issue.
  I rise today to speak about the importance of improving the ethics 
enforcement process that we currently

[[Page S2442]]

have. Last month I introduced legislation to create an outside 
congressional ethics enforcement commission that would be staffed by 
former judges and former Members of Congress from both parties. Under 
my proposal, any citizen could report a possible ethics violation by 
lawmakers, staff, or lobbyists. My commission would have had the 
authority to conduct investigations, issue subpoenas, gather records, 
call witnesses, and provide its full public report to the Department of 
Justice or the House-Senate ethics committees.
  I knew this proposal would not be the most popular one that I 
introduced in Congress, but I didn't anticipate the deafening silence 
that greeted it. Change is difficult and Members of Congress are 
understandably concerned about delegating investigations of their own 
conduct to an outside body, but I hope, when my colleagues learn a 
little more about the amendment I am offering with Senators Collins, 
Lieberman, and McCain, that they will understand an independent ethics 
factfinding body is not only a good idea but a necessary idea.
  Earlier this year, I was asked by the Minority Leader to take a lead 
role in crafting ethics legislation. I was glad to assume that role 
because I believe that the foundation of our democracy is the 
credibility that the American people have in the legitimacy of their 
Government. Unfortunately, over the past few years, that legitimacy has 
been questioned because of the scandals we have here in Washington.
  But one of the greatest travesties of these scandals is not what 
Congress did, but what it didn't do.
  Because for all the noise we have heard from the media about the 
bribes accepted by Congressman Duke Cunningham, the thousands of 
dollars in free meals accepted by other Congressmen, and the ``K Street 
Project'' that filled lobbying firms with former staffers, we have 
heard only silence from the very place that should have caught these 
ethics violations in the first place, the House Ethics Committee.
  For years now, it's been common knowledge that this committee has 
largely failed in its responsibility to investigate and bring to light 
the kind of wrongdoing between Members of Congress and lobbyists that 
we are now seeing splashed across the front pages. And the sad truth is 
that the House ethics process does not inspire public confidence that 
Congress can serve as an effective watchdog over its own Members.
  Time and time again over the past few years, the House Ethics 
Committee has looked the other way in the face of seemingly obvious 
wrongdoing, which has the effect of encouraging more wrongdoing. In 
those few instances when the committee has taken action, its leadership 
was punished, and it ceased to become an effective body. Coupled with a 
Federal Election Commission that was deliberately structured to produce 
deadlock, this has produced a dangerous outcome
  In the words of one outside observer:

       When everyone in Washington knows the agency that is 
     supposed to enforce campaign finance laws is not going to do 
     it and the ethics committees are moribund, you create a 
     situation where there is no sheriff. You end up in the Wild 
     West, and that's the context we've been operating under in 
     recent years.

  Without question, the Senate ethics process is far superior, and I 
commend my colleagues who have served--and continue to serve--
selflessly and tirelessly on the Senate Ethics Committee. Indeed, I 
have the greatest respect for Senator Voinovich and Senator Johnson. 
They have done an outstanding job in a difficult task. They are two of 
the finest people I have had the pleasure to serve with since I arrived 
in the Senate.
  But here's the sad reality. No matter how well our process works here 
in the Senate, it doesn't really matter since the American people 
perceive the entire ethics system--House and Senate--to be broken. Our 
constituents, unfortunately, do not distinguish between the bodies in 
their opinion of Congress. And as long as our credibility is stained by 
the actions--and inactions--of the other body, then the legitimacy of 
what we do is also called into question.
  With all due respect to my colleagues on the Senate Ethics Committee, 
there's some good reason for the American people to be skeptical of our 
enforcement system. After all, we in the Senate are our own judge, 
jury, and prosecutor. Under the current system, Members investigating 
their colleagues are caught in a bind. Either they investigate and 
become vulnerable to the allegation that they are prosecuting a Member 
for political reasons or they do not investigate and it looks like they 
are just covering up for a colleague. That investigation trigger has to 
be depoliticized for the good of Members and the integrity of the 
process.
  And so, we can pass all the ethics reforms we want--gift bans, travel 
bans, lobbying restrictions--but none of them will make a difference if 
there isn't a nonpartisan, independent body that will help us enforce 
those laws.
  That's why I come to the floor today to support this amendment for an 
Office of Public Integrity. The office is the next critical step in the 
evolution of ethics enforcement in the Senate and vital to restoring 
the American people's faith in Congress.
  This amendment doesn't have quite the same level of independence as 
the outside commission that I proposed setting up. But it does have 
much more independence than the current system, and for that reason I 
wholeheartedly endorse it and am proud to be a cosponsor.
  The Office of Public Integrity established in this amendment would 
provide a voice that cannot be silenced by political pressures. It 
would have the power to initiate independent investigations and bring 
its findings to the Ethics Committees in a transparent manner. Final 
authority to act on these findings would remain with the members of the 
Ethics Committees, which would satisfy constitutional concerns.
  Currently, in both the House and the Senate, the initial 
determination of whether to open an investigation has often resulted in 
a game of mutually assured destruction--you don't investigate Members 
of my party, and I won't investigate Members of your party.
  But what's interesting is that while there is often great 
disagreement and sometimes even deadlock in the decision to open an 
investigation, there's usually general agreement on what the final 
judgment and punishment should be. That's because the development of a 
full factual record can convince even the most ardent partisan that a 
Member of his own party should be disciplined.
  In this sense, the OPI proposal is an admirable attempt to reform the 
most troublesome aspect of the current ethics process while still 
retaining what works about it. Under this proposal, Ethics Committee 
members would be relieved of the most difficult part of their duties, 
which will make it easier for members to serve on the Ethics Committees 
and easier for them to carry out their responsibilities.
  Most importantly, it would add much-needed credibility to the outcome 
of the process itself. By having the courage to delegate the 
investigative function to an Office of Public Integrity, the U.S. 
Senate would be sending the message that we have confidence in 
ourselves and our ability to abide by the rules. That would be an 
important signal to send to the American people.
  To put this in some historical context, a similar approach was 
endorsed by a Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress that was 
cochaired by Congressmen Lee Hamilton, a Democrat, and David Dreier, a 
Repulblican, in 1997. Representatives Hamilton and Dreier recommended 
the establishment of an independent body to supplement ethics 
investigations through fact finding. Had that recommendation been 
embraced by the House then, it is possible that the recent House 
scandals could have been averted.
  In the Senate, similar proposals have been suggested over the years 
by Senators Bond, Grassley, and Lott, as well as former Senator Helms. 
And state legislatures in Kentucky, Tennessee, and Florida, among 
others, have established mechanisms to allow for independent input into 
ethics enforcement.
  Today, it's time for the Senate to take the lead, the same way it 
took the lead in creating the first congressional Ethics Committee in 
the 1960s.
  In the end, the true test of ethics reform is not whether we pass a 
set of laws that appeal to a lowest common

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denominator that we can all agree on, it's whether we pass the 
strongest bill with the strongest reforms possible that can truly 
change the way we do business in Washington. That's what the American 
people will be watching for, and that's what we owe them.
  Enforcing the laws we pass is a crucial step toward reaching this 
goal and restoring the public's faith in a government that stands up 
for their interests and respects their values.
  I commend, once again, Senators Collins and Lieberman for their 
outstanding work in the committee. I strongly urge my colleagues to 
support their amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine.
  Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Illinois for his 
support. He has worked very hard on these issues. I appreciate his 
comments.
  Mr. President, I yield to my partner and colleague from Connecticut, 
the ranking member of the Committee on Homeland Security, Senator 
Lieberman, for 15 minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Connecticut.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I thank the chairman of the committee, 
the Senator from Maine, for her leadership generally on this bill and 
to say and it may be repetitious, what a pleasure it is to work with 
her and how proud I am of what our committee has accomplished in a 
thoroughly nonpartisan way under her leadership.
  In that spirit, I am proud to join with Senator Collins as a 
cosponsor of this amendment and also pleased that Senators McCain and 
Obama have joined us as cosponsors of this amendment. Senator McCain 
deserves credit for having led, along with Senator Dorgan, the tough, 
independent investigation of the Abramoff scandal that led to the 
action that I hope Congress will now take to reform our lobbying laws. 
Senator McCain introduced a very strong lobbying reform bill of which I 
am pleased to be the cosponsor.
  Senator Obama has played a very important role in this debate on 
ethics reform, introduced a very strong enforcement proposal of his 
own, and his support of this amendment is very important to Senator 
Collins and me.
  The bottom line is the proposals that are in the Senate now that came 
out of the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs and 
the Rules Committee do represent significant reform of our existing 
lobbying regulations and laws.
  But there is a missing piece. The missing piece is enforcement, 
taking steps to make sure that strong rules will be accompanied by 
strong enforcement. That is exactly what this amendment does.
  When our committee considered this subject; that is, the Committee on 
Homeland Security, Senator Collins and I put down a bipartisan mark 
that would have created an Office of Public Integrity, a bipartisan, 
bicameral Office of Public Integrity, empowered to receive and oversee 
reports filed under the ethics rules in the Lobbyist Disclosure Act.
  The Office of Public Integrity also would have had the authority to 
give advice on compliance with ethics rules, the Lobby Disclosure Act, 
and the investigative violations of the ethics rules.
  We were very anxious to respond to concerns that somehow this 
independent Office of Public Integrity would become, as someone said, a 
rogue entity or violate the Constitution's mandate that each House of 
Congress determine its own rules and sanction its own Members when the 
facts justify that, so we included a number of protections to ensure 
that the office would be under the control of the Ethics Committee and 
that the Ethics Committee would have final say on interpretation of the 
rules and on the question of whether the rules had been violated.
  Some felt our proposal was meant to imply dissatisfaction with the 
Senate Ethics Committee and the job it has done. That was decidedly not 
the case. The opposite is true. Rather, it reflected our decision that 
if we are aspiring to genuinely elevate, improve, and strengthen not 
just our lobbying regulations but the credibility and legitimacy they 
have with the American people, whose faith has been undercut by so many 
recent events in the processes here in Washington, including the 
Abramoff scandal and the conviction of a Member of the other body, 
rather, it reflects that belief that we have to act in a way to restore 
that confidence.
  One way to do that is to say not only are we adopting tough new 
lobbying laws, but we are prepared to create an independent office to 
enforce them.
  That provision that was in the mark Senator Collins and I put before 
our committee was, in fact, removed by a majority vote of the 
committee. We have taken to heart the comments offered by our 
colleagues. Today we offer this amendment in a form that we think 
addresses the most serious and frankly realistic and accurate concerns 
of our colleagues--not the speculative fears or truly rank 
misunderstandings of what our intentions of the provision's unfortunate 
amendment were, and it still provides the element of independence that 
we need for ethics enforcement.
  First, here are some of the questions. A number of people raised 
questions about whether a bicameral Office of Public Integrity would be 
constitutional. I believe strongly that our original proposal was 
consistent with the Constitution's mandate that each House set and 
enforce its own rules. Nevertheless, in the spirit of accommodation, we 
have changed our original amendment to make the Office of Public 
Integrity a Senate-only office. That is what this amendment before the 
Senate today provides.
  Second, we have responded to concerns expressed about the authority 
of the Office of Public Integrity as Senator Collins and I initially 
proposed it, to give advice and opinions on the ethics rules. Some of 
our colleagues in committee worried that the Office of Public Integrity 
and the Ethics Committee might give conflicting advice. Although we 
always intended the Ethics Committee to retain ultimate interpretive 
authority, the amendment we offer today eliminates the advice-giving 
function of the Office of Public Integrity, leaving it with the Senate 
Ethics Committee.

  Third, our original committee proposal assigned to the Office of 
Public Integrity the responsibility for receiving, monitoring, and 
auditing filings under the Lobbying Disclosure Act. Improved compliance 
with that act should be one of the goals of the reform package that is 
before the Senate. However, I know there has been objection to that, 
and at some point we may offer that as an independent amendment--in 
fact, one I think for which there will be less objection.
  Fourth, we have left the responsibility of receiving and reviewing 
Member and staff financial disclosure statements with the Ethics 
Committee. Under the proposal we offer today, the duties of the Office 
of Public Integrity will center on the initial review of ethics 
complaints.
  These are good changes that respond to concerns expressed and still 
preserve the integrity and strength and independence of the Office of 
Public Integrity. It would remain a nonpartisan, independent, and 
professional office headed by a full-time executive Director who would 
serve for a 5-year term. The Director would be appointed by the 
President pro tempore of the Senate, upon the joint recommendation of 
the majority and minority leaders of the Senate.
  The selection and appointment of the Director would be made without 
regard to political affiliation and solely on the basis of fitness to 
perform the duties of the office.
  I have every confidence that, as called for by our proposal--this 
amendment--the Director will be a person of integrity, independence, 
and public credibility who will have experience in law enforcement, the 
judiciary, civil or criminal litigation, or has served as a member of a 
Federal, State, or local ethics enforcement agency.
  Our proposal will provide an important element of independence to the 
initial stages of an ethics complaint, while still retaining the full 
authority of the Ethics Committee. Let me walk through the process that 
we propose.
  Under our proposal, an ethics complaint may be filed with the office 
by a Member or an outside complainant, or may be initiated by the 
office on its own initiative. Within 30 days of the filing of the 
complaint, the Director of the Office will make an initial 
determination as to whether the complaint should be dismissed or 
whether there

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are sufficient grounds to conduct an investigation. The subject of the 
complaint is provided the opportunity during that period to respond to 
the complaint.
  The Director may dismiss a complaint if he or she determines that the 
complaint fails to state a violation, lacks credible evidence of a 
violation, or is inadvertent, technical, or otherwise de minimis in 
nature. In any case where the Director decides to dismiss the 
complaint, the Director may refer the case to the Senate Ethics 
Committee so that the Ethics Committee may decide if the complaint is 
frivolous.
  On the subject of frivolous complaints, let me assure my colleagues 
that we have provided strong safeguards. If the Ethics Committee 
determines that a complaint is frivolous, it may notify the Director of 
the Office of Public Integrity not to accept any future complaint filed 
by that same person, and the person who filed the frivolous complaint 
may be required to pay the costs of processing the complaint. Also, the 
Director will not be allowed to accept any complaint concerning a 
Member within 60 days of an election. This so-called cooling-off period 
before an election will ensure that we do not attract politically 
motivated complaints in the midst of competitive campaigns. Also, let 
me note that any member of the public can already file an ethics 
complaint with the Senate Ethics Committee, so in that respect our 
proposal continues current practice.
  If during the 30 days the Director determines that there are 
sufficient grounds to conduct an investigation, the Director must 
notify the Ethics Committee. The Ethics Committee may then overrule the 
decision by a two-thirds, public rollcall vote of the committee, and 
the committee must issue a public report. Thus, we preserve the 
ultimate authority of the Ethics Committee even at this early stage 
while providing a greater measure of both independence and 
transparency.
  If the Ethics Committee does not overrule the decision of the 
Director, the Director then conducts an investigation to determine if 
probable cause exists that a violation occurred. If the Director 
determines that probable cause exists that an ethics violation has 
occurred, the Director must then inform the Ethics Committee, and, 
again, the Ethics Committee may overrule the decision with a two-
thirds, public rollcall vote of the committee which must be accompanied 
by a public report.
  If the committee does not overturn the Director's decision, the 
Director then presents the case to the Ethics Committee, and the Ethics 
Committee makes the final decision as to whether a violation has 
occurred by a rollcall vote and a report that includes the vote of each 
member.
  If the Ethics Committee decides that a violation has occurred, the 
Director will recommend appropriate sanctions to the committee. The 
Ethics Committee, though, retains the final decision on whether 
sanctions will be imposed, what those sanctions will be, and whether to 
take action itself or recommend sanctions to the full Senate for 
consideration.
  Our proposal does preserve the ultimate authority of the Ethics 
Committee at every stage of the process while providing a much greater 
measure of both independence and transparency along the way. This is a 
way to give the American people confidence that we will have an 
independent entity, watchdog, assisting Senators preparing the case 
before the Ethics Committee.
  Finally, I note that, at the suggestion of Senator McCain, we are 
assigning to the Office of Public Integrity the role of recommending 
approval or disapproval of privately funded travel by Members and 
staff. The reform legislation that is before the Senate, reported out 
of the Rules Committee, contains a new preapproval process for 
privately funded travel. Giving this responsibility to the Office of 
Public Integrity will, here again, assure the American public that 
travel requests by Members of the Senate will be scrutinized by an 
independent office. This proposal, in sum, will add staff and support 
to the Ethics Committee process and will add greater independence and 
greater transparency. It is a sensible, sound, strong effort to assure 
the American people we are not only adopting reforms in our lobbying 
regulations and laws, we are taking action to make sure those reforms 
are enforced.
  I urge my colleagues to support our amendment.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine.
  Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, how much time is remaining on the side of 
the proponents?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. There is 38 minutes.
  Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I expect Senator McCain will be on the 
floor very shortly to speak in favor of the amendment. While we are 
waiting for his arrival, let me make a few more comments on the purpose 
of this amendment.
  Even though we are so fortunate to have the Presiding Officer as the 
chairman of the Ethics Committee and some of our finest Members serving 
on the Ethics Committee, the fact is, that does not change the public's 
frustration or doubt about the process. The public views the process as 
inherently conflicted. The public believes that investigations of our 
colleagues by our colleagues raise obvious conflicts of interests.
  No matter the incredible integrity of the Members who serve on the 
Ethics Committee, they simply cannot escape that problem of public 
perception. That is why Senator Lieberman, Senator McCain, and I have 
attempted to come up with a new approach in our amendment that is 
designed to restore the public's confidence in the ethics system. We do 
so by creating the new Senate Office of Public Integrity. This office 
would be headed by a Director, appointed by the President pro tempore 
of the Senate upon the joint recommendation of the majority and 
minority leaders of the Senate. This individual would have a 5-year 
term and could be reappointed. This is not a lifetime appointment of 
someone who could somehow get out of control. This person would have to 
have a background suitable for the position, and it would take a joint 
agreement of the majority and minority leaders to appoint the person to 
the 5-year term.
  I pointed out in my comments this morning that our proposal is not 
the same as the proposal advanced in the House by Congressmen Shays and 
Meehan, regardless of the merits of that proposal. It is not the 
version created or proposed by Senators Obama and Reid earlier. In 
fact, we have refined it from the proposal offered during the Homeland 
Security Committee's markup to try to accommodate some concerns that 
were raised by the Presiding Officer. But what this proposal does is 
recognize that the public does not have confidence in the current 
system.
  We do not undermine the authority of the Ethics Committee. We 
recognize and appreciate the hard work of the Ethics Committee, and we 
realize the Ethics Committee alone should retain the ability to decide 
what sanctions may be appropriate for a Member who has been shown to 
have committed some misconduct. The Ethics Committee is involved every 
step of the way, as a safeguard, as a check or balance.
  But I would ask my colleagues to consider allegations that may be 
raised against a Member and that are investigated by an independent 
Office of Public Integrity. Now, that office comes back and says: There 
is no merit to these allegations. That judgment is going to be readily 
accepted by the public because it has been rendered not by a group of 
us sitting in judgment of our colleague but, rather, by an independent 
Office of Public Integrity.
  Again, if the Office of Public Integrity found grounds to continue 
the investigation, found probable cause, conducted an investigation and 
came to the Ethics Committee with its findings, it is the Ethics 
Committee and not the Office of Public Integrity that has the decision 
to make on what sanctions, if any, are appropriate.

  I think we have struck the right balance. I think we have sustained 
the authority of the Ethics Committee, but we have also ensured that 
the investigations will be carried out by an independent Office of 
Public Integrity that would have the credibility to carry out this kind 
of sensitive investigation. After all, it is very difficult to 
investigate one of our colleagues.
  We are fortunate because we know each other in this body. We have a

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great deal of regard for one another. We are friends with the people 
with whom we serve. All of that helps make the Senate a more collegial 
body, helps us to get our work done. But it also raises questions in 
the mind of the public about whether serious allegations are 
independently and thoroughly investigated. I believe that is the 
advantage of the approach we put forward.
  This is a modest proposal. We are not suggesting the Office of Public 
Integrity should provide rulings on ethics matters, providing advice. 
We are not suggesting the Office of Public Integrity would decide 
sanctions to be imposed on Members. We build in that that is the job of 
the Ethics Committee. We do not change that. But we do try to deal with 
the perception that the current process is inherently conflicted.
  Let me run through how the process would work. Essentially, the 
office would do much of the investigative work that is now conducted by 
the staff of the Ethics Committee, with the notable exception, which 
Senator Lieberman mentioned, of ruling on requests for privately funded 
travel. The office would not provide advice or counsel. It would not 
issue advisory opinions. It would not have the power to enforce 
subpoenas. It could not make public the product of its investigations. 
And it could not directly refer matters to Federal or State 
authorities, such as the Department of Justice. All of those 
authorities would remain with the Ethics Committee.
  I make that point because, perhaps due to the many different versions 
of this concept, as advanced in the House or by outside groups or by 
other Members, there is a lot of confusion over the duties and 
responsibilities of the Office of Public Integrity. So I want to make 
clear what the powers of this office would be.
  What the office would do is accept complaints, and within 30 days of 
receiving a complaint would make an initial determination as to whether 
the complaint should be dismissed or whether an investigation is 
warranted. If the office dismisses a complaint, it may refer the case 
to the Ethics Committee to determine if the complaint is frivolous and 
whether sanctions should be imposed on the individual or the outside 
group filing the complaint. I think that is a big improvement on the 
current system.
  If, after the initial inquiry, the office finds sufficient grounds to 
open an investigation, it would provide notice to the Ethics Committee. 
The Ethics Committee would then have 10 days to overrule that 
determination.
  I want to make that point very clear, that the Ethics Committee can 
decide to overrule the decision of the Office of Public Integrity to 
pursue the investigation further or the Ethics Committee could decide 
to take no action at all, in which case the Office of Public Integrity, 
having found sufficient grounds to open an investigation, would 
proceed. If the office finds probable cause that a violation has 
occurred, the Ethics Committee would then have up to 30 days in which 
to overrule that determination or let it stand. If not overruled, the 
office then presents the case and the evidence to the Ethics Committee 
to vote on whether any rules or any other standards of conduct have 
been violated.
  Again, you see that the Ethics Committee is involved at every single 
stage. There is a report from the Office of Public Integrity and an 
opportunity for the committee to overrule the Office of Public 
Integrity. That opportunity is always available.
  Mr. President, I do expect Senator McCain will be joining us shortly. 
In the meantime, I suggest the absence of a quorum and ask unanimous 
consent that it be charged to both sides.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Coleman). Without objection, it is so 
ordered.
  The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. VOINOVICH. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. VOINOVICH. Mr. President, I rise to, first, commend Senators Lott 
and Collins for bringing the underlying bill to the floor of the 
Senate. I know both worked extremely hard to pass their respective 
pieces from the Rules Committee and the Homeland Security and 
Governmental Affairs Committee.
  Second, I want to make one thing clear: I strongly support lobbying 
reforms that protect the integrity of our legislative process, close 
loopholes, promote moral/ethical behavior, and enforce our Senate 
rules. Any reforms that make sense that are not cosmetic should be 
given the strongest consideration by this body. I am particularly 
pleased that this bill requires the completion of an ethics training 
program conducted by the Ethics Committee within 120 days of enactment 
for current Members of the Senate and staff as well as requiring 
training for incoming Members and staff. It is not mandatory today. It 
is voluntary. This makes it mandatory, which is an improvement.
  The Senate Ethics Committee professional nonpartisan staff already 
conduct numerous ethics lectures and seminars for the Senate community. 
The Ethics Committee staff also regularly conducts training for 
individual Member's offices upon request. In addition, the Ethics 
Committee staff receives and responds to over 200 calls per week asking 
specific questions about rules compliance. While I applaud the many 
positive aspects of the proposed lobbying reform bill, this amendment 
to create an Office of Public Integrity is off target and unnecessary. 
As a member of the Ethics Committee for 8 years and chairman for the 
past 3, I oppose the proposed OPI because it will harm the Senate 
ethics process rather than improve it.
  If adopted, the OPI will introduce partisan politics into a process 
that has been bipartisan. It is interesting to note that none of the 
sponsors of this OPI has served on the Ethics Committee, and all 
Members of the Ethics Committee currently, and others, are opposed to 
it. By its very design, the OPI will simply replicate the tasks the 
Ethics Committee does every day, including receiving complaints against 
Members and staff and investigating allegations of misconduct. Given 
all the other duties of the Ethics Committee staff and the need for the 
Ethics Committee to have its own counsel when reviewing the Director's 
recommendation, there would not be any reduction in the staff of the 
Ethics Committee. More importantly, the OPI would add a duplicate 
investigative stage because the Ethics Committee will need to conduct 
its own investigation to verify the merits of any complaint it receives 
from the Director of the OPI; otherwise, the Ethics Committee would be 
acting irresponsibly.
  Some proponents of the OPI have argued that the Ethics Committee 
cannot or does not get the job done. They believe that a third party 
must be appointed to ensure that nefarious acts are not committed 
within these walls. The fact that the Ethics Committee has an excellent 
track record of enforcement seems to have been forgotten by those who 
have taken this position, although I must say that the Senator from 
Maine has been very complimentary to the chairman of the Ethics 
Committee and the work we are doing. I am appreciative of that.
  Other OPI proponents argue that despite the great work of the Ethics 
Committee, the appearance of Senators enforcing our rules on other 
Senators is a problem that OPI will fix. Some of this criticism appears 
to be based on the fact that Members of the Ethics Committee and its 
staff are obligated to keep matters confidential. We can't talk to 
people about things. It is easy for critics to point and sneer when the 
committee and its members are obliged to confidentiality and are 
prohibited from responding to questions and criticism. Frankly, I 
believe it is the Ethics Committee's commitment to keep matters 
confidential that causes some to question the effectiveness and values 
of the Ethics Committee. However, it is this confidentiality that 
provides due process protection for Members and staff and keeps 
partisan politics out of the ethics process. These confidentiality 
provisions provide due process protection for Members while keeping 
partisan politics out of the ethics process.
  Nevertheless, if a colleague acts in a way that is contrary to the 
rules of conduct of the Senate, the Ethics Committee has the ability 
and the duty to investigate the allegation, and it does

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so. Right now we have a right to initiate investigations without a 
complaint. In terms of reading something in the newspaper, something 
brought to our attention and it seems like it casts a bad reflection 
upon the Members of the Senate, we have often sent letters off to 
Senators saying: We have seen this. We want you to respond to it.
  Frankly, that is why the proposed OPI is somewhat offensive. It 
suggests that Members lack the moral conviction to make difficult 
decisions when a fellow Member has acted in violation of the Senate 
rules.
  While sitting in judgment of one's peers is never easy, the Ethics 
Committee conducts itself with a sense that the reputation of the 
Senate is above any individual Member. In my opinion--I hope my 
colleagues will agree with me after considering this amendment--the OPI 
and its independent counsel is more cosmetic and, frankly, problematic. 
It seems as if proponents of the measure understand that as well. In 
fact, proponents of the OPI offered a much more robust proposal during 
the markup of the lobbying reform bill in the Homeland Security and 
Governmental Affairs Committee. The proposal was soundly defeated in a 
bipartisan manner. Recognizing all of the other flaws in the earlier 
proposal, this amendment strips away all of the other elements of the 
earlier proposal to offer nothing more than the creation of an 
independent counsel within the Senate.
  Frankly, I am confused. On the one hand, one would believe that in 
offering this amendment, faith in the Senate Ethics Committee would be 
low. However, the scaled-back version of the OPI suggests that the 
proponents recognize the Senate Ethics Committee is doing its job but 
still want to force this independent counsel on the Senate for no 
reason than to appease the media, frankly, and some of the watchdog 
groups. I keep hearing the public doesn't have any confidence in the 
process. There have been complaints about what has happened over in the 
other House. But the fact is, to my knowledge, we have not had 
complaints about the work of the Senate Ethics Committee. Certainly, I 
haven't heard any complaints from any of my constituents about this 
work, and I am chairman of the committee.
  Despite the misunderstandings and commentary by various groups, the 
Ethics Committee is already a vigorous enforcer of Senate rules. The 
Ethics Committee and its 11 professional, nonpartisan staff, including 
5 nonpartisan attorneys with many years of prosecutorial and 
investigative experience, are there to initiate investigations based on 
complaints from Members and staff, outside individuals and groups, as 
well as on its own initiative. What I am saying is, if this stuff comes 
to the attention of the staff, they go out and do the investigation. 
They look into the matter. They bring it to us and ask us: Do you think 
we should go forward. It is not as though we are controlling what they 
can do. That is one of the things the proposal for the independent 
counsel doesn't recognize. They are already in a position to do that. 
We are proposing to do what we are already doing.

  With the assistance of this professional nonpartisan staff, the 
Senate Ethics Committee is doing exactly what our colleagues and the 
American people should expect of us--protecting the integrity of the 
Senate and vigorously pursuing and sanctioning Senators and staff who 
violate the rules of the Senate. I have not heard any evidence to the 
contrary.
  The tradition of the Ethics Committee doing its job is a long one. 
For over 40 years, the Ethics Committee has operated in a way to meet 
the constitutional mandate that each body establish rules, investigate 
its Members for disorderly behavior, and hand out appropriate 
punishment. The Ethics Committee continues to meet this mandate today, 
and it does so in a bipartisan manner. In fact, published accounts 
reveal that the Ethics Committee has considered allegations involving 
some 35 Senators, all but 3 of which occurred after 1977.
  While these Members include only public allegations, frankly, this 
reveals that the Senate Ethics Committee has not had the problem of 
partisan gridlock that has affected the House ethics process. If we 
create a Senate OPI, however, I can almost guarantee the Ethics 
Committee will become partisan and gridlocked, especially in the 
present political environment.
  This is also why all six members of the Ethics Committee, three 
Republicans and three Democrats, oppose creation of the OPI. Over the 
years, the Ethics Committee has benefited from a bipartisan working 
relationship. This positive working relationship could be quickly lost 
under this new independent counsel. Moreover, the OPI appears designed 
to result in conflict and disagreement between the Ethics Committee and 
the Director of the OPI.
  First, Members should understand the three-stage process that has 
been proposed under the OPI and understand why this proposal would ruin 
the bipartisan nature of the system as well as creating an adversarial 
relationship between the Ethics Committee and the Director.
  At each stage of the OPI process, if the Director, prosecutor, 
independent counsel, or whatever you want to call him or her, 
determines that he or she believes there are sufficient grounds to 
conduct or proceed with an investigation, then the Director would 
notify the Ethics Committee. The Ethics Committee then has the 
opportunity to overrule the determination by a two-thirds vote. But if 
the Ethics Committee disagrees with the Director and votes to overrule, 
the Ethics Committee is required to issue a public report which would 
include a record of how each Member voted. While this OPI amendment 
does not specify what should be included in these public reports, as a 
practical matter, these public reports will include the Member's name, 
facts about the alleged misconduct, and the rationale for rejecting the 
Director's recommendations. By requiring the public report, a Member's 
name will be disclosed even if the Ethics Committee determines there is 
no violation of the rules.
  I think this new public reporting process will turn the existing 
Senate ethics process into a political public relations battle rather 
than a determination on the merits of each matter. What's more, the 
Director is not likely to be happy that the Ethics Committee disagreed 
with his or her conclusions.
  If you bring it in, talk about it, and then if you disagree with 
independent counsel and you have a vote, this will go back and forth. 
Then Members will start worrying about how they are voting in terms of 
the fact that they disagreed with the independent counsel's decision. 
Then we get into the issue of your votes in terms of various Members 
who are before the committee and having Members in your own caucus 
coming up to you and saying: Why did you vote that way or why didn't 
you vote this way? These considerations are not part of our 
decisionmaking today. This is a nuance that I think many people don't 
understand. That is how we keep this.
  People ask me about cases, and I say ``no comment.'' The media asks, 
and I say ``no comment.'' Once the name is out there, Katey, bar the 
door--especially today, unfortunately, in this partisan, political 
environment.
  I want to take a second to point out something that is obvious but 
may be overlooked in this debate. Issuing a subpoena to a Member of the 
Senate is a very serious matter, and Members know it. The heart of the 
subpoena power is a big stick that the Ethics Committee must 
occasionally use to enforce information requests during an 
investigation. The subpoena power is used judiciously. This power 
should not be delegated lightly as the OPI proposes to do.
  Proponents of the OPI also suggest that the Director of the OPI will 
be responsible and answerable to the Ethics Committee throughout the 
process. In fact, this Director would not be answerable and responsible 
throughout the process. After the Ethics Committee approves the 
Director's initial decision to begin an investigation, the Director 
would have the unchecked power to investigate. These investigations may 
go on as long as the Director, in his or her sole discretion, sees fit.
  We all know that independent of any power to sanction, the power to 
investigate is itself an awesome power and may itself impose on the 
subject of the investigation a heavy burden to his or her resources, to 
his or her reputation, to his or her ability to represent and serve 
constituents fully and effectively. The OPI amendment would resurrect 
the independent counsel in the

[[Page S2447]]

institution of the Senate. This would serve neither the interests of 
this institution nor the public.
  Finally, inherent conflict between the Ethics Committee and the 
Director, as I mentioned, is built into the way this determination is 
made.
  Advocates of the OPI state that the process would remove politics 
from the ethics process. I can guarantee you that by creating this 
independent counsel, politics would not only play a part in the ethics 
process but would be a decisive factor to every inquiry. Members of the 
Ethics Committee would have to explain why they voted the way they did 
to the media, their colleagues, and party members. Partisan 
considerations will transform a now bipartisan decisionmaking process 
into another partisan battle. The Senate has had enough of some of 
these partisan problems.
  I also find it troubling that Members believe it is better policy to 
turn over the investigative process to an unelected and unaccountable 
individual rather than leaving such an important responsibility with 
Members who respect the Senate as an institution and are accountable to 
the voters every 6 years.
  I also want to take a step back and discuss another reason proponents 
of the OPI claim it is necessary. Throughout the entirety of the recent 
scandals, reports appear that cast doubts upon the integrity of 
everybody on Capitol Hill. There is a belief that the Senate Ethics 
Committee was asleep at the wheel--or even worse, indifferent to the 
allegations in the Abramoff-related matter. As detailed in the 
committee response to Democracy 21, which is posted on the Ethics 
Committee Web site, the committee voted to follow its general practice 
of not initiating an investigation that might interfere with an ongoing 
Department of Justice criminal investigation. We keep hearing 
complaints from Democracy 21 and others that ``you guys should be 
involved in the Abramoff case.'' We discussed it and decided to follow 
the procedure we followed in the past. The Justice Department said: 
Keep your nose out of this. Let us do our work. When we are done, we 
will come to you.
  We had the same case in terms of Senator Torricelli. He was under 
investigation--this is public knowledge--by the Justice Department and, 
for some reason, they decided not to prosecute him. They sent the stuff 
to us after they did their investigation. By the way, it was helpful to 
us because we had the Justice Department investigation before us. As a 
result of that, we censured as a public admonition of Senator 
Torricelli. He decided not to seek reelection to the Senate. So I just 
want you to know that the opposition to this is a bipartisan 
opposition. People who have been around here and have been through the 
process understand that we are getting the job done.
  One other thing that I think will help is annual reports. As you 
know, right now we don't have to report what we do. People at home come 
up to me and say: What are you doing?
  I say: I am chairman of the Senate Ethics Committee.
  They say: What about it?
  I cannot talk about it.
  What do you do?
  I cannot talk about it. There is no record on this, and I put out an 
annual report every year and cannot talk about what we have 
accomplished.
  We have an amendment that we got in the committee, when it was marked 
up, that says we will report each year everything that we do. Members' 
names will not be mentioned, but at least the public will know that we 
are doing our work and we are not just sitting there letting everything 
pass us by. I am not sure that is going to satisfy some of the public 
interest groups, or that it will satisfy some of the media who have 
taken shots at me editorially because they think we are trying to hide 
something.
  But the fact is, we are trying to get the job done. We must preserve 
the reputation of this Senate. So I want to say that I think the 
creation of the OPI is not a positive step forward and, in fact, it 
would diminish the job that is being done in the Senate to enforce our 
ethics laws and rules.
  Mr. President, I reserve my time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine is recognized.
  Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I yield up to 10 minutes to the Senator 
from Arizona, who is a key supporter of the amendment.
  Mr. McCAIN. I thank the Senator from Maine. I will not take all of 
the 10 minutes. I would like to begin by thanking her and Senator 
Lieberman for their very hard work and their dedication to trying to 
fix a problem that perhaps some of my colleagues may not be aware of, 
and that is our reputation as a body is suffering rather significantly 
in the view of the American people.
  I view this amendment by the Senator from Maine as a way to help the 
Ethics Committee do its job because the questioning has been: Why 
haven't people been investigated? If you had a body that would help 
them determine whether a case is worthy of further investigation and 
pursuit or not, it seems to me it would relieve the Ethics Committee of 
some of the onus of making tough decisions when we are talking about 
our colleagues.
  I was interested in the comment by the Senator from Ohio that he 
won't investigate until after the Abramoff thing is done by the Justice 
Department. The Abramoff thing would not have been investigated by the 
Justice Department if it had not been for the Indian Affairs 
investigation; and while the Justice Department began and continued the 
investigations, we continued our hearings on the Abramoff case. If I 
may say, with a bit of ego, the Indian Affairs Committee contributed 
quite a bit to the information they needed in order to pursue this not 
unprecedented but egregious case of corruption of the system, staff, 
and Members. Really remarkable things happened under Mr. Abramoff. So 
somehow we on the Indian Affairs Committee were able to have an 
investigation--the little, obscure Indian Affairs Committee.
  But the fundamental point is that we need to restore the confidence 
of the American people in the way we do business. Hardly a day goes by, 
or at least a week, that there is not a major story about influence of 
special interests, wrongdoing, or certainly ethical questions that are 
raised. That is the kindest way that I can describe it. We need to fix 
the problem. So why not give this to the body of the Senate that is 
charged with these onerous obligations.
  I sympathize with anybody who is a member of the Ethics Committee 
because tough decisions have to be made and most of us are friends 
here. That is very tough.
  So why would it be harmful? And why would it not be helpful to have 
an Office of Public Integrity with a mission that would be carefully 
circumscribed, which, if they made a decision, could be overruled by a 
vote of the Senate, and would be helpful in clearing up sometimes a 
cloud of investigations such as those that characterized the 1980s and 
1990s, particularly in the other body where there were charges launched 
and there were partisan vendettas which many people called ``the 
criminalization of partisan differences.''
  Mr. President, I hope my colleagues recognize that when our approval 
ratings are down around 25, 26 percent, and there are people who 
continue to be deeply disturbed about the way we do business--whether 
or not it is legitimate, the perception is out there; you can look at 
any public opinion poll--should we not do what we can to help fix 
either a real or imagined problem that we have with the people we 
serve?
  It seems to me that an Office of Public Integrity that would 
recommend appropriate action taken by the Ethics Committee, not by the 
Office of Public Integrity such as has been recommended by this 
amendment, would be helpful to the Ethics Committee process, helpful in 
carrying out and determining whether these are partisan, unwarranted 
charges, or whether those are legitimate.
  I want to point out again that this is a legitimate difference of 
opinion. The Senator from Maine and I, and others, including Senator 
Lieberman, have a view that this is necessary. Others think it is not. 
Can we calm down a little bit? This is a legitimate subject of debate 
on whether we need it. I hope we can discuss this, but I also believe 
that if you don't do this, what are we going to do? What are we going 
to do to try to restore some of the confidence that the American people 
have clearly lost in us?
  Obviously, a functioning Ethics Committee, with a level of 
credibility with

[[Page S2448]]

the American people, is something I think would contribute to healing 
this breach that has developed between us and the people we represent.
  I thank the Senator from Maine and Senator Lieberman and others for 
this bipartisan effort. I would like to say a word about the so-called 
watchdog groups. I think they do a lot of good. They have done a lot of 
good for this body and for this Nation. There are people who are 
concerned about public integrity. There are people who bring issues 
before us and the American people. They are legitimate. I may not agree 
with them all the time, but I think to view them as adversaries, 
frankly, in my dealings with them they have been helpful. They 
certainly were in various investigations in which I and my committee 
have been involved, and also with reform efforts in which I have been 
involved. I, for one, appreciate their work and the dedication they 
have to giving a better Government to the American people.
  Again, I thank Senator Collins for her hard work, and I appreciate 
her efforts. I appreciate her and Senator Lieberman's bipartisan 
stewardship of one of the most important committees in the Senate.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. VOINOVICH. Mr. President, I yield 10 minutes to the Senator from 
South Dakota.
  Mr. JOHNSON. Mr. President, I rise to discuss the pending McCain-
Collins-Lieberman amendment to create an Office of Public Integrity. I 
thank my colleague from Ohio, Senator Voinovich, who serves as chairman 
of the Senate Ethics Committee. I serve as vice chair. This is a 
committee that has three Republicans and three Democrats, and it has a 
history of close bipartisan cooperation.
  I applaud Senator Voinovich's observations about the Abramoff scandal 
and the fact that the Department of Justice has an investigation that 
is ongoing. The Department of Justice actually has requested the Ethics 
Committee not to begin its own investigation for fear of jeopardizing 
criminal charges that may or may not be brought by DOJ, and we also 
recognize a much greater investigative capability and the importance of 
not duplicating efforts. So I appreciate Chairman Voinovich's 
observations in that regard.

  I thank Senators Collins, Lieberman, Lott, and Dodd for their efforts 
to bring to the floor this bipartisan lobbying reform legislation and 
their ongoing work to complete this important bill. I support the bill, 
and I believe many of the reforms we are debating are long overdue.
  As vice chairman of the Senate Ethics Committee, I am hopeful we can 
continue to work in a bipartisan manner to pass this legislation, 
conference the bill with the House, and enact these much needed 
reforms.
  I must say as an aside, while these reforms are much needed, the 
underlying truth is, I believe the greatest share of problems this body 
faces is due to a separate issue, that of campaign finance, but that 
will have to be taken up in a different context and different 
legislation.
  Unfortunately, I rise today to oppose the pending amendment. I know 
my colleagues have offered this amendment in an attempt to improve the 
ethics process and because they believe in good faith that the creation 
of a new Office of Public Integrity, or OPI, will address perceived 
shortcomings in the operations of the Ethics Committee. However, I am 
concerned this amendment attempts to fix something that, frankly, is 
not broken and will, in fact, have a detrimental impact on the Senate.
  As a relatively new member of the Ethics Committee, I do not have an 
entrenched loyalty to that committee. If I believed the committee was 
not taking its duties seriously or was acting in an irresponsible 
manner, I would be the first to call for a new approach. The truth is, 
I believe the Senate Ethics Committee operates effectively and in a 
bipartisan fashion. However, the members of the committee and its staff 
are obligated to operate under strict confidentiality, which I believe 
some of our colleagues and certain outside groups equate with inaction. 
This simply is not the case. To the contrary, the committee serves 
Senate offices in an advisory role, investigates matters of concern, 
and enforces the rules of the Senate on a daily basis. But to provide 
due process protections and to ensure professionalism, most of the 
committee's actions are confidential.
  I believe the Members who have had interactions with the Ethics 
Committee appreciate this professional approach which further 
encourages Members and their staff to seek the prior advice of the 
committee and avoids many potential problems.
  I recognize this perception of inaction must be addressed in order to 
restore public confidence in the ethics process. I thank the chairman 
of the Ethics Committee, Senator Voinovich, for offering an amendment 
during the markup of this bill that will allow the Ethics Committee to 
publish annually on a no-name basis a report detailing the activities 
of the committee. I believe this is an important step and will give our 
colleagues and the public a better idea of the committee's operations.
  I wish to spend a few minutes discussing my concerns about the 
amendment itself.
  First, I believe there are significant constitutional issues 
surrounding the creation of an independent Office of Public Integrity. 
The Constitution gives the Senate the authority to establish its own 
rules and to punish its own Members. An Office of Public Integrity that 
is outside the Senate would violate this section of the Constitution, 
as well as the speech and debate clause. As a consequence, such an 
office would never be able to acquire the information or compel the 
necessary testimony to investigate rules violations, keeping in mind 
that each Member of the Senate is subject to the same criminal laws as 
every other citizen of America but beyond those laws also must comply 
with the ethics rules we have internally in the U.S. Senate.
  An Office of Public Integrity that is set up within the Senate to 
avoid these constitutional issues, as I understand the current 
amendment as drafted, would merely duplicate the Senate Ethics 
Committee, would be a waste of resources, and would not solve the 
problems the sponsors perceive to exist. The two-tiered ethics process 
that would be created by this amendment would undoubtedly slow 
consideration of ethics complaints, create more doubt about the 
process, and make our colleagues and the public less confident in our 
ability to address these issues.
  I am also concerned about the practical operations of an Office of 
Public Integrity. As I understand the amendment under consideration, 
the Office of Public Integrity would take over most of the 
investigatory functions of the Senate Ethics Committee. When an ethics 
complaint is received, the Office of Public Integrity would 
preliminarily investigate the matter, and if grounds for further 
investigation are found, the matter would then be sent to the Senate 
Ethics Committee for approval. The decision to continue the 
investigation could be overridden by a public two-thirds vote of the 
Ethics Committee with a required public report on the matter. If 
approved, the matter would be referred back to the Office of Public 
Integrity for further investigation.

  At the conclusion of the investigation, if the Director of the Office 
of Public Integrity determines that there is probable cause that an 
ethics violation has occurred, the Director would, once again, send the 
matter to the Ethics Committee and, once again, this determination 
could be overridden by a public two-thirds vote of the Ethics Committee 
with a mandatory public report. Assuming the Ethics Committee did not 
override the Director's determination, the Office of Public Integrity 
would then present the case to the committee for a final ruling and 
implement any sanctions. Regardless of the committee's decision on the 
case, the amendment would require the committee to issue a public 
report at this stage of the process.
  I fail to see how this process of ethics cases bouncing back and 
forth between the Office of Public Integrity and the Ethics Committee 
will improve in any way the way ethics complaints are handled. Instead, 
the amendment would create more bureaucracy and a more belabored 
process.
  In addition, it is not clear if the underlying ethics complaint would 
remain confidential during this process. The amendment contains a 
provision prohibiting the Director or the staff of

[[Page S2449]]

the Office of Public Integrity from disclosing any information about a 
case unless authorized by the Senate Ethics Committee. However, I do 
not know how information will remain confidential when cases are being 
referred back and forth between the Office of Public Integrity and the 
Ethics Committee, especially when the amendment specifically requires 
the committee to issue public reports. This leaves open the possibility 
that Members will be forced to live under the cloud of an investigation 
as a result of every accusation brought before the Office of Public 
Integrity, regardless of its merit--regardless of its merit. Such a 
situation would only interject more partisanship into the ethics 
process and create a blunt tool for extreme partisan groups to make 
politically based attacks.
  I have no doubt that my colleagues have offered this amendment with 
the best of intentions and based on their belief that this Office of 
Public Integrity would improve how we do our business in the Senate. 
Once again, if I believed the Ethics Committee process was broken or 
that the proposed Office of Public Integrity would, in fact, improve 
the mechanism for considering ethics complaints in the Senate, I would 
support that amendment. However, I know the ethics process is working 
in the Senate.
  To address the perception of inactivity which is the result of the 
Senate's confidentiality rules, the bill does contain important 
language to mandate that the committee report in broad terms its 
activities, which will provide greater transparency to the committee's 
action.
  It is my hope that my colleagues will listen to the concerns about 
this amendment expressed by the current and past members of the Ethics 
Committee who best understand the committee operations and will join us 
in a bipartisan fashion opposing the McCain-Collins-Lieberman 
amendment.
  I yield back my time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  Mr. VOINOVICH. I yield up to 5 minutes to Senator Stevens.
  Mr. President, how much time remains?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Thirty-one minutes.
  Mr. VOINOVICH. How much time does the Senator need?
  Mr. STEVENS. How much time is left?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Thirty-one minutes.
  Mr. STEVENS. Ten minutes.
  Mr. VOINOVICH. I yield 10 minutes to the Senator from Alaska.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Alaska is recognized.
  Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I want to express my concerns regarding 
the creation of the Office of Public Integrity. We discussed this 
proposal in committee, and I joined a bipartisan group of Senators in 
defeating it, and rightly so.
  The proposed Office of Public Integrity would duplicate the efforts 
of the Senate Ethics Committee. Our Ethics Committee was established 
pursuant to the Constitution, which states each body of Congress must 
make its own rules. This office would, in effect, replace--or 
duplicate--the current rule of the Senate.
  The implication the sponsors here make is that in order to restore 
public confidence, we have to create something new. I do not think we 
should replace the Senate Ethics Committee, nor do I think we should 
imply that our current system is not working.
  I happen to have been the target of complaints to the Ethics 
Committee, and I can tell you it has a qualified staff headed by a very 
capable chairman and ranking member who have the public's trust.
  As a matter of fact, I once chaired this committee, and believe me, 
it is a difficult and thankless job, but one Chairman Voinovich is 
doing very well. If the Ethics Committee process is broken, we should 
fix, it. We should not create another layer of bureaucratic red tape 
and ask American taxpayers to pay $2 million a year to fund it.
  What's more, I am concerned that the Office of Public Integrity could 
be used as a partisan, political tool. The climate in Washington today 
is the most partisan I have experienced in my 37 years in the Senate, 
and we should think carefully about offering up another tool for 
partisan critics of either party to abuse. Under this proposal, 
accusations don't have to be verified, those making accusations are not 
under oath. This proposal will add another layer to what is already a 
very expensive process. Who will pay those costs? A Senator could face 
multiple accusations presented to this OPI--and the Senate Ethics 
Committee. The costs of legal assistance in such instances will be 
doubled.
  In my judgment, this proposal points us in the wrong direction, and 
it's a slap in the face to Chairman Voinovich and Senator Johnson, and 
all past chairmen for that matter.
  I have some concern about this amendment. I can state, as President 
pro tempore of the Senate, I would have a series of duties under this 
amendment subject to being told exactly what to do by the two leaders 
of the Senate. However, as I view this amendment, it does not create an 
entity that makes any decisions.
  I think the Senator from South Dakota is absolutely correct. The 
impact of this amendment would be that the Director of this office 
would become the investigatory arm of the Senate Ethics Committee. As a 
matter of fact, once the Director gets a complaint, he then has to make 
recommendations to the Senate Ethics Committee. The Senate Ethics 
Committee either approves or denies the recommendation. In terms of the 
investigation concept, the complaint with the Office of Public 
Integrity is not made under oath, it is not made under normal 
procedures.
  I agree with the Senator from South Dakota, I don't know how the 
Senate has the authority to create an independent body that is spending 
taxpayers' money that has the job of duplicating the investigatory arm 
in the Senate Ethics Committee. We have a Senate Ethics Committee 
investigating group, and it does a very good job.
  I happen to have been chairman of the Ethics Committee in the past, 
and I have also have been the subject of investigation by the Ethics 
Committee. I can assure my colleagues they do a good job. I can also 
assure my colleagues that it costs a considerable amount of money to 
comply with the inquiries of an ethics complaint. All this does is set 
up another entity that also will cause more attorney's fees and more 
time of the Senator to deal with the problem of someone having 
presented a complaint against him.
  If the Director decides to dismiss a complaint, it goes back to the 
Senate Ethics Committee. They decide whether it is frivolous. The 
Director doesn't make that decision. Again, it is back to the 
committee.
  I don't understand the Senator from Arizona saying this is supposed 
to take the workload off the Senate Ethics Committee. To the contrary. 
I agree with the assertion that has been made that I don't know of any 
Senator who would serve the Ethics Committee under this rule. I 
certainly would not. Whenever the Director determines there are 
sufficient grounds to conduct an investigation, he notifies the Senate 
Committee on Ethics, and the committee may overrule that. In other 
words, there is nothing this Director does without going back to the 
Ethics Committee and burdening the Ethics Committee. Under current 
Senate rules, the Ethics Committee can continue to investigate 
complaints presented to it. They have the procedures and they have the 
rules. They would have to follow them if the complaint was directed to 
that committee. There is nothing in here saying you can only present a 
complaint to the Director of this Office of Public Integrity.
  If the Director determines there is cause to proceed further, what 
does he do? He goes back to the Senate Ethics Committee and says that 
is his determination. The Ethics Committee then has the right to vote 
on that. I don't know how we are restoring public confidence in the 
system if we create an investigatory arm that comes back to the Senate 
Ethics Committee every time it wants to do something. They are the 
people who make the decisions now, and the process is working.
  I don't understand because of some complaints from public interest 
groups that the process is not working, mainly because--I applaud the 
initiative of Senator Voinovich and Senator Johnson and the decision by 
the committee to publish a report. I think that is a good one. That is 
a complaint that was heard back in the days when I was chairman of the 
committee. We, by nature, kept those decisions within the

[[Page S2450]]

Senate, except when there was a final decision made. I was here when 
one Senator was censored and one other expelled from the Senate because 
of a Senate Ethics Committee investigation.
  Whatever decision is made, whether the office is going to refer 
something to the Department of Justice, what do they do? The Director 
comes back to the committee and tells them the Director thinks it 
should be referred to the Department of Justice, and then the Senate 
committee votes on whether it should go to the Department of Justice.
  I tell the Senate, from my point of view, the Constitution gave us 
not only the right but the duty to create our own rules, and the rules 
we have--and they are very important--are the rules concerning our 
ethics. They are enforced internally by the Senate itself.
  The decisions made under this amendment would be no different than 
right now. The final decision will be made by the Senate Ethics 
Committee. All this really does is find a way to further publicize that 
complaints have been made.
  I know it says if there is a frivolous complaint made, then this 
Director can say you cannot present the complaint any longer to the 
Office of Public Integrity. There is nothing barring them from 
complaining to the Senate Ethics Committee again. The Senate rules are 
there. Anybody can file a complaint with the Senate Ethics Committee, 
and they are reviewed by very fine staff.
  I have to tell my colleagues, if we take the action to create 
something in the public--call it Office of Public Integrity--and it has 
no teeth, how have we restored confidence in the system? This is not a 
way to restore confidence in the system. The way to restore confidence 
in the system is for Senators to stop repeating rumors about the 
Senate, to stand up and say: The Senate has integrity and the Senate is 
doing its job.

  The Senators who serve on this Ethics Committee--and believe me, I 
remember trying to get someone to take my place. It took a long time to 
find someone to take my place because we had just gone through a long 
investigation of a Senator, and it was really a bitter period of time 
for the Senate Ethics Committee. No one wanted to serve on it anymore.
  This is going to present a situation where no one will serve on this 
committee. Why would they do it? They have someone, a director, who 
comes to them and tells them the director thinks some Senator has done 
something wrong. The Senate votes. Then what do they do? If he 
disagrees, then they publish it. What good does that do? The problem is 
the integrity of the rules. And I think, serving on both this 
committee--and I have been the chairman of this committee also, and the 
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee--these are heavy 
burdens, to carry out these responsibilities.
  The Senate Ethics Committee is a heavy burden. It takes more time 
than any Senator who hasn't served on the committee can possibly 
determine. Talk about reading. You have to read depositions, go through 
files; enormous time is put into this. What are we going to do now if 
we create this Office of Public Integrity? Someone else is going to do 
the investigations and bring it to the committee and say: What do you 
think about this? Guess what. In the final analysis, there is one 
section that says, in any event, the committee will comply with the 
Senate rules. So the whole body of Senate rules and the precedent 
behind Senate rules are still in place, but we create a new Office of 
Public Integrity on top of it to start the investigations. The 
investigatory process of the Senate Ethics Committee is a very unique 
one, and I urge the Senators to at some time read that rule and read 
the precedents under that rule which are set forth in the publication 
the Senate Ethics Committee has made.
  I agree we have to restore public confidence, but this is one aspect 
that destroys public confidence because it says you cannot have 
confidence in the investigatory side of the ethics process. There is 
nothing that says you can't have confidence in the committee itself 
because every final decision in this process is still made by the 
Senate Ethics Committee. That, to me, is not an improvement at all of 
the process.
  Furthermore, we ought to take into account the situation that exists 
right here in Washington, DC, now. In the 37 years I have been in the 
Senate, I have never seen such partisan people outside of the Senate on 
both sides accusing Members of the Senate. It is part of the political 
process now, it is not part of the ethics process. We have people 
accusing us almost daily of having done something wrong and publishing 
it through blogs and all that. I think we should be very careful in 
setting up another tool for these bloggers and these people to use to 
create more news, to create more charges against the Senate. So I urge 
the Senate to vote against this amendment and keep confidence in our 
own rules and our own procedure.
  It is my hope the Senate will follow the example of the Majority of 
the Rules Committee and the Governmental Affairs Committee. We will 
closely scrutinize this and other amendments before us.
  I cannot support an amendment that either replaces the Senate Ethics 
Committee or adds another layer to our already expensive and time-
consuming process. I urge the Senate to defeat this provision.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  Mr. VOINOVICH. Mr. President, I yield time to the Senator from Utah. 
How much time do I have remaining?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Twenty-one minutes.
  Mr. VOINOVICH. I yield 7 minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Utah is recognized.
  Mr. BENNETT. Mr. President, I have heard the arguments, and I agree 
with most of them. I simply want to put it all in perspective.
  Let us remember that the Senate Ethics Committee, under the man who 
is currently the assistant majority leader, the majority whip, Senator 
McConnell, censured the chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, a 
member of Senator McConnell's own party. The Senate Ethics Committee is 
not a namby-pamby, rollover, protect-the-party kind of institution. Let 
us remember that the current Democratic leader, the Senator from 
Nevada, was on the Ethics Committee when it censured a member of his 
own party with sufficient strength to cause that Member to recognize 
that he could not possibly seek reelection.
  There would be those who would say: Oh, Senator Reid will protect the 
Democrat. Senator Reid will see to it that the decision of the Justice 
Department, which said he had not violated a law, would be sufficient 
and would give him appropriate political cover. Senator Reid did not do 
that. Instead, the Ethics Committee came out with a statement so strong 
that the Senator in question withdrew himself from the election.
  Again, the Senator from Kentucky, when he was chairman of the Ethics 
Committee, came out with statements so strong that the chairman of the 
Senate Finance Committee--in some people's view, the most significant 
committee assignment anyone could have in this body--was forced to 
resign.
  Let us not listen to those who say the Senate Ethics Committee does 
not do its job and needs some kind of a watchdog--some kind of a 
gatekeeper, if you will--that will go out and gather those accusations 
which the Ethics Committee has not properly examined. Let's create the 
Senate version of the independent counsel.
  The Independent Counsel Act came after Watergate, as people reacted 
to the Watergate scandal and said: We need a counsel who is independent 
of all politics. They don't recognize that the people who ended up with 
the prosecutions and the convictions that sent members of the Nixon 
administration to prison were not people connected with an independent 
counsel; they were people out of the Justice Department. Let us 
remember that when the President tried to do things with the Justice 
Department that were viewed as being protective of him, there were 
individuals who refused to accept appointment, who resigned from the 
Justice Department rather than carry out a partisan agenda. We are 
getting the independent counsel mentality here of the same kind. There 
has been a scandal. Jack Abramoff has broken the law.
  I agree with the comment made by the Senator from Nebraska, Mr. 
Nelson, who said: Washington is the only place I know where, when 
people break

[[Page S2451]]

the law, our reaction is, change the law, make the law tougher.
  Jack Abramoff is going to go to prison, and he is going to go to 
prison under the old rules. He is going to go to prison under the 
existing laws. That doesn't say to me that the existing rules and the 
existing laws somehow failed. What failed is that Jack Abramoff failed 
his moral and integrity responsibility to abide by the law, not that 
there was something wrong with the law.
  So we had the Independent Counsel Act after Watergate, and we saw 
what happened. When the impeachment trial here in this Chamber was 
over, Senator McConnell and Senator Dodd, the chairman and ranking 
member respectively of the Senate Rules Committee, both went upstairs 
to the press gallery and both said: It is time to kill the independent 
counsel statute. The independent counsel statute has gone too far, it 
has created too much partisanship, it has created too much difficulty. 
A bipartisan call, and this body agreed, and the independent counsel 
statute lapsed, with no tears being shed for it in this body.
  Now there is a sense that somehow, in response to the Abramoff 
scandal, we must do the same thing that was done in response to the 
Watergate scandal. If we do this, at some future point, the future 
counterparts of Senator McConnell and Senator Dodd will go to the 
gallery and say it is time to kill the Office of Public Integrity.
  Let's go back to the way things make sense. We have heard all of the 
examples from all of the Senators as to the way this would work and the 
way it would make sense. I oppose this amendment, and I hope all of the 
Members of the Senate will do so as well.
  Mr. VOINOVICH. Again, the time remaining, Mr. President?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Fifteen minutes.
  Mr. VOINOVICH. I yield the Senator from Arkansas up to 10 minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arkansas is recognized.
  Mr. PRYOR. Mr. President, I commend Senators Collins and Lieberman on 
their great work on this underlying bill. I am on the Homeland Security 
Committee with them, and it is always great to work with them. They 
work in a very nonpartisan and bipartisan fashion.
  Also, I wish to thank Senator Voinovich and Senator Johnson for their 
leadership on the Ethics Committee on which I also serve. They have 
demonstrated what being real Senators is all about because they take 
their responsibility on ethics very seriously, and I am here today to 
support their position on this amendment and to oppose this amendment.
  The Ethics Committee works with diligence and without politics. I 
have only been on this committee for a little more than a year, and I 
will be the first to tell you that there is a problem with the House 
Ethics Committee. I think everybody agrees on that. But also, I am 
adamant to say that there is really not a problem at all on the Senate 
Ethics Committee because we take our responsibilities very seriously. 
We are there to protect the Senate, the integrity of this institution, 
and, just as the Constitution says, we are there to oversee the 
behavior of our colleagues. We do that in a very confidential manner.
  I must say that it is sometimes frustrating to outside forces who 
look and see us, and they may file something and they may not get an 
immediate response.
  I remember when I was starting out practicing law in Arkansas, a 
lawyer told me: Never try your case in the newspaper. I think that is 
very true when it comes to the world of ethics inside the Senate. If we 
allow the confidentiality to go away, then, in my view, we would be 
opening a Pandora's box. I can just imagine--again, in today's 
realistic political world--I can just imagine what it would be like if 
someone were to file a complaint and the next thing you know, there 
would be radio ads, television ads, Internet ads, blogs, et cetera, out 
there saying that so-and-so has ethics charges pending against him.
  The Senate Ethics Committee, although not perfect, is a much better 
option than the Office of Public Integrity. Again, I believe that is 
one of the reasons this amendment or something very similar to this was 
defeated in the committee on a bipartisan basis.
  I also notice that there are groups around Washington, DC, who are 
very supportive of the Office of Public Integrity. Basically, one of 
their complaints is that when they file a complaint with the Senate 
Ethics Committee, the complaint seems to go in a black hole. In fact, I 
have an e-mail that says we--the Ethics Committee--ignore outside 
complaints. Nothing could be further from the truth. I am here to tell 
you, nothing could be further from the truth. We consider all the 
complaints, wherever they come from, very seriously. We look at them, 
and we act on outside complaints, complaints that come from outside 
this body. We have spent a lot of time--hours and hours, in fact--on 
complaints that originated outside this body.
  Also, I think some of these groups say they acknowledge that the 
House has a problem with their Ethics Committee, but they say that both 
committees are in need of repair. Really, they can't point to anything 
in the Senate Ethics Committee that has gone wrong or any way that we 
failed on the Senate Ethics Committee. There is a reason for that. You 
can look back over the last 20 years, and you will see a number of high 
profile, very difficult, very tough, and oftentimes very complicated 
investigations the Senate Ethics Committee has undertaken which have 
led to some sort of admonishment of their own Members in the Senate.
  The last thing I wanted to say, is this: Being on the Ethics 
Committee, every day when I walk in that room, I ask myself, what did I 
do to make Harry Reid mad? Why did he put me on this committee? Because 
I will tell you, as the chairman will or as the cochairman will tell 
you, it is not an easy assignment. In fact, it is grueling.
  One thing we need to understand is that oftentimes, to get down to 
the facts and to get down to the truth, it takes time. It takes a lot 
of time. Sometimes you have witnesses who are no longer here. Some of 
these witnesses live in other parts of the country and even, in some 
cases, other parts of the world.
  There are meetings and meetings and meetings on these allegations. 
One thing I love about the Senate Ethics Committee is the high level of 
trust among the members in that committee. There is a culture of 
integrity in that committee. As I said, even though it is no fun to sit 
in judgment of our colleagues, it has worked very well.
  Because of the committee's policy of keeping its meetings closed and 
confidential, it allows a freedom within the Ethics Committee to really 
drill down and get into details and ask hard questions, questions that 
you might be afraid to ask in a public forum because you may not know 
the answer, and that answer may be very embarrassing and just by asking 
the question, it could turn into an allegation.
  The process we have right now--although it is closed, although it is 
confidential--works very well. In a lot of ways it is similar to 
turning the case over to the jury, where you allow the jury to go back 
into deliberations and hash it out however they want to do it. In the 
end, they come back and they do justice. I think our Founding Fathers 
got it right in article I, section 5, paragraph 2 when they said that:

       Each House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings, 
     punish its Members for disorderly Behavior, and with the 
     Concurrence of two-thirds, expel a Member.

  I think our Founding Fathers expected us to do this and not set up a 
third party office to do this.
  Again, I rise to join my two chairmen, the chairman and cochairman on 
the Ethics Committee, in opposing this amendment, and I encourage all 
my colleagues to do the same.
  Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I am voting against the Collins amendment 
because it is unconstitutional. Article I, section 5, provides:

       Each House may determine the Rules of its' Proceedings, 
     punish its Members for disorderly behaviour, and, with the 
     concurrence of two-thirds, expel a Member.

  The Senate has determined the rules for punishing its Members which 
carries out the constitutional mandate. That constitutional procedure 
does not permit delegation of that responsibility.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine.

[[Page S2452]]

  Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I found this debate to be both 
interesting and ironic. We have heard the proposed Office of Public 
Integrity described on the one hand as being a potentially out-of-
control, independent counsel/special prosecutor. Then we have heard it 
described as a toothless entity that simply duplicates the work of the 
Ethics Committee and would have to check with the Ethics Committee at 
its every stage of the investigation.
  In fact, neither characterization is an accurate one. Perhaps the 
best way to think of the proposed Office of Public Integrity is that it 
would be the investigative arm of the Ethics Committee. It would be an 
entity that would conduct a thorough, impartial, credible investigation 
of allegations and then report back to the Ethics Committee. It is 
essentially controlled by the Ethics Committee but has the ability to 
do independent investigations.
  It is neither an out-of-control special prosecutor nor is it a 
powerless office that simply duplicates the work being done and that 
would be done by the Ethics Committee anyway. In fact, one of the 
opponents of this amendment said that they would create a duplicate 
investigation. I don't understand how that conclusion can be reached. 
There is nothing in this amendment that would require the Ethics 
Committee to conduct a parallel investigation, and why would they? We 
have already heard the Chairman of the Ethics Committee say that they 
do not do an investigation when there is a parallel Justice Department 
investigation going on. Why would the Ethics Committee choose to 
duplicate the work of the Office of Public Integrity? This bill does 
not mandate that the Ethics Committee throw all common sense overboard. 
So that argument simply does not hold water.
  We have also heard it alleged that the Office of Public Integrity 
would make public information that is now confidential. But look at the 
plain language of the amendment. I am going to read it into the Record 
because this information to the contrary has been advanced on the 
Senate floor. Here is what it says: ``Disclosure.'' It is on page 11 of 
the amendment.

       Information or testimony received, or the contents of a 
     complaint or the fact of its filing, or recommendations made 
     by the Director to the committee, may be publicly disclosed 
     by the Director or the staff of the Office only--

  I am going to underscore that, Mr. President.

     --only if authorized by the Select Committee on Ethics of the 
     Senate.

  I don't know how it could be more clear, that the decision on 
disclosing information on the investigation cannot be made unilaterally 
by the Office of Public Integrity. Under our amendment, the Ethics 
Committee, not the Office of Public Integrity, has the sole authority 
to determine what parts of an investigation, if any, become a matter of 
public record. The OPI has no such authority. The language could not be 
more clear on that point.
  Second, although a vote of the Ethics Committee to overrule the 
Office of Public Integrity would be made public, that is because such a 
vote would end the case. In other words, the Ethics Committee would not 
be voting publicly multiple times on a particular investigation at 
every stage--contrary to the information, or the argument that was 
advanced earlier by the distinguished chairman of the Ethics Committee. 
This is how it would work. The Ethics Committee would vote only once, 
either to overrule the Office of Public Integrity, which it can do at 
any stage of the investigation, or at the end of the investigation the 
committee would vote on a final determination of whether a violation 
has occurred.
  I realize that Members have very strong views on this issue. I 
realize there are legitimate differences of opinion. I recognize that 
this is a difficult issue. But I hope that Members will look at the 
actual language of the amendment that Senator Lieberman, Senator 
McCain, and I have advanced. I recognize that there is a reason there 
is considerable confusion. There are all different versions of entities 
similar to the Office of Public Integrity that we are proposing. But we 
have drafted our proposal very carefully not to undermine the good work 
of the Ethics Committee, not to take away the final decisionmaking from 
the Ethics Committee but to promote public confidence in the integrity 
and the credibility of investigations by having this office, the Office 
of Public Integrity, conduct the investigation.
  Will the Presiding Officer inform me how much time is remaining on 
the proponents' side.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has 12 minutes remaining.
  Ms. COLLINS. I reserve the remainder of my time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Ohio.
  Mr. VOINOVICH. How much time do I have?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has 8 minutes.
  Mr. VOINOVICH. Mr. President, I yield 3 minutes to the Senator from 
Kentucky.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Kentucky is recognized.
  Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, I thank my friend from Ohio. I 
congratulate the Senator from Maine for her extraordinary work on the 
underlying lobby reform bill but respectfully disagree as to the 
appropriateness of adopting the Lieberman-Collins amendment.
  This amendment creates a new Senate Office of Public Integrity with a 
Director, appointed for a 5-year term, by the President Pro Tempore 
upon the joint recommendation of the majority leader and minority 
leader. He or she would literally be ``an investigation czar.'' Let me 
just highlight a few of the most problematic aspects of this proposal.
  No. 1 on the list of the ``Duties'' of the Director is, and I quote 
from page 3, ``(1) to investigate . . .''. At its core the OPI is 
really the ``SBI''--``Senate Bureau of Integrity''--not even of 
intelligence.
  To get the ball rolling, investigations by the Director are initiated 
by a complaint filed by anyone--a complaint without any requirements. 
In comparison, FEC complaints must be in ``in writing, signed and sworn 
to by the person filing such complaint, shall be notarized and shall be 
made under penalty of perjury and subject to the provisions of the 
criminal code.'' The complaint this integrity czar investigates doesn't 
have to meet any of those requirements--it could be filed via anonymous 
voicemail or on a beverage coaster--the name and address of the 
complainant isn't even required.
  The only restriction on the complaint is that a complaint against a 
Member can't be ``accepted'' within 60 days of an election involving 
such Member. Thus, complaints can be filed against a Member's staff, 
and on the flip side, complaints made, maybe not accepted, but made 
during that 60-day period against a Member gives that Member no way to 
clear their name until after that election.
  Making matters even more grim, these complaints are only against 
incumbents or their staff--so challengers can go hog wild in filing 
complaints and keeping their opponents under a cloud of suspicion--no 
matter how baseless. The only penalty for a frivolous complaint is they 
might not accept another one from that person, to the extent their 
identity is even known, and may incur costs resulting from the 
complaint. A very small price to pay for what would smear the good name 
of Members.
  The Director is required to go to the Ethics Committee before getting 
his full blown power to ``administer oaths, issue subpoenas, compel 
attendance and production of documents and take depositions.'' However, 
it takes a roll call vote of \2/3\ of the full committee to stop the 
Director's full blown investigation and the vesting of his full 
prosecutorial powers.
  This amendment strips the bipartisan 6-member Ethics Committee of one 
of its core functions--enforcement--arguably its most important--and 
vests it all in one unelected individual. I urge my colleagues to 
oppose this amendment.
  Let me say I know there are many watchers of the Senate, as an 
institution, who may well believe that the Ethics Committee is a body 
constituted to go easy on Senators. I must respectfully suggest to the 
public and to our colleagues that the facts are otherwise.
  I was vice chairman of the Senate Ethics Committee and then 
subsequently chairman of the Senate Ethics Committee during a time when 
my

[[Page S2453]]

party was in the majority in the Senate and had to, based on the facts 
in a particular case, offer a resolution to expel the chairman of the 
Finance Committee of the Senate from the Senate. That Member of the 
Senate subsequently resigned. But the vote in the Senate Ethics 
Committee was 6 to 0, on a bipartisan basis, to expel the chairman of 
the Finance Committee from the Senate. Surely, no one would consider 
that a slap on the wrist.
  I cite another example. When the current Senate Democratic leader was 
chairman of the Ethics Committee, it issued such a scathing report on a 
bipartisan basis that a Member of his party chose to discontinue his 
effort to be reelected in the fall of 2002. The Senate Ethics Committee 
respects, first and foremost, this institution and its reputation. I 
think it has undertaken extraordinary efforts over the years in 
protecting Members from spurious complaints and being able to sort out 
a genuine wrongdoing and, when genuine wrongdoing appears, go after it 
and not tolerate it.
  I particularly compliment the current chairman of the Ethics 
Committee, the Senator from Ohio, Mr. Voinovich, who has done an 
extraordinary job in this regard as well.
  So I hope our colleagues, on a bipartisan basis, will not support the 
Collins-Lieberman amendment. I think the Senate Ethics Committee can 
handle this job quite well in the future, as it has in the past.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator has expired.
  The Senator from Maine.
  Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, we are faced with a choice. We have the 
opportunity to pass significant legislation to strengthen our lobbying 
disclosure laws to ban practices that raise questions about undue 
influence of special interests and to strengthen the enforcement of 
those laws. Even without the Office of Public Integrity, I believe we 
have produced a good bill. But I believe that our legislation will be 
incomplete if we do not act to strengthen the enforcement process. I 
believe, after much study, that the best way to do this is to create an 
Office of Public Integrity.
  That is not in any way to indicate a lack of appreciation for the 
hard work of the fine members of our Senate Ethics Committee under the 
leadership of two individuals with great integrity. I understand that 
it is a thankless job to serve on the Ethics Committee, and contrary to 
the comment that was made earlier in the debate, I believe that this 
office, by conducting the investigative portion, by assisting the 
Ethics Committee in investigating allegations, would actually be of 
great assistance to the Ethics Committee.
  The chairman of the Ethics Committee has expressed, time and again, 
his frustration that the public does not know of the work the Ethics 
Committee does. It doesn't realize how seriously the investigations and 
allegations are treated; that it doesn't appreciate how difficult it is 
to pursue allegations against Members with whom one serves. I suggest 
that this amendment offers great assistance to the Ethics Committee. If 
there is an Office of Public Integrity which is conducting independent 
investigations and reporting its findings to the Ethics Committee, I 
think that enhances the public's understanding of the process, the 
public's acceptance of the process, and the credibility of the 
investigations.
  We are dealing with a reality that public confidence in Congress is 
very low. It is perilously low. It makes it difficult for us to pass 
legislation because the public believes that oftentimes our decisions 
are not in the public interest but, rather, beholden to some private 
interest. That saddens me because I know the people I serve with are 
individuals of great integrity, and the vast majority of elected 
officials in Washington and elsewhere are in public service for all the 
right reasons. But that perception is a reality we need to deal with. 
The best way to deal with it, in my judgment, is to pass strong, 
comprehensive legislation which will help repair the frayed bonds 
between the public and those who serve the public.
  The Office of Public Integrity is an integral part of achieving that 
goal. There is a lot of opposition to this amendment. I don't delude 
myself to the contrary. I have learned organizational change in 
Washington is the hardest kind of change to accomplish. I learned that 
when Senator Lieberman and I led the legislation restructuring and 
reforming our intelligence community, the most sweeping reforms in 50 
years. I have learned trying to change the organization of Congress or 
the way Congress works makes that reorganization of our intelligence 
community look easy.
  I recognize this is an uphill fight, but I believe it is the right 
thing to do. I hope our colleagues, before casting their vote today, 
will take the time to read the actual language of the amendment and to 
think about what we need to do to repair the breach between those who 
are elected and the people we serve, to promote and strengthen public 
confidence in the political process. I believe if our colleagues do 
that and if they care about restoring public confidence in Congress, 
they will support the amendment we have offered.
  I reserve the remainder of my time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Martinez). The Senator from Ohio.
  Mr. VOINOVICH. Mr. President, first, I again compliment the chairman 
of the Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee for the 
good job she and the committee have done in proposing legislation that 
will make a difference in the Senate and in the Congress. I respect 
everything the Senator has done. Some of the amendments making 
mandatory some of the things we are doing voluntarily I welcome. I 
thank the Senator.
  One thing I have tried to do is to inform Members about what the 
rules are so they do not get in trouble. I point out that even though 
the amendment is well motivated and meant to help the Ethics Committee, 
all six members of the Ethics Committee on a bipartisan basis oppose 
it. The Ethics Committee is the investigative arm of the Senate. It is 
a nonpartisan investigator of all matters brought before the Ethics 
Committee and, something some Members are not happy about, matters that 
are not brought before us, on the complaint of some, that we recognize, 
through the media, there is a problem with one of the Members, and we 
get involved in it. We do not have to wait for someone to file a 
complaint. We are the watchdog of the Senate. We want to protect the 
Senate's reputation. We admonish, we censor and, in some cases, eject 
Members of this Senate for not upholding the high standards all Members 
are expected to uphold after being elected to this Senate.
  I do not believe this is going to mend the problem in terms of public 
confidence. As I have mentioned, except for recently some criticisms, 
we did not get involved in the Abramoff investigation. Overall, in 
terms of the public, the Senate Ethics Committee has been doing the job 
they are supposed to do under the Constitution. Again, I underscore in 
terms of Abramoff, we did not get involved because of the fact that the 
Justice Department asked us not to get involved. They thought it would 
interfere with their investigation. I assure Members of the Senate and 
I assure the public and other groups that are looking in on us, once 
that investigation is finished and the information is sent here, if one 
of our Members or several Members are involved, we will fully 
investigate that. If those individuals have violated the rules of the 
Senate, they will be properly dealt with by the Ethics Committee.
  In terms of the specific parts of this legislation, I bring up 
something that has a problem, and that is that every time the Ethics 
Committee disagrees with the Office of Public Integrity, we have to 
have a published vote of the committee. As a result of that, what will 
happen, in my opinion, is that after a while, where the Ethics 
Committee does not agree with the Office of Public Integrity, you will 
build up an adversarial type of relationship. Members, in terms of how 
they vote, will start taking into consideration, gee, it is going to be 
public that we disagreed with this guy and people will ask, why did you 
disagree with that, and we get into that whole area of questioning 
people's motivation.
  It also gets us involved in partisanship, Members asking, why did you 
vote that particular way? You had a chance maybe to harm some other 
Member because of political reasons. Or why did you pick on one of our 
Members?
  This job is a very tough job. It is not a job that makes one popular 
with his

[[Page S2454]]

colleagues in this Senate. I believe rather than helping the situation, 
in spite of the fine motivation of the people sponsoring this 
amendment, rather than helping, it is going to hurt the situation and 
also make it very difficult in the future to have Members being willing 
to serve as a member of the Senate Ethics Committee.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Alabama.
  Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. President, I have been allocated 10 minutes to 
speak on the Wyden amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is correct.
  Mr. SESSIONS. I seek to use that time.
  Mr. INHOFE. Will the Senator yield for an inquiry?
  Is there a unanimous consent in terms of Members speaking?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Yes, the time is controlled by the Senator 
from Alabama and the Senator from Maine.
  Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, to clarify our situation, if I may, if 
the Presiding Officer would tell me if I am correct that there is still 
an amount of time remaining to the proponents of the Collins-Lieberman-
McCain amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. There is 6 minutes remaining.
  Ms. COLLINS. And I believe the time of the opponents has expired, the 
time that was controlled by Senator Voinovich; am I correct?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is correct.
  Ms. COLLINS. And I believe there is a parallel time agreement for 
further debate on the Wyden amendment; am I correct?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is correct.
  Mr. INHOFE. My request would be that I be acknowledged to speak on 
the Wyden-Grassley-Inhofe amendment in whatever order you are prepared 
to give me.
  Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I am going to reserve my 6 minutes for 
right before the vote for some concluding comments. I probably will not 
use all 6 minutes. I have no objection to turning now to the debate on 
the Wyden amendment.


                           Amendment No. 2944

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Alabama.
  Mr. SESSIONS. I assume Senator Inhofe will have time after I conclude 
my 10 minutes and I ask unanimous consent to that effect. He is on the 
other side of this issue.
  The Wyden amendment provides a new advantage for those who want 
bigger and more expensive Government. Senators who want time to study a 
bill before granting consent would have to put their names in the 
Record as objecting to it even though they may quickly decide they do 
not have an objection to the bill.
  First, the Senator from Oregon stated that this amendment--and this 
is a good example of what happens in the Senate--that this amendment 
was being blocked by a secret hold. But there was no secret hold. The 
leadership of the Senate knew that I had an interest in participating 
in the debate, but I had a meeting at the White House this morning and 
so I asked if they could accommodate that and set the debate at a time 
I could participate. That apparently was worked out.
  Under the Senator from Oregon's amendment, I would have had to submit 
a written request to the majority leader in order to participate in the 
debate, but I was at the White House and that was not very practical. 
Is telling my leader I would like an opportunity to be in the Senate to 
debate this issue now an unreasonable request? The Senator from Oregon 
has also stated that the intelligence authorization bill is being held 
up based on a secret hold. In truth, it is not a secret. I will tell 
the Senator who is holding that important intelligence bill: It is the 
two Senators from Massachusetts. Senators Kennedy and Kerry have 
objected to considering the bill because they want to offer amendments. 
Some say they are poison-pill amendments, but they are amendments they 
want to offer. So if the Senator has a problem about that, he should 
talk to his colleagues. The Senators may say this only applies to 
proceeding to a bill. This is an important thing, because in 99 percent 
of the cases, proceedings of the bill and passage of the bill happen at 
the same time. The bill is called up and asked to be passed by 
unanimous consent. It is all the same request. Frankly, the problem 
with this bill goes further than the mechanical application. It makes a 
statement. It basically says that passing bills is inherently a good 
thing, and we should assume any Senator who has never heard of a bill 
should consent to it. Anyone who dares not to grant promptly and 
immediately any such consent is some scoundrel who needs to be exposed 
to misdeeds.
  Senator Coburn has offered an amendment that says if we are going to 
have this hold amendment, he would offer one that says if you want to 
pass a bill and there is no quorum present, and you want to ram it 
through with no quorum present, you need to have a petition signed by 
100 Senators saying they are prepared to let the bill go through.
  Why not? It is not practical, perhaps, but the system is not designed 
to be practical. Frankly, it is too easy to pass bills. Bills flow 
through this body like water.
  I want the American people to know how bills are passed in this 
Senate. We were talking about some sunshine here. Let's talk about it. 
There is a system we have called a hotline. What is a hotline? In each 
Senate office there are three telephones with hotline buttons on them. 
Most evenings, sometimes after business hours, these phones begin to 
ring. The calls are from the Republican and the Democratic leaders to 
each of their Members, asking consent to pass this or that bill--not 
consider the bill or have debate on the bill but to pass it. Those 
calls will normally give a deadline. If the staff do not call back in 
30 minutes, the bill passes. Boom. It can be 500 pages. In many 
offices, when staffers do not know anything about the bill, they 
usually ignore the hotline and let the bill pass without even informing 
their Senators. If the staff miss the hotline, or do not know about it 
or were not around, the Senator is deemed to have consented to the 
passage of some bill which might be quite an important piece of 
information.
  So that is the real issue here. The issue is not about holds. The 
rules say nothing about holds. Holds do not exist. The issue is 
consent. Nobody has a right to have an individual Senator's consent to 
pass a bill. They act as though you have a right to get it. You would 
expect if you are going to say you have unanimous consent, you have 
consent. But that is not always the case.
  If staff do not have time to read the bill--some of these bills are 
hundreds of pages long--they frequently assume someone else has read 
it. Staff in the Senate offices do not read all these bills, and they 
go back to whatever they were doing before the hotline phone rang. 
Presumably, some committee staffer has read the bill at some point 
along the way, but in almost no case have actual Members of the Senate 
granted their intentional consent to the bills that pass during the 
day's wrapup that we often see late into the night on C-SPAN.
  In many cases, even Senators sponsoring the bill have never read it, 
unfortunately. Committee reports are filed on bills. Very few staff 
have read the committee reports. How do I know about this? I have the 
thankless task of chairing the Senate Steering Committee. One of our 
commitments is to review every bill that is hotlined in the Senate. My 
staff actually reads them. It is a service to my colleagues, I suggest. 
They read the CBO scores which tell how much the bill costs the 
taxpayers. A lot of times they do not want you to know that. Some 
committee, group, or someone has moved a bill on the floor--they move 
it along--and nobody has read the score. Many contain massive, new 
spending programs. Some bust the budget. We think Senators who are 
looking out for the taxpayers and taking the time to study bills should 
have the same rights as Senators who are willing to let big spending 
bills pass without reading them. This amendment is not good government. 
It will make it more likely that bills will pass in the middle of the 
night filled with pork and who knows what else.
  The current process established by the two leaders provides for 72 
hours for Senators to withhold consent and to read a bill. Beyond that, 
the objections become public. Under this amendment, if a Senator in an 
offhand conversation with the leader says, ``I

[[Page S2455]]

think we ought to take a hard look at this bill,'' does that mean his 
name should be printed in the Record? That is not workable. If I am on 
the floor, and the leader asks me if we ought to go to such and such a 
bill, and I say, ``No, don't do that, I think something else should go 
first,'' do I then immediately have to go to the floor and publish that 
in the Record?
  According to this resolution, any communication with the leader 
suggesting we not proceed to a bill would need to be printed in the 
Record and submitted to the leader in writing. However, if I 
communicate to the leader that we should proceed to some big spending 
bill, I can do that in secret. This gives a new advantage to those who 
want to pass legislation without review.
  Now, I take very seriously holding up a bill. We stay on our team, 
and we look at the matter promptly and try to give an honest response. 
And if we have a problem with a clause or two in a piece of 
legislation, we share that with the Senators who are promoting the 
legislation. Usually an agreement can be reached, and usually the 
legislation is cleared, anyway, without any significant delay.
  Line 4 of the Wyden amendment says:

       The majority and minority leaders of the Senate or their 
     designees shall recognize a notice of intent of a Senator who 
     is a member of their caucus to object to proceeding to a 
     measure or matter only if the Senator
       (1) submits the notice of intent in writing to the 
     appropriate leader or their designee; and
       (2) within 3 session days after the submission under 
     paragraph (1) submits for inclusion in the Congressional 
     Record and in the applicable calendar section described in 
     subsection (b) the following notice:
       ``I, Senator [blank], intend to object to proceeding to 
     [blank], dated [blank].''

  If a Senator tells their leader on the phone they have concern with a 
bill that was offered that night, must they quickly run down to his 
office and hand the leader a piece of paper? This says it must be 
submitted in writing; otherwise, the leader cannot recognize it.
  If the leader decides against proceeding to the bill, does that mean 
he has violated the rule?
  How can we prove that the leader did not simply change his mind, but 
rather that he illegally recognized an oral hold, which was not 
submitted in writing?
  Who is to make such a determination?
  Is the Parliamentarian going to be put in the uncomfortable position 
of trying to divine the motivations of a party leader?
  I am not sure what the purpose of the 3 days is, but here is what its 
effect is:
  If a bill is hotlined at 7:30 at night, and the leaders say it will 
be passed at 7:45 unless there is an objection, and my staff calls them 
to say please do not proceed, we would like to review the bill, rather 
than reading the bill, they would have to run to the leader's office 
with a piece of paper saying we object to the bill.
  Then, let's say they run back to the office, start reading, and after 
review, the bill looks fine. Let's say they even call back within the 
15-minute window that was given. The bill passes that night. The next 
day it passes the House, and is signed by the President. It is now law.
  On the third day, I would still need to insert a statement in the 
Congressional Record saying ``I, Senator Jeff Sessions, intend to 
object to proceeding [blank], dated [blank].''
  I intend to object to a bill that has already been signed into law?
  The amendment has been so poorly drafted that it is not even clear 
what it does. This is what we are dealing with.
  This poorly drafted amendment is intended to stack the deck, in favor 
of other poorly drafted legislation passing in the middle of the night 
with little or no review.
  Let's look at section (c) line 18:

       A Senator may have an item with respect to the Senator 
     removed from a calendar to which it was added under 
     subsection (b) by submitting for inclusion in the 
     Congressional Record the following notice:
       I, Senator [blank], do not object to proceeding to [blank], 
     dated [blank].

  This is the flip side: Maybe you looked at the bill and do not like 
it, but are willing to let it pass by a voice vote.
  Now, to get the ``scarlet letter'' I removed, you need to put a 
statement into the Record saying you do not object to the bill, which 
may not be altogether true.
  Further, what if you simply want to offer an amendment, or debate, 
but the leadership wants to pass the bill clean. How does this bill 
apply?
  I suppose one interpretation is it would not apply at all, because it 
only purports to apply to ``proceeding to a bill.''
  What if you want to offer a thousand amendments? What then? What if 
you prefer to proceed to a different version of the bill?
  What if you would simply like a rollcall vote on the motion to 
proceed, or would like time to debate, but the leadership does not want 
to grant you that. Technically, you are objecting to proceeding under 
those circumstances.
  I could stand here for hours discussing all the many ways this 
amendment is going to damage the Senate, and the many ways this 
amendment is absolutely worthless as a tool to prevent blocking of 
legislation in secret.
  But what I object to most is that this amendment says passing 
legislation is always preferable to slowing it down, that letting a 
bill pass is good no matter how poorly drafted, how costly, how late in 
the evening, or how few Senators have studied or even heard of the 
bill.
  How much pork is there? Passing bills is good: In many cases, that is 
not correct.
  There is a widely quoted story about the ``coolness'' of the Senate 
involving George Washington and Thomas Jefferson. Jefferson was in 
France during the Constitutional Convention.
  Upon his return, Jefferson visited Washington and asked why the 
Convention delegates had created a Senate. ``Why did you pour that 
coffee into your saucer?'' asked Washington. ``To cool it, `` said 
Jefferson. ``Even so,'' responded Washington, ``we pour legislation 
into the senatorial saucer to cool it.''
  The Framers intended the Senate to deliberate, to thoughtfully review 
legislation, not be a rubber stamp.
  This amendment says those Senators who are willing to grant consent 
to legislation they have never read or have perhaps never even heard 
of--those are the good Senators.
  But those Senators who dare to say: I would like time to read this 
legislation, to see how much it costs, to see whether it is within the 
national interests--they are the troublemakers. These scoundrels need 
to be exposed to the public.
  So, in summary, here is where we are.
  Passing midnight spending boondoggles with two Senators in the 
Chamber: Good. Reviewing legislation: Bad. Objecting to big spending 
legislation: Really bad.
  Lobbyists must be thrilled with this. Lobbyists who are pushing 
special-interest legislation will now have a ready-made target list.
  All they need to do is get the leadership to hotline the legislation, 
and within 3 days they will know who they need to talk to or jump on or 
``sick the dogs on.''
  I believe we need to return to the ``cooling'' Senate, not a 
``freezing'' Senate, where obstruction is the rule, nominees are 
blocked endlessly; not a ``greased'' Senate, where bad legislation 
passes at lightning speed late at night with no time for review, but a 
Senate where Senators are encouraged to take the time to pick up a bill 
and read it, to weigh the consequences for the American taxpayers.
  This amendment runs directly contrary to the spirit of reform this 
bill purports to address.
  I urge my colleagues to oppose the amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's time has expired.
  Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. President, I see several of the sponsors of the 
amendment here. Probably they disagree with some of my views, but I 
think they are worthy of their consideration.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Oregon.
  Mr. WYDEN. Mr. President, parliamentary inquiry: How much time is 
available on my side? My understanding is we have 10 minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Oregon controls 10 minutes.
  Mr. WYDEN. Mr. President, it is my desire to yield the first 3 
minutes to Senator Inhofe, the next 3 minutes to Senator Grassley, and 
then I will

[[Page S2456]]

speak. I thank my friend from Oklahoma.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Oklahoma.
  Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, first, let me say to my friend from 
Alabama, I do not think we have ever been in disagreement on anything. 
I have a little different take on this issue than he does and a little 
different background because of an experience I had when I served in 
the other body.
  First, I think realistically, looking at this, you may say ``in 
writing,'' but if you call your leader and tell him, ``I plan to go 
ahead and object to this,'' and he knows it is going to come in 
writing, unless you don't get along with the leader very well, I don't 
think that would be a real serious problem. But I do agree with the 
Senator from Alabama that passing laws is not necessarily a good thing. 
My feeling is we have too many laws, not too few laws. I have said that 
many times.
  But let me share with you an experience I had in the other body. When 
I was first elected in 1986 to the House of Representatives, I found 
there was a process used to keep the signatures of a discharge petition 
from being open to the public. So there could be something very 
popular. For example, a gun control bill might not be popular in West 
Texas, but there might be a West Texas Democrat whose party tells him 
for the national scene, ``We want lots of gun controls, and I know it 
is not popular in the State, but there is a way you can go home and say 
you opposed gun controls and at the same time you can get by with 
appeasing the leadership.''
  That is what they did. They would put the discharge petition in the 
drawer of the Speaker's desk, and you could not get it out unless a 
majority of people signed the discharge petition. Consequently, they 
would go ahead and tell people they had signed it when, in fact, they 
had not.
  I had a one-sentence bill that totally reformed that. It stated that 
all signatures on a discharge petition shall become public record. We 
actually had seven editorials by the Wall Street Journal. We had all 
these things saying: Finally, there is light.
  All I want--all I want--is to be able to have everyone being 
accountable for what they are saying. I have two holds right now, and I 
have said publicly that I am the one who has the holds. I have never, 
in the 12 years I have been here in this body, not specifically stated 
that I had holds when I did. So I think that is the main thing. There 
are similarities between the situation that occurred in the House, and 
I agree with Reader's Digest, the Wall Street Journal. They said that 
was the greatest single reform in the last 60 years.
  So when I first came to this body, I made this statement: that it 
appeared to me that being able to put on holds without being 
accountable is a very similar practice to the inability of knowing what 
the signatures were on discharge petitions. Consequently, I started 
back 12 years ago working on this issue. I am very happy to join 
Senator Wyden and Senator Grassley in what I consider to be a reform 
that is badly needed in the Senate.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that a November 1994 article 
in Reader's Digest by Daniel Levine be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

               [From the Reader's Digest, November 1994]

                How the Trial Lawyers Finally Met Defeat


                 A story of democracy and Capitol Hill

                         (By Daniel R. Levine)

       When a twin-engine Cessna airplane crashed near Fallon, 
     Nev., four years ago, the National Transportation Safety 
     Board (NTSB) ruled pilot error was the cause. But that didn't 
     stop lawyers for two of the injured passengers from suing 
     Cessna on the grounds that the seats on the 25-year-old plane 
     did not provide adequate support. The seats had been ripped 
     out without Cessna's knowledge and rearranged to face each 
     other. But the lawyers claimed that Cessna should have warned 
     against removing the seats. A jury awarded the two plaintiffs 
     more than $2 million.
       In Compton, Calf., a single-engine airplane nearly stalled 
     on the runway and sputtered loudly during take-off. Less than 
     a minute into the air it crashed, killing two of the three 
     people on board. On July 18, 1989, two days before the one-
     year statute of limitations would expire, the survivor and 
     relatives of the deceased passengers filed a $2.5 million 
     lawsuit naming the plane's manufacturer, Piper Aircraft 
     Corp., as a defendant. Not mentioned in the suit was the fact 
     that the plane, built in 1956, had been sitting at the 
     airport unused and uninspected for 2\1/2\ years. The case, 
     awaiting trial, has already cost Piper $50,000.
       The NTSB found that 203 crashes of Beech aircraft between 
     1989 and 1992 were caused by weather, faulty maintenance, 
     pilot error or air control mishaps. But trial lawyers blamed 
     the manufacturer and sued each time. Beech was forced to 
     spend an average of $530,000 defending itself in each case 
     and up to $200,000 simply preparing for those that were 
     dismissed.
       Such product-liability lawsuits have forced small-plane 
     makers such as Cessna to carry $25 million a year in 
     liability insurance. In fact, Cessna stopped producing 
     piston-powered planes primarily because of high cost of 
     defending liability lawsuits. Thus, an American industry that 
     15 years ago ruled the world's skies has lost more than 
     100,000 jobs and has seen the number of small planes it 
     manufactured plummet from over 17,000 in 1978 to under 600 
     last year.
       That may all change. Bucking years of intense lobbying by 
     trial lawyers, Congress voted last summer to bar lawsuits 
     against small-plane manufacturers after a plane and its parts 
     have been in service 18 years. The legislation will create an 
     estimated 25,000 aviation jobs within five years as 
     manufacturers retool and increase production.
       This was the first time that Congress has reformed a 
     product liability law against the wishes of the lawyers who 
     make millions from these cases. And the dramatic victory was 
     made possible because of the efforts of a little-known 
     Congressman from Oklahoma who challenged Capitol Hill's 
     establishment.
       On his first day in 1987 as a member of the U.S. House of 
     Representatives, Jim Inhofe (R., Okla.) asked colleague Mike 
     Synar (D., Okla.) how he had compiled such a liberal voting 
     record while winning reelection in a conservative district. 
     Overhearing the question, another longtime Democratic 
     Congressman interjected: ``It's easy. Vote liberal, press-
     release conservative.''
       This was a revealing lesson in Congressional ethics, the 
     first of many that would open Inhofe's eyes to the way 
     Congress really ran. He soon realized that an archaic set of 
     rules enabled members to deceive constituents and avoid 
     accountability.
       When a Congressman introduced a bill, the Speaker of the 
     House refers it to the appropriate committee. Once there, 
     however, the bill is at the mercy of the committee chairman, 
     who represents the views of the Congressional leadership. If 
     he supports the legislation, he can speed it through hearings 
     to the House floor for a vote. Or he can simply ``bury'' it 
     beneath another committee business.
       This arrangement is tailor-made for special-interest 
     lobbies like the Association of Trial Lawyers of America 
     (ATLA). For eight years, bills to limit the legal liability 
     of small-aircraft manufacturers had been referred to the 
     House Judiciary Committee, only to be buried. Little wonder. 
     One of the ATLA's most reliable supporters on Capital Hill 
     has been Rep. Jack Brooks (D., Texas), powerful chairman of 
     that committee and recipient of regular campaign 
     contributions from ATLA.
       The only way for Congressmen to free bills that chairmen 
     such as Brooks wanted to kill was a procedure called the 
     discharge petition. Under it, a Congressman could dislodge a 
     buried bill if a House majority, 218 members, signed a 
     petition bringing it directly to the floor for a vote. But 
     discharge petitions virtually never succeeded because, since 
     1931, signatures were kept secret from public. This allowed 
     Congressmen to posture publicly in favor of an issue, then 
     thwart passage of the bill by refusing to sign the discharge 
     petition. At the same time, House leaders could view the 
     petitions, enabling them to pressure signers to remove their 
     names. Of 493 discharge petitions ever filed, only 45 got the 
     numbers of signatures required for a House vote. And only two 
     of those bills became law.
       Inhofe saw the proposals overwhelmingly favored by the 
     American People--the 1990 balanced-budget amendment, school 
     prayer, Congressional term limits, the line-item veto--were 
     bottled up in committee by the House leadership. When 
     discharge petitions to free some of the bills were initiated, 
     they were locked in a drawer in the Clerk's desk on the House 
     floor. The official rules warned that disclosing names ``is 
     strictly prohibited under the precedents of the House.''
       In March 1993, Inhofe filed a one-sentence bill on the 
     House floor challenging the secrecy: ``Once a motion to 
     discharge has been filed the Clerk shall make the signatures 
     a matter of public record.''
       The bill was assigned to the Rules Committee, where it was 
     buried. Three months later, on May 27, Inhofe started a 
     discharge petition to bring the bill to a floor vote. Among 
     those signing was Tim Penny (D., Minn.), a lawmaker who after 
     ten years in the House had grown so disgusted that he had 
     decided not to run for re-election. ``Discharge petitions 
     procedures are symbolic of the manipulative and secretive way 
     decisions are made here,'' said Penny. ``It's just one more 
     example of how House leaders rig the rules to make sure they 
     aren't challenged on the floor.''
       Inhofe, though, was badly outnumbered. The Democrats 82-
     seat majority controlled the flow of legislation. But he was 
     not cowed. From his first years in politics Inhofe had shown 
     an independent streak--and it had paid off. After initially 
     losing elections for governor and Congress. He was elected to 
     three consecutive terms as mayor of Tulsa,

[[Page S2457]]

     beginning in 1977. In 1986, he ran again for the Congress and 
     won. Four years later, he bucked his own President, George 
     Bush, by voting against a 1991 budget ``compromise'' that 
     included a $156-billion tax hike.
       By August 4, two months after filing his discharge 
     petition, Inhofe had 200 signatures, just 18 shy of the 218 
     needed to force his bill to the floor. But the House 
     leadership was using all its muscle to thwart him. On the 
     House floor, Inhofe announced: ``I am disclosing to The Wall 
     Street Journal the names of all members who have not signed 
     the discharge petition. People deserve to know what is going 
     on in this place.''
       It was a risk. House leaders could make him pay for this 
     deed. But by making public the names of non-signers, he would 
     avoid a direct violation of House rules. Inhofe collected the 
     names by asking every member who signed the petition to 
     memorize as many other signatures as possible.
       The next day, The Wall Street Journal ran the first of six 
     editorials on the subject. Titled ``Congress's Secret 
     Drawer,'' it accused Congressional leaders of using 
     discharge-petition secrecy to ``protect each other and keep 
     constituents in the dark.''
       On the morning of August 6, Inhofe was within a handful of 
     the 218 signatures. As the day wore on, more members came 
     forward to sign. With two hours to go before the August 
     recess, the magic number of 218 was within his grasp.
       What happened next stunned Inhofe. Two of the most powerful 
     members of Congress--Energy and Commerce Committee Chairman 
     John Dingell (D., Mich.) and Rules Committee Chairman Joseph 
     Moakley (D., Mass.)--moved next to him at the discharge 
     petition desk. In a display one witness described as 
     political ``trench warfare,'' the two began ``convincing'' 
     members to remove their names from the petition.
       Standing near the desk was Rep. James Moran (D., Va.). 
     Moakley warned him that if Inhofe succeeded, members would be 
     forced to vote on controversial bills. ``Jim,'' he said 
     sternly, ``I don't have to tell you how dangerous that would 
     be.'' When the dust settled, Moran and five colleagues--
     Robert Borski (D., Pa.), Bill Brewster (D., Okla.), Bob 
     Clement (D., Tenn.), Glenn English (D., Okla.) and Tony Hall 
     (D., Ohio)--had erased their names.
       Still refusing to quit, Inhofe faxed the first Wall Street 
     Journal editorial to hundreds of radio stations. Before long, 
     he found himself on call-in programs virtually every day of 
     the week.
       When The Wall Street Journal printed the names of the 
     nonsigners on August 17, House members home for the summer 
     recess could not avoid the public outcry Inhofe had 
     generated. With scandals in the House bank, post office and 
     restaurant still fresh in their minds, voters were 
     demanding openness.
       Feeling outgunned, Moakley allowed his Democratic 
     colleagues to sign the discharge petition. When Rep. Marjorie 
     Margolies-Mezvinsky (D., Pa.) affixed her name to the 
     petition on September 8, she became the 218th Signatory.
       Inhofe's bill won overwhelming approval on the final vote, 
     384-40. Even though most Democrats had not supported him, 209 
     now voted with Inhofe. Groused Dingell: ``I think the whole 
     thing stinks.''
       The first real test of Inhofe's change came last May when 
     Representatives Dan Glickman (D., Kan.) and James Hansen (R., 
     Utah) filed a discharge petition to free their bill limiting 
     small-plane manufacturer liability. Even though it was co-
     sponsored by 305 members, the bill had been bottled up in the 
     Judiciary Committee for nine months. But because members' 
     signatures would now be public, voters would finally know who 
     truly stood for product-liability reform and who did not.
       Meanwhile, the Association of Trial Lawyers of America was 
     pulling out all the stops to kill the bill. Members 
     personally lobbied Congressmen and orchestrated a ``grass-
     roots'' letter-writing campaign in which prominent trial 
     attorneys urged their Representatives not to support the 
     bill. ATLA even fired off a maximum-allowable contribution of 
     $5,000 to Representative Hansen's opponent in the November 
     election.
       The pressure didn't work. Within two weeks 185 members had 
     signed, and House leaders realized it would be impossible to 
     stop the petition. Their only way was to offer a compromise 
     version. In mid-June, Brooks reported out of committee a bill 
     that differed only slightly from the original. On August 2, 
     the Senate approved similar legislation. The next day the 
     bill cleared the House without dissent. On August 17, 
     President Clinton signed it into law.
       Glickman, whose Wichita district is home to Cessna and 
     Beech aircraft companies, said the procedural change 
     spearheaded by Inhofe was crucial to victory. ``A lot of 
     forces did not want this bill to go forward,'' he continued, 
     ``and it would not have succeeded without the discharge 
     petition.''
       The success of this legislation is proof that when Congress 
     is required to do the people's business in the open, the 
     people--rather than special interests--win. The high cost of 
     product-liability lawsuits, to manufacturers as well as 
     consumers, will require far more sweeping reform of the tort 
     system. But the passage of this one bill is an important 
     first step in the right direction. And it took a little-known 
     Representative from Oklahoma to point the way.

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's time has expired.
  The Senator from Iowa.
  Mr. GRASSLEY. Mr. President, thank you. And I thank Senator Wyden for 
his leadership and the time.
  Everything this body has heard the Senator from Alabama say about 
what is wrong with this piece of legislation is entirely inaccurate. 
Everything he said we need to do to study bills--to hold them up until 
we get a feel about everything in a bill before enactment by this 
body--this amendment, which brings transparency to holds, does not in 
any way prevent any of that from happening. All it simply says is, if 
you are going to put a hold on legislation, you ought to have guts 
enough, not be a sissy that the public might find out who you are, why 
you are holding something up. State for the entire country why you 
think this person or this bill ought to be held up in the Senate. You 
can hold it up for a year. You can hold it up for 1 day.
  I have been putting things in the Record of why I put holds on bills, 
just as this amendment requires, for several years. And I can assure 
you, not one of my colleagues has beaten me up because they knew who I 
was. Not one of my colleagues has bloodied my nose. Not one of my 
colleagues has given me a black eye. Not one of my colleagues has done 
anything. It does not hurt. You can be a Senator. You can be out in the 
open. You can be transparent and still do the job you need to do.
  But after all, this is the Senate. The public's business ought to be 
public. That is what this legislation is all about. But it also has 
something to do with the practical workings of the Senate. If somebody 
does not like a bill you propose, and they want to slow it up, you can 
sit down and talk to them. Now you do not even know who they are, in 
many instances. If you are going to do business, you have to know who 
to talk to. Being a part of a collegial body, as we are, talking to 
each other is how you get things done and move the ball along.
  It is about open government. It is about reducing cynicism and 
distrust of public officials. It is about public accountability. It is 
about building public confidence. It is about making sure that as to 
what is being done here, the public knows who is doing it and why they 
are doing it. I do not see why there can be any opposition to this 
amendment.
  A hold is a very powerful tool and must be used with transparency. I 
believe in the principle of open government. Lack of transparency in 
the public policy process leads to cynicism and distrust of public 
officials.
  There is no good reason why a Senator should be able to 
singlehandedly block the Senate's business without any public 
accountability. The use of secret holds damages public confidence in 
the institution of the Senate.
  Our amendment would establish a standing order of the Senate 
requiring Members to publicly disclose when they place a hold on a bill 
or nominee. For several years now, I have made it my practice to insert 
a notice in the Congressional Record whenever I place a hold.
  Under our proposal, disclosing holds will be as simple as filling out 
a cosponsor sheet and Senators will have 3 days to do it.
  This proposal was drafted with the help of Senators Lott and Byrd, 
who as former majority leaders know how this body operates and how 
disruptive secret holds can be to the Senate's business. Senator 
Stevens has expressed his concerns about the use of secret holds. It 
says a lot that the longest-serving Members of this body oppose the use 
of secret holds and see them as a real problem.
  If Senators support the goal of the underlying bill to increase 
legislative transparency and accountability, then they should support 
this amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's time has expired.
  The Senator from Oregon.
  Mr. WYDEN. Mr. President, I yield to Senator Lott.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Mississippi.
  Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, very briefly, I rise in support of this 
amendment. I think the misuse of the hold in the Senate has become a 
fundamental problem. I do not see how anybody could support the concept 
of secret holds.
  Now, this may drive holds into some other category, but I think it is 
a step

[[Page S2458]]

in the right direction. I commend Senator Wyden and Senator Grassley 
for offering it.
  This proposal is an experiment in making the Senate and Senators more 
accountable to their colleagues and to the American people. This 
proposal addresses the issue of anonymous holds that Senators use to 
prevent consideration of legislation and nominations. This amendment 
would place a greater responsibility on Senators to make their holds 
public.
  It requires that the majority and minority leaders can only recognize 
a hold that is provided in writing. Moreover, for the hold to be 
honored, the Senator objecting would have to publish his objection in 
the Congressional Record, 3 days after the notice is provided to a 
leader.
  I believe that holds, whether anonymous or publicly announced, are an 
affront to the Senate, the leadership, the committees, and to the 
individual Members of this institution.
  This amendment does not eliminate the right of a Senator to place a 
hold. Some day, the Senate may decide that holds, in and of themselves, 
are an undemocratic practice that should no longer be recognized.
  Secret holds have no place in a publicly accountable institution. A 
measure that is important to a majority of the American public and a 
majority of Senators should not be stopped dead in it's tracks by a 
single Senator. And when that Senator can hide behind the anonymous 
hold, democracy itself is damaged.
  How do you tell your constituents that legislation they have an 
interest in, legislation that has been approved by the majority of a 
committee, is stalled and you don't know who is holding it up? What 
does that say about this institution?
  I think the secret hold should have no place in this institution, and 
I urge my colleagues to support this amendment.
  Mr. DODD. Mr. President, I understand this amendment requires public 
disclosure of certain holds--namely, those that rise to the level of 
expressing an intent to object to proceeding to a measure or matter.
  Any such objection would have to be submitted in writing and 
disclosed in the Congressional Record and printed in the Senate 
calendar of business. Quite frankly, if a Member's objection rises to 
that level, it is probably appropriate to publicly disclose such.
  But the term ``hold'' is used to apply to a much broader form of 
communication between Members and the leader. A hold is generally 
considered to be any communication in which a Member expresses an 
interest in specific legislation and requests that the Member be 
consulted or advised before any agreement is entered with regard to the 
issue.
  In that sense, a hold is a Senate mode of communication, rather than 
a procedural prerogative, and when used to communicate a Member's 
interest in a matter, it is more of an informal bargaining tactic, not 
an intent to derail or delay consideration of a measure.
  Such informal communication is not only important to the workings of 
this body, but it facilitates the development of unanimous consent 
requests and facilitates the consideration of legislation.
  In some respects, such informal holds act much like the Rules 
Committee proceedings in the House whereby Members present their 
position with regard to offering amendments to legislation.
  There is no such process in the Senate and often times informal 
holds, or consent letters, are the only means by which the leadership 
knows who has an interest in an issue and needs to be consulted in 
order to craft a unanimous consent agreement.
  This amendment does not affect such informal consultation and so will 
not impede the ability of the leadership to move the business of the 
Senate. However, when the communication rises to the level that a 
Member will object to proceeding, it is appropriate that it be 
disclosed.
  Consequently, consistent with the purpose of the bill before us, this 
amendment would provide greater transparency of the legislative process 
and increase public confidence in the outcome.
  I urge adoption of the amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Oregon.
  Mr. WYDEN. Mr. President, I think Senator Lott, Senator Inhofe, and 
Senator Grassley have said it very well. This amendment is about a 
simple proposition; and that is, the Senate ought to do its most 
important business in public, where every Senator can be held 
accountable. We have offered this bipartisan amendment to eliminate 
secret holds on the lobbying reform legislation for the same reason 
Willy Sutton robbed banks: Banks are where the money is. And secret 
holds are where the power is.
  Secret holds are one of the most powerful weapons available to 
lobbyists. I expect that each of our offices has gotten at least one 
call asking if the office would put a secret hold on a bill or nominee 
in order to kill it without any public debate, and without a lobbyist's 
fingerprints anywhere.
  Getting a Senator to put a secret hold on a bill is like hitting the 
lobbyist jackpot. Not only is the Senator's identity protected, but so 
is the lobbyist's. A secret hold lets a lobbyist play both sides of the 
street and gives lobbyists a victory for their clients without 
alienating potential or future clients.
  In my view, secret holds are a stealth extension of the lobbying 
world. It would be particularly ironic if the Senate were to claim it 
was adopting lobbying reform legislation without doing away with what 
is one of the most powerful tools available to a lobbyist.
  This has been a bipartisan effort. It has gone on for literally a 
decade. Senator Lott, to his credit, tried a voluntary approach with 
Senator Daschle. We want to emphasize--for example, the Senator from 
Maine, Ms. Collins, was involved in this--that this in no way 
eliminates the right of a Senator to have a consult, to have the 
opportunity to look at legislation, to review it when it comes out of 
committee. A Senator can seek that. In my mind, a consult is similar to 
a yellow light that says proceed with caution. A hold, on the other 
hand, is similar to a red light, a stop light. It is when a Senator 
digs in and says they are going to do everything they possibly can to 
block a piece of legislation from going forward.
  I want to protect Senators' rights, but Senators' rights need to be 
accompanied by responsibilities. We are talking about legislation that 
can involve billions of dollars, millions of our citizens, and the 
public's business ought to be done in public.
  What this amendment does is ban a staff hold, the so-called rolling 
hold where the hold is passed secretly from Senator to Senator. And 
when a Senator exercises the power of a hold to deal with an issue that 
is important to them, in the future, they will be held publicly 
accountable.
  This is long overdue. Senator Dole, when he was majority leader, 
spoke out on this, more eloquently than perhaps any of us are doing 
today. Senator Grassley, myself, Senator Inhofe, Senator Lott believe 
that it is time to bring sunshine to the Senate and for the Senate to 
do the people's business in public. I can't think of a more appropriate 
place to do it than on the lobbying reform bill we are working on 
today.
  I urge my colleagues to pass the amendment and to bring some sunshine 
to the Senate.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. All time has expired.
  Mr. WYDEN. I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, shortly we will vote on the Wyden-
Grassley amendment. First, we will vote on the Collins-Lieberman-McCain 
amendment which is the second-degree amendment. I applaud the 
initiative of Senators Wyden and Grassley. When this amendment first 
came up, I spoke in favor of it. I believe we do need to end the 
practice of secret holds.
  I ask unanimous consent to be added as a cosponsor to the Wyden-
Grassley amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Ms. COLLINS. Let me say a few final words about the amendment 
Senators

[[Page S2459]]

McCain, Lieberman, and I have proposed to create an office of public 
integrity. We are about to vote on that amendment, and then we will 
proceed to vote on Senator Wyden's amendment.
  I believe our proposal has struck the right balance. I draw this 
conclusion, in part, because my colleagues who are opposed to the 
amendment are arguing two conflicting extremes, and both obviously 
cannot be right. On the one hand, some of my colleagues are disparaging 
the Office of Public Integrity by calling it an independent counsel, by 
implying that it would be a too powerful, out-of-control entity that 
would conduct unfair investigations and put Members in peril.
  On the other hand, we have also heard colleagues during this debate 
say that the Office of Public Integrity would not have enough power 
because it can be overruled by the Ethics Committee. These two 
conflicting and inconsistent positions suggest that, in fact, we have 
struck the right balance. We have respected the role and the authority 
of the Ethics Committee, but we have strengthened the credibility of 
the investigative part of an inquiry into allegations of wrongdoing.
  At the end of the day, the debate and vote on our proposal comes down 
to a simple question. That is, what are we going to do to strengthen 
public confidence in the integrity of this institution? Regardless of 
how fine a job the Ethics Committee has done--and it has performed 
well--the fact remains that public confidence in Congress is near an 
all-time low. I believe the legislation that we have brought forth to 
strengthen our lobbying disclosure laws, to prohibit practices that 
raise conflicts of interest and, with our amendment, to strengthen the 
enforcement mechanism is critical to strengthening the bond between the 
people we serve and those of us privileged to be elected to public 
office.
  I urge my colleagues to support the modest proposal for a well 
balanced Office of Public Integrity.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. All time has expired. The question is on 
agreeing to the Collins amendment.
  Ms. COLLINS. I ask for the yeas and nays.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
  There appears to be a sufficient second.
  Ms. COLLINS. I also ask for the yeas and nays on the Wyden-Grassley 
amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The yeas and nays have already been ordered on 
the Wyden amendment.
  The question is on agreeing to amendment No. 3176 to amendment No. 
2944.
  The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk called the roll.
  Mr. McCONNELL. The following Senator was necessarily absent: the 
Senator from South Carolina (Mr. Graham).
  Mr. DURBIN. I announce that the Senator from West Virginia (Mr. 
Rockefeller) is necessarily absent on official business.
  I also announce that the Senator from West Virginia (Mr. Byrd) is 
absent due to a death in the family.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Alexander). Are there any other Senators 
in the Chamber desiring to vote?
  The result was announced--yeas 30, nays 67, as follows:

                      [Rollcall Vote No. 77 Leg.]

                                YEAS--30

     Baucus
     Bayh
     Biden
     Bingaman
     Burns
     Cantwell
     Carper
     Chafee
     Collins
     Durbin
     Feingold
     Grassley
     Kennedy
     Kerry
     Kohl
     Landrieu
     Lautenberg
     Levin
     Lieberman
     McCain
     Menendez
     Nelson (FL)
     Obama
     Reed
     Sarbanes
     Snowe
     Stabenow
     Talent
     Vitter
     Wyden

                                NAYS--67

     Akaka
     Alexander
     Allard
     Allen
     Bennett
     Bond
     Boxer
     Brownback
     Bunning
     Burr
     Chambliss
     Clinton
     Coburn
     Cochran
     Coleman
     Conrad
     Cornyn
     Craig
     Crapo
     Dayton
     DeMint
     DeWine
     Dodd
     Dole
     Domenici
     Dorgan
     Ensign
     Enzi
     Feinstein
     Frist
     Gregg
     Hagel
     Harkin
     Hatch
     Hutchison
     Inhofe
     Inouye
     Isakson
     Jeffords
     Johnson
     Kyl
     Leahy
     Lincoln
     Lott
     Lugar
     Martinez
     McConnell
     Mikulski
     Murkowski
     Murray
     Nelson (NE)
     Pryor
     Reid
     Roberts
     Salazar
     Santorum
     Schumer
     Sessions
     Shelby
     Smith
     Specter
     Stevens
     Sununu
     Thomas
     Thune
     Voinovich
     Warner

                             NOT VOTING--3

     Byrd
     Graham
     Rockefeller
  The amendment (No. 3176) was rejected.


                       Vote on Amendment No. 2944

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is now on agreeing to the Wyden 
amendment No. 2944. The yeas and nays have been ordered. The clerk will 
call the roll.
  The legislative clerk called the roll.
  Mr. McCONNELL. The following Senator was necessarily absent: the 
Senator from South Carolina (Mr. Graham).
  Mr. DURBIN. I announce that the Senator from West Virginia (Mr. 
Rockefeller) is necessarily absent.
  I also announce that the Senator from West Virginia (Mr. Byrd) is 
absent due to death in the family.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Are there any other Senators in the Chamber 
desiring to vote?
  The result was announced--yeas 84, nays 13, as follows:

                      [Rollcall Vote No. 78 Leg.]

                                YEAS--84

     Akaka
     Alexander
     Allen
     Baucus
     Bayh
     Bennett
     Biden
     Bingaman
     Bond
     Boxer
     Brownback
     Burns
     Cantwell
     Carper
     Chafee
     Chambliss
     Clinton
     Cochran
     Coleman
     Collins
     Conrad
     Cornyn
     Craig
     Crapo
     Dayton
     DeWine
     Dodd
     Dole
     Domenici
     Dorgan
     Durbin
     Enzi
     Feingold
     Feinstein
     Grassley
     Hagel
     Harkin
     Hatch
     Hutchison
     Inhofe
     Inouye
     Isakson
     Jeffords
     Johnson
     Kennedy
     Kerry
     Kohl
     Landrieu
     Lautenberg
     Leahy
     Levin
     Lieberman
     Lincoln
     Lott
     Lugar
     Martinez
     McCain
     Menendez
     Mikulski
     Murkowski
     Murray
     Nelson (FL)
     Nelson (NE)
     Obama
     Pryor
     Reed
     Reid
     Roberts
     Salazar
     Santorum
     Sarbanes
     Schumer
     Shelby
     Smith
     Snowe
     Specter
     Stabenow
     Stevens
     Talent
     Thomas
     Vitter
     Voinovich
     Warner
     Wyden

                                NAYS--13

     Allard
     Bunning
     Burr
     Coburn
     DeMint
     Ensign
     Frist
     Gregg
     Kyl
     McConnell
     Sessions
     Sununu
     Thune

                             NOT VOTING--3

     Byrd
     Graham
     Rockefeller
  The amendment (No. 2944) was agreed to.
  Mr. REID. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
  Mr. FRIST. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The majority leader.


                             Cloture Motion

  Mr. FRIST. Mr. President, we have made progress today on a very 
important bill, a bill that we brought to the floor now several weeks 
ago. It is an important bill that reflects upon this institution in 
terms of respect, in terms of integrity, and a bill on which we have 
made huge progress. Yet it is a bill about which it has come time, I 
think, really, now, to establish a glidepath to continue debate, allow 
germane amendments but recognize we want to keep those amendments on 
the bill itself.
  I had hoped we would have been able to reach an agreement to sequence 
a large number of amendments, but the amendments keep coming. And after 
talking to both sides of the aisle, I understand that we are not going 
to be able to get time agreements on those amendments. Therefore, my 
only option at this juncture is to bring this bill to a close with a 
cloture unanimous consent request.
  Therefore, I ask unanimous consent that the motion to proceed to the 
motion to reconsider the failed cloture vote be agreed to, the motion 
to reconsider be agreed to, and the Senate now proceed to a vote on 
invoking cloture on the underlying bill.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Democratic leader.
  Mr. REID. Mr. President, the legislation now before this body is 
imperfect, but it is sure good. I said before, and I say again, the 
work done by the Rules Committee and the Homeland Security and 
Governmental Affairs Committee is exemplary. It was bipartisan. They

[[Page S2460]]

brought pieces of legislation to the floor. It was melded into one, and 
this is what is now before this body.
  We have had amendments offered. Some have passed; some have not. As 
the majority leader has indicated, we tried to get the list of 
amendments agreed to. This would go on for weeks. We have immigration. 
I want to get to immigration. I want to come out of here with a good 
lobbying reform bill.
  As I said, this bill is not perfect, but it contains important 
reforms to strengthen both lobbying disclosure requirements and our own 
internal efforts in some very significant ways. No one needs to hang 
their head in shame about what we have done. It extends and strengthens 
a cooling off period for Members and staff, ends gifts and meals for 
lobbyists, requires preapproval and more disclosure for all trips, 
requires disclosure of job negotiations, prohibits the K-Street Project 
under Senate rules, eliminates floor privileges for former Members who 
become lobbyists, requires more disclosure by lobbyists--and that is an 
understatement--requires new disclosure of grassroots lobbying and 
stealth coalitions by business groups, reforms rules regarding 
earmarks, scope of conference and availability of conference reports to 
eliminate dead-of-night legislating.
  This is a good piece of legislation. I would like a lot more, but I 
don't believe the perfect should get in the way of the good. This is 
good.
  I urge my colleagues to vote for cloture so we can complete action on 
this bill quickly.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? Without objection----
  Mr. McCAIN. Reserving the right to object.
  Mr. FRIST. Mr. President, I understand there was no objection.
  Mr. McCAIN. I reserve the right to object.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona.
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, if we vote cloture, there will be several 
important amendments that will fall, including use of corporate jets, 
including earmarking, which is the reason we have the abuses that we 
have today. I will not support cloture, and I will tell my colleagues 
if we do have cloture, we will revisit those issues.
  There is no reason any Member of this body should pay only first-
class airfare for riding a corporate jet. Earmarking is out of control, 
and it has become a problem with all Americans, and we need to address 
at least those two issues.
  I hope my colleagues understand if we do invoke cloture, we will be 
revisiting those issues one way or another. I am disappointed that we 
could not address those very important aspects.
  I will not object to the unanimous consent request.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  By unanimous consent, pursuant to rule XXII, the Chair lays before 
the Senate the pending cloture motion, which the clerk will state.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

                             Cloture Motion

       We the undersigned Senators, in accordance with the 
     provisions of rule XXII of the Standing Rules of the Senate, 
     do hereby move to bring to a close debate on S. 2349: an 
     original bill to provide greater transparency in the 
     legislative process.
         Bill Frist, Mitch McConnell, Rick Santorum, Mel Martinez, 
           James Inhofe, Susan Collins, Trent Lott, John E. 
           Sununu, John McCain, Judd Gregg, Norm Coleman, Michael 
           B. Enzi, Wayne Allard, R.F. Bennett, Craig Thomas, 
           Larry E. Craig, George Voinovich, and Christopher Bond.

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is, Is it the sense of the Senate 
that debate on S. 2349, the Legislative Transparency and Accountability 
Act of 2006, shall be brought to a close?
  The yeas and nays are mandatory under the rule. The clerk will call 
the roll.
  The legislative clerk called the roll.
  Mr. McCONNELL. The following Senator was necessarily absent: the 
Senator from South Carolina (Mr. Graham).
  Mr. DURBIN. I announce that the Senator from West Virginia (Mr. 
Rockefeller) is necessarily absent.
  I also announce that the Senator from West Virginia (Mr. Byrd) is 
absent due to a death in the family.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Chambliss). Are there any other Senators 
in the Chamber desiring to vote?
  The yeas and nays resulted--yeas 81, nays 16, as follows:

                      [Rollcall Vote No. 79 Leg.]

                                YEAS--81

     Akaka
     Alexander
     Allard
     Allen
     Baucus
     Bayh
     Bennett
     Biden
     Bingaman
     Bond
     Boxer
     Brownback
     Burns
     Burr
     Cantwell
     Carper
     Chafee
     Chambliss
     Clinton
     Cochran
     Coleman
     Collins
     Conrad
     Cornyn
     Craig
     Crapo
     DeMint
     DeWine
     Dodd
     Dole
     Domenici
     Dorgan
     Durbin
     Enzi
     Feinstein
     Frist
     Grassley
     Gregg
     Hagel
     Harkin
     Hatch
     Hutchison
     Inhofe
     Inouye
     Isakson
     Jeffords
     Johnson
     Kennedy
     Landrieu
     Lautenberg
     Leahy
     Levin
     Lincoln
     Lott
     Lugar
     Martinez
     McConnell
     Menendez
     Mikulski
     Murkowski
     Murray
     Nelson (FL)
     Nelson (NE)
     Pryor
     Reed
     Reid
     Roberts
     Salazar
     Sarbanes
     Schumer
     Shelby
     Smith
     Specter
     Stabenow
     Stevens
     Talent
     Thomas
     Thune
     Voinovich
     Warner
     Wyden

                                NAYS--16

     Bunning
     Coburn
     Dayton
     Ensign
     Feingold
     Kerry
     Kohl
     Kyl
     Lieberman
     McCain
     Obama
     Santorum
     Sessions
     Snowe
     Sununu
     Vitter

                             NOT VOTING--3

     Byrd
     Graham
     Rockefeller
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Upon reconsideration, on this vote, the yeas 
are 81, the nays are 16. Two-thirds of the Senators voting, a quorum 
being present, having voted in the affirmative, the motion is agreed 
to.
  The Senator from California is recognized.
  Mrs. BOXER. Mr. President, I wish to take a couple of moments here to 
pay tribute to Erma Ora Byrd, the beloved wife of our good friend and 
colleague, Senator Robert Byrd. I will be a very few minutes.
  I thank Senator Lott because I know he has business he wants to 
attend to, and he is very supportive of my making a statement.
  (The remarks of Mrs. Boxer are printed in today's Record under 
``Morning Business.'')
  Mrs. BOXER. I yield the floor.
  Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  (The remarks of Mr. Lott are printed in today's Record under 
``Morning Business.'')
  Mr. LOTT. I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. REID. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.


                              Immigration

  Mr. REID. Mr. President, sometime tomorrow, hopefully, or the next 
day, we are going to move to immigration. There is widespread 
acknowledgment that our immigration system is badly broken. There is a 
crisis at our borders, and we need a comprehensive strategy to address 
it.
  Just yesterday, the Senate Judiciary Committee reported a bill with 
strong bipartisan support which would do much that is necessary to 
restore order to our immigration system. The committee bill offers real 
solutions with tough, effective enforcement and smart reforms. The bill 
is not perfect, but it is certainly a good bill. This legislation would 
secure our borders, crack down on employers who hire illegally, and 
bring undocumented immigrants out of the shadows. I commend Chairman 
Specter, Ranking Member Leahy, and Senator Kennedy, who has worked on 
these issues for more than 30 years, and the rest of the committee for 
their hard work in completing this bill.
  I have received assurances from the majority leader that it will be 
in order for Senator Specter to offer the committee-reported bill as 
the first amendment to Senator Frist's border security bill. That 
amendment will be a complete substitute, so if it is adopted by the 
full Senate, it will completely supersede the Frist bill.

[[Page S2461]]

  This is no different than we handle all other pieces of legislation. 
Based on those assurances, we have consented to vitiate the cloture 
vote--that happened earlier today--and allow the debate to move 
forward.
  Under the process we have agreed upon, the foundation of the Senate's 
upcoming debate on immigration policy will be the bipartisan committee 
bill.
  I will have more to say about immigration policy in the coming days. 
For now, I want to express my satisfaction that the full Senate will be 
allowed to debate the comprehensive, bipartisan immigration bill that 
the Senate Judiciary Committee reported yesterday. I welcome that 
debate.
  Mr. LEAHY, Mr. President, I filed an enforcement amendment to the 
bill on March 7 and look forward to an opportunity to offer that 
amendment and have it considered by the Senate. My amendment is the 
``Honest Services Amendment,'' No. 2924.
  The purpose of my amendment is to articulate more clearly the line 
that cannot be crossed without incurring criminal liability. If we are 
serious about lobbying reform, the Senate will adopt this amendment. It 
was only with the indictments of Abramoff, Scanlon, and Cunningham that 
Congress took note of the scandal that has grown over the last years.
  If we are to restore public confidence, we need to provide better 
tools for Federal prosecutors to combat public corruption in our 
Government. I explained this amendment back on March 9, and a copy of 
it is included in the Congressional Record of that day.
  This amendment creates a better legal framework for combating public 
corruption than currently exists under our criminal laws. It specifies 
the crime of Honest Services Fraud Involving Members of Congress and 
prohibits defrauding or depriving the American people of the honest 
services of their elected representatives.
  Under this amendment, lobbyists who improperly seek to influence 
legislation and other official matters by giving expensive gifts, 
lavish entertainment and travel and inside advice on investments to 
Members of Congress and their staff would be held criminally liable for 
their actions.
  The law also prohibits Members of Congress and their staff from 
accepting these types of gifts and favors or holding hidden financial 
interests in return for being influenced in carrying out their official 
duties. Violators are subject to a criminal fine and up to 20 years 
imprisonment, or both.
  This legislation strengthens the tools available to Federal 
prosecutors to combat public corruption in our Government. The 
amendment makes it possible for Federal prosecutors to bring public 
corruption cases without all of the hurdles of having to prove bribery 
or of working with the limited and nonspecific honest services fraud 
language in current Federal law.
  The amendment also provides lobbyists, Members of Congress, and other 
individuals with much needed notice and clarification as to what kind 
of conduct triggers this criminal offense.
  In addition, my amendment authorizes $25 million in additional 
Federal funds over each of the next 4 years, to give Federal 
prosecutors needed resources to investigate corruption and to hold 
lobbyists and other individuals accountable for improperly seeking to 
influence legislation and other official matters.
  The unfolding public corruption investigations involving lobbyist 
Jack Abramoff and MZM demonstrate that unethical conduct by public 
officials has broad-ranging impact. These scandals undermine the 
public's confidence in our Government. Earlier this month, the 
Washington Post reported that as an outgrowth of the Cunningham 
investigation, Federal investigators are now looking into contracts 
awarded by the Pentagon's new intelligence agency, the 
Counterintelligence Field Activity, to MZM, Inc., a company run by 
Mitchell J. Wade who recently pleaded guilty to conspiring to bribe Mr. 
Cunningham.
  The American people expect, and deserve, to be confident that their 
representatives in Congress perform their legislative duties in a 
manner that is beyond reproach and that is in the public interest.
  Because I strongly believe that public service is a public trust, I 
urge all Senators to support this amendment. If we are serious about 
reform and cleaning up this scandal we will do so. I hope the 
Republican leadership and the managers of the bill will accord me the 
opportunity to offer the amendment and improve the underlying measure.
  Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Isakson). Without objection, it is so 
ordered.
  Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that when the 
Senate resumes consideration of the bill tomorrow morning, Senator 
Feingold be recognized to offer his amendment No. 2962 relating to the 
definition of ``lobbyist'' for purposes of gifts; provided further that 
there be 40 minutes equally divided for debate prior to a vote in 
relation to the amendment, with no second-degree amendments in order to 
the amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that 
notwithstanding the adjournment of the Senate, all time until we resume 
the bill tomorrow count against the time limit under the provisions of 
rule XXII. I further ask unanimous consent that all first-degree 
amendments that qualify under rule XXII be offered no later than 11 
a.m. on Wednesday, other than a managers' amendment to be cleared by 
the managers and the two leaders.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

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