[Congressional Record Volume 152, Number 34 (Thursday, March 16, 2006)]
[Senate]
[Pages S2298-S2300]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
NEW COMPREHENSIVE COUNTERTERRORISM STRATEGY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I have spoken on the floor several times
about the administration's ill-conceived, poorly executed, and self-
defeating strategy in Iraq. Today, I intend to talk about how the war
in Iraq is having a far-reaching and negative impact on our ability to
conduct an effective fight against international terrorism. I saw this
firsthand during a recent visit to Thailand and Indonesia, two valuable
partners in the fight against terrorism in a strategically critical and
often underappreciated region. I visited these two countries to gain a
detailed understanding of the radical Jihadist networks that are
proliferating throughout the region and of what it will take to
effectively confront this threat.
I bring back from the trip both good news and bad news. The good news
is that we have a significant opportunity in Thailand, Indonesia, and
in Southeast Asia in general, to get our counterterrorism strategy
right. It is not too late to stem the relationship between
international terrorist networks and local extremist organizations. Nor
is it too late to tackle the root causes of extremism in the region.
Unfortunately, there is bad news. Unless we develop a truly
comprehensive, global strategy to counter terrorist threats, we will
miss the opportunity to gain the upper hand in the fight against
terrorism in Southeast Asia at what couldn't be a more critical time.
And changing our misguided policies in Iraq must be a central element
of this strategy.
First, international terrorist networks are alive and well in
Southeast Asia. During my visit, I examined the current nature of a
leading regional terrorist organization, al-Jesmaah al-Islamiyah, or
``JI'', and its affiliates--the threat it continues to pose to
countries throughout the region, how it has survived the deaths and
arrests of some of its key leaders, and its ties with al-Qaida. Most
importantly, I gained a more detailed understanding of the conditions
that have provided JI with a recruitment base and operational space.
JI takes advantage of vast areas of ocean, isolated islands, weak or
corrupt local and provincial governments, the absence of rule of law,
and marginalized Islamic populations to develop its strength. JI has a
presence throughout the region. And while arrests of prominent JI
leaders in the last few years have helped shed light on the
organization, it continues to operate in loosely formed cells, in
regionally oriented entities, and in partnership with other terrorist
organizations like the Abu Sayyaf group in the Philippines.
That said, according to a number of sources, including the
International Crisis Group, Congressional Research Service, and the
State Department, JI and al-Qaida have developed a symbiotic
relationship. There is some overlap in membership. They have shared
training camps in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Mindanao, and often help
one another with supply chain systems and transportation. Al-Qaida has
also provided JI with considerable financial support
JI and al-Qaida also exploit similar ground as they seek safe haven
and new recruits. These groups feed on anti-United States and anti-
Western sentiment, fueled in part by discontent and anger about United
States policies in Iraq. Unfortunately, the administration's refusal to
provide a flexible timeline for withdrawing United States troops from
Iraq allows these groups to portray us as occupiers of a Muslim
country. Until we show that we are truly committed to redeploying
United States troops from Iraq, terrorist organizations will continue
to find recruits in otherwise moderate Muslim communities, and we will
continue to make it harder to win the full backing of potential
partners and allies in the fight against terrorist networks.
It is in this light that I would like to lay out some of my key
observations from my recent trip. I will talk about the political and
security dynamics in both Thailand and Indonesia, and will argue that a
new counterterrorism strategy in the region must incorporate respect
for human rights, the rule of law, and the need to hold our friends and
allies accountable for making necessary democratic reforms.
I would like to begin with Thailand. Thailand is a critical strategic
partner of the United States in, among other things, the fight against
al-Qaida and its affiliates. Our close political and military
relationship goes back decades and is a vital component of United
States national security policies in the region. The 1954 Manila Pact,
together with the 1962 Thanat-Rusk communique, forms the basis of the
longstanding United States-Thai security relationship. Thailand's
airfields and ports play a particularly important role in United States
global military strategy, including having served as the primary hub of
the relief effort for the Indian Ocean tsunami.
Thailand has also shown its willingness to stand by the United States
in
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recent military campaigns. Thailand sent 130 soldiers, mostly
engineers, to Afghanistan to participate in the reconstruction phase of
Operation Enduring Freedom. Specifically, Thai forces are responsible
for the construction of a runway at Bagram Airbase, medical services,
and some Special Forces operations.
Thailand also contributed to reconstruction efforts in Iraq by
dispatching over 450 troops, including medics and engineers, to the
southern city of Karbala. The deployment proved unpopular with the Thai
public, however, particularly in the volatile southern provinces, and
in September 2004, Thai troops were withdrawn from Iraq.
While Thailand has been and will continue to be a strong ally, my
visit occurred during a politically fragile time for the government.
Public demonstrations and significant political pressure on the Prime
Minister highlighted the challenges of conducting an effective and
responsible counterinsurgency campaign while managing domestic
political pressures. The Thai Government has also struggled to account
for over 2,000 extrajudicial killings over the last few years, the
kidnapping of a prominent human rights lawyer by Thai police and his
death in police custody, and overly aggressive and heavy-handed tactics
used in the counterinsurgency campaign that in one case resulted in the
killing of over 70 detained suspects.
At the same time, though, preparations for national celebrations of
the King's 60-year reign underscored the underlying stability of
Thailand's constitutional monarchy. It is this stability that has
permitted the United States to pursue close counterterrorism and other
strategic ties with Thailand that transcend individual politicians and
parties. It also provides the foundation of a partnership that can and
must be based not only on an understanding of a common threat, but on a
shared commitment to finding solutions to the conditions that breed
extremism and terrorism.
My visit to Thailand focused primarily on Thailand's counterterrorism
role in the region. As I mentioned, longstanding tensions in the mostly
Muslim southern provinces of Thailand have recently exploded into
violent unrest that has claimed hundreds of lives. The unrest, which
has elements of a separatist insurgency, included brutal attacks on
civilians. Insurgent tactics have sometimes suggested the influence of
international terrorism, but Thai, United States Government, and
independent experts believe that neither al-Qaida nor its Southeast
Asian affiliates have been behind the violence so far. Thai officials
have noted publicly, however, that there has been evidence that many of
those involved in the unrest in the south had received militant
schooling or training outside of Thailand. It is possible that in the
near future international terrorist organizations like JI could exploit
the continuing unrest in Thailand's southern provinces.
The United States needs to have a clear understanding of what is
happening in Thailand in order to formulate an appropriate policy
response. With our Thai partners, we must remain vigilant to the
possibility that international terrorist organizations could take
advantage of unrest among disaffected Muslim populations in the south.
When I met Prime Minister Thaksin and a number of his key advisors
and cabinet members, I stressed the need for the Thai Government to
confront the root causes of this unrest before it becomes an
international security concern. This means promoting human rights and
accountability for abuses that have been committed by Thai security
forces and have helped fuel the unrest, as well as increasing
opportunities for disaffected or marginalized communities to join
regional and international economies. It also means promoting civil
society, economic development, transparency and increased political
participation of the Muslim community.
I was pleased to learn of the progress being made by the National
Reconciliation Council to address grievances stemming from the
government's policies in the South. I urged the Prime Minister to take
seriously the recommendations that the NRC will be delivering in the
coming months, and to emphasize the value of honoring the NRC as a
mechanism for strengthening dialogue between the Thai people and the
government.
I would like to shift to Indonesia now. After 3 days of meeting with
senior Indonesian Government officials including the President, the
Foreign and Defense Ministers, the new Chief of the Indonesian
military, and the police chief, I have a new sense of optimism about
United States-Indonesian relations. But while I am optimistic about
progress being made there, limited progress in areas such as military
reform and accountability for past crimes against humanity could
undermine further democratic reforms and counterterrorism efforts.
Indonesia is the world's largest Muslim country, and it is a critical
player in the global fight against al-Qaida and its affiliates. The
terrorist organization al-Jamaah al-Islamiyah and associated groups in
the region pose a serious threat to Indonesia and to the interests of
the United States, our allies, and our friends. In response to this
threat, we need a comprehensive counterterrorism strategy and a
bilateral relationship with Indonesia aimed at fighting terrorism while
supporting that country's efforts at democratization. Fighting
terrorism and supporting democratization are not incompatible--in fact,
democratic reforms and the growth of civil society in Indonesia have
gone hand in hand with expanded counterterrorism efforts, providing a
clear indication that Indonesia's political reforms do not come at the
cost of the government's ability to fight terrorism.
While the United States-Indonesia relationship has never been more
important, Indonesia's effectiveness in countering terrorist networks
and other emerging threats hinges on its ability to reform its
government, address past crimes and abuses, and improve both the
transparency and the effectiveness of the central and provincial
governments.
We cannot forget that the Government of Indonesia has had a poor
human rights record. The Indonesian military in particular has long
been a perpetrator of human rights abuses as well as a serious obstacle
to democratization. In recent years, efforts to reform the military,
while commendable, have produced mixed results. The greatest
improvement has been an increase in civilian control of the military
and the withdrawal of the military from active politics.
Ridding the Indonesian military of its private business holdings and
providing greater transparency have been harder to achieve. In some
areas, the military's treatment of civilian populations has improved,
but abuses still occur and there has been virtually no accountability
for past human rights violations. There is still a considerable amount
of distance to travel for the government and the military to become
``reformed,'' and while progress is being made, more needs to be done.
Serious tensions continue in Papua, the remote easternmost province
of Indonesia. Serious unrest due to repressive government policies,
poverty, and recent abuses by the Indonesian military and police forces
has created an environment of distrust, and I urged the Government of
Indonesia to address the abuses that are taking place and immediately
open up Papua to journalists and human rights organizations. Doing so
would be an important step toward making transparency and justice the
new norm for Indonesia.
United States policy toward Indonesia, including the implementation
of the administration's decision to resume military assistance, must
take these ongoing concerns into account. We must ensure that our
assistance promotes reform and human rights, we must remain vigilant to
any backsliding, and we must develop clear benchmarks for progress.
Carefully circumscribing any new military assistance is critical to
formulating an effective bilateral counterterrorism relationship. There
may be areas where the Indonesian military's role is warranted, such as
maritime security in the Strait of Malacca. But any resurrection of the
military's historical role in domestic security would be
counterproductive to the fight against terrorism, not least because it
would likely alienate much of the population. We must therefore make
clear that such a development would undermine our bilateral
relationship.
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We must also be alert to the risk that military assistance could
overwhelm other elements of a larger counterterrorism strategy. If
Indonesia is going to effectively fight terrorism, it must develop a
professional, capable, and honest police force and strong judiciary. An
imbalanced United States assistance program could harm reform efforts
and undermine Indonesia's nascent efforts to coordinate the
counterterrorism roles of its various military, police and civilian
agencies.
Finally, we must expand assistance programs in the areas of
education, economic development and the promotion of civil societies.
No counterterrorism strategy can succeed unless the political, social
and economic conditions that breed terrorism are confronted head on.
I do believe that we have an opportunity to create and execute a
comprehensive and effective counterterrorism strategy in Southeast
Asia. This strategy needs to take into account the unique nature of
each of our partners in the region and their internal political,
social, and economic dynamics, while addressing the root causes of
extremism and the conditions that fuel or support the growth of
terrorist networks.
The United States can take a leadership role in the region and can
help friends and allies like Thailand and Indonesia engage as full
partners in the fight against terrorist networks. In many cases, the
United States should push strongly for ending abusive or heavy-handed
government policies, addressing past human rights abuses, and opening
political space that allows the freedom to express political discontent
or dissatisfaction with government leaders or policies.
Unfortunately, our policies in Iraq are making it increasingly
difficult to execute such a strategy effectively. Public opinion in
Southeast Asia is critically important if we are to dry up potential
havens and recruiting grounds for terrorists. In Thailand, neither
anti-American nor anti-Western sentiment has taken root. At the same
time, however, Thai officials have stated that the withdrawal of Thai
troops from Iraq was motivated in part by the Iraq war's unpopularity
in the Muslim community. Indonesians' views on United States policy in
Iraq are harsher still, ranging from indifference to deep suspicion. At
best, Iraq is seen as ``America's problem;'' at worst, people question
our motives for being there. These widely held views make the
critically important work of engaging our friends and allies in the
fight against al-Qaida and its affiliates that much more difficult.
There are also opportunity costs to our narrow focus on Iraq. The war
in Iraq has drained precious resources away from what must be a global
counterterrorism strategy, one that addresses the dangers of weak
states and regions. The war also undercuts critical elements of this
strategy. Widespread global skepticism about our policies in Iraq makes
it all the more difficult for us to promote human rights and the rule
of law while seeking partners against extremism and violence.
The President's misguided, Iraq-centric foreign policy is both
symptom and cause of an alarming failure to conduct a comprehensive,
global war on the terrorist networks that threaten us. Southeast Asia
is but one of the regions that requires more focused attention. We
cannot afford to continue treating threats in this and other parts of
the world as secondary to an Iraq-focused national security strategy.
The time has long since come for the President to set a flexible
timeline for withdrawal from Iraq, and to develop a comprehensive,
global strategy to fight terrorist networks and the conditions that
breed them.
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